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A R I S T O T L E ' S
TREATISE ON POETRY,

T R A N S L A T E D :

W I T H

N O T E S

ON THE TRANSLATION, AND ON THE ORIGINAL;

A N D

T W O D I S S E R T A T I O N S,

O N

P O E T I C A L, A N D M U S I C A L, I M I T A T I O N.

BY THOMAS TWINING, M.A.

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M.DCC.LXXXIX.

P R E F A C E.

WHOEVER recollects, that, in writing a preface, he presumes, in some degree or other, to call the attention of the public more particularly to himself, will hardly be disposed to say more than he thinks necessary, and will say even that with some reluctance. To be allowed, however, to explain his own design, in his own defence, is a privilege which every writer may justly claim; and I am too sensible of the imperfection of the following work to deliver it up in silent confidence to the public judgment.

It may be said, I think, universally, of all translation, that it should give the *thoughts* of the original with all the accuracy possible, and the *language* as closely as is consistent with the purpose, which every man who writes must necessarily have in view—that of being read with satisfaction. No work can be read with satisfaction if it is ill written; and every translation is undoubtedly ill written, that does not, as far, at least, as *language* is concerned, read like an original; that, on the contrary, to every reader, at once discovers itself to be translation, by that constrained uncouthness of expression, harshness of phrase, and embarrassment of meaning, which necessarily result from the transference of idiom out of one language into another. A work so translated may be said to be translated into *broken English*. For the effect is much the same,

whether we are imperfectly acquainted with the language *in* which, or adhere too fervently to the language *from* which, we speak: whether we write English in Greek, or Greek in English. In both cases we write one language in the idiom of another.

But in steering from this rock, the translator, if he takes too wide a compass, will be in danger of running upon another. It is singular, that Pope, in one of his early letters, should have pointed out, by a sensible and true observation, the very defect, and perhaps the only general defect, of his own Homer. In a letter to Mr. Cromwell^a he says, "Let the sense be ever so exactly rendered, "unless an author LOOKS LIKE HIMSELF, in his HABIT and "MANNER, 'tis a disguise, and not a translation." Now, let every other merit possible be allowed to Pope's translation, it surely cannot be denied, that we have there a *manner*, a *look*, a *habit*, very widely different from that of Homer himself.—But poetical translation is attended with peculiar difficulty, and demands peculiar indulgence. The translator of prose into prose has far less excuse, when he departs so widely from the words of his author, as to retain no resemblance to his manner; and least of all, perhaps, would such liberty be excusable in a version of Aristotle, in whose writings, however perplexing on many other accounts, a translator is seldom embarrassed by any of those delicate "blossoms of elocution," which "drop off so easily" at his touch.

An English translator, it has been said, "is to exhibit his author's thoughts in such a dress of diction as the author would "have given them, had his language been English^b." An idea of translation, to which nothing can be objected, but the difficulty, I might perhaps have said, the impossibility, of its practical application. The rule, therefore, is not rule enough. It leaves too

^a Letter 24.

^b Dr. Johnson's Life of Dryden, p. 125.

much to the fancy and the prejudices of the translator; who will naturally imagine, that his *own*, or his *favourite*, style, whatever it be, is precisely that, which the author, had he written English, would have preferred. Perhaps the *end* of this rule cannot any way be more securely answered in practice, than by the observance of the rule I first mentioned—to depart no farther from the expression of the original, than is fairly required by the different genius of the two languages.

In saying what I think ought to be done by every translator, I have of course said, not, I fear, what I *have* done, but certainly what I have *endeavoured* to do, myself. My object, in few words, was, to produce a version sufficiently close and accurate to satisfy those readers who are acquainted with the original, and, at the same time, sufficiently *English* to be read without disgust by those who are not.—Such a version, at the time when I was induced to undertake the task, was certainly among the *desiderata* of our literature. We had then no English translation that could be read with patience by any one competently acquainted either with the Greek language, or with his own. I know indeed of but two attempts^c. The one, published in 1705, a mere translation of Dacier's translation, notes, and preface; though professing, in the title-page, to be translated from the original Greek, and accompanied, indeed, by some marginal *improvements* from the Greek text, most of which, if admitted into the version, would make it still worse than it is.—The other is a translation from the Greek, I know not by whom, published in 1775. It may speak suffi-

^c Fabricius gives the following account of a translation by Rymer: “*Anglice, Rimero interprete, cum Renati Rapini Observationibus Poeticis, è Gallico in idem idioma translatis, Lond. 1674.*”—*Bib. Græc. vol. ii. p. 124.*—The best inquiries I have been able to make justify me in concluding this account to be a mistake, occasioned by Rymer's translation of *Rapin's Reflections on Aristotle's Treatise of Poësie, &c.* published in 1694, and to which he prefixed his famous critical Preface.

ciently for itself by a few specimens, which, from among many others of the same sort, I have given in the margin^d.

It would be doing injustice to the translation lately given to the public by Mr. Pye, to place it, in any view, however favourable, by the side of these. A particular and critical examination of its merits would come with little propriety from me. So much, however, I may be allowed to say, for it is an indisputable fact, that Mr. Pye's translation and mine are frequently very different; and that, in many passages, if he is right, I must confess myself to be wrong.

It is natural for me to wish, that I could secure the indulgence of the reader, by giving him some idea of the uncommon difficulties, with which a translator of this work of Aristotle has to struggle. But they are such as can hardly be conceived, but by those who are well acquainted with the original; and even among them, I may venture to say, can be adequately conceived by those only, who have tried their strength against them by actual experiment. These difficulties arise from various sources: from the elliptic conciseness, and other peculiarities, of Aristotle's style, and from the nature of the work itself, which, in many parts of it at least, seems to have been intended for little more than a collection of hints, or short memorial notes, and has sometimes almost the appearance of a syllabus for lectures, or a table of contents^e; so that

^d P. 3, and throughout, ἦθη is rendered "*morals*."—p. 11, and 16, αὐτοσχεδιασματα, "*self-formed images*."—p. 31. πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἀγωνίας καὶ τὴν αἰσθάνην—"with regard to the *Controversies and the Conception*."—p. 57. ἀτεχνότεραι—"a degree nearer art."—p. 89. Ἐχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτείνεισθαι τὸ μέγεθος πολὺ τι ἢ ἐποποιῶν ἰδίων.—"*Epic has much peculiar for lengthening the greatness*."—p. 92. ἀδύνατα καὶ ἕνοστα—"Impossibilities and Suit-
"able."

^e —"He has a dry conciseness, that makes one imagine one is perusing a table of contents, rather than a book."—Gray's Letters, *Seet.* 4. *Let.* 3. The account Mr. Gray there gives of Aristotle's writings, though it is written with the sportive
pleasantry,

that we might apply to it, in some degree, what Aristotle himself is said to have written to Alexander the Great, who had reprimanded him for having published some private lectures which that Prince had received from him: "They are published," answered the philosopher, "and not published; for they are intelligible "only to those who have been my pupils'." An answer, which does indeed give some countenance to the assertion of Ammonius, that the obscurity of Aristotle's style was voluntary^g. Yet I hope the assertion is not true. I cannot persuade myself to give full credit to an account so degrading to a great philosopher. And surely it is but a perverse kind of apology, to assign, of all the causes of obscurity that *can* be assigned, the only one which leaves it totally without excuse. If, however, this was really the case, it must be confessed, that Aristotle succeeded well, and stood in little need of the admonition of the school-master mentioned by Quintilian, "qui discipulos *obscurare quæ dicerent* juberet, Græco verbo "utens, Σκοτισσον^h."—Another considerable source of difficulty is; that so many of the Tragedies and other poems, alluded to, and quoted, throughout the treatise, are lost.—But the chief of these sources, undoubtedly, is the mutilated and corrupt condition of the text. The work is but a fragment:—Πιδακ^g ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλιγῆ λιβας!—I wish I could add, Αλλ' ἦτις καθαρη τε και ἀχραιαντ^g ἀνερπει: but even of this fragment it may be doubted, whether it has been most

pleasantry of a familiar letter, is extremely just; except, perhaps, in one observation:—it seems hardly fair to conclude that Aristotle "lost himself," wherever his readers are now at a loss to find his meaning.

^g Ἰσθι ἐν αὐτῆς ΚΑΙ ΕΚΔΕΔΟΜΕΝΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ΕΚΔΕΔΟΜΕΝΟΥΣ· ξυνοτοι γαρ ἴσσι μονοις τοις ἡμων ἀκκασσιν.—See Aul. Gell. XX. 5. where the two letters, of Alexander and Aristotle, are preserved.

^h Πολλαχς τε συνεσφιγμενοι, [sc. το ἐιδ^g των Αριστοτελης συγγραμματαων,] και ἀσαφως πεφρασμενοι, ἔ δια την φυσιν τε γραφαιαντ^g, ἀλλ' ἔΚΟΥΣΙΩΣ τῆτο πεποιηκεν. Ammon. ad. Categ. Aristot. See also Fabric. Bib. Græc. vol. iv. p. 166.—ἀσαφειαν ἐπιτηδεων.

^b Quintil. VIII. 2.

injured

injured by mutilation, or by repair. The history given by Strabo, of the fate of Aristotle's works after his death, is so curious, and so effectually removes all wonder at the mangled state in which we find them, that I shall here, for the sake of the English reader, insert a translation of it.

“ The Socratic philosophers, Eraſtus and Coriscus, were natives
 “ of Scepsis¹; as was also Neleus, (the son of Coriscus,) who was
 “ a scholar of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and to whom the latter
 “ bequeathed his library, in which was included that of Aristotle.
 “ For Aristotle, who, as far as we know, was the first collector of
 “ books, and the first who taught the kings of Egypt to form and
 “ arrange a library, left his own collection of books, (as he also
 “ did his school,) to Theophrastus; and from Theophrastus it
 “ came to Neleus. Neleus removed it to Scepsis, and left it to
 “ his descendants; who, being illiterate persons, threw the books
 “ together as lumber, and locked them up: but afterwards, when
 “ they heard, that the Attalic monarchs, their sovereigns, were
 “ taking great pains to collect books for the Pergamenian library,
 “ they concealed them in a cave under ground; whence, after
 “ having been long *damaged by damp and worms*^k, the books both
 “ of Aristotle and Theophrastus were, at length, sold by some of
 “ the family, at a great price, to Apellicon the Teian. This man
 “ was rather a *lover of books*, than a *lover of wisdom*, or a Philoso-
 “ pher^l; and being therefore anxious to restore, at any rate, those
 “ parts of the manuscripts that had been destroyed or damaged, he
 “ had them fairly copied; and, *the vacuities in the writing being*
 “ *unskilfully supplied, they were thus published, full of blunders*. The
 “ old Peripatetics, who succeeded Theophrastus, possessing none
 “ of these writings, except a very few, and those chiefly of the

¹ A city of Mysia.

^k Ἐπονοτίας καὶ σήτων κακώμενα —.

^l Φροβισθηματικὸν ἢ φροσοφοῦν.—A very modern sort of character.

“ *exoteric* kind, were not qualified to philosophize accurately, but
 “ contented themselves with treating, in a shewy and superficial
 “ manner, such particular questions as were proposed. The later
 “ Peripatetics, however, who lived after the publication of those
 “ books, were enabled to teach the Aristotelic doctrines with more
 “ exactness; yet even they, from the multitude of errors in their
 “ copies, were frequently obliged to have recourse to explanations
 “ merely conjectural. And *these errors were much increased at*
 “ *Rome*. For immediately on the death of Apellicon, Sylla,
 “ when he took Athens, possessed himself of his library, and
 “ carried it to Rome; where the books fell into the hands of
 “ Tyrannio the Grammarian, a great admirer of Aristotle, who
 “ procured them from the librarian; and afterwards into those
 “ of certain booksellers, who employed careless and ignorant
 “ transcribers, and neglected to collate the copies with the ori-
 “ ginals; which is also the case with many other books trans-
 “ cribed for sale, both at Rome and Alexandria.”

In the division of the translation into Parts and Sections, there was no authority to restrain me from following my own ideas, and preferring that method which appeared most conducive to clearness.—By the marginal titles the convenience of the reader is consulted: he has the work, and its index, under his eye at the same time.—The order of the chapters I have not attempted to disturb. But if, on the one hand, I cannot admit the unnecessary and licentious transpositions of Heinſius, neither can I, on the other, assent to those commentators, who, like Dacier, defend, on all occasions, the common arrangement as authentic. If they are right, we must suppose one of the most strict and methodical of philosophers to have been sometimes almost as careless as old Montagne; who, as he tells us pleasantly, “ *n’avoit point d’autre*
 “ *ſergent de bande à ranger ſes pieces que la fortune.*”

” Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608, D. ed. Casaub.—See also Plutarch’s life of Sylla, p. 856. ed. H. St. and Bayle, art. TYRANNION.

Every translation should be accompanied with such explanations as are necessary to render it intelligible to those readers who are supposed, chiefly, to have recourse to translation; those, who are totally unacquainted with the language of the original. This is the object of the short notes under the version; in which, however, I have sometimes referred to the larger notes, when they were such as would answer the same purpose.

These last-mentioned notes, which follow the translation, and the two dissertations prefixed to it, (which indeed are but longer notes thrown into that form,) I wish to be considered as the principal part of my design. They form a full, and nearly a continued, commentary. My purpose was, to discuss all the difficulties of the *original*, of whatever kind: to remove, or at least to diminish them, where I could; where I could not, to state them fairly, and to confess them—the easiest part, certainly, of a commentator's duty, though not, perhaps, that, which is most commonly discharged.

As a great part of these difficulties arise from the obscurity or corruption of the Greek text, a great part of my comment is, of course, taken up by philological and verbal criticism. But though my plan obliged me to submit to an employment which wit has disgraced by the name of "word-catching," I hope it will not be found that I altogether "*live on syllables*." It is, indeed, rather hard upon a commentator, that he should be expected to "catch" the meaning of his author, and, at the same time, reproached for endeavouring to catch the words in which that meaning is contained. But, in executing this part of my task, I must confess myself to have, indeed, an insatiable appetite for obscurity, if I have discovered any *desire* of finding the text more corrupt and mutilated than it is. Where I have indulged conjecture, I hope I have always remembered that it *is* conjecture, and have neither

* "Each word-catcher, that lives on syllables."—Pope's Ep. to Arbuthnot.

insulted the reader, nor disgraced myself, by the disgusting, though privileged, language of emendatory criticism on antient authors. A *Latin* commentator, indeed, may *lay any wager*, that his author wrote this, or that; may assert his emendation to be *clearer than light itself*, and say to his reader, *if you are not a blockhead, you will be of my opinion*°, &c.—“*Nobis non licet esse tam disertis.*”

They, who think *any* interpretation better than none, may perhaps wish, that I had not employed so considerable a portion of my notes in merely stating difficulties which had not been fully seen or fairly acknowledged, without attempting to remove them; in combating interpretations hitherto acquiesced in as satisfactory, and shewing, that many passages, supposed to be sufficiently understood, are yet to be explained. This is certainly not that part of a commentator's duty, which is most pleasant, either to his readers, or himself; but it is surely a necessary and indispensable part of it, and I have endeavoured to discharge it faithfully. I hope I have no where either made a difficulty to shew my sagacity, or dissembled one to conceal the want of it.

We live in a delicate and fastidious age, in which learning, even in books, is hardly released from the necessity of observing, in some degree, what Fontenelle calls “*the exterior decencies of ignorance*”^p. But, if pedantry be an *unnecessary, unseasonable*, and therefore ostentatious, display of learning, I should hope, that the nature of my work would sufficiently secure me against *that* charge. It will scarce be thought strange, that notes, intended to explain a Greek author, and supposed, of course, to be addressed to Greek scholars, should abound with Greek quotations. One of my chief objects was, to illustrate Aristotle, wherever I could, from himself, and from Plato, to whose opinions and writings

° “*Quovis pignore contenderim.*”—“*Luce meridianâ clarius.*”—“*Tu, si sapias, mecum reponc.*”—&c. &c.

^p “*Les bienséances extérieures de l'ignorance.*”

he continually alludes. Another was, to relieve the dryness of so much philological discussion by passages, which, at the same time that they throw light upon the author, might also be expected to afford some pleasure to the reader, either as beautiful, or as curious. With the same view, I have now and then ventured to quit, for a moment, my direct path; to transgress Seneca's rule, "*Quò ducit materia sequendum est, non quò invitât,*" and to avail myself of some of those many openings, which Aristotle affords, into collateral, though not irrelative inquiries.

The time is come, when we no longer read the antients with our judgments shackled by determined admiration; when even from the editor and the commentator, it is no longer required as an indispensable duty, that he should see nothing in his author but perfection. No apology therefore, I trust, will be required from me, for speaking freely of the defects of this work of Aristotle, even where those defects appear to be his own.

It is necessary to mention, that many of my notes were written, and of more the materials were prepared, before I consulted, or indeed had it in my power to consult, some of the earliest and best commentators, whose works are too scarce to be procured at the moment they are wanted. In perusing them I might often have adopted the exclamation of the old Grammarian^a, "*Pereant, qui ante nos nostra dixerunt!*" But "every thing," says Epictetus, "has two handles;" and it required but little philosophy in this case, to be more pleased with the support which my opinions received from such coincidence, than mortified by the mere circumstance of prior occupation: a circumstance, which, after all, could not deprive me of the property of my own thoughts, though, as Dr. Johnson has observed on a similar occasion^b, I certainly

^a Donatus.

^b Pref. to Shakspeare.

can *prove* that property only to myself.—This coincidence, wherever I found it, I have scrupulously pointed out.

How much subsequent commentators, and Dacier in particular, have been obliged to the labours of those learned, acute, and indefatigable Italians, will perhaps sufficiently appear from the use I have made of them, and the frequent extracts, which the scarceness of their books has induced me to give from them in my notes. This I must be allowed to say, that, in my opinion, great injustice is done to their merits by those editors, who not only neglect to avail themselves of their assistance, but affect also to speak of them with contempt. The truth is, that to consult them is a work of considerable labour, and requires no small degree of patience and resolution. The trouble we are unwilling to take, we easily persuade ourselves to think not worth taking; and plausible reasons are readily given, and as readily admitted, for neglecting, what those, to whom we make our apology, are, in general, as little disposed to take the pains of examining as ourselves. And thus, “*Difficultas laborque difficendi DISERTAM NEGLIGENTIAM REDDIT*.”

In what I have here said, I allude, more particularly, to the commentaries of Castelvetro and Beni¹. Their prolixity, their scholastic and trifling subtilty, their useless tediousness of logical analysis, their microscopic detection of difficulties invisible to

¹ Cic. de Divin. I. 47.

¹ *Poetica d'Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta per Lodovico Castelvetro, &c. Basil. 1576.*

Pauli Benii, Eugubini, &c. in Aristotelis Poeticam Commentarii, &c. Venet. 1624.

Castelvetro's criticism is well characterized, and its effect upon his reader well described, by *Gravina*: “E perchè il Castelvetro, quanto è acuto e diligente, ed amator del vero, tanto è difficile ed affannoso per quelle scolastiche reti, che agli altri ed a se stessi, allora, i maggiori ingegni tendeano; perciò, per dispetto spesso e per rabbia vien da' lettori abbandonato, ed è da loro condannato, prima che intendano la sua ragione; la quale si rincrefcono tirar fuori da quei labirinti delle sue sottili e moleste distinzioni.” *Della Tragedia*, p. 75.

the naked eye of common sense, and their waste of confutation upon objections made only by themselves, and made on purpose to be confuted—all this, it must be owned, is disgusting and repulsive. It may sufficiently release a commentator from the duty of reading their works throughout, but not from that of examining and consulting them: for in both these writers, but more especially in *Beni*, there are many remarks equally acute and solid; many difficulties well seen, clearly stated, and, sometimes, successfully removed; many things usefully illustrated, and judiciously explained; and if their freedom of censure is now and then disgraced by a little disposition to cavil, this becomes almost a virtue, when compared with the servile and implicit admiration of Dacier, who, as a fine writer has observed, “avoit fait vœu d’être de l’avis d’Aristote, soit qu’il l’entendit ou qu’il ne l’entendit pas.”

Of the translations and commentaries written in the Italian language there is one, which deserves particular notice, though, by what hard fate I know not, it seems scarce to have been noticed at all: I mean that of *Piccolomini*^m. His version, though sometimes rather paraphractical, is singularly exact; and, on the whole, more faithful to the sense, or at least to what *I* conceive to be the sense, of Aristotle, than any other that I have seen. In his commentary, he has nothing of the Quixotism of Castelvetro and Beni. He does not fall forth so eagerly to the relief of *distressed readers*, as to create the distress for the sake of shewing his prowess in surmounting it. Some commentators appear to be really disappointed, when they find any thing which they cannot deny to

^m Marmontel, *Poétique Française*, Pref. p. 6.

ⁿ *Annotationi di M. Alessandro Piccolomini, nel libro della Poetica d’Aristotele; con la traduzione del medesimo libro in lingua volgare. In Vinegia. 1575.*—Piccolomini was archbishop of Patras. See Bayle. He also wrote *Copiosissima Parafrase nel Rhetorica d’Aristotele. Venet. 1565.* A clear, exact, and useful work, though prolix, and an unpleasant mixture of translation and comment.

be intelligible. Piccolomini fairly endeavoured to understand his author; and, which is no small praise, seems always to have understood himself. His annotations, though often prolix and diffused, are generally sensible, and always clear. They will sometimes tire the reader, but seldom, I think, perplex him.

With respect to the original work itself, it would be superfluous to enter, here, into any discussion of its merits and its defects. My ideas of both will sufficiently appear in the course of my notes. I must however remark one point of view, in which the criticism of Aristotle has always particularly struck me, though it seems to have been little noticed: And that is, that his philosophy, austere and cold as it appears, has not encroached upon his taste. He has not indeed *expressed* that taste by mixing the language of admiration with that of philosophy in his investigation of principles, but he has *discovered* it in those principles themselves; which, in many respects at least, are truly *poetical* principles, and such as afford no countenance to that sort of criticism, which requires the Poet to be “of *reason* all compact.” Aristotle, on the contrary, every where reminds him, that it is his business to represent, not what *is*, but what *should* be; to look beyond actual and common nature, to the ideal model of perfection in his own mind. He sees fully, what the *rationalists* among modern critics have not always seen, the power of popular *opinion* and *belief* upon poetical credibility*—that “a legend, a tale, a tradition, a rumour, a superstition—in short, any thing, is “enough to be the basis of the poet’s air-formed *visions*.” He never loses sight of the *end* of Poetry, which, in conformity to common sense, he held to be *pleasure*†. He is ready to excuse, not only impossibilities, but even absurdities, where that *end*

* See the translation, Part IV. Sect. 1. and the note there: Sect. 3, and 6.

† Letters on Chivalry and Romance, p. 300.

‡ This I have endeavoured to prove in NOTE 277.

appears to be better answered with them, than it would have been without them^a. In a word, he asserts the privileges of Poetry, and gives her free range to employ her *whole* power, and to do all she *can* do—that is, to impose upon the imagination, by whatever means, as far as imagination, for the sake of its own pleasure, will consent to be imposed upon. Poetry can do no more than this, and, from its very nature and end, ought not to be required to do less. If it is our interest to be cheated, it is her duty to cheat us^b. The critic, who suffers his philosophy to reason away his pleasure, is not much wiser than the child, who cuts open his drum, to see what it is within that caused the sound.

The English reader of Aristotle will, I hope, do him (and, I may add, his translator,) so much justice, as to recollect, when the improvements of modern criticism occur to him, that he is reading a book, which was written above two thousand years ago, and which, for the reasons already given, can be considered as little more than the fragment of a fragment. What *would* have been the present state of poetical criticism, had Aristotle never written, it is impossible to say: two facts, however, are certain; that he was the first who carried philosophical investigation into these regions of imagination and fiction, and that the ablest of his successors have not disdained to pursue the path which he had opened to them, and even, in many instances, to tread in his very footsteps. It may therefore, *possibly*, be true, that modern critics are, in some measure, indebted to Aristotle himself for their very pretensions to despise him. At least, the more we admire the skill

^a Part IV. Sect 2. and p. 120.

^b I allude to the ingenious saying of Gorgias, who called Tragedy, “ an imposition, where they who cheat us are bonester than they who do not cheat us, and they who are cheated, wiser than they who are not cheated.”—Τῆς τραγωδίας ἔστιν ἀπάτη, ἢ ὁ ἀπατησας ἄριστερος ἢ τὸ μὴ ἀπατησασαντες, καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος ἢ τὸ μὴ ἀπατηθεντες. *Plut. de aud. Poet.* p. 26. ed. H. S.

of those, who have raised and finished the structure, the more reason we have to respect the Architect, who not only gave the plan, but, with it, many specimens of masterly execution.

With respect to my own work, I have already said all that I thought it necessary to say, by way of explaining its design, and of apologizing for such particulars in the execution of it, as might appear most liable to exception. To suppose it free from imperfection and error, would be not only to forget the nature of the work, but to forget myself. I commit it with the less anxiety to the candour of the public, as I am confident, (and it is the only confidence I allow myself to feel,) that the time and the labour I have bestowed upon it will, at least, acquit me of that disrespectful indifference to the public judgment, which haste and negligence imply. It is now six years since the translation was finished; and both that, and the dissertations and notes, have received every advantage of revision and correction, which either my own care, or friendly criticism, could give them. And, upon this occasion, I cannot refuse myself the gratification of publicly acknowledging how much I owe to the accurate judgment and just taste of one person^c, in particular, in whom I found precisely that friendly censor, so happily and so comprehensively characterized by the Poet as

“ Eager to praise, yet resolute to blame,

“ Kind to his verse, but kinder to his fame ‘ : ”

—and of whom, indeed, I may say, without any fear of indulging too far the partiality of friendship, that he never shrinks from any task, whether of private kindness, or more general benevolence, that calls for his assistance, and stands in need of his abilities.

^c The Rev. Dr. Forster, of Colchester.

^d Hayley's Epistle on the death of Mr. Thornton.

I TAKE the only opportunity now left me to mention a book, which was very lately sent to me by a friend, and which I have read with great pleasure ;—*Dramaturgie, ou Observations critiques sur plusieurs piéces de Théâtre, tant anciennes que modernes*: [Paris 1785]—a translation from the German of the late Mr. Lessing. The notice taken of the original work in Mr. Winstanley's edition of Aristotle had, indeed, long ago excited my curiosity ; but I am unacquainted with the German language, and my inquiries afforded me no reason to conclude that the work had been translated. It contains many excellent and uncommon things. Mr. Lessing appears to me to have possessed, in no ordinary degree, that combination of taste and philosophy—of strength of feeling and strength of thought—upon which good and *original* criticism depends. He had, it seems, particularly applied himself to the study of Aristotle's treatise on Poetry ; as indeed sufficiently appears from several masterly discussions of difficult and contested passages in that work. I cannot but regret, that he did not write a regular commentary on the whole. From the specimens he has given, I have no doubt, that it would have been, in many respects, far superior to any other work of the kind ; though, at the same time, those specimens afford us reason to conclude, that we should have found in it some instances of refinement, upon Aristotle, at least, if not upon the truth ; and that, like many other ingenious men, he would, now and then, have transferred his own ingenuity to his author. Something of this refinement, I think, there is in his explanation of Aristotle's definition of Tragedy, and of the purgation of the passions, *tome 2. p. 6—35*. After considering, very attentively, that,

and some other explanations, in which he differs from me, I have not yet found reason to alter my opinion. But, had I seen this ingenious work in time, I should certainly have paid every attention due to the opinions of such a writer, by availing myself of his support, where we agree, and by giving my reasons, where we differ.



E R R A T A.

- Page 6. line 33. *for* and, *read* et.
26. — 31, *and in some other Italian quotations where it occurs, for* et, *r. e.*
37. — 24. *for* way, *r.* manner.
42. — 3 *from bottom, r.* Eumæus
58. — 5. *for* note, *r.* dissertation.
132. — 14. — *r.* Callippides.
133. — 11. — *r.* Sosistratus.
- 137—168. *In the references prefixed to the II first NOTES, for* p. 1, *read* p. 65.
for p. 2, *and* 3, *r.* p. 66. *for* p. 4, *r.* p. 67.
155. note ^l. — *r.* Satyricâ.
161. line 2. — *r.* Ερωποιία.
164. note ^c. *for* 44, *r.* 8.
- ibid.* line 20. — *r.* ὀρχησικον.
173. *after*, ANΘΡΩΠΩΝ, *insert* [De Leg. VII. p. 798. D.]
174. note ^p. *for* 81, *r.* 50.—note ^q. *for* 85, *r.* 51.
209. note ^f. — *r.* Anapæstic.
224. line 7. *for*, or *r.* for.
271. note ^a. — *r.* συνεσησεν.
311. line 19. — *r.* καλλιστη.
318. note ^z. *for* vol. ii. *r.* vol. i.
324. note ^a. *for* ab fuit *r.* abfuit.
376. line 6. — *r.* συναπεργαζομενοι.
418. line 8. — *r.* ἦπτα, *and* κρηπτα.
425. note ^k. — *r.* πολλαίς.
434. note ^b. *for* vol. i. *r.* vol. ii.
471. penult. — *r.* ἰς Θ, *or*, ἰς TE.
506. 5 & 6. — *r.* travailloit.
536. note ^c. — *r.* 326.

T W O

DISSERTATIONS.

I. ON POETRY CONSIDERED AS AN
IMITATIVE ART.

II. ON THE DIFFERENT SENSES OF THE
WORD, IMITATIVE, AS APPLIED TO
MUSIC BY THE ANTIENTS, AND BY
THE MODERNS.

DISSERTATION I.

ON POETRY CONSIDERED AS AN IMITATIVE ART.

THE word *Imitation*, like many others, is used, sometimes in a strict and proper sense, and sometimes in a sense more or less extended and improper. Its application to poetry is chiefly of the latter kind. Its precise meaning, therefore, when applied to poetry *in general*, is by no means obvious. No one who has seen a picture is at any loss to understand how painting is imitation. But no man, I believe, ever heard or read, for the first time, that poetry is imitation, without being conscious in some degree, of that “confusion of thought” which an ingenious writer complains of having felt whenever he has attempted to explain the imitative nature of Music*. It is easy to see whence this confusion arises, if we consider the process of the mind when words thus extended from their *proper* significations are presented to it. We are told that “Poetry is an imitative art.” In order to conceive how it is so, we naturally compare it with painting, sculpture, and such arts as are strictly and clearly imitative. But, in this comparison, the *difference* is so much more obvious and

* Dr. Beattie, *Essay on Poetry*, &c. ch. vi. §. 1.

striking than the *resemblance*—we see so much more readily in what respects poetry is *not* properly imitation, than in what respects it *is*;—that the mind, at last, is left in that sort of perplexity which must always arise from words thus loosely and analogically applied, when the analogy is not sufficiently clear and obvious; that is, when, of that mixture of circumstances, *like* and *unlike*, which constitutes analogy, the latter are the most apparent.

In order to understand the following treatise on poetry, in which *imitation* is considered as the very essence of the art^b, it seems necessary to satisfy ourselves, if possible, with respect to two points; I. In what senses the word *Imitation* is, or *may* be, applied to Poetry. II. In what senses it was so applied by ARISTOTLE.

I.

THE only circumstance, I think, common to *everything* we denominate *imitation*, whether properly or improperly, is *resemblance*, of some sort or other.

In every imitation, strictly and properly so called, two conditions seem essential:—the resemblance must be immediate; i. e. between *the imitation, or imitative work, itself*, and the object imitated;—and, it must also be *obvious*. Thus, in sculpture, figure is represented by similar figure; in painting, colour and figure, by similar colour and figure; in personal imitation, or mimicry, voice and gesture, by similar voice and gesture. In all these instances, the resemblance is *obvious*; we recognize the object imitated: and it is, also, *immediate*; it lies in the imitative *work, or energy, itself*; or, in other words, in the very materials, or *sensible media*^c, by which the imitation is conveyed. All *these* copies, therefore, are called, strictly and intelligibly, imitations.

^b See the *second part* of this Dissertation.

^c See Mr. Harris's Treatise on Music, &c. ch. i.

1. The materials of poetic imitation are *words*. These may be considered in two views; as sounds *merely*, and as sounds *significant*, or arbitrary and conventional *signs* of ideas. It is evidently, in the *first* view only, that words can bear any real resemblance to the *things expressed*; and, accordingly, that kind of imitation which consists in the resemblance of words considered as mere SOUND, to the *sounds* and *motions* of the objects imitated^d, has usually been assigned as the only instance in which the term *imitative* is, in its strict and proper sense, applicable to Poetry^e. But setting aside all that is the effect of fancy and of accommodated pronunciation in the reader, to which, I fear, many passages, repeatedly quoted and admired as the happiest coincidences of sound and sense, may be reduced^f; setting this aside, even in such words, and such arrangements of words, as are actually, in some degree, analogous in sound or motion to the thing signified or described, the resemblance is so faint and distant, and of so general and vague a nature, that it would never, *of itself*, lead us to recognize the object imitated. We discover not the *likeness* till we know the *meaning*. The natural relation of the word to the thing signified, is pointed out only by its arbitrary or conventional relation^g.—I do not here mean to deny that such resemblances, however

^d Mr. Harris's Treatise, &c. ch. iii.

^e Mr. Harris.—Lord Kaimes, Elements of Criticism, vol. ii. p. 1.

^f The reader may see this sufficiently proved by Dr. Johnson in his Lives of the Poets, vol. iv. p. 183. *æstus*, and in the Rambler, N^o 92. "In such resemblances," as he well observes, "the mind often governs the ear, and the sounds are estimated "by their meaning." See also Lord Kaimes, *El. of Crit.* vol. ii. p. 84, 85.

^g See Harris on Music, &c. ch. iii. §. 1, 2. This verse of Virgil,

Stridenti miserum stipulâ disperdere carmen—

is commonly cited as an example of this sort of imitation. I question, however, whether this line would have been remarked by any one as particularly harsh, if a

harsh

however slight and delicate where they really *are*, and however liable to be discovered by fancy where they are *not*, are yet a source of real beauties, of beauties *actually felt* by the reader, when they arise, or appear to arise, spontaneously from the poet's feeling, and their

harsh sound had not been described in it. At least, many verses full as harshly constructed might, I believe, be produced, in which no such imitation can be supposed. But, even admitting that such imitation was here intended, it seems to me almost ridiculous to talk of the "*natural relation* between the sound of this verse, and "*that of a vile hautboy.*" [Harris, in the chapter above referred to.] All that can be said is, that the sounds are, both of them, harsh sounds; but, certainly no one species of harsh sound can well be more unlike another, than the sound of a rough verse is to the tone of a bad hautboy, or, indeed, of any other musical instrument.—That, in the clearest and most acknowledged instances of such imitative vocal sound, the resemblance is, or can possibly be, so exact as to lead a person unacquainted with the language, *by the sound alone*, to the *signification*, no man in his senses would assert. Yet Dr. Beattie, in a note, p. 304, of his Essay on Poetry, &c. by a mistake for which I am at a loss to account, has ascribed to extravagant a notion to Rousseau. "There is in Tasso's *Gerusalemme Liberata*, a famous stanza, of which Rousseau "says, that a good ear and *sincere heart* are alone able to judge of it;" meaning, as appears from what follows, of its *sense*; for he adds, "The imitative harmony and the poetry are indeed admirable; but I doubt whether a person who understands "*neither Italian nor Latin, could even guess at the meaning from the sound.*" There can be no room for *doubt* in this matter;—he certainly could not: nor does Rousseau appear to have even hinted the possibility of such a thing. The passage is in his admirable letter *Sur la Musique Française*; where, in order to obviate the prejudices of those who regard the Italian language as wholly soft and effeminate, he produces two stanzas of Tasso, the one as an example of a sweet and tender, the other of a forcible and nervous, combination of sounds: and he adds, that to judge of *this*, i. e. of the *sound* only, not the *sense*, of the stanzas, and also of the impossibility of rendering adequately the sweetness of the one, or the force of the other, in the French language, "it is not necessary to understand Italian—it is sufficient *that we have an ear, and are impartial.*"—"Que ceux qui pensent que l'Italian n'est que le langage de la douceur and de la tendresse, prennent la peine de *comparer entre elles* "ces deux strophes du Tassé:—et s'ils desespèrent de rendre en François la *douce harmonie* de l'une, qu'ils essayent d'exprimer la *vauque dureté* de l'autre: il n'est pas "besoin *pour juger de ceci* d'entendre la langue, il ne faut qu' avoir *des oreilles & de la bonne foi.*"

effect

effect is not counteracted by the obviousness of cool intention, and deliberate artifice^h. Nor do I mean to object to this application of the word *imitative*. My purpose is merely to shew, that when we call this kind of resemblance, imitation, we do not use the word in its *strict* sense—that, in which it is applied to a picture, or a statue. Of the two conditions above mentioned, it

^h I am persuaded that many very beautiful and striking passages of this kind in the best poets were solely φυσικῆς ἀποματιῶσεως ἔργα, not τεχνικῆς μιμησασθαι τα γινόμενα πειραμενῆς, as it is well expressed by *Dion. Hal. Περὶ συνθεσεως*, § 20.—But the *Critic* is always too ready to transfer his own reflection to the *Poet*; and to consider as the *effects* of art, all those spontaneous strokes of genius which become the *causes* of art by his calm observation and discussion. Scarce any poet has, I think, so many beauties of this kind, fairly produced by strength of imagination, and delicacy of ear, as Virgil. Yet there are some verses frequently cited as fine examples in this way, which appear to me too visibly artificial to be pleasing: such as—

Quadrupedante putrem sonitu quatit ungula campum.

I am tempted to add to this note a passage from the first dissertation prefixed to the *Æneid* by that excellent editor, C. G. Heyne;—a man who has honourably distinguished himself from the herd of commentators, by such a degree of taste and philosophy as we do not often find united with laborious and accurate erudition. Speaking of the charms of Virgil's versification, he says, “*Illud unum monebimus, in errorem inducere juvenilem animum videri eos qui nimii in eo sunt, ut ad rerum sonos et naturas accommodatos & formatos velint esse versus. Equidem non diffiteor sensum animi me refragantem habere, quotiescunque persuadere mihi volo, magnum aliquem poetam æstu tantarum rerum abreptum et magnorum phantasmatum vi inflammatum, in sono cursus equestris vel tubæ vel aliarum rerum reddendo laborare; attenuat ea res et deprimit ingenium poetæ & artis dignitatem. Sunt tamen, ais, tales versus in optimo quoque poetâ. Recte; sunt utique multi; et si plures alios ad hoc lusus genus accommodare solet eorum ingenium qui talibus rebus indulgent. Sed mihi ad poetices indolem propius esse videtur statuere, ipsam orationis naturam ita esse comparatam, ut multarum rerum sonos exprimat; inflammatum autem phantasmatum specie objectâ animum, cum rerum species sibi obversantes ut oratione vivide exprimat laborat, necessario in ista vocabula incidere, vel orationis proprietate ducente. Ita graves et celeres, lenes ac duros sonos, vel non id agens et curans, ad rerum naturam accommodabit et orator quisque bonus, et multo magis poeta.*” [Heyne's *Virgil*, vol. ii, p. 39.]

wants that which must be regarded as most essential. The resemblance is, indeed, real, *as far as it goes*, and immediate; but, necessarily, from its *generality*, so imperfect, that even when pointed out by the *sense*, it is by no means always *obvious*, and without that, cannot possibly lead to any thing like a clear and certain recognition of the particular object imitated¹. I must observe farther, that this kind of imitation, even supposing it much more perfect; is, by no means, that which would be likely first to occur to any one, in an enquiry concerning the nature of the imitation attributed to Poetry, were it not, that the circumstance of its real and *immediate* resemblance, has occasioned its being considered, I think not justly, as the strictest sense of the term so applied.

For the most *usual*, and the most *important* senses, and even, as will perhaps appear, for the *strictest* sense, in which Poetry has

¹ The causes of this imperfection are accurately pointed out by Mr. Harris; 1. The “*natural* sounds and motions which Poetry thus imitates, are themselves but “*loose* and *indefinite accidents* of those *subjects* to which they belong, and consequently “do but *loosely* and *indefinitely* characterise them. 2. *Poetic* sounds and motions do “but *faintly* resemble those of *nature*, which are *themselves* confessed to be so *imperfect* “and *vague*.” [Treatise on Music, &c. *ch.* iii. § 2. See also *ch.* ii. § 3.] The following is a famous imitative line of Boileau :

S'en va frapper le mur, & revient en roulant.

If this line were read to any one ignorant of the language, he would be so far from guessing *what* was imitated, that it would not, I believe, occur to him that *anything* was imitated at all; unless, indeed, the idea were forced upon his mind by the pronunciation of the reader. Now, suppose him to understand French:—as the circumstance of *rolling* is mentioned in the line, he might possibly notice the effect of the letter R, and think the poet intended to express the noise of *something* that rolled. And this is all the *real* resemblance that can be discovered in this verse: a resemblance, and that too, but distant and imperfect, in the sound of a letter to the sound of *rolling* in general. For anything beyond this, we must trust to our imagination, assisted by the commentator, who assures us, that the poet “a cherché à imiter par le “son des mots, le bruit que fait UNE ASSIETTE en roulant.” *Sat.* iii. v. 216.

been,

been, or may be, understood to imitate, we must have recourse to language considered in its most important point of view, as composed, not of sounds merely, but of sounds *significant*.

2. The most general and extensive of these senses, is that in which it is applied to DESCRIPTION, comprehending, not only that poetic landscape-painting which is *peculiarly* called descriptive Poetry, but all such circumstantial and distinct representation as conveys to the mind a strong and clear idea of its object, whether *sensible* or *mental*^k. Poetry, in this view, is naturally considered as more or less *imitative*, in proportion as it is capable of raising an ideal *image* or *picture*, more or less resembling the reality of things. The more distinct and vivid the ideas are of which this picture is composed, and the more closely they correspond to the actual *impressions* received from nature, the stronger will be the resemblance, and the more perfect the imitation.

Hence it is evident that, of all description, that of *visible* objects will be the *most* imitative, the ideas of such objects being of all others, the most distinct and vivid. That *such* description, therefore, should have been called imitation, can be no wonder; and, indeed, of all the extended or analogical applications of the word,

^k Nothing is more common than this application of the word to description; though the writers who so apply it have not always explained the ground of the application, or pointed out those precise properties of description which entitle it to be considered as imitation. Mr. Addison makes use of *description* as a general term, comprehending all poetic imitation, or imitation by language, as opposed to that of painting, &c. See *Spectator* N^o 416. I. C. Scaliger, though he extended *imitation* to speech in general, [see Part II. Note ¹.] did not overlook the circumstances which render description peculiarly imitative. He says, with his usual spirit, speaking of poetic or verbal imitation,—“At *imitatio* non uno modo; quando ne *res* quidem. “Alia namque est *simplex designatio*, ut, *Eneas pugnat*: alia *modos* addit et *circumstantias*; verbi gratia—*armatus, in eque, iratus*. Jam hic est *pugnantis etiam facies*, “non solum *actio*. Ita *adjunctæ circumstantiæ, loci, affectus, occasiois, &c. plenior rem* adhuc atque *torsores* efficiunt IMITATIONEM.” [*Poet. lib. vii. cap. 2.*] We must not, however, confound *imitative description* with such description as is merely an *enumeration of parts*. See note ^m, second part of this dissertation.

this is, perhaps, the most obvious and natural'. There needs no other proof of this than the very language in which we are naturally led to express our admiration of this kind of poetry, and which we perpetually borrow from the arts of strict imitation. We say the poet has *painted* his object; we talk of his *imagery*, of the lively *colours* of his description, and the masterly touches of his *pencil*^m.

The objects of our other senses fall less within the power of description, in proportion as the ideas of those objects are more simple, more fleeting, and less distinct, than those of sight. The description of such objects is, therefore, called with less propriety *imitation*ⁿ.

^l Τα δὲ ΟΥΕΙ γινώσκω, δια ποιητικῆς ἐρμηνείας ἐμφραίνεται ΜΙΜΗΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ· οἶον, κωματικῶν ἄφεις, καὶ τοποθεσίαι, καὶ μαχχαί, καὶ περιγασεῖς παθῶν· ὥστε συνδιατιθεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς εἶδεσι τῶν ἀπαγγελουμένων, ΩΣ ΩΡΩΜΕΝΟΙΣ. *Ptol. Harmon. 3. 3.*

^m It cannot be necessary to produce examples of this. They are to be found in almost every page of every writer on the subject of poetry. The reader may see Dr. Hurd's Discourse on Poetical Imitation, p. 10, &c.—Dr. Beattie's Essay on Poetry and Music, p. 97, (*Ed. 8vo.*) and the note.—Dr. Warton on Pope, vol. i. p. 44, 45; vol. ii. 223, 227.—Lord Kaimes, *Elem. of Criticism*, vol. ii. p. 326.

Nor is this manner of speaking peculiar to modern writers. Φερε ἔν, says Ælian, introducing his *description* of the Vale of Tempe: καὶ τὰ καλεσμένα Τεμπῆ, τὰ Θεσσαλία, ΔΙΑΠΡΑΨΩΜΕΝ τῆ λογῶ, καὶ ΔΙΑΠΛΑΣΩΜΕΝ. And he adds, as in justification of these expressions, ἁμολογῆται γὰρ καὶ ὁ λογῶ, εἰαν ἔχη διὰ μιν φραστικῆν, μῆδεν ἀσθενέστερον ὅσα βελεται ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν κατὰ χειρουργίαν ὄντων. *Hist. Var. lib. iii. cap. 1.* Hence, also, the saying of Simonides, so often repeated, that “a picture is a silent poem, and a poem a speaking picture.” Lucian, in that agreeable delineation of a beautiful and accomplished woman, his ΕΙΚΟΝΕΣ, ranks the descriptive poet with the painter and the sculptor: ταῦτα μὲν ἐν ΠΛΑΣΤῶΝ καὶ ΓΡΑΦΕῶΝ καὶ ΠΟΙΗΤῶΝ ποιήεις ἐργαζονται. Homer, he denominates, τὸν ἀρίστον ΤῶΝ ΓΡΑΦΕῶΝ, “the best of PAINTERS;” and calls upon him, even in preference to Polygnotus, Apelles, and the most eminent artists, to paint the charms of his Panthea. See also the treatise Περὶ τῆς ΟΜΗΡΟΥ ποιητικῆς, towards the end. (Εἰ δὲ καὶ Ζωγραφίας διδάσκαλον Ομηρον φησὶ τις—κ. τ. ἀλλ.—)

ⁿ One obvious reason of this is, the want of that natural association just remarked, with *painting*, (the most striking of the *strictly imitative* arts,) which is peculiar to the description of *visible* objects.

Next

Next to visible objects, *sounds* seem the most capable of descriptive imitation. Such description is, indeed, generally aided by real, though imperfect, resemblance of verbal sound; more, or less, according to the nature of the language, and the delicacy of the poet's ear. The following lines of Virgil are, I think, an instance of this.

Lamentis gemituque et fœmineo ululatu
Tecta fremunt, resonat magnis plangoribus æther.

Æn. iv. 663.

But we are not, now, considering this immediate imitation of sound by sound, but such only as is merely *descriptive*, and operates, like the description of visible objects, only by the *meaning* of the words. Now if we are allowed to call description of visible objects, imitation, when it is such that *we seem to see* the object^o, I know of no reason why we may not also consider sounds as imitated^p, when they are so described that we *seem to bear* them. It would not be difficult to produce from the best poets, and even from prose-writers of a strong and poetical imagination, many instances of sound so imitated. Those readers who are both poetical and musical will, I believe, excuse my dwelling a moment upon a subject which has not, as far as I know, been much considered.

Of our own poets I do not recollect any who have presented *musical* ideas with such feeling, force, and reality of description, as Milton, and Mr. Mason. When Milton speaks of

———— Notes with many a winding bout
Of linked sweetness's long drawn out. *L'Allegro.*

* ΟΡΩΜΕΝΟΙΣ μάλλον ἢ ἀκροαμένοις ἔσκε τα [Ὅμηρος] πομπήματα.

Treatise de Hom. Poef. loco cit.

^p Lucian, in his *Imagines*, just now cited, has very happily described a fine female voice; and he calls the description, somewhat boldly, καλλιφωνίας καὶ ῥῆδος ΕΙΚΩΝ. *Tom.* ii. p. 12. *Ed. Bened.* Πας δὲ ὁ ποιῶν τε φηγεται. — κ, τ. αλ. —

And of—"a soft and solemn-breathing sound," that

Rose like a steam of rich distill'd perfumes,

And stole upon the air.

Comus.

Who, that has a truly musical ear, will refuse to consider such a description as, in some sort, imitative¹?

In the same spirit both of Poetry and of Music are these beautiful lines in *CARACTACUS*, addressed by the Chorus to the Bards:

————— Wond'rous men!

Ye, whose skill'd fingers know how best to lead,
Through all the maze of sound, the wayward step
Of Harmony, recalling oft, and oft
Permitting her unbridled course to rush
Through dissonance to concord, sweetest then
Ev'n when expected harshest.—

It seems scarce possible to convey with greater clearness to the ear of imagination the effect of an artful and well-conducted harmony; of that free and varied range of modulation, in which the ear is ever wandering, yet never lost, and of that masterly and bold intertexture of discord, which leads the sense to pleasure, through paths that lie close upon the very verge of pain.

The general and confused effect of complex and aggregated sound may be said to be *described*, when the most striking and characteristic of the single sounds of which it is compounded are selected and enumerated; just as *single* sounds are described (and they can be described no otherwise) by the selection of their principal *qualities*, or *modifications*.—I cannot produce a finer example of this than the following admirable passage of Dante, in which, with a force of representation peculiar to himself in such subjects, he describes the mingled terrors of those distant sounds that struck his ear as he entered the gates of his imaginary *Inferno*;—"si mise dentro alle segrete cose."—

¹ See also *Il Penferoso*, 161—166.

Quivi fospiri, pianti, ed alti guai
Rifonavan per l'aer senza stelle ;

— — — — —
Diverse lingue, orribili favelle,
Parole di dolore, accenti d'ira,
Voci alte fiocche, e suon di man con elle.

Inferno, Canto III.

The reader may be glad to relieve his imagination from the terrible ENAPTEIA of this description, by turning his ear to a far different combination of sounds ;—to the charming description of “ the melodies of morn,” in the *Minstrel**, or of the *melodies of evening* in the *Deserted Village* :

Sweet was the sound, when oft at evening's close,
Up yonder hill the village murmur rose.
There as I past with careless steps and slow,
The mingling notes came soften'd from below ;
The swain responsive as the milk-maid sung,
The sober herd that low'd to meet their young ;
The noisy geese that gabbled o'er the pool,
The playful children just let loose from school ;
The watch-dog's voice that bay'd the whisp'ring wind,
And the loud laugh that spoke the vacant mind.
These all in soft confusion fought the shade,
And fill'd each pause the nightingale had made †.

But

* Book I. *Stanzas* 40, 41.

† The following Stanza of Spenser has been much admired :

The joyous birdes, shrouded in cheareful shade,
Their notes unto the voice attempred sweet,
Th' angelical soft trembling voices made
To th' instruments divine, response meet ;
The silver-sounding instruments did meet
With the base murmur of the water's fall ;
The water's fall with difference discreet
Now soft, now loud, unto the wind did call ;
The gentle warbling wind low answered to all.

Fairy Queen, Book II. Canto 12, Stanza 71.

Dr.

But *single sounds* may also be so described or characterized as to produce a secondary perception, of sufficient clearness to deserve the name of imitation. It is thus that we hear the “far-off “Curfeu” of Milton;

Over some wide-water'd shore
Swinging slow with fullen roar'.

And Mr. Mason's “Bell of Death,” that

— pauses now; and now with *rising knell*
Flings to the hollow gale its fullen sound.

Elegy III.

I do not know a happier descriptive line in Homer than the following, in his simile of the nightingale :

Dr. Warton says of these lines, that they “are of themselves a complete concert “of the most delicious music.” It is unwillingly that I differ from a person of so much taste. I cannot consider as *Music*, much less as “delicious music,” a mixture of incompatible sounds, if I may so call them—of sounds *musical* with sounds *immusical*. The singing of birds cannot possibly be “attempted” to the notes of a human voice. The mixture is, and must be, disagreeable. To a person listening to a concert of voices and instruments, the interruption of *singing-birds*, *wind*, and *water-falls*, would be little better than the torment of Hogarth's enraged musician.—Farther—the description itself is, like too many of Spenser's, coldly elaborate, and indiscriminately minute. Of the expressions, some are feeble and without effect—as, “*joyous* birds;” some evidently improper—as, “*trembling* voices;” and “*cheareful* “*shade*;” for there cannot be a greater fault in a voice than to be tremulous; and *cheareful* is surely an unhappy epithet applied to shade; some cold and laboured, and such as betray too plainly the *necessities of rhyme*; such is,

“The water's fall with *difference discreet*.”

• The reader who conceives the word “*swinging*,” to be merely descriptive of *motion*, will be far, I think, from feeling the whole force of this passage. They who are accustomed to attend to sounds, will, I believe, agree with me, that the sound, in this case, is affected by the motion, and that the ringing of a bell is actually *heard in its tone*, which is different from what it would be if the *same* bell were struck with the *same* force, but *at rest*. The experiment may be easily made with a small hand-bell.

Ἦτε θαυμα τρωπῶσα χεει πολυηχεα φωνην*.

That which is peculiar in the singing of this bird, the variety, richness, flexibility, and liquid volubility of its notes, cannot well be more strongly characterized, more *audibly* presented to the mind, than by the *πολυηχεα*, the *χεει*, and, above all, the *θαυμα τρωπῶσα*, of this short description †. But, to return—

I mentioned also, description of *mental* objects; of the emotions, passions, and other internal movements and operations of the mind. Such objects may be described, either *immediately*, as they affect the mind, or through their *external* and *sensible effects*. Let us take the passion of Dido for an instance:

At regina gravi jamdudum faucibus curâ
Vulnus alit venis, et cœco carpitur igni, &c.

Æneid IV. 1.

This is *immediate* description.—But when Dido

Incipit effari, mediâque in voce resistit;
Nunc eadem, labente die, convivia quærit,
Iliacisque iterum, demens, audire labores
Exposcit, pendetque iterum narrantis ab ore.
Post, ubi digressi, lumenque obscura vicissim
Luna premit, suadentque cadentia sidera somnos,

* *Odyssæy*, T. 521. I am surpris'd at Ernestus's interpretation of *τρωπῶσα*; i. e. "de luscinia inter canendum se *versante*;" [*Index* to his *Homer*.] by which the greatest beauty of the description would be lost; and lost without necessity: for the natural construction is that which *Hesychius* gives: *τρωπῶσα—τρεπῶσα ΤΗΝ ΦΩΝΗΝ*.

† Not a single beauty of this line is preserved in Mr. Pope's translation. The *χεει*, "pours her voice," is *entirely* dropt; and the strong and rich expression, in *θαυμα τρωπῶσα*, and *πολυηχεα*, is diluted into "varied strains." [Book xix. 607.] For the *particular* ideas of a *variety of quick turns* and *inflections* [*θαυμα τρωπῶσα*] and a *variety of tones*, [*πολυηχεα*] the translator has substituted the *general*, and therefore weak idea, of *variety* in the abstract—of a song or "strains" simply *varied*. The reader may see this subject—the importance of *particular* and *determinate* ideas to the force and beauty of description—admirably illustrated in the *Discourse on Poetical Imitation*, [Hurd's *Horace*, vol. iii. p. 15—19.]

Sola domo mœret vacuâ, stratisque relictis
Incubat. —————

—here, the passion is described, and most exquisitely, by its *sensible effects*. This, indeed, *may* be considered as falling under the former kind of descriptive imitation—that of *sensible* objects. There is this difference, however, between the description of a sensible object, and the description of a mental—of any passion for example—*through* that of a sensible object, that, in the former, the description is considered as terminating in the clear and distinct representation of the sensible object, the landscape, the attitude, the sound, &c. : whereas in the other, the sensible exhibition is only, or chiefly, the *means* of effecting that which is the principal end of such description—the emotion, of whatever kind, that arises from a strong conception of the passion itself. The image carries us on forcibly to the feeling of its internal cause. When this *first* effect is once produced, we may, indeed, return from it to the calmer pleasure, of contemplating the imagery itself with a painter's eye.

It is undoubtedly, *this* description of passions and emotions, by their *sensible* effects, that principally deserves the name of *imitative*; and it is a great and fertile source of some of the highest and most touching beauties of poetry^v. With respect to *immediate* descriptions of this kind, they are from their very nature, far more weak and indistinct, and do not, perhaps, often possess that degree of forcible representation that amounts to what we call *imitative* description.—But here some distinctions seem necessary. In a strict and philosophical view, a *single* passion or emotion does not admit of description at all. Considered in itself, it is a simple internal feeling, and, as such, can no more be *described*, than a simple idea can be *defined*. It can be described no otherwise than in its *effects*, of *some* kind or other. But the effects of a passion are of two kinds, *internal* and *external*. Now,

^v See the Discourse on Poetical Imitation, of Dr. Hurd, p. 39, &c.

popularly

popularly speaking, by *the passion* of love, for example, we mean the whole operation of that passion upon the *mind*—we include all its internal workings; and when it is described in these internal and invisible effects only, we consider it as *immediately* described; these internal effects being included in our general idea of the passion. *Mental objects*, then, admit of immediate description, only when they are, more or less, complex; and such description may be considered as more or less *imitative*, in proportion as its impression on the mind approaches more or less closely to the real impression of the passion or emotion itself.—Thus, in the passage above referred to as an instance of such immediate description, the mental object described is a complex object—the passion of love, including some of its internal effects; that is, some *other* passions or feelings which it excites, or with which it is accompanied:

At regina gravi jamdudum saucia curâ
 Vulnus alit venis, et cæco carpitur igni.
 Multa viri virtus animo, multusque recurvat
 Gentis honos: hærent infixi pectore vultus,
 Verbaque: nec placidam membris dat cura quietem.

Æn. IV. initio.

Reduce this passage to the mere mention of the passion *itself*—the simple feeling or emotion of *love*, in the precise and strict acceptance of the word, abstractedly from its concomitant effects, it will not even be *description*, much less *imitative* description. It will be mere attribution, or predication. It will say only—“Dido
 “was in love.”

Thus, again, a complication of *different passions* admits of forcible and *imitative* description:

———— æstuat ingens
 Imo in corde pudor, mixtoque infania luctu,
 Et furiis agitatus amor, et conscia virtus.

Æn. XII. 666.

Here, the mental object described is not any single passion, but the complex passion, if I may call it so, that results from the mixture and fermentation of all the passions *attributed* to Turnus.

To give one example more:—The mind of a reader can hardly, I think, be flung into an imaginary situation more closely resembling the real situation of a mind distressed by the *complicated* movements of irresolute, fluctuating and anxious deliberation, than it is by these lines of Virgil:

———— magno curarum fluctuat æstu;
Atque animum nunc huc celerem, nunc dividit illuc,
In partefque rapit varias, perque omnia versat.

Æn. VIII. 19.

It may be necessary, also, for clearness, to observe, that description, as applied to mental objects, is sometimes used in a more loose and improper sense, and the Poet is said to *describe*, in general, all the passions or manners which he, in any way, exhibits; whether, in the proper sense of the word, *described*, or merely *expressed*; as, for example, in the lines quoted from the opening of the fourth book of the *Æneid*, the passion of Dido is *described* by the *Poet*. In these——

Quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus hospes?
Quam sese ore ferens!—quam forti pectore et armis!—

—it is *expressed* by herself. But is not this, it may be asked, still *imitation*? It is; but not *descriptive* imitation. As *expressive of passion*, it is no farther imitative, than as the passion expressed is imaginary, and makes a part of the Poet's *fiction*: otherwise, we must apply the word *imitative*, as nobody ever thought of applying it, to *all* cases in which we are made, by sympathy, to feel strongly the passion of another expressed by words. The passage is, indeed, also *imitative* in another view—as *dramatic*. But for an explanation of both these heads of imitation, I must refer to what follows.—I shall only add, for fear of mistake, that there

is also, in the second of those lines, *descriptive imitation*; but descriptive of *Æneas* only; not of Dido's *passion*, though it strongly *indicates* that passion.—All I mean to assert is, that those lines are not *descriptive imitation of a mental object*.

So much, then, for the subject of *descriptive imitation*, which has, perhaps, detained us too long upon a single point of our general inquiry.

3. The word *imitation* is also, in a more particular, but well-known, sense, applied to Poetry when considered as FICTION—to stories, actions, incidents, and characters, as far as they are *feigned* or *invented* by the Poet *in imitation*, as we find it commonly, and obviously enough, expressed, of nature, of real life, of truth, in *general*, as opposed to that individual reality of things which is the province of the historian*. Of this imitation the epic and dramatic poems are the principal examples.

That this sense of the term, as applied to fiction, is entirely distinct from that in which it is applied to description, will evidently appear from the following considerations.—In descriptive imitation, the resemblance is between the ideas raised, and the actual *impressions*, whether external or internal, received from the things themselves. In fictive imitation, the resemblance is, strictly speaking, between the ideas raised, and other ideas; the ideas raised—the ideas of the *Poem*—being no other than copies, resemblances, or, more philosophically, new, though similar, combinations of that general stock of ideas, collected from experience, observation, and reading, and repositèd in the Poet's mind.—In description, *imitation* is opposed to actual *impression*, external or internal: in fiction, it is opposed to *fact*.—In their *effects*, some degree of illusion is implied; but the illusion is not of the same kind in both. Descriptive imitation may be said to produce *illusivè perception*,—fictive, *illusivè belief*.

* Μῦθος—ἡγορία—ψευδὴς Εἰκονίζον τὴν ἀληθεῖαν.—Suidas, & Hesychius, voce Μῦθος.

Farther—descriptive imitation may subsist without fictive, and fictive, without descriptive. The first of these assertions is too obvious to stand in need of proof. The other may require some explanation. It seems evident that fiction may even subsist in mere *narration*, without any degree of *description*, properly so called; much more, without *such* description as I have called *imitative*; that is, without any greater degree of resemblance to the things expressed, than that which is implied in *all* ideas, and produced by *all* language, considered merely as *intelligible*. Let a story be invented, and related in the plainest manner possible; in short and general expressions, amounting, in the incidents, to mere assertion, and in the account of passions and characters, as far as possible, to mere attribution: this, as fiction, is still *imitation*,—an invented resemblance of real life, or, if you please, of history²,—though without a single *imitative description*, a single *picture*, a single instance of strong and visible colouring, throughout the whole³. I mean, by this, only to shew the distinct and independent senses in which *imitation* is applied to description and to fiction, by shewing how each species of imitation *may* subsist without the other: but, that fictive imitation, though it does not, in any degree, depend on descriptive for its existence, does, in a very great degree, depend on it for its beauty, is too obvious to be called in question^b.

The

² “Historiæ imitatio ad placitum.” Bacon, *De augm. Scient.* lib. ii. c. 13.

³ The *Æneid*, in this view, is equally *imitation* in every part where it is not, or is not *supposed* to be, historically true; even in the simplest and barest narration. In point of fiction, “tres littore cervos prospicit errantes,” is as much imitation, though not as *poetical*, as the fine description of the storm in the same book, or of Dido’s conflicting passions, in the fourth.

^b Yet even here a distinction obviously suggests itself. A work of fiction may be considered in two views; in the whole, or in its parts: in the general story, the *Métaphor*, fable, series of *events*, &c. or, in the detail and circumstances of the story, the account of such places, persons, and things, as the fable necessarily involves. Now,

The two senses last mentioned of the word *imitative*, as applied to description, and to fiction, are manifestly extended, or improper senses, as well as that first mentioned, in which it is applied to language considered as mere sound. In *all* these imitations, *one* of the essential conditions of whatever is *strictly* so denominated is wanting;—in sonorous imitation, the resemblance is *immediate*, but not *obvious*; in the others, it is *obvious*, but not *immediate*; that is, it lies, not in the *words* themselves, but in the *ideas* which they raise as *signs*^c: yet as the circumstance of *obvious* resemblance, which may be regarded as the most striking and distinctive property of Imitation, is here found, this extension of the word seems to have more propriety than that in which it is applied to those faint and evanescent resemblances which have, not without reason, been called the echo of sound to sense^d.

4. There seems to be but *one* view in which Poetry can be considered as *Imitation*, in the strict and proper sense of the word. If we look for both *immediate* and *obvious* resemblance, we shall

in the first view, nothing further seems requisite to make the fictive imitation *good*, than that the events be, in *themselves*, important, interesting, and affecting, and so *connected* as to appear credible, probable, and natural to the reader, and, by that means, to produce the illusion, and give the pleasure, that is expected:—and this purpose may be answered by mere *narration*. But in the detail this is not the case. When the Poet proceeds to fill up and distend the outline of his general plan by the exhibition of places, characters, or passions, these also, as well as the *events*, must appear probable and natural: but, being more *complex* objects, they can no otherwise be made to appear so than by some degree of *description*, and that description will not be *good* description, that is, will not give the pleasure expected from a work of imagination, unless it be *imitative*—such as makes us see the *place*, feel the *passion*, enter thoroughly into the *character* described. Here, the *fictive* imitation itself cannot produce its proper *effect*, and therefore cannot be considered as *good*, without the assistance of *descriptive*.

• See above, p. 5.

^d Pope's *Essay on Crit.* 365.—Indeed, what Ovid says of the nymph *Echo* [*Met.* iii. 353.] may be applied to this echo of imitative words and construction:—*Nec prior ipsa loqui didicit.* The *sense* of the words must *speak first*.

find it only in DRAMATIC—or to use a more general term—PERSONATIVE Poetry; that is, all Poetry in which, whether essentially or occasionally, the Poet personates; for here, *speech* is imitated by *speech*°. The difference between this, and mere narration or description, is obvious. When, in common discourse, we *relate*, or *describe*, in our own persons, we *imitate* in no other sense than as we raise *ideas* which resemble the things related or described. But when we speak *as another person*, we become mimics, and not only the ideas we convey, but the words, the discourse itself, in which we convey them, are imitations; they resemble, or are supposed to resemble, those of the person we represent. Now this is the case not only with the Tragic and Comic Poet, but also with the Epic Poet, and even the Historian, when either of these quits his own character, and *writes* a speech in the character of another person. He is then an imitator, in as strict a sense as the personal mimic.—In *dramatic*, and all *personative* Poetry, then, both the conditions of what is *properly* denominated Imitation, are fulfilled.

And now, the question—“in what senses the word *Imitation* “is, or may be applied to Poetry,”—seems to have received its answer. It appears, I think, that the term ought not to be extended beyond the *four* different applications which have been mentioned; and that Poetry can be justly considered as *imitative*, only by *sound*, by *description*, by *fiction*, or by *personation*. Whenever the Poet speaks in his own person, and, at the same time, does not either feign, or make “the sound an echo to the sense,” or stay to impress his ideas upon the fancy with some degree of that force and distinctness which we call description, he cannot,

° The drama, indeed, is said also to imitate *action* by *action*; but this is only in actual representation, where the players are the immediate imitators. In the poem it is nothing but *words* can be immediately copied. Gravina says well, Non è imitativa poetica quella, che non è fatta dalle parole.—[*Della Trag. fest.* 13.]

in any sense that I am aware of, be said to *imitate*; unless we extend imitation to *all* speech—to every mode of expressing our thoughts by words—merely because all words are signs of ideas, and those ideas images of *things*^f.

It is scarce necessary to observe, that these different species of imitation often run into, and are mixed with, each other. They are, indeed, more properly speaking, only so many distinct, abstracted *views*, in which Poetry may be considered as imitating. It is seldom that any of them are to be found separately; and in some of them, others are necessarily implied. Thus, dramatic imitation implies fiction, and sonorous imitation, description; though conversely, it is plainly otherwise. Descriptive imitation is, manifestly, that which is most independent on all the others. The passages in which they are all united are frequent; and those in which all are excluded, are, in the best Poetry, very rare: for the Poet of genius rarely forgets his proper *language*; and that can scarcely be retained, at least while he *relates*, without more or less of colouring, of imagery, of that *descriptive* force which makes us see and hear. A total suspension of all his functions as an imitator is hardly to be found, but in the simple proposal of his subject^g, in his invocation^h, the expression of his own sentimentsⁱ, or, in those calm beginnings of narration where, now and then, the Poet stoops to *fact*, and becomes, for a moment, little more than a metrical historian^k.

^f See *Hermes*, Book iii. ch. 3, p. 329, &c. And Part II. of this *Diff.* note ¹.

^g Arma virumque cano, Trojæ qui primus ab oris
Italiam, fato profugus, Lavinaque venit
Litora. *Æneid*, I.

^h Musa, mihi causas memora, &c. *Ibid.*

ⁱ Tantæne animis cælestibus iræ?
— — — — —
Tantæ molis erat Romanam condere gentem. *Ibid.*

^k Urbs antiqua fuit, (Tyrii tenuère coloni,)
Carthago, Italiam contra, Tiberinaque longe
Ostia, &c. *Ibid.*

The full illustration of all this by examples, would draw out to greater length a discussion, which the reader, I fear, has already thought too long. If he will open the *Æneid*, or any other epic poem, and apply these remarks, he may, perhaps, find it amusing to trace the different kinds of imitation as they successively occur, in their various combinations and degrees; and to observe the Poet varying, from page to page, and sometimes even from line to line, the *quantity*, if I may so speak, of his imitation; sometimes shifting, and sometimes, though rarely and for a moment, throwing off altogether, his imitative form.

It has been often said that ALL *Poetry is Imitation*¹. But from the preceding inquiry it appears, that, if we take *Poetry* in its common acceptation, for all *metrical composition*, the assertion is not true; not, at least, in any sense of the term *Imitation* but such as will make it equally true of *all Speech*^m. If, on the other hand, we depart from that common acceptation of the word *Poetry*, the assertion that “all Poetry is Imitation,” seems only an improper and confused way of saying, that no composition that is not imitative *ought* to be *called* Poetry. To examine the truth of this, would be to engage in a fresh discussion totally distinct from the object of this dissertation. We have not, now, been considering *what Poetry is*, or how it should be *defined*; but only, in what sense it is an *Imitative Art*: or, rather, we have been examining the nature and extent of VERBAL IMITATION in generalⁿ.

¹ This expression is nowhere, that I know of, used by Aristotle. In the beginning of his treatise he asserts only that the *Epic, Tragic, Comic, and Dithyrambic Poems* are imitations. Le Bossu, not content with saying that “every sort of Poem in general is an *imitation*,” goes so far as even to alter the text of Aristotle in his marginal quotation. He makes him say, ΠΟΙΗΣΕΙΣ *πασαι τυγχανουσιν εσαι μιμησεις το συνολου*.

^m See p. 23, note f.

ⁿ Imitation, in every sense of the word that has been mentioned, is manifestly independent on *metre*, though being more eminently adapted to the nature and end of metrical composition, it has thence been peculiarly denominated *Poetic imitation*, and attributed to the *Poetic Art*.

II. THE

II.

THE preceding *general* inquiry, “in what senses the word *Imitation* is, or may be, applied to Poetry,” brings us with some advantage to the other question proposed, of more immediate concern to the reader of this treatise of Aristotle,—“in what senses it “was so applied by HIM.”

1. It is clearly so applied by him in the sense which, from him, has, I think, most generally been adopted by modern writers—that of FICTION, as above explained, whether conveyed in the dramatic or personative form, or by mere narration in the person of the Poet himself^b. This appears from the whole sixth section of Part II. [of the original, ch. ix.] but especially from the last paragraph, where he expressly says, that what constitutes the Poet an *imitator*, is the *invention of a fable*: ποιητην μαλλον ΤΩΝ ΜΥΘΩΝ είναι δε ΠΟΙΗΤΗΝ ——— ὅσω ποιητης ΚΑΤΑ ΜΙΜΗΣΙΝ ἐστὶ μιμεται δὲ ΤΑΣ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ^c. He repeatedly calls the fable, or Μυθός, “an imitation of an action;” but this it can be in no other sense than as it is feigned, either entirely, or in part. A history, as far, at least, as it is strictly history, is not an *imitation* of an action.

2. It seems equally clear, that he considered DRAMATIC Poetry as *peculiarly* imitative, above every other species. Hence his first rule concerning the epic or narrative imitation, that its fable “should be *dramatically* constructed, like that of *tragedy*”^d:— τας μυθους, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις, ΔΡΑΜΑΤΙΚΟΥΣ:—his praise of Homer for “the *dramatic* spirit of his imitations:”—ἐτι και ΜΙΜΗΣΕΙΣ ΔΡΑΜΑΤΙΚΑΣ ἐποίησε^e: and above all, the remarkable expression he uses, where, having laid it down as a precept that

^a P. 19.

^b μιμεισθαι ἐστιν ——— ὡς ΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ και ΜΗ ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΟΝΤΑ. cap. 3. “The Poet may *imitate*, &c.—or, in his own person throughout, without change.” Part I. Sect. 4.

^c See Mr. Harris, *Philol. Inq.* p. 139. ^d Part III. Sect. 1. Of the orig. ch. xviii.

^e Part. I. Sect. 6. Orig. cap. iv.

the epic Poet “should speak as little as possible in his *own person*,” (ΑΥΤΟΝ δὲ τοῦ ποιητῆν ἐλαχίστα λεγέειν) he gives this reason—Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ΜΙΜΗΤΗΣ: “for he is not *then* the *IMITATOR*.” But, he had before expressly allowed the Poet to be an imitator even while he retains his own person^e. I see no other way of removing this apparent inconsistency, than by supposing him to speak comparatively, and to mean no more, than that the Poet is not then *truly* and *strictly* an imitator^b; or, in other words, that *imitation* is applicable in its *strict* and *proper* sense, only to *personative* poetry, as above explained; to that Poetry in which speech is represented by speech, and the resemblance, as in painting and sculpture, is immediate. I am not conscious that I am here forcing upon Aristotle a meaning that may not be his. I seem to be only drawing a clear inference from a clear fact. It cannot be denied, that, in the passages alleged, he plainly speaks of personative Poetry as that which *peculiarly* deserves the name of imitation. The inference seems obvious—that he speaks of it as *peculiarly* imitative, in the only sense in which it is so, as being the only species of Poetry that is *strictly* imitative.

I do not find in Aristotle any express application of the term except these two. Of the other two senses in which Poetry may be, and by modern writers has been, considered as imitation—*resemblance of sound*, and *description*—he says nothing.

^f Part III. Sect. 3. Orig. cap. 24.

^e See above note ^b.

^b So Victorius: “amittit *pené* eo tempore nomen Poetæ.” Castelvetro’s solution of this difficulty is the same; and I find his ideas of this matter so coincident with my own, that I am induced to transcribe his words: In his comment upon the passage, he says, speaking of the dramatic part of epic poetry, “Si domanda qui *solo* “*rassomigliativo*, (i. e. *imitative*) non perché ancora quando il Poeta narra senza introducimento di persone à favellare, non rassomigli, ma perché *le parole diritte poste in luogo di parole diritte, figurano, rappresentano, et rassomigliano* MEGLIO *le parole*, “che *le parole poste in luogo di cose non figurano, non rappresentano, non rassomigliano le cose*; in guisa che, *in certo modo si può dire* che il rappresentare *parole con parole* sia rassomigliare; e il rappresentare *cose con parole* non sia rassomigliare, “*paragonando l’una rassomigliare con l’altro, & non semplicemente.*” P. 554.

With

With respect, indeed, to the former of these, *sonorous* imitation, it cannot appear in any degree surprising that he should pass it over in total silence. I have already observed, that even in a *general* inquiry concerning the nature of the imitation attributed to Poetry, it is by no means that sense of the word which would be likely first to occur; and it would, perhaps, never have occurred at all, if, in such inquiries, we were not naturally led to compare Poetry with Painting, and other arts *strictly* imitativeⁱ, and as naturally led by that comparison to admit *sonorous* imitation as one species, from its agreement with those strictly imitative arts in the circumstance of *immediate* resemblance. But no such general inquiry was the object of Aristotle's work, which is not a treatise *on Poetic Imitation*, but *on Poetry*. His subject, therefore, led him to consider, not *all* that *might* without impropriety be denominated *imitation* in Poetry, but *that* imitation only which he regarded as essential to the art; as the source of its greatest beauties, and the foundation of its most important rules. With respect, then, to that casual and subordinate kind of imitation which is produced merely by the *sound* of words, it was not likely even that the idea of it should occur to him. Indeed, it is to be considered as a property of language in general, rather than of Poetry; and of *speech*—of actual pronunciation—rather than of language^k. Besides that the beauties arising from this source are of too delicate and fugitive a nature to be held by rule. They *must* be left to the ear of the reader for their effect, and *ought* to be left to that of the Poet for their production.

But neither does Aristotle appear to have included *description* in his notion of Poetic imitation; which, as far as he has explained it, seems to have been simply that of the imitation of human actions, manners, passions, events, &c. in *feigned story*; and that, *principally*, when conveyed in a dramatic form. Of description, indeed, important as it is to the beauty of Poetry in

ⁱ See above p. 3.^k See above, p. 5.

general, and to that of fiction itself, more particularly in the *epic* form, he has not said one word throughout his treatise: so far was he from extending Poetic imitation, as some have done, to that general sense which comprehends all speech¹.

But here, to avoid confusion, the sense in which I have used the term *description* must be kept in view. When it is said that Aristotle “did not include description in his notion of imitation,” it is not meant, that he did not consider the descriptive parts of narrative Poetry as *in any respect* imitative. The subject of a description may be either real, or feigned. Almost all the descriptions of the higher Poetry, the Poetry of invention, are of the latter kind. These Aristotle, unquestionably, considered as imitation; but it was *as fiction*, not *as description*;—as falsehood resembling truth, or nature, in general, not as verbal expression resembling, by its force and clearness, the visible representations of painting, or the perception of the thing itself. Had he considered description in *this* sense as imitation, he must necessarily have admitted imitation without fiction^m. But this seems clearly contrary

¹ Thus I. C. Scaliger, *Poet. lib. vii. cap. 2.* “Denique *imitationem* esse in “OMNI SERMONE, quia verba sunt imagines rerum.” He is followed by If. Casaubon; *De Rom. Satirâ*, cap. v. p. 340. Both these acute critics dispute warmly against Aristotle’s principle, that the essence of Poetry is imitation. And they are, undoubtedly, so far in the right, that *if*, as they contend, the only proper sense of Poetry is that in which it is opposed to *prose* (“*omnem metro astrictam orationem et posse et debere Poema dici.*” *Cas. ubi sup.*) then, there can be no other imitation common to *all Poetry*, than that which is common to *all speech*. See above, p. 22, 23.

^m It is obvious, that, if the *imitation* attributed to description consists in the clear and distinct image of the object described, every description conveying such an image to the mind must be equally considered as imitative, whether that object be real, or imaginary; that is, whether the imitation be of individual, or general nature; just as in painting, a portrait, or a landscape from nature, is as much imitation, as an historical figure, or an ideal scene of Claude Lorraine, though certainly of an inferior kind. Indeed, that which presents a real, sensible, and precise object of comparison, may even be said to be more obviously and properly *imitation*, than that which refers

trary to the whole tenor of his treatise. The beauty, indeed, of such description was well known to the ancients, and frequent examples of it are to be found in their best writers—their orators

us, for its original, to a vague and general idea.—It may be objected, that this will extend *imitation* to *all* exact description; and it may be asked, whether every such description, of a building, or of a machine, for instance, is to be called an imitation? I answer, that descriptions may be *too* exact to be imitative; too detailed and minute to present *the whole* strongly, as a picture. Technical descriptions are such. They may be said to describe *every part* without describing the *whole*. To give a complete idea of all the *parts*, for the mere purpose of information, and to give a strong and vivid *general* idea in order to please the imagination, are very different things. It is by *selection*, not by *enumeration*, that the latter purpose is to be effected. [See Dr. Beattie's *Essay on Poetry and Music*, part I. ch. 5. sect. 4.]—I believe it will be found, on examination, that every description, whatever be its purpose, or its subject, which does actually convey such a lively and distinct idea of the *whole* of any object, affords *some* degree of pleasure to the imagination, and is, so far, imitative; but whether it affords *such* a degree of that pleasure, or whether it be such in *other* respects, as to amount, on the whole, to what may properly be called *Poetical* imitation, is another question. I must again remind the reader, that the object of this Dissertation is to inquire *in what senses* the word *imitation* is applied to *language* in general—not to examine all the requisites of *such* imitation as deserves the name of POETRY. Though it has been said that all Poetry is imitation, it has never, I think, been said that all imitation is Poetry—See above, p. 20, and note ^a.

What I said above, of the difference between the description of *all the parts*, or *circumstances*, and the description of the *whole* by the selection of *those parts* or *circumstances* which are most striking, and characteristic of the thing described, may be illustrated by a single description of a *machine*, in Virgil: I mean the description of a *plough* in his *Georgics*.

Continuo in fylvis magnâ vi flexa domatur
 In burim, & CURVI formam accipit ulmus ARATRI.
 Huic ab stirpe pedes temo protentus in octo,
 Binæ aures, duplici aptantur dentalia dorso.
 Cæditur & tilia ante jugo levis, altaque fagus,
 Stivaque, quæ currus à tergo torqueat imos, &c.

I believe every reader will agree with me that the second line of this description: conveys, alone, a clearer *picture* of a plough to the imagination, than all that follows; which indeed differs little, if we except the *metre*, from a mere technical description in a dictionary of arts.

and

and historians, as well as Poets; and, particularly, in HOMER *. But there is one particular kind of description that may be said to be, in a great measure at least, peculiar to modern times; I mean that which answers to *landscape* in painting, and of which the subject is, prospects, views, rural scenery, &c. considered merely as *pictures*—as beautiful objects to the eye †. As the truth of this observation may not be readily admitted, and as the subject is curious, and has not, that I know of, been discussed, the reader will, perhaps, pardon me, if I suffer it to detain us from our direct path, in a digression of some length.

I do not mean to deny that there are some beautiful, though slight, touches of local description to be found in the antient Poets.

* Indeed, the very existence of an appropriated term, *εναρπυσια*, to denote the *clearness* and *visibility* of description, would alone furnish a sufficient proof of this, though every work in which it was exemplified had been lost.

† Descriptions of rural objects in the antient writers, are almost always, what may be called *sensual* descriptions. They describe them not as *beautiful*, but as *pleasant*;—as pleasures, not of the *imagination*, but of the *external senses*. Of this kind is the description of a Sicilian scene in the 7th pastoral of Theocritus, from ver. 131 to 146.—Refreshing shades, cool fountains, the singing of birds, sweet smells, boughs laden with fruit, the hum of bees, &c.—all this is charming, but it is not a *landscape*. [See Dr. Warton's *Essay on Pope*, vol. i. p. 4.] Nor does Virgil paint a landscape, though his reader may paint one for himself, when he exclaims,

— O qui me *gelidis* in vallibus Hæmi
Sistat, & ingenti ramorum *protegat* umbrâ.

Of the same kind is the famous description, in the *Phædrus* of Plato, of that spot on the banks of the Ilissus to which Socrates and Phædrus retire to read and converse together in the heat of a summer's day. The broad shade of a plane-tree, refreshing breezes, a spring, *μαλα ψυχρεῖ ἕδρα* †, to *cool their feet*, and, *what is best of all*, says Socrates,—(παρταν νομψεταισιν) a bed of grass in which they could recline at their ease—these are the materials of the description: not a single allusion to the pleasure of the eye.—We learn from a passage that follows this description, that the country had no charms for Socrates. His apology is curious. He could “*learn nothing from fields and trees.*” Συγγνωστε δὴ μοι, ὦ ἀγίτε, he says to Phædrus, who had rallied him on that subject, φιλομαθὴς γὰρ ἔμι. τα μὲν ἐν χωρίοις καὶ τὰ δένδρα ἕδεν με βελεῖ ἕδασθαι, ἢ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἀσέτι ἰσθρῶσι. *Phædrus*, p. 230. *Ed. Serrani.*

But it must be confessed, I think, that they scattered these beauties with a sparing hand, in comparison with that rich profusion of picturesque ideas which every reader of Poetry recollects in Shakespeare, Milton, Spenser, Thomson, and almost all the modern Poets of any name. Nor can I say that I am able to point out anything of this sort in the most descriptive of the *Greek* Poets—in Theocritus, or even in Homer—that fairly amounts to such picturesque *landscape-description* (if I may call it so), as I mean, and as we find so frequently in the Poets just mentioned. In Mr. Pope's *Poetical Index* to his Homer, we are referred, indeed, to descriptions of “*prospects*,” and “*landscapes of a fine country* ; but, if we turn to the original, we shall seldom, or never, find these landscapes. They are of Mr. Pope's painting ; sometimes suggested by a single epithet, as his

——— grassy Pteleon deck'd with chearful greens,
The bow'rs of Ceres and the sylvan scenes.

Iliad. II. 850.

One word only of this description is Homer's property, “*grassy*,” λεχεποιην^α. Many other instances may be found, particularly in his catalogue of the ships, which indeed he professes to have endeavoured to “*make appear as much a landscape or piece of painting as possible*.” [Obs. on the catalogue.] Sometimes he does more than “*open the prospect a little*,” as he expresses it ; he creates it. In his *perfidious* version (“*Perfida—fed quamvis per-*

^α II. B. 697. The adjective, *grassy*, however, is by no means adequate to—λεχεποιην,—i. e. την πολλαν ποαν εχρασαν και βαθειαν, εναντη, εν η εστι και ΔΕΞΑΣΘΑΙ, τετερι, ΚΟΙΜΗΘΗΝΑΙ. *Hesychius*.—Hence, probably, Mr. Pope's *bow'rs*, &c. A *single* word perfectly equivalent to a *single* word of the original cannot always be found. In this case, a translator, unwilling to fall short of the Poet's meaning, naturally endeavours to express in *more* words what *he* has said in one ; but in doing this, he will often be unavoidably reduced to the dilemma, of either misrepresenting the original, if he admits *different* or *additional* ideas, or, of weakening it by diffusion, if he does not.

“fida, cara tamen!”) “*lefty* Sefamus *invades the sky;*” and the river Parthenius

----- *vell'd thro' banks of flowers*
Reflects her bordering palaces and bowers.

Ib. 1040.

In Homer, the mountain and the river are simply *named*; not a single epithet attends them*. In the index to the *Odyſſey*, we find, among other deſcriptions, one, of “*the landſcape about Ithaca.*” This has a promiſing appearance. Mr. Pope indeed has done his utmoſt to *make* a landſcape of this deſcription; yet, even his tranſlation, though certainly beautiful, and even *pictureſque*, will hardly, I believe, be thought to come up to what a modern reader would expect from —“*the landſcape about Ithaca.*” Still leſs is this title applicable to the original“. All that can be ſaid of it without exaggeration is, that it is a very pleaſing ſcene, though deſcribed, as many things in Homer are deſcribed, with that ſimplicity which leaves a great deal, and *may* ſuggeſt a great deal, to the fancy of the reader. Though it does not anſwer to the idea given of it in Pope’s index, or in the *note* upon the place^o, yet it muſt be allowed to furniſh, at leaſt, ſome good *materials* for a landſcape; ſuch as, a grove^p, water falling from a rock, and a rustic altar. If the deſcription itſelf is too ſimple, ſhort, and *general*, to be, properly ſpeaking, *pictureſque deſcription*, yet it is ſuch as wants nothing, to become ſo, but a little more colouring of expreſſion, a little more diſtinctneſs and *ſpeciality* of touch. This, and more than this, Mr. Pope has given it; and that *his*

^o H. B. 853, 854.

^p Od. P. 204—211.

* It is obſervable that Homer gives us *an exact draught of the country*; he ſets before us, *as in a picture, the city, &c.*” Od. Book XVII. note on v. 224.

^p Homer’s grove is *circular*; ἄροιστος ἕρως ΚΥΚΛΟΤΕΠΙΣ, ver. 200. A circumſtance rather unpictureſque. Mr. Pope knew what to ſuppreſs, as well as what to add. He ſolters this into a “*ſurrounding grove.*”

deſcription

description is, at least, highly *picturesque*, will scarce be disputed. Homer gives us simply—"an altar to the nymphs?" Pope covers it with *moss*, and *embowers it deep in shades*; and in his concluding line, he goes beyond the description of the *place*, to the description of the *religio loci*"—of the *effect* of the place upon the minds of those who approached it.

Beneath, *sequester'd* to the nymphs is seen
 A *mossy* altar, *deep-embower'd* in green;
 Where constant vows by travellers are paid,
 And holy horrors solemnize the shade. v. 242.

—The additions of Mr. Pope's pencil are distinguished, in the above quotations, by *Italics*'. But, to *prove* the inferiority of the

* — βομ[⊙]—νυμφῶν. v. 210.

' Many such additions and improvements the reader will also find in his translation of Homer's description of the shield in the 18th book. To give one remarkable specimen:—The *eleventh compartment* of the shield, he tells us in his *Observations on the Shield* at the end of that book, is, "an *entire landscape* without human figures, an image of nature solitary and undisturbed, &c." Let us first view this landscape in the original. II. Σ. 587.

Ἐν δὲ νοίκῳ πείσσε περικλυτῷ Ἀμφιγυῖης,
 Ἐν κἀγῇ βήσση, μέγαν δῖον ὄρνυθλον,
 Σταδῶμ' τε, κλισίᾳ τε, κἀκίχρηας δὲ σκιῶς.

What I said of the simplicity and *generality* of the description last mentioned, in the *Odyssey*, is exactly applicable to this. Even in his *prose*-translation of these lines, [Obs. p. 123.] Mr. Pope could not perfectly command his fancy. "The divine artist then engraved a large flock of white sheep, *feeding along* a beautiful valley. *Innumerable* folds, *cottages*, and enclosed shelters, were *SCATTERED* *through the* PROSPECT." The expressions I have distinguished are Mr. Pope's; their effect on the *visibility* and distinctness of the picture, I need not point out. The last addition—"scattered through the prospect," is particularly *picturesque*.—Now, let us turn to his *poetic* version, and there, indeed, we shall find that finished landscape of which Homer furnished only the simple sketch:

Next this, *the eye* the art of Vulcan leads
 Deep through fair forests, and a length of meads;
 And stalls, and folds, and scatter'd cots between,
 And stony rocks that whiten all the scene.

antients in this species of description, by an accurate and comparative examination of all those passages which are commonly produced as examples of it, would be a task of considerable length, though, I think, of no great difficulty. The few instances here given from Homer are intended rather as illustrations of the difference I meant to point out, than as proofs of the *general* fact, which I leave to the recollection and the judgment of the reader. To me, I confess, nothing appears more evident.

And may we not account for this defect in antient Poetry, from a similar defect in the sister art of PAINTING?—For it appears, I think, from all that has been transmitted to us of the history of that art among the antients, that *landscape-painting* either did not exist, or, at least, was very little cultivated or regarded among the Greeks*. In Pliny's account of Grecian artists we find no landscape-painter mentioned; nor anything like a landscape described in his catalogue of their principal works. The first, and the only landscapes he mentions, are those said to be painted *in fresco* by one *Ludius* in the time of Augustus; “qui *primus instituit* amœnissimam parietum picturam;—villas, & porticus, ac
“topiaria opera—*lucos, nemora, colles,—annes, littora*—varias
“*ibi obambulantium species, aut navigantium, terræque villas*
“*adventium ævellis aut vehiculis, &c.*”—He likewise painted seaports;—“idemque ——— maritimas urbes pingere *instituit*, blan-

* The Abbé Winckelmann, eminent for the accuracy of his researches into every thing relative to the subject of antient arts, gives it as his opinion, that the paintings discovered in the ruins of Herculæum, (*four* only excepted,) are not older than the times of the Emperors; and he assigns this reason, among others, that most of them are only *landscapes*:—“*Payfages, ports, maisons de campagne, chassés, pêches, vues, & que le premier qui travailla dans ce genre fut un certain Ludio qui vivoit du tems d'Auguste.*” He adds,—“*Les anciens Grecs ne s'amusoient pas à peindre des objets inanimés, uniquement propres à recevoir agreablement la vue sans occuper l'esprit.*” [*Hist. de l'Art chez les Anciens, tome ii. p. 104.*] The remark seems just. *Men and manners*, were the only objects which the Greeks seem to have thought worth regarding, either in painting, or poetry.

“*diffimo aspectu*.” He seems to have been the Claude Lorraine of ancient painting. But, that *landscape* was not, even in Pliny’s time, a common and established branch of painting, may perhaps be presumed from the single circumstance of its not having acquired a name. In the passage just quoted, Pliny calls it only, periphrastically, “an agreeable kind of painting, or subject,” “*amœnissimam picturam*.*” He is not sparing of technical terms upon other occasions; as, *xylographus*, *anthropographus*, *catagrapha*, *monocromata*, &c. With respect to the Greeks, at least, this may be allowed to afford somewhat more than a presumption of the fact.

The Greek Poets, then, did not describe the scenery of nature in a picturesque manner, because they were not accustomed to see it with a painter’s eye. Undoubtedly they were not blind to all the beauties of such scenes; but those beauties were not heightened to them, as they are to us, by comparison with painting—with those models of *improved* and *selected* nature, which it is the business of the landscape-painter to exhibit. They had no THOMSONS, because they had no CLAUDES. Indeed, the influence of painting, in this respect, not only on Poetry, but on the *general taste* for the visible beauties of rural nature, seems obvious and indisputable †. Shew the most beautiful prospect to

* Plin. Hist. Nat. xxxv. 10.

† It is remarkable also, that the younger Pliny, where he describes the view from one of his villas, and compares it to a painted landscape, expresses himself, probably for want of an appropriated term, (such as *passage*, &c.) by a periphrasis;—“*formam aliquam ad eximiam pulchritudinem pictam*”;—i. e. “a beautiful ideal landscape.” Plin. Ep. lib. v. ep. 6.

‡ I do not know that there is, either in the Greek or Roman language, any single term appropriated to express exactly what we mean by a *prospect*. Pliny, in the epistle referred to in note *, and in the 17th of 2d book, has frequent occasion for such a term, but is obliged to have recourse to circumlocution—*regionis forma—regionis situm—facies—facies locorum*. “Tot *facies locorum* totidem fenestris & distinguit & miscet.” [ii. 17.] Ang.—“so many *prospects*.”

a peasant, who never saw a landscape, or read a description: I do not say that he will absolutely feel *no* pleasure from it; but I will venture to say, that the pleasure he will feel is very different in *kind*, and very inferior in *degree*, compared with that which is felt by a person of a cultivated imagination, accustomed to the representation of such objects, either in painting, or in picturesque Poetry. Such beauty does imitation reflect back upon the object imitated'.—What may serve to confirm the truth of these remarks, is, that from the time of Augustus, when, according to Pliny, landscape-painting was first cultivated, descriptions of prospects, picturesque imagery, and allusions to that kind of painting, seem to have become more common. I do not pretend, however, to have accurately examined this matter. I shall only remind the reader of the acknowledged superiority of Virgil in touches of this kind; of Pliny's description of the view from his villa, mentioned above; and of Ælian's description of the Vale of Tempe, and his allusion to painting in the introduction to it².

To return to *description in general*;—this, as I observed above, Aristotle was so far from including in his notion of *imitation*, that he is even totally silent concerning it; unless he may be thought slightly to allude to it in one passage, where he recommends it to the Poet to reserve his highest colouring of language for the *inactive*, that is, the merely narrative, or *descriptive*, parts of his poem³. Several obvious circumstances help to account for this silence. Intent on the higher precepts, and on what he regarded as the more essential beauties of the art—the internal construc-

2 “Elegant imitation has strange powers of interesting us in certain views of nature. These we consider but transiently, till the Poet, or *Painter*, awake our attention, and send us back to life with a new curiosity, which we owe entirely to the copies which they lay before us.” Preface to Wood's Essay on Homer, p. 13.

3 See above, Part I. note ^m.

4 Ἐν τοῖς ἀρτοῖς μερεσὶ, καὶ μὴτε ἠθικοῖς, μὴτε διαπονητικῶς. Cap. xxiv. Translation, Part III. Sect. 6. See the NOTE.

tion and contrivance of the fable, the artful dependence and close connection of the incidents, the union of the wonderful and the probable, the natural delineation of character and passion, and whatever tended most effectually to arrest the attention, and secure the emotion, of the spectator or the reader—intent on these, he seems to have thought the beauties of language and expression a matter of inferior consideration, scarce worthy of his attention. The chapters on *diction* seem to afford some proof of this. The manner in which he has treated that subject, will be found, if I mistake not, to bear strong marks of this comparative negligence, and to be, in several respects, not such as the reader, from the former parts of the work, would naturally expect^b. To this it should be added, that Aristotle's principal object was, evidently, Tragedy. Now in Tragedy, where the Poet himself appears not,—where all is action, emotion, imitation—where the succession of incidents is close and rapid, and rarely admits those ἀργα μερη, those “idle or inactive parts,” of which the philosopher speaks—there is, of course, but little occasion, and little room, for description. It is in the open and extended plan, the varied and digressive narration, of the Epic form, that the descriptive powers of the Poet have full range to display themselves within their proper province.

I have attempted, in the preceding discussion, to make my way through a subject, which I have never seen treated in a way perfectly clear and satisfactory by others, and which I am therefore far from confident that I have treated clearly myself. I can only hope that I have, at least, left it less embarrassed than I found it^c.

I shall

^b See the NOTES on that part.

^c Some writers, by *imitation* understand *fiction* only: others explain it only by the general term *description*; and others, again, give it a greater extent, and seem to consider language as *imitating* whatever it can *express*. [See above, note ^b, and Harris on *Music*, &c. ch. i.] Some speak of it as the imitation of *nature*, in general; others

I shall venture, with the same view, to terminate this inquiry by a few remarks on the *origin* of this doctrine of poetic *imitation*.

Its history may be sketched in few words.—We find it first in PLATO; alluded to in many parts of his works, but no where so clearly and particularly developed, as in the *third* and *tenth* books of his Republic. ARISTOTLE followed; applying, and pursuing to its consequences, with the enlarged view of a philosopher and a critic, the principle which his master had considered with the severity of a moral censor, and had described, as we describe an impostor or a robber, only, that being known, it might be avoided^d.

From these sources, but principally from the treatise of Aristotle, this doctrine was derived, through the later antient, to the latest modern writers. In general, however, it must be confessed, that the way in which the subject has been explained is not such as is calculated to give perfect satisfaction to those fastidious understandings that are not to be contented with anything less than distinct ideas; that, like the sun-dial in the fable, allow of no medium between knowing clearly, and knowing nothing.

Si je ne vois bien clair, je dis—Je n'en sçais rien^e.

It is one question, in what senses, and from what original ideas, Poetry was *first* called imitation by Plato and Aristotle; and another, what senses may have suggested themselves to modern writers, who finding Poetry denominated an imitative art, instead

seem to confine it to the imitation of *la belle nature*.—By some writers, the proposition, that “ALL POETRY is imitation,” is considered as too plain a point to need any explanation; while others are unable to see why *any* Poetry, except the *dramatic only*, should be so denominated. [See Wood's Essay on Homer, p. 240, *clavo*, and the note.]

^d The chief objections of Plato to *imitative* Poetry, particularly Tragedy, may be seen in the 10th book of his Republic, from *πρᾶτοντας, φασιν, ἀνθρώπου*;—p. 603, C, to *ἐμπροσ*, p. 608, B. Ed. Serrani.

^e *La Montre et le Quadrant*, in the ingenious and philosophical fables of La Motte. Livre iii. fab. 2.

of carefully investigating the original meaning of the expression, have had recourse, for its explication, to their own ideas, and have, accordingly, extended it to every sense which the widest and most distant analogy would bear.

With respect to the *origin* of the appellation—the very idea that Poetry is *imitation*, may, I think, evidently be traced to the THEATRE as to its natural source; and it may, perhaps, very reasonably be questioned, whether, if the drama had never been invented, Poetry would ever have been placed in the class of *Imitative Arts*.

That ARISTOTLE drew his ideas of Poetic imitation chiefly from the drama, is evident from what has been already said. His preference, indeed, of dramatic Poetry, is not only openly declared in his concluding chapter, but strongly marked throughout, and by the very plan and texture of his work. The Epic—that “greatest work,” as Dryden extravagantly calls it, “which *the soul of man* is capable to perform^f,” is slightly touched and soon dismissed. Our eye is still kept on Tragedy. The form and features of the Epic Muse are rather described by comparison with those of her sister, than delineated as they are in themselves; and though that preference which is the result of the comparison seems justly given on the whole, yet it must, perhaps, be confessed, that the comparison is not *completely* stated, and that the advantages and privileges of the Epic are touched with some reserve^g. It is, indeed, no wonder, that he, who held imitation to be the essence of Poetry, should prefer that species which, being

^f *Pref.* to his *Æneid*.

^g For example:—in Part III. sect. 2. [*Orig. ch. xxiv.*] he had allowed the greater *extent* of the Epic Poem to give it an advantage over Tragedy in point of *variety* and *magnificence*. But, in the comparison between them in his last chapter, this important advantage is entirely passed over, and only the *disadvantages* of the epic extent of plan are mentioned; its *variety*, the want of which he had before allowed to be a great defect, and even a frequent cause of ill success, in tragedy, is here stated only as a fault—as want of *unity*. [See Part V. sect. 3. *Orig. cap. xxvi.*]

more strictly imitative, was, in his view, more strictly *Poetry*, than any other.

With respect to PLATO the case is still plainer. In the *third* book of his Republic, where he treats the subject most fully, and is most clear and explicit, he is so far from considering “*all Poetry*” as imitation, that he expressly distinguishes *imitative Poetry* from “*Poetry without imitation*”^h. Nor does he leave us in any uncertainty about his meaning. His *imitative Poetry* is no other than that which I have called *personative*, and which the reader will find clearly and precisely described in the passage referred toⁱ. Imitation, then, he confines to the drama, and the dramatic part of the epic poem; and that, which with Aristotle is the *principal*, with Plato is the *only*, sense of *imitation* applied to Poetry. In short, that Plato drew his idea of the ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ of Poetry from the theatre itself, and from the personal imitations of *represented* tragedy, is evident from the manner in which he explains the term, and from the general cast and language of all his illustrations and allusions.—“When the Poet,” he says, “quitting his narration, makes any speech in the character of *another person*, does he not then assimilate, as much as possible, his language to that of the person introduced as speaking?—Certainly.—But to assimilate one’s self to another person, *either in VOICE or GESTURE*—is not this to IMITATE that person^k?” And in many other passages we find the same allusion to the imitations, by *voice* and *action*, of the actor and the rhapsodist; and even to ludicrous mimicry of the lowest kind^l.

All

^h Rep. 3. *ed. Ser.* p. 393. ἀνευ μιμησεως ποιησις. and *lib.* x. p. 605. ὁ μιμητικὸς ποιητής.

ⁱ Rep. 3. from D, p. 392, to D, p. 394. *ed. Ser.*

^k Ἀλλ’ ὅταν γε τινα λέγη ῥῆσιν ὡς τις ἄλλος ἂν, ἀρ’ οὐ τότε ἴμοιεν αὐτὸν φησομεν ὀψιμαδία τὴν αὐτὴν λέξιν ἕκαστον ἂν ἂν παροιστῆ ὡς ἕρποντα;—Φησομεν τι γὰρ ἔ;—Οὐκὲν το γέ ὁμοιον ἑαυτὸν ἄλλω, ἢ κατὰ ΦΩΝΗΝ, ἢ κατὰ ΣΩΜΑ, μιμησθαι ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἢ ἂν τις ἴμοιαι; *Rep.* 3, p. 393. *ed. Serran.*

^l *Ibid.* p. 395—κατὰ ΣΩΜΑ καὶ ΦΩΝΑΣ.—p. 397, γέλις δια μιμησεως ΦΩΝΑΣ τε καὶ ΣΩΜΑΣ. The reader may also see p. 396 and 397; in both which places he alludes

All this will scarce appear strange or surprising, if we recollect the close connection which then subsisted between *poetical* and *personal*

alludes even to the lowest and most ridiculous kind of mimicry. The passages are so curious and amusing, that the reader will pardon me if I suffer them, *in a note*, to lead me into a short digression. He speaks in them of *imitating*, or, as we call it, *taking off*, “the neighing of horses, and the bellowing of bulls—the sound of thunder, the roaring of the sea and the winds—the tones of the trumpet, the flute, and all sorts of instruments—the barking of dogs, the bleating of sheep, and the singing of birds—the *rattle of a shower of hail*, and the *rumbling of wheels*.”—The sublime Plato was not always sublime.—The expressions here are too strong to be understood merely of the imitations of *poetical description*; they are applicable only to *vocal* mimicry. Were there any doubt of this, it might be sufficiently removed by other passages of antient authors in which similar feats are recorded. Plutarch, [*De aud. Poet.* ed. H. Steph. p. 31.] commenting upon Aristotle’s distinction, Part I. § 5, between the pleasure we receive from the imitation, and that which we receive from the real object, observes, that—“though the grunting of a hog, the rattle of wheels, the whistling of the wind, and the roaring of the sea, for instance, are sounds, in themselves offensive and disagreeable, yet when we hear them well and naturally imitated, *they give us pleasure*.” And he records the names of two eminent performers in this way, *Parmeno*, and *Theodorus*; the first of whom possessed the grunt of the hog, and the other the rattle of the wheel, in high perfection.—This *Theodorus* was, probably, a different person from the tragic actor of the same name, whose vocal talents of a higher kind are mentioned by Aristotle in his Rhetoric, (*lib. iii. cap. 1.*) and who was eminent for the power of accommodating the tone of his voice to the various characters he represented. “The voice,” says the philosopher, “of Theodorus appears always to be that of the very person supposed to speak: not so the voices of other actors.” In order fully to understand which praise, it is necessary to recollect, that this vocal flexibility in an actor had far greater room to display itself among the antients, than it has with us, on account of the exclusion of women from their stage. Hence one of the objections of Plato to the admission of dramatic Poetry into his Republic: *ἔδη ἐπιτρέψομεν ὡν φοιμεν κινεσθαι, και δευ αυτες ανδρας αγαθες γενεσθαι, ΓΥΝΑΙΚΑ ΜΙΜΗΣΘΑΙ, ΑΝΔΡΑΣ ΟΝΤΑΣ. κ. τ. αλ.* [*Rep.* 3. p. 395, D.]—a passage which may also serve to confirm what has been asserted, that Plato, in speaking of Poetry as imitation, constantly kept his eye on the personal imitation of the actor or the rhapsodist.—To return to the art of vocal mimicry:—the passages above produced shew it to have been of very respectable antiquity. But there are two other passages that make it still more venerable; one in the hymn to Apollo attributed to Homer, *v.* 162, 3, 4,—where the musical *imitations* of the Delian virgins are described; (see Dr. Burney’s *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 372.) and

personal imitation. It was by no means with the antients as it is with us. Before the multiplication of copies was facilitated by the invention of printing, *reading* was uncommon. It was not even till long after, that it became, in any degree, the general practice, as it is now. Yet Poetry, we know, among the Greeks, was the common food even of the vulgar. But they *heard* it only. The philosopher, the critic, and the few who collected books when they could be obtained only by the labour or expence of transcription, might, indeed, take a tragedy or an epic poem into their closets; but, to the generality, all was action, representation, and recital. The tragic, and even the epic poet, were,

- another very curious passage in the *Odyssey*, Δ. 279, by which it appears, that the art was practised even in the Trojan times, and that the beautiful HELEN herself, among her other charms, possessed the talent of vocal mimicry in a degree that would, in modern times, have qualified her to make no inconsiderable figure at Bartholomew-fair. She is described as walking round the wooden horse, after its admission within the walls of Troy, calling, by name, upon each of the Grecian chiefs, and "*imitating the voices of their wives*."—Ἡρώτων Ἀργείων φωνῶν ἰκνῆσθ' ἀναγγίσσει. And so well did she *take them off*, that their husbands were on the point of betraying themselves by answering, or coming out. Anticlus, in particular, would have spoken, if Ulysses had not, by main force, *stopped his mouth with his hand*, till Minerva came to their relief, and took Helen away.

— ἀλλ' Ὀδυσσεύς ἴππῃ μαστάκα χερσὶ πίεζε
 ΝΩΛΕΜΕΩΣ ΚΡΑΤΕΡΗΙΣΙ, σαῶσε δὲ πάντας Ἀχαιούς! — Od. Δ. 287, 8.

A line *added* in Pope's translation of this passage, affords a curious example of misapplied ornament:—

Firm to his lips his forceful hands apply'd,
 Till on his tongue the flut'ring murmurs dy'd. B. IV. v. 391.

— one instance out of many that might be quoted, of the ridiculous effect produced, (especially in the *Odyssey*,) by continual efforts to elevate what neither *should* nor *can* be elevated. In the version of the 16th book, (a version *approved* at least by Mr. Pope) we have this line:

"They reach'd the *dome*; the *dome* with marble *shin'd*." v. 41.

— who would suspect this to be a description of the rude building which Eumæus, "αὐτῷ δὲ τιμῆς ἰσοσύνη?" [Lib. xiv. 8.] All that is to be found of this *marble dome* in Homer is a "*stone threshold*."—ἰπέρεβη θάμων ἄδων! v. 41.

in a manner, lost in the actor and the rhapsodist^m. A tragedy not intended for the stage, would have appeared to the ancients as great an absurdity as an ode not written for music. With *them*, there could be no difficulty in conceiving Poetry to be an *Imitative Art*, when it was scarce known to them but through the visible medium of arts, strictly and literally, mimetic.

^m The rhapsodist was defined to be, *the actor of an epic Poem*. Ραψῳδοί—ὑποκριταὶ ἔπων. *Hesych.*—Ραψῳδοί—ὅτι τὰ Ὁμήρου ἐπιπνὲν ἐν τοῖς θεατροῖς ἀπαγγέλλοντες.—*Suidas*. “Homer’s Poems,” says the ingenious and entertaining author of the *Enquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer*, “were made to be recited, or sung to a company; and not read in private, or perused in a book, which few were then capable of doing: and I will venture to affirm, that whoever reads not *Homer* in *this view*, “loses a great part of the delight he might receive from the Poet.”—*Blackwell’s Enquiry, &c.* p. 122.

DISSERTATION II.

ON THE DIFFERENT SENSES OF THE WORD,
IMITATIVE, AS APPLIED TO MUSIC BY THE
ANTIEN TS, AND BY THE MODERNS.

THE whole power of Music may be reduced, I think, to *three* distinct effects;—upon the *ear*, the *passions*, and the *imagination*: in other words, it may be considered as simply delighting the *sense*, as raising *emotions*, or, as raising *ideas*. The two last of these effects constitute the whole of what is called the *moral**, or *expressive*, power of Music; and in these only we are to look for anything that can be called *imitation*. Music can be said to imitate, no farther than as it *expresses* something. As far as its effect is merely physical, and confined to the ear, it gives a simple, original pleasure; it expresses nothing, it *refers* to nothing; it is no more imitative than the smell of a rose, or the flavour of a pine-apple.

Music can raise ideas, *immediately*^a, only by the actual resemblance of its *sounds* and *motions* to the sounds and motions of the thing

* *Moral*, merely as opposed to *physical*:—as affecting the *mind*; not as *Ethic*, or influencing the *manners*.

^a Music may raise ideas *immediately*, by mere *association*; but I pass over the effects of this principle, (important and powerful as it is, in Music, as in everything else,)

thing suggested^b. Such Music we call *imitative*, in the same sense in which we apply the word to a similar resemblance of sound and motion in poetry^c. In both cases, the resemblance, though *immediate*, is so *imperfect*, that it cannot be seen till it is, in some sort, pointed out; and even when it *is* so, is not always very evident. Poetry, indeed, has here a great advantage; it carries with it, of necessity, its own explanation: for the same word that imitates by its *sound*, points out, or hints, at least, the imitation, by its *meaning*. With Music it is not so. It must call in the assistance of language, or something equivalent to language, for its interpreter^d.

Of all the powers of Music, this of raising ideas by direct resemblance is confessed to be the weakest, and the least important. It is, indeed, so far from being essential to the pleasure of the art, that unless used with great caution, judgment, and delicacy,

as having nothing to do with *imitation*. If, to raise an idea of any object by casual association, be to *imitate*, any one thing may imitate any other.

I inserted the word, *immediately*, because Music has also a power of raising ideas, to a certain degree, through the *medium* of *emotions*, which naturally suggest correspondent ideas; that is, *such* ideas as usually raise *such* emotions. [See Harris, *on Music*, &c. ch. vi. and below, note^e.]

^b See Harris, *ibid.* ch. ii. where this subject is treated with the author's usual accuracy and clearness.

^c See *Dissert.* I.

^d When the idea to be raised is that of a visible object, the imitation of that object by painting, machinery, or other visible representation, may answer the same end.—A visible object strongly characterized by motion, may be suggested by such *musical* motion as is analogous to it. Thus, a rapid elevation of sounds, bears, or at least is *conceived* to bear, some analogy to the motion of flame;—but this analogy must be pointed out—“Il faut que l'auditeur soit averti, ou par les *paroles*, ou par le *spectacle*, “ou par quelque chose d'équivalent, qu'il doit substituer l'idée du feu à celle du son.” See M. D'Alembert's *Mélanges de Littérature*, vol. v. p. 158,—where the philosophical reader will, perhaps, be pleased with some very ingenious and uncommon observations, on the manner in which the imitative expression even of *Music without words*, may be influenced by the phraseology of the language in which the hearer *thinks*.

it will destroy that pleasure, by becoming, to every competent judge, offensive, or ridiculous. It is, however, to Music of *this* kind only that Mr. Harris, and most other modern writers, allow the word *imitative* to be applied^e. The highest power of Music; and that from which “it derives its greatest efficacy,” is, undoubtedly, its power of raising *emotions*. But this is so far from being regarded by them as *imitation*, that it is expressly *opposed* to it^f.

The ideas, and the language, of the ancients, on this subject, were different. When *they* speak of Music as imitation, they appear to have solely, or chiefly, in view, its power over the *affections*. By *imitation*, they mean, in short, what *we* commonly distinguish from imitation, and oppose to it, under the general term of *expression*^g. With respect to ARISTOTLE, in particular, this will clearly appear from a few passages which I shall produce from another of his writings; and, at the same time, the expressions made use of in these passages, will help us to *account* for a mode of speaking so different from that of modern writers on the subject.

What Aristotle, in the beginning of his treatise on Poetry*, calls ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ—IMITATION— he elsewhere, in the same application of it, to *Music*, calls ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑ—RESEMBLANCE. And he, also, clears up his meaning farther, by adding the *thing* *resem-*

^e Dr. Beattie, *On Poetry and Music*, p. 138, & *passim*.—Lord Kaims, *El. of Crit.* vol. ii. p. 1. Avifon, &c.—There is but *one* branch of this imitation of *sound* by *sound*, that is really important; and *that* has been generally overlooked. I mean, the imitation of the *tones* of *speech*.—Of this, presently.

^f Harris, *On Music*, &c. p. 69, 99, 100.

^g “If we compare *imitation* with *expression*, the superiority of the latter will be evident.”—Dr. Beattie, *On Poetry and Music*, p. 139, 140, &c.—Avifon, *on Mus. Expression*, Part II. § 3.

* και της ἀουδτικῆς ἢ ψαλτικῆς, και μιθετικῆς — μιμητικῆς.—See *Seft.* I. of the translation.

bled or imitated":—ὁμοιωμα ΤΟΙΣ ΗΘΕΣΙ—ὁμοιωματα ΤΩΝ ΗΘΩΝⁱ—“resemblance to human manners,” i. e. *dispositions*, or *tempers*; for what he means by these ἠθη, he has, likewise, clearly explained by these expressions—ὁμοιωματα ΟΡΓΗΣ και ΠΡΑΟΤΗΤΟΣ· ἐν δ’ΑΝΔΡΙΑΣ και ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗΣ, &c. “resemblances of the irascible and “the gentle disposition—of fortitude and temperance, &c.”^k This resemblance, he expressly tells us, is “in the *rhythm* and the “*melody* :”—ὁμοιωματα — ἐν τοῖς ΠΡΩΜΟΙΣ και τοῖς ΜΕΛΕΣΙΝ, ὀργῆς και πραοτητῶ^l. In these passages, Aristotle differs only in the *mode* of expression from Mr. Harris, when he affirms that “there are sounds to make us chearful or sad, martial or tender, &c.”^m :—from Dr. Beattie, when he says, “Music may inspire “devotion, fortitude, compassion;—may infuse a sorrow, &c.”ⁿ.

It appears then, in the *first* place, that Music, considered as affecting, or raising *emotions*, was called imitation by the antients, because they perceived in it that which is essential to all imitation, and is, indeed, often spoken of as the same thing—*resemblance*°.

This

^h In the same passage he uses the word μιμημα, as synonymous with ὁμοιωμα.

ⁱ Arist. de Repub. lib. viii. cap. 5, p. 455, *Ed. Duval*. Plato uses μιμηματα ΤΡΟΠΩΝ in the same sense. *De leg.* lib. ii. p. 655, *Ed. Ser.*

^k The word, ἠθη, taken in its utmost extent, includes *everything* that is *habitual* and *characteristic*; but it is often used in a limited sense, for the *habitual temper*, or *disposition*. That it is here used in that sense appears from Aristotle’s own explanation. I therefore thought it necessary to fix the sense of the word *manners*, which has the same *generality* as ἠθη, and is its usual translation, by adding the words “*dispositions* or *tempers*.”

^l The same expressions occur in the *Problems*, *Sec.* xix. *Prob.* 29 and 27.

^m Chap. vi.

ⁿ *On Poet. and Mus.* p. 167.—In another place Dr. Beattie approaches very near indeed to the language of Aristotle; he says, “After all, it must be acknowledged, “that there is some *relation*, at least, or *analogy*, if not *SIMILITUDE*, between “certain musical sounds, and mental affections, &c.” [p. 143.]

^o “Imitations, or resemblances, of something else.” [Hutcheson’s *Inquiry into the Orig. of our Ideas of Beauty*, &c. p. 15.] “Taking imitation in its proper sense,

This resemblance, however, as *here* stated by Aristotle, cannot be *immediate*^p; for between *sounds themselves*, and *mental affections*, there can be no resemblance. The resemblance can only be a resemblance of *effect*:—the *general emotions, tempers, or feelings* produced in us by certain sounds, are *like* those that accompany actual grief, joy, anger, &c.—And this, as far, at least, as can be collected from the passage in question, appears to be all that Aristotle meant.

But, *secondly*;—the *expressions* of Music considered in itself, and *without words*, are, (within certain limits,) vague, general, and equivocal. What is usually called its power over the *passions*, is, in fact, no more than a power of raising a *general emotion, temper, or disposition*, common to several different, though *related*, passions; as pity, love—anger, courage, &c.^q. The effect of *words*, is, to strengthen the expression of Music, by confining it—by giving it a precise direction, supplying it with ideas, circumstances, and an *object*, and, by this means, raising it from a calm and *general* disposition, or emotion, into something approaching, at least, to the stronger feeling of a particular and determinate *passion*. Now, among the antients, Music, it is well known, was scarce ever heard *without* this assistance. Poetry and Music were then far from having reached that state of mutual independence, and separate improvement, in which they have now been long established. When an antient writer speaks of MUSIC, he is, almost always, to be understood to mean *vocal* Music—Music and Poetry united. This helps greatly to account for the application of the

“as importing a *resemblance* between two objects.” [Lord Kaimes, *El. of Crit.* ch. xviii. § 3.] Imitation, indeed, necessarily implies resemblance; but the converse is not true.

^p See *Dissert. I. first pages*.

^q The expression of Aristotle seems therefore accurate and philosophical. It is everywhere—*ὁμοιωμα ἠθῶν*,—not *ἠαθῶν*—a resemblance “to *manners, or tempers*,” not “to *passions*.”

term *imitative*, by Aristotle, Plato, and other Greek writers, to musical *expression*, which modern writers *oppose* to musical *imitation*. That emotions *are* raised by Music, independently of words, is certain^r; and it is as certain that these emotions resemble those of actual passion, temper, &c.—But, in the vague and indeterminate assimilations of Music purely instrumental, though the effect is felt, and the emotion raised, the idea of *resemblance* is far from being necessarily suggested; much less is it likely, that such resemblance, if it did occur, having no *precise* direction, should be considered as *imitation*^s. Add *words* to this Music, and the case

^r This is expressly allowed by Aristotle in the Problem which will presently be produced:—και γαρ ἐστὶ ἢ ἄνευ λόγου μέλον, ὁμοίως ἔχει ἡθόσ.

^s I observed (*Note* ^a.) that Music is capable of raising *ideas*, to a certain degree, through the medium of those *emotions* which it raises *immediately*. But this is an effect so delicate and uncertain—so dependent on the fancy, the sensibility, the musical experience, and even the temporary disposition, of the *bearer*, that to call it *imitation*, is surely going beyond the bounds of all reasonable analogy. Music, here, is not *imitative*, but if I may hazard the expression, merely *suggestive*. But, whatever we may call it, this I will venture to say,—that in the *best* instrumental Music, expressively *performed*, the very indecision itself of the expression, leaving the hearer to the free operation of his *emotion* upon his *fancy*, and, as it were, to the free *choice* of such ideas as are, *to him*, most adapted to react upon and heighten the emotion which occasioned them, produces a pleasure, which nobody, I believe, who is able to feel it, will deny to be one of the most delicious that Music is capable of affording. But far the greater part even of those who have an ear for Music, have *only* an ear; and to *them* this pleasure is unknown.—The complaint, so common, of the separation of Poetry and Music, and of the total want of meaning and expression in *instrumental* Music, was never, I believe, the complaint of a man of true musical feeling: and it might, perhaps, be not unfairly concluded, that Aristotle, who expressly allows that “Music, even *without words*, has *expression*,” [See the Problem below.] was more of a musician than his master Plato, who is fond of railing at instrumental Music, and asks with Fontenelle,—“Sonate, que me veux tu?—*παιζαζαρεσπον, άνευ λογου γιγνομενοι ζυθμον τε και αρμησιαν γιγνισκειν, Ο, ΤΙ ΒΟΥΛΕΤΑΙ. De Leg.* ii. p. 669. [The story of Fontenelle is well known.—“Je n’oublierai jamais,” says Rouffcau, “la faillie du celebre Fontenelle, qui se trouvant excede de ces eternelles symphonies, s’ecria tout haut dans un transport d’impatience: *Sonate, que me*

case will be very different. There is now a precise object of *comparison* presented to the mind; the *resemblance* is pointed out; the thing *imitated* is before us. Farther, one principal use of Music in the time of Aristotle, was to accompany *dramatic Poetry*—*that Poetry* which is most peculiarly and strictly *imitative*¹, and where *manners* and *passions* (ἠθῆ καὶ πάθη) are peculiarly the *objects* of imitation.

It is, then, no wonder, that the Antients, accustomed to hear the expressions of Music thus constantly *specified*, determined, and referred to a precise object by the ideas of Poetry, should view them in the light of *imitations*; and that even in speaking of *Music*, properly so called, as Aristotle does, they should be led by this association to speak of it in the same terms, and to attribute to it powers, which, in its separate state, do not, in strictness, belong to it. With respect, however, even to the *instrumental* Music of those times, it should be remembered, that we cannot properly judge of it by our *own*, nor suppose it to have been, in that simple state of the art, what it is now, in its state of separate improvement and refinement. It seems highly probable that the Music of the antients, even in performances merely instrumental, retained much of its vocal style and character, and would therefore appear more *imitative* than *our* instrumental Music: and perhaps, after all, a Greek Solo on the flute, or the cithara, was not *much* more than a song without the words, embellished here and there with a little embroidery, or a few sprinklings of simple *arpeggio*, such as the fancy, and the fingers, of the player could supply.

voux tu?” *Diſt. de Muſ.*—SONATE.] I would by no means be underſtood to deny, that there is now, and has been at all times, much unmeaning traſh compoſed for inſtruments, that would juſtly provoke ſuch a queſtion. I mean only to ſay, what has been ſaid for me by a ſuperior judge and maſter of the art:—“There is *ſome* kind, even of inſtrumental Muſic, ſo divinely compoſed, and ſo expreſſively performed, that it wants no *words* to explain its meaning.”—Dr. Burney’s *Hiſt. of Muſic*, vol. i. p. 85.

¹ *Diſt.* I.

But there is another circumstance that deserves to be considered. *Dramatic Music* is, often, *strictly imitative*. It imitates, not only the *effect* of the words, by exciting correspondent *emotions*, but also the *words* themselves *immediately*, by tones, accents, inflexions, intervals, and rhythmical movements, *similar* to those of speech. That this was peculiarly the character of the *dramatic Music* of the antients, seems highly probable, not only from what is said of it by antient authors, but from what we know of their Music *in general*; of their scales, their *genera*, their fondness for *chromatic* and *enharmonic* intervals, which approach so nearly to those sliding and unassignable inflexions, (if I may so speak,) that characterize the melody of *speech*.

I am, indeed, persuaded, that the analogy between the melody and rhythm of *Music*, and the melody and rhythm of *speech*, is a principle of greater extent and importance than is commonly imagined. Some writers have extended it so far as to resolve into it the whole power of Music over the affections. Such appears to have been the idea of Rousseau. He divides all Music into *natural* and *imitative*; including, under the latter denomination, all Music that goes beyond the mere pleasure of the sense, and raises any kind or degree of emotion; an effect which he conceives to be wholly owing to an imitation, more or less perceptible, of the accents and inflexions of the voice in animated or passionate speech*. Professor Hutcheson was of the same opinion. In his *Inquiry concerning Beauty, &c.* he says—"There is also another "charm in Music to various persons, which is distinct from the "harmony, and is occasioned by its *raising agreeable passions*. The "human voice is obviously varied by all the stronger passions";

" now

* — λεγεται γαρ δη και ΛΟΓΩΔΕΣ ΤΙ ΜΕΛΟΣ, το συνημμενον εκ των προσωδιων των εν τοις ονομασι. [*Aristox. Harm. i. p. 18. Ed. Meibom.*] To this he opposes—ΜΟΥΣΙΚΟΝ ΜΕΛΟΣ.

* Dict. de Musique, Art. MUSIQUE—MELODIE, &c.

* Thus THEOPHRASTUS, in a curious passage cited by Plutarch in his *Symposiac*,

“ now when our *ear* discerns any *resemblance* between the air of a “ tune, whether sung, or played upon an instrument, either in its “ *time* or *modulation*, or any other circumstance, to the *sound of the* “ *human voice in any passion*, we shall be touched by it in a very “ sensible manner, and have *melancholy, joy, gravity, thoughtfulness,* “ excited in us by a sort of *sympathy* or *contagion*.” [Sect. 6. p. 83.] This ingenious and amiable writer seems to have adopted this opinion from PLATO, to whom, indeed, in a similar passage in his System of Moral Philosophy^r, he refers, and who, in the *third* book of his Republic, speaks of a *warlike* melody, inspiring *courage*, as “ *imitating the sounds and accents of the courageous* “ *man;*” and, of a *calm* and *sedate* melody, as *imitating the sounds* of a man of *such* a character^r.

With respect to ARISTOTLE—whether this was *his* opinion, or not, cannot, I think, be determined from anything he has *expressly* said upon the subject. In the passage above produced*, where so much is said of the resemblance of melody and rhythm

fiacs, p. 623, *Ed. Xyl.*—Μουσικῆς ἀρχαὶς τρεῖς εἶναι, ΛΥΠΗΝ, ΗΛΔΟΝΗΝ, ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙ-
ΑΣΜΟΝ· ὡς ἕκαστῶν τετραῶν παρατρέποντος ἐκ τῆς συνήθους καὶ ἐγγυμνοῦσι τὴν φωνήν. —“ There
“ are three principles of Music, *grief, love, and enthusiasm*; for each of these passions
“ turns the voice from its usual course, and gives it inflexions different from those of
“ ordinary speech.”—“ Il n’y a que les passions qui chantent,” says Rousseau; “ Pen-
“ tendement ne fait que parler.”—This passage of Theophrastus is introduced to
resolve the question—In what sense *love* is said to teach *Music*?—“ No wonder,”
says the resolver, “ if love, having in itself all these three principles of Music, *grief,*
“ *pleasure, and enthusiasm,* should be more prone to vent itself in Music and Poetry
“ than any other passion.”—Aristoxenus, describing the difference between the two
motions of the voice, in *speaking* and in *singing*,—(the motion by *slides*, and that by
intervals) says—διότι, ἐν τῷ διαλεγέσθαι φευγόμεν τοῖς ἰσωνίαι τὴν φωνήν, αἰ μὴ ΔΙΑ ΠΑΘΟΣ ὥστε
εἰς τοιαύτην κινήσιν ἀναγκασθώμεν ἔλθειν.—p. 9. *Ed. Meibonii*.

^r Vol. i. p. 16.

^z *De Rep. lib. iii. p. 399. Ed. Scr.* The expressions are—ἡ [sc. ἀρμονία—i. e. *melody*,] ἐν τῇ πολεμικῇ πράξει ὄντι ἀνδρείων — τρέποντος ἀν ΜΙΜΗΣΑΙΤΟ ΦΘΟΓΓΟΥΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣΩΙΔΙΑΣ.—And again—σφραγῶν, ἀνδρείων, ΦΘΟΓΓΟΥΣ ΜΙΜΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ.

* P. 47.

to manners, or tempers, not a word is said from which it can be inferred, that he meant a resemblance to the tones and accents by which those manners are *expressed* in speech. On the contrary, the expressions there made use of are such as lead us naturally to conclude, that he meant no more than I have above supposed him to mean; *i. e.* that the Music produces in us, immediately, feelings resembling those of real passion, &c.—For, after having asserted, that there is “a resemblance in rhythms and melodies to “the irascible and the gentle disposition,” he adds,—“This is “evident from the manner in which we find ourselves affected by “the performance of such Music; for we perceive a change pro- “duced in the soul while we listen to it.” And again—“In “melody itself there are imitations of human manners: this is “manifest, from the MELODIES or MODES, which have, evidently, “their distinct nature and character; so that, when we hear them, “we feel ourselves affected by each of them in a different manner. “&c.”—But the passage furnishes, I think, a more decisive

^a Δηλον δὲ ἐν τῶν ἔργων· ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΟΜΕΝ ΓΑΡ ΤΗΝ ΨΥΧΗΝ ἀκρωμενοι τοιῶτων.

^b Ἐν δὲ τοῖς μελεσιν αὐταῖς ἐστὶ μιμηματα τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν φανερον· ἐνθὺς γὰρ ἢ τῶν Ἀρμονικῶν διεστῆκε φύσις· ὡς ἀκούσας ΑΛΛΩΣ ΔΙΑΤΙΘΕΣΘΑΙ, καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τροπῶν ἔχειν πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν.—*κ. τ. αλ.*—The Ἀρμονικῶν, *i. e.* melodies, (or, more properly perhaps, *enharmonic melodies*) here spoken of, must not be confounded with what are usually called the *modes*, and described by the writers on antient music, under the denomination of *τροπῶν*, *i. e.* pitches, or keys:—these were mere transpositions of the same scale, or system; the Ἀρμονικῶν appear to have been, as the name implies, different melodies—scales, in which the arrangement of intervals, and the divisions of the tetrachord (or *genera*) were different. Aristides Quintilianus is the only Greek writer who has given any account of these Ἀρμονικῶν. (p. 21. Ed. Meib.) He asserts, that it is of *these*, not of the *τροπῶν*, that Plato speaks in the famous passage of his *Republic*, lib. iii. where he rejects some of them, and retains others. *This*, at least, is clear, that whatever the Ἀρμονικῶν of Plato were, Aristotle here speaks of the same. See his *Rep.* viii. p. 459.—Their distinctive names, Lydian, Dorian, &c. were the same with those of the *τροπῶν*, that of *syntono-Lydian* excepted, which, I think, is peculiar to the Ἀρμονικῶν. This coincidence of names seems to have been the chief cause of the confusion we find in the modern writers on this subject. The distinction has been pointed out in Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Mus.* vol. i. p. 32.—See also Rousseau's *Dict. art. SYNTONO-LYDIEN, & GENRE.*

proof that the resemblance here meant, was not a resemblance to *speech*. Aristotle asserts here, as in the *problem* of which I shall presently speak, that, of all that affects the *senses*, Music alone possesses this property of resemblance to human manners. In comparing it with painting, he observes, that *this* art can imitate, immediately, only *figures* and *colours*; which are not *resemblances* (ὁμοιωματα) of manners and passions, but only *signs* and *indications* of them (σημειω) in the human body: whereas, in Music, the resemblance to manners “*is in the melody itself*”. Now, whatever may be the meaning of this last assertion—for it seems not quite philosophical to talk of *such* a resemblance as being *in the sounds themselves*—whatever may be its meaning, it cannot well be, that the melody resembles manners *as expressed by speech*; because this would destroy the distinction between Music and Painting: for *words* are exactly in the same case with *colours* and *figures*; they are not *resemblances* of manners, or passions, but *indications* only. We must then, I fear, be contented to take what Aristotle says as a popular and unphilosophical way of expressing a mere resemblance of *effect*.

In one of his *Musical Problems*, indeed, he advances a step farther, and inquires into the *cause* of this effect of Music upon the mind. The text of these problems is, in general, very incorrect, and often absolutely unintelligible; *this* problem, however, seems not beyond the reach of secure emendation, though it may, possibly, be beyond that of secure *explanation*. As it has not, that I know of, been noticed by any writer on the subject, and may be regarded at least as a curiosity not uninteresting to the musical and philosophical reader, I shall venture to give the entire problem, as I think it *should* be read, and to subjoin a translation.

* — ἢκ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ὁμοιωματα των ἡθων, ἀλλὰ ΣΗΜΕΙΑ μαλλον, τα γινόμενα σχηματα και χρωματα, των ἡθων και ταυτα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶ σωματι ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. — ἐν δὲ ΤΟΙΣ ΜΕΛΕΣΙΝ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ἐστὶ μιμηματα των ἡθων. — κ. τ. αλ. — p. 455. Ed. Dunal.

ΔΙΑ ΤΙ το ἀκρῶτον μόνον ἤθ' ἔχει των αἰσθητων, (και γαρ ἕαν ἡ ἀνευ λογε μελ', ὁμως ἔχει ἤθ'·) ἀλλ' ἔ το χρωμα, ἔδε ἡ ὄσμη, ἔδε ὁ χυμ', ἔχει;— ἢ, ὅτι κινήσιν ἔχει μόνον; ἔχ' ἢν^d ὁ ψοφ' ἡμας κινεῖ· τοιαυτη μὲν γαρ και τοις ἄλλοις ὑπαρχει· κινεῖ γαρ και το χρωμα την ὄψιν· ἀλλα της ἐπομενης τῷ ταιετῷ ψοφῷ αἰσθανομεθα κινήσεως· αὐτη δὲ ἔχει ὁμοιοτητα [τοις ἤθεσιν]^e· ἐν τε τοις ῥυθμοις και ἐν τη των φθογγων τάξει των ὄξεων και βαρεων. (ἐκ ἐν τη μιξει· ἀλλ' ἡ συμφωνια ἐκ ἔχει ἤθ'·.) Ἐν δὲ τοις ἄλλοις αἰσθητοις τετο ἐκ ἔσιν. αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὐται πρακτικαι εἰσιν· οἱ δὲ πραξίξαις ἤθεσ σημασια ἐσι. [Problem xxvii. of Section 19.]

PROBLEM.

“WHY, of all that affects the senses, the AUDIBLE only has
 “any *expression* of the manners; (for melody, even *without words*,
 “has this effect—) but colours, smells, and tastes, have no such
 “property?—Is it because the audible alone affects us by *mo-*
 “*tion*?—I do not mean *that* motion by which as mere *sound* it
 “acts upon the *ear*; for *such* motion belongs equally to the
 “objects of our *other* senses;—thus, colour acts by motion upon
 “the organs of sight, &c.—But I mean *another motion* which we
 “perceive *subsequent* to that; and *this* motion bears a resemblance
 “to human manners, *both* in the *rhythm*, and in the *arrangement*
 “of *sounds* acute and grave:—not in their *mixture*; for HARMONY
 “has no *expression*^f. With the objects of our other senses this is
 “NOT

^d The text here, in the Ed. of Duval, stands thus:—κινήσιν ἔχει μόνον· ἢν ὁ ψοφ'—of which no sense can be made. The emendation appeared to me obvious and certain.

^e I insert—τοις ἤθεσιν—as plainly required by the sense of the passage, and fully warranted by Aristotle's repeated expressions of the same kind.—See above, p. 47.—I found no other corrections necessary.

^f This passage is remarkable. It is exactly the *language* of Rousseau—“il n'y a
 “AUCUN RAPPORT entre des *accords*, & les objets qu'on veut peindre, ou les
 “*passions* qu'on veut exprimer.” [Dict. de Mus. art. IMITATION: see also the last
 paragraph of art. HARMONIE.] Thus, too, Lord Kaimes:—“Harmony, pro-
 “perly so called, though delightful when in perfection, *both* NO RELATION to senti-
 “ment.”

“not the case.—Now these motions are analogous to the motion of human *actions*; and those *actions* are the index of the *manners*.”

In

“*ment*.” [El. of Crit. i. 128.] But how is this? The *same* intervals are the materials both of melody and of harmony. These intervals have, each of them, their peculiar effect and character, and it is by the proper choice of them in *succession*, and by that only, that *melody*, considered abstractedly from rhythm or measure, becomes *expressive*, or has *any* “relation to sentiment.” Do these intervals, then, lose at once, as by magic, all their variety and striking difference of character, as soon as they are heard in the simultaneous combinations of harmony? If this be the case, the vocal composer is at once relieved from all care of adapting the harmonies of his accompaniment to the expression of the sentiments conveyed in the words; and it must be matter of perfect indifference whether, for example, he uses the major or minor *third*—the perfect, or the false, *fifth*—the common chord, or the chord of the diminished *seventh*, &c.—With respect to Rousseau, it is not easy to see how this assertion of his can be reconciled with what he has elsewhere said. In his letter *Sur la Musique Française*, he expressly allows that every interval, consonant or dissonant, “a son caractère particulier, c’est à dire, une manière d’*affecter* l’*âme* qui lui est propre.”—And upon this depend entirely all the admirable observations he has there made, concerning the ill effects which a crowded harmony, and the “*remplissage*” of chords, have upon musical expression.—In another article [ACCORD] of his dictionary, this inconsistency is still more striking. One would not think it possible for the same writer, who in *one* place talks of intervals “*pres, par leur dureté, à exprimer l’emportement, la colère, et LES PASSIONS aigues*”—and, of—“*une harmonie plaintive qui ATTENDRIT LE COEUR*”—to assert in another part of the same work, that “*il n’y a AUCUN RAPPORT entre des accords, et LES PASSIONS qu’on veut exprimer.*”

Had these writers contented themselves with saying, that harmony has much *less* relation to sentiment than melody, they would not have gone beyond the truth. And the reason of this difference in the effect of the *same* intervals, in melody, and in harmony, seems, plainly, this—that in melody, these intervals being formed by *successive sounds*, have, of course, a much closer, and more obvious relation to the tones and inflexions by which sentiments are expressed in *speech*, than they can have in harmony, where they are formed by sounds *heard together*.

As to the assertion of Aristotle, it seems only to furnish an additional proof that the ancients did not practice anything like our counterpoint, or *continued harmony in different parts*. Where the utmost use of harmony seems to have been confined to unisons, octaves, fourths, and fifths—where at least no discords, (the most expressive materials of modern harmony,) were allowed—we cannot wonder that the

“*mixture*”

In this problem, the philosopher plainly attributes the *expressive* power of musical sounds to their *succession*—to their *motion* in *measured melody*. He also distinguishes the *rhythmical*, from the *melodious*, succession; for he says expressly, that this motion is “both in the *rhythm* (or *measure*,) and in the *order* or *arrangement* “of sounds acute and grave.”—But whence the effect of these motions? He answers, from their analogy to the motions of human *actions*³, by which the manners and tempers of men are expressed in common life. With respect to the analogy of *rhythmic* movement to the various motions of men in action, this, indeed, is sufficiently obvious. But Aristotle goes farther, and supposes that there is also such analogy in the motion of melody considered merely as a succession of different *tones*, without any regard to *time*; —εν τε των φθογγων ταξι, των ΟΞΕΩΝ και ΒΑΡΕΩΝ. He plainly asserts, that this succession of *tones*, also, is analogous to the motion of human *actions*. Now it seems impossible to assign any human action to which a succession of *sounds* and *intervals*, merely as such, has, or *can* have, any relation or similitude, except the *action* (if the expression is allowable,) of *speaking*, which is such a succession. If this be Aristotle’s meaning—and I confess myself unable to discover any other—I do not see how we can avoid concluding, that he agreed so far with Plato, as to attribute *part*, at least, of the effect of Music upon the affections to the analogy between melody and speech.

“mixture” of sounds in consonance should be thought to have *no relation* to *sentiment*, and that all the power of Music over the passions, should be confined to *melodious* and *rhythmical succession*.

³ The original is short, and rather obscure. It says, *literally*, “these motions are *practical motions* :” πρακτικαι εισιν. But that I have given Aristotle’s true meaning in my translation, is evident from a clearer expression in *Prob.* xxix. which is a shorter solution of the same question. His expression there is—κινησεις εισιν [sc. α̅ ρυθμοι και τα μελη] ΩΣΠΕΡ ΚΑΙ ΑΙ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ.—“Rhythm and melody are *motions*, “as *actions* also are.”

This analogy is, indeed, a curious subject, and deserves, perhaps, a more thorough examination and development than it has yet received^b. But I shall not trust myself farther with a speculation so likely to draw me wide from the proper business of this note, than just to observe, that the writers above-mentioned, who resolve *all* the pathetic expression of Music into this principle, though they assert more than it seems possible to prove, are yet much *nearer* to the truth than those, who altogether overlook, or reject, that principleⁱ; a principle, of which, instances

^b Much light has been flung upon this subject, as far as relates to speech, by Mr. Steele, in his curious and ingenious essay *On the Melody and Measure of Speech*. But the object of his enquiry was *Speech*, not *Music*. His purpose in tracing the resemblance between them, was only to shew that speech is capable of *notation*; not to examine how far the effect of *Music* on the passions depends on that resemblance.—His *notation* is extremely ingenious; but with respect to his project of accompanying the declamation of Tragedy by a drone bass, I must confess that, for my own part, I cannot reflect without some comfort upon the improbability that it will ever be attempted.

ⁱ After allowing that “different passions and sentiments do indeed give different tones and accents to the human voice,” Dr. Beattie asks—“but can the tones of the most pathetic melody be said to bear a resemblance to the voice of a man or woman speaking from the impulse of passion?” I can only answer, that to my ear, such a resemblance, in the “most pathetic melody,” is, *often*, even striking: and I have no doubt that in many passages we are affected from a more delicate and latent degree of that resemblance, sufficient to be *felt*, in its effect, though not to be *perceived*.—Dr. Beattie also asks—“if there are not melancholy airs in the *sharp* key, and cheerful ones in the *flat*?”—Undoubtedly, the peculiar and opposite characters of these keys, may be variously *modified* and *tempered* by the movement, the accent, and the manner of performance, in general: but they can never be *destroyed*; much less can they be changed, as Dr. Beattie supposes, to their very *opposites*. A cheerful air in a *flat* key, I confess, I never heard. If Dr. Beattie thinks the jig in the fifth solo of Corelli cheerful, because the movement is *allegro*, I would beg of him to try an experiment: let him only play the first bar of that jig, (with the bass,) upon a harpsichord, &c. in *G major*: and when he has attended to the effect of that, let him return to the *minor* key, and hear the difference.—As to “melancholy airs in a *sharp* key,” the word *melancholy* is, I think, used with considerable latitude, and comprehends different shades. In the *lightest* of these shades, it may perhaps be applied to some

stances so frequent and so palpable are to be traced in the works of the best masters of vocal composition—in those of PURCELL, for example, of HANDEL, and above all, of PERGOLESI—that I have often wondered it should have been neglected by so exact a writer as Mr. Harris, though it lay directly in his way, and, in one place, he actually touched it as he passed^k. He seems, here, to have deserted those antients whom, in general, he most delighted to follow.

But to return to *Aristotle*, and his treatise on Poetry:—the reader will observe that he does not there assert in general terms, that “*Music is an Imitative Art,*” but only, that the Music “*of the flute and the lyre*” is imitative; and even that, not always, but “*for the most part*”^l. I just mention this, because I have observed in many of the commentators, as well as in other writers, a disposition to extend and generalize his assertions, by which they

some airs in a major key: that key may, by slowness of movement, softness and smoothness of tone, &c. become solemn, tender, touching, &c.—but I cannot say I recollect any air in that key which makes an impression that can *properly* be called *melancholy*. But we must be careful in this matter to allow for the magic of *association*, which no one better understands, or has described with more feeling and fancy than Dr. Beattie himself. [See p. 173, &c.]—With respect to “a transition from “the one key to the other” [from major to minor, &c.] “in the *same air, without any sensible change* in the expression,” I must also confess that it is, to me, totally unknown.—One word more:—Dr. Beattie is “at a loss to conceive how it should happen, that a musician overwhelmed with sorrow, for example, should put together “a series of notes, whose expression is contrary to that of another series which he had “put together when elevated with joy.” [p. 180.]—But is not Dr. Beattie equally at a loss to conceive how it should happen that any man overwhelmed with *sorrow*, should put together, in *speaking*, (as he certainly does) a series of *tones*, whose expression is contrary to that of *another* series which he had put together when elevated with *joy*?—The two *facts* are equally certain, and, even at the first view, so nearly allied, that whoever can account for the one, need not, I am persuaded, be at the trouble of trying to account separately for the other.

^k Ch. ii. § 2.—particularly note ^l.

^l — τῆς ἀυδατικῆς ἢ ΠΑΡΕΣΤΗ καὶ κἀπαριστίας.

have sometimes involved the subject and themselves in unnecessary difficulties.

With respect to *modern* writers, at least, there seems to be a manifest impropriety in denominating Music *an Imitative Art*, while they confine the application of the term *Imitative* to what they confess to be the slightest and least important of all its powers. In this view, consistence and propriety are, certainly, on the side of Dr. Beattie, when he would “strike Music off the “list of *Imitative Arts*”.” But perhaps even a farther reform may justly be considered as wanting, in our language upon this subject. With whatever propriety, and however naturally and obviously, the arts both of *Music*, and of POETRY, may be, separately, and occasionally, regarded and spoken of as *imitative*, yet, when we arrange and *class* the arts, it seems desirable that a *clearer* language were adopted. The notion, that Painting, Poetry and Musicⁿ are all *Arts of Imitation*, certainly tends to produce, and has produced, much confusion. That they all, in *some* sense of the word, *or other*, imitate, cannot be denied; but the senses of the word when applied to Poetry, or Music, are so different both from each other, and from that in which it is applied to Painting, Sculpture, and the arts of design in general—the only arts that

ⁿ Page 129.

ⁿ What shall we say to those who add ARCHITECTURE to the list of *Imitative Arts*?—One would not expect to find so absurd a notion adopted by so clear and philosophical a writer as M. d’Alembert. Yet in his *Discours Prel. de l’Encyclop.* he not only makes Architecture an imitative art, but even classes it with *painting* and *sculpture*. He allows, indeed, that the imitation “*de la belle nature, y est moins frappante & plus resserrée que dans les deux autres arts*”—but how is it any imitation at all?—only because it imitates “*par l’assemblage et l’union des differens corps qu’elle emploie*”—what?—“*l’arrangement symmetrique que la nature observe plus ou moins sensiblement dans chaque individu, &c.*” [*Mel. de lit.* i. 63.] I can only say, that, upon this principle, the joiner, the smith, and the mechanic of almost every kind, have a fair claim to be elevated to the rank of *Imitative Artists*: for if a *regular building* be an imitation of “*la belle nature,*” so is a chair, a table, or a pair of fire-tongs.

are *obviously* and *essentially* imitative—that when we include them all, without distinction, under the same general denomination of *Imitative Arts*, we seem to defeat the only useful purpose of all classing and arrangement; and, instead of producing order and method in our ideas, produce only embarrassment and confusion. [See DISS. I. p. 3, 4.]



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P A R T I.

GENERAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW OF
POETRY AND ITS PRINCIPAL SPECIES.

I N T R O D U C T I O N.

MY design is to treat of POETRY in general, and of its DESIGN. several species—to inquire, what is the proper *effect* of each—what construction of a *fable*, or *plan*, is essential to a good Poem—of *what*, and *how many*, *parts*, each species consists; with whatever else belongs to the same subject: which I shall consider in the order that most naturally presents itself.

I.

Epic Poetry, Tragedy, Comedy, Dithyrambics, as also, for the most part, the Music of the flute, and of the lyre—all these are, in the most general view of them, IMITATIONS¹; differing, however, from each other in *three* respects, according to the different *means*, the different *objects*, or the different *manner*, of their imitation. *Poetry a species of IMITATION.*

¹ The application of this term to *Poetry*, in general, is considered in Dissertation I.—to *Music*, in Diss. II.—to *Dithyrambic Poetry*, in NOTE I.

II.

Different
MEANS of
Imitation.

For, as men, some through art, and some through habit, imitate various objects, by means of *colour* and *figure*, and others, again, by *voice*²; so, with respect to the arts above-mentioned, *rhythm*, *words*, and *melody*, are the different *means* by which, either single, or variously combined, they all produce their imitation.

For example: in the imitations of the flute, and the lyre, and of any other instruments capable of producing a similar effect—as the *syrinx*, or pipe—*melody* and *rhythm* only are employed. In those of Dance, *rhythm* alone, without melody; for there are dancers who, by rhythm applied to gesture³, express manners, passions, and actions.

The ΕΡΟΠΟΕΙΑ imitates by *words alone*, or by *verse*⁴; and that verse may either be composed of various metres, or confined, according to the practice hitherto established, to a single species. For we should, otherwise, have no *general* name which would comprehend the Mimes of SOPHRON and XENARCHUS, and the *Socratic* dialogues; or Poems in Iambic, Elegiac, or other metres, in which the *Epic* species of imitation may be conveyed. Custom, indeed, connecting the *poetry* or *making* with the *metre*, has denominated some *Elegiac Poets*, i. e. *makers*⁵ of *elegiac verse*; others, *Epic Poets*;

² Vocal *mimicry*; imitation by *tone* of voice merely: See Diss. I. towards the end, *Note* 1.—And *NOTE* 2, on this passage.

³ The expression *forms* inaccurate; for it is by their *gestures* that they *express*, or *imitate*;—not by the *rhythm*, or *measured motion*, of those gestures.—See *NOTE* 4, where I have endeavoured to account for Aristotle's expressing himself thus.

⁴ i. e. by *words* only, without *melody* and *rhythm*; or, at most, with no *other rhythm* than is implied in the idea of *metre*:—without rhythm in its *musical* acceptation of *time*. See *NOTE* 5.

⁵ It may be necessary to observe, that the Greek word, (ποιητης—*poietes*) whence *poeta*, and *poet*, is, literally, *maker*; and maker, it is well known, was once the current term for *poet* in our language; and to write verses, was, to *make*. Sir Philip Sidney, speaking of the Greek word, says—“wherein, I know not whether by luck or wisdom, we Englishmen have *nut* with the *Greeks*, in calling him *Maker*.”

Defence of Poetry.

Epic Poets; i. e. makers of *hexameter verse*; thus distinguishing the Poets, not according to the nature of their *imitation*, but according to that of their *metre* only. For even they, who compose treatises of medicine, or natural philosophy, in *verse*, are denominated *Poets*; yet HOMER and EMPEDOCLES have nothing in common, except their metre; the former, therefore, justly merits the name of *Poet*; while the other should rather be called a *Physiologist* than a *Poet*.

So, also, though any one should chuse to convey his imitation in every kind of metre, promiscuously, as CHAEREMON has done in his *Gentaur*, which is a medley of all sorts of verse, it would not immediately follow, that, on *that* account merely, he was entitled to the name of *Poet*.—But of this, enough.—

There are, again, other species of Poetry which make use of *all* the means of imitation, *rhythm*, *melody*, and *verse*. Such are, the *Dithyrambic*, that of *Nomes*, *Tragedy*, and *Comedy*: with this difference, however, that in some of these⁶, they are employed *all together*, in others, *separately*. And such are the differences of these arts with respect to the means by which they imitate.

III.

But, as the *objects* of imitation are the actions of *men*, and these men must of necessity be either good or bad, (for on this does *character* principally depend; the *manners* being, in *all* men, most strongly marked by virtue and vice,) it follows, that we can only

Different
OBJECTS
of imita-
tion.

So Spenser;

The god of shepherds, *Tityrus*, is dead,
Who taught me, homely, as I can, to MAKE.

Esp. Lit. Journ.

⁶ In Dithyrambic, or *Bacchic* hymns, and in the *Nomes*, which were also a species of hymns, to Apollo, and other deities, *all* the means of imitation were employed *together*, and *throughout*: in *Tragedy* and *Comedy*, *separately*; some of them in one part of the drama, and some in another. (See Part II. *SECT. I.*) In the *choral* part, however, at least, if no where else, *all*, melody, rhythm and words, must probably have been used *at once*, as in the hymns.

represent men, either as *better* than they actually are, or *worse*, or exactly *as* they are: just as, in *Painting*, the pictures of *Polygnotus* were above the common level of nature; those of *Pauson*, below it; those of *Dionysius*, faithful *likenesses*.

Now it is evident that each of the imitations above-mentioned will admit of these differences, and become a different kind of imitation, as it imitates *objects* that differ in this respect. This may be the case with *Dancing*; with the *Music* of the flute, and of the lyre; and, also, with the *Poetry* which employs *words*, or *verse* only, without *melody*, or *rhythm*: thus, *Homer* has drawn men *superior* to what they are⁷; *Cleophon*, *as* they are; *Hegemon* the Thasian, the inventor of parodies, and *Nicocharis*, the author of the *Deliad*, *worse* than they are.

So, again, with respect to *Dithyrambics*, and *Nomes*: in these, too, the imitation may be as different as that of the Persians, by *Timotheus*, and the Cyclops, by *Philoxenus*.

Tragedy, also, and *Comedy*, are distinguished in the same manner; the aim of *Comedy* being, to exhibit men *worse* than we find them, that of *Tragedy*, *better*.

IV.

Different
MANNER
of imita-
tion.

There remains the *third* difference—that of the *manner* in which each of these objects may be imitated. For the Poet, imitating the *same object*, and by the *same means*, may do it either in *NARRATION*—and that, again, either personating other characters, as *HOMER* does, or, in his own person throughout, without

⁷ Superior, that is, in courage, strength, wisdom, prudence, &c.—in *any* laudable, useful, or admirable quality, whether such as we denominate *moral*, or not. If superiority of *moral* character only were meant, the assertion would be false.—It is necessary to remember here, the *wide* sense in which the ancients used the terms *virtue*, *vice*—*good*, *bad*, &c. See NOTE 19.—The difference between *moral*, and *poetical*, perfection of character, is well explained by Dr. Beattie, *Essay on Poetry*, &c. Part I. ch. 4.—The heroes of *Homer*, as he well observes, are “*finer animals*” than we are; (p. 69.) not *better men*.

change:

change :—or, he may imitate by representing all his characters as real, and employed in the very ACTION itself.

These, then, are the three differences by which, as I said in the beginning, all imitation is distinguished; those of the *means*, the *object*, and the *manner*: so that *Sophocles* is, in one respect, an imitator of the same kind with *Homer*, as elevated characters are the *objects* of both; in another respect, of the same kind with *Aristophanes*, as both imitate in the *way* of action; whence, according to some, the application of the term *Drama* [i. e. *action*] to such Poems. Upon this it is that the *Dorians* ground their claim to the invention both of Tragedy and Comedy. For Comedy is claimed by the Megarians;³ both by those of Greece, who contend that it took its rise in their popular government; and by those of Sicily, among whom the poet *Epicarmus* flourished long before *Chionides* and *Mages*: and Tragedy, also, is claimed by some of the Dorians of Peloponnesus.—In support of these claims they argue from the *words* themselves. They allege, that the Doric word for *a village* is *COMÈ*, the Attic, *DEMOS*; and that *Comedians* were so called, not from *COMAZEIN*—*to revel*—but from their strolling about the *COMAI*, or *villages*⁴ before they were tolerated in the city. They say, farther, that, *to do*, or *act*, they express by the word *DRAN*; the Athenians by *PRATTEIN*.

DRAMA.
Digression
concerning
the different
national
claims to
its inven-
tion.

And thus much as to the *differences* of imitation—how *many*, and *what*, they are.

V.

POETRY, in general, seems to have derived its origin from two *causes*, each of them *natural*.

ORIGIN of
Poetry.

I. TO IMITATE is instinctive in man from his infancy. By this he is distinguished from other animals, that he is, of all, the most imitative, and through this instinct receives his earliest edu-

³ Who were all of *Doric* origin.

⁴ A derivation very honourable to itinerant players.

ation*. All men, likewise, naturally receive pleasure from imitation. This is evident from what we experience in viewing the works of imitative art; for in them, we contemplate with pleasure, and with the *more* pleasure, the more exactly they are imitated, such objects as, if real, we could not see without pain; as, the figures of the meanest and most disgusting animals, dead bodies, and the like. And the reason of this is, that to *learn*, is a natural pleasure, not confined to philosophers, but common to all men; with this difference only, that the multitude partake of it in a more transient and compendious manner. Hence the pleasure they receive from a picture: in viewing it they *learn*', they *infer*, they *discover*, what every object is: that *this*, for instance, is such a particular man, &c. For if we suppose the object represented to be something which the spectator had never seen, his pleasure, in that case, will not arise from the *imitation*, but from the workmanship, the colours, or some such cause.

Imitation, then, being thus natural to us, and, *2ndly*, MELODY and RHYTHM* being also natural, (for as to *metre*, it is plainly a *species* of rhythm,) those persons, in whom, originally, these propensities were the strongest, were naturally led to rude and extemporaneous attempts, which, gradually improved, gave birth to POETRY.

VI.

But this Poetry, following the different *characters* of its authors, naturally divided itself into *two* different *kinds*. They who were

Its division
into TWO
KINDS—
the SERIOUS
and the LU-
DICROUS.

* See Dr. Beattie's Essay on Poetry, &c. *Part I. ch. 6.*

† This is explained in NOTE 22.

* "RHYTHM differs from METRE, in as much as RHYTHM is *proportion, applied to any motion whatever*; METRE is *proportion, applied to the motion of WORDS SPOKEN*. Thus, in the drumming of a march, or the dancing of a hornpipe, there is *rhythm*, though *no metre*; in Dryden's celebrated ode there is METRE as well as RHYTHM, because the Poet with the *rhythm* has associated certain *words*. And hence it follows, that, though ALL METRE is RHYTHM, yet ALL RHYTHM is NOT METRE." Harris's *Philol. Inquiries*, p. 67.—where it is also observed, very truly, that "no English word expresses *rhythmus* better than the word, *time*. P. 69. *note*."

of a grave and lofty spirit, chose, for their imitation, the actions and the adventures of *elevated* characters: while Poets of a *lighter* turn, represented those of the *vitious* and *contemptible*. And these composed, originally, *Satires*; as the former did *Hymns* and *Encomia*.

Of the *lighter* kind, we have no Poem anterior to the time of HOMER, though many such, in all probability, there were; but, *from* his time, we have; as, his *Margites*, and others of the same species, in which the Iambic was introduced as the most proper measure; and hence, indeed, the name of *Iambic*, because it was the measure in which they used to IAMBIZE, [i. e. to *satirize*,] each other.

And thus these old Poets were divided into two classes—those who used the *heroic*³, and those who used the *iambic*, verse.

And as, in the *serious* kind, HOMER alone may be said to deserve the name of Poet, not only on account of his other excellences, but also of the *dramatic*⁴ spirit of his imitations; so was he likewise the first who suggested the idea of *Comedy*, by substituting *ridicule* for *invective*, and giving that ridicule a dramatic cast: for his MARGITES bears the same analogy to Comedy, as his ILIAD and ODYSSEY to Tragedy.—But when Tragedy and Comedy, had once made their appearance, succeeding Poets, according to the turn of their genius, attached themselves to the one, or the other, of these new species: the lighter sort, instead of *Iambic*, became *Comic* Poets; the graver, *Tragic*, instead of *Heroic*: and that, on account of the superior dignity and higher estimation of these latter *forms* of Poetry.

Whether Tragedy has now, with respect to its constituent parts⁵, received the utmost improvement of which it is capable, considered

³ i. e. hexameters, composed of dactyls and spondees, which were called *heroic* feet.

⁴ See Part III. Sect. 3.

⁵ i. e. the fable, the manners, the sentiments, &c.—See Part II. Sect. 2.

both in *itself*, and relatively to the *theatre*, is a question that belongs not to this place.

VII.

Both Tragedy, then, and Comedy, having originated in a rude and unpremeditated manner—the first from the *Dithyrambic* hymns, the other from those *Phallic* songs⁶, which, in many cities, remain still in use—each advanced gradually towards perfection, by such successive improvements as were most obvious.

TRAGEDY, after various changes, reposed at length in the completion of its proper form. ÆSCHYLUS first added a second actor⁷; he also abridged the CHORUS, and made the dialogue the principal part of Tragedy. SOPHOCLES increased the number of actors to three, and added the decoration of painted scenery. It was also late before Tragedy threw aside the short and simple *fable*, and ludicrous *language*, of its satyric original, and attained its proper magnitude and *dignity*. The *Iambic* measure was then first adopted: for, originally, the *Trochaic* tetrameter was made use of, as better suited to the satyric⁸ and saltatorial genius of the Poem at
that

⁶ Of the *licentious* and *obscene* RELIGIOUS CEREMONY here alluded to, the reader, who has any curiosity about it, may find some account in Potter's *Antiquities of Greece*, vol. i. p. 383.

⁷ The first who introduced a single actor, or speaker, between those choral songs which originally, we are told, formed the whole of *Tragedy*, i. e. according to the most usual derivation of the word, *the goat-singing*, was THESPIA, whom Aristotle passes over in silence. The story so often told, of him and his theatrical *waggon*, it cannot be necessary to repeat.—By introducing a *second* actor, Æschylus, in fact, introduced the *dialogue*; though it seems probable that the *single* speaker of Thespis told his tale, in part, at least, *dramatically*. See Brunoy's *Diss. sur l'Orig. de la Trag.* Sect. iii.—*Theatre des Grecs*, Tome i.

⁸ *Satyric*, from the share which those fantastic beings called *Satyrs*, the companions and *play-fellows* of *Bacchus*, had in the earliest Tragedy, of which they formed the chorus. *Joking*, and *dancing*, were essential attributes of these rustic semi-deities. Hence, the "*ludicrous language*," and the "*dancing genius*" of the old Tragedy, to
which,

that time; but when the dialogue was formed, nature itself pointed out the proper metre. For the *iambic* is, of all metres, the most colloquial; as appears evidently from this fact, that our common conversation frequently falls into *iambic* verse; seldom into *hexameter*, and only when we depart from the usual *melody* of speech. — *Episodes* were, also, multiplied, and every other part of the drama successively improved and polished.

But of this enough: to enter into a minute detail would, perhaps, be a task of some length.

VIII.

COMEDY, as was said before, is an imitation of *bad characters*; bad, not with respect to every sort of vice, but to the OBJECT AND PROGRESS *RIDICULOUS* only, as being a *species* of turpitude or deformity; since it may be defined to be—a *fault* or *deformity* of such a sort as is neither *painful* nor *destructive*. A ridiculous face, for example, is something ugly and distorted, but not so as to cause *pain*. of COMEDY.

The successive improvements of Tragedy, and the respective authors of them, have not escaped our knowledge; but those of Comedy, from the little attention that was paid to it in its origin, remain in obscurity. For it was not till late, that Comedy was authorized by the magistrate, and carried on at the public expence: it was, at first, a private and voluntary exhibition. From the time, indeed, when it began to acquire some degree of form, its *Poets* have been recorded; but who first introduced masks, or prologues, or augmented the number of actors—these, and other particulars of the same kind, are unknown.

Epicarmus and *Phormis* were the first who *invented* comic fables. This improvement, therefore, is of Sicilian origin. But, which the TROCHAIC or *running* metre here spoken of was peculiarly adapted; being no other than this:

“ Jolly mortals, fill your glasses, noble deeds are done by wine.”

The reader will not confound *satyric* with *satiric*; nor the Greek *satyric* drama, with the *satire* of Roman origin. See Harris's *Phil. Arrang.* p. 460. *note*. Or, Dacier's Preface to Horace's Satires. The two words are of different derivations.

of *Athenian* Poets, *Crates* was the first who abandoned the *Iambic*⁹ form of comedy, and made use of *invented* and *general* stories, or fables.

IX.

EPIC and
TRAGIC
Species
COMPARED.

Epic Poetry agrees so far with *Tragic*, as it is an imitation of *great characters* and *actions*, by *means* of *words*: but in this it differs, that it makes use of only one kind of metre throughout; and that it is *narrative*. It also differs in *length*: for Tragedy endeavours, as far as possible, to confine its action within the limits of a single revolution of the sun, or nearly so; but the time of *Epic* action is indefinite. This, however, at first, was equally the case with Tragedy itself.

Of their constituent *parts*, some are common to both, some peculiar to Tragedy. He, therefore, who is a judge of the beauties and defects of Tragedy, is, of course, equally a judge with respect to those of Epic Poetry: for all the parts of the Epic poem are to be found in Tragedy; *not* all those of Tragedy, in the Epic poem.

⁹ *Iambic*, i. e. *satirical*, and *personally* so, like the old *Iambi*, *invectives*, or lampoons, of which Aristotle speaks above, *See* 6. and from which the *Iambic metre*, which is not here alluded to, took its name.

P A R T II.

O F T R A G E D Y.

I.

OF the species of Poetry which imitates in *hexameters*, and of *Comedy*, we shall speak hereafter. Let us now consider TRAGEDY; collecting, first, from what has been already said, its true and essential definition.

DEFINITION of Tragedy.

Tragedy, then, is an imitation of some *action* that is *important*, *entire*, and of a proper *magnitude*—by *language*, embellished and rendered *pleasurable*, but by different *means* in different parts—in the *way*, not of *narration*, but of *action*—effecting through *pity* and *terror*, the *correction* and *refinement* of such passions.

By *pleasurable language*, I mean a language that has the embellishments of rhythm, melody, and metre. And I add, *by different means in different parts*, because in some parts metre alone is employed, in others, melody.

II.

Now as Tragedy imitates by *acting*, the DECORATION*, in the first place, must necessarily be *one* of its parts: then the

Deduction of its CONSTITUENT PARTS.

* *Decoration*—literally, the decoration of the *spectacle*, or *sight*. In other places it is called the *spectacle*, or *sight* only—ὄψις. It comprehends *scenery*, *dress*—the whole visible apparatus of the theatre. I do not know any single English word, that answers fully to the Greek word.

MELOPOEIA, (or MUSIC',) and the DICTION; for these last include the *means* of tragic imitation. By *diction*, I mean the metrical composition †. The meaning of *Melopaia* is obvious to every one.

Again—Tragedy being an imitation of an action, and the persons employed in that action being necessarily characterized by their *manners* and their *sentiments*, since it is from *these* that actions themselves derive their character, it follows, that there must also be, MANNERS, and SENTIMENTS, as the two *causes* of actions, and, consequently, of the happiness, or unhappiness, of all men. The *imitation of the action* is the FABLE: for by *fable* I now mean the *texture of incidents*, or the *plot*. By *manners*, I mean, whatever marks the *characters* of the persons. By *sentiments*, whatever they *say*, whether *proving* anything, or delivering a *general sentiment*, &c.*

Hence, all Tragedy must necessarily contain *six* parts, which, together, constitute its peculiar character, or *quality*: FABLE, MANNERS, DICTION, SENTIMENTS, DECORATION, and MUSIC. Of these parts, two relate to the *means*, one to the *manner*, and three to the *object*, of imitation². And these are all. These *specific parts*³, if we may so call them, have been employed by most Poets, and are all to be found in [almost] every Tragedy.

III.

COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE of the PARTS

But of all these parts the most important is the *combination* of *incidents*, or, the FABLE. Because Tragedy is an imitation, not

¹ *Melopaia*—literally, the *making*, or the *composition*, of the *music*; as we use *ἔπη*, or according to the French termination, which we have naturalized, *ἔπη*, to signify *epic poetry*, or *epic-making*, in general.—I might have rendered it at once, the *MUSIC*; but that it would have appeared ridiculous to observe, of a word so familiar to us, even that “*its meaning is obvious*.”

² Not the *constitution*, but merely the *metrical expression*—the *language* of the *self*. This is plain from the clearer definition, p. 78.

³ For a fuller account of *this* part of Tragedy, see *Sect. 22*.

⁴ *Melody*, and *diction*, to the *means*, which are *words*, *melody*, and *rhythm*: *decoration*, to the *manner* of imitating—i. e. by *representation* and *action*: *fable*, *manners*, and *sentiments*, to the *objects* of imitation—i. e. *men*, and their *actions*, *characters*, &c.

⁵ i. e. such are essential to Tragedy, and, together, constitute its *species*.

of *men*, but of *actions*⁴—of life, of happiness and unhappiness: for happiness consists in action, and the supreme good itself, the very *end* of life, is *action* of a certain kind—not *quality*. Now the *manners* of men constitute only their *quality* or *characters*; but it is by their *actions* that they are *happy*, or the contrary. Tragedy, therefore, does not imitate action, *for the sake* of imitating manners, but in the imitation of action, that of manners is of course involved. So that the *action* and the *fable* are the *end* of Tragedy; and in every thing the *end* is of principal importance.

Again—Tragedy cannot subsist without *action*; without *manners* it may: the Tragedies of most modern Poets have this defect; a defect common, indeed, among Poets in general. As among Painters also, this is the case with ZEUXIS, compared with POLYGNOTUS: the latter excels in the expression of the *manners*; there is no such expression in the pictures of ZEUXIS.

Farther—suppose any one to string together a number of speeches in which the manners are strongly marked, the language and the sentiments well turned; this will not be sufficient to produce the proper effect of Tragedy: that end will much rather be answered by a piece, defective in each of those particulars, but furnished with a proper fable and contexture of incidents. Just as in Painting, the most brilliant colours, spread at random and without design, will give far less pleasure than the simplest outline of a *figure*.

Add to this, that those parts of Tragedy, by means of which it becomes most interesting and affecting, are parts of the *fable*; I mean, *revolutions*, and *discoveries*⁵.

As a farther proof, adventurers in Tragic writing are sooner able to arrive at excellence in the language, and the manners, than in

⁴ See the Diss. *On the Provinces of the Drama*, ch. i. [Dr. Hurd's *Hor.* vol. ii.]

⁵ i. e. *virtuous* action.—The doctrine of Aristotle was, that the *greatest happiness*, the *summum bonum* or *end* of life, consisted in *virtuous energies* and *actions*; not in virtue, considered merely as an *internal* habit, disposition, or *quality*, of mind.

⁶ These are explained afterwards, *Sec.* 9.

the construction of a plot; as appears from almost all our earlier Poets.

The fable, then, is the principal part, the *soul*, as it were, of Tragedy; and the MANNERS are next in rank: Tragedy being an imitation of an *action*, and *through that*, principally, of the *agents*.

In the *third* place stand the SENTIMENTS. To this part it belongs, to *say* such things as are *true* and *proper*; which, in the dialogue, depends on the *Political*⁷ and *Rhetorical* arts: for, the ancients made their characters speak in the style of political and popular eloquence; but now, the rhetorical manner prevails.

The *manners* are, whatever manifests the *disposition* of the speaker. There are speeches, therefore, which are without manners, or character; as not containing any thing by which the *propensities* or *aversions* of the person who delivers them can be known. The *sentiments* comprehend *whatever is said*; whether *proving* any thing, affirmatively, or negatively, or expressing some *general reflection*, &c.

Fourth, in order, is the DICTION; that is, as I have already said, the *expression* of the sentiments *by words*; the power and effect of which is the same, whether in verse or prose.

Of the remaining two parts, the MUSIC stands next; of all the pleasurable accompaniments and embellishments of Tragedy, the most delightful.

The DECORATION has, also, a great effect, but, of all the parts, is most foreign to the art. For the power of Tragedy is felt without representation, and actors; and the beauty of the decorations depends more on the art of the mechanic, than on that of the Poet⁸.

⁷ The reader, here, must not think of our modern *politics*.—The *political*, or *civil art*, or *science*, was, in Aristotle's view, of wide extent, and high importance. It comprehended *ethics*, and *eloquence*, or the art of public speaking; every thing, in short, that concerned the well-being of a *state*.—See NOTE 57.

⁸ The reader will find a useful comment on this, and the two preceding sections, in the *Philolog. Inquiries*, Part II. ch. vi. viii. ix. xi.

IV.

These things being thus adjusted, let us go on to examine in what manner the FABLE should be constructed; since this is the first, and most important part of Tragedy.

Of the FABLE—[to Sect. 15.]

Now we have defined Tragedy to be an imitation of an action that is complete and *entire*; and that has also a certain *magnitude*; for a thing may be *entire*, and a *whole*, and yet not be of any *magnitude*⁹.

1. By *entire*, I mean that which has a *beginning*, a *middle*, and an *end*. A *beginning*, is that which does not, necessarily, suppose any thing before it, but which requires something to follow it. An *end*, on the contrary, is that which supposes something to precede it, either necessarily, or probably; but which nothing is required to follow. A *middle*, is that which both supposes something to precede, and requires something to follow. The Poet, therefore, who would construct his fable properly, is not at liberty to begin, or end, where he pleases, but must conform to these definitions.

It should be a PERFECT WHOLE—

2. Again: whatever is beautiful, whether it be an animal, or any other thing composed of different parts, must not only have those parts arranged in a certain manner, but must also be of a certain *magnitude*; for beauty consists in *magnitude* and *order*. Hence it is that no very minute animal can be beautiful; the eye comprehends the whole too instantaneously to distinguish and compare the parts:—neither, on the contrary, can one of a prodigious size be beautiful; because, as all its parts cannot be seen at once, the *whole*, the *unity*¹ of object, is lost to the spectator; as it would be,

—and of a certain MAGNITUDE.

⁹ i. e.—not be *large*.—*Magnitude* is here used in its proper and relative sense, of *greatness*; and with reference to some standard.

¹ The unity here spoken of, it must be remembered, is not *absolute* and *simple*, but *relative* and *compound*, unity; a unity consisting of different *parts*, the relation of which to each other, and to the whole, is easily perceived at one view. On this depends the perception of beauty in *form*.—In objects too extended, you may be said to have *parts*, but no *whole*: in very minute objects a *whole*, but no *parts*.

for example, if he were surveying an animal of many miles in length. As, therefore, in animals, and other objects, a certain *magnitude* is requisite, but that magnitude must be such as to present a whole *easily comprehended by the eye*; so, in the fable, a certain *length* is requisite, but that length must be such as to present a whole *easily comprehended by the memory*.

With respect to the *measure* of this length—if referred to actual representation in the dramatic contests, it is a matter foreign to the art itself: for if a hundred Tragedies were to be exhibited in concurrence, the length of each performance must be regulated by the hour-glass; a practice of which, it is said, there have formerly been instances. But, if we determine this measure by the nature of the thing itself, the more extensive the fable, consistently with the clear and easy comprehension of the whole, the more beautiful will it be, with respect to *magnitude*. In general, we may say, that an action is sufficiently extended, when it is long enough to admit of a change of fortune, from happy to unhappy, or the reverse, brought about by a succession, necessary or probable, of *well-connected* incidents.

V.

UNITY of
the Fable.

A *fable* is not *one*, as some conceive it to be, merely because the *hero* of it is *one*. For numberless events happen to one man, many of which are such as cannot be connected into *one event*: and so, likewise, there are many actions of one man which cannot be connected into any *one action*. Hence appears the mistake of all these Poets who have composed HERCULEIDS, THESEIDS, and other Poems of that kind. They conclude that because *Hercules* was one, so also must be the fable of which he is the subject. But HOMER, among his many other excellences, seems also to have been perfectly aware of this mistake, either from art or genius. For when he composed his ODYSSEY, he did not introduce all the events of his hero's life,—such, for instance, as the wound
he

he received upon Parnassus²—his feigned madness³ when the Grecian army was assembling, &c.—events, not connected, either by necessary or probable *consequence*, with each other; but he comprehended those only which have relation to *one action*; for such we call that of the *Odyſſey*.—And in the ſame manner he compoſed his *Iliad*⁴.

As, therefore, in other mimetic arts, *one imitation*⁵ is an imitation of *one thing*, ſo here, the fable, being an imitation of an action, ſhould be an imitation of an action that is *one*, and *entire*; the parts of it being ſo connected, that if any one of them be either tranſpoſed or taken away, the *whole* will be deſtroyed, or changed: for whatever may be *either* retained, or omitted, without making any ſenſible difference, is not, properly, *a part*⁶.

² This incident is, however, related, and at conſiderable length, in the ſixth book of the *Odyſſey*, (v. 563 of Pope's tranſlation) but digreſſively, and incidentally; it made no eſſential part of his *general plan*.—See Sect. 17.

³ A ridiculous ſtory.—“To avoid going to the Trojan war, Ulyſſes pretended to be mad; and, to prove his insanity, went to plough with an *ox* and a *horſe*; but Palamedes, in order to detect him, laid his infant ſon, Telemachus, in the way of the plough; upon which Ulyſſes immediately ſtopped, and thereby proved himſelf to be in his right ſenſes.”—(*Hyginus*, &c.)

⁴ Or, according to a different, and perhaps preferable, reading, thus:—“but he planned his *Odyſſey*, as he alſo did his *Iliad*, upon an action that is *one* in the ſenſe here explained.”—See the NOTE.

⁵ i. e. *one imitative work*. Thus *one* picture repreſents, or ſhould repreſent, but *one* thing;—a ſingle *object*, or a ſingle *action*, &c. So, every Poem, (the *Orlando Furioſo* as much as the *Iliad*;) is *one imitation*—*one imitative work*, and ſhould imitate *one* action, in Ariſtotle's ſenſe of *unity*, like the Poems of Homer; not a number of actions unconnected with each other, or connected merely by their common *relation* to *one* perſon, as in the *Theſeids*, &c. or to *one time*, as in the Poem of Arioſto; or, by their *reſemblance* merely, as in the *Metamorphoſes* of Ovid.

⁶ “The painter will not enquire what things may be admitted without much cenſure. He will not think it enough to ſhew that they *may* be there, he will ſhew that they *muſt* be there; that their *abſence* would render his picture *maimed* and *defective*.
“—They ſhould make a *part* of that *whole* which would be imperfect without them.”

Sir J. Reynolds, *Diſc. on Painting*, p. 106.

VI.

Different
Provinces of
the POET
and the HIS-
TORIAN.

It appears, farther, from what has been said, that it is not the Poet's province to relate such things as have actually happened, but such as *might* have happened—such as are *possible*, according either to probable, or necessary, consequence.

For it is not by writing in *verse*, or *prose*, that the Historian and the Poet are distinguished: the work of *Herodotus* might be versified; but it would still be a species of history, no less with metre, than without. They are distinguished by this, that the one relates what *has* been, the other what *might* be. On this account, Poetry is a more philosophical, and a more excellent thing, than History: for Poetry is chiefly conversant about *general* truth; History, about *particular*. In what manner, for example, any person of a certain character would speak, or act, probably, or necessarily—this is *general*; and this is the object of Poetry, even while it makes use of particular *names*. But, what *Alcibiades* did, or what happened to him—this is *particular* truth.

With respect to Comedy, this is now become obvious; for here, the Poet, when he has formed his plot of *probable* incidents, gives to his characters whatever names he pleases; and is not, like the Iambic Poets, particular, and personal.

Tragedy, indeed, retains the use of real names; and the reason is, that, what we are disposed to believe, we must think *possible*: now what has never actually happened, we are not apt to regard as possible; but what *has* been is unquestionably so, or it could not have been at all⁷. There are, however, some Tragedies in which one or two of the names are historical, and the rest feigned: there are even some, in which none of the names are historical; such is *AGATHO'S* Tragedy called *The Flower*; for in that, all is inven-

⁷ "or it could not, &c."—The philosopher might safely have trusted to any reader to find this *proof* of the *possibility* of what *has* actually happened.—A modern writer would certainly have omitted this; and I wish Aristotle had. But it is my business to say whatever he has said.

tion, both incidents, and names; and yet it pleases. It is by no means, therefore, essential, that a Poet should confine himself to the known and established subjects of Tragedy. Such a restraint would, indeed, be ridiculous; since even those subjects that are known, are known, comparatively, but to few, and yet are interesting to all.

From all this it is manifest, that a Poet should be a Poet, or *maker*, of *fables*, rather than of *verses*; since it is *imitation* that constitutes the Poet, and of this imitation *actions* are the object: nor is he the less a Poet, though the incidents of his fable should chance to be such as have actually happened; for nothing hinders, but that some *true* events may possess that *probability*³, the invention of which entitles him to the name of *Poet*.

VII.

Of *simple* fables or actions, the *episodic* are the worst. I call that an episodic fable, the *episodes*⁹ of which follow each other without any *probable* or *necessary* connection; a fault into which bad Poets are betrayed by their want of skill, and good Poets by the players: for in order to accommodate their pieces to the purposes of rival performers in the dramatic contests, they spin out the action beyond their powers, and are thus, frequently, forced to break the connection and continuity of its parts.

EPISODIC
FABLES,
the worst—
and why.

But Tragedy is an imitation, not only of a *complete* action, but also of an action exciting *terror* and *pity*. Now that purpose is

³ It may appear to the reader to be a strange observation, that “*some true events MAY be probable.*” But he will recollect what sort of *events*, and what sort of *probability*, Aristotle here speaks of: i. e. of *extraordinary events*, such as Poetry requires, and of that more *strict* and *perfect probability*, that closer connection and *visible* dependence of circumstances, which are always required from the *Poet*, though, in *such* events, not often to be found in *fact*, and real life, and therefore not expected from the *Historian*.—See the quotation from *Diderot*, NOTE 156.

⁹ *Episodes* — *episodic* circumstances — in the *second* sense explained NOTE 37: by no means in the modern and *epic* sense, of a *digression*, *incidental narrative*, &c.

best answered by such events as are not only *unexpected*, but *unexpected consequences of each other*: for, by this means, they will have more of the *wonderful*, than if they appeared to be the effects of chance; since we find, that, among events merely casual, those are the most wonderful and striking, which *seem* to imply design: as when, for instance, the statue of *Mitys* at Argos killed the very man who had murdered *Mitys*, by falling down upon him as he was surveying it; events of this kind, not having the appearance of *accident*. It follows then, that such fables as are formed on these principles must be the best.

VIII.

FABLES SIM-
PLE OR
COMPLI-
CATED.

Fables are of two sorts, *simple* and *complicated*; for so also are the *actions* themselves of which they are imitations. An action, (having the *continuity* and *unity* prescribed,) I call *simple*, when its catastrophe is produced *without* either *revolution*, or *discovery*: *complicated*, when *with* one, or both. And these should arise from the structure of the fable itself, so as to be the natural consequences, necessary or probable, of what has preceded in the action. For there is a wide difference between incidents that follow *from*, and incidents that follow only *after*, each other.

IX.

PARTS OF
THE FABLE.
I.
REVOLU-
TIONS.

A *REVOLUTION*, is a change, (such as has already been mentioned,) into the reverse of what is expected from the circumstances of the action; and that, produced, as we have said, by *probable*, or *necessary consequence*.

Thus, in the *Oedipus*¹, the messenger, meaning to make Oedipus happy, and to relieve him from the dread he was under with respect to his mother, by making known to him his real birth, produces an effect directly contrary to his intention. Thus, also,

¹ Sect. 7.—“events that are *unexpected consequences of each other*.”

² The *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles.

in the Tragedy of *Lynceus*: Lynceus is led to suffer death, Danaus follows to inflict it; but the event, resulting from the course of the incidents, is, that Danaus is killed, and Lynceus saved.

A DISCOVERY, as, indeed, the word implies, is a *change from unknown to known*, happening between those characters whose happiness, or unhappiness, forms the catastrophe of the drama, and terminating in friendship or enmity.

2.
DISCOVERIES.

The best sort of Discovery is that which is accompanied by a Revolution³, as in the *Oedipus*.

There are, also, other Discoveries; for inanimate things, of any kind, may be recognized in the same manner⁴; and we may discover whether such a particular thing was, or was not, *done* by such a person:—but the Discovery most appropriated to the *fable*, and the *action*, is that above defined; because such Discoveries, and Revolutions, must excite either *pity* or *terror*; and Tragedy we have defined to be an imitation of *pitiab*le and *terrible* actions: and because, also, by them the event, *happy*, or *unhappy*, is produced.

Now Discoveries, being *relative* things, are sometimes of *one* of the persons only, the *other* being already known; and sometimes they are *reciprocal*: thus, *Iphigenia* is discovered to *Orestes* by the letter which she charges him to deliver, and *Orestes* is obliged, by other means, to make himself known to her⁵.

³ Such is the *discovery* of Joseph, by his brethren, *Gen.* xlv.—the most beautiful and affecting example that can be given.

⁴ I do not understand Aristotle to be here speaking of *such* discoveries of “*inanimate things*” (rings, bracelets, &c.) as are the *means* of bringing about the *true* discovery—that of the *persons*. For, in what follows, it is implied that these “*other sorts of discovery*” produce neither *terror* nor *pity*, neither *happiness* nor *unhappiness*; which can by no means be said of such discoveries as are instrumental to the *personal* discovery, and, through that, to the catastrophe of the piece. Of these, he treats afterwards, *Sect.* 16.—Dacier, I think, has mistaken this.

⁵ See Mr. Potter’s *Euripides*:—*Iphigenia in Tauris*, v. 799, &c.

These

3. These then are *two* parts of the fable—*Revolution* and *Discovery*. There is a *third*, which we denominate, **DISASTERS**. The two former have been explained. *Disasters* comprehend all *painful* or *destructive* actions; the exhibition of death, bodily anguish, wounds, and every thing of that kind.

X.

PARTS INTO
which Tra-
gedy is DI-
VIDED.

The parts of Tragedy which are necessary to constitute its *quality*, have been already enumerated. Its *parts of quantity*—the *distinguisht* parts into which it is *divided*—are these: PROLOGUE, EPISODE, EXODE, and CHORUS; which last is also divided into the PARODE, and the STASIMON. These are common to all Tragedies. The **COMMOS** are found in *some* only.

The *Prologue*⁶ is all that part of a Tragedy which precedes the *Parode* of the Chorus.—The *Episode*⁷, all that part which is included between *entire Choral Odes*.—The *Exode*⁸, that part which has *no Choral Ode* after it.

Of the *Choral* part, the *Parode*⁹ is the first *speech* of the *whole Chorus*: the *Stasimon*¹, includes all those *Choral Odes* that are *without Anapests* and *Trochees*.

The *Commos*², is a general lamentation of the *Chorus* and the *Actors* together.

⁶ *Prologue*—This may be compared to our *first act*. See NOTE 40.

⁷ *Episode*—i. e. a part introduced, inserted, &c. as all the *dialogue* was, originally, between the choral odes. See Part I. Sect. 7. Note 7.

⁸ *Exode*—i. e. the *going out*, or *exit*: the concluding *act*, as we should term it. The Greek tragedies never *finished* with a choral ode.

⁹ *Parode*—i. e. *entry* of the Chorus upon the stage: and hence the term was applied to *what they first sung*, upon their entry. See the NOTE.

¹ *Stasimon*—i. e. *stable*: because, as it is explained, these odes were sung by the choral troop when fixed on the stage, and at rest: whereas the *Parode* is said to have been sung, *as they came on*. Hence, the *trochaic* and *anapestic* measures, being lively and full of motion, were adapted to the *Parode*, but not to the *Stasimon*.

² From a verb signifying to *beat* or *strike*; alluding to the gestures of violent grief. Such

Such are the separate parts into which Tragedy is divided. Its parts of *quality* were before explained.

XI.

The order of the subject leads us to consider, in the next place, what the Poet should *aim* at, and what *avoid*, in the construction of his fable; and by what means the *purpose* of Tragedy may be best effected.

What CATASTROPHE, and what CHARACTER, best adapted to the purposes of Tragedy.

Now since it is requisite to the perfection of a Tragedy that its plot should be of the *complicated*, not of the *simple* kind, and that it should imitate such actions as excite *terror* and *pity*, (this being the peculiar property of the Tragic imitation,) it follows evidently, in the first place, that the change from prosperity to adversity should not be represented as happening to a *virtuous* character³; for this raises disgust, rather than terror, or compassion. Neither should the contrary change, from adversity to prosperity, be exhibited in a *vicious* character: this, of all plans, is the most opposite to the genius of Tragedy, having no one property that it ought to have; for it is neither gratifying in a moral view, nor *affecting*, nor *terrible*. Nor, again, should the fall of a *very bad* man from prosperous to adverse fortune be represented: because, though such a subject may be pleasing from its moral tendency, it will produce neither pity nor terror. For our *pity* is excited by misfortunes *undeservedly* suffered, and our *terror*, by some *resemblance* between the sufferer and ourselves. Neither of these effects will, therefore, be produced by such an event.

There remains, then, for our choice, the character *between* these extremes; that of a person neither eminently virtuous or just, nor yet, involved in misfortune by deliberate vice, or villainy; but by some error of human frailty: and this person should, also, be some one of high fame and flourishing prosperity. For example, OEDIPUS, THYESTES, or other illustrious men of such families.

³ i. e. *eminently* virtuous, or good: for so he expresses it at the end of this section.

XII.

CATAS-
TROPHE
should be
SINGLE, and
that UN-
HAPPY.

Hence it appears, that, to be well constructed, a fable, contrary to the opinion of some, should be *single* rather than *double*; that the change of fortune should not be from adverse to prosperous, but the reverse; and that it should be the consequence, not of vice, but of some great frailty, in a character such as has been described, or *better* rather than *worse*.

These principles are confirmed by experience; for Poets, formerly, admitted almost any story into the number of Tragic subjects; but now, the subjects of the best Tragedies are confined to a few families—to Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, and others, the sufferers, or the authors, of some terrible calamity.

The most perfect Tragedy, then, according to the principles of the art, is of this construction. Whence appears the mistake of those critics who censure EURIPIDES for this practice in his Tragedies, many of which terminate unhappily; for this, as we have shewn, is right. And, as the strongest proof of it, we find that upon the stage, and in the dramatic contests, such Tragedies, if they succeed, have always the most Tragic *effect*: and EURIPIDES, though, in other respects, faulty in the conduct of his subjects, seems clearly to be the most *Tragic* of all Poets.

I place in the *second* rank, that kind of fable to which some assign the *first*; that which is of a *double* construction, like the *Odysssey*, and also ends in two opposite events, to the *good*, and to the *bad*, characters. That this passes for the best, is owing to the weakness⁵ of the spectators, to whose wishes the Poets accommodate

⁴ What is here meant by a *single* fable, will appear presently from the account of its opposite—the *double* fable. It must not be confounded with the *simple* fable, though, in the original, both are expressed by the same word. The *simple* fable is only a fable *without revelation, or discovery*. Sect. 8.

⁵ That weakness which cannot bear strong emotions, even from fictitious distress. I have known those who could not look at that admirable picture, the *Ugolino* of Sir Job.

date their productions. This kind of pleasure, however, is not the *proper* pleasure of Tragedy, but belongs rather to Comedy; for there, if even the bitterest enemies, like *Orestes* and *Ægijthus*, are introduced, they quit the scene at last in perfect friendship, and no blood is shed on either side.

XIII.

Terror and pity may be raised by the *decoration*—the mere *spectacle*⁶; but they may also arise from the circumstances of the *action* itself; which is far preferable, and shews a superior Poet. For the fable should be so constructed, that, without the assistance of the sight, its incidents may excite horror and commiseration in those, who *bear* them only: an effect, which every one, who hears the fable of the *Oedipus*, must experience. But, to produce this effect by means of the decoration, discovers want of art in the Poet; who must also be supplied, by the public, with an expensive apparatus⁷.

TERROR
and PITY to
be excited
by the AC-
TION, not by
the DECO-
RATION.

As to those Poets, who make use of the decoration in order to produce, not the *terrible*, but the *marvellous* only, *their* purpose has nothing in common with that of Tragedy. For we are not to seek for every sort of pleasure from Tragedy, but for that only which is *proper* to the species.

Jos. Reynolds.—To some minds, every thing, that is not *cheerful*, is *shocking*.—But, might not the preference here attributed to *weakness*, be attributed to better causes—the gratification of philanthropy, the love of justice, order, &c.?—the same causes which, just before, induced Aristotle himself to condemn, as *shocking*, and *disgusting*, those fables which involve the virtuous in calamity.

⁶ See a very pleasant paper of Addison's on this subject, *Spectator* N^o 42. We know the effect of the skull and black hangings in the *Fair Penitent*, the scaffold in *Venice Preserved*, the tomb in *Romco and Juliet*, &c.

⁷ Among other public offices, which the wealthier citizens of Athens were, by turns, called upon to discharge, was that of the *Choragi*, who were obliged, at their own expence, to provide a *chorus*, dresses, and, perhaps, scenes, and the whole decoration of theatrical exhibitions.

Since, therefore, it is the business of the Tragic Poet to give that pleasure, which arises from pity and terror, through *imitation*, it is evident, that he ought to produce that effect by the circumstances of the *action itself*.

XIV.

Of DISASTROUS INCIDENTS, and their proper management.

Let us, then, see, of what *kind* those incidents are, which appear most terrible, or piteous.

Now, such actions must, of necessity, happen between persons who are either friends, or enemies, or indifferent to each other. If an enemy kills, or purposes to kill, an enemy, in neither case is any commiseration raised in us⁸, beyond what necessarily arises from the nature of the action itself.

The case is the same, when the persons are neither friends nor enemies. But when such disasters happen between friends⁹—when, for instance, the brother kills, or is going to kill, his brother, the son his father, the mother her son, or the reverse—these, and others of a similar kind, are the proper incidents for the Poet's choice. The received Tragic subjects, therefore, he is not at liberty *essentially* to alter; *Clytemnestra* must die by the hand of *Orestes*, and *Eriphyle* by that of *Alcmaeon*: but it is his province to invent other subjects, and to make a skilful use of those which he finds already established.—What I mean by a skilful use, I proceed to explain.

The atrocious action may be perpetrated knowingly and intentionally¹, as was usual with the earlier Poets; and as EURIPIDES, also, has represented *Medea* destroying her children².

⁸ i. e. any of that *degree* of commiseration, which is requisite to the effect of the *deepest* tragedy, such as is the subject of this section. See NOTE 102.

⁹ Aristotle uses this word here, and in other parts of his works, in a wide sense, including *relations*, &c.

¹ As in *Macbeth*, *Richard the Third*, &c.

² See Mr. Potter's translation of the Tragedy here alluded to.

It may, likewise, be perpetrated by those, who are ignorant, at the time, of the connection between them and the injured person, which they afterwards discover³; like *Oedipus*, in SOPHOCLES. There, indeed, the action itself does not make a part of the drama⁴: the *Alcæon* of *Aplydamas*, and *Telegonus* in the *Ulysses Wounded*, furnish instances *within* the Tragedy⁵.

There is yet a *third* way, where a person upon the point of perpetrating, through ignorance, some dreadful deed, is prevented by a sudden discovery⁶.

Beside these, there is no other proper way. For the action must of necessity be either *done*, or *not done*, and that, either *with knowledge*, or *without*: but of all these ways*, that of being ready to execute, knowingly, and yet *not* executing, is the worst; for this is, at the same time, shocking, and yet not Tragic, because it exhibits no disastrous event. It is, therefore, never, or very rarely, made use of. The attempt of *Hæmon* to kill *Creon*, in the *Antigone*⁷, is an example.

Next to this, is the actual execution of the purpose⁸.

³ As in the *Fatal Curiosity* of Lillo.

⁴ The murder of *Laius* by *Oedipus*, his son, is supposed to have happened a considerable time before the beginning of the action.

⁵ Of these two dramas nothing more is known than the little that Aristotle here tells us. In the first, the Poet adhered so far to history, as to make *Alcæon* kill his mother *Eriphyle*, but with the improvement, (according to Aristotle's idea,) of making him do it *ignorantly*. The story of *Telegonus* is, that he was a son of *Ulysses* by *Circe*; was sent by her in quest of his father, whom he wounded, without knowing him, in a skirmish relative to some sheep, that he attempted to carry off from the island of *Ithaca*. It is somewhat singular, that the wound is said to have been given with a kind of *Otobeite* spear, headed with a sharp fish-bone. See Pope's *Odyssey* XI. 167. and the note.

⁶ As in *Merope*; Aristotle's own example.

* There is here much embarrassment and confusion in the original. See NOTE 105.

⁷ Of *Sophocles*. See Franklin's, or Brumoy's, translation.

⁸ The first of the three proper and admissible ways that were enumerated; that of *Macbeth*, &c.

To execute, through ignorance, and afterwards to discover, is better: for thus, the shocking atrociousness is avoided, and, at the same time, the discovery is striking.

But the best of all these ways, is the last. Thus, in the Tragedy of *Cressphontes*, *Merope*, in the very act of putting her son to death, discovers him, and is prevented. In the *Iphigenia*², the sister, in the same manner, discovers her brother; and in the *Helle*¹, the son discovers his mother, at the instant when he was going to betray her.

On this account it is, that the subjects of Tragedy, as before remarked, are confined to a small number of families. For it was not to *art*, but to *fortune*², that Poets applied themselves, to find incidents of this nature. Hence the necessity of having recourse to those families, in which such calamities have happened.

Of the PLOT, or FABLE, and its requisites, enough has now been said.

XV.

Of the
MANNERS.

With respect to the MANNERS, *four* things are to be attended to by the Poet.

First, and principally, they should be *good*. Now *manners*, or *character*, belong, as we have said before, to any speech or action that manifests a certain *disposition*; and they are bad, or good, as the disposition manifested is bad, or good. This goodness of manners may be found in persons of every description³: the manners of a woman, or of a slave, may be good; though, in general, women are, perhaps, rather bad, than good, and slaves, altogether bad.

The

¹ The *Iphigenia in Tauris* of Euripides.

² Of this Tragedy nothing farther is known.

³ i. e. to history or tradition.—See above, *Seet.* 6. p. 82. and *Seet.* 12. p. 88.

³ This is observed, to shew the consistence of this *first* precept with the next. The manners must be drawn as good as may be, consistently with the observance of *propriety*, with respect to the *general* character of different sexes, ages, conditions, &c.

It

The *second* requisite of the manners, is *propriety*. There is a manly character of bravery and fierceness, which cannot, with propriety, be given to a woman.

The *third* requisite is *resemblance*; for this is a different thing from their being *good*, and *proper*, as above described⁴.

The *fourth*, is *uniformity*; for even though the model of the Poet's imitation be some person of ununiform manners, still that person must be represented as *uniformly ununiform*.

We have an example of manners *unnecessarily bad*, in the character of *Menelaus* in the Tragedy of *Orestes*⁵: of *improper* and *unbecoming* manners, in the lamentation of *Ulysses* in *Scylla*, and in the speech of *Menalippe*⁶: of *ununiform* manners, in the *Iphigenia*

It might have been objected—"You say, the character must be *good*. But suppose the Poet has to represent, for instance, a slave?—the character of slaves in general "is notoriously *bad*."—The answer is,—*any thing* may be good in its kind.

⁴ That is, the manners may be both *good*, and *proper* or *becoming*; and yet not *like*. For example; should a Poet draw *Medea*, gentle, patient, &c. the manners would be both *good*, and *becoming*, but not *like*—not conformable to the historical or traditional character of the *individual*. The *portrait* would be defective.

⁵ The *Orestes* of Euripides.—Menelaus, throughout this play, as Mr. Potter has justly remarked, is "represented as an ungrateful, unfeeling, timid, designing politician."

⁶ The author had here, no doubt, given an instance of the violation of *resemblance* in the manners, though it be wanting in all the manuscripts.—Of the *Scylla*, nothing is known.—Some fragments remain of the *Menalippe the Wife*, (for this was the title,) a Tragedy of Euripides, the subject of which is a curiosity. *Menalippe* was delivered of two children, the fruits of a stolen amour with *Neptune*. To conceal her shame, she hid them in her father's *cow-house*; where he found them, and, being less of a philosopher than his daughter, took them for a monstrous production of some of his cows, and ordered them to be burned. His daughter, in order to save them, without exposing herself, enters into a long physical argument, upon the principles of *Anaxagoras*, to cure her father of his unphilosophical prejudices about monsters, and portentous births, and to convince him, that these infants *might* be the *natural* children of his cows. Part of this very speech is preserved by *Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, [See the *Ox. Eurip.* vol. iii. p. 371.] and it is this *masculine* philosophy that is here understood to be censured as an *impropriety* of character.—How would a Tragedy on such a subject as this, be *now* received by an audience?

at *Aulis*; for there, the *Iphigenia*, who supplicates for life, has no resemblance to the *Iphigenia* of the conclusion.

In the manners, as in the fable, the Poet should always aim, either at what is *necessary*, or what is *probable*; so that *such* a character shall appear to speak or act, necessarily, or probably, in *such* a manner, and *this* event, to be the necessary or probable consequence of *that*.—⁷ Hence it is evident, that the *development* also of a fable should arise out of the fable itself, and not depend upon *machinery*, as in the *Medea* ⁸, or in the incidents relative to the return of the Greeks, in the *Iliad* ⁹. The proper application of machinery is to such circumstances, as are extraneous to the drama; such, as either happened *before* the time of the action, and could not, by human means, be known; or, are to happen *after*, and require to be foretold: for to the Gods we attribute the knowledge of all things. But nothing *improbable* should be admitted in the incidents of the fable¹; or, if it cannot be avoided, it should, at least, be confined to such as are *without* the Tragedy itself; as in the *Oedipus* of SOPHOCLES.

[MACHI-
NERY.]

Since Tragedy is an imitation of *what is best*, we should follow the example of skilful portrait-painters; who, while they express the peculiar lineaments, and produce a likeness, at the same time improve upon the original². And thus, too, the Poet, when he

⁷ What follows, to the end of the paragraph, appears rather out of place. But see the NOTE. For *development*, see Sect. 18.

⁸ Of Euripides. *Medea* is carried off, at the end of the Tragedy, in a chariot drawn by flying dragons. See Mr. Potter's Transl. v. 1443, &c.

⁹ Pope's *Iliad*, II. 189, &c.—if the text here is right: but this is doubtful. See the NOTE.

¹ By *incidents of the fable*, Aristotle here plainly means, all those actions or events which are *essential parts* of the *subject* or *story*, whether previous to the action, and necessary to be known, or included in it, and actually represented *in* the drama. Compare *Part III. Sect. 6.*

² This seems intended to explain his *third* precept, of *resemblance* in the manners; to reconcile it with his *first*, and to shew what *sort* of likeness the nature of Tragic imitation requires.—Compare *Part I. Sect. 3.*—and *Part IV. Sect. 5.*

imitates the manners of *passionate* men, (or of *indolent*, or any other of a similar kind,) should draw an example approaching rather to a good, than to a hard and ferocious character: as *Achilles* is drawn, by AGATHO, and by HOMER. These things the Poet should keep in view; and, besides these, whatever relates to those *senses** which have a necessary connection with Poetry: for here, also, he may often err.—But of this enough has been said in the treatises already published.

XVI.

² What is meant by a DISCOVERY, has already been explained. Its *kinds* are the following.

Different
KINDS of
DISCOVER-
RY.

First, the most inartificial of all, and to which, from poverty of invention, the generality of Poets have recourse—the discovery by *visible signs*. Of these signs, some are *natural*; as, the lance with which the family of the *earth-born Thebans*⁴ were marked, or the stars which *Carcinus* has made use of in his *Thyestes*: others are *adventitious*; and of these, some are corporal, as scars; some external, as necklaces, bracelets, &c. or the little boat by which the discovery is made in the Tragedy of *Tyro*⁵. Even

* i. e. To the *fight*, and the *bearing*; in other words, to actual *representation*. See the NOTE.

³ The reader, who recollects the conclusion of Sect. 14, where the author took a formal leave of the “*fable and its requisites*,” and proceeded to the *second* essential part of Tragedy, the *manners*, will hardly be of Dacier’s opinion, who contends, that this section is rightly placed. His reasons are perfectly unsatisfactory.

⁴ The descendants of the original Thebans, who, according to the fabulous history, sprung from the earth when Cadmus sowed the Dragon’s teeth, &c.—This *noble race* are said to have been distinguished by the natural mark of a lance upon their bodies.

⁵ Sophocles wrote two Tragedies of this name, neither of them preserved.—The story of *Tyro* leads us to suppose, that Aristotle means the little boat, trough, or, as some render it, *cradle*, in which *Tyro* had exposed her children, on, or near, the river: the particular manner of the discovery, it would be in vain to guess.

these,

these, however, may be employed with more, or less skill. The discovery of *Ulysses*, for example, to his nurse, by means of his scar, is very different from his discovery, by the same means, to the herdsmen⁶. For all those discoveries, in which the sign is produced by way of *proof*, are inartificial. Those, which, like that in the *Washing of Ulysses*⁷, happen *suddenly* and *casually*, are better.

Secondly—Discoveries *invented*, at pleasure, by the Poet, and, on that account, still inartificial. For example; in the *Iphigenia*, *Orestes*, after having discovered his sister, discovers himself to her. She, indeed, is discovered by the letter; but *Orestes*, by [verbal *proofs*:] and these are such, as the Poet chuses to make him produce, not such, as arise from the *circumstances* of the *fable*⁸. This kind of discovery, therefore, borders upon the fault of that first mentioned: for, some of the things from which those proofs are drawn, are even such, as might have been actually produced as *visible signs*.

Another instance, is the discovery by the sound of the shuttle in the *Tercus* of SOPHOCLES.

Thirdly—The Discovery occasioned by *memory*; as, when some recollection is excited by the view of a particular object. Thus, in the *Cyprians* of *Dicæogenes*, a discovery is produced by tears shed at the sight of a picture: and thus, in the *Tale of Alcinous*, Ulysses, listening to the bard, recollects, weeps, and is discovered⁹.

⁶ See Pope's *Odyssey*, XIX. v. 451, &c. and the note there, on v. 461, and XXI. 226.

⁷ The antients distinguished the different parts of Homer's Poems by different titles accommodated to the different subjects, or episodes; and, in referring to him, they made use of these, not of the division into *books*. Thus, the part of the sixth book of the *Odyssey* above referred to, was called *The Washing*. The *Tale of Alcinous* was another title, which will presently be mentioned: See the NOTE on that passage.

⁸ See Mr. Potter's translation of the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, v. 884 to 910.

⁹ Pope's *Odyssey*, VIII. 569, &c.

Fourthly—

Fourthly—The Discovery occasioned by *reasoning or inference*¹; such as that in the *Chœphoræ*: “The person, who is arrived, resembles me—no one resembles me but Orestes—it must be he!” And that of *Polyides* the Sophist, in his *Iphigenia*²; for the conclusion of Orestes was natural.—“It had been his *sister’s* lot to “be sacrificed, and it was now his *own!*” That, also, in the *Tydeus* of *Theodectes*:—“He came to find his son, and he himself “must perish!” And thus, the daughters of *Phineus*, in the Tragedy denominated from them³, viewing the place to which they were led, *infer* their fate:—“*there* they were to die, for there they “were exposed!” There is also a compound sort of discovery, arising from *false inference* in the audience; as in *Ulysses the False Messenger*: he asserts, that he shall know the bow, which he had not seen; the audience falsely infer, that a discovery, by that means, will follow⁴.

But, of all Discoveries, the *best* is that, which arises from the *action itself*, and in which a *striking effect* is produced by *probable incidents*. Such is that in the *Oedipus* of SOPHOCLES: and that in the *Iphigenia*; for nothing more natural than her desire of con-

¹ *Occasioned* by reasoning;—i. e. by reasoning, (or rather, *inference*, or *conclusion*,) in the person discovered. See the NOTE.—It should be remembered, that Aristotle is not, in this chapter, *inventing* discoveries, nor enumerating all the kinds possible or practicable; but only classing and examining such, as he found in use, or could recollect, in the Tragedies and Epic Poems of his time.

² The subject appears to have been the same, as that of the *Iphigenia in Tauris* of Euripides. We are to suppose, that *Orestes* was discovered to his sister by this natural exclamation, at the moment when he was led to the altar of Diana to be sacrificed.

³ Of this, and the preceding Tragedy, we know nothing, but what we learn here: i. e. that in the one, a *father*, and in the other, the *daughters* of *Phineus*, were discovered, and, probably, saved, by those exclamations.

⁴ The original here is all incurable corruption, and impenetrable obscurity. See the NOTE.

veying the letter. Such discoveries are the best, because they alone are effected without the help of *invented proofs*, or bracelets, &c.⁵

Next to these, are the discoveries by *inference*.

XVII.

PRACTICAL
DIRECTIONS
for the
TRAGIC
POET.

The Poet, both when he plans, and when he writes, his Tragedy, should put himself, as much as possible, in the place of a spectator; for, by this means, *seeing* everything distinctly, as if present at the action, he will discern what is proper, and no inconsistencies will escape him. The fault objected to *Carcinus* is a proof of this. *Amphiaraus* had left the temple⁶: this, the Poet, for want of conceiving the action to pass before his eyes, overlooked; but in the representation, the audience were disgusted, and the piece condemned.

In composing, the Poet should even, as much as possible, be an *actor*: for, by natural sympathy, *they* are most persuasive and affecting, who are under the influence of actual passion. We share the agitation of those, who appear to be truly agitated—the anger of those, who appear to be truly angry.

Hence it is, that Poetry demands, either great natural quickness of parts, or an enthusiasm allied to madness. By the first of these, we mould ourselves with facility to the imitation of every form; by the other, transported out of ourselves, we *become* what we *imagine*.

When the Poet invents a subject, he should, first, draw a *general* sketch of it, and afterwards give it the detail of its *Episodes*, and extend it. The general argument, for instance, of the *Iphi-*

⁵ All this is extremely perplexing. I must refer the reader to the NOTE;—but, certainly, with no promise of any thing like perfect satisfaction.

⁶ As the subject of this Tragedy is not known, it seems impossible, from what is here said, even to guess how this was.

genia,

*genia*⁷, should be considered in this way: “A virgin, on the
 “ point of being sacrificed, is imperceptibly conveyed away from
 “ the altar, and transported to another country, where it was the
 “ custom to sacrifice all strangers to Diana. Of these rites she
 “ is appointed priestess. It happens, some time after, that her
 “ brother arrives there.” But *why?*—because an oracle had com-
 manded him, for some reason exterior to the general plan. *For*
what purpose?—This, also, is exterior to the plan.—“He arrives,
 “ is seized, and, at the instant that he is going to be sacrificed,
 “ the discovery is made.”—And this may be, either in the way
 of *Euripides*, or like that of *Polyides*⁸, by the natural reflection of
Orestes, that—“it was his fate also, as it had been his sister’s, to be
 “ sacrificed;” by which exclamation he is saved.

After this, the Poet, when he has given names to his charac-
 ters, should proceed to the Episodes of his action; and he must
 take care, that these belong *properly* to the subject; like that of
 the madness of *Orestes*, which occasions his being taken, and his
 escape by means of the ablution⁹. In dramatic Poetry the Epis-
 odes are short; but, in the Epic, they are the means of drawing
 out the poem to its proper length. The *general* story of the
 ODYSSEY, for example, lies in a small compass: “A certain man
 “ is supposed to be absent from his own country for many years—
 “ he is persecuted by *Neptune*, deprived of all his companions,
 “ and left alone. At home, his affairs are in disorder—the suitors
 “ of his wife dissipating his wealth, and plotting the destruction
 “ of his son. Tossed by many tempests, he at length arrives, and,
 “ making himself known to some of his family, attacks his ene-

⁷ *In Tauris*.—The general spirit of this precept of Aristotle is well illustrated
 by Diderot in the *Essai sur la Poésie Dram.* at the end of his *Père de Famille*, p. 292,
 &c. “Surtout, s’imposer la loi de ne pas jeter sur le papier une seule idée de détail;
 “ que le *plan* ne soit arrêté,” &c.

⁸ See the preceding section.

⁹ See v. 301, &c. and v. 1248, &c. of Mr. Potter’s translation.

“mies, destroys them, and remains himself in safety.” This is the *essential*; the rest is *Episode*.

XVIII.

COMPLI-
CATION and
DEVELOP-
MENT of
the Plot.

Every Tragedy consists of two parts—the *complication*, and the *development*¹. The complication is often formed by incidents supposed *prior* to the action, and by a part, also, of those that are *within* the action; the rest, form the development. I call *complication*, all that is between the beginning of the piece, and the last part, where the change of fortune commences:—*development*, all between the beginning of that change, and the conclusion. Thus, in the *Lynceus* of *Theodectes*, the events antecedent to the action, and the seizure of the child, constitute the *complication*; the *development* is from the accusation of murder to the end².

XIX.

Different
KINDS of
TRAGEDY.

There are four *kinds* of Tragedy, deducible from so many *parts*, which have been mentioned. One kind is the COMPLICATED; where all depends on *revolution* and *discovery*: another is the DISASTROUS³, such as those on the subject of *Ajax* or *Ixion*: another, the MORAL⁴, as the *Phthiotides*, and the *Peleus*: and, fourthly, the SIMPLE, such as the *Phorcides*⁵, the *Prometheus*, and all those Tragedies, the scene of which is laid in the infernal regions.

It

¹ Literally, the *tying*, and *untying*. With the French, *Nœud*, and *Dénouement*, are convenient and established terms. I hope I shall be pardoned for avoiding our awkward expressions of the *intrigue* and *unravelling* of a plot, &c. I could find no terms less exceptionable than those I have used.

² Of the plot of this Tragedy nothing is known. See the NOTE.

³ For these two kinds, see above, *sect.* 8, and 9.

⁴ i. e. In which the delineation of *manners* or *character* is predominant. See the NOTE.—Our language, I think, wants a word to express *this* sense of the Greek *ἠθικός*, and the Latin, *moratum*. *Mannered*, has, I believe, sometimes been used in this sense; but so seldom, as to sound awkwardly. We know nothing of the subjects here given as examples.

⁵ *Æschylus* wrote a Tragedy so named. It is difficult to imagine what he could make

It should be the Poet's aim to make himself master of all these manners; of as many of them, at least, as possible, and those the best: especially, considering the captious criticism, to which, in these days, he is exposed. For, the public, having now seen different Poets excel in each of these different kinds, expect every *single* Poet to unite in himself, and to surpass, the peculiar excellences of them *all*.

⁶ One Tragedy may justly be considered as the same with another, or different, not according as the subjects, but, rather, according as the complication and development, are the same or different.—Many Poets, when they have *complicated* well, *develop* badly⁷. They should endeavour to deserve equal applause in both.

XX.

We must also be attentive to what has been often mentioned⁸, and not construct a *Tragedy* upon an *Epic* plan. By an *Epic* plan, I mean, a fable composed of *many fables*⁹; as if any one, for

Too great
EXTENT of
PLAN to be
avoided.

make of these three curious personages, who were *born old women*, lived under ground, and had but one eye among them, which they used by turns; carrying it, I suppose, in a case, like a pair of spectacles.—Such is the tale! See Mr. Potter's *Æschylus*, p. 49, *quarto*.

⁶ What follows seems rather to belong to the preceding section. But perhaps Aristotle was led to this observation here, by what he had just dropped about the unfair and cavilling criticism of the times, which probably, (as Dacier has remarked,) denied the praise of invention to those who composed Tragedies upon old subjects, with old titles, which, we see, was the common practice of the Greek Poets.

⁷ No fault so common: see NOTE 59.—It was with the Greek Tragedians, probably, as with *Shakspeare*.—"In many of his plays the latter part is evidently neglected. When he found himself near the end of his work, and in view of his reward, he shortened the labour, to snatch the profit. He therefore remits his efforts where he should most vigorously exert them, and his catastrophe is improbably produced, or imperfectly represented." Johnson's *Pref. to Shakspeare*.

⁸ See Part I. *SECT.* 9.—II. *SECT.* 7.

⁹ i. e.—of many distinct *parts*, or *Episodes*, each of them capable of furnishing a *Tragic fable*. Compare Part III. *SECT.* 1. and V. *SECT.* 3. about the want of *strict* unity in the epic fable.

instance,

instance, should take the entire fable of the *ILIAD* for the subject of a Tragedy. In the Epic Poem, the length of the whole admits of a proper magnitude in the parts; but in the drama, the effect of such a plan is far different from what is expected. As a proof of this, those Poets, who have formed the *whole* of the destruction of Troy into a Tragedy, instead of confining themselves (as *Euripides*, but not *Æschylus*, has done, in the story of *Niobe*;) to a *part*, have either been condemned in the representation, or have contended without success. Even *Agatbo* has failed on this account, and on this only; for, in *revolutions*, and in actions also of the *simple* kind, these Poets succeed wonderfully in what they aim at; and that is, the union of *Tragic effect* with *moral tendency*: as when, for example, a character of great wisdom, but without integrity, is deceived, like *Sisyphus*; or, a brave, but unjust man, conquered. Such events, as *Agatbo* says, are probable, “as it is probable, in general, that many things should happen contrary to probability.”

XXI.

Of the
CHORUS.

The CHORUS should be considered as one of the persons in the drama¹; should be a *part* of the *whole*, and a sharer in the action: not as in *Euripides*², but, as in *Sophocles*. As for other Poets—

¹ *Actoris partes chorus, officiumque virile*
Defendat: neu quid mediis intercinat actus,
Quod non proposito conducat & bareat aptè.

Hor. A. P. 193.

² This expression does not, I think, necessarily imply any stronger censure of *Euripides*, than that the Choral Odes of his Tragedies were, in general, more loosely connected with the subject, than those of *Sophocles*; which, on examination, would, I believe, be found true. For, that *this* is the fault here meant, not the improper “*choice of the persons who compose the Chorus*,” as the ingenious translator of *Euripides* understands, is, I think, plain from what immediately follows; the connection being this:—“*Sophocles* is, in this respect, *most* perfect; *Euripides* *less* so; as to the *others*, “*their choral songs are totally foreign to the subject of their Tragedies.*” See Mr. Potter’s *Euripides*—Postscript to the *Trojan Dames*. Dr. Warton’s *Essay* on the *Genius*, &c. of *Pope*, vol. i. p. 71.

their

their choral songs have no more connection with their subject, than with that of any other Tragedy: and hence, they are now become detached pieces, inserted at pleasure³: a practice first introduced by *Agatbo*. Yet where is the difference, between this arbitrary insertion of an *Ode*, and the transposition of a *speech*, or even of a whole *Episode*, from one Tragedy to another?

XXII.

Of the other parts of Tragedy enough has now been said. We are next to consider the DICTION, and the SENTIMENTS. Of the
SENTI-
MENTS.

For what concerns the *sentiments*, we refer to the principles laid down in the books on *Rhetoric*; for to *that* subject they more properly belong. The *sentiments* include *whatever is the object of speech*⁴; as, for instance, to prove, to confute, to move the passions—pity, terror, anger, and the like; to amplify, or to diminish. But it is evident, that, with respect to the *things themselves* also⁵, when the Poet would make them appear pitiable, or terrible, or great, or probable, he must draw from the same sources; with this difference only, that, in the *drama*, these things must appear to be such, without being *shewn* to be such⁶; whereas, in

³ It is curious to trace the gradual extinction of the Chorus. At first, it was *all*; then, relieved by the intermixture of dialogue, but still *principal*; then, *subordinate* to the dialogue; then digressive, and *ill connected* with the piece; then borrowed from *other pieces* at pleasure—and so on, to the fiddles and the act-tunes, at which Dacier is so angry. (See his *Note* p. 335.) The performers in the *orchestra* of a modern theatre, are little, I believe, aware, that they occupy the *place*; and may consider themselves as the lineal descendants, of the antient *Chorus*.—*Orchestra* (*ὄρχηστρα*) was the name of that part of the antient theatre, which was appropriated to the Chorus. [JUL. POLLUX, IV. p. 423.]

⁴ See Harris's *Philolog. Inquiries*, p. 173, &c.

⁵ *Things themselves*—i. e. the *events, incidents*, &c. of the fable, as opposed to the *sentiments*, or *thoughts*. See the NOTE.

⁶ The circumstances which form the fable of *Lear*, *Othello*, *Oedipus*, &c. are such, as must of themselves, always appear in the highest degree atrocious, terrible, piteous, &c. whether the Poet be a *Shakspeare*, or a *Tate*. See the NOTE.

oratory, they must be *made* to appear so by the speaker, and *in consequence* of what he *says*: otherwise, what need of an orator, if they already appear so, in *themselves*, and not through his eloquence?

XXIII.

Of the DIC-
TION.
[To the end
of Part II.]

With respect to **DICATION**, one part of its theory is that, which treats of the *figures*⁷ of *speech*; such as, *commanding*, *entreating*, *relating*, *menacing*, *interrogating*, *answering*, and the like. But this belongs, properly, to the art of *acting*, and to the professed masters of that kind. The *Poet's* knowledge, or ignorance, of these things, cannot any way materially affect the credit of his art. For who will suppose there is any justice in the cavil of *Protagoras*—that, in the words, “The wrath, O goddess, *sing*⁸,” the *Poet*, where he intended a *prayer*, had expressed a *command*: for he insists, that to say, *Do this*, or *do it not*, is to *command*.—This subject, therefore, we pass over, as belonging to an art distinct from that of Poetry.

XXIV.

ANALYSIS
of DIC-
TION, OR
LANGUAGE
in general.

TO ALL **DICATION**, belong the following parts:—the *letter*, the *syllable*, the *conjunction*, the *noun*, the *verb*, the *article*, the *case*, the *discourse* or *speech*.

1. A *letter* is an indivisible sound; yet not *all* such sounds are letters, but those only that are capable of forming an *intelligible sound*. For there are indivisible sounds of brute creatures; but no *such* sounds are called *letters*. Letters are of three kinds; *vowels*, *semivowels*, and *mutts*. The *vowel*, is that, which has a distinct sound *without articulation*⁹; as A, or O.—The *semivowel*, that
which

⁷ *Figures of speech*—not in the *usual* sense of that expression; as appears, indeed, from his instances. See the **NOTE**; and *Hermes*, I. 8. about the *modes*: particularly, **NOTE (c.)**

⁸ In the opening of the *Iliad*.

⁹ Literally, *percussion*: i. e. of the tongue against the palate, or teeth, the lips against the teeth, or against each other, and all the other modes of *consonant* articulation.

which has a distinct sound *with* articulation, as S, and R. The *mute*, that which, with articulation, has yet no sound by itself; but joined with one of those letters that have some sound, becomes audible; as, G, and D. These all differ from each other, as they are produced by different configurations, and in different parts, of the mouth; as they are aspirated or smooth, long or short; as their tone is *acute*, *grave*, or *intermediate*: the detail of all which, is the business of the *metrical* treatises.

2. A *syllable*, is a sound without signification, composed of a mute and a vowel: for GR, without A, is not a syllable; with A, as GRA, it is. But these differences, also, are the subject of the metrical art.

3. A *conjunction*, is a sound without signification, * * * *
* * * * of such a nature, as, out of *several* sounds, each of them significant, to form *one* significant sound¹.

4. An *article*, is a sound without signification, which marks the *beginning*, or the *end* of a sentence; or *distinguishes*², as when we say, THE WORD φημι—THE WORD περι, &c.

* * * * *

5. A *noun*, is a sound, composed of other sounds; significant, without expression of *time*; and of which no part is *by itself* significant: for even in *double* words, the parts are not taken in

tion. See *Hermes*, III. 2. p. 322. where they are called “*concatēs*.” Dacier makes sad confusion here, both in his version, and his notes, by confounding the *names* of the consonants, when vowels are prefixed, or put after them, to make them *separately pronounceable*, (Te, eF, eL, &c.) with their powers *in composition*—as elements of *words*. Thus, it is strictly true, that S and R, have a *sound*, without the assistance of a vowel, merely by their mode of articulation. But D, or G, have no sound at all *by themselves*. The semivowels are l, m, n, r, f. (*Dion. Halicarn. De Struct. Orat. Sect. 24.*)

¹ See *Hermes*, p. 239, Note (a). Here are, in the original, *two* definitions; one intelligible, and one unintelligible. I believe I shall easily be excused for giving the reader the *intelligible* definition only. See the NOTE.

² *Hermes*, p. 216, &c.

the sense that *separately* belongs to them. Thus, in the word *Theodorus*, *dorus* is not significant³.

6. A *verb*, is a sound composed of other sounds;—significant—*with expression of time*—and of which, as of the noun, no *part* is *by itself significant*. Thus, in the words, *man*, *white*, indication of *time* is not included: in the words, *he walks*, *he walked*, &c. it is included; the one expressing the *present* time, the other the *past*.

7. *Cases* belong to nouns and verbs. Some cases express *relation*; as *of*, *to*⁴, and the like: others, *number*; as *man*, or *men*, &c. Others relate to *action* or *pronunciation*⁵: as those of *interrogation*, of *command*, &c. for, ἐβὰδισε; [*did he go?*] and, βαδιζε, [*go,*] are verbal *cases* of that kind.

8. *Discourse*, or *speech*, is a sound significant, composed of other sounds, *some* of which are significant *by themselves*: for *all* discourse is not composed of verbs and nouns;—the definition of *Man*⁶, for instance. Discourse, or speech, may subsist without a *verb*: *some* significant part, however, it *must* contain; significant, as the word *Cleon* is, in, “*Cleon walks.*”

³ The name, *Theodorus*, is derived from *Theos*, God, and *Doron*, a gift. Yet when the word is used, it stands for neither of these ideas, but merely for the *individual* so named.

⁴ These *only*, in *modern* grammar, are called *cases*: in Aristotle, *number*, whether in noun or verb, and the *tenses*, and *modes*, (or *moods*), of verbs, are comprehended under that term; because *cases*, (πρᾶσις—*casus*) are *endings*, *terminations*, *inflections*, &c. and, in the learned languages, *all* the above mentioned differences of meaning are expressed by different *terminations*. The French use *chute*, the literal translation of *casus*, in the sense of *termination*.—“*La chute d’une periode,*” &c. And *fall* is used, in our poetical language, for a close, or *cadence*, in music.

That strain again—it had a dying FALL.

Merch. of Venice. And so Milton in *Comus*, v. 251.

⁵ These *modes*, are the same which he calls *figures of speech*, Sect. 23. See the NOTE.

⁶ The definition alluded to appears to be this, literally rendered: “*A terrestrial animal with two feet.*” (ζῷον πτερον, διπτερον.) See the NOTE.

A discourse

A *discourse* or *speech* is *one*, in two senses; either as it *signifies one thing*, or, *several things made one by conjunction*. Thus, the *Iliad* is *one by conjunction*: the definition of Man, by *signifying one thing*.

XXV.

OF WORDS, some are *single*—by which I mean, composed of parts not significant; and some *double*: of which last, some have one part significant, and the other not significant; and some, both parts significant. A word may also be *triple*, *quadruple*, &c. like many of those used by the *Megalotæ*; as, *Hermocæcoxanthus*⁷. Every word is either *common*, or *foreign*, or *metaphorical*, or *ornamental*, or *invented*, or *extended*, or *contracted*, or *altered*⁸.

Different
KINDS OF
WORDS.

By *COMMON* words, I mean, such as are in general and established *use*.—By *FOREIGN*, such as belong to a different language: so that the same word may, evidently, be both *common*, and *foreign*, though not to the same people. The word *Σύριον*, to the Cyprians is *common*, to us, *foreign*.

A *METAPHORICAL*⁹ word is a word transferred from its *proper* sense; either from *genus* to *species*, or from *species* to *genus*, or from *one species* to *another*, or in the way of *analogy*.

1. From *genus* to *species*: as,

Secure in yonder port my vessel STANDS¹.

For, *to be at anchor*, is one *species* of *standing* or being *fixed*².

⁷ A strange word, and how it was applied we know not. It appears to be a consolidation of three Asiatic rivers—the *Hermus*, the *Cæicus*, and the *Xanthus*.

⁸ See the last paragraph of NOTE 190; an observation of importance to the right understanding of this enumeration.

⁹ For the *general* sense, in which *metaphorical* is here used, see the beginning of NOTE 183.

¹ From *Homer*, Od. A. 185.—In Pope's translation, I. 237.

“Far from your capital my ship *resides*.”

This would not answer my purpose, because the metaphor is changed.

² How widely different is the metaphor, when we talk of a ship *RIDING* at anchor!

2. From *species* to *genus*: as,

———— to *Ulysses*,

A THOUSAND generous deeds we owe——³.

For a *thousand* is a certain *definite many*, which is here used for *many*, in *general*.

3. From *one species* to *another*⁴: as,

Χαλκῶ ὄπωψον ψυχὴν ἈΡΥΣΑΣ.

And,

ΤΑΜ' ἀταρσὶ χαλκῶ.

For here, the Poet uses *ταμειν*, to *cut off*, instead of *ἀρῆσαι*, to *draw forth*, and *ἀρῆσαι* instead of *ταμειν*: each being a *species* of *taking away*.

4. In the way of *analogy*—when, of four terms, the *second* bears the same relation to the *first*, as the *fourth* to the *third*; in which case, the *fourth* may be substituted for the *second*, and the *second* for the *fourth*. And, sometimes, the *proper* term is also introduced, besides its *relative* term.

Thus, a *cup* bears the same relation to *Bacchus*, as a *shield* to *Mars*. A shield, therefore, may be called *the cup of Mars*, and a cup, *the shield of Bacchus*. Again—evening being to day, what old age is to life, the evening may be called *the old age of the day*, and old age, *the evening of life*; or, as *Empedocles* has expressed it, “Life’s setting sun.” It sometimes happens, that there is no *proper* analogous term, answering to the term *borrowed*; which yet may be used in the same manner, as if there were. For instance: to *scow*, is the term appropriated to the action of dispersing

³ *Il. B. 272.*—In *Pope, II. 333.*—but the metaphor is not retained.

⁴ This, and the next species, only, answer to what we call *metaphor*—the metaphor founded on *resemblance*. The two first species belong to the trope denominated, since Aristotle’s time, *Synecdoche*.

⁵ “Thy sun is set, thy spring is gone.” GRAY—*Ode on Spring*.

“Yet hath my *night of life* some memory.”

Shakspeare, Com. of Errors—last scene.

feed upon the earth; but the disperſion of rays from the ſun is expreſſed by no appropriated term; it is, however, with reſpect to the *ſun's light*, what *ſowing* is with reſpect to *ſeed*. Hence the Poet's expreſſion, of the ſun——

“ —— ſOWING abroad

“ His heaven-created flame.”

There is, alſo, *another* way of uſing this kind of metaphor, by adding to the borrowed word a negation of ſome of thoſe qualities, which belong to it in its *proper ſenſe*: as if, inſtead of calling a ſhield *the cup of Mars*, we ſhould call it *the wineleſs cup**.

AN INVENTED word, is a word never before uſed by any one, but coined by the Poet himſelf; for ſuch, it appears, there are; as ΕΡΝΥΤΑΙ⁶ for ΚΕΡΑΤΑ, *horns*, or ΑΡΗΤΗΡ † for ΙΕΡΕΥΣ, a *prieſt*.

A word is EXTENDED, when for the proper vowel a longer is ſubſtituted, or a ſyllable is infered.—A word is CONTRACTED, when ſome part of it is retrenched.—Thus, πολΗΘ, for πολΕΘ, and Πηληϊάδεω for Πηληϊάδω, are extended words: contracted, ſuch as ΚΡΙ, and ΔΩ, and ΟΥ⁷: e. g.

—— μια γινεται ἀμφοτερων ΟΥ⁸.

AN ALTERED word, is a word, of which *part* remains in its uſual ſtate, and *part* is of the Poet's making: as in

ΔΕΞΙΤΕΡΟΝ κατὰ μάζον⁹,

δεξιτερος is for δεξιός.

* For the *ornamental* word, or the *ornament*, (κοσμῶν) as Ariſtotle calls it, the definition of which ſhould have come in here, ſee NOTE 190.

⁶ i. e. *Branches*; which we alſo uſe for the *horns* of a ſtag. But Ariſtotle means a *new word*, not a *new application* merely, of a word already in uſe.

† A *ſupplicator*: literally, a *prayer*, taken in the ſenſe of *one who prays*; as *ſer* is uſed for *prophet*.

⁷ Κρι, occurs Il. E. 196.—Δω, Il. A. 425.

⁸ Part of a verſe of *Empedocles*, quoted by *Strabo*, p. 364. *Ed. Caf.*

⁹ Il. E. 393.

Farther;—

Farther; NOUNS are divided into *masculine*, *feminine*, and *neuter*. The *masculine* are those which end in ν , ρ , σ , or in some letter compounded of σ and a *mute*; these are two, ψ and ξ .—The *feminine*, are those which end in the vowels *always long*, as η , or ω ; or, in α , of the *doubtful* vowels: so that the masculine and the feminine terminations are equal in number; for as to ψ and ξ , they are the same with terminations in σ . No noun ends in a mute, or a short vowel. There are but *three* ending in ι ; $\mu\epsilon\lambda\iota$, $\kappa\omicron\mu\mu\iota$, $\pi\epsilon\pi\omega\epsilon\iota$: *five* ending in υ : $\pi\omega\upsilon$, $\nu\alpha\pi\upsilon$, $\gamma\omicron\upsilon$, $\delta\omicron\upsilon$, $\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\upsilon$.

The *neuter* terminate in these two last-mentioned vowels, and in ν and σ .

XXVI.

ON METRIC
DICTION.

The excellence of diction consists in being *perspicuous* without being *mean*. The most perspicuous is that which is composed of *common* words; but, at the same time, it is mean. Such is the Poetry of *Cleophon*, and that of *Sthenelus*. That language, on the contrary, is elevated, and remote from the vulgar idiom, which employs *unusual* words: by *unusual*, I mean, *foreign*, *metaphorical*, *extended*—all, in short, that are not *common* words. Yet, should a Poet compose his diction entirely of such words, the result would be, either an *ænigma*, or a barbarous jargon: an *ænigma*, if composed of *metaphors*; a barbarous jargon, if composed of *foreign* words.—For the essence of an *ænigma* consists in *putting together things apparently inconsistent and impossible, and, at the same time, saying nothing but what is true*. Now this cannot be effected by the mere *arrangement*¹ of the words; by the *metaphorical use* of them, it may; as in this *ænigma*:

A man I once beheld, [and wondering view'd,]
Who, on another, brags with fire had GLEW'D².

¹ By mere arrangement or construction of words used in their *proper* senses, you may produce *nonsense*, or *ambiguity*; but not, an *inconsistent* and *impossible*, yet *clear*, meaning.

² See the NOTE. The operation of *cupping* is meant, which the Greeks performed with an instrument of *brags*.

With

With respect to *barbarism*, it arises from the use of *foreign* words. A judicious intermixture is, therefore, requisite.

Thus, the *foreign* word, the *metaphorical*, the *ornamental*, and the other species before mentioned, will raise the language above the vulgar idiom, and *common* words will give it perspicuity. But nothing contributes more considerably to produce clearness, without vulgarity, of diction, than *extensions*, *contractions*, and *alterations*, of words: for here, the variation from the proper form, being *unusual*, will give *elevation* to the expression; and, at the same time, what is retained of *usual* speech will give it *clearness*. It is without reason, therefore, that some critics have censured these modes of speech, and ridiculed the Poet³ for the use of them; as old *Euclid*⁴ did, objecting, that “verification would be an easy business, if it “were permitted to lengthen words at pleasure:”—and then giving a burlesque example of that sort of diction: as,

* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *⁵

Undoubtedly, when these licences appear to be thus *purposely* used, the thing becomes ridiculous. In the employment of *all* the species of *unusual* words, moderation is necessary: for metaphors, foreign words, or any of the others, improperly used, and with a *design* to be ridiculous, would produce the same effect. But how great a difference is made by a *proper* and temperate use of such words, may be seen in *heroic* verse. Let any one only substitute *common* words in the place of the metaphorical, the foreign, and others of the same kind, and he will be convinced of the truth of what I say. For example: the same Iambic verse occurs in *Æschylus* and in *Euripides*; but, by means of a single alteration

³ Homer.

⁴ Not the Geometrician.

⁵ I have omitted the examples—two lines of incurable corruption; the “*confusion*” of which is “*worse confounded*” by an endless variety of various readings, which, after all, are only so many different shades of nonsense. See the NOTE.

—the substitution of a *foreign*, for a *common* and *usual* word, one of these verses appears beautiful, the other ordinary. For *Aeschylus*, in his *Philoctetes*⁶, says—

Φαγεδαινα, ἣ με σαρκας ΕΣΘΙΕΙ ποδῶ—

The cankerous wound that *eats* my flesh.—

But *Euripides*, instead of *ἐσθια* [*eats*] uses ΘΙΝΑΤΑΙ.

The same difference will appear, if, in this verse,

Νυν δε μ' εων ΟΛΙΓΟΣ τε και ΟΥΤΙΔΑΝΟΣ και ΑΚΙΚΤΣ⁷,

we substitute *common* words, and say,

Νυν δε μ' εων ΜΙΚΡΟΣ τε και ΑΣΘΕΝΙΚΟΣ και ΑΕΙΔΗΣ.

So, again, should we for the following,—

Διφρον ΑΕΙΚΕΛΙΟΝ καταθεις, ΟΛΙΓΗΝ τε τραπέζαν—⁸

substitute this:—

Διφρον ΜΟΧΘΗΡΟΝ καταθεις, ΜΙΚΡΑΝ τε τραπέζαν.

Or, change—*Ἠῶνες* ΒΟΟΩΣΙΝ⁹—The cliffs *rebellow*—to *Ἠῶνες* ΚΡΑΖΟΥΣΙΝ—The cliffs *resound*.

Ariphrades, also, endeavoured to throw ridicule upon the Tragic Poets, for making use of such expressions as no one would think of using in common speech; as, *δαματων ἄπο*, instead of *ἀπο δαματων*: and ΣΕΘΕΝ—and, *ἐγω δε ΝΙΝ*—and, *Αχιλλεως περι*, instead of *περι Αχιλλεως*, &c. Now it is precisely owing to their being *not* in common use, that such expressions have the effect of giving elevation to the diction. But this he did not know¹.

⁶ We have neither of the Tragedies here alluded to.

⁷ *Odyssy* IX. v. 515. of the *original*. It is obvious that these *differences* cannot be preserved in a translation.

⁸ *Od.* γ. 259.

⁹ *Il.* P. 265.—Pope's line is, "And distant rocks *rebellow* to the roar."

XVII. 315.

¹ Aristotle's thorough contempt of the critic, and his criticism, could not have been more strongly marked than by this short and simple expression. [—ΘΕΙΝΘ ΔΕ ΤΗΤΟ ἦγνει!]]

To employ with propriety any of these modes of speech—the double words, the foreign, &c.—is a great excellence: but the greatest of all, is to be happy in the use of *metaphor*; for it is this alone which cannot be acquired, and which, consisting in a quick discernment of *resemblances*, is a certain mark of genius².

Of the different kinds of words, the *double* are best suited to Dithyrambic Poetry; the *foreign* to Heroic; the *metaphorical* to Iambic. In Heroic Poetry, indeed, they have *all* their place; but to Iambic verse³, which is, as much as may be, an imitation of common speech⁴, those words which are used in common speech are best adapted; and such are, the *common*, the *metaphorical*, and the *ornamental*.

Concerning TRAGEDY, and the imitation by ACTION, enough has now been said.

² Metaphors are, evidently, much more important, and more of the *essence* of Poetry, than the other *sorts of words*. It is very easy, and very commonly practised by Poets of no genius or originality, to copy the *technical* language, the *formulae*, as it were, of Poetry—compound epithets, obsolete words, &c. These occur but now and then: *metaphorical* expression is continually wanted; and the beauty, force, and novelty of it, depend on the writer's own imagination. Indeed, almost all the beauty of Poetry, as far as *language* is concerned, all that distinguishes the Poet of genius, from the versifier who trusts solely to his ear, and to his memory, arises from the *uncommon* and *original* use of *metaphor*; especially, taking that word in Aristotle's latitude, as comprehending all *tropical* expression. Here, however, he plainly has *our* metaphor chiefly in view;—the metaphor founded on *resemblance*.

³ The verse of Tragedy. See the NOTE.

⁴ See above—Part I. Sect. 7.

P A R T III.

OF THE EPIC POEM.

I.

In what
EPIC and
TRAGIC
Poetry
agree.

WITH respect to that species of Poetry which imitates by NARRATION, and in *hexameter* verse, it is obvious, that the *fable* ought to be dramatically constructed¹, like that of Tragedy: and that it should have for its subject *one entire* and *perfect action*, having a *beginning*, a *middle*, and an *end*; so that, forming, like an animal, a *complete whole*, it may afford its *proper*² pleasure: widely differing, in its construction, from history, which necessarily treats, not of *one action*, but of *one time*; and of *all* the events that happened, to one person, or to many, during that time; events, the *relation* of which, to each other, is merely casual³. For, as the naval action at Salamis, and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, were events of *the same time*, unconnected by any relation to a *common end*, or *purpose*; so also, in *successive* events, we sometimes see one thing *follow* another, without being

¹ See below, *Sec.* 3.

² i. e. Opposed, (as appears from what follows,) to that which *history* gives. *Unity of interest* is essential to the pleasure we expect from the Epic Poem; and this cannot exist, at least, in the degree required, without *unity of action*.

³ Compare, *Part II. Sect.* 5, 7, and 8.

connected

connected to it by such relation. And this is the practice of the generality of Poets. Even in this, therefore, as we have before observed⁴, the superiority of HOMER's genius is apparent, that he did not attempt to bring the *whole* war, though an *entire* action with *beginning* and *end*, into his Poem. It would have been too vast an object, and not *easily comprehended in one view*⁵: or had he forced it into a moderate compass, it would have been perplexed by its variety⁶. Instead of this, selecting one *part* only of the war, he has, from the rest, introduced many Episodes—such as the *catalogue of the ships*, and others—by which he has diversified his Poem. Other Poets take for their subject the actions of *one person*⁷, or of *one period of time*⁸, or an action which, though *one*, is composed of too many parts. Thus, the author of the *Cypriacs*, and of the *Little Iliad*⁹. Hence it is, that the ILIAD, and the ODYSSEY, each of them, furnish matter for one Tragedy,

⁴ Part II. Sect. 5.

⁵ See Part II. Sect. 4.

⁶ Because “the length of the whole would” then “not admit of a proper magnitude in the parts;” and, thus, an Epic Poem constructed upon an *historical plan*, would be exactly in the same case with a Tragedy “constructed on an *Epic plan*.” See Part II. Sect. 20. and NOTE 153.

⁷ Part II. Sect. 5.

⁸ Of this kind seems the Poem of *Ariosto*, the *exordium* of which, not only expresses the miscellaneous variety of his matter, but, also, his *principle of unity*.

Le Donne, i cavalier, l'arme, gli amori,
Le cortesie, l'audaci imprese, io canto,
Che furo al TEMPO che passaro i Mori, &c.

Ariosto's expedient was, to “intertwist the several actions together, in order to give something like the appearance of one action,” to the whole, as has been observed of *Spenser*: [*Letters on Chivalry, &c.*] he has given his Poem the continuity of basket-work. Or, if I may be indulged in another comparison, his unity, is the unity produced between oil and vinegar by shaking them together; which only makes them *separate by smaller portions*.

⁹ So called, to distinguish it from the *Iliad* of Homer, of which it seems to have been a continuation. See the NOTE.

or two, at most; but from the *Cypriacs* many may be taken, and from the *Little Iliad*, more than eight; as, *The Contest for the Armour*¹, *Philoctetes*², *Neoptolemus*, *Eurypylos*³, *The Vagrant*⁴, *The Spartan Women*, *The Fall of Troy*, *The Return of the Fleet*⁵, *Sienn*⁶, and *The Trojan Women*⁷.

Again—the *Epic Poem* must also agree with the *Tragic*, as to its *kinds*: it must be *simple*, or *complicated*, *moral*, or *disastrous*⁸. Its *parts*, also, setting aside Music and Decoration, are the same⁹; for it requires *Revolutions*, *Discoveries*, and *Disasters*; and it must be furnished with proper *sentiments* and *diſtion*: of all which HOMER gave both the first, and the most perfect, example. Thus, of his two Poems, the *Iliad* is of the *simple* and *disastrous* kind; the *Odyſſey*, *complicated*, (for it abounds throughout with discoveries,) and *moral*. Add to this, that in *language* and *sentiments* he has surpassed all Poets.

¹ i. e. Between Ajax and Ulyſſes. *Æſchylus* wrote a Tragedy on this ſubject, of which the *Ajax* of *Sophocles* is the ſequel.—*Dacier*.

² The *Philoctetes* of *Sophocles* only remains.

³ Of the ſubject of this, and the preceding drama, we know nothing.

⁴ See Pope's *Odyſſey*, IV. 335. but what is there rendered *ſlave*, is, in Homer, *beggar*, or *vagrant*. The ſtory is alſo touched by *Euripides*, in his *Hecuba*. See *Potter's Tranſl.* v. 210, &c.

⁵ See the latter part of NOTE 116.

⁶ The ſtory is well known from *Virgil*, *Æn.* 2.—*Sophocles* wrote a Tragedy of this title.

⁷ A Tragedy of this name by *Euripides* is extant. See *The Trojan Dames*, in Mr. *Potter's* tranſlation.

⁸ See *Part II. Sect.* 19.

⁹ *Part I. Sect.* 9.

¹⁰ See Pope's tranſlation, XVI. 206, &c. where Ulyſſes diſcovers himſelf to *Telemachus*: XXI. 212. to the ſhepherds. —XXIII. 211. to *Penelope*.—XXIV. 375. to his father.—IX. 17. to *Alcinous*.—IV. 150, &c. *Telemachus* is diſcovered to *Menelaus* by his tears: v. 189, to *Helen*, by his reſemblance to his father.—XIX. 545. Ulyſſes is diſcovered to the old nurſe, by the fear.

II.

The Epic Poem *differs* from Tragedy, in the *length* of its plan, and in its *metre*. In what they DIFFER.

With respect to *length*, a sufficient measure has already been assigned². It should be such, as to admit of our *comprehending at one view the beginning and the end*: and this would be the case, if the Epic Poem were reduced from its antient length, so as not to exceed that of such a number of Tragedies, as are performed successively at one hearing³. But there is a circumstance in the nature of Epic Poetry which affords it peculiar latitude in the extension of its plan. It is not in the power of Tragedy to imitate several different actions performed at the *same time*; it can imitate only that *one* which occupies the stage, and in which the actors are employed. But, the Epic imitation, being *narrative*, admits of many such simultaneous incidents, properly related to the subject, which swell the Poem to a considerable size.

And this gives it a great advantage, both in point of *magnificence*, and, also, as it enables the Poet to relieve his hearer⁴, and *diversify* his work, by a variety of *dissimilar* Episodes: for it is to the satiety naturally arising from similarity that Tragedies frequently owe their ill success.

With respect to *metre*, the heroic is established by experience as the most proper; so that, should any one compose a *narrative* Poem in any other, or in a variety of metres, he would be thought guilty of a great impropriety. For the heroic is the gravest and most majestic of all measures; and hence it is, that it peculiarly admits the use of *foreign* and *metaphorical* expressions; for in this respect also, the *narrative* imitation is abundant and various beyond the rest. But the Iambic and Trochaic have more *motion*; the latter being adapted to *dance*, the other to *action* and *business*.

² See the preceding *Sett.* and *Part II. Sett. 4.*

³ In the dramatic contests. See the *NOTE.*

⁴ "Hearer."—See *Dissert. I. p. 42, 43.*

To *mix* these different metres, as *Cheremon* has done, would be still more absurd. No one, therefore, has ever attempted to compose a Poem of an extended plan in any other than heroic verse; nature itself, as we before observed⁵, pointing out the proper choice.

III.

Epic Narration should be DRAMATIC and IMITATIVE.

Among the many just claims of HOMER to our praise, this is one—that he is the only Poet who seems to have understood what part in his Poem it was proper for him to take *himself*. The Poet, in his own person, should speak as little as possible; for he is not then the *imitator*⁶. But other Poets, ambitious to figure throughout, themselves⁷, *imitate* but little, and seldom. HOMER, after a few preparatory lines, immediately introduces a man, a woman, or some other character⁸; for all have their *character*—no where are the *manners* neglected.

IV.

Epic admits the WONDERFUL more easily, and in a greater degree than *Tragedy*.

The *surprising* is necessary in *Tragedy* †; but the Epic Poem goes farther, and admits even the *improbable* and *incredible*, from which the highest degree of the surprising results, because, there, the action is not *seen**. The circumstances, for example, of the

⁵ Part I. Sect. 7.

⁶ Strictly speaking. See *Dissertation* I. p. 26.

⁷ This is remarkably the case with *Lucan*; of whom *Hobbes* says, that “no Heroic Poem raises such admiration of the Poet, as his hath done, though not so great admiration of the persons he introduceth.”—[*Disc. concerning the Virtues of an Heroic Poem.*]

⁸ As, gods, goddesses, allegorical beings, &c.

† See above, Part II. Sect. 7. p. 83, 84.

* The best comment to which I can refer the reader upon all this part of Aristotle, is to be found in the 10th of the *Letters on Chivalry and Romance*, in which the Italian Poets, and the privileges of genuine Poetry, are vindicated, with as much solidity as elegance, against those, whom Dryden used to call his “*Prose Critics*”—against that sort of criticism “*which looks like philosophy, and is not.*”—*Dr. Hurd's Dialogues, &c.* vol. iii.

pursuit of Hector by Achilles, are such, as, upon the stage, would appear ridiculous;—the Grecian army standing still, and taking no part in the pursuit, and Achilles making signs to them, by the motion of his head, not to interfere? But in the Epic Poem this escapes our notice. Now the *wonderful* always pleases; as is evident from the additions which men always make in relating any thing, in order to gratify the hearers.

V.

It is from HOMER principally, that other Poets have learned the art of *feigning well*. It consists in a sort of *sophism*. When *one thing* is observed to be constantly accompanied, or followed, by *another*, men are apt to conclude, that, if the latter *is*, or *has happened*, the former must also *be*, or must *have happened*. But this is an error. * * * * * For, knowing the *latter* to be true, the mind is betrayed into the false inference, that the *first* is true also¹.

FICTION
how made
to pass as
truth.

VI.

The Poet should prefer *impossibilities*² which *appear probable*, to such things as, though *possible*, appear *improbable*. Far from producing

Of the IM-
PROBABLE
and AE-
SURD.

¹ Pope's *Iliad*, XXII. 267.—Perhaps, the idea of stopping a whole army by a nod, or shake of the head, (a circumstance distinctly mentioned by Homer, but sunk in Mr. Pope's version,) was the absurdity here *principally* meant. If this whole Homeric scene were represented on our stage, in the best manner possible, there can be no doubt, that the effect would justify Aristotle's observation. It would certainly set the audience in a roar.

¹ For an attempt to explain Aristotle's meaning in this difficult passage, which, I think, has not hitherto been understood, I must refer the reader to the NOTE.

² This includes all that is called *faery*, *machinery*, ghosts, witches, enchantments, &c.—things, according to *Hobbes*, “beyond the actual bounds, and only within the *conceived possibility* of nature.” [See the *Letters on Chivalry*, as above.] Such a being as *Caliban*, for example, is *impossible*. Yet Shakspeare has made the character *appear probable*; not certainly, to *reason*, but to *imagination*: that is, *we make no difficulty about the possibility* of it, in reading. Is not the *Lovelace* of Richardson, in this view,

ducing a plan' made up of improbable incidents, he should, if possible, admit no one circumstance of that kind; or, if he does, it should be *exterior* to the *action* itself⁴, like the ignorance of *Oedipus* concerning the manner in which *Laius* died; not *within* the drama, like the narrative of what happened at the Pythian games, in the *Electra*⁵; or, in *The Mysians*, the man who travels from Tegea to Myfia without speaking⁶. To say, that *without* these circumstances the fable would have been destroyed, is a ridiculous excuse: the Poet should take care, from the first, not to construct his fable in that manner. If, however, any thing of this kind has been admitted, and yet is made to pass under some colour of probability, it may be allowed, though even, in itself, *absurd*. Thus in the *Odyssy*⁷, the improbable account of the manner in which *Ulysses* was landed upon the shore of Ithaca, is such, as in the

view, more out of nature, more improbable, than the *Caliban* of Shakspeare? The latter is, at least, consistent. I can *imagine* such a monster as Caliban: I never could imagine such a man as Lovelace.

³ The *general plan, story, or argument*, as *Part II. Sect. 17.* including events *prior* to the action, but necessary to be known.

⁴ See the beginning of the *Oedipus* of Sophocles. Though the ignorance of *Oedipus* appears in the drama itself, yet the *circumstances, upon which the improbability of that ignorance depends* (his coming to Thebes, marrying *Jocasta*, and living with her twenty years,) are *exterior* to the drama: i. e. *prior* to the opening of the action. See above, *Part II. Sect. 15.*

⁵ See *Brumoy, Th. des Grecs*, I. p. 428. I believe he is right in understanding the absurdity here meant to be—"d'avoir fait raconter comme inconnue, une chose dont *Clytemnestre* auroit pu sçavoir d'ailleurs la verité ou la fausseté, surtout s'a-gissant d'*Oreste* qu'elle craignoit."—The games in question were probably frequented by all Greece, and whatever happened at them, must have been matter of such public notoriety, that a fraudulent account would have been liable to immediate detection.

⁶ Of the subject of this Tragedy, and, consequently, of the *cause* of the *silence* here censured, we are entirely ignorant.

⁷ See Pope's *Transl.* XIII. 138, and the *note* there, and on v. 142. Homer seems, clearly, to have imagined this circumstance, for the sake of the interesting scene which follows when *Ulysses* wakes. See v. 220, &c. Of the original, v. 187.

hands

hands of an ordinary Poet, would evidently have been intolerable : but here, the absurdity is concealed under the various beauties, of other kinds, with which the Poet has embellished it.

The *Diction* should be most laboured in the *idle parts*⁵ of the Poem—those, in which neither *manners*, nor *sentiments*⁶ prevail ; for the manners and the sentiments are only obscured by too splendid a diction⁷.

⁵ In the *strictly narrative*, or *descriptive* parts, where the *Poet* speaks in his own person, and the *imitation*, the *drama*, which Aristotle considers as the true *business* of Poetry, is suspended. These he calls the *idle parts*. The expression is applicable also to *Tragedy*; for though its *imitation* is throughout, yet every drama must have its *comparatively idle* parts. Such is the description above alluded to, of the chariot-race, in the *Electra* of Sophocles. The choruses also may, in a great measure be so considered; and in them, accordingly, the language is “laboured” and “splendid.”—In *Epic* Poetry, these parts are of great importance to that *variety* which characterizes the species. [See above, *SecT.* II.] In so long a work, relief is wanted, and we are glad to hear the *Poet* in his turn.

⁶ The reader may wonder that Aristotle did not add—“nor *passion*.” But that part of the Epic and Tragic Poem, which he calls the *sentiments*, includes the *expression of passion*. See *Part II. SecT. 22.* And the *NOTE* here.

⁷ “His diction [*Thomson’s*] is in the highest degree florid and luxuriant; such as may be said to be to his images and thoughts *both their lustre and their shade*; such as invests them with splendour, through which perhaps they are not always easily discerned.”—*Dr. Johnson’s Life of Thomson.*

P A R T IV.

OF CRITICAL OBJECTIONS, AND THE
PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THEY ARE TO
BE ANSWERED.

I.

PRINCI-
PLES ON
which
Poetry is to
be DE-
FENDED.

WITH respect to CRITICAL OBJECTIONS¹, and the ANSWERS to them, the *number* and *nature* of the different *sources*, from which they may be drawn, will be clearly understood, if we consider them in the following manner.

I. The Poet, being an *imitator*, like the painter or any other artist of that kind, must necessarily, when he imitates, have in view one of these *three* objects;—he must represent things, *such*

¹ The original is, *Problems*. This appears to have been a common title of critical works in Aristotle's time. Objections, censures, and the most unreasonable cavils, were conveyed in the civil form of *problems* and *questions*. Thus, many criticisms on *Homer* were published under the title of *Homeric Problems*.

The scope of this part of Aristotle's work is of more importance to his subject than, at first view, it may appear to be. In teaching how to *answer* criticisms, it, in fact, teaches, (as far, I mean, as it goes,) what the Poet should do to avoid giving occasion to them. It seems, indeed, intended as an *apology* for *Poetry*, and a vindication of its privileges upon true *poetical* principles, at a time when the art and its professors were unfairly attacked on all sides, by the cavils of *prosaic* philosophers and sophists, such as *Ariphrades*, *Protagoras*, *Euclid*, &c. and by the *paritanical* objections of PLATO and his followers.

as they were, or are²;—or, such as they are said to be, and believed to be³;—or, such as they should be⁴.

2. Again: all this he is to express in words, either common, or foreign and metaphorical—or varied by some of those many modifications and peculiarities of language, which are the privilege of Poets.

3. To this we must add, that *what is right* in the Poetic art, is a distinct consideration from *what is right* in the political, or any other art. The faults of Poetry are of two kinds, *essential* and *accidental*. If the Poet has undertaken to imitate without talents for imitation, his Poetry will be *essentially* faulty. But if he is right in applying himself to Poetic imitation, yet in imitating is occasionally wrong; as, if a horse, for example, were represented moving both his right legs at once;—or, if he has committed *mistakes*, or described things *impossible*, with respect to other arts, that of Physic, for instance, or any other—all such faults, whatever they may be, are not *essential*, but *accidental* faults, in the Poetry.

II.

To the foregoing considerations, then, we must have recourse, in order to obviate the doubts and objections of the critics.

For, in the *first* place, suppose the Poet to have represented things *impossible* with respect to some other art. This is certainly a fault. Yet it may be an *excusable* fault, provided the *end* of the Poet's art be more effectually obtained by it; that is, according to what has already been said of that *end*, if, by this means, that, or any other part, of the Poem, is made to produce a more *striking effect*⁵. The pursuit of Hector is an instance⁶. If, indeed, this end might

APPLICA-
TION of the
last Princi-
ple.

² Compare Part I. Sect. 3.

³ This opens the door for the marvellous; machinery, ghosts, witches, faery, &c.

⁴ Compare Part I. Sect. 3.—II. end of Sect. 15. and below, Sect. 5.

⁵ Which is exactly the case with Homer's improbable account of the landing of Ulysses, mentioned above, Part III. Sect. 6. See Note 7.

⁶ Part III. Sect. 4.

as well, or nearly as well, have been attained, without departing from the principles of the particular art in question, the fault, in that case, could not be justified; since faults of every kind should, if possible, be avoided.

Still we are to consider, farther, whether a fault be in things *essential* to the Poetic art, or foreign and *incidental* to it: for it is a far more pardonable fault to be ignorant, for instance, that a hind has no horns⁷, than to *paint one badly*.

III.

APPLICA-
TION of the
first Princi-
ple.

Farther: If it be objected to the Poet, that he has not represented things conformably to *truth*⁸, he may answer, that he has represented them as they *should* be. This was the answer of *Sophocles*—that “he drew mankind such as they *should* be; *Euripides*, such as they *are*.” And this is the proper answer.

But if the Poet has represented things in neither of these ways, he may answer, that he has represented them as they are *said* and *believed* to be. Of this kind are the poetical descriptions of the Gods. It cannot, perhaps, be said, that they are either what is *best*, or what is *true*; but, as *Xenophanes* says, opinions “taken up at random:” these are things, however, not “*clearly known*.”

Again—What the Poet has exhibited is, perhaps, not what is *best*, but it is the *fact*; as in the passage about the arms of the sleeping soldiers:

————— *fixed upright in the earth*
Their spears stood by⁹.—————

For

⁷ “A hind with golden horns,” is expressly mentioned by Pindar in his 3d Olympic Ode, and by other Greek Poets. This inaccuracy in *natural history*, had probably been the subject of critical caviel.

⁸ i. e. to *common nature*. Above, he expresses it, by “representing things such as they *were*, or *are*.”

⁹ *Iliad*, X. 152.—In Pope’s translation, v. 170, &c.—On what *account* this had been

For such was the custom at that time, as it is now among the Illyrians.

IV.

In order to judge whether what is *said*, or *done*, by any character, be *well*, or *ill*, we are not to consider that speech or action *alone*¹, whether *in itself* it be *good*, or *bad*, but also *by whom* it is spoken or done, *to whom*, at what *time*, in what *manner*, or for what *end*—whether, for instance, in order to obtain some greater good, or to avoid some greater evil.

Critique or
FINDING OUT
THE CAUSE OF
SPEECH OR AC-
TION, how to
be examin-
ed.

V.

For the solution of *some* objections, we must have recourse to the *Diction*. For example:

ΟΤΡΗΑΣ μὲν πρῶτον—
“On MULES and dogs the infection *first* began.”

APPLI-
CATION of the
second Prin-
ciple.

POPE.

This may be defended by saying, that the Poet has, perhaps, used the word *ἄρνας* in its FOREIGN acceptance of *centinels*, not in its *proper* sense, of *mules*.

been objected to by the critics, we are left to guess. Dacier, after Victorius, supposes the objection to be, that the spears, so fastened in the ground, could not be readily disengaged, in case of a sudden attack. I shall only observe, that by Homer's description of the truce in the 3d book, this appears to have been the usual position of their spears when no attack was apprehended, and in open day-light; which makes it the less surprising that it should have been objected to as an impropriety in a situation of nocturnal danger, such as is described in the passage referred to.—What Pope, III. 177, translates, “*rest* their spears,” is, in Homer, “their spears were *fixed*.” (—παρὰ δ' ἄρνας μῆνιχα ΠΕΠΗΓΕΝ. v. 135.)

¹ This is plainly connected with what precedes, which cannot be properly *applied* without taking in the consideration of *character*, *circumstances*, *motives*, &c.—The speech of Satan, for example, in *Parad. Lost*, IV. 32, *taken in itself*, is horrible: referred to the *character* who speaks it, nothing can be *better*. It is, *poetically* speaking, exactly what it *should* be.

² *Il. I.* 69.—The reason of the objection here is not told, and has been variously guessed by the commentators. *Probably*, the propriety of making the *mules* the *first* sufferers, before horses and other animals, was the matter in dispute. The objection seems frivolous, and the solution improbable.

So

So also in the passage where it is said of *Dolon*—

—— ΕΙΔΟΣ μὲν ἔην κικλῶ³ ——

—— Of *form* unhappy. ——

The meaning is, not, that his *person* was *deformed*, but, that his *face* was *ugly*; for the Cretans use the word ΕΥΕΙΔΕΣ—“*well-formed*”—to express a beautiful *face*.

Again :

ΖΩΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ δὲ νερούρα⁴ ——

Here, the meaning is not, “*mix it strong*,” as for intemperate drinkers; but, “*mix it quickly*.”

2. The following passages may be defended by *METAPHOR*.

“*Now pleasing sleep had seal'd each mortal eye*;

“*Stretch'd in the tents the Grecian leaders lie*;

“*The immortals slumber'd on their thrones above*” ——

POPE.

Again ——

“*When on the Trojan plain his anxious eye*

“*Watchful he fix'd*” ——

² H. K. 316.—Pope, X. 375, has followed Aristotle's interpretation.

“*Not blest by nature with the charms of face,*

“*But swift of foot, and matchless in the race.*”

The objection of the critics is *supposed* to have been, that an *ill-made* man, could not be a good racer. See Pope's *Note*.

⁴ *Iliad* IX. 267, 8.—Pope follows the common, and probably the right, acceptation of the word. “*Mix purer wine*.”—Aristotle's interpretation has not made its fortune with the critics. He seems to have produced it rather as an exemplification of the *point* of answer which he is here considering, than as an opinion in which he acquiesced himself. It was, probably, an answer which *had* been given. The cavil, according to Plutarch, came from *Zeilus*. [See the *Symposiac Prob.* of Plut. V. 4, where this subject is discussed, and several other conjectural senses of the word *Zōpotepon* are proposed.]

³ Beginning of *Il. II.*—*What* it was that wanted defence in this passage, and that was to be taken metaphorically, we are not told. That it was the representation of the *Gods* as *sleeping*, is the most probable conjecture. This is somewhat softened by Mr. Pope's “*slumbered*.” *Homer* says—“*SLEPT all the night*.”—Εἴπιδον παννυχίοι.

⁶ *Iliad*, X. v. 13. (of the *Orig.* v. 11.) But Pope's version was not literal enough for my purpose. For the *supposed* objection, see my *NOTE*.

And——

And—

Αὐλῶν συριγγῶν ἢ ΟΜΑΔΟΝ⁷.—

* * * * *

For, ALL⁸, is put *metaphorically*⁹ instead of *many*; *all* being a *species* of *many*.

Here also—

———— The Bear ALONE,

“ Still shines exalted in th’ ætherial plain,

“ Nor bathes his flaming forehead in the main¹.”

POPE.

ALONE, is metaphorical: the most *remarkable* thing in any kind, we speak of as the *only* one.

We may have recourse also,

3. To ACCENT: as the following passage—

ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ δε δι' εὐχῶν ἀρεσθαι²—

And this—το μὲν ΟΥ καταπυθεται ἐμῆρω³—were defended by *Hippias* of Thafos.

⁷ *Ibid.* 15, 16.—*Orig.* 13. The sense of the example may be given, pretty closely, thus:

The distant voice of flutes and pipes he mark'd
With wonder, and the “*busy hum* of men.”

But this does not answer exactly to the *Greek*, where the word, which I have rendered *hum*, may signify either the *hum* or *murmur* of a multitude, or the *multitude itself*. See the NOTE.

⁸ As the Greek word for ALL, does not occur in any of the preceding examples, we suppose some example, corresponding to this explanation, to have been lost.

⁹ i. e. by *Synecdoche*. See above, p. 107.

¹ *Iliad*, XVIII. v. 565, 566, and see the note there.

² See Pope's *Iliad*, II. 9, and his note. For the Jesuitical distinction of *Hippias's* Theology, see the NOTE.

³ II. Ψ. 328.—Pope's transl. XXIII. 402.—“unperish'd with the rains.” According to a different accentuation of the word ΟΥ, in the original, it would mean, “*where* perish'd with the rains.”—See the NOTE.

4. TO PUNCTUATION; as in this passage of *Empedocles*:—

Ἀψα δὲ βνητ' ἐφύοντο τα πρῶν μαθὸν ἀθανάτ' εἶναι,
ΖΩΡΑ ΤΕ ΤΑ ΠΙΠΙΝ ΑΚΡΗΤΑ——

i. e. ——— things, before *immortal*,
Mortal became, and *mix'd before unmix'd**,
[Their courses changed.]

5. TO AMBIGUITY; as in—*παρορχημεν δὲ ΠΑΕΩΝ* ἰωξ⁵—where the word ΠΑΕΩΝ is ambiguous.

6. TO CUSTOMARY SPEECH: thus, wine mixed with water, or whatever is *poured out* to drink *as wine*, is called ΟΙΝΟΣ—*wine*: hence, *Ganymede* is said—*Δ.ἰ* ΟΙΝΟΧΟΕΤΕΙΝ⁶—to “pour the *WINE* to *Jove*:" though wine is not the liquor of the Gods. This, however, may also be defended by metaphor⁷.

* The verses allude to the two great physical principles of *Empedocles*, which he chose to denominate *friendship* and *strife*, and in which modern philosophers have discovered the Newtonian principles of *attraction* and *repulsion*. He held everything to be formed of the four element, and resolved into them again. *Friendship* was the uniting, *strife*, the separating, principle. The elements themselves, in their *separate* and *simple* state, were *immortal*; the things *compounded* of them, were *mortal*; i. e. liable to be resolved into their first principles.—As far as we can make anything of this fragment, it seems intended to express the two *contrary* changes of things; from *immortal* to *mortal*, by the *uniting* principle, and from *mortal* to *immortal*, i. e. from *mixed* to *unmixed*, by the *disuniting* principle. But the words—“*mixed before un-*” *mixed*,” will, plainly, express either of these changes, according as we place the comma, after *mixed*, or after *before*. It is imagined, that the critics mistook the punctuation so as to make *Empedocles* express only the same change in different words, and then censured this, as inconsistent with the expression, “*their courses changed*.” [*διαλλαττοῖτα πορεύεσ;—changing their ways.*]

⁵ *Il. K.* 252.—Pope's translation, *X.* 298. The original says—“*more than two parts of the night are past; the third part remains.*”—This the cavilling critics censured as a sort of *ball*. What is *guessed* to have been the answer, the reader may see, but I believe will hardly *wish* to see, in *Dacier's* notes.

⁶ *Il. γ.* 234. Pope, *XX.* 278, &c.—He renders it—“to bear the cup of *Jove*.”

⁷ The metaphor from *species* to *species*. See p. 108.

Thus,

Thus, again, artificers in *iron* are called Χαλκευς—literally, *bra-sifiers*. Of this *kind* is the expression of the Poet—Κνημυς νεοτευκτε ΚΑΣΣΙΤΕΡΟΙΟ⁸.

7. When a word, in any passage, appears to express a *contradiction*, we must consider, in how many *different* SENSES it may there be taken. Here, for instance—

—τη ῥ' ἔΣΧΕΤΟ χαλκεον ἐγχεῖ—

“ There stuck the lance⁹.”

POPE.

—the meaning is, was *stopped* only, or *repelled*.

Of *how many different senses* a word is capable, may best be discovered by considering the different senses that are *opposed* to it.

We may also say, with *Glauco*, that some critics, first take things for granted without foundation, and then argue from these previous decisions of their own; and, having once pronounced their judgment, condemn, as an *inconsistence*, whatever is contrary to their preconceived *opinion*. Of this kind is the cavil of the critics concerning *Icarus*¹. Taking it for granted that he was a Lace-

⁸ Il. Φ. 592.—Literally, “ greaves of tin.” But it is not *customary speech* with us, to say *tin*, for *iron* or *steel*. The *Greek* word for tin, however, appears to have been so used.—We are not here to understand the objection to have been pointed at the *improper use* of a word. The critics took, or pretended to take, the word in its *proper* sense, and thence objected to the absurdity of *tin* armour.

⁹ Il. XX. 321.—Mr. Pope seems to have translated very accurately here, and to have preserved even the ambiguity of the original; for the verb, to *stick*, admits, like the *Greek* word, (ἐχθεσθαι) of two senses;—that of being *fastened* to, or *fixed* in, and that of being *stopped*—prevented from going farther.—See the NOTE.

— “ impenetrable charms”

Secur'd the temper of th' ætherial arms.
Thro' two strong plates the point its passage held,
But *stopp'd*, and *rested*, by the third *repell'd*;
Five plates of various metal, various mold,
Compos'd the shield; of brass each *outward* fold,
Of tin each *inward*, and the middle, gold:
THERE STUCK THE LANCE.” —————

¹ Mentioned by Homer as the father of Penelope.

dæmonian, they thence infer the absurdity of supposing *Telemachus* not to have seen him when he went to Lacedæmon². But, perhaps, what the Cephælians say may be the truth. They assert, that the wife of *Ulysses* was of their country, and that the name of her father was not *Icarus*, but *Icadius*. The objection itself, therefore, is probably founded on a mistake.

VI.

Censure of
IMPOSSIBI-
LITY far-
ther confi-
dered.

The *Impossible*, in general, is to be justified by referring, either to the end of *Poetry* itself, or to what is *best*, or to *opinion*.

For, with respect to *Poetry*, impossibilities, rendered *probable*, are preferable to things *improbable*, though *possible*³.

With respect also to what is *best*⁴, the imitations of *Poetry* should resemble the paintings of *ZEUXIS*⁵: the example should be more perfect than nature.

To *opinion*, or what is commonly *said to be*, may be referred even such things as are *improbable* and *absurd*; and it may also be said, that events of that kind are, sometimes, not really improbable; since “it is probable, that many things should happen contrary to probability⁶.”

² See Pope's *Odyssy*, IV.

³ See *Part III. Sect. 6.* and *Note*², p. 119.

⁴ Improved nature, ideal beauty, &c. which, elsewhere, is expressed by, what *should be*. Compare the beginning of this *Part*, and *Sect. 3.*—*Part I. Sect. 3.*—*Part II. Sect. 15.* p. 94.

⁵ “In ancient days, while *Greece* was flourishing in liberty and arts, a celebrated painter, [*Zeuxis*,] having drawn many excellent pictures for a certain free state, and been generously rewarded for his labours, at last made an offer to paint them a *Helen*, as a *model* and *exemplar* of the most exquisite beauty. The proposal was readily accepted, when the artist informed them, that in order to draw *one* Fair, it was necessary he should contemplate *many*. He demanded therefore a sight of all their finest women. The state, to assist the work, assented to his request. They were exhibited before him; he selected the most beautiful; and from these formed his *Helen*, more beautiful than them all.”—Harris's *Three Treatises*, p. 216.

⁶ See *Part II. Sect. 20*, at the end; and *NOTE 156*.

VII. When

VII.

When things are said, which appear to be *contradictory*, we must examine them as we do in logical confutation: whether the *same thing* be spoken of; whether in the *same respect*, and in the *same sense*. * * * * *

INCONSISTENCE.

VIII.

Improbability, and *vitious manners*, when excused by no necessity, are just objects of critical censure. Such is the improbability in the *Ægeus*⁷ of *Euripides*, and the vitious character of Menelaus in his *Orestes*⁸.

IMPROBABILITY and VITIOUS CHARACTER.

Thus, the sources from which the critics draw their *objections* are five: they object to things as *impossible*, or *improbable*, or of *immoral tendency*, or *contradictory*, or *contrary to technical accuracy*. The *answers*, which are *twelve* in number, may be deduced from what has been said⁹.

Recapitulation.

⁷ Of this Tragedy, some inconsiderable fragments only remain.

⁸ See p. 93.

⁹ The reader, who regards his own ease, will, I believe, do well to take this for granted. If however he has any desire to try the experiment, he may read the NOTE on this passage; and I wish it may answer to him.

P A R T V.

OF THE SUPERIORITY OF TRAGIC TO
EPIC POETRY.

I.

OBJECTION
to TRA-
GIC.
GEDY.

IT may be inquired, farther, which of the two imitations, the EPIC, or the TRAGIC, deserves the preference.

If that, which is the least *vulgar*, or *popular*, of the two, be the best, and that be such, which is calculated for the better sort of spectators—the imitation, which extends to every circumstance¹, must, evidently, be the most vulgar, or popular; for there, the imitators have recourse to every kind of motion and gesticulation, as if the audience, without the aid of action, were incapable of understanding them: like bad flute-players, who whirl themselves round, when they would imitate the motion of the Discus, and pull the Coryphæus, when *Scylla* is the subject². Such is Tragedy. It may also be compared to what the modern *actors* are in the estimation of their predecessors; for *Myniscus* used to call *Callipedes*, on account of his intemperate action, the *ape*: and

¹ Though Aristotle instances in *gesture* only, the objection, no doubt, extended to the *whole* imitative representation of the theatre, including the *stage* and *scenery*, by which *place* is imitated, and the *dressés*, which are necessary to complete the imitation of the *persons*.

² See the NOTES.

Tyndarus was censured on the same account. What these performers are with respect to their predecessors, the Tragic imitation, when entire, is to the Epic. The latter, then, it is urged, addresses itself to hearers of the better sort, to whom the addition of gesture is superfluous: but Tragedy is for *the people*³; and being, therefore, the most vulgar kind of imitation, is evidently the inferior.

II.

But now, in the *first* place, this censure falls, not upon the *Poet's* art, but upon that of the *actor*; for the gesticulation may be equally laboured in the recitation of an Epic Poem, as it was by *Sostratus*; and in finging, as by *Minasitheus*, the *Opuntian*.

The Objec-
tion AN-
SWERED.

“ Again—All gesticulation is not to be condemned; since even all *dancing* is not; but such only, as is unbecoming—such as was objected to *Callipides*, and is now objected to others, whose gestures resemble those of immodest women⁴.

“ Farther—Tragedy, as well as the Epic, is capable of producing its effect, even without action; we can judge of it perfectly by *reading*⁵. If, then, in *other* respects, Tragedy be superior, it is sufficient that the fault here objected is not *essential* to it.

III.

Tragedy has the *advantage* in the following respects.—It possesses all that is possessed by the Epic; it *might* even adopt its

ADVANTA-
GES of Tra-
gedy.

³ “ It must be allowed, that stage-poetry, of all other, is more particularly levelled “ to please the *populace*, and its success more immediately depending upon the *common suffrage*.” *Pope's Pref. to Shakspeare*.

⁴ As no *actresses* were admitted on the Greek stage, their capital *actors* must frequently have appeared in female parts, such as, *Electra*, *Iphigenia*, *Medea*, &c. This is sufficiently proved by many passages of antient authors; and among others, by a remarkable story of an eminent Greek Tragic actor, told by *Aulus Gellius*. See the NOTE.

⁵ So above, p. 73,—“ the power of Tragedy is felt without representation and “ actors.”

metre:

metre⁵: and to this it makes no inconsiderable addition, in the Music and the Decoration; by the latter of which, the illusion is heightened, and the pleasure, arising from the action, is rendered more sensible and striking.

It has the advantage of greater clearness and distinctness of impression, as well *in reading*, as in representation.

It has also that, of attaining the end of its imitation in a shorter compass: for the effect is more pleasurable, when produced by a short and close series of impressions, than when weakened by diffusion through a long extent of time; as the *Oedipus* of SOPHOCLES, for example, would be, if it were drawn out to the length of the *Iliad*.

Farther: there is less *unity*⁶ in all Epic imitation; as appears from this—that any Epic Poem will furnish matter for *several* Tragedies. For, supposing the Poet to chuse a fable *strictly one*, the consequence must be, either, that his Poem, if proportionably contracted, will appear curtailed and defective, or, if extended to the usual length, will become weak, and, as it were, *diluted*. If, on the other hand, we suppose him to employ *several* fables—that is, a fable composed of *several actions*⁷—his imitation is no longer *strictly one*. The *Iliad*, for example, and the *Odysssey* contain many such subordinate parts, each of which has a certain magnitude, and unity, of its own: yet is the construction of those Poems as perfect, and as nearly approaching to the imitation of a single action, as possible.

⁵ See NOTE 36.

⁶ See p. 39, Note 5.

⁷ Compare *Part II. Sect. 20*, and *Note 9*.—Aristotle is not here speaking of that unconnected, *historical* multiplicity of action, which he had before condemned, [*Part III. Sect. 1.*] but of such as was *essential* to the nature of the Epic Poem. This is plain, from the *example*, which immediately follows; and, indeed, from the very drift of his argument.

IV.

If then TRAGEDY be superior to the EPIC in all these respects, and, also, in the peculiar *end* at which it aims⁸, (for each species ought to afford, not *any* sort of pleasure indiscriminately, but such only as has been pointed out,) it evidently follows, that TRAGEDY, as it attains more effectually the end of the *art itself*, must deserve the preference.

PREFER-
ENCE of
TRAGEDY.

AND THUS MUCH concerning TRAGIC and EPIC Poetry in *general*, and their several *species*—the *number* and the *differences* of their *parts*—the *causes* of their *beauties* and their *defects*—the *cenfures* of critics, and the principles on which they are to be *answered*.

CONCLU-
SION.

⁸ i. e. according to Aristotle's principles, to give "that pleasure which arises from terror and pity, through imitation." See p. 90.

N O T E S.

N O T E I.

P. I. **D**ITHYRAMBICS——IMITATION.

If the senses, in which the term *imitation* is applied by Aristotle to Poetry, have been rightly determined in the first Dissertation, there can be no difficulty with respect to the *imitative* nature of the Epic and Dramatic species. That of the Dithyrambic is not quite so obvious, and has accordingly been variously explained. The little, however, that remains of what Aristotle had said upon this subject, seems sufficient to release any commentator, who is willing to be released, from the trouble of conjectural ingenuity. In *Sect. 3. Part I.* where the different *objects* of imitation are considered, he expressly makes Dithyrambic Poetry imitative of *actions*, characters, and manners, as well as the Epic and Dramatic; and he, particularly, mentions the Persians and the Cyclops as *imitated* in the Dithyrambic and Nomic Poetry of Timotheus and Philoxenus^a. We may conclude, then, that he regarded this kind of Poetry as *imitative* because, though the mythological tales, which furnished the subject of these hymns, were,

^a — ὡς ΠΕΡΣΑΣ καὶ ΚΥΚΛΩΠΑΣ Τιμοθεῶς καὶ Φιλοξένου.

indeed, articles of Pagan faith, and depended not on the Poet's imagination, yet, in the *detail* of these stories, in describing the actions, and delineating the characters, of the deities themselves, and, still more, of other fabulous and heroic personages occasionally introduced, his fancy and invention must necessarily be, more or less, employed. This, as we have seen, was, in Aristotle's view, *imitation*; whether the form of that imitation was partly *dramatic* and personative, or mere *recital* in the person of the Poet^b. That the Poetry of these Dithyrambic compositions was chiefly of the latter kind, seems to be implied in the expression of Plato, who, where he explains his division of Poetry into *three* sorts—the *purely imitative*, or dramatic, the *purely narrative*, and the *mixed*—refers, for an example of the purely narrative, to Dithyrambic Poetry. Yet he says only, that it is to be found *chiefly* there—*ἴσχυρις δ' ἂν αὐτήν ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΠΟΥ ἔν Διθύραμβοις*^c. The expression is remarkable, and leaves room for more than a conjecture, that the Dithyrambic was sometimes imitative even in the strict sense of Plato; that is, that the dramatic mixture of the Epic was occasionally admitted. Instances of this occur in the Odes of Pindar^d; and many of the Odes of Horace are dramatic^e.

The embarrassment of the commentators seems to have arisen, principally, from the difficulty they found in conceiving, that *fiction* could be admitted into a species of Poetry addressed to the Gods, and founded on the established Theology of the age. The hymns of Callimachus, and those attributed to Homer, might have been

^b Diff. I. p. 25.

^c Rep. lib. iii. p. 394.

^d *Olymp.* I. *Anisf.* γ, where Pelops speaks. See also *Olymp.* VI. *Epode* α, and γ.—*Olymp.* VIII. *Ep.* β—And the prophecy of Amphiaraus, in *Pyth.* VIII. *Strophe* γ.—The Odes of Pindar, indeed, are not *strictly* Dithyrambic Poetry; but the chief difference was probably that of their *subjects*.

^e See Dr. Warton's *Essay* on Pope, vol. ii. 44, &c. where the beauties of those dramatic Odes, and particularly of the fifth *Epode*, are pointed out and illustrated with much taste.

sufficient to remove this difficulty. These are not, like the *Orphic* hymns, mere invocations, and *indigitamenta*, consisting in a short and solemn accumulation of epithets and attributes: they are *Epic, narrative hymns*; in which the birth, the actions, and even the characters and manners of the deities are described at length, and the fictions of the Poet's imagination are every where engrafted upon the popular creed. The mixture of dramatic imitation, in the Dithyrambic Poetry, is also rendered more probable by the frequent examples of it in these hymns; and especially in those of Hømer. From the enthusiastic, wild, *audacious* character^f peculiarly attributed to the Bacchic hymns, we have, surely, no reason to suppose in *them* a degree of scruple and reserve, with respect to all this, which we do not find in other antient religious compositions of a more sober and regular cast.

After what has been said, the reader will hardly think it necessary to have recourse to so distant and conjectural an interpretation as that of the Abbé Batteux, who says—"Le Dithyrambe est *imitation*, parceque le Poete, en le composant, exprime d'après le *vraisemblable*, les *sentimens*, les transports, l'ivresse, qui doit *regner* dans le Dithyrambe^g. This ingenious writer seems to have been forced into this solution of the matter by his desire of extending the principle of Poetic imitation beyond the limits, not only of Aristotle's meaning, but of all reasonable analogy. All Lyric Poetry he holds to be *essentially* imitative; and defining it to be that Poetry, "*qui exprime le sentiment*"^h, he is reduced to the necessity of making out these *sentiments*, or *feelings*, to be, in some sort, *imitations*; for no other reason, than, that they are assumed and feigned—the temporary produce of that voluntary enthusiasm, which the Poet, by the force of his imagination, excites in him-

^f "*Audaces Dithyrambos.*" *Hor.*

^g Ch. i. of his translation;—note, under the text.

^h See his *Beaux Arts réduits à un même principe*, ch. on *Lyric Poetry*: and vol. iii. of his *Principes de la littérature*, ch. i. *Traité* 6.

self during the moments of composition. But this belongs rather to the style and manner, than to the matter, of Poetry: if *imitation* at all, it is the imitation, not, properly, of the *Poet*, but of the *man*, in order to *become* the Poet.—The general character of Lyric Poetry is enthusiasm; and enthusiasm, says M. Batteux, “ n'est autre chose qu'un sentiment quel qu'il soit—amour, colere, joie, admiration, tristesse, &c.—produit par une idee¹.” But if all illusive feelings of this kind, raised in us by imagination, are *imitations*, then, not only every artist of genius is an imitator, when he conceives and plans his work, but even every man of sensibility, whenever he is led, by the voluntary excursions of his fancy, into warm and passionate feelings, that are not prompted by *real* circumstances.—It is certain, indeed, that not only Dithyrambic and Lyric Poetry, but Epic also, and perhaps every other species worth regarding, has its appropriated style and tone, which every Poet adopts and *imitates*, when he composes in the kind to which it belongs. But the same may be said of a history, a sermon, and even of a letter: for in these also, though we may not imitate any particular writer, we naturally conform to the general style and manner that characterize the particular species of composition. All this however has, manifestly, nothing to do with the *imitation* that we are considering.

The Lyric Poet is not always, and essentially, an *imitator*, any more than the Epic. While he is merely expressing his own *sentiments*, in his own *person*, we consider him not as imitating;—we inquire not whether they are the assumed sentiments of the Poetic character, or the real sentiments of the writer himself; we do not even think of any such distinction. He is understood to *imitate*, in the most *general* view, no otherwise than by *fiction*, by *personation*, by *description*, or by *sound*^k; in the view of Aristotle, only by the *two first* of these.

¹ *Principes de la Lit. Traité 6. ch. i.*

^k See *Dijert*, I. p. 22.

I will only add, that the Dithyrambic Poetry was, it seems, not originally imitative, but became so by degrees. This fact, and the causes of it, we learn from a curious passage, in the Harmonic Problems of Aristotle, which I shall have occasion to mention in another place.

N O T E 2.

P. 2. FOR AS MEN, SOME THROUGH ART, AND SOME THROUGH HABIT, IMITATE VARIOUS OBJECTS, &c.

I have followed the old and most authentic reading, *δια τῆς ΦΩΝΗΣ*: which, though not unexceptionable, has been rejected, I think, without sufficient reason. The philosopher is, here, only illustrating what he had said of the different *means* of poetical and musical imitation, by comparing those arts, in this respect, with other arts more *strictly* and *obviously imitative*. That he meant to confine his illustration to Painting, was a groundless fancy of Dacier, which led him into two unnecessary corrections of the text, and a very forced and improbable explication of the whole passage. The remark of Aristotle, parenthetically flung in, about *art* and *habit*, (*οἱ μὲν δια τεχνῆς, οἱ δὲ δια συνηθείας,*) was by no means *necessary* to his illustration. Dacier extends the parenthesis by the reading he adopts, (*οἱ μὲν δια τεχνῆς, οἱ δὲ δια συνηθείας, ἕτεροι δὲ ΔΙ' ΑΜΦΟΙΝ,*) then wonders, why Aristotle, “qui n'écrit pas un “feul mot inutilement,” should enter into such a detail; and then, wantonly alters the text, (from *δια τεχνῆς*, to *δια ΤΥΧΗΣ*,) in order to account for it in a manner, that leaves it more wonderful than he found it. Castelvetro had before proposed a similar alteration—*ἕτεροι δὲ ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙΣ*; but in a sense, which, could it be supported, would be far more to the purpose than that of Dacier:
i. e.

i. e. “ others, again, [imitate] *both* by colour and by figure.” This would answer to what follows,—that the different *means* of imitation, in the Poetical and Musical arts, were used, sometimes *separately*, and sometimes *combined*. To this sense, however, an objection immediately occurs. We may imitate an object by figure without colour, but not by colour without figure. This difficulty, indeed, Castelvetro endeavours to get rid of, by understanding σχήματα, here, to denote only the *solid form* of Sculpture, and χρώματα, Painting, as *chiefly* characterized by colour; and, thus, for an example of imitation by *both* those means, he is forced to have recourse to the coloured Sculpture of the antients^a. But it would be a waste of discussion to enter fully into the merits of an explanation, that is founded on a reading, by no means, I think, sufficiently warranted, either by the authority of MSS. or by any necessity of alteration.

^a That the antients sometimes coloured their statues, is well known. From many passages which might be produced as proofs, I shall select one from Plato, which is curious, and would be, alone, decisive. It is in the beginning of his 4th book *De Repub.*—It had been objected, that, by the severity of his laws relating to his *φυλακεις* or magistrates, they were reduced to a worse condition, with respect to happiness, than the rest of the citizens. His answer is, that the aim of his legislation was, not to provide for the superior happiness of any *one part* of his commonwealth, but for the greatest possible happiness of the *whole*. “Suppose,” says Socrates, “we were *painting a statue*; and any one should come, and object to us, as a fault, that we did not apply the most beautiful colours to the most beautiful parts of the body—that we had made the *eyes*, for instance, *black*, when we should have given them, as being the chief beauty of the human form, a *purple* colour.—It would,” continues Socrates, “be a very reasonable apology, if we should request this critic not to insist on our making the eyes so beautiful, as to have no longer the appearance of eyes; but to consider, only, whether, by giving to each *part its proper* colour, we should not make the *whole* beautiful.—This is precisely the apology I make for our legislation: I request the objector, not to insist on our allotting to the guardians of the state *such a* happiness, as would render them *any thing* else rather than *guardians*,” &c. *Plato De Rep. lib. iv. p. 420. C. Ed. Ser. Ωρωσε αν αυ η — &c.*

That

That the words *χρωματα* and *σχηματα* are very frequently joined by the Greek writers to denote painting, is certain^b. But Aristotle is not here speaking of the different *Arts* which employ these *means* of imitation, but of the *means* themselves, separately and abstractedly. The application of these, singly, or in their various combinations, to those arts, he has left to the reader. It seems probable, (as Victorius has observed,) that Sculpture, at least, was included in Aristotle's idea of *σχηματα*. Possibly, too, the word *may* be here used in its widest sense, of *figure* or *form* in general; which would take in the *outline* of Painting, the *solid* figure of Sculpture^c, and the *gestures* of the personal Mimic.

That, at least, the word *φωνη* is right, in the old reading, appears highly probable from the frequent mention of the voice, as a principal instrument of imitation, in antient authors^d. It is called by Aristotle, as Mr. Winstanley has judiciously observed, *παντων μιμητικωτατον των μοριων ημων*^e.

Farther—by this reading the illustration intended is more perfect, as it comprehends more “*means of different kinds*”—ΓΕΝΕΙ ἕτερα. The same reason favours also the extension of the word *σχηματα* to Sculpture, at least.

The only objection to the reading, *δια της φωνης*, is, the improbability that Aristotle should, without any apparent reason, envelop the whole passage in embarrassment and ambiguity, by such a change of phrase:—ΔΙΑ φωνης;—which every reader is naturally led to join, not with the datives, *χρωμασι και σχημασι*, but with ΔΙΑ τεχνης, and ΔΙΑ συνηθειας: but the word *φωνης* opposing such a

^b See *Arist. de Rep. lib. viii. cap. 5. p. 455. C. Plat. de Rep. x. p. 601. A. De Leg. ii. p. 669. A.*

^c *Σχημα* is defined by Socrates, in the *MENO* of Plato, to be, *περας τερεου*—“the boundary of *solid* form.”

^d See *Diff. I.* towards the end, *Note 1.* *Victorius* defends the reading on the same ground.

^e *Rhet. lib. iii. cap. 1. § 4.*

construction, has therefore, probably, been changed to ἀμφου.—This objection has not been solidly answered, I think, either by Victorius, or any other commentator; nor can I think the *change* of phrase here by any means sufficiently accounted for, merely by assigning, as Victorius does, a passage of *Lucian*, where the *phrase* itself, (to which no one objects,) occurs. [See Mr. Winstanley's note.]—I am much inclined, therefore, to admit the reading said by Madius to have been found in an antient MS. and confirming the conjecture of Robortelli,—ἑτέροι δὲ τῆς ΦΩΝῆς. This would clearly mark the bounds of the parenthesis, and fix the construction: και χρωμασι, και σχημασι, πολλα μιμενται τινες—(——) ἑτέροι δὲ τῆς φωνῆς.

N O T E 3.

P. 2. AND OF ANY OTHER INSTRUMENTS CAPABLE OF A SIMILAR EFFECT, AS, THE SYRINX OR PIPE.

The word Συριγγίς is usually understood to mean the *Fistula Panis*, constructed of reeds, differing in length, fastened together with wax and thread:—καλαμων συνθηκη, λινω και κηρω συνδεθεισα— as it is described by Jul. Pollux^a. Tibullus has presented in two lines almost as distinct an idea of its form as can be obtained from a drawing.

Fistula cui semper decrefcit arundinis ordo,
Nam calamus cerâ jungitur usque minor.

[Lib. ii. 5. 31.]

But the Συριγγίς of Aristotle, whatever it was, is here mentioned with the Lyre, and the Flute, as having some, though an inferior,

^a *Onomast. lib. iv. cap. 9.*

degree of the same *power* and *effect*:—*τοιωνται την δυναμιν*. This is hardly applicable to so very simple and rude an instrument as the pipe of Pan; a contrivance not beyond the invention of a school-boy. Instruments of nearly the same construction are found, at this day, not only in Turkey, and Arabia, but even in the island of New Amsterdam in the South Seas^b; and it is a circumstance somewhat curious, that, in France, the instrument of the Arcadian deity, or something very like it, is degraded to the use of travelling tinkers, and known by the name of *sifflet de chaudronnier*. The reader may see a description and a figure of it in Merseus^c; as he may, also, of the South Sea instrument in the Philosophical Transactions, vol. 65, Part I.—But he will not, probably, be much disposed to believe, that the wild and random sounds of this savage whistle have any thing to do with the chromatic system of the Greeks.

But the passage before us is not the only one, where the *Syrinx* is mentioned in a way which naturally leads one to suppose, that some instrument less simple and imperfect than the fistula Panis must be meant. It is often joined with the cithara and the flute, as an instrument of some importance and effect in concerts and choral accompaniments^d. In Lucian's treatise *Περὶ Ορχήσεως*, it appears, among other curious information upon the subject, that the words of the drama, which the pantomimic dancer was to express by gesture alone, were, at the same time, sung by a chorus, accompanied by various instruments, among which the *syrinx* is repeatedly mentioned, together with the *Αυλός* or flute^e. This has, certainly, the appearance of some more powerful instrument than the pastoral *syrinx*.—Indeed, from the passage of Pollux above referred to, there is reason to conclude, that there

^b Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 511.

^c *Harmonic*, p. 73.

^d See Spanheim, in Callimachus—Hymn, in Dianam, v. 243.

^e *Ed. Benedicti*, p. 942, E.—938, D, E.—945, B.

were two instruments of this denomination; that above described, which he calls the *rude*, or *extemporaneous* syrinx, [αυτοσχεδιῶ] and another, of similar form, but more artificial construction, which he describes as consisting, not of *reeds*, but of a number of *flutes* [αὔλοι πολλοί] arranged in the same manner. The passage is defective; but this seems to me pretty clearly to be the drift of it^f. By flutes, he must, at least, be supposed to mean pipes of larger size, and of more solid materials, such as those of which flutes were made.

It seems, on the whole, very probable, that the syrinx of Aristotle was *either* some such improved construction of the flute of Pan, or, as I rather incline to believe, some kind of single pipe, or flageolet. Any single pipe, modulated by the fingers, must be regarded as an instrument far superior to any kind of the fistula Panis, that could be played on only by the clumsy expedient of drawing it along the mouth;—"suprà calamos unco percurrere labro," as Lucretius has well described the operation^g. I cannot indeed say, that I have met with any passage in which the word Συριγξ, by itself, is *clearly* and *expressly* applied to a *single* musical pipe or flute. But such a sense is perfectly analogous to other common applications of the word^h; and, on the other hand, I know of no clear authority that restrains the meaning of the word, whenever it is singly used, to the fistula Panis. Athenæus speaks

^f The passage should, I think, be written as defective, thus: ἡ μὲν ἐν, (sc. συριγξ,) καλαμῶν ἐστὶ συνθετὴ λιγὴ καὶ κίτρω συνδεδεῖσα, ἢ γε αὐτοσχεδιῶ. * * * * * ΑΥΛΟΙ πολλοί, ἕκαστῶ κ. τ. ἀλλ.—Salmasius supplied the hiatus thus:—ΑΛΛ' Ἡ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΤΕΡΑ, αὔλοι πολλοί, &c.—I would not answer for the very words; but that something equivalent is omitted, I have little doubt. See *Ed. Henst.* p. 387. *Note* 43.—where, by the way, Kuhnus commends the emendation, but appears to misunderstand it.

^g *Lib.* v. 14⁶.

^h Vide *Lexica*: and see Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 511, where it is rightly observed, that "each of the pipes" which composed the fistula Panis, "was, properly, a Συριγξ."

of the μονοκαλαμῶς Συριγγῆ invented by Mercury, and opposes it to the πολυκαλαμῶςⁱ; and Spanheim^k, whose authority, in matters of erudition, is as great as the profoundest erudition can give to any man, understands this single-reed syrinx to be meant in the hymn to Mercury attributed to Homer, where it is said of that god, that—

ΣΥΡΙΓΓΩΝ ἑνοπήν ποιήσατο ΤΗΛΟΘ' ΑΚΟΥΣΤΗΝ. v. 509.

—a mode of characterizing the tone of the instrument, that reminds one of the “ear-piercing sife” of Shakspeare.

After all, a modern reader may be still surpris'd to find any degree of *imitation*, or *expression*, attributed to so trifling an instrument as a flageolet, or a common flute. But, in reading antient authors, it is frequently necessary, if we would either relish, or even understand them, properly, to lay aside modern ideas. And if this be necessary in general, it is, perhaps, peculiarly so in the subject of Music. *Expression*, in our musical language, usually conveys the idea of delicate and refined performance, and is almost appropriated to emotions of the tender and pathetic kind. But, with the antients, *imitation*, or *expression* (for the words appear to have been synonymous^l;) extended to every kind of emotion; to every *effect* produced, in any considerable degree, by Music upon the mind. Now very simple instruments, as well as very simple music, are capable of making impressions, and *strong* impressions, of the *joyous* kind, without any delicacy or refinement, either in the composition, or the execution. It is not, therefore, strange, that the syrinx, a shrill and lively pipe, should be ranked by Aristotle as an instrument of *some* expression; especially if, as it seems probable, the syrinx, of *whatever* kind, was considered as a *pastoral* instrument; and its expressions were, in consequence, aided by the association of rural and pastoral ideas^m. The rude syrinx of Pan was unquestionably

ⁱ P. 184.

^k Ubi suprà.

^l See Diff. II.

^m “One of the most affecting styles in music is the Pastoral. Some airs,” [we may add, and those *instruments*, also, on which we have been used to hear those airs

unquestionably of this kind, and appropriated to pastoral useⁿ; and, as far as it can be supposed to have affected by association, *might*, in the musical language of the Greeks, and by a hearer who *felt* that effect from it, be considered and spoken of as *imitative*, without impropriety. But being, as I conceive, of too simple and inconvenient a construction to admit of any expression but what it derived purely from associated ideas, it would not, I think, have been joined by Aristotle with the *most* expressive and *refined* instruments of the ancients, the *cithara*, and the *flute*^o, and mentioned as of “*similar power and effect*.”

N O T E 4.

P. 2. FOR THERE ARE DANCERS WHO BY RHYTHM APPLIED TO GESTURE——.

The Greek is—*οἱ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν*: but there is great reason to suspect the reading. It is generally rendered, “*Some dancers* :” but Victorius, who understands it in that sense, says—*durus tamen sermo*; and produces no authority for such a phrase. Heinsius

performed,] “put us in mind of the country, of *rural sights* and *rural sounds*, and “dispose the heart to that cheerful tranquillity, that pleasing melancholy, that “*vernal delight*,” which groves and streams, flocks and herds, hills and vallies, inspire.” Dr. Beattie—*Essay on Poetry and Music*, p. 142.

ⁿ Plato, Rep. iii. p. 399. *Serran*.

^o Aristotle, in the 8th book *De Republicâ*, cap. vi. where he is considering what instruments should be used in the musical education of children, excludes the *cithara*, as too complicated and difficult for any but professors. He calls it *τεχνικὸν ὄργανον*, and ranks it with the *ἀυλὸς* or flute. Plato, however, admits the use of the *cithara* in his republic, as a *more* simple instrument than the flute, which he forbids. [*Rep.* iii. *ubi supra*.] For some idea of the delicacy and refinement of execution, and force of expression, expected from the accomplished *Αυλητής*, I refer the reader to the *Harmônides* of Lucian, and to a passage in Philostratus, *Ed. Morel.* p. 228.

propofed—οἱ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν. The learned reader may, perhaps, agree with me, that—ΕΝΙΟΙ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν, would be preferable, as nearer to the text. It is not probable, that the degree of imitative skill here described was poffeffed by *all* dancers, or even by “*the greater part*” of them. A paffage from Aristocles is preserved by Athenæus, in which Telestes, a dancer employed by Æschylus, is mentioned as *remarkable* for this talent:—ΟΤΤΩΣ ΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΙΤΗΣ, ὡσε, ἐν τῷ ὀρχεῖσθαι τες ἑωτα ἐπι Θηβας, φανερα ποιῆσαι τα πραγματα δι ὀρχησεως. [*Athen. p. 22.*] This dancing appears plainly to have been of that *kind*, which was afterwards pushed to such an excess of cultivation by the *pantomimic* dancers in the age of Augustus^a; and which is well known to have divided all Rome into parties, and even, frequently, to have made the theatre a scene of bloodshed^b. Of this fact, I cannot help adding, that a proof somewhat curious is furnished by Valerius Maximus; who, in the arrangement of his miscellaneous work, places his chapter *De Spectaculis*, immediately after that, *De militaribus institutis*; and gives this reason: “*Proximus militaribus institutis, ad urbana castra, id est, Theatra, gradus faciendus est: quoniam hæc quoque, sæpenumero, animosas acies instruxerunt; excogitataque cultûs Deorum, et hominum delectationis, causâ, non sine aliquo pacis rubore, voluptatem et religionem CIVILI SANGUINE, scenicorum portentorum gratiâ, macularunt.*” [*Lib. ii. 4.*]—These *scenica portenta* were the Pantomimes.

Aristotle says here, δια τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν. It seems, at first view, that the inverse of this expression would have been more accurate—δια τῶν ῥυθμιζομένων σχημάτων—by rhythmic *gestures*. And, if he had been here considering the imitation of *Dance*, separately, and in itself, he probably would have expressed himself in that way. But dancing is here transiently mentioned,

^a — κατὰ τὸν ΣΕΒΑΣΤΟΝ μαλιτὰ· αἱ μὲν γὰρ πρῶται ἐκείναι [sc. ὀρχησεις] ὡσπερ τιτὸς ῥίξαι καὶ θεμελιοὶ τῆς Ὀρχησεως ἦσαν.—*Lucian. de Salt. p. 927. Ed. Bened.*

^b See *Tacit. and Sucton. passim.*

merely to exemplify what he had been saying, of the *combined*, or *separate*, use of *rhythm*, *words*, and *melody*; and to shew, in what manner, not only melody and rhythm might be separated from words, as in *music*; but *rhythm*, also, might be separated from *melody*, and used alone^c. Any mode of expression, therefore, which would have represented *gestures* (σχηματα) as the principal *means* of the imitation, would not have suited his purpose. It would, also, as *Victorius* and others have observed, have tended to confound the *means* of imitation in the poetic and musical arts, which he is here considering, with those means of a *different kind*, which he had just enumerated, as employed in arts of more obvious and strict imitation, and among which ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ were mentioned.

It has been also objected, that Aristotle is, here, professedly instancing ἐν ταῖς ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΑΙΣ ΤΕΧΝΑΙΣ—in the arts “*above-mentioned*”—and yet introduces *Dancing*, which had *not* been mentioned: a difficulty easily overcome, if we consider, that *Dancing* was among the *musical* arts; closely connected with *Poetry*, and, above all, with *Tragedy*.

N O T E 5.

P. 3. THE ΕΠΟΠΟΕΙΑ IMITATES BY WORDS ALONE, OR BY VERSE, &c.

In my translation of this perplexing passage, as far as the words—ποιοῖτο τὴν μιμήσιν—inclusively, I have given that sense which is now generally adopted, and in which almost all the

^c For such an instance, he could have recourse only to *Dance*; and so *Arist. Quintil.*—ῥυθμῶ δὲ ΚΑΘ' ΑΥΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ [νοεῖται] ἐπὶ ΨΑΛΗΣ ΟΡΧΗΣΕΩΣ. The whole passage, where he is considering *melody*, *rhythm*, and *words*, in their separate use, and in their various combinations, is curious, and may serve to illustrate this part of Aristotle's treatise.—See p. 31, 32. *Ed. Meib.*

commentators are agreed^a. And it has certainly *this* advantage, that it seems to be the only consistent and intelligible version that can be given of the *whole* passage, as it *now* stands. But it appears to me, after the closest attention I have been able to give it, that, in the present condition of the text, no man can reasonably be confident of conveying the true meaning of Aristotle in *any* translation or explanation that he can give.

The passage sets out with an expression most unfortunately ambiguous, and demonstrated to be so, by the very confidence with which the ambiguity has been denied, by critics and commentators of great learning and sagacity, in favour of interpretations directly opposite to each other. Some, by the expression, *λογοις ψιλοις*, have understood Aristotle to mean *prose*, and others, *verse*, *without music*.—But this is far from being all the difficulty with which a translator has to struggle in this passage. In the words—*εἰθ' ἐνι τινι γενει ΧΡΩΜΕΝΗ των μετρων τυγχανουσα ΜΕΧΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΝΥΝ*—there is, surely, something defective. All render this,—“*or, making use of some one kind of metre, AS IT HAS DONE to this day*”^b. And this, indeed, seems the only sense that can be given to the words as they stand. But it appears to me, that the original cannot, by any fair and warranted elliptical construction, be made to say this. Heinsius alone gives the fair and literal version; “*vel uno tantum genere utatur usque ad tempus nostrum*”—in plain English—“*whether mixing different metres together, or using some one kind of metre to this day*”^c. I am perfectly aware of the elliptical genius of the Greek language in general, and of Aristotle’s

^a Madius, Beni, Piccolomini, Heinsius, Dacier, Batteux.

^b “*Aut uno aliquo metrorum genere usa sit, quod à priscais temporibus ad nostrum usque facilitatum est.*” Goullston.—“*Ou qu’elle se contente d’une seule espee, comme elle l’a fait jusq’ à present.*” Dacier.—And so Piccolomini, “*Per quello che si vede fare fino ai tempi d’oggi.*”

^c It is so rendered, I find, by the English translator of 1775; “*either intermixing the various metres, or, using one particular sort to this very day.*”

style, in particular; yet to my ears, I confess, this English, non-sensical as it is, does not sound more strange than the Greek from which it is taken. Some word, or words, must, I should suppose, have been omitted between *τυγχανουσα*, and, *μεχρι*.

Again:—*ἔδεν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ΟΝΟΜΑΣΑΙ ΚΟΙΝΟΝ τῆς Σωφρονῶ και Ξενοφῶ μιμνῆς*, &c.—I submit it to those who are versed in the Greek language, whether it seems probable, that, if Aristotle had meant to express the sense usually given to the words, (i. e. “for we should otherwise *have no common name to give to,*” &c.) he would have expressed it in *that* Greek? I can only say that I know of no similar example. But farther: the words are *conditional*—*ἔδεν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν*—and yet the *condition* is by no means clearly pointed out. The sense may be, and has been, variously supplied. It seems not improbable, that there is some omission between the words, *νῦν*, and *ἔδεν*.—I am not able entirely to repel a suspicion—for I give it as nothing more—that the words, *μεχρι τε νῦν*, may belong to *this* sentence, and the whole may originally have stood thus:—*ἢτε μιγνυσα μετ’ ἀλλήλων, εἴθ’ ἐνι τινι γενει χρωμενη των μετρων τυγχανουσα. Μεχρι ΓΑΡ ΤΕ ΝΥΝ ἔδεν ΕΧΟΜΕΝ*, &c. i. e. “For we *have hitherto no common appellation*,” &c.—So much, as to the condition of the *text* in this passage.

The interpretation, which I have followed, has been very ably defended by several of the commentators, whose arguments I need not repeat; by none, I think, so powerfully as by Paolo Beni^c: but it requires considerable patience to follow him through the controversial *zigzag* of his captious and fatiguing logic.

The strongest support furnished by Aristotle himself to this extension of the term *Ἐπιποιησις* to *all imitation, fiction, invention, &c.* by *words only, without music, whether in verse or prose*, is, I think,

^a I have only transposed *γὰρ*, and omitted *ἂν*, for which omission there is MS. authority.

^c *Comment. in Aristotelis Poeticam, Partic. 6.*

to be found in *Sect.* 6, *Part* I. [*Original*, cap. ix.] For, if a history put into verse would, as he there asserts, be still a *sort* of history, we may infer, that an Epic Poem reduced to prose would, in *his* idea, have been still a *sort*, at least, of Poem.—What he says in the conclusion of that *section*—that the Poet should be the Ποιητής, or *Maker*, rather of his fable, than of his verse, has the same aspect.—The same idea is also favoured by the extent which he *has* actually given to the term *Epopœia*, in *Sect.* 3, *Part* I. [*Original*, cap. ii.] where it is expressly applied, not only to the serious Poetry of Homer, but to Poems of a comic, and even burlesque, character. An *Epic* Poem without elevation is, nearly, as repugnant to modern ideas as a *Poem* without verse. It would not appear much more strange to give the title of *Epic Poem* to Tom Jones, than to Hudibras; to apply it to the *Telmaque*, would, undoubtedly, appear much *less* strange^f.

It may be worth remarking, farther, that there is one circumstance, which, I think, would evidently tend to render this doctrine of Aristotle—if it *was* his doctrine—less extraordinary to the antients, than it appears to us; and that is, that the difference between metre, and well-measured prose, though, no doubt, sufficient to make them readily distinguished by the ear, seems to have been less than it is with us. To what a degree of refinement they carried their rules for the application of the various poetical feet to their prose compositions, and with what fastidious delicacy of ear they discriminated one combination of syllables from another, is well known from the writings of Cicero, Quintilian, Dion. Halicarnassensis, &c.—It would be thought a strange expression, were a modern writer to say, comparing the Orator and

^f Itaque video visum esse nonnullis, Platonis & Democriti locutionem, *etsi absit à versu*, tamen, quòd incitatiùs feratur, et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, *potius POEMA putandum* quam comicòrum Poetarum, apud quos, *nisi quod versiculi sunt*, nihil est aliud quotidiani dissimile sermonis. *Cic. Orat. cap. xx.*

the Poet, that the latter was “rather more confined by numbers:” “*numeris adstrictior paulo*.”

But, after all, the chief point of difficulty appears to me to lie, not in Aristotle’s asserting, that *Poetry*, in *his* idea of the word, might subsist without verse, but in his giving the name of *Ερρασια* to such compositions as the Mimes of Sophron, and the Dialogues of Plato. But of this, in the next note.

In my translation of the words, *λογοις ψιλοις*, I have ventured to depart from the common interpretation; but without any material change in the sense. They are generally understood to mean *prose*; and Dacier asserts positively, that, “those two words are never “joined by Aristotle or Plato in any other sense.” If he meant, that, wherever *ψιλο* is joined to *λογο*, it is always used to exclude *metre* only, he is certainly mistaken. He had, himself, but just before, quoted a passage of Plato, in which the expression, *λογοι ψιλοι*, appears clearly to mean, words *without melody*. It is in his second book *De Legibus*, where, complaining, in his usual strain, of the separation of Poetry and Music, he says of the Poets, that they employ *ῥυθμον μεν και ῥηματα*¹ *Μελες χωρις, ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ΨΙΛΟΥΣ ΕΙΣ ΜΕΤΡΑ ΤΙΘΕΝΤΕΣ. μελος δ’ αυ και ῥυθμος ανευ ῥηματων, ψιλη καθαρισει τε και αυλησει προσχρωμενοι*². The words, *λογες ψιλες εις μετρα τιθεντες*, Dacier translates, very strangely, “*mettant de la “simple prose en vers.*” But what has *turning prose into verse* to

³ *Cic. de Orat.* i. 16.—So, again, *Or. ad Brutum*, cap. lxvi. speaking of prose compared with verse, he says, “at liberior *aliquantò* oratio.”—To the same purpose *ibid.* cap. xx. Nam etiam Poetæ quæstionem attulerunt, quidnam esset illud quo ipsi differrent ab oratoribus. Numero maximè videbantur *antea*, et versu; *nunc* apud oratores jam *ipse numerus increbuit*.

^h *Ch.* i. Note 22.

¹ I have ventured to alter the word *σχηματα* to *ῥηματα*; a correction, which, I think, the learned reader will see to be obviously necessary, from the purport and expression of the whole passage. The opposition is clear—*ῥυθμον μεν και ρΗΜΑΤΑ μελες χωρις*—*μελο* δ’ αυ και ῥυθμος ανευ ΡΗΜΑΤΩΝ.

² *Ed. Serr.* vol. ii. p. 669.

do with Plato's complaint?—*ψιλοι*, here, applied to *λογοι*, answers evidently to *μελεις χωρις*, and excludes melody; just as, in *ψιλη κιθαρισει και αυλησει*, the same adjective answers to *ανευ ῥηματων*, and excludes *words*¹. And this appears to me to be the obvious sense of *ψιλοις* in the passage of Aristotle before us. By *λογοις ψιλοις*, I understand—not, words *without metre*, i. e. Prose—but, words *without music*. It is, surely, most natural, and most to Aristotle's purpose, to apply the privative force of *ψιλο*, here, to the two means of imitation, *melody* and *rhythm*; which are excluded in the *Εποποιια*, as *words* are, in the preceding instance of the flute and the lyre, and *both* words and music, in that of dance. And thus he *has* actually used the word, in the compound *ψιλομετρια*, in the next chapter. The only difference is, that there he has joined the word *ψιλο* to metre; here, to *words* in general. But in both places, the meaning is probably the same—i. e. “without *melody* and *rhythm*.”

The word *λογ* is, plainly, used by Aristotle, in his first enumeration of the means of imitation, [—*ἐν Ρυθμῳ και Λογῳ και Ἀρμονια. cap. i.*] in the general sense, of language, discourse, or *words*, whether with, or without metre; as we say, “the *words* of a *song*,” &c. as opposed to the music; and that, whether those words are verse, as in general they are, or prose, as in the songs of the *Messiah*, and in the anthems of our church. And, that the word *λογ* was purposely used by Aristotle in this latitude, is rendered highly probable by his varying the expression, where he

¹ I find this very passage mentioned by Casaubon, *De Satiricâ*, &c. p. 346, with the same explanation of *λογος ψιλος*.—This is not the only instance in Plato that contradicts the assertion of Dacier. In a passage of his *Symposium*, cited by Victorius, [*Ed. Serr.* p. 215.] the words—*ανευ ὄργανων, ψιλοις λογοις*—are, I think, rightly rendered by Serranus, “*Sine ullis instrumentis, affâ tantùm simpliciq̄ voce.*”

^m So Virgil: “—*numeros memini, si VERBA tenerem.*” *Ecl. ix.* Nothing is more common than this use of *λογ* in Aristotle and Plato. Thus the latter, *De Rep. lib. iii.*—*το μελο* ἐκ τριων ἐστι συγκειμενον, ΛΟΓΟΥ τε και Ἀρμονιας και ῥυθμου—which agrees exactly with Aristotle's account of the means of imitation.

speaks of Tragedy, Comedy, Dithyrambics, and Nomos, to which metre was essential, and substituting there, the word *Μετρῶ*, for *Λογῶ*". It was natural, then, that he should say, when he came to speak of the Epic imitation, as distinguished from those he had before mentioned, that it imitates *by words alone*—i. e. without *melody* and *rhythm*, or, as *we* should say, without *music*. But he adds—*ἢ Μετροῖς*—"or *verse*." And why?—Probably, because he thought his expression would be neither clear, nor exact, without it: not *clear*, because the most *usual* meaning of *λογοὶ ψιλοὶ* being *prose*, it might have been so taken here, and he might have appeared to *say*, at least, though no one could reasonably suppose he *meant* it, that the Epic imitates by *prose only*—*μοῦνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς*:—not *exact*, because, metre being, as he himself expressly says, a species, or *part*, of rhythm*, words, put into metre, were not, strictly speaking, *ψιλοὶ*, that is, *χωρὶς Ἀρμονίας καὶ ΡΥΘΜΟΥ*. And this is exactly conformable to the expression of Plato in the passage above quoted, where he considers *verse*, even unaccompanied by music, as still consisting of *rhythm* and words, [*ΡΥΘΜΟΝ μὲν καὶ ῥήματα Μέλους χωρὶς*;]—plainly regarding metre as a species, or form, of rhythm.

I understand, therefore, the meaning of Aristotle, in this expression—*τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς, ἢ τοῖς μετροῖς*, to amount to this;—"by words, without the other means of melody and rhythm, or at most, with so much of rhythm only, as is implied in the idea of metre: without rhythm, in its musical sense of strict time". This sense of the words agrees perfectly with what follows—*ἔδεν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν, &c.* i. e. "For otherwise—if we do not allow the *Ἐποποιία* to imitate *by words*, in the general sense, whether *prose* or *verse*—we shall have no common name for Epic imitations in *prose*; and, if we do not allow it to imitate in *either one or more species*

* ῥυθμῶν, καὶ μελῆι, καὶ ΜΕΤΡΩΙ. *Cap.* i.

ο τα γὰρ μετρα, ὅτι ΜΟΡΙΑ τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστὶ, φανερον. *Cap.* iv.

See the quotation from Mr. Harris, p. 70.

“ of metre, we shall have no common name for the same kind of
“ imitation in Elegiac, or other verse.”

The great advantage of this sense of *λογοις ψιλοις* is, that, while it leaves in full force that explanation of the *whole* passage, which I have followed, it removes, at the same time, or at least considerably weakens, what has always struck me as one of the strongest objections to it. Nothing appears to me more improbable, than, that Aristotle, advancing a doctrine so new, and so repugnant to the prevailing ideas of his own times, as, that a species of Poetry might subsist without verse, should chuse to present this novelty in the most offensive way, by beginning at once, and without any management, with the mention of *prose*: that he should say—
“ The Epic Poem imitates *by prose* alone, *or, by verse*.” If by *λογοις ψιλοις* he had meant prose, as Dacier and others contend, would he not naturally—one might say, unavoidably—have reserved those words for the last in the period? Would not the order, in short, have been this?—“ by verse alone; and that either
“ of a single kind, or mixed—or *even by prose*.” As I have rendered the words, *prose* is not *mentioned* at all, but implied only in the general expression of, *words*; as it is, equally, in his first enumeration of the means of imitation—*ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ ΛΟΓΩΙ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ*. At the worst, the idea of prose is not, as in the other version, presented *before* that of verse.

With respect to what I have said of the *novelty* of the philosopher's doctrine, and its remoteness from the common ideas of the antients concerning the importance of metre to Poetry, I may refer even to his *own* way of speaking, in general, upon that subject. In his Rhetoric, for example, he says—*ῥυθμον δεῖ ἔχειν τοῦ λογον, Μετρον δὲ, μὴ ΠΟΙΗΜΑ ΓΑΡ ΕΣΤΑΙ*.—“ In prose-composition there should be rhythm, *but not metre—for then it will be*
“ *a Poem*.” The reader may also be not displeas'd to see what

² *Rhet. lib. iii. cap. viii. p. 591. Ed. Duval.*

Socrates thought of the importance of verse, in a passage, which I have given in NOTE 229, respecting the privileges and advantages of Poetry.—Plato goes so far, as to compare Poetry, when reduced to prose, to a face, which, having no solid beauty of form and symmetry, has lost its *only* charm, when the bloom of youth, and delicacy of complexion, have deserted it. But the zeal of Plato for depreciating Poetry is well known. He would, probably, have approved the indignation of one of the Fathers, who called it “the Devil’s wine.” It must be confessed, however, that he has poured a great deal of this wine into his own writings; and were they to be reduced to *plain* prose, and stripped of that *ἀνθος*—that bloom and colouring of poetic diction, and poetic fancy, by which they are so distinguished, I should be in some pain for the appearance they would make.

But, to return:—After all that is to be said in favour of that interpretation, which, on the whole, I have thought it best to follow, I must end this note, as I began it, by declaring my conviction of the imperfect condition of the original, and confessing my doubt, whether the true meaning of Aristotle, in this passage, has yet been, or ever will be, discovered.

² — ἔοικε [ἴσ. τα των Ποιητων, γυμνωθεντα γε των της μουσικης ΧΡΩΜΑΤΩΝ, αὐτα ἐφ’ αὐτων λεγομενα,] τοις των ὈΡΑΙΩΝ προσωποισ, ΚΑΛΩΝ ΔΕ ΜΗ, οἶα γινεται ἰδεν, ὅταν αὐτα το ΑΝΘΟΣ προλιπη.—*Rep.* x. p. 601. *Ed. Serrani.*—This is quoted by Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii, cap. iv. p. 588. *Dunal.*—In Dr. Beattie’s Essay on Poetry, &c. *Part II. ch. ii.* it is, by mistake, attributed to Demosthenes. Nor is the meaning of the passage there fully given. Plato does not content himself with saying, that “*verisification is to Poetry, what bloom is to the human countenance.*” He says, that *verisification is to Poetry, what bloom is to a face, that has no beauty but bloom.*

N O T E 6.

P. 3. THE MIMES OF SOPHRON AND XENARCHUS, AND THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUES.

HAD Aristotle proposed only to extend the term *ἑποποιῖα* to all imitations of the NARRATIVE kind, whether in verse or prose, whether serious or comic, this, to a reader who should enter thoroughly into his ideas of Poetry, would not, perhaps, appear extraordinary. It would be only classing the different forms of Poetry, as one might expect him to class them, according to what he himself conceived to be the chief and most characteristic difference of their imitations. But here, we find the name applied to composition, of a character strikingly different—to Mimes, and Dialogues; for it is indeed, as Dacier says, a very obvious question, and one which cannot but have occurred to every reader—"les *Dialogues* ne ressembloient-ils pas plutôt au Poëme *Dramatique*, qu' au Poëme "Épique?"—An embarrassing question, and which, being at all events to be answered, he answers immediately, and roundly—"Non, sans doute." And why?—Because, says he, "the drama "imitates by *words and music*, the Epic Poem, by *words only*." But, to apply the expression of the philosopher to this critic—*πλεξῆας ἐν, λυα κακῶς*². This is much the same thing as if one should deny, that two men, of form and features strikingly similar, resembled each other, merely because their coats were of different colours; or, to come still nearer to the case, if one should assert that one of these men bore a greater resemblance to a third, with whom he chanced to agree in the single circumstance of *not* wearing a wig. Is it probable, that Aristotle, in classing and denominating a *principal* species of Poetry, should be guided by such a

² *Cap.* xviii.

circumstance as the mere absence of *music*? when even metre he regards as not essential, and speaks of it as one of the ἡδυσματα of Poetic language^b. He allows, indeed, that music is the most pleasurable of the ἡδυσματα, or *seasonings*, of Tragedy^c; but, that he regarded it as less essential than metre, is evident from the place which he assigns it in his arrangement of the six parts of Tragedy according to the order of their importance; for he there places it next before the Ὀψις, or *Decoration*, which he pronounces to be, of all the parts, “the most foreign to the Poet’s art:” ἡμισυ ὀψιαν τῆς ποιητικῆς^d.—On the other hand, the circumstance of *Narration* in the person of the Poet he every where seems to make an essential mark of distinction between the Epic and the Dramatic Poem^e: so that, in order to avoid making him absolutely inconsistent with himself, we must be obliged to suppose, with the commentators, that he uses the word Ἐποποιία in two senses; here, in its general and etymological sense, that of *imitating*, or *making, by words*^f, and every where else in the common and limited sense of *narrative imitation*^g. The first of these must be considered as a mere *proposal*: we must understand Aristotle to say no more than this—that some common term, to include *all compositions imitating by words only*, was wanted, and that the term, *Ἐποποιία*, was best adapted to that purpose. In the rest of his treatise he conforms to the established ideas and language.—This, however, is by no means satisfactory.

^b — λέγω δὲ ἩΔΥΣΜΕΝΟΝ λόγον, τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ. Cap. vi.

^c — μερικῶν τῶν ἡδυσμάτων. *Ibid.*

^d *Ibid.*

^e See Cap. v.—Cap. xxiii. *initio*. So Cap. xxiv. ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἐποποιίᾳ, διὰ τὸ ΔΙΗΓΗΣΙΝ εἶναι, &c.—and *ibid.* ἡ διηγηματικὴ μιμησις, is equivalent to ἡ Ἐποποιητικὴ μιμησις, in Cap. xxvi.

^f See the note of Heinsius.

^g As in the passages just referred to, *Note e.*

It still remains, I confess, no inconsiderable difficulty with me, to conceive, that Aristotle should, by applying the term *ἑποποιία* to all imitative writing, whether of a narrative or dramatic form, without music, give it an extension inconsistent, as it seems, with his own principles, and confounding those distinctions, which, in his own view, were the most essential. If he had meant so to apply the term in the passage before us, he would, surely, have been more explicit, and, where, after this passage, he first mentioned the *ἑποποιία* in the usual sense, would have added some words of limitation and distinction to prevent confusion. But this he has not done. Though evidently speaking of the heroic and narrative Epic, he calls it only, ἡ ἑποποιία; as if no other application of the word had been mentioned.

Of the MIMES of SOPHRON we can acquire but a very imperfect idea, either from what is said of them in ancient authors, or from the fragments that are preserved in Athenæus, Demetrius, and others. It has even been long disputed among the learned, whether they were prose or verse; and, at last, it seems to be settled, that they were neither; a kind of compromise comfortable enough to the disputants on both sides; for if the fragments are something between verse and prose, they, who assert them to be either, are something between right and wrong. I shall not enter into this discussion; but refer the reader to the remarks of the learned Valckenaer on the argument of the *Ἀδωνιαζουσαι* of Theocritus; where he will find some curious and uncommon information upon this subject^b. That these compositions, however, were either a species of the drama, or, at least, dialogues in the dramatic form, there seems to be no doubt^c. Dacier, indeed, asserts, that they were, like the Epic Poem, “une imitation composée de narration

^b *Theocriti Decem Eidyllia*, Lug. Bat. 1773. See, particularly, p. 200.

^c See *Casaubon, de Sat. Poef.* cap. iii. p. 115, 116, and the passage of Plutarch to which he refers, *Sympof. Prol. lib. vii. Prob. viii.* p. 1268. *Ed. H. St.* And, in his treatise *Ποτεζα των ζων, κ. τ. ζ.* p. 1792.

“ et d'action.” But he produces no proof of this, nor do I know of any.—I must farther observe, that, supposing what is related, of the fondness of Plato for the Mimes of Sophron, and of their having been his model in the *μιμησις προσωπων* of his own dialogues^k, to be true, it may reasonably be inferred, that we ought by no means to confound them with the *Roman* Mimes, or to apply to them, as is too often done, all that is said of the latter by Diomedes, and other writers of that age. Such licentious and obscene trash would not, surely, have been found *under the pillow* of the moral and reforming Plato; and that, *ὄλω ἐπι γῆρας εἶδω*, and, as some assert, even in the hour of death^l. In saying this, however, I do not forget, that *delicacy* is not to be sought for even in the strictest morality of antient times. For the best idea that can now be formed of the manner of this famous mimographer, we must have recourse, I believe, to the fifteenth *Idyl* of Theocritus^m, which, as we are informed in the MS. argument found by Ruhnkenius in the royal library at Paris, is an imitation of a Mime of Sophron upon a similar subjectⁿ. A more exact piece of natural delineation cannot be imagined. It is not, indeed, *la belle nature*; it is the nature of common and simple, or, as some affect to call it, of *low*, life; but copied with so close and faithful a pencil, that, to every reader accustomed, in any degree, to observe the manners of mankind in general, and whose taste is not perverted by affectation, or fettered by rule, the truth and *reality* of the imitation will, I believe, amply compensate for the want of dignity in the thing imitated. To those who receive no pleasure from *this* source, I would

^k See Valckenaer's *Theoc.* p. 194.

^l Sophron, mimorum quidem scriptor, sed quem Plato adeo probavit, ut suppositos capiti libros ejus, *cum moreretur*, habuisse tradatur. *Quintil.* i. 10.

^m The *Συρακουσαι*, ἡ Ἀδωνιαζουσαι. The Syracusan women, or, the women at the festival of Adonis.

ⁿ Παρεπλασε θε ποιηματιον ἐκ των παλαια Σωφρον θεωμενων τα Ισθμια. *Valcken. Decem Eid. Theoc.* p. 188.

rather

rather recommend the *belle nature* of Pope's Pastorals, or the still *finer* nature of Fontenelle's.—I would only observe farther, that this imitation of Sophron is in the strict dramatic form; and that it contains nothing in the least degree indecent, or disgusting.

Of the ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΙ, by which, undoubtedly, Aristotle meant chiefly, if not solely, the DIALOGUES of PLATO, I shall only observe, that they have all, in a high degree, the dramatic and imitative spirit, and that by far the greater part of them are in the unmixed dramatic form°, so as to admit of representation; and it, accordingly, appears from Plutarch, that those of the lighter cast among them were sometimes performed by boys, as an entertainment, at the Symposia of the Romans in his time".

N O T E 7.

P. 3. CONNECTING THE POETRY, OR MAKING, WITH THE METRE.

— Συνεπιποντες τῷ μετρῷ τὸ ποιεῖν.—Not, “on applique au vers seul l'idée qu'on a de la Poésie,” as M. Batteux renders it, but, as it is translated by Piccolomini, with his usual exactness—“giugnendo il verbo, Ποιεῖν, [*Poicin*, cio é fare,] con la qualità del “metro.”—I understand Aristotle's expression to mean, not the connection of the general idea of Poetry with that of Verse, though this indeed be *implied*; but, the junction of the word, Ποιεῖν, with the name of some *particular* metre, in the compound words, Ελεγιοποιοι, Εποποιοι, and the like.

° We have, I think, thirty-two dialogues of Plato, taking those *De Republicâ*, and *De Legibus*, which are now divided into books, as each *one* dialogue. Of these thirty-two, only six are in the *narrative* form.

p Plutarchi Sympos. Prob. lib. vii. Prob. viii.

N O T E 8.

P. 4. TREATISES OF MEDICINE OR NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
IN VERSE.

Two Poems of Empedocles—that concerning *Nature*, and his *Expiations*—contained together, according to Diog. Laertius, *five thousand* hexameters, and another, on the subject of *Medicine*, *six hundred*.—τα μὲν ἐν περὶ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ Καθαρμοὶ, εἰς ἔπη τετρασὶ πεντακισχίλια, ὁ δὲ ΙΑΤΡΙΚΟΣ λόγος, εἰς ἔπη ἑξακοσια [End of the Life of Empedocles.] This, by the way, confirms the emendation of Heinsius—φυσικῶν, for μεσικῶν. Nothing, I believe, is known of any antient Poem on the subject of Music.

The earliest philosophy was *natural* philosophy, and the earliest vehicle of that philosophy was verse. Orpheus, Hesiod, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Empedocles, and Thales, are all mentioned by Plutarch as poet-philosophers of this kind. Pythagoras is said to have written a Poem *On the Universe*, in hexameters^a. This measure was, at least, suited to the *dignity* of philosophical speculation. We cannot say so much of the verse chosen by Epicharmus for the vehicle of a treatise *Concerning sensible and intellectual objects*—Περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ νοητῶν—part of which is quoted by Diog. Laertius in his life of Plato^b. It was written in the Trochaic tetrameter, a very unphilosophical measure, if rightly characterized by Aristotle, who gives it the epithets of τροχαιῶν—ὀρμητικῶν—ΚΟΡΔΑΚΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ^c. An English reader would be surprised,

^a Περὶ τοῦ Ὄντος, ἐν ἔπιπ. Diog. Laert. VIII. 7.—And see Plut. Περὶ τοῦ μηδεμίαν ἰμμετραί, &c. p. 716. II. Steph.

^b III. 10.

^c Rhet. iii. 44. Poet. cap. xxiv. The word, κορδακικατέρον, cannot be adequately translated. “A jiggyth measure,” would be weak, to the force of the original. The Κορδαξ is known to have been a kind of dance, so full of buffoonery and indecency, that

prised, on opening a didactic and philosophical Poem, to find it written in the measure of—" *Jolly mortals, fill your glasses,*" &c.

N O T E 9.

P. 4. HOMER AND EMPEDOCLES HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON BUT THEIR METRE.

In his book *De Poetis*, Aristotle spoke somewhat differently. He there said, as cited by Diog. Laertius, " that Empedocles " resembled Homer *in the beauty of his* DICTION; abounding in " metaphors, and making a happy use of the other embellishments " of Poetic language^a." It does not seem easy to make this perfectly consistent with what he *here* asserts—that Empedocles had *nothing* in common with Homer *but his metre*. He meant, I suppose, no more, than that Empedocles had nothing of the *true* Poetic character of Homer, his *invention, imitation, &c.* But he certainly has *said* more.

N O T E 10.

P. 4. SO, ALSO, THOUGH ANY ONE SHOULD CHUSE TO CONVEY HIS IMITATION IN EVERY KIND OF METRE, &c.

The conjecture of Heinsius, who contended, that—*ἐν ἤδη και ποιητην προσαιγορευτεον*—should be read interrogatively, I have re-

that Theophrastus makes it one of the marks of his *Profligate Man*, that " he will " *even* dance the *Κορδαξ, sober, and without a mask.*"—*Theophrasti Charact.* cap. vi. *Περί Απηνειας.*

^a -- εν δε τῆ Περι Ποιητων φησιν [Αριστοτελης] ὅτι και ὈΜΗΡΙΚΟΣ ὁ Εμπεδοκλης, και δεῖτε περι την ΦΡΑΣΙΝ γεγονη, μεταφορικῶ τε ἂν, και τοις ἄλλοις τοις περι ποιητικῆν ἐπιτευγμασι χωριμενῶ. *Diog. Laert.* lib. viii. 57.

jected, because the sense it gives the passage appears to me to be trifling. It makes Aristotle say—"If Poets are to be denominated from their *metre*, what name is to be given to him, who writes a Poem in *all sorts* of metre? You cannot call him an Ἐποποιῶν, an Ἰαμβοποιῶν, &c. Is he, therefore, *not to be called a Poet at all*, because you cannot call him the Poet, or *Maker*, of this or that particular metre?"—But the answer to this would surely be obvious: "We cannot, it is true, call him any *one* of these, exclusively; we call him *all* these; he is the Poet of *every* metre, in which he composes; and, in *our* ideas, the *more* a Poet, in proportion to the number of the different measures, of which he shews himself a master."—I must also remark, that, in this way of understanding the passage, the word, ὁμοίως, is not accounted for, nor fairly rendered, I think, either in the version of Heinsius, or in any of those that follow him.

I have, also, rejected the reading of Victorius—ὍΥ ποιοῖτο τὴν μιμησῶν; because it appears to me, that the phrase will not admit of the sense, in which it is rendered, of *not imitating at all*.—It is observed by Victorius himself, that the phrase, ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μιμησῶν, is never used by Aristotle as equivalent to μιμεῖσθαι *only*, but always where he is speaking of the *means*, or *manner*, by, or in, which, the imitation is *made*. Thus, *cb.* i.—ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ τὴν μιμησῶν ἘΝ ΡΥΘΜῶΙ καὶ ΛΟΓῶΙ καὶ ἈΡΜΟΝΙΑΙ.—Again—ΔΙΑ ΤΡΙΜΕΤΡῶΝ κ. τ. αλ. ΠΟΙΟΙΤΟ τὴν μιμησῶν. And, at the end, ἘΝ ὍΙΣ ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ τὴν μιμησῶν—"the different *means*, *by which* they form or execute their imitation."—Thus, too, *cb.* xxiv.—ἔι γὰρ τις ἘΝ ἈΛΛῶΙ ΤΙΝΙ ΜΕΤΡῶΙ διηγηματικὴν μιμησῶν ΠΟΙΟΙΤΟ.—*cb.* vi. ἘΝ ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ [*sc.* μελοποιῖα καὶ λεξίαι] ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ τὴν μιμησῶν. So *ibid.* with a participle—ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΕΣ ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ τὴν μιμησῶν—as in the passage before us, ἀπαντα τὰ μετρὰ ΜΙΜΝΤῶΝ ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΟ τὴν μιμησῶν.—The construction and the sense are the same, when the same mode of expression is applied to other subjects; as, *esp.* iv.—τὰς μάθησεις ΠΟΙΕΙΤΑΙ ΔΙΑ ΜΙΜΗΣΕΩΣ—And, *Rhet.*

lib. i. cap. i. sect. 3. ΔΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΩΝ ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ τὰς πικρὰς καὶ τὰς λογικὰς—i. e. “to argue through the medium of common and popular truths.”—I do not know of any instance, in which ποιηθῆναι τὴν μιμησίν is used in any other way, or put simply for μιμῆσθαι. I cannot, for example, conceive, that Aristotle, instead of, το τε γὰρ ΜΙΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ συμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, (*carp. iv.*) would have written—το τε γὰρ ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ ΜΙΜΗΣΙΝ συμφυτον, &c. It appears to me, that, whether the phrase be used positively, or negatively, *some imitation* is equally implied; and this sentence—ἐἴ τις ἅπαντα τὰ μέτρα μιγνῶν ΟΥ ποιεῖτο τὴν μιμησίν—I should by no means think it accurate to translate—“If any one, mixing all sorts of metre, should *not imitate*;—but, (to construe literally for the sake of clearness,) “if any one should not *make* THE, (or, which is the same thing, HIS) *imitation* by *mixing* all sorts of metre.” This, I confess, appears clearly to me to be the fair English of that Greek; but as this certainly cannot be the meaning of Aristotle here, I must abandon the reading which gives it, and content myself with following that explanation, which is encumbered with the fewest difficulties^a. The sense, in this way, does not materially differ from that, which is given to the passage by those who adopt the reading of Victorius. The word, ὁμοίως, has thus its proper force. So has, ἐκ ἡδῆ, καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτεον. As if Aristotle had said—“Such a writer we might, certainly, on the first glance, call, a *versifier*—a *metre-maker*—ἐποποιον, ἐλεγχοποιον, &c. but we should not *immediately* (ἡδῆ), *merely on account of the variety of his versification*, allow him *also* the title of *Poet*—καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτεον.”

I must, however, be again permitted to declare my doubt, as to the integrity of the text.—I have here given, as I have been obliged

^a According to the version of Goulston—“Similiter verò etiam si quis omnia metrorum genera uno in opere permiscens, imitationem instituerit, (quemadmodum Chæremon, &c.) non statim Poetæ titulo, ob carmen, sed ob imitationem, insigniendus.” See also Castelvetro, p. 25, 26.

to do in many other places, that sense, which appears to me the *best* that can be given to the original *as it stands*; not that, upon which I can with any *confidence* rely, as the *clear* meaning of the author.

N O T E 11.

P. 4. AS CHÆREMÓN HAS DONE IN HIS CENTAUR.

From some curious fragments of this Poet preserved, or, rather, half-preserved, in Athenæus, his genius appears to have been of a gay and voluptuous cast, and to have delighted in minute description of pleasurable objects. In the lines quoted by Athenæus from his Tragedy of *Æneus*, which are a description of a group of beautiful virgins sporting by moon-light, there is certainly some fancy, and some elegance; but, of that kind, the effect of which is, perhaps, somewhat counteracted by too much appearance of affectation and research. And this corresponds with the character given of this Poet by Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric* [*lib. iii. cap. xii.*] that he was, ἀριβής ὡς περ λογογράφος; and of that class of Poets, whom he calls ἀναγνωστικοί; that is, whose productions, as we commonly express it, *read* better than they *act*; are more adapted to the *closet*, than to the *stage*. The antient Poets, both Greek and Roman, were often, I believe, indebted, for their *descriptive ideas*, to Painting, or Sculpture. This passage of Chæremón is certainly very *picturesque*, and was, probably, suggested by some painting on the same subject.

Athenæus says of this Poet, that he was particularly fond of dwelling upon the description of flowers—ἐπικαταφορὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθή^a; and cites some lines of that kind from his Tragedies.

In his *CENTAUR*, which Athenæus calls δράμα πολυμετρῶν, we must understand, that even the *dialogue* was in various metres; for in the *choral* parts this would have been no innovation.

^a *Athen. lib. xiii. p. 608.*

N O T E 12.

P. 68. POLYGNOTUS—PAUSAN—DIONYSIUS.

Polygnotus and *Pausan* are also mentioned by Aristotle in his 8th book *De Rep. cap. v.* where, speaking of Painting with a view to education, he says, that “young men should not be permitted to contemplate the works of PAUSAN, but those only of POLYGNOTUS, and of other artists who excelled in *moral expression*.” It seems probable, from this passage, that the pictures of *Pausan* were not only of a ludicrous, but also of a licentious cast. To what a degree the abuse of this art was carried in Aristotle’s time, appears from another passage, [*Rep. lib. vii. cap. xvii.*] in which he says, the magistrate should suffer no “licentious and indecent paintings or statues,” such as would endanger the morals of youth: but the exception that follows is curious;—“*Unless*,” he adds, “in the *temples* of some DEITIES OF THAT CHARACTER, whose legal and established worship consists in ludicrous and “wanton rites”.”

While I am upon this subject, I cannot forbear adding a singular passage of Euripides, where Hippolytus, vindicating himself, and asserting his chastity, says, with a *naïveté* that, I fear, would hardly be received with decent gravity by a modern audience;—

Λεχας γαρ, εἰς τοδ' ἡμερας, ἀγνων δεμας.
 Ουκ οἶδα ΠΡΑΞΙΝ ΤΗΝΔΕ, πλην λογω κλυτων,
 ΓΡΑΦΗ ΤΕ ΛΕΥΣΣΩΝ· εἰδὲ ταυτα γαρ σκοπειν
 Προθυμῶ ἔμι, ΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΝ ΨΥΧΗΝ ἔχων.

Hippol. v. 1003.

* — Δει μη τα ΠΑΥΣΑΝΟΝΟΣ θεωρειν τες νευς, ἀλλα τα ΠΟΛΥΓΝΩΤΟΥ, κ'αι ἰ τις ἀπο τῶν γραφεων ἢ των ἀγαλματοποιων εἶν ἠθικῶ.—*De Rep. viii. 5.*

ῥ — μηθεν μιτε ἀγαλμα μιτε γραφην εἶναι ΤΟΙΟΥΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΞΕΩΝ ΜΙΜΗΣΙΝ· εἰ μ'εταρα τισι ΘΕΟΙΣ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΙΣ, οἷς και τον τῶθασμον ἀποδιδωσιν ὁ θεμῶ.—

I am a stranger to the couch of love ;
 Nor know I of its rites more than the tale
 May have informed me, or the *Painter's pencil*
Presented to mine eye ; yet on such picture
 Dwells not mine eye delighted, for my mind
 Is as a virgin's pure.—

[Mr. Potter's Translation, v. 1060.]

The Pausan mentioned by Aristotle was probably the same painter, whose poverty only is recorded by Suidas^c, and of whose wit we have a curious specimen in Ælian^d.

Of DIONYSIUS, too, very little is known. That he excelled in *natural* representation and exact resemblance—in exhibiting men, such as he *saw* them, without ideal grace on the one hand, or exaggerated deformity on the other—is known, I believe, only from this passage of Aristotle. Dacier says this account is confirmed by Ælian; but I think he is mistaken. It appears to me, that the *μεγεθῶς* of which Ælian speaks, as the only difference between the paintings of Polygnotus and those of Dionysius, is literal, not figurative, magnitude. He says only, that the pictures of Dionysius, “ except, that they were *on a small scale*, were *exact* imitations of Polygnotus, in the *expression of passions and manners*, the *attitudes* of the figures, the lightness and transparency of the *draperies*, and every other circumstance^e.” It is not easy to see how Dionysius could copy so exactly, *εἰς ἀκριβείαν*, the *expres-*

^c Παυτανῶ πτωχότεροςῶ, was proverbial. Suidas. And see Aristoph. Plut. 602. Theognoph. 958. Acharn. 854.

^d Lib. xiv. cap. xv.—And see Dacier's note on the passage of Aristotle.

^e ὁ μὲν Πολυγνῶτῶ ἐγραφε τὰ μεγάλα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ΤΕΛΕΙΟΙΣ ἐεργαζέτο τὰ ἀλά· τὰ δὲ τὰ Διονυσῶ, ΠΑΛΗΝ ΤΟΥ ΜΕΓΕΘΟΥΣ, τῶν τῶ Πολυγνῶτῶ τεχνῶν ἐμμεῖτο εἰς τὴν ἀκριβείαν, παύῶ, καὶ ἄῶ, καὶ σχημάτων χρησῶν, ἰματίων λεπτοτήτας, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ.—Ælian. iv. 3. If the sense of the *whole passage* left room for doubt as to the sense of the word *μεγεθῶς*, it would, I think, be sufficiently fixed by what follows—*ἐν ΤΕΛΕΙΟΙΣ*, i. e. *just à laturà*, as rightly rendered by Perizonius; in *large figures*,—*as large as life*, &c. Dacier's “*visoit à la perfection*,” is nothing to the purpose.

tion, and the *forms*, or *attitudes*, of Polygnotus, without copying, at the same time, his greatness of manner, and his improvement of that nature which he imitated; for these seem entirely to depend upon those two circumstances, the expression of the countenance, and the airs and attitudes of the figures^f.

It seems, therefore, doubtful, whether Aristotle and Ælian speak of the same person. There must, in all probability, have been more painters than one, of that name; which was so common, that the *writers* so called, alone, furnished Meursius with matter for a whole book.—The pictures of Dionysius *the Colophonian* are mentioned by Plutarch^g as being painted with considerable *strength* of pencil, [— ἰσχυρῶς ἐχόντα καὶ τόνον,] but in a manner which appeared forced and laboured, [εὐθεβισσόμενον,] and which he opposes to the freedom and facility of *Nicomachus*, who seems to have been the *Fà Presto* of the antient painters^h. This fault, so likely to be that of the artist who aims at an exact and scrupulous resemblance of the nature that is before his eyes, may, perhaps, afford some presumption, that Plutarch and Aristotle speak of the *same* painter.

What Aristotle says of these *three* styles of picturesque imitation, is easily applied to modern times. The productions, indeed, of these antient artists, were perishable and of short duration;—“At *genus* immortale manet:” these specific characters have subsisted, and probably will subsist, in every period of the art. For the name of Polygnotus, it is obvious enough to substitute that of RAPHAEL, or other masters of the higher Italian schools. “When a man,” says Mr. Richardson, with that simplicity of enthusiasm,

“The painter has no other means of giving an idea of the dignity of the mind, but by that *external appearance* which grandeur of thought does generally, though not always, impress on the *countenance*; and by that correspondence of *figure* to sentiment and situation, which all men wish, but cannot command.”—Sir Jos. Reynolds’s *Disc. on Painting*, p. 111.

^f Life of *Timoleon*—vol. i. p. 461. *Hen. Steph.*

^h Luca Giordano was called, Luca *Fà Presto*. Pliny says of *Nicomachus*—“Nec fuit alius in eâ arte *velocior*.”—*Lib. xxxv. cap. x.*

which gives so amusing a singularity to his writings¹—“When a man enters into that awful gallery at Hampton-court^k, he finds himself amongst a sort of people *superior to what he has ever seen*, and very probably to what those really *were*.” This is exactly the *βελτιονας ἢ καθ’ ἡμας* of Aristotle. “Michael Angelo,” says the same author, “no where *saw* such living figures as he cut in marble.”—The Flemish and Dutch schools will supply plenty of substitutes for the *Dionysii* of antient painting—those, who, like Protogenes, “in *picturâ verum esse, non verisimile, volunt*.” Rembrandt must occur to every body. Even Rubens “took his figures too much *from the people before him*.” [*Sir Jof. Reynolds’s Disc.* p. 133.]

As for the *Paufons*, the buffoons of the art, *they* are to be seen in the windows of every print-shop. We must not, however, confound with these “Tom Browns of the mob,” as Mr. Walpole calls themⁿ, the moral humour of Hogarth, or the sportive, but harmless; exaggerations of Mr. Bunbury. Hogarth, indeed, in general, and in his greatest works, seems rather to belong to the *highest* class of the *exact* imitators of *vulgar nature*—*των φαταλων*. His Country-dance, however, may be mentioned as an example, and an admirable one, of *exaggerated* comic imitation, in which men are made, in some degree at least, “worse than they are”—*χειροτες ἐμαλζε*.—And if any man can look at this print, or at the *Family-piece*, the *Coffee-house Patriots*, or the *Long Story*, of Mr. Bunbury, without feeling a high degree of that

¹ See Mr. Walpole’s just apology for the singularities of Richardson’s style, and just censure of those, who saw nothing, in that sensible and original writer, but an object of derision.—*Anecdotes of Painting*.

^k Where the Cartoons then were.

^l *Theory of Painting*, p. 96. *Ed.* 1773.

^m *Plin.* lib. xxxv. *cap.* x. See his account of the laboriousness of that painter.—See also *Ælian. Var. Hist.* lib. xii. *cap.* xli. and *Plut.* in *Demet.* p. 1646. *Ed.* H.S.

ⁿ *Anec. of Painting*, vol. iv. p. 149.

pleasure which arises from the perception of strong humour, he must, I think, be still more unprovided with a sense of the ridiculous, than even that Crassus, who is recorded to have laughed *once*, though once only, in his life°.

N O T E 13.

P. 68. WITH THE MUSIC OF THE FLUTE AND OF THE LYRE.—

Thus PLATO, in the very language of Aristotle,—*τα περι της ἁρμυνης και πασαν μουσικην ἐστι τροπων μιμηματα* ΒΕΛΤΙΟΝΩΝ και ΧΕΙΡΟΝΩΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ. A modern reader, that is, a person who reads an antient author with modern ideas, might be inclined to ask, how men are to be represented as better, or worse, than they are, or how, indeed, represented at all, in a harpsichord lesson, or a solo for a German flute? But the same reader, supposing him in any degree conversant with music, would surely be at no loss to conceive, that it admits of the difference of *serious* and *comic expression*; and admits of it in various degrees, from the highest elevation and dignity of style, down to the coarse and vulgar jollity of the gavot, or the hornpipe. Now the meaning of Aristotle, put into modern musical language, amounts, I apprehend, to no more than that. Suppose, then, the music, in these different styles, to be accompanied by *words*, relating the actions, or imitating the speech, of low, or elevated characters; *we* might say, that the music was *expressive* of such actions, or characters; the *antients* would have said, that it *imitated* them. On the contrary, suppose this music merely instrumental, *we* should, in general, only say, that it was grand, and sublime, or comic, mean, vulgar, &c. But the antients, from the close, and almost inseparable connection of

° *Cic. de Fin.* v. 30.

their Music with Poetry, and particularly with the most imitative sort of Poetry, the Dramatic^r; and partly, also, from the nature of their Music itself^s, would, in this case likewise, have retained much the same language, and would have considered this Music as *imitative* of the manners and passions of exalted, or vulgar characters, or even as *representing* those characters themselves.—But the different ideas, or rather, the different language, of the antients and the moderns on this subject, I have considered more fully, and endeavoured to account for, in the *Second Dissertation*.

N O T E 14.

P. 68. CLEOPHON, AS THEY ARE.—

It may be worth while to remark, that the character Aristotle gives of the *diction* of Cleophon^a—that it was of the common and familiar kind, without Poetic elevation—corresponds with the account here given of the general object of his Poetry, the exact delineation of common nature and common life. He who means to represent *men* as they *are*, will also, of course, represent their *language* nearly as it *is*.

The only Poet of this name, of whom, I believe, any account is given, is recorded as a *Tragic* Poet^b: but Aristotle undoubtedly alludes here to a Poem of the narrative kind. In another part of his works he mentions a Poem of Cleophon, called MANDRABULUS^c. From the proverbial expression—ἐπι Μανδραβουλας χωρεῖ το πρῶγμα (“*worse and worse, like the affairs of Mandrabulus*”—)

^r Diff. II. p. 81, &c. ^s *Ibid.* p. 85.

^a Part II. Sect. 26. Of the *Orig.* cap. xxii.

^b *Suidas* v. CLEOPHON. He gives the names of some of his Tragedies.

^c *De Seph. Elench.* cap. xv. where we should, I suppose, for Μανδραβουλας, read, Μανδραβουλας.

in Lucian^d, and the account of its origin in Suidas, and Hesychius^e. it seems very improbable that the Poem was a *Tragedy*. We may rather conclude it to have been of a comic cast; and it seems no unreasonable conjecture, to suppose, that it might be of the narrative kind; modelled, perhaps, in some respects, upon the MARGITES of Homer. At least, the two heroes seem to have been of kindred characters.

N O T E 15.

P. 68. HEGEMON—INVENTOR OF PARODIES.

See Athenæus, p. 698, 699, and 406, 407. And Fabric. *Biblioth. Gr.* lib. ii. cap. vii.—The Athenians were delighted with this sort of *fun*—of all expedients to raise a laugh, the cheapest, and, at the same time, the most infallible. HOMER was the great and inexhaustible resource of these Parodists. The best and most considerable specimen remaining, of this kind of Poem, seems to be the Homeric description of an Attic supper by *Matron*, a great Parodist, and a great eater, in Athenæus, lib. iv. cap. v. Isaac Casaubon calls it, “Carmen ingeniosum, et leporis ac venustatis plenissimum.”—The first three lines may serve as a specimen:—

Δείπνα μοι ἔνεπε, Μεσσα, πολυτροπα καὶ μαλα πολλὰ^a,
 Ἄ Ξενοκλῆς ῥήτωρ ἐν Ἀθήναις δειπνισεν ἡμᾶς,
 Ἦλθον γὰρ ἰρκεισε, πολὺς δὲ μοι ἔσπετο λιμῶν^b.

The Poem, it must be confessed, has some pleasantry, and much dexterity of comical perversion. We cannot wonder at its effect

^a *De Mercede conduct.* 478. *Ed. Benedict.*

^b v. Ἐπι τε Μαιῶραβυλα.

^a Ἀδὲρα μοι ἔνεπε, Μεσσα, πολυτροπον, ὅς μαλα πολλὰ. *Hom. Od. init.*

^b Ἦλθον γὰρ ἰρκεισε, πολὺς δὲ μοι ἔσπετο λιμῶν. *Hom.*

upon a people, who had all Homer in their memories. It is easy to conceive the roar of the Athenian *upper gallery*, when, in the description of the cook, bringing in the supper, they heard this line :

Τῷ δ' ἄρα τεσσαρακοντα μελαιναι ΧΥΤΡΑΙ ἔποντο^c.

Sometimes the Parody depended on a pun; of which Athenæus gives, with great complacence, a curious example, in a scrap from a Parody of *Eubæus*, describing a quarrel between a barber and a potter. The barber, whose wife, it seems, the other attempts to force from him, addresses the potter in the language of Nestor^d:—

Μητε συ τονδ', ἀγαθὸν περ ἔων, ἀποαιρεο ΚΟΥΡΗΝ,

Μητε συ, ΠΗΛΕΙΔΗ.——

—where the joke depends on the allusion to ΠΗΛΟΣ, *mud*, or *clay*; and, probably, to the trade of the speaker, in the word *κρηνη*; or, perhaps, to the instrument of his art, which we may suppose the actor of the Parody to have brandished at his adversary.—But I do not mean to take to myself the honour of this illustration of an Attic joke. It is to be found in the *Poetics* of J. C. Scaliger.—See *Athen.* p. 699. B.

N O T E 16.

P. 68. THE DELIAD.—

The conjecture of Castelvetro, *την ΔΕΙΛΙΑΔΑ*, (which might be rendered, *The Poltroniad*,) was certainly ingenious, but, I think, unnecessary. Dacier's account is probably right; and both his idea, and the common reading, seem to receive some support from the similar national titles that are preserved of other pieces of this Poet; such as, *Κρητες, Λακωνες, Λημνιοι*.—See *Suidas* and *Fabricius*.

^c Τῷ δ' ἄρα τεσσαρακοντα μελαιναι γῆς ἔποντο. *Hor.* in *Catal.* *passim*.

^d See *Il.* l. 275, &c.

N O T E 17.

P. 68. SO, AGAIN, WITH RESPECT TO DITHYRAMBICS AND NOMES.

The expression, in this passage, is too general, and too little is known of the examples mentioned in it, to admit of perfect satisfaction, with respect to any thing farther than its general meaning; i. e. that *both* Dithyrambic and Nomic Poetry admitted the same differences in the *objects* of their imitation. For so, I think, the sense requires us to understand; not, that the imitation of *heroic* characters was appropriated to the one, and that of *light* characters to the other. Both these species of Poetry were *hymns*; and though the Dithyrambic, or hymn to Bacchus, might, indeed, from its wild and free character, be privileged with a greater latitude and variety of imitation, yet I know of no authority that will warrant our going so far, as to suppose, that they were essentially distinguished from each other in this respect, like Tragedy and Comedy^a.

The construction of the Greek I understand to be this:—*μιμησαυτο αν τις, ως Τιμοθεος και Φιλοξενος* [sc. *εμιμησαντο*] *Περσας και Κυκλωπας*.

I am astonished, that any commentators should have taken either of the compositions here mentioned for dramas; an idea totally repugnant to the plain sense of the whole passage, and to the evident purpose for which these examples are cited. With respect to the *Περσαι*, the passage of Pausanias may be regarded as decisive;—*Πυλαδα—αδοντος Τιμοθεου ΝΟΜΟΝ, τε Μιλησιε, ΠΕΡΣΑΣ*^b.

^a Yet so the last Ox. editor seems to understand:—" *Hoc differre Nomos à Dithyrambis, quod illis personas graves, his leves imitarentur.* p. 273.

^b *Paus. Arcad.*—And the Poem began with an hexameter verse which is there quoted. Yet Fabricius calls it a Tragedy.

The Poem of Philoxenus here meant must, clearly, have been either a Neme, or a Dithyrambic Poem; most probably, the latter. Philoxenus is recorded as a Dithyrambic Poet; and Aristotle's illustration will be more complete, if we understand him to exemplify in *each* of the kinds of Poetry in question. It is by no means *certain*, that the *Cyclops* of Philoxenus mentioned by Athenæus, Ælian, and others, is the piece here alluded to: and, if it were, which, undoubtedly, appears rather probable, I know of no sufficient proof that it was a *Drama*, as it has been repeatedly called. If Ælian is to be regarded, it certainly was not; for he calls it *μελος*—a term appropriated to Lyric Poetry.—*τον ΚΥΚΛΩΠΑ ἐργασατο, των εαυτε ΜΕΛΩΝ το καλλιστον*^c.

I mentioned, in the conclusion of NOTE 1. a problem of Aristotle, from which it appears, that the Dithyrambic Poetry was not originally *imitative*, but became so by degrees. It is the 15th of the Harmonic Problems, *Sect. 19*. It is there said, that the Dithyrambics, *after they became imitative*, laid aside the antistrophical form, (i. e. the division into corresponding stanzas^d,) in which, before, they had been composed^e. And the reason assigned for this is, that, originally, these Dithyrambic hymns were performed by chorusses of *gentlemen*, [*ἐλευθεροι*.] who could not sing in the style of artists, and professors: [*ἀγωνιστικως ᾄδειν*.] the words were, therefore, set to the simplest kind of melody, such as that, in which the same air is repeated to similar stanzas, as in our ballads^f.

^c *Æl. Var. Hist. lib. xii, cap. 44.*

^d *Ἀντιστροφῶν—Ἰση, Ὀμοία. Hesych.*

^e —*ἐπειδὴν μιμητικοὶ ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀντιστροφῆς, προτέρων δὲ εἶχον.*

^f *Διὸ ἀπλοτέρα ἐποιήοντο αὐτοῖς τὰ μελῶν· ἢ δὲ ἀντιστροφῶν ἀπλῶν ἀριθμῶν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἐν μετρίαισι* : i. e. (if I understand it rightly,) it consists of a number of parts that have one common measure.

That, in the Strophe and Antistrophe of the Greek Ode, the same musical strain was repeated, is clear from *Dionys. Hal. de Struct. Orat. § 19.* τοῖς δὲ τὰ μελῶν γράφασιν, κ. τ. αλ. And also from what Aristotle, in this Prob. says of the *Nemes*, which were not antistrophical, and the *melodies* of which, as well as the *words*, τῆ μιμητικῆς ἐπιπέδου Ἰση ἔτι τεταρτα γινόμενα.

But afterwards, it seems, the performance of these hymns, like that of the Nomes, was left to professed musicians, the ἀγωνισταί, or masters of the art, who contended with each other in trials of skill, and who were, of course, to exert all their *imitative* powers. The symmetry of strophe and antistrophe, and the simplicity of air regularly repeated, were ill adapted to this purpose, which required length, variety, and frequent changes² of metre, melody, rhythm, mode, genus, &c. in conformity to the various subjects of imitation, and transitions of expression^h.—This account, which affords some little glimpse of curious information, with respect both to the Nomic and Dithyrambic hymn, is confirmed, as far as the latter is concerned, by Dionysius Halicarn. *De Structura Orat. Sect.* 19. He there traces the progress of all this Lyric corruption, and names TIMOTHEUS and PHILOXENUS as the principal authors of these licentious and wicked innovations—“for, “in the time of the *old* Poets,” he says, “the Dithyrambic ode was an *orderly* and *regular* compositionⁱ.”

Plutarch, too, in the Dialogue *Περὶ Μουσικῆς*, speaks exactly the same language. Timotheus and Philoxenus are there repeatedly stigmatized as corrupters of the *good old music*; and the Παρδαρεῖς and Σιμωνίδαι τροπῶν, is opposed to the Φιλοξενεῖς^k, with a zeal similar to that, with which, in modern music, we sometimes hear the style of Corelli and Geminini opposed and preferred to the heterodox novelties of Haydn and Boccherini.

² See Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Mus.*, vol. i. p. 61, &c.

^h — ἀγωνιστῶν—ἐν ᾗδῃ μιμῆσθαι δυναμένων καὶ διακρινεσθαι, ἢ ᾗδῃ ἐγίγνετο μακρὰ καὶ πολυὴ δὴ· καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ΡΗΜΑΤΑ, καὶ τοῖς ΜΕΛΗ τῆ μιμητικῆ ἰσολογεῖται, ἀεὶ ἕτερον γινόμενα.—He adds, μάλλον γὰρ τῶ μελεῖ ἀνοσχητὴ μιμῆσθαι ἢ τοῖς ῥήματι—by which, I suppose, he means, that in this union of poetical and musical imitation in the Nomes, the *musical* imitation was considered as the principal and most essential object.

ⁱ — παρα γὰρ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ ἦν ὁ ΔΙΘΥΡΑΜΒΟΣ. What he means by τεταγμένῳ is sufficiently explained in the first paragraph of the same section.

^k *Plut. Ed. H. Steph.* p. 2092, and 2084.

The manner, in which Aristotle, in this Problem, speaks of the Nomes, when compared with his expressions relative to the Dithyrambics, rather leads one to suppose, that the former were not, even *originally*, composed in the antistrophic form¹: the least, however, that can be inferred from it, is, that they discarded that form, and, consequently, became complicated, artificial, and imitative, long before a similar revolution took place in the Dithyrambic Poetry and Music.—I may, also, observe that the variety of imitation, and changes of expression, clearly attributed by Aristotle to the Nomes, seem to confirm what I said above—that they did not *exclude* the same variety, in the *objects* of their imitation, which the Dithyrambic Poem confessedly admitted.

I will just add, that this Problem of Aristotle throws light upon a passage in his Rhetoric, which has embarrassed his commentators. He there [*lib. iii. cap. 9.*] compares the diction that is divided into periods, to the *Antistrophic Odes* “of the *old Poets* :” but, the λέξις ἐρισμένη, in which the sentence has no other unity than that which copulatives give it^m, nor any other measure than the completion of the *sense*, and the necessity of taking breathⁿ, or, as *Cicero*, in few words, so admirably describes it, “*illa sine intervallis loquacitas perennis et profluens*”^o—this Aristotle compares to what he calls the ἀναβολαί in Dithyrambic Poetry; meaning, I think, evidently, the long, irregular, *protracted* Odes of the more modern Dithyrambic Poets; such as those, of which he speaks in the Problem. For the word, ἀναβολή, here, does not, I believe, signify *exordium*, *prooemium*, as usually understood, but was, probably, the name by which these ᾠδαι μακραι και πολυειδεις^p

¹ Δια τι οι μεν Νομοι ει εν αντιστροφαις ΕΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΟ;—and, οι Νομοι ἄρχαιων ΗΣΑΝ.

^m — τη συνθεσμη μου.

ⁿ ἢ ἂν εχει τελθ καθ αυτην, αν μη το πραγμα λεγμενον τελειθ. The *periodic* diction, as opposed to this, he calls ἑυκατακτυεσθ. [§ 3.]—Ille rudis, inconditè fundit quantum potest, et id quod dicit SPIRITU, NON ARTE, determinat.—*Cic. de Or. iii. 44.*

^o *De Or. iii. 48.*

^p See note ^a

were distinguished, and opposed to the old and simple Dithyrambic in stanzas.

N O T E 18.

P. 68. EITHER IN NARRATION,—AND THAT, AGAIN, EITHER, &c.

It may safely be pronounced, that the original here, either is not as Aristotle left it, or, was carelessly and ambiguously written. As the ambiguity, however, does not affect the *general* sense of the passage, it is scarcely worth while to engage in a minute discussion of the comparative merits of the two different constructions, which have been adopted by different commentators and translators. The learned reader knows, or may see, what has been said on both sides. I have preferred that construction, which has always appeared to me to result most obviously and naturally from the words of the original.—ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν, ὅτε μὲν ΑΠΑΓΓΕΛΛΟΝΤΑ (ἢ ἕτερον τι γιγνομένου, ὡς περὶ Ὀμηροῦ ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ μὴ μεταβαλλόντα,) ἢ πάντας ὡς ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΑΣ καὶ ἐνεργούντας τὰς μιμνήμεναι.—

In the other, and most usual way of taking this passage, the mixture of *mere narration*, and *dramatic imitation*, in the Epic species, is expressed by the words, ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα, ἢ ἕτερον τι γιγνομένου. But it seems not likely, that Aristotle would thus oppose the word ἀπαγγέλλοντα, to ἕτερον τι γιγνομένου; because the term, ἀπαγγελία, is constantly applied by him, throughout the treatise, to the *narrative* species in general: it is opposed, not to the *dramatic part* of the Epic, but to the *drama* itself. Απαγγελία and διηγησις, are used by him as synonymous terms, and are both applied to the *whole* of the Homeric, or dramatic, Epic Poem^a.

^a See ch. v.—τῷ δε-----ΑΠΑΓΓΕΛΙΑΝ εἶναι—speaking of the Epic Poem.— And *cap.* vi. in the definition of Tragedy—καὶ ἔστι ΑΠΑΓΓΕΛΙΑΣ. So, ch. xxiii. and xxiv. *passim*.

On the other hand, the words—ἢ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ τι γιγνομενον—seem evidently opposed to—ἢ ὡς ΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ και μη μεταβαλλοντα, and should, therefore, be joined with *them*, not with *ἀπαγγελλοντα*.—Lastly, in this way of understanding the passage, Aristotle divides the different *manner*s of imitation, as he might naturally be expected to divide them, into those which characterize the two great and principal species, of which he means to treat—the NARRATIVE and the DRAMATIC. The two different *modes* of the former, i. e. the *pure* narrative, and the *dramatic* narrative, are, with more propriety than in the other construction, (in *his* view of the subject, at least,) flung into a subdivision.

In either construction, however, Aristotle agrees with *Plato* in enumerating *three* kinds of Poetry, the purely dramatic, the purely narrative, and the mixed^b. But the generality of the commentators seem, too hastily, to have taken it for granted, that Aristotle must therefore necessarily enumerate them in the same manner; and they have, accordingly, moulded the flexible and ambiguous construction of this passage, exactly upon the division of *Plato*^c.

I was glad to find myself supported here by the judgment of the accurate Piccolomini, whose version coincides with mine.—In UN MODO, per via di narratione,—e quistò, ò ponendo se stesso alle voite il Poeta in persona d'altri, come fa Homero, over conservando sempre la propria persona non mutata mai. Nel ALTRO MODO poi, introducendo persone à trattare et negoziare, come se le stesse persone che sono imitate, fussero.

With respect to the *imitation* here expressly allowed by Aristotle to subsist even in *my* narration, without the intermixture of any thing dramatic, see *Diff. I. p. 26*.

^b *Plato, Rep. lib. iii. p. 392, D, to 394, D, Ed. Serrani.* But, for the difference of *Plato's* doctrine, or rather of his *language*, from that of Aristotle, see *Diff. I. p. 40*.

^c See, particularly, *H. Casaubon, De Sat. Poes. cap. iii. init.* I agree perfectly with *Mr. Winstanley*, that his emendations are not necessary.

N O T E 19.

P. 69. ELEVATED CHARACTERS—Gr. ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΥΣ.

The adjective Σπουδαῖος, and its opposite, Φωλός, are words of considerable latitude. They, each of them, comprehend a number of different, though related, ideas, for which we have not, that I know of, any common word. Propriety itself, therefore, requires of a translator that, which, at first view, seems contrary to propriety—that he should render each of those words differently in different places. To have translated σπουδαῖος here, “good,” or “virtuous,” as it may generally be translated, would only have been giving an English word with a Greek idea, which none but readers of Greek would have affixed to it.

The Greeks appear to have applied the word, ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΝ, to whatever was, on any account, ἀξιῶν σπουδαῖος—whatever was respectable, important, admirable, serious, valuable, &c. as opposed to ΦΑΥΛΟΝ, which was applied, not to vice only, but to whatever was contemptible, trifling, light, ordinary, ridiculous—or, as we say in familiar English, good for nothing. Hence the various senses of both these words in the Greek writers, according as they were applied to persons, and things, that were the objects of esteem, or contempt, on different accounts. Sometimes, therefore, σπουδαῖος may be rendered by “good;” sometimes by “serious,” “earnest,” &c.—Sometimes, as in this passage, and in the definition of Tragedy, by “elevated,” “important,” &c.^a

Suidas explains the word, not only by Ἐναρετός, but by ΣΟΦΟΣ, and ΕΥΔΟΚΙΜΟΣ. See also the article, Φωλός. Hesychius gives,

^a Demosthenes has this expression:—ὁ μετριος καὶ ΦΑΥΛΑΣ λαβῶν πληγῆς—Orat. κατά Κριωνός.—So, bad, is sometimes used in familiar English, for, trifling: “no bad blows.”

^b Thus, Dacier—les gens les plus considerables.—Piccolomini—persone grave:—attione grave et magnifica.—Heinsius—bonestos. Gouliton,—prastantes, &c.

as fynonymous to Φαυλῶ, not only the general word, Κακῶ, but, ΕΥΤΕΛΗΣ—'ΑΠΛΟΥΣ—ΚΑΤΑΓΕΛΛΑΣΤΟΣ. And Phavorinus—φαυλον, το κακον, και το ευτελες, και το μωρον, και ΟΥΔΑΜΙΝΟΝ—Angl. “good for nothing.”

Some kind of *virtue*, in the extended sense given to the word ΑΡΕΤΗ by the antient writers on morals, was, indeed, always implied in the epithet Σπεδαῖῶ; but it included such good qualities, and endowments, as we do not usually call *virtues*; or, at least, such as we never include in our idea of a *virtuous man*: as, wisdom, courage, eloquence, &c.—Thus Aristotle himself;—το δὲ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΝ ἔναι, ἐστὶ τὸ ΤΑΣ ΑΡΕΤΑΣ ἔχειν^d. And what are these *virtues*?—they are—“all laudable habits.”—των ἐξῆων τας ΕΙΛΑΙΝΕΤΑΣ, ΑΡΕΤΑΣ λεγομεν^e.

The subject of Criticism is necessarily connected, in some degree, with that of Ethics; and unless we understand well the *moral* language of any writer, we cannot be competent judges of his criticism.

N O T E 20.

P. 69. IN SUPPORT OF THESE CLAIMS THEY ARGUE FROM THE WORDS THEMSELVES.

Ποιημενοι: τα ὀνοματα σημειον.—The participle, ποιημενοι, should be applied, I think, to *all* the Dorians—not confined, as in Dacier's translation, to those of Peloponnesus. See Goullon's version, which appears to me to be right.

Aristotle begins by saying expressly, that the *Dorians, in general*, laid claim to both Tragedy and Comedy, *on account of the term*

^e See Hume's *Principles of Morals*, Sect. 6. Part I.—particularly p. 111, &c.—and the note, p. 104.

^d *Mag. Moral.* i. 1.

^e *Eth. Nicom.*—*End of Book I.*—I may also refer the reader, on this subject, to *Cic. de Or.* lib. ii. cap. 84. “Virtus autem, quæ est per se ipsa laudabilis,” &c.

ΔΡΑΜΑ, which was a Doric word:—ΔΙΟ (i. e. from the term *Δραματα*, just before mentioned,) ἀντιποιεῖνται τῆς τε Τραγωδίας καὶ τῆς Κωμῳδίας Οἱ ΔΩΡΙΕΙΣ.—He then mentions the *peculiar* claims of the Megarians to Comedy, and of the Dorians of Peloponnesus to Tragedy; throwing in, parenthetically, some *other* arguments on which the former *also* founded their title to the invention of Comedy: after which, he returns, at the word *ποιούμενοι*, to shew, how these people concurred in arguing from the etymology of the words themselves; *all* of them, from the word *δραμα*, as it was common to Tragedy and Comedy, and they, who laid claim to *Comedy*, both from that, and *also* from the derivation of the word *Κωμῳδία*.

The construction, in this way, is, I confess, somewhat parenthetical and embarrassed; but the reader, who is accustomed to the style of Aristotle, will not, I believe, consider this as affording alone any sufficient presumption against the explanation here given.

N O T E 21.

P. 70. THE FIGURES OF THE MEANEST AND MOST DISGUSTING ANIMALS.—

Θηριῶν τε μορφᾶς τῶν ΑΤΙΜΟΤΑΤΩΝ.—This reading is strongly supported by the arguments of Victorius, the authority of MSS, and the sense and purport of the passage itself, which seems to require instances of *mean*, or *disgusting*, rather than of *terrible*, objects. Thus too Plutarch, in the passages referred to by Victorius, which undoubtedly allude to this of Aristotle.—Γεγραμμένην ΣΑΥΡΑΝ ἢ ΠΙΘΗΚΟΝ,——ἰδόντες ἠδομεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν, οὐχ ὡς καλόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁμοίον· ἔσσι γὰρ ἔδυναται καλόν γενέσθαι ΤΟ Αἰσχρὸν—κ. τ. αλ.—And presently after—καὶ ΝΟΣΩΔΗ μὲν ἈΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ, καὶ ΥΠΟΥΛΟΝ,

ὡς ἀτερπές θεῶμα, φευγομένῳ κ. τ. αλ.—See also his *Sympos. Problems*, lib. v. Prob. 1.

N O T E 22.

P. 70. TO LEARN IS A NATURAL PLEASURE——.

To the same purpose, in his *Rhetoric*, lib. i. cap. xi. p. 537. *Ed. Diaval.* Ἐπει δὲ τὸ ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ τε ἡδύ, καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι, τὸ τε μεμιμημένον², ὡς περὶ ΓΡΑΦΙΚΗ, καὶ ΑΝΔΡΙΑΝΤΟΠΟΙΙΑ, καὶ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ, καὶ παν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, καὶ μὴ ἡ ἡδύ εἴ το μιμημαῖ· ἔ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ χαιρεῖ, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμῶ³ ἐστὶ, ὅτι ΤΟΥΤΟ ΕΚΕΙΝΟ· ὡς ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ τι συμβαίνει.—“And as it is by nature delightful to LEARN, to ADMIRE, and the like, hence we necessarily receive pleasure from *imitative* arts, as PAINTING, SCULPTURE, and POETRY, and from whatever is well imitated, even though the original may be disagreeable; for our pleasure does not arise from the beauty of the thing itself, but from the *inference*—the *discovery*, that “THIS IS THAT,” &c. so that we seem to LEARN something.”——

Μανθανεῖν—to learn, to know, i. e. merely to recognize, discover, &c. See Harris, *On Music, Painting, &c.* ch. iv. note (b). The meaning is sufficiently explained by what follows. Dryden, who scarce ever mentions Aristotle without discovering that he had looked only at the wrong side of the tapestry^c, says—“Aristotle tells us, that imitation pleases because it affords matter for a rea-

² I cannot but suspect this reading. It was perhaps, originally, τὸ τε ΜΙΜΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ: otherwise, μεμιμημένον must here be taken *actively*, which, though not unusual, is in *this* place, I think, improbable, because the same participle immediately follows, in the *passive* sense.

^c “Methinkes this *translating*,” says Don Quixote, “is just like looking upon the *wrong side of arras hangings*; that although the pictures be seene, yet they are full of *thread-ends*, that darken them, and they are not seene with the plainnesse and smoothnesse as on the other side.” *Shelton’s Don Quixote. Sec. part, ch. lxii.*

“*soner* to enquire into the truth or falsehood of imitation,” &c.^d But Aristotle is not here speaking of *reasoners*, or *inquiry*; but, on the contrary, of the vulgar, the generality of mankind, whom he expressly *opposes* to philosophers, or reasoners: and his συλλογιζεσθαι is no more than that rapid, habitual, and imperceptible act of the mind, that “raisonnement aussi prompt que le coup d’œil,” (as it is well paraphrased by M. Batteux,) by which we *collect*, or *infer*, from a comparison of the picture with the image of the original in our minds, that it was intended to represent that original.

The fullest illustration of this passage is to be found in another work of Aristotle, his Rhetoric, *lib. iii. cap. x.*^e, where he applies the same principle to metaphorical language, and resolves the pleasure we receive from such language, into that which arises from the μαθησις TAXEIA—the exercise of our understandings in *discovering* the meaning, by a *quick* and *easy* perception of some quality or qualities common to the thing *expressed*, and the thing *intended*—to a mirror, for example, and to the theatre, when the latter is so called metaphorically, “The mirror of human life^f.”

In the Problems, *Seet. 19, Prob. V.* the same principle is applied to Music. The Problem is, Why we are more pleased with singing when we are acquainted with the air that is sung, than when it is new to us?—And one of the answers is, ὅτι ἤδῃ το μανθανειν—i. e. to say, this is such a tune, or song, &c. And indeed the pleasure afforded by *recognition*, is no where, perhaps, more visibly illustrated, than in the raptures and rhythmical agitation of a popular

^d *Parallel between Poetry and Painting*, prefixed to his translation of Dufresnoy. Dryden seems to have taken his idea from Dacier’s note on this place, which is extremely confused, and so expressed, as to leave it doubtful, whether he misunderstood the original, or only explained himself awkwardly.—The use that Dryden made of French critics and translators is well known. He commends “Dacier’s late excellent translation of Aristotle,” in the *Paral. between Poet. and Paint.* just before the passage above quoted.

^e *Ed. Duval.* In other Ed. differently divided, cap. vi.

^f See Harris’s *Philol. Inq.* p. 190, and note *.

audience, at the return of the leading air, in that species of infallible ear-trap, the RONDEAU.—I must add, as somewhat amusing, that Plato makes use of this principle to prove a dog to be a philosophical animal: “for, (he argues,) το φιλομαθες και φιλοσοφον, τ’αυτον, the love of *knowing*, and the love of *wisdom*, are one and the same thing. Now dogs are delighted with *knowing*, simply, and disinterestedly; they fawn upon every one whom they know, and bark at the approach of every stranger^ε; and that, without having ever experienced good from the one, or harm from the other^η.”

The philosophy of Aristotle here, though undoubtedly true, as far as it goes, will, I am afraid, to those who examine it, hardly appear to be perfectly satisfactory, or to reach the bottom of the subject. It is however to be considered, that what he has said, seems applicable *chiefly* to rude and unskilful spectators, and should, perhaps, be considered as a description of the effect of a picture or a statue upon children, and the multitude, who are little accustomed to view works of imitative art. And even with respect to *them*, the principle seems scarcely applicable but to portraits, and *individual* resemblances, such as may not be instantly recognized. When we look at a picture of that kind, we may not discover, till after a comparison of, at least, a few moments, that it is an imitation of *this* or *that* person; but, that it is an imitation of *a man*, we see at once; and where there is not even a momentary ignorance, or doubt, I do not see how any *information*¹ can be said to be acquired by the spectator, nor how, on the philosopher’s

^ε Every person, of whom, in Aristotle’s language, they cannot say—‘Ουτ’ εκει. “This is he.”

^η ‘Ον μιν αν ιδη ΑΓΝΩΤΑ, χαλεπαινει, εδεν δε κακον προσωπευθως· εν δ’αν ΓΝΩΡΙΜΟΝ, απλαχεται, κ’αν μηδεν πωποτε υπ’ αυτη αγαθον πεποιθοι.—Αλλα μιν κομψον γε φαινεται το παθ’ αυτη της φυσικης, και ΩΣ ΑΛΗΘΩΣ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΝ; κ. τ. αλ.

Ref. ii. p. 376. *Serran.*

¹ See below, note ¹.

own principles, (if I rightly understand him,) the pleasure conveyed by the imitation, can, in any sense, be resolved into that, which the mind receives from the exertion of its own powers in *inferring*, or *discovering*, the resemblance.—I say, on Aristotle's *own* principles, because, in the passage above referred to*, where he explains himself more fully in applying the principle to metaphor, he expressly allows, that this pleasure of recognition, is not afforded by *proper* or *common* words, since they instantly suggest their meaning and cannot be mistaken¹. Now a painting, considered as an imitation of a man, a horse, a house, *in general*, obviously answers in this respect, unless the imitation be grossly imperfect*, to the *common* and familiar word; the one suggesting its *original*, as readily and immediately, as the other suggests its *idea*.

Among Aristotle's illustrations of this physical principle of the pleasure of *Self-information*, as it might be called, there are two short passages, in particular, which seem to be so explicit with regard to the nature of that pleasure, that I will venture to add to the length of this note by a transcript and translation of them both. They will, I think, satisfy the learned reader that I have not, in the foregoing remarks, misrepresented the philosopher's meaning.

After having applied the principle to metaphor, he applies it in like manner to the *enthymemes*, or arguments, of the orator.

* Rhet. iii. 10.

¹ —τα δὲ κυρία ἸΣΜΕΝ.—“The Stagirite having told us what a natural pleasure we derive from INFORMATION, and having told us that, in the subject of words, *exotic* words want that pleasure from being obscure, and *common* words from being too well known,” adds, &c. Harris, *Phil. Inq.* p. 19c, note *.

* As it was, when Painting was in its *infant* state—ἐν γαλαξίῳ καὶ σπαργαμίῳ—according to the quaint expression of Ælian, *Hist. Var.* x. 10.—of which he seems to have been fond; for it occurs before *lib.* viii. *cap.* 8. It seems very properly guarded, in both places, by α—τροπον τινα.—The old painters of whom Ælian speaks were little aware of Aristotle's principle, when they wrote under their pictures—Τατο βεβή—Εκينو ἰππῶ—Τατο δινδρον.

Διο ἔτε τα ἐπιπολαία των ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκίμει· (ἐπιπολαία γὰρ λεγόμενα τα παντὶ δηλα, καὶ Ἄ ΜΗΔΕΝ ΔΕΙ ΖΗΤΗΣΑΙ·) ἔτε ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοούμενα ἔσι· ἀλλ' ὅσων, ἢ αἶμα λεγομένων ἢ γνώσις γίνεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν, ἢ μικρὸν ὑπεριζῆι ἢ διανοία· γίνεται γὰρ ὍΙΟΝ ΜΑΘΗΣΙΣ· ἐκείνως δέ, ἕδτερον^m.

“ For the same reason, we are pleased, neither with *superficial* arguments, (by which we mean such as are obvious to every one, and require no thought or *search* in the hearer;) nor with such as we do not understand when we have heard them; but, with those, which the mind apprehends, either *while* we hear them, (though not at *first*,) or in the *moment after* they are delivered:—for by *these*, we, *in a manner*, LEARN something: by the *others*, we *learn* nothing in either of these waysⁿ.”

The other passage, in which the nature of the pleasure that Aristotle means is still more expressly marked, is this :

Παντων δὲ των—συλλογισμων θορυβηται μαλιστα τα τοιαυτα ὅσα ἀρχόμενα ΠΡΟΟΡΩΣΙ, μὴ τῷ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι· αἶμα γὰρ καὶ ΑΥΤΟΙ ΕΦ ΕΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΧΑΙΡΟΥΣΙ προαισθανόμενοι· καὶ ὅσων τοσαύτον ὑπεριζῆσιν, ὥσθ' αἶμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν^o.

“ Of all arguments, those are most applauded^p, of which the audience have no sooner heard the *beginning*, than they *foresee* the conclusion;—not, however, from their being *trite* and *obvious*; for they are pleased, [*not only with the ingenuity of the speaker, but*]^q at the same time, WITH THEMSELVES and their

^m *Rhet.* iii. 10.

ⁿ ἕδτερον—i. e. neither *while* we hear them, nor *as soon as* we have heard them.

^o *Rhet.* ii. cap. xxiii. *Duval*. In some other editions, cap. xix.

^p “ *applauded*”—θορυβηται. The commentators strangely mistake the sense of this word here, and in *lib.* i. c. ii. They render it, absurdly,—*vehementius percussunt—perturbant maximè*, &c.—Whether an audience be *pleased*, or *displeased*, to any great degree, *noise* is equally the consequence; and the word *θορυβεῖν* is used, sometimes for the uproar of *approbation*, and sometimes for that of *dislike*.

^q I insert these words, because, though not in the original, they seem plainly implied in the expression—ἌΜΑ γὰρ ΚΑΙ αὐταί, &c.

“ own *sagacity*.—Those arguments, also, afford pleasure, which, “ the *moment* after they are delivered, we are no longer at a loss to “ apprehend.”

N O T E 23.

P. 70. IN A MORE TRANSIENT AND COMPENDIOUS MANNER.—

Επι βραχυ:—literally, “ for a *short time*.” As PLATO, *Rep.* iii. p. 396, *κατα βραχυ*, for a *moment*—*en passant*. Dacier’s explanation—*Quoi qu’ils ne soient pas tous également propres à apprendre*,—is, surely, wide of Aristotle’s purpose. None of the versions, that I have seen, seem to give the exact idea, except that of Heinsius:—“ *Quamquam minor BREVIORQUE ad hos perveniat voluptas.*”

N O T E 24.

P. 70. FROM THE WORKMANSHIP.—

Δια την ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΝ—“ neatness”—“ *finishing*,” &c. In the following passages of PLATO, it is opposed to a slight sketch:—*καὶ αὐτῶν τετῶν* [*sc.* *δικαιοσύνης, σωφροσύνης, &c.*] *ἐχ’ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ, ὡς περ νυν θεασασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελευτάτην ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΝ μὴ παριέναι*. *Rep.* vi. p. 504. So again, *lib.* viii. p. 548, the verb, *ἀπεργάζεσθαι*, is opposed to *ὑπογραφειν*.

N O T E 25.

P. 70. METRE—A SPECIES OF RHYTHM.

Μορία—*parts*.—The following passage will ascertain the sense of the word in this place, and justify my version. Explaining the different

different senses in which the word *Μεροϛ* was used, Aristotle says,—*ἔτι, εἰς ἃ τοῦτο εἰδῆσθαι δὲ διακρίθεται ἂν, ἄνευ τε Ποιητῆ, καὶ ταῦτα ΜΟΡΙΑ λεγέται τετὰ διὰ τὰ ΕΙΔΗ, τε ΓΕΝΟΥΣ φασι εἶναι ΜΟΡΙΑ.*—*Metaphys. lib. v. cap. 25.*—So, in *this* treatise, *cap. 5.*—*τε Λισχυρε εἰς το Γελοίου ΜΟΡΙΟΝ*—“a part, or *species*, of the ridiculous.”

N O T E 26.

P. 70. THOSE PERSONS, IN WHOM, ORIGINALLY, THESE PROPENSITIES WERE THE STRONGEST, &c.

It is obvious to remark here, that Aristotle, in this deduction of the art from the *mimetic* and *musical* instincts, includes verse in his idea of Poetry, which he, at least, considered as *imperfect* without it. All that he drops, elsewhere, to the disparagement of metre, must be understood only comparatively: it goes no farther, than to say, that imitation, that is, fiction and invention, without verse, deserves the title of *Poetry*, or *Making*, *better* than verse without imitation.

An eminent writer has adjusted this matter, and set it on its true and solid basis, in his Dissertation *On the idea of Universal Poetry*^a. What is there said, of “the origin and first application of Poetry among all nations,” will furnish the best comment I can give, upon the passage which is the subject of this note!

“*Poetry* is every where of the most early growth, preceding every other sort of composition; and being destined for the *ear*, that is, to be either sung, or at least recited, it adapts itself, even in its first rude essays, to that sense of measure, and proportion in sounds, which is so natural to us. The hearer’s attention is the sooner gained by this means, his entertainment quickened, and his admiration of the performer’s art excited. Men are ambi-

^a Dr. Hurd’s *Horace*, vol. ii.

“ tious of pleasing, and ingenious in refining upon what they
 “ observe will please. So that musical cadences and harmonious
 “ sounds, which nature dictated, are farther softened and im-
 “ proved by art, till Poetry become as ravishing to the ear, as the
 “ images, it presents, are to the imagination. In process of time,
 “ what was at first the extemporaneous production of genius or
 “ passion, under the conduct of a *natural ear*, becomes the labour
 “ of the closet, and is conducted by artificial rules; yet still, with
 “ a secret reference to the *sense* of hearing, and to that acceptation
 “ which melodious sounds meet with in the recital of expressive
 “ words.”

N O T E 27.

P. 71. MARGITES.

The scraps that have been preserved of this Poem, the *Du-
 ciad* of HOMER, are so few, and so short, that it may be worth
 while, for the convenience of the reader, to collect them.—

Μισαων θεραπων και ἐκηβολε Απολλων^α,

—a line as likely to be found in one kind of Poem as in another,
 and which affords about as good a *sample* of *this* Poem, as a brick
 does of the building from which it was taken.—The other frag-
 ments are a little more interesting, as they give some idea of the
 hero of the Poem.

ΓΟΝΔ' ἐτ' αὖ σκαπτηραι θεοι θεσαι, ἐτ' ἀροτρηα,
 Ουτ' ἄλλως τι σοφον' πασης δ' ἡμαρτανε τεχιης^β.

Πολλ' ἠπισατο ἔργα, κακως δ' ἠπισατο παντα^γ.

^α Cited by the Scholiast on the *Aves* of Aristophanes, v. 914.

^β Preserved by Aristotle, *Eth. lib. vi. cap. 7*, as far as the word *σοφον*. The remainder of the second line is in *Clem. Alexand. Strom. lib. i.*

^γ Plato, *Al. l. Secund. p. 147. Ed. Serrani.*

—This last stroke of character is not peculiarly antique. The line is of easy application in all times. It is not so easy to reconcile it with some other accounts, which seem to make *Margites* a downright idiot; such as, his not being able to number beyond five; his abstaining from all intercourse with his bride, lest she should complain of him to her mother, &c^d.—One cannot well conceive, how such a man should, as Homer expressly says, “*know how to do many things* ;” even though he did them ever so ill. But a tale, still more ridiculous, is told of this curious personage by *Eustathius*^e.

N O T E 28.

P. 71. HIS MARGITES BEARS THE SAME ANALOGY TO COMEDY, AS HIS ILIAD AND ODYSSEY TO TRAGEDY.

Whenever Aristotle speaks of COMEDY, we must remember, that he speaks of the Old, or Middle Comedy, which was no other than what *we* should call farce, and to which his definition of Comedy was adapted: *μιμησις φαυλοτέρων*; that is, as he explains himself, “an imitation of RIDICULOUS characters^a.”—This remark is necessary to explain what is here said of the *Margites*. A Poem, which, as far we can form any idea of it, celebrated the blunders and absurdities of an idiot, cannot well be conceived to have been analogous to any thing, that would now be denominated a *Comedy*. It seems to verge to the very bottom of the dramatic scale; “*jusq’ au bouffon*; celui-ci fera l’extrême de la Comedie,

^d Suidas, Art. MARGITES.

^e *Eustath.* ad Hom. Odyss. K.—See also Kuster’s note on Suidas, Art. MARGITES.

^a Chap. v. *Translation*, § 8. Part I. And see Dr. Hurd’s *Diff. on the Provinces of the Drama*, ch. ii. p. 201.

“ le plus bas degré de l'échelle, opposé au terrible qui est à l'autre “ bout^b.” The *Bourgeois Gentilhomme* of Moliere is certainly farce, however excellent in its way. But Monf. Jourdain is a very *Ulyssès*, compared with *Margites*.

N O T E 29.

P. 72. BY SUCH SUCCESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS AS WERE MOST OBVIOUS.

Ὅσον ἐγένετο φανερον αὐτης—literally, “ *so much of it as was manifest.*”—I doubt of the reading: but, taking it as it stands, I have given what appears to me to offer itself as the most natural and simple meaning of the expression, if not the only one that it will reasonably bear.

N O T E 30.

P. 72. ÆSCHYLUS-----ABRIDGED THE CHORAL PART.

The words are, ΤΑ Τε χορευ. Aristotle would hardly have expressed himself thus, had he meant, as Madius, Bayle, and others, have understood, a retrenchment in the *number* of choral performers. ΤΑ Τε χορευ, the choral *part*, is opposed to ΤΑ ἀπο σκηνης, the *dialogue*, *Prob.* xv. of *Scet.* 19. It is singular, that Stanley should misunderstand this passage; and still more singular, that he should cite *Philostratus*, who is directly against him: for his words are, συνεσαλε τες χορευς, ΑΠΟΤΑΔΗΝ ΟΝΤΑΣ: “ *he contracted the “ choruffes, which were immoderately long^a.*”

^b Fontenelle, Preface to his Comedies, vol. vii. of his works.

^a Stanl. in vit. Æschyli, *Ed. Pauw*, p. 706.

This is confirmed by one of Aristotle's Problems, referred to by Victorius^b. The Problem is, *Δια τι οι περι Φρυγικων ησαν μαλλον μελοποιοι;* (meaning, I suppose, more *Musicians* than the dramatic Poets of his own time:) The answer is, *η, δια το πολλαπλασια ειναι τοτε τα μελη εν ταις των μετρων τραγωδiais;*—I believe the passage may be rectified by transposition—*πολλ. ειναι τοτε τα μελη των μετρων εν τ. τ.* Perhaps, too, we should read, *των ΤΡΙΜΕΤΡΩΝ*. But, even taking it as it stands, it may sufficiently answer our purpose, as it shews clearly enough how much the Lyric parts of Tragedy, before the time of *Æschylus*, wanted contraction.

The prolixity of the Tragic Chorus, we know, was sometimes trying to the patience of an Athenian audience. This is pleasantly glanced at by *Aristophanes* in his *Ornithes*: where the Chorus of birds, descanting on the convenience of wings, tell the spectators, that if *they* had wings, whenever, in the Theatre, they “*found themselves hungry, and were tired with the Tragic Chorus, they might fly home and eat their dinners, and fly back again, when the Chorus was over.*”

XOP. Ουδεν ες' αμεινον, εδ' ηδον, η φυσαι πτερα.
 Αυτιχ', υμων των θεατων ει τις ην υποπτερο,
 Ειτα, πεινων, τοις χοροισι των Τραγωδων ηχθετο,
 Εκπτερομεν αν ετ' ηρισησεν, ελθων οικαδε,
 Κατ' αν, εμπλησθεις, εφ ημας αυθις αυ κατεπτατο. υ. 786.

N O T E 31.

P. 72. AND MADE THE DIALOGUE THE PRINCIPAL PART OF TRAGEDY.

— Και του λογον πρωταγωνισην παρεσκευασε.—Victorius, and others, have supposed Aristotle to mean the *Prologue*. But it seems to be

^b See. 19. Prob. xxxi.

a sufficient objection to this sense, that no example has been produced of the word *πρωταγωνιστης*, used as merely synonymous to *πρωτος*; as signifying *first* only, not *principal*. Nor is it easy to discover any reason, why Aristotle should have recourse here to an unusual and ambiguous expression, when, presently after, in speaking of the improvements of Comedy [cap. v.], he makes use of the proper and established term, *προλογος*. There seem to be no words in the Greek language, of which the sense is more clearly fixed, than that of *πρωταγωνιστης—πρωταγωνισειν*. They occur frequently, and always, as far as I know, in the same sense, of *principal—primas agere*, &c. To this sense, therefore, I thought it necessary to adhere. But I confess I cannot be satisfied with either of the explanations which have been given of the word *ΛΟΓΟΣ*. It appears strange to say, that Æschylus *first* introduced two actors, and then to add, as a *distinct* improvement, that he also *first* introduced a *principal part* or *character*:—unless we are to understand, what seems not very probable, that the two actors even of Æschylus himself were, *at first*, personages of equal dignity and importance in the drama, like the two kings of Brentford in the Rehearsal; and that, *afterwards*, he was the first who corrected this error, (in which he would probably have been followed by other Poets,) and reduced the drama to unity of action by a proper subordination of characters. But, admitting this *sense* to be without difficulty, the *expression* of it, I think, is not. *Λογος*, for a *part* in the drama, *role*, *personnage*, (as Dacier,) *character*, &c. seems harsh, and unusual. At least, I know no example of it.

The difficulties which attend both the *expression* and the *sense*, in each of these interpretations, have almost convinced me, that the very construction of the words has been mistaken; and that the meaning is, “ he *made* the *discourse*, or *dialogue*, the *principal part* “ of Tragedy.” This is well connected with what precedes, and agreeable to the known history of the Tragic drama, in which, originally, the Chorus was the *essential*, and the Episodes, or dramatic

matic part, only the *accessory*. But Æschylus “abridged the “*Chorus*, and made the *Episodic* part the *principal*.” Λογῶς, here, may well be understood to mean what Aristotle elsewhere calls λέξις; the *speaking*, or *recitative*, part of Tragedy, whether delivered by one or more actors, as opposed to the μελῆ, or Lyric part^a. Πάρεσκευασε, *reddidit, efficit, &c.* as, (to take the first instance of this common use of that verb which the Lexicons offer me) —εὐσεβέστερος τε καὶ σωφρονέστερος τῆς συνόντας παρέσκευασεν—“*magis pius et temperatos reddidit*.” And thus Aristotle himself, *cap. xix.* ὅταν ἢ ἔλεεινα ἢ δεινά——ἐξη παρασκευάζαν. i. e. to *make* things piteous, terrible, &c. as in Goulston’s version; and that of the accurate Piccolomini:—“*Quando occorre d’havere à far parere le cose, ò “miserabili, ò atroci,” &c.*—If the use of προταιγωνιῆς as an adjective be an objection, it is one to which the other explanations are equally liable. On the whole, I have not scrupled to prefer this sense in my version^c.

N O T E 32.

P. 72. SOPHOCLES-----ADDED THE DECORATION OF PAINTED SCENERY.

To adjust exactly the rival claims of Æschylus and Sophocles with respect to the ὄψις, or decoration, of the Tragic stage, would be a desperate undertaking. Some accounts are so liberal to Æschylus, as scarce to leave his successors any room for farther improvements. They give him “*paintings, machinery, altars, tombs, trumpets, ghosts, and furies:*”—to which others add a very sin-

^a See NOTE 90.

^b Xenophon. So Isocrates, Πάρασκευάζε σεαυτὸν πλεονεκτητῶν μεν ὀνιζιμένων, &c. *Ad Demonicum*.

^c Since this note was written, the same explanation has been given, and well supported, in the Camb. edit. of 1785. *Præl.* p. xxxi. &c.

gular species of Tragic improvement, the “ exhibition of *drunken men*.”—την δὲ σκηνὴν ἐκοσμησε, καὶ τὴν ὄψιν τῶν θεωρευμένων κατεπλήξε τὴ λαμπροτητι—ΓΡΑΦΑΙΣ καὶ μηχαναῖς, βωμοῖς τε καὶ ταφοῖς, σαλπυγγῶν, εἰδωλοῖς, ἔρῳνισιν.—MS. life of Æschylus, quoted by Stanley, *In vitam Æschyli*, and by *Fabric. Bib. Gr. lib. ii. cap. xvi. Sect. 2.*—And *Athenæus* says, πρῶτ^ο ἐκεῖν^ο-----παρηγαγε τὴν τῶν ΜΕΘΟΝΤΩΝ ΟΥΨΙΝ ἐς τραγωιδίαν. p. 428.—He adds an example. In the Tragedy called *Καβαίροι*, he introduced “ *Jason and his retinue drunk!*”

The passage given by Dacier from Vitruvius is very general; it says only, “ *scenam fecit*.” This may, or may not, include painting; which, indeed, rather seems to be implied, in what follows, about the improvements of Democritus and Anaxagoras, where the “ *imagines ædificiorum in scenarum picturis*” are mentioned. But all this is far outweighed by the testimony of Aristotle, who here explicitly attributes the introduction of *painted scenery* to Sophocles.

N O T E 33.

P. 72. IT WAS LATE BEFORE TRAGEDY----ATTAINED ITS PROPER DIGNITY.

—Οἷψε ἀπεσεμνωθη:—and to “ *late*,” we might add, *imperfectly*. For, what Horace says of the Roman Tragedy, is, in *some measure*, though perhaps not equally, applicable to the Greek:

———— in longum tamen ævum
Manserunt, hodieque manent *vestigia ruris*.

Ep. ad Aug. v. 160.

^a Primus Agatharcus Athenis, Æschylo docente Tragœdiam, scenam fecit. *Vitruv. Prof. in lib. vii.*

Prejudice aside, it cannot surely be said, that the Greek Tragedy, in the hands, at least, of Æschylus, Sophocles, or Euripides, ever attained its *proper dignity*. I do not speak of *modern* dignity; of that uniform, unremitting strut of pomp and solemnity, which is now required in Tragedy. This was equally unknown to the manners, and to the Poetry, of the antients. I speak only of such a degree of dignity as excludes, not simplicity, but meanness—the familiar, the jocular, the coarse, the *comic*. Now it cannot, I think, be said, with any truth, that these are thoroughly excluded in *any* of the Greek Tragedies that are extant: in *some* of them they are admitted to a very considerable degree. In particular, something of this sort—of what the French call *mesquin*—is almost constantly to be found in the *short dialogue* of the Greek Tragedies; in that part, I mean, which the eye, when we turn over any Tragedy, easily distinguishes from the rest, by its being carried on in a regular alternation of single verses*. In this “close fighting” of the dialogue, as Dryden calls it^b, which seems to have retained something of the spirit of the old satyric *diverbia*, where, in the origin of the Greek, as well as of the Roman drama,

VERSIBUS ALTERNIS *opprobria rustica fundunt*, HOR.

—in this part of the dialogue, we generally find, mixed indeed frequently with fine strokes of nature and feeling, somewhat more than what Brumoy calls “un petit vernis de familiarité^c,” especially when these scenes are, as they often are, scenes of altercation and angry repartee. In the *Iphigenia in Aulide* of Euripides, Menelaus, in the struggle with the old messenger for the letter, threatens to *break his head with his sceptre*,

Σκηπτρῷ ταχ' ἄρα σὸν καθαιμάζω κεφαί. Ὀ. 311.

* A sensible writer has justly remarked the ill effect of this symmetrical sort of conversation upon the illusion of the drama. [Letters on various subjects, by Mr. Jackson of Exeter, vol. ii. p. 109.] The English reader may see an example of it in Milton's *Comus*, v. 277—290.

^b Essay on Dram. Poesy.

^c Theatre des Grecs, tome iii. p. 205.

Fairly rendered by Mr. Potter's *verse*—

“ Soon shall thy head this sceptre stain with blood.”

Unfairly dignified by Brumoy's *prose*—

“ Prends garde qu'une *mort prompte* ne punisse ton audace.”

Even Sophocles, who gave the Tragic tone, in general, its proper pitch, between the *ὄγκος* of Æschylus, and the *ισχυροτη;* of Euripides^d, is by no means free from some mixture of this *alloy* in the language of his short dialogue. For example: in the scene between Ulysses and Neoptolemus in the *Philœtetes*, [v. 1250,] when Neoptolemus declares his resolution of restoring to Philœtetes his bow and arrows, at which Ulysses expresses his surprize by a repetition of the question, Τι φης;—τιν' εἰρηκας λογον;—Neoptolemus replies, “ *Would you have me tell you the same thing two or three times over?*”

Δις τ' αὐτα βελει και τρις ἀναπολειν μ' ἐπη^e; v. 1267.

In another scene of this Poet, between Teucer and Menelaus, after a long altercation about the interment of Ajax, Menelaus says—

Ἐν σοι φρασω—τονδ' ἐξιν ἐχι θαπτειν.

—to which Teucer replies—

Συ δ' ἀντακυσσον τετον ὡς τεθαψεται^f.

In plain English, but no plainer than the Greek—“ M. One thing I'll tell you—he shall *not* be buried. 'T. And I'll tell “ *another* thing—he *shall* be buried.”—Certainly this approaches

^d Aristophanes, in *The Frogs*, makes Euripides boast to Æschylus—

— ὡς παρελαβον την τεχνην παρα σε το πρωτον εἶθου;

Οιδισαν ὑπο κομπασματων και ρηματων ἐπαχθων

ΙΣΧΝΑΝΑ μεν πρωτιον αυτην, και το βαρ^g ἀρειλον. v. 490.

^e The reader may also see something of the same cast in the scene between Oedipus and Creon, *Oed. Tyr.* v. 550, &c. And in that between Oedipus and the two Shepherds, v. 1162, &c.—These scenes of snarling altercation, I suppose, were what gave occasion to the ridiculous idea of some Comic Poet, that “ *Sophocles seemed to have been assisted, in writing his Tragedies, by a mastiff-dog.*”

Κυνων τις εδοκει συμποισιν Μολοτικ^g. *Diog. Laert.* IV. 20.

^f *Ajax*, v. 159, 160.

very nearly to the language of a contest between two washer-women.

These may be reckoned among the passages, in which the spirit of Sophocles, according to the observation of a great critic, σβενυται ἀλογως πολλοακις, και πιπτεi ἀτυχεσατα. [Longin. Scēt. 33.]

In the *Antigone* there is a scene of altercation between Creon, Ismene, and Antigone, in which, when Ismene, pleading for her sister, asks Creon whether he will put *her* to death, who was to become the wife of his son, his answer is—

ΑΡΩΣΙΜΟΙ γαρ χἀτερων εἰσιν ΓΥΑΙ^ε.

The prejudiced admirers of the antients are very angry at the least insinuation that *they* had any idea of our *barbarous* Tragi-Comedy. But after all, it cannot be dissembled, that, if they had not the *name*, they had the *thing*, or something very nearly approaching to it. If that be Tragi-Comedy, which is partly serious and partly comical, I do not know why we should scruple to say, that the *Alceſtis* of Euripides is, *to all intents and purposes*, a Tragi-Comedy. I have not the least doubt, that it had upon an Athenian audience the proper *effect* of Tragi-Comedy; that is, that in some places it made them cry, and in others, laugh. And the best thing we have to hope, for the credit of Euripides, is, that he *intended* to produce this effect. For though he may be an unskilful Poet, who *purposes* to write a Tragi-Comedy, *he* surely is a more unskilful Poet, who writes one without knowing it.

The learned reader will understand me to allude particularly to the scene, in which the domestic describes the behaviour of Hercules; and to the speech of Hercules himself, which follows. Nothing can well be of a more comic cast than the servant's complaint^h. He describes the hero as the most greedy* and ill-mannered

^ε v. 576. This is not *much* more delicate than the answer of one of the Ægyptian fugitives to King Psammeticus.—*Herod. Euterp.* p. 63. *ed. H. Steph.*

^h *Alceſtis*, v. 757, &c.

* Hercules was renowned for his ἀλιεργα. The following extravagant description

mannered guest he had ever attended, under his master's hospitable roof; calling about him, eating, drinking, and *singing, in a room by himself*, while the master and all the family were in the height of funereal lamentation. He was not contented with such refreshments as had been set before him;

————— ἔτι σωφρονως ἐδεξάτο

Τα προστυχοντα ζενια—————

Αλλ' εἰ τι μὴ φερομεν, ΩΤΡΥΝΕΝ φερειν.

Then he drinks————

Ἐως ἔθερμην' αὐτον ἀμφιβασα φλοξ

Οινε'————

—crowns himself with myrtle, and sings, ΑΜΟΥΣ' ΥΛΑΚΤΩΝ
—and all this, alone. “Cette description,” says Fontenelle, “est
“si burlesque, qu'on diroit d'un crocheteur qui est de confrairie¹.”
A censure somewhat justified by Euripides himself, who makes
the servant take Hercules for a *thief*:

— πανεργον ΚΛΩΠΙΑ και ΛΗΙΣΤΗΝ τινα.

The speech of Hercules, φιλοσοφεντ² ἐν μεθῃ, as the scholiast observes, (v. 776,) “philosophizing in his cups,” is still more curious. It is, indeed, full of the φλοξ οινε, and completely justifies the attendant's description. Nothing can be more *jolly*. It is in the true spirit of a modern drinking song; recommending it to the servant to uncloud his brow, enjoy the present hour, think nothing of the morrow, and drown his cares in *love* and *wine*:

tion of his eating, preserved by Athenæus from the *Eufiris*, a *satyric drama* of Epicharmus, affords a curious specimen of the *satyric fun*.

Πρωτον μιν, ἀμ' ἐσθοντ' ἰδης νιν, ἀποθανοις.

Βρεμει μιν ὁ φαρυγγὲς ἐνδοθ', ἀραβει δ' ἄ γναθ³,

Ψοφει δ' ὁ γομφι⁴, τετριγε δ' ὁ κιννοδων,

Σιζει δε ταις ῥινεσσι, ΚΙΝΕΙ Δ' ὈΥΑΤΑ

Των τετραποδων ἐχ' ἦπτον————

Athen. lib. x. init.

¹ Oeuvres de Font. vol. ix. p. 415.

ΟΥΤΟΣ^k—τι σεμνον και πεφροντικῶς βλεπεις;
 Ου χρη σκυθρωπον, κ. τ. αλ.

ΔΕΥΡ' ΕΛΘ', ὅπως αν και σοφωτερω γενη.
 Τα θνητα πραγματ' οιδας ην εχει φυσιν;
 ΟΙΜΑΙ μεν ΟΥ· ΠΟΘΕΝ ΓΑΡ;—αλλ' αικυε με.
 Βροτοις απασι· κατθανειν εφειλεται,
 Κ' εκ εσι θνητων οσις εξεπιζεται
 Την αυριον μελλουσων ει βιωσεται.

Ευφρανε σαυτον· ΠΙΝΕ!—τον καθ ημεραν
 Βιον λογιζε σον, τα δ' αλλα, της τυχης.
 Τιμα δε και την πλειστον ηδιστην θεων
 ΚΥΠΡΙΝ βροτοισιν—κ. τ. λ. υ. 783—812.

If any man can read this, without supposing it to have *set* the audience *in a roar*, I certainly cannot demonstrate that he is mistaken. I can only say, that I think he must be a very grave man himself, and must forget that the Athenians were not a very grave people. The zeal of Pere Brumoy in defending this Tragedy, betrays him into a little indiscretion. He says, “ tout cela à fait penser à quelques critiques modernes que cette piece etoit une Tragicomedie; chimere inconnu aux anciens. Cette piece est du gout des autres Tragedies. antiques^l.” Indeed they, who call this play a Tragi-Comedy, give it rather a favourable name; for, in the scenes alluded to, it is, in fact, of a lower species than our Tragi-Comedy: it is, rather, *burlesque Tragedy*; what Demetrius calls *τραγωδία παιζουσα*^m. Much of the comic cast prevails in other scenes; though mixed with those genuine strokes of simple

^k “ You, fellow ! ”—Mr. Potter’s translation.

^l *Tome iii. p. 206.*

^m *Hæri Egm. § 170.*—Ο δε γεως, says this writer, *ελβετῶ τραγωδίας.* Neither Euripides, nor Sophocles, seem to have held this as an inviolable maxim.

and univerfal nature, which abound in this Poet, and which I fhould be forry to exchange for that monotonous and unaffecting level of Tragic dignity, which never falls, and never riles.

I will only mention one more instance of this Tragi-comic mixture, and that from Sophocles. The dialogue between Minerva and Ulyffes, in the firft fcene of the *Ajax*, from v. 74 to 88, is perfectly ludicrous. The cowardice of Ulyffes is almoft as comic as the cowardice of Falftaff. In fpite of the prefence of Minerva, and her previous affurance, that fhe would effectually guard him from all danger by rendering him invifible, when fhe calls Ajax out, Ulyffes, in the utmoft trepidation, exclaims—

Τι δράς, Αθανα ; μηδαιμως σφ' ἔξω καλεῖⁿ.

Minerva anfvers—

Ου σιγ' ἀνεξή, μηδε δειλιαν ἀρεῖς^o ;

But Ulyffes cannot conquer his fears:—

ΜΗ, ΠΡΟΣ ΘΕΩΝ—ἀλλ' ἐνδον ἀρκειτω μενων^p.

And in this tone the converfation continues; till, upon Minerva's repeating her promife that Ajax fhould not fee him, he confents to ftay; but in a line of moft comical reluctance, and with an *afide*, that is in the true fpirit of Sancho Pança:—

Μενοιμ' ἀν· ΗΘΕΛΟΝ Δ' ΑΝ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΩΝ ΤΥΧΕΙΝ^q.

No unprejudiced perfon, I think, can read this fcene without being convinced, not only, that it muft have actually produced, but that it muft have been *intended* to produce, the effect of Comedy.

It appears, indeed, to me, that we may plainly trace in the Greek Tragedy, with all its improvements, and all its beauties, pretty ftrong marks of its popular and *Tragi-comic* origin. For, Τρα-

ⁿ v. 74.--Anglicè, “*What are you about, Minerva?—by no means call him out.*”

^o “*Will you not be filent, and lay afide your fears!*”

^p “*Don't call him out, for heaven's fake:—let him ftay within.*”

^q “*I'll ftay—(afide) but I wifh I was not here.*”—“*J'avoue,*” fays Brumoy, “*que ce trait n'eft pas à la louange d'Ulyffe, ni de Sophocle.*” (*Tom. iii.*)

γῆδικα, we are told, was, originally, the only dramatic appellation*; and when, afterwards, the *ludicrous* was separated from the *serious*, and distinguished by its appropriated name of *Comedy*, the separation seems to have been imperfectly made, and *Tragedy*, distinctively so called, seems still to have retained a tincture of its original merriment. Nor will this appear strange, if we consider the popular nature of the Greek spectacles. The *people*, it is probable, would still require, even in the midst of their *Tragic* emotion, a little *dash* of their old satyric *fun*, and Poets were obliged to comply, in some degree, with their taste*.

When we speak of the Greek Tragedies as correct and perfect models, we seem merely to conform to the established language of prejudice, and content ourselves with echoing, without reflection or examination, what has been said before us. Lord Shaftsbury, for example, talks of Tragedy's being "raised to its height by Sophocles and Euripides, and no room left for further excellence or emulation." *Advice to an Author, Part II. Sect. 2.* where the reader may also see his unwarrantable and absurd interpretation of Aristotle's phrase, ἔσχε την ἐαυτης φυσιν, by which he makes the philosopher "declare, that whatever *idea* might be formed of "the utmost perfection of the kind of Poem, it could, in practice, rise no higher than it had been already carried in his time." I should be sorry to be ranked in the class of those critics, who

* *Cassaub. De Sat. Poesi, p. 21, 22.*—Constat sanè primis temporibus ignoratum fuisse discrimen inter Tragœdiam et Comœdiam:-----nam et Τραγωδία et Τραγωδία, primitiùs nomen fuit commune, quod postea διεσπασθη, ut ait Aristoteles, et veteres critici testantur. Idem: [sc. *Athenæus*] τραγωδία, το παλαιον, ἢν ὄνομα κοινον και προς την Κωμωδιαν· ἴσμεν δὲ, το μεν καινον ὄνομα ἔσχεν ἡ Τραγωδία· ἡ δὲ Κωμωδία, ἰδιον.

* "Scenical representations, being then intended, not, as in our days, for the "entertainment of the better sort; but on certain great solemnities, indifferently for "the diversion of the *whole city*, it became necessary to consult the taste of the multi- "tude, as well as of those, "quibus est equus, et pater, et res." *Notes on Hor. vol. i. p. 93.* See also p. 195.—*Plato* calls Tragedy, της ποιησεως ΔΗΜΟΤΕΡΕΣΤΑΤΟΝ τε και ψυχαγωγικωτατον. *Min. vol. ii. p. 321. Serr.*

prefer that Poetry which has the fewest faults, to that which has the greatest beauties'. I mean only to combat that conventional and *bearfay* kind of praise, which has so often held out the Tragedies of the Greek Poets, as elaborate and perfect models, such as had received the last polish of art and meditation. The true praise of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, is, (in *kind* at least, though not in *degree*,) the praise of Shakspeare; that of strong, but irregular, unequal, and hasty genius. Every thing, which this genius and the feeling of the moment could produce, in an early period of the art, before time, and long experience, and criticism, had cultivated and refined it, these writers possess in great abundance: what meditation, and "*the labour and delay of the file*" only can effect, they too often want. Of Shakspeare, however, compared with the Greek Poets, it may justly, I think, be pronounced, that he has *much* more, both of this *want*, and of that *abundance*.

N O T E 34-

P. 72. ORIGINALLY, THE TROCHAIC TETRAMETER WAS MADE USE OF, &c.

As the Trochaic measure was still occasionally admitted, even in the improved and serious Greek Tragedy, and, in particular, occurs very frequently in the Tragedies of Euripides, it is natural to suppose, that a still more frequent use of it would be one of the characteristics of the *satyric* drama, which seems to have been only

Ἦ Ποτερον ποτε κρειττον ἐν ποιματι και λογοις — μεγαλο ἐν ἐμοις διμασκημενον, ἢ το συμμετρον μεν ἐν τοις κατορθωμασι, ἕγιες δὲ παντη και ἀδιαπτωτοι. Long. Sect. 33. The ἕγιες παντη και ἀδιαπτωτοι is, surely, by no means the character of the Greek Tragedians. They who think it worth searching for must lay aside Sophocles, and Shakspeare. In the French Theatre, perhaps, they may find it; but they must be content, I fear, to take with it, the συμμετρον ἐν τοις κατορθωματι.

a sort of *revival*, in an improved and regular form, of the old *Trochaic Tragedy*^a with its chorus of dancing satyrs^b. It seems therefore somewhat remarkable, though I have not seen it noticed, that in the only satyric drama extant, the *CYCLOPS*, and that written by *Euripides*, who has made so much use of this measure in his *Tragedies*, not a single Trochaic tetrameter is to be found.

N O T E 35.

P. 73. THE IAMBIC IS, OF ALL METRES, THE MOST COLLOQUIAL, &c.

Compare *Rhet. lib. iii. cap. i.* and *cap. viii. Ed. Duval.* And *Demet. Περὶ Ἑσμ. Sect. 43.*

N O T E 36.

P. 73. ----SELDOM INTO HEXAMETER, AND ONLY WHEN WE DEPART FROM THE USUAL MELODY OF SPEECH.

It has been thought strange, that Aristotle should introduce here the mention of *hexameters*, when he has been speaking only of *Trochaic* and *Iambic* verse, and is accounting for the adoption of the latter, in preference, not to the *hexameter*, but to the *Trochaic tetrameter*: and it has, therefore, been doubted, whether we should not read *τετραμετρα*^a. But the established reading, I believe, is right. The *Trochaic tetrameter*, Aristotle has, both here, and in his *Rhetoric*, characterized as *σατυρικον* — *τροχαιον* — *ἀρχησιμωτερον* —

^a Aristotle's expression on this subject elsewhere, is, *ὅτι τὰς ΤΡΑΓΩΔΙΑΣ ποιοῦντες ---- ἐκ τῶν τετραμετρῶν εἰς τὸ ἑξαμετρῶν μεταβήσαν, &c. Rhet. iii. 1.*

^b See *Casaub. de Sat. Porf. lib. i. c. 3.*

^c *Ed. Ox. 1780, p. 277.*

and even *καρδαικωτερον*^b. He did not, I apprehend, consider it as being, in any degree, *λεπτικον*. It was therefore entirely out of the question, when a metre proper for the *general* dialogue of Tragedy was to be fought for: but the *hexameter* was not so; and it might, without absurdity, be asked by an objector, as Castelvetro and Piccolomini have observed, why *that* species of verse was not adopted; especially as the Tragic Poets were the successors of the Epic, or Heroic^c, and Homer, according to Plato, was “*the first of Tragic Poets*”. As its character was grave and stately, it might seem, on that account, well adapted to Tragedy, where, indeed, we actually find it occasionally introduced. But Aristotle objects to it as less proper, because, though *σεμνον*, it was at the same time, *ε̄ λεπτικον*^c. He allows, however, that it was not *σο̄* remote from the rhythm of common speech, but that it *might* be casually produced, like the Iambic, though it rarely happened^f. He even goes so far, as to allow, in his concluding chapter, that Tragedy “*might adopt the Epic metre*.”—All this seems to afford sufficient support to the common reading. The *Heroic* and *Iambic* feet are, in the same manner, considered together, *Rhet.* iii. 8.

^b See above, NOTE 8. and ^c.

^c —ἀντι των ἔπων, τραγῳδοδιδασκαλοι. *ch.* iv. *Transl. Part I. Sect.* 6.

^a —πρωτον των τραγῳδιοποιων.—*Repub. lib.* x. *p.* 607.

^c *Rhet.* iii. 8.

^f See *Quintil. lib.* ix. *ch.* 4.—The most singular instance of involuntary versification that I ever met with, is to be found, where no one would expect to find such a thing,—in Dr. Smith’s *System of Optics*. The 47th Sect. of *ch.* ii. *book* i. begins thus:—

“ When parallel rays
 “ Come contrary ways
 “ And fall upon opposite sides”——

If, as Quintilian says, “*Verbum in oratione fieri, multò sœdissimum est, totum; sicut etiam in parte, deforme*”—what would he have said to *half* an Anapæstic *stanza*, in *rhyme*, produced in a *mathematical* book, the author of which, too, was supposed to have possessed an uncommon delicacy of ear?

^g —τω μετρῳ [ἰς. της ἐποποιαις] ἔξεστι χρῆσθαι. *Cap. ult.*

By λεκτικὴ ἀρμονία, Aristotle means what Aristoxenus calls ΜΕΛΟΣ λογικὸς^h. We must not suppose him to use the word ἀρμονία here, in that lax and general sense, in which we commonly apply it to the *rhythm* of speech, when we talk of the *harmony* of a verse or a period. He speaks with his usual accuracy. Speech, as well as Music, has its *melody* and its *rhythm*; and these, in speech animated by passion, are so modified, as to approach, more or less perceptibly, to *musical* melody and rhythmⁱ. And what Aristotle here asserts, I think, is, that the Greeks seldom, or never, departed so far from the usual *rhythm* of speech, as to run into hexameter verse, except when they were led, by the same cause, to depart equally from its usual *melody* or *tones*.

N O T E 37.

P. 73. THE EPISODES WERE MULTIPLIED.——

The mistakes, into which some commentators have been led by annexing to the term Ἐπεισοδίων, as applied by Aristotle to Tragedy, the modern and *Epic* idea of a *digression*, “*hors-d’œuvre*, *intermede*, “*morceau d’attache*”, have been well pointed out by Le Bossu, *Tr. du Poeme Ep. liv. ii. ch. iv. v. vi.*^b. But he appears to me to have gone too far, and to have fallen into the opposite error, by extending the word even to the most *essential* parts of the general action, to which he will not allow the ἐπεισοδία to be, in any sense, *added*, *united*, &c.—but insists that they *constitute* that action,

^h *Harmon. lib. i. p. 18. Ed. Mcib.*—Ἀρμονία, here, is equivalent to μελῶς, as chap. i. iv. vi. &c.

ⁱ See Diff. II. p. 51, and *note x*.

^a Batteux’s note on this passage.

^b The Abbé D’Aubignac had led the way, in his *Pratique du Theatre, liv. iii. ch. i.*

“ comme

“comme les membres font la matiere des corps^c.” With this idea, he had, indeed, some reason to call the word ἐπεισοδιον, “*terme trompeur* ;” for, in this application of it, all sight of its etymological sense is lost. By all that I can gather from an attentive comparison of all the passages in which Aristotle uses the word, there appears to me no reason to suppose, that he any where meant to apply it indiscriminately to *all* the incidents of a fable; and it is for this reason that I have no where ventured to render it by the word *incident*, which would have been too general^d. Le Bossu’s definition is,—“Les Episodes font les parties necessaires de l’action *etendues avec des circonstances vraisemblables.*”—The death of Cato, for example, in the Tragedy of Addison, answers to this definition. But would Aristotle have called that an *Episode*? I can scarce think it. The most I can conceive is, that he might have applied the term ἐπεισοδια to the particular *circumstances* and *detail* of the action, which were the *additions* of the Poet’s fancy. Le Bossu mentions, as an instance, the escape of Orestes by means of the ablution, in the *Iphig. in Taur.* of Euripides; which, he says, Aristotle calls an *Episode*^e. But, it is not the *escape* of Orestes, (ἡ σωτηρια) that Aristotle so denominates; this was an *essential* circumstance, and is expressly included by him in that general sketch of the plot, *into* which the ἐπεισοδια were afterwards to be worked: and *one* of these Episodes was the detail of the *manner* in which the escape was effected, δια της καθαρσεως.—See NOTE 143.

The word ἐπεισοδιον is, I think, used by Aristotle only in *two* senses: 1. The *technical* sense, in which it is clearly defined to mean, *all that part, or, rather, those parts, of a Tragedy, that are included between entire choral odes*^f. 2. It is evidently applied, in

^c Chap. vi.

^d For the *incidents in general*, without distinction of essential or episodic, Aristotle’s word seems to be μερη—*parts* of the action. So, *ch.* viii. and xxiv.

^e *Ch.* xvii.—*Transl.* Part II. *Scet.* 17.

^f *Ch.* xii.—*Transl.* Part II. *Scet.* 10.

other passages, to the particular *parts*, subordinate actions, circumstances, or *incidents*, of the fable; but only, I think, to *such*, as were not *essential* parts of the Poet's plan or story, though they might be, and indeed ought to be, closely connected with it:—*such*, as, however important in the action, by contributing to promote the catastrophe, were yet no way necessitated by history, or popular tradition, or, in subjects of pure invention, by the Poet's *general* and determined plan, but depended on the invention or the choice of the Poet, who might, without any alteration in the καθολικὸν λόγον, as Aristotle calls it, of his drama, have conducted the action to its catastrophe by different *means*^a.

The word ἐπεισοδίων, then, appears to me never to be used by Aristotle but in its proper and derivative sense, of something *more or less* adventitious or accessory—something inserted, superadded, *introduced*^b, at pleasure, by the Poet. But the *Epic* Poem, from its extent of plan, and the variety requisite to its purpose, admits, and requires, subordinate actions of greater length and slighter relation to the principal action of the fable, than is consistent with the shorter compass, closer unity^c, and different end, of *Tragedy*. As the *Episodes* of Epic Poetry, therefore, had more distinctness, *entireness*, and projection from the subject, if I may so express myself, than those of Tragedy, this, as it was the most obvious, became in time almost the only, application of the term; till, at length, from the frequent *abuse* of this *Epic* privilege of *variety*,

^a This distinction is very well illustrated by Le Bossu, *liv. ii. ch. v.* “Mais, s'il étoit nécessaire,” &c.—to the end. But, in other respects, this chapter is *embrouillé*. He confounds (as the reader will see by his marginal quotations) ἀκρίβεια, *proper, natural, connected*, &c. with ἀναγκαῖα—*necessary, essential* to the story, &c. He confounds an *Episode* with an *essential* action *episoded*, i. e. extended and filled up by episodic or invented *circumstances*.

^b Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐπιπέσοδιαις [ἐπειδαῖς], δεῖ τὸν λόγον ΕΠΕΙΣΟΔΙΟΥΝ ἐπαιεῖν, ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ, ὡς γὰρ αὐτὸς Εἰσαφέρει. *Rhet. iii. cap. xvii. p. 605. Dival.*

^c καὶ ἴσως ἂν μετὰ ταύτην ἀμείβῃς ἢ τὸν ἰσοποιῶν. *ch. ult.*

and the μεταβαλλειν τον ἀκροντα^k, scarce any other idea was annexed to the word *Episôde*, than that of *digression*, *hors-d'œuvre*, something foreign to the subject, or connected with it only by the slightest thread. Hence, too, in *modern* language, the word, I think, is applied only to *entire* actions of this additional, or digressive kind; not to the minuter circumstances or incidents which form the detail of an action. Thus, we call the whole story of Dido, in the *Æneid*, an *Episôde*; but we should not give that name to any of the incidents by which the death of Turnus (an action essential to the fable,) is *circumstantiated*, though equally *introduced* and *supplied* by the Poet, and therefore equally, in Aristotle's sense, ἐπεισοδια. And so much, as to his use of this term, in general. Whether these remarks are well or ill founded, will best appear, when we come to apply them to the particular passages in which the word occurs. In that now before us, it is used, I think, in the *second* of the two senses I mentioned; and its best comment seems to be another passage, *cap.* xxiv. [*Transl.* Part III. *Seçt.* 2.] where the critic observes the advantage which the *Epic* Poem has in the *variety* of its *Episôdes*, and assigns the *want* of that variety, as one common cause of ill success in *Tragic* writing:—το γαρ ΟΜΟΙΟΝ ταχυ πληρεν ἐπιπτεαν ποιη τας τραγωδίας.

N O T E 38.

P. 73. THE RIDICULOUS — A SPECIES OF TURPITUDE OR DEFORMITY; SINCE IT MAY BE DEFINED, &c.

It has been asserted by some writers of eminence, that Aristotle here speaks, not of what is *laughable* or ludicrous, *in general*, but only of the *ridiculous*, in that particular sense of the word, in which it is distinguished from the merely *rybbic*, and implies

* *Çep.* xxiv.

laughter mixed with disapprobation or contempt^a. This, however, is certainly not what Aristotle has said; for the word γελαϊον, which he uses, is as general as possible, and answers exactly to our word *laughable*. And it is in this general sense, justified, I think, by common usage, that I have used the word *ridiculous* in my version. For though in a philosophical speculation the distinction above-mentioned may be necessary for clearness, and is undoubtedly well founded, yet, in common language, the word *ridiculous* is never used with this nice appropriation, but applied, like its Latin original, to *whatever excites laughter*.

But it is objected, that, if Aristotle means the *laughable in general*, his account of the matter is fallacious; because “men laugh at that, in which there is neither *fault* nor *turpitude* of any kind^b.” I answer, that this is true *in English*, but not true *in Greek*. Our word, *turpitude*, is confined, I think, to a *moral* sense, and I suppose is here so used by Dr. Beattie; and it is certainly true, that we laugh at many things that have in them no turpitude of *that* kind—nothing *morally wrong*. But the Greek word, ΑΙΣΧΡΟΝ, was a word of wide extent, and seems manifestly used here by Aristotle in its utmost latitude; comprehending every thing that is, in any degree, *ugly* or *deformed*, from atrocious villainy, the highest *moral ugliness*, to a ridiculous cast of features in an *ugly face*. It is the opposite to ΚΑΛΟΝ, which was used in a correspondent latitude of application.—The objections, which have been made to this passage, have chiefly, I think, been owing to this,—that the objectors have not been sufficiently aware of the extensive signification in which the Greeks used the words, καλον, αϊσχρον,—ἀρετη, κακια—σπερδαϊον, φαυλον—ἀμαρτημα, &c.—We translate the words of antient authors by words to which we annex different ideas, and then raise objections and difficulties from our

^a Beattie, *On Laughter and Ludicrous composition*—ch. i. p. 326.—Lord Kaim's, *El. of Criticism*, i. ch. vii.

^b Dr. Beattie, *ibid.* p. 332.

own mistakes. The consequence of taking *αἰσχρον* here in the restrained sense of *moral turpitude*, has been, that those writers, who have so taken it, have been obliged to deny, that *γελοῖον* means *laughable*, because the laughable in general could not truly be defined, “a species of *moral turpitude*.”

It plainly was not Aristotle's design here to enter into an accurate inquiry about the nature of laughter, and the distinction of *risible* and *ridiculous* objects. This he had perhaps done, in that part of this mutilated treatise, which related to Comedy, and to which he himself refers in his *Rhetoric*^c. His purpose, here, seems to have been, merely to support and explain his account of Comedy; *i. e.* that it was *μιμησις φαυλοτέρων*, “an imitation of *bad* “characters;” that is, as he immediately limits the sense of the general term *φαυλον*,—of *ridiculous*, or *laughable*, characters^d. Such, he continues, are properly denominated *φαυλοι*, *κακοι*, *bad*, &c. because the *laughable* (*γελοῖον*) is one species of the *αἰσχρον*, taken in its most general sense. “But to *what* species, or class,” it was obvious to ask, “does it belong?”—To *that* class, it is answered, of things *αἰσχρα*, which are *neither destructive nor painful*: for these, exciting terror or pity, are the property of Tragedy^e. And he asserts, I think, plainly, that *the laughable in general*, *το γελοῖον*, *i. e.* every thing that excites laughter, is *ἀμαρτημα ΤΙ καὶ αἰσχρῶν ἀνώδυνον καὶ ἐφθαρτικόν*—is, in some respect or other, *faulty*, *wrong*, *deformed*, but neither painful nor pernicious. What follows, about a ridiculous face, is, I think, clearly, not an *illustration* merely, as Dr. Campbell understands it to be^f, but an *instance*. This seems evident from Aristotle's using the very word *αἰσχρον*; (*προσωπον αἰσχρον*) which he would hardly have done, had he just

^c — διαριταὶ δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς. *Rhet.* i. 11. *Ed. Dival.*—
ἔρηται ΠΟΣΑ ΕἶΔΗ ΓΕΛΟΙΩΝ ἔστιν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς. *Ibid.* iii. 18.

^d See NOTE 19.—One of the explanations of *φαυλῶν* in *Hesychius* is *καταγελασῶν*.

^e See *cap.* xii. *initio*.—*Transl.* Part II. *End of Sect.* 9.

^f *Philos.* of *Rhetoric*, *book* i. *ch.* iii. *Sect.* 1.

before used the words *ἀισχυρον* and *ἀισχυρον*, as Dr. Campbell and Dr. Beattie contend that he *has* used them, in a *moral* sense only.

But it is objected—"We can never suppose that Aristotle would "have called distorted features "*a certain fault or slip*." To call them a *slip*, would indeed sound strangely; because that expression conveys the idea of something *morally* wrong. But when we say, that a very long nose, or a wide mouth, is a *fault* in a face, we use a very common expression; the word *fault* having, I think, the same latitude of application as the Greek word *ἀμαρτηρια*.

It must be observed, however, that all Aristotle says is, that these two characters, *deformity of some sort*, and *the absence of pain, or hurt*, are to be found in every object of laughter: he neither says, nor implies, the *converse*—that every thing so qualified is laughable^h. With respect to *one* of these characters—the absence of *pain or harm*—there can be no doubt. It is only saying that we cannot laugh at that which shocks us. As to the *other* general character, *deformity, ugliness, something wrong, &c.* (*ἀμαρτηρια* *ἢ καὶ ἀισχυρον*) it seems to me, that these expressions, taken in that large sense, in which Aristotle plainly means to use them, amount to much the same as those used by modern philosophers to characterize the *risible* in general; such as, "*incongruity, incongruous*" "*association, striking unsuitableness*ⁱ,"—"disproportion, inconsistency" "*and dissonance of circumstances in the same object*^k."—"With respect to works both of nature, and of art," says the ingenious and philosophical author of the *Elements of Criticism*, "*none of*

^h Phil. of Rhet. book i. ch. iii. *sect.* 1.

ⁱ "Though every incongruous combination is not ludicrous, every ludicrous combination is incongruous." Dr. Beattie, *On Laughter, &c.* ch. ii. p. 351.

^j Phil. of Rhet. *ibid.* p. 89, 93.

^k Beattie, *On Laughter*, from Dr. Gerrard. So Akenfide—

— *some incongruous form,*
Some stubborn dissonance of things combin'd.

Pl. of Im. b. iii. v. 250.

"them

“ them are risible but what are *out of rule*, some remarkable defect
 “ or excess; a very long *visage*, for example, or a very short one.
 “ Hence nothing just, proper, decent, *beautiful, proportioned*, or
 “ grand, is risible¹.” This appears to me to be exactly the mean-
 ing, and to approach very near to the language, of Aristotle. For,
 of whatever may be thus characterized it surely may be said, that
 it has *some species of fault, deformity, or distortion*: in Aristotle’s
 words, ἀμαρτημα Τι και ἀχρησ—ἀσχηρον Τι και ΔΙΕΣΤΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ.

Aristotle’s account, then, of the γελοιον, appears to be right, as
 far as it goes. It might, indeed, be objected to, as *too general*, had
 he given it as the result of an exact and particular analysis of the
 subject. But this, as I have already observed, was not his purpose
 in this place.

It is farther objected by Dr. Campbell, that to speak of *laughter
 in general*, “ would have been foreign to Aristotle’s purpose:” be-
 cause, “ laughter is not his theme, but Comedy; and laughter
 “ only so far as Comedy is concerned with it. Now the concern
 “ of Comedy reaches no farther than that kind of ridicule which
 “ relates to manners^m.”—Undoubtedly it was this kind of ridicule
 that Aristotle had principally in view. But I apprehend, that the
 Comedy here in question was concerned with the ridiculous or
 laughable in general. For Aristotle’s notion of Comedy, as an
 excellent writer has observed, “ was taken from the state and prac-
 “ tice of the Athenian stage; that is, from the *old* or *middle*
 “ Comedy, which answers to his description. The great revo-
 “ lution which the introduction of the *new Comedy* made in the
 “ drama, did not happen till afterwardsⁿ.” Now the old and
 middle Comedy, as I have before observed^o, were no other than

¹ Lord Kaims, *El. of Crit.* vol. i. ch. vii. Yet he, too, objects to Aristotle’s
 definition, as “ obscure and imperfect.”—*Ch.* xii.

^m *Phil. of Rhet.* b. i. ch. iii. sect. 1.

ⁿ *Disc. on the Provinces of the Drama*, p. 201.

^o NOTE 28.

what we should call Farce. To raise a laugh was so eminently their object, that *the ridiculous* (το γελοιον) is frequently used by Plato, as synonymous to *Comedy*, and substituted for it; as *pity* is also for *Tragedy*^p. Nor was it even very “foreign to Aristotle’s “purpose” to instance in a ridiculous face; for that this also was an established source of *fun* in the Greek theatre, is well known from the curious account of the comic masks in Jul. Pollux; who says, particularly of those of the old Comedy, that they were *ridiculous caricatures* of the persons represented:—ἐπι το γελοιοτερον ἐσχηματισο^q. The Athenians were certainly not more delicate than Cicero, who thought, we know, that bodily deformities were “*satis bella materies ad jocandum*’.” He, also, agrees perfectly with Aristotle, or rather follows him, in his account of the ridiculous: “Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi TURPITUDE ET “DEFORMITATE QUADAM continetur^r.”

N O T E 39.

P. 73. ITS POETS HAVE BEEN RECORDED.

The original is, οἱ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΟΙ αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ μνημονεύονται: the only fair translation of which, I think, is, “they who are called “its Poets.” But as it seems not easy to find any reasonable meaning

^p Ἄρ' ἔρχ' ὁ αὐτῶ λογῶ και περι ΤΟΥ ΓΕΛΟΙΟΥ;—meaning *Comedy*: and presently after, τάντων ποιητῶ ὅπερ ἐν ΤΟΙΣ ΕΛΕΟΙΣ, i. e. in *Tragedy*. *De Rep. lib. x. p. 606. ed. Serr.*—See also *De Leg. p. 816.* where, in perfect agreement with Aristotle, he uses this expression: ὅσα μὲν ἐν ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΛΩΤΑ ἐστὶ παιγνια, ἀ δὴ ΚΩΜΩΔΙΑΝ ΠΛΑΤΕΣ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ—κ. τ. ἀλ.

^q *Lib. iv. cap. xix.* And see Lucian, *De Salt. p. 925. ed. Bened.* He says, that the ridiculousness of the comic masks was regarded as a part of the entertainment; μὲρ τῆς τέρσεως.

^r *De Or. lib. ii. cap. 59.*

^s *Ibid. ii. 53.*

for this, I have not translated the word at all. The text is probably corrupt. Castelvetro conjectured, very ingeniously, ὈΛΙΓΟΙ ΜΕΝ ὍΙ ἌΥΤΗΣ ποιηται.—But this Greek, ὀλιγοί οἱ ποιηται, is, I fear, what the critics call, *πονηροί κομματῶς*. I will venture to mention another conjecture that has occurred to me. The learned reader will dispose of it as he pleases. It seems not improbable that Aristotle wrote, Ἡδη δὲ σχήματα τινα αὐτῆς ἔχεσης ὍΙΑ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ, ὍΙ αὐτῆς, &c. i. e. “When it had acquired a certain form, *sicb* “as we say,” alluding to what he had said of Homer’s suggesting, by his *Margites*, the true *form*, or *idea*, of Comedy, in which the *ridiculous* was substituted for the mere *invective* of the old *Iambic*, or *Satyric form*^a. Τα τῆς κωμωδίας ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ πρώτῶς ὑπεδείξεν, ἔψογον, ἀλλὰ ΤΟ ΓΕΛΟΙΟΝ δραματοποιήσας, [*cap.* iv.] See, also, what he says immediately after, of the *forms* (σχήματα) of Tragedy and Comedy being ἐντιμωτέρα, in higher credit and esteem, than those of the old *satirical* and *encomiastic* poems which preceded them: for this seems to accord with what he here says, that Comedy was *neglected* till it attained something of this its proper form, and aimed at its proper object, the ridiculous. The reader will see the connection: Ἡ δὲ κωμωδία, δια το ΜΗ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐλάθει.—ἩΔΗ ΔΕ ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ τινα αὐτῆς ἔχεσης ὍΙΑ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ, ὍΙ αὐτῆς ποιηται μνημονεύονται.—This differs from the present reading only by the insertion of a single letter, A, which might easily have been omitted, from its resemblance to the A that follows.

N O T E 40.

P. 73. PROLOGUES.

We are not, I think, to look for a sense of the word Προλογῶς, as here applied to *Comedy*, different from that, in which it is applied, *cb.* xii. [*Transl. Part II. Sect.* 10.] to *Tragedy*. In both, it

^a —τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ἰδέας,

was that *introductory* part of the drama, the business of which was, to give the spectator, either directly, in its very outset, or, more obliquely, in the course of it, so much information relative to the subject of the piece, as would enable him to follow the action without confusion^a. This we learn clearly from the following passage in that part of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where he explains and illustrates the oratorical *exordium*, by a comparison of it with that of the Epic Poem, and with the *prologue* of a drama. After giving, as examples, the openings of the *Iliad* and *Odyssèy*, he goes on, *καὶ εἰ Τραγῳδαὶ δὴλυσι περὶ τὸ δράμα, καὶ μὴ εὐθύς, ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ΠΡΟΛΟΓῷ γὰρ ΠΟΥ δὴλοι, ὡσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς*.—*ΚΑΙ Ἡ ΚΩΜΩΔΙΑ ὩΣΑΥΤΩΣ*^b.—This clearly excludes the *separate* prologue, such as that of the *Roman* Comedy; and it is, also, irreconcilable with Dacier's idea, that by the *prologue*, in the passage we are considering, Aristotle meant what was afterwards called the *Parabasis*; for this was merely an address from the Poet to the audience, through the mouth of the Chorus, occurring indifferently in any part of the play, and even, sometimes, at the *end* of it^c. It seems to differ from the prologue of the *Roman* Comedy, and of the modern drama, only in its being delivered by the Chorus, and in the body of the piece^d.

^a This purpose is well expressed in the *Rhet. lib. iii. cap. 14.*—ὁ δὲ ὡσπερ εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἀρχῆν, ποιεῖ ἐχρημένον ἀκολουθεῖν τῆ ἰστορίᾳ.

^b *Rhet. iii. 14.* The instance there given from Sophocles, *Ἐμοὶ πατήρ ἦν Πολυβόη*, seems an interpolation; for those words are not in any part of the *προλογος* of the *Oedipus Tyr.* even according to Aristotle's own definition of the word, *cap. xii.*—The sense too seems better without it; for he means, I think, to say, that it was the general practice of Sophocles to convey this information more *indirectly*, and *somewhere* in the Prologue, as it was the general practice of Euripides to do this *professedly*, and in the very opening.

^c As in the *Εκκαστ.* of *Aristophanes*, which closes with the *Παραβασίς*.—See *Suidas*, *v. παραβ.* and *Jal. Pollux.*

^d See the *Parabasis* of the *Nubes*, *v. 518*, which, its indecency excepted, is much of the same cast with the Prologues of *Terence*.

Tragedy, according to the usual account of it, seems to have consisted, at first, only of two parts, the *Χορικον*, and *Επεισοδιον*^c, and to have begun and ended with those *choral* songs, which were then esteemed the *essential* part of *Tragedy*. But, afterwards, these scanty fables, μικροί μυθοί, as Aristotle calls them, were drawn out to their proper size^d, not only by introducing a greater variety of *episodic* incidents^e, but by prefixing to the *first* choral song, (or to the first *speech* of the *entire chorus*, according to Aristotle's account of the *Parode*, *cap.* xii.) the introductory part called Προλογος, and adding, after the *last*, the concluding part called Εξόδος. The case was probably the same with *Comedy*. The *Phallic* songs, from which it received its birth^h, were, I suppose, regarded originally as the essential part of the *Comic* drama, in the same manner as the *Bacchic* hymns were of the *Tragic*. Aristotle plainly speaks of *Comedy*, as having gradually received similar additions and improvements to those of *Tragedy*ⁱ; and, among these, that of the Προλογος. That such an introductory part, or *æet*, which should be, as Aristotle expresses it, δειγμα λογε, and εδοποιησις τω επωντι^k, was indeed still more necessary to *Comedy* than to *Tragedy*, is obvious from the very nature of the former drama^l.

The nature and office of the *Greek* prologue, and its two different manners, are, I observe, very exactly expressed by Terence in the conclusion of his *separate* prologue to the *Adelphi*; as they are also very well exemplified in the two first scenes.

^c *Cap.* xii. *Transl. Part II. Sect.* 10.

^d *Cap.* iv.

^e See NOTE 37.

^h *Cap.* iv.

ⁱ προσωπα—προλογος—ωνων υποκριτων.—*Masks* were used in *Tragedy* also. Æschylus was, “*personæ—repertor honestæ*,” according to *Horace*.

^k *Rhet. ubi supra*.

^l See NOTE 59, and the passage from Athenæus,

Dehinc, ne expectetis argumenta fabulæ.
 Senes qui primi venient, hi, partem aperient,
 In agendo partem ostendent.——

That is, as I understand it, *part* of the plot they will open to you in the way of direct narration, like the prologues of Euripides, (as, in the soliloquy of *Mitio*,) and *part* they will *discover* in a more oblique and dramatic way, in the scene of action and dialogue that follows: “*In agendo partem ostendent.*”

I ventured, in a former note*, to say, that the Greek Tragedy appeared to me to have retained, with all its improvements, some traces of its origin. Something of this may be perceived, I think, in the very opening of many of the Greek dramas: but especially in those of *Euripides*, whose inartificial prologues of explanatory narration, addressed directly to the spectators, remind us of the state of Tragedy previous to the introduction of the *dialogue*; when it consisted only of a story told between the *acts*, (if I may so speak,) of the Dithyrambic *Chorus*, which was then the main body and substance of the entertainment. When I read the opening of the *Hecuba*:

ΗΚΩ, νεκρων κευθμωνα και σκοτε πυλας
 Λιπων, εν' Αδης χωρις ωκισαι θεων,
 ΠΟΛΥΔΩΡΟΣ, Εκαβης παις γεγως της Κισσεως
 Πριαμυτε πατρυ——κ. τ. αλ.^η——

—that of the *Perse* of *Æschylus*:——

ΤΑΔΕ μεν Περσων των οίχομενων
 Ελλαδ' εις αιαν πιζα καλειται.——

—or, even the——

ΑΥΤΟΣ ωδ' εληλυθα
 Ο ΠΑΣΙ ΚΛΕΙΝΟΣ ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ ΚΑΛΟΤΜΕΝΟΣ——

* NOTE 33, p. 205.

^η Almost all the Tragedies of Euripides open in the same manner. See, in particular, *Iphig. in Taur.* *Bacchæ*, and *Phænissæ*.

—of Sophocles", I cannot help thinking of the single actor of Theſpis, announcing his own name and family, and telling the ſimple tale of his achievements or misfortunes.

This ſort of *direct* explanation was afterwards, with much more propriety, taken from the *perſons* of the *drama*, and conſigned to the *actors* in a *detached* prologue, ſuch as thoſe of *Plautus* and *Terence*: a practice, which, if we did not know the attachment of Ben Jonſon to every thing antient, we might ſuſpect he meant to ridicule, by the pleaſant uſe he has made of it in the prologue to his puppet-ſhew of *Hero and Leander*, in the *Bartholomew Fair*.

“Gentles, that no longer your expectations may wander,
 “Behold our chief actor, amorous *Leander*,
 “With a great deal of cloth lapp’d about him like a ſcarf,
 “For he yet ſerves his father, a dyer at Puddle-wharf,” &c.

The next, and the *laſt* ſtep, in the hiſtory of *Prologues*, was again to leave the *argument*, as it had been left by *Sophocles*, to the oblique information and gradual development of the action itſelf, and to make the ſeparate prologue ſubſervient to other purpoſes, unconnected with the ſubject of the drama.—The worſt of theſe purpoſes, and the greateſt poſſible abuſe of the term, is to be found in what is called the *Prologue* of the *French Opera*; which is wholly compoſed of two ingredients, almoſt equally diſguſting to a juſt *poetical*, or *moral* taſte—*allegory* and *adulation*°.

° *Oed. Tyr.* v. 8.—Of all the *openings* of this Poet, that of the *Trachiniæ* reſembles moſt the manner of Euripides.

° See *Rouſſeau's* account of it, *Diſt. de Muſ. art.* PROLOGUE.

N O T E 41.

P. 73. EPICHARMUS AND PHORMIS FIRST INVENTED COMIC FABLES.—

Dacier, here, raises unnecessary difficulties. His positive assertion, that, in the old and middle Comedy, “ Il n’y avoit rien de *feint*,” [Notes 10 and 13] is surprising. The slightest inspection of Aristophanes will confute it. Was it, then, a *fact*, that *Socrates* used to be suspended in a basket for the benefit of aerial meditation? and that *Æschylus* and *Euripides* weighed their verses in a pair of scales, to decide, by that means, a contest or superiority, after they were dead? &c. Farther, it seems not easy to reconcile this assertion of Dacier’s, to what he afterwards says, *cb. ix. note 8*.

Μυθες ποιειν, is clearly *to invent plots or subjects*; and whatever is invented, or feigned, is, in Aristotle’s language, *καθολικη*, or *general*, as opposed to a strictly *historical* plot, which is *καθ’ εξακρον*, *particular*. See *cb. ix.*^b which is the best comment on this passage; especially what is there said of *Comedy*. The expression, therefore, which Aristotle presently after uses, in speaking of Crates, ἀφεμεν⊕ της ιαμβικης ιδεας, καθολικη ποιειν λογως η̄ μυθες, I understand to be no more than the development of the shorter expression which preceded, *μυθες ποιειν*. He does not say, that Crates was the first *Poet*, but only the first *Athenian Poet*, who invented such comic subjects. The distinction seems clearly marked: το μεν εν̄ εξ̄ αρχης εν̄ ΣΙΚΕΛΙΑΣ η̄λθε: ΤΩΝ ΔΕ ΑΘΗΝΗΣΙ, Κρατης πρωτ⊕—κ. τ. αλλ.

^a *Nubes*, Act I. Sc. III.—*Rana*, Act V. Sc. III.

^b *Transl. Part II. Sect. 6.*

N O T E 42.

P. 74. EPIC POETRY AGREES SO FAR WITH TRAGIC, &c.

Of the corruption of this passage I have no doubt. It has been proposed to eject the words, *μετα λογε*. My suspicion rather falls upon the word *μετρα*; which, as it adds nothing but embarrassment to the sense, (*λογε*, *speech*, or *words*, being a general term, and including *metre*, as in *cb. i.*³,) I have omitted. It appears to me, likewise, that the only meaning, which can reasonably be given to the expression, *μεχρι ΜΟΝΟΥ μετρα*, is—"as far as *metre alone*;" i. e. without considering the *other means* of imitation, *melody* and "*rhythm*." And, accordingly, some commentators, by *μετρον ἈΠΛΟΥΝ*, understand *verse alone*, without *music*. But had this been Aristotle's meaning, he would probably have used the appropriated and *clear* word, *φιλον*ᵇ. The proper and obvious sense of *μετρον ἄπλεον*, is, a *simple*, or *single*, kind of *metre*ᶜ. This sense seems also supported by what he says of the *metrical* difference of the Epic and Tragic Poems, *cap. xxiv.* where melody and rhythm are not taken into the comparison, but the different *kinds* of *metre* only, and their being *one*, or *many*:—*εἰ γὰρ τις ἐν ἄλλῃ τινι μετρῷ διηγηματικὴν μιμῆσιν ποιοίτο, ἢ ἐν ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ἀπρεπες αὐ φαίνοίτο.* And farther, that Aristotle did not mean to express by *μετρον ἄπλεον*, the exclusion of melody and rhythm, appears the more probable, because he sufficiently expresses this presently afterwards, when he says, that some of the *parts* of Tragedy were *peculiar* to it. Now these *parts* are no other than the decoration, (*ὄψις*), and the *Melopœia*, which included *melody* and *rhythm*.

³ See NOTE V. p. 155.

ᵇ *Ibid.*

ᶜ *Ἀπλεον*—*ΜΟΝΟΕΙΔΗΣ*—*Suidas*. Ἀπλεον—ΑΣΥΝΘΕΤΟΝ. *Hef.* So, *ἄπλεον* is opposed by Aristotle to *πεπλεγμενον*, *cap. x. et passim*: and to *ἑπιπλεον*, *cap. xiii. &c. xxi.*

On the whole, it seems not improbable, that the passage originally stood in some such way as this: Ἡ μὲν ἐν Ἐποποιίᾳ τῆ Τραγω-
δία μέχρι μόνου ΤΟΥ μετα λογε μιμησιν εἶναι σπαδαιων ἠκολυθησεν.

N O T E 43.

P. 74. THIS, AT FIRST, WAS EQUALLY THE CASE WITH TRAGEDY ITSELF.

It seems to have been taken for granted, without any foundation, by Dacier, and other commentators, that the modern rule, (for an *antient* rule it certainly is not,) of what is called the *unity of time*, was strictly adhered to in every period of the Greek drama: and this has led them, in this passage, to confound the length of the *action*, or fable, with that of the *representation*; for these, where a strict unity of time is observed, are indeed the same. But Aristotle here says plainly, that in the earliest state of Tragedy, *no rule at all*, with respect to the time of the action, was observed; that it was not only allowed to exceed “*a single revolution of the sun,*” but was “*indefinite*” (ἀόριστος) like that of the Epic Poem. This evidently cannot be applied, without absurdity, to the time of representation. Yet so it is applied by Dacier in his note on this passage, p. 70.

But it appears farther, I think, from what is said, and plainly said, in this chapter, that, after all we have heard so often about this famous unity of time, the rule receives not the least support from Aristotle's authority. Every one, who knows how much stress has been laid by modern critics on the *three dramatic unities*, and happens not to be well acquainted with Aristotle's treatise on Poetry, would, I suppose, naturally take it for granted, that they are all explicitly laid down, and enforced by him, as essential and indispensable laws, in that famous code of dramatic criticism. But the fact is, that, of these three rules, the only one that can be

called important—that of the *unity of action*—is, indeed, clearly laid down and explained, and, with great reason, considered by him as indispensable. Of the two other unities, that of *place* is not once mentioned, or even hinted, in the whole book; and all that is said, respecting the *time* of the action, is said in this chapter, and in these words: “Tragedy *endeavours, as far as possible, to confine its action within the limits of a single revolution of the sun, or nearly so*.” Almost all the commentators seem agreed in understanding the expression, *μια περιόδὸς ἡλίου*, to mean only an artificial day. But I own I could never yet perceive any good reason, why we should not permit Aristotle to *mean* what he seems, in plain terms, to *say*. If he meant only *twelve hours*; why did he prefer an expression so ambiguous, to say the *least* of it, as *μικρὴν περιόδον ἡλίου*, to the clear and obvious expression of *μικρὸν ἡμέραν*?—But, to wave this question, the utmost, which the most strenuous advocates for the unity of time can make of this passage, is this—that the Poet should *endeavour, as far as possible, to confine the supposed time of the action to that of a single day, or nearly so*. Now it seems allowed, that none of the Greek Tragedies extant could have taken up, in the representation, more than three or four hours. What Aristotle, therefore, here says, is so far from being a rule for the unity of time, that, on the contrary, it is saying as plainly as possible, that, in *his* view, it was no duty incumbent on the dramatic Poet even to *aim* at the observance of such a rule: for, had he thought otherwise, his mode of expression would, surely, have been very different. He would have proposed the strict unity of time—the exact coincidence of the actual time of *representation* with the supposed time of the *action*—as the point of perfection, at which the Poet was to aim: he would have said, “Tragedy *endeavours, as far as possible, to confine its action within the time of representation, or nearly so*.”

² — ὀτιμαλίστα πειραταὶ ὑπὸ μικρὴν περιόδον ἡλίου εἶναι, ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλαστεῖν. *Cap. v.*

It is certain, indeed, that the nature of the drama, *strictly* and *rigorously* considered, would require, I will not say, to the perfection, but to the *closeness*, of its imitation, the exact coincidence here mentioned; and it is on this foundation only, that *any* rule at all relative to time could be necessary, and that the dramatic Poet could, with any reason, be denied the privilege of the Epic. All I contend for is, that Aristotle has no where required such a coincidence; that he has not even mentioned it; much less has he, either here, or in any other part of his work, enjoined it as a rule. His rule is, as *generally* understood, “confine your action, as nearly as you can, to a single day;”—or, as I think, in conformity to his plain words, it *should* be understood—“to a single revolution of the sun, or twenty-four hours^b.”

It may, perhaps, be objected, that Aristotle has not delivered this in the form of a *rule*; that he only refers to *fact*, and to the usual *practice* of the dramatic Poets of his time. “*Tragedy endeavours,*” &c. But, surely, to mention the general practice of Poets with seeming approbation, or, at least, without a word to the contrary, is, in fact, to erect that practice, (as he has done on many other occasions throughout his treatise,) into a rule.—It is sufficient for my purpose, that, at least, he has given no *other* rule.

Moreover, what he here says of the practice of the Greek dramatists, seems somewhat adverse to the language of those modern critics, who so often appeal, if I mistake not, to that very practice, for the support of their rigorous unity of time. For, if his

^b It is diverting to hear Castelvetro gravely setting forth the inconveniences of being shut up for *four and twenty* hours in a theatre:—“Il tempo *stretto* è quello, che i veditori possono à suo agio dimorare sedendo in teatro; il quale io non veggio che possa passare il giro del sole, si come dice Aristotele, cio è, hore dodici: conciosia cosa che per le necessit  del corpo, come  , mangiare, bere, *disporre i superflui pesi del ventre et della vesica*, dormire, et per altre necessit , non possa il popolo continuare oltre il predetto termino cosi fatta dimora in teatro.”—p. 109.

expression does not prove, that he thought the rule of a *single revolution of the sun* the only rule which the Poets *ought* to observe, it surely proves, because it actually says, that he thought it the only rule, which, in general, they *did* observe. But what says Dacier? “ Une Tragedie, pour être parfaite, ne doit occuper ni plus, ni “ moins de tems, pour l’action, que pour la representation; car “ elle est alors dans toute la vraisemblance. *Les Tragiques Grecs L’ONT TOUJOURS PRATIQUE’.*” What he adds, it seems not very easy to comprehend: “ Et ils s’en sont fait une loi si indispensable, “ que *pour ne la pas violer, ils ont quelquefois violenté leurs incidens,* “ d’une maniere que je ne conseillerois pas de suivre:” *i. e.* in plain English, (for I can make nothing else of it,) “ they have so scrupulously adhered to the rule, that, sometimes, for the sake of observing it, they have been obliged to break it.” p. 118.

I believe, every reader, who, in perusing the Greek Tragedians, has taken the pains to examine this matter, must be sensible, that what Dacier so confidently asserts, of their *constant* adherence to this rule, is palpably false. I shall only mention one remarkable instance of the utter neglect of it, and that in SOPHOCLES; who, in this, as in other respects, is usually regarded, I think, as the most correct and regular of the three Greek Poets whose Tragedies are in our hands. In his *Trachinice*, v. 632, Lichas sets out to carry the poisoned garment to Hercules, whom he finds upon the *Cenæan* promontory, which is said^c to be about sixty Italian miles from the scene of the action. At v. 734, Hyllus, who was present when his father received the garment, arrives with the terrible relation of its effects. Thus, during the performance of about *a hundred lines*, a journey of about one hundred and twenty Italian miles is supposed to have been taken.—For this, and other instances of the same kind, I must content myself with referring the reader to the sensible and well written *Estratto della Poetica d’Aristotile*, published among the posthumous works of Metastasio, and which did not fall into

^c By Metastasio.

my hands till all my notes were written. It contains many ingenious and sagacious observations. The subject of the dramatic unities, in particular, is discussed at large, and, I think, in a very masterly and satisfactory way. And, with respect to the strict unities of *time* and *place*, he seems perfectly to have succeeded in shewing, that no such rules were imposed on the Greek Poets by the critics, or by themselves;—nor *are* imposed on *any* Poet, either by the *nature*, or the *end*, of the dramatic imitation itself^d.

It would be inexcusable to quit this subject without reminding the reader, that the unities of time and place, were long ago powerfully, and, in my opinion, unanswerably combated, as far as their *principles* are concerned, by Dr. Johnson, in his preface to Shakespeare, p. 20, &c.

N O T E 44.

P. 75. IN THE WAY, NOT OF NARRATION, BUT OF ACTION.

It is surprising, that so strange a phrase as *εἶδαν*---*δρωντων*—*formis*---*agentibus*—should have passed as genuine with any Greek scholar. It is still more so, that the obvious opposition of *δρωντων* to *ἀπαγγελίας*, and the no less obvious absurdity of *σπρῶσιν* narration to pity and terror, (*εἰ δὲ ἀπαγγελίας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἔλεος καὶ φόβου*) should have escaped the notice of any commentator^a.—I should write the passage thus; still considering it as imperfect:—*χωρὶς ἔλασε τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορφοῖς * * * [forte ΔΙΑ] δρωντων καὶ εἰ δὲ ἀπαγγ-*

^d *Capitolo 5.*

^a See the beginning of *cap. iii. Transl. scilicet. 4.*—I am glad to find myself well supported in these remarks by Mr. Winstanley's note on this passage. *Ed. Ox. 1780, p. 278.*—I cannot, however, but still regard the text as defective.

γελίας * * * * ἀλλὰ δι' ἔλεε και φοβε, κ. τ. αλ. Thus the word *δρωντων* will retain its proper sense, and the *αδινε* imitation of the drama, which Aristotle every where makes its characteristic distinction, as opposed to the *Epic*, will be, as we might expect to find it, in a *formal* and *exact* definition of Tragedy, distinctly marked.

I will just observe, farther, that this mode of expression—*δρωντων* ΚΑΙ ΟΥ δι απ. is familiar to Aristotle.—Here however it may be justified by the necessity of marking clearly the distinction between Dramatic and Epic Poetry. In other instances, as, *ετερωε και μη τον αυτον τροπον. cap. i.—ωε τον αυτον και μη μεταβαλλοντα. cap. iii.—ειδωε και μη αγνωων. Eth. Nic. v. 8.*—it seems hardly to admit of the same excuse. In the *Poets* we are less surprised to find it frequent. Victorius has pointed out Homer, II. Z. 333.

— ἐπεὶ με κατ' αἴσαν ἐνεκεσασ, εἰδ' ὑπερ αἴσαν.

—and Sophocles :

—— γνωτα, κ'εκ αγνωτα μοι
 Προσηλθεθ' ἡμεροντεε.—— *Oed. Tyr. 58.*

If any man, in reading the antients, can persuade himself to take such things for beauties, there is certainly no harm in it. The fact I take to be, that composition, even that of Poetry, was not yet so far improved and refined, as perfectly to exclude the inaccuracies and redundancies of popular and familiar speech.

P. 75. EFFECTING, THROUGH PITY AND TERROR, THE CORRECTION AND REFINEMENT OF SUCH PASSIONS.

Δι' ἔλεε και φοβε περαινεεα την των τοικτων παθηματων καθαροιν.—A history of the controversies which this obscure passage has excited among critics and commentators, and an exact statement and examination of the various explanations which have been given of it, would

would almost fill a volume. Among these, however, the opinions, that are worth regarding, or that can, with any shew of probability, be deduced from Aristotle's expression, are, I think, reducible to two. One is, that this *purgation*, or *moderation*, of the passions, is merely the effect of having them frequently excited, and of being familiarized with the occasions of them, in Tragic fiction; just as the passions of pity and terror are actually purged, or reduced to moderation, in a surgeon, a physician, or a soldier, by their being *accustomed* to those terrible or piteous objects that occasion them.—The *other* interpretation attributes the effect to the *moral lesson* and *example* of the drama: Tragedy *purges* the passions by the striking pictures it sets before us of the dreadful calamities occasioned by the unrestrained indulgence of them; by giving useful warnings, and preparing us to bear the ills of life with patience.—One, or the other, or *both*, of these meanings, have, I think, been attributed to Aristotle by the best commentators and critics. For the *first*, the reader may see Mr. Harris's *Disc. on Music, Painting, &c.* ch. v. note ^c.—Heinf. *De Trag. Const.* cap. ii. p. 22, 23. and *Castelvetro*, p. 117, 118.—For the *second*, Madius;—D'Alembert in his letter to Rousseau, *Mélanges*, tom. ii. p. 414.—Dryden, *Obs.* on the *Æneid*.—Abbè Du Bos, *Refl. sur la Poésie*, tom. i. sect. 44, &c.—For an explanation compounded of the two, Robortelli, Piccolomini, and Dacier, who, by the way, after declaring that *all* the explanations of former commentators “*serve* only to obscure the passage,” and that the true sense was *not to be found in any of them*, proceeds to give us, as that *true sense*, and as his own discovery, exactly what had been said before him^a.

Let us first see what Aristotle *says*. He says, that Tragedy, *by the means of pity and terror*, effects the purgation (*καθάρσις*) of *such* passions: i. e. of *pity and terror and other passions* of the same kind: for pity and terror seem clearly meant, by the expression, to be included in the effect. And this, in my opinion, is sufficient

^a See his note 8.

to overturn the *second* of the explanations just mentioned; for, according to that, terror and pity are not both the *means* and the *object* of the purgation, as Aristotle, I think, asserts them to be, but they are the *means only* of purging *other* passions—those passions, whatever they may be, which are supposed to produce the calamitous events exhibited to our view. Indeed, according to this idea, the object is rather the *vice* that arises from passion, than the passion *itself* which is the cause of it. But, besides this objection, I do not see any reason to think, that the *moral lesson* of the drama, and the effects it might have in moderating our passions through the *reflections* it excites in us, were at all in Aristotle's thoughts*. The *first* of the two explanations seems far more admissible. I believe it made a *part* of his idea, but I doubt whether it was the *whole* of it. What *was* precisely his meaning, and the whole of his meaning, will never, I fear, be the subject of a perfect, Stoical *καταληψις* to any man. There is, however, *one* passage in Aristotle's works, which throws *some* little light upon this; enough, at least, to keep us from false interpretations, if not to lead us to the true. It is in the *seventh* chapter of his *eighth* book *De Republicâ*. The Abbé Batteux is the only commentator I know of, who has paid a proper attention to this passage; but as I do not perfectly agree with him, either as to the translation he has given, or the use he makes of it, I shall produce so much of the original as appears to be of any importance to our present purpose, and subjoin a translation, with some necessary remarks.

The object of Aristotle, in the chapter referred to, is, to examine what kinds of *MUSIC* (i. e. of melody and rhythm,) are proper to be used in the education of youth. He mentions and approves a division, made by some philosophical writers of that time, of the different kinds of melodies, into Moral, Active, and Enthusiastic: *τα μὲν ἠΘΙΚΑ, τα δὲ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑ, τα δ' ἘΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑ*. By the first of these we are to understand a manly, grave, and simple

* See the concluding NOTE.

melody. The sense of *πρακτικα* is less clear; but I suppose it means a more complicated and *imitative* sort of melody, adapted to express human *actions*; for, in the 49th of the Harmonic Problems [See 19.] it is said of the *Hypo-Phrygian* mode, that it had ἠθῶ-πρακτικον, and was, on that account, used only in the dialogue and action of the drama, never in the *choral* part^b. And the same epithet, *πρακτικον*, is applied, in this treatise, to the Iambic measure^c. As to *enthusiastic*, it wants no explanation.—Aristotle then proceeds to observe, that “Music was to be used, not for one useful purpose “only, but for several,” which he enumerates; and one of them is—ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ ἕνεκα: with respect to which he says—τι δὲ λεγομεν την καθαρσιν, νυν μιν, ἀπλως· παλιν δὲ, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, ἔρμιν σαφεσερον:—“What I mean by *Καθαρσις*, or *purgation*, I shall now explain only in a short and general way; but “hereafter, in the books *concerning Poetry*, more explicitly and “clearly.”—And this, I suppose, he had done, in that part of this treatise which is lost.—He then proceeds thus:

—Φανερον, ὅτι χρῆσειον μιν πασαις ταις ἀρμονιαις, ἔ τον αὐτον δε τροπον πασαις χρῆσειον· ἀλλα προς μιν την παιδειαν, ταις ἠθικωταταις· προς δε ἀκροασιν [f. ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ], ἑτερων χειροεργωντων, και ταις πρακτικαις, και ταις ἐνθεσιασικαις. ὁ γαρ περι ἑνιας συμβαινει παθῶ ψυχας ἰσχυρας, τετο ἐν πασαις ὑπαρχει· τῷ δε ἥττον διαφερει και τῷ μαλλον. ὁιον, ΕΛΕΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΟΒΟΣ. ἐτι δ' ἐνθεσιασμῶ· και γαρ ὑπο ταυτης της κινήσεως κατακωχιμοι τινες εἰσιν. ἐκ δε των ἱερων μελων ὀρωμεν τετες, ὅταν χρῆσιωνται τοις ἐξοργιαζεσι την ψυχην μελεσι, καθισαμενες, ὡσπερ ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑΣ τυχαντας και ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ. ταῦτο δη τετο ἀναγκαιον πασχειν και τες ἐλεημονας, και τες φοβητικες, και τες ὄλως παθητικες· τες δ' ἄλλες, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβαλλει των ποιωντων ἑκάστω,

^b He says too—κατα δε την ὑποδωρισι και ὑποφρησι, ΠΡΑΪΤΤΟΜΕΝ· ὁ ἐν δικειον ἐτι χορῶ· ἐτι γαρ ὁ χορῶ μινδης ΑΠΡΑΚΤΟΣ.—κ. τ. λ.—The whole Problem, though mutilated, is curious, and throws some little glimmering of light upon the Greek drama, as far as *Music* is concerned.

^c *Cap.* xxiv.—το μιν [i. e. the *Trochaic* tetrameter,] ἀρχητικῶ· το δε, [the *Iambic* verse,] ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΟΝ. Whence Horace's,—“*natura rebus agendis.*” A. P. 83.

και πωσι γινεσθαι ΤΙΝΑ ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ, και κερ.ζεσθαι μεθ' ηδονης. [p. 458. Ed. Duval.]*

In this passage, for ἀκροασι I have no doubt that we should read καθαρισμ. The similitude of the words is sufficient to account for the mistake of the transcriber; and the purport of the whole passage seems to require the correction. For Aristotle is here shewing, in what manner the *three* different kinds of melody were to be applied to the different *purposes*, which he had just enumerated: προς ΜΕΝ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ, ταις η̄θικ. προς ΔΕ ΤΗΝ ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ, — ταις πρακτικαις, &c. The opposition is clear. And so, afterwards, a third purpose is mentioned — προς ΑΝΑΠΑΥΣΙΝ. [p. 459.] The words immediately following, ἑτερων χειρουργωντων, probably contributed to this mistake. They allude to his doctrine, in the preceding chapter, that boys should not be allowed to practice or perform, *themselves*, any but the simplest kind of Music, and upon the sim-

* This passage may be considered, alone, as a complete refutation of an opinion published some years ago by Professor Moor, of Glasgow, on the subject discussed in this note. He asserts, that by παθηματα Aristotle does not mean *passions*, but *sufferings*, or *calamities*; and that the sense of δι' ἐλεα και φοβη περανισα την των τοιωντων παθηματων καθαρισμ, is — effecting, or endeavouring to effect, “the removal of such calamities,” (i. e. as are represented in Tragedy,) “by means of exciting the passions of pity and “terror.” But the sense, both of καθαρισμ, and of παθηματα, is fixed, beyond dispute, by the passage I have quoted, where *pity*, *terror*, and other *passions*, are clearly mentioned as the *objects* of the καθαρισμ, or purgation. The Professor also asserts, that the word, which Aristotle uniformly uses to express the *passions*, is παθη, and that by παθηματα is “always meant, *sufferings*, or *calamities*.” This is a mistake. Παθη is continually used by Aristotle in the sense of *sufferings*; and παθηματα sometimes, though less frequently, in the sense of *passions*. So, *Rhet.* II. 22. p. 574. C. και περι των η̄θων, και ΠΑΘΗΜΑΤΩΝ — “concerning *manners* and *passions*.” See also, *Moral. Eudem.* II. 2. p. 205. B. where παθη and παθηματα are used synonymously. Many other instances, I make no doubt, are to be found in Aristotle’s works.

I should add, that I take my account of this explanation, and the arguments by which it is supported, from the *Monthly Review*, vol. xxx. p. 65; not having been able to procure the pamphlet itself, of which the title is — “*On the end of Tragedy, according to Aristotle: an Essay, in two parts, &c.* — By James Moor, LL.D. Prof. of “*Greek in the Univ. of Glasgow.*” — It is mentioned again, with approbation, in the 64th vol. of the same Review, p. 556.

plest and easiest instruments, such as were not *δεομενα χειροργουνης επισημους*. [p. 457.] But this was not the character either of the *active* and *enthusiastic* melodies, of which he here speaks, or of the *instrument* used in the accompaniment of them^d.

I shall now give what I think a fair and *literal* version of the passage.—

“ It is manifest then, that *all* the different kinds of melodies are
 “ to be made use of ; not all, however, for the same purpose. For
 “ *education*, the most *moral* kind should be used : for PURGATION,
 “ both the *active*, and the *enthusiastic* ;—*performed*, however, by
 “ others. For those passions, which in *some* minds are *violent*,
 “ exist, *more or less*, in *all* ; such as PITY, for example, and
 “ TERROR : and, again, *enthusiasm* ; for with *this* passion some
 “ men are subject to be possessed : but when the *sacred melodies*,
 “ intended to compose the mind after the celebration of the orgic
 “ rites, have been performed, we see those men become calm and
 “ sedate, as if they had undergone a kind of *purgation*, or *cure*.
 “ And the case must necessarily be the same with those who are
 “ particularly liable to be moved by PITY, or TERROR, or any
 “ other passion ; and with *other* men, as *far* as they are under the
 “ influence of any such passion ; *all* of them experiencing a *sort of*
 “ PURGATION, and PLEASURABLE RELIEF.”

From this passage, though far enough, I am sensible, from being perfectly clear and explicit, *two* things, at least, may, I think, be confidently deduced.—1. That *whatever* be the meaning of the term *καθαρσις*, or *purgation*, here, must also be its meaning in the treatise on Poetry ; since to *that* work Aristotle refers for a fuller explanation of it. The only difference is, that here, the term is applied to the effect of imitative *Music* ; there, to that of imitative *Poetry* ; of *that* species of it, however, which depended, we know, upon *Music*, for a very considerable part of

^d The *Ανθ.* See *ibid.* p. 459 and 457. And above, p. 148, note *.

its effect. 2. It is plain, that, according to Aristotle's idea, pity was to be purged by pity, terror by terror, &c.; contrary to the *second* of the two explanations above mentioned. For Aristotle is here *expressly* speaking of the use of *enthusiastic* Music applied *προς καθαρσιν*; and he says, that men, agitated by enthusiasm, were *purged* or *relieved from that enthusiasm* by the *ἱερὰ μελῆ*, which were plainly *enthusiastic* melodies; i. e. such as *imitated*, or *expressed*, that passion, and were intended to calm the mind, which had been violently agitated and inflamed; not, as M. Batteux understands, by the sudden opposition of *Doric*, grave, and *moral* strains, [p. 280, 1.] but by *pleasurable indulgence* of the *same* passion in *imitative Music*: *κεφιζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς*. These melodies were, probably, such as those of Olympus, which had been mentioned just before [cap. 5.] and of which Aristotle says, that they, *Ὁμολογούμεως ΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΑΣ ΨΥΧΑΣ ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑΣ*. Indeed, from the manner, in which the Music of Olympus is spoken of by Plato, and Plutarch, there is great reason to suppose, that these "*sacred melodies*" were no other, than the *very* melodies of that musician^f.

With respect to this *καθαρσις* itself, Aristotle by no means gives us in this passage, nor, indeed, professes to give us, a full and satisfactory explanation of it. *Some* light, however, he has flung upon it by the expressions, *ἰατρεια*, and *κεφιζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς*, which he uses as synonymous to *καθαρσις*: "*Purgation, cure, pleasurable relief.*" The Abbé Batteux understands Aristotle to mean no more by this, than that the passions of *terror* or *pity*, which, when excited by real objects, are simply painful, or, at least, have a predominant mixture of pain, are, by *imitation*, and the consciousness of *fiction*, *purged* or purified from this alloy of the disagreeable and painful,

^f — τῆς νόμῆς τῆς ἁρμονικῆς ἐξενεγκεν [sc. Olympus.] εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, εἰς οὖν κρῶται εἰς Ἑλλήνας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς τῶν θεῶν. *Plut. de Mus.* p. 2076. *ed. H. S.* See also Plato in the *Minos*, p. 318. *ed. Serr.* where he says of the melodies of Marsyas and Olympus, that they are, ΘΕΙΟΤΑΤΑ, καὶ μόνα ΚΙΝΕΙ.—See Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 359, &c.

and

and converted, on the whole, into an emotion of delight. His meaning may be clearer in his own words. Aristotle, he says, had established it as a principle—"Que les objets désagréables plaisent quand ils sont imités, même lorsqu'ils le sont dans la plus grande vérité". En appliquant ce principe à la Tragedie, il s'en suit, que c'est l'imitation qui est la cause du plaisir qu'elle produit, et non la nature des objets imités, puisque ces objets sont par eux-mêmes désagréables. C'est donc l'imitation qui ôte à la terreur et à la pitié l'accessoire désagréable qu'elles ont dans la réalité : c'est l'imitation qui opere la purgation Tragique, en mettant les malheurs imités à la place des malheurs réels, et en séparant par ce moyen ce que la pitié et la terreur ont d'agréable, comme émotions, d'avec ce qu'elles ont de désagréable, quand elles sont jointes à l'idée de malheurs réels^h." This account, which is exactly Fontenelle's solution of the pleasure arising from Tragic emotionⁱ, is liable to a difficulty not easily, I think, surmounted. It confines Aristotle's meaning to the *present pleasure* of the emotion; it supposes all the *purgation* to consist merely in rendering the feeling of the passion pleasurable;—not in any good effect which the *habit* of such emotion may produce, in correcting, refining, or moderating, such passions, when excited by real objects. Now, though it must be confessed, that Aristotle has not, in that short and *professedly* imperfect explanation given of the καθαρσις in the passage adduced, said any thing directly pointing to such effect, yet, I think, the whole turn and cast of his expression is such, as leads one naturally to conclude, that it was his meaning. The phrase, καθ' ἑσθαι μετ' ἡδονῆς, does indeed appear to express the *present* effect only; but I can scarce conceive, that he would have

^e Cap. iv. *Transl. Part I. Sect. 5.*

^h Principes de la Littérature, tom. iii. p. 81.—I refer to *that* work, because the author appears to me to have explained himself there with more clearness and precision than in the note on his translation of Aristotle in the *Quatre Poétiques*.

ⁱ Réflex. sur la Poétique, Sect. 36.—Hume's *Essay on Tragedy*.

used such a word as καθαρισμός, and still less, ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ, without a view to something beyond the pleasurable relief or vent of the moment; especially, in a chapter, where he is professedly enumerating and examining the uses of music^k. Farther, the words, ἐλεημοναίαι, φοβητικαί, παθητικαί, confirm this idea; being all words expressive of *habitual excess*, requiring correction and moderation^l.

But, what still more strongly opposes the Abbé Batteux's idea, is, that Aristotle is here, as Heinsius and others have well observed, evidently combating the doctrine of Plato, whose great objection to Tragedy, was, that it feeds and inflames the passions^m. It could be no answer to this, to allege, that the feeling of passion excited by Tragic imitation is pleasurable; for this is so far from being called in question by Plato, that it is the very foundation of his objection. The pleasure afforded by such Poetry is allowed by him in its utmost extent. "Let its advocates," he says, "undertake to shew us that it is not merely pleasurable, but USEFUL also, and we will lend a favourable ear to their apology; for we shall surely be gainers by the convictionⁿ." Now Aristotle, if I understand him rightly, undertakes this apology, and points out the utility required. And no one, I think, can reasonably doubt, that such was his intention, who has attended to the following passage of Plato:—ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπο τῶν ἀλλοτρῶν εἰς τὰ οἰκεία^o ΘΡΕΨΑΝΤΑ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ΙΣΧΥΡΟΝ ΤΟ ΕΛΕΕΙΝΟΝ, ἐξ ῥαδίου ἐν τοῖς

^k —ἢ μίας ἐνεκεν ΩΦΕΛΕΙΑΣ τῆ μετρίῃ χρῆσθαι δεῖν.—*Ubi supra*.

^l The same thing seems implied in the word κατακωχμοί; and in the expression—ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἑνίας συμβαίνει παθῶ ψυχῆς ΙΣΧΥΡΩΣ—.

^m ΤΡΕΦΕΙ γὰρ ταῦτα, he says, in his figurative language, ΑΡΔΟΥΣΑ, δεῖν ΑΥΧΜΕΙΝ.—*De Repub. lib. x. p. 606. D.*

ⁿ *Ibid.* p. 607, C, D, et passim.

^o Δοίμεν δὲ γε πῶς ἂν καὶ τοῖς προσηγοῖς αὐτῆς — λόγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἴπῃ, ὡς ἔ μοι τὴν ἭΔΕΙΑ ἄλλα καὶ ΩΦΕΛΙΜΗ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τοῦ ἀνθρώπινον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμμετρίως ἀποσομεῖται. κερδάνομεν γὰρ πῶς, εἴαν μὴ μόνον ἡδέια φάσῃ, ἀλλὰ ΚΑΙ ΩΦΕΛΙΜΗ.—*Ibid.*

'ΑΥΤΟΤ ΗΑΘΕΣΙ ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ'. For, to this objection, there cannot well be a more direct and pointed answer, than Aristotle's assertion, as *usually* understood—that the *habit* of indulging the emotions of pity, or terror, in the fictitious representations of Tragedy, tends, *on the contrary*, to moderate and refine those passions, when they occur in real life.

But though the Abbé Batteux's idea of this *purgation* appears to me by no means to be the *whole*, it must, I think, be admitted as a *part*, and an essential part, of Aristotle's meaning. For the effect depends, not merely, as some commentators seem to suppose^a, on the having our passions *frequently* and *habitually* excited, but, on the having them so excited *by fictitious representation*. Pity and terror *frequently* excited by such objects and such events in *real* life, as the imitations of the Tragic scene set before us, would rather tend to produce apathy than moderation. Nature would struggle against such violent and painful agitation, and the heart would become callous in its own defence. We must be insensible, that we might not be wretched. It is far otherwise with *fictitious* passion. There, the emotion, though often violent in spite of the consciousness of fiction, is always, more or less, delightful. We indulge it, as one of the first of pleasures; and the effect of that indulgence, frequently repeated, is perhaps, that, while it moderates *real* passion by the frequency of similar impressions, it, at the same time, *cherishes* such sympathetic emotions, in their *proper* and *useful* degree, by the delicious feelings which never fail to accompany the indulgence of them in imitative representation.

The passions of savages, or of men in the first rude stages of civilization, are ferocious and painful. They *pity*, or they *fear*,

^a *Ibid.* 606. B.—“The habit of indulging our passions in the concerns of others, will, of necessity, bring on the same habitual indulgence in those which relate to ourselves: for he, who has *nourished* and strengthened to excess the passion of *pity*, for example, by habitual sympathy, in the misfortunes of *other* men, will not find it easy to restrain the same kind of feelings in his *own*.”

^a Heinsius *De Trag. Constit.* cap. ii.—Harris *On Music*, &c. ch. v. note ^c.

either

either violently, or not at all. With them, there is hardly any medium between ungovernable agitation, and absolute insensibility. — Suppose such a people to have access, like the Athenians, to theatrical representations, and to have their passions kept in frequent and pleasurable exercise by *fictitious* distress; the consequence, I think, would be, that, by degrees, they would come to have more *feeling*, and less *perturbation*. Instead of sympathetic emotions rarely excited, painfully felt, and soon extinguished, they would gradually acquire a calm, lasting, and useful habit of general tenderness and sensibility. In polished society, where the passions are accustomed to be indulged in *fiction*, either in the theatre, or by reading, and the pain is converted, on the whole, into one strong and delightful feeling, by the charms of imitation, Poetry, Music, aided by the indistinct consciousness of fiction—these passions, even when excited by *real* objects, seem to retain, (at least, in cases where we are not *too closely* touched,) some tincture of the same pleasurable emotion, which attended them, when raised by works of imagination; they are more moderately and agreeably felt, more easily governed, and more gentle and polished in their expressions.

Such appears to me, on the whole, to be the most probable explanation of Aristotle's meaning: I must, at least, confess it to be the only reasonable meaning, that I am able to discover. How far it is *true*, and founded on solid observation, is another question, which I willingly submit to the philosophical and thinking part of my readers.

I cannot omit to observe, that the short explanation given by MILTON, in the introduction to his *Samson Agonistes*, appears to coincide exactly, *as far as it goes*, with my idea of the passage.—
 “ Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath been ever held the
 “ gravest, moralest, and most profitable of all other Poems:
 “ therefore said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity, and
 “ fear or terror, to purge the mind of those and such like passions;

“ that is, to temper and reduce them to just measure, with a kind of
 “ delight, stirred up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated.”

One thing should be added. Aristotle's assertion must be considered relatively to his own times, and nation. He speaks of the effects of Tragedy on the *people of Athens*, who, as *reading* was then no popular occupation', had scarce any opportunity of indulging *fictitious* emotion, but at the Theatre, and who, we know, were *there* accustomed to indulge it perpetually. With us, the case is widely different. The doctrine, therefore, of Aristotle, that “ *Tragedy purges the passions,*” translated, if I may so speak, into *modern truth*, would perhaps amount only to this—that the habitual exercise of the passions by *works of imagination in general*, of the serious and pathetic kind, (such as Tragedies, Novels, &c.) has a tendency to soften and refine those passions, when excited by real objects in common life.

N O T E 46.

P. 75. IN SOME PARTS METRE ALONE IS EMPLOYED, IN OTHERS MELODY.

A passage of very tantalizing brevity. By *δια μετρων MONON*, are we to understand, according to the obvious and literal meaning of the expression, that in *some* parts of Tragedy the verse was merely recited, *spoken*, as in modern Tragedy?—This contradicts what, by many writers, has been considered as a fact thoroughly established, that the Greek Tragedy was accompanied by musical instruments, and was therefore strictly *musical, throughout*:—for as to the dreams of the Abbé Du Bos, Rousseau, and others, about a *noted declamation*, a declamation accompanied by *Music*, yet not *sung*—this is too manifest an absurdity to stand in need of con-

* See Diff. I. p. 42.

futation.

futation. If, as Rousseau says, it is “impossible to understand “ what the antients have said about their theatrical declamation, “ without supposing this^a,” would it not be better to say, at once, that we do *not* understand it, than to explain it into impossibilities? As for the systematic Abbé Du Bos, he was set upon proving his point; and he proves it like a man resolved to prove it, by wresting all sorts of authors to his purpose, and translating them as he pleased^b. All we know clearly, is, that the antient drama *was* accompanied, (in *part*, at least,) by musical instruments. I conclude, confidently, that since the instruments could not *speak*, the actors must *sing*: that their declamation must certainly have been, strictly speaking, *musical*, however simple; the chanting of the simplest *plain chant*, being as truly *Musical*, i. e. as essentially distinct from *speech*, as the most refined melody of a modern opera^c.

If, then, the Greek Tragedy had a *musical accompaniment* throughout, it must have been *sung* throughout. But here, Aristotle says, as plainly as words can say it, that in *some* parts of Tragedy, “*metre only*” was employed:—*δια ΜΕΤΡΩΝ ἑνια ΜΟΝΟΝ*: that is, as it is necessarily implied, *without* the two other *ἡδυσματα*, or *seasonings*, of Tragic language, just mentioned, melody and rhythm^d.

Some commentators, I know, endeavour to evade the force of this expression, by saying, that Aristotle means, by *δια μετρων μονου*, only the *noted declamation*, which, being a sort of recitative, was not regarded as strictly musical, nor denominated *μελοσ*^e. And in

^a Dict. de Musique, Art. OPERA.

^b For a refutation of Du Bos, the reader may see Condillac’s *Essai sur l’orig. des connoiss. humaines*—*tom. iii. ch. 3.*

^c See Diss. II. p. 52. note ^x.

^d Λεγω δὲ ἡδυσμασμενον μεν λογον, του εχοντα ρυθμικη και ἁρμονικη, και μετρον. Το δε, χωρις των ειδων, το δια ΜΕΤΡΩΝ ΕΝΙΑ ΜΟΝΟΝ περιεσθαι—.

^e So M. Batteux.

support of this, it is alleged, that the word *λεξις*, *speech*, is applied by him afterwards in a similar manner^f; as *λεγεσθαι* is also by Plutarch, who talks of “some of the Iambics being *spoken with an accompaniment*, and others, *sung*”: as we sometimes say of a singer, that he *speaks* recitative well. But all this, I confess, does not satisfy me. It is one thing, to apply occasionally the word *λεξις* or *λεγεσθαι*, in this *comparative* way, to such kind of singing as most *resembles* speech, and another, to say roundly, that some parts of Tragedy made use of *metre*, or *verse*, *only*; and that too, immediately after having *fixed* the exclusive sense of *μονον*, by enumerating the three *ἁδυσματα* of Tragic diction, which he asserts to be *separately* used in different parts, i. e. *ῥυθμῶν*, *ἁρμονια*, *μετρον*^h,—RHYTHM, MELODY, and METRE. They who dispute this meaning, must at least, I think, allow that if it *had* been the meaning, Aristotle could not well have expressed it with more precision. How can *μετρῶν* here be taken in the loose and comparative sense contended for, when, in the very words immediately preceding, it is carefully limited to its strict and proper sense, by being expressly discriminated from *melody*, as well as from *rhythm*?

But after all, the fact, that the Greek Tragedy was *sung throughout*, though often asserted, has not yet been *proved*; nor do I think that it can be proved; at least, by any passage of ancient authors, that I have seen adduced to prove it. The Abbé Vatry, in a dissertation, *Sur la recitation des Tragedies anciennes*, undertook to prove, in form, that the Greek Tragedies were *sung*, “*d’un bout à l’autre*,” like our operas. But how does he prove this?

^f See *ch.* xii.—ΑΕΞΙΣ ὁδὸς ΧΟΡΟΥ.

^g Dial. de Mus. p. 2090. *ed.* H. S.—Τα μὲν λεγέσθαι παρὰ τὴν κρῆσιν, τὰ δὲ ἀδῆσθαι.

^h The reading in *all* the MSS. is, ῥυθμον, καὶ ἁρμονίαν, καὶ ΜΕΛΟΣ. On comparing this passage with Aristotle’s other enumerations of the three *means* of imitation in *cap.* i. especially at the end of it, where *Tragedy* is mentioned as using *all* those means, κατὰ μέτρον, i. e. ῥυθμῶν, καὶ μετρῶν (which is synonymous to *ἁρμονία* elsewhere,) καὶ ΜΕΤΡῶν, no one, I think, can entertain any degree of doubt, as to the truth of Victorius’s emendation, καὶ ΜΕΤΡῶΝ.

—by proving, what indeed is easily proved¹, that a *part* of the Iambics, or the dialogue, was sung, and then by taking it for granted, that the ancients could not possibly have endured so barbarous a custom, as the mixture of speech and singing in the same piece. “ Il ne paroît pas qu'on puisse douter que ces *cantiques* ne se chantaient ; mais de cela même je crois pouvoir conclurre, que tout le reste se chantoit, quoique différemment ; car le bon sens, et ce que les anciens nous disent, nous conduit à penser que leur recitation étoit partout de même nature, et qu'elle ne se bigarroit point, tantôt d'une simple declamation, et tantôt d'un chant musical^k.”

By the same presumptive mode of arguing, the Abbé might also have proved, *à priori*, that the Greeks could not possibly have been guilty of the modern barbarous *bigarrure* of serious and ludicrous, in their Tragic drama. But the first Greek Tragedy he had opened would probably have overturned his reasoning^l.

A thorough discussion of all the passages of ancient authors, that throw any light upon this question, relative to the dramatic representations of the Greeks, would draw me much too far beyond my bounds. I must content myself with pointing out (for I think it has not been observed,) the stubborn difficulty which this passage of Aristotle appears to me to throw in the way of the common opinion upon this subject ; and with hazarding a merely *hypothetical* conjecture, that, *if*, as Aristotle *seems* plainly to say, *some* part of the Greek Tragedy was spoken, like our Tragic declamation, without any musical accompaniment, it was, most probably, that part of the dialogue, which, as I have before observed, in NOTE 33, is, in every Tragedy, easily distinguished from the rest ; by its being carried on in a sort of quick repartee of verse to verse.

¹ The 30th and 49th of Aristotle's *Harmonic Prob.* Sect. 19. are, alone, sufficient proofs of this point.

^k Mem. de l'Acad. Roy. des Inscriptions, &c. tome II. p. 343, *Novo*.

^l See NOTE 33.

As, in this part of the dialogue, we almost constantly find the Tragic tone lowered to a more colloquial pitch, and even approaching frequently to the jocular and burlesque, it seems reasonable to think, that here, *if anywhere*, the musical accompaniment, and the elevation of lengthened and chanting tones, were withdrawn, and common *conversation* left to common *speech*.

But what, again, are we to understand by—*και παλιν ετερα δια μελες*?—Are we to repeat *μουρον*, and understand *Melody alone*, without the two other *ηδυσματα*, Rhythm and Metre? This cannot be. For though we may strip the Tragic language of melody and of rhythm, or, in other words, of *Music*, we cannot strip it of metre. The antients most certainly did not admit *prose* into their Tragedies; and as little can we conceive them to have set *prose* to *Music*^m.

Dacier, and some other commentators, understand by *μελ* here, *Music*, including rhythm. This sense of the word is certainly warrantable; but it can hardly be the sense here: for, surely, an instance, in which *all the three ηδυσματα* were used, (as they must be, if *metre* be indispensable, and *μελ* imply *rhythm* and *melody*,) would be but a strange illustration of the ΧΩΡΙΣ *εκασε των ειδων κ. τ. αλ.*

I do not see what remains, but, that we take *μελ* here in its most restrained sense, as distinct from *rhythm*, or *time*, and synonymous to *αρμονια*; that sense, in which Aristotle had used it before, in his first chapterⁿ. And if we do this, we must necessarily,
I think,

^m The reader will observe that Aristotle is expressly speaking of the *ηδυσματα* of Tragic *speech* or *language*: *λεγω δε ηδυσμενον μεν ΛΟΓΟΝ τον ερχοντα ρυθμον, &c.*—*Words*, therefore, are equally implied in all these *ηδυσματα*, and, consequently, *Music alone*—i. e. *instrumental Music*, is here entirely out of the question.

ⁿ — *ρυθμος και ΜΕΛΗ και μετρον*, answering to his *first* division, *ρυθμος και λεγω και ΑΡΜΟΝΙΑ*.

The word ΜΕΛΟΣ, it may be useful to observe, occurs in three different *musical* senses. 1. Sometimes, as here, and in the Greek writers on *Music*, in the same sense as *αρμονια*—i. e. *melody*, abstracted from rhythm, or time. Thus, Aristides Quintilianus,

I think, understand, that some parts of the dialogue were *sung* without *rhythm*: I mean, without *musical* rhythm, or *time*, though certainly not without that poetical or prosodic rhythm, by which in *reciting* verse, and, indeed, even in the most familiar conversation, the syllabic quantity must have been *relatively*, at least, observed, though not, I presume, with the inflexibility of musical measure, nor with such a rigorous equality of *long* to *long*, and *short* to *short*, as is essential to the execution of what is properly called *Musical*, and as I suppose to have been observed in the choral odes^o. Thus the dialogue of the Greek Tragedy will appear to have been not improperly compared to our recitative; differing from the chorus, as our recitative differs from the *airs*, both in the absence of strict time, and in the *kind* of melody, which was also, as mere *melody*, less *musical* than the *choral* melody, and more imitative of *speech*, as well as of *action*^p. Whether the monologues, or *long speeches*—the *μακρὰί ῥήσεις*, as Plato calls them^o—were performed in the same way, as the rest of the dialogue, or, as it has been imagined, were distinguished by being more measured and musical, is a point not easily cleared up. The passages commonly appealed to for this

p. 32, and see p. 7, his account of *μελῳδία*, &c. 2. Sometimes, for *air*, or *measured melody*; as in the definition of Bacchius, p. 19. (*Ed. Meib.*) 3. Sometimes it is used as equivalent to *sung*, including melody, rhythm, and *words*. Thus Plato—το ΜΕΛΟΣ ἐν τριῶν ἐστὶ συνημμένον, λόγος τε, καὶ ἀρμονίας, καὶ ῥυθμῶν. *Rep.* iii. p. 398. D. In another place, however, he uses it in the *narrowest* and narrowest sense, for *mere melody*: ΜΕΛΟΣ δ' αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀνευ ῥημάτων, *De Leg.* ii. p. 669. —This third, and fullest sense of the word is what A. Quintil. expresses by *mel^o τερειν.* p. 6.

^o This has been well remarked by Dr. Burney, *Hist. of Mus.* vol. i. p. 161. “The “melody of antient declamation,” &c.—M. Burette goes so far as to suppose, that no strict rhythm was admitted even in the *choral* part of the antient Tragedy. His authority is the following passage of Plutarch's *Dial. de Mus.*—τῶν μὲν χωρηματικῶν ῥησέων, καὶ ΠΥΘΜΩΝ, τραγῳδία μὲν ἰδέσθω καὶ τμηρὸν κεχρησται. p. 2084. *ed. H. S.* But the text here is evidently corrupt. The name of some particular *species* of rhythm is probably omitted. See *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscrip.* tome xix. p. 427. *οὐτάνο*.

^p See Aristotle's Problems, *Sec.* 19. *Prob.* xv. and xlix.

^o *De Rep.* x. p. 605.

purpose, from the grammarians Diomedes and Donatus, about the *Cantica* of the *Roman Comedy*, I look upon as a very frail foundation of any conclusion with respect to the *Greek Tragedy*. The passage of Plutarch above quoted, *note* ², furnishes the strongest support I know of for such a distinction. For, if by “*spoken or recited to an instrumental accompaniment*,” (τα μὲν [ἰσ. των ἰαμβειων] ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ παρα την κιθαρην) Plutarch meant, as I think he must mean, *sung in recitative*, not literally *spoken*, (for how could that admit of a musical accompaniment?) then, ἀδῆσθαι, which is opposed to it, must of course imply, not mere *singing* as opposed to *speech*, but a more *musical* and *measured* melody.

N O T E 47.

P. 76. THE MEANING OF MELOPOEIA IS OBVIOUS——.

I have ventured to depart from the common interpretation, by understanding the word *δυναμις*, here, to mean, not the power, and *effect*, of the *Melopoëia* itself, but the power, i. e. the *meaning*, of the *term*. Aristotle is here, as usual, explaining the terms he had made use of. It was directly to his purpose to say, as a reason for omitting a definition in this instance, that the *meaning* of the word was well known; but not at all to his purpose, to say—“ I need not explain the *word*, because the *power* and *effect* of the *thing* “ signified by it, (that is, of *Music*,) is well known.”

Dacier is amusing here. He wonders what could induce the Greeks to make Music a part of their drama; and at last, “*après bien des recherches*,” he discovers one principal cause to have been this—that they had very musical ears; but he does not dis-

^r See the Abbè Du Bos, *Reflex. sur la Poëf. &c.* vol. iii. *See* II, &c.—This writer’s explanation of the passage of Aristotle that we have been considering, is worth the reader’s inspection, as a perfect model of misrepresentation, absurdity, and blundering.

cover the cause of his own wonder, which, in all probability, was, that *he* had not.

N O T E 48.

P. 76. OR DELIVERING A GENERAL SENTIMENT.

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines *γνώμη* by *καθολε ἀποφανσις*. [Lib. ii. cap. xxi. p. 572.] Thus below, in this chapter, for, *ἀποφαινονται γνώμην*, his *first* expression, we have, *καθολε ἀποφαινονται*.—This has been loosely and inaccurately rendered in all the translations I have seen, except those of Castelvetro and Goulston.

N O T E 49.

P. 76. THESE PARTS----HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED BY MOST POETS.

Locus, as the critics say, *conclamatus*. Time is too precious to be wasted in the support, or refutation, of random conjectures upon a passage of such desperate corruption.—How can *ἐκ ὀλιγοι*, “*not a few*,” be tortured into, “*all*,” or, “*almost all*?” Yet so Dacier, Batteux, Goulston, &c. On the other hand, if fairly translated, “*not a few Poets* have made use of these parts,” how strangely it will follow—“*for EVERY Tragedy* has them all!”—And how is the *ὡς εἶπεν*, to be applied? to *ἐκ ὀλιγοι*, or, to *εἶδεσι*?

In the midst of these difficulties, all I could do was to make my version consistent with *itself*; faithful to the *original*, I could not make it, without making it nonsensical.

Those commentators, who apply the *ὡς εἶπεν* to the word *εἶδεσι*, seem favoured by *cb.* xii. where, speaking of the same essential parts of Tragedy, Aristotle says—*εἰς μὲν ΩΣ ΕΙΔΕΣΙ δεῖ χρῆσθαι*.

N O T E 50.

P. 77. THE SUPREME GOOD ITSELF----IS ACTION, NOT QUALITY.

See *Ethic. Nicom.* I. 5, 7, 8. *ed. Wilk. & Mag. Moral.* I. 4, p. 149, 150, *ed. Duval.*

N O T E 51.

P. 77. THE TRAGEDIES OF MOST MODERN POETS HAVE THIS DEFECT.

This receives illustration from what Aristotle presently after says, of “ the *rhetorical manner* prevailing in the Poets of his “ time:” *οἱ δὲ νῦν, ῥητορικῶς. cap. vi:* and from his observation, at the close of *cap. xxiv.* [*Transl. Part III. Sect. 6.*] that “ the “ *manners and sentiments are only obscured by too splendid a “ diction.*”

What he has here said of the recent Tragedies of his time, may perhaps be said, in general, of our modern Tragedies, compared with those of Shakspeare. The truth, I believe, is, that the Tragedy of a refined and polished age will always have less *ῥητορικῶς* than that of ruder times, because it will have more dignity; more of that uniform and level elevation, which excludes strong *traits* of character, and the simple, unvarnished delineation of the manners. Indeed, what the Greeks denominated *ῥητορικῶς*, is the peculiar province of *Comedy*^a, and is seldom to be found in Tragedy, except in that stage of its progress, when it is not yet thoroughly and distinctly separated from Comedy; from the imitation of *common*

^a Illud (*ῥητορικῶς*) *Comœdiæ*, hoc (*παιδικῶς*) *Tragœdiæ*, simile.—*Quintil.* p. 302, *ed. Gib.*

life, and *natural* manners'. Such are the Tragedies of Shakspeare; and such, as I have before ventured to suggest, are those of Euripides in particular, which, in proportion as they have less dignity, have more ἡθῶν, than the Tragedies of Sophocles. But in neither of them, nor, probably, even in those very Poets here censured by Aristotle, was the "language of *Poets*," substituted for "the language of *men*," as it is almost constantly in the French Tragedy, and too, often, in our own Tragedies of the *French school*.

N O T E 52.

P. 77. POLYGNOTUS EXCELS IN THE EXPRESSION OF THE MANNERS.

I see not the smallest reason for the substitution of ἀγαθῶν, for ἀγαθῶν, which is the reading, we are told, of all the MSS. What Aristotle had said before of Polygnotus, *cap. ii.*—ὅτι κρείττους ἐμάζε —seems not to afford the slightest ground for alteration here. [See Mr. Winstanley's *ed.* p. 281.] Painters are compared in very different points of view, in these two passages: *there*, as imitating *good or bad, serious or ridiculous, elevated or low*, objects: *here*, only as expressing, or not expressing, *manners*. It was directly to Aristotle's purpose to say, that Polygnotus was a "good manner-painter;" (ἀγαθῶν ἡθογραφεύων)—not at all to his purpose, (besides the awkwardness of the expression itself,) to say, that he was "a manner-painter of good men:" (ἀγαθῶν ἡθογραφεύων.)

^b — ἀπλαν, says Demetrius, καὶ ἀποικτον, το ἡθῶν. *Seel.* 28.—And see Longinus, *Seel.* 9, where he very justly calls the *Odyssey*, κωμῶδιαι τις ἡθολογεύμεν,

^c "Addison," says Dr. Johnson in his admirable preface to Shakspeare, "speaks the language of Poets, and Shakspeare, of men.—The composition refers us only to the writer; we pronounce the name of *Cato*, but we think on *Addison*."

N O T E 53.

P. 77. JUST AS IN PAINTING, &c.

I hope I shall not much shock even the most conscientious adherents to the established inaccuracy and authentic blunders of ancient manuscripts, by having ventured to adopt here the transposition first proposed, I believe, by Castelvetro^a. I can only desire those readers, who may be alarmed at my temerity, to read the passage—*παραπλησιον γαρ ἐστι—κ. τ. αλλ.—το, ἐκονα,*—first, where it stands in all the editions, and then, where I have placed it, immediately after the words—*ἐχουσα δε μυθον και συζασιν πραγματων.*—If this experiment alone be not sufficient to convince them of the propriety, or, rather, the necessity, of the transposition, I despair of the success of any arguments I am able to produce in the support of it. To me, I confess, it is among those things that are too evident for proof.

N O T E 54.

P. 77. ADVENTURERS IN TRAGIC WRITING ARE SOONER ABLE, &c.—

Aristotle argues here upon a principle rather rhetorical and popular, than philosophical—that, which infers superior *worth* from

^a *Poetica d' Aristotele*, &c. p. 142. Ed é da sapere, che di sotto si truovano *in luogo non convenevole queste parole, παραπλησιον—ἐκονα.* Le quali parole debbono seguirsi prossimamente dopo *πραγματων*, &c. Heinsius, too, saw the necessity of the transposition, but appears to me to have, in a great measure, destroyed the propriety of it, by inserting the passage, not immediately after *πραγματων*, but after *ἀναγασεις*, in the next sentence. See his note, in Goulston's ed. or the Ox. ed. 1780.

superior

superior *difficulty* and *rarity*:—το χαλεπωτερον και σπανιωτερον, μείζον, (sc. αγαθον,) as he lays it down in his *Rhetoric*, *lib. i. cap. vii.* p. 529.

Lord Bacon, in his *Essay On Gardens*, uses the same argument, and almost in Aristotle's words, with respect to the superiority of gardening to architecture: "A man shall ever see, that when ages grow to civility and elegancy, *men come to build stately sooner than to garden finely; as if gardening were the greater perfection.*"

The truth, however, of the fact here asserted by Aristotle, appears, not only from the earlier dramatic Poets of every nation, but from the defects of plots in general, whether Dramatic or Epic; and from the rarity of those dramatic fables, for which the Poet has trusted entirely to his own invention, without recourse to history, or novels, or the productions of other dramatists^a.—"En general, il y a plus de pieces bien dialoguées, que de pieces bien conduites. Le Génie qui dispose les incidens, paroît plus rare que celui qui trouve les vrais discours. Combien de belles scenes dans Moliere!—On compte ses dénouemens heureux.—On seroit tenté de croire qu'un drame devoit être l'ouvrage de deux hommes de génie, l'un qui arrangeât, et l'autre qui fit parler."—Diderot, *de la Poés. Dram.* p. 288.

N O T E 55.

P. 78. TO THIS PART BELONGS, &c.—

Aristotle is not here *defining* Διανοια, as his expression, τετο δε ΕΣΤΙ, seems, at first view, to imply: he is only explaining the subservience of the sentiments to the manners; he is shewing *why* they are *next* in rank and importance to the *manners*; namely, because manners or characters, are, in great part at least, manifested by the sentiments. Dacier's note here is good. "Aristote suit

^a See Harris's *Philol. Inq.* p. 160.

“ici l'ordre naturel. Les sentimens sont pour les mœurs, ce que
 “les mœurs sont pour l'action. Comme un Poete tragique ne
 “peut bien imiter une action, qu'en employant les mœurs, il ne
 “peut non plus bien marquer les mœurs, que par le moyen des
 “sentimens ; & par conséquent les sentimens tiennent le troisieme
 “rang dans la Tragedie.”

N O T E 56.

P. 78. WHICH, IN THE DIALOGUE, DEPENDS ON THE
 POLITICAL AND RHETORICAL ARTS.

—Ὅπερ, ἐπι τῶν λόγων, τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.—I have not seen the words, ἐπι τῶν λόγων, satisfactorily explained. I cannot agree with those commentators, who by λόγοι, here, understand, *oratory, prose eloquence*, as opposed to Poetry: a sense, indeed, very common, in Aristotle and other writers; but if we adopt it here, how follows—οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίησαν λεγοντας? for here, Aristotle evidently speaks of *Poets*; not of *orators*, as Dacier renders it. The passage, then, fairly translated, would stand thus:—“which, (i. e. the choice of proper sentiments,) in
 “ORATORY, is the business of the political and rhetorical arts:
 “FOR the antient Tragic Poets made their characters speak poli-
 “tically,” &c. Nothing can well be more incoherent.

Ἐπι τῶν λόγων, means, I think,—in the *speeches, discourse, or dialogue part* of the drama, as distinguished from the *choral or lyric part*, which had nothing, or comparatively nothing, to do with ἦθος or *character*, and in which the Poet was, of course, to draw his διανοία, or *thoughts*, principally at least, from different sources; not from the stores of civil wisdom, or rhetorical art, but from those of Religion, Ethics, Mythology, and Poetry. The word λόγοι, is clearly used in the same sense, in a passage that presently follows:—διόπερ ἐκ ἔχουσιν ἦθος ἐνίοι τῶν ΛΟΓΩΝ—“some
 “of the *speeches, or the dialogue.*”

NOTE

N O T E 57.

P. 78. FOR THE ANTIENTS MADE THEIR CHARACTERS SPEAK IN THE STYLE OF POLITICAL AND POPULAR ELOQUENCE; BUT NOW, THE RHETORICAL MANNER PREVAILS.

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΣ ἐποίησαν λεγοντάς, οἱ δὲ νῦν, ῥητορικῶς.— So, *Rhet. lib. ii. cap. xxii.* p. 573, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΙ συλλογισμῶ— a *Civil* or *Oratorical* syllogism, as opposed to the *strict dialectic* syllogism: a distinction which he presently after expresses by, ἀκριβεσσερον, and ΜΑΛΑΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ, συλλογιζεσθαι [*ibid.*] And thus, here, the same term, πολιτικῶς, is used, to distinguish the popular, and less laboured, though more solid, eloquence of the Senate or the Forum, from the studied and declamatory composition of the professed rhetoricians. A similar use of the word occurs in the passage quoted in NOTE 229, from the *Euagoras* of Isocrates, where, ὀνομασι ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΙΣ, is plainly synonymous with ὀνομασι ΚΥΡΙΟΙΣ. See also Dion. Halicarn. *De Struct. Orat. p. 4. ed. Upton*, and Faber's note.

That Aristotle, however, by *Politics* (ἡ πολιτικῆ), means *only*, as Dacier asserts, “ l'usage commun, le langage ordinaire des peuples,” cannot, surely, be admitted. The force and extent of the term is well known^a. “ CIVILIS SCIENTIA,” says Quintilian, “ idem “ quod SAPIENTIA est.” It comprehended all the necessary knowledge of the Πολιτικῶς, the *vir civilis*, the *public man*. It included, of course, eloquence, or the faculty of public speaking, but that, of a kind very different from the “ *umbratile genus*,” as Cicero calls it, of the rhetorical schools^c. What Aristotle says of the

^a See *Eth. Nicom. lib. i. cap. ii. and iii.* and *Mag. Moral. lib. i. cap. i.*

^b *Lib. ii. cap. xv. p. 106. ed. Giff.*

^c *Cic. de Or. ii. 15 to 19.* where he traces the separation of *eloquence* from *philosophy*. The difference of the political and rhetorical styles may be well illustrated, I think,

the old Tragic Poets, that they made their personages speak like such a man, not like a *Rhetorician*, cannot be better illustrated than by Quintilian's character of *Euripides*. "Illud quidem nemo
 " non fateatur necesse est, *iis qui se ad agendum comparent, utili-*
 " orem longè *Euripidem* fore. Namque is, *et in sermone* —
 " magis accedit *oratorio generi, et sententiis densus*; et in iis quæ
 " à *sapientibus* tradita sunt, penè ipsi par, et in dicendo ac respon-
 " dendo *cuiilibet eorum qui fuerunt IN FORO DISERTI comparandus.*"
 [lib. x. cap. i.]

That Dacier, with so precise and clear an expression before his eyes, as, ΕΠΟΙΟΤΝ λεγοντας, should understand this of the antient *orators*, and roundly pronounce Victorius to be mistaken in applying it to the *Poets*, seems perfectly unaccountable.

I do not see in this passage any foundation for the refinement of Castelvetro, Dacier, and other commentators, who refer the *ἔνοντα* to the political science, and the *ἀρμοστροντα* to rhetoric. The word *ἀρμοστροντα*, has, I think, the same sense as in *cap. xv.* and means, such sentiments, or thoughts, as, being adapted to the person speaking, are expressive of the *manners*: for it is in this view, as I before remarked, that Aristotle is here considering the *sentiments*, or *Διανοια*. Τα ἔνοντα, as Victorius has observed, is equivalent to τα ὑπαρχοντα; and it was clearly the business of rhetoric (*ῥητορικῆς ἔργον*,) to teach both the ὑπαρχοντα and the ἀρμοστροντα. See *Rhet. lib. ii. cap. xxii.* p. 573, E. and *lib. iii. cap. vii.* p. 590, D. *ed. Duval.*

I think, by a comparison of the style of Cicero, (in his *Orations*,) with that of Demosthenes: for on this subject, I cannot but agree with the remarks of Lord Monboddo, *Orig. and Prog. of Lang.* vol. iii. p. 184, and vol. ii. *Diff.* III.

N O T E 58.

P. 78. THERE ARE SPEECHES, THEREFORE, WHICH ARE WITHOUT MANNERS----AS NOT CONTAINING, &c.

The reading I have followed is, I think, fully authorised, by MSS. and by common sense.—See Mr. Winstanley's note, p. 282.—The Abbé Batteux has given the passage thus, from a MS. (N^o 2117,) in the King of France's library. Εσι δε ἡθ^ο μιν το τοικτον, ὁ δηλοι την προαιρεσιν, ὅποια τις ἐσιν· διοπερ ἐκ ἐχσιν ἡθ^ο ἐνοι: των λογων, ἐν οἷς ἐκ ἐσι δηλον ὅτι προαιρεται ἢ φευγει ὁ λεγων.

The common reading stands thus:—Εσι δε ἡθ^ο μιν το τοικτον, ὁ δηλοι την προαιρεσιν, ὅποια τις ἐσιν, ἐν οἷς ἐκ ἐσι δηλον, ἢ προαιρεται, ἢ φευγει ὁ λεγων· διοπερ ἐκ ἐχσιν ἡθ^ο ἐνοι των λογων.—Which is thus rendered by Mr. Harris: “MANNERS OF CHARACTER *is that which discovers* WHAT THE DETERMINATION [of a speaker] *will be, in matters, where* IT IS NOT YET MANIFEST, *whether he chuses to do a thing, or to avoid it*.” Now if this were true, I do not see how there could be any ἡθ^ο, in any play, after the first discovery of the speaker's character. In the *Avarice* of Moliere, for instance, it is sufficiently *manifest* from the very first scene in which Harpagon appears, what his avarice will lead him to *chuse* or to *avoid*, in any circumstance of the drama. Is there, for that reason, no ἡθ^ο, no sentiments that mark his character, in any thing he says during the rest of the play?—Nay, more; according to this reading, there can be no ἡθ^ο at all in any part of that drama: for the προαιρεσις or propensity of *the Miser* is completely known to every reader or spectator from the very title of the piece.

I know, indeed, that Le Bossu, and others, have given a meaning to this passage, by *making* Aristotle say, what he certainly does

^a The words—*την προαιρεσιν ὅποια τις ἐσιν*, are not, I think, rendered with Mr. Harris's usual accuracy,—“*what the determination of a speaker will be.*” Προαιρεσις, here, is not *particular determination*, but that habitual and *general propensity* which is the *cause* of particular determinations.

not say—viz. when it is not yet manifest “*ex indicio dicentis*,” what the will, or choice, of the speaker is^b. But if the common reading were right, we might, surely, expect to find the words, ἐν οἷς ἐκ ἐστὶ δῆλον, &c. subjoined in other places where he defines the ἤθη. Yet we have nothing like it in cap. xv. *initio*; nor in the second book of his *Rhetoric*, where he says only, ἤθη δ’ ἐχουσι λόγοι, ἐν ὅσοις δῆλη ἢ προαιρέσις^c: nor in other passages of the same work, relative to the same subject.

Piccolomini’s translation agrees with mine, and is expressed with his usual accuracy.—“Ma il costume nel parlar’ é quello, “il quale mostra fuora, è apparir fà il volere, et l’election di chi “parla. Peroche alcuni parlari si truovano, li quali non hanno “costume; come ch’ in essi non appaia, et non si manifesti, quello, “che ò elegga, ò fugga, con la sua volontà, chi parla.”

N O T E 59.

P. 78. A BEGINNING, IS THAT, &c.

See Harris, *Philol. Inq. Part II. ch. v.* These definitions must be understood wholly to refer to the wants, and expectations, of the spectator. He must *want* nothing before the beginning, nor *expect* any thing after the end. Nothing, however, is more common than both these defects; than perplexed beginnings, and unsatisfactory conclusions. Henry Fielding, we are told, used “to execrate the man who invented fifth acts.” The inventor of *first* acts has not given dramatic Poets much less trouble. Most modern plays have, I think, more or less of this intricacy in their beginnings; but it is especially the case with Comedy. It

^b Heinſius *De Trag. Conf.* cap. xiv. Le Boſſu, *Du Poème Epique*, livre iv. ch. 4.

^c Cap. xxi. p. 572. E.

^d Harris, *Phil. Inq.* p. 161.

seems, indeed, by no means easy for a modern comic writer, of whom invention, novelty, variety of incidents, and ingenuity of contrivance, are required, *δεναι*, as Aristotle well expresses it, *ὡσπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα, τὴν ἀρχὴν*—i. e. *to put the beginning fairly into the spectator's hand.*" The spectator, and even the reader, of a new Comedy, is generally employed, during the first scenes, in guessing an ænigma; and when, at length, he comprehends what is going forward, his attention, interest, and sympathy, are disturbed and distracted, by looking back, to understand what he *should* have understood at first. Hence the advantage which the *Tragic* Poet, from the notoriety of his subjects, generally possesses over the *Comic*; and which is so pleasantly described in the fragment preserved by Athenæus from Antiphanes or Aristophanes^c, that I shall save the reader the trouble of turning to it.

———— Μακαριον ἔστιν ἡ Τραγωδία

Ποίημα κατὰ παντ' εἶγε πρῶτον οἱ λόγοι

ὑπο τῶν θεατῶν εἰσιν ἐγνωρισμένοι

Ποιῶν καὶ τιν' εἶπεν, ὡς ὑπομνησάι μόνον

Δει τὸν ποιητὴν. Οἰδιπέων γὰρ ἂν γε φῶ,

Ἔτα δ' ἄλλα παντ' ἴσασιν.—ὁ πατὴρ Λαίῳ,

Μήτηρ Ἰοκάστη—θυγατέρες, παῖδες, τινες.—

Τι πείσῃ ἔτῳ, τι πεποίηκεν.—ἂν παλιν

εἴπῃ τις Ἀλκμαίωνα, καὶ τὰ παῖδια

παντ' εὐθύς εἶρηκεν.—ὅτι μανεῖς ἀπέκτενε

τὴν μητέρα.— — — —

— — — —

Ἡμῖν δὲ ταυτ' εἴη ἔστιν ἄλλα πάντα δεῖ

εὐρεῖν, ὀνόματα κείνα, τὰ διωκόμενα

πρῶτον, τὰ νῦν παρόντα, τὴν καταστροφὴν.

τὴν ἐσβολὴν ἂν ἐν τῇ τετραῶν παραλίπῃ

Χρέμης τις, ἢ Φαίδων τις, ἐκσυριττεται,

ΠΗΛΕΙ δὲ ταυτ' ἔξεστι καὶ ΤΕΤΚΡΩῖ ποιεῖν.

^b See NOTE 40.

^c Athen. lib. vi. See *Cayendor*, in locum.

Thus rendered by Grotius^d—

— — Scilicet Tragœdia
 Felix poema est : nam principio cognitum
 Argumentum omne spectatori est, antequam
 Verbum hiscat aliquis : nomen tantum dicere
 Poetæ satis est. Oedipum præscripsero,
 Jam reliqua per se norunt ; pater est Laïus,
 Jocasta mater ; tum qui nati et filiæ,
 Quid fecit, quid patietur. Si promiserit
 Alcmaëona alius, ipsi dicent pueruli,
 “ Hic ille est qui interfecit matrem infaniens.”—

— — — — —
 — — — — —

At nobis ista non licent, sed omnia
 Sunt invenienda, nomina imprimis nova,
 Res antequæ, res præsentæ, exitus,
 Initia. Ex illis siqua pars defecerit,
 Exsibilatur Phido, sive ille est Chremes ;
 Illa alia facere Pelco et Teucro licet.

When the *middle* of a drama is not sufficiently connected with what precedes,—that is, in Aristotle's language, when it is not, *αὐτο μετ' ἄλλο*,—a new plot seems to begin: a fault not uncommon in double and complicated fables^c. If, on the other hand, it wants the *μετ' ἑκαυο ἕτερον*, the piece seems finished before its time. The *Sampson Agonistes* of Milton, according to Dr. Johnson, is deficient in both requisites of a true, Aristotelic *middle*. Its “ *intermediate* parts have neither *cause* nor *consequence*, neither hasten “ nor retard the catastrophe'.” The criticism appears to be just.

^d *Excerpta ex Trag. et Com. Græcis*, p. 622.

^c Qu'y a-t-il de plus adroit que la manière dont Terence a entrelacé les amours de *Pamphile* et de *Charinus* dans l'*Andrienne*? Cependant l'a-t-il fait sans inconvénient?—Au commencement du second acte, *ne croiroit-on pas entrer dans une autre pièce?* Diderot, *De la Poés. Dram.* p. 283.

^f Life of Milton.

It is seldom, however, that a beginning, a middle, or an end, is defective in both the conditions required. A beginning, which, strictly speaking, *did not naturally require any thing to follow it*, (μετ' ἔκκεινο ἕτερον πεφυκεν εἶναι,) would put even the most attentive spectator into the situation of Shakspeare's drowsy tinker :

Sly. A goodly matter, surely.—*Comes there any more of it?*

Page. My Lord, 'tis but *begun*ᵘ.

The most usual defects, and which, I suppose, Aristotle had principally in view, are those of *beginnings* which do not properly, in his sense, *begin*, and of *endings* which do not *end*. The first perplex us, by supposing something to have preceded, without clearly telling us what; the other leave us dissatisfied, by disappointing our natural expectations of something more to follow. Of this last fault, instances may be found in abundance; particularly in the conclusions of Shakspeare^b. In *Plautus*, and even in *Terence*, we find this imperfection supplied by a very simple and clumsy contrivance, that, of informing the audience that the play was over, and telling them in what manner they were to *suppose* the catastrophe completed.

Spectatores, *Fabula hæc est acta* : vos plausum date.

Plaut. Mostel.

Spectatores, quod futurum est *intus*, hic memorabimus.

Hæc Casina hujus reperietur filia esse è proximo;

Eaque nubet Euthynico nostro herili filio.

Id. in fine Casinæ.

Ne expectetis dum exeant huc : *intus* despondebitur;

Intus transigetur, *si quid est quod restat*.

Ter. And.

ᵘ Taming of the Shrew.

^b See Dr. Johnson's Preface to Shakspeare, p. 16. There cannot be a stronger proof of Shakspeare's haste in the conclusion of his plays, than his passing over in total silence the interesting character of old Adam, at the end of *As you like it*; a defect felt, I believe, by every spectator and every reader of that charming comedy.

The fault opposite to this—that, of prolonging the piece beyond the point of satisfactory conclusion—has been attributed to the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles. The criticism is tasteless, on every account. The reader may see it well confuted by Brumoy. But *one* of his answers is alone sufficient, on the principles of Aristotle: “*Le spectateur en effet seroit-il content s’il ignoroit le sort de Jocaste, d’Oedipe, et de sa famille?*” &c.¹ “Oedipus,” says Voltaire, “is fully acquainted with his fate at the end of the fourth act. *Voilà donc la pièce finie*”^k.—He might have learned better criticism from a writer of far inferior abilities. “Il faut aussi prendre garde que la catastrophe achève pleinement le Poëme dramatique; c’est à dire, qu’il ne reste rien après, ou de ce que les spectateurs doivent sçavoir, ou qu’ils *vueillent* entendre; car s’ils ont raison de demander, *Qu’est devenu quelque personnage intéressé dans les grandes intrigues du Theatre, ou s’ils ont juste sujet de sçavoir, Quels sont les sentimens de quelq’un des principaux acteurs après le dernier evenement qui fait cette catastrophe,*—la *pièce n’est pas finie, il y manque encore un dernier trait*!” That is to say, in Aristotle’s language, a drama so concluded, (as the *Oedipus Tyrannus* would be, if it ended with the *fourth* act,) would want the *true* τελευτη, or *end*—that, after which, ἄλλο ἔδει ΠΕΦΥΚΕΝ ἐναι.

¹ Theatre des Grecs, i. 376.

^k Critique sur l’Oedipe de Sophocle.

^l D’Aubignac, Pratique du Theatre, tom. i. p. 126. This author, though neither a good writer, nor a deep scholar, has collected in this book a good deal of curious *theatrical* erudition, and made some acute and judicious observations on the rules of dramatic writing. He was unfortunate when he attempted to put his theory into practice by writing a Tragedy. “Je sçais bon gré,” said the great Condé, “à l’Abbé D’Aubignac d’avoir suivi les regles d’Aristote, mais je ne pardonne pas aux regles d’Aristote, d’avoir fait faire une si mauvaise Tragédie à l’Abbé D’Aubignac.”

N O T E 60.

P. 79. WHETHER IT BE AN ANIMAL, &c.

Αλλά τοδὲ γε ὀίμαι σε φαναι ἂν δεῖν, πάντα λογόν ὍΣΠΕΡ ΖΩΟΝ. συνεσαναι, σωματι τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτῆ· ὡσεὶ μητε ΑΚΕΦΑΛΟΝ εἶναι μητε ΑΠΟΥΝ, ἀλλὰ ΜΕΣΑ τε ἔχειν, καὶ ΑΚΡΑ, πρεποντα ἀλληλοῖς καὶ τῷ ὍΛΩι——.

Plato, in *Phædro*, p. 264, ed. Ser.

N O T E 61.

P. 79. BEAUTY CONSISTS IN MAGNITUDE AND ORDER.

There is something singular, something, at least, not quite consonant to modern ideas, in the great stress which the ancients appear to have laid upon *size*, as a necessary constituent of beauty in the human form. They seem, indeed, to have despised every thing that was not *large*; and to have estimated beauty, not by measure only, but by *weight* also. “Magnanimity,” says the Philosopher in his *Ethics*, “consists in greatness of soul, as *beauty* also consists in *greatness of body*. Little men may be called *ἀσμοί*, and *συμμετροί*, *pretty*, and *well-shaped*, but not ΚΑΛΟΙ, *handsome*, or *beautiful*.”

That magnitude should have entered, as essential, into their idea of a handsome *man*, is not surprising. The utility of strength, and the connection between strength and size, is sufficient to account for this. But what appears most singular is, that they insist no less upon the importance of magnitude to *female* beauty,

* *Ethic. Nicom. lib. iv. cap. 3.*

—ΘΗΛΕΙΩΝ δὲ ἀρετῆ, σώματ' ἔμειν, καλλ' ἔχει καὶ ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ". HOMER seldom omits size in his descriptions of this kind.

Ἔσκε δὲ πατρ' ἔμοιο γυνὴ Φοινισσ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ,
Καλὴ τε ΜΕΓΑΛΗ τε, καὶ ἀγλαὰ ἔργ' εἰδυῖα.

Od. O. 416.

Nor let it be objected, that this praise comes from a swine-herd; for Eurymachus, a suitor, and a courtier, compliments Penelope, by telling her, that she was more *accomplished in mind, handsome,* and LARGER, than other women:

—— ἔπει περιεσσι γυναικῶν
Εἶδ' ἔτε, ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ τε, ἴδε φρεναὶς ἐνδόν εἴσας.

Od. Σ. 248.

And, indeed, when Minerva, that Penelope might fascinate the suitors, anointed her with the cosmetic wash of Venus, and gave a supernatural heightening to all her charms, at the same time that she made her skin "*whiter than ivory,*" she made her also "*taller and stouter.*"

Ἀμβροτὰ δῶρα δίδε, ἵνα μιν θησαιατ' Ἀχαιοί·
Καλλεῖ μιν οἱ πρῶτα προσωπα τε καλά καθήρην
Ἀμβροσίῳ, οἷον περ' εὐσεφάν' Κυθερείῃ
Χρισταί, εὐτ' ἂν ἦ Χαριτων χορον ἡμεροῦντα·
Καὶ μιν ΜΑΚΡΟΤΕΡΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΣΣΟΝΑ θηκεν ἰδεσθαι,
Λευκοτέρην δ' ἄρα μιν θηκεν πρῖσε ἑλεφαντ'.

Ibid. 190.

Thus, too, of the daughters of Pandarus:

Ἦρη δ' αὐτήτιν περὶ πασῶν δῶκε γυναικῶν
Εἶδ' ἔκαι πρυτὴν, ΜΗΚΟΣ δ' ἔπορ' Ἀρτεμῖς ἀγνή.

Od. Φ. 6.

When Penelope, in the beginning of the twenty-first book, goes to fetch the key of the repository, where the bow of Ulysses was kept, Homer describes her as taking hold of the key with her "*stout hand:*"

^b Rhod. i. cap. v.—Xenophon, describing *Panthea*, says—*ἀνερχομένη—πρωτον μιν,* τῆ ΜΕΓΕΘΕΙ, ἑπτα δὲ τῆ ΡΩΜΗΙ, &c. *Cyropad. lib. v. initio.*

ἔειλετο δὲ κληῖδ' εὐκαμπέα ΧΕΙΡΙ ΠΑΧΕΙΗ.

Od. φ. 6.

—which Ernestus, who allows, that, “*manu crassá, non benè convenit*” “*feminæ pulchræ et reginæ,*” would fain soften down into the *main potelée* of the French.

Quintilian observes of *Zeuxis*, who drew the heads and limbs of his figures very large, that, in this, he followed HOMER, “*cui*” “*validissima quæque forma, etiam in sæminis, placet;*” and, that he did this, “*id amplius atque augustius ratus*”: and, indeed, these ideas of the ancients relative to beauty, both male and female, seem to have been owing, in part, at least, to their ideas of that *majesty* and *dignity*, which they considered as essential attributes of their divinities, and which imply superior size and strength. To tell a lady that she was taller and stouter than most of her sex, was a great compliment: it was comparing her to a goddess.

It seems, then, that Shakspeare, in the quarrel between Helena and Hermia in his *Midsummer Night's Dream*, has, without knowing it, made Hermia perfectly *classical* in her resentment, and Lyfander, in his reproaches:

Her. Puppet! Why so?—Ay, that way goes the game.

Now I perceive that she hath made compare
Between our *statures*; she hath urged her *height*,
And with her personage, her *tall* personage,
Her *height*, forsooth, she hath prevail'd with him.

— — — — —
— — — — —

Her. Little again?—nothing but *low* and *little*?
Why will you suffer her to flout me thus?
Let me come to her.—

Lyf. Get you gone, you *dwarf*,
You minimus of hind'ring knot-grafs made,
You bead, you acorn!—

Act iii. *Scene* 8.

* XII. 10.

M m

NOTE

N O T E 62.

P. 79. NO VERY MINUTE ANIMAL CAN BE BEAUTIFUL---
NOR ONE OF A PRODIGIOUS SIZE.

I am by no means perfectly satisfied of the integrity of this passage; but no better comment can, I think, be given upon it, as it stands, than that of Beni.—“ Non *priora* [i. e. quæ valdè “ *pusilla,*] quia eorum spectatio [*θεωσις*] momento penè temporis “ fiat, ac propterea spectatio ipsa confundatur;—quod est, tantâ “ celeritate comprehendantur ac *veluti absorbeantur partes omnes,* “ ut non liceat partem à parte, ut caput à thorace, internoscere, “ atque adeo partes *conferre mutud, symmetriamque et proportionem* “ *agnoscere et aestimare.*—Non *posteriora,* [i. e. valdè magna,] quia, “ è contrario, in tam ingenti mole ac magnitudine, partium mul- “ titudo cognitionem impediât, quæ non possit *simul* [*ἀμα*] haberi: “ *dum enim spectatur una, propter distantiam deperit et evanescit* [*δι-* “ *χεται*] *cognitio alterius; ita ut unum et totum non appareat animal.*” [Benii *Comm. in Aristot. Poet. p. 205.*]

The reader may, after this, be amused with seeing what strange work Lord Shaftsbury has made with this passage in his *explanatory* translation of it. *Essay on the freedom of Wit and Humour. Part IV. Sect. 3.*

N O T E 63.

P. 80. EASILY COMPREHENDED BY THE EYE, &c.

ΕΥΣΥΝΟΠΤΟΝ—No words furnish a more striking proof of the richness, compression, force, and *convenience,* of the Greek language, than those which Aristotle here uses;—*ΕΥΣΥΝΟΠΤΟΝ, ΕΥ-*
ΜΗΜΟΝΕΥΤΟΝ,

μνημονεύτου, συνδολῶ. The reader needs only see to what a feeble length of periphrastic wire-drawing a translator is reduced, if he would give their full value: *Easily comprehended by the eye.*—“*Que l’œil puisse comprendre et mesurer aisément et tout d’un coup.*” [Dacier.] “*Qui puisse être saisi d’un même coup d’œil.*” [Batteux; the most compressed of all Aristotle’s translators.] “*Un tout en-semble où la vue ne s’égare point.*” [Marmontel, *Poétique Fr. Pref.*]

Of the same kind are the words, ἐνεπακολοθητον—“*such as the understanding can easily follow and keep up with*” : ἐναναπνευσῶ, — of a period, “*that does not put one out of breath*”.

N O T E 64.

P. 80. IF A HUNDRED TRAGEDIES &c.

The supposition of *a hundred Tragedies* performed in concurrence seems merely to be a sort of hyperbolic *fling* at the known intemperance of the Athenian people with respect to theatrical exhibitions; and Dacier has rightly, I think, accounted for this “*exuberantia orationis*, as Victorius calls it”.

But Dacier, and the Abbé Batteux after him, make Aristotle’s expression too hyperbolic for hyperbole itself, when they translate, “*S’il falloit jouer cent Tragedies en un jour.*” For if the Tragedies were only half an hour long, and played without intermission, they would have required a day of *fifty hours*. We must understand, surely, with Beni, “*Si centum Tragœdiæ, verbi gratiâ, totis illis spectaculorum diebus recitandæ proponerentur*” ; which will still leave hyperbole enough.

^a Rhet. I. ii. p. 517.

^b *Ibid.* III. ix. p. 592.

^c Quis enim non intelligit hanc (i. e. εκατον Τραγωδιῶν) exuberantiam orationis esse? *Vid. in locum.*

^d *Comment.* p. 211.

Dacier is also mistaken, I believe, in concluding, from what Aristotle says, that it was once an *established custom* with the Greeks to regulate the length of Tragedies by the *clepsydra*, or hour-glass. His expression seems to imply at *least*, that it had been *rarely* practised, if it does not, as M. Batteux thinks, imply some doubt, whether it had been done at all:—ὡσπερ ποτε και ἄλλοτε ΦΑΣΙ.

Thus much, however, as to the limited length of these performances, we may easily conceive; that when, to gratify the immoderate fondness of the Athenians for the drama, an uncommon number of Tragedies were exhibited in concurrence, and the contending Poets were apt to encroach upon the patience of the audience, by lengthening out their pieces in order to *show off* themselves, or their *actors*^c, the *Lord Chamberlain* of these exhibitions might be obliged, in compliance with the clamours of the people, to confine the representation of each drama to *some* limited time.

N O T E 65.

P. SO. A FABLE IS NOT ONE----MERELY BECAUSE THE HERO OF IT IS ONE.

Mr. Hume, in his *Essay on the association of ideas*, represents this passage of Aristotle as *contrary* to the doctrine he there lays down, and which is unquestionably true—that “in all productions, as well as in the Epic and Tragic, a *certain unity* is required,” &c.—and, “that the unity of action which is to be found in biography or history, differs from that of Epic Poetry, *not in kind, but in degree.*” I see here no *contrariety* at all. Aristotle certainly did not mean to say, that a biographical Poem, if I may so term it, (a Poem *περι ένα,*) has *no* unity, *no* relation of cause and effect, &c. to connect the incidents; but only, that it has not *that degree* of unity, which is requisite for the purpose of

^c See *cap. ix. Transl. Part II. Sect. 7.*

Tragic, or even Epic, Poetry. Mr. Hume himself allows, that Poetry “requires a stricter and closer unity in the fable;” and this is all that Aristotle appears to mean. The persons censured by him for concluding, that, “because Hercules was one, so also “must be the fable, of which he was the subject,” were right enough, as philosophers, but as poets, certainly wrong.

This chapter, in which Aristotle considers so particularly the *unity* of fable, as distinct from its *totality*, led me once to think it probable, that the word *μιας* was originally in the definition of Tragedy, *cap. vi.* as we find it afterwards in *cap. xxiii.*—περὶ ΜΙΑΝ πράξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν. But perhaps the supposition is unnecessary, and *unity* may be sufficiently implied in the words *τελείας καὶ ὅλης*: ὉΛΟΤΗΤΟΣ, as he elsewhere says, ἘΝΟΤΗΤΟΣ ΤΙΝΟΣ ὈΥΣΗΣ. *Metaph. lib. v. cap. 26.*

N O T E 66.

P. 80. EITHER FROM ART, OR GENIUS.

Ἦτοι δια τεχνην, Ἡ ΔΙΑ ΦΤΕΙΝ.—It appears from this, as well as from other passages of Aristotle’s treatise, that in the midst of all the coldness of philosophical investigation and analysis, he never lost sight of the difference between that spontaneous operation of genius and feeling in the Poet, which *produces* poetic beauty, and the slow and cautious process of calm examination and inquiry in the Critic, whose business it is to discover its *principles*. It is not every philosophical critic that avoids this error. Nothing is more common, than to suppose that to have been *produced* by art and reflection, *about which*, when produced, art and reflection have been employed^a. Thus languages, we are told, must have been originally *formed* by art, because they cannot be *analysed* without art:

^a See Diff. I. p. 7. note ^b.

Grammarians and Philosophers must have formed language, because language has formed Grammarians and Philosophers.

N O T E 67.

P. 81. BUT HE COMPREHENDED THOSE ONLY WHICH HAVE RELATION TO ONE ACTION, &c.

Οδυσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν, ἐπὶ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη—ἈΛΛ' Ἄ περι μίαν πράξιν, ὡς λεγομένην τὴν Οδυσσειαν, ΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΣΑΝ. So the text stands. “Non cecinit omnia---sed quæ circa unam solam actionem, qualem Odysseam dicimus, confiterunt.” [Goullston.] Victorius reads, ἈΛΛΑ, and ΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΣΕΝ; but does injustice, I think, to his own reading, by his construction and his version: περι μίαν πράξιν—συνεσησεν: “circa unam actionem—MANSIT.” This is, surely, very harsh. I should punctuate, and translate, thus:—ἀλλὰ περι μίαν πράξιν, ὡς λεγομένην, τὴν Οδυσσειαν συνεσησεν ἕμοιως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα. [sc. συνεσησεν]. “Sed circa unam actionem, qualem dicimus, Odysseam conficit; pariterque Iliadem.”—“But he planned his Odyssey, as he also did his Iliad, upon an action, that is *one*, in the sense here explained.”—And that this is the true reading, and the true sense, of the passage, I was once thoroughly persuaded. The construction of the whole is, thus, clear and natural. The circumstance of the plural verb συνεσησαν with the plural neuter, ἅ, is avoided; and the word συνεσησεν retains its proper and usual sense, as applied, throughout, by Aristotle, to the composition, or construction, of the Fable.—So, *cap.* ix. συζησαντες τον μυθον. *cap.* xvii. and xxiii.—τες μυθες συζησαναι—*et passim*. I will not, however, dissemble what is against me. The reading ἀλλ' ἅ, besides its support from MSS. answers better to the ἅπαντα ἕσα, which precedes:—ὅκ ἐποίησεν ἈΠΑΝΤΑ ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη—ἈΛΛ' Ἄ περι μ. π. &c. But, if ἀλλ' ἅ be retained, the passage, I think, should stand thus:—ἀλλ' ἅ περι μίαν πράξιν, [sc. ἕσιν,] ὡς λεγομένην τὴν Οδυσσειαν, ΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΣΑΝ.

ΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΣΕΝ^a. According to the construction of Piccolomini:—*quelle cose accolse*, ch'al corpo d'una attione, la qual chiamiamo Odissea, servissero:—and the Abbé Batteux—“ Il a rapproché tout ce qui tenoit à une seule action.”—συνεσχεν ἃ περι μίαν πράξιν: i. e. *composed his fable of those circumstances only*, which relate to *one* action. Thus, immediately after—τὰ ΜΕΡΗ ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ.

Unwilling to make alterations that do not appear absolutely necessary, I have followed this last reading; though with some remaining partiality to my first conjecture. That the sense would be clearer, and the construction less elliptical and embarrassed, is certain. But I am afraid this is but a questionable proof of corruption in the writings of Aristotle.

N O T E 68.

P. 81. THE WHOLE WILL BE DESTROYED, OR CHANGED.

Destroyed, if any part be *taken away*, (ἀφαιρέμενε)—disturbed or *changed*, if it be *transposed* (μετατιθεμενε). In the first case it will be no longer a *whole*; in the last, not the *same whole*. This seems the meaning, as it is well rendered by M. Batteux: “ Que les “ parties en soient tellement liées entre elles, qu’une seule tran- “ sposée, ou retranchée, ce ne soit plus un tout, ou le même

^a I cannot reconcile the commentary of Victorius on this passage with his *text* and his *version*. His text stands thus: ἄλλα περι μίαν πράξιν, εἰαν λεγμεν τὴν Οὔδυσσειαν, συνεστησιν. His version is—“ Verum circa unam actionem, qualem dicimus Odyseam “ *manfit*.”—But, in his remarks, he translates *exactly* as if he had read and understood the passage in the way here proposed. “ Verum *quæ* circa unam actionem, “ qualem Odyseam vocamus, *constituit*.”—And, “ *Quæ* circa unam, autem, actionem “ *coagmentasse* inquit Homerum.”—Again—“ Quare verè dici potest, ipsum *com- “ plexum fuisse, quæ* circa illum *actionem*.” Nor does he give, in his commentary, any other version, or explanation, or mention a word about the change of ἄλλα into ἄλλα, which he had adopted in his text.

“ tout.”

“ tout.”—But I cannot think διαφερεσθαι right. It is rendered by Goulston, “ *diversum reddatur, et moveatur, totum.*” So Piccolomini, “ *diversò---e mutato,*” &c. But, besides the manifest tautology, I doubt whether there be any good authority for this sense of the verb διαφερεσθαι—i. e. to be *made different*, or *changed*. At least I have not found any instance of it in Aristotle’s writings. If we retain διαφερεσθαι, it must, I think, be taken in the sense of *discerpi, distrabi, &c.* But I am almost persuaded, that Aristotle wrote ΔΙΑΦΘΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ, *spoiled*, or *destroyed*. So in his *Topics*, ΦΘΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ το ὍΛΟΝ. *vol. i. p. 258. B. cd. Duval.*

N O T E 69.

P. 82. POSSIBLE, ACCORDING TO PROBABLE, OR NECESSARY, CONSEQUENCE.

Compare *cap. xv. Χρη δε και εν τοις ηθεσιν. κ. τ. αλ.*—[Transl. Part II. Sect. 15. p. 93.] The expression, δυνατα κατα—το αναγκαιον, “ possible---according to necessity,” appears strange at the first glance: but in fiction, events may be *supposed* to happen, as in real life they *do* happen, not only probably, but necessarily; that is, not only as they were *likely* to happen, but as, morally speaking, they could not *but* happen.—“ Puisque la fonction du vraisemblable dans la Tragedie, est d’empêcher l’esprit de s’appercevoir de la feinte, le vraisemblable qui le trompe le mieux est le plus parfait, et c’est celui qui devient *nécessaire*. Un caractere etant *supposé*, il y a des effets qu’il doit nécessairement produire, et d’autres qu’il peut produire, ou ne produire pas.” Again—“ La perfection est de faire agir les personnages, de maniere qu’ils *n’ayent pas pu agir autrement*, leur caractere *supposé*,” &c. Thus Fontenelle, in his excellent *Reflexions sur la Poetique*; in several parts of which, that clear and philosophical writer has, I believe

†

without

without any such intention, coincided with, and illustrated, the positions of Aristotle.—See particularly, *Seçt.* 58, to 65, inclusively.

N O T E 70.

P. 82. A SPECIES OF HISTORY—.

Ἱστορία ΤΙΣ—“ a *sort* of history.” It is singular, that almost all the translators should have neglected a word so important as the pronoun is in this passage. May we not infer from this expression, that if Aristotle had been asked, whether an Epic imitation in prose would be a *Poem*, or not, he would have allowed it to be, ποίημα ΤΙ, a *kind* of Poem, as having the essence of Poetry, *invention* and *imitation*? See NOTE V. p. 153.

N O T E 71.

P. 82. A MORE EXCELLENT THING THAN HISTORY.

Σπεδαιότερον. It means no more than, in plain English, a *better* thing. The word occurs frequently in Aristotle's works, in this general sense. So, *Rhet.* I. vii. p. 528, B. και ἂν αἱ ἐπισημοὶ καλλιῆς ἢ σπεδαιότεραι, και τα πραγματα καλλιῶ και σπεδαιότερα.—And, *ibid.* I. ix. p. 531, E. Και αἱ των φύσει σπεδαιότερων (*superior* by nature) ἀρεταὶ καλλιῆς, και τα ἔργα· οἷον ἀνδρῶν [ἴσ. σπεδαιότεραι αἱ ἀρεταὶ, &c.] ἢ γυναικῶν.—See, also, *Ethic. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. vii.* p. 78, C. ἀτοπου γὰρ εἴ τις την ἐπισημην πολιτικην—ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΤΑΤΗΝ οἰεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ το ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ των ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν.

Dacier translates the word, “ *morale* ;” Batteux, “ *instructive* ;” but this is rather giving the reason *why* it is σπεδαιότερον, or, a superior thing.

N O T E 72.

P. 82. IS NOT, LIKE THE IAMBIC POETS, PARTICULAR AND PERSONAL.

Ἰαμβοποιῶσι.—Strictly, the writers of the *ψογοὶ* or satirical invectives that preceded Comedy. [See *cap. iv. Transl. Part I. Sect. 6.*] But I believe Aristotle meant here to *include*, at least, the authors of the first rude Comedy, “*of the Iambic form—*” τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ἰδέας. See *cap. v. Transl. Part I. Sect. 8.*

It appears, that the *Poem* called *Ἰαμβῶν*, whatever it was, was *represented*, or *acted*, as well as Tragedy and the Epic: for, in his seventh book *De Rep. cap. xvii.* the philosopher forbids boys to be *spectators* of *Iambi* and *Comedies*:—τὰς δὲ νεωτέρους ἐπ’ ἸΑΜΒΩΝ, ἔτε κωμῳδίας ΘΕΑΤΑΣ νομοθετητέον, πρὶν ἢ—κ. τ. ἀλ. p. 448, E.

N O T E 73.

P. 82. WHAT HAS NEVER ACTUALLY HAPPENED, WE ARE NOT APT TO REGARD AS POSSIBLE.

This must be restricted to those *extraordinary* actions and events, of *public* and *elevated* personages, which usually make the subject of Tragedy. The best comment I have seen, or that, I think, can be given, on this passage, is that of Piccolomini; but it is so long, that I can only refer to it^a. We have, however, the substance of it in the following observation of Brumoy.—“*La Tragedie ne s’est point sous-divisée*” (as Comedy, he observes, had been,) “*en Tragedie réelle, et Tragedie de pure imagination. Je crois en trouver la raison dans la nature de l’esprit humain. Il n’y a que*

^a *Annotazioni*, &c. p. 141, &c.

“ la vraisemblance dont il puisse être touché. Or il n’est pas vrai-
 “ semblable que des faits aussi *grands* que ceux de la Tragedie, des
 “ faits qui n’arrivent que dans les maisons des *rois*, ou dans le sein
 “ des *empires*, soient absolument inconnus. Si donc le Poete in-
 “ vente tout son sujet, jusq’ aux noms, l’esprit du spectateur se
 “ revolte; tout lui paroît incroyable, et la piece manque son effet,
 “ faute de vraisemblance. Mais comme la Comedie ne touche que
 “ la vie commune et ses ridicules, le spectateur peut supposer et
 “ suppose en effet, en se laissant aller à l’enchantement du spectacle,
 “ que le sujet qu’on lui présente est un fait réel, quoiqu’ il ne le
 “ connoisse pas. *Il n’en seroit pas de même, si le sujet comique avoit*
 “ *du merveilleux* ^b.”

N O T E 74.

P. 83. A POET SHOULD BE A POET OR MAKER OF FABLES,
 RATHER THAN OF VERSES.

So Plato, almost in the same words:—*ἐννοησας ὅτι τον ποιητην
 δεοι, εἴπερ μελλοι ποιητης εἶναι, ποιειν ΜΥΘΟΥΣ, ἀλλ’ ἔ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ.*—
Phædon, p. 61, ed. Serr.

N O T E 75.

P. 83. NOR IS HE THE LESS A POET, THOUGH THE INCI-
 DENTS OF HIS FABLE SHOULD CHANCE TO BE SUCH AS HAVE
 REALLY HAPPENED, &c.

The original, as it stands, (for I doubt of its integrity,) is very
 ambiguous and obscure. The sense I *wished* to give it, is this:
 “ Nor will he be the less a Poet, though he should *found* his Poem

^b Theatre des Grecs, i. p. 207.

“ upon fact : for nothing hinders, but that some *real* events may
 “ be such, as to *admit* of *Poetic* probability ; and he who *gives*
 “ them this probability, and *makes* them such, as Poetry requires,
 “ is so far entitled to the name of *Poet*, or *Inventor*.”

And thus, indeed, the passage is explained by Robortelli and some other commentators : and Casaubon seems to have so understood it ; for, quoting the words *κ'αν ἀρα συμβῆ γεγονομενα ποιειν, κ. τ. αλ.*—he says, “ ad ea solum dramata referendum, quorum hypothesis ab historia est ; ut Perfarum Æschyli : fabulæ verò totius *συθεσης* ab ingenio Poetæ.” I do not, however, see how this sense can be fairly extracted from the words, as they now stand. That which I have given in my translation, and which was first suggested to me by the word *συμβῆ*, I was afterwards glad to find supported by the opinion of Victorius.

The expression—*ὃν ΣΥΜΒΗΙ γεγονομενα ποιειν*,—“ if he should *happen*,” &c. is very strong, and hardly applicable to a Poet *choosing* a true story for the outline of his fable. It indicates accidental coincidence with truth. The word *ἔναι*, also, is on the same side :—“ may *be*,” does not suit the sense above given, which requires, “ may *become*”—may be *made* such by the Poet ; not, “ may *be* such,” in themselves, which is the obvious meaning of *τοιαντα ΕΙΝΑΙ*. Farther ; Aristotle has just told us, that *probability* is the Poet’s province, and yet, at the same time, that Tragedies were usually founded, and *should*, in general, be founded, on historical *fact*. Now it would, surely, be rather strange, after all this, to say, “ *nothing hinders*, but that some real events *may* be “ made to have poetic probability :”—*ἔδεν ΚΩΛΥΤΕΙ τοιαντα ἔναι ὅα ἂν ἐκὸ γενεσθαι, κ. τ. αλ.*—

But, to the interpretation which I have preferred, these expressions are all exactly suitable, and the meaning and connection of the whole seems to be this :—Aristotle had been opposing *Poetry* to *fact* : he had said expressly, that the *γεγομενα* were the peculiar

? *De Satyricâ*, &c. p. 345.

province of the historian ; the *δία ἀν γεινοίτο*, and the *ἐπι*, of the Poet. An objector, misapprehending, or misrepresenting, his meaning, might have urged—“ the incidents of this or that Poet “ have actually happened ; they are *γενομένα* ; and therefore, according to your *σων* doctrine, not proper for Poetry, nor the “ work of a *Poet*.”—To this Aristotle answers, that, though the object of the Poet be not *truth*, yet his invented probabilities may coincide with truth : and real events, even of the Tragic and extraordinary kind, *may* have happened as probably and naturally as he has supposed them to happen. He is still, therefore, no less a *Poet* ; not only as having actually *invented* the incidents, but as having invented them with true Poetic probability.—And thus Victorius :—“ Non omnes eos—qui *fortuitò incident* in res quæ “ exitum jam habuerint, in culpâ esse ; quia fieri possit, ut res “ aliquæ *factæ*, ita factæ sint, ut verisimile sit illas factas esse ; et “ esse denique ejusmodi, ut effici potuerint ; *quo nomine* (inquit,) “ ille *Poeta* eorum aliquo modo est : officium enim Poetæ est, verisimile sectari, et ea quæ effici possunt sumere : quod in illis “ rebus illo modo *factis* non desideratur. Retinet igitur, hâc de causâ, nomen Poetæ.” I confess, indeed, that the passage is, in this way, nothing more than an answer to a senseless cavil. But such cavils, we know, the sophists of those times^b did not disdain to make, nor Aristotle always disdain to answer. See *cap. xxv. Transl. Part IV.*

N O T E 76.

P. 83. OF SIMPLE FABLES, THE EPISODIC ARE THE WORST.

Why, of *simple* fables—*ἀπλῶν μυθῶν* ? as if the fault here noticed were *peculiar* to the *simple* fable ; that is, as the term is defined in

^b Such as *Protagoras*, *Euclid*, *Ariphrades*, mentioned hereafter in this treatise.

the following chapter, the fable that is without *revolution* or *discovery*. But surely this could not be Aristotle's meaning. Something, I am persuaded, is wrong: but I have no probable conjecture to offer; unless it may be thought probable, that ΑΠΙΑΝΤΩΝ, abbreviated perhaps by the transcriber, might be mistaken for ΑΠΙΑΩΝ. What Dacier says in his note is ingenious and true; but by no means, I think, fully accounts for Aristotle's expression, which implies more, than that these unconnected Episodes, "se rencontrent *plus ordinairement* dans les fables simples."

Victorius states the difficulty fairly, and only asks, with a modesty which inferior critics often want, "*An valet quicquam ad eum (scrupulum) evellendum, quod Tragedia simplex suâ sponte non valdè elegans est; cui si accesserit hoc vitium, merito deterrima vocari potest?*"—For my own part, I must answer in the negative. This idea has been adopted by Goulston, and Le Bossu. They make Aristotle say—"Simple fables are not so good as *complex*, and simple fables that are Episodic, are the worst of all."—This is to supply a meaning, not to find one.

For the sense of *Episodes* here, see NOTE 37.

N O T E 77.

P. 83. IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THEIR PIECES TO THE PURPOSES OF RIVAL PERFORMERS, &c.

That actors, as well as Poets, contended for the prize in these Tragic games, or *ἀγῶνες*, might be sufficiently proved by a single passage in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, where, explaining the difference between *προαιρεσις*, and *βελησις*, he says, "we may *will*, or *desire*, things not at all in our own power to effect; as, that such a particular actor may gain the prize:"—*ὑποκριτην τινα νικᾶν, ἢ ἀθλητην*^a. The reader may also see a passage in the *Rhetoric*, lib. iii.

^a *Ethic. Nicom.* III. iv. ed. Duval. p. 30.

ἀγωνισαί—ΟΙ ΤΗΟΚΡΙΤΑΙ. Hesych.

cap. i. which throws some illustration upon *this* passage, by shewing the great importance of the players at that time, and the dependance of the Poets upon them: for Aristotle there says of these dramatic contests, that, ἐκεῖ μείζον δυνάμει ΝΤΝ τῶν ποιητῶν αἰ ὑποκρίται: “the *actors* now, have greater power—are more regarded, and of more importance to the success of the dramas—“than the *Poets*.” A revolution somewhat similar is recorded by Plutarch to have happened between the later Dithyrambic Poets and their ἀυληται, or flute-players:—το γὰρ παλαιόν, ἕως εἰς Μελαίνωπιδην τὸν τῶν δθυραμβῶν ποιητὴν, συμβεβηκει, τὰς ΑΥΛΗΤΑΣ παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν λαμβάναν τὰς μισθούς, ΠΡΩΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΟΥΣΗΣ δηλονοτι ΤΗΣ ΠΟΙΗΣΕΩΣ, τῶν δ’ ἀυλητῶν ὙΠΗΡΕΤΟΥΝΤΩΝ τοῖς διδασκαλοῖς: ὕψερρον δὲ [i. e. when, as he says, the music of the flute became more complicated, refined, and difficult,] καὶ τὰτο διεφθάρη^b. But all this is nothing, to what we have heard of the modern despotism sometimes exercised by great opera singers over the composers.

The effect which this influence of the players might have, in *lengthening* and *disuniting* the action, according to Aristotle's complaint here, may be easily imagined. Castelvetro observes, with great probability, of these ill-connected ἐπεισοδία,—“Et, peraventura, queste digressioni fatte per compiacere i rappresentatori, riguardavano più à *quello che i rappresentatori sapevano bene confare*, che alla *materia naturale della favola*; accioche essi mostrassero quello che valeffero, in quello dove erano piu effercitati, et perciò piu agevolmente ottenessero la vittoria^c.” Here, too, the *musical* reader, will be again reminded of the privilege so

^b *De Musicâ. ed. H. St. p. 2091.*

^c *Poet. d' Arist. p. 220.*—“Suum igitur quisque,” says Cicero, nofeat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum judicem præbeat; ne *scienci* plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiæ: illi enim, non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui *voce* freti sunt, Epigonos, Medumque; qui *gestu*, Menalippam, Clytæmnestram; semper Rutilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam; non sæpe Æsopus Ajacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scænâ, non videbit vir sapiens in vitâ?”—*De Offic. I. 31.*

intemperately exercised by modern Italian fingers—the lineal descendants, according to some, of the *ὑποκριται* of the *Greek Opera*—that of setting aside, whenever they please, both the *Poet*, and the *composer*, by the introduction of such songs, from other operas, as they think most favourable to the display of their peculiar talents.

The influence of *modern* actors upon the productions of the *Poet*, is, perhaps, not less than that of the *antient*; but it seems to be exerted most frequently in a contrary way, though one full as likely to spoil the *ἔπιξις* of the piece—that of *lopping*. The distress of a *Poet* on such occasions is represented with true comic force by Mr. Sheridan in his *Critic*:

UND. PROMPTER.

Sir, the carpenter says it is impossible you can go to the park scene yet.

PUFF.

The park scene! no—I mean the description scene here, in the wood.

UND. PROMPT.

Sir, *the performers have cut it out*, &c.

End of Act II.

N O T E 78.

P. 83. BEYOND THEIR POWERS——.

I cannot agree with the commentators, who render *παρα την δύναμιν*, “*supra id quod ferat*:—referring *δύναμιν* to the fable itself. I think it means *ultra vires*, beyond the powers of the *Poets*. And so the Abbé Batteux—“*au-delà de sa portée*.”

The greater the *length* of the fable, the greater, evidently, is the difficulty of filling it up with consistent probability; without violating that close connection of incidents, and unity of action, which the rules of Aristotle, and the nature of the drama, require.

N O T E

N O T E 79.

P. 83. THAT PURPOSE IS BEST ANSWERED BY SUCH EVENTS AS ARE NOT ONLY UNEXPECTED, BUT UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF EACH OTHER.

Ταυτα δε γινεται μαλιστα τοιαυτα, και μαλλον όταν γενηται παρα την δοξαν δι' ἀλληλα.—This is certainly corrupt; nor does it seem easy to form any probable conjecture, how it stood, as Aristotle left it. Whether the words, και μαλλον, be right or not, they serve, as the text at present stands, only to embarrass a passage, which, if we omit them, seems clear enough, both in construction and meaning. In this I perfectly agree with the last Oxford editor; though I think they should not be hastily ejected from the text^a.

The connection and drift of the whole passage seems to me to be this. Aristotle is here recommending the close connection of incidents, arising *probably* or *necessarily* from each other, in a new point of view—as being of great importance, not only to the *unity* of fable, but to the principal object of Tragedy, the production of *terror* and *pity*. For events are best adapted to this purpose, most *striking* and affecting, when they happen, not only παρα την δοξαν, but παρα την δοξαν ΔΙ' ΑΛΛΗΛΑ: when the wonder arises, not only from their happening unexpectedly, but from their being the *consequences* of events from which no one could have expected them to follow. Thus connected, as cause and effect, they will be more surprising, and consequently more affecting, more *terrible* or *piteous**, than if they appear to happen by chance—ἀπο τε αὐτοματε και της τυχης—εἰκη—MET' ἀλληλα only, not ΔΙ' ἀλληλα, according to the distinc-

^a Mr. Winstanley's edit. p. 287.

* The effect of *surprise*, when combined with *pity* or *terror*, is, to add force to these latter passions, which necessarily predominate in the combination, and to raise the *whole* feeling to a higher pitch. See Hume's Essay on Tragedy.

tion in the next chapter^b. To illustrate this, Aristotle observes, that even events merely fortuitous, are more wonderful and striking, when they are such, as in any degree suggest to the spectator an idea of purpose and design; like the accident he mentions of the statue that fell upon the murderer of the person represented by it.—And all this is connected with what follows, as well as with what precedes; evidently pointing to his doctrine about the *περιπετεια* in the next chapters.

N O T E 80.

P. 84. THE STATUE OF MITYS, &c.

In Plutarch, thus:—*και το Μιτιν τε Αργειν, κατα γασιν ἀναιρεθεντ^ς, ἀνδριαντα χαλκην ἐν ἀγορα, θεας ὕψης, ἐμπροσθεν τῷ κτειναντι του Μιτιου, και ἀνελειν.* [*Περι των βραδεως, &c. p. 980, ed. H. St.*]

N O T E 81.

P. 84. FABLES—SIMPLE, AND COMPLICATED.

It is high time to discard the technical jargon of *implex* fables, used by Addison^a, and others, after the French writers. If any authority were requisite for speaking English, I have that of Mr. Harris, who renders Aristotle's *ἀπλοι*, and *πεπλεγμενοι*, by *simple*, and *complicated*.—*Phil. Inq. p. 146.*

^b *Car. x. Διαφerei πολυ. κ. τ. αλ.*

^a *Spectator, N^o 297.*

N O T E 82.

P. 84. WHEN ITS CATASTROPHE IS PRODUCED WITHOUT EITHER REVOLUTION OR DISCOVERY.

Ανευ περιπέτειας ἢ ἀναγνωριστικῆ ἢ μεταβασις γινεται.—Μεταβασις, is the *change* of fortune which constitutes the catastrophe of the piece. This, which is common to *all* Tragedy, must not be confounded with the Περιπέτεια, which, however important, is not essential. Le Bossu, Dacier, and others, by not attending to this distinction, have introduced much confusion into one of the clearest parts of Aristotle's work. Thus, Dacier says—" Il appelle fable *simple*, celle ou il n'y a ni changement d'état, ni reconnoissance, et dont le denouement n'est qu'un simple passage de l'agitation et du trouble au repos et à la tranquillité."—He adopts the language of Le Bossu^a. Undoubtedly, there are Tragedies without a *sudden* and *unexpected reverse* of fortune; but where is the Tragedy, antient or modern, in which there is no "*changement d'état?*" This would be no other than a Tragedy without a catastrophe. Thus, these writers take μεταβασις to signify the mere passage, progress, or *suite*, of the piece^b: whereas it clearly signifies a *change*; a transition from prosperous to adverse, or at least from adverse to *more* adverse, fortune, or the contrary; as Beni has well observed^c. The sense of the word is clearly fixed by other passages; and in *cap.* xviii. he expressly makes the μεταβασις, such a change of fortune as is common to every Tragedy. ΕΣΙ ΔΕ ΠΑΣΗΣ ΤΡΑΓΩΔΙΑΣ, ΤΟ ΜΕΝ, ΔΕΣΙΣ, ΤΟ ΔΕ, ΛΥΣΙΣ.—

^a *Du Poeme Ep.* II. 16.

^b " Non si prende μεταβασις in questo luogo per *mutatione*, come credono alcuni, ma per lo *processo* dell' azione dal principio al fine." Castelvetro, *p.* 242.

^c *Comment.* *p.* 255.

λεγω δε δεσιν μεν ειναι την ἀπ' ἀρχης μεχρι τετε τε μερος ὁ ἑσχατον εἰναι, ἐξ ἧ METABAINEI εἰς εὐτυχιαν· λυσιω δε, την ἀπο της ἀρχης ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΕΩΣ μεχρι τελευς.

Mr. Harris, in his *Philol. Inquiries*, p. 145, &c. seems to have deserted Aristotle for Le Bossu, who, with little reason, in my opinion, passed with him, as well as with Lord Shaftsbury, for “*Aristotle’s best interpreter*.” Throughout his chapter on this subject, above referred to, he appears to me to confound the μεταβασις, or *change*, which Aristotle makes essential to *all* Tragedy, with that particular *kind* of change which he denominates περιπετεια: for he uses, repeatedly, the word *revolution*, (his translation of περιπετεια,) to express what Aristotle means by μεταβασις, μεταβαινω, μεταβαλλειν. He speaks of *Othello*, and *Lear*, as *complicated* fables, and having *revolutions*. And so, indeed, they have, if we take the word in Aristotle’s sense of μεταβασις; I do not see that they have, in his sense of περιπετεια. In neither of those Tragedies can it, I think, be said, that the *catastrophe* is produced by a *sudden change, to the reverse of what is expected, by the spectator, from the circumstances of the action*. At least, with respect to *Othello*, this seems to admit of no dispute. [See the next NOTE.]

The Abbé Batteux gives, I think very properly, the *Polievste* of Corneille, as an example of the *simple* fable. “*La fable simple, qui n’a ni revolution subite, ni reconnoissance; qui commence, continue, s’acheve, sans secouffes, ni retours inattendus. Ainsi Polievste reçoit le baptême, son zele lui fait renverser les autels des payens, il est arrêté, jugé, mis à mort: c’est une fable simple*.”

Victorius, Beni, Piccolomini, and Goulston, agree with me in my idea of this passage, where the words, συνεχης και μιας, are not put to characterize the *simple* fable, as Victorius well observes, but refer merely to that unity and continuity of action, which had been established as necessary to Tragedy in general.

^d Treatise On Music, Painting, &c. p. 83, Note.

^e Principes de la Lit. tome iii. p. 84.

N O T E 83.

P. 84. A REVOLUTION IS----A CHANGE INTO THE REVERSE OF WHAT IS EXPECTED FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACTION.

Εσι δε περιπέτεια μιν, ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή, καθάπερ εἴρηται.

The sense of these words has not, I think, been exactly given in any translation I have yet seen, except that of the accurate and judicious Piccolomini: “La Peripetia intendo io essere una mutation di fortuna, che (fatta nel modo che si é detto,) accaschi *al contrario di quello che dalle cose ordite aspettar si potesse.*” In literal English—“When the things that are doing (τα πραττομένα) have an effect the very reverse of what is expected from them.” That this is the meaning, appears plainly from the instance immediately subjoined: ὡςπερ ἐν τῷ Οιδιποδὶ, ἔλθων ΩΣ ΕΥΦΡΑΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ Ὀιδίπιδος, καὶ ἀπαλλάττων τε πρὸς τὴν μητέρα φοβεῖ, δηλώσας ὅτις ἦν Τ’ΟΥΤΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΕΠΟΙΗΣΕ. As the words—ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πρατ. μετ. are rendered by Dacier, and others—“*changement de fortune en une fortune contraire*”—they express nothing but what is common to Tragedy in general; and περιπέτεια is confounded with μεταβολή. [See last NOTE.] But, it is well observed by Piccolomini, “Non s’ha, parimente, da intendere, quando diciamo la peripetia essere mutation di fortuna, ogni sorte di mutatione da una conditione et stato di fortuna ad un’ altro; non potendo essere Tragedia alcuna in cui qualche così fatta mutatione non si ritrovi.” [p. 167.] In the usual way of translating the passage, a circumstance essential to the περιπέτεια is entirely omitted in the definition; its being *surprising*, and *contrary to expectation*². This, it is true,

² Περιπέτεια δὲ λέγεται τὰ ΠΑΡ’ ΕΛΠΙΔΑ συμβεβηκότα πάντα, καὶ ὕτως παρὰ ΤΡΑΓΗΚΟΙΣ ἐτι καλεῖται.—Schol. Nicand. quoted by Robertelli, p. 106.

Dacier has expressed in his version, by the words, “*contre ce qu'on avoit attendu.*” But this is, professedly, his own supplement of Aristotle's text. And indeed I once thought the text defective, and that Aristotle had probably written it—μεταβολη, ΠΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΔΟΞΑΝ, καθωπερ ερηται: alluding to the latter part of *cap. ix.* But, as I now understand the passage, this idea is sufficiently implied. The words, καθωπερ ερηται, have puzzled and divided the commentators, by their obscurity of reference. Upon the whole I am inclined to think, they point to what he had said *cap. ix.* [*Transl. Part II. Sect. 7.*] which, as I before observed, [NOTE 80,] seems manifestly to be a preparation for *this* chapter; and in which the words, παρα την δοξαν δι' αλληλα—events that are “*unexpected consequences of each other*”—answer to the definition of περιπετεια, as here explained.

That this is the *meaning* of Aristotle's words, I have no doubt. But, perhaps, even the words themselves have been inaccurately rendered, and πραττομενων should be constructed, not with μεταβολη, but with εναντιον:—εις το εναντιον των πραττομενων: i. e. *in contrarium eorum quæ aguntur.* This was suggested to me by the literal version which the accurate Mr. Harris has given of the words in his *Philol. Inq. p. 148.*—“A REVOLUTION is, as has been already said, a change into *the reverse of what is doing.*” The definition, I think, though its *sense* be the same in either way, would thus be more clear, and would answer more exactly to what follows.

N O T E 84.

P. 84. THUS IN THE OEDIPUS; THE MESSENGER, &c.

—Ελθων ως ευφρανων τον Οιδιπεν, και απαλλαξων τε προς την μητερα φεβε. Alluding, probably, to the very words of the messenger in Sophocles:

Τι δητ' ἔγωγ' εἰ ΤΟΥΔΕ ΤΟΥ ΦΟΒΟΥ σ', ἀνάξ',
 Ἐπειπὲρ ΕΤΝΟΥΣ ΗΛΘΟΝ, ΕΞΕΛΥΣΑΜΗΝ;

υ. 1012.

N O T E 85.

P. 86. THESE THEN ARE TWO PARTS OF THE FABLE—
 REVOLUTION AND DISCOVERY.

Δυο μὲν ἐν τε μυθε μέρη ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ ἐστὶ, περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις.
 “*Circa hæc.*” About *what*? What are we to understand by
 ταυτα?—Victorius says, τα πραττομενα; and Dacier, after him,
 “*Qui regardent le sujet.*” I cannot be satisfied with this. Τα
 πραττομενα, the *subject*, the *action*, are sufficiently expressed by the
 word μυθε. Would Aristotle have said, “These are two parts of
 “the *fable* relative to the *fable*?” I have, therefore, neglected the
 word περι in my translation, in conformity to the probable con-
 jecture of Madius. Every reader sees how easily it might get
 into the text from the word περιπετεια which presently follows.
 I rather think, however, that, retaining περι, we should read, περι
 Τ' ΑΥΤΑ:—“*circa eisdem res;*”—to point out the close connec-
 tion of these two parts of the fable, as things of the *same kind*,
 and counterparts, as it were, to each other, co-operating to the
 same effect—the production of terror, pity, surprise, &c. And
 thus they are afterwards mentioned together, as constituting *one*
species of Tragedy: ἡ μὲν γὰρ, πεπωλεγμενη, ἧς το ὅλον ἐστὶ ΠΕΡΙΠΕΤΕΙΑ
 ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΓΝΩΡΙΣΙΣ. [cap. xviii. Transl. Part II. Sect. 19.] The
 same mode of expression occurs in the *Ethics ad Nicom.* lib. iv.
 cap. 13. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΑΥΤΑ δὲ σχεδὸν ΕΣΤΙ καὶ ἡ ἀλάζονεια; μεσοτης:
 “*in iisdem vertitur.*” That is, as appears from the context, the
 virtue, of which he is there speaking, was of the *same kind*, or *class*,
 with that, which was the subject of the foregoing chapter. Both
 were among the ἀρεταὶ ὁμιλητικαὶ. So, in the conclusion of the
 subsequent

subsequent chapter—τρεῖς ἐν αἰ ἐξημέραι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσοτητες· Εἰσι δὲ
 πασαι ΠΕΡΙ λογῶν τινῶν καὶ πράξεων ἰουδαίων.

N O T E 86.

P. 86. DISASTERS, COMPREHEND ALL PAINFUL OR DE-
 STRUCTIVE ACTIONS, &c.

It seems hardly reconcilable with philosophical accuracy, to use
 such an expression as ΠΑΘΟΣ ἐς ΠΡΑΞΙΣ—defining the *suffering*
 to BE the *action* that causes the suffering.

In his *Metaphysics* he puts it thus:—τα μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ
 λυπηρῶν ΠΑΘΗ λεγεται^a.

This word, παθος, in the sense here used, is very embarrassing
 to a translator. The word *passion*, in this sense, of *suffering*, is,
 with us, appropriated to a subject, from which it cannot, without
 a sort of profanation, be transferred to any other. The French,
 however, have done this without scruple, though the word, when
 so applied, must be explained before it can be understood. Upon
 the whole, I could find no *single* words that seemed to me to an-
 swer so *nearly* to παθος, and its adjective, παθητικῶν, in the sense in
 which they are used here, and in *cap.* xviii. as *disaster*, and its
 correspondent adjective, *disastrous*. Their original, *desastre*, is ex-
 plained in the Dict. of the French Academy, by “*accident funeste.*”

“ Wherein I spoke of most *disastrous* chances,

“ Of *moving accidents* [παθη] by flood, and field.”

Othello, *Act* I. *Sc.* III.

^a V. 21.

N O T E 87.

P. 86. THE EXHIBITION OF DEATH, &c.

Εν τῷ φανερῷ θανατοῖ.—A plain passage, which the commentators seem to have taken great pains to perplex with difficulties of their own invention. The plain meaning of the expression is, *exhibited on the stage*: ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινόμενε ΤΟΥ ΠΑΘΟΥΣ, as it is expressed in the Rhetoric, *lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 560.*

Aristotle is here only explaining the term παθῶ; not laying down a *rule*, nor deciding concerning the propriety, or impropriety, of such exhibitions. Nothing is more evidently absurd, than the attempts of Dacier and other French critics to transfer the delicacy of *their* theatre to that of the antients. The scrupulous *delicacy* of French Tragedy was, I believe, as unknown to the Athenian stage, as its rigid and strutting *dignity*. A single passage, and that, from the most polished of the three Greek Tragic Poets whose works are extant, may sufficiently prove this; I mean the *description* of Oedipus tearing out his own eyes, in Sophocles.

Τοιαυτ' ἐφύμων, πολλακίς τε κούχ' ἀπαῖξ
 Ηρασο', ἐπαιρων βλεφαρῶ φοινίαι δ' ὄμω
 Γληναὶ γενεὶ ἔτεγγον' ἔδ' ἀνίσταν
 Φοῦν μυδῶσας σαγονας· ἀλλ' ὄμω μελας
 Ομβρῶ χαλαζῆς αἵματος ἔτεγγετο*.

Oed. Tyr. v. 1284.

“ Thus oft exclaiming, he his eyelids raised,
 “ And rent the orbs of sight; the bleeding balls
 “ Imbath'd his cheeks, nor ceased the gushing drops,
 “ But rain'd a shower of black and streaming gore.”

Potter's Translation.

* This line is, undoubtedly, faulty. The best emendation I have seen proposed appears to me to be that of Mr. Heath, who would read, αἵματοις—i. e. contracted, αἵματες.

But Sophocles did not confine himself to *description*. Oedipus himself immediately appears upon the stage, and exhibits the shocking spectacle of his bloody eyes to the audience. Certainly, the French rule, “de ne pas ensanglanter le Theatre,” was not *much* more strictly observed here by Sophocles, than it was by Shakspeare in his *LEAR*, where Gloster’s eyes are *trodden out*, ἐν φανερω, upon the stage.

I cannot quit this instance from Sophocles, without diverting the reader, (for I am persuaded it will divert him,) with Pere Bru-moy’s apology, or, rather, with the joint apology of him, M. Dacier, and Boileau. “Le grand CORNEILLE et ses successeurs Tragiques, ont crû que ce seroit une chose horrible d’exposer Oedipe aveugle et sanglant aux yeux des spectateurs. M. Dacier leur repond *très-bien* par ces vers de DESPREAUX, Art Poet. chant ii.

“ Il n’est point de serpent, ni de monstre odieux,
 “ Qui par l’art imité ne puisse plaire aux yeux.
 “ D’un pinceau delicat l’artifice agréable
 “ Du plus affreux objet fait un objet AIMABLE !
 “ Ainsi pour nous CHARMER, la Tragédie en pleurs
 “ D’Oedipe tout sanglant fit parler les douleurs ?.”

This is pushing Aristotle’s principle, of the pleasure we receive from the imitation even of disagreeable objects^b, rather farther than, I believe, he thought of. A critic of much more taste and much less prejudice, speaking of the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles^c, has observed, “that the antients thought *bodily pains* and “wounds, &c. (περιωδυνιαι και τρασεις) proper objects to be repre-

^a *Theatre des Grecs*, i. 345.

^b Above, cap. iv. Transl. Part I. Sect. 5.

^c See v. 749, &c. particularly, 796,7 : and the description of the bleeding wound, v. 845.

Μελαινα τ’ ἀκρα τις παρερωγεν ποδῶ
 Ἄμωρρατης φλεψ. —

“fented on the stage. See also the *Trachiniæ* of Sophocles, and “the lamentations of Hercules in it^d.”

Hippolytus, after having been dragged over the rocks, and almost torn to pieces, by his fiery courfers, appears upon the stage with his mangled and bleeding limbs^e.—But, according to Boileau, Dacier, &c. these are all “*objets aimables*.”

N O T E 88.

P. 86. THE COMMŌI ARE FOUND IN SOME ONLY.

The Greek says—*ἴδια δέ, τὰ ἀπο σκηνης ΚΑΙ κομμοι*. Here, the *κομμοι*, and the *τὰ ἀπο σκηνης*, are represented as distinct things. But in the definition afterwards, *Κομμοι* appears to be the name given to the *joint* lamentation of the chorus and the actors. *Κομμοι δέ, θρηνη κοινῃ χορῆ και ἀπο σκηνης*. Victorius states this difficulty, but without giving any satisfactory solution. And indeed I see no way of reconciling these passages, unless we suppose Aristotle to have expressed himself very loosely and inaccurately, and to have meant, that *κομμοι* was the name appropriated to *that part of the Χορικον* which joined or alternated with one or more of the *ἀπο σκηνης*—i. e. the *actors*; so that by, *Κομμοι δέ, θρηνη κοινῃ χορῆ και ἀπο σκηνης*, we are to understand only, that *Κομμοι* was that *θρηνη* or lamentation of *the chorus*, in which the *actors*, alternately, took part; as if the Greek had been thus:—*θρηνη χορῆ ὍΥ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΟΥΣΙΝ ὀ ἀπο σκηνης*. And so, *τὰ ἀπο σκηνης ΚΑΙ κομμοι* would only mean, the *κομμοι* of the chorus *with* the *απο σκηνης*—that is, mixed with the lamentation of the actors, or persons of the drama.

^d Dr. Warton's Essay on Pope, vol. i. 73, *Note*.

^e *Hippol.* Eurip. v. 1236, &c.—and 1348. In Mr. Potter's translation, v. 1318, 19, 20; and 1438, &c.

But it seems more for the credit of our philosophical critic, to give up the *first* of these passages as corrupt, and to adhere to the plain sense of the *definition*. I have, therefore, taken no notice of the words, *τα ἀπο σινηης*, in my version. Nothing is lost by the suppression. The sense of the word *κομμη* is left, like that of the other terms, to be fixed by its definition.

N O T E 89.

P. 86. BETWEEN ENTIRE CHORAL ODES.

I confess myself not satisfied as to the meaning of this expression, ὍΛΩΝ χορικῶν μελῶν. I have therefore adhered to the fair and literal translation of the *words*.—But what is an *entire* choral ode or song? Is it that, which is in the regular lyric form, in strophe and antistrophe? So it seems most natural to understand it. But a difficulty meets us. For when the *Παροδ*, as it often, and indeed almost always, happens, is not such a regular Antistrophic Ode, what *name* is to be given to that part of the Tragedy, which lies between the *παροδ* and the first Antistrophic Ode? It cannot make a part of the *Προλογ*, for that ends with the *Παροδ*. The *Exode* is out of the question. There remains only the *Episode*; and to that it cannot belong, consistently with Aristotle's definition of *Ἐπεισοδιον*, because it will not be, according to *this* sense of ὁλων, "*between entire choral Odes*." If we take *entire* to mean, *all choral*, i. e. not broken and interrupted by the ἀπο σινηης, or the persons of the drama, we shall still be embarrassed with the same difficulty: for, whenever the *παροδ* is not, in this sense, *entire*, which is frequently the case*, the part between that and the first *entire* Ode, will be without a name.

* As in the *Παροδ* of the *Orestes* of Euripides, the *Elektra* of Sophocles, &c.

Shall we, then, with some commentators, suppose Aristotle by ὅλων χοροῖων μελῶν, to have meant only, ὅλα χορὰ μελῶν—i. e. melodies sung by the *whole chorus*^b? This removes the difficulty. Yet I can hardly conceive, that he would have expressed himself in a manner so wantonly ambiguous, when the clear and decisive expression—ὅλα χορὰ, which he presently after uses, was so obvious.

From an accurate and philosophical writer, one would naturally expect a chapter of *definitions* to be clear. But whoever expects it here will certainly be disappointed. Almost every definition, to be perfectly intelligible, wants *other* definitions, which are not given, and which the obscure and imperfect information to be found in other antient authors will not enable us to supply.

N O T E 90.

P. 86. THE PARODE IS THE FIRST SPEECH OF THE WHOLE CHORUS.

Παροδῶ μὲν ἢ πρώτη ΛΕΞΙΣ ὅλα χορὰ.—Though λέξις, in its proper signification, is mere *speech*, yet it appears to have been occasionally extended to such *melody* as imitated speech, and to have answered nearly to the modern term, *recitative*. [See NOTE 46, and particularly the passage from Plutarch at the end of it.] And such, I have no doubt, is the sense in which it is here used, to distinguish the melody of the *Parodos* from that of the regular choral odes; which I suppose to have been a more varied, measured, and, as we may, not improperly, term it, a more *musical* melody. For want of understanding this distinction, the commentators have made strange confusion, by taking λέξις, either in its literal sense

^b So Goullston—"Inter plenos choricos cantus; qui scilicet ab universis fiebant chorus." Vici. "*Pleni integrique cantus.*" So Piccol. "*Intieri canti.*" Heinſius, Dacier, and Bateux, avoid the difficulty by omitting the word ὅλων in their translations.

of mere *speaking*, or in a sense absolutely synonymous with μελῶ, as Dacier does. But it is hardly to be imagined, that Aristotle would use the word λέξις without any reason; and, that the Παροῶ could not be mere speech, or declamation, such as that of our stage, seems evident enough from the expression, λέξις ὈΛΟΥ χορῶ. A number may *sing* together, in a kind of measured recitative, or simple chanting; but they cannot well *speak* together, without intolerable confusion. This would be that very χορῶ διαλεκτικῶ, which Demetrius mentions as a thing absurd and unheard of⁴.

There is a singular passage in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which affords, I think, a strong confirmation, both of the sense which I have here given to the word λέξις, and of the propriety of its application in that sense to the choral Παροῶ. In the 11th section of his treatise *De Struct. Orat.* in order to shew, how little profody was regarded by the composers of the Tragic melodies, he criticises the melody of the following lines from the *Orestes* of Euripides:

Σιγα, σιγα, λευκον ἰχνος ἀρβυλης

Τίθειτε, μη κτυπαίτε—

Ἀποπροβατ' ἐκείσ', ἀποπροθι κίτας.

v. 140.

Now it is remarkable, 1. that he calls this, ΜΕΛΟΣ, and yet represents it as *said* by Electra: *Ευριπίδης ΜΕΛΩΝ, ἃ πεποιήκε την Ηλεκτραν ΛΕΓΟΥΣΑΝ*—προς τον χορον.—2. That the melody, to which these words were set, was the simplest possible; a kind of

⁴ Demet. *περι Ερμ.* Sect. 168, where speaking of some poems of Sappho, that descended beneath the Lyric dignity and elegance, both in subject and style, he says, “they were fitter to be recited, than sung, and were ill adapted to be performed by a chorus, or accompanied by the lyre; unless,” says he, “there were such a thing as a speaking chorus:”—*εἰ μὴ τις ἐν χορῶ διαλεκτικῶ.*

Choral *recitative*, indeed, judiciously introduced, and not continued too long, I have often thought, might occasionally be so managed as to produce a striking effect. An example of it, and a very fine one, is to be found in an Oratorio of that admirable composer, Eman. Bach, of which the title, in English, is, *The Israelites in the Wilderness.*

chanting

chanting recitative. The three first words, for instance, were set to one note^b.



Σιγα, σιγα, λευκον—

—and in other words too, the same tone, as this author clearly informs us, was frequently repeated. This may be regarded as somewhat of a musical curiosity. For it is an authentic, though indeed a very scanty and imperfect specimen, of one part of the dramatic choral music of the Greeks. 3dly, This very melody was probably that of the *παροδῶς* of this Tragedy. Dionysius, indeed, gives these words to Electra^c; but in all the editions of Euripides which I have seen, the two first lines are given to the chorus; with more propriety, I think, if we attend to what goes before. Electra had just said to the chorus, on their coming in while Orestes was sleeping;

Ω φίλταται γυναῖκες, ἤσυχῳ ποδι

Χωρεῖτε, μὴ ψοφατε, μὴδ' ἐς ὠκυπτοῦ.— v. 134.

The words, therefore, which Dionysius, quoting probably by memory, attributes to Electra, would seem to come more naturally from the mouths of the choral virgins, repeating to each other the caution she had given them. But whether this be so or not, yet, that this was the *first entry* of the chorus upon the stage, is clear from the preceding speech of Electra: and the Lyric part, which follows that speech, if it does not *begin* with, probably *contains*, at least, the *πρωτὴν λέξιν ὅλας χορῆς*; being all in the regular choral form of Strophe and Antistrophe, and, in all probability, set throughout to melody of the same kind. Perhaps the *whole* chorus might not begin to sing, till the third Strophe, *Ποτνια, ποτνια νυξ*.—If,

^b Εἰ γὰρ δι τούτοις, το, Σιγα, σιγα, λευκον, ἐφ' ἑΝΟΣ ΦΘΟΓΓΟΥ ΜΕΛΩΔΕΙΤΑΙ.

^c So does the author of one of the arguments prefixed to the Tragedy: ὡς φησιν Ἐλεκτρα τῷ χορῷ.

as Victorius contends, *this* be not the *Parodos*, it cannot begin before, v. 316.

Αι, Αι,

Δογμαδες ὤς—ν. τ. αλ.—

But, the very application of the word *παροδ*, which properly signifies the *entry*, or *arrival* of the chorus^d, to the *πρωτη λεξις*, or *first speech* of the whole chorus, shews, I think, sufficiently, the close connection of the two things; and that we are never to look for that *first speech*, at such a distance from the *first entrance*, of the chorus.

But, it may, perhaps, be objected to the distinction I understand here between *λεξις* and *μελ*, that it will expose us to the very difficulty mentioned in the last Note: it will make Aristotle's enumeration of the parts into which Tragedy is divided, incomplete; because, if we admit it, the part between the *παροδ* and the first *Στασιμιον* or regular Ode, will want a name. For, if any thing, it must be *Επεισοδιον*; but this, it may be said, it cannot be, because it will not be, according to Aristotle's definition, *μεταξύ χορικών ΜΕΛΩΝ*; the *Parode* being not *μελ*, but *λεξις*.—It seems a sufficient answer to this objection, to observe, that *λεξις*, here, is not opposed to *μελ* in general, but only to a particular *species* of *μελ*. Strictly speaking, the simplest chant, or even such recitative, as approaches the nearest to common speech, is yet as much *μελ*, melody, *music*, as the most refined Opera song^e. It is called *λεξις*, only comparatively. Nay, the word *μελ* is sometimes, in a wider sense, applied even to *speech* itself^f. And so, above, we have *λεκτικη*

^d — ἡ μὲν ΕΙΣΟΔΟΣ τῆς χορῆς, ΠΑΡΟΔΟΣ. *Jul. Poll.*—And so the scholiast on Heracleitus: ἔτι καλεῖται ἡ πρώτη των χορῶν ἐπι τὴν σκηνὴν εἰσοδ. *Ed. de Pauw.* p. 74.

^e See *Diff. II.* p. 52, note ³, and the passage of Aristoxenus, concerning the essential distinction between *all speech*, and *all singing*; *i. e.* that in the one, the voice moves by *slides*, in the other, by *intervals*, or *skips*.

^f *Diff. II.* p. 51. note ²: and *Dion. Hal. See. XI.*

'ΑΡΜΟΝΙΑ⁵. Aristotle, therefore, in the expression χορικῶν ΜΕΛΩΝ, may be supposed, without any inconsistency, to *include*, what, afterwards, in the particular definition of παροδῶ, where distinction was necessary, he denominates λεξις.

It must be owned, that Aristotle's parsimonious brevity has left some confusion in this subject; but, in the illustrations of his commentators, it is "*confusion worse confounded.*" And this has arisen from their applying to the Greek drama, without the slightest foundation, the Roman division into *five acts*. It is now, I believe, pretty well understood, that such an idea is totally inapplicable to the Greek Tragedy^b. If we *must* talk of acts, it would be more proper to say they had *three*; forming our division upon the three parts, which, according to Aristotle, were essential to every drama, the Προλογῶ, the Επεισοδιον, and the Εξῆδῶ; not upon the number of choral odes, which is different in different dramas. In the *Trachiniae*, for example, there are not fewer than *six* choral odes. If these are to determine the number of acts, as Dacier contends, this Tragedy will consist of *seven*. Brumoy, to divide this piece into five acts, is reduced to admit an entire ode in the middle of his first act; so that the *Episode*, which Aristotle defines to be that part which is μεταξυ ὄλων χορικῶν μελῶν, begins in the Προλογῶ, and before the Παροδῶ, which, according to Brumoy, must be the *second ode*. Another ode he is obliged to admit in the middle of his last act; contrary to Aristotle's definition of Εξῆδῶ.—Dacier makes the prologue of the *Oedipus Coloneus* consist of 700 verses¹. Nothing can be more improbable, or more inconsistent with Aristotle's idea of its purpose. [See NOTE 40.] But he was forced into this absurdity,

⁵ Cap. 4.

^b This was proved long ago in a dissertation by the Abbé Vatry, in the 11th vol. of the *Mém. de l'Acad. Roy.*, &c.—See also the preface to Franklin's *Sophocles*.—Yet Lord Kaimes says, positively, of the Greek Tragedies—"there are *five acts* in *each*."—El. of Crit. ii. 414.

¹ Note on Aristot. p. 177.

only by the supposed necessity of reducing the intervals between the odes to three, and, consequently, the *acts*, (adding the *prologue* and *exode*,) to *five*. For if the true *parode* be at v. 118, (Ὅρα τις ἀρῆν; κ. τ. αλ.) as I doubt not it is, there will then be four such *intervals*, and, consequently, *six* acts. He repeats the same mistakes in dividing the *Phœniſſæ*, in which there are five regular odes, as in many other of the Greek Tragedies. In the *Oedipus Tyrannus* he makes the ode, Εἰπερ ἐγὼ μαντις εἰμι, (v. 1096,) come in the middle of an act; and then, *because* he chose to place it so, is forced to deny that it was *ſung*, though it is in the most regular Lyric form^k.

The expreſſion, ΠΡΩΤΗ λεξις ὅλας χοροῦ, ſeems to imply, that *other* choral parts, beſide the *Parode*, were alſo λεξις; *i. e.* were ſung by the whole chorus in the ſame ſort of chanting and ſimple melody. But who will undertake to diſtinguiſh theſe parts, and to tell us, exactly, what was *Air*, and what *Recitative*? what was ſung by the whole choir, and what was, *à voce ſola*^l?—I will not bewilder my reader and myſelf in a labyrinth without a clue.

The ſcholiaſt upon the *Phœniſſæ* (v. 212.) ſays, that the Παροδὸς was ſung by the chorus, “*as they entered upon the ſtage.*”—Παροδὸς δὲ, ἐς τὴν ἀδὴν χοροῦ βαδίζοντες, ἀδομένη ἀμα τῆ ἐεισοδῶ, ὡς το—Σιγα, σιγα, &c. And, indeed, in the example he here gives from the *Oreſtes*, the *entrance* of the choral troop is clearly marked by what precedes. *Electra* ſays——

^k *Remarques ſur l’Oedipe*, at the end of his tranſlation of that Tragedy.

^l The learned reader knows that this cannot be determined by their ſpeaking of themſelves in the *ſingular number*, for this they do almoſt conſtantly, in all the *Odes*. So, Εἰπερ ΕΓΩ μαντις εἰμι, juſt referred to, &c.—Neither can we ſay, what at firſt view, indeed, ſeems probable, that *whatever* appears in the regular *Lyric* form of *Strophe* and *Antiſtrophe*, was *air*, as oppoſed to recitative, or mere chant: for in ſome Tragedies the Παροδὸς itſelf is in this regular *Lyric* form; as, in the *Trachiniæ* and *Electra* of Sophocles; *Iphig. in Aul.* of Euripides, &c.

Ἴδ' αὖ ΠΑΡΕΙΣΙ τοῖς ἔμοις θρηνημασι
Φίλαι συνῶδοι.—

v. 132.

And this is frequently the case. Thus, in the *Phœnissæ*, that the *Τυριον ὀιδμα λιπεσ'*—v. 212, (not, *Καδμῶ ἐμολε*—v. 651, as Dacier makes it,) is the true *Parode*, as, indeed, it is expressly called by the author of the Greek argument prefixed to the *Perse* of Æschylus, is confirmed by this passage, announcing the entry of the choral virgins, in the preceding Iambics, where the old attendant desires Antigone to retire:—

Ὅχλῳ γὰρ, ὡς παραγμῶ ἐσηλθεν πολῶν,
ΧΩΡΕΙ [*is coming*] γυναικῶν πρὸς δόμους τυραννικῆς.

v. 206.

Thus too, in the *Oedipus Coloneus*, the first appearance of the chorus is thus announced by Antigone:

Σιγαῖ· ΠΟΡΕΥΟΝΤΑΙ γὰρ ὈΔΕ δὴ τινες
Χρονῶ παλαιῶι.—

v. 111.

And the *Παροδῶ* immediately follows, v. 117.

In the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the arrival of the choral women is marked by themselves:

Χο.—ΕΜΟΛΟΝ· τι νεον; &c.

v. 137.

See also, v. 65. Ὅυπω----παρεῖσιν.—

The *Parode* is not less distinctly marked in the *Medea*, v. 131. Χο. *Εκλυον φωνῶν*—κ. τ. ἄλ.—in the *Heraclidæ*, where the chorus is called in by Iolaus, v. 69:—in the *Helena*, v. 179:—in the *Hercules*, v. 107, &c.

When the attendant spirit, in *COMUS*, “opens the business of the drama to a solitary forest, without an audience,” he does no more than Venus^m, and the ghost of Polydorusⁿ, and Iphigenia^o, and many others, in the Tragedies of Euripides, had done before him. The learned and ingenious editor of Milton's Occasional Poems says, that, “in a Greek Tragedy, this objection would

^m In the *Hippolytus*.

ⁿ *Hecuba*.

^o *Iphig. in Aul.*

“ have been obviated by the *chorus*, which *was always present* ;” but I am afraid the want of “ *recollection*” must be transferred from Milton to himself⁹. There are not, I think, more than three or four Greek Tragedies, in which the chorus is present from the beginning⁹.

This Παροῦσι, or *entry of the chorus*, probably made one of the most splendid and popular parts of the ΟΥΣΙΣ, or *sheew*, of the ancient Tragedy. It is mentioned by Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, as a custom of the Megarians, who were a luxurious and ostentatious people, to be at the expence of furnishing *purple dresses* for the Παροῦσι even of their *comic stage*¹. It appears, however, from a curious fragment of Menander, to have been a practice, not uncommon with the Greek *Managers*, to place mutes among their choral singers, in order to complete the *visible* number requisite:

— — — ὡσπερ των χορων
 Ὅου παντες ἀδουσ', ἀλλ' ἀφωνοι δυο τινες
 Ἡ τρεις παρεσηκασι, ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΕΣΧΑΤΟΙ,
 Ἐις τον ἀριθμον.—και τειθ' ὁμοιως πως ἔχει¹
 Χωραν κατεχομεν, ζωσι δ' οἱς ἐστιν βιῶσι¹.

— — — As in a chorus
All do not sing, but, in the hindmost ranks,
Some two or three stand mute to make a number,
So is it here ;—we serve to fill a place ;
They only live, who have the means of living.

¹ Mr. Warton's edit. of Milton's Occ. Poems, p. 129. “ Milton did not recollect, that the Spirit was opening the business of the drama to a solitary forest, “ without an audience.”

⁹ See Dacier, p. 170, note 5.

¹ και κωμωδοις χρηστων, εν τη ΠΑΡΟΔΩΙ περιφουσαν εισφερων, ὡσπερ οι Μεγαρεις, IV. 2. ed. Ox. Wilk.

¹ Menand. and Philem. Reliq. ed. Clerici, p. 221.

N O T E 91.

P. 86. THE STASIMON INCLUDES ALL THOSE CHORAL ODES THAT ARE WITHOUT ANAPÆSTS AND TROCHEES.

Στασιμον δε, μελῶν χορῶν το ἀνευ ἀναπαισε και τροχαιε.—If we are to understand this strictly, as expressing the *exclusion* of those feet from the regular odes, I cannot perceive it to be true. Dacier, therefore, understands only, that those feet were *very rarely* used in those Odes, compared with the Παροδῶν, which he calls “mier chant du chœur;” in which, he says, and very truly, that they *prevail*.—“Ces deux pieds----*regnent*,” &c. p. 179.—It is possible that Aristotle might *mean* this; but it is not what he *says*. He says, “that μελῶν—that lyric part, of the chorus, which is “without anapæsts and trochees.” I rather think, he means only those Odes, the regular *stanzas* of which are not broken and interrupted by an intermixture of anapæstic or trochaic *verses* κατα συσημα, (according to the metrical language,) like the *Parodos*, as I take it to be, of the *Antigone*,—Ακτις ἀελια—v. 100—that of the *Philoctetes*—Τι χρη—v. 136, and of the *Prometheus* of Æschylus. And this, I believe, will, *in general*, be found true of the regular Odes subsequent to the Παροδῶν. For, in the Παροδῶν itself, the general prevalence of the anapæstic measure must be evident to every one who turns over the Greek Tragedians.

N O T E 92.

P. 86. THE COMMOS, &c.

Κομμῶν——“Ἦγατο γυναικων μυρια πληθυσ, μετα ΚΟΜΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ “ΟΛΟΛΥΓΗΣ”——τῶτεςι, γοε και ὄδυμα.—*Suidas*.

The

The phrase, ἀπο σκηνης, is commonly used by Aristotle to denote the *actors*, as distinguished from the chorus; because, as Jul. Pol- lux tells us, ΣΚΗΝΗ ΜΕΝ ΤΠΟΚΡΙΤΩΝ ἰδίου, ἢ δὲ ἔρχησθαι τε χοροῦ^a. Thus, *Prob.* xlix. of *DeSt.* 19, speaking of the *Dorian* and *Hypophrygian* modes, he says, they were both, χοροῦ μὲν ἀναμύσσεια, τοῖς δὲ ἀπο σκηνης ἐκείσθαι.—So, *Prob.* xxx. and *Prob.* xv. τὰ ἀπο σκηνης, (the *dialogue*,) is opposed to τὰ τε χοροῦ—the *chorus*. I was much surprised, therefore, to find the meaning of this phrase so widely mistaken, in the late Camb. edit, where ἀπο σκηνης is thus explained: “id est, ἀπέχουσι—*ad chorigi manus, non Poetae, pertinens*”^b.

An example of the Κομμῶν, pointed out by Victorius, may be found in the *Andromache* of Euripides, v. 1197.

I know not why some of the commentators confine these joint lamentations of chorus and actors to the *Exode*, or what they call the last *act*. They are often, I think, to be found in other parts of the drama; “dans le *cours des actes*,” as Dacier rightly observes. We have an example of this between Tecmessa and the chorus, in the *Ajax*, v. 901. Ἰω, μοι μοι——. Another occurs very early in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, v. 143, &c. where Iphigenia, assisted by the choral virgins, her attendants, performs the funereal libation to the *manes* of her brother, whom she supposes to be dead, and sings a funereal dirge. The *chorus*, indeed, have so small a part in this lamentation, that it may be thought hardly to answer Aristotle’s definition of θρηνητικῶν κωνῶν &c. But this, in fact, seems no objection, because the lamentation of Iphigenia is broken off abruptly, as Mr. Markland has well observed, at v. 235, by the arrival of the shepherd. I consider it, therefore, only as an unfinished Κομμῶν. But, that it answers to that idea, appears, I think, from the whole cast of it; from the frequent occurrence of the interjections, ΦΕΥ, ΦΕΥ—ἔ, ἔ—αἰ, αἰ—οἱ μοι, &c.—and of the very word, θρηνητικῶν, throughout^c, and, from the answer of the chorus:

^a IV. 19.

^b *Ed. Cantab.* 1785, p. 125.

^c Ω δμωαι, δυσθρηνητοις
Ως θρηνοις ἐγκειμαι.

v. 143.

Χορ.

Χορ.—ANTIΨΑΑΜΟΥΣ ᾠδὰς

Ἦμνον τ' Ἀσηταὺ σοι

Βαρβαρὸν ἰαχὰν

— — —
Δεσποινὰ γ' ἔξ' αὐδάσω,

Ἦταν ἐν ΘΡΗΝΟΙΣΙ μῆσαν

Νεκυσι μελεον^d.

v. 178.

To thee thy faithful train
The Asiatic hymn will raise,
A doleful, a barbaric strain,
Responsive to thy lays,
And steep in tears the mournful song,
Notes which to the *dead* belong;
Dirinal notes attun'd to woe
By Pluto in the realms below.—

Potter's Eurip. v. 206.

N O T E 93.

P. 87. THIS RAISES DISGUST, RATHER THAN TERROR OR COMPASSION.

Literally,—“ for this is *neither terrible, nor piteous, but shocking.*” εἰ γὰρ φοβερόν, εἰ δὲ ἐλεεινὸν τετο, ἀλλὰ μισρόν ἐστιν.—But we certainly must not understand Aristotle to assert, that *no* pity is

^d “ *Mortuis miseram.*” “ *Quid hoc sit, nescio,*” says Mr. Markland. But, perhaps, it should be rendered, “ *Mortuis vanam, inutilem,*” in the Homeric sense of μελεῖ. See Il. Ψ. 795—μελεῖ αἶν.—*useless, unavailing* praise. So, in Virgil—“ *inani munere.*” Æn. vi. 886.—And, Æn. xi. 51.

Nos juvenem *exanimum*—

— *vano* mœsti comitamur honore.

ΜΕΛΕῖ—ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ. *Suid.* and *Hesych.*—So, Apoll. Rhod. i. 1249. ΜΕΛΕΗ δὲ οἱ ἐπλετο φωνή.—“ *Vanus ei erat clamor.*”

excited by the sufferings of an exemplary character. This would be directly contrary to his own account of pity: Ελεος μὲν, περὶ τοῦ ἀναξίου^a. He must mean only, that they are *rather* shocking, than affecting; as it is well rendered by Piccolomini; “un così fatto caso “ non hà, nè del terribile, (*per dir così,*) nè del compassionevole; “ ma *più tosto* hà dell’ abominevole, et dello scellerato.” That is, as this clear and exact, though prolix, writer has explained it in his subsequent *annotation*,—“quello affetto dell’ odio et dell’ abominazione, *sopravanza* in modo l’affetto del timore, et quel della “ compassione, che gli *ricuopre*, et *gli asconde*, et *supera*, in modo “ che *quasi* non si fan sentire.”

Μιᾶρον—*shocking, disgusting, &c.* because contrary to our established ideas of justice, and to every moral sentiment of our nature. History, indeed; must represent facts as they are; without any regard to the sentiments they may excite. But the case is far otherwise with the fictions of the Poet. We think he ought not to make such a representation of things^b. We consider it as discouraging to virtue, as immoral,—even, in some degree, as irreligious. What reader of CLARISSA does not find the pity, the *pleasurable* pity, at least, which it is the object of such a work to excite, frequently counteracted, and diminished, to say no more, by some indignant feelings of this kind? The story of *Sidney Biddulph*, though a work of considerable merit in the execution, is liable to the same objection. The mind of a reader is harrassed and revolted throughout by the most improbable and *determined* perverseness of unfortunate combinations; and shocked, at last, by the wanton production of misery, neither deserved, nor likely.—Οὐ φοβερόν, εἰδὲ ἐλεεινὸν τῦτο, ἀλλὰ μιᾶρον. Fontenelle says, in perfect conformity with Aristotle, “Plus le heros est aimé; plus il est

^a And see Rhet. II. 8.

^b “Cum historia vera successus rerum minime pro meritis virtutum et scelerum “ narret; corrigat eam *Poesis*, et exitus et fortunas, secundum merita, et ex lege “ Nemesios, exhibet.”

—Bacon, *De Aug. Sc. lib. ii. c. 13.*

“ convenable

“convenable de le rendre heureux à la fin. Il ne faut point ren-
 “voyer le spectateur avec la douleur de plaindre la destinée d’un
 “homme vertueux.” Reflex. sur la Poet. *Scet.* 52.

To do justice to the author’s meaning, two other things should be kept in mind: 1. That, by his ἐπιεικής, he here means a character of consummate virtue, whose misfortunes were not drawn upon him by *any fault* of his own. This is evident from what follows. The sense of the word is sufficiently fixed by its opposite, ΣΦΟΔΡΑ πονηρον, as well as by the equivalent expression, ἀρετή ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ και δικαιουσυνή, in his description of the *proper* character for Tragedy^c. 2. That he presently afterwards softens a little the rigour of his precept as *here* delivered, by saying, that the character should be *either* such as he had prescribed, “or *better* “*rather than worse* :” βελτιον μωλλον ἢ χειρον.

N O T E 94.

P. 87. FOR IT IS NEITHER GRATIFYING IN A MORAL VIEW, &c.

Ουτε γαρ ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ —. Without entering into a long discussion of all that has been urged by the commentators in favour of the different senses they have assigned to the word φιλανθρωπον here, I shall only say, that, upon the most attentive comparison of this passage with another, in cap. xviii. where the term again occurs, it appears to me, that the *full* meaning of it is, *gratifying to philanthropy*; pleasing by its conformity to our natural sense of justice, by its *moral tendency*. Indeed this seems to follow from the word *μιαρον*, to which φιλανθρωπον is opposed. The representation of a good man (ἐπιεικής) made miserable is *μιαρον*—*disgusting*,

^c For Aristotle’s account of ἐπιεικεια, the reader may consult *Eth. Nicom.* V. 10. ed. *Wilk.*

shocking. Why? Plainly, on account of its evident injustice, and immoral tendency. The representation of a *very bad* man (σφοδρα ποιησ) punished by calamity, is φιλανθρωπον;—that is, pleasing to the spectator, on the same principle, from its opposite tendency.

A singular, but somewhat similar, use is made of the same word in Plutarch's dialogue *περὶ Μουσικῆς*; where, speaking of the wicked innovations of the more modern musicians, Timotheus, Philoxenus, &c. he says of them—φιλοκαινοὶ γεγονασί, τὸν ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΟΝ καὶ θεματικὸν ΝΥΝ ὀΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ διωξάντες. M. Burette's note upon this is perfectly unsatisfactory^a. I believe we should read—ΤΟ φιλανθρωπον καὶ ΘΕΑΤΡΙΚΟΝ—κ. τ. αλ.—i. e. "being lovers of "novelty, they affect what is now termed the *pleasing* and *theatrical* style." The *Theatre*, we know, was considered by the *purists* of that time, as the great source of corruption in Music. The reader may see how Plutarch rails, on this subject, p. 2081, and 2089; where he laments—παντας τες μουσικης ἀπτομενες προς την ΘΕΑΤΡΙΚΗΝ προσκεχωρημεναι μεσαν.—It appears, from his expression, ΝΥΝ ὀνομαζομενον, that this was a new and fashionable use of the word φιλανθρωπον; which, from the sense of *pleasing to natural benevolence*, (as in the passage of Aristotle,) seems to have been extended to signify, what was *pleasing*, and grateful, to the popular taste, in *general*; in opposition to those more chaste and severe productions of the artist, which aimed only at the gratification of the critical, and the learned. And, indeed, no sort of *philanthropy* is more common, in all times, and in every art, than that of accommodation to the public taste.

^a Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscip. vol. xix. p. 325, *est. ed.*—In H. Stephens's ed. of Plut. p. 2080.

N O T E 95.

P. 87. OUR TERROR, BY SOME RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN THE SUFFERER AND OURSELVES.

Thus, in the *Rhetoric*, it is recommended to the Orator, as one method of exciting terror in his hearers, τῆς ὁμοιοῦτος δεικνύσθαι πασχόντας, ἢ πεπονθότας^a. Aristotle's doctrine concerning the importance of this *resemblance to ourselves* in the object of the passion to be excited, and the extent he gives to the word ὁμοίος, may be seen in the passages of his *Rhetoric* referred to in the margin^b. The resemblance, however, *here* particularly meant, is undoubtedly resemblance of *character*. This is well explained by M. Batteux in few words: “Un crime atroce, un horreur de *scélérat*, “revolte le spectateur, et par cette revolte même, le rassure contre “la crainte; parcequ’il se sent aussi éloigné du malheur, qu’il “l’est du crime.” [*Quatre Poétiques, tom. i. p. 307.*] Or, as it is more fully developed by Piccolomini, “Riputando, per il più, “gl’ uomini se stessi buoni, o almeno non cattivi, ed in somma, “non degni di male; e, per conseguente, *diffimili à quelle persone* “*inique, in cui veggon’ il male, et in questo differenti da esse, che elle* “lo meritano, ed essi non lo meritano: non vengon’ à dubitar di “cadere in tai mali, et, conseguentemente, non ne nasce timore in “loro.” p. 194.

^a II. 5.

^b *Ubi supra, Cap. viii. p. 559, E.—Cap. x. init.*

N O T E 96.

P. 87. NOR YET INVOLVED IN MISFORTUNE BY DELIBERATE VICE, OR VILLAINY; BUT BY SOME ERROR OF HUMAN FRAILITY.

Μητε δια κακιαν και μοχθηριαν μεταβαλλων εις την δυσυχιαν, αλλα δι' αμαρτιαν τινα ——. Thus, in the *Ethic. Nicom.* V. 10. p. 69. he uses μοχθηρια, and κακια, as synonymous: and, VII. 9; where he says of μοχθηρια, that it is ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ πονηρια—a vicious *character, disposition, habit, &c.*—It also implies *deliberate choice* and intention, (— όταν δε εις προαιρεσεως, μοχθηρια, V. 8.) in opposition to αμαρτια, which excludes προαιρεσις, and is ανευ ΚΑΚΙΑΣ. (*ibid.*)

To understand rightly what the philosopher says in this part of his work on Poetry, and especially his application of his doctrine to such characters as Oedipus and Thyestes, we ought carefully to take his own sense of his own words. For want of this, Dacier^a confounds himself and his readers in his note about *Thyestes*. He mistakes Aristotle's sense of αμαρτια. Dacier's "*involontaire*" includes both ανεσιον, and απροβλευτον, which Aristotle distin-

^a A fine writer, M. Marmontel, has fallen into this and several other mistakes, by following Dacier and other translators, (for we are none of us to be depended on,) instead of taking the meaning of Aristotle from Aristotle himself.—See his *Poétique Française*, tom. ii. p. 109, where he adopts Dacier's "*involontaire*." In another place he says, "Dans *Sophocle*, Oedipe voyant arriver les enfans qu'il a eu de sa mere, il leur tend les bras et leur dit: *approchez, embrassez votre — Il n'acheve pas, et le sublime est dans la reticence.*" Now the fact is, that this *reticence* is solely the property of the good father Brumoy, with respect to whom we may apply to M. Marmontel the words of Aristotle, quoted below,—ἀδικῶ μεν ἐν ἐστὶ, ἀδικεῖ δε. *Brumoy* translates — "*approchez, et embrassez votre ----- frere,*" &c. — *Sophocles* wrote—

— — δευ' ἰτ', ἐλθετε
Ως τας ἀδελφας ταςδε τας ἑμας χερας.

gives;

guishes; *his ἀμαρτηματα* being not *involuntary*, but only, *not ἐκ προαιρεσεως*. See the whole *cap. x*, of *lib. 5*, as above. One passage, in *cap. ix*. of *lib. 7*, will particularly illustrate Aristotle's examples. Ὅι ΑΚΡΑΤΕΙΣ (such were Oedipus and Thyestes, men of ungovernable passion,) ΑΔΙΚΟΙ μὲν ἐκ ἐσσι, (i. e. are not *unjust men*—not *κακοι, μοχθηροι*, of bad *dispositions*, &c.) ΑΔΙΚΟΥΣΙ δὲ—yet they commit transient and occasional wrong, *δια παθῶ*, as he says elsewhere^b.

The objections made by Corneille, Fontenelle, and other critics, to such subjects as that of the Oedipus, which they hold to be improper for Tragedy on account of the supposed fatality of the crimes committed, are well and solidly answered in an excellent note of the Abbé Batteux upon this passage.

N O T E 97.

P. 88. UPON THE STAGE AND IN THE DRAMATIC CONTESTS.

—*Ἐπι των σκηνων και των ἄγωνων*—i. e. merely, in the *representation*. There seems to be no more foundation for the distinction which Dacier here supposes, between *σκηνη*, and *ἄγων*, than for the same distinction between *ἄγων*, and *ὑποκριται*, in the similar expression, *ἄγωνῶ και ὑποκριτων*, in *cap. vi*.

N O T E 98.

P. 88. EURIPIDES—THE MOST TRAGIC OF ALL POETS.

—More, however, it has been observed, with respect to the emotion of *pity*, than that of *terror*. And so, Quintilian: “ In affec-

^b Ὅ μὲν ἀκρατης, εἰδως ὅτι φαντα, πραττει δια παθῶ. VII. 2. p. 86.

“ tibus

“ tibus cum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui MISERATIONE con-
 “ stant, facile præcipuus.” [*lib. x. c. 1.*] Yet the powers of this
 admirable, though unequal, genius, were by no means confined to
 emotions of tenderness and pity. He, too, as one of “ *Nature’s*
 “ *darlings,*” possessed that “ *golden key,*” which can not only “ *ope*
 “ *the sacred source of sympathetic tears,*” but can “ *unlock*” also,
 and at the same time, the “ *gates of horror,*” and of “ *thrilling*
 “ *fears.*” As proofs of this, I am tempted to produce two passages
 of this Poet, which I could never read without shuddering.

In that scene between Medea and Jason, in which, previous to
 the execution of her horrid vengeance, she deludes him with
 feigned reconciliation and submission, when Jason, addressing the
 children, says,

Ἰδοίμι δ’ ὕμᾶς εὐτραφεὶς ἠβῆς τελευ-
 Μολούτας, ἐχθρῶν τῶν ἐμῶν ὑπερτερές^a.

—Medea turns away her face and weeps : and when Jason asks
 the reason of her tears, she answers,

Οὐδέν.—τεκνῶν τῶνδ’ ἐννοεμένη περὶ^b.

“ And why,” says Jason again, “ lament thus over these children?”

—Medea, then, knowing, but veiling in ambiguity, her dreadful
 purpose of destroying them, replies,

Ἐπικτὸν αὐτῆς.—Ζῆν Δ’ ὅτ’ ἔΞητύχοῦ τέκνα,
 εἰσηλοῦ μ’ οἰκτὸς, εἰ γένησεται ταδε!

v. 930.

“ I am their mother:—when thy wish was breath’d
 “ That they might live, a piteous thought arose,
 “ *If that might be!*”—— *Potter’s Eurip. v. 1000.*

^a “ O may I see you blooming in the prime
 “ Of manhood, and to every virtue train’d,
 “ Superior to my foes!” [Mr. Potter’s Transl. v. 989.]

^b “ Nothing:—I was but thinking of my sons.”

The

The other passage is in the *Electra*. In the fine scene between Orestes and Electra, immediately after the murder of their mother, Orestes asks his sister,

Κατειδες διον ἀ ταλαιῶ ἕων πεπλων
 Εβαλεν, ἐδειξε, μασον ἐν φουαις;— v. 1206.

Mark'd you not, how my mother, e'er I struck her,
 Withdrew her robe, and to our view expos'd
 The breast that nourish'd us!—

I know not what more can be said to the praise of Euripides, than, that no one, I believe, can read this scene without being reminded of the *MACBETH* of SHAKESPEARE.

N O T E 99.

P. 88. THAT WHICH IS OF A DOUBLE CONSTRUCTION, AND ALSO ENDS IN TWO OPPOSITE EVENTS TO THE GOOD, AND TO THE BAD, CHARACTERS.

ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ, ἥ—ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΝ ἔχουσα—i. e. “That construction “which has a double construction.”—Can this be as the author left it? I cannot but suspect the *first* συστασις to be an interpolation. Without it, all will go on well.—Ἡ μὲν ἐν—καλλιζα Τραγωδία ἐκ ταυτης της συστασεως ἐστὶ. — — Δευτερα δε, [sc. Τραγωδία,] ἡ πρωτη λεγομενη ὑπο τινων ἐστὶ ἡ διπλην τε την συστασιν ἔχουσα,—και τελευτωσα δςς.

* The excellent translator of Euripides will pardon my having recourse here to a version of my own, merely for the sake of pointing out more distinctly to the *English* reader that *particular circumstance* of the original, which strikes me most. Mr. Potter's lines are,

“ Didst thou see her, when she drew
 “ Her vests aside, and bared her breasts— v. 1338.

The particle, TE, here, is neglected by most of the commentators and translators, who, accordingly, of *two* distinct things make *one* only; understanding Aristotle, by his *διπλη συζασις*, to mean only a fable that has a *double catastrophe*, ending oppositely to opposite characters. But the expression is, “that has *both* a “double construction, and a double catastrophe.” *διπλην TE την συζασιω. ΚΑΙ τελευτωσα—κ. τ. αλ.* We must not, however, confound this *double construction* with duplicity of *action*, and what we call *double plots*. I believe Castelvetro, who did not let the *τε* escape him, has explained it rightly. “Dice, che questa costituzione di favola “è doppia, percioche *ha due maniere di persone*, l’una di buone, o “di mezzane, et l’altra di scelerate.” (p. 293.) An explanation that will come still better recommended to the reader by the coincident opinion of the learned and accurate author of *Critical Observations on Books, ancient and modern*; who has given the following explanatory version of this passage^a: “That constitution “of an Epic tale^b, which is reckoned the first by some, is in reality “but the second in point of excellence, namely, that which, like “the *Odyssy*, *has a double set of characters*, one virtuous, and one “vicious, and wherein the action *also* ends contrarywise to the “virtuous and vicious agents, so that the former terminate in “prosperity, and the latter in adversity.”—These two things, though closely connected, are evidently distinct. There may be a double set of characters, where yet there is no contrariety of catastrophe, but all ends well to all.—Such a fable, as Aristotle describes, though a very different thing from our *plot* and *under-plot*, yet, as it consists of opposite characters, opposite interests, and opposite events, may well enough be considered as of a double construction—*διπλης συζασεως*. Unity of *action*, indeed, upon Aristotle’s

^a Number I. p. 3.

^b I do not see the learned writer’s reason for inserting the word *Epic*. Aristotle is here plainly speaking of the *Tragic* fable, though he draws his illustration, indeed, from an Epic Poem.

principles, was essential both to the *single* and to the *double* fable; yet that unity admits of degrees, and the double fable was *less strictly one* action than the single. The *single* fable might be compared to a single stream: the *plot* and *under-plot*, to two separate, though contiguous, and now and then intermingling, streams: Aristotle's fable of *double construction*, to two opposite collateral currents, (if such a thing may be imagined,) in the same channel:

N O T E 100.

P. 89. THIS KIND OF PLEASURE IS NOT THE PROPER PLEASURE OF TRAGEDY, BUT BELONGS RATHER TO COMEDY, &c.

What *is* the proper pleasure to be expected from Tragedy, we have already been told, and we are told again, more plainly, if possible, in the next chapter. It is—*ἡ ἀπο ἐλεος και φοβου ἩΔΟΝΗ*: “the pleasure that arises from pity and terror^a. The double fable Aristotle seems to have considered as not giving this pleasure, or at least, as giving it weakly and imperfectly, because all the unhappiness of the *catastrophe* falls on the odious characters, the *σφοδρα πονηρες*. In the room of this pleasure, which Tragedy *ought* to give, the double fable substitutes that of a satisfactory conclusion; a catastrophe accommodated to the wishes of the spectator. But this, says Aristotle, is a pleasure that *rather* belongs to Comedy than to Tragedy: *ΜΑΛΛΟΝ της κωμωδίας ὀκεια*. For he is not here rejecting this double plan, but only shewing why it is not, as some held it to be, the *best*, *πρωτη*. Such Tragedies, he says, afford a pleasure of the same *kind*, at least, with that which Comedy affords; though Comedy indeed goes farther; for there, all must end well; enemies, as inveterate as Orestes and Ægisthus, must shake hands

^a Transl. Sect. 13.

at last, and the spectator must be dismissed with no impresson upon his mind, but that of pure and unmixed pleasure.

If we understand the passage in this way, it will not, I think, be necessary to suppose, what, I own, I was once much inclined to suppose with Heinsius, that the text is defective; and that, after the word *θεαταις*, Aristotle had, originally, mentioned the *third* and *worst* kind of fable, terminating in a happy event to *all* the characters; to which, and not to the *second* species, what follows about Comedy was meant to be applied. Very specious reasons might certainly be produced in support of such a conjecture, if it were necessary. But we have no encouragement from MSS. to suspect any omission, and the passage, as here explained, seems to have little, or no, difficulty. The chief objection is, that what is here said of Comedy is not applicable to the double Tragic fable, in which there is no reconciliation of enemies^b, &c. But it was not, I think, intended to be so closely applicable. All that Aristotle meant must have been, to shew, that the pleasure arising from his *second* species of fable, differed only in *degree* from that of Comedy; that the circumstance of *ending satisfactorily* was common to both*.

Chaucer's Monk had the true Aristotelic idea of Tragedy:-----

Tragedie is to fayn a certain storie,
As olde bookes maken us memorie,
Of *him that stood in gret prosperitee*,
And is *yfallen out of high degree*
In to miserie, and *endeth wretchedly*^c.

But

* See the note of Heinsius.—Castelvetro supposes Aristotle to be answering a *tacit* objection—"Why not a happy termination for *all* the characters, good and bad?" p. 294.

* The author of one of the arguments to the *Orestes* of Euripides, says, το δε δράμα ΚΩΜΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΝ ἔχει τὴν καταστροφὴν.

^c Canterbury tales, v. 13979. Mr. Tyrwhitt's ed.—Chaucer, however, uses the word *Tragedy* in a loose sense, (as Dr. Burney has observed, Hist. of Mus. vol. ii. p. 320.) for a *tragicall story*. And for this he seems to have Plato's authority:—τῆς τε ΤΡΑΓΙΚΗΣ

But the knight, and the host, were among the θεαται ΑΣΘΕ-
ΝΕΙΣ :

Ho! quod the knight, good fire, no more of this:
That ye han faid is right *ynough* ywis,
And mochel more; for litel hevinesse
Is right ynough to mochel folk, I gesse.
I say for me, it is a gret *diseſe*, [*uneasinesſ*]
Wher as men have ben in gret welth and eſe,
To heren of hir foden fall, alas!
And the contrary is joye and gret folas,
As whan a man hath ben in poure eſtat,
And climbeth up, and wexeth fortunat,
And ther abideth in prosperitee:
Swiche thing is gladſom, as it thinketh me,
And of ſwiche thing were goodly for to telle^d.

N O T E 101.

P. 89. WHO MAKE USE OF THE DECORATION TO PRO-
DUCE, NOT THE TERRIBLE, BUT THE MARVELLOUS ONLY—

One would think, that commentators on Aristotle might find enough in this work to satisfy the keenest appetite for difficulties, without any assistance from their own invention. Yet here, they have contrived to perplex one of the plainest passages that can be found. Nothing can well be clearer than Aristotle's expression: —*οὐ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερὸν, διὰ τῆς ἐψεως, ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατοειδὲς μόνον, παρασκευαζόντες.*—He is not, as some critics have supposed^a, examining here *three* different ways of raising *terror*, but

ΤΡΑΓΙΚΗΣ ποιήσεως ἀπτομένως, ἐν ἰαμβείοις, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΕΠΕΣΙ. *Rep.* x.—And so presently after,—ὍΜΗΡΟΥ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῃ τιῶν ΤΡΑΓΩΜΕΤΡΩΝ: and he calls Homer *πρωτον των τραγωδιστων*. See, also, p. 152, *E. ed. Serr.* vol. i.

^d v. 14773, &c.

^a Robortelli, Castelvetro, Piccolomini, Beni.

two only;—by the plot itself, which he justly pronounces to be the best way, and by the ἄψις, the spectacle, scenes, dresses, &c. As for those Poets, he continues, who make use of the ἄψις, for the purpose of exciting, not *terror*, but *wonder only*, they are out of the question; this “*has nothing to do with Tragedy*,” &c. If Aristotle, by τερατώδες, had meant only, as has been understood, a monstrous degree of the terrible—“*mostruoso, soprano spavento*,” as Castelvetro calls it^b, he surely would not have used so strong an expression as—ΟΥΔΕΝ Τῆ Τραγωδίᾳ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΟΥΣΙΝ. He does not here exclude even the τερατώδες, absolutely, and in general; but the mere τερατώδες; τερατώδες ΜΟΝΟΝ—“*only the wonderful*,” and that, δια τῆς ἄψεως. The marvellous and supernatural, may, we know, in the hands of a Poet of genius, be made a powerful instrument of Tragic terror. Aristotle would hardly, I imagine, have censured a drama like that of Macbeth, as having “*nothing in common with Tragedy*.”

The difficulty, indeed, of managing the visible τερατώδες, so as to produce any *serious* effect, is sufficiently great. We have, I think, but one dramatic Poet who *could* walk, though others may have *dared* to walk, “*within that circle*.” The decoration of the *Eumenides* of Æschylus, and his chorus of *fifty* furies, with their *μυγμοί*, and their ὠγμοί^c, their *snorings*, their screams, and their torches, may very well be conceived to have put women and children in a real fright; but whether it produced any sympathetic, illusive, and pleasurable, terror—the only terror in question^d—I should much doubt. Yet Dacier, very gravely, produces this story of children fainting away, and women miscarrying, with the fright, as an example of *Tragic* terror excited by the ἄψις^e. Ac-

^b P. 298. M. Batteux follows this interpretation. He translates τερατώδες, “*effrayant*.”

^c See v. 116, &c.

^d See Dr. Campbell’s *Philos. of Rhetoric*, book I. ch. ii. p. 323.

^e P. 213, and 47, note 36.—The story is told by the anonymous writer of the life of Æschylus:—ὡς τε μὲν νηπία ἐκλυθαί, τα δὲ ἐμβρυα ἐξαμβλῆσθαι.

According to Dacier's account, the allegorical personage of *Λυσσα*, or Madness, in the *Hercules Furens* of Euripides, appears in her aerial car, "with a hundred heads, round which hiss a thousand serpents." It is rather difficult to conceive how this could have been managed. These hundred heads, in the passage of the chorus alluded to, v. 884, certainly belong to the serpents, not to *Λυσσα* herself; and the emendation of Reiske seems probable; — *ἑκατογκεφαλοῖς Ὀφείων ἰαχνημασι*.—"centicipitibus serpentum sibilis". Even so, I can scarce imagine an Athenian audience to have received this exhibition with countenances perfectly Tragic. The arrival of old OCEAN mounted upon his *Griffin*, in the *Prometheus* of Æschylus, must, one would suppose, have had as ridiculous an effect, as I remember the entrance of the Minotaur to have had upon the audience, some years ago, in the opera of *Teseo*.

If such a dramatic entertainment as our *Pantomime* had existed in the days of Aristotle, he would probably have represented the Tragic Poets, whom he here censures, as encroaching on *that* province: for, indeed, the *τερατωδες μονον δια της οψεως παρασκευαζομενον*, would accurately enough express the *ἡδονην ονειρων* of the pantomime.—But, what would the philosopher have said to a species of the drama, of which the *ὄψις*, which he places at the very bottom of his scale [*cap. vi.*], is the very *soul*—*ἀρχη και οἶον ψυχη*: and where the *σκευοποι*, or the carpenter, takes the lead of the Poet?—To do it justice, however, it has its *Μυθος*, its fable, such as it is, with its *beginning*, its *middle*, and its *end*; though a spectator may be often puzzled to make, as we commonly say, head or tail of its plot. It has also its *δεσεις* and its *λυσεις*, its *navds* and its *denouemens*, in great abundance; being, indeed, from beginning to end, a continued series of *knots*, tied by love, and cut by magic. Here are also *περιπετειαι* and *ἀναγνώσεις*, revolutions, and discove-

^d P. 215.

^e See the Ox. Euripides,

ries, in plenty; though the chief revolution, indeed, be in the scenery;—ἡ εἰς το ἔναντιον των ὈΡΩΜΕΝΩΝ μεταβολη. And with respect to *discoveries*, the pantomime may be characterized as Aristotle characterizes the *Odyſſey*,—ἀναγνωρισεις γαρ διολε—“it abounds throughout with discoveries^d”; for the poor hero is perpetually discovered, and very seldom εἰς φιλιαν^e. Then there are *Παθη* too, *disasters*—the *πραξεις ὀδυνηραι*^f at least, which, to the upper gallery, make the merriest part of the entertainment. An essential character, the *clown*, is even appropriated to this purpose of *suffering*, and his clothes well wadded for the reception of blows, kicks, and falls^g. But Aristotle little foresaw, I suppose, when he wrote his first chapter, that a species of drama *without words* would one day be invented: still less, probably, could he have imagined, what to the antients would have appeared the strangest part of this business, that, though *accompanied throughout* by MUSIC, yet it would not imitate “by gesticulated *rhythm*”—*δια σχηματιζομενων ΡΥΘΜΩΝ*; the gestures of the actors in pantomime, being not at all regulated by the *measures* of the music, or only occasionally, and accidentally, according to the ear, and inclination, of the performer^h.

^d Cap. xxiv. Transl. Part III. Sect. 1.

^e Cap. xi.

^f Cap. xii. *imit.*

^g The Germans, not many years ago, were, it seems, so fond of this sort of *humour*, that Dr. Burney tells us, “bills were regularly brought in to the managers at the end of each week, in which the comic actors used to charge; “So much for a slap on the face,”—“So much for a broken head,” &c.—See vol. ii. of Dr. Burney’s entertaining *Journal of a Tour through Germany*, &c. p. 223.

^h The pantomimic exhibitions of the Romans, spoken of in NOTE 4, and described pretty fully by Lucian, *De Salt.* were widely different. They were a species of dance, and the gestures of the performers were strictly governed by the rhythm of the music; the *words*, which it was the business of the dancer to express by those gestures, being *sung*, at the same time, by a chorus.

N O T E 102.

P. 90. MOST TERRIBLE, OR PITEOUS —.

After having established, that the terrible and piteous should arise from the circumstances of the action itself, Aristotle proceeds to examine *what* are the circumstances that will produce the highest degree of terror and pity, within the *proper limits*; that is, so as to avoid what he calls the *μιαρον*, the shocking, and disgusting. And this, perhaps, led him here to use the words *δεινα*, and *διντρα*, as being, if I mistake not, rather stronger than *φοβερα*, and *ελεεινα*. For the subject of this chapter seems, in short, to be, *the proper management of the Πωλη or disastrous incidents*: “Comment,” as Dacier has rightly observed, “on doit se conduire dans les actions *atroces*,” p. 236. Without this leading idea it would be difficult to explain satisfactorily some passages that follow.

N O T E 103.

P. 90. BETWEEN FRIENDS.

Εν ταις φιλιαις.—For the wide sense in which Aristotle here uses the word *φιλια*, see *Ethic. Nicom.* VIII. 1, and 7, *ed. Ox.* 1716, and the passage quoted in NOTE 276.

N O T E 104.

P. 90. BUT IT IS HIS PROVINCE TO INVENT OTHER SUBJECTS, AND TO MAKE A SKILFUL USE OF THOSE WHICH HE FINDS ALREADY ESTABLISHED.

Αυτον δε εύρισκειν δεί, και τοις παραδεδομένοις χρησθαι καλώς. The expression is too short and general to be clear. It is fairly capable of not less than *three* different meanings. *Εύρισκειν*, may mean, to *invent* a subject from pure imagination, as Agatho invented his ANΘΟΣ^a: or it may mean only, to *find out* a new historical subject; or, lastly, to *invent*, not a subject, but only *circumstances* and *incidents*, by which the *old* subjects may be varied; which is Dacier's idea:—"Le Poete doit inventer lui-même, *en se servant* comme il faut des fables reçues."—I shall only say, that, on the whole, I prefer the second of these explanations. Aristotle, it is true, had allowed^b, that a Poet ought not to be chained down to the old *traditional stories*; and even, that it would be *ridiculous* (γελοῖον) to suppose subjects of pure invention absolutely prohibited. But this is delivered as a permission, not as a precept; and he would hardly have enforced a permission by such an expression as he here uses — εύρισκειν ΔΕΙ. Again—αυτον ΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ, (against Dacier's explanation,) seems plainly opposed to τοις παραδεδομένοις ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ—“to *use* old *subjects* properly, and to *invent* or *find out* new *subjects*: not new *incidents* for an *old* subject. This may, perhaps, receive some illustration and support from a similar passage in the Rhetoric^c. In the *second* chapter of the first book, he divides the *proofs* of the orator into two kinds—the *ἀτεχνοι*, and

^a Cap. ix. Transl. Part II. Sect. 6.

^b *Ibid.*

^c It is quoted, I see, by Robortelli.

the ἐντεχνοί. The οἰτεχνοί are the *external* proofs; witnesses, the torture, writings, and all such proofs as are *ready provided to the pleader's hand*—ὅσα μὴ δι' ἡμῶν πεπορισται, ἀλλὰ προὔπηρχεν. The ἐντεχνοί he defines to be those *argumentative proofs* which depend on the art and invention of the orator himself. He then concludes—ὡς εἰ δὲ τετων, τοῖς μὲν ΧΡΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ, τα δὲ ΕΥΡΕΙΝ:—“ of these “ proofs, the first sort we have only to make a proper *use* of; the “ other we must *invent*.”

N O T E 105.

P. 91. BUT OF ALL THESE WAYS, &c.

All this is not a little *embrouillé*.—Aristotle describes *three* ways only. Then he says, or seems to say,—“ There *is no other way* :” —παρα ταυτα ἐκ ἑσιν ἄλλως. And to prove this, he enumerates all the ways *possible*; which, at last, turn out to be *four*. Hence the text has been supposed defective. [See Castelvetro; and Goulston's supplemental translation.] Perhaps there is no occasion to suppose this. That, at least, there is no accidental omission of a *fourth* case, (that of *purposing* without *executing*,) seems pretty clear from the expression, ΕΤΙ δὲ τρίτον παρα ταυτα: “ there is *still* a third “ way *beside these*.” It would have been rather strange, if, immediately after this, he had proceeded to mention a *fourth* way.—Taking then the passage as perfect, we must understand, I think, by ἐκ ΕΣΤΙΝ ἄλλως, not—there *is no other way possible*—but, there is no other *proper, admissible* way: non licet aliter—it *must* not be done in any other way. For, he proceeds, there are but *four* ways possible; but of all *these*, (τετων δὲ—i. e. these four *possible* ways,) that of being “ *ready to execute, knowingly, and yet not executing*,” is the worst, and not to be enumerated by a critic among those ways which a Poet may be allowed to use.

Thus Dacier appears to have understood the passage, by his translation, which, I think, is right, as to the sense. But I thought Aristotle's meaning might be clearly enough expressed without periphrasis, or supplement.

N O T E 106.

P. 92. BUT THE BEST OF ALL THESE WAYS IS THE LAST.

In the 13th chapter (Transl. *Scēt.* 12.) Aristotle had pronounced *that* to be the best constituted Tragedy, which terminates unhappily; and had represented that species, which gratifies, by its catastrophe, the sympathetic wishes of the audience, as inferior, and affording a kind of pleasure *rather* appropriated to Comedy. Yet here, he *appears* to give the preference to a plan calculated to afford that very pleasure in the highest degree. This seeming inconsistency has given the commentators much trouble. It is rather surprising, that Dacier should have perceived what had escaped the superior acuteness of the Italian annotators, *viz.* that Aristotle is not, in this chapter, inquiring what is the best constitution of a Tragic fable *in general*, but, what is the best method of managing the most disastrous and atrocious incidents of Tragic story, so as to produce the highest possible degree of Tragical emotion in the spectator, without producing *horror* and disgust*. With this view of the subject, the reader, perhaps, will not see much difficulty in reconciling Aristotle to himself. He might surely say, without inconsistency, "Tragedy, to be perfect, should terminate unhappily. Yet there may be particular exceptions to this general rule. The *end* of Tragedy is, to excite terror and pity; and that end is most effectually answered, when those emotions are not only excited in the *course* of the drama, (as they undoubt-

* See NOTE 102.

“ edly may be, and to a high degree, even in such pieces as *end*
 “ fortunately,) but are left impressed upon the mind of the spec-
 “ tator by the catastrophe itself. Yet this Tragic *terror* is not to
 “ be pushed to absolute *horror*, nor the *τρογαικον* to be confounded
 “ with the *μιαρον*: and I allow, that where the circumstances of
 “ the traditional story, from which the Poet takes his plot, are
 “ such, as leave him only the alternative, either of disgusting and
 “ shocking the spectator, or of gratifying his wishes, the latter is
 “ clearly to be preferred; and the *διπλη συζασις*, the *double fable*,
 “ to which I assigned only the *second* place †, will, *in that parti-*
 “ *cular case*, deserve the *first*.”

Nothing seems more just, or more accurately expressed, than Aristotle's idea of the end of Tragedy; that it is, “ *to give that*
 “ *pleasure which arises from pity and terror through imitation:*”—την
 ἀπο ἔλεος και φοβου δια μιμησεως ἡδονην παρασκευαζεν—*cap. xiv.* (Transl.
 P. II. Sect. 13.) But the Greek Tragedians will be thought, I believe, by most modern readers, to have sometimes pushed this principle rather too far, and to have excited a degree of horror, which even the charms of imitation cannot well be conceived to have softened into pleasurable emotion; and it appears to me, that Aristotle himself inclined to this opinion, and that he intended this chapter as a lesson of caution to the Poets against this excess. He seems plainly to have considered the *actual* murder of a mother, a son, a brother, and the like, as incidents rather too horrible to be exhibited in *any* way. If the deed *must* be done, let it, he says, if possible—if the story will permit it—be done ignorantly. But it will be still better, if you can avoid doing it, entirely; if you can contrive to make the *expectation*, combined with the *atrociousness* of the event expected, answer your purpose, by raising as much anxiety, commiseration, and terror in the spectator, as may consist with that *pleasure* which is the end of Tragedy, and then relieving him at last, by prevention at the very moment of execution. That

† Transl. p. 88.

Aristotle thought the end of Tragedy might be sufficiently answered by the mere *expectation* of such events, properly managed, appears from his expression above:—*εἰ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφόν, ἢ υἱὸς πατέρα, ἢ μητὴρ υἱόν, ἢ υἱὸς μητέρα, ἀποκτενῆ, ἢ ΜΕΛΛΗ*—*ταύτη ζήτησεον.* “When a brother kills, or *is going to kill,*” &c.

For this purpose, not only the expectation must be such, that the action shall appear imminent and inevitable, but the action itself expected must be such, as, had it taken place, would have been dreadful, “*intolerable,*” &c.—*τι των ΑΝΗΚΕΣΤΩΝ*”, as Aristotle expresses himself in describing these prevented *παθη*. By these means, the emotion of terror is brought as near as possible to that which would arise from the actual perpetration^b.

If the purport of this chapter has been here rightly explained, the reader will see how Aristotle has been misrepresented by many modern critics, who have understood him to recommend the *Cresphontes* of Euripides as a model of the best possible construction of a Tragic fable in general. Thus Maffei, in the dedication of his *Merops*—“Parla di essa Aristotele nella Poetica, dove trattando de’ modi di ben comporre la favola, dà per esempio dell’ ottimo il *Cresfonte d’Euripide*, in cui l’ atrocità veniva dalla ricognizione *impedita.*”—And Voltaire, in his letter to Maffei, prefixed to the French *Merops*: “Aristote, dans sa Poétique immortelle, ne

^a I find the same thing observed by Robortelli, whose short comment is worth transcribing. “Addit verò Aristoteles—*τι των ἀνηκεστων*: grave enim atroxque factum illud in Tragediis esse oportet, quod aliquis patraturus *fermè* fuerit, quia maximum offert auditoribus terrorem, qui proprius Tragediæ est, et admirationem incredibilem. *Aliunt enim, Quid si mactasset?—quàm parum ab fuit à cede!*” p. 160.

^b This is well observed, and well expressed, by Piccolomini, (p. 215, &c.) who, with Victorius and other commentators, confesses himself embarrassed by the seeming inconsistency of the author in this passage, and gives the *imminence* of the perpetration as the *only* solution that occurs to him. His comment is excellent, but too long for transcription. I had not seen it when my remarks were written; but I was glad to find them so supported.

“ balance pas à dire, que la reconnoissance de Merope et de son
 “ fils, etoit le moment le plus intereffant *de toute la scene Grecque.*
 “ Il donnoit à ce coup de Theatre la preference *sur tous les autres.*”

N O T E 107.

P. 92. MEROPE, &c.

Plutarch's account of the effect of this *coup de Theatre* upon the audience, is worth transcribing, though apparently incorrect.

Σκοπει δε την εν τη Τραγωδία ΜΕΡΟΠΗΝ, ἐπι τον υἱον αὐτον, ὡς φονεα
 τιν ὕε, πελεκυν ἀραμενην, και λεγεσαν—

Ὅσιωτεραν δὴ τηνδ' ἐγὼ δίδωμι σοι
 Πληγην—

ὅσον ἐν τῷ θεατρῷ κινήσει ποιεῖ, συνεχροθιάζουσα φονεῖ [ah, φοβῶ?] και
 δεῖ μη φθασῆ τον ἐπιλαμβανομενον γεροντα, και τρασῆ το μαιρακιον.—
 [Περὶ Σαρκοφ. p. 1837, ed. H. St.]

For other fragments of this Tragedy, the reader may see the
 Ox. Euripides.

N O T E 108.

P. 92. THE MANNERS SHOULD BE GOOD.

Good, in the usual sense of *moral* goodness; the only sense which
χρησα, applied to *manners*, will bear, and which, even though the
 word would admit of other senses, would here be fixed, beyond a
 doubt, by the plain, unequivocal expression of the whole passage.
 Dacier admires and follows the nonsense of Le Bossu, who makes
χρησα ἤθη mean *poetically good*; that is, *well marked* by the Poet;
 in which sense, the rule is equally well observed by Milton in his
Satan, and by Richardson in his *Grandison*. “There are,” ac-
 cording

ording to this “*best interpreter of Aristotle*,” “*deux fortes de bonté dans les mœurs; l’une que l’on peut appeller morale, et qui est propre à la vertu: et l’autre est la poetique, à laquelle les hommes les plus vicieux ont autant de part que les gens de bien*.” How could Mr. Harris, with his thorough knowledge of the Greek language, and his clear and exact turn of thinking in general, recommend all this, as “*a fine and copious commentary on this part of Aristotle’s Poetics*?” I shall not waste time in confuting, what has been sufficiently confuted long ago^d.—Τῆς ἀλμης, του θαυτου ἐπιπυταιεν;—Dacier’s note is a curious specimen of absurd interpretation supported by false translation^e.

The best comment I have seen on this passage is that of Heinſius; which I shall therefore give entire.

“*Cæterum, in moribus, quatuor tenenda esse docet Aristoteles; quorum primum est, ut sint boni. Quod est exponendum pluribus.—Inter ea quæ quam maximè in Tragœdiâ reprehendebat PLATO^f, vel præcipuum hoc erat;—quod nimirum varia, non uniformis, sit illius imitatio; et occasione oblatâ, probos juxta improbosque imitetur; nonnunquam autem improbos tantum: quo facillimè animum, quod supra monebamus, decipi humanum, qui dum solum respicit decorum, quod propositum est illi, bonorum sæpe, et malorum, discrimen non agnoscit, et, ut ipse Poeta,*

^a Harris, On Music, &c. p. 83, note.

^b Traité du Poëme Ep. lib. iv. c. 4.

^c See Philol. Inquiries, p. 166; and Le Bossu, lib. iv. c. 4, 5, &c. to which he refers.

^d By Mr. De la Barre. See *Mem. de l’Acad. &c.* his *second Diff. Sur le Poëme Epique*. See also M. Batteux’s satisfactory note on this passage.

^e Aristotle says plainly, the ἡθου will be χρηστων, if the προαιρεσις is χρηστη, and the contrary:—φαιλον μεν, [sc. ἡθου ἐξει,] εἰαν φαιλην [sc. προαιρεσιν ποιη φανεραν,] χρηστων δε, εἰαν χρηστων. See, now, Dacier’s version of this: “*Il y a des mœurs dans un discours, ou dans une action, lorsque l’un et l’autre font connoître l’inclination ou la resolution telle qu’elle est, mauvaise si elle est mauvaise, bonne si elle est bonne.*”

^f See *De Rep.* iii. p. 394, 395, &c. (*Ed. Serr.*)—the passages here alluded to.

“*utroſque*

“ utroſque mores imitatur; quo nihil magis in republicâ pernicioſum excogitari poteſt. Quippe ratione iſtâ ſcholam vitiorum, non virtutum, fieri theatrum; et quidem quanto magis hanc in partem inclinamus omnes. Præterea, interpretes Platonis— alium admitti ab eo negant Poetam, quam qui omni varietate ſublatâ, Deum et *bonorum virorum actiones* imitetur*; cætera enim delectare quidem, non autem docere; plerumque vero mores vitiare ac corrumpere, ideoque nocere magis quam prodeſſe. *Huic ut occurreret Philoſophus, primum hoc de moribus præceptum eſſe voluit, probi ut eſſent*; tales enim eſſe in Tragœdiâ non modo poſſe, quod negabat Plato, ſed et, *quantum ratio poematis permetteret, debere*. Confirmant hoc exempla tragicorum; qui ſine ullâ lege hanc tamen legem ſunt ſecuti. Etiam poſteriores critici, qui nonnullas veterum hoc nomine notârunt, *quod aut omnes, aut pleraſque, peſſime moratas haberent perſonas*. Qualis eſt, ex. grat. Euripidæ *Oreſtes*; in quo, præter Pyladen, improbi omnium ſunt mores[‡]. Neque enim hæc mens Ariſtotelis, aut non alios quam optimè moratos, eſſe inducendos, aut, ſi alii inducantur, quos fuiſſe improbos conſtat, probos iis tribuendos eſſe mores: ſed, *ut, quantum ratio permittit, plures optimè morati in eodem inducantur dramate*. Quamvis enim et utrique requiruntur, et tam horum quam illorum ratione conſtet *decorum*, probos tanto eſſe præferendos, quanto plus conducunt cum ſpectantur[‡].”

To do full juſtice to Ariſtotle’s meaning, it muſt be obſerved,
 1. That what he ſays ſhould be underſtood *chiefly*, though by no

* Plato ſays, the Poets ſhould be obliged, *την τε ἀγαθὴν εἰκόνα ἢ οὐκ ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιηταῖς, ἢ μὴ παρ’ ἡμῶν ποιεῖν*—“to imitate *good characters*, or not to imitate at all.”—*Rep.* iii. p. 401. B.

‡ He alludes, I ſuppoſe, to the censure paſſed upon that Tragedy in one of the arguments prefixed: το δράμα των ἐπι σκηνης εὐδοκίμωντων, ΧΕΙΡΙΣΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΤΟΙΣ ΗΘΕΣΙ ΠΛΗΝ γὰρ Πυλαδῆς, πάντες φασὸσι ἦσαν.

[‡] *De Trag. conſtit.* cap. xiv.

means *solely*, as some have explained itⁱ, of the *principal characters*. 2. That the word Χρησῶ does not imply a character of high and exemplary virtue. It seems to answer to our popular expression, *a good sort of man*; and it excludes *absolutely*, only habitual vice, bad disposition, *πονηρία*, ΜΟΧΘΗΡΙΑ, as it is expressed in a passage that should be compared with this^k. 3. That the rule, even with respect to *such* characters, is not absolute; as is evident from Aristotle's expression, when he gives an *example* of the violation of it, παραδειγμα *πονηρίας* ΜΗ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΝ: and, again, in cap. xxv. ὅταν ΜΗ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ὈΥΣΗΣ, κ. τ. αλ.—4. That what he presently adds, ἐστὶ δὲ ἐν ἐκαστῷ γενεῖ^l, is a necessary modification of the precept, and shews, that he did not mean, as Heinsius well observes, to exclude *comparative badness* of manners, but meant only—as good as *may* be, consistently with the observance of the *other* requisites mentioned—the ἀρμοστον, and the ὁμοιον.

The *reason* of the precept, Aristotle has not given us. But, it appears, I think, clearly, from his substituting the word ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ (*hurtful, pernicious,*) for *μοχθηρα*, or *πονηρα*, in his enumeration of the greatest faults of Poetry at the end of cap. xxv^m. that, however he might differ from Plato as to the hurtful tendency of Tragedy, and of *imitative* Poetry in general, he so far at least agreed with him, as to admit the danger of those poetical, embellished, and flattering, exhibitions of *vice*, in which, as one

ⁱ So M. Batteux; and Marmontel, *Port. Française*, ii. 181, who defends the true sense of *χρησά ἔθης*, but says, that “the *interesting personage* of the piece is the *only one* “whom Aristotle had in view.” But, Aristotle instances in *Menclaus*, who certainly is not “*le personnage intéressant*,” in the *Orestes*. His instance of *slaves*, too, shews the precept to be *general*.

^k Cap. xxv. at the end, where this fault in the manners is expressed thus—Οὐβη δὲ ἐπιτιμίας—ΜΟΧΘΗΡΙΑ· ὅταν μὴ ἀναγκῆς ὕσης, κ. τ. αλ.—See, Transl. Part IV. Sect. 7.

^l What he means by *γενεῖ*, is explained in the *Rhet.* II. 7.—λεγω δὲ, ΓΕΝΟΣ μὲν, καὶ ἠλικιαν· ὅου παῖς ἢ ἀνὴρ, ἢ γέρον.—καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἀνὴρ·—καὶ Λακωνί, ἢ Θετταλί, &c.

^m Transl. Part IV. Sect. 7.—See, NOTE 260.

of the most eloquent, and I might add, the most *Platonic**, of modern writers expresses it,—"L'auteur, pour faire parler chacun selon son caractère, est forcé de mettre dans la bouche des méchants leurs maximes, et leurs principes, revetus de tout l'éclat des beaux vers, et débités d'un ton imposant et sentencieux, pour l'instruction du parterre." With respect to characters of atrocious villainy, such as that of Glenalvon in *Douglas*, which can excite only pure detestation, I believe the ideas of Plato, and perhaps of Aristotle, were very nearly, if not exactly, the same, which this admirable writer has expressed in the concluding note of his *Nouvelle Eloïse*.—"En achevant de relire ce recueil, je crois voir pourquoi l'intérêt, tout foible qu'il est, m'en est si agréable, et le fera, je pense, à tout lecteur d'un bon naturel. C'est qu'au moins ce foible intérêt est pur et sans mélange de peine; qu'il n'est point excité par des noirceurs, par des crimes, ni mêlé du tourment de hait. Je ne sçauois concevoir quel plaisir on peut prendre à imaginer et composer le personnage d'un scelerat, à se mettre à sa place tandis qu'on le représente", a lui prêter l'éclat le plus imposant. Je plains beaucoup les auteurs de tant de Tragédies pleines d'horreurs, lesquels passent leur vie à faire agir et parler des gens qu'on ne peut écouter ni voir sans souffrir," &c.

* On this subject especially. See his whole letter to M. D'Alembert against the establishment of a Theatre at Geneva.

° Lettre à D'Alembert, p. 54.—Plato, after citing some verses of Homer which he conceived to have a pernicious tendency, says, that he reprobates them—*ἔχ' ὡς ἐ ποιητικά και ἡδέα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀκνεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσῳ ποιητικώτερα, τοσοῦτω ἤττον ἄκοϋστέον παισὶ και ἀνδρασι,* &c.—*De Repub.* iii. *circ. init.*

¶ In Plato's figurative and expressive language—*ἑαυτοῦ ἐμπαττεῖν τε και ἐπιταυαί ἐῖς τας των κακιστων τυπας.* *Rep.* iii. p. 396.—And see before, p. 395, C. D.

N O T E 109.

P. 92. IN GENERAL, WOMEN ARE, PERHAPS, RATHER BAD THAN GOOD.

“Aristote,” says M. Batteux, “ne parle pas ici des femmes en général, mais seulement de celles que les Poètes ont mises sur le Théâtre, telles que Medée, Clytemnestre,” &c. This is polite; but it will not make Aristote polite. He speaks plainly; and what he says is, I fear, but too conformable to the manner in which the antients usually speak of the sex in general. At least, he is certainly consistent with himself: witness the following very curious character of women in his *History of Animals*, which I give the reader, by no means for his assent, but for his wonder, or his diversion.

Γυνή, αἰδρῶς ἐλεημονεσέρον καὶ ἀριδακρυ μαλλον ἔτι δὲ φθονερωτερον τε καὶ μενυκροτερον, καὶ ΦΙΛΟΛΟΙΔΟΡΟΝ μαλλον, καὶ ΠΛΗΚΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ^a. ἔτι δὲ καὶ δυσθυμεν μαλλον—καὶ δυσελπι, καὶ ΑΝΑΙΔΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΨΕΥΔΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ^b, ἐνοσητοτερον τε, καὶ μνημονικωτερον ἔτι δὲ, ΑΓΡΥΤΙΝΟΤΕΡΟΝ^b ΚΑΙ ὈΚΝΗΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ καὶ ὄλως ἀκνητοτερον—
 κ. τ. αλ — [*De Hist. Animal.* lib. ix. cap. 1.]

To make the reader amends for the pain which this cool and serious invective of the philosopher and the naturalist may have given him, I cannot resist the temptation of presenting him with a specimen of more sportive satire on this subject, in a very plea-

^a Πληκτικωτερον (i. e.) ΤΥΡΙΣΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ, says Hesychius. I am afraid the word means what it says. Jul. Pollux gives it as one of the epithets of a boxer. We might translate it, with well-bred ambiguity—“more striking.”

^b i. e.—“more able to keep late hours, and, at the same time, more lazy, than men.”

fant fragment, preserved by Athenæus, from a Comedy of Eubulus.

Ω Ζευ πολυτιμητ', εἰ κακῶς ἔγω ποτε
 Ἐρω γυναικας, νη Δι' ἀπολοιμην ἀρα.—
 Παντων ἀριζου κτηματων. εἶδ' ἔγενετο
 Κακη γυνη Μηδεια, Πηνελοπεια δε
 Μεγα πραγμ'.—ἔρει τις ὡς Κλυταιμνηστρα κακη ;—
 Αλκινησιν ἀντεθηκα χρησην.—ἀλλ' ἴσως
 Φαιδριαν ἔρε κακῶς τις.—ἀλλα, νη Δια,
 Χρησι τις ἴν μανται----τις;—ὁμοι, δειλαι—
 Ταχέως γε μ' εἰ ΧΡΗΣΤΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΕΣ ἔπελιπου.
 Τωνδ' αὖ ΠΟΝΗΡΩΝ ἐτι λεγειν πολλας ἔχω.

If ever against woman-kind I rail,
 Great Jupiter confound me!—for of all
 The good things of this world, *they* are the best.
Medea, you will say, was bad :—agreed ;
 But, what a jewel was *Penelope* !
 Urge you the wicked *Clytemnestra* ?—I,
 Oppose the *good Alceſtis*.—If you tell me
 Of *Phædra*,—I remind you of the *good*,
 —Stay, let me see—the good—Alas ! how soon
 My memory fails me there ; while, of the *bad*,
 Examples in abundance still occur.—

See Athen. p. 559, or the *Excerpta ex Trag.* &c. of
 Grotius, p. 657.

N O T E I I O.

P. 93. RESEMBLANCE----A DIFFERENT THING, &c.

The words, ὡσπερ εἰρηται, are embarrassing ; for the *difference* here
 spoken of had not been mentioned *before*, as the expression, in its
 most obvious sense, implies. The only meaning I can find is

this. The two requisites, the *ἀξιοσπου* and the *ὁμοιον*, *propriety*, and *resemblance*, might easily be confounded; the *ὁμοιον* being indeed only the *ἀξιοσπου* in another point of view. The violence and fierceness of Medea, for example, which form her *historical*, or *traditional* character, and, therefore, the *likeness* of the Poet's picture, may be said to be *ἀξιοσπου*, *proper* or *suitable*, with respect to the individual, though *ἀπρεπη* και *μη ἀξιοσπου*, *improper* and *unsuitable*, to the *general* character of the sex.—And thus Piccolomini:—"la terza conditione che assegna Aristotele à i costumi, " la qual consiste in esser *simile*, non differisce della seconda, posta " nell' esser *convenevoli*, in altro, se non che la conditione del con- " venevole riguarda *l'universale*; com' à dire, che quel costume " *convenga* ad un principe, quello ad un suddito, quello à l'uomo " &c.—senza considerer questa particular persona, ò quella: et la " conditione del *simile* riguarda il *particolare*; come à dire, qual " costume *convenga* di porre in uno che habbia da rappresentar' " *Achille*; qual in quello che habbia da representare *Oreste*," &c. (p. 220.)

Indeed, Aristotle would hardly have thought of admonishing the reader not to confound the two things, had he not seen that they were *liable* to be confounded. He would not have remarked, that they were *different*, had they been perfectly, and obviously, *distinct*. I think then, that the words, *ὡσπερ εἰρηται*, must refer only to the *ἀξιοσπου*, and the meaning must be, that, to make the manners *like*, is a different thing *not only* from making them *good*, but even from making them *proper*, *in such a way as had been said*—in *that* sense, in which the word *ἀξιοσπου* had just been used, and explained by his instance. But if we understand the passage thus, there should be no stop after *ποιησαι*².

² By Piccolomini's version, (for he says nothing about this difficulty in his commentary,) it appears that he understood the passage as I do: "—essendo così fatta " conditione diversa dall' esser' i costumi formati buoni, et ancora convenevoli nel modo " che già si è detto."

But,

But, why does Aristotle mention *at all*, a difference so very obvious as that between *resemblance*, and *goodness*, of manners?—*These* two requisites could not easily be confounded, any more than *likeness* and *beauty* in a portrait. There was more danger of a reader's thinking the *ὁμοιον* too different from the *χρησον*, and, as a *general* precept, incompatible with it. And so indeed he seems to have apprehended himself, by what he presently after says^b about the *μιμησις βελτιονων*, and his rule, that the Poet, in imitation of the painter, should exhibit his characters as much *better* than they were, or are supposed to have been, as is consistent with the preservation of the *likeness*.

N O T E III.

P. 93. **THOUGH THE MODEL OF THE POET'S IMITATION BE SOME PERSON OF UNUNIFORM MANNERS, STILL THAT PERSON MUST BE REPRESENTED AS UNIFORMLY UNUNIFORM.**

Τεταρτον δε, το ὁμαλον κ' ἔην γὰρ ἀνωμαλῶς τις ἢ, ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρεχων και ταικτον ἢ ὅτι ὑποτιθεῖς, ἰμοῦς ὁμαλῶς ἀνωμαλον δεῖ εἶναι.----“ which “ last words,” says an eminent writer, “ having been not at all “ understood, have kept his interpreters from seeing the true sense “ and scope of the precept. For they have been explained of such “ characters as that of *Tigellius* in Horace; which, however proper “ for satyr, or for farcical Comedy, are of too fantastic and whim- “ sical a nature to be admitted into Tragedy; of which Aristotle “ must there be chiefly understood to speak, and to which Horace, “ in this place, alone confines himself. ’Tis true, indeed, it may “ be said, that “ though a *whimsical* or *fantastic* character be “ improper for Tragedy, an *irresolute* one is not. Nothing is “ finer than a struggle between different passions; and it is per-

^b At the end of this Sect. of the translation; and of cap. xv. of the original.

“ feclly

“fectly natural, that in such a circumstance, each should prevail
 “by turns.”—But then there is the widest difference between the
 “two cases. *Tigellius*, with all his fantastic irresolution, is as
 “uniform a character, as that of *Mitio*. If the expression may be
 “allowed, its very *inconsistency* is of the essence of its *uniformity*.
 “On the other hand, *Electra*, torn with sundry conflicting passions,
 “is most apparently, and in the properest notion of the word,
 “*ununiform*. One of the strongest touches in her character is
 “that of a high, heroic spirit, sensible to her own, and her fa-
 “mily’s injuries, and determined, at any rate, to revenge them.
 “Yet no sooner is this revenge perpetrated, than she softens, re-
 “lents, and pities. Here is a manifest *ununiformity*, which can,
 “in no proper sense of the expression, lay claim to the critic’s
 “ὁμαλον, but may be so managed, by the Poet’s skill, as to become
 “consistent with the basis or foundation of her character, that is,
 “to be ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον. And that this, in fact, was the meaning
 “of the critic, is plain from the similar example to his own rule,
 “given in the case of *Iphigenia*: which he specifies (how justly,
 “will be considered hereafter) as an instance of the ἀνωμαλε,
 “irregular, or ununiform, character, ill-expressed, or made *incon-*
 “sistent. So that the genuine sense of the precept is, “Let the
 “manners be uniform; or, if ununiform, yet consistently so, or
 “uniformly ununiform:” exactly copied, according to the reading
 “here given, by Horace. Whereas in the other way, it stands
 “thus: “Let your characters be uniform, or unchanged; or, if
 “you paint an ununiform character (such as *Tigellius*) let it be
 “ununiform all the way; *i. e.* such an irregular character to the
 “end of the play, as it was at the beginning; which is, in effect,
 “to say, let it be *uniform*,” which apparently destroys the latter
 “part of the precept, and makes it an unmeaning tautology with
 “the former^a.”

^a Comment. on the Ep. to the Pisos, &c. vol. i. p. 104, &c.

I have given this passage entire, that the reader may have it fully in his power to judge, for himself, whether I mistake or misrepresent the meaning of any part of it. I should be sorry to be thought capable of a perfect confidence in my own opinion, however carefully and deliberately formed, when it is opposed by that of such a writer. But, after having repeatedly considered this comment, as it certainly deserves to be considered, with all the attention in my power, I am obliged to confess, that it does not satisfy me, and that the common interpretation still appears to me to stand its ground.—My reasons are these :

1. I cannot think, that *such* change, irresolution, and *temporary* inconsistency as arises from “ conflicting *passions*,” comes under the meaning of Aristotle’s ἩΘΟΣ ἀνωμαλον.—Ἡθός, is the prevailing *disposition*, the habitual προαιρεσις, or settled *character*. “ Electra,” it is said, “ torn with sundry conflicting *passions*, is most “ apparently, and in the *properest* sense of the word, *ununiform*.” Not so, I think, in Aristotle’s sense of the word ἀνωμαλον, as expressly applied by him here to ἠθῆ, or *manners*. The irregularities of *conduct*, or of sentiment and speech, arising from *passion*, seem to be a distinct thing from such as imply a change of the fixed, prevailing ἠθός, or characteristic *manners* of the person. When such *passionate ununiformity* as that above described in Electra, is so managed by the Poet’s skill, “ as to become consistent with the basis or “ foundation of her character,” that character is *not*, then, I think, as the ingenious critic considers it to be, ὁμαλῶς ἀνωμαλον, i. e. (as it is expressed in the beginning of the following note, p. 127.) “ an “ ununiform character justly sustained, or, uniformly ununiform:” it is not, if I understand Aristotle rightly, ἀνωμαλον at all, in his sense; for he speaks only of anomalous *manners*; and anomalous *manners*, plainly, cannot be made “ consistent with the basis or “ foundation of a character,” in any other sense, than as that very anomaly itself constitutes the character. And this I take to be Aristotle’s meaning: for he is speaking of that anomaly, in which
different

different *characters*, not, in which “different *passions*, prevail “by turns.”

2. The very expression,—*ἔρην γὰρ ΑΝΩΜΑΛΟΣ ΤΙΣ ἢ ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρεχών, καὶ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ ΗΘΟΣ ὑποτιθεῖς*, seems plainly to indicate an ununiform *character*, such as he explains by the *ὀμαλως ἀνωμαλον* that follows.—*ἀνωμαλῶς* ΤΙΣ—an *anomalous* PERSON: i. e. a person of inconsistent *manners*, or *character*. This expression seems hardly applicable, without violence, to such casual and merely *apparent* inconsistency, as arises from conflicting passions, and is reconcilable with “the basis or foundation of a character.”

3. “The genuine sense of the precept,” we are told, “is, Let the manners be uniform; or, if ununiform, yet *consistently* so, “or *uniformly ununiform*.” But, *consistently*, and *uniformly*, seem to present different ideas. Aristotle’s word, *ὀμαλως*, presents only the latter of these:—*uniformly*—that is, more literally, *equally* *, *evenly*, &c. it does not, I think, answer at all to *consistently*, in the sense in which it is evidently applied, in this explanation, to what is *not incongruous*—*not unaccountable*, &c.^b. Had this, therefore, been Aristotle’s meaning, he would, probably, have used, either *ἑκαστως*, or *ἔνλογως*, or some other such word appropriated to that meaning; not *ὀμαλως*, which is never, as far as I know, used in the sense of *consistently*.

4. But it is objected, that if we take *ὀμαλως ἀνωμαλον* to mean “*uniform all the way*, i. e. such an irregular character to the end “of the play, as it was at the beginning,” this, “is, in effect “to say, let it be uniform; which apparently destroys the latter

* In Horace’s character of *Tigellius*, *lib. i. sat. 3.* “*Nil ÆQUALE*,” is, ἕδεν ὈΜΑΛΟΝ. And so, “*Vixit INÆQUALIS*”—*ἀνωμαλῶς*, in *sat. 7. lib. ii.* of *PRISCUS*, another character of the same stamp, “*VERTUMNIS, quotquot sunt, natus iniquis.*” v. 14.

^b Thus, in the next note—“All these considerations put together, *Electra* might “assist at the assassination of her mother, *consistently* with the strongest feelings of “pity and affection.” Notes on the Ep. to the Pisos, p. 112.

“ part of the precept, and makes it an unmeaning tautology with “ the former.”—The first part of the precept, I think, is, Let the manners be uniform; or, as we say, *of a piece*. Now to this an objector might say,—“ This cannot be an indispensable rule; *uniformity* cannot be essentially requisite to the manners: “ for, what, if the Poet should take for the subject of his imitation a person whose manners are *not* uniform?”—The answer, or “ second part of the precept,” is,—“ then, that want of uniformity must be such as constitutes the very *character* itself; for “ this falls within the rule; the “ very inconsistency” of the character (to use the ingenious critic’s own words,) being, in this case, “ of the essence of its uniformity.” I confess I do not here perceive any thing that can properly be called *tautology*; for though the philosopher says, indeed, in the *second* part of the precept no more than he *meant* to say in the *first*; yet he plainly apprehended it was more than he might be *understood* to say, and therefore he subjoined this necessary explanation. What he says is, in short, only this—“ Let the manners be uniform: an ununiform *character* “ is no exception to this rule.”

The *Tigellius* of Horace offered himself naturally enough, upon this occasion, to the commentators, as an illustration. We need not, however, suppose Aristotle to have thought of so very fantastic and comic a species of incoherence. Mutability and caprice are sometimes found in higher characters, where they are less ludicrous in their appearance, and, sometimes, very serious in their effects. And though, perhaps, *any* character of the kind may

* Le Bossu observes, very well, in explaining this rule, that whenever the Poet admits this inequality of manners, “ il doit bien faire remarquer aux auditeurs, que “ cette inégalité est un caractère qu’il donne exprès à un personnage.” Livre iv. ch. 7. The following comparison is no unhappy illustration of Aristotle’s precept. “ Il “ arrive quelquefois qu’une même personne est égale et inégale (ὁμοίως ἀνομοίως) en “ même tems. Parceque le caractère, qui dans la plus-part des hommes ressemble “ au soleil, dont l’égalité consiste à paroître toujours le même, en d’autres ressemble à la “ lune, dont l’égalité n’est qu’ à changer quatre fois de faces en un mois — *Ib.* p. 450.

have too much of a comic cast to accord with *our* ideas of Tragic dignity, we have no reason to conclude, that it would have found the same difficulty of admittance upon the Greek stage, where the Tragic muse did, not unfrequently, condescend to be seen, “ Δακρυσειν γελοιασα.”

I shall only add to this note the following passage from the commentary of Victorius, which appears to me to explain well, in few words, the meaning, and the spirit, of Aristotle’s precept.

“ Studens ostendere quantopere hoc præceptum custodiendum sit, affirmat, si quis fortè—varius dissimilisque sibi inductus semel sit, eum, talem in omni facto totius fabulæ servandum esse, ut æquabilitas à Poetâ custodiat in naturâ illâ inæquali ostendâ: quod non fieret, si aliquis levis, nec in eodem proposito permanens, inductus, paulò postea firmus et obstinati animilingeretur. Si morum igitur inæqualitas naturæque inconstantia constanter servanda est, quanto magis natura indolesque stabilis, par sibi ac jugis ad extremum servari debet.”

N O T E 112.

P. 93. WE HAVE AN EXAMPLE OF MANNERS UNNECESSARILY BAD, IN THE CHARACTER OF MENELAUS, &c.

Mr. Potter, in the introduction to his translation of the *Orestes*, says of this passage, that it “ may be considered as a mysterious oracular sentence, which wants an expounder.” I can only say, that I think the commentators would have reason to congratulate themselves, if no sentence of this mangled work wanted an expofitor more than this. Whether we read ἀναγκαῖον, or ἀναγκαια;—an *unnecessary example* of bad manners, or an example of *unnecessary badness* of manners; the sense seems evidently the same: and that Aristotle could not mean, what the excellent translator of Æschylus and Euripides seems to think he might mean—to “excuse the Poet upon the necessity”—sufficiently appears from

another passage, at the end of the 25th chapter, [Transl. Part IV. Sect. 7.] where this character is again mentioned as an instance of vicious manners, *excused by no necessity*—μη ἀνάγκης ἕσσης.—Mr. Potter complains of “the little light which the passage derives from the connexion:” I think without reason. For as the other examples given are examples of the *violation* of his *other* precepts, relative to *propriety*, and *uniformity*, of manners, the connection plainly indicates *this* to be an example of the similar *violation* of his first rule—that the manners should be *good*. So far, then, seems to be clear. In what particular view Aristotle thought the badness of the character *not necessary*, may be, indeed, less clear. I should suppose him to mean, that the historical, or traditional, character of Menelaus, and the observance of the ὁμοίον, by no means obliged Euripides to paint him in such colours. With respect to the plea, that it was necessary, because “the drama could not,” *otherwise*, “have been worked up to this terrible height of Tragic distress,” Aristotle’s answer would, perhaps, have been similar to that which he makes upon another occasion:—*i. e.* the Poet should not, originally, have so constructed his plan, as to bring upon himself the necessity of committing so great a fault:—ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἔδει συνιστάσθαι τοιαύτας. [sc. μύθους]. cap. xxiv.

N O T E 113.

P. 93. OF UNUNIFORM MANNERS, IN THE IPHIGENIA AT AULIS, &c.

“How does this appear, independently of the name of this great critic? Iphigenia is drawn indeed at first, fearful and suppliant: and surely with the greatest observance of nature. The account of her destination to the altar was sudden, and without the least preparation: and, as Lucretius well observes, in commenting her case, NUBENDI TEMPORE IN IPSO; when

“ her thoughts were all employed, and, according to the simpli-
 “ city of those times, confessed to be so, on her promised nuptials.
 “ The cause of such destination too, as appeared at first, was the
 “ private family interest of Menelaus. All this justifies, or rather
 “ demands, the strongest expression of female fear and weakness.
 “ But she afterwards recants and voluntarily devotes herself to
 “ the altar.” And this, with the same strict attention to proba-
 “ bility. She had now informed herself of the importance of
 “ the case. Her devotement was the demand of Apollo, and the
 “ joint petition of all Greece. The glory of her country, the
 “ dignity and interest of her family, the life of the generous
 “ Achilles, and her own future fame, were, all, nearly concerned
 “ in it. All this considered, together with the high, heroic
 “ sentiments of those times, and the superior merit, as was be-
 “ lieved, of voluntary devotement, Iphigenia’s character must
 “ have been very unfit for the distress of a whole Tragedy to turn
 “ upon, if she had not, in the end, discovered the readiest sub-
 “ mission to her appointment. But, to shew with what won-
 “ derful propriety the Poet knew to sustain his characters, we
 “ find her, after all, and notwithstanding the heroism of the
 “ change, in a strong and passionate apostrophe to her native
 “ Mycenæ, confessing some involuntary apprehensions and regrets,
 “ the remains of that instinctive abhorrence of death, which had
 “ before so strongly possessed her.

Εὐρέϊας Ἑλλάδι μέγα φαῖ—

Θανῶσα δ’ ἐπ’ ἀναινομαι.

Once the bright star of Greece—

But I submit to die.

“ This, I take to be not only a full vindication of the consistency
 “ of Iphigenia’s character, but as delicate a stroke of nature as is,
 “ perhaps, to be found in any writer.” [*Commentary on the Ep. to
 the Pijôs, &c. vol. i. p. 113, &c.*]

If all I knew of the Tragedy in question was from this inge-
 nious

nious defence, I should certainly acquit Euripides. I cannot acquit him, or can only partially acquit him, when I read the Tragedy itself. The fact perhaps is, that the question, whether the critic's censure be just or not, cannot possibly be decided by any *general* statement of the case. That Iphigenia, so circumstanced as she is here, and very justly, described to be, *might* at first be timid and suppliant, and, at last, meet death with resolution, and this, without any inconsistency, or duplicity of character, will hardly be disputed. But the question is, whether Euripides *has* actually *so* drawn this timidity, and this resolution, as to preserve the unity of character. To determine this fairly, we must, at last, have recourse to the *detail* of the Poet's execution, and the actual *impression* which, on the whole, it leaves upon the reader's mind. All depends here upon *degree* and *manner*. A single *nuance* in the colouring, a slight depression or elevation of tone, in the suppliant, or the heroine, may be sufficient to determine the impression this way, or that. What this impression was upon Aristotle's mind, it may be observed that he has marked very precisely and clearly by the expression, ὍΥΔΕΝ ΕΟΙΚΕΝ Ἡ ἸΚΕΤΕΤΟΥΣΑ ΤΗ ὙΣΤΕΡΗ:—"the supplicating Iphigenia is NOTHING LIKE the Iphigenia of the conclusion." The expression, I think, does not imply, that he thought the mere circumstance of her supplicating at first for life, and recanting afterwards, was, of itself, necessarily inconsistent, but, that the *manner* in which she supplicated was such, as to make her, in that part, appear to be a different *character*, another *person*, from what she appears to be when she recants.

My own opinion I confess to be, that though the considerations suggested in this ingenious defence of Euripides may prove the censure of Aristotle to be too strongly, or, at least, too *generally*, expressed, yet they do not prove it to be without foundation. I say, *too generally*, because ^{perhaps} there is but one passage in the speech of the *suppliant* Iphigenia, to which the ὍΥΔΕΝ εἰκέν is fairly,

fairly applicable, in its full force. Her speech, *Εἰ μὲν τοῦ Ὀρφέως*, &c. v. 1211, which, on the whole, is highly pathetic, ends with these unhappy lines :

— — μαινεται δ' ὅς ἐυχεται
Θανειν' ΚΑΚΩΣ ΖΗΝ ΚΡΕΙΣΣΟΝ Η ΘΑΝΕΙΝ ΚΑΛΩΣ^α.

v. 1249.—

I leave it to the reader to determine, whether *any* intervening circumstances, that can be imagined, will make it at all conceivable, that the *same* Iphigenia, should, *in the short space of time taken up by the recital of, at most, only 35 lines of dialogue*^b, experience such a total change of sentiments, as to express the most heroic resolution, and the utmost sensibility to the glory of dying for her country ; as to say,—

— — διδαμι σωμα τ' εμον Ἑλλάδι.
Θυετ', ἐκπορθεῖτε Τροίαν' ταυτα γαρ μνημεια με,
Δια μακροε, και παιδες εἶτοι, και γαμοι, και δοξ' ἔμη. v. 1397^c.

^a This is softened in Mr. Potter's version:

— — “ of his senses is he left,
“ Who hath a wish to die ; for life, though ill,
“ Excels whate'er there is of good in death. v. 1365.

^b The reader of Euripides will observe, that Iphigenia continues the same strain of consternation and lamentation *after* the speech of her father in reply to her supplication ; (v. 1255, &c.) and even at v. 1317, she says she dies, “ *impiously murdered by an impious father* :”

Σφαγαισω ἀνοσιοισιν
Ἀνοσιε πατρῷ.

From the end of this monostrophic lamentation to her heroic speech v. 1368, there are, I think, but 35 lines.

ε — — ‘ For Greece I give my life.
“ Slay me, demolish Troy : for these shall be
“ Long time my monuments, my children these,
“ My nuptials, and my glory.” —

Potter's Eurip. v. 1549.

It

It seems probable, that Aristotle had chiefly in view the particular lines I have quoted; and had he any way pointed his censure to that passage — had he said, εἶδεν εοικεν ἢ ὈΥΤΩΣ ἰκετευεσσα, &c. quoting, or referring to, the verses, I think there could have been no objection to the justice of his criticism.

Gravina, who has also defended Euripides in his book *Della Tragedia*, lays great stress upon a circumstance, which does, indeed, seem to be of considerable moment in the Poet's justification; I mean, the effect of *necessity* in producing courage and resolution. “Non é maraviglia, se Ifigenia, quantunque per naturalezza del fessò, timida, ed amorosa della vita, *finchè la poteva sperare*; poi *resa forte dalla necessità*, madre spesso anche delle virtù morali, come anima generosamente educata, disprezza la morte, e cangia l'amor della vita in compiacenza di gloria. Il che alla giornata anche osserviamo in persone di nascita e d'animo vile, che condotte alla morte, arditamente l'abbracciano, quantunque al primo avviso costernate rimanessero; *perchè l'idea della necessità non avea usata ancor la sua forza.*” [Sett. 19.]

This seems much to the purpose; and it is supported by its agreement with what we find in the Tragedy itself. For the change in the sentiments and language of Iphigenia is not, as we have seen, produced before the scene in Trochaics between Clytæmnestra and Achilles; the very scene in which the inevitable necessity of the sacrifice is first made clearly apparent. The effect of this on the resolution of Iphigenia is visible also in her speech:

— τα δ' ΑΔΥΝΑΘ' ἡμιν καρτερεν εἰ ῥαδιον.

— — — — —
 Αλλα και σε τεθ' ὄραν χρη, μη διαβληθης στρατω,
 ΚΑΙ ΠΛΕΟΝ ΠΡΑΞΟΜΕΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ.—

— — — — —
 ΑΛΛ' ΑΜΗΧΑΝΟΝ·—διδωμι σωμα τ'εμον Ελλαδι, &c.

τ. 1372.

The

The learned Mr. Markland, in his excellent edition of the two *Iphigenias*, defends Euripides upon very different ground. He admits the inconsistency, not only in the character of Iphigenia, but in all the characters of the play, except Clytemnestra; and even in the chorus. But all this he supposes to have been *intended* by the Poet, as a moral lesson—a striking picture of the “levity and inconstancy of the human mind.” And he wonders, which I cannot say I do, that this should have escaped the ἀγχινοια of Aristotle^d.

N O T E 114.

P. 94. HENCE IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT ALSO, &c.—

Heinfius pronounces this whole passage, to the words, εν τῷ Οιδ. τῷ Σοφ.—inclusively, to be certainly out of its proper place^a. And I should be of his opinion, if such digressive and parenthetical insertions were not very usual with Aristotle. The expression, however, should be observed:—φανερὸν ἐν ὅτι ΚΑΙ τὰς λυσεις, &c. that “the development *also*,” &c. *i. e.* as well as the *other* incidents of the fable, just mentioned. Most of the versions neglect the word και, which is important, and greatly helps the connection. This digression, however, though not unrelated, is but slightly and obliquely related, to his present subject; and seems introduced rather ἀπο μηχανης, and in violation of his own rule—τέτο μετα τετο ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ ἐκϑ. It interrupts the connection, and obscures the purport, of the chapter; and though we allow it to be where the author placed it, we may fairly question, whether he has placed it where it *should* be.

^d P. 190. Note on v. 1375.

^a *De Trag. cap. xii.*

N O T E 115.

P. 94. MACHINERY.

Απο μηχανης.—It appears from Jul. Pollux, lib. iv. cap. 19. that the term, *μηχανη*, was not applied indiscriminately to the machinery of the play-house in *general*, but was appropriated to that particular machine, in which Gods and Heroes made their appearance in the air. *Μηχανη δε, θεες δεικνυσι και ηρωας τες εν αερι*.—I hope it was something better than the *Μηχανη* of the French opera, so pleasantly described by Rousseau :—

“ Les chars des Dieux et des Déeses sont composés de quatre
 “ solives encadrées et suspendues à une grosse corde en forme d’escar-
 “ polette ; entre ces solives est une planche en travers, sur laquelle
 “ le Dieu s’asséye, et sur le devant pend un morceau de grosse toile
 “ barbouillée, qui fert de nuage à ce magnifique char. On voit
 “ vers le bas de la machine l’illumination de deux ou trois chan-
 “ delles puantes et mal mouchées, qui, tandis que le personnage se
 “ démene et crie en branlant dans son escarpolette, l’enfument
 “ tout à son aise. Encens digne de la divinité^a.

The account of the machinery of a Greek Theatre, in the chapter of Jul. Pollux above referred to, is curious, and amusing, as far as it is intelligible.

N O T E 116.

P. 94. OR THE RETURN OF THE GREEKS IN THE ILIAD.

Και εν ΤΗ ΙΛΙΑΔΙ τα περι τον αποπλεν. It has been disputed, whether Aristotle here speaks of the Iliad of Homer, or of some

^a Nouvelle Eloise, Part II, Let. xxiii.

Tragedy called *The Iliad*. See Dacier's note.—But, if we suppose the text to be right here, I see not how we can reasonably reject the first of these interpretations. Ἡ ΙΛΙΑΣ, as Beni has well observed, can only be, ΤΗΕ Iliad,—i. e. *Homér's Iliad*. Dacier supposes the Tragedy to have been called, “*The Iliad, or, The return of the Greeks;*” and to be that mentioned by Longinus, Sect. 15, and attributed to Sophocles. But, even supposing a Tragedy to be meant, it seems very clear from Aristotle's expression, that the title must have been, Ἡ Ιλιάς, only; for he says, ΕΝ ΤΗ ΙΛΙΑΔΙ ΤΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ἈΠΟΠΛΕΥ—i. e. “the circumstances, or incidents, *relative to the return of the Greeks, in [the Tragedy of] The Iliad.*”—So, cap. xxiv.—ἐν τῇ Οδύσσειᾳ—τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκθέσιν.—Indeed, *The Iliad*, taken alone, seems an improbable title for a Tragedy; but Dacier's junction is still more improbable. He might as well have imagined a Tragedy with this title—Ἡ Οδύσσεια, Ἡ, Ἡ ΕΚΘΕΣΙΣ.—As to the Tragedy of Sophocles mentioned by Longinus, it seems clearly to have been his POLYXENA^a.

Supposing, then, the text not to be defective, we cannot, I think, avoid understanding Aristotle to speak of the *machinery*, (to use the word in his general sense,) in the second book of the *Iliad*, where Minerva descends to prevent the return of the Greeks^b. It is true indeed, as has been objected, that an instance drawn from an *Epic Poem* is not what one would expect here, where the subject is *Tragedy*; and, that though there be, in this instance, a difficulty solved—a *knot cut*—yet *this λυσις*, is not, properly, λυσις μυθε, in that sense, in which Aristotle applies the term in cap. xviii^c. to the *final* denouement of a Tragic fable.—We must therefore suppose him to have produced this, merely as an obvious and well known example of the *sort* of supernatural interposition, or

^a See the note of Ruhnkenius in Toup's Longinus.

^b Il. B. 155, &c.

^c Transl. Part II. Sect. 18.

machinery, that would be improper in the *λοσις* of a Tragedy. For, that he intended to censure the “*ministeria Deorum*,” so necessary to the Epic Poem, and so frequent in the great model of all Epic Poems, cannot be imagined without absurdity, and is by no means necessarily implied, as Dacier seems to think, in this interpretation.

Such appears to me to be the only meaning, and the best apology, which the passage will bear, taking for granted the integrity of the original. But of this, I confess, I doubt. M. Batteux translates—“*la petite Iliade*.” But if we admit that sense, as Aristotle certainly would not have called *that* Poem THE *Iliad*, without distinction, we must necessarily suppose the text defective, and the word ΜΙΚΡΑ: to be omitted^d; and it seems very probable that this was the case. The illustration, indeed, will still be drawn from an Epic Poem; but from one of an irregular and *historic* structure, consisting of a string of ill-united stories^e, and which seems to have been considered as a sort of *seed-plot*, or *nursery*, of subjects for the use of the Tragic Poets: so that in referring to it, Aristotle may be understood to refer to such Tragedies as were founded on it; of which he enumerates himself no fewer than *eight*, and one of these was called ΑΠΟΠΛΑΟΥΣ; taken, I suppose, like the *Polyxena* of Sophocles mentioned by Longinus; from that part of the *Little Iliad*, which related the detention of the Greeks in the Thracian Chersonese, and the appearance of the ghost of Achilles demanding the sacrifice of Polyxena. See the *Hecuba* of Euripides, v. 35, &c. and 104, &c.—and the fine description of the sacrifice, v. 519, &c.—In Mr. Potter’s translation, v. 36—102—501.

* — τὴν ΜΙΚΡΑΝ *Iliada*—and, ἐκ τῆς ΜΙΚΡΑΣ *Iliad*Ⓞ. cap. xxiii.

• See Aristotle’s account of it, cap. xxiii. Transl. Part III. Sect. 1.

N O T E 117.

P. 95. OR OF INDOLENT—.

Ραθυμῶ :—indolent—*nonchalant*. *Hesychius* explains Ραθυμῶ,—
 Ὁ ΜΗ ΠΟΝΗΤΙΚΟΣ ἀλλ' ΕΚΛΥΤΟΣ. It is improperly rendered,
 “*timide*,” by M. Batteux, and “*mansueto*,” by the Italian trans-
 lators.

N O T E 118.

P. 95. SHOULD DRAW AN EXAMPLE APPROACHING RA-
 THER TO A GOOD, THAN TO A HARD AND FEROCIOUS, CHA-
 RACTER.

The original is—Ὀὐτω και τον ποιητην, μιμαμενον και ὀργιλῆς και ῥα-
 θυμῆς, και ἄλλα τα τοιαυτα ἔχοντας ἐπι των ἠθων, ἐπιεικῆας ποιειν παρα-
 δεγμα ἢ σικληροτητῶ δει: οἶον τον Αχιλλεα Αγαθων και Ὀμηρῶ.—A
 passage that has much perplexed and divided the commentators.
 Of all the explanations which this perplexity has produced, that
 of Dacier is the most improbable and ill-founded. He forces
 ῥαθυμῶ into the sense of, *emporté, furieux*, and makes it “*encherir*
 “*sur ὀργιλῶ.*” *Επιεικῆα*, he wrenches from the obvious and proper
 sense in which it is continually used by Aristotle, into that of
probability. And the result of this violent operation upon the
 passage, is the following strange version:—“*Il faut tout de même,*
 “*qu'un Poete qui veut imiter un homme colere et emporté, ou*
 “*quelqu' autre caractere semblable, se remette bien plus devant*
 “*les yeux ce que la colere doit faire vraisemblablement (i. e. ἐπιεικῆας)*
 “*que ce qu'elle a fait (i. e. ἡ σικληροτητῶ!) et c'est ainsi,*” &c.
 I may venture to leave all this to the learned reader's rejection,
 without

without any farther comment. I shall only just observe, that the expression, ΚΑΙ ὄργ. ΚΑΙ ῥαθ: evidently marks different characters; not, as Dacier makes it, different degrees only of the *same* character.

Heinsius first suggested, that the phrase ἐπιεικειας ἢ σκληροτητος, was elliptical, and μαλλον to be understood. But in spite of the “*Attica venustas*,” I am much more inclined to suspect an *omission* of the word. Aristotle would hardly have used a mode of expression so unavoidably ambiguous — or rather, that would, almost unavoidably, lead to a *wrong* sense; for, the fact is, that *all* the commentators, before Heinsius, understood the ἢ, as indeed every reader, I believe, would at first naturally understand it, in the disjunctive sense of, *or*. Besides this, I doubt whether any example of this elliptic phrase occurs in Aristotle’s works. That it *may*, I will not take upon me to deny; but it seems, at least, very unusual. An instance of it I have not found; but the reader may find many instances of the full phrase, μαλλον ἢ, even in this treatise^a. However, one, or the other, of these suppositions, it seems necessary to adopt. The passage will then, without forcing the words ἐπιεικεια and σκληροτης from their usual and proper signification, afford a clear and consistent meaning. *Επιεικεια* is used, I think, here, as it is in cap. xiii. in the general sense of *good*^b. *Σκληροτης* plainly relates only to his first instance, of the ὄργη, the *angry* character, of which it seems to express the extreme degree. In the *Ethics ad Nicom.* we have—ΑΓΡΙΟΙ και ΣΚΛΗΡΟΙ, as synonymous, or very nearly so^c. A passage of Plato may serve to illustrate and confirm this sense of the word.

^a Cap. i. φυσιολογον ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Η ποιητην.—cap. ix. ΜΑΛΛΟΝ των μυθων— Η των μετρων.—cap xxiv. προαιρεισθαι τε αδυνατα και εικοτα, ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Η δυνατα και απιθανα.

^b So, in the *Rhet.* lib. i. cap. 5. ἐπιεικης is plainly used as synonymous with χρης. For, defining the word χρησοφιλια, he says—ὁ δε και ΕΠΕΙΚΕΙΣ ανδρες, [sc. φιλοι εστι] ΧΡΗΣΤΟΦΙΛΟΣ.

^c Lib. iv. cap. 8. *ed. Wilk.*

Speaking of the θυμοειδές, or *irascible* nature, he says, it may produce the ἀγριον:—και ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφεν, ἀνδρείον ἀν' ἐστὶ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Δ' ΕΠΙΤΑΟΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΔΕΟΝΤΟΣ, ΣΚΛΗΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ τε και χαλεπὸν γίγνεται ἂν, ὡς το ἐπιθεῖ.—And just before—ΑΓΡΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ τε και ΣΚΛΗΡΟΤΗΤΟΣ, και ἂν μαλακίας τε και ἡμεροτήτης*.

The sense of the passage, then, will be, that, in order to reconcile the *first* precept, of the χρῆσιον, with the *third*, of the ὁμοιον, the character should be brought as *near* to a *good* one, as is consistent with the circumstance of *likeness*. Thus, if such a character as that of Achilles is to be drawn, its striking features are to be preserved, but, at the same time, to be rather improved and softened, than exaggerated. For the expression must be observed, Aristotle does not say absolutely, according to the sense of Heinsius, that Achilles *ought* to be drawn, or *was* drawn, πᾶραδειγμα ἐπιεικειῆς; but *rather* so than otherwise;—ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ἢ σκληροτήτης.—“Loin de charger encore le defect, il le rapprochera de la vertu;” as M. Batteux has very well expressed the *spirit* of the rule, though he has generalized it, and made it refer to *all* that precedes—και ὀργιλῆς, και ῥαθυμῆς, &c.—whereas it appears plainly, from what has been said of the force of σκληροτήτης, that the words, ἐπιεικειῆς ποιῆν παραδ. ἢ σκληρ. can be applied only to the ὀργιλοι; for as to the ῥαθυμοῖς, such a character may, indeed, be flattered into the ἐπιεικειῆς, but cannot well, by any distortion, be made to appear σκληροῖς.

Still, however, what every one, I believe, naturally expects at the first reading of this passage, as it now stands, is, that after having mentioned *two* instances of *faulty* characters, the ὀργιλοι, and the ῥαθυμοι, Aristotle should mention *two* corresponding instances of *good* qualities *bordering* upon, or connected with, each, and of which the Poet might avail himself, to give to each a favourable turn. But, instead of this, we have a *good*, and a *bad* quality, (ἐπιεικειῆς, and σκληροτήτης,) both of which, as we have seen,

* De Repub. lib. iii. *ed. Meib.* p. 228.

can be made to relate only to his *first* instance, the ὀργιλῶ; so that all the rest, between the words ὀργιλῶς, and ἐπιεικειῶς, must be parenthetical. The harshness and embarrassment of such a construction, led me formerly to suspect an error in one of the words, ἐπιεικειῶς, or σκληροτητῶ; and a conjecture was suggested to me by a passage in the *Rhetoric*, which, I hope, will at least be thought plausible enough to excuse my laying it before the reader. The suspicion seemed to fall upon σκληροτητῶ; for the ἐπιεικεία would answer well enough as a softening, or improvement, of ῥαθυμία; as an indolent man, who concerns himself about nothing, and cares only for his own ease, is often spoken of as a *quiet, good kind* of man. Instead of σκληροτητῶ, then, I thought it not improbable, that Aristotle might have written ἀπλοτητῶ. The passage of Aristotle himself which suggested this to me, is in the first book of his *Rhetoric*, cap. ix. where, delivering the usual precepts relative to the art of encomiastic misrepresentation, he says,—Ληπτέον δὲ-----ἐκαστον, ἐκ τῶν παρακολοθευόντων αἰεὶ, κατὰ τὸ ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΟΝ· οἶον, ΤΟΝ ὈΡΓΙΛΟΝ καὶ τὸν μανικόν, ἌΠΛΟΥΝ· καὶ τὸν ἀνθαδῆ, μεγαλοπρέπη καὶ σεμνόν· κ. τ. ἀλλ. The whole passage is much to the purpose of this place; and is, plainly, not more applicable to the Rhetorician, with respect to the hero of his oration, than it is to the Poet, with respect to the hero of his poem. A passage of Euripides will add, perhaps, some probability to this conjecture. In the *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Achilles thus draws his own character:

Ἐγὼ δ' ἐν ἀνδρῶ ἐυσεβέσατε τραφεῖς,
 Χειρῶν, ἐμάθον τῶς τροπῶς ἌΠΛΟΥΣ ἔχειν.
 Καὶ τοῖς Ἀτρεΐδαις, ἣν μὲν ἤγνωνται καλῶς,
 Πεισομέθ'. ὅταν δὲ μὴ καλῶς, ἔπεισομέθ'. υ. 926.

Where the meaning of τροπῶς ἀπλῶς, is very well fixed by the two subsequent lines, and by the expression, ἐλευθερὰν φύσιν, in the verse that follows them.

Plato, also, in the *Hippias*, talks much of the simplicity, truth, and sincerity, of Achilles; as if, in his view, they were the pro-

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minent features of what was good in the Homeric character of that hero. When Socrates asks Hippias, whether Achilles is not represented by Homer as an artful, designing character, Hippias answers—*Ημισα γε, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἀλλ' ἈΠΛΟΥΣΤΑΤΟΣ*. And, again, *ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεύς ἐν ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ ἈΠΛΟΥΣ* ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεύς πολυτροπῶς τε καὶ ψευδής^c*. And the following lines are there quoted, in which Homer has made Achilles strongly mark this feature of his own character :

Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδῃ, πολυμηχαν' Ὀδυσσευ,
 Χρῆ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπεῖν,
 Ἥι περ δὴ φρονεῖω τε, καὶ ὡς τέτελεσμένον ἔσαι^d
 Ἐχθρῶς^e γὰρ μοι κεινῶς ὁμῶς αἶδαο πυλῆσιν,
 Ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κευθεῖ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ βάζει.

Il. ix. 308.

The sense, then, of the passage before us, according to this conjecture, would be this:—If the Poet chuse for the subject of his imitation a *passionate*, or an *indolent* man, he should give to the former the cast of plain sincerity, and honest frankness; and to the other, (the *ἑαυμῶς*) that of moderation, gentleness, good-nature, and what the French, by an expressive word which our language wants, term, *bonhomme*.—But I dwell too long upon a mere conjecture. The evident propriety of the word *συλληροτής*, as applicable to the *unsoftened* and *unflattered* character of Achilles, may justly, perhaps, protect it from suspicion; though, on the other hand, the passages I have adduced, added to the improbability of the *ellipsis* supposed by Heinsius, the embarrassment of the parenthesis, and the advantage of leaving the ἦ to its most obvious, *disjunctive*, sense, prevent me from a total rejection of this idea.

The word *παρεπίδημα*, here, is taken by most of the commentators to mean a *perfect ideal model*^e—“*summum exemplar*.” For

* Tom. i. p. 364. *ed. Serr.*

^b Ἐπειρῆς—ἭΡΑΟΣ, ΜΕΤΡΙΟΣ.—*Suidas*.

^c Robertelli, Victorius, Piccol. Beni, Gouillon.

this

this I see no reason. I take it to be used here, as it is generally, I believe, if not always, used by Aristotle, merely for *an example*. Of this the reader may easily satisfy himself by consulting the useful index to Mr. Winstanley's edition.

N O T E 119.

P. 95. AS ACHILLES IS DRAWN BY AGATHO AND BY HOMER.

PLATO, in the *third* book of his *Republic*, gives a very different view of the Homeric Achilles. He makes him a mere compound of extreme *pride* and extreme *meanness*: ὡςτε ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσηματα δυο ἐναντιῶ ἀλλήλων, ἀνελευθερίαν μετα φιλοχρηματίας, καὶ αὐ ὑπερηφάνιαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων^a. To which we may add, as a companion, Dr. Jortin's portrait of Achilles: "A *boisterous, rapacious, mercenary, cruel, and unrelenting brute*; and the reader pities none of his calamities, and is pleased with none of his successes^b!" This is far enough from the παραδειγμα ἐπιεικειας. But for a juster account of this matter, and for the best illustration of this passage of Aristotle that can be given, I refer the reader to Dr. Beattie's analysis of the character of this hero, as drawn by Homer; *Essay on Poetry, &c. Part I. ch. iv.*

^a "So that he united in himself two vices the most opposite to each other; avaricious meanness on the one hand, and, on the other, an insolent contempt both of Gods and men."—P. 174, *ed. Maffey*.

^b Six Dissertations, p. 214.

N O T E 120.

P. 95. AND BESIDES THESE, WHATEVER RELATES TO THOSE SENSES WHICH HAVE A NECESSARY CONNECTION WITH POETRY.

Here are two readings: *τας παρα τα ἐξ ἀναγκης ἀπολεθεσας αἰσθησεις τη ποιητικη*: and, *τα παρα τας ἐξ ἀναγκης, &c.* but in both, the object, and general sense of the passage, seem to be the same, though in both, the expression, it must be confessed, is sufficiently embarrassed and obscure. I have preferred the latter, (which is that of Victorius,) as being, on the whole, the clearest*.

The *senses* that *belong to, accompany, or are connected with*, Poetry, are, plainly, the *sight*, and the *hearing*, as relative to the *Οψις*, or *spectacle*, in the whole extent of that term, and to the *Μελοποιία* or *Musick*. When these are said to be *ἐξ ἀναγκης ἀπολεθεσαι τη ποιητικη*, it cannot be meant that the parts relative to them are *essential* to the Tragic Poem, like the *fable, manners, &c.* but only, that they are necessary appendages of the drama *in its complete state*, as designed for *representation*. This is perfectly conformable to what was before said of the *Οψις*; that, though confessedly, in one view, *ἡμῖσα ὀκειον της ποιητικης*^a, yet, in another view, *ΕΞ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ἂν εἴη τι μοριον της Τραγωδίας ὁ της Οψεως κοσμη*^b.

The drift of the precept is obvious. The *decoration* should be such as to agree with the rules just laid down for the *manners*.

* In the treatise *Περὶ αἰσθησεως*, the same expression occurs:—*ἡ μὲν ἄρη και γευσις ΑΚΟΛΑΟΥΤΟΙ ΠΑΡΩ ΕΞ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ*. “*Tactus et gustus animalia omnia necessarid comitantur.*” *Tom. i. f. 6 3. ed. Daval.*

^a Cap. vi.—“*is most foreign to the art.*”—*Transl. Part II. Sect. 3.*

^b *Ibid. ibid.* “*The DECORATION must necessarily be one of its parts.*” *Part II. Sect. 2.*

The scenery, dresses, action, &c. must be ἀρμοττοντα, ὁμοια—probability, nature, and the *costume*, must be observed. Even the μιμησις βελτιωνων, the *improved imitation*, has here, too, its obvious application. The squalid hair, and ragged dress, of Electra^c, must, as well as the σκληροτης of Achilles, be a little flattered in the representation, and not too like, &c.

The rule extends, also, to the *Melopœia*, or the *Musick*; which, from other passages of Aristotle's works, we may suspect to have been sometimes such, as sacrificed propriety, and just expression—the ἡθη, the πρεπον, &c. to the depraved taste of what he calls the φορτικοι spectators^d.

It is probable that Aristotle alludes, also, to cap. xvii. and to the mistakes, which the Poet is liable to commit, who composes without keeping the *stage*, and the effects of representation, in his eye^e.

Though the Poet neither painted the *scenes*, nor made the *dresses*, yet all this formed one of the six constituent *parts* of Tragedy; fell, of course, under the direction and controul of the Poet, and was of the utmost importance to the success of his piece, at a time when *representation* was almost essential to the idea of dramatic poetry^d.

^c Σμεψαι μὲ ΠΙΝΑΡΑΝ ΚΟΜΑΝ,

Καὶ ΤΡΥΧΗ ΤΑΔ' ἔμων πεπλων.

Eurip. Electra, 184.

^d See, *De Repub.* lib. viii. cap. 6, and 7, p. 457, E. 459, A. *ed. Duval*. The *contests* (ἀγωναί), indeed, of which he speaks in these passages, seem to have been merely *musical*. But the known influence of the same *popular audience* in the dramatic contests, and the caution given by Aristotle in the passage we are considering, make it probable, that even in the music of *Tragedy*, especially in the instrumental part of it, something of the same accommodation might prevail.

^e Transl. Part II. Sect. 17.

^d See *Diff. I.* Part II. at the end.

N O T E 121.

P. 96. ALL THOSE DISCOVERIES IN WHICH THE SIGN IS PRODUCED BY WAY OF PROOF.

Ἄι πίσειως ἐνεκα. Well explained by Dacier after the Italian commentators. Indeed, the very words of Homer, in the passage alluded to, sufficiently illustrate the meaning of the expression.

Εἰ δ' ἄγε δὴ καὶ ΣΗΜΑ ἀριφραδὲς ἄλλο τι δεῖξω,
Ὅφρα μὲ εὖ γνωτὸν, ΠΙΣΤΩΘΗΤΟΝ τ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ,
ὍΥΛΗΝ———, &c. Od. φ. 217.

“ To give you *firmer faith*, now trust your eye :

“ Lo! the broad *scar* indented on my thigh.”

Pope, xxi. 226.

Other instances of *signs* thus used, not for the purpose of *accidental* discovery, but as confirmations of a *voluntary* discovery previously made, may easily be found. Thus, in the *Electra* of Sophocles, when Electra asks her brother, Ἥ γὰρ σὺ κενῶ;—he answers——

— — Τηνδε προσβλεψασ' ἐμῆ
Σφραγίδα πατρῶ, ἐμὰ δ' εἰ σαφὴ λεγῶ.

N O T E 122.

P. 96. THOSE WHICH----HAPPEN SUDDENLY AND CASUALLY, ARE BETTER.

Ἐκ περιπετειᾶς.—“ Non valet hic περιπετειᾶς, mutationem illam “ ingentem fortunarum, sed, ἐκ περιπετειᾶς, significat, casu, fortuito, “ et quia ita cecidit.”—Victorius.

• †

So

So in the passage from Polybius quoted by Suidas, under the words Περιπετεια, and Ευμενης:—ἐ τυχῆ το πλειον συνεργῶ χρωμεν³, ἐδ' ΕΚ ΠΕΡΙΠΕΤΕΙΑΣ, ἀλλὰ δια της ἀγχνοιας. κ. τ. λ.

Aristotle's using the word thus, adverbially, after having hitherto used it only in its technical, or dramatic, sense, of a sudden change of fortune, produces some ambiguity; and the more so, as the adverbial phrase, ἐκ περιπετειας, seems not to be of very common occurrence. Heinſius, taking περιπετεια in the dramatic sense, translates—“*quæ e mutationibus in contrarium oriuntur;*” which, indeed, is the obvious meaning of the expression, if *not* understood adverbially. But it cannot be Aristotle's meaning, because the discovery of the scar of Ulyſſes was not the consequence of any such περιπετεια. Indeed, it was neither the consequence, nor the cause, of any reverse of fortune.

I have sometimes suspected that Aristotle might write it, ἐκ ΠΡΟΠΕΤΕΙΑΣ, by which all ambiguity would have been avoided. But, perhaps, after all, the phrase had no ambiguity to *Greek* ears, and the passage may be right as it stands.

N O T E 123.

P. 96. DISCOVERIES INVENTED, AT PLEASURE, BY THE POET, AND, ON THAT ACCOUNT, STILL INARTIFICIAL.

Δευτεραι δε, αι πεποιημεναι ὑπο τε ποιητε, διο ἀτεχνοι.—The expression, πεποιημεναι ὑπο τε ποιητε, must necessarily, I think, be understood *emphatically*, and must mean, not merely *invented*, (for so are the other discoveries also, which follow,) but *arbitrarily* invented by the Poet, and *obviously* so, “upon the spur of the occasion;” in opposition to such means of discovery and recognition, as, though still indeed of the Poet's invention, are artfully prepared in the very texture of his plot, and appear to arise, necessarily or probably,

bably, from the action itself. And thus I find it well explained by Piccolomini: — “ Chiama Aristotele questa seconda specie di riconoscimento, fatto dal Poeta: e così lo chiama, non perché in tutte le specie il Poeta non sia quello che li riconoscimenti, siccome le altre parti dell' azione e della favola ponga e formi coi versi suoi; ma ha dato à questa specie più ch' all' altre questo nome, perché in essa, non fondandosi il Poeta, nè nello stesso connettimento delle cose, e nella stessa favola, nè in segno alcuno che la persona stessa, che s'ha da riconoscere, gli offerisca inanzi; egli, per questo, come libero divenuto, à suo mero (quasi) arbitrio, reca, finge, e pone in bocca della persona à voglia sua, quella occasione di riconoscimento che più gli piace,” &c. [p. 230.] — Yet, as this sense is rather inferred from the explanation subjoined, (ταυτα ἐν αὐτῷ λέγει Ἄ ΒΟΥΛΕΤΑΙ Ὁ ΠΟΙΗΤΗΣ, ἀλλ' ἐκ ὁ ΜΥΘΟΣ) than expressed by the words themselves, I am much inclined to suppose some omission in the text.

The other reading, ὄΥΚ ἀτεχνοί, is very plausibly supported by the Abbé Batteux, from a passage of Aristotle's Rhetoric, which has been already mentioned in NOTE 104^a. I doubt, however, whether that passage be fairly applicable to this^b. But though it were, the sense above given, and which I think *must* be given, to the expression πεπενημένοι ὑπο τε Π. seems hardly reconcilable with this reading. For can we conceive that Aristotle would assign as a *reason* why such discoveries are *not inartificial*, that they are *arbitrarily* (and therefore easily,) invented by the Poet?—ΔΙΟ ἐκ ἀτεχνοί.

I must observe, however, that though these two readings are diametrically opposite,—ἀτεχνοί—ἐκ ἀτεχνοί—yet, it is some comfort, that whichever we adopt, the general sense of the passage

^a Rhet. I. c. ii. Ταυ δὲ πεισῶν, ἢ μετ' ἀτεχνῶν ἔστιν—κ. τ. λ.

^b In that passage, ἀτεχνῶν, is opposed to ΕΝΤΕΧΝΑ, and means, such things as are *foreign to the orator's art*.—Here, the word means, not *foreign to the Poet's art*, but *only—requiring little, or no art, or ingenuity of invention, in the Poet*.

will be the same. As such discoveries *are* of the *Poet's invention*, they are *not ἀτεργοί*, in the rhetorical sense: as they require very *little* invention, compared with those which arise from the action itself, they may, in this view, be denominated, *ἀτεργοί*. In either reading, therefore, Aristotle will be found to say the same thing; i. e. that the discoveries of this *second* species are, in point of art and ingenuity, superior to the *first* species, and inferior to all the *rest*.

N O T E 124.

P. 96. ORESTES, AFTER HAVING DISCOVERED HIS SISTER, DISCOVERS HIMSELF TO HER.

The Greek is—ἀνεγνωρισε την ἀδελφην, ἀνεγνωρισθεις ὑπ' εἰσενης:—this, as Victorius has observed, seems to say the reverse; i. e. that Orestes discovered his sister *after* having been discovered by her: which is not the fact. One would rather have expected—ἀναγνωρισας την ἀδελφην, ἀνεγνωρισθη ὑπ' ἐκείνης: which would also have been clearer, and not have given occasion to the commentators to suppose, that the discovery of Iphigenia by the letter was meant to be included in this *second* and faulty species of discovery; whereas the expression ὍΙΟΝ Ορ. ΑΝΕΓΝΩΡΙΞΕ την ἀδελφην, leads very naturally to that idea. But it is easy to see, upon the least reflection, that the discovery of *Orestes only* is the example here intended. This is sufficiently explained by Dacier after Victorius. It was natural enough, however, for Aristotle to mention the *other* discovery, in passing, as being the counterpart of a *double ἀναγνωρισις* in the same drama. [See cap. xi. at the end. Transl. Part II. Sect. 9.]—But this whole passage, I may say, this whole chapter, has undoubtedly been most miserably mangled in transcription.

N O T E 125.

P. 96. BUT ORESTES, BY [VERBAL PROOFS] &c.

The reading which Victorius regarded as most authentic is this:—ἐκεῖνⓄ δε * * * * * ταυτα ἐν αὐτⓄ λεγει ἃ βελεται ὁ ποιητης, ἀλλ' ἐχ' ὁ μυθⓄ.—But *four* Medicean manuscripts, and, it seems, *all* those in the King of France's library, agree in reading—ἐκεῖνⓄ δε αὐτⓄ λεγει, *ν. τ. λ.*^a, and, in the latter, we are told, the words are written without any *hiatus*. This last reading, however, appears to me short and deficient. I cannot but think that the author, after the words ἐκεῖνⓄ δε,—had expressed the *means* of the discovery, and by them denominated *this* species, as he has all the others:—δια σημειων—δια μνημης—ἐκ συλλογισμου—. But *how* the vacancy was filled, it is impossible to determine; and it is of the less consequence to determine, as we are in possession of the Tragedy itself. Δια σημειων, which Victorius found in one MS. or, δια τεκμηριων, as Dacier ingeniously conjectured from the words of Euripides himself, seem most probable. In point of *meaning*, it is indifferent by which of these appellations these discoveries were distinguished; τεκμηριον being, according to Aristotle's own definition in his *Rhetoric*, only a species of σημειον. Τετων δε (i. e. των σημειων,) το μεν ἀναγκαιον, τεκμηριον^b. Σημειον is a *sign*, or *token*: Τεκμηριον, a *certain, decisive* sign, such as puts an *end* to all doubt, according to the derivation of the word given by Aristotle in the passage just referred to. We see, therefore, with what strict propriety the word is used by Euripides, when Iphigenia demands, and Orestes professes to give, a *decisive* proof:

^a See *edit. Ox.* 1780, and Batteux's translation, *note 3*.—But M. Batteux is mistaken in saying that *Victorius* omits the words ταυτα ἐν:—he gives them in his text, and translates them in his commentary. He rejects only the supplement, δια σημειων.

^b *Lil. i. cap. ii. p. 517. ed. Duval.*

Iphig.—ἔχεις τι τῶνδε μοι ΤΕΚΜΗΡΙΟΝ ;

And Orestes, presently after, when he produces his last and strongest proof, says——

Ἄδ' εἶδον αὐτῷ, ταδε φρασῶ ΤΕΚΜΗΡΙΑ °

It is, indeed, some objection to *δια σημειων*, in this passage of Aristotle, that it would appear to confound *this* discovery with the *first*, by giving it the same denomination. But this, perhaps, would be sufficiently obviated by the explanation immediately subjoined:—*δια σημειων*. ΤΑΥΤΑ ΜΕΝ Ἐν αὐτῷ ΛΕΓΕΙ ἁ βυλεται, &c. *Σημειον*, in the *first* species of discovery, is used for *visible, external* proofs: here, it would be used for *verbal, argumentative* proofs; as it *is* used, continually, in this treatise. And it may also be observed, that Aristotle himself, at the end of this chapter, (if the integrity of the text be admitted,) refers to this sort of discovery, among others, under the denomination of *πεποιημενα ΣΗΜΕΙΑ*.

N O T E · 126.

P. 96. FOR SOME OF THE THINGS, FROM WHICH THOSE PROOFS ARE DRAWN, ARE EVEN SUCH AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN PRODUCED AS VISIBLE SIGNS.

—Ἐξην γὰρ ἂν ἐνια καὶ ἐνεργειαν.—In the sense which I have given to this obscure sentence, the only sense that I thought could fairly be extracted from the words, I am glad to find myself supported by the judgment of Victorius.—“*Quare propè dictum peccatum est: (δὲ ὁ ἐργῶς τῆς ἐξηγητικῆς ἀμαρτίας ἐστίν.)* quia si illa quibus usus est Orestes “ non omninò *signa* fuerunt;—neque enim ostendi potuerunt;—“ propè tamen illa accesserunt; atque ita propè ut quædam ex “ *ipsis illius profus generis fuerint*, quamvis ita *ipsis ille usus non*

° *Iphig. in Taur.*—from v. 808—to 826.—In the *Electra* of Sophocles, ΣΑΦΗ ΣΗΜΕΙΑ is used, v. 892, as equivalent to *τεκμηριον* which occurs afterwards, v. 910.

“fit. Hoc enim arbitror valere, “*licebat enim quædam etiam portare*”—id est, manu tenere, et jubere ut ipsa videret ac reminisceretur,” &c.

Electra, because all the proofs of Orestes were not of this kind, but only *Electra's work*, and the *lance*.

N O T E 127.

P. 96. THE DISCOVERY BY THE SOUND OF THE SHUTTLE.

Ἡ τῆς κερμίδος φωνή—Dacier, after some other commentators, makes a *speaking shuttle* of this; and wonders, as, indeed, he well might, that the great critic should let so monstrous an absurdity pass without a severer censure than that of its *wanting art*. Others understand, much more reasonably, not the literal, but the metaphorical, *voice* of the shuttle, in the epistolary web by which Philomela is said to have conveyed to her sister the dismal tale of her sufferings,

—ἴσ'ε ποικιλμασι ΣΤΟΜΑΤΙ χρῆσαμενη,

in the language of that most curious of all Poets, *John Tetzels*^a.

But as this seems to have been the current traditional story, I do not see how it could be adduced as a circumstance *invented* at pleasure by the Poet. I should rather suppose, that the discovery in question, whatever it might be, was effected by the *sound* of the shuttle, which Aristotle calls, φωνή, *voice*, not, probably, in his own language, but in the poetical language of the Tragedy itself to which he alludes. For these κερμίδες, it seems, were a very *vocal* sort of things, nothing like the shuttles of “these degenerate days.” Every one recollects the “*arguto pœline*” of Virgil. But this is nothing to the amplification of some Greek epigrammatists, who scruple not to compare them to swallows, and even to nightingales;

^a *Chil.* vii. 142.—See Ovid's *Metam.* lib. vi. 572, &c.

Κερκιδας ὀρθρολαλοισι ΧΕΛΙΔΟΣΙΝ ἐμελοφωνες—

And, Κερκίδα δ' εὐποιητον ΑΗΔΟΝΑ—^b.

Hence the ridiculous fancy of Joseph Scaliger, that the metamorphosis of Procne into a swallow was exhibited in the *Tercus* of Sophocles, and that a *shuttle* was made use of, instead of a *whistle* or *bird-pipe*, to imitate the swallow's voice!—

N O T E 128.

P. 96. THUS IN THE CYPRIANS OF DICÆOGENES—.

That this was a distinct Poem from the *Κυπρια* mentioned afterwards in cap. xxiii. seems clear from this single circumstance, observed by Victorius, that the Epic Poem called *The Cypriacs*,—*τα Κυπρια ἐπη*,—is mentioned there by Aristotle, as it is, generally, by other antient writers, in terms that imply a doubt of its author^a: whereas here the author is named, without any expression of uncertainty.

Whether the Poem was *Epic*, or *Tragic*, cannot be determined; nor, from the ambiguity of the *case*, *τοις Κυπριοις*, whether the title of it was *Τα Κυπρια*, or, *Οι Κυπριοι*—*The Cypriacs*, or, *The Cyprians*. The latter is, certainly, the most probable title for a *Tragedy*, and therefore, as Dicæogenes is recorded only as a *Tragic* and *Dithyrambic* Poet, I have ventured to adopt it.

^b *Anthol. lib. vi. cap. 8.*

^a — ὁ *τα Κυπριακα ποιησας*—.

N O T E 129.

P. 96. IN THE TALE OF ALCINOUS.—

See Od. VIII. 521.—There is another *discovery* of the same kind in the 4th book, where Menelaus recognizes Telemachus by the tears he sheds at the mention of his father. There is not, I think, either in Homer, or in any other Poet, a more natural and affecting picture of friendly regret on the one hand, and filial affection on the other.—“Of all the friends I have lost,” says Menelaus, addressing himself to Telemachus without knowing who he was—“*one* there is, whom I lament more than all “the rest:”——

—— ὅσε μοι ὕπνον ἀπερχθαιρει και ἐδωδην
Μνωομενω· ἐπει εἴτις Αἰχαιων τοσσ' ἐμογησεν
‘Ὅσσ’ Ὀδυσσευς ἐμογησε και ἦρατο·—τω δ’ ἄρ’ ἐμελλεν
Λυτω κηδε’ ἐσεσθαι, ἐμοι δ’ ἀχθῶ αἰεν ἀλασον
Κενε, ὅπως δη δηρον ἀποιχεται· εἶδε τι ἰδμεν,
Ζωει ὄγ’, ἢ τέθνηκεν. Ὀδύρονται νυ πε αὐτον
Λαερτης θ’ ὁ γερων, και ἐχεφρων Πηνελοπειαι,
Τηλεμαχῶ θ’, ὃν ἐλειπε νεον γεγαωτ’ ἐνι οἴκω.

Ὡς φατο·—τω δ’ ἄρα πατρῶ ὑφ’ ἡμερον ὤρσε γοοιο.
Δακρυ δ’ ἀπο βλεφαρων χαμαδις βαλε, πατρῶ ἀκουσας,
Χλαιναν πορφυρεην αὐτ’ ὀφθαλμοῖν ἀνασχων
Λμφοτερησι χερσι· νοησε δε μιν Μενελαῶ.—

Od. Δ. 105—².

That the title, *Alcinous*, or *Alcinus*, ἀπολογῶ, was understood to refer *chiefly* to the long narration of Ulysses, which occupies four books of the *Odyssey*, seems clear, even from the proverbial

* Not ill translated by Fenton, in *Pope's Odyssey*, book iv. 131.

application of the expression. Ἀπολογία Ἀλκίνοου.—ἐπι τῶν φλογα-
 ρηντων, και μακρον ἀποτεινοντων λογον.—*Suidas*. And so Jul. Pollux :
 —ἐπι μακρων ῥησεων^b. But a passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric leaves
 no doubt. He there expressly mentions Homer's *account* of the
 speech of Ulysses to Penelope, Od. xxiii. 310, &c. as being the
 Ἀλκινε ἀπολογία compressed into an abridgment of thirty verses.—
 Παράδειγμα ὁ Ἀλκινε ἀπολογία, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐν τριακονταί ἐπέτι
 πεπονηται^c. Now those verses are, in fact, a mere *table of contents*
 to the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th books, which contain the nar-
 rative of Ulysses at the court of Alcinous.—This title, therefore,
 (Ἀλκινε ἀπολογία) must *at least* have extended to those *four* books.
 But the passage which is the subject of this note, seems to prove
 that it extended still farther; for here we are referred to the *eighth*
 book under that title; though the speech, the μακρὰ ἔησις of
 Ulysses, does not commence till the *ninth*. The editions prefix the
 title, Ἀλκινε ἀπολογία, *only* to the eighth book.—The fact seems
 to be, that the titles, by which the different parts of Homer's
 Poems were first distinguished, were applied to parts of very un-
 equal lengths; so that afterwards, when the equal, or nearly equal,
 division into *books* took place, it would not always coincide ex-
 actly with the other division, formed by the different *distinct* sub-
 jects or episodes of the Poem; but *one* title would sometimes
 comprehend several books, and different parts of the *same* book,
 would sometimes be distinguished by different titles. Thus, for
 example, the *fifth* book of the Odyssey had *two* titles, Καλυψὸς
 Ἀντρον, and Σχεδια, or Τα περὶ τὴν σχεδιαν: and the last book *three*,
 Νεκυϊαν—Τὰ ἐν Λαερτυ—and, Σπειδαί^d. And thus, on the other
 hand, the title, Ἀλκινε ἀπολογία, is not, I apprehend, to be con-
 sidered as appropriated to any one book, but, probably, compre-
 hended *five* books—from the eighth to the twelfth, inclusively;

^b II. 4. and VI. 26.

^c III. 16. p. 603. *ed. Duxal.*

^d See *Ælian V. Hist. lib. xiii. c. 14*, and the notes of Perizonius.

perhaps,

perhaps, was understood to refer, generally, to the whole *Episode of Alcinous*; as indeed the expression ΑΛΚΙΝΟΥ ἄπολογία—“the story of ALCINOUS”—seems rather to imply. And the different parts of this long Episode were, again, subdivided by other titles; such as, Κυκλωπία, Νεκυία, Τα Κριμαίης, &c. Indeed, the title, Ἀλκίονε Ἀπολογία, though prefixed only to the eighth book, seems evidently extended beyond that book by the title subjoined as its equivalent,—Ἡ, τα τε Οδυσσεως παρα Ἀλκίονε. But how the word ἄπολογία got into the plural number here, I do not well understand. This circumstance, however, together with the idea of its being confined to this single book, has, I think, led Perizonius and other learned men into mistakes concerning the *reason* of the appellation. Perizonius (*ubi sup.*) thinks the eighth book was so called, “because there are several speeches of Alcinous in it;” and others suppose, that the title alludes to the songs of Demodocus*.

N O T E 130.

P. 96. THE DISCOVERY OCCASIONED BY REASONING, OR INFERENCE; SUCH AS THAT IN THE CHOEPHORÆ—.

Here is much obscurity and confusion.—One thing, however, seems clear; that ἐκ συλλογισμῶν, cannot mean as some interpreters have understood it to mean, “by reasoning or inference in the mind of the person who *makes* the discovery;” because this is common to *all* the modes of discovery. When Electra recognizes her brother, does she not *infer*, or, in the philosopher’s language, *syllogize*? “This man has seen the lance—nobody *could* see it but Orestes—This *is* Orestes.”—And the same may be said of all the other recognitions. Discovery by *inference*, therefore, *on*

* Schmidius, in Pind. Nem. p. 34.

the part of the discoverer, cannot be made a distinct species. The discovery Aristotle means, is plainly a discovery, not *made*, but *occasioned*, by inference. Throughout all his instances, he considers only the means, or occasion, of discovery, as furnished, in some way or other, by the person discovered. With respect to bodily marks, bracelets, &c. the letter of Iphigenia, and the verbal τεκμηρια of Orestes, this is obvious enough. But the case is the same with the discovery *by memory*: in both the examples of that species, the persons are discovered, not by recollection in the discoverers, but by the *effects* of it in themselves. And so here too, in the three *last* examples of discovery ἐκ συλλογισμῶν, however obscure in other respects, *this* at least seems clearly enough expressed, that the persons are discovered by their *own* reasoning, or inference; that is, by something which it leads them to *say*^a.

But, the difficulty is, that Aristotle's *first* example, appears not to accord with this idea, and with the other examples. The *inference* here, *appears* to be, even from the words themselves^b, and, if the *Choëphoræ* of *Æschylus* be intended, as the commentators suppose, certainly *is*,—inference in the mind of the person who *makes* the discovery. But as this, for the reasons already given, cannot, I think, be admitted, we must either leave this *knot* as it is, or solve it by supposing some *other* Tragedy, not extant, to be meant, in which the *conclusion* mentioned was, as in all the other instances that follow, the *occasion* only of the discovery^c. Nor will this appear a very improbable supposition, if we recollect the

^a Some time after these remarks were written, I found them coincide exactly with those of Piccolomini, whose comment on this passage is, as usual, exact and clear. See also Benius, who follows him.

^b Τεταρτη δὲ, ἢ ἐκ συλλογισμῶν· οἶον, ἐν Χορηφοῖς, [αἰ. Χλορηφοῖς] ὅτι, ὁμοῖοις τις ἐληλυθεν· ὁμοῖοι δὲ ἄθεις ἀλλ' ἢ Ορεστης· οὐτ' ἄρα ἐληλυθεν.

^c So, Beni: "Itaque primum exemplum sic intelligendum crediderim, ut *Electra* "agnita sit, non Orestes: ita, nimirum, ut *cum Orestes eo modo ratiocinantem audiret* "puellam, dum Orestem sibi similem diceret, inde *Electram agnoscat.*" Pauli Benii, in *Ar. Poet. Comment.* p. 348.

swarm of Tragic Poets who were continually exercising their invention upon a few popular subjects, and the number of different Tragedies which, in consequence, we find recorded, not only on the same *subject*, but even with the same *title*; often with some slight variation only, in the *mode* of a discovery, and other episodic incidents of the plot, which would still leave a general resemblance, a sort of *family* likeness, between them, such as, in fact, we find in Tragedies on the same subject now extant; in the *Electra* of Sophocles, and that of Euripides, and the *Choëphoræ* of Æschylus.

But we may say, farther, that this supposition seems to be favoured by the Tragedy of Æschylus, itself; with which, what Aristotle here says, appears to me by no means exactly to correspond. The reader, who will take the trouble to examine the whole passage supposed to be here alluded to, from v. 166, to v. 233^d, will, I believe, think with me, that the discovery, in that play, cannot with propriety be denominated a *discovery made by inference from resemblance*. The circumstances of the lock of hair, and the footsteps, produce in Electra's mind no more than a glimmering of hope—*συννομαι δ' ὄτ' ἐλπιδος* [v. 192.]—and she is so far from *discovering* Orestes *by them*, that even when he appears before her, she is not convinced till he produces the *ὑφασμα*—the vest, or veil. This is justly remarked by Brumoy; “Tout cela “ (i. e. the hair, &c.) *ne fait que la rendre plus inquiete*: Elle demeure donc dans ce trouble jusqu' à ce qu' Oreste paroisse à ses yeux. Il se montre tout à coup, et *se fait reconnoître pour son frère, en lui présentant un voile qu'elle a tissé elle-même*.” This I take to be the true *ἀναγνωριστις* of this drama; and it belongs

* In Mr. Potter's Æschylus, from p. 329, to 334. *Quarto*.

* *Theat. des Grecs*, ii. p. 6.—Mr. Potter is of the same opinion:—“*No discovery* “ is from hence raised: but the mind of Electra is deeply struck; she reasons and “ conjectures, and so is finely prepared for the discovery which soon follows.” *Notes* on the *Choëphoræ*.

rather to Aristotle's *first* class—*δια σημειων*; if not even to the worst sort of that class, where the sign is produced *πιστως ενεκα*,—*by way of proof*. Indeed, even admitting that Electra may be considered as recognizing her brother by inference from the resemblance of the lock of hair and the footsteps only, still, as Piccolomini acutely and solidly observes, this instance would belong to the *first* species of discovery *by signs*. “Questo riconoscimento non è della quarta specie, ma della prima; nato, non da sillogismo, ma da segno: poiché Elettra, preso per segno d’Oreste la capigliatura, sopra tal segno, quasi sopra mezzo termine, fabbrica il sillogismo che ella fa in se stessa, argomentando, che colui fusse Oreste: havendo io già detto, ch’ in ogni riconoscimento suol’ intervenir sillogismo ed argomentazione dentro all’animo della persona riconoscete.” p. 236.

N O T E 131.

P. 97. “HE CAME TO FIND HIS SON, AND HE HIMSELF MUST PERISH.”

It is not very obvious, how these words are to be brought to any thing like *reasoning*, or *inference*.—But all here is darkness. The far-fetched explanation which Dacier has condescended to borrow, without notice, from Castelvetro, for whom, in his preface, he expresses so much contempt, only serves to make the “darkness” more “visible.”

I know not whether it be worth while to remark a mere resemblance of expression, but a very close one, in Homer:

Μη πατερ’ αντιθεου ΔΙΖΗΜΕΝΟΣ, ΑΥΤΟΣ ΎΔΑΩΜΑΙ.

Od. O. 90.

N O T E 132.

P. 97. THERE IS ALSO A COMPOUND SORT, &c.

When the *meaning* of an author cannot be satisfactorily explained, all that a translator can do, is, to be particularly careful to render faithfully his *words*. This I have *endeavoured* to do here: but whether I *have* done even this, the manifest corruption of the text must leave uncertain. Whatever sense may be enveloped in the Greek, I hope remains enveloped in the English. But what that is, I will not undertake to say.—With respect to the title of the drama, Οδυσσευς Ψευδαγγελος, if I have not given it its only *possible* sense, I have, surely, given it its most natural and obvious sense:—Ulysses *in the disguise* of a messenger. For I am really not able to see, how the words, without violent twisting, can be made to signify *passively*, as Castelvetro would have it, “Ulysses *di cui sono recate false novelle;*” though Victorius has pronounced a man to be a fool, who pretends to determine which of these two meanings is the right one*. Had a *false Ulysses* been meant, it seems probable, that the word Ψευδοδυσσευς would rather have been used; as Ψευδηρακλης, *The false Hercules*, was the title of a Comedy of Menander.

Αιαντων εν τῷ—*sc. τα θεατρα*: I see no other construction, as the text stands. And so Victorius:—“*Spectatores ita accepisse illam “vocem, tanquam si ipsi, rei illius auxilio, ipsum agniture essent.”*”

Ulysses seems to have been a rich and valuable resource to the dramatic writers. His history furnished the subjects of many *Comedies*, as well as *Tragedies*. See Casaubon upon Athenæus, p. 297.—There were, *Ulysses Wounded*—*Ulysses Mad*—*Ulysses the Deserter*—*Ulysses Shipwrecked*—*Ulysses Weaving*, &c.—The subject

* “Hæc enim ita incerta sunt, ut *stultum* esse videatur aliquid ipsorum affirmare.”

of the play here mentioned seems to have been suggested by Homer, Od. Ξ . 120. But, *what* it was—how this discovery was *compound* ($\sigmaυνθετ\textcircled{\text{C}}$)—or how, indeed, it was a discovery at all—what the precise *paralogism* was, &c. I confess myself totally unable, from the short, perplexed, and probably *corrupt* words of the text, to make out. The reader may see, however, a great variety of different conjectures in the commentators; and I believe when he has read them all he will find himself just where he was. For my part, I leave this bow of Ulysses to be bent by stronger arms than mine:—

Ω φίλοι, ἔ μιν ἐγὼ τανυῶ.—λαβέτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλ\textcircled{\text{C}}.

N O T E 133.

P. 97. BUT OF ALL DISCOVERIES, THE BEST IS THAT WHICH ARISES FROM THE ACTION ITSELF——.

I agree with those commentators, who understand this to be given by Aristotle as a species of $\alpha\nu\alpha\gamma\nu\omega\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$ distinct from any of the preceding. This appears, 1. From his examples, which are very different from all those before produced, and not reducible, I think, to any of his classes. The discovery of Iphigenia by the letter, is, indeed, mentioned under his *second* class, but not as an *instance* of that species.—See NOTE 124. 2dly, and principally, from his saying, “After these, the *next* best are the discoveries “*by inference*”—naming an *entire species*; which he would not, surely, have done, had his *best of all discoveries* been such, as might be found equally in the *other* species; had he been speaking, as some understand him, only of the best way of *using* the discoveries already enumerated.

N O T E 134.

P. 98. SUCH DISCOVERIES ARE THE BEST, BECAUSE THEY ALONE ARE EFFECTED WITHOUT INVENTED PROOFS, OR BRACELETS, &c. NEXT TO THESE ARE THE DISCOVERIES BY INFERENCE.

If the words, *πεποιημένων σημείων*, refer, as it is generally understood, to the *second* sort of discoveries exclusively, it is not easy to see how it can be true, that the *fifth* and best sort of discoveries, that *ἐκ πραγμάτων*, is the *only* one that is effected without *invented signs, bracelets, &c.*—for, on this supposition, the same may evidently be said of the *third* and *fourth* classes, those by *memory*, and by *inference*, which are expressly distinguished from the two first classes.

This inconsistency is not, I think, to be removed, but by understanding the words *πεποιημένα σημεία*, here, to be used in a wider sense, as including the *third* and *fourth* species, and, in general, all discoveries that have *any degree* of the defect which Aristotle means to point out by the expression *πεποιημένοι ἀπο τε ποιηταί*, used in describing the *second* species, as opposed to what he calls, *ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων*; though that *second* species only is expressly so denominated, because it had this fault in the most glaring degree.

Any incident, or single action, of that combination of actions that compose a fable, is said, I think, to be *ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων*, when it is *prepared in the texture* of the plot, and appears to follow so naturally and of course (*κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαιὸν ἢ τὸ ἐπιπέδον*)—from the incidents which precede it, that the spectator does not see how it could have been otherwise^a. On the contrary, those incidents

are

^a What is here expressed by, *ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων*, is more fully expressed, *κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαιὸν ἢ τὸ ἐπιπέδον*, where

are not ἐξ αὐτῶν πραγμάτων, which are not thus gradually prepared, but have, more or less, the appearance of *expedients* brought in to answer the purpose of the moment; which suggest the idea of occasional and easy contrivance; which, though not, perhaps, improbable, yet have not *such a degree* of probability, as answers fully the purpose of dramatic illusion, by acting upon the mind of the spectator as *necessity*^b, and keeping his attention rivetted to the action, without suffering him, as it were, to turn his eyes a moment from it, to the resources of the *Poet's* invention.

Now the *third* and *fourth* sorts of discovery appear, when we examine them, to be of this kind. They are not prepared and brought on gradually by the *previous* circumstances of the fable, as in the examples given from the *Oedipus*, and *Iphigenia in Tauris*, but effected by contrivances, more or less naturally introduced by the Poet, at the moment when they are wanted; by *tears* suddenly shed at the sight of a picture, by an *exclamation* suddenly uttered. These, therefore, are not improperly included under the denomination of πεποιημένα (ὑπο τε ποιητε); and they are, also, in the proper and logical sense of the word, σημεια; the *tears*, in the one case, and the illative *reflection*, or *exclamation*, in the other, being *signs* or *tokens*, by which the persons are recognized. And thus, what Aristotle here says seems true—that the discovery which arises out of the action itself, is the only sort that is entirely effected ἀνευ τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ περιδεραιῶν: by περιδεραια, meaning the *first* class of discoveries, and under πεπ. σημ. comprehending the *three* other classes.

where he says of the discovery and revolution, that they should arise ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τε μύθου ὡς ἐκ τῶν προγεγεννημένων συμπλαίνει, ἢ ἐξ ἀναγκῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος, γιγνεσθαι ταῦτα. *Transl. Part II. Sect. 8.*

^b “ Puisque la fonction du vraisemblable dans la Tragedie, est d’empêcher de s’appercevoir de la feinte, le vraisemblable qui trompe le mieux est le plus parfait, et c’est celui qui devient *necessaire*.” Fontenelle, *Refl. sur la Poetique*, *Sc. 7. 63.*

He has, plainly, arranged his modes of discovery, as he had before arranged the modes of managing the *παθη*, or *disastrous incidents*, of Tragedy (*cap. xiv.*)—in the order of their comparative excellence; beginning with the *worst*, and proceeding gradually to the *best*. When he tells us, that the discoveries by *inference* are the *next best*, he evidently considers them, as *not* being, strictly at least, ἐξ αὐτων πραγματων; and so far, I think, is intelligible: but, in *what respect* they are better than the preceding species, διαμνημης, he has not told us. The discovery by *recollection* may, perhaps, in this respect be regarded as *less* ἐξ αὐτων πραγματων, or, *more* of the “*Poet’s making*,” as it seems to require the introduction of something accidental and extraneous, such as the *picture* in his first instance, and the *Bard* and his performance, in the second; circumstances, which have *more* the appearance of expedients than the reflection of Orestes, for example, in the Tragedy of Polyides. For that reflection arose, at least, *naturally*, and *solely*, from his *situation*, and that situation was essential to the fable.—But it is time to release the reader, and myself, from the embarrassments of one of the most corrupt, confused, and ambiguous chapters of this mutilated and disfigured work.

N O T E 135.

P. 98. THIS, THE POET, &c.

Ὁ μη ὄρωντα τον θεατην ἐλανθανεν. Dacier has, at least, I think, satisfactorily proved, that this passage wants *some* emendation, and that the sense must be—“*escaped the Poet, (not the spectator,) for want of his seeing, or conceiving himself to see, the action.*” He might have added to his other reasons, that the word *λανθαινοιστο*, applied just before to the *Poet*, seems to fix the same application of *ἐλανθανε* here. The opposition, as he has observed, is strongly marked:—it *escaped the Poet*; ἐπι ΔΕ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΗΝΗΣ, &c.
but

but upon the *stage*, &c. Castelvetro had seen this before Dacier, and conjectured, ὁ μὴ, ἔρωντα, ΩΣ τον θεατην, ἐλανθανεν AN. “La qual contrarietà non farebbe potuto essere celata a Carcino, se avesse riguardata la sua Tragedia non come Poeta, ma come *veditore*.” The ingenuity of the conjecture may be allowed; not so, I fear, the accuracy of the Greek.

N O T E 136.

P. 98. IN COMPOSING, THE POET SHOULD ALSO, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, BE AN ACTOR.

—Τοις σχημασι συναπεργαζομενον ποιαν.—The same expression occurs in the *Rhetoric* III. 8.—ἀναγκη τις συναπεργαζομενες σχημασι, και φωναις, και ἐσθητι, και ὁλως τη ὑποκρισει, ἐλεινοτερος εἶναι. But there, this is mentioned only as the means, by which the *Orator* may excite greater emotion in the hearer, immediately: here, as the means, by which the *Poet* may excite a stronger emotion, a greater *reality* of imagination and feeling, and a more perfect alienation of person, if I may venture so to call it, in *himself*, immediately; in order to produce afterwards a correspondent effect upon the spectator, by the force and truth of his imitation.

“I have often observed,” says the admirable author of the *Inquiry concerning the Sublime and Beautiful*, “that on mimicking the looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frightened, or daring men, I have involuntarily found my mind turned to that passion whose appearance I endeavoured to imitate; nay, I am convinced it is hard to avoid it, though one strove to separate the passion from its correspondent gestures^b.” I believe, however, it is hardly possible to put on the bodily appearance of any passion,

^a P. 371.

^b Part IV. Sect. IV.—See also the curious account there given of Campanella.

without *previously* turning the mind, *in some degree*, to that passion. But it is certain, that the effect, in this case, will react upon the cause, and convert a slight and nascent emotion into a more steady, strong, and real feeling of the passion.

A singular instance of the practice of this rule of Aristotle—*σχημασι συναπεραζομενον ποιειν*—in a sister art, is given in the following curious account, from Felibien, of Domenichino, a painter remarkable for *expression*.

“ Il ne pouvoit comprendre qu’il y eut des peintres qui travail-
 “ lassent à des ouvrages considérables avec si peu d’application,
 “ que pendant leur travail ils ne laissassent pas de s’entretenir avec
 “ leurs amis. Il les regardoit comme des ouvriers qui n’avoient
 “ que la pratique, et nulle intelligence de l’art; etant persuadé
 “ qu’un Peintre, pour bien réussir, doit entrer dans une parfaite
 “ connoissance des affections de l’esprit et des passions de l’ame;
 “ qu’il doit les sentir en lui même, et s’il faut ainsi dire, *faire les*
 “ *mêmes actions et souffrir les mêmes mouvemens* qu’il veut repré-
 “ senter: ce qui ne se peut au milieu des distractions. Aussi on
 “ l’entendoit quelquefois parler en travaillant, avec une voix lan-
 “ guissante et pleine de douleur, ou tenir des discours agréables et
 “ joyeux, selon les divers sentimens qu’il avoit intention d’expri-
 “ mer. Mais pour cela, il s’enfermoit dans un lieu fort retiré,
 “ pour n’être pas apperçu dans ces differens états, ni par ses élèves,
 “ ni par ceux de sa famille; parcequ’il lui étoit arrivé quelquefois,
 “ que des gens qui l’avoient vû dans ces transports, l’avoient soup-
 “ çonné de folie. Lorsque dans sa jeunesse il travailloit au Tableau
 “ du Martyre de S. André qui est à S. Gregoire, Annibal Carrache
 “ étant allé pour le voir, il le surprit comme il étoit *dans une action*
 “ *de colère et menaçante*. Après l’avoir observé quelque temps, il
 “ connut qu’il representoit un soldat qui menace le S. Apôtre.
 “ Alors ne pouvant plus se tenir caché, il s’approcha du Dome-
 “ niquin, et en l’embrassant, lui avoua qu’il avoit dans ce moment-
 “ là beaucoup appris de lui^b.”

^b Felibien,—*Entretiens sur les vies des Peintres*, &c. tome iii. p. 379.

I will just observe, farther, that this precept, or rather *counsel*, of Aristotle, would appear the less strange to the Poets of his time. because, as he himself tells us, the earlier Tragic Poets were also *actors*: ὑπερχοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ Τραγῳδίας ἢ ποιῆσαι το πρῶτον.—*Rhet.* III. 1.—But, indeed, I am so far from seeing any thing strange or improbable in this advice, that, on the contrary, if it be liable to any objection at all, it is, perhaps, rather to that of being unnecessary: for I scarce believe, that any Poet of genius, antient or modern, ever yet composed a Tragedy without practising involuntarily, in *some* degree or other, what the critic here recommends. No dramatic Poetry, I think, can be less chargeable with the *μωρίων*, than that of the French. Yet M. Marmontel sees no difficulty in this precept. In his account of this part of Aristotle's work, he says, “ Il recommande que l'on soit présent à l'action que l'on veut peindre, que l'on se pénétre soi-même des sentimens que l'on doit exprimer, et qu'on imite, en composant, l'action des personnages qu'on met sur la scène: méthode qui contribue réellement à donner au style plus de chaleur et de vérité. [*Poet. Franc.* I. p. 15.] Mr. Mason says of the late ingenious and amiable Mr. Whitehead, whose dramatic compositions, whatever other merit may justly be allowed them, certainly bear no marks of any unmanageable phrensy in the Poet,—that “ he is apt to believe, that he always *acted*, or at least *declaimed*, while he was composing for the stage.” If, then, even the *modern* Tragic Poet is, almost necessarily, more or less, “ an actor in composing,” there can surely be little difficulty in conceiving an *Æschylus*, or a *Sophocles*, in their free, solitary, and unwritten meditations, to have given still greater scope to their imaginations, and, Ὅσα Διὸν ἄνθρωπον, at least, σχήμασι συνωπηρεγασσάσθαι. We must, for once, divest ourselves of modern ideas, and think, not of a spruce Poet of “ these degenerate days,” shut up in his study, with his pen in his hand, and his writing-table before him—but of *Euripides*, retired into that lonely, dark, and shaggy cavern, which is said to have been the favourite scene of his

Tragic meditations. “ Philochorus refert, in infulâ Salamine
 “ *speluncam esse tetram et horridam, quam nos vidimus, in quâ Euripi-*
 “ *pides Tragedias scriptitârît.*”—*Aul. Gell. xv. 20.*

N O T E 137.

P. 98. FOR BY NATURAL SYMPATHY, &c.

Ἰθαιωτατοι γὰρ ἀπο τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οἱ ἐν πάθεισιν ἐσι.—Nothing, I think, can be more forced and improbable, than the sense given to the words, ἀπο τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως, by Victorius, and, after him, by Goulston and Dacier: “ *eorum qui pari naturâ ingenioque præ-*
 “ *diti, &c.—De deux hommes qui feront d’un égal genie, celui qui fe*
 “ *mettra dans la passion fera toujours plus persuasif.*”

If the text be right, the only sense I see is that given by Heinsius:—“ *propter similitudinem ejusdem naturæ:*”—i. e. “ *from natural sympathy.*”—But I am much disposed to suspect, that we should read, ἀπ’ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΤΗΣ φύσεως—*ab ipsâ naturâ*;—*Ipsâ naturâ comparatum est, ut, &c.*—A similar, but contrary, transposition, of the same words, occurred at the end of the second chapter: ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ—plainly, as Victorius observes, instead of ἐν Τῇ ΑΥΤῇ.—And, indeed, this sense is so obvious, that Robortelli, Castelvetro, and Piccolomini, have all given it in their translations, though certainly not warranted by the text. However, as the other reading seems to express, though somewhat obscurely, the same idea, I have not departed from it any farther, than by adopting the explanatory version of Heinsius, which takes the meaning, and leaves the obscurity.

N O T E 138.

P. 98. WE SHARE THE AGITATION OF THOSE WHO APPEAR TO BE TRULY AGITATED—THE ANGER OF THOSE WHO APPEAR TO BE TRULY ANGRY.

Χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος, και χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ἀληθινωτατα. I have given that sense of this passage, in which all the commentators I have seen are perfectly agreed. But I cannot dissimble a difficulty which has always occurred to me in this interpretation, though, to my surprise, I have not found it any where taken notice of. I mean, that it gives a *transitive* sense to the verbs, *χειμαίνει*, and *χαλεπαίνει*. With respect, particularly, to the verb *χαλεπαίνειν*, (for the other occurs but seldom,) the difficulty from the general, if not the constant, use of it, as a verb *neuter*, seems not easily to be overcome. This use of it, by Aristotle himself, and by other prose writers, is so common and well known, that it would be mere trifling to produce instances. That it is *never* used by them transitively, it would be rash, perhaps, even in those, whose Greek reading is much more extensive than my own, to affirm. I can only say, that I have never seen a *clear* instance of it, either in prose, or verse. The lexicographers, indeed, send us to Homer: but without giving any instance that appears to me to be at all decisive^a. And, on the other hand, the word occurs *clearly* in its usual and intransitive sense in other passages: as, *Il. E. 256. Π. 386. Σ. 103, &c.* But even admitting the verb to be now and then used by Homer in a sense indisputably transitive, it seems very unlikely, that Aristotle should transplant so rare, and poetical, a use of the word, into plain and philosophical prose; especially as *other* verbs were probably at hand, if he meant what

^a See *Il. T. 183.*

he is supposed to mean, which would not have been liable to this ambiguity.

This difficulty has sometimes led me to suspect, that the passage may possibly, after all, admit of a different sense; and that Aristotle may have meant only to say this:—"The Poet should work himself, as far as may be, into the passion he is to represent, by even assuming the countenance, and the gestures, which are its natural expressions. For they, of course, have most probability and truth in their imitation, who actually feel, in some degree, the passion: and no one *expresses agitation* of mind (*χειμαίνει*) so naturally, (*ἀληθινωτάτα*), as he who is really agitated, (*χειμαζόμενος*), or *expresses anger* (*χαλεπαινει*) so naturally, as he who is really angry (*ὀργιζόμενος*)."—Thus, the forms, *χειμαίνει*, *χαλεπαινει*, will retain their neuter signification, referring to the Poet's *expression* of the passion in his composition; as, *χειμαζόμενος*, and *ὀργιζόμενος*, refer to the *internal* feeling of the passion, which he has excited in his own mind. *Χειμαζεσθαι*—to be violently agitated in mind:—*Χειμαίνειν*—to *express* that agitation by *words or actions*^b: *ὀργιζεσθαι*—to be angry: *χαλεπαινειν*—to *express* that anger by words or actions.—It will, perhaps, be objected, that *χαλεπαινειν*, used as a verb neuter, appears to be synonymous with *ὀργιζεσθαι*. That it may be often so, I will not take upon me to deny: but numerous instances may certainly be produced, where it is *not* so—where it clearly denotes something beyond the mere internal passion. In this line of Homer, for example;

Ζεὺς, ἔτε δὴ ἔ ἀνδρῶσσι ΚΟΤΕΣΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ ΧΑΛΕΠΗΛΗΝΗ.

Il. II. 386.

— "*iratus scindit*;"—where the *anger* of Jupiter is expressed by *κοτεσσαμενος*; but *χαλεπηλη* goes on to the external demonstration of it, *ἔτε λαβροτάτων χειρὶ ὕδαρ*. v. 385.

^b This verb seems to be rare. I neither recollect, nor can, at present, find, any other instance of it, than in the 9th Pastoral of Theocritus, v. 20, where it is used impersonally: *χειμαίνει*, i. e. when *it is winter*. An instance, which, as far as it goes, is in favour of the sense I would give to the word here.

So, too, Od. T. v. 83.

Μη πως τοι δεσπονα κοτεσσαμενη ΧΑΛΕΠΗΝΗ:—

—which, in vulgar language, would be fairly rendered, “left your
“mistress should be angry, and scold.”

Thus, again, Il. Ξ. 256, of Jupiter:

— ὁ δ' ἐπεχρομεν^Θ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕ

ΡΙΠΤΑΖΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΔΩΜΑ ΘΕΟΥΣ.—

In the very passage adduced to exemplify the *transitive* use of this verb, Il. T. 183, it appears to have the same sense: for the words, ὅτε τις προτερ^Θ χαλεπήνη, allude to Agamemnon's own words, Il. B. 378.

Και γὰρ ἔργον Ἀχιλλεύς τε μαχεσσαμέθ', ἔνεκα κερῆς.

Ἀντιβίως ΕΠΕΕΣΣΙΝ· ἔγω δ' ἦΡΧΟΝ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΩΝ.

Χαλεπαίνειν is here, I think, put as synonymous with μαχεσθαι ἐπέεσσιν. Agamemnon confesses, that he himself gave the first *verbal provocation*; alluding, I think, to his speech, v. 131, where he first hints at the seizure of Briseis. For though Achilles speaks, indeed, somewhat roughly to the king in the preceding speech, yet his *wrath* cannot properly be said to commence before the subsequent speech, Ω μοι, ἀναιδέην, &c. v. 149.

I shall add only an instance or two more.—In the first book of Plato's *Repub.* Socrates says to Thrasymachus,—ἐλεεσθαι ἐν ἡμῶς πολὺ μαλλόν ἐπι^Θ ἐσι πε, ὑπο ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν, ἢ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ—*i. e.* “we deserve rather to be pitied by you wise men, than to be “scolded at.”—In the passage quoted NOTE 22, p. 188, Plato says of a dog,—ὅν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνωστα, ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕΙ·—ὅν δ' ἂν γνωρίζων, ΑΣΠΑΖΕΤΑΙ: “*fawns* on those he knows, and *barks* at strangers.” In the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, Il. 2, we have—Ἀισθομεν^Θ δὲ ποτε Λαμπροκλεα, τὸν πρεσβυτάτην υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ, πρὸς τὴν μητέρα ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΟΝ-ΤΑ: *i. e.* “when he had *heard* him *speaking angrily* to his mother.”

It seems, then, that the passage will fairly admit of the meaning I have proposed. And whether that meaning would not be more

to Aristotle's purpose, than the other, I willingly submit to the reader's consideration. For *why* recommend it to the Poet to help his imagination by *action*, when he composes?—plainly, for the sake of the effect of this method upon his *poetry*; that his *expression* of passion may have more of truth and nature; that his characters may χειμασθαι, or χαλεπασθαι, ἀληθινωτατα*. Now it seems more consonant to this purpose, that the words which follow as the *reason* of the advice, should refer to this *immediate* effect upon the Poet's work, which is the object of the advice, than to the more *remote* and *implied* effect of the work upon the spectator. It seems, indeed, to have been this reference to the audience, in the usual way of understanding the passage, that led Madius into the mistake of supposing this precept intended, not for the Poet, but for the *Player*.

Such are my objections to the sense hitherto given to this passage, and my reasons for thinking, that its meaning may have been mistaken. I abandon them, without reserve, to the judgment of the learned reader: in my own, it is impossible for me to confide, when I reflect, that the whole band of commentators, who have preceded me, have acquiesced, without doubt or scruple, in that interpretation which to me appears so unsatisfactory.

N O T E 139.

P. 98. GREAT NATURAL QUICKNESS OF PARTS——.

Ευφυες ἢ ποιητικὴ ἔστιν——. Ευφυΐα—ΟΞΥΤΗΣ. *Hesychius*. See also Casaub. upon Athenæus, p. 454, and Suidas, *voc.* Ευφυα, and Ευφυΐα, where the passage he quotes from *Alex. Aphrod.* shews

* It is somewhat in favour of this interpretation, that it gives the adverb, ἀληθινωτατα, its most natural and obvious construction, with the verbs, χειμασθαι and χαλεπασθαι. As the passage is commonly understood, it must be joined with the *participles*.

what

what was the *common* idea of *ἔμφυια*, though its *propriety* is disputed. The *ἔμφυεις* were generally understood to be *οἱ ῥαδίως—μανθάνοντες, ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχοντες πρὸς πάντα τὰ μαθηματά, &c.* The passage seems to allude to *Ethic. Nicom.* III. 5. p. 113. *ed. Willk.*

No epithet can be more exactly adapted to the *ἔμφυης*, than that of *ἔμπλαστος*, which follows; a man of quick, *mimetic* parts, who can *turn himself*, as we say, *to every thing* with equal facility, and mould himself, without effort, to every form. But the word had considerable latitude, and would have been applied by the ancients, to the *genius* of a Shakspeare, the *talents* of a Foote^a, or the *docility* of a school-boy^b.

N O T E 140.

P. 98. OR, AN ENTHUSIASM ALLIED TO MADNESS——.

Ἡ *μανικὴ*.—My translation here will, I fear, be thought too paraphrastical. But this is one among many passages, that have occurred, where I have found it impossible to give, at the same time, *word for word*, and *idea for idea*. This, indeed, is the great misfortune of translation; for what Mr. Harris has observed is too true,—that “much of the force of the original will necessarily be lost in the translation, where *single* words in one language cannot be found corresponding to *single* words in the “other.”

^a Philip of Macedon would have caressed such a man as Foote. He delighted, we are told, ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἐτφύεσι καλεμένοις, καὶ τὰ γελοία λέγουσι καὶ ποιοῦσι. *Athen.* 260.

^b Πὰρὰ τῶν ἐτφύων, says Isocrates, speaking of scholars, δεῖ μὲγαν λαμβανεῖν μισθόν, ὅτι πολλα μανθάνουσι· παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἀφύων, ὅτι πολλὰς κοπὰς παρεχέσσι.—An admirable inscription for a school door.

^a *Philos. Arrang.* p. 211, *not.*

The word, *μανία*, wanted no explanation to Greek readers, to whom, from the writings of Plato, in particular, it was familiar to consider *enthusiasm* of every kind, as a species of *madness*. They would understand no more, from Aristotle's expression, than that *comparative* insanity which Cicero has so exactly expressed:—
 “Poetam bonum neminem—sine inflammatione animorum existere
 “posse, et sine quodam afflatu quasi furoris.”—But what can a mere modern reader think, when he is told, in Dacier's translation, that, to succeed in Poetry, “il faut avoir un genie excellent, ou
 “*etre FURIEUX?*”

Nor could I, without danger of confounding the philosopher's distinction, have rendered *ἐνθουσία* by the single word *genius*; which, as we usually apply it to the fine arts, implies much of that very warmth, and illusive power, of imagination, that “*inflammatione animorum*” which Aristotle meant to express by the other word, *μανία*.

I must not omit, that this whole passage receives considerable illustration from another, in the *Problems*, pointed out by Mr. Winstanley in his edition, p. 292^d.

If Aristotle had given any instance of the *μανία* among the Tragic Poets, it would, in all probability, have been Æschylus. It is pleasant to observe the appearance which the wild invention and ferocious sublimity of his PROMETHEUS, had to the eye of a French critic, of admirable good sense, indeed, but, *καρδία νηφοντα*. “Je crois,” says Fontenelle, “qu'Æschile étoit UNE MANIERE

^b See, particularly, the *Phædrus*, p. 244, 245, *ed. Serr.*—Aristotle himself, too, in his *Rhetoric*, says—*ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΟΝ γὰρ ἡ ποίησις*, III. 7. *ed. Duval.*—I cannot help just reminding the reader of the admirable humour with which Horace ridicules the *practical* abuse of this idea, in his *Art of Poetry*, v. 295—304.

^c *De Or.* II. 46.

^d P. 817, B. *ed. Duval.* Ὅστις δὲ μανὴν &c.—to *ἐνθουσία*, C. The reading, *ἐνθουσία*, instead of *ἐξέτασις*, if it stood in need of any confirmation, would be confirmed by this single passage beyond all doubt.

“DE FOU, qui avoit l’imagination très-vive, et pas trop réglée.” He would probably have said much the same of Shakspeare. The charge certainly cannot be retorted upon the French Tragic writers. It is related of the unfortunate Nat Lee, that, when he was in Bedlam, somebody had the inhumanity to tell him, it was a very easy thing to write like a madman. “No,” replied the Poet, “it is not an easy thing to write like a madman; but it is a very easy thing to write like a fool.” I believe these two things are almost equally difficult to our ingenious neighbours. It would be hard to detect Racine writing like a fool. But I confess I never read him without wishing he had written a little more like a madman. We must allow him much merit;—but he never “rolled his eye” in the “*fine phrensy*” of the Poet; he knew little of “*the tricks*” of “*strong imagination*.” The character given of him by Lord Kaims appears to me perfectly exact and just; that “he is always sensible, generally correct, never falls low, maintains a moderate degree of dignity without reaching the sublime, paints delicately the tender passions, but is a stranger to the genuine language of enthusiastic or fervid passion¹.”

I have often wondered, what it was that could attach Mr. Gray so strongly to a Poet whose genius was so little analogous to his own². I must confess I cannot, even in the *dramatic* fragment given us by Mr. Mason, discover any other resemblance to Racine, than in the *length* of the speeches. Its fault, indeed, is Racine’s; its beauties are, surely, of a higher order. What pity, that a work of genius, should have been smothered in its birth, by a little cold and trifling criticism!—We have, indeed, been told, that “it was *certainly* no loss to the English stage, that *Agrippina* was

¹ *Tome ix.* p. 415.—“Il me semble,” says this agreeable writer, “qu’il ne faut droit donner dans le sublime, qu’à son corps défendant.” [Preface to his *Hist. des Oracles*.] No wonder then, that he could not relish Æschylus.

² *Elements of Crit.* vol. i. p. 488.

³ See Letter xvi. Sect. 4, of the *Memoirs of Mr. Gray*.

“ never finished :” but we have been told it by the same critic who has pronounced, also, that the BARD of Gray, only “ *endeavour* at sublimity ;” who saw in the juvenile Poems of Milton “ no promise of Paradise Lost ;” and who has admitted, with seeming complacence, into the catalogue of English POETS, such names as *Blackmore*, *Kalden*, and *Pomfret*—

“ Alcandrumque Haliumque Noemonaque Prytanisque !” —

N O T E 141.

P. 98. WHEN THE POET INVENTS A SUBJECT—.

Here is a confusion of various readings, none of them, I think, free from suspicion. How the sense given to the passage by Victorius, and almost all the commentators, is *fairly* to be obtained from any of them, I confess, I never could see. I follow the common, and, in my opinion, the least suspicious, reading—*τις τε^a λογες τις πεποιημενες*—. And I understand Aristotle to speak of subjects, either wholly invented by the Poet, like the *Λυβ^o* of Agatho, or, having only some very slight and general foundation in history or tradition.—*Λογ^o*—the *general story*, or *argument*.—(*Λογ^o*—*Ἡ ΤΟΥ ΔΡΑΜΑΤΟΣ ΤΥΠΟΘΕΣΙΣ*. *Hejychius*.)—*ΚΑΙ αὐτον ποιεντα*,—because, I suppose, such *arguments* were commonly drawn up by *others*, probably in the *Διδασκαλιαι*, and, perhaps, prefixed to the copies of the play. But here, Aristotle—“ *etiam ipsum hoc facere jubet; quod novum erat, et inusitatum* :”—as the force of *ΚΑΙ ΑΤΤΟΝ* seems rightly explained by Victorius.

* *τις ΔΕ λογες*, which, according to VICTORIUS has MS. authority, would, perhaps, be preferable.

N O T E 142.

P. 99. WHEN HE HAS GIVEN NAMES TO HIS CHARACTERS——.

This seems to shew plainly, that by *λογας πεποιημενους* the critic means only such subjects as were of the Poet's own invention^a. For he says—*first*, form a general sketch of your fable; *then*, give names to your characters. This manifestly implies, that the names were not already fixed by history or tradition, but were at the Poet's choice. To avoid this difficulty, the Abbé Batteux translates, “on remet les noms^b.” But this, certainly, is not what Aristotle *says*; and it is too trifling, surely, to be what he *means*. If the names are given by the particular history which the Poet follows, what purpose will it answer to omit them in his plan?—They will certainly be in his mind; they may as well be upon his paper. In short, the method here recommended by Aristotle seems perfectly absurd and nugatory, upon any other supposition than that of a story, either wholly invented by the Poet, or, of which, at least, he owes only some slight hint to fact, and real life. In this case, and in this only, it is, that the subject *first* presents itself to the Poet's mind in a general and abstracted view, which he afterwards circumstantiates by time, place, and names, and fills up by the detail of particular episodes and scenes.

That this is the meaning, will appear, I think, still more clearly from the 9th chapter, with which this passage should be compared. What is *here* said of the method to be pursued by

^a As, *πεποιημενον ὄνομα*, cap. xxi. “a word of the Poet's invention.”—*πεποιημενα σημεια*—*πεποιημεναι ἀνσχηματισει*, cap. xvi. and, *πεποιημενα ὀνοματᾶ*, cap. ix. “names invented by the Poet.”

^b And, see his note, N^o 3, upon chap. xvi.—It is the explanation of Beni:—“jam nomina imponi jubet, non tam illa fingendo, quam reddendo.”

Tragic Poets, answers exactly to what is *there* said of the *Comic*: συζησαντες γαρ τον μυθον δια των ἐπισημων, ὍΤΤΩ ΤΑ ΤΥΧΟΝΤΑ ὄΝΟΜΑΤΑ ΕΠΙΤΙΘΕΑΣΙ;—with this difference, indeed, that the *Comic* writer may give whatever names he pleases; while the *Tragic* generally adopts *historical* names, even when his subject is feigned. Yet Aristotle, there, not only allows that *Tragedy*, as well as *Comedy*, may be *all* invention, both plot and names, but even says, that it would be “*ridiculous*” to think otherwise: γελοιον τετο ζητων. And he immediately adds, that it is the *invention* or *making* of his *fable*, (not of his *verse* only,) that truly constitutes the *Poet*°.

N O T E 143.

P. 99. THAT THE EPISODES BELONG PROPERLY TO THE SUBJECT—.

See NOTE 37.—Here are two instances given by Aristotle of what he means by ἐπεισοδια in dramatic Poetry. They confirm, I think, what was said in that note. That Orestes should be *taken*, *by some means or other*, and should, by some means or other, be *saved*, were essential parts of the Poet’s fable. *These* were not episodes, in Aristotle’s view; for he expressly includes them both in that general sketch of the story, which is previous to the intertexture of the episodes:—ἐλθων δε και ΛΗΦΘΕΙΣ—and, ἐντευθεν δε η̄ ΣΩΤΗΡΙΑ. The *episodes* are the circumstances by which the Poet chose to effect this *capture*, and this *escape*; i. e. the *madness* of Orestes, and the *ablution* of the statue; or rather, these facts drawn out into some particularity of descriptive narration, so as to form distinct, though subordinate, parts of the action; for this, perhaps, made a part of Aristotle’s idea of ἐπεισοδιον.—And the

° Cap. ix.—Transl. Part II. Sect. 6.

examples here given seem to confirm this. See the *Iphig. in Tauris*, v. 260, to 340.—v. 1153, &c.—And, particularly, the narration of the ἀγγελῶν, v. 1327, &c.

From the very observation, that these episodes should be *properly related to the subject*^a, and from what he adds of the difference of dramatic and epic episodes in point of *length*, it clearly appears, that, as I observed in the note referred to, the word is not applied to Tragedy in a *different sense* from that in which it is applied to the Epic Poem.

N O T E 144.

P. 99. BUT IN THE EPIC THEY ARE THE MEANS OF DRAWING OUT THE POEM TO ITS PROPER LENGTH.

Ἡ δ' ἐποποιῖα τέτοις μηκνεται.—Compare cap. xxiv. Ἐχει δὲ πρὸς το ἔπεκτενεσθαι, κ. τ. αλ.—το, ἐπεισοδίοις.

N O T E 145.

P. 99. THE GENERAL STORY OF THE ODYSSEY—LIES IN A SMALL COMPASS.

Μικρῶν, (instead of μακρῶν,) has now the support of a manuscript. See, *ed. Ox.* 1780, with the learned editor of which I perfectly agree. Λογῶν is plainly used here in the same sense as before, for the general argument, or summary, of the Poem: whereas, if we read μακρῶν, it *can* mean only the *entire* story at full length, with all its episodes. Farther; the epitome of the *Odyssey* which fol-

^a They could not therefore be considered by Aristotle as "*parties nécessaires de l'action*," according to Le Bossu's definition, lib. ii. ch. 6.

lows, is evidently the exemplification of the preceding assertion, that the story of the *Odyssey*, stripped of its episodes, is very *short*.

Homer himself has given us a still more general outline of the Poem in two lines and a half;—*συναψιν πασης της Οδυσειας*, as the scholiast has observed upon it :

Φην, κακα πολλα παθοντ', ὄλεσαντ' ἀπο παντας ἑταιρους,
 Αγνωσον παντεςσιν, ἕκκοσῳ ἑνιαυτῳ,
 Οκαδ' ἔλευσεσθαι.—

Od. B. 174.

—where, *ὄλεσαντ' ἀπο παντας ἑταιρους*, is equivalent to Aristotle's *μονε ἄντ*.

N O T E 146.

P. 99. PERSECUTED BY NEPTUNE——.

ΠΑΡΑΦΥΛΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΥ ὑπο τε Ποσειδανῶ.—The same idea is thus expressed by Virgil :

—— *nec Teucris addita Juno*
Usquam aberit. *Æn. VI. 90.*

—upon which passage the reader will find an excellent and useful note in the best of all editions of this Poet, that of Heyne.

Horace comes still nearer to the word *παραφυλαττεσθαι* :

Incontinentis nec Tityi jecur
Relinquit ales, nequitiae ADDITUS
CUSTOS. *Lib. III. Ode iv.*

N O T E 147.

P. 99. AND MAKING HIMSELF KNOWN TO SOME OF HIS FAMILY——.

Αναγνωρισας τινας, αυτοις ἐπιθεμεν——. This is all very strange, and, probably, very corrupt; as may appear, merely from the awkward and cacophonous repetition of the pronoun—ΑΥΤΟΣ ἀφινεται----ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ἐπιθεμεν, ΑΥΤΟΣ μεν ἐσωθη.

And what is, ἀναγνωρισας τινας?—Certainly, not what one expects. Ulysses, we know, was *discovered* by the nurse, and *discovered himself* to Eumæus, and the herdsman, and to Telemachus; but I do not recollect that he *discovers* any one. Castelvetro saw this; and he says, that “ὀνειων is to be understood; and that the signification “of the word ἀναγνωρισας here must be observed, which is, not “that Ulysses *discovered* any of his friends, but that he *made himself known to them*.” But we have no authority, that I know of, for *this* use of ἀναγνωρίζω with an accusative case. Piccolomini, too, understands this passage as Castelvetro did—“*datosi* “*à conoscere ad alcuni.*” And the Abbé Batteux—“*se fait recon-* “*noître,*” &c.

But what, again, is, αυτοις ἐπιθεμεν?—Does αυτοις refer to the *friends*, or to the *enemies*, of Ulysses?—Is ἐπιθεμεν, *deceiving, imposing on*, as it is rendered by Victorius, and others after him, or, as others understand it, *attacking*? for it will bear either of these senses. I have preferred the latter as most obvious, and, on the whole, most to the purpose. *Επιτιθεμενοι* is used by Aristotle in this sense, *Rhet.* II. 5. It generally, I believe, implies an attack more or less *insidious*, such as that of Ulysses upon the suitors. The scholiast upon Homer, *Od.* γ. 156, observes, that a day of

^a P. 382.

festivity was made choice of, as furnishing a favourable opportunity of attacking the suitors: *ἵνα τῶν ἀνδρῶν περὶ τὴν ἑορτὴν καταγινόμενων, ἔγκαιρον ἔχη το* ΕΠΙΤΙΘΕΣΘΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΜΝΗΣΤΗΡΣΙ.

N O T E 148.

P. 100. I CALL COMPLICATION, ALL THAT IS BETWEEN THE BEGINNING OF THE PIECE, AND THE LAST PART, &c.

Aristotle is here, as usual, very short and dry in the information he bestows upon us concerning this *δεσις* and *λυσις*. I wish he had given us a definition of their *meanings*, instead of a mere designation of their *places*. One would suspect, on the first view, from the mention of a change *εἰς ἐντυχίαν only*, (in which reading all the MSS. I think, agree,) from his *injunctio*, (if it be the same Tragedy as he before cited, *cap.* xi.) and from the *common* acceptation of the word *λυσις* itself, that he was speaking only of those Tragedies in which the principal characters are extricated from the difficulties they were involved in, and the end is happy. And, indeed, the way in which Le Bossu, and others after him, explain this *nœud* and *denouement*, leads naturally to this idea, and seems hardly consistent with their allowing, as they do, that the *denouement* may be *either* calamitous or prosperous*. For they explain the *nœud*, or *δεσις*, by “*obstacles à vaincre*”^b—“*efforts contraires—*” “*i. e. aux efforts du héros pour l'exécution de son dessein*.”^c—“*Les* “*obstacles présentés s'appellent nœuds, et la manière dont on les* “*force, se nomme, denouement*.”^d—This will do very well for *Aeneas*, or *Ulysses*. But when *Oedipus* finds himself guilty of

* Le Bossu, *Traité du Poème*, Ep. II. 16.

^b Batteux's note on this passage.

^c *I. e.* Bossu, II. 13.

^d Batteux, *Principes de la Lit.* tome ii. p. 226.

parricide and incest, and, from a state of regal dignity and happiness, becomes a wretched, blind, and banished vagabond—this is but a strange way of *surmounting obstacles*.

The truth is, that the obstacles of the *δραμα*, or the *knot*, are those which are presented to the *mind* of the *spectator*; the difficulty overcome is that of *seeing how the piece will terminate*. And thus, indeed, the Abbé Batteux more accurately expresses himself elsewhere:—“*Le nœud dans le Cinna est, de sçavoir si Cinna tuera Auguste,*” &c.^e. The *λυσις* is, to the *spectator*, the solution of the problem, “*How will all this end?*” And we may add, the more difficult the problem, the greater the pleasure of the solution.

It may be objected, that this is applicable only to those Tragedies, the subjects of which are totally unknown to the *spectator*; and it may be asked, “*Where is the problem to be solved, in those dramas, which we have repeatedly seen and read, and of which we are perfectly acquainted with the catastrophe, and every incident that leads to it?*” To this I can only answer, that it is a fact, and certainly a curious fact, that it makes little difference, or none at all, in the sympathetic interest which a *spectator* feels during the course of the action, whether he knows, or does not know, beforehand, how the piece will end. “*Quelque prévenu que l’on soit de la manière dont tout va se résoudre, la marche de l’action en écarte la réminiscence: l’impression de ce que l’on voit empêche de réfléchir à ce que l’on sçait; et c’est par ce prestige que les spectateurs qui se laissent toucher, pleurent vingt fois au même spectacle.*—[Marimontel, *Poet. Franc.* ii. 220.]

The term *λυσις*, therefore, is as applicable to the calamitous catastrophe of the *Oedipus*, as to the satisfactory conclusion of the *Iphigenia in Tauris*. For Aristotle expressly gives these parts,

^e Princip. de la Lit. tome iii. p. 51. And so, too, Le Bossu, where he says of the *nœud*, that it lasts “*autant de temps que l’esprit du lecteur est suspendu sur l’événement de ces efforts contraires,*” &c. *ib.* xiii. Dacier, too, talks in the same equivocal language. See his notes, 1, 2, and 3.

as parts of every Tragedy. Εἰ δὲ ΠΑΣΗΣ τραγωδίας, το μὲν, δεσῖς, το δὲ, λυσις.

N O T E 149.

P. 100. THE LYNCEUS OF THEODECTES—.

Castelvetro has *guessed*, with some ingenuity, the subject and plot of this Tragedy, from Hyginus, Fab. 45. See Goulston's supplemental version, which is taken from him. It seems, however, very improbable, that a Tragedy should be denominated from a person who had no other share in the action, than that it passed under his roof.

Dacier understands this to be the *Lynceus* mentioned before, cap. xi. All I see is, that his application of the word, *παιδιον*, to *Lynceus* the *husband* of Hypermnestra, cannot be admitted. The diminutive *παιδιον*, is, I believe, never used but to signify a *child*. In this respect, certainly, Castelvetro's conjecture has greatly the advantage; as it has, also, in the explanation of *ἀτιμωσις τε θανάτου*, which, in Dacier, is terribly forced. See his version.

N O T E 150.

P. 100. THERE ARE FOUR KINDS OF TRAGEDY, DEDUCIBLE FROM SO MANY PARTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED.

It is incumbent on a commentator to state, as clearly as he can, the difficulties of his author, whether he be able to remove them, or not. This has not been done with respect to this passage, in any of the comments that I have seen,

Aristotle

Aristotle says, Τραγωδίας δὲ εἶδη εἰσι τεσσαρεσὶ τσσαυτα ΓΑΡ καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐλεχθη. “There are four species of Tragedy; *for* so many “also are the *parts* which have been mentioned.” This is saying, as expressly as words can say it, that the four different *species* of Tragedy correspond to, and, of course, arise from, four different *parts* already mentioned. Now what are those parts? *Four* parts of *quantity* have indeed been mentioned; (cap. xii.) but these are quite out of the question. If we have recourse to what are called the parts of *quality*^a, these are *six*; and if, with Dacier, we reduce them to *four*, by throwing out the *decoration* and the *music*, the four that remain, i. e. *fable*, *manners*, *sentiments*, and *dic-tion*, will furnish out, among them, only *one* of the species of Tragedy enumerated—that which is denominated ἡθικη. These, then, cannot be the *four parts* pointed at as the foundation of the four species. There remain only the parts which Aristotle calls μέρος ΜΥΘΟΥ: the parts, not of Tragedy, but of *one* of the *essential parts* of Tragedy—the *Fable*. These he enumerated in the 11th chapter^b, and to these, the commentators, in general, are agreed in understanding Aristotle to allude.

But the difficulty here is, that he refers to *four parts mentioned*, and here are only *three*—i. e. περιπέτεια, ἀναγνωρισίς, (which he expressly calls δύο μύθε μέρος,) and, *thirdly*, πάθος: ΤΡΙΤΟΝ δὲ, πάθος.—There is no mention of ἠθικη, to furnish his third species, the *moral* Tragedy; nor, indeed, was it, by any means, to be expected there, where he is professedly enumerating the parts of the *Fable*. Πάθη, in the sense in which the word is there used^c, may, unquestionably, be considered as parts of the *Fable*; ἡθικη, or manners, cannot.

^a Cap. vi. Transl. Part II. Sect. 2.

^b Transl. Part II. Sect. 9, at the end.

^c Πάθος, in its usual sense, of *passion*, is a part, not of the μύθος, but of the Διαιρεσις. (See cap. xix. Transl. Part II. Sect. 22.) But, in the sense defined cap. xi. (Transl. Part II. Sect. 9.) it is an *action*—ΠΡΑΞΙΣ φθαρτικη, &c. and, therefore, part of the *plot*, or συνθεσις πραγμάτων, as much as the revolution, and discovery.

The Abbé Batteux thinks the *etlic* species is tacitly implied, as the opposite, or negative, of the *pathetic*. The three parts of the fable, περιπέτεια, ἀναγνωρισίς, παθῶν, give, *directly*, only two species of Tragedy; the two first constituting, (one, or both of them,) the *complicated*, (πεπλεγμένην,) and the third, the *pathetic*, or *disastrous*, Tragedy. The two other species are only the negatives of these. If the fable is *without* revolution or discovery^d, the Tragedy is *simple*, as opposed to *complicated*; if, *without* παθῶν, or disasters, it is ἡθικῆ, as opposed to παθητικῆ.—Such is the explanation of this ingenious writer^e; which seems to be much favoured by the manner in which these species are arranged afterwards, when applied to *Epic* Poetry in *cap.* xxiv.; where we have—ἡ γὰρ ἈΠΛΗΝ ἢ ΠΕΠΛΕΓΜΕΝΗΝ,—ἡ ΗΘΙΚΗΝ ἢ ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΗΝ, δεῖ εἶναι; and, also, by the frequent opposition of παθῶν and ἡθῶν, παθητικὸν and ἡθικόν, in antient writers^f.—It may, indeed, be objected, that this cannot be reconciled to Aristotle's words—τοσαυτὰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔΛΕΧΘΗ; which seem to refer clearly to four parts that had been all expressly *mentioned*. But, if we should suppose Aristotle here to consider that as said, which was only implied, and as explained, which was only hinted, we should, perhaps, take no liberty that is not warranted by the magisterial and elliptic brevity of his general style, and even by similar instances in his writings^g. But even this will not entirely remove the difficulty, while, by the

^d — ἌΝΕΥ περιπέτειας ἢ ἀναγνωρισίως, as he says above, in defining the *simple* fable. *Cap.* x.

^e See his note; and his *Principes de la Lit.* tome iii. p. 84.

^f See, for instance, *Rhet.* III. 17. *Quintil.* VI. 2, p. 299, 300, *ed. Giff.* &c.—I am aware, indeed, that in this opposition, παθῶν is not taken in the dramatic sense, of blood shed, disasters, &c. but in the usual sense of *passion*. But as this sense is, in fact, involved in the former, (for we can scarce conceive a disastrous, or, as we call it, a *deep*, Tragedy, that is not also highly *pathetic*, or *passionate*,) this is not, perhaps, any material objection.

^g His references are frequently obscure, or ambiguous. So, the καβατέρεινται, *cap.* xv. see NOTE 83. And the, ὡσπερ εἰρηται, *cap.* xv. see NOTE 110.—An embarassment of enumeration somewhat similar to that of this passage has occurred in *cap.* xv. see NOTE 105.

parts alluded to, we understand Aristotle to mean only the *μερη μυθε* of the 11th chapter: because *ἡθο*, as I before observed, could be neither mentioned, nor implied, as a part of the *fable*. Perhaps, therefore, he meant to use the word *μερη* in a *general* sense, as he clearly does use it, cap. xxiv. *και τα ΜΕΡΗ, ἔξω μελ. και ὀψεως, τ'αυτα' και ΓΑΡ περιπετειων δει, κ. τ. αλ.*—where the *και ΓΑΡ* shews, that the *parts* he had just mentioned included *both* the six constituent parts of Tragedy, and the three *parts of the fable* which he enumerates. If we understand *μερη* in this way, the meaning will only be, that so many different *parts*, (of one kind or other,) have been mentioned (*ἐλεγχθη*,) from which these species may be deduced: these are, the *three μερη μυθε*, which furnish the *complicated*, the *simple*, and the *pathetic*, species; and the *second* of the essential parts of Tragedy, *ἡθο*, which, though indeed it be a part of every Tragedy, admits, according to Aristotle's own account, of more or less^h, and, when predominant, may be characteristic of another species, the *ethic*, or *moral* Tragedy, naturally enough opposed to the *pathetic*.

I confess I see no other possible consistent sense that can be given to this passage, as we now read it: for *four* parts are here mentioned; and *four* parts cannot be made out, if we confine ourselves to the *μερη ΜΥΘΟΥ* in cap. xi.

Dacier seems to have perceived this; and his explanation agrees so far with mine, that he, also, makes “*la peripetie, la reconnoissance, la passion, et les mœurs*,” the four parts that produce the four sorts of Tragedy. But when, in order to reduce the *seven* parts, (i. e. *fable, manners, diction, sentiments, discovery, revolution, disasters*,) to the *four* which he wants, he rejects three, i. e. *fable, diction, and sentiments*, because they are *common to all Tragedy*, he makes a distinction for which there seems to be no foundation; the *manners* being equally included by Aristotle among those parts which are expressly *ΠΑΣΗΣ τραγωδίας μερη*ⁱ. But, though all

^h Cap. vi.—ἀνε δε ἴσον γιναι' αὐ (ἰ. Τραγωδία) &c.

ⁱ Cap. vi.

these

these parts necessarily belong, in some degree or other, to every Tragedy, any one of them may be so predominant, as to characterize a Tragedy, and give it, if we please, a specific denomination. Thus, there may be, and there *is*, such a species as the *sentimental* Tragedy, of which, in the critic's language, το ὄλον ἢ Διαιονία:—another, of which the *language* may be the most striking character—ἢς το ὄλον ἢ Λεξις^k; and he himself speaks of a sort of Tragedy that might very well be denominated, ἢ Οπτικη^l, of which examples are not wanting on the modern stage. The Italian opera is a Tragedy, ἢς το ὄλον ἔστιν ἢ Μελοδοποιία.—But Aristotle's business was not to enumerate all the different species which want of taste or judgment might produce, but those only which were considered as legitimate, and such as sound criticism would approve. Hence, he has recourse, for the formation of the *four* regular and authorised species, only to the two *first* and most *important* of the six constituent parts of Tragedy—the FABLE, and the MANNERS.

But after all, when we have made the best we can of the text in this passage, we must allow, I believe, that it is more for the credit of Aristotle to suppose it faulty. And that it is so, I am the rather inclined to think, as one difficulty still remains. The expression—“there are *four* sorts of Tragedy; FOR *so many* parts “have been mentioned”—seems clearly to imply, not merely, that those four sorts are deducible, *in some way or other*, from those parts, but, as I at first observed, that they, *respectively*, arise from those parts, *each* of which produces its *correspondent* species of Tragedy. But this, as we have seen, is by no means the case. Of the four parts, only παθος, and ἦθος, produce directly their correspondent species, the παθητικη, and the ἠθικη. The other two

^k Of the first, Mr. Harris gives *Measure for Measure* as an instance; of the last, *Cato*.—*Philol. Inq.* p. 161.—But *Cato* seems rather a compound of the two species. Dr. Johnson, in his life of Addison, has more justly characterized it by—“just *sentiments* in elegant *language*.”

^l See *cap.* xiv. *Transl.* Part II. *Sect.* 13.

parts, περιπετεια, and ἀναγνωρισις, denominate *one* species from their presence, (the πεπλεγμενη,) and another, (the ἀπλη,) from their absence.

N O T E 151.

P. 100. ANOTHER, THE MORAL——.

ἠθικη.—“ Videant studiosi hujus libri, an intelligi debeant, et “ tanquam ἀπο κοινης repeti, et hic et infra, verba illa quæ in expli- “ catione fabulæ *implexæ* posuit: intelligo, inquam, hæc—ἥς το ὄλον “ ἔσιν: et quod præterea utroque loco convenit, inde sumptum, “ [i. e. παθῶ—ἠθῶ] ut, quemadmodum inquit in describendâ illâ “ perplexâ—ἥς το ὄλον ἔσι περιπετεια και ἀναγνωρισις,—ita, in *patheticâ*, “ —ἥς το ὄλον ἔσι παθη; et in *moratâ*, ἥς το ὄλον ἔσιν ἠθη.” So Victo- rius; and the observation seems just and important.

By ἠθικη, I cannot think, that the mere absence of παθη is meant, as M. Batteux supposes^a, or, as Dacier and others take it, the mere *moral tendency* of the example. I understand the τραγωδία ἠθικη to be, in the most obvious and usual sense of the word, that kind of Tragedy, ἥς το ὄλον ἔσιν ἠθη—of which the *manners* are the predominant part; which seems sufficiently to imply the absence of that violent perturbation, deep distress, and terrible catastrophe, which distinguish the *pathetic* species. This obvious sense of ἠθικη is confirmed by Aristotle’s exemplification in *cap.* xxiv. For there, he plainly opposes it to the παθητικον of the Iliad, and applies it to the Odyssæy; a poem eminently characterized as a picture of life and *manners*^b. The word is also used, evidently, in the same sense in the *Rhetoric*; where the two species of the drama, ἠθικον, and παθη-

^a “ La fable morale, opposée à la *Pathétique*, doit être celle où il n’ y a point de sang “ répandu; telles sont le Cinna de Corneille, et la Berenice de Racine.”—*Principes de la Lit.* iii. p. 85.

^b See Longinus, *Secl.* 9, *ad finem*.

τιζον, are mentioned, as being, each of them, accommodated to *action*, and preferred, on that account, by the players, as peculiarly favourable to the display of their mimetic powers^c. Now this would not be the case, if by *ἠθικη* nothing more than a moral lesson and a virtuous example were intended. Yet this idea is by no means excluded by the other; and Victorius seems to have rightly adjusted this matter. “Animadvertendum autem Tragœdiam illam
 “vocari *moratam*, quæ non solum accuratè mores exprimit, sed eos
 “etiam inducit *probos*; quod ipse significavit supra, ubi de moribus
 “differuit; primum enim præcepit ut *χρησα ἠθη* fingerentur.”

If it be objected, that, the delineation of *manners* being the peculiar province of *Comedy*, this account of the *Τραγωδία ἠθικη* confounds the limits of these two opposite species of the drama; we may answer, that the *moral*, or rather *mannered* Tragedy, (for we seem to want a word here,) though allowed by Aristotle, was certainly not that which he himself considered as the best, or the most *Tragic*^d: yet, that even this was sufficiently distinguished from *Comedy* by the *kind* of manners which it imitated. They were to be, if possible, *good*, (*χρησα*),—at all events they were to be, on the whole, *serious*—*σπεδασι*: whereas the object of *Comedy*, with respect to manners, as to every thing else, was the *ridiculous*. We must remember too, that, as I have before observed, the two dramas were by no means, in Aristotle's time, so rigorously separated as they now are. There were, then, but two dramatic muses, the muse of *Tragedy*, and the muse of *Farce*. Yet there is something between a flood of tears and a broad laugh; and as *Farce* obstinately refused to put any degree of restraint upon her muscles, *Tragedy*, who, as we have seen, was so accommodating, as even, occasionally, to approach to the very laugh of *Farce*, frequently

^c — ἀγαπητή δέ, [sc. λέξις—*oratorical diction*] ἡ ὑποκριτικώτατη ταύτης δὲ δύο εἶδη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ, ΠΟΙΚΗ, ἡ δὲ, ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΗ. διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ ΤΟΙΑΥΤΑ ΤῶΝ ΔΡΑΜΑΤῶΝ διικνεῖσι, καὶ οἱ ποιῶσι τὰς ταύτης. [sc. ὑποκριτὰς.] *Rhet.* III. 12.

^d See *cap.* xiii. *Transl.* Part II. Sect. 12.

condescended to dry her tears, and to put on, without scruple, the intermediate *smile*, which *Comedy* should have supplied.

N O T E 152.

P. 100. AND, FOURTHLY, THE SIMPLE, SUCH AS-----
AND ALL THOSE TRAGEDIES, THE SCENE OF WHICH IS LAID
IN THE INFERNAL REGIONS.

Το δὲ τετάρτον, οἶον, αἴτε Φορκιδῆς, καὶ Προμηθεύς, καὶ ὅσα ἐν αἴδῳ—
The enumeration of these species in *cap.* xxiv. leaves no room to doubt the omission of the word ἈΠΛΟΤΝ here. Το δὲ τετάρτον, ἀπλῆν, οἶον, &c.

The commentators have been much puzzled to discover, why all those Tragedies, that have for their subject *τα ἐν αἴδῳ*, should be of the *simple* construction; and I have, indeed, been sometimes strongly inclined to believe, that the words, *καὶ ὅσα ἐν αἴδῳ*, were out of their place, and belonged to the *second* species; thus: ἡ δὲ Παθητικῆ, οἶον, οἵ τε Λιαντές, καὶ οἱ Ἰξιοῦες, καὶ ὅσα ἐν αἴδῳ. Why such subjects should belong to the *disastrous* class, no one can want a reason; and the words follow naturally, and pertinently, in this view, after the instance of *Ixion*. I have been surpris'd not to find so obvious a conjecture in any of the comments. Piccolomini, indeed, glances at it:—"Non sò vedere, perchè più tosto in effempio delle Tragedie *pathetiche*, che delle semplici, non le habbia poste; habbendo riguardo in ciò *alle puniton, e supplicii dell' inferno.*" p. 255. And it is very singular, that Dacier's note (N^o 10.) is exactly such, as if he had himself made this conjecture; of which, however, he says nothing. But, after all, it is obvious enough, as Beni has observed, that, in these *infernal* Tragedies, no *περιπετραίσι*, no *sudden reverse* of circumstances, could well have place. The comment of that acute Italian upon this passage, is the best I have seen, and will, perhaps, satisfy the reader, that no such conjecture is

wanted.—“ Clausula hæc sit ;—ex istiusmodi fabulis exemplum
 “ duxisse Aristotelem ad illustrandam *simplicem* fabulam, quòd cum
 “ illi [sc. Tantalus, Sisyphus, &c.] in eas pœnas atque tormenta,
 “ non à prosperitate, quemadmodum Oedipus et alii plerique,
 “ devolventur, sed ab initio ad finem usque illis jaçtarentur,
 “ *peripetia aberat quàm longissimè*. Imò verò, non modò repenti
 “ fortunæ commutatio haud fiebat, quod est proprium peripetiæ,
 “ verum etiam *mutatio in decursu toto fiebat levissima ac propè nulla* ;
 “ ita ut ab initio ad finem usque, mira *simplicitate* flueret fabula.
 “ Ex quo fiebat, ut commodiùs ex aliis, in quibus *repenti* vulnera,
 “ cruciatus, et cædes contingebant, *patheticæ* duceretur exemplum,
 “ quàm ex iis, quibus nullus *repenti* cruciatus infligebatur, et tamen
 “ *simplicitas* de quâ dicebam mirificè apparebat.”—*Benii Comment.*
p. 372.

As to the reading itself, *ἐν αἰδέ*, it seems to be sufficiently confirmed even by a collation of blunders; for the MSS. exhibit, *ἐν αἰδοι—ἐν αἰδ—ἐν αἰδε—ἐν αδέ*.

Victorius seems to doubt, I know not why, whether there existed any such Tragedies. The *Σισυφῶ Πετρουλισης* of Æschylus must, clearly, have been of this kind; and probably his *Ψυχαγωγοι*. His *Prometheus* may be conceived to come the *nearest* of any Greek Tragedy extant to a specimen of this kind of drama.—Dacier has very properly reminded us here of what Aristotle had said, *cap.* xiii. of the *old Poets*—that *τὰς τυχόντας μυθεσ ἀπηριθμεν*—i. e. they took, as we say, any subject that came uppermost.

N O T E 153.

P. 102. BUT IN THE DRAMA, THE EFFECT OF SUCH A PLAN IS FAR DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS EXPECTED.

Πολυ παρα την ὑποληψιν ἀποβαινει :—literally, “ it turns out very differently from what was expected, or supposed, by the Poet.”

The

The ὑποληψίς, the view, and expectation of the Poet, when he crowds so many incidents into his piece, is, that he shall make it interesting and pleasing by its *variety*. But the contrary happens. The necessity of not exceeding the usual length, and time of representation, reduces the proposed variety to a confused and huddled mass of incidents, not long enough dwelt on, or sufficiently detailed, to be either interesting, or clear. His Poem will be καταπεπλεγμενον τη ποικιλια, as the critic well expresses it in another passage that should be compared with this^a. Thus, the Poet, in this ill-judged attempt, is disappointed in the same manner as the architect, who aims at a beautiful *variety* by a multitude of small and crowded ornaments, which spoil the *general* effect, and, at the same time, are too many, and too minute, to afford pleasure by separate inspection. And thus, πολυ παρα την ὑποληψιν αποβαινει; or, as the ingenious author of the *Analysis of Beauty* has expressed the same idea, in a chapter which affords no bad illustration of this passage from a sister art, “*variety, when overdone, is a check upon itself*”^b.

Such appears to me to be the meaning of this passage, which, I think, has not been fully seen by any of the commentators.

^a Cap. xxiii. Transl. Part III. Sect. 1. “*perplexed by its variety.*”

^b Hogarth’s *Anal. of Beauty*, cap. viii.—a work, to which, with all its imperfections, I think it may fairly be said, that the public have not done full justice; perhaps, through the author’s own fault, who did it *more* than justice himself, by his pretensions. When Hogarth attempted to philosophize, he was lost. His meaning is often obscured by awkward expression, and sometimes seems, pretty plainly, not to have been well known even to himself. (See particularly his chap. on *Proportion*.) Yet the book abounds, I think, with sensible, useful, and, at the time it was written, I believe, *uncommon*, observations. The ideas of eminent artists, relative to their own arts, must always be, more or less, valuable and useful; and they ought not to be discouraged from communicating those ideas to the public, by criticism too severely exercised upon the *manner* in which they do it. A few ideas, even roughly thrown out, from an artist of genius, will often be of more utility to the progress of the art, than whole pages of fine writing and refined speculation from the unpractised *amateur*.

N O T E 154.

P. 102. AS EURIPIDES, BUT NOT ÆSCHYLUS, HAS DONE,
&c.

This passage affords a good specimen of the distressing ambiguity that prevails so remarkably throughout this work. It fairly admits of two different constructions, and two different senses*. It may be thus: ὅσοι περσιν ἰλιε ὄλην ἐποίησαν και μη κατα μερῶ, (ὡσπερ Ευριπιδης Νιοβην, ἢ Μηδειαν, και μη ὡσπερ Αισχυλῶ,) ἢ ἐκπιπτουσιν—κ. τ. αλ. Or thus: ὅσοι περσιν ἰλιε ὄλην ἐποίησαν,—και μη κατα μερῶ (ὡσπερ Ευρ. Ν. ἢ Μ. [ἴσ. κατα μερῶ ἐποίησε,] και μη ὡσπερ Αισχ. [ἴσ. ὄλην ἐποίησε.]) ἢ ἐκπιπ. κ. τ. αλ.—In the first of these ways, the censure will fall on Euripides; in the other, on Æschylus. Victorius contends for the first, but his reasons, though plausible, seem not decisive. The whole, as he observes, turns upon this—whether the ὡσπερ refers to the *whole* sentence—ὄλην ἐποίησαν και μη κατα μερῶ,—or, only to the words immediately preceding, i. e. κατα μερῶ. On the whole, the last construction, I think, offers itself most naturally; and it seems rather favoured, too, by the similar application of μη ὡσπερ, to the *Poet censured*, presently after; where, speaking of the Chorus, he says it should συναγωνιζέσθαι, ΜΗ ὩΣΠΕΡ παρ' Ευριπιδῆ, ἀλλ' ὩΣΠΕΡ παρα Σοφοκλει.—But this, after all, is one of those passages, where the “*æquato examine lances*” are so nicely balanced, that a commentator might continue in suspense for ever, if the necessity of going on did not oblige him to turn the scale by a touch of his own hand.

* Dacier's interpretation (*note* 19.) I pass over as perfectly inadmissible. This forced construction he borrowed from Castelvetro, p. 398.

N O T E 155.

P. 102. FOR, IN REVOLUTIONS, AND IN ACTIONS OF THE SIMPLE KIND, THESE POETS SUCCEED WONDERFULLY IN WHAT THEY AIM AT; AND THAT IS, THE UNION OF TRAGIC EFFECT WITH MORAL TENDENCY, &c.

Those annotators who make the words, Ἐν δὲ ταῖς περιπέτειαις—the beginning of a separate precept relative to the use of the wonderful, have the natural construction of the text, and the uniform reading of all the MSS. against them. The natural and obvious construction, surely, is, ἐν τετῶ μόνῳ· ἐν Δὲ ταῖς περ.—κ. τ. αλ. And this is also confirmed by the mention of Agatho again, presently afterwards. All the MSS. too, it seems, give θαυμασως, which can never be forced into the sense of “*per admirabile*.” The alteration proposed by Heinfius—στοχαζέται, and βελεται—in order to make this refer exclusively to Agatho, seems unnecessary. Στοχαζονται refers, very naturally, to Agatho in conjunction with the other Poets just mentioned, whose mistake, and whose failure, were the fame.

I have ventured to render this passage in a manner somewhat different from any translator or commentator that I have seen^b. Τραγικὸν γὰρ τετο, καὶ φιλανθρωπὸν. The question is, to what τετο refers? The commentators are divided. It appears to me, that it refers to the *purpose*, at which these Poets are said to have aimed; and the τετο, which follows, explains the τραγικὸν καὶ φιλανθρωπὸν.—Τετο ΓΑΡ—“*for* this (i. e. which they aim at,) is both Tragic and Moral.” The reader will see how exactly what

^a Yet so Mr. Winstanley seems to understand it. See his note, p. 294. If there are any examples of the *adverb θαυμασως* so used, I could wish he had produced them.

^b The best comment is that of Benius, p. 379.

follows

follows suits this sense; and how this passage helps to confirm the sense given to the word φιλανθρωπον, in cap. xiii. [See NOTE 94.] where, ἐλεεινον και φοβερον, is plainly equivalent to τραγικον here. The difficulty was, to reconcile these two effects. Aristotle's expression, στοχαζονται ΘΑΥΜΑΣΤΩΣ — “surprisingly well” — implies this difficulty, and, that he does not speak of the practice as perfectly agreeable to his own theory of the Tragic drama. — In the subjects here instanced, there was the φιλανθρωπον, because the ἀδικια and πονηρια were punished: and, at the same time, the τραγικον, though not amounting to what the critic required, was not wanting, because there was the *un-expected reverse of fortune*, a calamitous event, παθη, &c.^c. The persons suffering, too, were distinguished by eminent *wisdom* and *courage*; and though such characters are not what Aristotle recommends as the fittest for *Tragic* purposes^d, yet, by the substitution of admirable and splendid, for moral and estimable, qualities, they are made to produce, in some degree, a similar effect upon the spectator.

This appears to me to be the sense of the passage; and it leads me strongly to suspect, that, instead of ἐν τοις ἈΠΛΟΙΣ πράγμασι, we should read—ἐν τοις ΔΙΠΛΟΙΣ πρ. How easily the mistake might happen, is obvious to the eye. My reasons are these: 1. The φιλανθρωπον.—moral tendency—poetical justice, &c. was the *very* characteristic of the *double* fable, (διπλη συζασις) and the *very* reason, probably, why the Platonic critics, as well as the good-natured audiences, preferred it as the *best* plan^e. 2. The instances here given seem to accord exactly with this idea. They are plainly examples of the διπλη συζασις, not of the *simple* fable—i. e. *the fable without revolution or discovery*. The expression, τραγικον

^c ἢ τραγικον, ΑΠΛΘΕΣ γαρ, cap. xiv. “*not Tragic*, because it exhibits *no disastrous* event.” Transl. Part II. Sect. 14.

^d See cap. xiii. ὁ μεταξὺ, &c. Transl. Part II. Sect. 11.

^e See cap. xiii. Transl. Part II. Sect. 12. *last* parag.

γὰρ τῆτο καὶ φιλανθρωπον, implies, that the *Tragic and Moral* were aimed at, and effected, by these Poets, *both* in the περιπετεῖαι, and in the *other* actions mentioned, whatever they were—ἐν τοῖς περιπ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς—πραγμασι: and, consequently, his subsequent examples of the τραγικὸν καὶ φιλανθρωπον must equally accord with *both*. But, if we read ἀπλοῖς, this will not be the case; for those examples are such as necessarily imply *revolutions*, and a *sudden and unexpected turn of events*, which suit very well with ΔΙΠΛΟΙΣ πραγμασι, but are incompatible with ἀπλοῖς; the *simple* fable being defined by this very circumstance, that it is ἀνευ περιπετείας, &c. (cap. x.)

N O T E 156.

P. 102. SUCH EVENTS, AS AGATHO SAYS, &c.

This alludes to these two lines of Agatho:—

Ταχ' ἂν τις ἐκεῖ αὐτο τὰτ' εἶναι λεγοί,
Βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν ἐκ ἐικότα.

Even *this*, it may be said, is *probable*,
That many things *improbable* should happen,
In human life.—

See *Rhet.* II. 24, p. 581, *ed. Duval*.—And Bayle's Art. AGATHON, note [F], who mentions a similar maxim of St. Bernard's: "Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinatè fieri." "Il est tout à fait de l'ordre, que de tems en tems il se fasse quelque chose contre l'ordre."

This general, and, if I may call it so, *possible* sort of *probability*, may be termed, *the probability of romance*; and these lines of Agatho furnish a good apologetical motto for the novel writer. It might be prefixed, perhaps, without impropriety, even to the best productions of the kind—to a CLARISSA, or a CECILIA. Nothing is so commonly complained of in such works, as their *improbability*;
and

and often, no doubt, the complaint is well founded: often, however, the criticism means nothing more, than that the events are *uncommon*, and proves nothing more, than the want of fancy, and an extended view of human life, in the reader. If the events were *not* uncommon, where would the book find readers?

“ Si la nature ne combinoit jamais des evenemens d’une maniere extraordinaire, tout ce que le Poete imagineroit au-delà de la simple et froide uniformité des choses communes, seroit incroyable. Mais il n’en est pas ainsi. Que fait donc le Poete? — Ou il s’empare de ces combinaisons extraordinaires, ou il en imagine de semblables. Mais au lieu que la *liaison* des evenemens nous échappe souvent dans la nature, et que, faute de connaître l’ensemble des choses, nous ne voyons qu’une concomitance fatale dans les faits; le *Poet* veut lui qu’il regne dans toute la texture de son ouvrage une liaison apparente et sensible; en sorte qu’il est *moins vrai, et plus vraisemblable que l’historien.*” — Diderot, De la Poes. Dram. at the end of his *Pere de Famille*, p. 306.

N O T E 157.

P. 102. THE CHORUS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS ONE OF THE PERSONS IN THE DRAMA—AND A SHARER IN THE ACTION.

This is not, I think, contradicted, but only properly limited and explained, by what the author says elsewhere—that, to *αἶ*, is, ἐκ ὀμίμου χορωῶν ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ χορὸς ΚΗΔΕΥΤΗΣ ΑΠΡΑΚΤΟΣ: εὐνοίαν γὰρ μόνον παρεχεται ὁὶς παρῆσι”, He is, there, comparing the Chorus with the *persons* of the drama. In that view, the Chorus might be said, comparatively, to have *no share in the action*.—But *here*, he is comparing those Choruses whose songs are properly connected

^a Prob. 49, of *Sett.* 19.

with the action, and who are interested in its event, with such as appear to have no concern with it, and to be, not merely inactive, but *indifferent*, spectators. In this view, it was as natural to say—the Chorus should be regarded as a *person* of the drama, and a sharer in the action: a sharer, that is, not by the *active part*, but by the warm interest, which it takes, and expresses, in that action. However, the word ἀπραγῆ must not be taken in its strictest sense. We find the Chorus, in the Greek Tragedies, frequently contributing, in some little degree, to the progress of the action, by *active* offices of friendly attention and assistance; as, for example, in the *Philætetes*, and the *Ajax* of Sophocles.

N O T E 158.

P. 103. THEIR CHORAL SONGS, &c.

There cannot, surely, be the least doubt, that, for ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝΑ, we should read, ΑΙΔΟΜΕΝΑ: an emendation so obvious, that it occurred to me the first time I ever read the passage. But I afterwards found, that it had occurred, long ago, to Madius; a circumstance, which, to my great astonishment, has been passed over in utter silence by all the subsequent commentators that I have seen. The words of Madius are—“Mendum igitur in “verbis omnino esse censeo; ac primum in voce *διδόμενα*, quæ in “*locum vocis αἰδομένα irrepsit*: nam verbum *εἶδεν*, quod paulò post “ponitur, aperte indicat, locum, ut nos fecimus, castigandum.”—I can attribute it only to some inadvertence, or mistake, that Mr. Winstanley, in his note, p. 294, has omitted to take notice of this most material part of Madius’s comment on the passage. The emendation is confirmed by the εἶδεν, and αἶδεν, which follow; by the extreme facility of the mistake, and by the difficulty of giving any reasonable explanation of the other reading. *Διδόμενα*, says Victorius, “quia magistratus eos (sc. *choros*) dabat.” But he

agrees that *μελη* is understood; and though we read, often, of the magistrate's *giving a Chorus*, (*δεναι χορον*,) that is, furnishing the expence of the choral dresses, &c. we no where read, I believe, of their *giving the Choral Odes*.

N O T E 159.

P. 103. BUT IT IS EVIDENT, THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE THINGS THEMSELVES ALSO, &c.

Και ἐν τοῖς πραγμασι. The alteration of Heinsius, *δραμασιν*, appears to me, not only to be unnecessary, but to pervert Aristotle's meaning. Τα πραγματα, here, are, I think, the *things themselves*—the circumstances and incidents of the action or fable, as opposed to *Διανοια*, the *sentiments*, or *thoughts*, and to *ὅσα ὑπο τε ΛΟΓΟΥ κ. τ. αλ.* He had referred to the rhetorical treatises for what concerns the *διανοια*; he goes on, (after a short explanation of *διανοια* and its various branches,)—"But it is plain, that, not only for the *διανοια*, or sentiments, but *also* for the *things themselves*, (ΚΑΙ ἐν τοῖς πραγμασι,) how they are to be made *terrible*, *pitious*, &c. the Poet should draw from the same sources, and may be referred to the same treatises."—Thus, for example, in the second book of Aristotle's Rhetoric, he may learn what sort of *things*, *persons*, and *events*, are proper to raise *terror*, or *pity*^a, the peculiar objects of Tragic imitation. After which observation, he goes on, very naturally and properly, to remark, as Dacier has well observed, "la *différence* entre les *choses* que traitent les Orateurs, et celles que traitent les Poetes."—For the rest, my idea of this passage accords with that of Dacier, (note 3); but he does not appear to have seen the force of the expression, ΚΑΙ ἐν τοῖς πραγ. Indeed, he entirely drops the conjunction, which is here of great

^a See particularly cap. v. and viii. ed. Duval.

importance;

importance; for it seems to fix the sense of *πραγμασιν*, and to point its opposition to *διανοια*:—Τα μὲν ἐν περὶ τὴν ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΝ ἐν τοῖς ῥήτ. κεισθω· — — — δὴλον δέ, ὅτι ΚΑΙ ἐν τοῖς ΠΡΑΓΜΑΣΙΝ ἀπο τῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι.—

In Goulston's version, which follows Castelvetro, this opposition is rightly expressed; but in what follows, Aristotle's meaning is, I think, mistaken: for the *difference* he is shewing, (*πλην τοσούτου διαφέρει, &c.*) is not, I apprehend, the difference between the *things* and the *sentiments, in Tragedy*, but, between the *things themselves only*, considered in different views, as the subject of the *Orator*, or of the *Poet*.—These commentators understand the expressions, ἐν τῷ λογῷ, and, τὰ λεγόντων, of the *dramatic* speech, and speaker.

N O T E 160.

P. 103. MUST DRAW FROM THE SAME SOURCES.—

—Απο τῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι.—The expression, *χρησθαι ΑΠΟ*, is, I believe, uncommon. It seems rightly explained by Victorius “—to borrow from:” —“*quasi utendum illinc sumere atque mutuari.*”

N O T E 161.

P. 103. WITHOUT BEING SHEWN TO BE SUCH.—

—Ανευ διδασκαλιας. “Senza che si dica e che s'insegnì che sian “tali.”—*Piccolomini*:—I believe, very exactly. The reader may compare *Rhet.* I. 2. p. 514, B.—and III. 1. p. 584, B. and, (*διδασκαλικη*), I. 2. p. 515, A.

The truth of what the philosopher here observes, may appear from this single consideration. Suppose two *Tragedies* written by two Poets on the same subject, and of which the plot and princi-

pal incidents are the same^a: and suppose two pleadings of the same *cause*, by two speakers. It seems very plain, that the difference of the effect upon an audience in the former case, would bear much less proportion to the difference between the *Poets*, than it would, in the other case, to the difference between the *Speakers*.

N O T E 162.

P. 104. IF THEY ALREADY APPEAR SO IN THEMSELVES.

—Εἰ φανωιτο ἡδεα.—That ἡδεα is wrong, I have no doubt. For if we admit it, we must take it, as Victorius does, for a single instance; as if Aristotle had said, “*aut jucundæ, aut tristes, aut atroces, &c.*--- : *quamvis enim nunc unum horum ponat, i. e. “jucunda, reliqua tamen audienda sunt.”*—But how improbable it is, that he should not chuse his single instance, if he meant to give one, out of those which had just been mentioned?—that he should not rather have said, εἰ φανωιτο ἔλθαι, ἢ δεινα, than ἡδεα, *jucunda*; which, besides, is evidently not at all to his purpose. I cannot, therefore, help thinking it something more than probable, that Aristotle wrote this, φανωιτο ΗΔΗ [*sc. τοιαυτα*—that is, ἔλθαι, δεινα, &c.)—“If they appear *already* so;—in *themselves*.” The elliptic brevity of the expression will hardly be objected to, in a writer who abounds with instances much more harsh and obscure than this. In the same manner, τοιαυτα is understood with φανωιτο just before:—τα μὲν δε φανωιτο (sc. τοιαυτα) ἀνευ διδασκαλιας.

The same conjecture had, I find, occurred, long ago, to Castelvetro, but, which I think somewhat singular, has not been taken

^a For example, the *Mercure* of Voltaire, and that of Aaron Hill. As *poems*, there can be no comparison between these two productions. But I doubt whether, in both, the same *style* has not always produced much the same effect upon the audience. This shews the truth and propriety of the rank which Aristotle assigns to the *style*, as the “*soul* of Tragedy.”

notice of by any of the commentators I have seen. He says—"ἐφαίνοιτο ἡδέα: coloro, li quali non riconoscono che qui sia errore, affègnino à queste parole, se possono, senso degno e conveniente ad Aristotele. Adunque io crederei che non fosse male à leggere ἡδη, in luogo d' ἡδέα, e' l' senso farebbe convenevole." [p. 406.]

The reader may see a very different explanation of this whole passage in the Abbé Batteux's notes; but an explanation which cannot, in my opinion, be reconciled to the text. His censure of Dacier and others, that they have rendered this chapter "à contrefens," seems to me to recoil upon himself.

N O T E 163.

P. 104. FIGURES OF SPEECH—.

—Τα σχήματα τῆς λέξεως—. Dacier, Batteux, and indeed almost all the commentators, seem to take *σχήματα*, here, for the *gestures*, modifications of countenance, and tones of voice, that *accompany* speech*. But, *first*, I much doubt whether the Greek will fairly admit of such a sense. Aristotle says, *σχήματα λέξεως*, figures, or forms, *of the speech itself*, not *of the speaker*. The same expression occurs several times in the *Rhetoric*, and always means the form of the diction itself; never the gesture with which it is delivered^a.—2. Aristotle explains himself by—*οἷον, τὶ ἐντολὴ καὶ τὶ ἐνχη*, &c. i. e. *what they are*, not, *what action or tone of voice they require*^b; "avec quel ton et quel geste on ordonne," as M. Batteux

* "Σχήματα vocat habitus quosdam, conformationesque oris, frontis, oculorum, vultus, gestulationis manuum," &c. Robertelli, p. 227.

^a Rhet. II. 24, p. 579. III. 8, p. 591, B. and 10, p. 594, B.—And *De Soph. Elench.* p. 284, D.

^b Had this been his meaning, he would rather have said *τὶ ἐντολῆς—τὶ ἐνχῆς*, &c.

unwarrantably translates it.—3. Aristotle says, that no blame, or none worth regarding, (ἀξίον σπεδῆς,) can fall upon *the Poetry*, (εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν,) in consequence of the Poet's ignorance of these matters, or of his not knowing them technically. A remark, surely, very unnecessary, if mere action and pronunciation were intended by σχήματα.—But, 4. The thing seems evident from the instance given of a criticism of this kind. Protagoras plainly charged Homer with ignorance, or inaccuracy, with respect to these σχήματα λεξέως, whatever they were. Now, according to the common explanation, the criticism could fall only on Homer's *pronunciation* or *action*: but, of this, Protagoras knew nothing; all he appears to have meant, is, that Homer had made an improper use of the *imperative mood*; that is, had used one σχήμα λεξέως, where he *should* have used another.

But *what*, then, *are* we to understand by these σχήματα λεξέως?—The learned reader will immediately see, that, as Victorius has observed, they are not to be confounded with those σχήματα λεξέως, of which we hear so much from Cicero, Quintilian, Dion. Hal. &c.—those “*figuræ verborum*,” which are opposed to the σχήματα διανοίας, the “*figuræ mentis, sententiarum*,” &c. Indeed, no such division of σχήματα is, I believe, to be found in Aristotle. It seems to have been the invention of the later Rhetoricians; and how little they were agreed, as to the number and the species of these σχήματα, the propriety of the division itself, and even the precise sense of the word σχήμα, may be seen in Quintilian IX. 1.—The σχήματα λεξέως of Aristotle, in this place, are plainly such, as would have been denominated by later writers, σχήματα διανοίας—figures of the *thought* or *sense*. Indeed we find them actually enumerated among the figures of that class. See *Dionysj. Halicarn. de Struct. &c. Sect. 8.*—So Quintilian; “*Figuras quoque mentis, quæ σχήματα διανοίας dicuntur, res eadem recipit omnes, in quas nonnulli dividerunt species dictorum, (i. e. of jokes, bons mots.)*”

“ Nam et *interrogamus*, et *dubitamus*, et *affirmamus*, et *minuamur*,
“ et *optamus*.”

I see, therefore, not the least reason, why the expression *σχημα λεξέως* should not be rendered here, exactly as in the other passages above referred to, “ *figura orationis*” — *form*, or *configuration*, of *speech*. For *λεξίς*, it must be observed, is here used, not in the particular sense of *diction*, or *style and manner of expression*, (as it is used *Rhet.* III. 8.) but in the general sense of *λόγος*, *speech*, as we find it used in the beginning of the next chapter.

But though I cannot admit, that *σχηματα* means “ *configurations oris*,” &c. or, should be so rendered, yet I certainly admit, that Aristotle appears plainly to consider these different forms of speech, or sentences, with a *view* to action, or delivery; and, possibly, the observation of Victorius may be well founded, that—
“ *vocatæ hæ figuræ ita videntur, quia aliter atque aliter vultus, totumque corpus, cum variantur illæ, conformantur; ut meritò hæc de causâ, σχηματα, figuræ, ipsæ appellatæ sint.*”—I find the same thing in the following passage of *Aristides Quintilianus*, which seems evidently to allude to this very part of Aristotle’s treatise, and may be thought to afford some illustration.—Περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν ΣΧΗΜΑΤΩΝ φύσεως, οἷς προσάγειν χρὴ τὰ νοήματα, ἔ πολλα λεγεῖν δεῖν ἡγεῖμαι. ἸΚΑΝΗ ΓΑΡ Ἡ ὙΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΔΗΛΩΣΑΙ. Καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἑκάστων [i. e. each of these *σχηματα διανοίας*, οἱ *νοημάτων*,] ἢ συσελλείπῳ, ὡς αἱ παραιτήσεις, ἢ ἀνήσῳ, ὡς αἱ συγχωρησεις, τὴν διανοίαν· καὶ ἢτοι μικροπρεπεί, ὡς αἱ διορθώσεις, ἢ μεγαλειώ, ὡς αἱ γνωμολογίαι καὶ ἀφηγήσεις, ἀπεργάζονται. ὧν ἑκάστῃ τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν ἘΚ ΤῶΝ ΤΥΠῶΝ ΑΡΙΣΤ’ ἈΝ ΔΙΑΓΝΟΙΗΜΕΝ, ὧΝ [leg. forte ὄΥΤῃ] ἘΚΑΣΤΟΝ, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΤΗΣ ὙΠΟΚΡΙΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙΡΟΝ, ΤΟΙΣ ΣΩΜΑΣΙΝ ΕΝΤΙΘΗΣΙ· ΠΑΡ’ Ὁ ΚΑΙ ΣΧΗΜΑΣΙΝ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΣΥΝΕΒΗ ΚΛΗΘΗΝΑΙ^d.

I rather suspect, we should read ΠΡΟΑΓΕΙΝ, in the beginning of this passage; in the sense of *ἐκφέρειν*, *προφέρειν*, &c. Meibomius

^c *De Instit. Or.* VI. 3. p. 316. *ed. Giff.*

^d *Aristid. Quintil. “De Musica,”* p. 86, *ed. Mitomii.*

renders σχημάτων, “*gestuum*,” which cannot be the meaning; for by the τετων ἐκασον, and the exemplification which follows, (παρρητησεις, συγχωρησεις, &c.), and, indeed, by all the rest of the passage, it is clear, that he speaks of the *configurations* of the *speech* or sentence, of which he goes on to describe the different effects, *first* on the *mind*, and, ultimately, on the *action*, of the speaker. The version should, therefore, have been thus:—“*De figurarum naturâ quibus animi notiones preferendæ*,” &c. Or, if προταγων be right, the meaning, I think, must be—“*to which those νοήματα are to be referred—under which they are to be classed*.” See the passage above, from Quintilian, and that of Dion. Hal. Sect. 8. which is much to the purpose.

Why Aristotle should dismiss this subject, as of much more concern, to the Actor, than to the Poet, requires no explanation. There could scarce, indeed, be any other occasion for the study of these σχήματα, but in order to learn, or to teach, in what manner, with what variations of tone, countenance, and gesture, propriety required them to be pronounced.—At the same time, it will not appear strange that he should *mention* them, if we recollect, that the Poets themselves were, at first, actors also, in their own pieces, and, afterwards, no doubt, instructed their actors; and hence perhaps, after all—not, as is commonly understood, from the *moral* teaching of the drama itself*—the well known phrases, διδάσκειν τραγωδιῶν, *docere fabulam*, &c. may, most naturally, be accounted for.

Nor was this practice peculiar to antient times. We know with what eagerness and animation Voltaire *taught his Tragedies*, almost to his latest hour. During his last visit to Paris, where he died, “*Il n’y vit rien, ne songea à y rien voir; il n’y vécut que pour des Comédiens, qu’il fatiguoit, en voulant leur donner des leçons de declamation*.”

NOTE

* See Casaub. in Athen. p. 413. and *De Satyr. Poet.* p. 113.

• Tableau de Paris, tome viii. p. 20.—Since this note was written, I have had the satisfaction

N O T E 164.

P. 104. THE PROFESSED MASTERS OF THAT KIND—.

—Τε την τοιαυτην ἔχουσι ἌΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟΝΙΚΗΝ.—For this word, see *Etb. Nicom.* I. 1, 2.—Thus, here, it seems to mean that *master art*, which teaches the principles of elocution, the art of *public speaking, in general*.

N O T E 165.

P. 104. THE CAVIL OF PROTAGORAS—.

See *Hermes*, I. 8, p. 144.

This, it seems, was his usual style of criticism; for, *διανοιαν ἀφεις, προς τ'ενομα διελεχθη*, as Diog. Laertius says of him^a. He seems, indeed, to have been the inventor of these *σχηματα λέξεως*. At least the same writer says, *διελε τον λογον ΠΡΩΤΟΣ εις τεσσαρα: ΕΥΧΩΛΗΝ, ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΝ, ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΝ, ΕΝΤΟΛΗΝ*· (οι δε, εις επτα— κ. τ. αλ.) *εις και πυθμενας ειπε λογων*:—“the *foundations* of speech^b.”

There is something amusing in the history of this man. He was originally a *porter*; and might have continued so, if his extraordinary genius for *tying up wood* had not attracted the notice of Democritus, by whose instructions and encouragement, from an eminent porter, he became as eminent a sophist. The reader

is satisfied to find the above explanation of the phrase *διδασκειν πραχθια*, &c. supported by Heyne: “*Διδασκαλ. est poeta, qui fabulam committit, in theatrum pro-* “*ducit; quia cum aedotes docet.*”—*In Epieteti Enchir. cap. xvii.*

^a IX. 52. *ed. Meib.*

^b IX. 54.—See *Hermes*, as above, about the different species of sentences; and *ib.* ii.

may see the story in Aulus Gellius, V. 3.—The public was, certainly, not much obliged to Democritus. Protagoras was of more use to mankind when he invented porter's *knots*^c, than when he invented the *σχηματα λεξεως*, and undertook to teach, at the price of *a hundred minæ*^d, the art of Belial——

—— “to make the worse
“Appear the better reason:”——

—του ἥττον λόγον κρείττον ποιειν^e.

“If a *cobler*,” says Socrates in the *Meno* of Plato, “or a *taylor*, should return the shoes, or the clothes, he undertook to mend, in a worse condition than that, in which he received them, he would soon lose his business, and be starved for want of work. But it is not so with the *sophists*. PROTAGORAS was able to carry on, for forty years together, without detection, and with great credit, the trade of spoiling all those who became his disciples, and sending them back much worse than he found them^f.”

N O T E 166.

P. 104. TO ALL DICTION BELONG, &c.——

See Diff. I. p. 37.—After having discussed *three* of the constituent parts of Tragedy, the fable, the manners, and the sentiments, Aristotle now comes to the *diction* (Λεξις), upon which he bestows three chapters. His subject plainly required him to speak of the

^c — την καλημενην ΤΥΛΗΝ, ἐφ' ἧς τα φορτια βασαζουσι, ευρεν, ὡς φησιν Αριστοτελης. *D. Laert.* IX. 53.

^d Above £. 300.—*D. Laert. ibid.* and *Suidas*. Aristotle, however, gives a different account of the way in which he was paid, *Ethic. Nicom.* IX. 1.

^e See *Rhet.* II. 24, p. 581, D.

^f *Ed. Serr.* tom. ii. p. 91.

diction of *Tragedy*^a, not of poetic diction *in general*; much less, to descend to the grammatical elements of *language in general*. Yet, of his three chapters on diction, the first is merely grammatical, and such, as even in a *rhetorical* treatise would appear misplaced; and even the two following chapters relate to *poetic* language in general, without any thing applicable to the diction of *Tragedy* in particular—his proper subject—except a single observation, or, rather, *hint*, at the end of the third chapter^b.

Dacier, who discharged, with as much fidelity as any commentator ever did, the duty of seeing nothing amiss in his author, has zealously defended the propriety of this grammatical chapter: but all he says amounts, I think, to little more than this—that the chapter should be there, because it is there. No man is nice about reasons, when the point to be proved has been determined before he looks for them.

N O T E 167.

P. 104. DISCOURSE OR SPEECH—.

ΛΟΓΟΣ.—Mr. Harris, in the *Hermes*, p. 19, has rendered the word, *sentence*. He took that *part* of the idea, that suited his subject; but, that this is not the whole sense of the word, but only a sense *included* in the word, is evident from what is said below, in the definition of λογος, where the entire *Iliad* is comprehended under that term. Had I *here* rendered λογος by *sentence*, I must, to have been consistent in my translation, have there called the *Iliad* a *sentence*.

The word λογος here plainly answers—not to *sentence*, exclusively, nor yet, exclusively, to what Mr. Harris calls “*Oration* or

^a See the conclusion of cap. xxii. Περι μεν εν Τραγωδίας, κ. τ. αλ.

^b See NOTE 209.

“*Discourse*,” as composed of *several sentences*; but, it is a general term, comprehending *both* these, and applicable, like the Latin word *oratio*, or the English, *speech*, to every *significant* combination of words, whether consisting of a single sentence, or of many; as, indeed, appears from Aristotle’s definition itself. Nay, the word appears not even to have been limited to a complete *assertive* sentence; for the philosopher, in the treatise *περι Ἑρμηνείας*, gives the denomination of *λογος* to these *two* words—*καλος ἱππος*. He says, ἐν τῷ ΛΟΓΩ, (in *hac oratione*,) *καλος ἱππος*. It was what he calls a *merely significant λογος*, as distinguished from an *assertive λογος*, or *proposition*, such as, *καλος ΕΣΤΙΝ ἱππος*.

I was unable to find any English word, that would express *λογος* adequately, and clearly. And it seems somewhat remarkable, that the Greek language, rich and copious as it is, should not afford—at least I am not aware that it does—any single word *perfectly synonymous* to our word, *sentence*. *Λογος*, as I have observed, is too *wide*; it serves equally to express a single sentence, or a whole *speech*, or even *less* than a sentence. It is applied by Aristotle to a combination of *two* words—a substantive and an adjective, without a *verb*—and, to the *Iliad*. *Περιοδος* was only one particular *kind*, or *form*, of sentence^b. *Κωλον* did not necessarily contain a complete *sense*, or *thought*, which is essential to our word, *sentence*^c.

^a *Hermes*, p. 324.

^b See *Rhet.* III. 9. p. 592.

^c *Demet. de Elec. Sect.* 2.

N O T E 168.

P. 105. IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE MOUTH——.

ΤΟΠΟΙΣ.—Clearly right; nor can I conceive, what should have induced any critic to suspect this reading.—See *Dionys. Halicarn. Sect. 14.*—his curious and accurate analysis of articulation: and *Aristides Quintil. p. 89, ed. Meib.*—where, in describing the formation of the letters, these expressions occur:—ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ὀδόντας ΤΟΠΩΝ—and, ἐκ μεσῆ τε φωνητικῆ ΤΟΠΟΥ. See, also, *Hermes, III. 2, p. 322.*—ΤΟΝΟΙΣ, which had occurred to Mr. Winstanley*, would be mere tautology; for that idea is *fully* expressed afterwards, by ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρυτητι. Thus, *Rhet. III. 1. τοὺς ΤΟΝΟΙΣ, ὀΐον ὀξεία καὶ βαρεία, καὶ μεση.*

N O T E 169.

P. 105. AS THEIR TONE IS ACUTE, GRAVE, OR INTER-MEDIATE.

—Ὄξύτητι, βαρυτητι, καὶ τῷ μεσῷ.—All the commentators seem agreed, that by τῷ μεσῷ is meant the *circumflex*. Mr. Foster, in his *Essay on Accent, &c.* expresses some degree of doubt about this^a; and, I confess, it appears to me to be somewhat more than doubtful. Certainly, the only *obvious* and *proper* sense of the word *mean*, or *middle*, thus applied to the pitch of sound, is, that which is *between* ὄξυ and βαρυ; not, that which is *compounded* of the two, as the circumflex is always represented to be. At least the expression, in this latter sense, would not be very accurate and philosophical. A circumflexed syllable is described to be, a syllable that has *both*

* Ed. Ox. 1780, p. 296.

^a P. 22.—See the *note*.

an acute and a grave accent;—*ἀμφοτέρως τὰς τασεῖς*, as it is expressed by *Dion. Halicarn. Sect. 11*. The voice first rises, and then falls, on the *same* syllable. A man would be thought to speak very strangely, who should describe any object painted half white and half black, by saying, that it was of a colour *between black and white*.

But, farther, I observe, that in other passages of Aristotle's works, where he speaks of accents, the word *μεσον* no where occurs. Indeed, he uses neither this, nor any other word, to denote the *circumflex* accent. He mentions only *ὄξυ*, and *βαρυ*, acute, and grave. See *De Soph. Elench.* p. 284, C.—288, E.—304, A.—306, A. *ed. Duval*. In the last of these passages especially, his expression is remarkable: *ἐἰ παρα προσῳδιαν ὄξειαν, Ἡ ΒΑΡΕΙΑ προσῳδία λυσις· ἐἰ δὲ παρα βαρειαν, Ἡ ΟΞΕΙΑ*. That is—"If the sophism supposes the acute accent, the answer is—it is the grave accent; and vice versa." Here are no traces of the triple division of accents, given by later writers, into acute, grave, and circumflex. Nay more; he speaks in the same way, even when the very ambiguity in question lies between an acute, and a *circumflex*, accent; as, *ἐ*, (*non*,) and *ἔ* (*ubi*). See the passage, p. 304, A: where the circumflexed *ἔ* is expressed by the word *βαρυτερον*^b.—This, I confess, much increases my doubt with respect to the word *μεσω* in the passage before us. For, had that been Aristotle's term for the *circumflex* accent, as the common explanation supposes, we probably should have found the expression in some of the passages referred to; at least, in that last mentioned.

I cannot, surely, be misunderstood, as meaning to infer, from these passages, that the flexure itself of the voice upon a single syllable, which was afterwards denominated by Grammarians, *περισπωμενη*, was unknown to Aristotle and the earlier writers. The *thing*, undoubtedly, has always existed, and *must* exist, more

^b A marginal note in Duval's ed. says—"Semper enim Aristoteles βαρειαν vocat τὴν περισπωμένην."

or less, in every language. But these passages *do*, I think, afford a pretty strong presumption, that the circumflex had then no appropriated term^c, and, consequently, that, in this passage, the word *μεσον* has a different, and its *usual* and *proper*, meaning; that, in which it is used continually by the writers on Harmonics^d.

But, farther, it appears to be so used by Aristotle himself, in a similar passage of his *Rhetoric*. In the beginning of the *third* book, speaking of oratorical *action* or *delivery*, (ὕποκρισις) as far as it relates to the voice, he says, ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὐτὴ δεῖ χρησθῆαι πρὸς ἑκάστον παθῶν· οἷον, ποτε μεγαλῆ, καὶ ποτε μικρᾶ, καὶ ποτε μεσῆ· καὶ πῶς τοῖς τούτοις, οἷον, ὀξείᾳ, καὶ βαρεῖᾳ, καὶ ΜΕΣΗ. Now, even supposing this to relate to *accents*, it seems, that *μεσῆ*, here, should naturally have the *same* meaning, with respect to ὀξείᾳ, and βαρεῖᾳ, as it has when applied immediately before to μεγαλῆ and μικρᾶ, where it plainly means the *medium* between loud and soft.—But I think the passage clearly does *not* relate to the mere syllabic *accent*: for he is there professedly speaking of the accommodation of the voice to the expression of different *passions*; he must therefore mean *such* variation of tone or pitch, as depends upon the speaker's choice; not that of the *accentual* acuteness and gravity; for this is always spoken of as a fixed and invariable thing^e. Aristotle therefore means, I believe, exactly what Cicero has expressed in the following words; and, from the similitude of the expres-

^c Mr. Foster, who had undoubtedly examined this matter more thoroughly than I pretend to have done, does not, I think, produce any such *clearly appropriated* term, from Aristotle, Plato, Aristoxenus, or any other writer of that age. See ch. v. p. 140, &c. of his very learned *Essay on Accent and Quantity*, &c.

^d See the passage from Euclid, below. Thus too *Bacchius*: Τροπος τῆς φωνῆς ποσὸς λεγόμεν ἔναι; — Τρεῖς· ὀξύν, ΜΕΣΟΝ, βαρύν. p. 10. *ed. Meib.*—meaning, by *μεσον*, the Phrygian mode or key, which was *between* the Dorian and the Lydian, as D is between C and E.—So *Arist.* *Quintil.* ταῦτων, ὃ μὲν ὀξυῖ, πρὸς τὰ βαρύτερα τῆς φωνῆς ἐνεργήματα χρησιμῶν· ὃ δὲ λυδίῳ, πρὸς τὰ ὀξύτερα· ὃ δὲ φρυγίῳ, πρὸς τὰ ΜΕΣΑ. p. 25.

^e See Mr. Foster's *Essay*, p. 23, 24, 25.

sion, it seems probable, that he had this very passage of Aristotle before him, or in his memory.—“ Nam voces, ut chordæ, sunt “ *intentæ*, quæ ad quemque tactum respondeant, *acuta*, *gravis*; “ *cita*, *tarda*; *magna*, *parva*; quas tamen inter *omnes* est sua quo- “ que in genere *mediocris*.”—That is, as it seems rightly explained by Dr. Pearce, every one of these differences of voice, high and low, loud and soft, &c. has its *medium*—*μεσση*^f. To this passage of Cicero, I shall add one from Quintilian to the same purpose, and which affords a still clearer commentary upon that in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle.—“ *Utendi voce multiplex ratio. Nam præter illam “ differentiam quæ est tripartita, acutæ, gravis, flexæ,—tum intentis, “ tum remissis—tum elatis, tum inferioribus modis, opus est,— “ spatiis quoque lentioribus aut citatioribus. Sed iis ipsis MEDIA “ interjacent multa*.” If the reader compares this with the passage of Aristotle, he will see how exactly it answers to the Greek. Here are *three* differences of voice corresponding plainly to the three mentioned by Aristotle. The difference of *intentis* and *remissis* (*loud* and *soft*) expresses his *μεγαλη και μικρα*; that of, *elatis*, et *inferioribus modis*, (*acuter*, or *graver*, *tones* or *itches*,) his *ὀξεια και βαρεια*; and that of *spatiis* *lentioribus*, &c. (*quicker* or *slower times*) his *ῥυθμοις τισι*, &c. And, that Quintilian did not understand, by *ὀξεια* and *βαρεια*, the acute and grave *syllabic accent*, is clear from his expressly saying, that there are those *three* differences *besides* that of the different accents—“ *præter illam differentiam,*” &c.—*Lastly*, the “ *media interjacent multa,*” plainly alludes to the *μεση* of Aristotle.

The following passage, from the clear and accurate musical treatise of Euclid, will serve to illustrate, at the same time, *both* the terms of Aristotle, *τοις*^h and *μεση*. Enumerating the different accep-

^f Cic. de Or. III. 57. p. 47, ed. Pearce.

^g II. 3.

^h Whenever Aristotle clearly speaks of accents, he always, as far as I have observed, used the word *ῥυθμοις*, not *τοις*. See the passages above referred to, in the treatise *De Sept. Ethic.* And, in this work, cap. xxv.

tations of the word *τον*, one of which is *τασις*, *tension* or *pitch*, his instance of that sense of the word, is, *ὁ δὲ, ὡς τασις, τον* λεγεται, καθ' ὃ φάμεν ὀξύτονευ τινα, ἢ βαρυτονευ, ἢ ΜΕΣΩΙ ΤΩΙ ΤΗΣ ΦΩΝΗΣ ΤΟΝΩΙ κεχρησθαι: *i. e.* a *middling pitch of voice*¹.

On the whole, then, I see no reason why we should not understand the word *μεσῶ* to be used in the same sense in the passage which is the subject of this note. For though, indeed, Aristotle is there speaking of *single letters*, and therefore can only mean *syllabic* accents or tones, yet it is plain, that these accents must have admitted of the distinction of *high*, *low*, and *intermediate*, even in *single words*, when of more than two syllables^k; much more, in whole *sentences* or *periods*, where what Mr. Foster calls the *oratorical* accent, (*if*, indeed, it be compatible with a *fixed* syllabic accentuation of single words, of which I profess myself not yet convinced,) must necessarily have varied the tone or pitch of the *same nominal* syllabic accent, from word to word.

But whatever sense of the word *μεσῶ* we adopt, there is a difficulty, in this passage, which I must leave as I find it. The mention of *tone* or *pitch* of voice here, seems to me to be strangely misplaced. Accent, or tone, belongs to *syllables*, not to *letters*, of which Aristotle is here speaking. The vowels, indeed, may be acute or grave; but *as* syllables making a part of words, not as *letters*, *separately* considered, as they here are.—Besides; the other differences mentioned are fixed, *essential* differences. Of these letters, he says, *some* are formed in this manner, and *others*, in that: some are aspirated, and others smooth—some long, others short. But, can it be said, with any propriety, that *some* are *acute*, and

¹ P. 20, *ed. Meib.*

^k Let any man pronounce a word of many syllables—*μεγαλοσπερέτατα*, for example—having *one acute* syllable, as *D. Halic.* says, *among many grave*—*ἐν πολλοῖς βαρυσ.* *See II.* He will hear plainly, if he has any ear, that *the acute* syllable is only the *acutest*; and that the *grave* syllables are of different degrees of elevation, and some of them of course, *μεσῶ*—intermediate, between the *most acute* and the *most grave*.

others grave? Are there vowels that are *always* acute, as there are vowels that are *always* long?—This seems not more accurate, than it would be to conclude an enumeration of the differences of *words*, by adding that some are *said*, and some are *sung*:—or rather, it seems just the same, as if a man, describing the different sorts of bricks that are made, should conclude with telling us, that some are put at the top of a wall, some at bottom, and some in the middle.

N O T E 170.

P. 105. A CONJUNCTION IS A SOUND, &c.——

The whole of this *first* definition of the conjunction appears to me to be corrupt beyond all hope of restoration from conjecture. Mr. Harris plainly passes it over as inexplicable, and takes the second definition only^a. I may well, therefore, be excused for not attempting to translate, what I confess myself totally unable to comprehend. I do, indeed, understand very well, that a conjunction, “neither *hinders* nor *constitutes*—neither *gives* nor *takes away*—the *meaning* of the sentence in which it stands.” But how this can be regarded as a *definition* of a conjunction, I do *not* understand. To define a thing *only* by what it does *not* do, (for it is here given as a separate and complete definition,) is hardly reconcilable with Aristotle’s logical accuracy^b. Dacier, in his translation, has obviated this objection, by uniting the two definitions; but without any authority from the text.

I must, again, confess, that what follows, about the situation of the conjunction in different parts of a sentence, has not been

^a Hermes, II. 2. *note* (a).

^b See *Topic*. lib. vi. cap. 6. *sect.* 5.—where he represents a definition as vitious, ἐν ἀποφρασεὶ διαγῆ το γεν^α—i. e. if the specific difference be expressed by a negation. He excepts the definition of *mere privations*, (as *blindness*;) which *can* be defined no otherwise. *sect.* 7.

made intelligible to me, by any explication I have seen; particularly, the expression, καθ' αὐτον, which M. Batteux, after Castelvetro, renders, “by its nature:”—“à moins que par elle-même elle ne soit faite pour être au commencement.” But this sense cannot be admitted; nor, I think, any other, than—“by itself—alone.” This Mr. Winstanley explains by ἀνευ ἀνταποδοσεως: but I cannot see how his translation—“modo eas conjunctiones excipias quæ in initio periodi, καθ' αὐτες,—ritè stare non possunt,” &c.—accords with Aristotle's words—ἢν μη ἀρμοττη ἐν ἀρχῃ λογεσθῆναι καθ' αὐτον—i. e. “unless they are such as should be placed in the beginning, by themselves.”—To make these words correspond to Mr. Winstanley's version, another negative seems wanting.

N O T E 171.

P. 105. AN ARTICLE-----MARKS THE BEGINNING OR THE END OF A SENTENCE.

The commentators all tell us, that this means the *prepositive*, and the *subjunctive* article; but none of them have clearly and fairly shewn us, how the one, because it is placed before a word, marks the beginning of a sentence or discourse, (ΛΟΓΟΥ ἀρχὴν;) or, how the other marks the end of it, because it follows the word to which it belongs. In the very sentence before us, for example, Ἀρθρον δὲ ἐστὶ φωνη ἀσημεῖον Ἡ λογὸς ἀρχὴν ἢ τελεῖ, ἢ διορισμον, δηλοῖ—in what sense does the subjunctive article, ἢ, mark the end of the sentence—τελεῖ λογὸς? “L'article subjonctif,” says Dacier, “est celui qui marque la fin du discours: c'est-à-dire, qu'il suit la chose qu'il designe, comme, qui, lequel.”—It is easy to explain things in this manner.

For my part, I see not what is to be made of this, unless we may understand Aristotle to mean only that power of the article,

by which, in the Greek language, it distinguishes the subject from the predicate, in certain propositions, and determines the *order* of definition. See *Hermes*, II. 1. p. 230.—But, then, this is no other than a species of διορισμῶς, and is, indeed, given by Mr. Harris as one example of the *definitive* or *ascertaining* power of the article.

The *second* definition of the article, (—φωνη ἄσημῶς ----- to συντιθεσθαι) I have omitted. It is the first definition of the conjunction repeated *verbatim*. It may, indeed, be *true* of both; but if so, it must inevitably follow, I think, either that the two things must be the same, or, that the words are not truly a *definition* of either. Yet this passes smoothly with all the commentators I have seen, except Madius and Piccolomini.

N O T E 172.

P. 105. FOR EVEN IN DOUBLE WORDS, &c.

Compare cap. ii. and iv. of Aristotle's treatise Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας. This is rendered by Piccolomini, with his usual accuracy, "perchè nei nomi doppij [ò ver composti] non usiamo le parti d'essi, secondo che, da per sè prese, hanno significazione: come, (per essempio) in questo nome Theodoro, quella parte (*doro*) non é significante." p. 286.

N O T E 173.

P. 106. INDICATION OF TIME IS NOT INCLUDED, &c.—

ὍΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ ΤΟ ΠΟΤΕ. See *Hermes*, I. 6, note (*d*), p. 96. Aristotle has given a fuller definition of the verb, in the book Περὶ Ἑρμ. cap. iii.

N O T E 174.

P. 106. OTHERS RELATE TO ACTION OR PRONUNCIATION—.

Ἡ δὲ, κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά—sc. σχήματα: meaning the σχήματα λέξεως mentioned just before, cap. xix. with which these modes plainly coincide; for the πτώσεις ῥημάτων here mentioned are no other than the Ἑγκλίσεις, *modes*, or *moods*, of the Grammarians.—[See *Hermes*, I. 8, p. 144, and particularly the notes there.] Καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἐγκλίσεις, ὡς δὴ τινες ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΡΗΜΑΤΙΚΑΣ καλεῖσι. *Dion. Hal. de Struct. &c. Sect. 6.*—But *he* speaks of the term as applied only to the *modes*; for the *tenses*, διαφοραὶ χρόνων, are immediately after mentioned by him, as not included in that term. But Aristotle, in the *περὶ ἑρμην.* expressly mentions the *tenses* also, as πτώσεις ῥημάτων. See cap. iii. *Sect. 5.*

N O T E 175.

P. 106. FOR ALL DISCOURSE IS NOT COMPOSED OF VERBS AND NOUNS:—THE DEFINITION OF MAN, FOR INSTANCE—.

—Ὅτι γὰρ ἅπας λόγος ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων συγκρίνεται· ὅτι τε ἀνθρώπου ὄρισμός· ἀλλ' ἐνδεχεται ἀνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον. This is very ambiguously expressed. We are left to make out, as well as we can, whether the “definition of man,” is referred to as an instance of a sentence without a verb, or of a sentence with both noun and verb.—The *construction* seems, indeed, to lead more naturally to the latter interpretation. But the other, I think, is more to Aristotle's purpose, (for, an example of a sentence with both noun and verb, it was hardly necessary to produce,) and is confirmed by the following passage in his book *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*:

Ἀναγκη

Αναγκη δε παντα λογου ἀποφαντικον (every *assertive* sentence or speech) ἐκ ῥηματων εἶναι, ἢ ἐκ πτωσεως ῥηματων· και γαρ ὁ τε ἀνθρωπος λογος (i. e. ὄρισμος, *definition*; for so λογος is continually used by Aristotle,) ἐαν μη το, ἐξω, ἢ, ἐσαι, ἢ τι τοιαυτον ΠΡΟΣΤΕΘΗ, ἐπω λογος ἀποφαντικος^a. The definition itself, (the same, probably, to which he alludes in the passage before us,) follows; it is, ζων πεζον διπεν^b. Now these *three* words alone constitute the *definition*, and it is of this only that Aristotle here speaks. In the full, assertive sentence, Ἀνθρωπος ἐστι ζων πεζον διπεν, the two first words are no part of the definition itself, but, as Victorius has well observed, only *indicate* the thing defined. And accordingly, the philosopher, we see, in the above quotation, considers the verb as superadded to the definition.

However, this sense would be so much more clearly expressed, if the words—ὄιον, ὁ τε ἀνθρωπος ὄρισμος—followed, instead of preceding, the words ἀλλ' ἐνδεχεται ἀνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λογον, that I should hardly doubt of their being misplaced, if this sort of embarrassment were less frequent than it is in Aristotle's writings.

This whole passage receives much illustration from that part of the treatise *περι ἔργων*. to which I have referred. A sentence without a verb is what Aristotle calls a *significant* sentence, but not an *assertive* sentence, or *proposition*; i. e. that *affirms* or *denies* something, and of which it may be predicated, that it is *true*, or *false*^c. Such only, in that *logical* work, it was to his purpose to consider; the other, the merely *significant* sentence^d, he dismisses, as belonging rather to rhetoric and POETRY. Ὅτι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις [λογοῖς], ἀφεισθωσαν ῥητορικῆς γὰρ, ἢ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, ὀκειοτέρα ἢ σκεψῆς. ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικὸς τῆς νῦν θεωρίας^e.

^a P. 38, C.

^b The same definition occurs in other parts of his works; vol. i. p. 167, B.—237, D.—vol. ii. 920, 921.

^c See cap. iv. sect. 4 and 5. p. 38.

^d He instances in *procatory* sentences or speeches;—ὄιον, ἢ εὐχη, λογος μὲν, ἀλλ' ἔτε αἰτίας, ἢ τε ψευδῆς. *Ibid.*

^e *Ibid.*

N O T E 176.

P. 106. SIGNIFICANT, AS THE WORD CLEON IS, &c. —

It has been observed, that the sense seemed to require an instance of a sentence with only *one* significant word; at least, not composed of both verb and noun, as βαδιζει Κλεων is. But I rather believe, that Aristotle did not *intend* this as an instance of such a sentence, but merely as an explanation of the σημαίνει, and καθ' αὐτα σημαίνει τι, that precede. “It is not,” says he, “essential to what I call λογῶν, *oratio*, that it should contain both a noun and a verb, i. e. that it should be a complete *proposition*: but *some* significant part it *must* have; significant, I mean, as a whole word, separately taken, *as* Cleon is, for example, in the sentence, *Cleon walks*; not as making a part of a *word*, like δωρον in the compound name Θεοδώρον, which *has*, indeed, a meaning, but not καθ' αὐτο—κεχωρισμενον—*by itself*—as a *word* in the sentence.”

That this is the meaning, seems probable from the chapter in which Λογῶν is defined in the book περι Ερμηνειας. For there, as soon as he has given the definition, (Λογῶν δὲ ἐστὶ φωνη σημαντικη—ἧς των μερων τι σημαντικον ἐστὶ ΚΕΧΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΝ,) he immediately proceeds to explain the expressions; declaring what sort of *significant part* he means. “Significant,” he says, “as the *word* ἀνθρώπου is; that is, *κεχωρισμενον, by itself*; not as, ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ, or ἐκ ἐστὶ, which *signify* as *assertive* sentences, nor yet, as a syllable, or part of a simple *word*, (like ὅς in μὸς,) or, even as a *word* making part of a compound word¹.”

Now, what Aristotle there expresses fully, he meant, I think, to say, more briefly, in the words, ΜΕΡΟΣ μεντοι ἀει τι σημανον ἐξει* οἷον ἐν τῷ, Βαδιζει Κλεων, ὁ Κλεων. [ἴδ. σημαίνει.]

See *Hermes*, I. 2, p. 21, note (d).

* Cap. iv. p. 38.

N O T E 177.

P. 107. A DISCOURSE MAY BE ONE, IN TWO SENSES, &c.

Compare, *περι Ερμην. cap. v. p. 38.*—*Analyt. Post. lib. ii. cap. 10. p. 169, E.*—*Metaphyf. VII. 4. p. 910, D.* (where he uses *τω συνεχει*, as equivalent to *συνδεσμω*) and *VIII. 6, p. 931, C.*

N O T E 178.

P. 107. LIKE MANY OF THOSE USED BY THE MEGALIOΤÆ—.

I have read, in some ludicrous book, of a country that was “*lost by the ignorance of geographers.*” This seems to have been the case of these *Megalistæ*, if such a people ever existed. They are nowhere recorded.—Dacier reads, *μεγαρίζοντων*—“*ceux qui disent de grandes choses* : and cites *Hjckelius*—*Μεγαρίζοντες*—*μεγαλαλεγοντες*. But this is too distant from the present reading, *Μεγαλιωτων*. Mr. Winstanley’s conjecture—*μεγαλειων*, ως^a, is somewhat nearer, and, in other respects, preferable : but it is, I think, a strong presumption against its truth, that Aristotle constantly uses *ειον*, when he gives an instance ; never, as far as I recollect, ως.

I have sometimes thought it not very improbable, that the passage might originally have stood thus : *των μεγαλα Διωκοντων* : i. e. of those who *affect*, *aim at*, are *fond of*, grandeur and pomp of expression ; who *love hard words*, as we say. Nothing more common than this sense of *διωκειν*. They who are versed in emendatory criticism, and the *theory* of transcriptive blunders, know it to have been one source of corruption in ancient manuscripts, that

^a Ed. Ox. 173c, p. 298.

the transcribers, when they found vacuities and *lacunæ* which they could not fill up, rather than reduce the price of their copy by visible imperfection, often chose to write the passage as if there had been no such chafins; especially when that could be done, as in this case, with some passable appearance of a meaning^b. And thus, here, if we suppose the letters I have distinguished by capitals to have been destroyed, or rendered illegible, in the original MS. ὑπονοτίας και σητων^c, they would leave exactly the letters we now have—μεγαλ**ιω***των.

If a commentator, harrassed by obscurity and perplexity, can now and then relieve his labour by treating a passage of desperate corruption as a riddle, and can amuse himself by guessing the meaning, when he cannot inform his readers by discovering it, who will envy him this harmless privilege? I have here hazarded my *guess* with others; but I give it for what it is. None of us, I believe, have yet deprived our successors of the same amusement. The riddle, probably, still remains, and will remain, till the arrival of those “*codices expectandi*” of which the critics talk so much; those precious manuscripts, that are always to be *waited for*, and never to be *expected*.

N O T E 179.

P. 107. BY COMMON WORDS, I MEAN &c. —

Κυριον.—I have translated this, *common*, not *proper*, because this last term would convey a wrong idea; for *κυριον* here is plainly opposed, not to *μεταφορα* only, but to all the other species of words just enumerated: not to what is *figurative* only, as the Latin *proprium* is, but to whatever is *unusual*. This appears indeed from

^b See Le Clerc's *Ars Critica*, P. III. S. I. C.XVI. *parag.* 7.

^c See the passage from Strabo, given in the preface.

the definition—"a word that every body uses." What we call *proper* words are only one sort of the *καθὰ ἑαυτὰ* of Aristotle. The expression must even include all those words, which, though originally metaphorical, are, as Mr. Harris says, "so naturalized" by common use, "that ceasing to be metaphors, they are become, " (as it were,) the proper words^a." That is, as an excellent writer has expressed it, "they have nothing of the *effect* of metaphor upon the hearer. On the contrary, like *proper* terms, " they suggest directly to his mind, without the intervention of " any image, the ideas which the speaker proposed to convey by " them^b."

The same clear opposition of *καθόν* to whatever is *uncommon* in speech appears throughout the next chapter, where *γλωττα*, *μεταφορα*, &c. are all said to be *ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟ ΚΑΘΟΝ*, and included under one common term of *ξενια*.—See also *Rhet.* III. 2. p. 585, A.

N O T E 180.

P. 107. SO THAT THE SAME WORD MAY BE BOTH COMMON AND FOREIGN, &c.

If *καθόν* here meant only *native*, in opposition to *foreign*, (*γλωττα*) as some commentators have supposed^a, it would be arrant trifling to observe, that the same word might be, at the same time, *γλωττα* and *καθόν*, i. e. *foreign* and *native*, to different nations. For it could not possibly be otherwise; as Robortelli observes, and calls the observation, which he explains as Aristotle's, "*magnoperè adnotandum, et PULCHRUM SCITU.*" p. 246. Dacier follows him:

^a *Phil. Inq.* p. 198. He gives for instances—the *foot* of a mountain—the *bed* of a river. He, also, has rendered *καθόν* by *common*, p. 191, note.

^b *Philos. of Rhet.* vol. i. p. 185, 186. See *Demet. Περί Εξηγησεως*, Sect. 88.

^c Robortelli, and Castelvetro after him.

“Cela ne *sçauroit être autrement*, le même mot qui est étranger pour celui qui l’emprunte, ne peut qu’être propre pour celui qui le prête.”—But, if it *must* be so, why does Aristotle say it *may* be so?—*είναι δυνατόν*?—The truth is, that a *foreign* word is not necessarily a *common* word, in his sense of *κυριον*, among the people to whom it is *native*; it may, or may not, be so; it cannot, indeed, be to *them* *γλωττα*, but it may be a metaphorical word, or a word of any of the other species enumerated as *ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟ ΚΥΡΙΟΝ*^b.—Aristotle seems to have added this observation on purpose to prevent the very mistake which these expositors have made: to prevent *κυριον* from being taken merely as the opposite to *γλωττα*.

N O T E 181.

P. 108. A THOUSAND IS A CERTAIN DEFINITE MANY.—

Το γὰρ μυρίον, πολυ ἔστι.—Here, I may venture, I believe, for once, to adopt the positive tone of emendatory criticism. *Legendum οἰμηπὸ*, πολυ ΤΙ ἔστι. The sense, indeed, no one can mistake: but the text, as it stands, does not express that sense. It says only, “for a thousand is *many*, which he now uses instead of *many*.” There can be no doubt, that Aristotle added ΤΙ here, as in all the other instances, ἔσαναι ΤΙ—ἀφελαι ΤΙ. But, to put the matter beyond all doubt, he afterwards, speaking of the same sort of metaphor, says, το γὰρ Παντες ἀντι τῶ πολλοι, καὶ μεταφορῶν, εἰρηται το γὰρ Παν, ΠΟΛΥ ΤΙ. *Cap. xxv.*—I am surprised that so very obvious an error should have escaped the notice of all the commentators I am acquainted with.

^b *Cap. xxii.*

N O T E 182.

P. 108. FOR HERE, THE POET USES *ταμεν*---INSTEAD OF *ἀρυσαι*, &c.

Here a commentator is not perplexed by a little glimmering of light, that promises to shew him something, and shews him nothing; but is relieved at once from all trouble by a total and comfortable obscurity. The quotations are so short, and, in all probability, so incorrect, that it seems impossible to apply to them Aristotle's definition of this metaphor, or to see *how*, where the Poet has used *ταμεν*, *ἀρυσαι* would have been the *proper* word, and vice versa. Yet the commentators slide over this difficulty. *Victorius*, however, has noticed it, and, giving up the quotations as inexplicable and incorrigible, proposes a more intelligible example from the *Rhetoric*, III. 2.—το φαναι, τον μεν πτωχευοντα, εὐχεσθαι τον δε εὐχομενον, πτωχευειν· οτι ἀμφω ἀιτησεις. *Dacier* has entirely omitted the passage, and substituted another from the *Rhet.* III. 11. p. 597, B.—Not, however, that he did not *understand* the passage; it was an inviolable rule with him always to understand his author: but only, it seems, because the example could not conveniently be *expressed in French*—“ il ne peut être traduit en “ nôtre langue.”

Castelvetro gives a very pleasant illustration. He does not pretend to see how *ταμεν* and *ἀρυσαι* are put for each other in the Greek examples: but he says, that, to *draw*, and to *cut off*, might be thus metaphorically put for each other; if, for example, we should say, “ Take this pruning hook, and *draw* some “ branches from the olive-tree: or, Take this pail, and *cut off* “ some water from the fountain^a.”—Undoubtedly any man may speak in this way, who chuses it.

^a “ Prendi quella falce, e attigni de'rami dell' ulivo; o vero, Prendi quella secchia, “ e taglia dell' acqua del fonte.” p. 453.

N O T E 183.

P. 108. IN THE WAY OF ANALOGY, WHEN OF FOUR TERMS, &c.

The difficulty here is, to distinguish clearly this, which Aristotle calls the *analogical* or *proportional metaphor*, from the metaphor which precedes it—that *from species to species*: for as to the two first sorts, that from *genus* to *species*, and *vice versa*, they plainly belong, as has been observed, to the trope since denominated *Synecdoche*; the word μεταφορά being clearly used by Aristotle in its most general sense, including *all* the *tropes*—all the ways in which a word is *transferred* to a meaning different from its *proper* meaning. See *Cic. Or.* cap. xxvii. Of the four species of μεταφοραι here mentioned, only the two last seem to answer to *our* METAPHOR—the metaphor founded on some *resemblance* between the thing *from* which, and that *to* which, the term is transferred.

The difference between these two sorts of metaphors, as far as I am able to comprehend it, appears to me to be only this. Each of them is founded on some resemblance; but in the first, the resemblance perceived is between the two things themselves; in the other, between the *relations* which they, respectively, bear to two other things^a. Those are metaphors ἀπ' εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδους, where the likeness is perceived, as Aristotle elsewhere expresses it, “*by the* “*genus*;” that is, where the *common* quality, which constitutes the likeness, immediately occurs, and it is, therefore, sufficient simply to substitute the one word for the other. Those are metaphors κατ' ἀναλογίαν, where the resemblance is not thus perceived by the common *quality*, but by the common *relation*, of the two

^a ἢ γὰρ ἈΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγου, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΕΤΤΑΡΕΣΙΝ ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΙΣ. i. e. “*Analogy, or proportion, is equality of ratio, or relation, and requires four terms at least.*” *Ethic. Nicom.* V. 3.

things;

things; where, therefore, that relation must be pointed out, more or less expressly. Thus, to take Aristotle's own examples, when old age, or rather, an *old man*, is called "*flubbe*," the resemblance is sufficiently perceived, by a comparison of the things themselves; in Aristotle's language, we perceive it "*by the genus*:—*ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ [Ὅμηρος] το γήρας ΚΛΑΜΗΝ, ἐποίησε μάθησιν και γνώσιν δια τε γενεῆς· ΑΜΦΩ γὰρ ΑΠΗΝΘΗΚΟΤΑ*"^b. But when old age is called "*evening*," what strikes us is the resemblance *with respect* to two other things, *life*, and *day*; a resemblance of *relation*.

In this idea of the *analogical metaphor* I have the concurrence of Piccolomini. "*La metafora di proportione è quella, che sopra la somiglianza dei rispetti che hanno l'une cose con l'altre, sarà fondata;*" &c. See his *annotations*, p. 305, and his clear and useful, though prolix, *Parafrase della Retor. d' Arist.* tom. iii. p. 52, &c. In the rest of his explanation he does not satisfy me.

N O T E 184.

P. 108. AND, SOMETIMES, THE PROPER TERM IS ALSO INTRODUCED, BESIDES ITS RELATIVE TERM.

—Και ἐνίστα προστιθεασιν ἀνθ' ἑ λέγει προς ὁ ἐστίν.—No words can well be more obscure and perplexing. Taking them as they are, they seem to admit, fairly, of only one sense—that which Victorius gives them. "*Et quandoque apponunt, pro quo dicit ad quod est.*" That is, as he explains this literal and obscure version, they add, "*ad quod refertur illud nomen quod omittunt, et pro quo aliud vocabulum usurpant.*" Προστιθεασιν, προς ὁ ἐστίν [sc. τετο] ἀνθ' ἑ λέγει: i. e. they add, to the *substituted* word (*sup*), the word to which

^b Rhet. III. 10. p. 593. The passage of Homer alluded to is in Od. E. 214, 215. See Harris's *Philol. Inq.* p. 191. For the force of the expression, ἐποίησε μάθησιν, see NOTE 22.

the *proper* word (*shield*) relates; i. e. *Mars*. They not only name *cup*, instead of *shield*, but call it the *cup of Mars*.

My objection to this sense of the passage is, that it seems to confound the analogical metaphor with that *from species to species*, in which one word is simply put in the room of the other, as *καλαμη* is used in the passage of *Homer*, referred to by *Aristotle* as an example of that sort of metaphor^a:

Ἀλλ' ἐμπης καλαμην γε σ' οἶομαι εἰποσόντων

Γνωσκάν.

— — — —

Od. ξ. 214.

For if, “*sometimes*,” ἐνίοτε, this addition is made, it is implied, that not only *sometimes*, but *generally*, and for the *most* part, the analogical metaphor is used in the same manner as that ἀπ' εἶδός &c. and *cup* is merely called *shield*, and *old age*, *evening*. But, if I understand the matter rightly, it is essential to this kind of metaphor to express *two* terms, at least, of the four which constitute the analogy; i. e. to express *with* the metaphorical word, either the thing to which the *proper* word belongs, (as, *evening of life*,) or, as *Aristotle* presently after says, a *negative epithet*. See NOTE 189.

And the philosopher himself *seems* to have said this, (for I confess the passage is not perfectly clear,) in the following words: ΑΙΕΙ ΓΑΡ ΕΚ ΔΥΟΙΝ λεγονται [ἴσ. αἰ. ἐπικειν, *comparisons*], ΩΣΠΕΡ Ἡ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ· οἶον, ἢ ἀσπίς, φαρμακόν, ἐστὶ ΦΙΛΑΛΗ ΑΡΕΟΣ, και, τοξον, ΦΟΡΜΙΓΞ ΑΧΟΡΔΟΣ· ἔγω μὲν ἐν λογιῶν, ΟΥΧ' ΑΠΛΟΤΝ· το δ' εἶπεν το τοξον “φορμιγγα,” ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα “φιλάη,” ΑΠΛΟΤΝ^b. Thus “*capitis nives*,” for gray hairs; *evening of life*; *morning of the year*; *eye of day*; and, among many instances in the *Rhetoric*,

^a He does not, indeed, expressly call it, ἀπ' εἶδός ἐπι εἶδος; but that it is so, seems sufficiently clear from his expressions, ἐποίησε μάθησιν δια τὸ ΓΕΝΟΥΣ—and, ΑΜΦΩ γὰρ ἀπαιθθηκότα, which answers to ἀμφω γὰρ ἀφελαν τι ἐστὶ, here.

^b Rhet. III. II. p. 596. E.

^c Quintil. VIII. 6.

δημε ῥοπαλον—λημη τε Περαιεως—ὁδὸ τῶν λογῶν, &c.^d.—The fact, indeed, seems to be, that this analogical metaphor is only a way of stating metaphors founded on resemblance*, when that resemblance, depending wholly, or chiefly, on *relation*, would not be obvious, and the metaphor, consequently, would be harsh and obscure, unless the relation were, by some means or other, pointed out.—Victorius himself allows, that, in Aristotle's own examples, the mere substitution of *cup* for *shield*, and of *evening* for *old age*, would be "*nimis durum*."

I think, then, that Aristotle *meant* to say, and, in some way or other, *had said*, "And *sometimes*," (ἐνίοτε,) now and then, for the sake of clearness, "they add the *proper* word, (the word, ἂνθ' εἰ— "for which, the metaphorical word is put,) *to*, or *besides*, the πρὸς "ὁ εἶσι—i. e. that *to which* the proper word *relates*." They not only call the shield, the *cup* of *Mars*, but they mention *shield* also, and say, the *shield* is the *cup* of *Mars*: or, taking the other instance, *old age* is the *evening* of *life*^e. Thus all will follow naturally: ΚΑΙ ἐνίοτε — *And*, sometimes, they add the *proper* term, &c. Εἰσίοις δὲ, ἐν εἴῳ ὄνομα — ἀναλογικόν.—*But*, in *some* analogical metaphors, there *is* no proper term; in that case, therefore, the meta-

^d Rhet. III. 10.—Instances abound in Homer:—ἡνιοχὸς νηὶ—ἕβαρ ἀγρῆς—ποιμένα λαῶν—σπέρμα πυρὸς—a *seed* of *fire*, for a *spark*. (Od. E. 490.) &c.—See the *Life of Homer*, commonly attributed to *Dion. Halic.* and given in vol. v. of the ed. of Homer by Ernestus, p. 162.

* It seems, that any instance of the *metaphora à specie* &c. may be stated analogically: thus, "*old age*, we may say, is to *man*, what *stubble* is to *corn*," &c. And, on the other hand, converting an analogical metaphor into a metaphor from *species* to *species*, we may say, *evening* and *old age* are, *both of them*, ends of certain *portions of time*.—It was, perhaps, the vicinity of these two species of metaphor, and their convertibility, that induced later writers to drop the distinction, though they made many other distinctions which Aristotle did not.

^e Thus Homer uses the analogical metaphor in the following line:

Ὅσδ' ἐνὲρ ἔρετμα, τὰ τε πτερεὰ νηυσὶ πελοῦνται.

Od. A. 124.

"*Oars*, which are the *wings* of *ships*."

phor cannot be *σὸ* used: yet it may be used in the *σιν*, and most common way, as well as if such *proper* term subsisted; it is still an *analogical metaphor*, and may be used as such:—*ἕθεν ἤττον, ὁμοίως* [i. e. *ἀναλογίως*, as Castelvetro rightly explains it,] *λεχθήσεται*. Thus, in the metaphor exemplified, of *σῶν*, applied to the *σιν*, we may say the *sun* *σῶν* his *rays*, though we cannot assign any *proper* term, for which *σῶν* is put—any *word* appropriated to the dispersion of *light* from the sun, as, to *σῶν*, is appropriated to the dispersion of *seed*.—Such appears to me to be the connection of this passage.

It will, undoubtedly, be objected, that the sense I would give the words *προσθεασιν* &c. cannot be fairly obtained from them as they now stand: and I confess it cannot; unless we might be allowed to render the words thus, taking *προς* as a repetition of the preposition in *προσθεασιν*: “they add the word, *for* which they use, “or *say*, the metaphorical word, (*ὡθ' ἔ* ΛΕΓΕΙ,) *το* ὁ *ΕΣΤΙ*—to “what it *is*—to the word which *is* used: they add the word that “*should* be to the word that *is*.” But this appears to me so harsh and improbable a construction, that I would rather suppose the passage to be defective. *Perhaps* it might originally be thus:—*Και ἐνιοτε προστιθ. ὡθ' ἔ* λεγει, ΠΑΡΑ [*το*] *προς* ὁ *ἔστι*—i. e. *besides* adding the thing *to which* the proper term *relates*^f. But there seems to be still another fault in the passage. I cannot reconcile the plural *προσθεασιν*, with the singular, *λεγει*. Goulston renders “*apponit*;” and I am surprised that no MS. should exhibit *προσ-τιθησιν*. That *λεγει* is right, is highly probable, from the singular verb *ἔρει*, repeatedly used here, and the *ἔποιο*, afterwards: *ἔ* *την* *ἀσπίδα* *ΕΠΟΙ*—*ι. τ. ἀλλ.*

^f The transcribers, seeing two prepositions, *παρα προς*, unusually put together, and not understanding the *relative* sense of *προς* ὁ, might reject the first as redundant.

N O T E 185.

P. 108. THE SHIELD, THE CUP OF MARS, &c.

Φιαλήν Ἀρεως.— The φιαλή seems to have been a large, expanded, (ἐκπεταλον,) kind of vessel, like a ewer. See II. ψ. 270, and the notes. Hesych. v. Ἀμφιθετός.—It had also, sometimes, an ἔμφαλος, or *umbo*. See *Athen.* p. 501. It had probably, therefore, *some* resemblance to a shield, which makes the metaphor appear less strange; as Piccolomini has remarked, p. 306: who also observes, very well, that this kind of metaphor is then most clear and perfect, when the resemblance of *relation* is aided by some degree of resemblance between the things themselves: and that here, for example, if *lance* were used instead of *shield*, the metaphor would be spoiled, though the common relation would still subsist.

This seems to have been a favourite instance of this sort of metaphor; for it occurs several times in the *Rhetoric*. See III. 4, p. 588, and II, p. 596, E. In the former of these passages Aristotle says, that an analogical metaphor ought to admit of inversion: thus, says he, if we may call the cup the *shield* of *Bacchus*, we may, with equal propriety, call the shield the *cup* of *Mars*. But Demetrius observes, alluding to that passage of the *Rhetoric*, that this is not the case of every such metaphor: ἐπει τὴν ὑπὸ ἄρειαν μὲν τῆς ἰδῆς, ποδὰ ἐξῆν εἶπεν τὸν ποιητὴν^a, τὸν δὲ τὴν ἀνθρώπου ποδὰ, ἔκτετι ὑπὸ ἄρειαν εἶπεν. *See* *l.* 79.

^a II. B. 824.

N O T E 186.

P. 108. OR AS EMPEDOCLES HAS EXPRESSED IT, LIFE'S
SETTING SUN.

Δυσμας βίη.—Victorius has pointed out this expression in Plato's sixth book *De Legibus*, where the Athenian says, *ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν δυσμαῖς τε βίη, οἱ δὲ, ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, νεοί*^a: probably alluding, in Plato's usual manner, to the very passage of Empedocles. See also Ælian, *Var. Hist.* II. 34.—*ἐπι δυσμαῖς ἔσμεν*: where, as the metaphor was sufficiently explained by the subject of the conversation, the word *βίη* is not added. Victorius remarks, also, the *βίη ΔΥΝΤΟΣ ἀυγαῖς* of Æschylus, *Agamem.* v. 1132. The rest of that passage is very obscure^b; but *this* expression seems, clearly enough, to describe the *dying eye*, that opens, for the last time, upon the light:—

Βλεψαι πρὸς ΑΥΓΑΣ βελεται τας ἡλια,
Ως ἔποτ' αὐθις, ἄλλα νυν πανυσατον,
Ακτινα, κυκλονθ', ἡλια προσοψεται. Eurip. *Alcest.* 203.

or, in the finest picture of the kind, I think, that Poetry affords,

— — — oculisque errantibus, alto
Quæfivit cœlo lucem, ingemuitque repertâ. *Æn.* IV. 691.

—The poetical reader, I believe, will pardon me, if I wander so much farther from my subject, as to take occasion, from these beautiful passages, to point out three lines of Petrarch, which shew,

^a *Ed. Serr. tom. ii. p. 770.*

^b I am inclined to read, and point the passage thus:

— — — ἀπε και δοσι πτωσιΜΟΥΣ
Ξυνανται, βίη δυντ⊕ ἀυγαῖς.

i. e. “such as destroys, *dispatches* (as we say,) those who fall by the spear, *in the last* “gleams of setting life.”

that his powers were not confined to the expression of amorous tenderness, but were capable of rising, on occasion, to the true sublime. In the sonnet, “*Se lamentar augelli,*” &c.^c. written after the death of Laura, he imagines himself to hear her voice, in his solitude, consoling him for his loss, in these lines:

Di me non pianger tu ; ch' i miei dì ferfi
Morendo eterni ; e, NEL ETERNO LUME,
Quando mostrai di *chiuder* gli' occhi, APERSI !—

N O T E 187.

P. 108. THERE IS NO PROPER ANALOGOUS TERM, &c.

Όνομα κεμενον.—Κεμενον, here, is equivalent to κυριον ; a word established by common usage.—Ετι, εἰ ΜΗ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΙΣ ὀνομασι χρηται, εἰον Πλατων, ὄφρυοσκιον, τον ὀφθαλμον. — — — παν γαρ ἀσαφες το ΜΗ ΕΙΩΘΟΣ.—Topic. VI. 2. p. 242.—See also, *Categ.* c. vii. p. 23, C.

N O T E 188.

P. 109. — — — SOWING ABROAD
HIS HEAVEN-CREATED FLAME.—

Σπειρων θεοκτισαν φλογα.—Part of an Iambic verse, and probably from some Tragic Poet. The commentators quote Virgil's “*Spargere lumine terras.*” This, however, is not exactly applicable, because *spargere* does not, I think, appear to have been the proper, *specific* word, for *sowing*, as *σπειρων* was. The passage of Lucretius is more apposite :

^c Ed. di Gessualdo, p. 288.

Sol etiam summo de vertice dissipat omnes
Ardorem in partes, et *lumine* CONSERIT *arva*. II. 211.

Every reader will recollect Milton's beautiful application of this metaphor to the stars :

And *sow'd* with stars the heav'n, thick as a field.—
P. L. VII. 358.

—and to the dew-drops, metaphorized into *pearls*, V. 1.

But the idea of *pouring*, applied to the great fountain of light, seems both a more just, and a more elevated, metaphor. It is happily touched by Virgil in this line :—

Jam sole *infulso*, jam rebus luce repletis. *Æn.* IX. 461.

—a *sketch* which Thomson has finely filled up, and finished :

— — young day *pours in* apace,
And opens all the lawny prospect wide :
The dripping rock, the mountain's misty top,
Swell on the sight, and brighten with the dawn ;
Blue, thro' the dusk, the smoking currents shine.

Summer, 52.

In his *hymn*, he has taken up the metaphor in a sublimer tone :

Great source of day! best image here below
Of thy Creator, ever *POURING wide*,
From world to world, the vital ocean round! v. 66.

—To which I cannot restrain myself from adding a fine passage of the same kind in the hymn of *Dionysius* to the sun :

Ἄκτινα πολυσεφρον ἀμπλεκων,
Ἄιγλας πολυδερχεα^a ΠΑΓΑΝ
Περι γαιαν ἀπασαν ἔλισσων.
ΠΟΤΑΜΟΙ δὲ σέθεν ΠΥΡΟΣ ΑΜΒΡΟΤΟΥ
Τικτεσιν ἐπηρατον ἀμεραν.

NOTE

^a M. Burette prefers *πολυκερδεα*, a reading of a French MS. ; and he translates it, "une riche source." He should have said, "a cunning source;" for I do not believe there is good authority for any other sense of *πολυκερδης*.—See *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscriptions*.

N O T E 189.

P. 109. THE WINELESS CUP.—

Αἰων. This emendation of Victorius, (instead of ἀλλὰ ὄνει, the reading of all the editions and MSS.) seems confirmed, beyond all doubt, by *Rhet.* III. 6, p. 590, A. and 11, p. 597, A.

Metaphors, from their nature, are in danger of being obscure, or forced, though it is essential to their beauty and effect, that they should be clear and apposite. For this purpose, a metaphor may be guarded in various ways. If the simple substitution of the improper, for the proper, term, would be obscure, or harsh, the metaphor may be converted into an *image*, or *comparison*; it may be used *analogically*, and we may say, φιάλη ΑΡΕΟΣ, or φιάλη ΑΚΙΝΟΣ; or, if that be not sufficient for perspicuity—that is, if the meaning be not sufficiently pointed out by the manner, or circumstances, in which the expression is introduced, we may join these, (φιάλη Ἀρεῶν ἄων,) or even add to either of them the *proper* word itself^b.

There is a fine instance of this *negative* mode of explaining a metaphor, in Isaiah, li. 21. “Thou drunken, *but not with wine**.”

Inscrip. tom. vii. Dissert. sur la Melopée, &c.—The reader may see the hymn, at the end of the *Ox. Aratus*, and in Dr. Burney’s *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 90, with a translation. There is, also, a translation in Dodsley’s *Miscellany*, vol. v. But, however partial I may be thought, I must give the bays on this occasion to my friend. He is no professed Poet; but his version has, surely, far more of the animation, enthusiasm, and solemnity of the original. No *Persian*, indeed, could have entered more thoroughly into the spirit of solar adoration.

^a See *Demet.* Sect. 80.—And, again, Sect. 86, of the negative epithet used for the same purpose.

^b See above, NOTE 184.

* See Bp. Lowth’s *Comm. on Isaiah*.

The same end is often answered by an epithet, *affirming* of the thing *expressed* some quality belonging to the thing *signified*; thus, ships are “*floating bulwarks*,” and the lyre a “*chorded shell*,” where Dryden has made the same use of the affirmative epithet, *chorded*, that Theognis did of the negative, ἀχορδῶ, in his metaphorical expression for a bow—φορμυγῆ ἀχορδῶ¹. Sometimes the explanatory epithet is itself a metaphor; as in the πτερωτοῖς ἄρμασι of Euripides;—“*winged chariots*.” Here we have a double metaphor; *chariot* for *ship*, and *wing* for *sail*.

It should be remembered, that these *negative* epithets are very common in the Greek Poets. Victorius points out many instances: as, κίον ἀναυλοτάτον, Eurip. Phœniss. 818.—θιασον ἀβακχευτον, Orest. 319.—μηρυτηῶ ἀφθεγμετα, Æsch. Eumen. 245.—ἀπτεροῖς πωτημασιν, *ibid.* 250, &c.

N O T E 190.

P. 109. — — — AN INVENTED WORD, &c.

Between this and the preceding definition Aristotle must have placed that of κοσμῶ—the *ornament*, or *ornamental word*. That it was purposely passed over by him is hardly credible. This is, most probably, one of the lamentable διαβεβηματα that Strabo talks of².

The commentators differ widely as to the meaning of κοσμῶ. Castelvetro says, the word admits, here, of five different senses, which he sets up, like nine-pins, for the pleasure of knocking them all down.—The only reasonable account of the matter seems to be that given by Dacier from Victorius. It seems clear enough,

¹ Mr. Maſon's Ode to the Naval Officers.

² Demet. Sect. 86.—Arist. Rhet. II. 11, p. 597.

³ See the passage in the Preface.

that

that what Aristotle here calls *κοσμῶς*, is *included*, at least, under what he calls *ὀκειον* in the *Rhetoric*. For he says, at the end of the next chapter (*cap.* xxii.) speaking of those species of *words* that are used in *prose*, that they are these three, *το κυριον, και μεταφορα, και ΚΟΣΜΟΣ*: and in the *Rhetoric*, after referring to the very enumeration of words in *this* chapter, and setting aside such as he calls *practical*, (i. e. *γλωτται, διπλα ὀνοματα, &c.*) he says, *το δε κυριον, και το ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ, και μεταφοραι, μοναι χρησιμει προς την των ψιλων λογων λεξων παντες γαρ μεταφοραις διαλεγονται, και τοις ΟΙΚΕΙΟΙΣ, και τοις κυριοις*^b. And these *ὀκεια ὀνοματα*, again, seem plainly synonymous with *ἐπιθετα*, mentioned presently after:—*δει δε και τα ἐπιθετα και τας μεταφ. κ. τ. λ.*—By *ὀκεια* and *ἐπιθετα*, Aristotle seems to have expressed the *genus*, of which, *κοσμῶς*, the *ornamental* or *embellishing* epithet, was a species. But as he has not, by any means, explained himself fully, nor given any definition either of *ὀκειον* or *ἐπιθετον*, the mist which he has left upon this subject must remain. I shall only remark, that the word *κοσμῶς* is *once*, (and I think but once,) used by him in his *Rhetoric*, apparently in the same sense as in this chapter. For, speaking of the propriety of diction, and its correspondence to the subject, he observes, that “an *ornament* should not “be applied to a *mean* word; for this,” says he, “has the appearance of burlesque; which is the case with Cleophon, who has “used expressions of this sort as ridiculous, as it would be to “talk of an “*AUGUST fig-tree*.” The word *κοσμῶς* here, and the example by which he explains it, seem to prove, that *κοσμῶς*, in the treatise on Poetry, means such an epithet as *embellishes* or *elevates* the thing to which it is applied. For I do not imagine that the term includes what the Grammarians call *perpetual epithets*, such as “*humida vina*,” *γαλα λευκον, &c.* because Aristotle expressly says, that the *κοσμῶς* is used in common speech: now these

^b Rhet. III. 2. 585.

^c — μητ' ἐπι τοῦ ἔντελει ὀνοματι ἐπη ΚΟΣΜΟΣ· εἰ δε μη, κομῶδια φαινεται· ὡν ποιοι Κλεοφων· ὀκειος γαρ ἐνα ἐλεγε, και εἰ εἰπειεν αὐτ, ΠΟΤΝΙΑ ΣΥΚΗ.—III. 7, p. 590.

redundant epithets are banished, both by him, and by Quintilian^a, even from *oratory*; much more from ordinary discourse.

It may be objected, as it *has* been objected by Piccolomini (p. 337), that, as an epithet may, at the same time, be a *foreign* word, a *metaphorical*, an *extended*, or of any of the other sorts, it could not be enumerated by Aristotle as a *distinct species* of words among the rest. But the truth is, that he is *not* there enumerating so many distinct *species of words*, which exclude each other, but only a number of *distinct properties* of words, several of which may subsist together in the *same* word. Thus, an *extended* word may, manifestly, be, at the same time, a *metaphorical*, or a *foreign* word, or both: a *metaphorical* word may be, also, an *invented*, *extended*, *altered* word, &c. But none of these words can be, at the same time, *υπολα*, *common* words; and the only exclusive distinction that Aristotle intended, is between the *common* word, and the others; *all* of which are words, on some account or other, *uncommon*.

N O T E 191.

P. 110. NOUNS ARE DIVIDED, &c.

In passages where great corruption and little importance meet, a commentator may be reasonably indulged in silence, or brevity. What all this has to do in the midst of an analysis of *poetical* language, as distinguished from that of *prose*, I confess myself totally unable to see.

The defects of the passage have been fully pointed out by almost all the annotators. See Mr. Winstanley's note, p. 300, *ed. Ox.* 1780.—But we have lately been told, that all the commentators have entirely mistaken the sense of the passage, and supposed it, without reason, to be imperfect, merely because they did not see,

^a Rhet. III. 3, p. 587, C.—Quintil. *De Inst. Or.* VIII. 6.

that Aristotle here speaks, not as a Grammarian, but as a Philosopher, and is considering, not the conventional gender of verbal inflection, but the real gender of the *things signified*. Thus, it is admitted, indeed, that all *words* ending in ν , and ρ , are not masculine; yet, if we examine the nature of the *things denoted* by words of those terminations, we shall find, it seems, that *they* are masculine, though the words themselves are regarded as feminine*. Let us try, then. Μητηρ, for example, ends in ρ . Did Aristotle's philosophy lead him to consider a *mother* as of the masculine gender?

N O T E 192.

P. 110. THE EXCELLENCE OF DICTION CONSISTS IN BEING PERSPICUOUS, WITHOUT BEING MEAN.

Λεξέως ἀρετή—i. e. of diction, or language, *in general*; not, “*elocutionis Poeticæ*,” as Goulston and others render it. For Aristotle gives the *same* definition of the excellence of *oratorical* diction, in his Rhetoric; adding, only, with respect to the *degree* of elevation, such a restriction as his subject there required^a. Now had he intended here a definition of the language of Poetry, as discriminated from that of Prose, he would hardly have confined himself to two characters common to *both*; viz. that it should be *perspicuous*, and yet not *mean*, or low, like colloquial language, consisting only of common and proper words, without metaphors, or any of the other ornamental words which he enumerates; *some* of which he makes essential to the *excellence* (ἀρετήν) and *proper* elevation, even of *prose* elocution^b. For, that this is the force of ταπεινή, is clear from his own explanation.

* “Non enim omnia quæ desinunt in ν et ρ sunt masculina; nisi ad sensum earum. “*rerum quas denotant respicias, qui mas est, licet ipsa nomina feminina habeantur.*”

Ed. Cantab. 1785, p. 156.

^a Rhet. III. 2, p. 584.

^b See Rhet. III. 2, p. 585.

Still, it is obvious to ask, why the philosopher, when his subject was the excellence of *poetic* diction, should thus set out with a *general* definition, instead of giving us, at once, the definition of the *species*.—The reason, I suppose, was, that he conceived the *poetic* to differ from the *rhetorical* language, only in the *degree* of elevation above ordinary speech^c; and to define *degrees* is not easy. Nor, indeed, was even *this* difference common to *all* Poetry. If the diction of the Dithyrambic and other Lyric kinds, and the Heroic, with their pompous apparatus of compound epithets, foreign and antiquated words, and boldness of metaphor, rose far above the highest elevation of prose diction; on the other hand, that of Tragedy, we know, frequently descended, in its lowest parts, even below what Aristotle assigns as the proper level of rhetorical speech, to a style differing from common speech in no other circumstance but that of metre^d.—Dacier, with the stiff and inflexible dignity of French Tragedy before his eyes, appears to have been shocked at the expression, μη ταπεινή; for he translates, not the words only, but the *ideas*, of his author, into *French*: “La vertu de l’expression consiste dans la netteté et dans LA “NOBLESSE.”

N O T E 193.

P. 110. SUCH IS THE POETRY OF CLEOPHON——.

See NOTE 14. From what Aristotle says of this Poet in the *Rhetoric*^a, it appears, that he sometimes variegated his vulgarity with a dash of bombast. He gave fine epithets to low words. The εὐτελες ὀνομα, there, agrees with what is said of him here.

^c See the ch. of the Rhet. last referred to.

^d See what is said at the end of this chapter, (*cap.* xxii.) about the Tragic and other species; and NOTE 209.

^a III. 7.—See NOTE 190, p. 448.

What is there said of Cleophon, La Motte says of HOMER himself.—“ Homere emploie quelquefois les *mots les plus vils*, et “ il les releve aussitôt par *des epithetes magnifiques* ^b.” It must, indeed, be confessed, that, after all the apologies of critics and commentators, Homer’s Διὸς ὑφορβῆ—“ *divine swineherd*”—has not, to our ears, a much better effect than ποτνια στυγή. The only reasonable way of defending Homer, is, surely, to content ourselves with saying, in general, that the expression *could* not have the same incongruous appearance in Homer’s time; as, in that case, he certainly would not have used it. At least, this would be a better apology, than to assert, with Boileau, that σὺβωτης is one of the *finest words* in the Greek language^c.”

N O T E 194.

P. 110. AND THAT OF STHENELUS.

This seems to explain a fragment of Aristophanes, in which the Poet, alluding probably to the flatness and insipidity of the diction of Sthenelus, as wanting the poetic seasoning of metaphor, &c. introduces some hungry fellow saying, that “ he could make “ shift to eat even some of the *words* of Sthenelus, *if they were “ but dipped in salt, or vinegar.*”

^b Disc. sur l’Iliade.

^c Reflex. 9, sur Longin.—“ Il n’y a peut-être pas dans le Grec deux plus *beaux mots* que σὺβωτης & βεκολῆ.”—Le Bossu, the admired *Le Bossu*, apologizes in a different way. The passage is a morsel of such rare and exquisite absurdity, that I cannot withhold it from the reader. “ Nous trouvons de grandes bassesses dans les termes “ de claudrons & de marmites, dans le sang, dans les graisses, dans les intestins & “ autres parties des animaux; parceque tout cela n’est plus que dans nos cuisines & “ dans nos boucheries, & que ces choses nous font bondir le cœur. Et nous ne pre- “ nons pas garde, que tout cela, au temps d’Homere et de Virgile, étoit au goût du S. “ *Esprit même, qui n’a jamais pu l’avoir mauvais; que Dieu avoit très-soigneusement “ ordonné toutes ces choses à Moïse,*” &c. *Traite du Poëme Epique*, VI. 8.

: Κα: πως ἔγω Σθενελε φαγοιμ' ἀν ῥήμα τι,
 Εἰς ὄξος ἐμβραπτομενον ἢ λευκας ἀλας. *Athen. IX. init.*

N O T E 195.

P. 110. AN ÆNIGMA, IF COMPOSED OF METAPHORS—.

“ Ut modicus autem atque opportunus ejus usus illustrat orationem, ita, frequens et obscurat et tædio complet; *continuus* “ *verò in allegoriam et ænigma exit.*”—*Quintil. VIII. 6.*

N O T E 196.

P. 110. THE ESSENCE OF AN ÆNIGMA CONSISTS, &c.

I can neither assent to the emendation proposed by Mr. Win-
 stanley, nor see the least want of any emendation. The passage
 appears to me perfectly clear and unexceptionable, as it is. Τα
 ὑπαρχοντα must, by no means, be joined with ἀδύνατα. It evidently
 means here, in a sense very usual, things that actually *exist*—i. e.
 are *true*. As, *Rhet. II. 25*, λυεται δε και τα σημεια,——κ'αν ἢ ὑπαρ-
 χοντα: where, ὑπαρχοντα is synonymous with ἀληθες, in *lib. i. cap.*
ii. p. 517—λυτον δε, κ'αν ΑΛΗΘΕΣ ἢ.

The passage is accurately and closely rendered by Piccolomini.
 “ La forma e l'essentia dell' enigma consiste in questo, che *nel dir*
 “ *cofi, che VERAMENTE SIANO, si congiungano insieme cose ch' ap-*
 “ *raiano impossibili à star' insieme.*”—And this is an exact definition
 of an ænigma—such an ænigma, at least, as Aristotle means. But
 in the other way of constructing the passage, which is that of
 Castelvetro, and some other interpreters, it is no definition at all.
 For if the *essence* of a riddle consists *merely* in “ *putting together*
 “ *things that are incompatible and impossible,*”—τα ὑπαρχοντα ἀδύνατα
 συναψα.—

συναψαι—then the Italian Poet made a *riddle*, when he described a man fighting after he was cut in two:

— — — del colpo non accorto,
Andava combattendo, ed era morto*.

N O T E 197.

P. 110. NOW THIS CANNOT BE EFFECTED BY THE MERE ARRANGEMENT OF THE WORDS, &c.

Κατα μὲν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων συνθεσιν.—*Heinsius*—τῆν τῶν ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ὀνομάτων—. But the κυριον ὄνομα, as I have already observed, is, throughout, opposed by Aristotle, not to μεταφορα only, but to *all* the other words. He would hardly, therefore, have used it here in a different sense, as opposed to *metaphor* only. If any emendation were necessary, I should think ΑΛΛΩΝ ὀνομάτων more probable^a. But perhaps no word is wanting. Aristotle had used the expression, ἀδύνατα ΣΥΝΑΨΑΙ—“to put together things impossible.” This might lead to suppose, that an ænigma might be made by the mere συνθεσις ὀνομάτων—by a certain *arrangement* or *construction* of the words only. Therefore he adds—“this cannot be done by the “mere arrangement of the words; by the *metaphorical* use of “them it *may*.”

As this sense seems sufficiently clear^b, supposes no defect in the text, and, after all, coincides, in the main, with that of Heinsius, (for we must necessarily understand, an arrangement of words *not metaphorical*—) I have adopted it in my translation, after Dacier, and Batteux.

* Berni, *Orlando Innamorato*, lib. ii. canto 24, stanza 60.

^a So, I find, Piccolomini translates:—“dell' altre parole.”

^b It seems also to result, most naturally, from Aristotle's expression; in which, κατα τῆν τῶν ὀΝΟΜΑΤΩΝ ΣΥΝΘΕΣΙΝ, and, κατα ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑΝ, seem opposed:—“by “*construction*—by *metaphor*.”—If he had written κατα τῆν τῶν ΑΛΛΩΝ (or ΚΥΡΙΩΝ) ὀνομ. συνθ. he would probably have written also—κατα δὲ τῆν τῶν μεταφορῶν (sc. συνθεσιν.)

N O T E 198.

P. 110. A MAN I ONCE BEHELD, &c.

See *Rhet.* III. 2, p. 586, where this is called an *approved*, or *admired*, riddle:—ἐν τῷ ἀνιγματι τῷ εὐδοκίμῳ.— I wish it may εὐδοκίμῳ with a modern reader. In Athenæus another line appears:

Ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκῶν ἐπ' ἀνερὶ κολλησάντα,
 'Οὕτω συγκολλῶς ὥσε' συναίμα πρῶτον. *Lib.* ix. p. 452.

But Casaubon seems right in supposing this pentameter to have been a modern addition; for it is not found, I believe, in any more ancient writer. Even in Plutarch, I observe, that the hexameter not only appears by itself, as in Aristotle, but is plainly given as the *whole*. See his *Symposium*, p. 267, *ed. H. St.* It appears from that passage to have been the production of a lady, *Eumetis*. I doubt whether, in these “degenerate days,” it would have gained her a prize in the *Lady's Diary*.

The Greeks were fond of these puzzles. The reader may find some curious specimens of this sort of wit in *Athenæus*, X. 448, &c.

N O T E 199.

P. 111. AS OLD EUCLID DID, OBJECTING, &c.

Fontenelle talks in the same way. “Du tems d'Homere c'étoit
 “ une grande merveille qu'un homme pût assujettir son discours à
 “ des mesures, à des sillabes longues et breves, & faire en même
 “ tems quelque chose de raisonnable. On donnoit donc aux Poetes
 “ des licences infinies, & on se tenoit encore trop heureux d'avoir
 “ des vers. *Homere pouvoit parler dans un seul vers cinq langues*
 “ *differentes;*

“ *differentes* ; prendre le dialecte Dorique quand l’Ionique ne l’ac-
 “ commodoit pas ; au défaut de tous les deux, prendre l’Attique,
 “ l’Eolique, ou le commun ; *c’est-à-dire, parler en même tems,*
 “ *Picard, Gascon, Normand, Breton, & François commun.* Il pou-
 “ voit *allonger un mot s’il étoit trop court, l’accourcir s’il étoit trop*
 “ *long* ; personne n’y trouvoit à redire^a.”

But, could this ingenious and sensible writer *seriously* suppose, that the language of Homer’s poems had at all the same effect to a hearer, or reader, of his time, that an English poem would now have, if composed of all the provincial dialects of Great Britain ? — We are always told, how Homer enriched his language by “ visiting all the principal nations of Greece, and learning the “ peculiarities of their speech^b.” Just as if an English poet, because he had resided some time in Yorkshire, or Lancashire, might, in his next poem, put *neet* for *night*, *loise* for *lose*, or a *bal- liblast*, a very well-sounding Lancashire word, for a *blaze*.

This account makes the language of Homer no other than the *κοιτισμ* which Quintilian reprobates, among the *vitia orationis*^c : something worse than the “ Babylonish dialect” of Hudibras ;

— — “ a party-colour’d dress
 “ Of patch’d and piebald languages.
 “ — — — — —
 “ It had an odd promiscuous tone,
 “ As if he’d talk’d three parts in one ;

^a *Digression sur les Anc. et les Mod.*

^b Blackwell’s *Enquiry*, &c. p. 292.—And so, indeed, the author of the treatise *De Hom. Poes.*—Λέξει δε ποιικίη κεχρημεν[Ⓞ], της από πασης διαλεκτης των Ελληνων χαρακτηριστας ἐγκαταμιξεν, ἐξ ὧν δηλ[Ⓞ] ἐστ, πασαν μεν Ελλάδα ἐπελθων και παν ἐθν[Ⓞ].

^c “ *Κοιτισμ* quoque appellatur quædam mista ex variâ ratione linguarum oratio ;
 “ *ut si Atticis Dorica, Ionica, Æolica etiam dicta confundas.* Cui simile vitium est apud
 “ nos, si quis sublimia humilibus, vetera novis, poetica vulgaribus misceat.”

De Inst. Or. VIII. 3, p. 396. *ed. Gibb.*

Quintilian certainly did not intend this for a description of *Homer’s* language.

“ Which

“ Which made some think, when he did gabble,
 “ They had heard three labourers of Babel;
 “ Or Cerberus himself pronounce
 “ A leash of languages at once.”

With such an idea of Homer's language, Fontenelle might well add—“ Cette étrange confusion de langues, cet assemblage bizarre de mots tout défigurés, étoit la langue des dieux; du moins *il est bien sûr que ce n'étoit pas celle des hommes.*”—And, indeed, I firmly believe with Lord Monboddo, that “ such a mongrel dialect was never written by any man;” and that “ Homer wrote, either the language that was spoken in the country where he was born and educated, or that was used by the poets that had written before him, and was the established language of Poetry.”

N O T E 200.

P. III. AND THEN GIVING A BURLESQUE EXAMPLE OF THAT SORT OF DICTION.

Ἰαμβοποιησας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει.—Two senses have been given to the word Ἰαμβοποιησας; both of them, I think, far from satisfactory. Some render it—*making Iambic verses*: “ *Iambis usus est.*” [Vid.] But, is it likely, that Euclid, meaning to ridicule Homer's hexameters, should do it in *Iambic* verse?—Besides that the lines themselves, such as we find them, have not the least air of Iambics, but fall easily enough, with a little help, into hexameters. In this I perfectly agree with Dacier; though I see no reason to suppose with him, that Euclid had composed—“ *un ouvrage en vers heroïques.*”

† *Orig. and Prog. of Lang. vol. iii. p. 19.*—And see the rational account given of this matter, and of the progress and intermixture of the Greek dialects in general, by Mr. Burgess, in his valuable edition of the *Miscell. Crit. of Dawes, Pref. xxi.* and p. 405.

Others, and Madius in particular, understand the word to mean, *satirizing, ridiculing*, the Poet;—" *se moque de lui.*" [*Dac.*] A meaning that, undoubtedly, suits the *passage* better; whether it suits the *word* itself I much doubt, but will not venture to decide. As Aristotle uses *ιαμβοποιος*, in the sense of a *satiric Poet*^a—a maker of the *ιαμβος*, or *satiric poem*, he may possibly have used the verb, *ιαμβοποιειν*, here, in the correspondent sense of *making a satire upon*, or *burlesquing*:—*ιαμβοποιησας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει*.—"having ridiculed him " *in that sort of diction,*" in the following manner, &c.—As this sense appears to me, on the whole, far more eligible than the other, I have followed it: for I see no third sense that can, with any shew of probability, be extracted from the present text. But that it is defective, and that *ιαμβοποιησας* is an error, I have very little doubt. If conjecture might be indulged, I should be inclined to suppose, that *what* Aristotle had said was this;—"that it is an " easy matter to versify, *even in common speech*, (*ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει*;) " if " one may be allowed to extend syllables and words at pleasure, " so as to convert, for instance, an *Iambic foot*, which is continu- " ally occurring in common conversation^b, into an *Heròic* or " *Spondee.*" And the examples that follow, were probably two *prose* sentences so converted, or convertible, into hexameters. But as to the *manner* in which Aristotle had expressed this in the text, I have no conjecture to offer that is satisfactory, even to myself.—Of the mangled lines which follow, with their perplexing variety of indeterminable readings, I shall say with Victorius, " *veritate desperatâ, nihil amplius curæ de hac re suscipere volui.*" It is some comfort however, as M. Batteux has observed, that both the *objection* of Euclid, and Aristotle's *answer*, are clear enough, independently of the examples.

I ought to mention, that Castelvetro has explained this passage, *without* supposing the text wrong, in a manner different from any

^a See *cap.* ix.

^b *Cap.* iv.—*μαλιστα γαρ λεκτικον, &c.*

other interpreter, and which, in part, accords with my idea. By *ιαμβοποιειν* he understands neither *satirizing*, nor making Iambic *verses*; but, making Iambic *feet instead of spondees, in hexameter verse*. And the sense he gives the whole passage is this: “It would be a very easy thing to write *heroic verse*, if this liberty of *extension* were allowed; for then, a Poet might put Iambic feet in the room of Spondees, and commit no fault, because the short syllables might be lengthened at pleasure.” And the lines that follow he supposes to be examples of such defective hexameters.

There is somewhat ingenious in this explanation, as there is in many others of this acute writer; but it has likewise the fault, which many of his explanations have; that of being by no means reconcilable with the original.—See his comment. p. 481.

N O T E 201.

P. III. WHEN THESE LICENCES APPEAR TO BE THUS PURPOSELY USED——.

—Το μὲν ἐν ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ πῶς χρωμενον, κ. τ. ἀλ.—The force, both of *φαίνεσθαι*, which I understand to be emphatic here, and of *πῶς*, seems perfectly well explained by Castelvetro. “Non so perchè alcuni vogliono rimuovere di questo testo, *πῶς*, essendoci stato posto per dimostrare, che allora il vizio si scopre, e’l rifo si muove, quando si comincia *in alcun modo a riconoscare, che il poeta ha usata a studio, e ricercata questa maniera di parole.*” p. 482.

So, too, Piccolomini’s translation—“*l’esser veduto---usar così fatto modo di locutione.*”—For *πῶς*, I once suspected we should read *ΑΠΡΕπῶς*; as presently after—*χρωμενὸν ἀπρεπῶς*. But I believe *πῶς* is right:—*aliquo modo*.

N O T E 202.

P. III. HOW GREAT A DIFFERENCE IS MADE, &c.

Ὅσον διαφέρει.—Not “quantum excellat,” as Goulston and others translate; but, “*what a difference the proper use of such words makes*”—“*how different the effect is.*” As, above, *cap. x.* ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ γὰρ πολὺ—“it makes a great difference:” and, *cap. xviii.* τὴ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ.—Nothing more common than this use of the word. The *difference* here expressed, is, plainly, between the ἀρμωττον, and the ἀπρεπώς, in the use of such words: χρωμεῖσθε ΑΠΡΕΠΩΣ—τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ ἀπρεπώσασαίτο ΤΟ ΔΕ ἈΡΜΩΤΤΟΝ ὅσον διαφέρει—κ. τ. λ.

N O T E 203.

P. III. —AND TEMPERATE USE OF SUCH WORDS—.

—Ἐπιθεμενων των ὀνοματων εἰς τὸ μετρον:—literally, “*the words being put into the metre:*” i. e. as Victorius and others explain it, “*taking care, that, in changing the words, you do it “salvo metro.”*” A very unnecessary caution surely; besides that the Greek hardly *says* that, whatever it may *mean*. Let us try its meaning by the fairest test, that of strict and literal translation; for we can sometimes see nonsense in *English*, which we cannot see in *Greek*. “*But what difference is made by a proper use of such words, may be observed in hexameter verse, when the words are put into (i. e. as it is explained, adapted to—) the metre.*”—*What words?*—Metaphorical, foreign, extended, &c. of which he had just been speaking. Very well. But how—*put in, or adapted to, the metre?*—for not a word has *yet* been said about *changing* the words. Goulston understands, putting in these poe-

tical words *instead of the proper and common words*^a. I see nothing of this in the original.

In short, it appears to me, that nothing tolerable can be made of the phrase, εἰς τὸ μετρον, taken in this sense. If it might be taken, as some have taken it^b, *adverbially*, for μετρωσ—*to a moderate degree*—all would be well. “Let it be considered in heroic verse, what a difference is made by such words, when *properly* used, and *not inserted, or introduced, too frequently.*” But I cannot think that the expression will admit of this sense, though somewhat favoured, perhaps, by the circumstance of μετρον having been just before used in the sense of *moderation*: τὸ δὲ μετρον, κοινὸν ἀπαντων, &c. If the article τὸ were omitted, the adverbial sense would be *less* improbable; but, εἰς τὸ μετρον, can only, I think, mean—*into the metre*. Still, however, I incline to think this was Aristotle’s meaning, and that he probably wrote εἰς τὸ ΜΕΤΡΙΟΝ. A single letter makes all the difference. The word μετριον, as far as that may add any probability to my conjecture, occurs in that part of the *Rhetoric* where he is treating of the very *same* subject—the proper and *moderate* use of metaphors, epithets, and other tropical and ornamental words, in oratory. Thus, III. 2, p. 586, speaking of epithets and diminutives, he says, εὐλαβεισθαὶ δὲ δεῖ, καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ ΜΕΤΡΙΟΝ. And again, of epithets—δεῖ στοχαζέσθαι τοῦ ΜΕΤΡΙΟΥ. p. 587.

As this was the only satisfactory sense I could make of the words, I have ventured to give it in my version.

^a See the notes on his Latin version.

^b Castelvetro—Dacier—(“*mises avec mesure.*”) and the editor of the unaccented Ox. ed. of 1760.

N O T E 204.

P. 112. FOR A COMMON AND USUAL WORD——.

Κυριε ἐωθοτϙ. As κυριον, in Aristotle's sense, is *common*, the addition of ἐωθοτϙ, (*usual*), seems, at first view, to be mere tautology. But the case, as it is very well explained by Victorius, appears to have been this. The word ἐσθια, which he here calls κυριον ἐωθϙ, was not *strictly* κυριον, but only a *common metaphor*; that is, a word which, though *originally* metaphorical, had acquired, by constant use as a surgical term *, the *effect* of a *proper* word. [See NOTE 179.] As κυριον, therefore, in Aristotle's enumeration, was opposed to μεταφορα, as well as to γλωττα, and the rest of the poetical words, the application of it here, to a word that was evidently metaphorical in its original use, might seem inconsistent: the word ἐωθοτϙ was therefore, probably, added, to obviate, in his short way, this objection.

I cannot guess what induced Dacier to render γλωτταν, here, by “*not metaphorique* ;” or Castelvetro to assert, that Aristotle calls θοναται a *foreign* word, only on account of the *boldness of the metaphor*. By γλωττα, I think, we are to understand, any word that belongs either to another language, or another *dialect* of the same language, and that is not naturalized by *common* and *popular use*. For foreign words, by long usage, become common and popular words; like *entire*, *dame*, and a great number of other French words in our language, which were γλωτται when first introduced, and for a considerable time afterwards; but have now, for many years, ceased to be considered as *foreign* words. Such words in the Greek language Aristotle, I apprehend, did not com-

* Aristotle, probably, would not have given the denomination of κυριον, at all, to the same word in this line of Homer:

Τες ἀμα σοι παντας πυρ ἐσθει.—

Il. Ψ. 182.

prehend under the term *γλωτται*, as not being *strange, uncommon, ξενικα*. This is evident from a passage in his *Rhetoric*: *αἱ μὲν ἐν ΓΛΩΤΤΑΙ, ΑΓΝΩΤΕΣ· τὰ δὲ ΚΥΡΙΑ, ΙΣΜΕΝ*^b.

There is, however, one sort of poetic words not distinctly provided for in Aristotle's enumeration; I mean, *obsolete* words. Yet these make so considerable a part of the privileged language of verse, that we can hardly suppose him to have overlooked them. *Γλωτται* seems the only class to which they can possibly be referred: yet his definition of *γλωττα* is, "a word, ὃ χρωνται ΕΤΕΡΟΙ; which is not applicable to an obsolete word, used by *nobody*. Perhaps he did not think it worth while to distinguish between words belonging to *another* language, or dialect, and words that *once* belonged to the native language, but which, having long fallen into disuse, have, when occasionally revived, the effect of *foreign* words.

N O T E 205.

P. 112. THE CANKEROUS WOUND THAT EATS MY FLESH.

—Φαγεδαινα ἢ με σαρκας ἐσθια ποδῶ.—We should read, probably, for the sake of the metre, either *φαγεδαινα γ' ἢ*, as it is corrected in the Oxford Euripides, or, which seems still better, *φαγεδαινα δη*, which is Du Pauw's emendation. And *σαρκας*, for the same reason, must have been altered to *σαρκα*, in the verse of Euripides, as, I see, it is given in the Oxford edition.

Had Aristotle told us no more about these two lines, than that *one* of them was of Æschylus, and the other of Euripides, what critic would not have confidently given the *θοναται* to Æschylus?

^b *Rhet.* III. 10. *imit.*

N O T E 206.

P. 112. Νυν δὲ μ' ἔων ΟΛΙΓΟΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΤΙΔΑΝΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΚΙΚΤΣ.

Od. IX. 515.—In the *altered* line, thus:

Νυν δὲ μ' ἔων ΜΙΚΡΟΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΑΣΘΕΝΙΚΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΕΙΔΗΣ.

Among these substituted terms, that μικρὸς answers to ὀλιγὸς is clear enough; but how αἰδῆς answers to ἀκικτς, it is not easy to make out. This difficulty struck me, long before I had seen the comment of Victorius, who makes the same remark; and I had accounted for the mistake in the same way that he does: for, if ἀκικτς be the true reading, the commentators must, probably, have been misled by taking it for granted, that the substituted words must necessarily correspond, in *order*, as well as *meaning*, to the original words^a. But it is easy to see, that αἰδῆς, *ugly*, or *deformed*, cannot answer to ἀκικτς, which is *weak*; and that ἀσθενικὸς does exactly answer to it. Ἄκικτς—ἌΣΘΕΝΗΣ, ἀδυνατὸς. *Hesych.*—But my difficulty goes still farther. I do not see how αἰδῆς can correspond, in meaning, to ἐτιδανὸς. I once thought it should be ΑΕΙΚΗΣ. — Ουτιδανὸς — ὑδενὸς ἀξίḡς. *Hesych.* Αεμελις — εὐτελής, ΟΥΔΕΝΟΣ ΑΞΙΟΤΣ: and, ΑΕΙΚΕΣ — ΕΥΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΗΤΟΝ. *Id.* So *Suidas*; Αεμελις — ὁ εὐκαταφρονητὸς. But, notwithstanding the authority of lexicographers, and the common derivation of the two words, αἰκῆς and αεμελις, I question whether the former is ever used by Homer in the sense of ἐτιδανὸς, *contemptible*, *mean*, &c. though αεμελις is. Αεικῆς seems always to mean, *indignus*, *unworthy*, *bad*, *shocking*, *shameful*, &c. It is a word of *serious indig-*

^a —“ Aristotelem, ordinem Homericorum verborum in immutatione eorum non servasse; atque id fecisse, ut metrum servaret; et, quum inquit, ἀσθενικὸς, quod secundum apud ipsum est, tertium apud poetam exprimere voluisse.” *Vid. Comment. p. 237.*

nation^b. *Αεικελιον* seems to be used sometimes in *that* sense^c, and sometimes in the *contemptuous* sense^d, as in the line of Homer which Aristotle next produces. The only passages that I have found in Homer, where *ἀεικής* will admit well of this sense, are *Od.* Π. 199, and *Od.* Ω. 249, in the expressions, *ἀεικεα ἔσσο*, and, *ἀεικεα ἔσσαι*: yet even there, it is not necessary to render it “*meanly clad* ;” it may be, as in other places, *sadly, unbecomingly, indignè*, &c.

With respect to the word *ἐτιδων*, Hesychius gives *ἀσθενής* as one of its meanings; and *ἀσθενε* might well enough answer to it here, were it not for the stronger claim of the word *ἀκίως*; which, however, after all, may *possibly* be a mistake. We know how variously Homer was read and quoted by the antients. Three Medicean manuscripts here give *ἀειδής*, instead of *ἀκίως*^e; and so, the *ed. Ald.* and the version of *Valla*. This reading is also mentioned by *Eustathius*. Perhaps, then, *ἀειδής* might be the reading of Aristotle’s copy—the precious copy *ἐν ναυθῆνι*, of which we hear so much; and he might mean to exemplify his proposed experiment of substituting *common*, for *poetical*, expression, only in the *two first* words; repeating the last, *ἀειδής*, merely to complete his verse. But whatever becomes of this conjecture, one thing I cannot help just observing—that this reading, *ἀειδής*, is favoured by the preceding lines in Homer. *Polyphemus* says—

Ἀλλ’ αἶε τινα φῶτα ΜΕΓΑΝ καὶ ΚΑΛΟΝ ἔδεγμην

Εὐθαδ’ ἔλευσεσθαι, μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ΑΛΚΗΝ.

Νυν δὲ μ’, ἔων ΟΛΙΓΟΣ τε καὶ ΟΥΤΙΔΑΝΟΣ καὶ ΑΚΙΚΥΣ, &c.

v. 513.

One would expect the three words in this last line to answer, as opposites, to *great, handsome, and strong*, in the two first: which they

^b Vide indices Homericos.

^c As *Od.* Δ. 244. ξ. 32. θ. 231.

^d Ind. Homer.

^e See Mr. Winstanley’s edition.

will not do, if we read *ἀεικεις*; for *ἐτίδαν*, though it may very well be opposed to *μεγάλην ἐπιειμενον ἀλκην*, cannot be, with any propriety, opposed to *καλον*. Whereas, if *ἀειδης* be substituted for *ἀεικεις*, all will answer exactly; *ὀλιγ*, to *μεγαν*, *ἐτίδαν*, to *μεγάλην ἐπιειμενον ἀλκην*, and *ἀειδης*, to *καλον*.

In these examples, it is not always easy to ascertain the particular class, to which Aristotle would have referred the words which he changes. We learn, however, that all these Homeric words were *ξενια*, *uncommon*, and *poetical*; and that all the substituted words were *κυρια*—words in *common* and familiar use.

N O T E 207.

P. 113. FOR IT IS THIS ALONE, WHICH CANNOT BE ACQUIRED, &c.

Well translated, though very freely, by M. Batteux. “C’est la seule chose qu’on ne puisse emprunter d’ailleurs. C’est la production du génie, *le coup-d’œil d’un esprit qui voit les rapports.*” Compare *Rhet.* III. 2, p. 585, D. and 11, p. 595, E. where it is observed, that, *και ἐν φιλοσοφια, το ὍΜΟΙΟΝ, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΠΟΛΥ ΔΙΕΧΟΥΣΙ, θεωρειν, εὐσοχε.*—See Mr. Harris’s *Philol. Inq.* p. 186, 187, where all these passages are quoted and translated.

N O T E 208.

P. 113. THE DOUBLE ARE BEST SUITED TO DITHYRAMBIC POETRY, &c.

—Χρησιμωτατη ἡ διπλη λέξις τοις διθυραμβοις· οὗτοι γὰρ ψωφωδεις· αἱ δὲ γλωτται, τοις ἐποποιοις· σεμνον γὰρ και ἀνθαδες· ἡ μεταφορα δὲ, τοις ἱαμβειοις. *Rhet.* III. 3, p. 587.

N O T E 209.

P. 113. BUT TO IAMBIC VERSE, WHICH IS, AS MUCH AS MAY BE, AN IMITATION OF COMMON SPEECH——.

This, as I have already observed^a, is the only passage in these three chapters concerning the *diction*, that strictly relates to the subject—the diction of *Tragedy*, as distinguished from that of the Epic, and other species. It is a hint only; but a pregnant hint, and one that might furnish matter for a dissertation of some length. How frequently, even in the best Tragedies, do we see the Poet, as it were, through the actor; hear him indulging himself in his *own* language, instead of imitating that of his characters; substituting declamation for passion, *describing* when he should *express*^b; and, in the unrestrained and *epic* elevation of his diction, losing all sight of that *natural* language, of which, undoubtedly, the language of Tragedy should be, according to the precept here *implied* by Aristotle, only an *improved imitation*. This improvement, indeed, admits of *more* or *less*, but should, at least, bear always the same *proportion* to what we conceive would be the natural language* of the

^a NOTE 166.

^b See *Diff.* I. p. 18.

* What I here call *natural* language is, by no means, confined to *simple* and *familiar* language. See NOTE 226, and Dr. Hurd's note on v. 94 of the *Ep.* to the *Pilos*, there referred to. To which I must add the judicious observations communicated to the public, long after this note was written, by Mr. Mason, in his memoirs of Mr. Whitehead, p. 58, 59, 60. I perfectly agree with what is there said—that the Tragic style not only admits, but demands, “the use of strong images, metaphors, and figures;” that “it cannot, indeed, be truly impassioned without them;” and that “while it discards unmeaning epithets, it should be liberal of those, that add force and vigour to the sentiment.” Nor is all this in any degree incompatible with *such* imitation, *such improved* imitation, of common

the persons who speak, in the situation, whatever it may be, of the scene before us. For this last circumstance makes a great difference. Tragedy has its *ἀργα μέρη*, its comparatively “idle parts,” as well as the Epic Poem^c; and, considering how rare the talent is of true poetic fancy, and poetic expression, the critic, who would rigorously exclude them from every part of Tragedy, must be an *Ariphrades*, or a *Euclid*.—The first speech of Caractacus, in Mr. Mason’s exquisite drama, is highly poetical. Possibly, a severe critic might wish it somewhat less so;—but we have so little of such Poetry!—No Poet, however, knows better than Mr. Mason, when the simpler tone of nature and passion should take place. When Caractacus is exhorted by the Druids to “bethink him”—

— — if ought on this vain earth
Still holds too firm an union with his soul,
Estranging it from peace——

—he answers,

— — — I had a Queen:—
Bear with my weakness, Druid!—This tough breast
Must heave a sigh—for she is unreveng’d.
And can I taste true peace, she unreveng’d?
—So chaste, so lov’d a queen!—ah, Evelina,
Hang not thus weeping on the feeble arm
That could not save thy mother.——

The reader will find some excellent observations on this subject in Dr. Beattie’s Essay on Poetry, &c. Part II. chap. i. Sect. 1, p. 224, &c. and Sect. 3, p. 267, 268, where a charming example of simple Tragic language is given from *Othello*^d.

speech, (ΟΤΙΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ λέγειν μιμεισθαι,) as Aristotle attributes to Tragic diction, which he does not require to be confined to common and ordinary expression, (*κωμικα*;) but expressly allows it to use also metaphors, and epithets: το κωμικον, και ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ, και ΚΟΣΜΟΣ. cap. xxii.

^c Cap. xxiv. *Transf.* Part III. Sect. 6.

^d In his note, Dr. Beattie has “translated it into the *finical* style.” But we see plainly, that he is by much too good a Poet to succeed well in spoiling good Poetry.

With

With respect to the *Greek Tragedy*, its earliest language appears to have been of a low and burlesque kind—the *λεξις γελοια* of its satyric origin, conveyed in the suitable vehicle of the dancing *tetrameter*^c. When it was reformed and dignified, (*ἀπεσεμνωθη*,) *Homer* was the model; and *ÆSCHYLUS*, with a conception naturally sublime, and the *Iliad* before him, raised the tone of Tragedy above its proper pitch, not only to the pomp of the *Epic*, but even, frequently, to the wild, and tumid, and dark audacity of the *Dithyrambic*: so that, sometimes, as extremes will meet, the *λεξις γελοια*, which he took so much pains to avoid, came round and met him, in the shape of bombast, at the very moment when he thought himself at the greatest distance from it. There could not well be any thing in the theatrical cart of *Thespis* more laughable, than to call smoke “*the brother of fire*,” and dust, the “*brother of mud*.”

SOPHOCLES reduced the *general* language of his dialogue to a more equable and sober dignity, but still, *Homer*, we know, was his great model^e; and of his diction it may, perhaps, be said, that it is often *Epic*, though his measure is *Iambic*. Most modern

^c Cap. iv. *Transl. Part I. Sect. 7.*

^f Πυρῶ κασιν. *Sept. contra Theb. v. 500.*—κασιν πηλα---κων. *Agam. 503.*—The commentators are very amusing, when they admire this, and tell us, it is the same thing as the beautiful expression of χρυσεας τικνον ἐλπιδῶ, applied to the Oracle, in the *Oedipus* of *Sophocles*, [v. 161], the *παμφορη γουιας τρινα* of *Æschylus*, applied to flowers [*Perf. 620.*] or the “*Sylva filia nobilis*,” of *Horace*. [See *Burton’s Pentalogia*, and *Stanley’s notes on Æschylus.*] *De Pauw*, indeed, finds fault; but he is equally diverting in another way. His note upon *κασιν πηλα*, is—“*Inepte: pulvis ille est ipsum lutum arefactum et comminutum: oculati vident statim.*”—It is to be observed, that both these metaphors of *Æschylus* are in the *dialogue* part. *Dante* has a *riddling* metaphorical expression of the same kind, but much more poetical. He calls a hoar frost, the *sister of snow*.

Quando la brina in su la terra assẽmpra
L’imagine di sua sorella bianca. *Inferno, Canto xxiv. v. 4, 5.*

^e Ὅμηρον μὲν, Σοφοκλεα ἐπιμον, Σοφοκλεα δὲ, Ὅμηρον τραγικον. *Suidas, v. POLEMON. Diog. Laert. IV. 20.*—το παν Ὅμηρικως ὀνομαζε. *Auctor Vitæ Sophoclis.*

readers, however, will, I believe, think it, (as we are told many *antient* readers did^h,) more adapted to the genius of Tragedy than that of EURIPIDES; who seems to have been regarded by the antients as the first who brought down the *language* of Tragedy into unison with the *measure*, so that the one bore the same degree of resemblance to common speech in its *expressions*, as the other did in its *rhythm*. At least, this appears to have been Aristotle's opinion, from a passage in his *Rhetoric*, where, after having explained the difference between the diction of Oratory and that of Poetry, and the foundation of that difference, he observes, that such a degree of embellishment as forces on the hearer the idea of art, and labour, and preparation, is to be avoided, not only by the Orator, but even by the Poet, if he would be natural and affecting: and he compares such *evidently artificial* language to the voices of the generality of actors, as opposed to the voice of *Theodorus*, which always appeared to be the real voice of the character he personated; whereas *their* voices were evidently feignedⁱ. He then adds—"The best way to conceal artifice, and make your language appear easy and natural, is, by forming it, chiefly, of the words and phrases of customary speech, properly *selected*; as EURIPIDES does, *who first set the example*^k."

A passage, that precedes this, deserves to be given entire, from its close connection with the subject of this part of the treatise on Poetry, and the curious, though short, sketch it contains of the *history* of Tragic diction.

^h Namque is, (*Euripides*,) et in *sermone* (quod ipsum reprehendunt quibus *gracitas et cothurnus et sonus Sophoclis* videtur esse sublimior,) magis accedit oratorio generi. — *Quintil. X. 1.*

ⁱ See *Diff. I. p. 41.* in the note.

^k — διὰ λαίβαταιν ποιητῶν, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλατμένως, ἀλλὰ πεφυκτως· τὸτο γὰρ πῶς ἐκεῖνο δὲ, τ' ἐναντίον· —, καὶ οἷον ἢ Θεόδωρος φωνῆ πεποιθεὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν ἢ μὲν γὰρ, τὰ λεγόντων ἴσθαι ἴσθαι, αἱ δ' ἄλλοτριαι. κλεπτεται δ' εὐ, ἐὰν τις ἐκ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας διαλέκτου ἐκλεγων συντίθη' ὅπως Euripides ποιῆι, ΚΑΙ ὙΠΕΔΕΙΞΕ ΠΡΩΤΟΣ. *Rhet. III. 2. p. 585. B.*

“ As the Poets appeared to owe their reputation to their *lan-
 guage*, which never failed to be admired, however foolish and
 “ absurd the *matter* it conveyed; on this account, even *profè*
 “ diction was, at first, poetical, like that of *Gorgias*. And even
 “ now, they, who use such language, are looked upon, by illite-
 “ rate people, as the finest speakers; which is far from being
 “ true; for *oratorical* diction, and *poetical* diction, are different
 “ things. And as a proof of this, we see what has actually hap-
 “ pened: for now, even among the Poets themselves, those who
 “ write *Tragedy* no longer make use of that sort of language;
 “ but, as they had exchanged the Trochaic *verse* for the Iambic,
 “ because *this*, of all metres, approaches the nearest to common
 “ speech; so now, they have also discarded all those words and
 “ phrases, so remote from common speech, with which the earlier
 “ Tragic Poets used to embellish their diction, and which are still
 “ employed by those who write *Hexameters*. It would be ridi-
 “ culous, therefore, to imitate the Poets in a language, which
 “ they themselves have abandoned as improper¹.”

The Abbé Batteux, by understanding *ιαμβειοις* here to mean Iambic, or satirical, *Poems*, has, unluckily, thrown away the only passage in these three chapters, that was strictly to Aristotle's purpose. He has, also, with Dacier, misrepresented his meaning, by rendering—“ *ne peut recevoir que ce qui est employé dans la conversation.*” We are, undoubtedly, to understand, ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ *ἀρμόττει*, as before: for that Aristotle did not mean absolutely to

¹ — ἐπει δὲ οἱ ποιῆται, λεγοντες εὐνήθη, δια τὴν λέξιν ἔδοκον πορισασθαι τῆδε τὴν δόξαν· δια τῆτο, ποιητικῆ πρῶτῃ ἐγενετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίας· καὶ νῦν ἐτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν τὰς ποιήτας οἰοῦνται διαλεγέσθαι καλλιῆσα. Τῆτο δὲ ἄκ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἕτερα λόγῳ καὶ ποιητικῆς λέξις ἐστίν. Διὰ δὲ το συμβαινόν· ἄδε γὰρ οἱ τὰς Τραγῳδίας ποιῶντες ἐτι χρωσται τοῦ αὐτοῦ τροποῦ· ἀλλ' ὡσπερ καὶ ἐκ τετραμμετρῶν εἰς το ἰαμβεῖον μετεβήσαν, δια το τῶ λόγῳ τῆτο τῶν μετρῶν ὁμοιοστατοῦ εἶναι τῶν ἀλλῶν· ἔτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφηκασίν, ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτὸν ἐστίν· οἷς δ' οἱ πρῶτων ἐκοσμεῖν, καὶ ἐτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἑξαμμετρα ποιῶντες, ἀφηκασίν. [The repetition of ἀφηκασίν, here, has much the appearance of error. I suspect we should read thus: ἔτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτὸν ἐστίν, οἷς τ' οἱ πρῶτων ἐκοσμεῖν καὶ—ποιῶντες, ἀφηκασίν.] διὸ γελοῖον μιμεῖσθαι τῆτες, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄκ ἐτι χρωσται ἐκείνῳ τῶ τροπῷ. *Rhet.* III. 1. p. 584.

exclude the other Poetic words—the double, the foreign, &c. from every part of the Tragic dialogue, is plain from his allowing the occasional use of them even in *prose*. *Rhet.* III. 2, p. 585, C. 7. p. 590, E. 591, A.

N O T E 210.

P. 115. EVEN IN THIS, THEREFORE, &c.

Ἡδη και ταυτη.—Ἡδη—*already*—*even* in the *first* operation of his genius—the very choice of his subject, and formation of his plan. Such appears to me to be the force of ἦδη in this passage, which, I think, is injured by those commentators who punctuate—ὡσπερ ἐπισημεν ἦδη—“as we have *already* said.”

N O T E 211.

P. 115. HE HAS, FROM THE REST, INTRODUCED MANY EPISODES—.

Νυν δε, εν μεροσ απολαβων, επεισοδιοις κεχρηται ΑΥΤΩΝ πολλοις.—*i. e.* as the commentators explain it, of the *other parts* of the war. But, what should we think of this English—“Selecting “*one part* of the war, he introduces many episodes of *them*?” If Aristotle meant the *other parts* of the war, αυτων must, surely, be wrong: if αυτων be right, I confess I cannot see *what* he meant. I wish we had manuscript authority for the αυτου of *Heinsius*, which is adopted and explained by *Le Bossu*, II. 5, and 6.—But a learned friend has suggested to me a conjecture still more probable; that Aristotle wrote ΑΛΛΩΝ. Νυν δε, εν μεροσ απολαβων, επεισοδιοις κεχρηται ΑΛΛΩΝ [*sc. μερων*] πολλοις. “Selecting *one part* “only of the war, he has, from *other parts*, introduced many “Episodes,” &c.

N O T E 212.

P. 115. THE AUTHOR OF THE CYPRIACS, AND OF THE LITTLE ILIAD.

To the authors usually referred to on the subject of these Poems, it may now be useful to add Heyne, *Excursu primo ad Æn. II.* p. 228, 229—a very learned and curious dissertation concerning the writers on the Trojan war.

N O T E 213.

P. 116. THE FALL OF TROY.

See Heyne, *Excursu primo ad Æn. II.* p. 230, 231.

N O T E 214.

P. 116. HOMER GAVE BOTH THE FIRST, AND THE MOST PERFECT, EXAMPLE.

Ἄριστος ἀπασιν Ὅμηρος κειμήτιον, καὶ πρῶτον, καὶ ἴσως.—“ Neque quemquam alium, cujus operis *primus* auctor fuerit, in eo *perfectionissimum*, præter HOMERUM, et *Archilochum*, reperiemus.” *Vell. Paterculæ*, I. 5.

Victorius, and other commentators, have, I think, done some injustice to the force of Aristotle's expression here, by taking the adverb, ἴσως, too literally. They render it—“ *ita ut satis putari debeat.*” (*Vict.*)—“ *accurate satis.*” (*Goulston.*) &c.—This gives the word, indeed, but falls short of the meaning, which Castel-

vetro alone has, according to my idea, adequately expressed: “Gran lode è quella, che è data da Aristotele ad Homero, che egli sia stato il *primo*, che abbia usate tutte e quattro le specie dell’ Epopea, &c.—e le habbia usate *bene & perfettamente.*” And his translation is—“Le quali cose tutte Homero usò, e *primo*, e *perfettamente.*” Undoubtedly, the literal meaning of *ἰκανως* is, *sufficiently well*; but in *Poetry* nothing is *sufficiently well*, that is not as well, or nearly as well, as *possible*: and, farther, if I am not mistaken, the Greek writers, not unfrequently, use *ἰκανως*, and *ἰκανως*, as the Italians use the word *affai*; sometimes for *enough*, (which, I suppose, is the primary signification of *affai*,) and sometimes for *much, a great deal, very, &c.* Ἰκανην—ἀρκυσαν, ΠΟΛΛΗΝ. *Hesych.*

N O T E 215.

P. 117. IF THE EPIC POEM WERE REDUCED FROM ITS ANTIEN T LENGTH, SO AS NOT TO EXCEED THAT OF SUCH A NUMBER OF TRAGEDIES AS ARE PERFORMED SUCCESSIVELY AT ONE HEARING.

If we knew certainly, how many Tragedies were performed at one hearing, (*εἰς μίαν ἀκροασιν*,) we should know, with equal certainty, to what length Aristotle thought the Epic Poem ought to be reduced, in order to be perfectly, or sufficiently, *ἔυσηνοπτον*. But, unfortunately, the premises here are not less obscure than the conclusion; the information to be picked up in ancient authors, relative to the Tragic contests and the *Tetralogiae*, being extremely imperfect and unsatisfactory. Let us however try, what little glimmering of light may be thrown upon this subject, from those authors, or from the nature of the thing itself.

The general principle, upon which Aristotle here fixes the length of an Epic Poem, is the same with that, upon which he

*

fixes

fixes the length of a Tragedy: viz. “that it should be such as to admit of our comprehending, at one view, the beginning and the end. And this,” he goes on, “would be the case, were it reduced from its antient length, so as not to exceed that of such a number of Tragedies, as are performed successively at one hearing.” Here then is a rule, which, at the time he wrote it, was as clear and determinate, as if he had expressly said, that an Epic Poem ought not to exceed a certain number of verses. But, as an ingenious friend has suggested to me, “he probably chose to put his rule in the way he has put it, rather than in this latter way, as wishing to convey an intimation, that the length of an Epic Poem should be such, as would admit of its being fairly recited, or read, in a single day.”

It seems to have been a commonly received opinion, that the four dramas of each Poet, which composed the *Tetralogiae*, were always performed at one hearing—in one day*. In this case, if *one* Poet only produced his Tetralogia, there could be but four Tragedies; if *two*, there must be eight; if *three*, twelve, and so on: there could be no intermediate numbers. In so obscure a subject, I certainly shall not take upon me to decide. The passage, however, commonly adduced, I believe, as the principal authority in this matter, from *Diogenes Laertius*, appears to me to be against this supposition. The words are these: Εκεινοι [sc. *Tragici*] τετρασι δραμασιν ἠγωνίζοντο, Διονυσιοις, Ληναιοις, Παναθηναιοις, Χυτροις, ὧν το τεταρτον ἦν σατυρικον· τα δε τεττερα δραματα ἐκαλεῖτο Τετραλογια².—Here are *four* festivals, and *four* dramas; and the most obvious meaning of the passage, surely, is, that each contending Poet produced, not his entire Tetralogia at the *same* festival, but one Tragedy only at *each* different festival. And so H. Casaubon appears to have understood it. “*Quot Athenis Liberalia agitabantur, tot fabulas di-*

* See Dacier, p. 118.

² *Diog. Laert.* III. 56.

“ *versas a Tragicis Poetis doceri solitas legimus* ^b.” But it seems difficult to reconcile this account with what is generally, I think, said, and what Casaubon himself has elsewhere said, of the satyric piece; viz. that it was played *between*, or *after*, the serious Tragedies, on each festival, by way of relaxation and relief^c. For, to say, that of the *four* dramas exhibited by each Poet on the *four different* festivals, the *fourth* was a satyric drama, (ὡς το ΤΕΤΑΡΤΟΝ ἢ σατυρικόν,) is to say, pretty plainly, that *all* the satyric pieces were performed together at the fourth and last festival, the *Χυτροί*. And so indeed some commentators seem to have understood it^d. Perhaps the matter might, not unreasonably, be compromised, by supposing the rule, in fact, to have been, that, of the different Poets contending on each day, *one* should always produce the satyric drama of his Tetralogia, and that drama always close the exhibition of the day.—But I forbear to indulge conjecture farther upon this dark subject. Let us return to Aristotle and his rule.

Dacier tells us, very gravely, that *twelve*, and sometimes *sixteen*, Tragedies were performed in one day^e: an account, which, upon the very face of it, exceeds all bounds of probability. It is rather difficult to conceive, that the representation of a single Tragedy could take up less time than three hours. If however we suppose it to have taken up only *two*, and also, what could hardly be the case, that Tragedy succeeded Tragedy without any intermission, just

^b De Satyr. Græc. Poef. lib. i. cap. 5.

^c *Ib.* cap. iii. p. 128.

^d *Chytris*] Genus hoc *certaminis satyrici* fuit, ut ex Laertii verbis apparet, in quo, *dramate satyroi um proprio certaretur.* *Dio. Laert. ed. Meib.* III. 56, note 205.

^e P. 118, note 15.—This reminds one of the account given of Chinese plays, “ dont la representation dure dix ou douze jours de suite, en y comprenant la nuit, “ jusqu’ à ce que les spectateurs & les acteurs las de se succéder éternellement, en “ allant boire, manger, dormir, & continuer la piece, ou assister au spectacle, sans que “ rien y soit interrompu, se retirent enfin tous, comme de concert.” Brumoy, *Theatre des Grecs*, I. 53.

as scene succeeded scene in the same piece, the whole exhibition of the day, according to Dacier's lowest statement, would have taken up 24, and according to his highest, 32 hours. But is it conceivable, that any audience, however intemperate their fondness for this amusement, could sit so many hours together to hear Tragedies, and to hear them attentively, so as to judge of, and decide upon, their comparative merits?—This account, therefore, of Dacier, that the number of Tragedies performed “at one hearing,” and to the same audience, (for that is implied,) amounted to *twelve*, we may venture at once to reject as the most palpable impossibility. Shall we then suppose *eight*, the next lowest number possible, on the supposition, that the four dramas of the *Tetralogia* were exhibited in one day? The representation of eight Tragedies, we may venture to say, could not possibly take up less time than sixteen hours. Let any man conceive himself sitting in a Theatre, and hearing Tragedy after Tragedy, from six o'clock in the morning till ten at night, and then pronounce as to the probability of even this supposition. If we reject this number, and still adhere to the common notion of these exhibitions, we shall be reduced to a single *Tetralogia*; in which case there can have been no *rival* exhibition on the *same day*. It seems therefore impossible to adjust this matter in any reasonable way, without supposing, that the four dramas of the *Tetralogia* were exhibited on different festivals: a supposition, I think, fairly deducible from the passage of Diog. Laertius above quoted. A supposition too, which seems to be rendered more probable from the very nature of *rival* exhibitions; as each contending Poet would then produce his drama at the same hearing, each hearing would be a distinct day of contest, and there would be, at each contest, a sufficient ground of judgment upon the comparative merits of each performance. This idea will allow us to assign about *twelve* hours, as the utmost time taken up by the whole exhibition of the day; and the great difference of length, which we observe in the Greek Tragedies

gedies that are extant, will also allow us to conclude, that, occasionally, *five*, or possibly even *six* Tragedies, *might* be brought within that compass, or nearly so^f. On this ground, then, it will appear, I believe, that the extent, to which Aristotle proposed to limit the Epic Poem, could hardly exceed that of about 7000 lines.

But, if we admit this, we must of course admit, that he meant to include the Poems of Homer in the number of those which he regarded as too long. And that he did so mean, however unwilling Dacier and other commentators are to allow it, I have no doubt^g. For, 1. The actual length of those Poems seems sufficiently to prove this. The number of lines in the Iliad is nearly 15,000; in the Odyssey, nearly 12,000. Now whoever can believe it possible, that an audience could sit, and make a common practice of sitting, 22, or even 18 hours together, to hear Tragedies, (which, at the lowest allowance, of *two* hours only for the performance of each piece, must have been the case, if Homer's Poems fell within Aristotle's rule,) may believe, that he thought those Poems of a proper length. Dacier, indeed, tells us, that even the Iliad may be read through in a single day^h. For a wager, indeed, I will not say what might be done, if we had *reading* races

^f See NOTE 64, p. 268. There are not 1100 verses in any of the seven Tragedies of Æschylus, except the *Agamemnon*. Some of those of Euripides fall short of 1200 lines: *e. g.*—the *Alkestis*, *Heraclidæ*, *Rhesus*. Several are within 1300. It should also be considered, that the *satyric* dramas, which probably closed the entertainment of the day, were, perhaps, considerably shorter than the serious Tragedies, as is the case with our farces; at least, if we may judge from the only drama extant of the kind, the *Cycleps* of Euripides, in which there are but 709 vers.s.

^g Beni and Piccolomini are of my opinion. See their commentaries. Victorius, too, though by ἀρχαίων he understands the Poets before Homer's time, yet, by his explanation of Aristotle's rule, plainly supposes Homer to be glanced at; for he makes the time, allowed by the critic for the recitation of an Epic Poem, to be only *eight* hours. P. 250.

^h —“L'Iliade, l'Odyssée, & l'Enéide, sont entièrement conformes à la règle d'Aristote: elles peuvent être lues chacune dans un seul jour.” P. 415.

at Newmarket. But, 2. Had Aristotle meant to except Homer, why not expressly except him? Gladly as he appears to seize every opportunity of giving the Poet his just praise, would he not, here also, have opposed his conduct to that of other Poets, as he has done in so many other instances? Or why, indeed, refer us to the number of Tragedies successively performed in one day, when he might as well have referred at once to the Iliad, or the Odyssey? All this seems to leave no doubt, that he thought those Poems drawn out to too great a length. And this is also conformable to what he afterwards says, of the advantage which the Tragic has above the Epic Poem in this circumstance, that it effects its purpose “*in a shorter compass*”—*ἐν ἑλαττοῦ μῆκει*ⁱ. I do not forget what he had said in the preceding chapter—that if Homer had taken the whole war for his subject, his Poem *would not have been* *ἔυσυνοπτον*: which, it may be urged, implies, that he thought it *was* *ἔυσυνοπτον* as Homer had managed it, and therefore not too long. But the contradiction here is merely apparent. The *ἔυσυνοπτον* admits of degrees; and all that Aristotle appears to mean, in the passage before us, is, that the Poems of Homer would have been *more* *ἔυσυνοπτα*, and, in that respect, more perfect, had they been shorter.

But, to return once more to the dramatic exhibitions—the time of *twelve* hours seems to be the very utmost that can reasonably be allowed, and is more, I believe, than will readily be allowed, without considering the particular character of the Athenians, and the circumstances attending these theatrical exhibitions. The intemperate fondness of that people for these amusements is well known; and Aristotle himself gives us a pretty strong picture of it, when he says, though only in the way of hyperbolical supposition, “if A HUNDRED Tragedies were to be exhibited in concurrence^k.” We must, also, consider the *variety* of subjects in the

ⁱ *Cap. ult.*—The proverbial expression, *μικροτερον Ιλιαδ*[⊕], is well known.

^k *Part II. Sect. 4.*—*Orig. cap. vii.* See NOTE 64.

different Tragedies performed, and, indeed, the variety resulting from the very nature of the Greek drama, with its choral troop, its odes, its accompaniments of music and dance: the relief, also, of the *satyr*ic drama, which closed the performance by way of Farce; the pleasure of *comparing* the rival Poets and actors, the zeal of party in favour of this, or that, particular Poet or performer, &c.—And we may add to all this a curious circumstance in the dramatic history of the Greeks; that the people never sate *ἀσπιον θεογονίας*, but eat, and drank, and regaled themselves with cakes, and nuts, and wine, during the performance, like an English audience at Sadler's Wells, or Bartholomew Fair¹.

In the whole theatrical system of the antients, and every thing relating to it, all seems to have been proportionably vast, extravagant, and gigantic. Their immense theatres, their colossal dresses, the flirts, buskins, or heroic *pattens*, on which the actor was mounted^m, their masks that covered the whole head, their loud, chanting, and *speaking-trumpet* declamationⁿ—all this is upon the same scale with the intemperate eagerness of the people for these amusements, the number of Tragedies exhibited in one day, and, we may add, the almost incredible number said to have been written even by their best Poets.—Would not this last circumstance alone, supposing not a single drama to have been preserved, have furnished a reasonable proof, *à priori*, or, at least, a strong presumption, that the Greek Tragedy *must* have been, in many respects, a simple, unequal, imperfect thing, just such as, in fact, and prejudice apart, we

¹ See Athen. p. 464, F. and *Cassaub. Animadvers.* p. 779, and the passage there cited from Aristotle's *Ethic. Nicom.*

^m The reader will find a curious description of the dress and figure of the ancient Tragic actors in Lucian's treatise *De Salt.* p. 924. *ed. Ben.* and *De Gymnas.* p. 406, 415. But he will allow something for the exaggerations of a man of humour. See, also, the *Gallus*, p. 263.

ⁿ See Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, I. p. 154, and *Pl. IV. Fig. 1, 2, 3.*

find it to be°? SOPHOCLES, confessedly the most correct and polished of the three great Tragic Poets, is said to have written above *an hundred* Tragedies^p.

N O T E 216.

P. 117. FOR, IN THIS RESPECT ALSO, THE NARRATIVE IMITATION IS ABUNDANT, AND VARIOUS, BEYOND THE REST.

Περισττη γαρ και η̄ διηγηματικη μιμησις των̄ άλλων.—περισττη is rendered, by almost all the commentators, *eximia, præstantior, more excellent*, than the other imitations; which makes Aristotle directly contradict himself. And this Victorius allows, at the same time that he adheres to that sense:—“*præstantiorem esse [hanc poesin] inter cæteras, et altiorem locum tenere.*” How this can be reconciled with the critic’s decided preference of Tragedy in the last chapter, I do not see. I believe Dacier is right, in giving to *περισττη*, in this passage, the sense of, *more abundant*—*la plus excessive de toutes*^a. The text, however, appears to me to be defective: for what becomes of the *και*, which Dacier, and other translators, have been forced to neglect? The only fair version of the passage, as we now read it, is this:—“for *the narrative imitation* ALSO, is more abundant, &c. ΚΑΙ η̄ διηγ. μιμ.—of which I can make no reasonable sense.—Farther, some word seems wanting, to express *in what* the Epic is *περισττη*; and this Dacier found himself obliged to supply in his translation and note: *en cela la plus excessive*—. I cannot, therefore, help suspecting, that *ταυτοις* [sc. *ξενικοις ὀνομασι*], or rather *ταυτη*, has been omitted; and that we should read thus—περισττη γαρ, και ΤΑΥΤΗι, η̄ διηγηματικη μιμησις των̄

° See NOTE 33.

^p 123: See *Suidas. Fabric. Bib. Græc.—Cesaub. in Athen. p. 496.*

^a The same sense is given to the word by Robortelli; but he understands *περισττη των̄ άλλων*—abundant *in other things also*: a sense which, I believe, the phrase will not bear; besides that, for this purpose, the *και* should be otherwise placed—*και των̄ άλλων*.

ἄλλων^b. “*In this respect too*”—alluding to the several other respects mentioned in this chapter, in which the Epic imitation was περιττη των ἄλλων: as, in the *time* of its action, and the *length* of the Poem itself; in its *Episodes*, and the variety and μεγαλοπρεπεια arising from them, and from the admission of contemporary events; in the degree, also, to which it admits of the *wonderful*, and even the *incredible*^c. This, also, agrees perfectly with what he had said, cap. xxii. και ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἥρωικοῖς ΑΠΑΝΤΑ χρησιμα τα εἰρημενα.

N O T E 217.

P. 117. HAVE MORE MOTION.

Κινητικα. The scruple of Victorius, who proposed to read κινητα, from a doubt, whether κινητικα would admit of a *passive* sense, seems to have been ill-founded. The passage in Plutarch, *De primo frigido*, referred to by Goulston in his note, is this: ὡς βραδεια και ΣΤΑΣΙΜΟΣ [αντικειται] προς ὄξύρροπον και ΚΙΝΗΤΙΚΟΝ. p. 1755, ed. H. S. But the word is used in the same sense by Aristotle himself, in the 50th of the Harmonic Problems, p. 770, where κινητικον is applied to the acuter sound of a concord, on account of the velocity of its vibrations, and opposed to ἡρεμικον, by which he characterizes the graver sound.

N O T E 218.

P. 117. THE OTHER, ADAPTED TO ACTION AND BUSINESS.

Πρακτικον.—See NOTE 45, p. 234.

^b So above, cap. xxiii.—ΚΑΙ ΤΑΥΤΗ θεσπειται ἂν φανειν Ομηρον παρα τας ἄλλας.

^c See what presently follows in this chapter: Part III. *See*. 4. of the translation.

N O T E 219.

P. 118. THE POET, IN HIS OWN PERSON, &c.

The reader may compare Plato's account of Homer, *De Rep.* lib. iii. p. 393, *ed. Serr.* p. 178, *ed. Maffey.*

N O T E 220.

P. 118. BUT EPIC POETRY----ADMITS EVEN THE IMPROBABLE AND INCREDIBLE, FROM WHICH THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF THE SURPRISING RESULTS, BECAUSE, THERE, THE ACTION IS NOT SEEN.

Δει μὲν ἐν ἐν ταῖς Τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν το θαυμασον· μαλλον δ' ἐνδεχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ το ἀλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μαλιστα το θαυμασον, δια το μη ὄραν εἰς του πραττοντα.—Such is the reading which I have followed. The sense, which I have given it, accords very nearly, if not exactly, with that given by Victorius and Goulston, and adopted by Dacier and M. Batteux^a. Victorius supports his emendation—ΑΛΟΓΟΝ, instead of ἀναλογον—by reasons of considerable cogency: viz. the difficulty, or, rather, the impossibility, of making any satisfactory sense of το ἀναλογον, as the *text* of the passage stands^b ;
the

^a —“ Mais encore plus dans l'Épopée, qui va en cela jusq' au déraisonnable ; car, “ comme dans l'Épopée on ne voit pas les personnes qui agissent, tout ce qui passe les “ bornes de la raison est très propre à y produire l'admirable & le merveilleux.” Dacier.—“ L'Épopée, pour étonner encore plus, va jusq' à l'incroyable ; parce que ce “ qui se fait chez elle n'est point jugé par les yeux.”—Batteux.

^b If ἀναλογον be right, it can be understood no otherwise, I believe, than *adverbially*—ἀνλογως—in proportion; as it has been understood by those commentators who have adhered to that reading. But, in proportion to what? *Cajetanus* explains it

the explanatory *instance* itself, which *immediately* follows, and is, plainly, an instance of the *ἀλόγον*, and even expressly called *γελοῖον*, *ridiculously* improbable; and the similar instance, presently after given, of the *landing of Ulysses* in the *Odyssey*, which he expressly calls, *τα ἐν Οδυσσεῖα ΑΛΟΓΑ*, &c.

But, though I think the sense of the passage, thus read, and thus explained, is, in itself, unexceptionable, yet I can by no means rely with perfect confidence upon the reading from which it is obtained. *All the manuscripts*, it seems, give, with one consent, *ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ*. This circumstance, in a passage not free, in *other* respects, from suspicion, should be sufficient to prevent our admitting the emendation of Victorius, however probable, without some reserve—" *expreſtandi codices.*" I should perhaps, therefore, have done better, had I omitted the doubtful part of the passage—the words, *το ἀναλογον, διο μαλιζα συμβαιει το θαυμασον*: for the omission will leave a clear and complete sense; and, moreover, a sense, in which the only meaning that can well be given to the words omitted, seems, in fact, to be implied. *Δει μιν ἐν ἐνταις τραγωδῖαις ποιεῖν το θαυμασον· μαλλον δ' ἐνδεχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ, — δια το μη ὄρεν εἰς τον πραττοντα.* "The surprising is necessary in *Tragedy*: but "the *Epic Poem* admits of it to a greater degree, — because, "there, the action is not *seen*."

thus: "Ma, se si conviene fare la maraviglia nella Tragedia, molto più si conviene, "ed é licito, à farla nell' epopea *secondo proportionem*. *Quasi dica*—se in una azione "ristretta al termino d'un giorno, & allo spatio d'un palco, [of a *stage*,] si fa *maraviglia, che sia d'un grado*, si dovrà fare in azione che sia, pogniamo, di trentafette "giorni, e avvenuta in mare & in terra, quale è l'azione compresa nell' *Odissia, secondo proportionem, di trenta & sette gradi*:—&c, *το ἀναλογον*, è detto *averbiallymente*, come se "fosse, *ἀναλογως*, p. 549.—I know not how the reader will relish this *Rule of Three* explanation.—But what is to be made of the *διο*, which follows?—" *Therefore* [i. e. *because* the *Epic* is more capable of the surprising than *Tragedy*] *συμβαιει μαλιζα το θαυμασον*—"the surprising occurs, or is to be found, *most* in the *Epic Poem*, *because* "there the action is not *seen*."—I see no other *fair* translation of the passage, according to the old reading.

N O T E 221.

P. 119. ACHILLES MAKING SIGNS, &c.

The passage is this :

Λαοισιν δ' ANENETE KAPHATI δι⊕ Αχιλλεύς,
 Ουδ' ἔα ἔμεναι ἐπι Ἑκτορι πικρα βελεμνα,
 Μη τις κυδ⊕ ἀροίτο βαλῶν, ὁ δὲ δευτέρ⊕ ἔλθοι.

II. 22. 205.

N O T E 222.

P. 119. IT CONSISTS IN A SORT OF SOPHISM, &c.

In the words, δι' ὃ δὴ ἀν—to προσθῆναι, inclusively, the text seems evidently mangled beyond all hope of conjectural restoration. This *ulcus insanabile* I presume not to touch, either as commentator, or as translator. I can make nothing consistent of it myself: I have seen nothing consistent made of it by others.

The words, τετο δὲ ἔσι ψευδ⊕, are ambiguous. Victorius doubts, whether they mean, “ this posterior *fact* is false,” (the τοδι γινεται,) or, “ this *conclusion* is false”—namely, ἐι το ὑστερον ἔσι, και το προτερον ἔνοι. What follows, had it been tolerably clear, would, probably, have fixed the sense of ψευδ⊕. As this is not the case, I have given it that sense which appears to me most obvious; and I think I am warranted by the very same expression used in the same sense, in the *Rhetoric*, II. 23, p. 579, A, where, ἔσι δὲ τετο ψευδ⊕, clearly means, this is a false *conclusion*.

But the most important question is, in what manner Aristotle meant to apply this logical paradoxism to Homer's management of fiction. None of the commentators, whom I have seen, appear to me to have given any satisfactory explanation.

The paralogism *παρ' ἐπομένον*, à *consequenti*, here alluded to, the reader will find clearly explained in several parts of the philosopher's other works^a. It consists in taking a proposition as convertible, that is not so. Because rain wets the ground, we conclude, when we see the ground wet, that it must have rained. Because every man in a fever is hot, we conclude, that a person who is hot must be in a fever: ἀνάγκη ΚΑΙ τον θερμον πυρεττειν^b. These are some of Aristotle's own explanatory instances.—Now, he tells us here, that Homer's art of *lying*—ψευδη λεγειν ὡς δει—consists in imposing his marvellous fictions upon the reader's imagination by a sort of poetic sophism, similar to this logical sophism. And this is all he says. He has left us to make out the similitude as well as we can. No writer, I believe, ever paid more frequent compliments of this kind to the sagacity of his readers.

Dacier, with other commentators, seems to understand nothing more, than that artful intermixture of historical, or acknowledged, *truth*, which, by throwing the mind, as it were, into a posture of belief and conviction, has its effect even upon what we know to be feigned, and makes the false pass glibly with the true. But I cannot think, that this comes up to Aristotle's meaning, nor that his observation, here, amounts only to that of Strabo:—ἐκ μηδεν^c ἀληθες ἀναπτειν κανην τερατολογιαν, ἐχ Ομηρικόν, κ. τ. ἀλ^c. For no one has attempted to shew, and I believe no one can shew, *how* that, which Aristotle says of the particular paralogism denominated *παρ' ἐπομένον*, is applicable to the intermixture—the *mere juxtaposition*, of fact and fiction.

The similitude of the logical and poetic sophism appears to me to be this. It is not merely, that, where there is a mixture of history

^a Tom. I. p. 286, A, and B. Sect. 6, 7, 8.—*Rhet.* II. 24, p. 580, E. ed. Duval.

^b Tom. I. *ubi supra*.

^c *Lib.* I.—And see Dacier's note, p. 427.

and fiction, the truth makes the fiction pass; but the comparison, I think, relates to the connection between the *fictions* of the Poet, considered as cause and effect, as antecedent and consequent. The Poet invents certain extraordinary characters, incidents, and situations. When the actions, and the language, of those characters, and, in general, the *consequences* of those events, or situations, as drawn out into detail by the Poet, are such as we know, or think, to be *true*—that is to say, poetically true, or *natural*; such, as we are satisfied must necessarily, or would probably, follow, if such characters and situations actually existed; this probability, nature, or *truth*, of representation, imposes on us, sufficiently for the purposes of Poetry. It induces us to *believe*, with hypothetic and voluntary faith, the existence of those false events, and imaginary personages, those ἀδύνατα, ἀλογα, ψευδη—those marvellous and incredible fictions, which, otherwise managed, we should have rejected: that is, their improbability, or impossibility, would have so forced themselves upon our notice, as to destroy, or disturb, even the slight and willing illusion of the moment.

Whenever, says the philosopher, *supposing* such a thing to be, it would certainly be followed by such effects; if we see those *effects*, we are disposed to infer the existence of that *cause*. And thus, in Poetry, and all fiction, this is the *logic* of that temporary imposition on which depends our pleasure. The reader of a play, or a novel, does not, indeed, syllogize, and *say* to himself—“Such “beings as are here supposed, had they existed, *must* have acted “and spoken exactly in this manner; therefore, I believe they “*have* existed:”—but he *feels* the truth of the premises, and he *consents* to feel the truth of the conclusion; he does not revolt from the imagination of such beings. Every thing follows so naturally, and, even, as it seems, so necessarily, that the probability and truth of nature, in the *consequences*, steals, in a manner, from our view, even the *impossibility* of the *cause*, and flings an air of truth over the whole. With respect to *fact*, indeed, all is equally
ψευδῆ;

ψευδῶ; for if the *causes* exist not, neither can the *effects*. But the *consequent lies* are so told, as to impose on us, for the moment, the belief of the *antecedent*, or fundamental *lie*^d.

For instances of this art, no reader can be at a loss. He will find them, not only in almost all the “*speciosa miracula*” of Homer, but even in the wilder and more absurd miracles of Aristophanes; whose poem is, indeed, a striking example of the most improbable, and, in themselves, revolting *lies*^e, to which, however, every poetical reader willingly throws open his imagination; principally, I believe, from the easy charm of his language and versification, and the remarkable distinctness of his painting; but, partly too, from the truth and *nature* which he has contrived to sling into the *detail* of his description. But were I to chuse, from the productions of poetic genius at large, an example, which would, singly, illustrate this passage of Aristotle, more than any other that I recollect, it should be the *Caliban* of Shakspeare.

I shall only add, without troubling the reader with any comment of mine, one passage of the *Rhetoric*, which may serve, both to illustrate the paralogism itself, here alluded to, and to confirm the application which I have given it. In that passage, Aristotle applies the paralogism παρ’ ἐπομεινον, to the effect of oratorical elocution, in producing persuasion and conviction in the hearers. — Πιθανοὶ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· ΠΑΡΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΤΑΙ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὡς ἀληθῶς λεγόντων, ὅτι, ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἔτι ἔχειν ὡς οἰοῦνται, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἔτι ἔχει, ὡς ὁ λέγων, τὰ πρᾶγματα, ἔτι ἔχειν^f. — “What the Orator says, is, likewise, rendered probable and credible by

^d Hobbes, with his usual acuteness, observes, that “*probable fiction* is similar to reasoning rightly from a false principle.” p. 13, of his works, *Sect. 9.*

^e It may be said of this Poet, in the language of Shakspeare’s *Coriolanus*, that he has —

Murder’d *impossibility*, to make
What cannot be, slight work. —

Act v. Sc. 3.

^f *Rhet.* III. 7, p. 590. — See also, *ibid. cap. xvi. p. 603, E.* ἐτι, ἐν τῶν παθητικῶν, &c. a passage, which Victorius cites as illustrating the words — δια γὰρ τὸ εἶδεναι, &c.

“ a suitable

“ a suitable diction and elocution. For we are cheated into the
 “ persuasion, that the orator speaks truly, merely because we know
 “ that men, so circumstanced as he assumes to be, are actually
 “ affected in *that* manner: so that we take it for granted, that
 “ things are really as the speaker represents them to be, when, in
 “ fact, they are not so.”

The art here pointed out by Aristotle, as eminent in Homer's poetry, evidently extends to fiction in general; but, by ψευδη, I understand him to allude, *chiefly*, to fictions of the extraordinary, marvellous, and improbable kind—such as require the utmost art and management of the Poet to make them pass. The connection of the whole passage, if I am not mistaken, shews this to be the author's meaning; the application of ψευδη being fixed, both by the terms θαυμασον, and αλογον, in what precedes, and by the αδυνατα και εικοτα which follow, and which I take to be, or, at least, to include, those very ψευδη λεγομενα ως δει, of which he had, immediately before, been speaking.

N O T E 223.

P. 120. IF, HOWEVER, ANY THING OF THIS KIND, &c.

I much doubt of the integrity of the text. The sense I have given seems to be the only one, which the passage, as it now stands, will reasonably bear. Dacier, after Victorius, understands—“ if the admission of *one* improbable circumstance be the means “ of giving more probability to the *rest*.” I do not well comprehend this: I am sure it is not what Aristotle has *said*. His words are, αν δε θη, και φαινεται ευλογωτερον—i. e. “ if he *has* introduced “ such a circumstance, or incident, and *it* (not the *rest*, the *whole*) “ has some appearance of probability,” &c.

I suppose Aristotle meant to say, that, though improbabilities, are certainly faults, and ought to be carefully avoided in the first choice and structure of a fable, yet, they might be so well managed by a Poet of genius, (especially in the *Epic*, which is here the subject,) as to appear *rather probable*—*ἔυλογωτερον*;—to pass with some shew of probability; and, in this case, should be *admitted*, or *tolerated*, even though pushed to the *ἀτοπον*, or *absurd*. This sense accords perfectly with what immediately follows, which is precisely an instance of such management; of absurdity, or, at least, improbability, (*τὰ ἐν Οδύσσεια ἀλογα*—) veiled by the charms of poetry, and finding almost as ready an admission into the imagination of the reader, under the passport of the beauties by which it is accompanied, as if it were, in itself, ever so consonant to nature and experience. With respect to the words—*ἔιδεχασθαι καὶ ἀτοπον*—it seems necessary to adopt one or the other of the two manuscript readings—*ἐκδέχασθαι*, or *ἀποδέχασθαι*. The former of these verbs Mr. Winstanley takes in the sense of *ἀπειργαίνω*, *κωλύω*, upon the authority of *Suidas*. But in the very passage adduced by that lexicographer, the *immediate* sense of *ἐκδέχασθαι* is, to *receive*. *Γεῖρα τε παρατεταγμένα ἢ, εἰς τὸ ΕΚΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ τὰ τῶν βαρβαρῶν τόξευματα*. i. e. to *receive* them; and *by* receiving them to *keep them off* from their bodies. *Arcere*, here, is only what we may call the *consequential* meaning of the word. I do not see, that it may not, in this place, very well bear the sense of *receiving*, *admitting*, or, rather, *tolerating*: but of this I would not be understood to speak positively. This seems, at least, to be the sense, which the purport of the passage requires; and it refers, I think, not to the *Poet himself*, as some understand it, but to the audience, or the reader. When Aristotle has just said, *ἀν δὲ θῆ*—i. e. “but if he *has* introduced, or admitted it,” how can he be understood to add, “he *should* admit it?” Farther, the word *ἔνεκτα*, (*tolerabilia*,) which, in the instance immediately subjoined, clearly relates to the hearer, or reader, seems sufficiently to
fix

fix the *same* reference of the correspondent word, ἐνδεχέσθαι, or ἀποδεχέσθαι, here.

Mr. Harris, in his *Philol. Inquiries*, p. 220, though he has not quoted, or translated, this particular passage, appears, pretty clearly, to allude to it, and to have understood the verb as here explained. He says, speaking of *improbabilities* in the drama—" 'Tis true, " indeed, *did such plays exist,*" [ὅν δε θη—] " and were their other " dramatic requisites good, these improbabilities might be *endured,* " and the plays be still admired."

The version of Piccolomini agrees with mine:—" Ma se, po- " nendovisi poi qualche cosa, che in se habbia del non ragionevole, " *si adorerà, & si tratterà, in maniera, ch'ella apparir possa ragio-* " *nevole, potrà, in tal caso, trovarvi luogo.*" p. 392.

N O T E 224.

P. 121. THE ABSURDITY IS CONCEALED UNDER THE VA-
RIOUS BEAUTIES, &c.

In the language of *Pindar*,—

Και πε τι και βροτων φρενας,
ὑπερ του ἀληθη λογον,
δεδαϊδαλμενοι ψευδεσι ποικιλοισ*
ἐξαπατωντι μυθοι.

ΧΑΡΙΣ δ', ἀπερ ἀπαντα τευ-
-χει τα μειλιχα θνατοις,
ἐπιφεροισα τιμαν,
ΚΑΙ ΑΠΙΣΤΟΝ ἘΜΗΣΑΤΟ ΠΙΣΤΟΝ
ΕΜΜΕΝΑΙ————.

Olymp. I.

* " L'homme est de glace aux vérités,
" Il est de feu pour les menfonges."

La Fontaine, Fab. 174.

The reader, I believe, will be pleased with the comparison of a *poetical* passage so remarkably apposite to this observation of the *philosopher*; and, indeed, to all this part of his treatise, relative to the management of fiction.

On account of the same *general* relation to the subject, I may be excused for adding these agreeable lines of *Plautus*:—

Sed quasi Poeta, tabulas cum cepit sibi,
 Quærit quod nusquam est gentium, reperit tamen,
 Facit illud verisimile quod mendacium est,—
 Nunc ego Poeta fiam. *Pseud. Act I. Sc. 4.*

N O T E 225.

P. 121. THE IDLE PARTS OF THE POEM—.

ἌΡΓΑ μέρη. The expression is best explained, according to my idea of it, by *Cassiodoro*.—“Dobbiamo—intendere per *parti* “*otiose*, quelle, nelle quali il poeta *parla di sua persona*, & con “*favella sua* ci fa vedere quello che si fa: le quali perciò si do- “mandano, *μᾶρῃ ἀργα*, che non sono in atto, ed operanti, come sono “quelle, le quali sono rappresentate in palco, & quelle, nelle quali “per gli poeti epopei sono *introdotte le persone à favellare*; le quali “parti, perchè paiono pressochè montare in palco, ed operare, si “contrapongono alle parti otiose, e contengono, principalmente, “le *sententie*, ed, accessoriamente, i *costumi*.” p. 578.

Dacier’s “*parties foibles*,” in which he is followed by M. Batteux, presents a different, and, I think, a wrong idea.

N O T E 226.

P. 121. IN WHICH NEITHER MANNERS NOR SENTIMENTS PREVAIL.

It has been inquired, why Aristotle here passes over in silence the *passionate* parts of the Poem; to which a laboured and splendid diction seems as ill suited, as it is to the expression of manners and sentiments. This inquiry has produced another; whether he did, or did not, mean to include the *passionate* parts in *διανοητικοις*. *Madius* contends that he did: *Victorius*, that he did not. I believe the latter is right. For if we take *διανοια*, here, in that wide sense which is given it in *cap. xix^a*. it will include “*whatever is the object of speech*;”—“*every thing*,” as Mr. Harris has explained it, “*for which men employ language*”^b. If, therefore, the *μερη διανοητικα*, here, comprehend those *thoughts* which express *passion*, they will also comprehend such as express *manners*, or *character*; from which Aristotle expressly distinguishes them: *μητε ἠθικαις, μητε διανοητικοις*.

But, whether he did, or did not, mean to include the *passionate* parts of the Poem, it seems true, and he would probably have allowed it, that such a diction as he here describes is improper for the expression of *passion*: nor is this at all inconsistent, as, on a superficial view, it may seem to be, with the following passage in his *Rhetoric*.—*Τα δὲ ὀνοματὰ, τὰ ἐπιθετὰ, καὶ διπλὰ πλεῖω, καὶ τὰ ξένα, μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λεγόντι ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΩΣ: συγγνωμὴ γὰρ ἀργιζομένη, κακῶν φανῶν “ ἔρανομηκεῖς, ἢ πελωριον” εἶπεν^c, &c.* The strong and figurative language, and, what may be called, the *natural Poetry* of

^a *Transf.* p. 103.

^b *Philolog. Inquiries*, p. 173, &c.

^c *Rhet.* III. 7, p. 590, E.

passion—a sort of Poetry which we every day hear from the mouths of those, who never made, and scarce, perhaps, ever read, a verse—this is a very different thing from the ΔΙΑΠΟΝΕΙΝ λέξεις, the ΔΙΑΝ ΔΑΜΠΗΡΑ λέξεις, of which the philosopher here speaks.—But, for an exact, though short, discussion of this subject, with its proper distinctions and limitations, I must refer the reader to an excellent note on v. 94, of Horace's *Epistle to the Pisos*^d. It will be found, I think, perfectly consistent with *both* the passages of Aristotle here considered, and will afford the best support to the above remarks.—See NOTE 209.

N O T E 227.

P. 121. OBSCURED BY TOO SPLENDID A DICTION.

ΑΠΟΚΡΥΠΤΕΙ γὰρ παλιν ἡ λιαν λαμπρα λέξις τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς διανοίας.
—In the same sense, in which ἐγκρυπτεται is used, in a similar passage of *Longinus*, Sect. 15.—where, speaking of the effect of lively imagery, in stealing one's attention from *argument*, he says, Φυσεὶ δὲ πως, ἐν ταῖς ταπεινῶν ἀπάσῃ, αἰ τὸ κρεττονὸν ἀκκομεν ὄθεν, ἀπο τῶ ἀποδεδεικτε περιελκομεθα εἰς τὸ κατα φαντασίαν ἐκπληκτικον, ὡ τὸ πραγματικον ΕΓΚΡΥΠΤΕΤΑΙ ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΠΟΜΕΝΟΝ.—So also, Sect. 17.—ΑΠΕΚΡΥΨΕ τὸ σχημα—τῷ ΦΩΤΙ ΑΥΤΩΙ.—And again—διὰ ΔΑΜΠΡΟΤΗΤΑ—τὴν τεχνὴν ΑΠΟΣΚΙΑΖΕΙ, καὶ οἶον ἐν ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΨΕΙ τηρεῖ.

The following passage of the *Rhetoric*, concerning the mixture of the *argumentative* with the *pathetic*, will also help to illustrate that before us.—Καὶ ὅταν παθὸν πάσης, μὴ λεγε ἐνθυμημαῖ ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρεσει τὸ παθὸν, ἢ ματην εἰρημενον ἔσαι, τὸ ἐνθυμημαῖ ἐκκρεσει γὰρ αἰ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας, αἰ ἀμαῖ καὶ, ἢ ΑΦΑΝΙΖΟΥΣΙΝ, ἢ ἀσθενεὶς ποιῶσιν, *Rhet.* III. 17. p. 604, E.

In the same manner the expression of Aristotle is well explained by *Piccolomini*, in his commentary, p. 394.

^d Dr. Hurd's Horace, vol. i. See, particularly, p. 79, 80.

N O T E 228.

P. 123. IN WORDS, EITHER COMMON, OR FOREIGN, &c.

Λεξεί ἢ και γλωτταις—. *Heins.* ΚΥΡΙΑΙ λεξεί, ἢ και γλωτταις. The insertion seems necessary, but would, perhaps, be better thus: λεξεί, Η ΚΥΡΙΑΙ, ἢ και γλωτταις, &c. Victorius and other commentators suppose κυρια to be understood. But this I cannot conceive. Λεξίς appears clearly to be used here, as in *cap.* xxii. for diction in general, including, as in that chapter, every *sort* of words.

N O T E 229.

P. 123. WHICH ARE THE PRIVILEGE OF POETS.

ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. The same expression is made use of by *Isocrates*, in the following passage, to which I referred in NOTE 5, p. 158, and in which the privileges and advantages of the Poet are well set forth, and the importance of *verse* to the effect of even the best poetry, is strongly insisted on.

Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ ΔΕΔΟΝΤΑΙ κοσμοί. Καὶ γὰρ πλησιάζοντας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς θεὰς οἰοῦντ' αὐτοῖς ἔσι ποιῆσαι, καὶ διαλεγόμενας, καὶ συναγωνιζόμενας, οἷς ἀν βεβληθῶσι· καὶ περὶ τετῶν δηλωσαι, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις^α ὀνομασίην, ἀλλὰ, τὰ μὲν, ξένοις, τὰ δὲ, καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ, μεταφοραῖς· καὶ μὴδὲν παραλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πασι τοῖς εἰδέσι διαποικίλαι τὴν ποιήσιν. Τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὰς λόγους ἔδδεν ἔξῃσι τῶν τοιούτων ἀλλ' ἀποτομῶς, καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς^β, καὶ τῶν ἐνθύμηματων τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις,

^α τεταγμένοις, here, is equivalent to Aristotle's κυριοῖς; as, καινοῖς, to his πεποιθημένοις, and ξένοις, to his γλωτταις.

^β See note 57, p. 255.

ἀναγκαιὸν εἶναι χρῆσθαι. Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς, οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν πάντα ποιῶσι· οἱ δὲ ὑδὲν ἔχοντων κοινῶν ἐστὶν ἅ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχει χάριν, ὡς, ἂν καὶ τῆ λεξῆς, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμημασιν, ἔχη κακῶς, ὁμῶς τὰς γὰρ ἑυρυθμίαις καὶ τὰς συμμετρίας ψυχραγωγῶσι τὰς ἀκούοντας. Καταμαθεὶ δ' ἂν τις ἐκείθεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν· ἢ γὰρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμαστῶν τὰ μὲν ἄοματα καὶ τὰς δίκαιας καταλιπῆ, τὸ δὲ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ διαλύσῃ, φανεῖται πολὺ καταδύσειν τῆς δόξης, ἣς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. See NOTE 5, p. 158, the passage from Plato.

N O T E 230.

P. 123. WHAT IS RIGHT IN THE POETIC ART, IS A DISTINCT CONSIDERATION FROM WHAT IS RIGHT IN THE POLITICAL, OR ANY OTHER ART.

This is one of those passages, which the commentators appear to me to have darkened by illustration. See, particularly, *Dacier's* note. His account of the difference between Poetry and *all other arts*, seems evidently false. What Aristotle says of Poetry—that it has two kinds of faults, essential, and incidental—is, at least, true of all other *imitative arts*. It is even true, as *Beni* has shewn, of Rhetoric and Logic^a. Aristotle only says, (to give the passage *literally*,) “the rightness of the poetic, and the rightness of the “political art, are not the same; nor of any other art and the “poetic art.” The plain meaning of which appears to me to be that which I have given—that the ὀρθότης, or rectitude, of Poetry itself, is not to be confounded with that of Politics, nor of any

^c *Euag. circ. init.*

^a “Nam Rhetorica & Dialectica suos egredi fines solent, & in alienos campos excurrere, perinde ferè ac nos de Poeticâ docemus. Temere igitur Aristoteles, quod inter Poeticam & Politicam notavit discrimen, idem inter Poeticam, rursus, ac ceteras artes, notasset: nam Rhetorica & Dialectica ejusdem videri possunt rectitudinis cum Poeticâ.” *Beni Comm. in Arist. Poet. p. 460.*

other art that may be the *incidental subject* of the Poetry, which, in itself, may be good, and even excellent, though it may deliver things false or inaccurate in Politics, Natural History, Navigation, Geography, &c. This sense of the passage seems clear of all the difficulties with which the common explanation is embarrassed, and leads naturally to the following division of the faults of Poetry, into essential and incidental.—*Castelvetro* is the only one, of the commentators I have consulted, who appears to agree with me, if I understand him rightly, in this explanation of the passage ^b.

The allusion, here, to the severe objections of PLATO, who would allow of Poetry no farther than as it could be made to coincide with the views of his own strict and moral legislation, has been sufficiently pointed out. The reader may see, particularly, a fine passage to this purpose in the *seventh* book of his *Laws*, [p. 817, *ed. Serr.*] where, addressing the Tragic Poets, he refuses to admit them into his republic, till the magistrates have satisfied themselves, by inspection of their poems, that they contain nothing but what is in perfect unison with the laws and moral discipline of the state.—Μη δὴ δοξήτε ἡμᾶς ῥαδίως γε ἔτιωσ ὑμᾶς ποτε παρ' ἡμῖν εἶσεν, σκηνας τε πηξάντας κατ' ἀγοραν, και καλλιφωνες ὑποκριτας εἰσαγομενες, μείζον φθεγγομενες ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν δημηγορεῖν προς παιδας τε και γυναικας και τον παντα ὄχλον, των αὐτων λεγοντας ἐπιτηδευματων περι μη τα αὐτα ἀπερ ἡμεις, ἀλλ', ὡς το πολυ, και ἐναντια τα πλεῖσα. Σχεδον γαρ τοι κ' ἂν μαινομεθα τελειως ἡμεις τε και ἀπασα ἡ πολις, ἣτις ἐν ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέποι δοῦν τα νυν λεγομενα, πριν κριναι τας ἀρχας, εἴτε ῥητα και ἐπιτηδεια πεποιηκατε λεγειν εἰς το μεσον, εἴτε μη. Νυν ἐν, ὡ παιδες μαλακων μεσων ἐκγονοι, ἐπιδάξαντες τοις ἀρχαισ. πρωτον τας ὑμετερας παρ. τας ἡμετερας ὠδας, ἂν μεν τα αὐτα γε, ἢ και βελτιω, τα παρ' ὑμῶν φαινεται λεγομενα, δωσομεν ὑμῖν χορον· εἰ δὲ μη, ὡ φιλοι, ἐκ ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθα.—*De Leg.* VII. p. 817.—To this way of talking it was a plain and direct answer,

^b See p. 592, and 599, of his commentary.

to say—Ουχ' ἢ αὐτῆ ὀρθότης^c ἐστὶ τῆς ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ καὶ τῆς ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ.

In what is added—ἐδε ἄλλης τεχνῆς καὶ ποιητικῆς—Aristotle may, I think, be supposed to glance more particularly at that part of the *tenth* book of Plato's *Republic*, where he exposes the idle notion, current among the rhapsodists, that Homer was a perfect master of all arts and sciences. And with respect to the absurdity of this notion, Aristotle undoubtedly agreed with him. But there was danger, lest the credit of Homer should suffer from the *manner* in which Plato combated this idea. For those extravagant admirers of Homer not only asserted the *fact*, that he had an accurate knowledge of every art and science on which he touched, but they went farther, and maintained, that such accuracy was essential to a good Poet: Αναγκη γαρ, they urged, τον ἀγαθον ποιητην, εἰ μελλει περι ὧν ἂν ποιη, καλωσ ποιησεν, εἶδοτα ἄρα ποιειν, ἢ μη εἶοντε εἶναι ποιειν^d. Now Plato, whose object here is to vindicate his rigid exclusion of all mimetic poetry, and that of *Homer* in particular, from his republic, confutes the *fact*, without confuting the *general* position. While he shews the pretensions of the Homerists to be false, he *seems*, at least, to allow, that they *ought* to be true. For he flings in no savings; he no where says, what Aristotle has here said for him—that the want of this supposed accurate knowledge of arts and sciences no way affects the character of Homer as a Poet. By denying that he *had* that knowledge, and, at the same time, not denying, or not *expressly* denying, that he *ought* to have it, he leaves the reader to understand, that he meant to detract, on this account, from his merit as an *imitator*. And this, indeed, is

^c This very word, ὀρθότης, is often used by *Plato*; and, particularly, in this passage, which perhaps Aristotle had in his view—Καιτοι λεγασι γε οἱ πλειστοι, μουσικῆς ὈΡΘΟΤΗΤΑ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς περιζουσαν δυναμιν.—An idea which he rejects with abhorrence. The word *μουσικῆ* here is used in its widest acceptation, including Poetry, *De Leg.* ii. 655.

^d *Rep.* X. p. 598, E. *ed. Serr.*

perfectly consonant to the whole design of this part of his work, which was, to discredit poetic imitation in general, by shewing *the distance of its representations from truth*°.

N O T E 231.

P. 123. THE FAULTS OF POETRY, &c.

The original is— ΑΥΤΗΣ δε της ποιητικης διττη ἡ ἀμαρτία. The word *αυτης* appears to me to make strange confusion. For Aristotle is here distinguishing two sorts of faults in Poetry, *essential* and *accidental*; and his expression, presently after, for the former, is ΑΥΤΗΣ ἡ ἀμαρτία—“ a fault of the Poetry *itself*.” As the text stands, therefore, it is just as if he had said—“ There are two “ faults of the *Poetry itself*: one, of the *Poetry itself*, and the “ other, *incidental*.”—Accordingly Dacier, Batteux, and almost all the translators, neglect the word *αυτης*. Possibly it might, originally, have stood thus:—ὕδὲ ἀλλης τεχνης, και ποιητικης αυτης. Της ΔΕ ποιητικης, &c.

° This fanciful argument is thus shortly and clearly stated in the *Comment. on the Ep. to the Pisos*, &c. vol. i. p. 254. “ Poetical expression,” says the philosopher [*Plato*], “ is the copy of the Poet’s own conceptions; the Poet’s conception, of things, and “ things, of the standing archetype, as existing in the divine mind. Thus the Poet’s “ expression is a copy at third hand, from the primary, original truth.”—See *Plato De Rep.* 10. p. 597, 598.—To prove his point the better, he shews, that the Poet’s conceptions are distant even from the truth of *things*, because his knowledge of those *things* is imperfect and inaccurate. p. 598, 599.

N O T E 232.

P. 123. IF THE POET HAS UNDERTAKEN TO IMITATE WITHOUT TALENTS FOR IMITATION——.

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ προεἴλετο μιμησασθαι ἀδυναμῖαν.—So, the MSS. But ἀδυναμία never, I believe, means *impossibility*, but *want of power, incapacity*^a. This was, long ago, sufficiently proved by Victorius. If the word be right, some preposition must be wanting. Hein- sius supplies—ΚΑΤ' ἀδυναμῖαν. The credit of the conjecture is due to Castelvetro^b. Still the phrase, μιμησασθαι κατ' ἀδυναμῖαν, for *imitating without ability, or talents, for imitation*, is harsh, and, as far as I know, unsupported by any other example. It seems not improbable, that Aristotle might have written it—ΠΑΡΑ ΔΥΝΑ- ΜΙΝ. Supposing the three first letters of the preposition to have been destroyed, the passage would stand thus—μιμησασθαι**ΑΔΥ- ΝΑΜΙΝ: which it was obvious enough for the transcriber to *mis- correct* into ἀδυναμῖαν. The phrase, προεἴλετο μιμησασθαι παρα δυ- ναμιν, would be clear and unexceptionable. So, *cap.* ix.—παρα την δυναμιν παρατειναντες μυθον.

Victorius remarks, and, I think, justly, that Horace probably had his eye upon this passage, in the lines——

*Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, æquam
Viribus; et verfatè diu, quid ferre recuset,
Quid valeant, humeri. Cui lecta potenter erit res, &c.
Epist. ad Pif. v. 38, &c.*

—where Aristotle's προαιρεσθαι, he thinks, is expressed by “*sumite materiam,*” and, *lecta res:*” and κατ' ἀδυναμῖαν glanced at in the other expressions, but, particularly, in the adverb—“*potenter.*”

^a Ἀδυναμία δὲ ἐστὶ ΣΤΕΡΗΣΙΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΣ. *Metaph.* V. 12. p. 893, C.

^b P. 602, of his commentary.

N O T E 233.

P. 123. TO HAVE REPRESENTED THINGS IMPOSSIBLE WITH RESPECT TO SOME OTHER ART, &c.

No interpretation that I have seen, or been able to devise, of this whole ambiguous, perplexed, and, probably, mangled passage, is without its difficulties. All I could do was, to chuse that, which, after the closest attention to the original, and to the best comments, appeared to me “*minimis urgeri.*” I will not attempt to drag the reader after me, through the detail of my own doubts and embarrassments. But lest my version, from that degree of closeness, to which, in all passages where the *meaning* is doubtful, I have thought it right to confine myself, should retain, in some degree, the ambiguity, or obscurity, of the original, some explanation may be necessary.

By the various expressions, *μιμησασθαι κατ' αδυναμιαν—αμαρτια η καθ' αυτην—αυτης—καθ' εαυτην*, and, above all, by *ΚΑΚΟΜΙΜΗΤΩΣ ἐγραψε*, which seems to fix clearly the sense of the rest, Aristotle means, I think, to indicate all such faults as are incompatible with *good imitation*—that is, in *his* view, with *good Poetry*. All other faults he denominates, *κατα συμβεβηκε*—*incidental*. Faults he allows them to be; but smaller, and more pardonable, faults: *ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ γαρ, ἐι μη ἦδει, &c.* In this class he reckons, *τα αδυνατα*—*things impossible*. The expression is unhappily ambiguous: for we may understand either *αδυνατα in general*, or, *αδυνατα κατ' ιατρικην η αλλην τεχνην*. The commentators are divided. I cannot be of *their* party, who adopt the first of these senses. I see not how impossibilities, or absurdities*, *in general*, could, consist-

* That the *αδυνατα* here meant are not what he afterwards calls *πιθανα αδυνατα*, *probable impossibilities*, but such as he denominates *αλογα*, is plain from his instance; *παραδειγμα, η τω Ἐκτορος διαξι*, which he had, in the preceding chapter, expressly given as an instance of the *αλογον*. See *Transl.* p. 118, 119.

ently with Aristotle's principles, be admitted by him into the number of merely *incidental* faults^a—κατα συμβεβηκε—such as affected not the *Poetry itself*. We must, I think, understand—ἀμαρτηματα ἢ ἀδυνατα—things *inaccurate*, or, what is worse, *impossible*, καθ' ἑασην τεχνην—upon the principles of some *other* art^b.

Aristotle then goes on, and applies his solution, founded on the foregoing distinction, to the *worst* species of such *incidental* faults—to things ἀδυνατα. Take, he says, the *worst*: suppose the Poet to have represented something *impossible*, with respect to some particular art, as that of medicine, geography, &c. This, strictly speaking, is a fault; but it is a fault that may even be *justified*, (ὁρθως ἔχει,) if, by means of it, the Poet has answered, better than he could have done without it, the *end* of his *own* art, &c.—Still, he continues, supposing this not to be the case, we are to consider, whether the fault, admitting it to *be* a fault, be των κατα την τεχνην, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκε, &c.—If the pursuit of *Hector* cannot be absolutely *justified* by the θαυμασον, the ἐκπληξις which is produced by it, still it is not *κακομιμητως γεγραμμενον*; the *Poetry* is good, and the end of Poetry, the pleasure arising from the wonderful and the striking, *is* actually attained, though it be true, that it *might* have been attained without the fault in question.

By the expression, τα προς αὐτην την τεχνην ἀδυνατα, I understand—with respect to the art of which the Poet speaks; not, with respect to the art of Poetry itself: though I confess the latter sense to be that, which the words, αὐτην την τεχνην, *the art itself*, most naturally present. But this sense of the expression seems to me to be utterly irreconcilable with the sense of the *whole* passage. In rejecting it I have the concurrence of Victorius, Piccolomini, and M. Batteux.—Besides, that the expression itself seems to be jargon.

^a In recapitulating the different critical objections to which Poets were exposed, he expressly selects *improbability*, and vicious manners, as the *justest* grounds of censure. Ὅρθη δὲ ἐπιτιμῆσις, καὶ ΛΛΟΓΙΑ καὶ μοχθηρία. *Cap. penult.*

^b So M. Batteux: see his note on the passage.

For, what are “ things impossible to, (or, with respect to,) the art of “ Poetry itself?”—The only reasonable meaning of the phrase is—things, which it is beyond the power of the art to represent or imitate; as it is beyond the power of painting to imitate sounds^c. But how can the phrase be applied, as Dacier applies it, to the *ἄλογον*, “ *deraisonnable—tout ce qui est absurde?*” Is it not just as possible for Poetry to represent a horse flying, as a ship sailing?—The sense, which I have given, seems also supported by the antithetic expression that follows—*τελῶ το ἄΥΤΗΣ*—“ its own purpose;” and still more by the clearer phrase which he presently after uses—*την ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ τεχνην*—“ the art to which these “ things belong.”

I must, however, repeat my confession, that no passage of this treatise appears to me to be of more desperate perplexity than this; nor is there any of the numerous and stubborn difficulties I have had to encounter, of which I wish to be understood to offer my solution with less confidence. Here, as in many other places, had I waited for perfect satisfaction, I might have stood still for ever:—

— — — *ἔικελῶ ἀνδρι*
Κεινω, ὅς ἐν τριοδοισι πολυτριπτοισι κυρησας
Ἔσῃ ἐφορμαιωνων· κραδιη δε οἱ ἀλλοτε λαμη,
Ἄλλοτε δεξιτερην ἐπιβαλλεται εἰς ὄδον ἐλθειν.
Παπταινει δ' ἑκατερθε· νοῶ δε οἱ ἦῦτε κυμα
Ἐιλειται,—μαλα δ' ὄψε μιης ὠρεζατο βελης^d.

^c Plato uses—*ἀδυνατα EN τη τεχνη*, in this sense:—*Κυβερνητης ἀκρῶ, ἡ ἰατρῶ, τα τε ΑΔΥΝΑΤΑ EN ΤΗΙ ΤΕΧΝΗΙ, και τα δυνατα, διαισθικεται*, *Rep.* II. p. 360. *ed. Serr.*

^d Oppian, *Ἀλιευτ.* III. 501, &c.

N O T E 234.

P. 123. ACCORDING TO WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY SAID OF THAT END.

Το γὰρ τελευτᾷ ΕΙΡΗΤΑΙ. This reading has been questioned; but, I think, without sufficient reason. It may very well be understood to refer to all that Aristotle had said, or, at least, *hinted*, about the end of the art—the θαυμασον, *cb.* xxiv.—ἐκπληξίς, *cap.* xiv. and xvi. &c. This is not the only instance in this treatise, of reference to something *implied*, as if it had been expressly *said*.—See NOTE 150, p. 396, and *note* (g.)

Victorius illustrates ἐκπληκτικώτερον by an apt quotation from Aristotle himself: Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΣ ΘΑΥΜΑΣΙΟΤΗΣ εἶναι ΥΠΕΡΒΑΛΛΟΥΣΑ. *Top. lib.* iv.

Strabo says—Μυθε ΤΕΛΟΣ, ἡδονην και ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΝ. *p.* 25. *ed. Cas.*

N O T E 235.

P. 124. WHETHER A FAULT BE, &c.

Ποτερων ἐστὶ το ἀμαρτημα' των κατα την τεχνην, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκε. —I cannot perceive, that this wants any emendation; much less, that it is, as Mr. Winstanley says, “*nullo sensu*.” He contends for the certainty of ΑΤΟΠΩΤΕΡΟΝ—a reading, which Robertelli says he found in all the manuscripts he consulted. I would only ask, whether Aristotle can be conceived to have written such a sentence as this?—“A fault in the Poetry itself is a more *absurd* thing than a fault in some other incidental matter; FOR it is “a *less* fault,” &c. Yet this, I think, is the plain English of the Greek—

Greek—Ἐτι, ἀτοπώτερον ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμαρτήμα τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκῶς ἔλαττον ΓΑΡ—κ. τ. λ.

Victorius contends strongly, and, I think, with much better reason, for ποτερον. He says well—"Nam quæ adjunguntur videntur significare ita prorsus legi debere: duo enim genera peccatorum contraria inter se indicant. *Utrorum igitur peccatorum id, cujus arguitur poeta, videndum esse præcipit: alterum enim eorum genus faciliorem excusationem habet.*" p. 274.

N O T E 236.

P. 124. HAS NOT REPRESENTED THINGS CONFORMABLY TO TRUTH—.

Ὅυκ ἀληθῆ.—An ἐπιτιμησις very frequent in the mouth of PLATO, to whom, undoubtedly, Aristotle here alludes. "The Poets ought not," says Plato, speaking of the representations of *Hesiod* and *Homer*, "to be permitted to tell us—ὡς θεοὶ θεοὶς πολεμῶσι τε, καὶ ἐπιβελουεσι καὶ μαχονται· ΟΥΔΕ ΓΑΡ ΑΛΗΘΗ^a."—They ought not, λοιδορεῖν ἀπλῶς ἔτω τὰ ἐν αἵδε, ἀλλὰ, μάλλον, ἐπαινεῖν· ὡς ΟΥΤ' ΑΛΗΘΗ λεγοντας, ἐτ' ὠφελίμα τοῖς μέλλουσι μαχιμοῖς ἐσεσθαι^b.—So again, of Homer's account of the cruel treatment of the body of Hector by Achilles, and of his sacrificing twelve Trojan captives to the manes of Patroclus [*Il. ψ.*]: ξυμπαντα ταυτα ΟΥ φησομεν ΑΛΗΘΗ εἰρησθαι.—And again, presently after—οὐθ' ὅσια ταυτα, ΟΥΤ' ΑΛΗΘΗ^c. To all which objections, as appears from what follows, Aristotle's answer would have been—ὅτι ἔτω ΦΑΣΙΝ.

^a *De Rep.* II. p. 142. *ed. Maff.*

^b *Ibid.* III. p. 160.—He alludes particularly to the famous declaration of Achilles, *Od. Λ.* 487, which he immediately quotes; with other passages of the same kind.

^c *Ibid.* p. 174.

N O T E 237.

P. 124. SOPHOCLES—DREW MEN, SUCH AS THEY SHOULD BE; EURIPIDES, SUCH AS THEY ARE.

The difference here intended, between the two great Tragic Poets, seems to me to be rightly explained by Dacier in few words: “Sophocle tâchoit de rendre ses imitations parfaites, en suivant toujours bien plus ce qu’une belle nature étoit capable de faire, que ce qu’elle faisoit. Au lieu qu’Euripide ne travailloit qu’à les rendre semblables, en consultant davantage ce que cette même nature faisoit, que ce qu’elle étoit capable de faire.” p. 458.—It is thus indeed, that, by comparing different passages, we shall find Aristotle clearly explain himself. What he here means by ἀληθῆ, is sufficiently clear from the synonymous expressions, οἷοι ἐῖσι—ὅια ἦν, ἢ ἐς, in this chapter, and ὁμοίως—καθ’ ἡμᾶς—and, οἱ νυν, in chapter ii. where he explains the different objects of poetic imitation^a. To these expressions are opposed another set of expressions, which I take to be synonymous with each other—ὅια εἶναι δεῖ—εἶς δεῖ, here; το βελτιον, and the παραδειγμα ὑπερεχον, presently after; καλλίως, cap. xv^b.—βελτιονας ἢ καθ’ ἡμᾶς—βελτιονας των νυν, cap. ii^c. All these expressions correspond to the various expressions of, *improved nature*—*la belle nature*—*ideal beauty*, &c. in modern writers.

The objection then, to which Aristotle here points out the best answer, I understand to be this—“Your imitation is not *true*; it is not an exact copy of such nature as we see about us.”—The answer is—“No: but it is an *improved* copy. If I have not represented things as they *are*, I have represented them as they *ought* to be.”

^a Transl. Part I. Sect. 3.

^b Transl. p. 94.

^c Part I. Sect. 3.

A very different explanation of this passage has been given by an eminent critic; but, I confess, it appears to me to be irreconcilable with Aristotle's expressions, clearly interpreted, as I think they are, by comparison with each other. According to that explanation, the answer of Sophocles to the objection—*ἐκ ἀληθῆ*, and indeed the sense of the objection itself, are very different from what Dacier, and, I believe, all the commentators, have represented them to be.—The explanation is this:

“ And this will further explain an essential difference, as we are told, between the two great rivals of the Greek stage. Sophocles, in return to such as objected a want of truth in his characters, used to plead, *that he drew men such as they ought to be, Euripides such as they were.* Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη, αὐτῶ μὲν οἷος δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδης δὲ, οἷοι εἶσι. The meaning of which is, Sophocles, from his more extended commerce with mankind, had enlarged and widened the narrow, partial conception, arising from the contemplation of *particular* characters, into a complete comprehension of the *kind*. Whereas the philosophic Euripides, having been mostly conversant in the academy, when he came to look into life, keeping his eye too intent on single, really existing persons, sunk the *kind* in the *individual*; and so painted his characters naturally indeed, and *truly*, with regard to the objects in view, but sometimes without that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth^d.”—Again—after an illustration of this meaning, by a comparative examination of the *Electra* of Sophocles with that of Euripides, the conclusion is—“ Whether this representation of Sophocles be not more agreeable to *truth*, as collected from wide observation, *i. e.* from human nature at large, than that of Euripides, the capable reader will judge. If it be, the reason I suppose to have been, *that Sophocles painted his characters, such as, from attending to numerous instances of the same kind, he would*

^d *Comment. on the Ep. to the Pisos, p. 255.*

“conclude they ought to be; Euripides, such, as a narrower sphere of observation had persuaded him they were.”

From these two passages compared, it appears, I think, that by *ὅσα δὲ εἶναι*—such as they ought to be—the learned commentator understands, such as they ought to be *in order to possess* “that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth.” But a comparison of Aristotle with himself, in the several passages above referred to, seems to fix the sense clearly to that ideal perfection, that poetic elevation and improvement of nature, which may be said, rather, to exclude such “general and universally striking likenesses” of “human nature at large:” and this, I think, was the very objection made to Sophocles by the patrons of his rival.

According to the interpretation which I am taking the liberty to examine, Sophocles is made to answer the charge by denying its truth: for the answer, as here stated, will be this—You say, my representations are *not true*, and those of Euripides are true. I deny this. You use the term improperly. My representations are “agreeable to truth,” because they are “collected from wide observation, i. e. from human nature at large;” those of Euripides are *not* agreeable to truth, because they are representations, not of the kind, but of individuals.—The answer, as I understand Aristotle, is very different. The charge is not denied^f, or explained away; but *admitted* and *justified*. Sophocles says, “If you would have men represented *as they are*—ὅσῃ εἰσι.—you must, indeed, go to Euripides. I have *not* drawn them so—I never intended to draw them so. I have done better—I have delineated mankind, not such as they really are, but such as they ought to be.” Eu-

^e *Ibid.* p. 259.

^f The reader will observe, that in all the objections, drawn from this source, the truth of the objections—the *facts*—“this is not true”—“this is neither true, nor as it ought to be,” &c. are all admitted. Οὐκ ἀνέστη ΑΛΛ’ ὅσα δὲ.—Εἰ δὲ ΜΗΔΕΤΕΡΩΣ, ὅτι ἔτω φασί.—Ἰσως δὲ ΟΥ βέλτερον μὲν, ΑΛΛ’ ἄρως εἶχεν.

ripides does not appear to have been charged, by those objectors, with what may be termed *individual improbability* of imitation, but with too close and portrait-like delineation of *general* nature. In short, the difference, which I understand to be here intended, between the two Poets, cannot be more exactly expressed, than it is by the ingenious commentator himself, in the beginning of the note to which I refer; where it is observed, [p. 253] that “*truth*” “may be followed too closely in works of imitation, as is evident in two respects. For, 1. the artist, when he would give a copy of nature, may confine himself too scrupulously to the exhibition of *particulars*, and so fail of representing the general idea of the *kind*. Or, 2. in applying himself to give the *general* idea, he may collect it from an enlarged view of *real life*, whereas it were still better taken from the nobler conception of it as subsisting only in the *mind*.” Now, if we apply the latter of these differences to the two Poets in question—if we say, “In applying himself to give the *general* idea, *Euripides* collected it from an *enlarged view of real life*; whereas *Sophocles* took it from the nobler conception of it, as subsisting only in the *mind*”—this will express exactly what I take to be the sense of Aristotle.

To the support, which the common interpretation of this passage receives from Aristotle himself, may be added that which it receives, and, I believe, is generally acknowledged to receive, from the Tragedies themselves, which are extant, of the two Poets in question. That *Euripides* is, *in general*, liable to the censure of *particular* imitation—of “sinking the *kind* in the *individual*,” I cannot say I have observed. But who can read this Poet *without* observing the examples, with which he every where abounds, of that very “*general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth?*” In *Sophocles*, we find more elevation, more dignity, more of that improved likeness, and ideal perfection, which the philosopher expresses by his $\delta\iota\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\iota\text{---}\pi\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \beta\epsilon\lambda\text{---}\tau\iota\upsilon\upsilon$, &c. In *Euripides*, we find more of the $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$, the $\delta\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$, &c.—

we are oftener reminded of the common nature and common life, which we all see around us. And if this, in conjunction with other causes^b, be sometimes found to lower the imitations of this Poet, beneath the proper level of Tragic dignity, and to produce something of the *καμάρδια τις ἠθολογεμένη*, which Longinus¹ attributes to the *Odyssæy*, the fault is amply redeemed, perhaps in those very parts, by the pleasure which results from the closeness and obviousness of the imitation; certainly, in many others, by those precious touches of nature, which must, at once, strike every individual of every audience; such, if I mistake not, as are much more rarely to be found in Sophocles, and such, perhaps, as, after all that we have heard about the *beau idéal* and *improved nature*, can only be produced by an exact transcript of nature, *as it is*; of what the Poet has actually *felt* himself, and actually *seen* in others.

The truth seems to be, that both in Poetry, and in Painting, if the *sublime* be aimed at, the Poet, and the Artist, must look up to the *ὁρα ΔΕΙ εἶναι*: their eyes may “glance from earth to heaven,” and they may “body forth the form of things *unknown*.” But, if emotion and the *pathetic* be their object, they will, neither of them, attain their end, unless they submit to descend a little towards *earth*, and to copy with some closeness that nature which is before their eyes. We are told of *Michael Angelo*, that “his people are a superior order of beings;” that “there is *nothing* about them, *nothing* in the air of their actions, or their attitudes, “or the style and cast of their very limbs or features, *that puts one in mind of their belonging to our own species*.” If this be the character of that painter’s works, I must confess, for my own part, that I should be disposed to turn from them to those of the charming artist, whose words I quote, where we see human nature

^b Such as were mentioned in NOTE 33.

¹ *Sæcl.* 9.

^k Sir Jos. Reynolds’s Discourses, &c. p. 170.

improved, but not *forgotten*. I am very well content to be reminded of my own species, as he reminds me of them. But this, at least, is certain, that such a character, applied to a *Tragic Poet*, would be the severest censure that criticism could pronounce*.

N O T E 238.

P. 124. BUT, AS XENOPHANES SAYS, &c.

ΑΛΛ' ἔτυχεν, ὡσπερ Ξενοφάνης· ἀλλ' ἔ ΦΑΣΙ ταδε. Thus all the MSS. and editions. *Victorius* proposed—ἀλλ' ἔ ΣΑΦΗ ταδε: and supported his conjecture by the following fragment of *Xenophanes*, preserved in *Sext. Empiricus*, to which he supposes *Aristotle* to allude :

Και τό μεν ἐν ΣΑΦΕΣ ἔτις ἀνηρ ἰδεν, ἔδε τις ἔσαι
 Εἰδως, ἀμφι θεων τε, και ὅσσα λεγω περι παντων.
 Εἰ γαρ και τα μαλιστα ΤΥΧΟΙ τετελεσμενον εἰπων,
 ΑΥΤΩ ὁμως ἐκ οἶδε, δοκῶ δ' ἐπι πασι τετυκται^a.

Few conjectural emendations invite assent by a more remarkable union of ingenuity and probability: and, as it appears to me, that, without *some* emendation, nothing consistent or satisfactory can be made of the passage, we need, I think, have little scruple in admitting the reading of *Victorius* as true, till manuscript authority produces something better.

Xenophanes is here introduced, probably, because he had written against the theology of *HOMER* and *HESIOD*^b. The following lines are quoted from him by *Sextus Empiricus*:

* The writer just quoted, among other excellent observations on this subject, in his notes on *Du Fresnoy*, allows, that, even in *painting*, “a dash of individuality is sometimes necessary to give an interest.”

^a The sense is—“Concerning the nature of the Gods, and of the universe, nothing ever has been, or ever can be, *clearly* known by man. For should we even *chance* to *guess* the truth, we cannot *know* it to be the truth. All is mere *opinion*.”

^b *Diog. Laert.* IX. 18.

Παντα θεοις ἀνέθηκαν Ὀμηρῶδ' Ἡσίοδῶ τε,
 Ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειδα και ψογῶ ἐσι,

ΚΛΕΠΤΕΙΝ, ΜΟΙΧΕΥΕΙΝ τε, και ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΑΠΑΤΕΥΕΙΝ*.

By alluding to those other verses, where he descants on the uncertainty and obscurity of all inquiries relative to the nature of the Gods, and asserts, that all, on that subject, is mere *conjecture* and opinion, Aristotle seems, sily enough, to have intended to make Xenophanes answer himself; and to excuse Homer's theology, even by the testimony of one who had been most forward to condemn it. "These *may* be opinions taken up at random, as *Xenophanes* says; and *his* representation of the Gods may be the true:—but, as he *himself* owns, these are matters *not clearly known*.—ΑΛΛ' ἐ σαφη ταδε.—Homer was therefore right, as a Poet, in following popular tradition and belief."

Aristotle also alludes here, without doubt, to the objections of ΠΛΑΤΟ, *De Repub.* II. p. 150, &c. *ed. Maffey*.

I cannot forbear to mention one curious maxim of Xenophanes about drinking, which we find in some pleasant elegiac lines preserved in *Athenæus*. It was his opinion, it seems, that no man had drunk too much, provided he was *able to walk home without a guide*.

Ὅυχ' ὕβρις πινειν δ' ὅποσον μεν ἔχων ἀφικαιο

Ὅικαδ' ΑΝΕΤ ΠΡΟΠΟΛΟΥ.—

Athen. p. 462.

And what says the *severe* and *moral* ΠΛΑΤΟ on this subject?—He forbids *young* men this indulgence, but allows it to *old*:—μεθης δε, και πολυονιας τοπαραπαν ΤΟΝ ΝΕΟΝ ἀπεχεσθαι. Till the age of 18, he allows *no* wine; for, to drink it at that time of life, he says, is "*adding fire to fire, both in body and mind*."—πυρ ἐπι πυρ ὀχετευαν, εις τε το σωμα, και την ψυχην. From 18 to 30, a *moderate* use of wine might be allowed:—ὄνε γευεσθαι τε ΜΕΤΡΙΟΥ. At 40, and after, it might be used in a *jolly* kind of way—εις παιδιαν.—ῶσε

* See the *Poesis Philosophica* of Hen. Stephens, p. 36, where other fragments of this philosopher are collected.

ἀνηβαν ἡμᾶς, καὶ δυσθυμίας ΛΗΘΗΝ γίγνεσθαι, μαλακωτερον ἐκ σκληροτερε
 το της ψυχης ἦθ', καθαπερ εἰς πυρ σιδήρου ἐντεθεντα, γιγνομενον' καὶ ἔτιω
 εὐπλαστοτερον εἶναι. For wine, says he, was given to man, as—φαρ-
 μακον---ἐπιμαζρον της τε ΓΗΡΩΣ αὐσηροτητ'.—*De Leg. II. p. 666.*
ed. Scrv.

N O T E 239.

P. 125. WHETHER WHAT IS SAID, OR DONE, &c.

I believe *Victorius* is right in referring this to the accusation, or
 ἐπιτιμησις, which Aristotle, at the end of the chapter, expresses by
 ὡς βλαβερα. “ Arbitror autem rationem hanc pertinere ad for-
 mam eam, quam vocavit, ὡς βλαβερα. Docet enim nunc, si
 poeta arguitur, quod personam aliquam induxerit, quæ quippiam
 dixerit aut fecerit, quod meritò reprehendi possit, aut speciem
 habeat nocendi, quomodo illud defendi purgarique debeat.” *p. 278.*
 It is true, the word βλαβερον does not here occur: but Aristotle
 uses other words, as synonymous, at the conclusion of the chapter;
 as, μοχθηρια, πονηρια: and here, the same thing is sufficiently indi-
 cated by the moral expressions, μη καλωσ, and φαυλον. And though
 this solution cannot, that I see, be considered as arising from the
 application of any of the three principles laid down at the begin-
 ning of the chapter, yet it seems plainly connected, as I have ob-
 served in the notes on the translation, with what precedes.

N O T E 240.

P. 125. FOR THE SOLUTION OF SOME OBJECTIONS, WE
 MUST HAVE RECOURSE TO THE DICTION.

Τα δε, προς την λεξιν ορωντα δει διαλυειν. So, undoubtedly, the
 passage should be punctuated; not, as in some editions, very absurdly,

τα δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν, ὅραντα δὲ διαλυεῖν: of which the fair, and only fair, translation would be—"Those objections, which relate to the "diction, we must solve *by looking at them*!" Goulston, who adopts this perverse construction, is forced to supply:—"his modis "intuentem:" and Heinsius has inserted εἶπας in his text; on what authority, I know not. But the true construction certainly is, ἐρωτα πρὸς τὴν λέξιν—i. e. by having an eye to, or, considering, "the diction." And so the passage was, long ago, well explained by Victorius; who was followed by Castelvetro, Piccolomini, and Beni.—Dacier, though he translates rightly, mistakes the sense with those, whose translation is wrong. He supposes Aristotle here to be suggesting answers to *objections against the diction*. But the instances might have set him right; none of them appearing to be criticisms on the diction, but, all of them, objections to the *sense*, though the *answers* are drawn from the *diction*. Indeed Dacier seems to have seen this, and is therefore forced to make the *diction*, Λεξις, include the *thoughts*, διανοίαν; thus confounding Aristotle's clear distinction^b.

In this whole chapter, *words* are considered no farther, than as they afford the means of obviating objections against the *sense*.

N O T E 241.

P. 126. WHEN ON THE TROJAN PLAIN HIS ANXIOUS EYE, &c.

The censure, here, is generally supposed to have fallen on the word ἀβήρησαι, and the absurdity of making Agamemnon *see* the Trojan camp, and the Grecian fleet, by night, and when he was

^a "Quæ vero ad dictionem pertinent, oportet *intuentem* solvere." Ed. Cantab. 1785.

^b "La diction a deux parties; car elle comprend ordinairement *les pensées* & l'*expression*." p. 468, note 27.

shut up in his tent. To this, Aristotle is understood to reply, that the word is *metaphorical*; he saw with his *mind's eye*.—For my part, I would much rather confess, that I do not understand the instance at all, than suppose the philosopher capable of thus explaining away one of the finest descriptive touches in the whole Iliad. The entire passage is this :

Ἦτοι 'ὅτ' ἐς πᾶδιον το Τρωϊκόν ἀθήσειε,
 θαυμαζέεν πυρὰ πολλὰ, τὰ καίετο Ἰλίου προ,
 Αὐλῶν συργγῶν τ' ἐνοπην, ὀμαδὸν τ' ἀνθρώπων.

II. K. v. 11.

I can hardly think it possible for any man, of the least taste, to read these lines, and understand them to express merely the *thoughts* of Agamemnon. Mr. Pope, who has shewn so much taste in making the most of all Homer's *picturesque* descriptions^a, has, in his translation, done ample justice to this. Yet, in the *note*^b, this cruel metaphorical *sponge* is applied, without compunction, upon the supposed authority of Aristotle; though, after all, the evident corruption and deficiency of this whole passage leaves it dubious, whether this, or, indeed, any other meaning, assigned, or assignable, be the true one.

All, in this description, seems clearly *literal*. The verb, ἀθήσειε, is no where in Homer, I believe, applied to *mental* vision. Still less is θαυμαζέεν applicable to mere *thought*, or *recollection*. And what, after all, is Agamemnon made to *see*? Only what he might easily see, even as he lay on his couch—the *fires* of the Trojan camp. Add to this, the sense still more evidently literal of what fol-

^a See *Diff.* I. p. 31, &c.

^b II. X. v. 13. where, in the note, this explanation by *metaphor* is given with seeming acquiescence. In Clarke's Homer, too, it is adopted, and ἀθήσειε is explained, "animo videret: secum circumspicaret. Κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἶρηται. *Aristot. Poetic.* "cap. xxv."

lows—of his *bearing* the military music^c, and “the *busy hum of men.*”

There are few descriptions in Homer, that, to me, appear more beautiful than this little military night-scene. Whatever may be supposed with respect to *Agamemnon*, we, who read, are made to *see*, and *bear*. But, take away the literal sense, and you take away, with it, the whole beauty of the passage.—And, after all, what is the difficulty? *Agamemnon*, though retired to his tent, was kept awake by his anxiety. The enemy was not far off; and he apprehended the design of some nocturnal incursion^d. In this situation, is it difficult to imagine, that he might frequently rise, and look with an anxious eye *towards* the Trojan camp, and *towards* the ships?—for this is all which the expressions, ΕΣ πεδιον ἀθήσειε—ΕΣ νηας ἰδοι—here imply. Nor is it at all improbable, that he might have these views as he lay upon his bed, through windows, or apertures, made perhaps for that very purpose. The commentators seem to have thought only of a modern officer, snugly shut up in a close and comfortable tent, and disturbed by no fear, but that of a sore throat, or the rheumatism. The *tents* of the antients were mere huts, or hovels^e. The *marquee* of Achilles himself, as it is minutely described by Homer^f, seems to have been little better than a cow-house.

As I have given the passage from Homer, the reader may not be displeas'd to compare that sketch with a far more finished and exquisite *night-piece*, but of the same kind, by our own great Poet.

Pope has expressed this, I think, in a very happy line:—

“Hears in the passing wind their music blow.”

^d Δυσμενεες δ' ἄνδρες σχεδόν ἕαται, ἕδε τι ἰδυει,
Μη πως καὶ δια νυκτᾶ μνηστῶσι μαχεσθαι.

υ. 100, 101.

^e “Trojanis temporibus, tentoria nondum erant lintea. Achivorum κλισιαὶ σπιρί-
“τιβος lignisq̄ue constabant, vimine intertexto, humisq̄ue aggesta; adeoque tuguria potius.”
Heyne ad Virgil. Æn. 1. Æneid. 16.

^f *Il. Ω. 449.* Pope's transl. XXIV. 553, and the note.

From

From camp to camp, through the foul womb of night,
 The *hum* of either army stilly sounds,
 That the fix'd centinels almost receive
 The secret whispers of each other's watch :
Fire answers *fire* ; and through their paly flames
 Each battle sees the other's umber'd face :
 Steed threatens steed, in high and boastful neighs,
 Piercing the night's dull ear ; and from the tents,
 The armourers, accomplishing the knights,
 With busy hammers closing rivets up,
 Give dreadful note of preparation. *Henry V. Act iv.*

N O T E 242.

P. 127. Αυλων συριγγωνθ' ὀμαδον.—*Il. K. v. 13.*

—So Aristotle. In our editions of Homer, the whole line is—

Αυλων συριγγων τ' ἐνοπην, ὀμαδον τ' ἀνθρωπων.

I cannot agree with those commentators who take the objection here to fall upon the word *ἐνοπην*, which means, *voice*, “ & ne se “ dit proprement,” says Dacier, “ que des *hommes*.” This would be a mere *verbal* objection; for the *meaning* is plain enough. But Aristotle, as I have already observed, is not here considering criticisms on the diction, but, such criticisms on the *διανοια*, or *thoughts*, as may be obviated by means of the diction.

Farther; he is here shewing, how objections may be removed by having recourse to metaphor—by saying, “ the expression is “ not to be taken in its *proper*, but, in its *metaphorical* sense.” But Dacier's explanation makes the *objection* to be, not the impropriety of the *literal* sense, (for that was out of the question here), but only the impropriety, or harshness, of the *metaphor*; and the *answer*, according to him, is no other, than a denial of the charge, and a justification of the metaphor. And this will be
 equally

equally the case, whether we take Aristotle's quotation as it stands—*συριγγων ἢ ὄμαδον*—or suppose him to mean, *συριγγων τ' ἐνοπῶν*, as we read it in our editions: except, that the former would be much the bolder and harsher metaphor of the two.

So much then for, what the criticism was *not*. What it *was*, must always, I fear, in the present condition of the text, remain a problem. One conjecture only occurs to me, and that, such as I cannot take upon me to offer with any degree of confidence. Perhaps Aristotle had, originally, quoted, or meant, at least, to refer to, the *whole* verse, as we read it; and the censure might be pointed at the expression—*ὈΜΑΔΟΝ τ' ἀνθρώπων*. The proper and derivative sense of *ὄμαδος* seems to be that of *a crowd, a multitude, a heap*^a; its secondary sense, by a common metonymy of *cause* for *effect*, the *murmur*, or *tumult*, occasioned by a multitude. So *Hesychius*: *Ὀμαδος*—(1.) ΑΘΡΟΙΣΙΣ, (2.) ΘΟΡΥΒΟΣ. (1.) ΟΧΛΟΣ, (2.) ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ.—ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ, ἀπο τῆ, ὄμας.—Perhaps, then, some hyper-critic might take, or *chuse* to take, the word here in its primary sense, of *multitude*, and ask, how Agamemnon could, by night, perceive, and “wonder at,” the *multitude of men*? *θαυμάζειν—ὄμαδον ἀνθρώπων*. To this it would be a proper answer, to say—you mistake the meaning of the word *ὄμαδον*: it is not used here in its proper sense, of a *multitude*, but, in its metaphorical sense, for the *effect* produced by the *voices* and the bustle of a multitude. The criticism, I confess, would be frivolous enough; yet not more so than many others, to which Aristotle has condescended to furnish answers. It will perhaps be thought a more solid objection to my conjecture, that the word, *ὄμαδος*, seems to be constantly used by Homer in the *secondary* sense. So, *Il. M.* 471.—*B.* 96.—*Od. K.* 556: *Κινυμένων δ' ἑταρῶν ΟΜΑΔΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΤΗΙΟΝ ΑΚΟΥΣΑΣ*. Nor can I say, that I have found any instance in *Homer*, of this word used in its *primary* sense. The *other* sense may, therefore, appear

^a In the *Orphean Argonautics*, v. 112, *Ψαμάθς* ὈΜΑΔΟΣ, occurs, for “a heap of sand.” *Apollon. Rhodius* uses the word in the same sense—as, I. 347. IV. 198.

too common and established to have admitted of any difficulty. But to this circumstance, a critic, disposed to cavil, and furnished with sufficient authorities for the *primary* sense from *other* authors, may easily be imagined to have paid no regard.

N O T E 243.

P. 127. ALL, IS PUT FOR MANY—.

ΤΟ γὰρ ΠΑΝΤΕΣ, ἀντι τε Πολλε, κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴηται. The word, πάντες, does not occur in any of the preceding examples. But, says M. Batteux, it is *virtually* contained in the first example—ΑΛΛΟΙ μὲν ἴα θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι, &c.—for ἄλλοι means ΠΑΝΤΕΣ ἄλλοι. “Aristote traduit *l'idée*, & non le *mot*.” Dacier understands the passage in the same manner. This explanation appears to me forced and improbable. Aristotle says plainly, ΤΟ πάντες—εἴηται—*i. e.* “*the word πάντες;*” and I believe, with Victorius, Piccolomini, and Heinſius, that some corresponding *example* is lost, as the *explanations* of the other examples appear to be likewise.

N O T E 244.

P. 127. ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ δὲ οἱ εὐχῶ ἀρεσθαι.

Καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνυπνιον τε Λαγαμμενον, ὅτι ὅΤΚ ΑΥΤΟΣ ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν—
 ——— δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὐχῶ ἀρεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ ΤΩΙ ΕΝΤΗΝΙΩΙ ΕΝΕΤΕΛΛΕΤΟ δίδοναι.—*De Soph. Elench.* p. 284, *ed. Dival.*—This clearly confirms the common explanation, which makes *Hippias* substitute δίδομεν, the infinitive, (for δίδομεναι,) used imperatively, instead of δίδομεν, the first person plural of the present tense.

A very curious solution this. Jupiter tells no lie. He only orders the dream to lie for him: "Ce qui est *très différent*," says Dacier; "car alors le mensonge ne vient pas de Jupiter, il vient "du songe."—Dacier tells us also, that this hemistich, which does not appear in our copies of Homer^a, was altered, "par une *fraude* "*piuſe*." I cannot see any great *piety* in the fraud; because nothing appears to be added to the impiety of the passage by the words objected to, or to be taken from it, by the suppression of them. If the words were in *Aristotle's* Homer, they were probably in *Plato's* also. Yet, in the passage at the end of the second book of his *Republic*, where he alludes to this part of Homer, he, very properly, takes no notice of these words, but censures the *whole* circumstance, of Jupiter's being represented as *sending* such a deceitful dream:—την τε εὐπνιε ΠΟΜΠΗΝ ὑπο Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι^b.—The theology, indeed, of this charming writer, was of a very different complexion from that of Hippias, or of Dacier.—Κριμὴ ἀρα ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ἀπλεν καὶ ἀληθες, ἐν τε ἔργῳ, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ^c καὶ ἔτε αὐτὸς μεθισταται, ἔτε ἀλλως ἐξαπατα, ἔτε κατα φαντασίας, ἔτε κατα λογῆς, ἔτε κατα σημαίων πομπας, ἔθ' ὑπαρ, ἔθ' ὄναρ^c.

N O T E 245.

P. 127. Το μὲν ΟΥ καταπυθεται ὄμβρω.

This correction, also, of Hippias, is somewhat more explicitly mentioned, *De Soph. Elench.* p. 284. The passage was censured as *absurd*, (ὡς ἀτοπῶς ἐρηκτοα) by those critics who read ἔ. But what the absurdity was, we are not told by Aristotle. His com-

^a Instead of it, we read—Τρωεσσὶ δὲ κινδὲ' ἐρηπται. *H. B.* 15.—See Clarke's note.

^b P. 154, *ed. Maff.*

^c *Ibid.*

mentators tell us, that it consisted in first calling the post “*dry*,” *ἄνυον*^a, and then saying—“*where it was rotted by rain.*” I cannot say I comprehend this. Are *rotteneſs* and *dryneſs*, as *Beni* very well asks, incompatible?—Nor is it clear, what conſtruction, or what ſenſe, was given to the paſſage, by thoſe who read ζ, inſtead of ε̇.—But the reader will hardly thank me for detaining him with a diſſertation upon a rotten poſt.

N O T E 246.

P. 128. AND MIX'D BEFORE UNMIX'D.

Ζωρα τε τα πριν ΑΚΡΗΤΑ, [*διαλλαττοντα κελευθες*: for ſo the verſe is completed, in *Simplicius* and *Athenæus*.] This ſeems the beſt and moſt authentic reading, and *Dacier*'s the moſt reaſonable explanation. The meaning of the words, *ζωρον*, *ζωροτερον*, was matter of great diſpute among the antients themſelves. See *Plutarch's Sympoſ. Prob. V. 4.*—*M. Batteux*, taking it to mean *pure, unmixed*, reads, conſiſtently with that idea, for *ἀκρητα*, *ΚΕΚΡΑΤΟ*. But, that this word, whatever it was, meant *unmixed*, ſeems plain from the paſſage of *Athenæus*, p. 423, 424, about *Theophrastus*; who, it ſeems, in a treatiſe on *drunkenneſs*, adduced theſe very lines of *Empedocles* to prove, that the meaning of *ζωροτερον* was, not *pure wine*, but *wine mixed with water*.

The expreſſion, *διαλλαττοντα κελευθες*, ſeems to prove, as *Dacier* has explained it, that the ſecond verſe was not intended merely as explanatory repetition, in other *terms*, of the change deſcribed in the firſt, but as deſcriptive of a *contrary* change; an interpretation which is ſomewhat ſupported by the two following lines of the ſame Poet, on the ſame ſubject:—

^a The lines are—

Εστικε ξυλον ἄνυον, ἕσαι τ' ὄργυι, ἕπερ ἄνυ.,
 Η δρυϙ; ἡ πευκης, το μεν ε̇ καταπιβεται εὐδερ.

Il. φ. 327.

ΑΛΛΟΤΕ μὲν, φιλοτητι συνερχομέν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,
 ΑΛΛΟΤΕ δ' ΑΥ, διχ' ἕκαστα φορευμένα νεκεῖα ἔχθει².

—and, perhaps, still better, by the lines quoted by Aristotle, *Phys. Auscult.* VIII. p. 408. The expression—ΜΑΘΟΝ ἄθανατ' εἶναι—is well explained by Casaubon, upon Athenæus, p. 718,—“μαθον, “ pro εἰωθεισαν, aut ἐπεφυκεισαν :—*didicerant esse, pro erant, vel solebant, esse,*” &c. See also the verses just referred to, in the *Phys. Auscult.* where the same expression occurs—ΜΕΜΑΘΗΚΕ φρεσθαι.

Of *διαρσεις* and *συνθεσις*, and the ambiguity of *punctuation*, as a source of sophistical argumentation, more may be seen, if it be thought worth seeing, *Rhet.* II. 24, p. 580. *De Soph. Elench.* p. 284, 288, 303, *ed. Duval.*

N O T E 247.

P. 128. TO AMBIGUITY—.

Ἀμφιβολία. i. e. such ambiguity, as does not depend on the different senses of *single words*, (which Aristotle calls *ὁμωνυμία*,) but on the different senses, of which *two or more words are capable, independently of their punctuation.* See, *De Soph. Elench.* I. cap. iv. which clears up his distinctions, between *διαρσεις, ἀμφιβολία, ὁμωνυμία, &c.*

N O T E 248.

P. 128. WHATEVER IS POURED OUT TO DRINK AS WINE.

Upon v. 363 of *Od. Ω.* (—*κερωντας ἀιθοπα ὄνον*—) Eustathius says—*τρυγείων, ἐμβαλλοντας εἰς κρατήρας:* and Gataker remarks, on

² *Paef. Philos. H. Steph.* p. 21.

occasion of the same passage—“ το κερᾶν, five κερασαι, licet *miscere* “ proprie significet, usurpatur tamen simpliciter ἀντι τε, ἐγχεειν, και “ δίδουαι πινειν* pro *infundere*, in calicem scil. five cyathum, et *bibere*—“ dum porrigere*.” As a proof that the verb was so used, without the idea of *mixing*, we meet with it applied to *nectar* :

—ΚΕΡΑΣΣΕ ΔΕ ΝΕΚΤΑΡ ἑσθρον. *Od. E. 93.*

The Gods hardly drank *nectar and water*.—But it is even applied to pure *water* itself :

Θυμηρες ΚΕΡΑΣΑΣΑ κατα κρατῶ τε και ὤμων.

i. e. pouring it over my head and shoulders. Od. K. 362.

N O T E 249.

P. 128. HENCE GANYMEDE, &c.

I have adhered, without scruple, to the transposition mentioned in Mr. Winstanley's note^a ; which had been proposed, I know not by whom, before Victorius published his commentary. Victorius opposes it ; but, I think, without sufficient reason. Piccolomini saw, and has well defended, the necessity of it, which appears to me to be obvious. I would read the whole passage thus : Τα δε, κατα το ἐθῶ της λεξῆως ὀιον, τον [forte, TO] κεκραμμενον, ἄινου φασιν ἕναι· ὄθεν εἰρηται ὁ Γανυμηδης,

Διῖ ὀινοχοουειν,

ἔ πινοντων ἄινον. Εἰη δ' ἄν τετο γε και κατα μεταφοραν. Και, Χαλκεις, τυς τον σιδηρον ἐργαζομενες ὄθεν πεποηται,

Κνημις νεοτευκτη κασσιτεροιο.

This differs from Mr. Winstanley's arrangement, only with respect to the words—εἰη δ' ἄν τετο γε, &c. which appear to me to be-

* See Clarke's Homer.

^a *Ed. Ox.* 1780, p. 307.

long to the single example immediately preceding them in the editions. The commentators agree, I think, in making them refer to *all* the examples. But I cannot be persuaded, that Aristotle, after formally proposing the ἐθελολεξέως, as a *distinct* solution, would immediately say, that *all* the instances he gives might as well be defended κατὰ μεταφορὰν. I understand him to say—"though *this* example, indeed, may *also* be defended by metaphor." The expression confirms this:—εἰη δ' ἂν ΤΟΥΤΟ ΓΕ και κατὰ μεταφορὰν.

Besides, there seems to be a pretty plain reason, why this instance might be considered as a metaphor, and the others not so. *Nectar* was *the wine of the Gods*; and the resemblance was sufficiently obvious, to make the substitution of the one for the other an easy metaphor. With the other examples the case is different. *Brass* and *iron* are indeed, each of them, *species* of *metals*. But the common *genus* is too *general* to constitute that obvious resemblance which is requisite to a metaphor. Their likeness, to use the philosopher's own language, is not perceived *by the genus*^b. Oil and vinegar are both liquids; yet the substitution of the one for the other would make a very strange sort of metaphor; because they have no *other* resemblance to each other, but as liquids. Hence, Aristotle denominates such substitutions not *metaphors*, but *customary modes of speech*; both because the *resemblance* is not obvious enough for metaphor, and because, as the name implies, they are *common* and *established* expressions, (κυρια,) however, in themselves, improper.

^b See NOTE 183.

N O T E 250.

P. 129. THE MEANING IS, WAS STOPPED ONLY, OR REPELLED.

Dacier supposes the critics to have objected to the improbability of a long spear's remaining fixed in a shield, like an arrow, or light dart. I cannot so conceive it. The lines themselves are the best comment here.

Ὅυδε τοτ' Αἰνείαο δαίφρονος ὀβριμον ἔγχος
 Ρηξέ σακτος χρυσος γὰρ ἐρυκταίε, δωρα θεοιο·
 Αἰλλα δυω μεν ἔλασσε δια πτυχας, αἰ δ' ἀρ' ἐτι τρεις
 Ησαν· ἐπει πεντε πτυχας ἤλασε Κυλλοποδιων,
 Τας δυο, χαλκκιας, δυο δ' ἐνδοθι, κασσιτεροιο,
 Την δε μιαν, χρυσην· τη ῥ' ἐσχετο χαλκκεον ἔγχος.

Il. γ. 267, &c.

The shield was composed of five plates; the two first, of brass; the two *innermost*, next the body, (for that seems to be the sense of ἐνδοθι^a,) of *tin*, κασσιτεροιο^b; and one in the middle, of *gold*; and *there* the spear was stopped: ΤΗι ῥ' ἐσχετο. Now this might mean, *stuck*, or, was *fastened*, in it^c. But this, it was objected, would have been a manifest contradiction; for Homer had said, not only

^a It may, however, mean—*within* the brass plates. If so, we must understand the two *external* plates, on the opposite sides of the shield, to have been *brass*, and the two *iron*, *within*, and contiguous to, them. In either case, the plate of gold will be the *third* and *middle* plate.

^b Meaning, I suppose, according to the ἐθος λεξεως, *iron*.

^c As, by the way, the same word clearly appears to mean in a similar passage, *Il. H. 248*. But, there, it is used with the preposition ἐν.

Ἐξ δε δια πτυχας ἤλθε δαίτων χαλκκος ἀπειρης,
 ΕΝ ΤΗ Δ' ΕΒΔΕΜΑΤΗ ΡΙΝΩ ΣΧΕΤΟ.

that the gold *stopped* it—*χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύπηκε*—but, still more expressly, that the spear penetrated *two* of the plates, and that the *three others* remained unpierced. But the spear could not well be *fixed*, or *fastened*, in the plate of gold, which was the *third*, without piercing it.—And thus the objection appears to have been rightly understood by *Victorius* and *Gouljém*.

N O T E 251.

P. 129. OF HOW MANY DIFFERENT SENSES, &c.

I may say with *Victorius*, “*hic locus valdè me torfit.*” The words are these:—*το δὲ, ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται, ὡδὶ πῶς· μάλισ' ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὴν κατ' ἀντικρῦ.*—In this passage, as in many others, there is just glimpse enough of *some* meaning, to mock a commentator with the hopes of discovery, and to deprive him of the comfort of doing at once, what, after all his efforts, he will probably find himself obliged to do at last—of abandoning the passage as unintelligible. For my own part, I do not see *one* clear and satisfactory sense, that can be made of the words, without conjectural emendation; and if we open that door, we shall be, again, confounded by the number of different senses which ingenuity may propose, with equal pretensions to our acceptance.

Dacier translates thus: “*Et le plus court moyen de se tirer de ces endroits, c'est de prendre le mot dans un sens tout contraire à celui qu'on lui donne ordinairement.*” *Piccolomini* and *Beni* understand it thus: “*How many senses a word admits of, may best be known by considering the significations opposed to it:*” a sense preferable, I think, at least, to any other that has been offered, because it certainly does receive some support from the 15th chapter of *Aristotle's* first book of *Topics*^a; where he treats of *Homonymy*, or *equivocation*, and points out different means, by which we may

^a P. 180. See *Sect.* 2, 3.

discover,

discover, what, and how many, different senses a word will admit of; and among these is the rule here supposed to be alluded to; *i. e.* that any single word must admit of as many different significations as are *opposed* to it. As, for example, to the word *acute*, we oppose, sometimes *grave*, sometimes *blunt*, sometimes *dull*, or *stupid*. *Acute* therefore has, of course, three different senses, corresponding to those three *opposite* senses.

But though this explanation of the passage must be allowed to give an *Aristotelic* meaning, yet I cannot think it a meaning that arises, fairly and clearly, from the text. In particular, the expression, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ [scil. σημασίαν—for so it is supplied—] ΚΑΤ' ΑΝΤΙΚΡΥ, has, to me, a very suspicious appearance. I much doubt, whether Aristotle would have used the word *ἀντιμεν* to denote contrariety of *meaning*, or any thing but *local* opposition. I believe he would have used *ἐναντίον*, or *ἀντιμεμενον*; as he does *constantly* in those parts of his logical works, where he treats of *contrariety*, and of the *opposite senses* of words^b; and where I have not found the phrase, *κατ' ἀντιμεν*, once made use of in that sense.—However, as this interpretation seems to be the *least* exceptionable of any, and I see nothing better to propose, I have admitted it in my version: but I should certainly not accuse any reader of being very fastidious, if he preferred a blank to this, or any other meaning, that has been given to this *dark saying*.—Emendatory conjectures, indeed, have occurred to me, as to others; but none of them plausible enough even to impose upon myself.

^b See *Topic* I. 15, above referred to: and, II. 7, 8, *et passim*.

N O T E 252.

P. 129. ARGUE FROM THESE PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THEIR OWN.

ΑΥΤΟΙ ΚΑΤΑΨΗΦΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ.—I cannot think this word so free from all difficulty as Mr. Winstanley does. He says, “Egregie dictum καταψηφισαμενοι, ut sensus sit: hi perinde ac *judices quidam decernentes* ratiocinantur,” &c.—But the question is, whether the word will admit that sense, or any other, than that of *condemning*, passing sentence *against*, &c. which is not to Aristotle’s purpose in this place. The fair sense of καταψηφισαμενοι συλλογίζονται, is, if I mistake not, “they argue, or form their conclusion, *after*, “or, *in consequence of*, having *condemned*”—what?—We must necessarily understand them to have condemned, either the *passage* in question, or, the *opinion of others* about the sense of it. But Aristotle, in what follows, says plainly, that they condemned the passage, or the opinions of others relative to it, *in consequence of* their *σων* preconceived and erroneous *notions*; and the idea of *condemnation*, or *censure*, here, would be only an awkward, tautological anticipation of the ἘΠΙΤΙΜΩΣΙΝ, ἀν’ ὑπεναντιον ἢ τῆ αὐτων ἐνηττει, which follows. I think, therefore, that the proposed correction of *Heinsius*, κατασοφισαμενοι, must be allowed the praise, both of ingenuity and probability. In my version, however, I have contented myself with making the best I could of that reading which has the authority of all the manuscripts, and all the commentators, except *Heinsius*, on its side.—*Victorius* thinks the word will bear the sense of “*cum sententiam tulerint*;” but he adds—“quamvis in præpositione, quæ verbo adjuncta est, vis “*infit contra alios id faciendi.*”

N O T E 253.

P. 130. THE OBJECTION ITSELF, THEREFORE, IS PROBABLY FOUNDED ON A MISTAKE.

Δι' ἁμαρτημα δε το προβλημα ἐκ[⊙] ἐσι. “Metuo ne hic locus corruptus manufve fit.” *Victor*.—To give these words any meaning that may not easily be controverted, is, I believe, impossible. I have made them say, what it seems to me most probable that the author *meant* to say: “So far is this criticism from proving Homer to be wrong, that it is, itself, probably, founded on a mistake.”

N O T E 254.

P. 130. THE IMITATIONS OF POETRY SHOULD RESEMBLE THE PAINTINGS OF ZEUXIS—.

Τοις δ' εἶναι, οἷς Ζευξίς ἐγράφεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βελτίον· τὸ γὰρ παραδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερῆχειν.

M. Batteux proposes this arrangement:—Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βελτίον· τὸ γὰρ παραδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερῆχειν, τοις δ' εἶναι, οἷς Ζευξίς ἐγράφεν^a.

That the words, τοις δ' εἶναι, οἷς Ζευξίς ἐγράφεν, belong to the *second* way of defending the impossible, by referring it to the βελτίον—οἷα δεῖ εἶναι, &c. seems clear. Nor is it any objection to this, as some have thought it^b, that Aristotle had before mentioned the paintings of *Zeuxis*, as deficient in the expression of the *manners*^c. For it by no means follows, from this deficiency of *Zeuxis* as to

^a So, at least, the passage is printed in the edition I use of M. Batteux's *Quatuor Poetiques*, (*Paris 1771*), not as they are quoted by Mr. Winstanley, p. 309.

^b See Goulston's version and notes.

^c *Cap. vi. Transl.* p. 77.

manners, that he did not represent προς το βελτιον, with respect to beauty, grace, dignity of form^d, &c.: and it seems to be *this* kind of improvement, in painting, by which Aristotle, here and elsewhere, illustrates the μιμησις βελτιον^e of poetry. Compare, particularly, *cap.* xv. Επει δε μιμησις ἐστὶ ἡ Τραγ. βελτ. &c.^e.

The story of the manner, in which Zeuxis is said to have collected the βελτιον for his famous picture of Helen, is well known. See *Cic. de Invent.* II. 1. *Plin. Nat. Hist.* XXXV. 9. Bayle, art. ZEUXIS.

I agree, therefore, perfectly with Mr. Winstanley, that the words, ποιητες δ' εἶναι οἷος Ζ. ἐργ. should be transposed: but I do not see, that any alteration, farther than the mere transposition, is necessary. I would read—Αλλα και προς το βελτιον [scil. δε ἀναγειν] ποιητες δ' εἶναι [scil. δει] οἷος Ζευξις ἐγραφεν· το γαρ παραδειγμα δε ὑπερχειν.

N O T E 255.

P. 130. TO OPINION, OR WHAT IS SAID TO BE, MAY BE REFERRED, &c.

Προς ἃ φασι, τα ἄλογα: [scil. δει ἀναγειν:] for so, I think, with Mr. Winstanley, the passage is to be understood; and so it is explained and translated by Castelvetro. The expression, ἃ φασι, or οἷα φασι, is used by Aristotle as synonymous with δοξα, and οἷα δοκει. Thus,—οἷα ΦΑΣΙ και ΔΟΚΕΙ, at the beginning of this chapter: and afterwards—ἔτω φασιν.

But it will not, I think, be found possible to give this passage a consistent sense, unless we understand him to mean, what, as the

^d Zeuxis plus membris corporis dedit, id amplius atque angustius ratus, atque (ut existimant,) HOMERUM secutus, cui validissima quæque forma, etiam in fœminis, placet. *Quintil.* XII. 10. p. 627, *ed. Giff.*

^e *Transl.* p. 94.

text stands, he does not expressly say, *i. e.*—“By general opinion we may excuse, not only the πιθανον αδυνατον, but even such things as are manifestly improbable, or absurd.” As if he had written, προς ε φασι, ΚΑΙ τα αλογα. And thus Goulston has supplied:—“Ad ea quæ aiunt, [rediguntur hæc quæ dixi; et] illa, quæ sine ratione sunt.”

N O T E 256.

P. 131. WHEN THINGS ARE SAID, WHICH APPEAR TO BE CONTRADICTIONARY—.

Τα δ' υπεναντια ως ειρημενα.— The words, ως ειρημενα, have distressed all the commentators; and no sense, which they have laboured to force upon the expression, is, to my apprehension, satisfactory. Heinsius corrected by transposition—Τα δ' ως υπεναντια ειρημενα: “Ea, quæ tanquam subcontraria dicta videntur.”—An easier and more probable emendation, I think, would be—Τα δ' ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ ειρημενα.

N O T E 257.

P. 131. AND IN THE SAME SENSE—.

The word is, ωσαυτως: “simili modo,” as all the commentators render it. I cannot say I have been able thoroughly to satisfy myself, as to the precise meaning of the expression, from any thing I have found in Aristotle's logical works*. If, “in the same manner,” does not mean, “in the same sense,” I confess I do not know what it means. I understand Aristotle to say, that, if the *subject* of the propositions, charged with being contradictory, be

* See *De Sophist. Elench.* 285, D. 287, E.

the *same*, and spoken of in the *same respect*, we must still examine, farther, whether the two propositions admit of a *sense* really and accurately *opposite* to each other; which cannot be the case, unless the *same words*, in each proposition, have exactly the *same sense*. And this meaning seems to be supported by the following passage from the treatise *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*:—Καὶ ἐς τὸ ἀντιφασίς, (*nempe*) καταφασίς καὶ ἀποφασίς αἱ ἀντικειμεναὶ. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι, τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, μὴ ὁμωνυμῶς δὲ^b. That is, as it is well explained in the analytical Synopsis prefixed to Duval's edition:—"Affirmatio & negatio oppositæ, contradictionem faciunt. "Oppositio est ejusdem, de eodem, non homonymè; nam accipi debent termini in oppositione, eodem modo ac sensu."

All that follows—*viz.* ὡς καὶ αὐτὸν, ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγει, ἢ ὁ αὐτὸν φρονιμῶς ὑποβηται—is either so corrupt, or so darkly expressed, that I have only to confess myself unable even to guess what Aristotle meant to say. Commentators indeed have explained, and translators have translated; but I have seen no explanation that approaches to satisfaction, nor any translation, but what is either unintelligible, or unwarrantable, or both. I do not mean to except myself; for I had translated thus:—"We must also consider the *person* who speaks, and whether the contradiction be to what *he himself* said, or to what any reasonable man would *understand* him to have said^c." But, to wave other objections, which, no doubt, the learned reader will easily make for me, the verb, ὑποθεσθαι, will, I believe, by no means bear this sense, of *supposing, understanding*—ὑπολαβεῖν. At least, *Aristotle* seems always to use it in that of *advising, suggesting, &c.* So *Rhet.* I. 9, p. 533.—ὅταν ἐπαινῶν βελῆ, ὅρα τι αὐτὸν ὑποθέσθαι· καὶ ὅταν ὑποθέσθαι, ὅρα τι αὐτὸν ἐπαινῶν. Accordingly, Goulston has given the

^b *Cap.* vi. p. 39. Elsewhere he expresses this—ἐλεγχῶ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφασίς τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐνῶ, μὴ ὀνοματῶς, ἀλλὰ ἰσχυρῶς. *De Soph. Elench.* p. 285, D.

^c Alluding, as I supposed, to the former passage about the *verbal υπεναντία*; and *Glauco's* answer, *viz.* the contradiction is only to the critic's erroneous *opinion*, and *miscconception*, of the passage: ἀλογῶς πρὸς ὑπολαμβάνουσι.

word this sense in his version:—"videndumque, an eâ in re, "quod prudens præceperit, secutus sit." But, of what force this circumstance is, or how it is to be applied to obviate the charge of *contradiction*, I do not see.

Being therefore obliged to reject the only version, which seemed to me to offer any tolerable meaning, I have left a blank in my translation.

N O T E 258.

P. 131. WHEN EXCUSED BY NO NECESSITY, &c.

—Ὅταν μη ἀναγκῆς ἔσῃς, μηθεν χρησηται τῷ ἀλογῷ, ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγαιτῆ πονηρία, ὡσπερ ἐν Οἰεσῇ τῆ Μενελάω.—Such was the confused state in which *Robortelli* found the text, which he, very ingeniously and solidly, rectified thus:

—Ὅταν μη ἀναγκῆς ἔσῃς μηθεν, χρησηται τῷ ἀλογῷ, ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης ΕΝ Τῷ ΑἰΓΕΙ Τῆ πονηρία, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ Οἰεσῇ τῆ Μενελάω.

Some MSS. for Αἰγαιτῆ, give Αἰγαιτη, which, as Goulston has observed, suggests the true reading—ἐν τῷ ΑἰΓΕΙ, Ἡ Τῆ πονηρία—κ. τ. λ.

By the *Ægeus*, Robortelli understood the character of that name, in the *Medea* of Euripides. To this Victorius very reasonably objected, that the mode of expression, ἐν τῷ Αἰγαι, seems plainly to indicate a *Tragedy* so named; not a character only in a Tragedy of a different name. But this is no objection to Robortelli's reading, though it is to his explanation of it. See the fragments at the end of the Oxford Euripides, where several passages of the *Ægeus* are quoted from Stobæus, &c.

N O T E 259.

P. 131. THUS THE SOURCES OF OBJECTIONS ARE FIVE, &c.

This enumeration may seem, at the first view, to be deficient; for one of the objections was—*Ουκ ἀληθῆ*:—"the representation is not conformable to *truth*." But this, perhaps, may be considered as falling under the charge of *ἀλογον*. For he, who accuses a Poet of departing from nature, experience, and the *δία ἧν, ἣ ἐστ*, says, in other words, it is *improbable, incredible, absurd, &c.* Or, when this objection was relative to *truth* of another sort—to theological truth, as violated by the poetic representations of the Gods, it then came, properly, under the *βλαβερον*; it was of immoral and pernicious tendency. And thus we find Plato objecting continually to the theology of Homer; sometimes, as *not true*—*ΟΥΚ ΑΛΗΘΗ*^a; sometimes, as *hurtful*—*τοις ἀνευσι ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ*^b.

The objections answered by considerations drawn from the *diction*, (*Sect. 5.*) appear to be all reducible to one or other of these *five* sources.

N O T E 260.

P. 131. OR, OF IMMORAL TENDENCY.

Βλαβερα: *i. e.* *hurtful on account of their immoral tendency*. So the word is used by Plato; to whose objections, and to the very *language* in which he expresses them, Aristotle so frequently alludes. Censuring the immoral tendency of some of Homer's

^a See NOTE 235.

^b See the passage from Plato in the next NOTE, where both these expressions occur.

representations of his hero Achilles, Plato says—Οὐθ' ὅσια ταῦτα, εἴτ' ἀληθῆ·—καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκερῶσι ΒΑΑΒΕΡΑ·—The reason follows: πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ συγγνωμὴν ἔξει, κακῶ ἄντι, πεισθῆεις, ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττεισι τε καὶ ἐπραττον “Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχισποροὶ——.” Ὡν ἕνεκα, παύσειν τις τοιαύτας μυθεῖς, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὴν εὐχερείαν ἐντυκτώσι τοῖς νεοῖς, ποιηρίας. *De Rep.* III. p. 176, *ed. Mass.*

Compare the precept, *cap.* xv^a. about making the character as morally good as possible: and see NOTE 108. It is obvious however to observe, that when the *μοχλῆρια*, the *villainy* of a character, is overcharged, it brings with it its own antidote. Such characters as *Iago*^b, or *Glenalvon*, can be *βλαβερα* to no reader or spectator. They excite only pure and unmitigated disgust. Not all the art of the Poet, or the charms of Poetry, can cheat us into any degree of sympathy with them, even for the moment in which they are speaking. We feel, there, no such struggle between immoral approbation and moral indignation, as Dr. Johnson has described, in his observations upon the different *effects* produced on the spectator, by the villainy of Rowe's *Lothario*, and that of Richardson's *Lovelace*. The passage is so much to the purpose of this note, so justly thought, and so well expressed, that I am persuaded I shall gratify the reader by transcribing it.

“ The character of *Lothario* seems to have been expanded by
 “ Richardson into *Lovelace*; but he has excelled his original in
 “ the *moral effect* of the fiction. *Lothario*, with gaiety which
 “ cannot be hated, and bravery which cannot be despised, retains
 “ too much of the spectator's kindness. It was in the power of
 “ Richardson alone to teach us at once esteem and detestation, to
 “ make virtuous resentment overpower all the benevolence which

^a *Transl.* p. 92.

^b “ There is always danger, lest wickedness, conjoined with abilities, should
 “ steal upon esteem, though it misses of approbation; but the character of *Iago* is so
 “ conducted, that he is, from the first scene to the last, hated and despised.” [Dr.
 Johnson. Note at the end of *Othello*.]—Not so, Shakspeare's *Richard*.

“ wit, and elegance, and courage, naturally excite, and to lose at
 “ last the hero in the villain.”

N O T E 261.

F. 131. OR AS CONTRARY TO TECHNICAL ACCURACY.

—Παρα την ἀξιοτητα, την κατα τεχνην. Most of the commentators understand the art of *Poetry* itself. But, if I am right in the explanation I have given, NOTE 233, of the expression, προς αυτην την τεχνην, the sense of the expression here must be the same. I understand Aristotle to mean, the *rightness*, not of *Poetry* itself, but of *other* arts, which may be incidentally the subject of the *Poetry*; and the words, I think, express the source, or εἶδος, as he terms it, of objections relative to all faults κατα συμβεβηκεν, as opposed to those, which he distinguishes by the various expressions of, ἀμαρτιαι καθ' εαυτην, &c.⁴

The other interpretation of the words is fairly liable, I think, to the following objections. 1. If we understand the *poetic* art itself to be meant, then the objection to faults κατα συμβεβηκεν—to impossibilities and inaccuracies with respect to *other* arts and sciences—will be entirely omitted in this enumeration. This is very improbable, considering how common a source of critical censure this was. For while, on the one hand, the extravagant admirers of Homer made no scruple to assert, that his Poems contained the principles of *all arts and sciences*; on the other, we know how eagerly the *Zoilists* caught at every apparent inaccuracy of this kind; and, particularly, with respect to his *geography*. One instance, at least, of this sort of cavil, we have in this chapter: the censure of the passage, Ὀμη δ' ἀμμορον, *Il.* Σ. 489, fell on

⁴ Lives of the Poets, vol. ii. 526.

⁴ See NOTE 233.

Homer's ignorance of astronomy^b.—2. By the manner in which Aristotle here mentions, first, the five sources of critical censures, and then, immediately, the twelve sources of *λυσεις* or *answers*, it is plain, I think, that he means—answers to those censures, and to *all* of them. But this cannot be the case, if we understand *essential faults* in the *Poetry itself*, or *bad imitation*: for this admits of *no* answer, but a direct denial of the fact. Whereas, if we understand *incidental errors* in *other arts*, all will be consistent; and *every* fault enumerated will find its answer in some of the *λυσεις*, which had been pointed out in the preceding part of the chapter, and are referred to in this enumeration.—3. If the *art* here mentioned be the art of *Poetry* itself, and the faults against that art be, as I understand them to be, *essential faults*, faults which constitute bad Poetry, *i. e.* in Aristotle's view, *bad imitation*, this plainly implies, that the *four other* faults enumerated are *not* essential, but accidental faults; *κατα συμβεβηκε*. But, that *just* faults as *improbability*, and *immorality*, (*ἄλογα, βλαβερα*,) which had just before been singled out from the rest, as *ἔρθαι ἐπιτιμησεις*—as the most solid objections, and such as admitted of no excuse—that *these* should be considered by Aristotle as faults merely incidental, not to be objected to the Poetry itself, not affecting the merit of the *imitation*, *ἔ καθ' ἑαυτην ἀμαρτια*, is what, as I have before said, I cannot easily conceive.^c

The expression itself—*παρα την ἄρθοτητα την κατα τεχνην*, is indeed ambiguous; and they, who prefer the sense which I have rejected, will perhaps think it favoured by the similar expression, *clearly* applied to faults against the art of *Poetry* itself, in the passage,—*ποτερων ἐσι το ἀμαρτημα, των ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκε*. The expressions, however, are not exactly the same. There, it is, *κατα ΤΗΝ τεχνην*—"against *the* art:" here,—*κατα*

^b For instances of such objections, both to the geography, and the astronomy, of Homer, the reader may consult *Strabo*, *passim*.

^c NOTE 233.

τέχνη: "contrary to the rectitude of *art.*"—But Aristotle had before used an expression, that seemed still more strongly to point at the art of *Poetry*: τα πρὸς ΑΤΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ ἀδύνατα: which, however, it seems necessary, for the reasons given in NOTE 235, to understand in the same sense, which I have here given to κατὰ τέχνην. But that passage, and indeed this *whole* chapter, is, in its present state, so full of obscurity and ambiguity, that every interpretation which can be given must necessarily be, in a great measure, conjectural and disputable. All I can venture to be confident of is, that my explanation of this passage is *consistent* with my explanation of the other; and that either both are right, or both are wrong.

N O T E 262.

P. 131. THE ANSWERS, WHICH ARE TWELVE, &c.

How the different Λυσεις or *solutions* proposed throughout the chapter are reducible to 12, and *which* are the 12 that Aristotle meant, are questions, which the defective state of the original renders it very difficult, if not impossible, to answer, with any certainty. And indeed the matter is of so little importance, that it is by no means worth while to enter into any examination of the various modes of reckoning, by which different expositors have endeavoured to solve the problem. *Victorius*, indeed, is so wise, as to give up the attempt. It will be very easy however, and therefore, I hope, not very foolish, just to enumerate all the λυσεις, which actually have been mentioned in the chapter, in the order in which they occur, and then to examine, by way of experiment, whether they are any way reducible to *twelve*.

1.—τυγχάνει τε τέλος, τε αὐτης.—*i. e.* The *end* of *Poetry* is better answered, &c.

2.—κατὰ συμβεβηκός - - - The fault is *incidental*.

*

3.—οὐκ

- 3.—ὅια δει, (οἱ, βελτιον) - - - It is what is *best*, or what *should* be.
- 4.—ὅια φασι, (οἱ, ὅια δοκε) - - It is according to *general opinion*.
- 5.—ὅια ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν (οἱ, ἕτως εἶχεν, οἱ, ἀληθῆ) - - - to *truth*.
- [6.—σκεπτεον—εἰς τον πραττοντα, προς ὄν, ὅτε, &c.] - [Confider *circumstances*.]
- 7.—Γλωττη - - - - Defend, by the *foreign* sense of the word.
- 8.—Μεταφορα - - - - by *Metaphor*.
- 9.—κατα Προσῳδιαν - - - - by *Accent*.
- 10.—Διαίρεσει - - - - by *Punctuation*.
- 11.—Αμφιβολια - - - - by *Ambiguity*.
- 12.—κατα το ἔθος της λεξεως - - - - by *Customary speech*.
- 13.—Ποσαχως ἂν σημηνει—οἱ, καθ' ὁμωνυμιαν by the *different senses* of a word.
- [14.—Γλαυκωνος λυσις] - - - - [Glauco's answer.]
- [15.—εἰκοθεν, και παρα το εἰκοθεν γινεσθαι] [Probable, that many things should happen improbably.]
- [16.—Ου το αυτο, ἢ ε' προς το αυτο, &c.] [The *same thing* is not spoken of, or, not in the *same respect*, &c.]

Here are, then, 16 different *answers*. Of these, it seems, upon the whole, most probable, that the 12 not enclosed in brackets, are the 12 which Aristotle means. My reason is, that in the beginning of the chapter, after laying down the *three* distinct considerations, of the different *objects* of imitation, the privileges of *poetical language*, and the distinction of *essential* and *incidental faults*, he immediately, and explicitly, refers to those three principles, as *sources* of all the *answers*. Ωσε δει τα επιτιμηματα—ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ἐπισκοπευτα ΛΤΕΙΝ. Now it will be found, I believe, that the 12 answers above mentioned *are* drawn from those sources, and that the *four* remaining answers are not.

But *why* these four, which evidently are proposed as answers, and seem to be *distinct* answers, were not admitted in the concluding enumeration, it may not be easy to shew. Perhaps, Aristotle reckoned only as *one* solution, the *two* which he assigns to the *same* objection, with an *ἢ*, or *ἔτις τε καὶ*, &c. This would throw out N^{os} 14, and 15, which seem, indeed, to be mentioned only as a sort of secondary or subsidiary answers.—As to N^{os} 6, and 16, he might consider them as *one*; both of them, in fact, saying the same thing, and nearly in the same words—*i. e.* “*circumstances* must be “considered.” Still however, taking these together as *one* answer, that answer will be supernumerary; and how it is fairly to be got rid of, it is difficult to see: the more difficult, because it is the *only* λυσις furnished by the whole chapter to the objection of *immoral tendency*, (βλαβερα,) upon which so great stress is laid.

All that seems tolerably clear is, that the 12 answers intended in the recapitulation are those 12, which are deducible from the *three* principles laid down at the opening of the chapter. In this idea, which I had formed before I consulted any commentator, I was glad to find myself supported by *Goulston*, in his accurate analysis; where he makes the 12 answers to be those here assigned, and draws them from the three sources at the beginning of the chapter: *viz.* *three* from the *first* source, (N^{os} 3, 4, 5,)—*seven* from the *second*—the *distion*, (N^{os} 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,)—and *two* from the *third* source, (N^{os} 1, and 2.)

N O T E 263.

P. 132. IF THAT WHICH IS THE LEAST VULGAR OR POPULAR BE THE BEST—.

—ΗΤΤΟΥ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗ.—The word φορτικον is used in a number of different, and sometimes nicely discriminated, senses, which cannot, all of them, be expressed by any *single* word in our language.

guage. Sometimes, for example, it is to be rendered by *extravagant, violent, charged, outré*^a, &c. as in the following passage of *Diog. Laertius* about Bion:—ἦν δὲ καὶ θαυμάσιος, καὶ πολὺς ἐν τῷ γέλῳ διαφορῆσαι, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΙΣ ὀνομασίᾳ κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων χρωμένῳ^b.—*i. e.* *extravagant, exaggerated, outrés*, as Bayle has well explained it, art. BION, note [B], where he gives an instance of this extravagance of expression in that philosopher, from Plutarch, who calls it ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ^c.

Sometimes, applied to *persons*, it means *troublesome, tiresome*, &c. as in *Ælian*—πολὺς ἦν λαλῶν, καὶ ἔδωκε ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ. *Var. Hist.* XII. 13.—Sometimes, *insolent, overbearing*, &c. as, in the same writer, it is said of a famous courtisan,—ἦ δὲ ἦν ΤΙΠΕΡΗΦΑΝΟΣ καὶ δεινὸς ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗ. XII. 63^d.—Sometimes, again, and that very frequently, it is used as synonymous with ἀνελευθερός, βαναυσός, *popular, low, vulgar*, &c. as opposed to what is *liberal, refined, delicate, genteel*, &c. Thus Plutarch—ἀνελευθερὸς κομιδῆ καὶ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΑΣ—φαντασίας. p. 216, *ed. H. S.* And Plato—ὁ φιλοτιμῶς—τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗΝ τινα ἡγεῖται.—“The ambitious man looks upon gain as a *vulgar* sort of pleasure,” *De Rep.* IX. p. 254, *ed. Mass.*—Jul. Pollux describes a species of dance called Μόδιον, as,

^a The Latin writers use *molestus* in this sense; for whatever is violent, overdone, laboured, affected, &c. Thus Cicero, in the following elegant passage of his *Brutus*: “Volo enim, ut in scenâ, sic etiam in foro, non eos modò laudari, qui celeri motu & difficili utantur, sed eos etiam quos statarios appellant, quorum sit illa simplex, in agendo, veritas, non MOLESTA. *i. e.* *μη φορτικῆ.* cap. xxx. Again—“Latinè loquendi accurata, et sine MOLESTIA diligens, elegantia: *i. e.* without labour or affectation.” cap. xxxviii.—Catullus, too, of an *affectèd* gain;

— — illa, quam videtis
Turpe incedere, mimicè ac MOLESTE
Ridentem, catuli ore Gallicani.

^b IV. 52.

^c *Ερωτικ.* p. 1371. *ed. H. St.* See also the *Timon* of Lucian, *ed. Ben.* p. 59.—ἰσοσει ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΣ διαλεγόμεναι—*i. e.* (as the context shews,) *with the extravagance of Tragic rant.*

^d *Τερεπτικῶς, ὑπερφρον, βραχὺς, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ, ἐπαρχῆ.* *Jul. Poll.* VI. 5.

ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΝ

ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΝ ὄρχημα και ναυτικόν—“a vulgar and sailor-like dance;” the *borriphe*, I suppose, of the Greeks*. And thus Athenæus, where he mentions, from Herodotus, the curious story of *Agarista*, (the daughter of Clisthenes, king of Sicyon,) and her suitors, says, that Clisthenes rejected *Hippoclidés*, ἰδὼν----ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΣ ὄρχησαμένον: because he did not *dance like a gentleman*†: a charge, which, according to Herodotus, seems indeed to have been pretty well founded; for he tells us, that Hippoclidés got upon a table and *danced upon his head*‡.—But let us return to Aristotle. This *last* sense of the word φορτικῶν appears to me clearly to be that, in which it is here used by him. I cannot think, that by φορτικῆ, he intended to express, as Dacier, and the commentators before him, explain it, the *trouble and expence* of theatrical exhibition—the number of things wanted—actors, scenes, dresses, music, &c.^h. Of all the commentators I have seen, M. Batteux alone gives, in a short note, what I think the true meaning of the word in this place:—“φορτικῶν, grossier, digne des mercenaires. Aristote, Poëtic. VIII. c. 6. oppose le spectateur mercenaire & ignorant, φορτικῶν, au spectateur honnête; & le plaisir grossier, ἡδονὴ φορτικῆ, les danses grossières, κωμικῆς φορτικωτέρας, au plaisir delicat, aux danses honnêtes.”

Aristotle himself will here be his best commentator, in the passages to which M. Batteux refers.

Some sorts of *rhythm*, he says, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΣ ἔχουσι τοὺς κινήσεις, (*violent and vulgar*,) οἱ δὲ, ΕΛΕΓΓΟΕΡΙΩΤΕΡΑΣⁱ. Again, in the

* And see *Suidas*, v. Μόλιον.

† P. 628.

‡ — Τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔστηκεν ἐπὶ τῶν τραπέζων, τοῖς ΣΥΝΑΕΣΙ ΕΧΕΙΡΟΝΟΜΗΣΕ. *Herod.* VI. p. 238. c. II. St.

^h —“*hæret φορτικῆ—i. e. quæ paucioribus eget adjunctis extrinsecis sumpti,*” &c. *Robortelli*.—“*Mano gran ja,*” in the same sense, *Castellectro*.—“*Manco carca & manco*” “*U janzja U aiata.*” *Piccol.*—*Beni* follows *Robortelli*. *Fكتوريس* renders—“*impor-*” “*ti a et i d’ja,*” but enters into no particular explanation. *Dacier*—“*la moins*” “*comparé, & ce qui demande le moins d’aide & de secours.*”

ⁱ *De Pœt.* VIII. 5. p. 455. B.

next chapter, relative to the musical education of youth, he speaks of the pleasure of a *popular* musical audience, as a *vulgar, illiberal* sort of pleasure. "The performer there," he says, "aims only at the *pleasure* of the hearers, και ταυτης ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗΣ· δὸςται δ' ΤΩΝ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩΝ κρησμεν ἐντι την ἐργασίαν, ("such performance does not become a *gentleman*,^k") ἀλλὰ ΘΗΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΝ· (the playing of a man who is *paid* for playing:) και ΒΑΝΑΤΣΟΥΣ δὴ (*mechanics*) συμβαίνει γυγνεσθαι· πονηρῶ γὰρ ὁ σισιτῶ πρὸς ἐν ποιηται. το τελεῶ· ὁ γὰρ ΘΕΑΤΗΣ, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ ὦν, μεταβαλλειν ἐνὸς την μι- σικην.— *Ibid.* p. 457, S.—In the next chapter is the following passage, still more directly to our present purpose, in which he expressly distinguishes, as here, the two sorts of spectators, or hearers:—θεατης διττῶ, ὁ μὲν ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ και ΠΕΠΑΙΔΕΥΜΕΝΟΣ, ὁ δὲ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ, ἐκ βαναυσων, και θητων, και ἄλλων τοιστω, συζημενῶ. p. 459, A¹.

The word occurs frequently in other parts of Aristotle's writings, and seems generally, if not always, to be used in the same senseⁿ.

By *φορτικῆ*, then, applied to Tragedy, I think it clear, that he means only—calculated for *φορτικοί* spectators; adapted to the entertainment of *popular* audiencesⁿ—to the taste, as we commonly

^k In discussing, however, the question, whether boys should learn Music practically, and play or sing themselves, Aristotle determines, that they *should*, and gives this reason, that "it is a thing impossible, or, at least, very difficult, for those, who do not actually *practise* an art, to be *good judges* of it." p. 456.—It might be so in those days. Modern connoisseurs, both in Music and Painting, find no such difficulty.

¹ So Plutarch, in the beginning of his *Comparison of Aristophanes and Menander*, p. 1567, ed. H. S.—Τὸ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΝ, φησιν, ἐν λόγοις, και ἡμερικόν, και ΒΑΝΑΥΣΟΝ, ἄς ἐστὶν Ἀριστοφάνει, Μενανδρῶ δὲ ἔθικας. Και γὰρ, ὁ μὲν ΑΠΑΙΔΕΥΤΟΣ και ΙΔΙΩΤΗΣ εἰς κεινῶ λέγει ἀδισκεται, ὁ δὲ πεπαιδευμένῶ δυσχεραίνει.

ⁿ *Ethic. Nicom.* IV. 8.—βωμοποιοί—και φορτικοί. And I. 5, where he says, that, 'ΟΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ και ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΑΤΟΙ, held the *summum bonum* to be *pleasure*. See also *Rhet.* III. 1. p. 584, A.

^o Mr. Pope, probably without thinking of Aristotle, has almost translated him, where, in his preface to Shakespeare, he says—"It must be allowed, that stage-poetry, of all others, is more particularly *levelled to please the populace*."

express

express it, of the *upper gallery*, as opposed to the refined and cultivated taste of men of reading and reflection.

As far as I can judge, from a comparison of the different senses of the word with its etymology^o, the common idea, which runs through and connects them all, is that of *excess*, or, perhaps, more exactly, of offensive, disgusting, or *burdensome*, by *excess*, of some kind or other.

N O T E 264.

P. 132. AS IF THE AUDIENCE, WITHOUT THE AID OF ACTION, &c.—

Ὡς γὰρ ἐν αἰσθανομένων, ἂν μὴ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΣΘΗ, πολλὴν κίνησιν κινεῖται—This wound has been sufficiently probed. When I found, that the “*medica manus*” of Mr. Toup had been tried upon it, I looked, at least, for the “*salubres Ambrosiæ succos, et odoriferam panaceam^a*,” if not for the precious *Dicłammus*, that would entirely heal it. He proposed to read—ἂν μὴ ΑΥΛΟΣ ΠΡΟΣΘΗ^b. I should be very sorry to do any injustice to the emendation of so masterly a Greek scholar; but I am obliged to confess, that I do not understand it. “The imitators have recourse to every kind of “motion, just as if the audience were not able to understand (or, “to bear) them, *without the addition or accompaniment of a flute.*” How any sense can be made of this, or of any other fair version of the passage, so corrected, I cannot discover. The emendation, surely, requires to be explained, at least; and if Mr. Toup gave any explanation in his letter to Mr. Winstanley, it is to be wished, that the learned editor had communicated it to the public in his note.

^o From ΦΟΡΤΟΣ—onus,

^a *Æn.* XII. 411.

^b See Mr. Winstanley’s note, p. 309 of his edition.

It is some comfort, however, that the general *meaning* of the passage seems liable to little or no difficulty; and, accordingly, in that, all the commentators, I think, are agreed, however widely they may differ as to the *reading*.

N O T E 265.

P. 132. LIKE BAD FLUTE-PLAYERS, WHO WHIRL THEMSELVES ROUND, WHEN THEY WOULD IMITATE THE MOTION OF THE DISCUS—.

This is one of those antique curiosities, which we stare at, without knowing very well what to make of it.—'Αν ΔΙΣΚΟΝ δεημιμεισθαι. We should think it very strange, if we were told of a flute-player *having occasion* to imitate a *quoit*. But we are not to understand this of a mere instrumental solo, but of a performer accompanying *words* sung by a Chorus, (as appears from the mention of the *Coryphæus*,) and endeavouring, in an absurd manner, to express them. The antient *Αυλητης*, or *Tibicen*, was not, it seems, a mere sedentary performer, like those of a modern orchestra. He accompanied the Chorus with his *person*, as well as with his instrument, and seems to have paraded about the stage, in a pompous dress; to have made a part of the *Οψis*, or *show*, and to have joined in all the *turns*, and *returns*, and various evolutions, of the choral dance. Hence the description of Horace:

Sic priscæ motumque et luxuriam addidit arti
Tibicen, traxitque VAGUS per palpita vestem. A. P. 214.

Lucian, in his *Harmonides*, describing the requisites of a good *Αυλητης*, mentions, among the rest,—καὶ ΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ ἐν ῥυθμῷ^a.—The great masters, no doubt, respected themselves, and confined their motion to the dignity of a sort of rhythmic strut. But Aristotle,

^a P. 638, *ed. Ben.*

here, is describing the tricks of the φαυλοι or φορτικοι performers. Such a performer *might* have occasion, or rather take occasion, to imitate the whirling or rolling of a disc, if the subject, for example, of the choral song chanced to be the story of *Apollo* and *Hyacinthus*; which is mentioned by Lucian in a long list of fabulous subjects, enumerated as a part of the knowledge requisite to an accomplished pantomimic dancer^b. Or, the subject might be taken from Homer, *Od. θ. 186*, &c.

Κυλισμενοι. Dacier, in his note, translates this, “*rolling themselves upon the ground.*” This would be φορτικον indeed. Yet in this idea he follows *Victorius*; who enters into a discussion, of some length, to prove that κυλισμενοι can mean nothing but *rolling on the ground*. Nor will he allow the difficulty of doing this *while they were playing* to be a sufficient objection. Certainly, the usual and proper sense of the word is on his side. But it was natural enough, surely, to apply to the motion *imitating*, the term proper to the motion *imitated*.

^b *De Salt. p. 933. ed. Ben.*—A modern dancer—perhaps even *M. Vestris* himself—would stare at the account which Lucian gives in that treatise, of the accomplishments necessary to make a *perfect dancer*. “He must not only understand music, but poetry, *geometry*, and above all, *philosophy, natural and moral*; rhetoric, painting, sculpture; especially, he must have an excellent memory, and have all history at his fingers ends, from the creation of the world down to Cleopatra,” &c. *Logic*, indeed, Lucian confesses, is not absolutely necessary. But so great, he says, must be his knowledge, that, “*like Homer’s Chalcas*, he must know——

“—— τα τ’ ὄντα, τα τ’ ἔσομενα, προ τ’ ἔντα!”

All this Lucian professes to prove; but, as might well be expected, some of his assertions are very lamely made out, others flurred over, or entirely neglected. The treatise, however, is, upon the whole, a curious piece; and, though far from sufficient to give a clear and complete idea of the pantomimic dance of the ancients, yet it affords more information about it, than is to be found, I believe, any where else.

N O T E 266.

P. 132. AND PULL THE CORYPHÆUS WHEN SCYLLA IS THE SUBJECT.

Ἐλκοντες τον Κορυφαιον.—To imitate *Scylla*,—"naves in faxa tra-
 bentem," as Virgil has expressed it^a. But it is not easy to see, how the performer, at least while he was playing, could well spare a hand for this operation.—This was even worse than what we call *humouring* a catch; when, for instance, a singer who is performing Purcell's "*Fie, nay prithee, John*"—thinks it necessary to collar his neighbour.

N O T E 267.

P. 133. THE TRAGIC IMITATION, WHEN ENTIRE—.

Ἡ ὍΛΗ τεχνη. Heinsius proposed, ἡ ἈΛΛΗ τεχνη. But I believe the established reading to be right. The *whole* art—*i. e.* Tragedy, as *represented*; with *all its constituent parts*, and, as it was said before, *ἀπαντα μιμεμενη*. For it might, as Aristotle presently observes, be read, or recited, like an Epic Poem; and, in that view, the comparison here made would not hold.

Τεχνη—*i. e.* the *Tragic* art: for so he uses the word, *cap. i.* not for the whole Poetic art, but for a single branch of it:—ἐν ταῖς ἐξηγημέναις ΤΕΧΝΑΙΣ—*i. e.* Epic Poetry, Tragedy, Comedy, &c. So too at the end of that chapter: τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ΤΕΧΝῶΝ. And, again, at the end of *this* chapter, (as I understand the passage,) τῆς ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ἔργῳ. See NOTE 277.

^a Æn. III. 425.

N O T E 268.

P. 133. TO HEARERS OF THE BETTER SORT—.

—Θεαταις ἐπικαις : to which he opposes φαυλες. The word ἐπικαις seems rightly explained here by Dacier—"les honnêtes gens; " c'est à dire, les gens qui ont eu une meilleure education." The passage, which he quotes from *Plato*, is much to the purpose of this chapter. Συγχωρω δὴ τογε τοσούτον καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δὲν τὴν μερικὴν ἡδονὴν κρινεσθαι· μὴ μὲντοι τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων· ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκείνην εἶναι μερσαν καλλίστην, ἣτις ΤΟΥΣ ΒΕΑΤΙΣΤΟΥΣ, καὶ ΙΚΑΝΩΣ ΠΕΠΑΙΔΕΥΜΕΝΟΥΣ τέρπει.—*De Leg.* II. p. 658.

Aristotle uses ἐπικαις in the same sense, *Eth. Nicom.* IV. 8, p. 186, *ed. Wilk.*—τοιαῦτα λεγεῖν καὶ ἀκρεῖν, δὲα τῶ ἐΠΗΕΙΚΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩ ἀρμοττεῖ.

N O T E 269.

P. 133. AND IN SINGING—.

Καὶ διαδόντα. There seems great reason to suspect this word. For, what is the force of the preposition here? Some commentators, without disputing the reading, neglect the preposition entirely, and render the word as if it were the simple participle, ᾄδοντα. Others understand, *singing throughout*: "qui continenter canit." *Goultf.* But the proper sense of διαδεῖν, would, I think, be—to sing *differently*—to sing *out of tune*,—as, ΔΙΑΦΩΝΕΙΝ. And so the word is actually used in the treatise Περὶ Κόσμου, in Aristotle's works, and opposed to ΣΥΝᾄδον, as ΔΙΑΦΩΝΕΙΝ is to ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ:—συμφερομενον, καὶ διαφερομενον· συναδον, καὶ ΔΙΑΔΟΝ". "The agree-

^a *Tem.* I. p. 609.

“ing, and the disagreeing, the *consonant*, and the *dissonant* ^b.” But as the word cannot here be admitted, in that which appears to be its only proper and warrantable sense, I suspect, it might, originally, have been only ῥᾶδοντα. Considering how frequently Δ and Α were confounded by transcribers, ΚΑΙ ΑΙΔΟΝΤΑ might easily be blundered into ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΙΔΟΝΤΑ. One MS. reading is διαΔιδοντα; where the ΔΙ, plainly enough, arose from the ΑΙ.

The commentators understand from this passage, that there were two sorts of rhapsodists; one, of those who *recited* Epic Poetry, and another, of those who *sung* it. Whether this can be proved from other passages of antient authors, I know not. From this, it certainly cannot. Aristotle says, ΚΑΙ ῥαψῳδοντα—ΚΑΙ διαδοντα ^c. Whatever the διαδων was, he is here clearly distinguished from the ῥαψῳδων—the *rhapsodist*.

That the rhapsodists did not, in the strict and *musical* sense, at least, of the word, *sing* the verses of Homer, but *recited* or *declaimed* them only, we may pretty safely infer, from what is expressly said of Epic Poetry at the beginning of this work — that “it imitates by *words only*,” without melody and rhythm—i. e. without *music*. This, indeed, will not prove that Epic Poetry was *never* sung, any more than what was said of Tragedy—that it imitates by *words* and *music*—will prove that it was never recited, or read. Yet the least, I think, that can be inferred from it, is, that Epic Poetry was, in general, and for the most part, recited or declaimed only; and, consequently, that the *rhapsodists*, properly so called, being the established *performers* of Epic Poetry, as the

^b Harris, *Philos. Arrang.* p. 47.

^c This passage is much mistaken by M. Batteux, who renders it, “Qu'on peut faire des gestes en recitant l'Épopée,---qu'on peut même chanter,” &c. Faire des gestes, comes far short of ΠΕΡΙΕΡΓΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ σημειοις. The και which precedes the participle, ῥαψῳδοντα, is omitted: and to produce his sense of διαδοντα—qu'on peut même chanter, the Greek should be—ἐστὶ περιεργαζεσθαι---και διαΔΕΙΝ.

*actors*⁴ were of Tragic, performed it always in that manner; without *singing*, any farther, than as the tones of loud and sustained declamation approach more nearly to singing than those of common reading. The earliest *Lyric* Poet-Musicians, indeed, as we learn from Plutarch and Athenæus, used to sing even the hexameters of *Homer* and *Hesiod*, as well as their own, to the lyre. But they, plainly, speak of this, as of an *antient* practice:—τον Τερπανδρον, ΚΙΘΑΡΩΔΙΚΩΝ παικτην ὄντα νομων, [*hymns*,] κατα νομον ἔκασον, ΤΟΙΣ ΕΠΕΣΙ, τοις ἑαυτε, και ΤΟΙΣ ὍΜΗΡΟΥ, ΜΕΛΗ περιτιθεντα, ΑΙΔΕΙΝ ἐν τοις ἀγωνισιν. *Plut. Dial. de Mus.* p. 2074, *ed. H. St.* And afterwards—ὅτι δε οἱ κιθαρωδικοι νομοι, ὍΙ ΠΑΛΛΑΙ, ἐξ ΕΠΩΝ συνισαντο, Τιμοθεῶ ἐδήλωσε, &c. p. 2075. So, too, Athenæus:—“*Chamaeleon*, in his book about *Stesichorus*, και μελωδηθηται φησι, ἔμονον τα Ὅμηρου, ἀλλα και Ἡσιόδα, και Αρχιλοχου, &c. ΚΑΙ μελωδηθηται —“ were *even* sung.” p. 620.

It is not, however, at all improbable, that *Homer* might be sometimes *sung*, in *Aristotle*'s time, and that this *Mnasiltheus*, (of whom nothing is known,) might be a performer in this way. But, that this was a distinct thing from *ραψωδία* seems pretty clear.

N O T E 270.

P. 133. WHOSE GESTURES RESEMBLE THOSE OF IMMO-
DUST WOMEN.

The passage of *Aulus Gellius*, to which I referred in my note on the translation, as a story, both curious in itself, and confirming what was there advanced, is this. “*Histrion* in terrâ Græciâ fuit
“ famâ celebri: qui, gestûs et vocis claritudine & venustate, cæteris
“ antestabat. Nomen fuisse aiunt POLUM. Tragicædias poetarum
“ nobilium scitè atque asseveratè acitavit. Is Polus unicè amatum

⁴ *Ραψωδοί*, and *ὑποκριται*, are continually joined together, See *Plato*, in that entertaining dialogue, the *Io*, tom. I. p. 532, D. 535, E. and in a great many other places.

“ filium morte amisit. Eum luctum quum satis visus est eluxisse,
 “ rediit ad quæstum artis. In eo tempore Athenis *Electram* So-
 “ phoclis acturus, gestare urnam quasi cum Orestis ossibus debebat.
 “ Ita compositum fabulæ argumentum est, ut, veluti fratris reliquias
 “ ferens *Electra*, compleret commisereturque interitum ejus, qui
 “ per vim extinctus existimatur. Igitur *Polus*, lugubri habitu
 “ *Electræ* indutus, ossa atque urnam à sepulchro tulit filii; &
 “ quasi Orestis amplexus, opplevit omnia, non simulachris neque
 “ imitamentis, sed luctu atque lamentis veris & spirantibus.
 “ Itaque, quum agi fabula videretur, dolor actitatus est.” *A. Gell.*
 VII. 5.

N O T E 271.

P. 134. THE MUSIC AND THE DECORATION, BY THE
 LATTER OF WHICH THE ILLUSION IS HEIGHTENED, &c.

The Greek, here, in either of the two readings warranted by
 manuscript authority, is unsatisfactory and suspicious, and the
 sense, consequently, uncertain. The reading of the old editions
 is—*δι' ἧς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἐπιζῶνται ἐναργεστάτα*: which *Victorius* renders—
 “ *per quam voluptates percipiunt evidentissimè* :”—“ *through, or by*
 “ *means of, which, they perceive the pleasures most evidently*.” No-
 thing can well be more harsh, or strange.—*ἐπιζῶνται*—*they per-*
ceive:—*Who?*—The spectators. To this mode of speaking,
 however, I should not object; because this *ellipsis*, of *οἱ ἀνθρώποι*, is
 frequent in both the Greek and Latin writers*. Thus, in the be-
 ginning of this chapter, *κρῆνται*. This answers to that very con-
 venient idiom, of which the French make so much use, and which
 we so often find the want of—*on s'agite*—*on apperçoit*, &c.^b

But,

* See *Sant. Minoru.* IV. 4, and *Periz. note* 39.

^b According to *Menage*, the Fr. *on*, is only a corruption of *homme*; and *on dit*,
 for example, was antiently written, “ *hœm dit*.” And thus the Italian writers use

But, the verb, ἐπιγινώσκονται, will, I apprehend, by no means bear the sense here forced upon it, of *perceiving* pleasure^c; or any sense, but that of *understanding*, or *knowing*. Were I, therefore, obliged to make *some* sense of this reading, it would be this:—“per quam [quæ efficiuntur] voluptates, nōrunt homines apertissimè:” — “the pleasures, which are produced through which, are clearly understood—well known to all. But this, I confess, is violent interpretation; and, in particular, I *doubt* whether the word ἐναργεῖς is ever used, by Aristotle at least, as merely synonymous to φανερόν; as evident to *reason* or *understanding*, and opposed to *doubtful*. It always means, I believe, evident, clear, visible, to *the eye of imagination*. Thus, *cap.* xvii.—Δει δὲ τὰς μύθους συνίσταται — — ὅτι μάλιστα ΠΡΟ ΟΜΜΑΤΩΝ τιθεμένων· ἔτι γὰρ ἂν ΕΝΑΡΓΕΣΤΑΤΑ ὄΡΩΝ, ὅσπερ ΠΑΡ’ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ, &c. These words seem to furnish the best comment upon the passage in question, and will perhaps lead us to the most reasonable and least exceptionable interpretation of it; for perfect satisfaction is not, I think, to be expected, in the present condition of the text. We ought, surely, at all events, to adhere to the proper and clear meaning of the adverb ἐναργεστάτα, as used in the passage just cited; where the word itself, and the explanatory expressions which accompany it, afford a pretty strong presumption, that Aristotle, here, meant to express the particular advantage which Tragedy receives from the *ὄψις*, or, from actual *representation**

nom. Thus—“quando *nom* se n'accorge.” *Tasso's Aminta*.—“*Uom* dice.” *Petrarch, Sen.* 190, &c. And thus the Germans use the word *man*: *man saght*—*men say*—*they say*, &c.—See Menage's *Observaz. supra P. Aminta*.

^c *Nic.* himself admits this objection: “Verbum hoc (ἐπιγινώσκονται) in solens videtur in hoc significatu.”

* So the passage was understood by the editor of the *Ox. ed.* without accents, 1765, who refers δὲ ἵς to the ὄψις, and proposes this emendation: δὲ ἵς, (scil. ὄψεως) ΤΗΣ ἸΔΟΝΤΗΣ συνίσταται τὰ ἐναργεστάτα—“per quam, voluptatis pars evidentissima efficitur; quippe quæ oculis subiecta est fidelibus.” But I cannot think that Aristotle would have written, δὲ ἵς, ΤΗΣ ἰδούσης——.

as giving to the imitation the greatest possible *reality* of effect, and producing the most perfect illusion in the spectator. Yet this, it must be owned, is very obscurely expressed, if it *be* expressed, by the Greek; which, according to the *best* reading, that of Victorious, and of many MSS^d. will stand thus: και ἐτι, ἐ μικρον μεροσ την μεσικην και την οψιν ἐχει, δι' ἣς ἄΙ ἠΔΟΝΑΙ ΣΤΗΝΙΣΤΑΝΤΑΙ ἐναργεστα: that is, according to the only *sense* which I can find for it—“and the decoration, or spectacle; by means of which, the pleasures we receive from Tragedy^e, are rendered more sensible, striking, illusive,” &c. But many objections may, undoubtedly, be made. For the fair and literal version would be this: “by means of which, *the pleasures are formed, composed, constructed, or constituted*^f, in the clearest and most visible manner.” I give, here, what I apprehend to be the only fair sense of the verb, συναίσσασθαι; but it seems to be, by no means, the proper word in this place, and probably is not the word which Aristotle wrote. If any one MS. would offer me ΠΑΡΙΣΑΝΤΑΙ, I would readily accept it. *Ælian*, describing the effect of a trumpet, sounding suddenly, at the instant when a famous painting was exhibited, of a warrior in the act of rushing to the battle, says—ἀμα τε ἐν το μελοσ ἤμεετο τραχυ και φοβερον—και ἐδεικνυτο ἡ γραφη, και ὁ στρατιωτης ἐβλεπετο, τε μελεσ ΕΝΑΡΓΕΣΤΕΡΑΝ την φαντασιαν τε ἐμβροηθεντ^g ἐτι και μαλλον ΠΑΡΑΣΤΗΣΑΝΤΟΣ: *i. e.* “*presenting* to the imagination a still “more lively and striking image^g.” But again—ἀί ἠδοναι, is not

^d See Mr. Winstanley's edition.

^e It is, certainly, most natural to understand the pleasures of the music and decoration to be here spoken of. And so it is generally understood. But I cannot see how the words will admit that sense: for the Greek does not say—“by which the most sensible and striking pleasures are produced,” but, “by which the pleasures (*i. e.* some of the pleasures,) are produced in the most sensible and striking way.”—ἐναργεστα. To express the other sense, Aristotle would probably have written, ἐναργεστα:—ἐί ἢ ἐν ἐναργεσταται συναίσσασθαι ἠδοναι.

^f Vict.—*conflantur*—*coagmentantur*. And, indeed, in this sense, and no other, is the verb συναίσσασθαι used throughout the treatise.

^g *Var. Hist.* II. 44.

what one would expect here. To speak, indeed, of *terror* and *pity*, as the *pleasures* of Tragedy, is perfectly agreeable, both to the doctrine, and to the language, of the author, throughout^b. But, it is not, properly, the *pleasure*—it is not the *terror*, or the *pity*—that is rendered more ἐναργεῖς; but that *pleasure* is heightened by the *action* being rendered so.

Upon the whole, however, I see no other meaning that can be obtained from the words, without still greater violence and improbability of interpretation. Dacier, Batteux, and Goultton, make the assertion—οἱ ἠδοναι, &c. relate to both music and decoration. But it is, surely, quite unwarrantable to give to—δι' ἧς, the sense of, δι' ὧΝ, or δι' ἉΙΝ. Besides that the *music*, however great the *pleasure* it may afford, cannot, I think, properly be considered as contributing to the ἐναργεῖα, or as heightening the *illusion*, of Tragedy. *Victorius*, who read—την μεσοτην και ΤΑΣ ὈΥΕΙΣ, very consistently made ἧς refer to μεσοτην only: and *Castelvetro* very properly observes, that, “if we read—την ἀφω—i.e. predette parole “ [i. e. δι' ἧς οἱ ἠδοναι, κ. τ. αλ.] havranno rispetto alla vista; & “ conteneranno la commendatione della detta vista, per la quale si “ constituisca il diletto più manifestamente—che non si fa per le parole “ dell' epopea.” p. 690. He appears, I think, to have understood the passage in the way I have proposed. But he mentions another reading, which I have not seen noticed anywhere else—ἐν ἐργεσιαι^c. This had occurred to me, formerly, as a conjecture, before I had seen *Castelvetro's* commentary. But it gives much the same sense, and would remove no difficulty with respect to the passage itself; though, as I shall presently have occasion to observe, it might suit better with what follows.

^b See NOTE 277.

^c “Alcuni testi leggono ἐν ἐργεσιαι.”——

N O T E 272.

P. 134. IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF GREATER CLEARNESS—AS WELL IN READING, AS IN REPRESENTATION.

Εἶτα, και το ἑναργες ἔχει, και ἐν τη ἀναγνωσει, και ἐπι των ἔργων.—It seems rather strange, that, immediately after mentioning the ἑναργες of the Ὀψις, Aristotle should say—“Then, it has *also* the “ἑναργες,” &c. It was this which induced me to suspect, that for ἑναργεσατα, in the preceding passage, we should read—ἐνΕργεσατα: “By means of which, [*i. e.* of the Ὀψις,] the pleasures we receive “from Tragedy (those, of *terror and pity excited by imitation*, as he “says *cap. xiv.*.) are rendered more *forcible and efficacious.*” But the objection is, perhaps, not of sufficient force to warrant a departure from the established reading of all the manuscripts, ἑναργεσατα: and we may, well enough, understand the author, as if he had said—“Then, farther, another advantage is, that Tragedy “has *this* ἑναργες, not only on the *stage*, and on account of the “Ὀψις, but even in *reading* also.”

That ἀναγνωσει is right, (not ἀναγνωρισει,) I cannot entertain a doubt. Nothing can be more evidently nonsensical than this distinction—“*both* in the *discoveries*, and in the *incidents* ;” as if a discovery were not an incident.

The expression, ἐπι των ἔργων, for, in *representation, acting, performance*, &c. seems liable to no difficulty. Thus, *De Rep.* VIII. p. 455, δηλον ἐκ των ΕΡΓΩΝ—from what happens in the *performance* of such music^b. And see *ibid. cap. vi.* throughout which, ἔργα is repeatedly used for musical *performance*; particularly, p. 457,—τα θαυμασια και περιττα ΤΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ, “*surprising and elaborate performance.*”

^a —την ἀπο ἐλπης και φοβης δια μιμησεως ἩΔΟΝΗΝ.

^b See *Diff.* II. p. 53.

N O T E 273.

P. 134. ATTAINING THE END OF ITS IMITATION IN A SHORTER COMPASS.

Dryden says of this passage—"It is one reason of Aristotle's, "to prove that Tragedy is the more noble, because it turns in a "shorter compass; the whole action being circumscribed within "the space of four and twenty hours. He might prove as well, "that a mushroom is to be preferred before a peach, because it "shoots up in the compass of a night." &c.

If Aristotle had said, that Tragedy was the more noble, because a Poet could *compose* a Tragedy in much less time than an Epic Poem, the simile would have been justly applied. Dryden had, but just before, said, that "the *effects* of Tragedy are too *violent* "to be lasting." But he did not give himself time to see, that Tragedy owes this greater *violence of effect* to the shortness of its plan; that is, to its stricter unity, its more concentrated and unbroken *interest*, its "close accelerated plot"; to that *ἀθροον*, as Aristotle calls it, so essential to the purpose of Tragedy, which is, to give the *pleasure of strong emotion*. The Epic Poem is of too tedious a length, too various and episodic, to produce *that* effect in the same degree as Tragedy, which is read, or seen, *at once*, and without interruption.

But the case was, that Dryden, (who, as I have before had occasion to remark^b, appears to have taken his idea of Aristotle from French translation,) wrote this in the preface to his translation of

^a Dr. Hurd's *Disc. on Poet. Imit.* p. 140.

^b P. 187, note (d).

an *Epic Poem*^c; on the contrary, when he was writing on *Tragedy*, he gave *Tragedy* the preference^d.

N O T E 274.

P. 134. HIS POEM, IF PROPORTIONABLY CONTRACTED, WILL APPEAR CURTAILED.

—Μυερον.—Nothing is more diverting than the explanation which some commentators give of this word, and its application here. The Poem, it seems, is compared to the tail of a mouse, or a rat, which grows less and less towards the end:—"versus extremum at-
"tenuata^a." I never heard, that any naturalists have observed this property to be peculiar to the tails of rats and mice. The fact seems to be, that the words μυερον, and μειερον, however their etymologies may appear to differ, have both the same meaning—that of cropped, curtailed, tronqué, as M. Batteux translates it. ΜειερονⓈ ριχⓈ, i. e. ὁ κατὰ τὸ τελεῖν ἔλλειπων χρονῶ. [*Hephaest. p. 92, ed. De Pauw.*]—To which is opposed, δολιχοερονⓈ—a long-tailed verse: ὁ κατὰ τὸ τελεῖν πλεονάζων συλλαβῆ.

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle applies μειερονⓈ to a period that is too short, and disappoints the ear by ending abruptly. The passage is curious for its expression, and illustrates both the word itself, and its application, here, to a Poem, which disappoints the expectation of a reader in the same manner, by ending before its time. Δει δὲ, καὶ τὰ κωλα, καὶ τὰς περιόδους, μὴτε ΜΕΙΟΤΡΟΤΣ ἔναι, μὴτε ΜΑΚΡΑΣ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ΜΙΚΡΟΝ [i. e. μειερον] προσπταίειν πολλὰκις ποιεῖ

^c Preface to the *Æneid*.

^d "Though *Tragedy* be justly preferred above the other"—i. e. the *Epic Poem*, *Essay on Dram. Poesy*.

^a So Robortelli, Victorius, Goulston.—"Appaia una coda di tipo." *Castelvetre*.—"Venga ella à far' apparenzia di coda di forcio, col suo fine angusto." *Piccol.*

τον ἀκροατην ἀνάγκη γαρ, ὅταν, ἐπι ὄρμων ἐπι το πορρω, και το μετρον εἶ
 ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄρε, ΑΝΤΙΣΠΑΣΘΗ παυσαμενε, ὍΙΟΝ, ΠΡΟΣΠΤΑΙΕΙΝ
 γιγνεσθαι, δια την ΑΝΤΙΚΡΟΤΣΙΝ. *Rhet.* III. 9, p. 592, *ed. Dunal.*

N O T E 275.

P. 134. IF EXTENDED TO THE USUAL LENGTH—.

Ἀπολεθόντα τῷ τε μετροῦ μήκει—. Almost all the commentators and translators understand—*answerable to the length of the metre*. And this is, certainly, the most obvious and unforced sense of the words: for, had Aristotle meant, by μετρον, the standard *measure*, or *length*, of the *Poem*, as other commentators understand it, he, probably, would have rather said—τῷ τε ΜΗΚΟΥΣ ΜΕΤΡΩΙ^a. Μετρον is so used in the passage given in the last note: το ΜΕΤΡΟΝ εἶ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄρε. If, however, *metre* be the sense, (for, after all, the passage is ambiguous,) the expression must, I think, be understood as a short way of saying—“conformable to the usual length “of *Poems in that metre*”—of *Poems in heroic verse*. See what is said, *cap.* xxiv. about the adaptation of the hexameter to Epic Poetry: εἰδεις ΜΑΚΡΑΝ συσασιν ἐν ἄλλῳ πεπονηκεν ἢ τῷ ἤρωι.—I cannot conceive that Aristotle meant to say, that the length of the Epic Poem was proportioned, or ought to be proportioned, to the *length of the metre*. Yet so the commentators. “Si—Poeta secutus “fuerit longitudinem, quæ *instar* videtur ejus *carminis*.” *Vict.*—“*Si cum metri longitudine provebatur.*” *Goullt.* &c. It was not the *length* of the hexameter which made it the fittest measure for heroic Poetry, but the nature of the *feet* of which it is composed; and on *that* account it was preferred, as *σασιμωτατον και ὀγκωδεσατον των μετρων.* *cap.* xxiv. The length of a verse is to be measured by the *times* (χροναι) which compose it. Now the hexameter is but

^a Ἐς, μήκος ἐστ, *cap.* xxiv. and *cap.* vii.

one third longer than the Iambic trimeter; their respective *times* being 24, and 18: so that the length of an Epic Poem would be strictly proportioned to the length of its *verse*—*τω τε μετρε μηκει*—were it longer by *one third* only than a Tragedy.

N O T E 276.

P. 134. DILUTED.

Ἵδαση—*watery*. Aristotle uses the same metaphor in the following passage of his second book *De Republica*, where, opposing the community of wives and children proposed by *Plato*^a, he very justly objects, that it would weaken the bond of social union, by *diluting* the social affections, and destroying—

Relations dear, and all the charities
Of father, son, and brother——.

Par. Lost, IV. 756.

—Εν δε τη πολει, την ΦΙΛΙΑΝ αναγκαιον ἽΔΑΡΗ γινεσθαι, δια την κοινωνικην την τοιαυτην, και ημεισα λεγειν τον εμον^b, η υιον, πατερα, η πατερα, υιον. Ωσπερ γαρ μικρον γλυκι, εις πολυ υδωρ μιχθεν, αναισθητον ποιει την κρασιν, ετω συμβαινει και την οικειοτητα, την προς αλληλες, την απο των ονοματων τετων—κ. τ. λ. I stop there, because the passage is evidently defective, though the sense is plain.

^a *Rep. V.*

^b He alludes here to Plato's expressions, who contended, on the contrary, that the bond of social unity must be the closer, where all the citizens—*αμα φεγγωνται*——*τα τοιαυδε ρηματα, το τε ΕΜΟΝ, και το ΟΥΚ ΕΜΟΝ.* p. 356, *ed. Mass.*

N O T E 277.

P. 135. AND, ALSO, IN THE PECULIAR END AT WHICH IT AIMS—.

Και, ἐτι, τῷ της τεχνης ἔργῳ—. The *expression* is ambiguous. It may mean, either the end, or business, of the *Poetic art* in general, or, that of *Tragedy*—of the *Tragic art*^a. The latter, however, seems, pretty clearly, to be the *meaning*: for his expression—*τετοις τε διαφέρει πασι, ΚΑΙ ΕΤΙ τῷ της τεχνης ἔργῳ*—shews the author to be speaking, here, of a *distinct* advantage. But, if we understand it to mean, that *Tragedy* answers the end of *Poetry* better than the *Epic*, this cannot be considered as an advantage distinct from those enumerated before, which are, plainly, such as contribute to the *general* end of *Poetry*—that of giving pleasure—of interesting, delighting, striking, &c. Whereas, if the *peculiar* end of *Tragedy* be superior to that of *Epic Poetry*, this, indeed, is an additional and separate advantage. Besides, the parenthetical insertion which immediately follows—*δει γαρ, ἔ την τυχεσων ἡδονην ποιειν αυτας* (*i. e.* the *Epic* and *Tragic* Poems,) *ἀλλα την ἐρημενην*—plainly implies, that the *τεχνης ἔργον*, of which he had been speaking, was that of affording the particular pleasure *proper* to the species. And thus, too, the word *ἔργον* is used in other passages: *τραγωδίας ἔργον*, *cap. vi.* and *cap. xiii.*

The words, *μαλλον τε τελος τυγγανεσα*, present a similar, but more embarrassing, ambiguity. Is *τελῶς*, here, the end of *Poetry*, or the end of *Tragedy*? If we take it in the latter sense, Aristotle will say, that *Tragedy* is superior, *both* because its end—the peculiar effect which it purposes to produce—is superior to that of

^a See NOTE 267.

the Epic Poem, *and*, because it attains that end more perfectly than the Epic attains *its* end. But this Aristotle has not proved, nor does it appear to be true. On the other hand, if we understand *τελος* to mean the end of the *poetic art*^b, it is obviously true, that, if Tragedy be superior in all those respects which he had mentioned—in its closer *unity*, its *brevity*, its *έννομα*, its *music*, and its *decorations*—and, *besides*, (*και ἐτι*) in the specific end at which it aims—it must, on the whole, be preferable to the Epic Poem, as answering more effectually the *end* of *Poetry*, by *giving greater pleasure*.

For, that this, in Aristotle's view, was the great end of the art, and of all its branches, appears, if I mistake not, evidently, from many other passages of this treatise, as well as from that now before us. Nor does he, any where, appear to me to give any countenance to an idea, which rational criticism has, now, pretty well exploded—that *utility* and *instruction* are the end of Poetry. That it may indeed be rendered, in some degree, useful and improving, few will deny; none, that it *ought* to be made so, if it can. But, that the *chief end* and *purpose* of Poetry is to *instruct*—that Homer wrote his *Iliad* on purpose to teach mankind the mischiefs of discord among chiefs, and his *Odyssèy*, to prove to them the advantages of staying at home and taking care of their families^c—this is so manifestly absurd, that one is really astonished to see so many writers, one after the other, discoursing gravely in defence of it^d.

It

^b As it does in a similar expression, *cap.* xxv. which favours the same sense here: “*ἐι τυγχανωι τε τελος τε αυτης*—*i. e.* of *Poetry* in general.

^c “*La verité qui sert de fond à cette fiction, et qui avec elle compose la Fable, est, Que l'absence d'une personne hors de chez soi, ou qui n'a point l'œil à ce qui s'y fait, y cause de grands desordres.*”—And again—“*Ces grands noms de Rois, de Heros, d'Achille, d'Agamemnon, & d'Ulyssè, ne designent pas moins les derniers Bourgeois,*” &c.—*Du Poeme Ep.* I. 10.

^d *Piccolomini*, in particular, p. 369, &c. of his *Annot. nella Poet. d'Arist.* And

It is true indeed, that Aristotle, in his account of Tragedy, mentions the correction and refinement of the passions, pity, terror, &c. as a useful *effect* of Tragic representations. But he no where, either in his definition, where we might surely have expected him to be explicit, or in any other part of his book, calls that effect the *end* of Tragedy. All his expressions prove, that *his* end, both of Tragic and of Epic Poetry, was *pleasure*; though, with respect to Tragedy, he asserts, (by way, as I have before suggested, of obviating Plato's objections to it^c;) that the pleasure arising from it was so far from being pernicious, that it was even useful; so far from *inflaming* the passions of men, that it tended, on the contrary, to purify and moderate them in common life. When the reader sees the expressions, to which I allude, laid together, he will hardly, I think, entertain any doubt upon this head.—τα μεγιστα, εις ΨΥΧΑΓΩΓΗΙ^f η Τραγωδια, μυθε μερη εστιν, &c. *cap.* vi. —εστι δε εχ αυτη απο Τραγωδιας ΗΔΟΝΗ. *cap.* xiii.—ε γαρ πασαν δε ζητειν ΗΔΟΝΗΝ απο Τραγωδιας, αλλα ΤΗΝ ΟΙΚΕΙΑΝ. Επει δε την απο ελεε και φοβε, δια μιμησεως, δει ΗΔΟΝΗΝ παρασκευαζειν τον ποιητην—*cap.* xiv.—ιν, ωσπερ ζων εν ολον, ποιη την ΟΙΚΕΙΑΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ. *cap.* xxiii.—την οψιν, δι' ης ΑΙ ΗΔΟΝΑΙ, &c. *cap.* ult.—δει γαρ ε την τυχεσαν ΗΔΟΝΗΝ ποιειν ΑΥΤΑΣ, αλλα την ερημενην. *ibid.*

From all this it appears, I think, indubitably, that the great *end* of Poetry in general, was, in Aristotle's opinion, to give *plea-*

the reader may see, if he has any stomach to see, the disgusting nonsense of Le Bossu upon this subject, *ch.* ii. iii. iv. &c. of his first book. By way of perfect contrast, he may then turn to the Dissertation *on the Idea of Universal Poetry*, [Dr. Hurd's *Hor.* *vol.* ii.] See also Dr. Beattie's *Essay on Poetry and Music*, *ch.* i.—This absurd notion was also long ago combated in a matterly manner by that fine and philosophical writer, La Motte, in the discourse prefixed to his Odes, p. 23—31.

^c NOTE 45, p. 239.

^f This looks much, as if he would have assented to the rational assertion of *Eratosthenes*, which Strabo combats, —ποιητην παντα στοχαζεσθαι ΨΥΧΑΓΩΓΙΑΣ, ΟΥ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑΣ. *Strabo*, p. 15. And see the *Diss.* *on the Idea of Univ. Poetry*, above referred to.

sure; as *Castelvetro*, long ago, rightly contended. “Coloro, che vogliono, che la poesia sia trovata principalmente per giovare, o per giovare & per dilettae insieme, veggano che non s’oppongano all’ autorità d’Aristotele, il quale, qui ed altrove, non par che le affegni altro, che *diletto*; e se pure le concede alcuno *giuocamento*, glielo concede per accidente; come è la purgatione dello *spavento* & della *compassione* per mezzo della *Tragedia*.” p. 505.

The *peculiar end* of Tragedy, he has expressly told us, is to afford *that pleasure*, which results from fictitious terror and pity: την ἀπο ἔλεε και φοβε δια μιμησεως ἡδονην.—What he regarded as the peculiar end of *Epic Poetry*, I observe that he has nowhere distinctly said. But from what he *has* said, of the advantages which its plan affords, with respect to *grandeur*, and *variety*, and the admission of the *wonderful* and *surprising*^g, and also of the superior *richness* of its *language*^h, we may collect, that his ideas on this subject accorded with those of the best modern critics; and that he held the *end* of the Epic Poem to be, according to the exact description of an eminent writer, “*admiration*, produced by a “*grandeur* of design, and *variety* of important incidents, and *sustained* by all the energy and minute particularity of *description*”ⁱ.

This *end*, however, and these peculiar advantages, of the *Epic* plan, Aristotle has not, as I have before remarked^k, brought forward, to complete the comparison in this chapter: but he plainly, and, I think, justly, considered them as more than compensated by the closer interest, more perfect illusion, stronger emotion, deeper impression, and, in *his* view, more useful tendency, of Tragedy. The Epic Poem loses in force of *effect*, what it gains in variety; in nature and passion, what it gains in grandeur and sublimity. The very necessity, and the merit, of its *variety*, and of the ἐπετα-

^g Cap. xxiv.—*Transl. Part III. Sect. 2.*

^h Cap. xxii. *ad fin.* and cap. xxiv.—Διο και ηρωταας, &c. *Transl.* p. 113, and 117.

ⁱ Dr. Hurd’s *Disc. on Poet. Imit.* p. 141.

^k P. 39.

διεν ἀνομοιοις ἐπεισοδίοις¹, are a confession of its defects, as implying a too great extent of plan, a feebleness of interest, a want of relief. It seems, indeed, to be the great art of the Epic Poet, to make us amends, by the striking beauty of particular *parts*, for the fatigue and *ennui* which unavoidably results, more or less, from the *whole*. A strong proof of the superiority of Tragedy, and of the justness of Aristotle's decision, is, that every reader is most delighted with the *Episodes* of Epic Poetry; with those subordinate and more compressed actions, which give us the very pleasure of *Tragedy*—which interest and affect us by exciting *pity* and *terror*: with the meeting of Hector and Andromache, and the supplication of Priam to Achilles for the body of his son, in the *Iliad*; with the love, despair, and death, of Dido, the episode of Nisus and Euryalus, and the parting scene between old Evander and his son, in the *Æneid*^m.

But though, of all the pleasures which Poetry, or Music, or Painting, can afford, the pleasure of *emotion* deserves to be esteemed the greatest, yet all those arts certainly afford considerable pleasures of *other* kinds; and, perhaps, to do full justice to the *Epic Poem*, we ought not to characterize it by any one particular and principal pleasure, but by that *variety*, which is peculiar to it, and which comprehends, in some degree or other, *every* sort of pleasure, that *serious* Poetry can giveⁿ. Whatever, therefore, may be decided

¹ *Cap.* xxiv.

^m *Æn.* VIII. 557, &c.—particularly, from v. 572 to 584. I do not know any where a finer example of natural pathos, heightened by the nicest selection of expression, and by such harmony of versification, as would almost make nonsense pass upon the understanding for sense, through the recommendation, if I may be allowed such an expression, of the ear.

ⁿ Some writers give still greater latitude to the variety of Epic Poetry. And indeed, if what *should*, or *may*, be done, is to be determined by what *has* been done by the best Epic Poets—by Homer, Virgil, and Tasso, (for Ariosto is a *comic* Poet,) it even admits, occasionally, of *some* departure from rigid dignity, and of some approach, at least, to the smile of Comedy, though not to the broad laugh of Farce. See Lord Kaimes, *Elem. of Criticism*, vol. i. p. 289, and the treatise Περὶ Ὁμήρου ποιήσεως, p. 257, vol. v. of *Ed. Hom. Ernesti*.

with

with respect to the comparative excellence of the *Poems* themselves, we may safely perhaps assent to the general decision of criticism, respecting the comparative *merits* of the *Poets*, and allow, that “the first praise of genius is due to the writer of an Epic Poem; as it requires an assemblage of all the powers which are singly sufficient for other compositions.”

° Dr. Johnson's *Life of Milton*.

T H E E N D.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

PAGE 15, *Note (w)*. It ought to have been mentioned, that this book of the *Odyssæy* was not translated by Pope himself, but by Fenton.

P. 95. BY AGATHO.] Perhaps I ought rather to have adhered to the old and best authenticated reading, ἀγαθόν. Victorius found *Agathon* only in one MS. and was induced to prefer it, principally because the other reading could not well be reconciled with *his* interpretation of the passage. He also objects, that the conjunction, καί, in that reading, would have no meaning, “*cum esset, illo pacto, nihil quod copularet.*” But καί must then be rendered *etiam*, and, indeed, can be understood no otherwile, if we read ἀγαθόν; and the sense will be—“as Achilles is made a good character *even* by Homer;” as if he had added—who has so well observed the ὁμοίον, the historical likeness, and has painted in so strong colours the angry violence of his temper. This sense would be sufficiently expressed in my translation, by reading—“as Achilles is drawn, *even* by HOMER.”

P. 121, *Note 9*. “*But that part,*” &c.] I found reason to alter my opinion, and the NOTE referred to, after this note on the translation was printed. *Delete*, therefore, “*But that part,*” &c. to “*Scil. 22,*” inclusively. And read—*See* the NOTE.

P. 171. It escaped me, till that note was printed, that *Ælian* also says, “*Dionysius the Colophonian.*” it must therefore be allowed to be probable, that if Aristotle and Plutarch speak of the same painter, so do also Aristotle and *Ælian*. The difficulty, however, pointed out, of reconciling *Ælian*’s account with that of Aristotle, will still remain.

P. 195. Though I think it clear, that Stanley misunderstood the passage of Aristotle, I confess it is by no means clear, that he misunderstood that of Philostratus. This, therefore, was too hastily advanced: for though the general use of the adverb

ἀποπαθόν

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ἀποταδῆν certainly favours the sense in which I understood the passage, yet I fear there is no good authority for the word χορῶν, used as we use *chorus*, to signify the choral *ode* or *song*. It always, I believe, means the choral *performers*. The verb, συνεσιδῆς, also contributed to mislead me, if I was misled; as it is more applicable to the *contraction* of *proximity*, than to the *diminution* of *number*. Yet it is used in the same sense, and on the same subject, by *Jul. Pollux*, IV. 15, *ad finem*.

P. 289. See also the description, in the *Trachiniae* of Sophocles, of Hercules dashing out the brains of Lichas against a rock, v. 779—782.

P. 300. “Purple dresses,” &c.] — — χορῶν ἄριστοι,
 ἸΜΑΤΙΑ ΧΡΥΣΑ ΠΑΡΑΣΧΩΝ ΤΩ ΧΟΡΩ, ἴκανοι φορεῖ.

Translated by Grotius, — — “Aut lectus scena: præbitor,
 “Aureas gregi cum vestes dederit, fert centunculum.”

Antiphanes, apud Athen. p. 103.
Grotii Excerpta, &c. p. 627.

P. 374, NOTE 135. The alteration, however, from ΘΕΑΤΩΝ, to ΠΟΙΗΤΩΝ, is rather violent; and it is suggested to me by Castelvetro's conjecture, that Aristotle might, perhaps, express the *sense* given by Dacier, without using the word ποιητών, and that what he said might be this: “which escaped him [*i. e.* Carcinus] *for want* “of seeing the action, as a spectator.”—ὁ μὴ ὄρωντα ΩΣ [or ΩΣΠΕΡ] θεατῶν [sc. ὄντα] ἐλανθάνεν. This is favoured by the preceding expression,—ὄρων, ΩΣΠΕΡ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνομένων τοῖς πραττομένοις.

P. 394. “παῖδιον—never used but to signify a child.”]—Unless ἀποκορισμῶς, as a term of endearment; as we often apply *child* to a grown person: a sense in which it can hardly be used here.

P. 475. “One Tragedy at each different festival.”] And thus, I find, Menage understood. “On ne représentait, chacun de ces jours-là, qu'un poëme de chaque “poëte.” *Pratique de Theatre, par D'Aubignac*, ii. p. 48.

I N D E X I.

OF POETS, CRITICS, PHILOSOPHERS, &c.

MENTIONED BY ARISTOTLE.

A.

ÆSCHYLUS - - Page 72. 102. 111, 112.

AGATHO - - - - - 82. 95. 102, 103.—A Tragic Poet, the contemporary of Socrates, Euripides, &c. A few fragments only of his works remain, which confirm the account given by ancient writers of his style; that it abounded with ornamental refinements, and particularly with *antitheses*. [See *Ælian*, V. H. XIV. 13. and *Aristoph. Theophr.* v. 58, &c. and Kuster's note.] The following lines may afford a pretty good specimen of his turn, both of writing and thinking :

Τεχνη τεχνη ἐπιπέδῃ, καὶ τεχνη τεχνη.

Arist. Ethic. Nic. VI. 5.

Τὸ μὲν παρέρχῃ, ἔργον ἄς, πεινῶντα,

Τὸ δ' ἔργον, ἄς παρέρχῃ, ἐπιπικνεῖται.

Athen. V. init.

See also NOTE 156.—Grotii *Excerpta ex Trag.* &c. p. 437. Boyle, *Art. AGATHON.* And Sydenham's translation of the *Συμποσ. π.* of Plato, (*The Banquet*;) p. 9, l. 122, note 96.

ARIPHRADES - - - - - 112. He is known only by the wretched piece of proaic criticism there mentioned.

ARISTOPHANES - - - - - 69.

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ASTYDAMAS - - Page 91. There were two Tragic Poets of this name, father and son. The former is said to have written not fewer than 240 Tragedies. *Suidas*:—who has also recorded his vanity, *art.* Σαυτην ἐπαυεις.

C.

CALLIPPIDES - - - 132, 133. A famous Tragic actor. See Plutarch, *· Apophthegm. Lacon.* p. 376, *ed. H. St.* From the story there told, it seems probable enough, though, I think, by no means certain, that the proverbial expression, Τραγικῶ πῖθικῶ, (*ἐπι των παρ' ἀξιων ΣΕΜΝΥΝΟΜΕΝΩΝ*, *Suid.* and *Hesych.*) might, as it has been supposed, have originally alluded to the vanity of this actor. In the *Symposium* of Xenophon, when the buffoon, Philip, is asked—*Ἐπι τῶ γελοιοποιεῖν μεγα φρονεις*;—he answers, *Δικαιοτερον γ', εἶμαι, ἢ ΚΑΛΛΙΠΠΙΔΗΣ ὁ ὑποκριτής, ὅς ὕπερσεμνυνεται ὅτι δυναται πολλας κλαιοντας καθίζειν.* p. 880, *ed. Leunclavii.*—It seems much more doubtful, whether the passages referred to by Dacier, in Suetonius, *Tiber. cap.* 38. and Cic. *ad Attic. lib.* xiii. *cp.* 12, have the same allusion.

CARCINUS - - - - 95. 98. Of this Tragic Poet only a few trifling lines are preserved. What *Suidas* says of him gives us no very high idea of his genius; viz. that, of 160 Tragedies which he composed, *one* only obtained the prize in the dramatic contests.

CHÆREMÓN - - - - 67. 118.—See NOTE II. For the passage there mentioned, and other fragments, the reader may also see *Grotii Excerpta*, p. 845, and Sir William Jones's *Poef. Asiatic. Comment.* p. 408.

CHIONIDES - - - - 69. One of the earliest and most eminent Athenian Poets of the *old* Comedy. *Suidas.*

CLEOPHÓN - - - - 68. 110. See NOTE 14.

CRATES - - - - 74. He is said to have flourished about 12 or 15 years before Aristophanes; of course, in the time of the old Comedy.

D.

DICÆOGENES - - - 96. Tragic and Dithyrambic Poet. *Suid.*

DIONYSIUS - - - - 68. See NOTE 12, and the *additions and corrections.*

E.

EMPEDOCLES - - - 67. 108. 128. The Sicilian Poet-philosopher, contemporary with Sophocles. See NOTES 8 and 9, and p. 128, *note* 4. He is often quoted by Aristotle, and many fragments of his Poetry are preserved in various ancient authors. See *Diog. Laert. in vitâ*: the *Poefis Philosophica* of H. Stephens, &c.

EPICHRMUS

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EPICHRMUS - - Page 69. 73.—of Syracuse, a *philosophical* and a *comic* Poet. The names of 40 of his Comedies are recorded, and a considerable number of fragments from them, and some from his philosophical poetry, are extant. See Grotii *Excerpta*, and the *Poet. Philos.* of H. Stephens.

EUCLID - - - - III. Of what Euclid Aristotle speaks, it seems impossible to ascertain. Victorius says, he is here called *the old Euclid*, to distinguish him from Euclid the philosopher, the disciple of Socrates, and founder of the *Megarie* sect. [*Diog. Laert. in vitâ.*] But as that Euclid flourished, according to the common account, about 60 years before Aristotle, he might well enough be called ὁ ἀρχαῖος, and there is certainly no improbability in supposing a cavilling logician to have been also a cavilling critic. See *Diog. Laert.* and Bayle, art. EUCLIDE.

EURIPIDES . . . 88. 90. 99. 102. III, 112. 124. 131.

G.

GLAUCO - - - - 129. Whether this was Glauco the *Teian* mentioned by Aristotle, *Rhet.* III. 1, as Dacier asserts after Robortelli, is very uncertain.—I know not why Goulston, in his version, calls him "*Glauco Sophista.*"

H.

HEGEMON - - - - 68. See NOTE 15.

HERODOTUS - - - 82.

HIPPIAS, of *Thafes* - - 127.—known, I believe, only from this mention of him.

HOMER - - - - - 67, 68, 69. 71. 80. 95. 111. 115, 116. 118, 119. 121.

M.

MAGNES - - - - - 69. An Athenian Poet of the old Comedy. *Suidas.*

MNASITHEUS - - - 133.—of whom nothing more is known.

MYNISCUS - - - - 132. I do not know that he is any where else mentioned, except by Athenæus, who calls him "*the Tragic actor, Myniscus,*" and gives him an honourable place in his *Memoirs of Gluttony*, lib. viii. p. 344.

N.

NICOCHARIS (or NICOCHARES) 68. - - In NOTE 16, I have, with Dacier and others, supposed him to be the Athenian Comic Poet, contemporary with Aristophanes. [*Suidas.*] But this seems doubtful. Victorius thinks, with some

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reason, that Aristotle added, ὁ τῆν Δωριᾶδων, in order to distinguish him from that Poet. And, farther, he is here instancing in *narrative* or *Epic* Poetry, and the *Deliad* was certainly a Poem of that kind. But no such Poem is attributed to Nicocleus the Comic Poet.

P.

PAUSAN - - Page 68. See NOTE 12, p. 169, 170.

PHILOXENUS - - 68.—of Cythera, contemporary with Plato; a Tragic and Dithyrambic Poet, famous for his musical innovations, his jokes, and his gluttony. See Dr. Burney's *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 418, &c.—*Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscrip. tome six. p. 315, octavo.*—But there were several persons of the same name, and, unfortunately, of similar character, who appear to have been confounded with each other, even by antient writers themselves. See Perizonius, *Ælian, V. Hist. X. 9.*

PHORMIS [PHORMOS, *Athen. and Suid.*] - - 73. A Sicilian Comic Poet contemporary with *Epicharmus*.

POLYGNOTUS - - 63. 77.—See NOTE 12.—Pliny, *N. Hist. lib. xxxv. cap. 9.*—*Ælian, V. Hist. IV. 3.* where Perizonius points out, as some illustration of the passage of Aristotle, cited NOTE 12, p. 169, a picture of this painter, mentioned by Pausanias, (*in Phocicis*,) which represented the punishment of an undutiful son in the infernal regions.

POLYIDES, *the Sophist*, 97. 99.—does not occur, that I know of, any where else. The title of *Sophist* seems sufficiently to distinguish him, if the name does not, (for in some MSS. it is Πολυειδῆς,) from *Polyidus* the Dithyrambic Poet, Musician, and Painter, mentioned by *Diodor. Siculus*, [*lib. xiv.*] and *Etymol. Mag. voce Ατλας*.

PROTAGORAS - - 104. See NOTE 165.

S.

SOPHOCLES - - 69. 72. 91. 94. 96. 97. 102. 124. 134.

SOPHRON - - - 66. This famous Sicilian Poet was contemporary with Euripides. He wrote *Mimes*, some for male, and others for female characters, in the Doric dialect. Some very obscure fragments are preserved by Demetrius, Athenæus, &c. See NOTE 6, p. 161, 162.

SOSISTRATUS - - 133. A rhapsodist.

STHENEIUS - - 110. See NOTE 194. He is mentioned, I believe, only by Aristotle, and by Harpocration, who records him as a Tragic Poet of the age of Pericles, and says, that he was accused of plagiarism.

T. THEODECTES

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T.

THEODECTES - Page 97. 100. A Rhetorician, of Phaselis in Lydia; the scholar of Plato and Isocrates. He is said to have composed 50 Tragedies, and an *Art of Rhetoric* in verse. He is frequently mentioned by Aristotle, Dion. Halicarn. Quintilian, &c. His fellow-citizens erected a statue to his memory. See *Plut. in vitâ Alexandri*, p. 1236, *ed. H. S.* Only a few trifling fragments of his works remain.

TIMOTHEUS - - - 68. See NOTE 17. The famous Poet-musician of Miletus, contemporary with Euripides. He was banished by the Spartans for improving a musical instrument by the addition of a few strings, which they called “*disbe-*”
 “*nouring the antient Music*, and “*corrupting the ears of youth:*”—*δυσχερετα τας ακουας των νεων*. The words of this curious decree are preserved by Boethius. See *Cesarb. in Athen.* p. 613, or page 66, 67, of the *Ox. ed. of Aratus*. The reader will find a full and entertaining account of Timotheus in Dr. Burney’s *Hist. of Music*, vol. i. p. 405.

TYNDARUS [*al.* PINDARUS] - 133.—An actor, clearly; but we know nothing farther.

X.

XENARCHUS - - 66. A Comic Poet, of whom the reader may see a pleasant fragment in *Athen.* p. 225, describing a curious trick practised by the Athenian fishmongers to evade the law by which they were forbid to pour water upon their stale fish in order to make them appear fresh. See *Grotii Excerpta ex Trag.* &c. p. 697.

XENOPHANES - - 124. The Colophonian, eminent in the class of philosophical Poets, or, rather, poetical philosophers, about the time of Pythagoras. See NOTE 238.—*Diog. Laert.* IX. 18.—*Bayle*, art. **XENOPHANES**.

Z.

ZEUXIS - - - 77. 130. The famous painter. See the *note* p. 130, and NOTE 254.

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TO THE DISSERTATIONS AND NOTES.

The letter n refers to the notes at the bottom of the page.

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