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


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Dr. HANCOCK'S SERMONS

A T

Mr. Boyle's Lecture, 1706.



ARGUMENTS

To Prove the

BEING OF GOD.

WITH

OBJECTIONS

Against It,

A N S W E R'D.

Being Several Sermons Preach'd at the Cathedral-Church of St. *Paul*, in the Year 1706. on Account of the Lecture Founded by the Honourable *Robert Boyle*, Efq;

By JOHN HANCOCK, D.D. Rector of St. Margaret's Lothbury, London; and Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of Bedford.

L O N D O N:

Printed for B. Aylmer, Sen^r. & Jun^r. at the Three Pigeons against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill. MDCCVII.



To the Moft Rev^d Father in GOD,

T H O M A S,

Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury*, Primate of all *England*, and Metropolitan:

And to the Right Worfhipful

Sr Henry Afbhurft, Bart

Truflees for the LECTURE Founded by the Hon^{ble} Robert Boyle, Efg;

Most Revd and Hond,

Humbly prefume to beg your Favourable Acceptance of this mean Difcourfe. I confefs, 'tis as far below the Dignity of the Subject, as the Author (among fo many Great Men that have gone before, and are likely to fol-A 3 low low after,) is below the Notice of the Publick. I can rather with than hope the Performance may anfwer the Defign of the Founder, and be no Difparagement to the Truftees, to the Lecture, or to my Self. With my humble Thanks for the Honour you have done me; I am,

Most Reve and Hone's

Your most Obliged Humble Ser

JOHN HANCOCE.

THE

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PREFACE.

Think fit to acquaint the Reader, here are but Six of the Eight Sermons : The other Two beginning another Subject, could not properly be printed. I am fenfible, I have Reason to make some Excuse for the Language, which (I fear) will feem to some, less elaborate than it ought to be : But I hope for the Readers Pardon, the' the Diction be sometimes a little mean and homely, if he find it (as I believe he will) plain and intelligible. I have not troubled my felf with Citing many Authors, which would have swell d the Bulk of the Book, without much Advantage to the Common fort of Readers. As to those whose Objections I answer, I have feldom cited their Words at large, much lefs (as I might eafily have done) brought a great many Citations under each Head: My Answers are often so short, it would have look'd like an Indecency

cency to have done it. I think I have not misrepresented them in any thing : If any object this against me, I can easily do My Self Right by (hewing the contrary; or Them, by owning my Mistake. I confess, I defign d to bring the Discourse into as little compass as I could, being of Opinion that few read, and fewer understand long Books: And therefore, I am not without hope this little Tract may be of Some Use to those that have but little Leisure (or, it may be, less Mind) to read larger Discourses. If any despise this for its want of Learning, there are bigger Books enough on the Same Subject; where they may receive full Satisfaction. Begging the Reader's Candor, as to any Imperfections, or Mistakes he may find in this little Piece, I bid him beartily farewell.

ACTS

ACTS XVII 23. Claufe ult.

Whom therefore ye ignorantly worfhip; bim declare I unito you.

HE Context runs thus: Ver. 22, 23. Then Paul flood in the midfl of Mars hill, and Said, Te men of Athens, I perceive ye are in all things too Superstitious. For paffing by, and beholding your Devotions, I found an Altar with this Infeription; To the unknown God. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you. Ver. 24. God that made the world, and all things therein, he being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in Temples made with hands. neither is worshipped with mens hands, as though he needed any thing; Seeing he giveth to all men life and breath, and all things.

In the Beginning of this Chaptel we have an Account of St. Pauls B Preach-

Preaching at *Theffalonica*: And when the *Jews* there raifed a Tumult among the People, he was forced to leave that Place, and comes to *Berea*; and by his Preaching making feveral Converts there, we have a great Character given of 'em, That they were more noble than those of Theffalonica; for they received the word with all readinefs, and fearched the Scriptures daily, whether those things that were preached by St. Paul were fo.

But when the *Jews*, hearing of St. *Paul's* preaching at *Berea*, followed him thither too, he was brought by the Brethren to *Athens*: Where he was preffed in Spirit to preach the Gofpel, when he faw the City wholly given to *Idolatry*. And having diffuted in the Synagogue with the *Jews*, was encounter'd by fome of the *Epicurean* and *Stoick* Philofophers: And being brought to *Arcopagus*, makes this Diffourfe to thefe Learned *Athenians*, of which my Text is a part.

Te men of Athens, &c.

These Words will easily lead me (if Opportunity offer it self) to speak both of Natural and Reveal'd Religion,

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on, and particularly of that which is the Foundation of both, the Belief of a God. We fee the Apoftle does not here go about to convince 'em that there is a God: He fuppoles'em, from the Universal Confent of Mankind, and other Arguments that might be brought from undeniable Principles and Matters of Fact, fully convinced that there was a God.

The Fault he charges 'em with, is, That they were erroneous in their Belief of many Gods. He was preffed in fpirit, when he faw the City wholly given up to Idolatry; and that they were too fuperfitious in their Worlhip; when left they fhould mifs any God; they would erect an Altar to the Unknown God.

But things in these Latter Ages (at least with a great many who would be thought Men of deeper Reach and Sagacity, and of more Philosophy than other Men), go quite otherwise? They are not to be charged with believing many Gods; we have Reach to think some believe none at all; are so far from being superstituous in their Worship, that they do not pretend to any such thing as Worship of any God; B 2

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and Atheifm is come in the room of Polytheifm.

Before I enter upon my Proof of the Being of God, it may not be amifs to fay fomething briefly of that Queftion, Whether there ever have been fuch Men as Atheifts in the World?

And here I think there are Two Sorts of Men that may, not without Reafon, be called Atheifts.

1. There are a fort of Ignorant, Carele's People, that are fo immers'd in Senfe, and whofe Minds grovel fo on the Duft, and are fo buried in the Cares and Pleafures of the World, that they never fo much as think of God: God, as the Pfalmift fays, is not in all their thoughts. Such as these the Apostle fays are without God in the world; "Asta, is not in of Atheists in the World.

These are not the Atheists we are enquiring after; but, Secondly, Whether there ever have been, or are, any Atheists in Principle; that is, such Men as have reason'd themselves into an Opinion, That there is no God.

Some indeed have been call'd Atheifts, that are not : _____So Socrates

was

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Nay indeed the most Atheistical Gentlemen of our Modern Times, are often a little shy of the Name of Atheift, becaufe in fome Places it might happen to expose 'em to the Lash of the Law. So Vaninus being afraid of the Inquisition, pretended to submit all his Opinions to the Judgment of the Church. We may observe likewife, the most Atheistical Writers, often in their Books, talk of God like other People, as if they believed there were one, but in other Places they speak out : However they advance fuch Principles and Affertions as effe-Aually defiroy the very Supposition of a God.

I fee no Reafon indeed why we fhould reject the Teftimonies of *Dioge*nes Laertius, *Plutarch*, *Cicero*, and others of old, who mention feveral, fuch as *Diagoras*, *Protagoras*, *Sc.* that were commonly in those Times reputed Atheifts: Or of *Vaninus* and others that B 2 con6

confefs there are Atheifts now: Or why we fhould think Vaninus himfelf, Hobbs, Spinofa and others, who tho' they talk of God, yet advance fuch Principles and Affertions as are utterly inconfiftent with the Belief of a God; I fay, why we fhould think 'em any thing lefs than Atheifts, is hard to itnagine.

To proceed therefore to what I intend to difcourfe on from thefe Words, that which is the Foundation of all Religion, The Exiftence of a God.

I believe I need not tell any one what we mean by God——To wit, a most perfectly Wife and Powerful Self-existent Independent Being, that is the Maker and Governor of all Things.

Now before we proceed to those Reafons that may ferve to prove the Certainty of the Existence of such a Being, we must confider of what kind those Arguments must be, and whence they must be fetch'd, whether from Reason or Revelation.

And one would think this fhould never have been a Question among any that pretend to Common Sense, when 'tis so plain at first fight, that Revelation

tion must fuppose a God, and therefore the Tellimony of the Scriptures that contain that Revelation cannot properly be brought to prove it.

Indeed those Miraculous Works that attend an Extraordinary Revelation, often are, and justly may be brought to prove the Existence of God, that makes the Revelation : But to prove the Being of a God, only from the Testimony of those Books that are pretended to contain that Revelation, is only to beg the Question in dispute.

Tis hard to give an Account why the Sociaians, that pretend fo much to Reafon, that they will fcarce depend upon Revelation for any thing that does not at first fight appear agreeable to their Reason, should defend such a Doctrine, That the Knowledge of God must be had only by Revelation: 'Tis much if Reason, (that they pretend to. be fuch a Guide in Religion) should fail us in that which is the Ground of all Religion. But they pretend Scripture for it. They tell us this Knowledge is called Belief and Faith. Heb. 11.6. He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, Gc. Now Belief (fay they) must be grounded on Revelation.

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But the Anfwer is eafy, That Faith or Believing, in the Language of Scripture, as well as in our Common Way of fpeaking, does not always fignific Faith in the flricteft Senfe, or Affent to fome Truth upon Teflimony; but Knowledge or Opinion, any kind of Affent, be the Ground and Reafon of it what it will; So that this Argument fignifics just nothing.

They urge again, That the Scriptures tell us, fome Men believe no God, *Pfal.* 14. *The Fool bath faid in his Heart there is no God.* Which (fay they) could not be, if Natural Reafon could convince us there is a God.

But no-body ever faid Natural Reafon would convince us there is a God, if Men will not use their Reason, and attend to those Arguments that may be had from Reason to prove there is a God.

So that upon the whole, it remains unqueflionable, not only that Reafon may be fufficient to prove the Exiftence of a God, but that Arguments taken from that chiefly, are proper to be infiled on in this Marter.

From hence another Question eafily offers it felf to our Confideration; Whether

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Whether the Notion of God be innate and inbred, in the ftricteft Senfe; or whether only Man, being endued with a Faculty of Reafoning, affifted by the Notices of Senfe, and Infruction from others Obfervation, & c. comes to form fuch Arguments as may convince him of the Exiftence of a God? For both thefe Ways of Notice may well enough be fignify'd by the Terms of innate, inbred, natural Notions of God.

I should not much dispute with those that plead so stiffly for Innate or Connate Ideas, or Notions bred in us, or born with us; but yet if any think all that can truly be meant by 'em is, that Man is born with fuch Capacities, that by degrees, and in time, upon the Information he receives from his Senfes, and Reafoning from 'em, and the Notions he gets from Instruction, Education, and Conversation in the World, he comes to the Belief of a God ; I cannot think they undermine the Belief of a God, or affert any thing dangerous to Natural or Revealed Religion.

For, as far as we can tell, the Soul upon its Union with the Body, exercifes

cifes few, if any Acts of Reafon; or attends to any fuppofed Innate Notions of any thing, much lefs of God, for a confiderable time.

Yet I would not fay with fome, that the Soul is a meer *Rafa Tabula*; becaufe I do not think that is a proper Metaphor in this Cafe. The Soul is an Active Principle; tho' when joined with the Body, not capable for fome time of Exerting and Exercifing its Reafoning Faculties, at least about very few Objects.

What Principles or Seeds of Knowledge may be Connate with us, we cannot tell. But whatever Natural Capacities there may be in the Soul, certainly a great Difference will be made by Inftruction, Education, Conversation, the Customs of the Places where, and the Notions and Opinions of Men among whom we live: And the fame Man brought up in *England*, would be almost as different from himfelf if he were brought up in *India*, as if he were another Man.

Not but that the Arguments to prove a God are fo clear, that fcarce any Man that attends to 'em, but must be convinced by 'em. But fuppole

pofe a Man were born and bred in a Wildernefs among Beafts, without ever Converfing with Men, 'tis queftionable, whether thefe fuppofed Connate Inbred Notions of a God, would ever appear and exert themfelves.

This Question about Innate Ideas may be fufficiently determined, by obferving the Difference between the Cafe of Adam, who was created a Perfect Man, with Reafon and Speech : and that of his Posterity, who are born Infants in an imperfect State. No doubt he had Inbred Connate Ideas; for we find he at first underftood the Natures of the feveral Beafts, and gave Names to 'em. But whether those that are born in such a weak and imperfect State as all Men now are, have fuch Connate Ideas, may justly be question'd : However, we are willing every one fhould enjoy his own Opinion in this Cafe.

Another thing we fhould take notice of, before we enter upon the Proof of the Existence of a God, is; Whether this Proposition, God is, or there is a God, be such a self-evident Proposition, that it needs no Proof, but the understanding the Terms of the Proposition. position. Whether, that as every one knows the Truth of this Proposition, The Whole is greater than any of its Parts, that does but know what is meant by Whole, and what by Part; fo every one must fee the Truth of this Proposition, *That God is*, who knows what is meant by God, and what it is to be.

But this is not a fafe Way of Arguing, nor is it at all fit, to build fo important a Point of Doctrine on fo weak a Foundation : For if you fhould tell a Man he must believe this Truth, because it is felf-evident; he will tell you, he doubts of it only because it does not appear felf-evident to him.

No doubt this Proposition, That God is, or that there is a God, is a certain and neceffary Truth; but it may not be felf-evident to us, and therefore must be proved by, and deduced from other Truths that are notiora quoad nos, more evident to us. And therefore, notwithstanding the neceffary Existance of God, that God is, and cannot but be, this Truth, that God is, wants to be supported by other Evidence, if we would convince any Man

Man that pretends to deny or doubt of it.

I now come to the Confideration of those Arguments that may ferve to Evince the Being of a God.

And here I shall first take a very short Notice of Two Arguments, upon which great Stress is laid by the Great *French* Philosopher *Des Cartes*. And they are these :

First, he tells us, That if we confider well this Matter, and have a clear and distinct Idea of God, we shall find Existence is an infeparable Property of his Effence; and that we can no more conceive an absolutely perfect Being (fuch as we suppose God to be) without Existence, than we can Conceive a Mountain without a Valley, or a Triangle that has not its Three Angles equal to two Right ones.

But if we confider, that Existence is as necessary to the Actual Persection of any other Being, as it is to that of God; and the Ideal Persection (from which that Philosopher argues) of any Being, may be conceived without it,

When we might have the fame Notion of a Mountain or Triangle, tho' there were no fuch things in Being. When When all the Philosophy in the World has diftinguish'd between the Essence and Existence of Things; or if you will, between their Ideal and their Actual Existence.

When it will be harder to prove in the way that Philosopher takes, that Existence pertains to the Essence of God, than it is another way that God does actually Exist.

When if we grant that Philosopher, that actual Existence must be imply'd in the Notion of an absolutely perfect Being, such as we suppose God to be; yet the Question will still return, Whether there be any such absolutely perfect Being in the World ? And so we are but just where we were before.

When a Man that has a mind to be an Atheift, will certainly tell him, That because he has formed, as he thinks, a clear and distinct Idea of an absolutely perfect Being, whose Effence is Exissence, it does not really follow there is such a Being in the World; and that he only supposes and begs the thing in Question.

And when whatever fome nice Speculators, and Men of Metaphyfical Heads, may make of the Argument;

to confirm themfelves in the Belief of a God, yet as it will never convince an Atheift, fo it will not be underflood by, nor is it fit to be proposed to, the generality of Men.

Being these things, I think, are so, I do not think it safe to insist upon this nice Argument, in the Case before us.

I know there have been a great many Learned Men, and great Philofophers, that have floutly defended the Argument ; and I fuppofe have made it clear to themfelves, tho' I believe they will find it hard to do it to fome other People.

Another Argument that Philosopher makes use of, to prove the Existence of a God, is from the clear and distinct Idea of God, that is Born with us, Bred in us, or Imprinted on our Souls.

'Tis impossible, fays that Philosopher, we should have such clear and distinct Ideas, but from some Being that has all the Perfections contain'd in those Ideas; that is, from God; and confequently we may infer from such Ideas, that there is a God.

But

But this Argument I doubt, is worfe than the other; for 'tis plainly in our Power to form Ideas of Beings more perfect than our felves, yea of an abfolutely Perfect Being.

And though we fhould not fuppofe fuch Notions or Ideas of God imprinted on our Natures, yet we fee by Experience we can from Institution, Conversation with other Men, Observation of the Creatures, form fuch Notions of God.

So, though when we do believe à God, and are rightly inform'd of our Dependance upon him, as to the Frame of our Natures, we may believe fuch clear and diffinct Ideas of himfelf were woven by him in the Frame of ourNatures (though that, as I have fhew'd before, is a Question) ; -- yet sure if a Man had no Knowledge or Belief of the Existence of a God, he would never conclude, that because he finds in his Mind a clear Idea of an abfolutely perfect Being; therefore there is fuch a Being : And that only because if it were not from that Being, he could have no fuch Ideas, when he plainly finds in himfelf a Power of Forming fuch Ideas.

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I would be far from running down any Argument that might be of any Service against the Atheists; or from thinking that Great Man that used these Arguments, delign'd to betray the Caufe, Gc. But it looks a little odd, that that Philosopher should infift on thefe, and lay fo much Weight upon them, when he paties by all the common and long-received Arguments to prove the Existence of a God.

I now come to those Arguments 1 shall infift upon for the Proof of this Truth.

And, by way of Preparation for our better Reception of those Rational Arguments that do directly prove the Being of a God, I shall in the first place infist upon that which is commonly brought, from the univerfal Confent of Mankind in this Matter.

And here we may, in the first place, confider the Matter of Fact ; whether the Confent of Mankind in the Belief of this Truth, be fo general and univerfal as is pretended.

It hath been generally taken for granted, that there was no Nation fo barbarous, but we might find fome Foot-

Footfleps of their Belief and Worfhip of a God. And it is certainly true of all the more Civilized Nations, that were formerly known to the more Learned Parts of the World.

But fince Navigation was improved, and many Difcoveries have been made of feveral People that were unknown before, fome have pretended to find fome Exceptions from this General Rule.

And indeed fome Travellers give us a difinal Account of those People that live about the *Cape of Good Hope*, in *New Holland*, and fome other formerly unknown Parts of the World.

But as to these pretended Exceptions from the universal Consent of Mankind in the Belief of a God, we may consider,

I. That 'tis possible those that affert those things may not have well enquired into the Matter, or have sufficiently informed themselves.

'Tis plain, those that by accident light upon such barbarous Countries, can take but a transient View of any of the Customs of such Countries, much less of their Religion, or their Notions of a God; whereas if they had

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had lived among 'em, and had more Opportunity of Conversing with 'em, they might have found Reason to give another Account of them.

2. Accordingly, in fome Inflances we find, that later and more full Difcoveries have given another kind of Account of fome of those Barbarous People.

3. That most of those People that are pretended to Believe no God, and to have no Religion, appear so very Unciviliz'd, that they are little better than Brutes: And 'tis no great Wonder, if those that are fallen so far below the common Pitch of Human Nature in all other Things, should proportionably sink below it in their Sense of Religion, and Belief of a God.

4. If we should grant there may, in the more Barbarous and Unciviliz'd Parts of the World, be some People that own no God this is no just Exception to the general Confert of Mankind in this Matter.

We believe there are fome Philofophical Atheifts; Does it therefore follow, that Atheifm cannot be difproved by true and found Philofophy? C 2 The The Pyrronian Sect of Philofophers were Scepticks, and deny'd there was any Certainty of any thing in the World : Does it therefore follow, that Mankind muft not generally believe their Senfes and their Reafon too, in the plaineft Inftances of Senfe and Reafon? Some Men are born Monfters : Does this prove Human Nature to be a Monftrous Thing?

5. 'Tis very poffible, those Nations that are faid to be Exceptions to the universal Confent of Mankind in this Matter, may Believe a God, and yet have no Rites of Publick Worship, and so be thought not to own a God.

So that upon the whole, it is poffible those pretended Instances of some People that Believe no God, may not be true; or if any of 'em be so, there is no great Reason they should be thought to signify much by way of Exception to this Universal Consent of Mankind as to the Belief of a God.

Having thus far confider'd, how Matter of Fact ftands, as to the Univerfal Confent of Mankind in the Belief of a God, I shall now, as to the Va-

Validity of this Argument, propose these Things to your Consideration.

1. That the Ancient Roman and Greek Writers infift much upon this Argument, to prove the Being of a God. Paffages to this Purpofe are fo numerous, and fo common in Authors, that 'tis needlefs to cite 'em.

2. Whatever Original we affign to this general Confent of Mankind in the Belief of this Truth, it will ftill add to the Force of the Argument.

If we suppose with some, it comes from a kind of a Natural Instinct that the Notion of God is imprinted upon, and woven into our very Natures: This shews, how natural the Belief of God is to Mankind; and that they can scarce be thought Men, that have cast off this Belief.

If we fuppofe with others, this general Belief comes from the Common Obfervation that all the World do and may make of the Excellency and Beauty of the Creatures, and thereby learn to know God as the Creator : This plainly fhews how Cogent those Arguments are, that are taken from the C_3 Works

Works of God, to prove his Being, when all the World agrees in 'em.

Or whether we fuppofe this Belief to come by Tradition from fome common Parent of Mankind; this makes it very probable, that that Common Parent of Mankind was Created and Inftructed by God.

So that which Way foever we fuppofe this Belief of a God came to be fo common in the World, flill it adds Strength to the Argument, and makes it of greater Force to prove the Exiftence of God.

3. Indeed fo General and almost an Universal Confent of Mankind in this Truth, is it felf of great Weight and Moment, to confirm our Belief of the Truth of it.

We use to argue fo in other Things. What feems true to fome Wife Men, feems fomewhat probable: What feems true to most or all Wife Men, is very probable: What most Men, both wife and unwife, affent unto, doth ftill look more likely to be true. But what all Men generally confent in, hath the highest Probability, and comes fo near Demonstration, that it may pass for ridiculous Arrogance and Self-conceit,

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ceit, to deny the Truth of it. How ridiculous did Anaxagoras make himfelf, when he denied Snow was White ?---- Zeno, when be faid Motion is impoffible ? ----- Her.1clitus, that Contradictory Propositions might be both True? And Epicurus little less than they, when he pretended the World was made by Chance? And they upon the fame account are little less than Ridiculous, that deny there is a God, as going contrary to the general Suffrage and univerfal Confent of Mankind ; and faying in e eet all the World are Fools but themfelves.

But the Atheift endeavours to invalidate this Argument Two ways.

1. By giving a parallel in ance of a falfe Opinion that has been receive l with almost as general a Confent as that of the Existence of God.

2. By pretending to give an Account how this Opinion of the Exittence of God might come to be fo common, without fuppofing the Truth of it.

1. The Atheist tells us, that this general and almost universal Confent of Mankind concerning the Existence of God, is no more an Argument of the C 4 Truth Truth of it, than the like almost general Confent as to Polytheism, is an Argument that there are more gods than one.

But as to this we may confider,

1. That the wifeft and beft in all Ages differted from the Multitude in that point.

2. That even among the generality of the grosseft Idolaters, and in the worft times of Polytheifin, the general Opinion was, That there was one Chief and Supreme God, that had Abfolute Power over the other gods, as well as Men; fo that it feems probable, that at least those of the Heathen Idolaters that confider'd any thing, looked upon the other gods to be but an inferior fort of Beings, a fort of Semidei, Mediators between God and Men, and to whom, by the Will of the Supreme God, fome kind of Worship was due : As the Romanifts now do their Saints, the Worship of which, they pretend ultimately terminates in God himfelf.

And I think *Tertullian* or St. Cyprian fomewhere obferve, (and upbraid the Heathen with it) That it was common with them in their ordinary Difcourfe, to fpeak of God in the Singular

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lar Number; which was an Evidence Reafon taught them to believe there was but One that was truly God.

3. This feems rather an Argument that there is a God, that the generality of the World fhould be fo fond of the Belief of a God, as to run out into fo much Superfition in the Worlhip of him. So the Worlhip of fo many falfe gods rather fhows there is a true One. — As Counterfeits infer a real Thing.

4. That which most of all alters the Cafe as to the Belief of One God, and the Belief of many gods, is this; that as to the One there is all the Reason in the World for it; and as to the other, that of Polytheisin, there is all the Reason in the World against it.

But there are feveral ways the Atheift pretends to tell us how this Notion of a God might become fo Univerfal. As

1. From Ignorance of Second Caufes. — When any extraordinary Events happen either good or bad, Ignorant Men, fay they, are apt to attribute 'em to invisible Powers, and to interest God in 'em.

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But if this were all, how come the wife as well as the unwife, the greateft Philosophers as well as the meaneft Mechanicks, to Believe a God ?

'Tis indeed quite contrary; it's generally Men's Ignorance of, or at leaft their not rightly confidering of, and arguing from Second Caufes, that is the caufe of Atheifm: For Second Caufes, if confider'd right, naturally lead us to the First Caufe, that is, God.

2. The Atheist tells us, the Notion of God might come from Tradition.

This makes against the Atheist, for it is impossible there should be any fuch universal Tradition, unless we suppose all the World to come from one first common Parent, who probably was made by God, and delivered down the Belief of a God to all his Posterity.

3. The Atheist tells us, this univerfal Confent of Mankind in the Belief of a God, might come from an extravagant Fear, and fo be only a Sign of the extream Weakness and Frailty of Human Nature.

But this is a meer Pretence.

If

If these supposed Fears proceeded from without, 'tis the same with Tradition; if from within, 'tis probably from Conviction of a God.

'Tis much more reafonable to believe Men's Fears proceeded from a juft and well-grounded Belief of a God, than that their Belief of a God fhould come from an uncertain Jealoufy and a groundlefs Fear of they know not what.

Spinofa indeed fays, That Fear is the Caufe of all Religion. So it is indeed, if we mean a just and reasonable Fear of God. But 'tis a filly thing to suppose that Religion took its Rife from a general and groundless Fear of Men knew not what.

We find, for all thefe Men's Pretences, that most Men are not very apt to those groundless Fears; for notwithstanding Men are fully perfuaded there is a God, and that 'tis a foolish and dangerous thing to neglect their Duty to him, yet they are too apt to forget themselves, and to put far from them the Fear of God.

But how comes this Fear of a God to be fo universal over all the World; the greatest Princes, the wifest Statefmen, men, the most Learned Philosophers, the most Valiant Captains? Are all these a Pack of Fools? Yet we find such as these are no less subject to these Fears of God than other Men.

Nay, even these Atheists themselves, while they pretend to be above the Belief of a God, yet cannot wholly free themselves from the Fear of him; and their Hearts give their Tongues the lie: And therefore we find, fome of our Modern Atheists (as is faid of *Hobbs*) durft scarce be alone by themfelves.

One would think, if it were as thefe Men pretend, those should be most in fear, that know most of God, and are ofteness thinking of him : But we find the contrary, Atheistical Persons are most disturbed with them, even while they do what they can, *that God* may not be *in all their Thoughts*.

'Tis a vain Pretence therefore that this universal Confent of Mankind in the Belief of a God, can proceed from I know not what Fear of Invisible Powers.

4. The Atheist pretends, this univerfal Consent of Men, in the Belief of a God,

God, might proceed from the Defigns of Crafty Politicians, who to make the People more fubmiffive to Government, began and propagated the Belief of a God.

But this, if we confider it well, will appear to be as groundless a Surmife as any of the other.

It's flrange, if this were fo, we have no Account in Hiftory who was the first Inventor of the Belief of a. God.

'Tis common enough for Princes and Politicians to make use of Mens Fiery Zeal and Bigotry, or to encourage fome particular Sect of Religion, to ferve their own Ends : But they are not often known to be the Inventors of a New Religion, much less can they be supposed the first Authors of that Belief which is the Ground of all Religion.

We find all the Lawgivers that Hiflory informs us of, fuppofe this Belief of a God, and take it for granted as that which had long fince taken root in the Hearts of Men, and was carried by the Vogue of the World.

This Suggestion seems to suppose that all Mankind were fometime or other under one Government, else no one Prince would attempt it, nor could any great number of 'em agree to undertake it.

These Atheistical Men we have now to deal with, fay, 'Tis impossible we should have any Notion of a God: If this be so, those Politicians that should go about to impose this Belief of a God upon the World, would have an hard task to beat it into the Heads of Mankind.

In fhort, the very Supposition is abfurd in it felf: For if the Belief of a God had not been grounded before in the Reafon of Mankind, no Prince or Politician would attempt to posses the World with fuch a Notion: Nor could all the Princes and Politicians in the World, if they could join together, by all their Power and Cunning, bring the Belief of a God to be fo universal as it is.

Having thus fpoken of the Argument to prove the Being of a God, taken from the general Confent of Mankind, I shall now proceed to infist upon fome other Arguments to prove the fame: And

And for fome Reafons I shall produce the chief Arguments I intend to infift on for the proof of this Truth, without giving a particular Answer to all those Objections that are commonly made against 'em, by the Defenders of Atheism; and shall referve a more full Answer to those Objections till afterwards.

And here, in the first place, the Atheist must needs grant that fomething has existed from all Eternity. If he will grant that there is any thing that now 1s, he must grant that fomething always has been.

There is nothing in the World clearer than this, That nothing can come out of nothing, without fome Caufe befides it felf; for then the fame thing must be both before and after it felf; must at the fame time be, as a Caufe, and yet not be, as an Effect: That is, be, and not be, at the fame time; which is a flat Contradiction.

Now fince 'tis fo plain that fomething is eternal, and this Self-exiftence, or Eternal Exiftence is certainly a Perfection; fure 'tis much more reafonable to believe it to belong to fuch a Perfect Being as we fuppofe God to be, than

than to fuch a dull unactive thing as Matter is; which yet the Atheifts believe to be eternal.

I dare not indeed rely too much upon that Argument the Cartefians take from the Notion they have of Self-exiftence, or Neceffary or Eternal Exiftence, being implied in the very Idea of God; becaufe I am afraid the Atheift will fay, they beg the Queftion.

But methinks when we are fure that fomething must have been from Eternity, or elfe nothing could now be; and the Atheist himself believes Matter to have been fo; it is much more reasonable to believe that this Perfection of Self-existence, or Necessary or Eternal Existence, should belong to such a Perfect Being as we suppose God to be, than to such a dull stupid fenseless thing as we find Matter to be; and confequently, that there must be a God.

And thus I have fpoke briefly of the first Argument I think fit to infiss on, f or the Proof of this Truth, That there is a God.

2. Another Argument may be taken from the impossibility there is, that there

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there should be an infinite Succession of Causes and Effects.

As, for inftance, in the Generations of Mankind, we must at last come to a Man that was not generated.

Now as to thefe first Parents of Mankind, we must either suppose they were from Eternity, which I believe none will think, that confiders the frail Condition of Human Nature in the State it is now in :

Or we must fay, as fome of the Atheifts too boldly affert, That Men fometime or other fprang out of the Earth, like Mushrooms in a Night. And if fo, 'tis strange the Earth has fo long ago lost its Virtue, that no fuch Things should be known or heard of now for fo many Thousand Years.

Or we must fay, That these first Parents were made by some Superior and Powerful Being; and that is him we call God.

3. 'Tis plain, the Scripture fends us to the Works of God, to learn his Exiftence. Rom. 1. 21. For the invisible things of him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead. Pfal. 19. 1, 2. The Heavens declare the D Glory

Glory of God, and the Firmament sheweth his handy-work.

Indeed, there is no Account to be given, how fuch a Glorious and Regular Frame of Things, as the World that is now before us, fhould come to be, without fuppofing a God; that is, an infinitely Wife and Powerful Being, that was the Great and Wife Creator, and is the Governor of it.

Tully fomewhere speaks of this Matter, to this Purpofe. Says he, If any of us should come into a great House, every way exactly contrived for Ufe and Ornament, and fhould find there no Inhabitants, nothing but Rats or Mice, or fome fuch mean Creatures; Should we think that the feveral Parts of that House jumbled together by Chance? Or were contrived and made by those despicable Creatures ? Or that it never was built at all, but had been for ever? No certainly, we fhould rather conclude, that it was fome wife Architect, (tho we faw him not, nor knew who he was,) that was the Builder of Juch an Houfe.

So the Cafe is here : We fee before our Eyes a most Noble Fabrick and Frame

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Frame of Things. We find no Being, that we know any thing of, that can make fo much as one Pile of Grafs, nor an Hair of our Heads, nor the meaneft Creature that creeps upon the Earth. Shall we think this Noble Frame was never made? Or that it was made by a Cafual Jumblement of Atoms? No; 'tis much more rational to conclude, there is One Intelligent, Wife, and Powerful Being, that was the Maker of it; and this Being we call God.

To inflance particularly in Two Parts of this Noble Frame; the Heavenly Bodies; and the Bodies of Animals, and particularly that of Man here on Earth.

1. The Heavenly Bodies. Not to enquire into the Nature of those Bodies which we know little of, more than that probably the Sun is a Vast Ball or Globe of a Fiery Nature; for we see Fire on Earth casts forth both Light and Heat : And that the rest of the Planets are Solid Opake Bodies, fomething like that Earth on which we live. I say, not to enquire into this, the very Motions of the Heavenly Bodies, which we are by Expe-D 2 rience

rience plainly affur'd of, are fo ftupendous and wonderful, as may well convince us, that there is fome infinitely Wife and Powerful Being, that was the Caufe, and is the Director of 'em.

'Tis much the fame thing in this Cafe, whether with the Old Philofophy we fuppofe the Earth to be the Center; or with the New Philofophy, we make the Sun to be the Center of this Orb in which we live; and all the Planets, and our Earth among the reft, to move round about it. I fay, this is all one; their Motions are fo wonderful, as may convince us there is a God.

That fo many Vaft Bodies, fome of 'em fo many times bigger than this our Earth, fwimming only in Liquid Air or *Æther*, fhould yet fo exactly keep their Places and Diftances from their Centre, perform their Motions round the Centre of their Orb or Vortex in fo exact a Space of Time, and at the fame time many of 'em move round their own Centres. That thefe Stupendous Motions fhould be fo regularly continued, without any confiderable Variation, for fo many Thoufand

fand Years; is fuch a Wonder of Nature, as may force any Man to believe there is a God.

To give any tolerable Account of the Reafon of this, has non-plus'd all the Ancient and Modern Philosophers.

The Aftronomers, by long and many Observations, may attain to a pretty accurate Knowledge of their feveral Periodical Revolutions : But when they pretend to dive into the Original Caufe of these Wonderful Motions ; by what Internal Principle, or by what External Force they were begun, or are carried on for fo many Thoufand Years; they are at a Lofs what Account to give of it. They tell us indeed of Gravitation, and Attraction, of Vis Centripeta's, and fuch fine Words; but they leave us as much in the dark as we were before. And they had e'en as good plainly confess they know nothing of the Matter; and fpend the Time they use to employ in enquiring into the Reafon of em, in admiring and adoring that infinitely Powerful Being that is the Caufe of 'em.

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For my part, if any one fhould tell me of a Cannon that would throw a Ball to the Weft-Indies, or of a Globe that with one Turn of a Man's Hand would turn round its Center for an Hundred Years together; I fhould think it much more eafy to give a Philofophical Account of it, than it is to give any Account of the Heavenly Motions, without fuppofing fomething above the Power of Matter, or the Common Laws of Motion we can obferve in this Lower World.

Another Inflance of the Works of Nature I chufe to infift upon, is, the Bodies of Animals here on Earth, and particularly that of Man. Well might the Pfalmift cry out, (*Pfal.* 135.) *I* am fcarfully and wonderfully made.

If we confider how wonderfully thefe our Bodies are conceived and nourifhed in the Womb, that fo many Parts of fuch different Contexture and Solidity, fhould grow, and that fo regularly, from a little Moifture. That when we are Born, the Parts of our Bodies fhould be ordinarily fo exactly Uniform, and fitted for the Ufe and Convenience of the Body. That Monftrous Bodies fhould be fo rare as they are.

If we confider the vaft Variety of the Parts and Humours in the Body: The Veins and Arteries, the Nerves and Ligaments, the Flefh and Bones: How exactly the feveral Parts are fuited to the Ufes of the Body, either for Receiving in its Aliment, Concocting and Diftributing of it; or for Voiding its Superfluities and Excrementitious Juices.

And particularly, if we confider the *Crafis* and Circulation of the Blood, which is the Life of the Animal. That the Blood fhould receive Nutrimental Particles from fuch a vaft Variety of Aliment; and continue for fo many Years in fo exact a *Crafis* and Temper, as to be fit to Circulate through fo many little Paffages, particularly in the Extream Parts of the Body.

Nay, indeed, the Circulation it felf of the Blood through the Body, is the greateft Wonder of all. 'Tis a kind of perpetual Motion in the Body. The beft Anatomift or Natural Philofopher in the World, cannot give any tolerable Account how this Circulation is begun, or carried on, or what is the true Principle or Caufe of D 4

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it. As for Inflance, Whether the Motion and Expansion of the Blood, do first cause the *Diastole*, or Opening Motion of the Heart; or whether the *Systole*, or Contracting Motion of the Heart, do originally cause the Progressive Motion of the Blood?

In a Word; The whole Oeconomy of the Animal is fo Wonderful, that Galen himfelf could not forbear, upon the Contemplation thereof, to break out into the Prailes of God, the Creator of it.

I might here fay fomething of that more Noble Part of Man, his Soul; which as it could not Exift of it felf. fo certainly, if we regard those Noble Faculties of Understanding, Wil7 ling, Remembring, Chusing, Refufing, Self-moving, Contemplating, and Confidering Things that are above Matter, and depend not on it ; cannot come from any merely Material Caufe. And which, as it is a Proof and Evidence, so it is a near Resemblance of fuch a perfectly Wife and Good Being as God is, But of this I shall have a fitter Occasion to speak, among the Objections that are made against the Being of a God.

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4. Another Argument we may ufe, to prove the Being of a God, may be taken from the Regularity of the Acting even of Inanimate Creatures, in order to the Accomplifting of those Ends for which they were defigned by Nature.

We may lay down this for a Rule, That whatever acts conftantly, and regularly, and certainly, in order to fome End; either must understand and defign that End it felf, or be guided and directed by fome other Being that does fo.

Now if we look upon the feveral Creatures, even those that have no Life, Sense, or Understanding, and see how regularly they are directed in their Motions and Actions; it will make us, whether we will or no, own and believe an infinitely Wise and Powerful Being, that does either immediately it self direct those their Motions, or has fixt such an Order of Nature, that they cannot vary from it.

Thus, if we confider how regularly Heavy Things defcend; the Plants grow according to their feveral Kinds; Animals are begotten, brought forth, and grow up; the Heavenly Bodies are

are conftantly and regularly moved, while they know nothing of the matter.

If we think that even those Creatures, that have not only Life, but Reafon and Understanding, yet in those Actions that belong to Vegetative Nature, act without Counfel or Defign : The Mother does not confult, how the Child shall grow in her Womb. We eat our Meat, and confider (it may be) fo far as to chufe Things we think wholefome ; but after that, we take no further Care, but leave Nature to do its Work. We Plant Flowers, or Trees, but leave the Earth to nourish them. And all these Works are done as certainly and regularly, as if we our felves had the doing of them. If we confider thefe things, we fhall eafily think there is a God.

But fome one may fay, Nature does this.

What do they mean by Nature? If they mean the particular Nature of every Individual Thing, 'tis no more than to fay, Such things are done, tho' we know not how, or by whom: Which is in effect to fay nothing.

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If they mean Common Nature, abfiract from Individuals; that is but a Logical Notion, and can do nothing. If they mean by Nature, any Active Principle, diftinct from the Things themfelves; it must be either fuch a particular Plastick Nature, as fome fuppose to be in every Individual thing, and that is an Active Principle in the Formation of it, tho' it have it felf no Sense or Understanding.

Now, it may juftly be queftion'd, Whether there be any fuch Nature : tho' fome great Philofophers do affert it : Or, if there be, they that affert it, make it to depend on God.

If they mean by Nature, any Active Intelligent Principle, that fo certainly and regularly guides these Inanimate Creatures; then by Nature they mean God; and fo before they are aware, confess there is a God.

However, the thing is clear, that 'tis utterly impossible that fo vast a Variety of Creatures as we here fee in the Universe, that have no Life, Sense, or Understanding, should go on so regularly as they do, without the Guidance and Direction of superior.

perior Intelligent Mind and Being, fuch as we fuppofe God to be.

And thus the Regular Acting of Inanimate Things, in order to those Ends for which they seem so well to be design'd, is a plain Proof of an infinitely Wise and Powerful Being, that is, of a God.

Indeed, we cannot much wonder the *Epicureans* of old banish'd all Final Caufes out of Philosophy; and tell us, Those Aptitudes that are in the feveral Creatures, or in the feveral Parts of any of 'em, for such and such Ufes, were found out afterwards.

For certainly, these Final Causes do not well agree with their Doctrine, of Blind Chance being the Cause of this Regular Frame of the Creation.

Nor need we any more wonder, that Spinofa ridicules 'em, and tells us, That Nature proposes no End to it felf; and that all Final Causes are but Humana Figmenta, the Fictions of Men.

For these agree no better with that no less Blind Necessity he sets up for his God, when he says, that exnecessitate divinæ Naturæ, infinita infinitis modis saqui debent : An infinite Number of Things, by

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by no lefs infinite Ways, must follow from the abfolute Necessity of the Divine Nature. Which Hypothes, (when he makes the Universe to be his God) as I shall shew hereafter, is but another Name for the Epicurean Chance.

Nay, *Cartefius* himfelf, being too much addicted to his Mechanick Principles, tells us, It is not for us to guefs for what End God made fuch and fuch Things thus or thus; and that we are not able to judge of the Defigns of God.

We confess we are not able to dive into the Abyss of Divine Providence, nor to make an adequate Estimate of all the Wise Ends of God in hisWorks: But there are many Things that are so obvious, that he that runs may read 'em.

Can any one think, (to inflance in our own Bodies) that the Eyes were not made for the ufe of Seeing; the Ears, of Hearing; the Mouth, to receive Aliment; the Teeth, to chew it; the Stomach, to digeft it; the Bones and Sinews, for Strength; the Joints, for Bending; and the Mufcles, for the Motions of the Body? And can we not plainly fee the Ufe and

and End of thefe; tho' we do not know fo exactly the End and Ufe of all the Parts and Humours of the Body?

The *Epicurean* will tell us very wifely, no doubt, that all these came by Chance; and that their Use was found out afterwards, I suppose, by Chance too.

And 'twas very eafy to do it ; for we find, even Children themfelves find the Ufe of these Things as foon as they are born.

Well ! even these *Epicureans*, or Fatalists themselves, if they will think a little, must own, these and such like Things would not have been made otherwise, and could not have been made better, if the Highest Wisdom had been concern'd in the making of 'email And therefore, that they are very absurd, to ascribe those things to Blind Chance, or Necessity, in which so plainly appears the Footsteps of the Greatest Wisdom, and which are to plain a Proof of a God.

Another Argument we may make use of, to prove the Being of a God, is, The Excellent Harmony there is found in the several Parts of the Creation. And

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And this may be confider'd Two Ways.

I. With refpect to the greater or lefs Perfection of those Creatures that are visible to us.

2. With refpect to the Subferviency of the lefs Noble to the more Noble Creatures.

1. With respect to the Perfection of those several Sorts of Beings that are visible to us.

Some there are that are without any Power fo much as of Vegetation, or Propagation of their Kind. Others there are, that are endued with a Power of Vegetation, that are propagated from Seeds according to their Kind, that grow, and live, and dye. A Third fort, are, Animals that have a Life of Senfe; if not (as 'tis probable) fome Degree of Reafon too, in their Sphere.

But there are yet a more Noble fort of Animals we call Men; that have not only Senfe, and fome low Degree of Reafon, but fuch Noble Faculties as enable them to underftand Things that are above the Reach of Senfe.

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I would not drive any Argument further than it will eafily go; but methinks this plain *Climax* in the Creatures that are visible to us, can scarce chuse but lead a confidering Man to believe there are a Higher fort of Rational Beings that depend less on Matter, and are not so clogg'd and prefs'd down with it, as these Rational Natures in Mankind seem to be. And confequently, that we must at last come to fome One most perfectly Rational, Intelligent, and Wise Being, that is the Cause and Original of all Things.

A Second Thing, in which this Excellent Harmony of the Creatures appears, is, in the Subferviency that the lefs Noble have to the more Noble Creatures.

Those that want Life are subservient to those that have it. If we look up to Heaven, the Heavenly Bodies do not shine only for themselves, but by their Benign Influence do assist the Vegetation and Growth of Plants and Animals on Earth. If we sook down on Earth, the Earth, by the Heat and Moissure that comes from the Heavens, brings forth Grass and Plants;

Plants; those feed and nourish the Brutes; and both they, and Herbs and Plants, are useful unto Men.

So that here feems to be plain Footfteps of the Wildom of a God, who hath made fuch ample Provision for all his Creatures, and particularly for that Noble Creature Man, that he might devote himfelf to the Service of him that made him.

But here we have fome fo abfurd, as not only to deny, but even to ridicule this Order and Harmony of the Creatures, and the Subferviency of one Part of the Creation to another.

This Spinofa plainly does, in the first Part of his Ethics *de Deo*, and founds it all in Imagination.

I know not whether it be fit to difpute with, or possible to convince Men that will advance fuch abfurd Affertions.

However, we cannot much wonder he should do it; for any thing that looks like Wisdom and Design in the Frame of the World, must destroy his abfurd Hypothesis, of God's being a Necessary Agent.

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But fome tell us, 'tis not likely that fuch vast Heavenly Bodies were made to ferve so vile and mean a Creature as Man is.

But to this it's eafily answer'd;

That Man, nay the meaneft Animal may, for any thing we know, be a more Noble Creature than the Sun it felf : Inafmuch as the meaneft Creature, that has Life, and Senfe, is and must be more Noble than the greatest that is destitute of them.

However, 'tis plain to Experience, that the Sun it felf is fubfervient, not only to the Vegetation of thefe our Bodies, and those of the Inferior Animals, but even of the Plants themfelves; even of the meanest Seeds or Grains that are cast into the Earth.

What other Ends and Ufes there may be of those Heavenly Bodies, befides their illustrating the Glory of their Creator, we cannot tell: But I think we may well argue from the Harmony of the Creation, and the Subserviency of the less Noble to the more Excellent and Noble Creatures, that there is an infinitely Wife Being, that is the Author of 'em,

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Another Argument to prove there is a God, may be taken from Natural Confeience.

Rom. 2. The Gentiles, fays the Apofile, who have not the Law, are a Law unto themfelves; which shew the Work of the Law written in their hearts, their Conscience bearing witness, &c.

Now 'tis plain, that Confcience of Duty and Obligation, must imply a Respect to some Law, either Natural or Positive; and a Law must suppose a Lawgiver.

Since all Men then have a Senfe of Duty and Obligation, this must fuppole a Natural Conviction, either imprefied upon their Natures, or gathered by Rational Collection, that there is a God.

That there is generally more or lefs fuch a Senfe in Mankind, appears, in that their Heart finites 'em, not only for those Faults that are open to the View of Men, or may expose 'em to the Penalties of Human Laws, but for the most Secret Miscarriages of their Lives.

But fome may fay, This only argues, they have through Prejudice, or upon Miftake, entertain'd an Opinion E 2 there there is a God; which will have (as to Matter of Confeience) the fame Effects as if there really were one.

To this I anfwer, There is a mighty difference between this, and the Cafe of a Superfitious or prejudiced Religionift : For the one, when he is convinced (as he often is) of his Miftake and Folly, will be eafy and quiet.

But here we find these Things very plain.

That the greateft Scoffers at Religion, fuch as the *Roman* Emperors *Tiberius* and *Caligula*, have not been proof againft the Pangs of Confcience, and their guilty Fears. That those that have ftudiously made it their Business to difengage themselves from all Sense of Duty, have not been able to do it; but ever and anon these Natural Sentiments would return upon them.

And further, those that have pretended upon Philosophical Principles to have already done it, as to the Stings of Natural Confcience, and the guilty Fears that iffue from it, have been just like, if not worse than other Men.

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So that it's plain, the Notions of a God are either fo firmly imprinted upon, and fo throughly rooted in the Nature of Man; or at leaft by a neceffary and unavoidable Reafoning from the Works of God to his Exiftence, do fo ftare 'em in the face; that they cannot eafily be obliterated, but convince Men whether they will or no, that there is a God.

But indeed, if we confider this Matter well, we fhall find there cannot be any fuch thing as Confcience, nor any just Ground for a Sense of any moral Obligations, without the Supposal of a God.

Some may tell us, it may be, that these Obligations may arise from the Nature, Reason, and several Relations of Persons and Things, antecedently to our supposing 'em agreeable to the Will of God.

But this, tho' it may found a Fitnefs and Agreeablenefs of Virtue to the Nature of Things, yet it is far from fuperinducing any Obligation, and laying a Foundation for Natural Confcience.

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We may fee then what Friends the Atheifts are to Civil Society, and how much they confult the Good of Mankind, when they affert that which in the true Confequence of it, loofes the very Bonds of Duty, and fets every one at liberty to do what they lift, to injure and wrong their Neighbours as they pleafe.

No doubt there does appear a General Fitnefs and Agreeablenefs in Virtuous Actions; and it would be an honourable and a generous Thing, fo far to confult the General Good of Mankind, as to practife accordingly. But alas! how weak an Incitement will this Point of Honour be to Virtue and Juffice, without the Belief of a God.

The Atheift is fo fenfible that what I now affert is a just Confequence, that he is not ashamed boldly to affert, That there is (antecedent to Human Laws) no real Difference between Good and Evil, no moral Obligation.

Mr. *Hobbs* tells us over and over, That there is nothing fimply or abfolutely Good or Evil; nothing in its own Nature Juft or Unjuft. That

Good and Evil are only Names that fignify our Appetites and Averfions. Spinofa has feveral Passages exactly to the fame Purpose. And Mr. Blount tells us, The Virtues that Men extol fo highly, are not of equal Weight and Value in the Balance of Nature.

I am not very careful in Citing what they fay, for it will be hard to abuse 'em in this Case, by faying worfe Things than are to be found in their Writings.

But, by those Gentlemens Leave, they herein contradict the General Senfe of Mankind.

For tho' there may be fome Difference in the Sentiments of Men in flating fome nicer Cafes in Practical Things; yet in the greater Lines of Duty, all Mankind agree. Who ever thought it was all one, Whether we Worthip God, or Blaspheme him? Or, if this be not a proper Instance for the Atheift, who pretends to think there is no God ; we may ask him, Is it all one, to Honour our Parents, or to Affront 'em ? to Love and Oblige our Neighbour, or to Kill him ? to be Merciful, or Cruel ? to be Kind to our Brother, or Rob and Spoil him ? Is

Is there no Obligation as to any of these Things, but what comes from Human Laws?

Indeed, if these Vices were establish'd by never so many Human Laws, would that make 'em Just and Reasonable ?

But thefe Atheifts think they folve the Matter, by telling us, That 'tis neceffary Men fhould, for Peace and mutual Security, enter into Civil Society, and make mutual Contracts; and that fuperinduces an Obligation to Juffice and Virtue.

Well, if it be neceffary that these Things should be secured by Civil Contracts, fure there must be an antecedent Obligation to'em : And if they be so necessary to the Good of Mankind, that Publick Peace cannot be maintain'd without 'em, 'tis a Sign they were Good in themselves before.

But we may ask these Men, How it comes to pass, that there lies such an Obligation upon Men to keep their Contracts when they are made?

It feems we must fuppose there is fomething Good and Evil in it felf: Tis not all one, to keep our Contracts,

tracts, or to break 'em. And why may not all the other greater Inftances of Virtue be as good as this ?

Or what Reafon can be given, why we fhould be more obliged to this, than any of the other?

The Truth is, unlefs we fuppofe what the Atheift pretends to deny, a God, our most folemn Engagements and Contracts will fignify but little; and when we think it our Interest to do it, we may as easily break 'em, as make 'em.

The Sum is, Virtue, Justice, &c. moral Good and Evil, is founded in the Nature and Reafon of Things; and iffues from those Relations we ftand in to God and one another. We may be fure, if there be, as we believe there is, a Just and Holy God, that did Make, and does Govern the World, 'tis agreeable to his Will, that his Rational Creatures should govern themfelves according to the Eternal Rules of Reafon. And, I think, we may fafely affert, That those Rules that Establish the greater Instances of Virtue and Morality, are as plain, clear, and undoubtedly certain, as any Principles in Philosophy, or any Propolitions

politions in Mathematicks can be. And therefore the Atheift, (let him talk what he will of the Obligation of Human Laws, and of keeping Contracts) he really diffolves the very Bonds of Civil Society, turns the World into a Foreft of Wild Beafts, and is a Publick Enemy to Mankind.

Another Argument that may be brought to prove the Being of a God, are fome extraordinary *Phænomena* that prove there are Invifible Beings, whofe Power exceeds what we can obferve of the Ordinary Courfe of Nature.

Such are there that follow; Apparitions, Witches, Demoniacks, Prodigies and Prophecies.

Thefe, I confefs, do not directly and fully prove the Being of a God: Becaufe they may more immediately fometimes proceed from Beings, (tho' of greater Power than Men, yet) in Power inferior to the Supreme God.

If we can convince the Atheift, that there is an Invifible World, a World of Spirits, of Beings Superior to Man, and that do not depend on Matter; he will be almost forced to acknowledge One Supreme, Independent,

dent, Omnipotent Spirit, that is the Maker and Governor of that Invifible World. If we can thus take the Outworks, the Fortrefs in which he defends himfelf will not hold out long.

The Atheift feems well aware of this, for he flarts at the very Mention of any of thefe extraordinary *Phanomena*, and musters up all his Forces to attack the first Appearance of any fuch Things.

And I confefs, I cannot look upon any one Thing as a furer Sign that the Age we live in hath a Tangue of Atheifin, than the fo common Disbelief of fuch extraordinary Occurrences as are above the Power of Vifible Nature.

But above all, I cannot but wonder at those that pretend to believe the Scriptures, by which all these Things are plainly afferted, and yet generally ridicule and run 'em down.

It cannot be deny'd, there are many false and feigned Stories of such Things; and therefore it well becomes Wife and Prudent Men, not to be too hasty in Believing 'em.

But it does not therefore follow, but there may be fuch Proof, and (no doubt)

doubt) fometimes is fo, as may and ought to fatisfy a wife and cautious Man of the Truth of fome Matters of Fact of this Nature.

A Man would not prefently conclude, becaufe there are a great many Cheats that pretend fair, therefore there is no Truth among Mankind. Or, becaufe there are a great many Fables interspers'd in History, that all Hiftory is fabulous. Or, that becaufe there is a great deal of Bad Money, that there is none Good. Neither would one conclude, that because some People have been deceived by a weak and fearful Imagination, and fome others have impos'd upon the World out of Defign; that therefore the wifest, and most curious and confiderate Men, that have fometimes pretended have received full Satisfaction as to thefe Things, have either themfelves been deluded, or defigned to impose upon Mankind.

But to fpeak more particularly as to Apparitions. We have fo many Inftances of 'em in Holy Scripture; (and we hope the Atheift himfelf will at leaft allow that to be as credible as other Hiftories :) Almost all Hiftorians

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ans fo abound with 'em, and we have fo many authentick and well-attefted Inftances of 'em in modern Times; that I think it is very abfurd and unreafonable, wholly to deny, or fufpect the Truth of 'em.

Nor is it necessary that we should be able, or fit we should be required to give an account of all the Difficulties that occur about 'em. As for inftance, whether Apparitions (fuppofing fome of 'em to be true) be the Spirits of Men departed, or any other Spirit. For what End and Defign God may permit 'em to appear; whether upon any particular Reasons that might concern them or their Relations in this Life. What Power they have of assuming Bodies, whether Real or only Appearances; and of what Nature those supposed Bodies are ; how they put 'em on , and what becomes of 'em when put off, whether they are condenfed Vehicles, or of any other Nature : Thefe. and many other curious Questions, we are not bound or able to answer.

We know fo little of that intermediate State of Souls departed, that we cannot pretend to fay much about it.

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This indeed we believe, that there is no occasion for such Apparitions now, either to make any new, or to confirm the old Revelation. We have Moses and the Prophets; a Revelation well attested and confirmed already; and they that will not hear them, neither will they be perfuaded, though one rose from the dead.

But yet we cannot fay, but there may be occafion, (fo far as God fees fit) by fome fuch extraordinary Occurrences, to convince a Sceptical and Infidel Age, that there are invifible Powers, when they are fo commonly deny'd and run down, by many that would be thought to have more Wifdom and Philofophy than the reft of Mankind.

For my part, I cannot fee why thofe that believe there ever were Apparitions, (as thofe that believe the Scriptures muft) fhould deny there are any fuch now? Or why the Atheiit, that pretends to build all Knowledge upon Senfe, fhould deny fuch fenfible Appearances, (if well and fufficiently attefted) unlefs he will leave Mankind no Knowledge at all.

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As to that Queftion, Whether there be any fuch thing as Witches or Wizards; that is, Perfons that deal with the Devil, or have Familiar Spirits, I think there is no great Reafon wholly to doubt of it.

I know the Common People are too forward in their Cenfures as to this Matter; and 'tis like, many may have been thought to be fuch, that are not; and 'tis not unlikely fome may have been condemned by Rafh Judges, or Ignorant Juries, without any just Occafion.

But still I think, when Scripture is fo clear in the Point, when there are fo many Authentick Histories of Perfons that have been fo accounted, even by the wife and fober part of Mankind, and that have confess'd themselves to be fo, I think it is abfurd wholly to denyit.

As to Scripture, I confels we are told the Word in the Original fignifies Poyfoners; and fuppofe it be fo, that will not do the bufinefs: For what fhall we fay to those Scriptures that mention those that have Familiar Spirits? What shall we fay to the Witch of *Ender*, confulted by King Saul? where where we have an Inftance of a Witch and an Apparition together. For whatever Spirit it was that appeared, an Apparition there was, and raifed by a Witch; which is enough to our Purpofe.

But it may be the Atheift will laugh at Scripture Hiftory; let him then enquire impartially into Matter of Fact, and I believe he will find Authentick Hiftories of those that have been counted even by the discreet and fober part of Mankind, Witches, that have by the Power of Evil Spirits done things above the ordinary Power of Nature.

As to the Question, Whether there be any Demoniacks or no? the Scripture, so far as we will believe that, is clear in the Matter; We read our Saviour cast out many Devils, and suffer'd them not to speak, because they knew him.

'Tis faid indeed by fome Writers, that this was a Common Form of Speech ufed by the Jews of that time, for those that were distemper'd in their Bodies. But besides that Scripture is clear against it, Josephus himself assures us, the Jews were of another Opinion. And

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And many Inftances we find recorded by the most Learned Physicians, fuch as *Sennertus*, *Fernelius*, and Others; of Persons, that after all the best Judgment they could make, and Means they could use, they could not but judge to be posses'd by Evil Spirits.

Now when fuch Perfons do not only difcover Secrets, and declare Things paft, but future alfo, and befides this, fpeak in Languages they had never learnt; we cannot think fuch to be mere Madmen, but rather that they are poffefs'd by Evil Spirits.

I confefs, the Roman Church (tho' perhaps they may afford us fome Inflances of Perfons too well acquainted with Evil Spirits; and fome of their Pretended Saints have not without fome Reafon been fufpected;) yet they have fo tired the World with their Apparitions of Saints, and their pretended Demoniacks, that perhaps that has not been the leaft Occafion of the Scepticifin of the prefent Age as to thefe Things; nothing being more common than for Men to run from one Extreme to another, from grofs Superfition to open Infidelity.

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Well, upon the whole, I think there is no Reafon we fhould deny there have been, and fometimes ftill are Apparitions of Good or Evil Spirits; or that there are fuch Perfons as we call Witches, Wizards, Magicians, or Conjurers, that deal with Evil Spirits, or Demoniacks that are possified by 'em.

And fo far as there is Evidence enough to fatisty any Rational Man from these extraordinary Appearances, that there are Invisible Powers, we may be well prepared for, and strongly inclined to the Belief of God.

And particularly ; As, if there be Good Spirits that are the Guardians of Mankind, it feems very probable that they were made by, and depend upon, and do Service to One Infinite, Éternal, Good Spirit : So on the other hand, if there be a great Number of Evil and Malicious Spirits, of fogreat Power and Might, 'twill be hard to fuppeie they should not do more Mifchief in the World, but that there is an infinitely Wife, Good, and Powerful Spirit, that fuperintends the Aftairs of the World, fets Bounds to the Power and Malice of fuch Evil Spirits.

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rits, and without whofe Permission they can do nothing.

I now come to fpeak fomething of Prodigies and Prophecies, but effecially of those real and unquestionable Miracles recorded in the Holy Scriptures, done by *Moses* and the Prophets, and by our Lord and Saviour Jefus Christ, and his Apostles.

As to Prodigies; That fuch Wonderful Works have often happen'd in the World, as are above (what we can obferve of) the ordinary Courfe of Nature, and must be attributed to fome Invisible Powers of greater Might than any Agents we are acquainted with; we have the Concurrent Testimony of the best Heathen Authors. To affert these to be wholby fabulous, is little less than to call in question the Verity and Authority of all History.

Now thefe, as I faid before, (at leaft many of them) do not directly prove a God; but they are a certain and undeniable Proof of fuch Invifible Powers, the Acknowledgment or which will naturally lead to the Behef of a God.

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Another Thing fit to be infifted on in this Cafe, is, Prophecy. We find by Experience, that the Wifeft Men, affifted by the Power and Sagacity of mere Nature, cannot certainly tell us what will be on the Morrow.

When we find therefore fuch Predictions made by any Men as come to pafs, we may well conclude they were affifted by fome extraordinary Infpiration, or Revelation.

The Heathen Writers, and particularly Cicero, argue thus: Si eft Divinatio, funt Dii; If there be any fuch thing as Divination, or Foretelling future Things, there must be Gods.

Now, of those Things that are told before they come to pass, there are Two forts.

1. Such as are foretold but a little before, and whofe immediate Caufes are then in being.

And these (we can easily believe) may be foretold by the Natural Sagacity, or Knowledge, of Finite Spirits, whether good or bad.

For they, fo far as God permits, by their Invifibility and Agility, may be privy to the Defigns of Rational and Free Agents, and may know Things that

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that happen in far diftant Places, or are defign'd by the most Close Politicians; and so be capable of Foretelling Things beyond the Reach of the Wifest Men.

And this Kind of Prophecy is at leaft, as I faid before, an Evidence of Invifible Rational Powers; the Extent of whole Knowledge far exceeds that of Mankind, and fo may lead us a good way towards the Belief of One Infinitely Wife and Intelligent Spirit, that is, God.

Or, 2. The Things foretold may be fuch as are to come to pass in far distant Ages to come: And, as far as we believe any such Prophecies made and fulfilled, so far we must be convinced that there is a God.

For we cannot eafily believe, any Finite Limited Spirit, can by any Natural Sagacity foretell Things to come to pafs, at the diffance of fome Hundreds or Thoufands of Years.

Now, not to mention the Pretences made by prophane Hiftories to fome fuch Things, we that are Chriftians firmly believe, that there have been Men endued with fuch a Prophetick Spirit. Witness the Prophecies record- F_3 ed

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ed in Scripture of the Meffas, nay that of Daniel concerning the Succeffion of the Four Great Empires, fo clear and plain, (as to fome Things at leaft,) that fome of the Ancient Writers against the Christians not being able to deny it, have been fo bold as to pretend, they must be written after the Things were come to pass.

Now Itake fuch Prophecies as thefe, to be a most irrefragable Witness of the Being of God; it being utterly impossible that any Man, or indeed any Finite Spirit, should foretell Things at fuch a distance, without fome special Revelation from such an Infinite and Omniscient Being as we suppose God to be.

As to thole true and proper Miracles that have been (if we believe our Religion) done by *Moles* and the Prophets of old, and by our Saviour and his Apoftles under the Golpel-Difpenfation; as they are certain Proofs of the Truth of our Religion, fo they at the fame time prove the Being of a God.

For whatfoever extraordinary Work proves the Truth of a Revelation from God, must at the fame time prove

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prove the Being of that God whofe Revelation it is.

Of these there are Two forts.

1. Such Works as are above the Power and ordinary Courfe of Nature, tho' not above the Power of fome Invifible Spirits, of greater Might than Mankind. Now thefe at leaft prove (as I have faid before) an Invifible World of Spirits, and fo lead us to the Belief of a God.

Or, 2. They are fuch Works as are above the Reach of any Creature, and fo are proper only to God: And these are a direct and full Proof of the Being of a God.

Some (it may be) here may ask, Why Miracles are ceafed, and are not wrought now as well as formerly, to confirm our Belief of a God ?

To which I anfwer; That 'tis hard to fay, whether they be totally ceafed, or no.

But if they be fo, 'tis becaufe the Chriftian Revelation is fufficiently confirmed already, fo that there is no Occafion for the Continuance of this Miraculous Power in the Church, for the Confirmation of the Truth of our Religion.

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And as to the Belief of a God, the Existence and Attributes of God are so plain from his Works, that we need not any further Confirmation of the Truth of 'em.

However, fo far as Miracles may be looked on as a Proof of a God, those that have been already wrought are a fufficient Evidence of this Truth.

I might here infift on fome other Metaphyfical Arguments to prove the Being of God, and which may have (if well confider'd) fome Weight in 'em: But becaufe it is my Defign, as near as I can, to propose only fuch Arguments, and in fuch a way too, as may be obvious to the Understanding of all, I shall omit them, and proceed now to confider the Objections that are made by the Atheist's against the Being of a God.

And I shall chufe to rank those Objections that are advanced by the Atheists, under the several Heads of the Attributes that those that Believe a God usually ascribe to him, and to which they seem most directly to be oppofed.

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And here in the first place, the Atheist is so bold as to affert, That we have no Idea of God at all. That the Word *God* is only an empty Sound, a Name that fignifies nothing, a Word that has no Idea belongs to it.

This Bold Affertion is no lefs than an open Affront to the common Senfe and Experience of Mankind.

For do we not find, that the Generality of Mankind have fome fuch Notion of God as this, That he is a Being of Abfolute Perfection, or a Being of the most Perfect Power, Knowledge, and Goodnefs? Or (if you will) yet more explicitly, A most Perfect Understanding, Being or Mind, existing himself from Eternity, and the Cause of all other Things: That he is himself Independent; that all Things else depend on him.

Is not this a fufficiently clear and plain Idea of God?

Do not we find by Experience, that there are Words in all Languages to fignify fuch a Being? And that tho' those Words many times differ in Sound, as much as any one Word can well differ from another; yet the Idea and Notion they are apply'd to fignifignify, is very much the fame all over the World.

Nay, the Atheist himself cannot deny, that he has at least fome such Notion of a God; else how comes he to deny there is any such Thing ?

For the Argument returns upon himfelf; and as he objects against the Theis, that when they talk of, and affert a God, they affert they know not what; fo 'tis no less true, that when the Atheist denies a God, if he have no Notion at all what is meant by the Word God, he denies he knows not what.

For certainly, 'tis as neceffary to have fome Notion of a Thing to the denying, as well as to the afferting the Existence of it.

Nay indeed, the Atheift in this Point confutes himfelf : For one Account he gives of the Opinion that there is a God, is a certain feigning Power in the Mind of Man, whereby it can by compounding and dividing its own Ideas, form a Notion or Conception of Things impossible, of Things that neither were, are, nor ever will be.

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Now he himfelf must grant, there is in the Mind of Man a Power at least of forming an Idea of fuch a Being as we call God, as well as other Things; and therefore it must be a wild Affertion to fay, we can have no Idea of God.

But I have spent too much time on so extravagant a Notion.

The Atheist infiss further on another Argument much of the like Nature; and that is, what the Theists fay and confess of God, That he is Incomprehensible; and saccording to his wife Way of Reasoning, must be nothing.

To which I answer;

1. There is a great difference between Apprehension and Comprehenfion; between any Thing's being inconceivable, and incomprehensible; between knowing nothing of a Thing, and knowing all that is to be known of it.

We fhould count that Man very abfurd that would affert, a good Anatomift knows nothing of the Body of Man, becaufe he cannot exactly tell the Ends and Ufes of every minute Part Part of it. Or, of a Scholar, that he knows nothing of Natural Philosophy, because there are some *Phænomena* that bassle the best Philosophers. Or, of a Seaman, that he knows nothing of the Sea, because in some Places he cannot fathom the Depth of it.

'Tis true, we have no just and adequate Notion or Idea of the Essence of God; but we do and may clearly know many of his Attributes, at least that fuch Attributes do and must belong to fuch a Perfect Being.

2. 'Tis one thing to know the Exiftence, and another to know the Effence of Things.

Must we conclude we our felves have no Bodies, because we do not exactly comprehend the whole Oeconomy of an Animal? Or that we have no Souls, because we cannot discover the Naked Essence of a Spirit, nor how it is and can be vitally united to the Body? Or that we do not see and hear, taste and smell; because we cannot tell what it is in these External Objects that affects our Sense, or how they do it?

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So in the Cafe before us, we have fuch weighty Arguments to prove the Being of a God, as may convince any Man that is not an obftinate Sceptick, and fuch as must prevail with us, tho' we knew much less of the Attributes of God than really we do.

This Truth, That there is a God, fhines upon us from the Creatures like the Sun in the Firmament; but as if we gaze too much on that Glorious Luminary with our Bodily Eyes, we fhall be fo far from feeing into its Nature, that our Eyes may be dazzled, and we may lofe our Sight by looking on it:

So here, tho' as the Apostle fays, Rom. 1. The eternal Power and Godhead of the Divine Nature, be clearly feen by the things that are made; yet we must not pretend to look too wishly upon that Glory, lest we become vain in our Imaginations, and our Minds be struck blind with the Lustre of it.

God is not Inconceivable, tho' he be Incomprehenfible : We may know that he is, tho' we fhould not know what he is : We may know fomething of him, tho' far from all that is to be known : We may be affured of many of

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of his Attributes and Properties, tho' we cannot have any adequate Notion of his Effence : We may know enough of those Attributes, if not to gratify our Curiofity, yet to ground our Worfhip and Obedience.

3. 'Tis not to be expected we fhould comprehend the Effence of God, when perhaps we do not perfectly underftand the Effence of any thing in the whole World.

We have a great many forts of material Objects daily before our Eyes, and we are apt to fancy we know a great deal of 'em; but 'tis in a great measure Prejudice, and we take things upon Trust, without a due and thorough Examination of the Grounds and Measures of our pretended Knowledge.

We hear and fee, and tafte and fmell, we reafon and difcourfe, we move and walk; and perhaps all this while, if we are put to it, cannot give any tolerable Account how we do fo, nor of the true Reafon how and why; we move fo much as one of our Fingers:

And shall we think to fearch into the Depths of the Divine Nature, or must we not believe there is a God, unless we can do fo ? The

The Atheift makes a mighty Noife againft Spirits, Immaterial and Incorporeal Beings, as unintelligible things. But will he pretend to tell us exactly wherein the Effence of Matter, his darling Deity, confifts ?

One calls it Extension, a Property that, for ought any one knows, belongs to empty Space as well as Body. Another calls it refifting Bulk, or impenetrable Subfrance; but this feems to be only with respect to it felf: There may for ought we know, be a great many forts of Beings, that may penetrate the bulk of Matter.

The truth is, we are deceived by the Appearances that Matter makes to our Senfes, into a fond Opinion that we know a great deal of it, when perhaps we may know as little of the true Effence of Body, as we do of Spirit.

There is no Reafon therefore the Atheift fhould argue against the Being of God, because we own him to be Incomprehensible.

Another Attribute, or rather Mode of the Attributes of God, is that of Infinity.

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This the Atheift quarrels with, and tells us, The word Infinite fignifies nothing in that which is fo called ; that he that calls any thing Infinite, does but attribute an unintelligible Name to a no lefs unintelligible Thing.

But if we confider what is truly meant by Infinite, when apply'd to God, we fhall find neither the Name nor Thing is truly unintelligible.

Now there's a Negative and Politive Infinity.

A Negative Infinity.

So we fay Number is Infinite, becaufe whatever Number we fuppofe, we may by adding more Units make it greater. So we may fay Matter is Infinite, becaufe fuppofe what extent we will of it, we may yet add to it, and fuppofe a greater. So Time is Infinite, becaufe if we fuppofe any definite Number of Years paft, we may yet fuppofe more; or if we fuppofe Millions of Ages to come, we may yet fuppofe more to fucceed em.

There is likewife a Politive Infinity, and this we apply to God.

By which we do not mean, that God is every thing that is or can be, for then every thing would be God, or

or at least a Part or Property of him; which feems to be fomething like *Spi-nofa*'s Notion of God.

For God (if I may fo fpeak) tho' Infinite, is at it were limited and bounded by the Perfection of his Nature. He that fhould fay God were a Body, would derogate from his Excellency and Perfection.

Nor when we call God Infinite, do we mean that every thing we attribute to God, is to be afcribed to him in the higheft degree that can be fuppofed; but in fuch a degree, as is confiftent with the trueft and higheft Perfection.

Thus when we fay, God is Infinite in Mercy; we mean only fuch a degree of Mercy, as is confiftent with the Perfection of God, as he is a Juft Governour. For, as Juftice without the Mixture of Mercy would be fevere Tyranny, fo Mercy without Juflice would be Folly.

Thus, when we fay, God is Infinite in Power; we mean only, that God can do every thing that is poffible and fit to be done; every thing that does not imply a Contradiction to the Truth of Things, or to the Ex-G cellency 13

Objections against the

cellency and Rectitude of his Nature and Will.

So that we fee, the Attributes of God are as it were bounded and limited by one another; and the Excellency of the Divine Nature is chiefly feen, in the Glorious Harmony that may be observed among them.

'Tis eafy to fee from what I have laid down, what is the true Notion of Infinite, when we apply it to God.

'Tis neither more nor lefs than abfolute Perfection. When we fay, God is Infinite in Power, we mean Perfect in Power; that he can do all Things that are poffible and fit to be done : And fo of the reft.

So that tho' (at first fight) this Term of *Infinite* may feem a little dark and intricate; yet, if we attend to the true Sense and Meaning of it, it will appear easy and obvious to the meanest Understanding.

But becaufe this Term of Infinite is moft efpecially (and perhaps moft properly) applied to Two particular Attributes of God, his Immenfity, and Eternity; I fhall here take Occafion to fay fomething of 'em. God's Infinite

nite Prefence is his Immenfity, and his Infinite Duration is his Eternity.

As to his Omniprefence, tho'we cannot pretend to underftand the Manner how he is prefent in all Places, yet not only Scripture, but Reafon affures us he is fo.

That Objection-the Social make against the Omnipresence of God, from impure and nasty Places, is frivolous; for it supposes God to have Sense as Animals.

The greatest Difficulty, is, to conceive God's Immensity, without Divifibility into Parts; and how the Divine Essence can be whole every where.

I think it is not fafe for us to define any thing as to the *Modus* of this Immenfity of God; and freely to confefs, that upon this as well as other Accounts, the Nature of God is to us Incomprehenfible. But

I. It feems most rational to conclude, That the most Perfect Being must be every where; not included in, or limited by any Place, nor excluded out of any.

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2. It feems very clear, That fuch an Extension as we find Bodies have, that infers Divisibility into Parts, is an Imperfection, and below the Excellent and Perfect Nature of God. And therefore, if God be every where, he must be fo in fome more perfect Manner than that of Corporeal Extension: For the Effence of God, whatever it be, must be Simple and Indivisible.

3. The Difficulty of conceiving the Omniprefence of God without Divifibility, is no greater than that of conceiving a Finite Spirit, that we fuppofe to be in this or that Place, and not in any other at the fame time.

For unlefs we fuppofe fuch a Spirit to be in a Mathematical Point, the fame Objection about Divifibility will ftill return.

And therefore the Socinians, who own Finite Spirits, have not at all mended the Matter, by fuppofing God to be only in Heaven as to his Effence, and every where only as to his Power and Energy.

For befides, that it feems abfurd to feparate God's Power from his Effence, and

and no lefs abfurd to make him a Finite and Limited Spirit; there will be the fame Objection against the Simplicity and Indivisibility of his Effence upon their Supposition, as there is upon our supposing him Omnipresent.

Unlefs (as I think fome of them are not very averfe to) they fuppofe God, as the Anthropomorphites did, to be only a vaft Great Body of Human Shape; and then indeed they effectually deftroy both his Simplicity and Immenfity.

Nay, it feems as inconceivable, how God's Power and Providence can be every where, when his Effence is confin'd to a certain Place; as it is, how he can be every where whole and entire.

For if he be only in Heaven, we must either suppose that he hath Created an Infinite Number of Finite Spirits, to whom he leaves the Government of this Lower World : This was (as we find in *Hefod*) the Opinion of fome of the Ancient Heathen :

Or elfe we must fuppose, he acts upon this Lower World only by the Mediation of Matter, as the Sun in the Firmament. And tho' this Sup-G 3 position

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position may be Conceivable as to fome few *Phænomena*, yet we can no more conceive, that the whole Scheme and Extent of Providence can be accounted for this way, than we can have any just Notion of the Manner of the Omniprefence of God.

But there is a greater Difficulty yet ; and that is, How God can be faid to Preferve and Uphold all Things in their Being, if he be not Omniprefent?

For tho' we might fuppofe God to keep the World in Motion, by acting upon it at a diftance by intermediate Matter; yet 'tis utterly unconceivable, how he can by the Influence of any intermediate Matter, conferve Things in their Being, when he is not prefent with them.

I confefs, according to the Opinion of those who think there is requisite a Positive Influx of an Omnipotent Cause, to Annihilation as well as to Creation; this would not be so great a Difficulty.

But I rather incline to think, that without the continual Power of God exerting it felf in Confervation, as it did

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did at first in Creation, all Things would fall to their first Nothing.

And the Scripture feems to favour this Opinion, when it tells us, that God upholds all things by the word of his Power, Heb. I. And the Apoftle, Acts 17. fays, In him we live, and move, and have our being.

Tho' the Greek Particle ε_{ν} , according to Hebraifins very common in the New Teftament, hath a great Variety of Signification; yet in this Place it teems to be very Emphatical, and to imply not only the general Conferving Power of God, but his Intimate Prefence with all his Creatures.

However, as I faid before, if we have this (as I think, Juft) Notion of the Conferving Power of God, 'tis utterly impossible to conceive it can be, without his Omniprefence. The Atheift perhaps will be apt to flart the forementioned Objection, against the Existence both of an Infinite and Finite Spirit too; but (I think) without all Reafon : For when fuch an Exrenfion as implies Divifibility is plainly an Imperfection, and the very Ground of those Mutations and that Corruption that Material Beings are liable G 4

liable to; methinks 'tis highly probable there are nobler Beings, whofe Effences are Simple and Indivifible. And if we allow any fuch Finite Spirits, notwithftanding this Objection from Extension and Divifibility; I fee no Reafon why we may not fuppofe an Infinite and Omniprefent One too.

As to the Attribute of Eternity, the first Question is, How we must conceive of the Eternity of God?

The Common Definition given of Eternity is, that it is Interminabilis vitæ tota fimul & perfecta possificito.

The Schoolmen generally, and not a few of our modern Authors, interpret this Definition fo, as to affert that there is no fuch thing as Succeffion of paft, prefent, and to come, in the Eternity of God; but that it is *tota fimul*, all at once, an Eternal *nunc ftans*, an Eternal Now.

So that according to them, there must be an Essential Difference in the Duration of God, from that of the Creatures.

Others think that this, if it be not an abfurd, yet it is at least an unintelligible Notion, and never to be cleared up, so as to make it intelligible to, or

or of any Use against the Sceptick or Atheist. That we may as well suppose a Point commensurate to a Line, as such a *nunc stans* to a Perpetual Duration. That we may as easily suppose the Immensity of God to be a Point, as his Eternity an Instant.

These Men think it fufficient to affert, That God has as full and comprehenfive a Knowledge of all Things past, present, and to come, with one View of his Understanding; and that Things to come are as much fubject to his Knowledge, and his Powerful Guidance and Direction, as if they were all at once actually prefent to him. That as long as we fecure the Immutability of God, and believe that God neither gets nor lofes any thing by a Succeflive Duration; that he is the fame yesterday, and to day, and forever; their Notion of Duration, or Time, will ferve as well to all the Purposes of God's Excellency and Perfection, as that of the other.

And indeed it feems, that Time (as related to any particular Being) is nothing but the Duration of it; which feems to have no relation at all to the Reft or Motion, to the Mutability lity or Immutability of the Subject of that Duration.

Only when we come to compare the Duration of one Thing with that of another, we are forced to measure their common Duration by fome Regular Motion; by the certain, conitant, and regular Process of which, we may judge of that Duration.

But if any judge this will not clear the Matter, and that there must be fuch an Effential Difference between the Duration of God and the Creatures, and that not to affert it would derogate any thing from the Excellency and Perfection of God; I shall not diffute the Point with them.

That God is Eternal, is plain; for Something muft be Eternal, or effe Nothing could be at all. If God be not Eternal, he can never be at all: For certainly, tho' if we fuppofe fuch an abfolutely Perfect Being as God is, to be Eternal and Self-exiftent, we may eafily grant him to be the Author and Caufe of other Things: Yet if we fuppofe him not to be Self-exiftent, or (which is all one) Eternal, we are fure upon that Suppofition, he can never be at all': It being utterly impof-

impossible, that any thing that was not before should come into Being without a Cause; and we are fure, nothing in the World can possibly be the Cause of such a Being as God is.

Nay indeed, the Atheift himfelf cannot have the Confidence to object any thing against the Being of God, upon account of our afcribing to him this Attribute of Eternity; when he must own, that fomething must be Eternal, and he himfelf attributes Eternity to dull and fenfeless Matter, the most imperfect of all those Things that deferve to be called Beings.

And therefore we find, the Atheifts do not object against the Existence of a God, because we fay he is Eternal; but that they may shew, there is no need of an Eternal God to folve the *Phænomena* of Nature; and that they may not be forced to acknowledge fuch an Eternal Being as God is, they aferibe this Eternity to other Things, which they substitute instead of a God. As

1. All forts of Atheifts agree in this, that they affert Matter to be Eternal, Ingenerable, and Incorruptible.

Some

Some fuppofe the Atoms, or finall Particles of Matter, by infinite Motions and Eslays, at length by Chance fell into this Regular Frame. This was the *Hypothefis* of the *Epicureans*.

Others, much to the fame purpofe; That out of the Power of Matter were generated Forms and Qualities; as Anaximander.

Others; That not only Motion, but Life, Senfe, and Understanding, is included in Matter, and Natural to it. These are called the *Hylozoifts*, or those that affert Life belongs to Matter as Matter.

Others there are, that affert there is One Common Regular (tho' Senfelefs and Unintelligent) Plaftick Nature; that forms Matter into this Regular Frame: And these were the Stoical Atheifts.

As to the Eternity of Matter, I have these Two Things to assert against the Atheists.

1. That it feems very Rational to conclude, That Matter did not Exift from Eternity. 2. That if it did, it will be still as difficult to give any tolerable Account of the Regular Frame of the World, as it was before.

I. That

1. That it is much more probable, that Matter did not Exift from Eternity; but was Created by God. And that if we confider,

1. That it is agreeable to Reafon to conclude, That there is but One Independent, Self-exiftent, Eternal Being. The very Notion of Independent and abfolutely Perfect, which is very near allied to Self-exiftent or Eternal, feems to imply Unity in it felf.

2. The very Suppofal of Independency, Abfolute Perfection, Omnipotence, feems to imply, That all other Beings muft (as to their Exiftence) depend upon that One Independent, abfolutely Perfect, Self-exiftent, or Eternal Being; and confequently, that Matter, as to its Exiftence, cannot be Self-dependent, but muft originally come from that One Independent, Self-exiftent, Eternal Being, that we call God.

3. It is reafonable to think, the lower and meaner any thing is in the Rank of Being, the more likely it is to be dependent upon fome more Noble Being.

Objections against the

Now mere dull and flupid Matter, divefted of all noble Forms and regular Frame, *the rudis indigestaque Moles* of Matter, is the meanest of any thing we know in the Rank of Being, and therefore most likely as to its Existence, to depend upon some such Noble and absolutely Perfect Being as we suppose God to be.

4. Being it is most rational to believe there is but One Eternal, Selfexistent, Independent Being, 'tis much easier to suppose that God created Matter, than to make a kind of God Almighty, as all Atheists do, of such a dull and stupid thing as Matter is; and to suppose it fome way or other (no-body knows how) not only to be That out of which, but by which all things were made.

Indeed Spinofa makes it plainly appear, that Matter is his God. He tells us, that Exiftence is included in the very Nature and Notion of Subflance; and that the Exiftence of it is an Eternal Truth; that there is but one Subflance: That Subflance is infinite: That there neither is nor can be any Subflance but God; for no Subflance can be produced, nor can one Subflance pro-

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produce another. That the effential Properties of Subftance are Extension and Cogitation. And because he must affert but One God, he makes Substance indivisible, (that is, there is no Vacuum) and that it is not compounded of Parts; and that all the supposed Parts are only modally diftinguished.

So that it's plain Old Strato's Ghoft, tho he hath been dead fo long ago, begins to walk again. This is but the old *Hylozoick* Hypothefis, (with fome abfurd Additions,) That Life, Senfe, and Understanding is effential to Matter; fet out with a great Pomp of precarious Definitions, and pretended Demonstrations, in the Mathematical way.

For when he tells us there is but One Subftance; and that there is no Subftance but God; and that the effential Attributes of this Subftance are Cogitation and Extension; by this Subftance he must mean (and 'tis plain from his Bookhe does fo) Corporeal Subftance or Matter to be his God.

I now come to the Second Thing, and that is, If we should suppose Matter

Objections against the

ter to be Eternal, yet that will not at all fuperfede the neceffity of believing a God : It being utterly impoffible to give any tolerable Account of the Frame and Fabrick of this World, (tho Matter were Eternal) without the Suppofal of a God.

It cannot be denied, but most of the Ancient Philosophers that we have any Acquaintance with, held the Eternity of Matter; such as *Plato*, *Ariftotle*, and others.

They generally make Two Principles, Mind and Matter.

And if any fhould think fo now, I fhould be far from charging them with Atheifin, as long as they own and believe a most Perfect Intelligent Being, that prefides over the Motions and Mutations of Matter, and by its powerful Operation produces out of it fuch an orderly and regular Frame, as that of the World that is now before us, and preferves and governs it when it is made.

And here it may be worth our while to confider, what Account the Atheift gives of this regular Frame of Things, without fuppoling a God.

And

And the first Supposition is that of Democritus and Epicurus, That all Things came not from any Mind and Understanding, but from Senfeless Nature and Chance. That after the various infinite Motions of the Atoms and Particles of Matter, wherein all Tricks were tried, and all manner of Forms experimented; they came at last to Settle in this Orderly and Regular Frame of Things, we see before our Eyes.

But as to this *Hypothefis*, we may confider, That it may feem one of the most absurd Things in the World, to attribute that to mere Chance, in which there appear plain Footsteps of the Highest Wildom.

Tully fomewhere tells us, That the Order and Conftancy of the Heavenly Motions, can neither be afcribed to Nature, nor Fortune; but is full of the higheft Reafon and Wifdom.

And in another place; What can possibly be clearer, fays he, than when we look up to Heaven, that there must be fome Deity, of a most excellent Mind and Wisdom, by whom these Things are govern'd? And again;

That .

That all the Parts of the World are fo framed, as they could neither be fairer to the Sight, nor better for Ufe.

And therefore he concludes; He fcarce deferves the Name of a Man, that afcribes 'em to Chance, and does not fee in 'em the Prints and Footsteps of the Highest Wisdom.

2. 'Tis utterly impoffible, that fuch a Regular Frame, where there is fuch vaft and infinite Variety of Noble Creatures, fhould ever arife by the mere Cafual Motions of the Parts of Matter. It might, as far as we can fee, move for endlefs Ages, before it could hit on any one fuch *Species* of Animals, as we find fo vaft a Variety of in the World.

We have a famous Paffage even of Mr. Hobbs himfelf ('tis a little Wonder how it came to drop from him,) to this purpofe; They, fays he, that can look upon all the Parts of an Animal, and yet not fee they were made and adapted to their feveral Offices by fome Mind; Ipfi profecto fine mente effe cenfendi funt, they must be thought not to be Men themfelves. Hobbs de Hom. C. I. And

And if it be out of the Power of Cafual Nature ever to light upon any fuch Regular Syftem as that of any one Animal, how much more upon fo infinite a Variety of Regular Syftems of Matter, as are to be found in the Heavenly and Earthly Bodies we daily fee, and others perhaps in other Orbs that we know nothing of.

If we fee any excellent and regular Piece of Art, (as for inftance, a fair Structure, or a fine Picture;) we prefently think of, and admire the Skill of the Artificer, tho' we do not know who he is, or did not fee him work.

How much more Reafon is there we fhould believe the fame of the Works of Nature, that are fo incomparably more acurate and artificial, that all the Art that ever was fhewn in the World (put it all together) comes not near that of the Structure of the meaneft Animal; why, I fay, fhould we not think there is a Divine Artificer, or an infinitely Wife God, tho' we do not fee him work ?

Tully fays, If the Cafual Concourse of Atoms can make a World, why can it not make a Porch, a Temple,)

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an House, or a City, which are so much easier than that?

If any (fome Hundred Yearshence) thould affert of this Noble and Stately Fabrick where we now are, That the Stones, Brick, Lime, Mortar, and Timber, met together by mere Chance, and rang'd themfelves without the help of any Hands or Engines, without the Art or Contrivance of any Architect, into this Stately Regular Frame in which now they are; he would only deferve to be laugh'd at for his Folly.

Yet this is a Thoufand times eafier than the *Epicurean* Supposition, of the World's being made by Chance.

If all the Men upon the Vaft Continent of *Europe*, *Afia*, and *Africa*, were ftruck blind on a fudden, and required to meet together in the Plains of *Mefopotamia*; how many Ages (if they could be fuppofed to live fo long) might they wander up and down before it were done? Yet this is infinitely eafier than what the *Democritick* Atheift would have us think is a poffible and plaufible Account of the Beginning of the World without a God; (*i. e.*) That blind and fenfelefs Mat-

ter,

ter, fhould (tho' it were by never fo many Millions of Cafual Motions) ever meet and fix in fo many Regular Syftems, as we fee in this Noble Fabrick of the World.

So that we may well conclude the Hypothesis of the *Epicurean* Atheist is utterly impossible.

3. How comes it to país, that in fo many Thousands of Years, as far as History informs us, no new Species of Being, suppose of Animals, have been produced ?

Chance is fo irregular a thing, that we may as well fuppofe it to produce Hundreds and Thoufands more Species of Beings out of Matter, as those it is fuppofed to have produced already.

And therefore we may well conclude, that fince no new Species have been, as far as we can tell, produced for fo many Thoufand Years, those that are already, depend upon the Will and Wisdom of fome such Intelligent and Powerful Being as we suppose God to be; and not upon the mere casual Motions of blind and sensels Matter.

4. Nor

4. Nor is there any account to be given, why and how the World flould fo long continue in fuch a regular Frame as now it is, and we are fure for fome Thoufands of Years it has been, without any confiderable Alteration.

If Chance had made the World, in all probability Chance would long e're now have marr'd it too.

Nor is there any Reafon to think, if the World by fome unimaginable Chance had fometime hit into this regular Frame, that it fhould have continued fo, tho it were but the fpace of one Day, much lefs for fo many Thoufand Years; and that it does fo, upon the *Epicurean* Supposition, is the greatest Chance in the World, next to the making of it by Chance.

For fince by the very Suppolition, Matter is indifferent to all Motions, and its Motions are merely cafual, the Motions of the Atoms and Particles of any quantity of Matter, that by Chance has hit into a regular Syftem, must be still cafual; and there will be a much greater Tendency in the Motions of that particular System to a Dissolution of the System, than there

there was or could be in the general cafual Motions of Matter to the making of it.

Indeed the Epicureans talk of a certain Gravitation in Matter, that they fuppole is the Principle of its Motions: But this is in a fort to suppose the World made before it was made : Nor could there be any Gravitation of Matter, or Tendency in it to a Center, when probably there were no Centers; nor could the World be made by Chance, without a great many other forts of Motion, befides that of Gravitation, or a direct Tendency of Motion towards fome Center.

If the Atheist shall fay, The prefent Frame of the World is most eafy and natural, and therefore continues as it is; how will he prove it, or what Reafon can he give why it is fo ?

I may with much more Reafon fay, That on his Supposition there is no fuch thing as Nature : For Nature, in the lowelt Senfe and Signification of it, must denote a fixt and regular State, and process of Motions, of Generations and Corruptions; but upon the Epicurean Supposition there can be no fuch thing. H 4

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If we mean indeed by Nature, a diftinct Powerful Intelligent Principle, that by its Power and Energy preferves and continues the prefent Frame of the World ; this is what we would have the Atheist believe; i. e. a God. But then we fay, that if the World cannot be continued in this beautiful and regular Frame, without fuch an Intelligent Principle as they may call Nature, and we call God; much lefs could it be made without it. But if we could fuppole, that by the infinite variety of the cafual Motions of the Parts of Matter, there could in fome lucky Moment happen fuch a regular Frame as that of this World ; yet it could scarce continue a Moment, without fuch an Alteration as would be deftructive of the Beauty and Harmony of it.

And therefore we cannot but think Des Cartes much too bold, when only fuppofing that God had impressed upon Matter at first such a quantity of Motion, he takes God along with him no further, but pretends to tell us how the World might be made, or rather make it felf.

And

And the we cannot accufe him of Atheifin, yet we think his Hypothefis has too great a Tendency to it, and borders too much on this *Epicurean* Account of the making of the World.

Nor would I have any think the Time is ill fpent in exposing this Hypothefis: For the our Modern Atheists do not fo much infiss on the *Epicurean* Scheme directly and explicitly, yet it is easy to shew that all the other Atheistical *Hypothefes* that shut God out of the World, must be derived from and grounded upon this.

And yet the Democritick Atheifts are fo fenfible how weak and infufficient this Account is of fuch a Glorious and Regular Syftem as that of this World, that they tell us for their Excufe, there are infinite Worlds befides this; tho' (it may be) not one of them fo exactly uniform and regular as this is. This is gratis diflum; 'tis enough for us, that we know fuch a World as this we live in could never be made by mere Chance, without fome Wife and Powerful Being guiding and directing the Motions of Matter.

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The next Atheistical Hypothesis, is, that which derives all Things from Dead and Senseless Matter, by way of Forms and Qualities.

This is very much of the fame Nature, and liable to the fame Exceptions with that of the *Democritick* or *Epicurean* Atheifts.

For if these supposed Forms and Qualities be really any thing diffinct from Matter, they must either proceed from some diffinct, intelligent, generating Principle: And if the Atheist suppose this, he must suppose a God:

Or they must be made by some Native Energy, that is supposed to be innate in Matter. And this Supposition falls in exactly with the Hylozoick Hypothesis, that makes Life it self Natural to Matter; and is to be spoke to when we come to that Hypothesis. Or else these Forms and Qualities must be educed out of the Power of Matter; and this must still be (if we suppose no God) by the mere Casual Motions of the Parts of Matter: And then they must be supposed to be only so many Appearances to our Senses, arifing

fing from the infinite Variety in the Figure, Site, and Motion of the Parts of Matter. And this falls in with the *Epicurean Hypothefis*: So that there is no Occafien I should fay any thing more of the Abfurdity of this Hypothefis.

The Third Supposition is, That all Matter is endued with a Natural Plaftick Life, neceffary, ingenerable, and incorruptible.

This Supposition has indeed a clofe Connection with Atheifin: For if Matter have fuch a felf-active Power, as to improve it felf into Life, Senfe, Confcious Understanding, and Selfenjoyment; there needs no God.

This is indeed a very wild Affertion, and therefore tho' very anciently affirmed by *Strato*, yet never gain'd any Reputation, till lately reviv'd by fome modern Atheifts.

This is indeed to fuppofe Matter perfectly wife, when it has no Knowledge at all, as far as we can difern by Experience and Obfervation. To fuppofe Matter, and every Particle of it, to understand all its own Congruities and Capacities; which we must fupfuppofe, if we fuppofe it to form it felf into Plants or Animals, is indeed to fuppofe it to have a greater and more perfect Knowledge before its Formation into the feveral Species of Being, than it has after, and to know that which the most Rational Beings know little or nothing of.

Nay indeed, if all Matter as Matter is endued with Senfe and Underftanding; what Account can be given why the whole Maſs of Matter fhould not become Animals, and we fhould have nothing but Senfitive or Rational Beings in the World?

Nay, we might drive this a little further, and fay as fome have done, That the World it felf may be a great Animal, or (as Spinofa feems to fuppofe) a God.

But fince all thefe Suppositions are fo abfurd in themfelves, and fo plainly contrary to Experience; we may well conclude, That Life, but efpecially Senfe and Understanding, are diffinct from Matter, and above the Power of it.

But of this I shall fay more in another Place.

The

The Fourth Atheistical Supposition is that of fome of the *Stoicks*; That there is One Common, Regular, and Methodical, (but Unintelligent) Plaflick Nature, that is the Caufe of this Regular Frame of Things.

If they mean by Plaftick Nature, the Course of Nature, they must return to some One of the foregoing Suppositions; That all Things were generated, either by mere Chance, and the fortuitous Motions of Matter, or by some Native Life and Energy in Matter; and so they assert nothing diffinct from the rest of the Atheists.

If they mean by Plaslick Nature, fome Active Principle diffinct from Matter; I think, they in effect give up the Caufe of Atheifin. For,

1. It is as impossible to suppose, that any such Unintelligent Plastick Nature should be so constant and regular in its Operations, as we see it must be by the Frame of the World; without depending on, and being guided by some Superior Intelligent Nature; as it is to suppose the World made by Chance, or to proceed from any Native Life and Energy of Matter.

2. If

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2. If we can fuppofe One Vegetative, Unintelligent, Plastick Nature, distinct from Matter; why may we not suppose such a Rational, Intelligent, Powerful Being as God is? And to be sure, 'tis much easier to believe such a Being to be the Cause of such a Regular Frame as that of this World, than such a Blind and Senseles Nature as the Stoical Atheists suppose to be the Cause of it.

And thus I have faid fomething very briefly of the feveral Accounts the Atheift gives of the Exiftence of this World without a God : And upon the whole it will appear, there is no Reafon at all to believe (from what Account the Atheift gives of the Exiftence of the World) that there is no God; and that we may well conclude, that there is a God, that is the Creator, and Maker of the World.

And I fhould now come to fpeak of those Objections, that are made by the Atheist against what we attribute to God, as we suppose him to be the Maker of the World.

But before I do this, I might fpeak a word or two, whether the World it felf, not only as to the Matter, but

as to the Form of it too, may not be fuppofed to be Eternal.

Now as to this Eternity of the World, there may be two Suppositions; the one supposes a God, and the other not.

1. Some that have afferted the Eternity of the World, feem to have fuppoied it to be fo, by way of Emanation from the Divine Nature, as Light is from the Sun.

This feems to have been the Opinion of *Ariftotle*; who tho he afferts the Eternity of the World, yet fo plainly in other places owns a God as the Caufe of it, that one cannot but think he was of the Opinion, That the World it felf was Eternal, by way of Emanation from God.

This is indeed an abfurd Opinion, as making God a neceflary Agent, and difcarding all Liberty and Freedom in the Will of God, as to the Creation of the World. But however, they that hold this, cannot fo properly be called Atheifis.

Some have pretended likewife, That the World might be in the Form it now is, from Eternity.

But

Objections against the

But this feems abfurd; it being hard to conceive an Eternal Succeffion of any fort of Motions, (for inflance, those of the Heavens,) or of Generations and Corruptions, such as those of Animals on Earth : Our Thoughts will naturally lead us to some beginning of 'em.

'Tis true, we can eafily have a Notion of the Eternal Existence of such an immutable Being as God is; that is, that there never was a Time when he was not: But it must be confess'd, that it is very hard to apply this to any Succession of Motions and Generations; and therefore it appears at first fight absurd to suppose the World, in the state it now is, was Eternal.

I confefs I cannot infift upon this as alone an infallible Demonftration of the Being of a God, and the Creation of the World : But I muft fay it is much eafier to apprehend the Eternity of fuch a Perfect and Immutable Being as God is, than to apply that Notion to the World collectively confider'd, or to any Beings that are a part of it; the very Frame and Conflictution of which fuppofe many Motions and Mutations, which in their own Nature imply

imply a Beginning fome time or other of fuch Motions and Mutations.

And therefore I cannot but think (tho we fhould fet afide Revelation) it is much more rational to conclude the World had a Beginning, and that it fome time or other was made by fuch an infinitely Powerful and Wife Being as we fuppofe God to be.

But here the Atheift makes an Objection against the Possibility of Creation, by alledging that common Rule in Philosophy, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*; Out of nothing can be made nothing.

As to which Maxim, we may first confider what is the Senfe of it. And 'tis this ; That no real Effence can begin to be, that was not before, without fome material Cause, or without fome preexistent Matter, out of which it must be made. And in this true Sense of the Proposition we may justly believe it is a false Proposition. For,

1. Many of the Ancient Philofophers did not think fo. "Tis plain, many at least of the *Platonists* did believe Human Souls, as that they were Essences distinct from the Body; fo, that they were created by God out of nothing; that is, they were made I withwithout any preexistent Matter out of which they were made.

And therefore they muft needs understand that Maxim in Philosophy, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, Nothing can come from Nothing, only of those Productions that are made according to the ordinary Course of Nature; none of which are made without some preexistent Matter.

2. I think there is a great deal of Reafon we fhould diftinguifh between what is done by the ordinary Courfe and Power of Nature, as now eftablifhed; and what may be, or is not impoffible to be done, by an Abfolute, Unlimited, Infinite Power. It is not very reafonable for us to pretend to determine what can or cannot be done by the moft Perfect Power.

3. And this will appear the more reafonable, if we confider we can never prove, That to fuppofe Something to be produced from Nothing (that is, fome real Effence to begin to be, that was not before, without any preexistent Matter, by the Power and Energy of fome Cause,) implies a Contradiction.

' Tis

'Tis true, it implies a Contradiction, that a Thing fhould be and not be, at the fame time; but not at all, that a Thing that was not before fhould begin to be; if there be (as for ought we know there may) fome Caufe of fufficient Power to produce it, tho' there be nothing out of which it is made.

These Arguments will be the more cogent, if we confider there are a great many Operations in Nature, that as they have been all along thought by the best Philosophiers to be above the Power of Material Beings, fo may be fufficient to convince a Rational Man, that there are Substances diffinct from Matter, and that were not made out of it, but probably by the immediate Power and Energy of fome infinitely Powerful Being, fuch as we believe God to be.

And if we are convinced that there are fuch Immaterial Beings, diffinct from Matter, created out of Nothing by fome infinitely Powerful Spirit; we may much more eafily fuppofe, Matter it felf, (that is a much lefs noble and excellent Being, than those other by their Operations appear to I 2 be;) be;) was at first made out of Nothing by the Power of God.

But of these I shall speak in another Place.

We are apt indeed, in our Difputes both in Philosophy and Divinity, to run up every thing that we do not understand the *Modus* of, to a Contradiction; as the Atheist will (no doubt) do all Creation out of Nothing, from this received Principle in Philosophy, that ex nihilo nihil fit; Nothing can come out of Nothing.

This comes from our want of confidering; That Contradictions are only clear in those Propositions, whose Terms being truly understood, the Affertion does destroy the very Supposition. As if we should fay, The Whole is less than the Part : This (if we mean it in the fame respect) plainly implies, the Whole not to be the Whole, and the Part not to be a Part.

But there are (and may be) Ten Thousand Things, possible or impossible, that we do not know enough of 'em to fay, whether they be fo or not; we cannot difprove 'em, by shewing that they imply a Contradiction.

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Of this kind, I fuppofe the Thing in queftion to be. For tho' it be a juftly received Truth, That according to the Natural and Ordinary Courfe of Generations and Corruptions, Nothing is made out of Nothing, or without Pre-exiftent Matter; yet there is no Reafon at all we fhould carry this fo far, as to deny Creation out of Nothing, to an Infinite or moft Perfect Power.

Nay indeed, the Atheift is guilty of more abfurd Suppositions than this.

The Epicurean Atheist, that afferts the World was made by the Casual Motions of Matter, if he do not fuppose such a Principle as God is, he must suppose that Motion originally came from Nothing; or that either all the whole Mass of Matter, or at least some Parts of it, contains in it a self-moving Principle; which yet he denies to God, the most Perfect Being.

Those Atheists that suppose Forms and Qualities, must either fall in with the *Epicureans*, and confess they are only Modifications of Matter; or they must suppose 'em generated out \mathbf{I}_{2} of

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of Nothing, and corrupted again into Nothing.

Those that suppose Life, Sense, and Understanding to result from Matter, do (in effect) suppose it to arise from Nothing; the noblest and highest Thing in the World, to come from the basest and meanest: When we see plainly by Experience, that the noblest and most active Kinds of Matter have no such things.

Those that affert a blind, senseles, Plastick Nature, in effect affert, That the Highest and Noblest Effects of Wisdom result from Nothing; at least from a Cause utterly insufficient for the Production of 'em; that is, from a mere dull, lumpish, senseless Nature.

And all this muft be fuppofed to be done without any efficient, at leaft any intelligent Caufe at all: Which ene would think fhould be a wilder Suppofition, than to fuppofe that Something may come from Nothing, by the Power and Efficacy of an Infinite or most perfectly Powerful Being, fuch as we believe God to be.

Well,

Well, (in fhort) 'tis certain, Nothing can come from Nothing, without fome Powerful Efficient Caufe : But that there is no Caufe fo Perfect in Power, as to be able to produce Something out of Nothing, or out of no Pre-existent Matter, may be afferted, but can never be clearly proved by the Atheist.

And here it may not be antifs, to fay fomething of that which those that believe a God afcribe to him; That he is the Original of Motion; as to which, I think, we may affert,

That an Infinite Series of Dependent Motions is impossible; and that it is a false Affertion of *Spinofa* and others, That whatever Body is moved, must be moved by another, and that by another, and fo on without end.

For no Number of Motions can be actually infinite; we must at last come to a Beginning of Motion.

And therefore, whereever the Motion begun, or whencefoever it originally came; whether we fuppofe it from a Body, or fome other more Noble Being, that Being muft have in it felf a felf-moving Principle.

Now

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Now fure, it is much more reafonable to afcribe the Original and Beginning of Motion to fuch a Perfect Being as we fuppofe God to be, than to fuch a dull and fenfeles Thing as Matter.

And 'tis fo far from being true, (as the Atheift boldly afferts,) That a Spirit cannot act upon Matter; that (according to the trueft Idea we can get of Matter) 'tis impoffible that any Part of Matter can be the Firft and Original *Motor*, or begin any Motion, without being firft moved by fome Being or other, that has in it a felf-moving Principle; which to all appearance Matter cannot have.

But here fome object, that Motion is Natural to Matter.

Here we must enquire, What those that affert this mean, when they lay, Motion is Natural to Matter?

Do they mean, that Motion is Natural to all Matter? Then must all Matter be naturally and constantly in Motion, and so there would never be any Rest in any Parts of Matter, and consequently there could be no Productions in Nature, nor any fixed State of Material Things.

Do

Do they mean, that Motion is Natural to fome Parts of Matter; as for inflance, to the finer and more fubtile Parts of it, fuch as *Cartefius's Materia* primi Elementi?

This may eafily be granted, when there is really fuch a fubtile Matter : But it may juftly be queftion'd,

1. Whether fuch fubtile Particles be originally in Matter? Or whether they did not rather come from that Motion that was imprefs'd upon, and conferved and carried on in the vaft Bulk of Matter, by the first Original of Motion, that is, God? Or

2. Whether it be any thing to the Atheifts purpole to affert this, when 'tis fo plain to Reafon, that this fubtile fiery Matter, fuppoled to pervade all the groffer Bulk of Matter, cannot do any thing without the powerful Influence of fome Higher Being, towards the Making fuch a World as this is.

3. To be fure, this *Materia fubtilis*, that *Cartefius* fuppofes to be in perpetual Motion, (and therefore, if Motion be Natural to any Matter, 'tis to this;) could never it felf have been generated by the mutual Attrition of the groffer Parts of Matter, without the

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the fpecial Influence of fome Superior Being, carrying on those Motions.

But (it may be) those Men that assert Motion to be Natural to Matter, will say, they mean not actual Motion, but a *Conatus*, or Tendency to Motion in Matter.

If they mean by this Tendency to Motion, only a Natural Fitnefs or Aptitude for Motion; this is eafily granted: But then this is nothing to the prefent Purpofe, and must still suppose fome Original *Motor*, fome Original of Motion distinct from Matter.

If they mean fomething more yet by this *Conatus* or Tendency to Motion, and fuppofe this to be in all Matter as Matter; either they must fuppofe an equal Tendency of the Parts of Matter, every way at the fame time; and then this will be but to fuppofe all Matter to be perfectly at Reft, and that there can be no fuch thing as Motion in Matter.

For when there is an equal Tendency of one Part of Matter this way, and of the adjacent Part of Matter the contrary way, and fo of every Part of Matter every way; this is indeed to suppose there is no Tendency to

to Motion any way; or at leaft if there be, 'tis to no purpose, and can never produce any Motion at all in Matter. This is much like a late Notion and Affertion in Philosophy, That every thing attracts every thing; which is in effect to fay, that nothing attracts any thing.

Or if they suppose the Parts of Matter to tend one way more than another, they must suppose all the Parts of Matter to tend the same way: And tho' they should suppose this, 'tis very questionable, whether they can produce any Motion, without some Vis impressa, which supposes an Original of Motion.

Or if we could fuppofe any fort of Circular (or Direct) Motion to be begun in Matter, by any Native Gravitation of it, or fuch a Tendency of Matter directly to fome Center; this can never be fuppofed to produce any fuch Mixture of Matter, as we plainly fee is neceffary to the Production of the feveral Species of Beings in the World.

Indeed, if we fhould grant all that fome modern Philosophers do or can affert, or even suppose, concerning Mo-

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Motion's being Natural to Matter; we are come no further than the very Beginning of the Epicurean Hypothefis.

And therefore this Supposition will not at all ferve the Atheift, unlets he could fhew it possible, that the mere Casual Motions of the Parts of Matter, can (without fome Intelligent Mind, and All-powerful and Wife Being) ever hit upon fo Orderly and Regular a Frame as that of this World.

So that admit what Supposition we will, 'tis clear enough, that the World was Created; and that it could not ever come to be as it is, without fome infinitely Wife and Powerful Being, fuch as we believe God to be.

And thus I have done with those Objections that the Atheists make against the Belief of a God, as to his being supposed to be the Creator of the World, and (which is much the fame) the Original, the Source and Fountain of all the Motions of it.

I fhould now come to confider those Objections which are made against the Being of a God, with respect to another Attribute that all that believe a God ascribe to him, and that is Omniscience,

nifcience, or perfect Knowledge and Wifdom.

But becaufe the Atheift muft own there is fuch a thing as Knowledge and Wildom in the World, and yet is unwilling to own a God, that is, a Being Omnifcient, or of moft Perfect Knowledge and Wildom, he muft fome way or other afcribe this Knowledge to meer Matter, and affert there is no fuch thing as immaterial or incorporeal Beings in the World.

Before I proceed any further therefore, I mult fay fomething as to that grand Objection the Atheift makes againft the Being of a God, as he is fuppofed to be a Spirit, or an incorporeal and immaterial Being.

Let us confider therefore what is the Opinion of the ancient and modern Atheifts as to this Matter.

Both Plato and Ariflotle, Sextus Empircus, and Lucretius, affure us, there were many of Old that thought there was but one Nature; that there is nothing but Body, and that all other things are but the Paffions and Affections of that.

So that our modern Atheifts are not the first Inventors of this Notion, they only only tread in the Steps of the Ancients; only they have a little refin'd upon fome of their Notions, and express themfelves with fomething more of Confidence in the Matter.

Thus Mr. *Hobs* tells us, That to affert immaterial Subftance, is not Error, but Nonfenfe; that to talk of incorporeal Subftance, is as much as to fay an incorporeal Body; and becaufe he must for Fashion fake own a God, he afferts God to be a most pure, fimple and corporeal Spirit.

Spinofa afferts as much, tho' not in express Terms, yet in just Confequence, when he tells us there is but one Substance; that there is no Substance but God, whose effential Attributes are Extension and Cogitation; so that according to him there must be no Substance, but Matter, only one of the effential Properties of this Matter is Cogitation as well as Extension.

But on the contrary, we believe that there is in the World a Subfrance or Effence diffinct from and much more noble and excellent than that of Matter or Body, and particularly that there is one infinite and most perfect Effence or Subfrance that we call God.

'Tis

'Tis plain the Scripture tells us that God is a Spirit, and fpeaks every where of Angels or good Spirits, and Devils or evil Spirits, of the Souls of Men as diffinct from the Body.

Nor can what either Mr. *Hobbs* fome Time ago, or fome other later Authors have faid to elude those places of Scripture that speak of these things, so much as put any tolerable Gloss on their Opinion.

And 'tis no lefs plain that the Generality of the ancient *Greek* and *Roman* Philofophers own immaterial or incorporeal Subftances, and plainly diffinguifh between Mind and Body, between the paffive and active Principle.

And even those of them that seem to think Matter to be eternal, yet plainly own there must be a powerful active Principle they call Spirit or Mind, distinct from Matter, without which Body or Matter would remain a dull unactive and stupid thing, uncapable of ever arriving at any regular Frame.

And whereas Mr. *Hobbs* pretends this Notion proceeded only from the abufe of abstract Names, and of *Aristotle's* Philosophy about Forms and Qualities, 'tis

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'tis to be observ'd that this Opinion prevailed among the best Philosophers, long before *Aristotle* himself was born; much more, long before his Philosophy had such a Vogue in the World.

It was the common Opinion under the ancient and truly genuine Atomick Philosophy, long before *Democritus*, *Leucippus* or *Epicurus*, corrupted that Philosophy, by pretending to make a World by the meer casual Motion of Matter without a God.

Sure if incorporeal Subfance were fuch a nonfenfical or contradictory thing as these Gentlemen make it, it would force have been to generally received by the best Philosophers, both Heathen and Christian, fo long ago.

We have a late Author that (being to prove the Mortality of the Soul, or rather that there is no fuch thing as a Soul in Man, diftinct from the Body) throws off this Argument, by ridiculing the Notion of Soul or Spirit, as an old Heathenifh and Popifh Notion; as if it had been only a Piece of Prieftcraft, for a pretence to kindle the Chymical Fire of Purgatory to make Gold.

But we may fuppofe he takes this Courfe, becaufe he faw it would be hard upon him, to difpute not only against the Reason of the Thing, and Scripture too, but against the commonly received Notions of the Wifest Men, and Best Philosophers, (both Heathen and Christian) from the first History we have of Philosophy, down to this present Time.

And to make fuch Infinuations pafs the eafier upon Mankind, we may obferve another Artifice our modern Corporealifts make ufe of; and that is, (in their Books) to write a long Chapter of the Power of Prejudices; whereby they would infinuate, that all the Old-received Notions of Incorporeal Subftances diffinct from the Body, are only Prejudicate Opinions, Notions taken upon truft, and built upon the Authority of Others.

And you must take it for granted, that these Free Thinkers have reason'd, forsooth, without the least Prejudice, and have set Philosophy free from its Bondage to the Authority of Men.

Well, be this as it will; let us come to the Thing it felf. It is a very unfair and uncertain way of arguing, to difpute against the Existence of a Thing, because we have no just Notion and Conception of it. For there are a Thousand Things that may be, and ('tis likely) really are, that we have no adequate Idea of, if any at all, and therefore we cannot argue certainly about 'em, whether they be or not.

Nay, those Things that are now most obvious, if we had been created without fuch Faculties as give us notice of 'ein, would probably have appeared impossible. Thus, What Idea could a Man born blind have of Colours; or a Man without Ears, of Sound; or one that never had any Taste, of Savour?

If any shall fay, We might be convinced of these Things by Reason, and the Information of other Men: The Case is so here. We not only have the concurrent Testimony of the best and wisest Men in all Ages, that there are Incorporeal Beings; but we are as fure as we well can be in any such Case, that the Faculties we plainly see in some Intelligent Beings, are above the Power of mere Matter.

And we are no lefs fure, that fuch a Glorious Regular Frame as that of this World, could neither make it felf, or come to be without a Caufe, by any Native Power in Matter, or the Cafual Motions of it, nor be made by any thing that is obvious to Senfe; but mult require fuch an infinitely Wife and Powerful Being as God is.

2. Upon first Enquiry we fhall find, we have no just Notion of the true Effence of Matter it felf, farther than that we are fure that fuch and fuch Properties (that we plainly perceive in it) must have fome Subject in which they inhere, and that must be the Support of 'em.

3. It is the Opinion of fome great Philofophers, That there are fuch Properties as cannot belong to Body, that yet are as plain, and clear, and intelligible, as those that Sense and Experience tell us are the Properties of it.

The Properties of Matter that are obvious to our Obfervation, are thefe, Extension, Divisibility, Figure, Capacity of Motion, Impenetrability.

The Properties that are commonly afcribed to a Spirit, are, Self-penetration, Self-motion, and Indivifibility: And, with refpect to Matter, Penetrating, Moving, Altering Matter, and being United to an Organical Body.

As to the Indivisibility of a Spirit, they object, That 'tis impossible to conceive fuch a Being without Extention, or that without Divisibility into Parts. But

I think, 'tis clear, that Divisibility into Parts is an Imperfection; and an Effence Simple, and Uniform, and Indivisible, and confequently not naturally subject to Disfolution, by any Disfunion or Disjunction of Parts, must be more perfect than any Material Things can be.

2. There is no greater Difficulty in conceiving a Simple Effence, without fuch Extension or Quantity, as must imply its being divisible into Parts; than there plainly is in conceiving the Divisibility of Matter in infinitum.

We find, those that are throughly vers'd in Mathematicks, assert roundly, That Matter is (and must be) divisible *in infinitum*; and that this

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is as demonstrable as any thing in the World can be, \cdot tho' to vulgar Appreprehension this feems to imply, there must be as many Parts in a Cube of an Inch Diameter, as there is in the whole Body of the Earth.

All that is to my purpofe, is, Whatever Demonstration there may be given of the infinite Divisibility of Matter, our Understanding must be as much at a loss in the conceiving of it, as it can be in conceiving a Spirit, or a Simple Effence without such Extension as implies Divisibility.

Another thing commonly attributed to a Spirit, is, Self-motion, and the Moving of Matter.

Now the Atheift has no Reafon to object against this, when he himself ascribes it to Matter.

But if Self-motion be impofible in Matter, as no doubt it is, there must be fomething fuch as we call Spirit in the World, or there could never be any fuch thing as Motion.

Moft Philosophers (and particularly Des Cartes) allow Matter to be originally Uniform : So that if we suppose either Motion or Rest to be Natural to Matter, it must be so to all Matter. K 3 If

If we fuppofe Motion Natural to all Matter, it must be abfolutely necessary, and fo there could never be any Regular Productions out of Matter; for the same necessary Motion that might happen to make 'em', would unmake 'em again.

If (as is more reafonable) we fuppofe Reft originally Natural to Matter, and that it was only endued with a Capacity of Motion; 'tis plain, Motion could never be begun, without fome higher Principle than Matter.

So that which foever of the two we fuppofe, there must at once be fuppofed fome infinitely Powerful Being, that must either begin Motion in Matter, or guide, direct, ftop, and bound the irregular Motions of Matter, in order to the Production of Beings out of it.

Indeed, it may not be fo proper to call this Power of Motion in an Infinite Spirit, Self-motion, becaufe it is fuppofed to be Omniprefent; but when this is communicated to a Finite Spirit, as we have no Reafon to doubt it may be, 'tis proper enough to call it Self-activity, or Self-motion.'

And

And'tis much eafier to conceive this of a Simple, Undivided Effence, fuch as we fuppofe a Spirit to be, than of any Part of Matter.

But they object, A Spirit cannot move Matter, becaufe it is fuppofed to penetrate it, and cannot act upon the Surface of it.

To this I answer;

'Tis confefs'd, that Matter acts upon Matter by its Surface : But it cannot do this without a Vis impressa, which must originally come from some higher Principle than mere Matter.

If we grant this, it takes off the Objection; and we ought not to fuppofe a Spirit cannot act upon Matter, (when we plainly fee it must do fo) because we cannot understand how it takes hold of it, or acts upon it.

Nay indeed, it feems reafonable to fuppofe, that Spirits, as their very Nature gives 'em a Capacity of penetrating Matter, fo (as they are Free Agents) when they pleafe they may have a greater Power over any Part of Matter, than any Material Thing can be fuppofed to have. Nay, if those that object this will fuppole with us that Spirits can penetrate Matter, I think they may easily believe, that they have a greater Power over Matter by this Penetration, than they could have, if they could, like Bodies, act only on the Surface of it.

And it feems reafonable to fuppofe, that upon the account of this very Penetration of Matter, there may be a clofer Union of Spirit with Body, than there can be of any Parts of Matter between themfelves.

And this leads me to another Property of a Finite Spirit, that it may be united to an Organical Body.

It was the Opinion of fome Ancient Philofophers, That only God the Supreme, and Infinite, and most Perfect Spirit, was without all Body; and that all Created Spirits had fome kind of Bodies, fome Terrestrial, others Aerial, or Ætherial, with which they were united, and in which they acted.

But this (will the Atheift fay) is impossible, that fuch a pure fimple Effence, as we fuppose a Spirit to be, should

fhould be united with fuch a großs Thing as Matter is.

Now before we grant the Atheift this, we requeft him to tell us, how the Parts of Solid Matter (fuch as Wood and Stone) are fo clofely united?

What Hooks or Cement is the Caufe of this Union? And fince those must have Parts, (for Matter is divifible *in infinitum*;) What unites those Parts together?

Is it only clofe Contact of Surface? The most Solid Bodies (as appears to Experience) have many Interstices and Vacuities, that are capable of being fill'd with, and are pervious to fome more subtile and Heterogeneous Matter.

Is it (as *Cartefius* feems to fuppofe) only Reft that does it? This likewife is against Experience.

So that 'tis plain, we know as little of the true Caufe (or *Modus*) of the Union of the Parts of Matter, as we do of the Uniting of Spirit with Matter.

Will the Atheist fay, there is no fuch thing as Solid Matter, because he knows nothing of the Cause of that Solidity? So

So that as far as we can judge, the Properties that are commonly afcribed to a Spirit, or Immaterial Subfrance, are as conceivable and accountable, as those that are taken for granted to belong to Matter.

But the Atheift (it may be) will fay, 'Tis needlefs to fuppofe fuch a Thing as Immaterial Subflance, or Spirit; becaufe all the *Phænomena* may be folved by mere Matter, and the Properties that are afcribed to Incorporeal Subflance, may and do belong to Matter.

Our modern Corporealifts tell us, Senfe, Imagination, Underftanding, Memory, Reafon, Spontaneous Motion, may be only the Effects of the Motion of Matter in Organical Bodies. So that a Man may be mere Organized Matter.

And upon the fame ground Spinofa will tell us, that there needs nothing but Matter: For there neither is, nor can be but One Substance; and Cogitation, as well as Extension, is an Effential Property of that Substance.

As to Spinosa's Notion, of Cogitation being Essential to Matter, 'tis so big with Monstrous Absurdities, that

'tis a wonder any one can have the Confidence to defend it.

Upon this Supposition, every Particle of Matter must be an Intelligent Being, if not a God.

Or if we fuppofe with him, that all the Collective Mafs of Beings is God; What a ftrange kind of Deity will this make; fubject to all the Imperfections, Changes, and Alterations, that can be imagined in all or any of the Parts of Matter?

But to compleat the Abfurdity of his *Hypothefis*, as he fays there is but One Subftance, fo he tells us, this Subftance is indivifible: When 'tis fo plain to Reafon and Experience, that each Particle of Matter is a diftinct Subftance by it felf, and divifible from all others.

And yet as abfurd as this Hypothefis of Spinofa is, he was forced upon it, from the Infufficiency of the other Hypothefis, That tho' Senfe and Reafon be not Effential to Matter, yet Matter may (by the Various Configurations and Motions of its Parts) be improved into Senfe, Reafon, and Understanding; or which is all one, that Senfe and Understanding are nothing

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thing but the Motions of the finer and more fpirituous parts of Matter in Organical Bodies.

I now come to fhew the Unreafonablenefs of that Supposition, That tho Senfe and Reafon should not be effential to Matter, yet Matter may by the various Configurations and Motions of its Parts, be improved into Senfe, Reafon, and Understanding; or, which is all one, that Senfe and Understanding are nothing but the Motions of the finer and more fpirituous Parts of Matter in Organical Bodies.

Now one Account that fome Modern Corporealifts give of this, is that advanced by Mr. *Hobbs*, That Senfe, Reafon, and Understanding, are nothing but the Reaction of the Corpufcles of the *Senforium*, occasioned by the Object.

By this Reaction I fuppole can be meant nothing but the Refiftance that is made in the Senforium, to the Impressions of the Object. But this is a very unfatisfactory, and indeed abfurd Account of the Matter. For,

• Hence it will follow, that whereever there is Matter in Motion, there must be at least Sense it not Reason too;

too; for where-ever there is Action, there is fome kind of Reaction or Refiftance.

Nor is there any Account to be given, why upon this Suppolition the Objects of Senfe fhould not themfelves have Senfe too; for the Reaction will be mutual, and confequently by this Suppolition the Senfe mult be fo too.

From this Supposition it likewife feems to follow, that where-ever there is the most violent Action, if there be a proportionable Re-action or Refistance, there must be the quickest Sense and Understanding; and so, for Instance, the Hammer and the Anvil must be the most fensible Things in Nature.

But that which is most confiderable in this Cafe is this, that this Hypothefis does not at all reach the Question; it gives no account at all of those Thoughts, those Acts of Imagination, Remembrance, Reason, Judgment, and spontaneous Motion, that begin from within, and do not at all depend upon the Pressure of external Objects, and therefore must depend upon and proceed from some internal Principle; which, whether it can be Matter or no, no, we fliall confider more in the Sequel of this Difcourfe.

So that I think I may difinifs this Hypothefis, as that which appears abfurd at first View.

There are fome late Authors that pretend to believe there is no fuch thing as a thinking Subftance in Man, diftinct from the Body; but that Reafon and Understanding is only an Emanation from Life.

They talk of a Flammula Vitalis, the Spirit of Life, the Breath and Blood of our Lives, the glowing Particles of the Blood, and fuch other Cant; but give no tolerable Account of the Matter.

For we cannot but obferve, the Acts of Senfe, Reafon and Understanding are transacted in those Parts of the Man that are most remote from the chief Vitals, the Heart and Lungs, and therefore feem to have little or no immediate Dependence on the vital Breath, or the glowing Particles of the Blood.

The Brain is of a cool and flaccid Substance, and the Animal Spirits, that may be thought the immediate Instruments of its Operations, seem not to be any such bot and glowing Particles

ticles as these Authors speak of, but rather a fine liquidJuice percolated from the Blood into the nervous Substance, and which is requisite to keep the Brain in a due Temperature.

And therefore we find nothing fo much diffurbs the Brain in its Operations as too great a Quantity of thefe *hot and glowing Particles*, (that come either from acute Diffempers, or from the drinking too much of hot and fpirituous Liquors,) and dry up the native gentle moifture of the Brain and nervous Subfrance.

And if the Soul were fuch a fiery flammeous Bedy as fome fuppofe it to be, it would be to far from acting by fuch Organs, that it would wholly deftroy 'em, or at least unfit 'em for fuch Operations.

Befides, if the Acts of Reafon and Underftanding did immediately depend upon the Motion of the Blood and Spirits, without any higher Principle, thofe Thoughts and Acts of Reafon that are fuppofed to be Emanations from 'em, must be always the fame, or at least proceed in fome certain determinate Courfe; and there must be the fame Train of Thoughts and Reafonings fonings in all Men, or in the fame Man at all Times.

For the Motion of the Blood and Spirits, and the Communications between the Vital and Animal Parts, are always (in healthful Perfons at leaft) uniform, certain, and regular; and the fame Caufes, acting always alike, muft have the fame Effects.

So that upon this Supposition, a Man would be a meer Machine, or a finer piece of Clockwork.

But we find by Experience there is in us fome voluntary felf-moving Principle; that we can think or not, think of this, or that, or the other thing; let our Thoughts ramble in a Moment from London to the East or West-Indies, and our Imaginations can travel in a Minute from the North to the South Pole.

But it may be fome may fay, this internal Principle may be nothing but the Motion of the finer and more active and fpirituous Parts of the Organs of the Animal.

Well, we will fuppofe this in fome measure to be true, and that the feveral Motions of the Animal Spirits in the Organs, are the Instruments of the feveral

feveral forts and degrees of Cogitation; ftill the Queftion will return; What is the true Original Caufe that begins, guides, directs, and bounds that infinite Variety of the Motions of the Animal Spirits, in the feveral forts and degrees of Cogitation, and the Reprefentation of fo vaft a Variety of Objects to the Underflanding?

Is it the Subfance of the Brain? That (of it felf) to all appearance is fuch a dull and fenfeles Thing, that a Lump of Curds, as a great Philosopher fays well, may feem as capable of it, as a Lump of Brains.

Is it the Animal Spirits? Thefe neither have any felf-moving Principle in 'em, nor can move but as they are moved : Nor can any one Particle of 'em fingly, nor any Combination of 'em, fo determine their own Motions, as to be the Original Caufe of Thought and Understanding in the Man.

There is no Mechanical and merely Material Caufe we can have recourse to in this Matter, but the Circulation of the Blood; which being a Motion fo conftant, fimple, and uniform, cannot be the genuine Caufe of fo many L Kinds, Kinds, of fo vaft a Variety of Voluntary Motions, as muft be fuppofed in the feveral forts of Cogitation, and the Spontaneous Motions of the Body; that partly occafion'd by the Influence of External Objects upon the Senfes, and partly without any Dependance at all on them, muft proceed from fome Internal Spontaneous Principle of Action.

But to fpeak a little more particularly of the feveral Acts that are commonly afcribed to the Soul, and that the Corporealifts would have us believe may be the Refult of mere Organized Matter.

Imagination, as it fignifies the common Senfe that is as it were the Treafury of the Notices of the External Senfes, does in a great measure depend on the Organs.

But we find in our felves likewife a Power of actual Imagination, that is, not only of revolving and recollecting those Images that are, upon the Notice of Sense, or from former actual Imaginations treasured up; but of compounding, dividing, variously diversifying those Images, nay, of forming

Being of God, Anfiver'd.

ing New ones of Things that (it may be) never were, or never will be.

Now this is that we may juftly fay is above the Power of Organized Matter, and must be ascribed to some Higher Principle.

Memory is another Faculty in Man: Tho' this, as it is the Treafury of the Mind, may depend in fome meafure upon the Organs; yet it is certain, that the Acts of Remembrance, or the Attention we give to those Images that are in this Treafury, must be afcribed to fome Higher Principle, and cannot be fupposed originally to proceed from any part of the Brain, or fubtile Matter contained in it.

Judgment, or the Sentence we pafs within our felves of the Truth or Falfehood of Things, according to those Notices we have, and those Ideas we form of 'em, by comparing our Ideas of 'em : This likewife is a Faculty above the Power of mere Matter.

This we can do, or fufpend our doing of it, as we pleafe. Now what is there in the Brain, or the Animal Spirits in it, to which this Power can be afcribed ?

Again;

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Again; Another Power in Man is, that which we properly call Reafon; or the Deductions we make, and the Confequences we draw of one Truth from another. Certainly, the Truth or Falfhood of Propositions, or of Confequences, are not the Objects of Senfe, and are above the Power of the most fubtile and spirituous Matter in the World.

Again; Self-reflection is another Power in Man. When we have exercifed our Reason about any Objects, we can again recollect and revolve 'em in our mind, judge of, confider, correct and amend, approve or reject these very Acts of our own Reason. This likewife (to all appearance) is above the Power of Organized Matter. Again; Self-confcioufnefs, or the intimate Knowledge we have of our own internal Actions and Cogitations, is (to all appearance) above the Power of Organized Matter. Nor (as far as we can judge) can any, the most subtile and finest Matter in the World, however mixed, modify'd and moved, any more be confcious of its own Motions, than a Stone, or a Clod of Earth.

Self-

Self-enjoyment, or that Pleafure we take in reflecting upon our own Security and Happinefs, or the certain Profpect we have of being fo for the future, is another Property and Power in Man, that is above the Capacity of mere Matter, and must fuppofe fome Higher Principle to be the Source and Fountain of it.

Again; That Power of Willing, or Nilling, or Sufpending, and the Liberty we plainly by Experience find in our felves of Acting, or not Acting, is another Proof of fome Higher Rational Principle, than mere Matter. For whatever Motions there are in Matter, tho' never fo Cafual, are yet (as to the Matter it felf moved) neceffary, and must depend upon some Vis impressa of some other Matter; till we come at laft to fome Being that has in it a felf-moving Principle, which (to all appearance) no Part of Matter can have, and therefore is not capable of beginning any Spontaneous Motion.

Nay, even Senfe it felf, that feems (more than any of the forementioned Things) to depend upon Matter, if we confider it diffinctly, will appear L 3 imposfi-

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impoffible, without fome Higher Principle than bare Matter.

For if we confider well, we shall find, that the Impression made by External Objects upon the Sensorium, is not properly what we ought to call Sense, but the Attention to, or Perception of that Impression, by that which is the true Principle of Sensation: And that Matter, however organized, can no more have Sense without some Higher Sentient, than the Soul can have such formal Sensations without the Organs of Sense.

And whether we determine with fome, that the Objects of Senfe are real Qualities; or with others, that they are only Appearances to our Faculties; 'tis the fame thing. Still there must be fomething above mere Organized Matter, that must be affected by, attend to, really perceive and judge of, those real or apparent Qualities.

But that which most effectually fluews the Abfurdity of this Hypothefis, is this; That 'tis utterly impossible to give any tolerable Account of Spontaneous Motion, without fupposing fome Higher, and more Noble and Pow-

Powerful Principle, than mere Matter.

'Tis plain, there is fomething in us (whatever it be) that has a Defpotick Dominion over the Members of the Body, and that we can (within fuch a Sphere of Natural Power) move'em when, and as we pleafe: So that in this there is the fame Difficulty, as there is in other Acts of Defign or Understanding. Tho' the Impressions of Senfe may be the Occafion of thefe Spontaneous Motions, it is impossible they should be the genuine and adequate Cause of 'em. It is impossible, the gentle Impressions that are made by External Objects upon our Senfes, should by mere Mechanism force the feveral Members to exert their utmost Strength, as we fee they often do.

Tho' the Impressions of Sense may be the Occasion, yet they can never be the Cause of the vast Variety of Spontaneous Motions of the Body, without the Intervention of some Higher Principle that judges of those Sensations, and directs the Locomotive Faculty in exerting its Strength and Vigor.

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What

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What Account can be given, why we fhould not run as faft from an Horfe, as from a Bear, (when the one as powerfully ftrikes the Senfe as the other;) but the Intervention of fome differing Principle above Matter, however moved and modify'd, whereby we apprehend danger from the one, and not from the other?

So that it's plain, what we call the Soul, cannot be any Concretion of Atoms, as the *Epicureans* affert; for this (if the Atoms be never fo fine) is ftill but Body; and fuch a Concretion of Atoms cannot be in an Organized Body, without Penetration of Dimenfions.

Nor can it be any *Flammula vitalis*; for we plainly fee by Experience, there is nothing like any fuch thing in a Body, when in Health and Vigor. The natural Heat of an Healthtul Man is very gentle and moderate, and fcarce differnible: But effectially the Brain, which by all is held to be the Inftrument of Senfe and Underflanding, is fuch a moift and flaccid Subflance, as has in it no appearance of any fuch thing.

Nor

Nor can it be the Animal Spirits : For however they may be the Inftruments of Perception, it is impossible they should have any such Innate Power of directing and determining themfelves, in such a manner, as to produce such a vast Variety of Internal Actions in the Man, or Spontaneous Motions of the Body; or that the Impressions of Sense should by mere Mechanism be the Cause of such Inward Sensations and Cogitations, or fuch a vast Variety of Spontaneous Motions.

Some late Authors talk indeed of a Spirit of Life in Man, that they fuppole is the Caufe of Senfe, Reafon, and Understanding. If they mean only the finer and more active Parts of Organized Matter, I have already shew'd, it is impossible these should be the Primary Caufe of Human Actions.

If we could think they mean any fimple Effence diffinct from the Body; the Difpute is at an end, and they allow what we call an Human Soul.

And

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And then (I think) they fpeak properly enough, to call it the *Spirit* of *Life*, that is, that Spirit that is the true Caufe of Life.

And whereas they argue from the Word *Pfyche*, in *Greek* fignifying both Soul and Life, that the Soul is nothing but the Life of the Animal; I think they ought to argue quite otherwife, that this is fo, becaufe the Soul is in another Senfe the Life of the Animal, that is, the true Caufe of the Life of it.

But perhaps it may be faid, we must not argue, that 'tis impossible that Matter should have Sense and Understanding, because we cannot conceive how it can be : For Matter may have. Properties that we know nothing of.

This is the last Refuge of the Corporealist.

But it is to be obferved, we do not affert here only, that we cannot apprehend how Reafon and Understanding can come from mere Matter; but we think we have Reafon positively to affert it cannot be.

That the vaft Variety of Motions, that must be supposed to all the Acts of Reason and Understanding, (supposing

poling they were nothing but Motion in Matter) cannot pollibly proceed from the regular and uniform Motion of the Blood and Spirits in the Body.

That there is no Kind, or Part, or Particles of Matter in the Organized Body, that can poffibly fo determine themfelves, as to be the Beginning of the Spontaneous Actions and Motions of the Man, (and efpecially of those that do not at all depend on the Imprefions of the External Senfes;) without fome fuch Diffinct, Internal, Spontaneous Principle, as we fuppofe the Soul to be.

Some may fay, perhaps, What! Shall we fay that God cannot give to Matter a Power of Thinking?

I confeis, we flould be very cautious how we fay what God cannot do. And fome late Corporealifts that pretend to own a God, talk much of the Power of God in this Cafe; and that he can eafily put Senfe, and Reafon, and Understanding, into mere Matter.

We confess, if these Gentlemen do really believe a God, *i. e.* an infinitely Powerful Spirit, distinct from Matter; the Question about Matter thinking

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ing or not thinking, would be of fomething lefs Concernment.

But we cannot fee then why they fhould make it the grand Queftion in Philofophy, (or write grand Effays about it,) Whether Matter can think, or no? and bend their whole Strength to ridicule all the Ancient Philofophy about Human Souls; and (by fubtile Evafions) wreft those Scriptures that fo plainly speak of the Soul as a Thing diffinct from the Body; if there were not a Snake in the Grass, fome Defigu in the bottom of it.

And I think it not hard to guefs what that may be. For if they can once perfwade the World, that Matter may think, they may not defpair of perfwading it to drop the Notion of a God.

For the true Senfe of what they affert, when they fay, God can put the Power of Thinking into Matter, muft be this; That God can fo modify Matter, as that it may become a thinking Subfance, and yet be Matter ftill.

From this the Atheift will cafily draw this Confequence; That Matter may (by the various Motions and Confi-

Configurations of its Parts) be improved into Senfe, and Reaton, and Underftanding: Or (it may be) with Spinofa affert, That Cogitation as well as Extension, is an Effential Property of his One Subftance, that is, of Matter.

But then if there be, as we believe there is, an effential difference between Mind and Matter, between Spirit and Body; if Thinking, to all appearance, be above the Power, and beyond the Capacity of mere Matter; I fee no danger in afferting upon this Suppofition, That God cannot put the Power of Thinking into Matter; any more than it would be to affert, That God cannot make a Body to be a Spirit while it is a Body, or a Spirit to be a Body while it is a Spirit.

Our Saviour tells the Jews, God was able of Stones to raife up Children to Abraham: But fure one might fafely fay, they could not be Stones and Children to Abraham at the fame time.

If a Man should enquire, Whether God could put the Cold of Snow or Ice into the hottest Fire, and yet at the same time it should be as much Fire Fire as it was before; and fhould affert it might be done : He might as well, I think, affert, That it might be Fire and not Fire at the fame time.

So that though there may be Ten thousand things possible to God, that we might think impossible, yet we must not, under pretence of ascribing Power to God, assert what will deftroy the very Nature of Things, and the Being of Truth; unless we will with some of the Schoolmen assert, That God can make two contradictory Propositions both to be true.

In fhort; fince Thought is the quickeft thing in the World, if that be nothing but Motion, one would think those things that are hottest, and of the quickest Motion, should be nearest to Thought and Perception.

But we find, for inflance, Fire has no more Senfe or Underflanding than Water; nor Water boil'd to the greateft degree of Heat, than cold Water; nor the most rectified, the strongess, and most exalted Spirits, than the dulless Phlegm; nor is a Red-hot Iron any nearer Thinking, than a Cold one.

Con-

Contrary to all this, we find the Brain, that as far as we can tell is the immediate Inftrument of inward Senfations, and of Thought and Underftanding, is of a clammy and unactive Nature and Subftance; and feems, as far as we can judge of it, to be a mere paffive Principle, as to the Acts of inward Senfation and Intellection.

And the Animal Spirits are not any hot and glowing Particles, nor at all of a fiery Nature, but rather a liquid Juice, of a watery Subflance; and therefore there muft be fome active Principle diffinct from Matter, that is the true Source and Original of those internal Acts of Reason and Underftanding.

There is an Objection that I forefee will be made against our Assertion; That Sense it felf cannot be supposed to be from mere Matter, but must require some higher Principle, distinct from Matter, that may perceive the Impressions made on the outward Senfes by External Objects.

The Objection is this: That if we fuppole Brutes to have Immaterial Souls, they must be Immortal too, or elfe we lose one main Argument for the

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the Immortality of Human Souls, that which is commonly taken from their Immateriality.

It was, as we may probably think, to avoid this Difficulty, that *Cartefius* afferted Brutes to be mere Machines, and to have nothing either of Senfe or Underflanding.

But by avoiding this, I doubt he ran himfelf upon a greater Abfurdity, to deny that to Brutes, that is plain and obvious to Experience; that they have not only Senfe, but fomething of Knowledge and Reafon too in their Sphere and Degree.

We are as fure as can be of this, not only from the Likenefs of their Organs to thofe of Men, but from the Signs of Senfe they give, and the Actions they do, that they have Senfe, and fomething of Knowledge and Reafon too, or fomething fo like it, that we know not what elfe to call it.

We indeed give it another Name, and call it Inflinct; and fo with refpect to God the Giver of it, we may (if we pleafe) call Human Reafon too.

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But

But if we fhall aftert, there is nothing but Mechanifin in Brutes, when many of 'em have quicker Senfe than we, and in fome things in their Sphere they act with as much Sagacity as our felves; I fay, if we aftert this, we fhall find it hard to defend our felves against the Atheist, if he shall take the Boldness to affert, That Man may be only a finer and more curious Piece of Mechanism.

As to the forementioned Objection against this, I confess, the Immateriality of Human Souls has been actually brought as a certain Argument of their Immortality, and that even by those that did not suppose the Brutes to be mere Machines.

And fo far the Argument will certainly hold; That what is Immaterial, (fuch a fimple Effence as we fuppofe the Soul to be) has not in it felf the Principles of Corruption, as Bodies have, and confequently is fit in its Nature to be Immortal.

But as whatever received its Being from God, must depend upon his Good Will and Pleasure for the Continuance of it; and the Highest Angel in Heaven (as to his Immortal Duration) M 162

as much depends on God, as the Soul of the meanest Man on Earth; fo we may fuppofe God to be guided by Infinite Wildom, in giving this Immortality. And that which feems in Conjunction with their Immateriality to determine and prove the Immortality of Human Souls, is, that Superior Degree of Reafon they have, where-by they are capable of Knowing God, and their Duty and Obligations to him, and of having a Senfe of Moral Good and Evil; and, by confequence, of being accountable to God, the Great Governor and Judge of all the World, and of Receiving Rewards, and Suffering Punifliments in another Life.

And feeing the common Senfe of all Men is, That God hath eftablished a Law for Mankind; it may well be expected he should call 'em to account, and reward their Obedience, and punish their Disobedience to it.

And feeing this is not generally and exactly done in this Life, 'tis highly probable (even to Reafon it felt) it will be in another, and that the Soul is immortal.

And

And being it is clear, the Brutes have none of them Knowledge or Reafon in this degree, nor in thefe Things, nor any Capacity of underftanding their Obligations to God, nor any Senfe of him, or their Duty to him, (and confequently are not capable of any Account in an Afterftate;) there is not the fame Reafon to believe their Spirits are immortal, (however capable they may be of it, by their being immaterial,) as there is for those of Mankind.

Nor is it reafonable to expect we fhould determine what God does with them; that we neither do, nor perhaps can know any thing of.

The Words of Solomon, Eccl. 3. 21. may teach us Modefly in this Cafe: Who knoweth, faith he, the fpirit of man that goeth upwards, and the fpirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth? Where he feems (tho' he intimates, we know little of thefe Things) by the fpirit of man's going upward, to intend a future immortal State. Then shall the Spirit (as he fays elfewhere) return to God who gave it.

But whether he means, by the Spirit of the beafts going downward, An-M 2 nihi-

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nihilation, or fomething else; 'tis not much material to determine.

Whatever Difficulties there may be in this Supposition, I think they are much lefs than those plain Abfurdities even to common Sense and Experience, when we suppose Brutes to be mere Machines, and to have nothing in them, either of Knowledge and Reason, or indeed of Sense it felf.

I hope, this Difcourfe of a Spiritual Subftance, or Soul in Man, will not be thought a Digreffion; for indeed it is fo near a-kin to the Subject I am upon, and fo almost neceflary, as part of an Answer to the Objections made against the Being of Spirit, (or Mind) and Immaterial Substance in general, that I could not prevail with my felf to omit it.

And thus I have faid fomething (as briefly as I could) by way of Anfwer to that bold Affertion of Atheiftical People, That all the *Phænomena* of Human Nature, and all those Noble Acts that are commonly ascribed to the Soul in Man, may be accounted for by the mere Motion of the finer Parts of Matter, in the several Organs of the Body: 'And confequently, That Being of God, Anfiver'd.

That Matter is capable (fay they) by the feveral Motions and Configurations of its Parts, to be improved into a Capacity of Senfe, and Reafon, and Understanding.

I now come to fpeak briefly of fome Objections, that are made against the Being of a God, with respect to this Attribute of Knowledge.

And first; They object, there can be no Knowledge, without the Organs of Senfe and Knowledge: That is, Flesh, Blood, and Brains, as Mr. Hobbs boldly afferts. And that all Knowledge is but Senfe, or at leaftis grounded in it; and therefore there can be no God, becaufe we suppose him to be a Knowing Being, and yet not to have the Inftruments of Knowledge.

But this is but a weak Objection. For.

1. This Knowledge by Senfe, is, as we have Reason to believe, a weak and imperfect Way of Knowledge, and perhaps the meanest that deferves to be called by that Name; and acquaints us only with the Surface of Things, and does not throughly let us into the Nature of 'em. M 3

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And I think we may well reafon just the contrary way; That fince we, by all the Notices that we can get by Senfe, and our Reafoning upon it, know fo little of the true and intimate Nature of Things; there is fome other more Noble Being, that by fome more perfect way knows Things as they are in themfelves, as the Scripture afferts of God; Known unto God are all his works, from the foundation of the world.

And as to what they fay, That Senfe is the only Knowledge, and that we know nothing, but what we know by Senfe; 'tis manifeftly falfe. For then, he that fees, or feels, or taftes a thing *ipfo facto*, knows all that is to be known of it. And befides, Experience tells us, we can form Notions, and have Knowledge of Things, that have little or no Dependance upon Senfe.

And whereas they fay, All Knowledge is but Paffion, or the Impression of the Object upon the Knowing Faculty, Senfe, or Imagination; this likewife is against Experience; there being a great many Acts of the Understanding that begin from within, and

and do not at all depend upon the Impreffions of Senfe: And we can have Ideas of Things that are not the Objects of any of our Senfes.

And whereas they further tell us, That there are but Five Senfes, and there can be neither more nor lefs; and that thefe are all the Means and Ways of Knowledge: This is neither true, nor to the purpofe.

For he that gave us these Senfes, could have given us more, or fewer, even external Ways of Notice. Nor are we to judge of the Possibility of Knowledge in the most Perfect Being, by the narrow Scantling of our own imperfect Ways of Understanding.

And it is highly probable, we fhall arrive at an higher and more perfect Knowledge, when we are divested of these Earthly Bodies.

So that our Knowledge, and the Ways of arriving at it, feem to be fuited to our prefent State; and those Senses that we here are so affected with, and keep such a stir about, in the State they now are, feem rather to clogg and hinder, than to promote and further the Native Capacities of M 4 OUR our Souls, with respect to any clear, and perfect Knowledge of Things.

And whereas they further object, That Things are before Knowledge, and not Knowledge before the Things known; neither is that univerfally true.

We have Reafon to affert, Whatfoever is possible to be, or to be done, is possible to be known; and that whatever actually is, or is done, is actually known by fome Being or other.

And from hence it follows, there is fome All-knowing Being, and fuch a Being is that we call God.

Now, as we have all the Reafon in the World to believe that all Things were made by fuch a Being, fo we are fure he must have a perfect Knowledge of 'em, before he could make 'em.

For it must be in Natural, as it is in Artificial Things; he that is now to build an House, may take his Model, and frame his Idea of it from tome other House that is built before : But he that built the first House, must form the Plan and Model of it from his own Understanding, So it is here. God, Being of God, Anfwer'd.

God, the Great Architect of the World, muft know it, before he made it.

I might have been more large in anfwering thefe laft Objections, but my defigned Brevity would not give the leave; and they do not feem to be of any great Weight and Moment: And therefore I shall pass on to some other Objections.

Another Objection that is brought by fome Atheistical Perfons against the Being of a God, is, against his Wifdom, fo far as it may appear in the Creation of the World.

Certainly, fay they, if the World had been made by a God, it would have been made much better than it is. We should not have fo many vile and mean, fo many useless and unprofitable, fo many noxious Creatures as are in the World, as it now is. To which I answer,

1. That when in the greater Inftances of Created Beings, we find fuch plain Footfteps of Infinite Wifdom as may fully convince us there is a God; methinks we fhould rather argue the other way; That fince 'tis fo plain the World was made by Infinite Wifdom, there-

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therefore it could not well be made better (all Things confider'd) than it is; and that those supposed Defects or Faults that are found in it, are not in the Things themselves, but in our Apprehension; and that 'tis our Ignorancethat betrays us to think so of 'em.

And ('tis plain) this may be the Cafe. For

To make a right Judgment of the Wifdom of God in the Making of the World, we must not have regard to our private Interests, or felfish Passions, but to the Good of the whole.

And as to Mankind particularly, we muft confider 'em not only with refpect to the prefent, but the future : And if we would make a right Judgment in this Cafe, it would require one comprehensive View of the Divine Providence, and the comparing one Thing with another, and Things prefent with all those that are to come, both in this Life, and in another.

For, as it is in Reafon of State, private Men that cannot be let into the Knowledge of it, cannot make a Judgment of the Wifdom of it; fo it is much more true of the Secrets and Mysteries of Creation and Providence. Those

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Those Things may be great and momentous, that we think mean and inconfiderable; those Things highly useful and neceffary one way or other, that we think needless and useless: Those Creatures that we think only noxious and dangerous, may (upon some account or other that we know nothing of,) be highly neceffary, and greatly beneficial to the World.

So that all that this Objection proves, is this; That we cannot dive into the Mysteries of the Wisdom of God in the Creation of the World; And fince there is fo much of Wisdom fo plainly visible in it, we should (methinks) have the Modesty to think, there may be Wisdom that we cannot understand.

As a good Subject, that plainly fees by the Tenour of his Government, that his Prince is a Wife Governor, will not prefently conclude those Actions foolish and impolitick that he does not see the Reason of.

And therefore it was bold Blafphemy in one of the Kings of Arragon, who faid he could have told God how he might have mended feveral things in the making of the World.

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There are indeed feveral things the Atheifts inftance in as Faults and Imperfections in the Make of this World; but they are not worth the mentioning; tho a fair Account might be given of all or moft of 'em.

For we do or can know fo little of the Nature of Things in themfelves, or of the Relation they bear to one another, or to the Univerfe; much lefs of the whole Scheme of the Wifdom and Providence of the Great Creator, in the making and governing of the World, that a moderate Senfe of this will filence all fuch Objections, that have indeed no ground, but in our own Ignorance of Things.

The next Objections I shall mention, are such as seem to reflect on the Justice or Goodness of God.

All that own a God, an infinitely Perfect Being, must own these and the like Moral Perfections are as essential to him, as any other Attributes.

The great Objection the Atheift makes against the Being of a God, as to this Point, is taken from the manifold Evils, and the great Confusions of this World.

Now

Now as there is a Twofold fort of Evil, that of Sin, and that of Suffering; fo if we can give a good Account of God's permitting the one, we fhall be able to give an eafier and better Account of the other.

But becaufe thefe Atheifts we have to deal with, deftroy the Suppofition, and take away the very Queftion concerning God's permitting Sin or Moral Evil, by afferting there is no fuch thing as Liberty, nothing but abfolute and immutable Neceffity in the World, (which in the true Confequence of it is to affert there is no fuch thing as Moral Good or Evil;) before I enter upon that Objection, I muft fay fomething of Neceffity and Liberty.

In the first place, let us see what these Gentlemen think of this matter. Spinof.a suppose God himself to do whatever lies in his Power, from an absolute Necessity of his Nature. That from this all things are and must be just as they are, and could be no otherwife. That Things could be made after no other Manner, and in no other Order, than they were made. And to fay the contrary, is with him as abfurd, as to talk of a Triangle whose Three

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Three Angles are not equal to Two right ones.

Mr. Hobbs likewife in feveral places of his Works, fpeaks to this purpofe. That no Man can be free from Neceffitation. That voluntary Actions have all of them neceffary Caufes. Nay, as to the Deity himfelf, we may obferve he denies him any Knowledge or Understanding; afferts him to be without any Ends or Defigns in his Actions and Operations.

So that the true Confequence of thefe Gentlemens Opinion is, That there is no difference between Voluntary and Natural Agents; between a Man, and a Stock or a Stone; and that thofe Beings the World have thought to be free and voluntary Agents, and to have a Principle of acting or fufpending their Actions within themfelves, make all their Motions with the fame Neceffity, and with as little Choice, as a Stone falls downward, or an Arrow fhot out of a Bow moves forward.

This is the just Confequence of what they affert in their Writings : And to affert, as they in effect do, That every Thing that ever was or is, and Being of God, Anfwer'd.

and every Action that ever was done, together with every Mode and Circumftance of Being or Action, was of abfolute Neceffity juft as it is, and could not polfibly be otherwife, is methinks at firft View, to any Man of common Senfe, fo abfurd an Opinion, that it deferves rather to be laugh'd at than confuted. And yet this is what thefe Gentlemen affert fometimes in little lefs than express Terms, and at other times in the true Confequence of what they fay.

I confess, these Gentlemen sometimes talk of Liberty, as they do fometimes of a God, like other People : Whether they do it with defign a little to bring themfelves off as to their wild Affertions, or whether fometimes Truth flips from 'em before they are aware, I cannot fay ; but the main Drift of their Difcourfes are as I have before defcribed 'em. As to the Liberty of Human Actions, that there is no abfolute Neceflity in all of them, I may leave every one of you to prove it to your felves : And there is never a Man in the World, but can effectually confute Holbs and Spinofa for himfelf, tho perhaps he may not be able to answer all their Cavils. As

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As the old Philofopher, when there was one that was fo impertinently bold, as to deny there could be any fuch thing as Motion, (juft as thefe Gentlemen do there can be any Liberty,) thought the beft way of confuting him, was to get up and walk before him.

So let any of us fhut our Eyes, and put our felves as much as may be from under the Influence of our Senfes, and try whether we must not be confcious to our felves, that we can make a Thousand Spontaneous Motions, and think of as many Things, how, or when, or as we pleafe. And that, for instance, when we rife up, we might if we pleafe fit still; and when we walk this Way, we might as well have walked the contrary Way. When we think of the Exchange or St. Paul's at London, we might as well if we pleafed have thought of that at Amsterdam or St. Peters at Rome. Let any of the Admirers of Holbs or Spinofa tell us if they can, the Necessary Causes of thefe and fuch like Voluntary Adions. Or fay in good earnest if they dare, that we could not in the most minute Circumstance, or Mode of Thought or Action,

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Action, do any otherwife, than just as we do.

And as to what Spinofa fays of his God, he is guilty of fo many and fo grofs Abfurdities, that one might juftly wonder any Man can have the Confidence to affert fuch Things, unlefs he defigned to banter Mankind.

He tells us, There is but One Subflance; and that there is no Subflance but God; and that Cogitation is an Effential Property of this Subflance: And yet, when he denies any fuch thing as Liberty to his God, and makes him a Being that acts to the utmost of his Power ex necessitate Naturx; he (in effect) denies he has any Cogitation, Apprehension, or Understanding at all.

For where-ever there is Apprehenfion and Understanding, there must be in proportion Spontaneity and Liberty; the one being a necessary Confequence of the other.

When he denies Liberty to God, he makes him an imperfect Being: For certainly a Being that has Understanding, is more perfect than one that has not; and a Being that has Election and Liberty, much more noble that N one one that acts from an abfolute Neceffity, and can do no otherwife.

Again: What he fuppofes concerning God, (in the just Confequence of it) fuppofes him not to act at all; but rather to be merely passive, and to act only as he is acted upon; or with fuch a blind *Impetus*, as may be in the meanest Being in the whole World.

And whereas Spinofa fays, If we fuppofe any thing could have been otherwife than as it is, it will follow, that the Nature of God might have been other than what it is:

This is a plain Fallacy, for want of diftinguishing an absolute Necessity of Nature, from an absolute Necessity of Acting.

There are in God Two forts of Neceffity.

A Neceffity of Nature; by which he muft be abfolutely perfect, and can be no otherwife: And a Neceffity of Exiftence; He Is, and cannot but Be.

And as to his Actions, there follows (from the neceffary Perfection of his Nature) a Neceffity that what he does, fhould not be difagreeable to his Infinite Perfection.

But

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But to affert he lies under a Neceffity of Nature to do all he can do; or that he could not do any thing otherwife than he does; are Affertions that fo intrench upon the Liberty and Sovereignty of God, that no Man that has any right Notion of God, can affert or defend 'em. This muft infer, that God fhould make every day a new World, and deftroy it when he has done.

But there is no danger of this; for alas, *Spinofa* means no fuch thing by his God.

For 'tis plain, by laying what he in feveral Places fays of God together, he can mean nothing by God but the Univerfe, or the vaft infinitely extended Bulk of Matter.

And, by Cogitation, he can hardly mean any thing but Local Motion.

And when he afcribes Omnipotence to his God, he can mean only fome fuch thing as the Philofophers call *Potentia materix*, the Power of Matter.

And his Necessitas divinæ naturæ, the Necessity of the Divine Nature, is but the fame with Epicurus's Cafual Motion of the Atoms, or Parts N 2 of

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of Matter; which (as they are fuppofed not to be guided by any Rational Agent,) may be faid to be Cafual, as they depend upon the Motions of fome other Parts of Matter; (according to that Supposition of Spinofa, Whatfoever is moved, is moved by fome other thing, and that by another, and fo on without end;) I fay, upon that account they may be fulled neceffary.

So that what Spinofa fays, that Ex neceffitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis fequi debent, is fo far from being true, that no Regular Frame of Things (neither this that now is, nor any other,) could ever follow from the Neceffary or Cafual Motions (call 'em which you will) of the Parts of Matter; without being begun and carried on regularly by fome Being that hath Understanding and Liberty, Power and Wifdom, in the higheft Perfection, fuch as we fuppofe God to be.

Now as this Supposition of *Hobbs* and *Spinofa* (That there is nothing but abfolute Necessity, no fuch thing as Liberty in the World;) is abfurd in the Nature of the thing, fo it is of most

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most pernicious Consequence to Religion; which, upon this Supposition, must be quite banish'd out of the World.

For certainly, fuch a God as *Hobbs* and *Spinofa* defcribe, cannot be the Object of our Worship or Obedience.

For if he made us, and could not help it; he preferves us too, and cannot help it; and (it may be) muft reward us, or (as it happens from the Neceffity of his Nature) punifh us, and cannot help it: In this Cafe, what are we beholden to him? or what Duty can we owe or pay to him? Efpecially, when according to what they fometimes fay, He cannot know whether he did thefe Things for us or no.

And the Cafe is the fame with refpect to our felves: If we have no fuch thing as Liberty, and do every thing we do from abfolute and immutable Neceffity; either we can have no Reafon or Religion, or 'tis utterly to no purpofe.

Having premifed these Things concerning that absurd Hypothesis of our modern Atheists, whereby they discard all Liberty, and ascribe all Things and N 3 Acti-

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Actions to an Abfolute Neceffity; I come now to fay fomething of the Objection made against the Being of God, from a supposed Defect of Goodness, in his permitting Sin (or Moral Evil) in the World.

The Sum of what they fay as to this Matter, is this; If God can, and will not, hinder Sin, it cannot be reconciled with that infinite Goodnefs we afcribe to him.

In anfwer to this; First, I believe none will deny but it is more for the Honour of God to make a Free Creature, one that hath Understanding and Liberty, than to make only fuch as are carried by a blind and fatal Necessity of Nature in all their Actings. 'Tis a greater Demonstration of Power and Wisdom, nay, and Goodness too in God, than the other could be.

We may ask any of these Gentlemen, Whether they would rather have been Stocks or Stones than Men?

Nay, if God had made no Rational Creatures, he would have had no Honour at all by the Work of Creation, when there was no Creature that could

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could know and admire the Beauty and Order of it.

And as 'tis more for the Honour of God that there should be Free and Rational Creatures, fo it plainly makes for the Perfection of the World, and the Beauty of the Universe, that there should be fuch Creatures. And if there had been none fuch, the World would have been but a few Removes from the Original Chaos, or a dead and fenfeless Lump and Mass of Matter.

And as to the more or lefs Perfection of the feveral Creatures, there is a great Beauty in the Order and feveral Degrees of it. Will any fay, the World is not much better as it is, than if God had made all the Stones Diamonds, or all the Flowers Tulips or Lillies, or all the Trees Cedars ?

But these Gentlemen cannot reconcile the Defectibility of Rational Creatures, with the Goodness of God.

Methinks, it is easy to diffinguish between a Necessity and Possibility of Sinning.

It feems no more necessary, that God fhould put all Rational Agents above the Poffibility of Sinning, than that N 4

that he fhould put all Matter above the Power of Corruption.

God is not at all obliged to impart the utmost Extent of his Goodness to any Creature, nor an equal Degree and Measure of it to all.

As I have faid before, his Attributes are as it were bounded and limited by one another; and fo the Extent of his Goodnefs is bounded by his Wifdom, and the reft of his Glorious Perfections.

Many Attributes in God, and many Virtues in Men, appear more glorious than they could have done, if all Rational Creatures had been created in an indefectible State.

'Tis enough in this Cafe, that God does not lay his Rational Creatures under a Necellity of Sinning, tho' he does not do all he can by his abfolute Power to over-rule their Free Wills to that which is Good; no more than he flops the Force of Fire and Water, when apply'd to Mifchievous Purpofes.

'Tis fufficient that he deals with 'em as Rational Creatures; gives 'em a Senfe of Good and Evil, and at leaft a general Senfe and Apprehension of his

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his Juffice and Mercy, if not to all the special Revelations of his Will.

That he puts 'em in a Capacity of a greater Happines, upon the good Use of their Reason and Liberty, than that of a State of mere Nature. And that he will expect no more from 'em, than according to what he gives to 'em; he will not expect Ten Talents, where he gives but One.

That when he comes to judge the World, he will proceed according to the Rules of Equity, Juffice, and Goodnefs. They that have had only the Law of Nature, fhall be judged only by that; and only they that have had the Gofpel, are to answer for the Neglect and Abuse of it.

And this is likewife Anfwer enough to that other Objection the Atheift makes against the Being of God, from a supposed Defect of his Goodness; That he has let so great a Part of the World lye in gross Ignorance of the Means of their Happiness: He will one day make it appear he does no wrong, nay, that he has been Good and Kind to all Mankind. But the Atheift ftill objects againft the Providence, and on that account againft the Being of God, from the unequal Diftribution of Rewards and Punifhments in this World. He fays, there is not a fufficient Diffinction made between Good and Bad Men, which there ought to be, and would be if there were a God.

Now, in anfwer to this Objection, there are these Things fit to be confider'd.

That it must be confess'd, the Good and Bad are not fo clearly diftinguish'd here by their prosperous or adverse Condition, as that we may venture to fay, This is a Good, or that a Bad Man, from any outward Dispensations; where we cannot judge of them by the Tenour of their Lives and Actions. Solomon observes, No man knows the Love or Hatred of God, by all that is before him.

It must be confefs'd likewife, that this has been an Objection that has not only been made by Atheistical People, but (as appears from Scripture) has puzzled fome very Good Men too. When *David* faw the Wicked in great Prosperity, while he himfelf Being of God, Answer'd.

felf and fome other Good Men were under fevere Trials and Chaftifements, at firft he was ready to fay, *Then have I cleanfed my heart in vain*, and wafhed my hands in innocency. But when he confider'd the different Ends of thefe Two forts of Men, (very often here, and certainly hereafter,) he foon recover'd himfelf from this doubting Defpondency in the Providence of God.

Alas, we reafon wrong as to this Cafe in abundance of Things.

We are very often miftaken in the Men we count Good or Bad. Some Men that make a fair Show of Religion, may be indeed very Bad Men, and may be fecretly guilty of very Enormous Vices. And on the contrary, fome Men, that we (through Prejudice, or becaufe it may be they do not agree with us in fome nice Opinions,) judge to be Bad Men, may in the main be Good Men before God.

Again; We often miftake the Nature of Profperity and Adverfity: We judge of it only (it may be) with refpect to this prefent State, or with refpect to the more or lefs Abundance Men have of this World. Whereas it ought ought to be judged of, rather by the Relation it has to the most Momentous Concerns of a future State, or at least with respect to the more or less true Enjoyment Men have of what they posses in this World.

And therefore we often judge amifs of the profperous or adverte Eflate of other Men : We fee (it may be) the fair Outfide of their Fortunes, but we know little of their Cares and Fears. They are Rich and Great, and thence we conclude they must needs be Happy and Profperous. Whereas, the very little that fome Good Men we overlook and count unfortunate do poffefs, may (as to real Enjoyment and Satisfaction) be much better than the great Riches and Power of fuch Ungodly Men.

However, let 'em posses and enjoy too as much of the World as they will, if their Prosperity in this World be (through their Abuse of it) an Occafion of their Misery in the next, they are not much to be envy'd for their Pomp and Grandeur in this World. Nay indeed, if they go on obstinately in their Wicked Course, they are rather Being of God, Answer'd.

rather to be pity'd as a most Wretched fort of People.

From hence it eafily follows, that God may make a greater Diftinction between Good and Bad Men, even in this World, than we are aware of; and make fome Good Men really profperous, and fome Bad Men really wretched and unhappy, tho' we know it not.

But it is further to be confider'd, That tho' God do not generally in this World make a vifible Difference between Good and Bad Men as to outward Profperity, yet he very often appears in fo extraordinary a manner, in protecting, fupplying, rewarding the one, and in punifhing the other, even in this Life, as is fufficient to vindicate his Providence, as to this Matter.

But let us fuppofe the utmost the Atheift can object in this Cafe; That the Wicked not only Live, but Dye in the greatest Worldly Prosperity; yet as long as he that believes a Just God, must believe that probably there will be another State, this will easily account for the Dispensations of God's Providence in this World, when God may may (in that future Life) make an ample Amends to Good Men for all their Sufferings here; and take a flrict and fevere Account of the Actions of Wicked Men, however they might poffibly efcape Punifhment in this prefent State.

And indeed the various Difpenfations of Rewards and Punifhments to Good and Bad Men in this Life, is a very good Argument that there will be a future State, when God will make a true and final Difference between Good and Bad Men; but if rightly confider'd, it is no Argument at all againft the Providence and Being of God.

But there are fome other Things that are objected against the Providence and Being of God.

As, that fuch a Providence as we afcribe to God, is utterly impossible; or if not, that 'tis below God, and inconfistent with his Happines, to take care of fo many, and such little Things.

As to the first; That 'tis impossible for any Being to attend to such an infinite Variety of Things at once : This

is

Being of God, Answer'd.

is to meafure God by our felves. We can no more judge of his Knowledge and Underflanding by ours, than we can of his Power by our own, which is but mere Impotency.

If I do not mif-remember, fome Authors tell us, *Julius Cæfar* was able to dictate to Seven *Amanuenfes* at once; which, if we were to judge by the common Capacity of other Men, we should think impossible.

'Tis no harder to believe that God governs and difpofes all Things, now the Order of Nature is fettled, than that he made 'em before that was done.

But, fay they, 'tis below God to take care of fuch minute and little .Things:

Non vacat exiguis rebus adesse Jovi.

Well, this is still to argue, as if God were like to Men.

'Tis below the Dignity of a King to be troubled with little and minute Affairs, becaufe it is impossible for him to attend to 'em : But with God the Cafe is otherwife; 'tis as easy for him to take a Providential Care of all Things, Things, as it is for us to take care of One Thing.

Those we call little Things, as they are Part of the Creation, and make up the Beauty, Harmony, and Order of it, are Great Things; and therefore however minute in themselves, 'tis no more below God to Order and Govern them by his Providence, than it was to make 'em by his Power.

But would not this Providence of God be inconfistent with his Happinefs?

Not at all; for ftill we ought not to judge of him by our felves. He knows all Things knowable, and can do all Things possible with the greateft Eafe and Pleafure.

Indeed, Reafon tells us, That all Things possible are equally easy to a Proportionate Power. A strong Man can as easily lift an Hundred Pound Weight, as a weak Child can Ten. An able Mathematician sees as clearly fome of the most abstructe Demonstrations, as a vulgar Understanding does the most obvious Truths.

Now let us apply this to the Cafe before us, and we shall fee the Providence of God will appear so far from being

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being uneafy, diffracting, and cumberfome to him, or any way deftructive of his Happinefs; that it muft be eafy, pleafant, and delightful.

And if we might (as theic Men do) argue from what we find in our felves, fo as to affert any thing concerning God, it would be quite the contrary. As we find, to Men of Active Natures and Tempers Idlenefs is the greateft Burthen, and to be active in their Sphere the greateft Pleafure; fo to God, who (if we may fpeak with the Schools) is a *Pure Act*, the univerfal Extent of his Providence is one Part of the Perfection of his Happinefs.

And thus I have proposed fome Arguments to prove the Existence of a God, and answer'd fome of those Objections that are commonly brought against it.

I confets, there are many other Arguments, that are made use of by some very Learned Men for the Proof of it; I deny not, but when reprefented in their full strength they may be conclusive.

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But I have (to the beft of my Judgment) made choice of those Arguments that have been most generally used and approved by Learned Men, especially such of 'em as seem to lye more level with the Capacities of Ordinary Readers, for whose Benefit especially these plain Discourses are design'd.

And I have also chose to answer those Objections chiefly, that (among many others that might have been mention'd) seem to have most Weight in them.

As to those Men that are funk fo deep into Sense, or are so bufy'd with or, even bury'd in the Cares of this World, that they seem to be but a better fort of Brutes in the Shape of Men, they never consider whether there be a God, or not; such Difcourses are wholly lost upon them, they never read or think of 'em.

For, those that openly profess Impiety, and have given themselves up to work all Uncleanness with Greediness; if they have (as it often happens) a Tangue of Atheism, it is mostly rather because they wish there were no God, than that they think there is none; and they run to Atheism as a Re-

by way of Application.

Refuge, becaufe they cannot be eafy under the Apprehensions of a God.

All the Avenues to these Mens Judgments are flopt by their corrupt Affections, and their violent and unruly Lufts.

Those that pretend to be Atheist, or Scepticks upon Principle, that read and think themfelves into Speculative Atheifm, we may observe yet are generally a fort of People that have a mighty Opinion of themfelves, fet an high Value upon their own Reafon, Learning, and Philofophy ; talk much of the Ignorance and Prejudices of other People; run down the Syftematick Divines; in short, talk at such a rate, as if Philofophy, and Wifdom, and Knowledge had begun to live, and were to dye with them : And yet after all this vain Boaft of Science and Demonstration, in many Things advance fuch precarious Affertions for Principles, and fuch Shadows of Reafon for Demonstrations, that one would be apt to think they had a mind to infult the Reafon of Mankind.

He

He that carefully reads *Hobbs* and *Spinofa*, and fome other later Writers, I believe, will think I am not much out in what I fay of 'em.

I doubt, these Men think themfelves in too high a Class of Reason and Philosophy, to be wrought upon by any thing that I can say to 'em.

But there are Two Things I cannot but tell them upon this Occafion.

1. That their way of Writing is very unfair, and unlike (what they pretend to be) great Philosophers.

We may observe, the general Way of almost all our modern Scepticks, is, that of Infinuation :

They in their Writings talk of God and Religion, and Chriftianity too, like other People; while in the mean time they advance fuch Affertions and Reafonings, as undermine the Foundation not only of Revealed, but Natural Religion, and the Belief of the Being of a God.

If they were generous Adverfaries, or fuch as would make the World think they intended to carry their Point by Dint of Reafon and Philofophy, they would write at another rate;

by way of Application.

rate; they would modeftly fignify their Doubts as to thefe Things, and fairly reprefent their Reafons for it, and be willing patiently to hear what can be faid againft them: And they would fcorn fuch Arts of wheedling their weaker and more unwary fort of Readers.

In fhort, those Arts of Infinuation that plainly appear in their Writings, are as much below the Character of Good Men, as Good Philosophers, and Good Christians.

2. There is another thing that cannot be juftify'd by any Men of fober Senfe, and which yet too many of their Writers and their Profelytes and Abettors are grofly guilty of; and that is, their Scoffing at Religion, and making the Belief of those Things that concern it, the Subjects of their Ridicule and Railery.

Sure, the Arguments that are brought against their Scepticism and Infidelity, are not fo weak and contemptible as to deferve to be laugh'd out of Countenance, and to be made a Jest of, and the Sport of Conversation. Nor do they pretend to such O 3 De-

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Demonstration on their fide, as should make it a ridiculous thing to oppose 'em.

I doubt it is rather a Sign the Caufe and the Men too are not very good, when fuch Methods are pitch'd upon for the Defence of 'em.

But to add fomething farther.

'Tis a very uncomfortable State these Men leave the World in, when they suppose all Things to be carried on by a blind Chance, or fatal Neceffity, without the Providence and Government of God.

1. The very Thoughts of this muft make Men uncafy, and full of Fear and Horror; like Men in a Storm, tofs'd upon the Waves of a Rolling Sea, without hope of any Harbour.

And the Atheifts themfelves are great Inflances of this; no Men generally more fubject to terrible Fears than they. Whether it be, that their Mind mifgives them fometimes that there may be a God, and that they have Reafon to dread his Vengeance, whofe Providence and Being they have difcarded: Or whether it be in part the Natural Confequence of that uncertain and uncomfortable State that Man

by way of Application.

Man must needs be in, that believes there is nothing but blind Fortune, or fatal Necessity in the World. Which foever it be, we cannot wonder if fuch Men be full of diffurbing Fears and Horrors.

2. They loofe all the Bonds of Duty, and undermine the very Foundation of Morality. If there be no Lawgiver, there can be no Law; if no God, no Reward to be expected for a Virtuous Life, no Punishment for Wickedness but in this Life, and confequently, no Obligation to Virtue but from Human Laws.

And therefore we find most of those Writers speak out, and like themselves in this Point, and plainly own no other Foundation of Virtue and Morality, but what comes from Human Laws, which (they fay) are grounded only upon Compact.

So that (with them) the Keeping of our Contracts is the Original Law of Nature, and the very Foundation of all Morality. Tho' it will be very hard to fhew there lies any, real Obligation upon Men to that, without fuppoling a God, further than the Fear of Human Laws and Punifhments. Tip

'Tis true, fome late Writers have. advanced the *Point of Honour*, as a Foundation of Virtue; and it must be confess'd, it is a generous thing to observe the Rules of Virtue and Religion.

But 'tis to be confider'd, That this very Notion of Honour implies there is fome real Excellency in Virtue; and that there is originally and from the Nature of the Thing, a real Difference between Virtue and Vice, Moral Good and Evil, or at leaft that the Generality of the World think fo.

For Honour is *in bonorante*, not *in bonorato*; and is nothing but the Opinion that other Men have of our Dignity and Excellency. So that when a Man is virtuous upon a Point of Honour, he is fo becaufe he values the Opinion the Generality of the World have of Virtue; and becaufe if he should be otherwife, he would suffer in their Judgment of him.

Which (as I faid before) implies at leaft, That the Generality of the World think that Virtue is a truly Good, Noble, and Generous Thing.

But

by way of Application.

But if these Gentlemen will have the *Point of Honour* to be fomething within them, and to have little or no respect to the Opinion of other Men; then Honour must be nothing but a Noble Scorn to do an ill, a base, and ungenerous thing; and so it must proceed from that which they would pretend to deny, a Sense they have of a real Difference there is between Moral Good and Evil.

But alas, how weak a Principle of Virtue and Morality this Point of Honour is, we fee by daily Experience; when the Generality of the World are below the Senfe of it, and the Great Men of the World too often act as if they thought themfelves as much above the Senfe of true Honour, in the juft Extent of it; and only place it in fome nice Punctilio's, that have nothing either of true Honour or Difhonour in 'em, or (it may be) fometimes in fome Things that are truly difhonourable.

So that the Atheist can have no real Principle to act upon but Self-love. Others, whose Principles are good, their Lives may be bad; but it is very hard

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hard to suppose but the Atheist must be a Bad Man.

3. We may add further, this Opinion is of most pernicious Confequence to Society, to the Publick, and to Government.

'Tis true, thefe Gentlemen feem to país a great Complement upon Princes, and to pay a great Deference to Human Laws and to Government: But as their Principles encourage Princes to opprefs their Subjects, fo they fet Subjects at liberty to difturb their Governors.

For if Power and Right be the fame thing, then the meaneft Subject (if he can get into the Throne, and find Abettors to fupport and keep him there,) has as good a Right, according to these Men, as can be had in this Cafe; and what he has done to his Lawful Prince, another may do to him, and fo on without end.

It would fhock a Man to think what a World this would be, fhould this Belief generally prevail. This would fet Men at liberty to give the full Swing to their corrupt Inclinations; the Ambitious, to be Diffurbers of the Peace of their Country; the Luft-

by way of Application.

Luftful, to be Corrupters; the Covetous, to become Cheats, and Perfidious, and Oppreffors; the Proud and Paffionate, upon every little Affront and Provocation, to reek their Spleen, and to give the full Swing to their Revengetul Refentments: But above all, the Envious and Malicious, to do hurt to their Neighbour, even when they do no good to themfelves, and to do Mifchief for Mifchief fake. And all this they might do upon Principle, and when they had done, defend too.

These and the like things have been often better represented to these Men by many Learned Persons, than I can pretend to do : But 'tis to be feared, they are deaf to good Advice, they are too wise to be instructed, or too proud to be reproved.

Whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear, we ought to bear our Testimony for God and Religion.

If they be really plunged into the Gulph of Atheifin, God Almighty recover 'em, that they may own him their Maker, before they find him their Judge. If in any of 'em it be Pride and Singularity that is the bottom of their pretended Atheifm; a little Confideration would convince 'em what an heinous thing it must be, to raise themfelves a Reputation at the Expence of God and Religion; and how extremely foolish it is, for the vain Opinion or Praise of a few Loose Men, to affront the Judgment of all the Sober part of Mankind.

But there may be fome honeft People that may have fome Doubts, and be fometimes under fome Difficulties as to those things. Tho Arguments and Advice may in a great measure be lost upon such Men as I have mentioned before; yet there may be fome that may have fome Inclinations to Scepticifin, that yet may be willing to hear Arguments on one Side, as well as on the other. And to subject, I would give a short Advice.

1. That they would ferioufly and impartially confider the Arguments for the Being of a God.

And particularly, that they would accuftom themfelves to the ferious Contemplation of the Works of God. The

The Pfalmist tells us, The Heavens declare the Glorv of God, and the Firmament sheweth his Handy-work.

Indeed we have the moft prevailing Arguments before our Eyes, to convince us of the Being of God, tho we fhould never look into Books for 'em. He that fhall ferioufly think of the vaft Variety, the exact Harmony, the excellent Contrivance, the mutual Subferviency, the certain and regular Motions of the feveral Parts of the World, will fee fuch plain Footfleps of Infinite Power and Wifdom, as will almoft force him to the Acknowledgment of a God.

2. That they would not look upon every little Difficulty that may be ftarted by Atheiftical People, as fufficient to balance the clear Evidence there is for this Truth, That there is a God.

If we fhould act at fuch a rate in other things, it would foon lead us to a general Scepticifm; and we fhould foon find we must believe nothing in the World. It we must not believe our Eyes, because we cannot tell how we see; nor our Ears, because we know not how we hear; nor that we think,

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think, or underftand any thing, becaufe we are not fully acquainted with the Manner how we do it, nor can give a clear Solution of all the Difficulties that may be ftarted by a fubtile Difputant about these Things; the Confequence would be, That we must deny there is any fuch thing as Certainty, Senfe, and Underftanding.

So it is in the Cafe before us.

'Tis one thing, clearly to know That God is; and another, to know What he is. We may have a full Affurance of his Exiftence, tho we may be in the dark in many things as to his Effence.

Nay, I will fay farther; Tho we fhould not be able to give a clear Solution of all those Difficulties that may be ftarted as to the Existence of God, from some of his Attributes; yet neither would this be of any weight against such plain Evidence as we have for the Being of a God.

For this may proceed only from our Ignorance, from that imperfect Knowledge we have of God in this prefent ftate. And this will appear the more reafonable, if we confider,

1. That

1. That the Atheift himfelf pretends to nothing like Demonstration in this Case. The utmost he pretends to, is, That the Arguments for the Being of a God are not conclusive; that there are Objections against the Being of a God, that cannot be clearly answer'd, and Difficulties that are not easily folv'd; and pretends to give some Account how the World might be without a God: He does not fo much as pretend to any thing of Certainty in the Case.

2. We ought to confider, the Accounts the Atheifts give of the Exiftence of the World without a God, are not only attended with fome Difficulties that they cannot give a clear Solution of, but fuch Abfurdities, Impoffibilities, and Contradictions, as flare in the Face of Reafon, and feem to argue a great deal of Partiality in those that propose 'em, and a mighty Willingnefs, Propensity, and a ftrong Inclination to believe there is no God.

This has before been flewn in part, and might be much more largely, of all the feveral Atheiftical Hypothefes, of

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of the Existence of the World without a God.

But that which most effectually fhews the Abfurdity of these Mens Reasonings, is, That they are forced to allow that to dull and stupid Matter, the most imperfect of all Beings, that yet they deny to God.

Thus they object against Eternity and Infinity in God, and yet are forced to allow it to Matter : For if there were not an Eternal God, there must be Eternal Matter; and 'tis certain there may as well be Infinite Matter without God, as any at all.

They will not allow a Spirit to have Understanding, because it has no Flesh, Blood, and Brains; and yet are forced to recur to this as their last shift, That Matter as Matter, has Thought and Understanding; and that Cogitation is as effential a Property of Matter or Substance as Extension: And some others that are not so bold as to affert this, yet profess they do not know but it may be so.

They ftart a great many Difficulties about the World's being made by a Being of Infinite Power; but they can eafily believe the World might make it

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it felf, and be improved by a fortuitous Jumblement of Atoms, into that Glorious and Regular Frame we now fee it in, with the Addition too of those Noble Intelligent Beings, that (to all appearance) have Powers above the Capacity of mere Matter.

They will not allow, that a Spirit can be a Principle of Motion to any Matter : But they must allow upon their own *Hypothefis*, either, That Motion is natural to all Matter, (and then there could be no Reft, and confequently no Production of any thing;) or, if Reft be natural to Matter, fome Matter that was at Reft must first move it felf: Both which Suppositions are abfurd enough.

Sure, those who advance fo many Abfurdities themselves, and give Accounts of their Opinions, liable to infuperable Objections, ought not to reject fuch plain and demonstrative Evidence for the Being of a God, upon every little Objection that through our imperfect Understanding of the Nature of that God whose Existence we affert, we cannot fo clearly account for. 3. I would advife fuch Perfons as I am now fpeaking to, that they would have a fpecial Care of Pride.

As this has in the Church been the Root of Herefies, fo (no doubt) of Infidelity too.

We may obferve, there is a ftrange Itch in fome of the more Philofophical and Studious Part of Mankind, to make themfelves a Name by advancing fomething ftrange and new: And when they cannot do any thing extraordinary in the common way, they think to make themfelves confiderable by their being fingular, by advancing and defending Notions that lie crois to the Senfe of Mankind.

And if once they catch this Difeafe, the more abfurd their Notions, and the more extravagant their Affertions are, the more famous they think they make themfelves.

And as fome drudge on in the old beaten Road of Philofophy, without the leaft Freedom of Thought; fo fome others, under the Pretence and Character of Free Thinkers, care not what they fay, fo it be far enough from the received and vulgar Notions of the World.

And as it is with fome Superflitious Religionists, the lefs they have to fay for themselves, the more proud, and conceited, and confident they are, and the more they despise other People: So it is generally with these Philosophical Infidels; the more abfurd their Notions, the more precarious their Affertions, the more weak their Reafonings; with the greater Pride and Confidence do they vend their wild Notions as New Difcoveries, and talk with fuch a contemptuous Air, as if all Mankind had been led blindfold, till they were born to enlighten the World.

Plato gives this Account of the Atheifts of his Time. Diagoras and Theodorus are faid to have profess'd Atheifm, becaufe they would have the Glory of being the Authors of fome New Opinion. And he that reads Vaninus, Machiavel, Hobbs, Spinofa, Blount, and fuch others of our modern Atheifts; will find fuch a Vein of Pride and Vanity, and Contempt of others runs through their Writings; that tho he will easily fee they have advanced little, but what they are beholden for to the Ancient Atheistical Writers, yet they P 2

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they have clearly out-done 'em in that great Virtue of pretended Adepts in Philofophy, a good Conceit of themfelves.

But above all, let them take care that while they believe a God, they do not live as if there was none.

As Practical Atheifm is very abfurd in it felf, fo it is efpecially in Men of Senfe, Thought, and Reading, ftrangely preparative for Speculative Atheifm.

'Tis true, those Men that are to busied about the World, that they never think at all, may go on in their Lufts without remorfe: But for those whose Employments (or Curiosity) engages them to read and think of these Things, if they live vicious Lives, 'tis hard to think but they must in a little time alter their Belief or Practice; and if the Power of their Lufts be fo predominant, that they will continue to live as if there were no God, they may likely in a while endeavour to perfwade themselves that there is none.

The Apostle to the Romans fays of the Heathen, That because when they knew God, they glorify'd him not as God, God

God fuffer'd them to become vain in their imagination: This he may do, by fuffering Men to fall into Atheifin as well as Polytheifin; or the Belief of no God, as well as that of many Gods.

In fine, let us who pretend firmly to believe in God, that he is the Maker and Governor of us and all the World, live under a conftant Senfe of our Duty and Obligations to him. Let not us, while we profefs to know God, in Works deny him. Let not us give that Scandal to the Infidel Part of the World, as to give 'em occafion to fay, That while we pretend to believe better, we live worfe than they.

To this end, let us well confider and apply what we believe concerning this God.

That he is in himfelf a Self-exiftent, Immutable, Eternal, Omnipotent, Omniprefent, infinitely Wife, and abfolutely Perfect Spirit. That he is the Great Creator, Preferver, and Governor of us and all the World. That he is a Juft, and Holy, and yet a Good and Merciful God.

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That from the Confideration of thefe and the like Glorious Attributes of God, there must needs iffue an Obligation upon those Creatures that are capable of knowing God, and those Perfections that are Effential to the Divine Nature, to the Exercise of all fuitable inward Affections towards this God, and giving all decent external Demonstrations of the fame.

Let us therefore conftantly live under an awful Senfe of his Majefty and Prefence. Let us repofe an entire Confidence in his Powerful Providence. Let us have an ardent Love to him, as one that is indeed the Higheft Object of our Love, infinitely Good in himfelf, and Bountiful to us. Let us yield a full Submiffion to his Pleafure, under all his Providential Difpenfations; as knowing it is fit he fhould do what he pleafes, and is Wife and Good, and will do what is beft for us.

But particularly, let us Chriftians who live under the Gofpel-Difpenfation, and believe we have the clear Revelations of his Word and Will, exercife a firm Faith in his Word, yield a full

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full Obedience to his Revealed Will, hope in his Mercy, give him that Spiritual Worfhip that by his Word appears to be fuitable to his Nature, and agreeable to his Will; and do our beft to teftify our Gratitude for his Mercies, and to anfwer the End of Chrift's Coming, and walk in all Things worthy of that Religion we profefs; according to that Pathetical Exhortation of the Apofile, *Phil.* 1. 27. Only let your Converfation be, as it becometh the Gofpel of Chrift.

FINJS.

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