The Chaos in Europe

Frederick Moore

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A Consideration of the Political Destruction that has Taken Place in Russia and Elsewhere and of the International Policies of America

By

Frederick Moore

Author of
"The Balkan Trail" and "The Passing of Morocco"

With an Introduction by

Charles W. Eliot, LL.D.

President Emeritus, Harvard University

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INTRODUCTION

THIS small book, entitled *The Chaos in Europe*,—the title by no means represents the scope of the treatise,—is good reading for every American who desires to understand the complicated political and commercial situation in Russia, the Balkan States, and the Near and Far East which four years and a quarter of giant war have created, and the objects to which the efforts of the free nations that have overcome Germany should be steadily directed. The book appears in the nick of time—when the Peace Conference is about to enter on its long debates.

Mr. Moore has had a rare experience as an active newspaper correspondent and studious traveller, which, added to his natural gift for accurate observation and statement, has qualified him to a remarkable degree to

describe to his countrymen the present political and social conditions in both Europe and Asia. He has had excellent opportunities to observe many national armies, and has accompanied several on campaigns prior to the present war; he has paid repeated visits to Russia, including Siberia; he has lived for several years in China as an agent of the Associated Press; and he has spent much time in the Balkan countries and Turkey, both while war was going on and while the incessant strife was merely political and diplomatic.

Mr. Moore describes vividly what he believes to be the actual moral, political, and commercial situation in Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey, and sets forth the urgent need of complete co-operation among the victors in the War in order to secure the fruits of victory. He is not as sanguine by temperament as most Americans are; and his years of observation and experience in the Near East and the Far East have shown him how very formidable is the task to which the

American people under the lead of the present Administration have set their hands.

Mr. Moore's three main propositions are as follows: (1) America and the *Entente* Allies should immediately give effective military and industrial aid to Russia. To bring this aid is, of course, a comparatively easy thing since the surrender of Bulgaria and Turkey, as the Black Sea is now open to the Allies and South Russia is accessible. (2) The United States should forthwith enter without reserve, by treaty published to all the world, into an offensive and defensive alliance with the other nations that have been at war with Germany, in order that perfect co-operation may take place among the whole group for the preservation of peace through control of the seas and oceans by this alliance and the maintenance of an overwhelming land force, and through common action for any necessary number of years concerning the production and distribution of foods, fuels, and raw materials, and the use in their common interest of

the commercial marine of the allied nations. (3) The resulting limited League of Nations should agree on the policy to be followed towards backward peoples, and towards the new nationalities which have been set free by the War, and are now being encouraged to establish governments of their own. It would prove to be the nucleus of a comprehensive and durable League to prevent war. These propositions merit the careful attention of American leaders of opinion, and of the mass of the people without distinction of race, religion, or party.

Not the least interesting chapter in the book is the chapter on the Backward State, and the proper treatment of such peoples by more advanced peoples who desire to trade with them. It describes in a clear and striking way what have been the common modes of dealing with China on the part of Occidental Powers, and maintains that there should hereafter be international control of contracts made by Occidental governments with China, or any similar backward states.

This policy will obviously require a full and public agreement among all the Occidental Powers concerned. Mr. Moore's long residence at Peking, and his acquaintance with many Chinese and Japanese persons of influence, make his advice on this subject of peculiar value. He speaks on behalf of the Chinese people; but also in the interest of peace. His last word on this subject is that America should come at once to the aid of Russia; else we shall have on our hands another huge backward state like China that will furnish causes for other wars.

In a few passages the author gives expression to frank criticism of the American Congress and the Administration; but he expects great good at home and abroad to come out of the losses and sacrifices of the War. His last words are—"May the nation fulfil its splendid mission."

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
December 10, 1918.

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CHAPTER I

FROM DEFEAT TO VICTORY

"The issue is settled. In the Spring we were being sorely pressed. The Channel ports were being threatened, and the steel of the enemy was pointed at our hearts. It is Autumn. The capital of Turkey is almost within gunfire of our ships. Austria is shattered and broken. The Kaiser and the Crown Prince have abdicated."

LLOYD GEORGE.

THE collapse of the Central Powers came with amazing rapidity and with terrible thoroughness. It is a sudden and marvellous transposition of the two groups of belligerents.

In June of this present year, less than four months prior to Bulgaria's capitulation, the enemy openly boasted of their intention to impose a German peace on the States of Europe, and they intimated that later they would deal with the United States as we deserved. Flushed with achievement and at the height of success their confidence was supreme. Many allied statesmen, at the same time, were depressed with doubt of the ability of the allied armies to reconquer all the territory that was lost. Most of the continent of Europe was in the hands of the Central Powers, and with the destruction of Russia the road to the East lay wide open to the Germans.

On May 4th Lord Robert Cecil, the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said:

> "Of course it has proved futile to prophesy in this war, but I believe the German general plan is, supposing that they cannot win a decisive victory over the Allies, to go on fighting in the West until they have

acquired complete commercial hold over the East. If they once really establish themselves in Russia, there is no reason why they should not fight the whole world for ever."

On May 24th Lloyd George said:

"We are dealing with a ruthless Prussian despotism that is out for plunder, loot, and pillage. Treaties restrain them just as little today as in the day of Belgium. They do not intend to bring the war to an end until their basket is as full as it can hold."

On June 5th the French Premier, Clemenceau, was temporarily silenced by the Socialist uproar in the Chamber of Deputies, the Socialists at that time wanting to come to terms with Germany. When order was restored the Premier said:

"We are staking the game on the coming of the Americans."

It was a tragic hour. Some men doubted whether the American soldiers could reach

Europe in time to save France and Italy; and some, on both sides of the water, feared that we had entered the war too late. Without years of war how was it possible to recover the occupied territory and shatter the splendid strategic position the Germans had attained? And in the course of years they threatened to organize Russia and utilize her resources to offset those of the United States.

The Western Front had hitherto proven unbreakable—Lloyd George had called it such; the Italians had long since lost hope of alone forcing the entry into Austria; the Macedonian front seemed impregnable; the Allies had failed in their effort to force the Dardanelles; the British forces in Palestine and Mesopotamia were stationary, and even if they could move their progress would affect but little the general military position; and the United States had objected to the entry of Japan into Russia for the purpose of re-creating the Eastern Front.

German and socialist propaganda had

successfully sown mutiny in Italy, causing the serious disaster of 1917; the French army had sustained a minor mutiny in the same year, and the labour unions, even including the munition workers, were affected by the "international" idea which Germany had fostered; important men and newspapers in England, including the former Foreign Minister, Lord Lansdowne, and the leader of the Independent Labour party and former cabinet member, Arthur Henderson, advocated entering into negotiations with the Germans and strove hard to bring about an "understanding"; and in the United States, men in high places feared that President Wilson clung to his former doubt whether it would be well for either side to win the war. The President had not subscribed to a policy of victory and he was temporizing with the Bolsheviki, whom practical statesmen recognized at once to be in effect agents of the Germans.

It does not require a military understanding of the higher strategy of the war to

comprehend the value that Russia's collapse might have been to the Central Powers if they had been given time to consummate the advantage. It was the worst calamity that had befallen the Allies, more than neutralizing, up to July 18th, the entry of America into the war. Premier Clemenceau, according to a press despatch on June 5th, pointed out in the Chamber of Deputies how the number of men released from the Eastern Front for service elsewhere actually numbered 200 divisions, over 2,000,000 men. This statement may have been an error but it bears out further the gravity with which European statesmen regarded the situation.

Any man of intelligence who has read the newspapers for the past four years can perceive the significance of the loss of one jaw from the vise on which the allied generals were depending to squeeze Germany into submission. It seemed now to be necessary to bite at the enemy for a long time with the other jaw only; and that jaw, though potentially more powerful, had been engaged up

to the present in preventing the German rows of steel teeth from sinking deeper into the flanks of France, Belgium, and Italy. The Russian cataclysm threatened to protract the war for years. Some Britons, Frenchmen, and Italians, appalled before the prospect of having to turn the aggressive against the Germans and of driving them yard by yard out of France and across Belgium, then to attack their formidable Rhine fortifications, believed the cost would be the manhood of their nations.[1] In the opinion of many military men, this method of winning by frontal attacks on the Western Front was the promptest and only certain method of defeating Germany; but others,

[1] Ex-Premier Caillaux, leader of the French Radical party, was convinced from the beginning of the war up to the time of his arrest, after American troops began to arrive in France, that the Republic could not defend herself successfully against the German military monarchy; and he endeavoured to create a panic of fear in French minds. His purpose was to end the war on any terms for the sake of the mere economic rehabilitation of France. With this object in view he appears to have co-operated (according to the treason charge) with the military enemies of his country.

chiefly the statesmen, advocated the long and tedious way around through Russia in order both to save that country—a necessity of victory and of a secure peace—and to replace the other jaw of the vise.

It is remarkable how coolly America as a whole regarded the situation. We had watched Britain go into the war and had seen her armies fall back with those of France; we had seen Italy enter and make slow progress forward and finally suffer a severe defeat; we had seen Turkey and Bulgaria unite the way for Germany to Bagdad; we had seen Serbia's destruction; we had seen Rumania's quick subjection; we had seen the menacing success of the submarine —and yet we never doubted that the Allies would win the war. It seems probable that they would have been defeated had the United States continued neutral. Had there been any conception of what August, 1914, meant to the world this country could not have tolerated for the three first years of the war the work of propaganda that was

carried on throughout its length and breadth, among the negroes in the South and in the mansions on Fifth Avenue, in the tenement on the Bowery, and in the highest government offices.

We came very near giving defeat to the Allies. Our protest at their blockades, our passports to German agents, our encouragement to the Bolsheviki and indirectly to pacifist elements in Italy, France, and Britain all had injurious effect. Had we not entered the war at last, or, having entered it, failed to give visible, tangible, and quick proof that we meant to participate to the full extent of our power, the French and Italian governments would probably have been unable to resist the pressure of their own radicals, and, against their opposition, continue the war after the German "drives" of the past spring and summer. More successful those drives would have been had our army not appeared in France—not because of the numbers (250,000) who were sufficiently prepared to go into the front

trenches, but because of the moral stimulus of the million other Americans that arrived in France and went into training behind the lines.

What would have been the condition on the Western Front last summer if we had not been fighting Germany? Without our forces in opposition, the German assurance would have been decidedly enhanced, while the hopes of the Allies would have been decidedly lessened. Our money would not have gone to the assistance of the Allies. French, British, and Italian bonds would have lost considerable value. The encouragement which our pledges gave the Allies would have been lacking and discouragement would have taken its place. Clemenceau, if Premier of France, would probably have been in no position to employ drastic measures with Caillaux, Humbert, Malvy, Bolo Pasha, and the other scoundrels of the "defeatist" group.

Had we not entered the war, our pacifists, Germans, Sinn Feiners, and impractical

theorists would have been emboldened in their campaigns here. Hearst would have been conducting not one but a dozen pro-German publications. Not a small factor would have been the increased activities of the Sinn Feiners in Ireland, and of those English socialists and labour elements who advocated "negotiations" with the Germans and sought to force the hands of their government even as late as September 3d. The assistance of our navy against the submarines, of our food supplies to England, of our pressure upon the neutrals would have been denied the Allies. The British Navy would have been divided, fleets being in American waters and in other seas endeavouring to prevent the smuggling of supplies, as before we entered the war, from American ports into neutral countries, thence to make their way into Germany. The U-boats would have been more effective because of this scattering of the British Navy and owing to the absence of our assistance, direct and indirect.

There is little doubt that the Continental

Allies would have been brought to German terms last summer but for the fact that circumstances at last drove the United States into the war, and that some members of our War Department understood the crisis in the situation and were ready when Lloyd George, in March, sent his memorable appeal to President Wilson for troops. It was thought that America was not sufficiently well prepared—nor were we; but remarkable organizing ability prevailed in the War and Navy Departments, and the drafted soldiers were men of surprising capacity and determination. No study was too arduous for them to undertake, no discipline too trying, no enterprise beyond their zeal. And with like enthusiasm thousands of able men from every walk of life crowded to Washington to render service to the government. The restraint of our long period of watchful waiting in the face of an unquestionable cause had fired the country with unprecedented determination.

The test came late in March when Lloyd George cabled the President asking him to

send our soldiers to stem the German waves of victory that were sweeping towards the Channel coast. The President replied that he would do so, if the British could furnish the ships.

The American marine had been degenerating for forty years; British ships had been reduced by submarine activity to the bare necessity, it seemed, of war requirements; the British Isles were already restricted in rations; but to save the allied armies from disastrous defeat, British tonnage took on the added task of transporting the American troops to France. Britain and France together provided such equipment and arms as our soldiers lacked.

Meanwhile to stiffen the allied lines that were wavering and had even temporarily broken, the British Government sent the home army, including eighteen-year-old boys, across the Channel to France. The government broke its pledge that these youths should be granted leave of absence to visit their parents before going across, but there

was no time to permit them even to say good-bye. Every available ship was put into the transport service, for the time being imperilling the islands' food supply—and, of course, there was grumbling and discontent at home, and criticism of the government.

But the sacrifice saved the day. The boys of England, Scotland, and Wales fortified the veterans of Britain and France and with them paid the cost till the new troops got to the front from America.

Then came the work of our men. What was it to be? No one knew. Less than a hundred thousand of them were well-trained troops, but none had seen such service as that through which the men of Europe had been passing for nearly four years. Would unseasoned troops hold the line against the machine-like, victorious enemy? Our men were inclined to doubt their ability. They knew they lacked knowledge and experience, but they resolved that bravery should make up for their lack in skill. That it did we know.

The heroism of half-trained men, the

modest attitude of an army that knew its limitations and inadequacy, but was anxious to make up with courage, disregarding the price, what it lacked in preparation and equipment; an army that was willing to take the humbler part, working with and under the veterans of Britain and France—these men blotted out for the nation the humiliation of that long period of our indecision, when, protected by the soldiers and sailors of the Allies, we watched the victorious German assault and apparently were willing to take no part in upholding liberty.

The stimulus of actual war is such, of course, that men learn in a third or a quarter of the time they would otherwise require to master the problems; nevertheless the military task of the present day is so difficult and so detailed that it seemed impossible for our men to meet the disciplined and long-trained German troops on equal terms in the brief period of a few months. A spirit of discipline and a willingness to labour hard to learn were necessary, and observers of

armies feared that our democracy would lack these essentials as other democracies had done.

I saw an army similar to the American, in Egypt in the early days of the war, as nearly like ours in raw material as any could possibly be. The men looked and dressed like ours, and wore broad-brimmed hats. This was the Anzac army from the new democracies of Australia and New Zealand—composed of brave, confident, strong, healthy, intelligent individuals, but untrained, undisciplined, unaware of the requirements of the undertaking they had come upon. They were confident of success and ignorant to a suicidal degree of the serious nature of their task. After their defeat at Gallipoli, one of the English officers, who was also a member of Parliament, went to London on leave from the trenches in France in order to say on the floor of the House of Commons that it was murder to send any but fully trained troops into the trenches of the present day. Certain divisions of Anzacs were taken to

France but they were not put into battle until they had been subjected for months to gas attacks, bombardments, and thorough disciplining. It is the latter essential of modern warfare that the Anzacs so thoroughly lacked at first. They would accept no discipline; they said they knew how to shoot; refused instruction at the hands of the British officers sent to Egypt to train them; and went unprepared to fight against the least efficient army in Europe, the Turkish. Later, however, the world became less contemptuous than it was in 1914 of the effectiveness of Teuton organization, of which the Turks possessed a little; and conscription, which Australia refused to adopt, had a sobering effect upon Americans.

We were different from what we probably would have been had we too entered the war in its early days. President Wilson's delay, though costly in many respects, had this splendid moral effect: while watching and studying Europe and suffering in spirit with her, false pride left us and we became a new

race ready to emerge from our isolation and in a brotherly way help the other nations of the world, which we had hitherto often criticized, sometimes with ignorant vanity.

Those years of waiting had their value. They were sobering years. They did not save us from war, but they served us. They made us humble. They shattered our false pride and gave us a sense of deep respect for Belgium, France, Britain, Italy, and Serbia. Our years of watching showed us what their cause really was and how they paid their price for freedom, willingly and awfully. We had little understood the cause at first.

Though late and poorly prepared, our soldiers got to France in time, and with their heroic reinforcement the Allies were able in the brief passage of four months to wrest victory from the grasp of the German and turn the waves of terrible frontal attack overwhelmingly against him.

Bulgaria saw the writing on the wall and threw herself upon the mercy of the Allies; whereupon, Germany and Austria, their

dream of conquest vanished, appealed to President Wilson, their last hope, to save them from utter disaster. Their merciless armies, their terrible submarines, and their long-effective net of intrigue had all failed; and now came their plea for mercy and their insidious effort to divide the United States from the Allies. But the country had been warned and was steeled against this final device, and when President Wilson replied in phrases that appeared not unfavourable to Prince Maximillian's plea of October 6th, the storm of protest and concern that arose throughout the nation's length and breadth showed him that, in spirit if not in covenant, America had become one of the Allies. The President then changed his tone; and the elections, a month later, decisively defeating a party that had just concluded a victorious war, gave evidence that either the President's policies or his methods in dealing with Germany and the Allies were not approved by the majority of the American people.

It is a wonderful and thorough victory the American armies and the people labouring behind them have enabled the Allies to achieve, and if the President and the statesmen who assist and follow him in office—for the task is one of years—labour with equal ability in the work of reconstruction, the long stride of progress that the world will take can be made to justify the awful cost that the nations have paid.

CHAPTER II

THE HIGH TIDE OF GERMAN SUCCESS

As a result of the most able, intensive, and unscrupulous trickery the world has ever known, employed in support of relentless military operations, the Germans found themselves, at the beginning of last summer, opposing the Allies as effectively as they were at the beginning of the war. They had failed in many ways; but on the other hand their victories had been colossal. They had not reached Paris or Calais but they controlled Petrograd and Constantinople. They had not starved England into submission or cut off France from the United States; but they were still constructing submarines enough to keep the combined navies of Britain, France, Italy, and this country thoroughly busy. They had not accom-

plished the quick defeat of France; but they had caused the world to doubt whether Central Europe could be starved into submission. They had lost their African and Pacific colonies, but what were those uncivilized and remote dependencies as compared with the Balkans, the Turkish Empire, and Russia?

Approximately four fifths of the Continent of Europe lay under German domination; Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, the Turkish Empire, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, part of Greece, part of Albania, Finland, the so-called Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, Poland, Ukrania, Rumania, parts of northern France and northern Italy, and European Russia. The northern neutrals, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, were in such a position that they were compelled to submit to the deliberate destruction of their merchant ships and the lives of their seamen, being defenceless against their ruthless neighbour. Controlling the Black Sea and the Baltic the Germans could shell the Sultan's capital if that monarch displeased them, or Copen-

hagen and Stockholm if the governments of those cities dared to thwart the German will.

The Germans had been mentally prepared as well as physically trained to make a great sacrifice. They believed in their cause, and history is replete with examples like theirs of self-sacrifice—though none on such a gigantic scale. Fanaticized, in part deceived, lured by the prospect of victory, and at the same time appalled by the danger of defeat, the Germans seemed a long way from surrender. Their strategic position was a stimulus to them to persist. They not only dominated the Continent of Europe, with the exception of the peninsulas, but the road to Asia lay wide open to them on the East, while on the Western Front an impasse appeared to exist that was not likely to be broken until some new and mightier factor was developed or until disintegration set in on one side or the other, among one or more states.

After the destruction of Russia, it was necessary for the Central Powers only to

conclude the war while retaining their military effectiveness in order to win it. Under the process of stifling Russia by cutting her off from western and southern seas, that country lay at Germany's mercy, and the fact that Russia was no longer a military power made it imperative for the Allies and America to destroy the military forces of the Central Coalition.

Compromise with Germany would have been fairly safe, perpetuating the balance of power in Europe, up to the time of Russia's collapse; but subsequently it was impossible, with any measure of safety for the future, for the Allies to make peace without complete victory. To leave Russia mutilated and Germany effective would have given substantial success to the latter. Germany could have relinquished her claims to her colonies, surrendered Alsace-Lorraine, indemnified Belgium, recreated Serbia, and handed the Trentino and other *irredenta* over to Italy, and yet she would have won enough to justify her rulers in going to war in 1914.

She sought repeatedly and by many devices to obtain peace under these conditions, directing her machinations primarily at President Wilson while labouring at the same time to influence radical and socialist elements in Italy, France, and Britain; and in view of the many pronouncements of these elements and of President Wilson that were open to construction unfavourable to victory, grave fear prevailed in the minds of many observers who understood the menace.[1]

With the destruction of Russia the Germans had all to win or all to lose, and their hopes ran high. The situation was this: The crippled states on the east of Germany and Austria-Hungary, now more than a score in number, would in future, if peace could be made, have to buy from Central Europe and

[1] As late as September 3, 1918, the British National Trade Union Congress, which met at Derby, representing 4,500,000 organized labouring men, intended to pass a carefully prepared resolution demanding negotiations for an immediate peace, but the British, French, and American victories that came late in August caused the Congress to insert a modifying clause calling for negotiations "as soon as Northern France and Belgium were evacuated."

sell to her—having no nearer or better market. At the same time, strategically controlling the expanse of territory, the resources, and the populations that lie within the several wide Slav frontiers, German mastery over the surviving free states of Europe threatened to become serious both in a military way and economically. The prestige of that successful autocracy, strategically located so that, with Austria-Hungary, it cut Europe in half, supported by its people, and controlling the most formidable armies in the world, would have been such that other nations would hesitate long before defying its challenges again over future questions.

The great advantage which the Central Powers would derive from the wreckage of Russia lay in territorial proximity. Just as the original Slav menace lay largely in this proximity, so now the advantage lay there. The new lands the Germans hoped to exploit were in the backyard, so to speak, of the Middle Europe hegemony, while their front gate was protected by a hitherto unbreakable

army. If no other evidence were available of the opportunity the German leaders foresaw, their audacity in partitioning Russia a year ago was sufficient proof of their supreme confidence in their own might. They handed over a section of the Caucasus to Turkey and permitted her to land in the Crimea; they recognized Ukrania as an "independent" state, and then occupied Kiev, the capital; they marched armies, evidently for permanent occupation, along the Black Sea littoral known as Bessarabia; they handed a portion of Rumania over to Bulgaria, annexed another, and continued to occupy what sections of the country they thought they needed, meantime, as in Ukrania, dictating what government should be formed; they held Poland and the lower Baltic States for future confederation; took Finland under a protectorate and gave her a German prince, putting troops into that state also, and demanding military co-operation in return; they occupied the Åland Islands, thereby permanently menacing the Swedish

capital; and later they required the Bolsheviki to recognize the independence of the Caucasus state of Georgia. There was never a greater conquest made in so brief a time in the history of the world—nor one that was held so briefly. It is as if the Atlantic seaboard, from Maine to Cuba—though these states would by no means cover the extent of territory affected in Russia—were torn from the side of this country. Only if the armies of the United States were trampled in the dust could such destruction be accomplished.

The Teuton's wildest dream of glory never opened the gates of the Orient to him in the way the Bolsheviki had flung them apart. Protected by formidable, he thought unconquerable, space, which was formerly Russia's strength, the exploitation of the East seemed now open to the German. His early dreams of Eastern power gave him visions of Asia Minor. But now, what to him was Turkey and the Persian Gulf? The road was open to the Indian frontier, to Thibet and Turkestan and Mongolia, and beyond those countries

to China, with a score of other undefended intermediary Khanates, each the territorial size of a great state, lying across the route. The German was like Aladdin when the door of the treasure house, unguarded, swung upon its hinges at the cry of "Open Sesame!" His own limitations, his own inability, his own inadequate strength to gather in the riches, was his greatest embarrassment.

Through the self-destruction of Russia, Germany automatically became more powerful than she had ever been before—requiring the American armies as a supplement to those of the Allies to offset the augmentation of German power. At no previous time in her history had Germany had only one frontier to guard. Relieved of pressure on her Eastern Front, her Western became at once more formidable. Besides the increase of man power that went to Germany by the release of prisoners, she obtained potential control of enormous sources of supplies—grain and cattle, copper, platinum, and antimony, cotton, iron, and many other necessities of

war. The Baltic Sea and the Black—with the Danube reaching from the latter far into Hungary, and canals connecting the upper reaches of the river with the harbour of Hamburg—became German lakes.

Nor were these yet all of Germany's actual and potential achievements. The Bolsheviki had repudiated the six or more billions of Russian debt, which had come from the Allies, mostly from France, while they were unable to refuse to pay indemnity to Germany. As for labourers, had Germany not been so far gone herself or had the Allies and America given her time to recover, she could ultimately have exchanged her three or four millions of starving prisoners for many comparatively fresh and able-bodied working-men, who could have been brought if necessary from the borders of Siberia.

A million more of the Prussian Guard and what could Germany not have done in the spring of 1918?

CHAPTER III

THE DESTRUCTION OF RUSSIA

"When Lenine's brief hour ends he will have the satisfaction of knowing that he did more harm to the human race than was ever done by any one man in such short time since history began to be recorded in the tombs along the Nile."—From the *New York Times.*

WHEN the Russians definitely deserted the Allies at Brest-Litovsk, some men, in the heat of the moment said: "Let them go; let them stew in the grease Germany will provide for them." But President Wilson said: "No, we must not desert them; we should not." The President spoke largely from sympathy with the struggling Russian people, sympathy with the masses and with so-styled "liberal" elements being a dominant

note in his character and in those of several men in his cabinet. For later he opposed plans of the Allies for military intervention in Russia, until, as has often been the case with him, he came to see that their plans were not based merely on selfish interests.

There was one compensating benefit in the delay the President caused, for which we have to thank him: events were given time to display themselves in their true colours. Certainly the vision of the Allies and ourselves was considerably cleared and defined during the months we remained inactive. No reasonable man could now dispute the condition of Russia and the absurdity of Bolshevik ideas. It was during those months that we came to realize that disaster stared the Allies in the face and that the Germans would obtain victory if pacifist and defeatist ideas, many of which were not pro-German but only the result of ignorance, extended any further.

What was the condition of Russia? It is worth applying the situation to the United

States in an effort to realize just what has happened there. If eighty per cent. of us Americans were illiterate and had been tricked by socialist and German promises of free land and wealth into laying down our arms and handing over to the Germans the Atlantic seaboard with the exception of a narrow strip of territory surrounding New York (Petrograd); if the German army, unopposed, had then marched further inland, occupying sections of other states as well as those along the Atlantic; if the I. W. W. controlled the local governments of most of the country, and many states had declared independence and had taken up arms against other states; if mobs of ruffians had destroyed many of the government records, looted the government buildings, including the White House and the Treasury, plundered the homes of middle-class people as well as of the wealthy, brutally massacred many of them and turned many out into the streets; if the capital were removed from Washington to Chicago or St. Louis, where German agents

and German soldiers, liberated from our prison camps, were given arms and then permitted to move freely across the country and operate with an I. W. W. "red guard"; if, on top of all this, W. R. Hearst had established himself like Lenine and was controlling the central government with other self-styled "liberators," financed to a large extent by Germany,—we should then have a state of affairs resembling that which exists in Russia today. The parallel is not exact, of course, but it seems to me to have value in bringing home to us what has actually happened in the afflicted country we are called upon to help for the sake both of two hundred million Slavs and of ourselves.

Along with their good qualities too many of the Russians have also serious failings, which have served the Germans in the past and might even serve them again in the future. Russia's present condition is due not only to the corruption and incapacity of the former court and bureaucracy, but also to the ignorance and corruption of the peasants and the

city masses. Socialists are wont to depict the working-people of every country as virtuous and downtrodden, and governors of them as slave drivers. But these pictures are only sometimes and in spots true, and would be the same or worse if the order were reversed, and the working-man, with less education and mental training, were put on top. Organizations of socialists are not as a rule properly described by the name they have chosen to gather under. Frequently the socialist is an arrant autocrat or a half-educated man of bitter prejudices, and often the democratic leader who does not call himself a socialist is a truer liberal than the most talkative and plausible maker of plans for righting evils. Such is definitely the case in Russia. The peasants there have their vices, and the so-called socialist leaders who now dominate are arrogant, ignorant autocrats, not as liberal no. as capable as the Czar and his governors. As a result, the country has passed from the terrible régime of the Czar to a worse one, out of

which it may not emerge for decades unless military assistance is given to its ablest men.

It is a piteous tragedy, and not the sort of story that we Americans love. We like an old-time drama with hero and villain and various other stage-like and unreal people; but Russia is not composed of such. We welcomed the overthrow of a tyrannical government and looked for the rising of a virtuous people who would accept the leadership of a noble Kerensky and follow him to glory, victory, and an administration of justice and prosperity. But Kerensky was a blunderer himself, and was unable, having destroyed Russia's power, to accomplish efficient reorganization—the people preferring to heed the enticing bribes of Lenine and Bronstein whose pseudonym is "Trotzky." What irony of fate is this, that a man from among the oppressed race of Jews should rise to a foremost governmental position, and should be in part, with many other Jews, the means of Israel's vengeance upon a people that persecuted her, creating conditions

terrible for Russia, menacing to her Allies, and useful only to the enemies of liberty!

A people cannot lead themselves. Even in a democracy as enlightened as ours there must be definite leaders. To talk of the proletariat ruling is absurd. The proletariat, if its party rules, must have leaders. The change in Russia was from one group of leaders to another; and the last group, being composed of less capable leaders, relied for support and assistance on Germany. The group came into being with Germany's aid by connivance with the system they pretended to abhor.

The contemptible government of the Czar was not contemptible down to the last private that did its bidding. In no country is this the case. Heroism and ability were evident in every rank. There were virtues in the humblest peasant soldier and great ability among the grand dukes. They were willing to pour out their blood for Russia though they knew that neither she nor they were without fault. But the system, a heritage of

past ages, was exceedingly bad and gave power and opportunity to creatures of the sort that exploit their fellow men. The system of a permanent autocracy is one that will always work dangers to a nation, and to mankind outside the autocratic nation, and even the form of it ought to be abolished, though statesmen everywhere hesitate and fear to make the change until disaster forces it upon them. Although men require leaders they must also have the right to choose those leaders. Hereditary monarchs and other hereditary systems are relics of a past age.

As a consequence of stupidity on the part of the Czars of Russia and illiteracy among the people, both became the dupes of unprincipled men, who exploited and influenced the nation. Imperialism, promoted or inspired with various motives, reigned supreme; but there was not the intelligence to make aggression a safe and secure policy. Instead of educating the people to play the most effective part, as the German rulers had

done, the Czar's agents depended on the country's natural might, and maintained ignorance. The Kaiser relied for support first on the menaced position of Germany and later on the promise to his people of domination and plunder; the Czar feared to make a change and continued the old method of maintaining loyalty by religious exhortation and military force. A leader can generally retain authority in the face of a foreign enemy by military force; and so the Czar could have done had the Germans not created conditions that destroyed his power, employing, according to their method, several factors besides arms in accomplishing their object. They had laid their plans and worked at the destruction of Russia by means of trickery and corruption long before they set their arms to the task. The Czar was encouraged in stupidities, and efforts were made to undermine his loyalty in the alliance Russia had with France. Bribery and propaganda—cheaper by far than the operation of armies—were at work for many years.

Declarations of friendship were at times employed, and at others the "mailed fist." Dishonest officials could obtain incomes from the Kaiser's agents, while those not corruptible were subjected to propaganda which took the form of flattery, trickery, or hostility as the case warranted. The Germans could often bring about the dismissal of Russian ministers. Trade and traffic with Russia were promoted intensively, and German business men were in a minor though very definite way agents of the Kaiser.

There seemed no danger of catastrophe to Russia when the war began. German agents, ready and informed of their government's plans, dynamited munition plants, armouries, and other factories of military importance; but the armies of the Czar marched forward into East Prussia and down to the Carpathians, time and again saving the Western Front by their prowess on the East. The participation of Britain gave them greater confidence; and when Turkey took the side of Germany, Russian statesmen rejoiced

that they would now obtain authority over the Sultan's capital and the waterways it controlled to the Mediterranean. A Russian name was given to Constantinople at once; it was called Czaregrad. Even when astute Bulgarian statesmen, realizing the importance of their pivotal geographical position, began to bargain with the opposing enemy governments, the Czar's ministers, to whom the *Entente* felt compelled to leave the negotiations, deported themselves with arrogance, certain that the Bulgars dared not take up arms against them. But the Bulgar leaders, especially after the defeat of the British at Gallipoli, felt that they could safely ally themselves with the Germans.

Then came the disasters and the disillusionment of the Russian bureaucrats. Bulgaria could not be made a highway from the *Entente* countries to Russia; she was serving the Germans and Turks instead. And the Germans, after digging themselves into the flanks of France and Belgium so that the Allies could not eradicate them, turned

upon the Russian armies and drove them back out of Poland. No match for the Teuton soldier was the heavy Russian peasant —stupid, partly trained, badly supplied, ill-fed, eaten by disease, unprotected by a proper medical department. As one to six, the Kaiser, in a speech to his troops after one victory over the Russians, compared the effectiveness of his helmeted men; and undoubtedly the German soldier was equal to several of Russia's. In hundreds of thousands, until they actually numbered millions, the Russians were made prisoners, and the rest of the army was driven back beyond Warsaw in disordered rout.

The allied press made light of this defeat and much of Russia's resumption of the offensive the following year, 1916; but it is a practice of the press to stress the news in favour of its own side, and actually the recovery of territory was but slight and was the Czar's final effort. Disintegration set in both in his government, where the coming calamity was now descried, and in the dis-

heartened, disease-ridden, hungry army. To prevent the débâcle the rulers, perhaps the Czar himself, resorted to dishonour of a dastardly character. His minister, Stuermer, —probably a German at heart as well as in blood—agreed not only to come to terms of peace, deserting France, Britain, and the other Allies, but also to induce Rumania to enter the war so that she too should fall a prey to Germany and Austria. What a purchase! Rumania's oil wells, Russia's platinum supply (over ninety per cent. of the world's output), and a thousand other necessities! What would Germany not do or pay for this?

When the defeat of Rumania was accomplished and the perfidy of the Russian Court became evident, the Czar's overthrow came; and Nicholas II., in ignominy and distress, was hurried away to Siberia and subsequently put to death by the long-docile people whom a wise ruler could so easily have governed. But drunk were the people with their new-found licence, which the Germans and their

own Russian socialists had preached to them —drunk like famished and thirsty children tasting sweet wine for the first time; and easily they fell the prey of creatures that used them for their own designs. Some men will still argue that Lenine was the people's friend. He may have meant to be, in which case he was a fool. And some will argue that he was no fool; then, he was a knave.

The Germans knew the value of the man's teachings—they were German teachings!—and gave him assistance, which he accepted. It was not possible for him to govern as long as the army existed, the officers being as a rule loyal to Russia and men who observe military principles of honour. So Lenine, Trotzky, and their associates preached from behind the lines the same doctrines the Germans were preaching from in front. Indeed, Lenine had been given a special train to cross Germany from Switzerland to Russia when the revolution was proclaimed; and there seems no doubt that at that time he was in the pay of the Germans, who an-

ticipated the value his services would be to them.

Soldiers left the trenches, killed their officers, often with hideous brutality, and started on their long journeys back to the villages or cities to take the lands and the property the Germans and the Bolsheviki told them they could have. They commandeered trains, plundered at will, destroyed in wanton fashion, and murdered from time to time the bourgeoisie whom their pernicious leaders had declared to be their enemies—those middle class people who as a class were the enemies only of Lenine and the Kaiser.

Incompetent and with Russia's power destroyed, these mad theorists went into conference with the Kaiser's representatives, who had promised them peace without indemnities and annexations. They thought themselves clever to enter into such a bargain and believed they could outwit the Kaiser and his junkers. Their policy was to accept his money intending to destroy him

later. Lenine planned to prove to the world both that the Kaiser could be trusted and that the German Bolsheviki were about to take control in Germany. But his effort had the contrary effect, strengthening the authority of the German junkers, and proving that no faith under political circumstances could be placed in the word of a German. The German has been an able exploiter of fools, upon whom he has no mercy.

The Bolsheviki balked and refused to sign the terms the Germans dictated, whereupon the German armies penetrated deeper into Russia. The Bolsheviki called upon the people to rise and resist, not knowing that an army cannot spring into being from citizens or peasantry overnight. Petrograd was threatened and the Bolshevik government fled to Moscow, which was likewise threatened; whereupon they accepted the Teuton terms and signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Peace between Germany and Ukrania, the vast territory north of the Black Sea, had

already been concluded, recognizing the independence of the latter, into which the German armies advanced, ostensibly to drive out the Russian Bolsheviki, but primarily to make good the pledge of that grain-producing country to supply foodstuffs to the Central Powers. The Bolsheviki were required to sign an acceptance of this accomplished condition, and also of the separation of Finland, and of Poland, Lithuania, Esthonia, Courland, and Livonia, which provinces Germany meant to take in one form or another into vassalage. The cession of Kars, Batoum, and neighbouring districts was demanded for their annexation to the Turkish Empire (which, under Teuton protection, sought again to stride the road of expansion after retreating for more than a century). Bessarabia was cut off; and following as an unavoidable consequence came the submission of Rumania. Six months later, by a special treaty, the "independence" of Georgia was required and obtained as well as an indemnity of 6,000,000,000 marks. This

was done in spite of pledges of no indemnity and no annexations!

The game was chess, but that was beyond the acumen of the Bolsheviki, so they said the game was wrong and asked for draughts.

"Draughts!" exclaimed the Germans. "We'll help you arrange the board." They smiled at Lenine's stupidity and he mistook the smile for one of friendship or gentleness. In two moves the Germans cornered the ignoramus, and the rest was a matter of gathering in the scattered pieces.

Nevertheless, in spite of their experience, the Bolsheviki leaders, like the "Scientists" who declare that pain does not exist, replied to a message from President Wilson that Russia had achieved a great victory, a liberation!

CHAPTER IV

THE METHODS OF THE BOLSHEVIKI

BUT was it a liberation for Russia or was it plunder for Lenine, Bronstein, and ilk? Under the régime of the Czar the Constituent Assembly had been elected by the people, and the Social Revolutionists had a landslide majority, the Bolsheviki a miserable minority. They determined, therefore, that the Assembly should not meet; and before the day of its meeting they began arresting those of its members who got within reach of their claws. A week before the day of convening they abolished the law courts and substituted revolutionary tribunals as a sign of what the arrested might expect. When the great day came, only fifty members appeared out of the six hundred whom the people had chosen.

The night before, as a further warning of what was coming, the Bolsheviki arrested Shingareff and Kokoshkin, and the day following they decreed the arrest of all Cadet leaders.

For a month the Bolsheviki sought, by the recognized methods of anarchists, to pack and control the Assembly in spite of their numerical inferiority; and on January 19th of this year it was allowed to meet. The Bolsheviki had formed an alliance with their future victims, the Social Revolutionists of the Left, and hoped to control the Assembly.

But when it met their hopes were disappointed. Their prunings and decimations and the fear of them had excluded about two hundred of the six hundred members. Four hundred answered the roll-call; and of these the Bolsheviki and the Social Revolutionists of the Left had about 150 votes altogether. The Social Revolutionists of the Right controlled it by an enormous majority. They elected Tchernoff chairman by 244 votes to

151 for Maria Spiridonova,—the leader of the Left, who last July was to discover how the Bolsheviki had betrayed her party and to launch against them the war of underground terror.

The Bolsheviki instantly presented a resolution declaring that all power was lodged in the Soviets. By a vote of 273 to 140 the Assembly voted to defer consideration of this abdication. Immediately the Bolshevik delegates withdrew, and the sailors who acted nominally as a guard fell upon the Assembly and drove it out of the hall. That night Shingareff and Kokoshkin were murdered in their beds. The Constituent Assembly was dispersed to the four winds, and Lenine, Bronstein, and their several confederates constituted themselves tyrants over Russia, responsible only to themselves and indirectly to Germany.

An exceedingly interesting light is thrown on both the attitude of the Bolsheviki and that of Britain in an interview given by Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador

to Petrograd, to a number of newspaper men of that city on December 8, 1917:[1]

"Judging by recent practice, secret diplomacy will soon be a thing of the past, and diplomatists must, therefore, more than ever, have recourse to the press as a channel of communication with the people. It is for this reason that I welcome your visit in order that through your kind offices I may appeal to the Russian democracy against those who wilfully misrepresent the policy of my government. What, you ask me, is our attitude toward Russia, and how do we view the negotiations for an armistice that have been opened on the Russian front? As regards the first of these questions, I can assure you that our attitude is one of sympathy for the Russian people, worn out as they are by their heavy sacrifices in this war and by the general disorganization that is the inevitable consequence of any great upheaval like that of your revolution. We bear them no grudge nor is there a word of truth in the reports

[1] Taken from *The City of Trouble* by Meriel Buchanan, daughter of the Ambassador, published by Charles Scribner's Sons.

that have been circulated to the effect that we are contemplating any coercional punitive measures in the event of their making a separate peace. With regard to the second question, the council of the people's commissaries, in opening negotiations with the enemy without previous consultation with the Allies, committed a breach of the agreement of August 23–September 5, 1914, of which we had a right to complain. We cannot for a moment admit the validity of their contention that a treaty, concluded with an autocratic government, can have no binding force on the democracy by which that government has been replaced, as such a principle, if once adopted, would undermine the stability of all international agreements. But, while we repudiate this new doctrine, we do not desire to induce an unwilling ally to continue to contribute her share to the common effort by an appeal to our treaty rights. There are still higher principles to which we might, if we so desired it, appeal—principles, moreover, that are fully recognized by the council of the people's commissaries. They are those of a democratic peace, of a peace that accords

with the wishes of the smaller nationalities, that repudiates the idea of extracting plunder out of conquered enemies under the name of war indemnities, or of incorporating in great empires the territories of reluctant populations. Such, broadly speaking, is the peace which my government equally with the Russian democracy wishes to see secured to the world. The council of the people's commissaries is mistaken, however, in thinking that they can secure this peace by asking for an immediate armistice to be followed by an agreement. They are, if I may use a homely expression, putting the cart before the horse. The Allies, on the contrary, desire to arrive first at a general agreement in harmony with their declared aims, and then to secure an armistice. So far not a word has been said by any German statesman to show that the ideals of Russian democracy are shared by the German Emperor or his government, and it is with the German autocracy, and not with the German people, that negotiations for an armistice are being conducted. Is it likely that the Emperor William, when once he knows that the Russian army has ceased to

exist as a fighting force, will be disposed to subscribe to a democratic and durable peace such as the Russian people desire? No; the peace which he contemplates is a German imperialistic one. Though the Allies cannot send representatives to take part in the armistice negotiations, they are ready, so soon as a stable government has been instituted that is recognized by the Russian people as a whole, to examine with that government the aims of the war and the possible conditions of a just and durable peace. Meanwhile they are rendering Russia the most effective assistance by holding up the bulk of the German armies on their respective fronts. The important victories of the British troops near Cambrai are of good augury for the future, for this democratic peace which we all so ardently desire will never be attained till the military power of the Kaiser has been broken.

"I have, I hope, shown how friendly are our feelings and how sincerely we desire to stand by Russia in this hour of crisis. Can, I venture to ask, the same be said of Russia's feelings toward us? Is it not a fact that hardly a day passes without some bitter attack being made on my country

by what are now the official organs of the press? To read them one would think that Great Britain, and not Germany, was the enemy, that Great Britain provoked the war for her own imperialistic and capitalist aims, and that she is responsible for all the blood that is being shed. I am not going to repeat the oft-told tale of the beginning of the war; I should only like to ask what would be Russia's position today had we not intervened when Belgium's neutrality was violated by Germany? Without the British fleet and our newly formed armies in which three million volunteers had enlisted, Russia would today be Germany's vassal, and autocracy would reign supreme in Europe. Had we stood aside there would have been no revolution and no liberty for the people. The German army would have seen to that, and without our co-operation Russia would never have won her freedom. Are we not, therefore, entitled to claim that we should be treated as friends instead of being made the object of scurrilous attacks? In his appeal to the Moslems of the East, Monsieur Lenine spoke of us as rapacious extortioners and plunderers, while he incites our Indian subjects to

rebellion. He placed us on a somewhat lower level than the Turks, to whom he would hand over Armenia, forgetting the awful massacres already perpetrated there. It is an unheard-of thing for a man who claims to direct Russian policy to use such language of a friendly and allied country. How does he think that the British tyrant enforced his will in India with three hundred million inhabitants? Is he aware that the British garrison which before the war amounted to seventy-five thousand men has now been reduced to fifteen thousand, owing to the loyal support of the native races? Is he aware that one of our chief aims is to prepare the diverse and often hostile races for self-government, and that our own government encourages the formation of Indian societies and committees for this very purpose? Hardly any of them are anti-British, and none approach the Soviet in character.

"The position of Englishmen in this country is not an enviable one at the present moment. They are singled out for attacks and regarded with suspicion. During the seven years that I have been ambassador here I have worked heart and

soul to bring about the closest understanding between Russia and Great Britain, but though I have associated, as it is my duty, with members of all parties, I have ever since the February revolution maintained a strictly neutral attitude. Prior to that date I did, it is true, endeavour to use my influence with the Emperor in favour of some form of constitutional government, and I repeatedly urged him to make concessions to the legitimate wishes of the people. Now that his sovereign rights are vested in the Russian people, the latter will, I trust, pardon my transgression of the strict rules of diplomatic etiquette. I would, in conclusion, venture to address one word of warning to the Russian democracy. Their leaders are, I know, animated by the desire of creating a brotherhood of the proletariats of the world in order to secure universal peace. I fully sympathize with the object they have in view, but I would ask them to consider whether their present methods are likely to appeal to the democracies of other countries, and more especially to my own. They are creating, perhaps unintentionally, the impression that they set more store by the German

than by the British proletariat. Their attitude toward us is more calculated to estrange than to attract the sympathies of the British working classes. During the great war that followed the French Revolution the speeches delivered against Great Britain and the attempts made to provoke a revolution in our country did but steel the resolve of the British people to fight out the war to the end and rallied them round the government of the day. History will, if I mistake not, repeat itself in this twentieth century."

For many months President Wilson considered what action should be taken regarding the Bolsheviki, striving to influence them for some time, and finally in September (1918) the State Department sent the following communication to various American representatives accredited to foreign governments:

"This Government is in receipt of information from reliable sources revealing that the peaceable Russian citizens of Moscow, Petrograd, and other cities are suffering from an openly avowed campaign

of mass terrorism and are subject to wholesale executions. Thousands of persons have been shot without even a form of trial; ill-administered prisons are filled beyond capacity, and every night scores of Russian citizens are recklessly put to death; and irresponsible bands are venting their brutal passions in the daily massacres of untold innocents.

"In view of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to befriend the Russian people and lend them all that is possible of assistance in their struggle to reconstruct their nation upon principles of democracy and self-government, and acting therefore solely in the interest of the Russian people themselves, this Government feels that it cannot be silent or refrain from expressing its horror at this state of terrorism. Furthermore, it believes that in order to check the further increase of the indiscriminate slaughter of Russian citizens all civilized nations should register their abhorrence of such barbarism.

"You will inquire, therefore, whether the Government to which you are accredited will be disposed to take some

immediate action, which is entirely divorced from the atmosphere of belligerency and the conduct of war, to impress upon the perpetrators of these crimes the aversion with which civilization regards their present wanton acts."

The allied governments had such information long before that of Washington and wanted to take action, but the attitude of President Wilson made it inadvisable for them to do so, primarily because Germany would be able to make capital in Russia and elsewhere over the disagreement between the President of the United States and the Allies.

The consequences of the calamity to Russia herself were immediate. The cities of European Russia are now starving. Petrograd, according to present dispatches, is almost without bread or potatoes. Paper money has no value in many districts, the people refusing to exchange commodities for the currencies of the Czar, the Bolsheviki, or the Germans. Metal money has disappeared. Anarchists

arm and hold improvised fortresses in the principal cities, and outlawry is rampant. Assassinations of single Bolsheviki occur and hundreds of men and women are put to death as a penalty. Such conditions prevail that the coming of the Germans in many places was desired as a relief. A cholera scourge has broken out; and the winter promises unprecedented horrors. All who can escape are fleeing into the adjacent States which Germany cut off from Russia. And the terms of the armistice with Germany provide that German troops remain in those provinces till relieved by allied troops.

The so-called liberal socialists talked of government but are incapable of establishing it, and generally speaking, whatever order exists is maintained by independent local administrations, and by means of wanton, often needless, and arbitrary executions. Such is the plight to which great Russia has been brought down. Who could have encouraged worse brutality among the ignorant soldiers? Who could have been more

arrogant and autocratic? Who, other than these socialists, would have sold their country into such depths of degradation by such methods of dishonour in order to experiment with theories? Even the Czar's scheme was but a half measure as compared with that of Lenine and Trotzky. His plan was to become himself a vassal of the Kaiser, to save what he could of and for the nation. But his depth of stupidity and crime did not descend to the deliberate wholesale destruction of his own people.

A country as vast as North America — as Canada, the United States, and Central America combined—embracing one seventh of the land surface of the earth, 8,500,000 square miles, with a population of 180,000,000, went down to defeat before the combined destroying elements of socialism and military force, opposing factors which planned later to destroy one another. Russia was unconquerable by either of these forces alone, even in her negligence, disorder, and corruption. Only by their combination could she

have been destroyed. In the hands of leaders of honesty and intelligence what a nation she could have been! From ocean to ocean across two continents her empire swept. She was complete within herself, needing only outlets by southern routes to the waterways of the world. Granaries sufficient for the whole world could have been developed upon her plains, and great mineral wealth, while her man power, properly enlightened and organized, could have dominated the continents upon which she lay for centuries, not as a protective beneficent covering of the North, but as a blight and a menace.

Russia, lying across Europe and Asia, needed no fleet. Sea power was unnecessary for her defence. To attack her successfully by land could have been made impossible for the Central Powers. To attack her by sea should have been impossible for any coalition that could have been formed. Russia in the hands of leaders of honesty and ability would have been more than unconquerable; she could have led and helped

much of the world. But development was not encouraged, trade was restricted, ignorance and superstition actually propagated. With all her vast territory of Siberia practically nothing was done; and it remains today comparatively a wilderness, with a population of less than six million white inhabitants. Few but strategic lines of railway were constructed, and those usually built with the object of furthering the Czar's ambition. His agents bore themselves with arrogance, and his soldiers perpetrated cruelties only with less restraint upon the subject Asiatic races than upon their own people.

But what Russia could have been she might still be. She has able men, not self-seekers, who will come to the front if opportunity be given them. It is necessary for the Allies to discover those real men and devise the means to help them, not excluding the use of armed force. The task of reconstructing Russia is gigantic, yet it is necessary to accomplish it and to begin upon it at once.

Compared with the work of the Bolsheviki

and the massacres and other loss of life they have already caused and will further cause, the French Revolution was a transient episode accompanied by a series of lynchings.

CHAPTER V

HOW GERMANY PLANNED AND PREPARED

"There are some men who say, 'Drop it and let us have peace by negotiation.' There is no compromise between freedom and tyranny, no compromise between light and darkness. I know that it is better to sacrifice one generation than to sacrifice liberty forever. That is what we are fighting for, and Heaven grant that we fight through to the end."
—LLOYD GEORGE, September 12, 1918.

WITH the defeat of Russia in the Far East in 1904, the Germans had tangible proof of what they had supposed, that the adversary on their eastern frontier was a Colossus with feet of clay; and when the spectacle of Russia's incapacity both with fleet and army became apparent, and her defeat at the hands of the Japanese was followed by mutinies

and rebellion at home, the Kaiser and his war lords were able to smack their lips and rub their hands with glee. The pudding was proved. They spoke kind words to the Czar and comforted him with cries of "Yellow Peril," while they bribed his ministers and plotted his destruction. "Yellow Peril" was a part of their game, played in many countries, not excluding the United States.

While Germany played confidence tricks, Austria-Hungary, her ally, maintained hostility to the Petersburg government. This was in keeping with the system of the Triple Alliance—of which Italy was an uninformed partner. Berlin and Vienna followed the same method in dealing with Turkey and sometimes with the Balkan States—and it is known how they tried similar practices on the Allies and the United States in the war. Berlin replied to Lloyd George and President Wilson in terms of war; Vienna spoke softly and even on occasions paid compliments—especially and flagrantly to President Wilson. In Turkey, Austria played

the aggressor, brow-beating the Sublime Porte from time to time, while the Kaiser acted as the Turk's friend. Whenever interference was proposed (generally by Britain with the object of preventing massacres) Austria and Russia insisted on taking the lead, these rivals declaring themselves to be "the most interested" nations. Playing the other part, the Kaiser invariably refrained and even went further, comforting the Sultan, openly befriending the Turks in conducting their butchery, and declaring himself, after the Armenian massacres of the nineties in particular, the protector of Islam.

With the other states of the Balkans the policy was shifted as circumstances required. But with these smaller countries Austria was generally left alone to deal. There, it was her policy to cultivate friendship with Bulgaria and maintain hostility with the Serbs. She wanted excuse for war with the latter and might need the friendship of Bulgaria. There was tangible reason for this; Serbia and

Montenegro blocked the Austrian way to Turkey and down the east shore of the Adriatic, while Bulgaria could serve the aggressive designs of the Dual Monarchy and at the same time impair the Balkan policies of Russia. Differences with Serbia were kept alive deliberately. Efforts to terminate those existing among the Balkan States (in which Britain, as in the efforts to terminate Turkish massacres, was always foremost, were persistently and successfully thwarted. Though generally accompanied with politely phrased reasons and arguments, the system of the Germans was apparent.

The intrigue with Bulgaria was intended to make Russia no longer feared by that country, and Bulgaria's German king helped to accomplish the design; while at the same time the Serbs retained complete confidence in the power of their fellow Slavs of the north. I remember being criticized by Serbian officials as uninformed in 1908 for expressing doubt in Russia's ability to save them. I was then in Belgrad as a correspondent of

the London *Times*, watching the mobilization that resulted from the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within a few weeks the Serbs were demobilizing, having received very definite evidence that Russia had not yet recovered sufficiently to accept the German challenge. Suddenly and without warning a German army had been mobilized (early in 1909) on the Russian frontier, and the Petersburg foreign office had received formidable intimations from Berlin that Serbia must sign a treaty with Austria-Hungary foregoing for ever any claim to the Slav provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and meeting other requirements of the Dual Monarchy.

"Within three years," it was said in Belgrad, "the Russian forces will be reorganized." Within three years the Agadir incident came, and the *Entente* nations again gave way to a certain extent to Germany's demands.

Having travelled between London and the Balkan States a number of times, I had

come to know that the British Government under Balfour's premiership comprehended the dangers of the situation. They perceived the far-reaching consequences that would eventually, if Britain did not interfere, make Germany the state she wished to be. The dream of *Deutschland über Alles* was to be made real in the flesh at whatever cost in blood. And Germany was not a nation that had, like Russia, neglected her talents. Materially she had made the best of what she had, even interpreting religion to suit her needs, and she was able in that day to attack and defeat any and all of her neighbours on the Continent. With Germany in control from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, there could be no safety for Britain. As Russian troops might have been shifted to Russia's great military advantage, from ocean to ocean in a dozen days, Germans could be moved, once the Bagdad road was completed, from the shores of the North Sea to those that could form naval bases from which to menace India and Egypt. With

these "interior lines," as the military phrase goes, covering so vast an extent of self-supporting territory, sea power, slow moving and, as time has proved, the prey to submarines, would give place in effective transportation to strategy based on railway communication.

Russia and Japan had not signed the treaty of Portsmouth before the British Government, then Conservative, began preparations for an understanding with France; nor was the work begun a day too soon, Germany now being ready to make her assault. Though it was not till 1914 that the Kaiser was prevailed upon to force the situation to one of war, he began actually to dictate to Europe in 1905. The ally of Russia, attached to her for mutual defence against the German coalition, was the first victim. Choosing to make an issue of the agreement reached between Britain and France over their Morocco settlement, the Kaiser's government provoked a question a year old, and after unsatisfactory discussions, demanded

the dismissal of Delcassé, the French foreign minister.

As one of the Associated Press correspondents in London at that time, I used to be received at the Foreign Office and given news. On one of my visits at the period of the Delcassé crisis, I was informed by Sir Lucas Mallet (later ambassador to Constantinople) that the British Government had told the French that Britain would support them, participating as their ally in war, if the French decided to refuse to meet the German demands. This offer of Britain, made by her Conservative government through Lord Lansdowne (the very minister, curiously, who has recently been advocating negotiations with Germany), caused a panic in Paris when it was made public, and at the same time gave the Germans a clear view of what they could expect from Britain. Nevertheless, the Germans were willing to push the issue to the verge of war nine years before it actually happened, being confident in the superior strength which time has proved

they actually possessed. In that year, they could certainly have defeated France and Russia even with Britain's assistance.

The Anglo-French *Entente* was a very new thing. In the previous year, 1904, Britain was the ally of one and France of the other party to the war in Manchuria. The British had had differences of long standing with the French, which they had settled on liberal terms, both Lansdowne and Delcassé realizing the nonsense of continuing old rivalries and claims in North Africa in the face of the peril that faced France herself.

Suddenly the Kaiser challenged the new *Entente* and it all but fell apart. France was not prepared for war either in armament or in spirit. International socialism, led by the Germans, had been making great progress among the French, and since 1900 or 1901 they had not kept up their naval construction, nor had their war department obtained appropriations adequate for defence. Russia, their ally, was undergoing revolution and was disorganized, and Britain,

their new-found friend, had not yet won their confidence. There were outcries in the press, encouraged if not actually inspired by the Germans, against the trickery of "perfidious Albion," and the French refused, as one paper put it, to pull the British chestnuts out of the fire, preferring to accept, at German command, the resignation of their foreign minister. The German attitude, however, followed by the Algeciras Conference, soon opened the eyes of the French people to the gravity of their position and caused them to realize that socialism as promoted in Berlin was not only an institution of some liberal men but also one of the mightiest weapons utilized by the Kaiser's clique.

Then, in 1906, Britain changed governments and a new policy, one of temporizing and seeking an understanding with the Germans, was adopted. Because of internal political questions, the Balfour administration gave place to that of the Liberal party led by Asquith. Passions were worked up to unfortunate heights. Balfour was not an

incorrigible aristocrat and imperialist, nor was Lloyd George, the most virulent Liberal orator, a mere destroyer. Yet an outsider might have thought this from the manner in which the campaign was conducted. Today, we see these men allied at the head of the empire in the most important crisis of its existence. The Conservatives had the interest of Britain at heart, as they have shown by sacrificing their sons in Britain's traditional way; to the Liberals the German danger appeared to be a bugbear and the real issue was the betterment of conditions at home.

No fair-minded man will deny that there was need of improvement in social conditions in England—and that there is still great need. The country had become sodden in an out-of-date class system. Great wealth and wrong ideas of the prestige of mere birth had developed evils in a generally splendid state.

On the other hand, the Germans, inspired with the hope of world dominion, had made

mighty progress in general fitness and organization, which they realized was necessary to military efficiency. Lloyd George pointed out this German fitness, blamed the earls and dukes of Britain for blighting the nation, and sought to institute reforms on German lines but without the military organization. His fellow political leaders went so far as to undo the pledge to France (which was not again fully renewed until after the war began); and, some of them, certain that their Conservative opponents were rank imperialists seeking only to prevent a friendly nation finding a place in the sun, endeavoured to come to terms with Berlin. Such is often the way in the heat of political enmities; politicians adopt new foreign policies not on their merits but because they are contrary to the policies of rival politicians.

It is no wonder if the Kaiser was really deceived, though he may only have pretended to be, in thinking Britain would not fight. The Liberal government actually went so far as to cease building first-line battleships

for the period of a year in order to show the German Government their good will. The Kaiser in response attested his faith in his own strong arm, attempting by secret construction to overtake, during this twelve months of folly, as much as possible of the British lead. At the end of the year, the British were somewhat roused, but still pacifists held portfolios in the cabinet. For eight years, the Liberal government temporized with Germany, even, when the final issue came, dividing on the declaration of war, several members of the body retiring from office in preference to participation.

The situation in this country during the period of our indecision had phases similar to those of Britain's pre-war years. Both the Liberal government in London and the Democratic here had socialist tendencies and pacifist members. In England, such men left office immediately upon the declaration of war and very soon a coalition cabinet was formed; but President Wilson is not a man who readily co-operates with those whose

views differ from his nor does he change his appointees.

Perhaps the most deterring factor with us, the one which made us willing, as a nation, to keep out of war as long as we did, was the condition of Russia, under a despotic government. There were some Americans even in important government offices who seemed to prefer to see Germany win than that the Russian autocracy should be permitted a further lease of existence. They did not realize, perhaps, how near German victory was, or what her victory would mean both to Russia and to the rest of the world. The Russian bureaucracy was losing authority steadily and was certain soon to give way before a more or less representative form of government. The Czar's government was, for the time being, better than anarchy to be followed by German conquest. Unfortunately, too many Americans, some being theorists insufficiently experienced in international affairs, were willing to take chances, not considering the cost, with schemes that

had not yet been tested; and such men gave suggestions, sympathy, and even assistance to Bolsheviki leaders who left this country to go to Russia and aid the Germans in destroying the power of the Czar and the effectiveness of his army.

"The overthrow of Russia and her surrender to Germany was largely brought about by American social revolutionists, many of whom, strange to say, by concealing, for the time being, their real purposes, managed to go to Russia from this country under the auspices of the Federal Administration. In the words of an official investigator of high intelligence and standing, more than half of these men whom this government was thus sending over were anarchists whose luggage was loaded down with anarchistic literature of all kinds, with editorials from the pro-German press, and with speeches of a pacifist senator."—Senator MILES POINDEXTER.

"Two auxiliary weapons has Germany employed for the attainment of her diabolical aims—bribery and socialism. The

first was too crude for enlightened nations, but it was employed with complete success in the Czar's Russia. Any one who has lived in Petrograd can testify to that. But the second one she employed very cautiously and very deftly in all European countries, in America, and in 'free' Russia. She had to create the impression that the German socialists were pacifists, internationalists, anti-Kaiserites; and never, never would they permit the junkers to unsheathe the sword. It was necessary to foment—outside of Germany—a strong anti-war sentiment by preaching universal brotherhood and exposing the wickedness and uselessness of wars. And who could do this work better than a respectable German socialist? Of course, Scheidemann was selected—a well-known educated leader of the German socialists.

"It was Scheidemann who for years was preaching resistance to Junkerism in all lands, and while his country was secretly and feverishly preparing for war to the last button, he was lulling his foreign comrades to sleep by asserting that Germany would never dare to declare war, that the first rattle of the sword would be the signal

for a nation-wide strike in industrial Germany; that the Socialist party was so strong and so well-drilled that the Kaiser would not even dream of antagonizing it, and that it was the duty of every socialist and every radical to hinder as much as possible the warlike preparations in their respective countries. How well he succeeded is proved by the fact that not a single country, not even France, was fully prepared for the war. How great his influence was over the American socialists is clearly indicated by their infamous St. Louis manifesto, in which our entrance into the war on the side of the Allies is branded as 'the greatest crime in history.'"
—THEODORE ARISON.

The German socialists were, with few exceptions, Germans first, and served the war lords as long as they believed that a military victory or a compromise could be chieved.

CHAPTER VI

THE VALUE OF VICTORY

NEARLY thirty nations, the foremost of the world, have been at war, involving approximately a billion and a half of people. The armies alone numbered over forty millions of men. Presidents, kings, emperors, and sultans have striven, some for victory, others to save what they could from the ravage of disaster and defeat. Involved in the struggle and confusing it there were conflicts of colour, race, language, religion, politics, and class. On neither side were the issues clear-cut and without internal dissensions. The problems were everywhere blurred and complex. But though the details of them were difficult, if not impossible, for any man fully to comprehend—as we see by the errors that premiers and presidents made—

the attitude and goal of the United States ought to have been and to be so definite that they could not be misunderstood, either by ourselves and the Allies, or by our enemies. The object of America ought to have been to win the war decisively, and to form a league of peace-loving nations that will strive to prevent the ghastly inhumanity of future slaughters and to adjust and regulate as many as possible of the world's problems for the benefit and advancement of mankind.

That this is the nation's mission most Americans believe, and it is a heroic mission. None but a bold, strong, young, wealthy nation would have the daring to undertake with such certain confidence so altruistic a programme fraught with so many pitfalls. To the older nations, we are the inspiration and the hope for the attainment of this ideal, —which some of them have striven for before and failed to achieve.

Both our great political parties have committed themselves to tasks that are stupendous, and their views differ only as to methods

of attainment. The policy of one party, dominated by its single leader, is idealistic and theoretical, and for that reason seems to the other party unattainable and in danger of bringing the world harm rather than good. The policy of the other party is described by the first as reactionary, illiberal, and tending to a perpetuation of the same old order of international conditions that permitted the present war to develop. But though opinions differ as to the practical methods of progress and the value of President Wilson's policies, the country as a whole strode along in the struggle with magnificent assurance, willing to make any sacrifices for which the leaders should call. Cowardice was individual and infrequent; self-interest was under cover, afraid to show its mien; and the enemy in our midst was comforted and abetted only by pacifist and socialist elements which became more and more insignificant.

In one way or another we gave encouragement to the Allies to liberate Belgium, to deliver Alsace-Lorraine to France, to free the

Italian Irredenta, to recover Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania, to give to the Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary liberty or autonomy, to make the Polish people independent, to save Russia and reunite her several parts, and to destroy the rule of the massacring Turk over subject Christian races that he conquered seven centuries ago and has all but destroyed. These things were impossible for the Allies to accomplish alone. They had not sufficient power to overcome the advantageous position which the Germans had attained. Nor had the United States alone sufficient strength to undo the German victories. But together we saw the light of a new day and became united in bloodshed and sacrifice and in one great desire.

There was no alternative. The Allies had tampered with the Germans and so had we, but they remained implacable. The issue had come clearly to be one of victory or defeat. Compromise was a narrow line, too dangerous to take chances with. It would have been better to prolong the war for as

many years as proved necessary to make victory certain, in order, as far as possible, to terminate intrigue and secret diplomacy, as well as competitive armament.

There were men in this country who saw danger in an allied victory. So blinded are they by the motes in American and British eyes that they could not see the bludgeon that was being swung over our heads. According to their ideas the Allies and America are not to be trusted to administer international justice, and a victorious Britain would only take the imperialist place to which Germany aspires. Ignorance or prejudice is the basis of these assertions of warped minds. British statesmen for many years have been willing to enter an Anglo-American confederation on equal terms and British interests both on the Atlantic and Pacific are identical with those of the United States, while British ideals are similar. The democratic colonies of Australia, Canada, and South Africa are factors of further influence. Only trade rivalries exist between

us, and these exist between city and city in this Union and between merchant and merchant in the same city. If war is to continue for the sake of extended commerce there can be no hope that it will ever end.

Germany having been brought to safe terms, some, but by no means all, of the questions that now exist as causes of war can be peaceably adjusted. But action is necessary, international action, co-operation with other states, and an end of squeamish consideration for the rights of backward peoples—whose present condition and hopes of future democracy are often greatly enhanced by foreign control. It will be necessary to trust ourselves and the Allies and go ahead. With the elimination of Russia, and with Italy and France depending for their safety on Britain and the United States, the war came to be a struggle primarily between the Teutons and the Anglo-Saxon peoples for the supremacy of their respective ideas and ideals.

If the league of nations is formed, or even if the present *Entente* (with America) is

maintained, and if President Wilson will see that this country plays the international part that lies before it, many things can be accomplished. The Balkan frontiers can be redrawn on fairly equitable ethnological lines and a confederation promoted among the states whose hostilities have hitherto been encouraged by Austria-Hungary and the Russia of the Czar. The remnants of the subject races of the Turks, which they have massacred for centuries, can be delivered from them and in one way or another protected. These tasks are difficult but by no means impossible of a measure of solution if we are wise and willing to take our part and do our duty in adjusting world problems. Russia can be given the vast assistance and support necessary for developing a new government, and untrammelled outlets to the sea can be secured for her. China can be protected and resuscitated. These are a few of the things that can be done by co-operation with the present Allies. President Wilson is giving the country high inspiration to perform

such new and noble things, which came to be the nation's object in the war; but there is a far gap between programme and achievement. We know that the President can outlive idealistic policies, but hitherto he has been slow in action, and some of his achievements have been thrust upon him.

The great hope of the world lies undoubtedly in the formation of a league of nations with the English-speaking countries and colonies as a nucleus. Compromise might have meant militarism on a more gigantic scale than we have yet known, with probably three factors, the German, the Anglo-American, and the Asiatic, competing in armaments and intriguing against each other. It will be indeed a misfortune if the war fails to complete and perpetuate what it has already brought about in part, a league of the Allies and the United States. To such a league the other nations will be glad sooner or later to adhere.

CHAPTER VII

INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA

"No party in Russia and no class is capable of establishing anything that will endure. Order must be re-established by force, firm and energetic but friendly and humane force, which will open to the Russians the possibility of again finding themselves."— From a Czecho-Slovak memorandum to Japan and the other Allies. According to a Tokyo dispatch, July 10th.

THE programme of the Allies and the United States should be not only to secure the military protection of the states east of Central Europe but to bring about their reconstruction. The reconstruction of states like Serbia and Rumania can be accomplished with money; the rest can be left to those countries themselves, their institutions being

substantially democratic, their statesmen capable, and their problems comparatively simple. But the reconstruction of Russia—whose wretched bureaucracy cannot be permitted to revive, whose anarchistic régime must be terminated, and whose problems are as wide and variegated as the Empire itself, like the reshaping of the Turkish Empire, is distinctly a matter for the Allies and this country to undertake as an international programme, employing whatever military force is necessary.

Having made it our high purpose in the war to right wrongs in many countries, the United States will stop short of great opportunities if we withdraw from international activities. We plan to participate in establishing a league of nations; but even that is not enough. We should not lose a chance to terminate a permanent cause of war; and one of the greatest future causes of war, if intervention is not developed seriously, will probably lie in that vast nation containing so many illiterate peasants who sought universal peace

but, instead, prolonged the world war and brought anarchy upon themselves.

An old Chinese proverb, accredited I believe to Confucius, says: "Reading without thinking is useless; thinking without reading is dangerous." The war has taught us that force without proper ideals is dangerous, and also that ideals without force are useless.

The problem of Russia is first to liberate her from the Bolsheviki and then to assist her in reorganization, imposing it upon her if necessary. Many Americans, including President Wilson, have seen danger in intervention by the Allies in Russia. There are dangers, of course, but they are dangers of detail and not main issues. The Allies have entered to liberate and organize and not to destroy, plunder, exploit, and subject. There is no danger of Britain, France, Italy, or the United States permanently occupying or annexing Russian territory. The only interest or desire of these nations is to aid the Russians in establishing as quickly as

possible a capable government of their own. Nor is there any danger—if the United States recognizes the situation and plays the international part to which she is called—of Japan annexing any Russian territory.

The question of Japan entering Siberia and the negotiations which took place over this subject between the United States, Japan, and the British and French governments seem to me to carry several important lessons. Soon after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the French and British governments decided that it was imperative to get the Japanese to enter Siberia and penetrate as far as possible into Asiatic Russia, saving as much of that country as they could from the Germans, drawing off a certain number of German troops from the Western Front, and giving support to as many Russian elements as would rally to combat German domination.

The allied governments did not know at that time whether President Wilson would send the American army to France and Italy

in force or whether that army, hurriedly trained and disciplined and only partially equipped, would be very effective. Nor did they know whether it could be successfully transported. On the other hand, the Japanese were in a position to dispatch two million soldiers to Siberia.

The Japanese Government agreed with the Allies to send a large army into Siberia; but subsequently, on learning that President Wilson would not approve of their doing this, they withheld their forces, not wishing to deepen the distrust of their motives that already existed in the United States. Such suspicion and the criticism that would find expression in the American press and in diplomatic circles would, of course, injure the cause of the Allies and benefit Germany. President Wilson was in a position to deprive the Allies at a critical time of an effective force and his influence was so used.

Whether the President was wrong and the Allies right or whether the contrary was the case is not the point I want to raise; my

point is the grave error in this country's remaining outside the councils of the Allies. The President's independence of the Allies in the matter of counsel has seemed not only unwise but at variance with the principle of the league of nations which he has ardently espoused. He advocated understanding and co-operation; but he was reluctant in well-known instances to co-operate with other governments and unwilling to heed advice from other statesmen in this country. This matter of intervention in Russia was a case in point, as was also our entrance into the war.

The President would probably have had his way in the allied council as well as out of it; so that his unfortunate undoing in public of an important decision of the Allies need not have occurred. Had we been in close counsel with the other nations fighting Germany, the worst that could have happened is that the Allies would not have requested Japan to take action. An international council for the determination of

diplomatic policies and higher strategy might have been as vital to the winning of the war —and might still be as vital in the settlement of European problems—as military co-operation on the long Western Front. Incidentally, it is worthy of note that in replying to the German request for an armistice the President first consulted the allied governments of France, Britain, and Italy before making his reply of October 8, 1918; and on November 15th, Mr. Lansing first asked the German Government to address their pleas for food and a moderation of the armistice to all the Allies. And it is worthy of note also, that the Senate, evidently desiring to influence the President's decision, let him know by a discussion its opinion of the German proposal. The Senate is the treaty-making body and Congress alone may declare war, but both war and peace may be brought about by the President, whose prestige in foreign relations (no matter who holds the office) is almost the controlling factor in determining the nation's conduct.

President Wilson is holding the country to high principles and a noble mission in the programme that he is interpreting for us. But where another leader would surround himself with recognized authorities, the President seeks his advice from men of his own choosing who are very often not authorities. He sat for a long period during the war, in effect as supreme judge, able to confirm or oppose many of the important decisions of the allied council. The President demanded and received an extraordinary assignment of authority from Congress; and he gathered about him a small group of men whose advice he was at liberty to take or reject as he saw fit. Last spring the situation was such that he could have brought about a compromise with Germany. Had he taken a stand for peace by negotiation, as one of the labour parties in England and many of the Socialists in Italy and France were doing, it is difficult to see how the Allies could have continued the war. This, however, would have been difficult for him to do later, because of the

radical change in the military aspect of the situation. It was said by the Bulgarian Minister to Washington that the withdrawal of his country from the war was due largely to the principles of justice for enemy and ally alike enunciated by President Wilson; but on the other hand, the entry of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers was due in part, undoubtedly, to the belief in 1915 that President Wilson would permanently keep the United States out of the war. Is it reasonable to expect that an effective league to enforce peace can be one of the results of the forthcoming Peace Conference, if the other members of the league can look forward to only that sort of co-operation on the part of the United States which that country has exhibited towards the Entente Allies for two years past?

In the first years of the war, our hostility to Germany was seriously tempered by two conditions prevailing on the allied side—the despotism in Russia and the aggressive char-

acter of Japan. We breathed with moral relief when the Czar's government was overthrown; but when the proposal came that Japan be requested to send troops into Siberia the cry was raised throughout the United States that once having entered the Japanese would never withdraw. With some men the opinion seemed to prevail that we had better compromise the war with Germany than let Japan annex any portion of Siberia.

But Siberia is not Russia. The Germans could have been the doom of the northern Slavs, subjecting more than 175,000,000 of them, while the vastest dream of the Japanese could extend no further westward than Lake Baikal, which would give them control only over the eastern section of Siberia, containing a population of about three million Russian subjects, many if not most of them being Asiatics and not Russian settlers.

It was argued that once a yellow race was drawn into Russia the Russians would go over *en masse* to the side of the Germans, their real enemies. This opinion was based

largely on the belief that the attitude of the Russian was the same as that of the American toward Asiatic people. But the Russians do not regard other races with the contempt that we do. In fact, the Siberian governments, when they began to overthrow the Bolshevik freebooters, appealed to the Japanese Government for assistance. Moreover the Russians ought to be able eventually to drive the Japanese out of Siberia if they should attempt to remain there.

After more than six months of effort on the part of British and French officials, as well as many Americans, to persuade President Wilson to take their view, the President came to an arrangement not with the Allies but with Japan alone, attempting to restrict the Japanese forces, like our own, to a few thousand men. The following communication was issued on August 3, 1918, by the State Department.

"In the judgment of the Government of the United States—a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching con-

siderations of the whole situation—military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia, rather than help her out of her distresses. Such military intervention as has been frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would, in its judgment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own or to feed their own men, women, and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, the resolute and confident purpose, of winning on the Western Front, and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

"As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances,

therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence.

"With such objects in view, the Government of the United States is now co-operating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighbourhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only Powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two

Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok, and in safeguarding, so far as it may, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented.

"In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavours to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.

"These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been

communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war.

"It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labour advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks.

"It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the governments with which it is associated will, wherever necessary or possible, lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans."

A part of the comment of the *New York Times'* Washington correspondent, who transmitted the foregoing statement, is of some interest, although the situation has changed considerably since it was written on August 3d.

"It is fairly apparent from the formal statement, which, although issued in the name of the Acting Secretary of State, is understood to have been written by President Wilson, that Great Britain and France feel that the plan is not sufficiently comprehensive. In Washington official circles, however, the contention is adhered to that if the Allies send any large force of troops into Russian territory the Russian people might show their resentment by turning to the Germans and asking their help to expel the allied forces.

"Limiting membership of the commis-

sion to Americans is likewise certain to prove disappointing to leading men of other allied nations interested in the regeneration of Russia and the salvation of that country from Teutonic rule. It had been urged with great earnestness that the commission should be composed of distinguished citizens of all the allied nations, headed preferably by an American of the highest standing and one known to the Russian people.

"As it was clear that Theodore Roosevelt was better known to Russians than any other man in the allied nations, his name immediately came to the front in informal discussions of plans to help Russia, but it was agreed from the outset that there was no prospect of Colonel Roosevelt's selection. There had been reports that the commission would work in cooperation with American propagandists sent into Siberia and that the Red Cross would take part in the relief work which the plan contemplated, but the intention to send Young Men's Christian Association workers as members of the commission had not been suggested in public discussions of means for helping Russia. . . .

"In formulating his Russian policy the President has consulted mainly with Justice Louis D. Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court, and Colonel E. M. House of New York and Texas, his unofficial adviser on policies connected with the war and on most other matters of public importance. He has also had conferences on the Russian situation with the diplomatic representatives of allied nations and with emissaries of Russian groups and Czecho-Slovaks.

"After the Russian collapse, when Japan, with the concurrence of Great Britain and France, proposed to the United States that Japanese troops should be sent to Vladivostok to protect the interests of the allied nations, the President expressed dissent as to the wisdom of this policy, and the Japanese Government thereupon assumed the attitude that it did not care to make any further overtures and would wait until the Allies could agree among themselves as to what was the best course of procedure. At the same time Japan reserved the right to take measures for protecting her own interests if they were threatened from Siberian territory. Since

then no headway had been made by those anxious to bring about allied action to protect Russia from the Germans until the remarkable success of the Czecho-Slovaks in operations against former German and Austrian prisoners of war in Siberia attracted the attention of President Wilson and furnished the foundation for a move by the United States.

"Out of this Czecho-Slovak military progress has grown the plan announced by the State Department this evening. The President was anxious to avoid any course that would give ground for the charge that the United States or the other Allies contemplated the exploitation of Russia or had any selfish purpose in dealing with that stricken country. When it was apparent that the sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks were with the Russian people and that their only purpose in battling through Siberia against the former German and Austrian prisoners of war was to make their way to Vladivostok in order that they might find means of transportation to France and take their place in the fighting line, the President conceived his plan of using the Czecho-Slovaks as the

basis for a policy of clearing Siberia of Teutonic influences without in any way running counter to Russian opinion. Then began the conferences and study out of which was born the plan announced this evening.

"Japan and the United States will each send an equal force of soldiers to Vladivostok. The combined numbers of the two units will be much less than a division of United States troops. Great Britain is sending several hundred soldiers from Hong Kong, and France is sending a few companies of colonial troops from Cochin-China to Vladivostok. These will act independently of the combined Japanese-American force. The official statement issued tonight shows that Great Britain and France were left free to take whatever military measures they deemed best in connection with the Russian question.

"Whatever there may be of disappointment over the President's plan or of criticism of it, there is a hopeful feeling among those most interested that it marks a beginning of a policy of helping Russia which may develop into something more comprehensive. That it may lead ulti-

mately to trouble for Germany is conceded. Encouragement is found among those who wished for a larger policy in the last paragraph of the official statement. This is regarded as an invitation to Great Britain, France, and Italy to stand ready to be of aid should the plan be expanded."

Within a few weeks after the promulgation of the foregoing State Department communication the Sisson papers and a new State Department note to various European governments (printed in an earlier chapter) showed that the Administration had given up hope in the Bolsheviki establishing a government acceptable to the Russian people. (It had been obvious to most men at once that Bolshevik ideas were impracticable.) About the same time, press dispatches announced the participation of American with allied troops in the Murmansk region fighting against the Bolsheviki red guard. Evidently the President had at last come to the Allies' point of view that force as well as a process of mental healing was necessary to the situa-

tion. He had struggled in vain with notes to direct the Bolsheviki in the right way, as he had sought by the same means to purify the German Government. There is little doubt that, contrary to the President's view, the presence of allied and American forces in Russia would help to stabilize the country quickly, and instead of further reducing the existing supplies would enable the people, by making production and communication safe, to augment and increase the supply of necessities. Siberia is an unlimited storehouse of food, and great quantities of wool and leather are produced; and the presence of foreign troops ought to enable the Russians to get such necessities safely to their European provinces.

The official Japanese communication issued simultaneously with that of the State Department on August 3d is also of interest.

> "The Japanese Government, actuated by sentiments of sincere friendship toward the Russian people, have always entertained most sanguine hopes of the speedy

re-establishment of order in Russia and of the healthy, untrammelled development of her national life.

"Abundant proof, however, is now afforded that the Central European empires, taking advantage of the defenceless and chaotic condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country and are steadily extending their activities to Russia's eastern possessions. They have persistently interfered with the passage of Czecho-Slovak troops through Siberia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted, and they practically assume a position of command.

"The Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the co-belligerents, to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern.

"In the presence of the danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops actually are exposed in Siberia at the hands of the

Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the untoward course of events and a certain number of their troops already have been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok.

"The Government of the United States, equally sensible of the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for the early dispatch of troops to relieve the pressure weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces. The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desire of the American Government, have decided to proceed at once to make disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission, and a certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok.

"In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain constant in their desire to promote relations of enduring friendship and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated they will

immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military."

CHAPTER VIII

JAPAN AND CHINA AND THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

THOUGH the situation in Europe is the important and immediate problem requiring solution, there are, of course, a score of others that the Allies will be unable to undertake without our assistance, but which can be solved without great difficulty if the United States will now depart from the traditional policy of "no entangling alliances." It is a heroic mission to which we are called. No other nation is in a position of geographic location, power, prestige, and wealth to make possible the work of an international character that lies before the world. The condition of China is one of these important problems, and the solution of one phase of it

appears to be at hand ready for us to solve by a proclamation or a signature.

China is one of the many backward states whose condition is a constant source of war. Her potential wealth has enticed adventurers and traders from many nations to her shores and has caused many wars. On the route from the United States to her ports and rivers lies the island empire of Japan, producing some coal. Japan was a closed kingdom, denying to foreigners the right of entry, less than three quarters of a century ago. An American expedition of ten ships of war was sent to Tokyo Bay in 1853 and the Shogunate government was required, by tacit threat of force, to open several ports to American ships and traders. Other nations followed immediately, and within ten years Japanese sovereignty had been seriously impaired, several indemnities had been required of the country, and civil war had broken out as a result of the foreign "invasion." Being of a more practical nature than most Asiatic people, the Japanese saw that the European

and American warships that entered their harbours had to be met by similar warships. They saw, too (what most Asiatics do not see), that in order to maintain these expensive engines of defence an entire new system of government, development of resources, organization, and education was necessary. So they set about getting everything that was required in the way of knowledge. It is an interesting indication of their enterprising character that it was a Japanese who first sought out St. Francis Xavier and suggested to that pioneer missionary the bringing of Christianity to Japan.

In a little over a quarter of a century after Commodore Perry's appearance before Tokyo, a Japanese fleet entered one of the Korean harbours and summoned that hermit kingdom likewise to let down its barriers. Again, the European and the American traders, warships, and missionaries followed immediately, and soon Korea was a battleground for concessions, political influence, and privileges.

Japanese prestige, of course, was foremost

in Korea, as they meant it to be. The Japanese realized that their semi-barren rocky islands did not contain the latent wealth necessary to enable them to maintain fleets of battleships and armies of sufficient size to oppose the aggressive white Powers; so they determined to create for themselves that which made the other nations wealthy —empire. Britain, France, and Russia were bringing their empires to her very door, and America was later so to do; and those white nations had exacted greater privileges for their own people sojourning in Japan than the Japanese enjoyed, while at the same time they restricted the privileges of Japanese visiting their countries.

The Japanese regarded the Chinese with contempt because of their disregard of their own rights. The contempt was reciprocated until the war of 1894 brought China to terms in about as many days as it took the modern trained Japanese soldiers to march across Korea and enter Manchuria.

China was required to surrender the im-

portant island of Formosa, to lease the peninsula of Liaotung to Japan, and to renounce her claim of sovereignty over Korea. But before Japan was able to annex the latter country and occupy the leased Manchurian territory she was required to fight a greater adversary, Russia.

In order to make her position secure, so that she might undertake to stop the encroachments of the Czar's armies in her direction, Japan deemed it advisable to enter into alliance with one of the rival Powers of Europe, and found Great Britain ready to accept the proposal. The preamble of the original Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Korea as well as China, but in the renewals of the treaty various modifications were made, one eliminating the pledge regarding Korea. The clause providing for the protection of China still stands, but the Japanese Government in 1915, the year after the war began, attempted secretly (which is in contravention of the

Alliance) to encroach seriously to their own advantage upon the independence of China. Japan had entered the European war and had captured the German leased territory and fortress of Kiaochow, and the temptation was too great for her to resist to take control in China before the European Powers were again in a position to interfere. But publicity in the American and European press caused her government to withdraw the most serious of their twenty-one demands.

Later in the war, after the Dardanelles proved impregnable and Bulgaria closed the last hope of the Allies to reach Russia across Europe, Japan became one of the first sources of supply for Russia; and Britain and France found themselves unable to deny to Japan the recognition of her "special position" in China. Subsequently the American Government also recognized this "position," at the same time obtaining from the Japanese a renewal of their frequently repeated declaration respecting the independence and integrity of China.

The people of Japan do not seem to have been satisfied with the Tarauchi government's renewed pledge contained in the Lansing-Ishii agreement nor with that government's programme of entering Siberia without requiring what is called in diplomatic language "compensation." Those were among the principles that caused the fall of Count Tarauchi's government from office in September (1918). A government may make such pledges but a country may not live up to them.

The temptation that China offers to Japan is almost irresistible. The Japanese are a people of great pride who resent the superior attitude which the white races assume, but they have not the wealth or power to exact equal rights for themselves throughout the world. In China lies their opportunity. In a score of years the Japanese could so organize China that the wealth they would derive would make them one of the three or four really great Powers of the world. China's man power would make soldiers; and her

mines, farms, and industry, now barely active, would make wealth for both China and Japan. There are between three and four hundred million Chinese and they can live and raise families on a wage of ten cents a day.

What is the solution to this problem that may within a generation shake the world? The immediate solution of the day, not that of the future, lies in an agreement with Britain. The interests of Britain are the same as those of the United States in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic. Her policy regarding China has always been for the preservation of that country's sovereignty and the prevention of aggression there. Her interest and desire is to maintain the Open Door and free and equal rights for all nations to trade in China. Around the Pacific Ocean her colonies are spread—Canada, Australia, New Zealand—and many of her dependencies. Her position will be menaced and rival armaments will be continued if the Japanese become masters of

China. They are still a long way from it, but the temptation is there, the encroachments are relentless, and spirit is moving Japan.

In the formation of the league of nations, the interests of America, Britain, France (possessing Indo-China), and China herself will be united and Japan will be protected from the temptation that now constantly lures her. Her statesmen, the best of them, are now saying that they will welcome the new order of justice that may be set up in place of what has hitherto prevailed—a system of competing nations seeking rival power and wealth. The Japanese have learned and played the old game as ably as the most grasping nation; and they will also prove themselves capable of playing the new and more generous game which a union of Britain and America can establish. The history of the Japanese would indicate that—though they have transgressed the laws of fair dealing, as all other nations have done at times—they would be among the most

trustworthy members of such a league as President Wilson proposes.

Since the year 1900, it has been the policy of the United States to give diplomatic support to China in maintaining her integrity; but both our Republican and Democratic administrations have deliberately avoided any pledges or agreements that might lead us to war in China's defence. The Root-Takahira and the Lansing-Ishii agreements are not binding treaties, not having been ratified by the Senate, and their wording tacitly disavows the intention of employing force. On the other hand, Britain's alliance with Japan provides for war if necessary. Britain, however, might be unable to protect China if her own partner in the agreement were the nation seeking to break the purpose of the alliance; but if the United States were also a pledged party to the preservation of China's independence this problem of the Pacific would be solved.

In the capacity of Associated Press correspondent located in Peking for a number of

years, I have repeatedly had to report to the press of this country Japanese aggressions, and I have always regretted to do so. I hated to see the Hearst papers and the Germans in the United States making capital out of this Eastern situation. In their effort to keep America out of the war, they constantly dragged the Japanese herring across the German trail. I have never ceased to feel that Japan's determination to secure and protect her position in the Far East was largely justified and was not different except in method from what the United States would do if situated geographically and restricted politically in the same way that Japan is. But my attitude has been unusual; most Americans located in China, including officials, have been hostile to Japan. (This, incidentally, is a condition that is found in every foreign country. The average American sympathizes with the people amongst whom he lives, and advocates their political causes. I have observed this attitude in Turkey, Bulgaria, England, France, and

Germany, as well as in the Extreme Orient. Those Americans residing in Japan are generally friends of the Japanese.)

A year ago, Americans who sympathize with China and condone her failings were wont to say the menace that Japan pretended to foresee did not exist. Later, those more reasonable partisans who understood the situation in Europe and Asia, perceived the danger of Germany spreading eastward. The American Government officially recognized this menace in a document which is reprinted in a later chapter of this book. The Japanese could not know until recent months that America was going to see the Allies through the war to victory; and they do not know now whether the league of nations will be formed and will displace by a new system the old one of armament and competition for wealth. The German menace to Siberia and to China gave the Japanese excuse for negotiating a secret treaty with the Peking government in the spring of this year, said to provide for the protection of

Manchuria from possible German aggression. All such treaties are dangerous to the independence of China and to the future peace of the world.

CHAPTER IX

THE BACKWARD STATE[1]

"A truly democratic government in America will help to organize the Chinese only as the Chinese request credit, expert guidance, and economic and educational assistance. But the actual organization which a liberal America or Britain would accomplish in China in ten years the German militaristic régime would probably do in two or three years."—FRANK BOHN, August 5, 1918.

THE International Consortium recently operating in China became a noteworthy

[1] This chapter was not originally a part of the book. I have decided to put it into the volume, however, because it demonstrates in concrete form the difficulties involved in one of the world's most important problems, and at the same time serves as a specific example of an effort at international control, for the purpose of lessening the danger of war.

example of an effort to internationalize government loans and concessions in a country where uncontrolled competition threatened the welfare of that country and endangered the continuance of peace between the Powers. The example is worthy of serious consideration because such governments as that of China are a source of injury and injustice to their own people and constant danger to international peace. To show the danger that lies in such states it is necessary only to give the names of the foremost of them: China, Turkey, and Persia. A general statement can be made which is applicable to each, showing how conditions in them provoke war.

In none of those backward states is the government sufficiently stable to preserve itself in power against rebellion or to protect the country from foreign aggression without other foreign assistance. It is the constant policy, therefore, of the government in power, to seek foreign support or protection in one way or another, and it is frequently the policy

of the opponents of the existing government, often armed rebels, likewise to seek foreign assistance in order to overthrow the men who hold the offices. Hitherto it has often been to the interest of one or more Powers to support the existing government while rival Powers have sometimes supported the opponents.

Foreign financiers and concessionaires, though they generally prefer plain business transactions, almost always find it necessary to involve themselves or permit themselves to be involved in politics either by the government of the backward country or by that of their own state. It has been almost invariable, for instance, that the Chinese Government in giving concessions or making loans to American financiers, has had a primary domestic or international political motive. Americans have, within the last three years, obtained from China concessions said to be on better terms than the Chinese have ever before granted; but the obvious purpose of the Chinese was to involve the United

States Government politically with other Powers. This example is given to show that even a country with a policy like that of the United States under President Wilson, and even concessionaires who seek entirely for unentangled business, are made to play political parts and do, consciously or unconsciously, accept those parts.

Once the seed of rivalry is sown, the fertilizer is poured upon it from various sides and it fructifies rapidly. The concessionaire wishes to make his profits, and, therefore, seeks the support of his government, while the concessionaires of rival countries in turn invoke the assistance of their governments (Britain, France, Russia, and Japan, in the case of the contract above cited) to prevent the consummation of a new concession that conflicts with concessions previously granted. The newspapers take up the question and the rival concessionaires, generally backed by their governments, lay their cases before their own national publics, and the nations take up the argument, each as a rule advocat-

ing the side of its own concessionaires. Yet the cause of those concessionaires or financiers may not be the right one. In the case of America, we have the infamous instance of the Hankow-Canton Concession, one of the most shameful episodes of concession mongering on record. There are also, of course, records of dishonourable dealings on the part of British, Russian, French, German, Belgian, Austrian, and Japanese concessionaires. No nation is free of unscrupulous men who can influence considerable capital.

The man with the simple solution to this problem of loans and concessions, says that none should be contracted, that backward nations should be left to work out their own salvation. Such a policy of withdrawal would not be satisfactory even if you could persuade all other nations to keep their capitalists away, for then you would divide the world into two groups, the progressive nations, that would continue to progress, and the backward ones that would sink deeper into disorder and ignorance. De-

velopment of enterprises and construction of railways, though accompanied at times by dishonesty and some bloodshed, have certainly promoted welfare and advancement throughout the world; and many financiers are, like men of other professions, highly honourable and sometimes even altruistic. But apart from this theoretical reasoning, it is impossible to keep even our own American promoters, financiers, and engineers away from the countries that need and want their services. It is, therefore, essential to find a means to control and regulate the danger, and terminate the system of free scrambling for concessions; and with this object in view it is worth studying the practical beginning that was made in China by the International Consortium.

The government officials of the backward state are sometimes corrupt and many of them are incapable of properly filling the offices which they hold. Men who are both capable and honest seldom attain high office. The principal business of office-holders (with

exceptions, of course) is to get rich and retain power. Their political opponents (likewise with exceptions) are the same sort of men. Those in office seek loans for the conduct of state affairs or for improvements, such as railway and steamship construction, mining enterprises, oil development, and so on. Those out of office raise money for purpose of rebellion, promising to reward their backers with concessions; and sometimes the government of one Power or group of Powers, whose interests are opposed by the authorities in the backward state, find it expedient to give assistance or cause assistance to be given to the rebel party. And this is often the right thing to do.

A notable instance is the case of Mehemet Ali of Egypt, who, with the sympathy, if no more, of France, practically freed Egypt from Turkish rule and then almost conquered Turkey, which was saved only by the actual intervention of the Powers, nearly causing a general war. British aid through Gordon to the Chinese Government in the Taiping

rebellion, and events in Mexico (both the French intervention which put Maximilian on the throne followed by the threat of the United States after our Civil War, and the recent course of the Wilson Administration in that country) are other instances. The Allies are now, properly and with good purpose, supporting a faction in Russia.

It is not always the case that the officials of the backward state demand and receive bribes from the foreigners for granting concessions or making loans. In China they generally do not. But the Chinese official, nevertheless, obtains his "squeeze" in one of the dozen recognized ways. Money is borrowed by a backward government to construct a railway of, say, five hundred miles, but after all the money is spent there may be only forty miles of roadway and very little rolling stock. A score of millions are borrowed for the purpose of stabilizing currency, but the money goes and the currency remains unsound. Yet the government (probably a new one composed of men who

were not in office when the first loan was made) applies for another loan in order to complete the railway or renew the attempt to reform the currency; and these men assert, of course, that they are not like their predecessors. Rebels always claim to be righteous and capable.

It will be seen, therefore, that if the railway, or whatever it may be, is to stand as security for the loan, it is essential that the foreign capitalists who supply the money shall superintend the construction and control the line until the debt is repaid, or if the loan be for currency reform, that they must supervise the reformation. And it is also essential that the capitalists have the support of their own government, otherwise the loan may be repudiated by a new government in the backward state or a parallel railway line may be constructed. The Chinese have threatened but have never repudiated a foreign loan, though it is a common practice to grant conflicting concessions to financiers of rival Powers.

It will be seen how essential it is under such conditions to control the granting of concessions and the making of loans to nations that have unstable governments with more or less unstable policies both internal and foreign. It is fantastic and impracticable to regard such states, whose integrity is already in each case seriously impaired or threatened, as free and independent and deserving of equal loan and concession privileges,—as Mr. Morgan Shuster arbitrarily regarded Persia, and President Wilson and Mr. Bryan formerly regarded China. Loans freely made to any government or governments in a backward state will bankrupt that state in the course of time; and loans will always be made, even if the bankers do not offer them of their own free will, through the Power or Powers seeking, for political motives of their own or as protection from the political motives of others, to control or influence the backward state. It has been to the interest of both France and Germany to finance and get

control in Morocco; to the interest of Britain, France, and Germany to finance Turkey; and to the interest of several Powers, including the United States and Japan (though this is difficult for Japan), to finance and control China; and so on.

The aggressive nation offers the money in return for strategic privileges, coaling stations, authority over arsenals, or some other important arrangement; whereupon it is immediately necessary for the rival Power or Powers, whose object may be to preserve the independence of the backward state, to prevent the aggressive design; and in order to do this without movement of warships or troops it is necessary to grant the loan desired. Bankers are asked to make the advances, which they will do only, as a rule, if repayment is guaranteed by the Power or Powers.

In China a system of spheres of influence was developed twenty-five or more years ago in order to lessen the danger of war between the Powers, but the scheme seemed

definitely to mark out the territory for annexation, and promptly led to military and naval encroachments and war. The attention of the Chinese was drawn to the latent wealth of their country and the Boxer rising resulted, the object, which failed, being to drive the foreigners out. Four years later (1904), the Russo-Japanese War resulted from the most aggressive form that concession hunting had taken in the Far East.

Sometime after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, banking groups of the three leading lending nations, Britain, France, and Germany, came to an agreement pledging themselves in future to make no loans to China and accept no concessions from her except jointly, each national group obtaining a one-third share of all such transactions. The governments, realizing the dangers of uncontrolled competition, agreed to discourage all loans and concessions sought by capitalists outside the Consortium. Had the governments not sanctioned the agreement and had they refused to aid in its operation,

independent German, French, and British competition would have nullified its purpose and effect, and China would have continued on the downward road, paying constantly increasing rates of interest on bonds constantly deteriorating in value, till, as in Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, and Persia, bankruptcy resulted. And concessions would have been obtained from her on the same scale as formerly, many being with political objects or supported of necessity by Powers that had to be ready to employ force against the political objects of others.

The principles were adopted of making loans only for specific purposes and of supervising the expenditure of those loans so that they should not be applied by the Chinese to other purposes than those for which the sums were borrowed. The notorious case of appropriations for the Chinese navy being spent on a summer palace with a lake and a marble boat for the Empress Dowager, is an indication of what would happen if the expenditures were not supervised by foreign-

ers. Money was to be loaned for practical developments, improvements, legitimate expenses, reforms, and reorganization, not for political or party purposes or for ambitious schemes of no practical value, such as a vast army, which China is in no position to maintain or control. Opportunity for large personal plunder on the part of officials —this being one of the primary purposes for which an army is maintained in China—was to be eliminated as far as the Consortium could do so.

But the Consortium would never be able to control all the banks or include all the governments in the world, so the Chinese could always borrow small sums at higher rates of interest from independent financiers who would not insist on control, such bankers not caring what the officials did with the money.

It is important as well as interesting to note that China has never had a budget, and has never maintained a record of her actual income or expenditures, and that, of the

important institutions of the government, only those controlled by foreigners keep accurate records. One reason for this is the sheer inability of the Chinese to keep systematic accounts for large amounts—they have no trained accountants; and another is that the accounts make possible the discovery of officials who follow the centuries-old custom of personal appropriations. There are no effective laws or system of courts and police in the country to punish such officials, who, when put in prison, are put there, as a rule, only because their political adversaries are in power. The Chinese Government bank is unsafe for ordinary deposits; the Chinese officials themselves place their deposits in the foreign banks established in Peking and the Treaty Ports, depositing in the government bank only such funds as they are willing to risk sacrificing for the pretence of trusting that institution.

When the Consortium made contracts for the construction of railways, the railways were to be owned by China but were to stand

as security; naturally, therefore, it was necessary to see that they were constructed and properly operated till the loans were paid off. When loans were made for purposes which afforded no tangible holding as security —such as for the payment of troops and for currency reform—it was necessary to obtain as security the hypothecation of definite revenues. But unless the revenues were controlled by foreigners there was danger of the security dwindling away. It was necessary, for this reason, and also highly advisable for the benefit of the Chinese as well as the foreign bond holders, that a foreigner should be put in control of the securities. In the case of the Consortium, which was under constant and severe criticism, this supervision was performed with the utmost consideration for the Chinese, even at times with laxity and ineffectiveness. As an outside, independent observer with no intrinsic interest or reason for sympathizing with either side, and desiring only to see the Chinese people benefited and the danger of

war terminated, I personally offered frequent advice to the Chinese to accept the Consortium, and to the legations and bankers to insist on more serious and fuller control.

It seems to me necessary to subject China to a period of international tutelage; otherwise she may be conquered and subjected by a single Power or divided between two or more. The process is already at work. In the past twenty years she has practically lost all of her so-called dependencies; has submitted to grave encroachments within the provinces of China proper; has suffered the contest of three foreign wars on her soil; has been through three major revolutions, and is at present in the throes of another; and has suffered serious encroachments on her internal general sovereignty. Foreign troops are established in her principal cities and guard one of her state railways and several foreign-owned railways; and foreign gunboats patrol the upper reaches of the Yang-tse-kiang, six days' journey from that river's mouth. American troops and Ameri-

can gunboats participate—and properly, and for the benefit of China—in this infringement of her sovereignty.

At the request of Secretary Knox, during the Taft administration, "The American Group" of banks was formed; and an old promise on the part of a Chinese official to give certain railway concessions to Americans was revived, and subsequently a loan was made. The primary object was not business but politics, the preservation of the integrity and independence of China, and the "open door." The business to be obtained had not been sufficient to attract any large American group hitherto and it was now sought at Mr. Knox's special request and with the guarantee of the State Department's support.

It is of importance to note that the financing of China at the rate of five per cent. interest was on a European basis, which was considerably lower than the American standard; therefore, the loans in which the American Group participated were in themselves such that no other American bankers

—as time has proved—would or could undertake without considerable difficulty. As financial undertakings they were undesirable. The construction of railways on a percentage-above-cost basis was of course satisfactory, but here China was protected as she had never been before, by the legations, as, in a measure, supervisors of the contracts. The Powers were sponsors for the bankers they had selected, and recourse to the legations and beyond them to the Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, and other governments, and to publicity in the press (which has generally served the Chinese well), was always open to them.

I do not mean to contend that the scheme was entirely devoid of mercenary motives. It was not. The bankers naturally wanted their commissions, and some of them had an eye only for business. Accordingly, the British-French-German Consortium objected at first to the entry of the American Group into the field, but they saw that unless they shared their business the Americans could

seriously compete with them, and the American Group sought and obtained admission into the general Consortium, making it, in 1911, one of four Powers.

Secretary Knox, following the policy of John Hay, had previously proposed the internationalization of Manchurian railways, owned and controlled by Russia and Japan, but both these Powers had refused to pool their interests. Later, when the Chinese Government sought to obtain the so-called Reorganization Loan from the Four-Power Group, intending to spend part of the money in Manchuria, Japan and Russia obtained admission to the Consortium, which then included six Powers.

It is significant of the safeguarding value of such internationalization that these two aggressive countries, Japan and Russia, sufficiently respected the power and prestige of the Quadruple Group to refrain from opposing it, but, on the contrary, sought to become members of it.

The Consortium had now become highly

political and international, for Russia and Japan in 1912, even to a less degree than the United States, were not lending nations. France and Britain were the financiers of their respective allies, who were expected to borrow money from them in order to lend it to China. Thus, it is obvious, the whole project of financing China was lifted above the condition of secrecy and competition, both these dangerous features being obliterated from the activities of the Consortium. Secrecy among the governments and among the banks was impossible, and even secrecy from the press was out of the question with six groups of banks and seven governments knowing what was going on. It was always to the interest of one or more to make use of public opinion.

Of course the Chinese sought constantly to obtain independent loans free of such restrictions as the Consortium imposed. It was the purpose of the Consortium and the legations to insist upon supervision of expenditure over all sums China should in future

borrow. The Chinese were left at liberty to select their own foreign supervisors, who became Chinese employees, the only restriction being that the character and ability of the supervisors should meet with the approval of the banks and legations.

When the Reorganization Loan of $125,000,000 was made in 1912 for the purpose of disbanding the revolutionary army and reorganizing the new republican government, one of the Six Powers' conditions was that foreigners should control the expenditure in order, for one thing, to see that the soldiers were actually paid off and sent to their homes, and not dismissed without money and left to organize brigand bands, many such bands, some numbering thousands of men, having already taken to murder and plunder. Unfortunately, the supervision in this case was ineffective and the army is intact today, and the Chinese will have to get more money to pay it off.

Another requirement of the Consortium —and this is worthy of particular notice—

was that an expert should be appointed to the joint control, with a Chinese, of the Salt Gabelle—the revenue from that tax serving as security for the repayment of the loan. Sir Richard Dane, formerly an Indian government official, was recommended to the Chinese, who accepted him; and the Gabelle, disorganized by the revolutions, immediately began to assume a stable character. When the European War began and the European nations ceased lending money to China, the Gabelle proved to be the salvation of the Chinese Government, as the following amazing record will show. Prior to 1913, when the reorganization was begun, the Chinese Government had no records to show what its revenue was from this important tax, which in the following year became its first source of income. An English official estimated that the tax had once paid approximately $20,000,000 annually; a Japanese estimate put the highest annual income at $11,000,000. It dwindled to less than $5,000,000 during the revolutions (I give this figure from memory)

when most of the provinces withheld remittances from Peking.

Sir Richard Dane's success was due to his personal integrity, ability, and character. A less strong and experienced man would have been defeated by Chinese obstruction; but Sir Richard proved himself a loyal and able servant of the Chinese, willing to tolerate neither corruption in them nor unfairness to them on the part of the banks, some of which wished to read contracts always in their own favour.

He organized a Salt Police force; put a stop to much smuggling; created a sort of civil service making the positions of Chinese employees secure if they were loyal and honest, and insecure if otherwise; and, with the assistance of only a score of foreign supervisors, so reorganized the Gabelle that the net return to the government in 1915, the second year of his labours, after the entire expense of administration had been deducted, was nearly $40,000,000.

This sum was far more than what was

required for the security of the loan, and the Chinese Government was, as always, in serious need of funds. Not contemplating so rapid or large an increase in this revenue the Chinese had agreed to the holding of the surplus by the banks, for the payment of interest and amortization. The French bank wished to retain all, and the others had to consider doing likewise. Sir Richard, however, insisted that they hand over to the Chinese Government the surplus over the sums necessary for security, and they were unable to withstand the international pressure he was able to bring to bear. This is an instance of the value of international control of contracts made with a backward state.

Although evidence of the stabilizing influence of foreigners in high authority was not lacking, the Maritime Customs and the Post Office being noteworthy examples of long standing, Chinese officials persistently objected to the employment of other foreigners on the grounds of encroachment upon their independence. At the same time minor

English and American bankers denounced as unfair and discriminating the restriction to a few banks of the privilege of making loans to China. The British got over some of the hostility by expanding their Group and admitting a large number of British banks; the Germans obeyed their government's orders; the French Government prevented outside French loans by refusing to permit them to be listed on the Paris Bourse. This had also the effect of reducing Belgian and other loans to a minimum. But the propaganda of the Chinese and certain Americans in the United States had its effect in 1913 when the Democratic administration came into power and denounced the Consortium as an unfair and unjust limitation of the authority of an independent nation. The pledges given by Secretary Knox to the American Group were withdrawn, which made it impossible for that Group to keep its agreement with the other Groups, for other American banks were now to have the assistance and encouragement of the State Depart-

ment in making uncontrolled loans to China in competition with the Consortium.

The withdrawal of the American Group left the Consortium a Five-Power Group, which operated as such till the present war began. It was then no longer possible for the European nations to finance China, and the State Department under Mr. Lansing succeeded in finding no American group that would do so. The Chinese were, therefore, unable to obtain further large loans except from Japanese bankers, whose government, like other wise governments, participates in arranging or sanctioning the terms of these loans.

J. P. Morgan & Co., in June, 1918, were requested by the State Department to reconstruct an American Group, and they consented to do so after being promised protection and after the State Department agreed to the reconstruction of the Consortium.

The Consortium was a sincere effort on the part of a league of nations to support China and put her on a sound financial basis.

The scheme was the work of practical men who knew China and had worldly wisdom and experience, and several of them were men of fine scruples, and, what is more, high training in honesty. I knew most of them personally and several of them intimately. The Consortium's programme ought to have been proclaimed altruistic and along lines of international control by a league of nations; but the Occidental world was not then ripe for the acceptance of this principle. The governments concerned would have done well to make their policies publicly known by a measure of proper and dignified press agenting; but the Taft administration asked for support not on high moral principles but in order to maintain the Open Door, and on the ground of American trade requirements (which won little sympathy from the public in general, the average American caring little to support the promotion of foreign trade for the benefit of "Wall Street"); and almost the only other publicity the Consortium secured was from the pens and tongues of critics.

Most of the critics were Chinese, whose pride rebelled at being placed under further control and tutelage; some of them were Americans who know no better than to assume that all financial and diplomatic schemes must be evil; and some were mere promoters and jealous rival bankers.

The scheme had its faults. It is impossible to create any international programme that will be perfect and work exact justice to all nations and each man or group of men. The foremost, perhaps, of the flaws in the scheme was that it stifled free competition, which is a principle the trading nations and their merchants have set up. But the advantages to China and to the world far outweighed this injustice to those promoters and capitalists who were not included in the selected banking groups.

The original American Group included J. P. Morgan & Co., the National City Bank, the First National Bank, and Kuhn, Loeb, & Co. The new Group recently organized includes a much larger number of American

bankers, all who can legitimately be expected to compete for Chinese loans and who want to participate.

It was the political business of the Democratic party to win the election of 1912 by depicting Republican policies in bad colours, and the Democrats obtained from the Consortium's critics their information regarding the American Group, who had gone into China at the specific request of Secretary Knox, with the purpose of developing the international project and lending America's support to the protection of that country.

It is a recognized and proper privilege of one administration to undo the work of another when that work has been proved unsound, or when the new administration has been elected upon contrary principles; but in changing policies there are ways of diplomatic usage, of common courtesy and common sense, which in this case were totally ignored. The American Government had entered into agreements with six other

Powers, who had at least the right to be heard, even if the Taft Administration had entirely forfeited that consideration at the hands of the Democrats. At any rate, those other nations, even if not given the privilege of explaining their intentions and interests in China, ought certainly to have been given warning of the coming condemnation of their efforts. But the denunciation came without consultation and without notice, and from the President himself. This was in 1913.

A little over a year later a diplomatic note on the same general subject of the Far East was sent to one of the American embassies to be delivered to the government to which the embassy was accredited. (For obvious reasons I cannot give the embassy or the purport of the note.) The newly appointed Democratic ambassador, a business man of no diplomatic experience but of intelligence, took it upon himself to disobey instructions because of the undiplomatic phraseology of the note; and without informing the State Department, he suppressed it.

Mr. Bryan is gone, and has taken with him much of the discredit, which he did not alone deserve, for such crude and often dangerous diplomacy; and with experience the Administration has grown wiser and has reversed several of its policies, the international financing of China being one. The President should receive large credit for changing his mind and abandoning practices which did not advance the fulfilment of his generous purposes.

The following is the State Department communication issued on July 29, 1918, after the Administration had decided to revive the International Consortium:

> "China declared war against Germany very largely because of the action of the United States. Therefore this government has felt a special interest in the desire of China so to equip herself as to be of more specific assistance in the war against the Central Powers. Until the present time the engagements of the United States in preparing to exert effectively its strength

in the European theatre of war has operated to prevent specific constructive steps to help China realize her desires. Recently, however, this government felt that, because of the approach to Chinese territory of the scenes of disorder, a special effort should be made to place proper means at the disposal of China. Consequently, a number of American bankers, who had been interested in the past in making loans to China and who had had experience in the Orient, were called to Washington and asked to become interested in the matter. The bankers responded very promptly and an agreement has been reached between them and the Department of State which has the following salient features:

"First: The formation of a group of American bankers to make a loan or loans and to consist of representatives from different parts of the country;

"Second: An assurance on the part of the bankers that they will co-operate with the Government and follow the policies outlined by the Department of State;

"Third: Submission of the names of the banks who will compose the group

for the approval of the Department of State;

"Fourth: Submission of the terms and conditions of any loan or loans for approval by the Department of State;

"Fifth: Assurances that if the terms and conditions of the loan are accepted by this Government and by the Government to which the loan is made, in order to encourage and facilitate the free intercourse between American citizens and foreign states which is mutually advantageous the Government will be willing to aid in every way possible and to make prompt and vigorous representations, and to take every possible step to insure the execution of equitable contracts made in good faith by its citizens in foreign lands.

"It is hoped that the American Group will be associated with bankers of Great Britain, Japan, and France. Negotiations are now in progress between the Government of the United States and those governments which it is hoped will result in their co-operation and in the participation by the bankers of those countries in equal parts in any loan which may be made.

"Besides the war-like conditions which confront China on her northern and western borders, there is a further incentive to co-operate with all these governments, because the war has created a community of interest between them and their citizens and those of other governments and has broken down barriers which once have existed and has made easier the intercourse between them. It is hoped that if the project succeeds it will serve as an agency through which this community of interest and the consequent expansion of our mutual interests abroad may be adequately and properly expressed."

If, out of sentimental instead of practical consideration for the Chinese, and from a false idea of putting them on their mettle and treating them with the dignity of a fully independent state, the new Consortium loans to the present temporary Peking government large sums of money without effective foreign control, we are liable to do the Chinese people and their country serious injury.

Furthermore, if we do not take serious

measures to assist Russia in a hard practical way, we shall probably have in her another backward state added to the large number, or another group of small states, like the Balkans, menacing the peace of Europe, Asia, and America. This is another reason for an immediate beginning in Russia, and for the immediate formation of the league of nations with the substantial nucleus of the Allies.

CHAPTER X

THE END OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

"The principle of balanced powers, often thoughtlessly underestimated, is a cardinal influence in history and has played a great rôle in maintaining peace during long intervals, in which mankind has been able to advance in wealth, useful arts, and general civilization."—JOHN BATES CLARK.

WE are witnessing the end of a system that developed what was known as the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, two mighty rival military forces that amassed armaments such as the world has never before known. Hostile critics will go further and say that the system brought on the greatest war that the world has ever known, which, in a way, is true. The war was actually brought about by the ambition of a portion of one

group to destroy the balance, and was made possible by the failure of the other group to keep its armaments fully adequate for defence. When the Central Powers succeeded in amassing a preponderance of military, strategic, and political power they assaulted the rival group.

The power of the Central group is now destroyed, and the old system has given place for the time being to a project for a league of nations. We already have in the Allies a dominating league, which, influenced by the United States, will arrange the terms of peace. So we have seen the termination of a system, with many faults and shortcomings but which—be it said to its credit—maintained peace among the struggling Powers of Europe for forty-three years. From 1871 to 1914, no two great Powers engaged in war in Europe. Because the system prevailed, making it dangerous to break the peace, storm after storm was weathered and diplomatic settlements of controversies were achieved; in many wars the issues were localized; and many aggressions were prevented or limited.

Fortunate for the world was the fact that one Power long possessed a preponderating weight of forces and that that Power constantly restrained those that dominated on the Continent, being a nation without territorial interests or aspirations there. Britain was favourably situated on a group of islands apart from the mainland and had no important British populations inhabiting neighbouring mainland countries.[1] Britain was able to regard the problems of the Continent dispassionately (though to a less degree than we could do), her first interest being to maintain the peace there. This purpose she was repeatedly able to accomplish by placing the weight of her influence and menace on the side of a threatened weaker state or group of states.

It has been the policy of the French Re-

[1] The greatest difficulty in arranging the new frontiers in Europe lies in the fact that few nations on the Continent are self-contained, including all their respective populations within their own boundaries or potential boundaries. Overlapping exists everywhere and could not hitherto be adjusted, except in a few cases, without economic injury or political danger to one or more neighbours.

public, since 1871, to avoid and endeavour to prevent European wars; but this has been the policy of Britain for a much longer time. The navy and the geographical isolation of the latter enabled her to act as constable in Europe, repeatedly compelling opponents to seek solution of their differences by diplomacy rather than force. British statesmen were sometimes unable to prevent war or annexations of territory—as in the case of the Russo-Turkish and the Balkan wars, and in the annexations of Schleswig-Holstein and Bosnia and Herzegovina; and on occasions they were compelled to use, or at least to mobilize and threaten to use, force. Nevertheless they constantly refrained, since the taking of Gibraltar, from acquiring continental territory for their country. Only in backward countries has Britain acquired territory in modern times; and wherever she has done this she has carried better government to the people, many of whom she liberated from tyrants or from bad government of their own.

It is true of course that Britain's aggressions (like ours against the Indians, the Mexicans, and the Filipinos) were contrary to the principle of self-determination; but no man can contend that, for the present, regions like India and Egypt are not vastly better off under British rule, or that those countries would not lapse again immediately into conditions dangerous to themselves and to the peace of the world if Britain should withdraw. The life of the outcast in India and that of the "infidel" (non-Moslem) in Egypt has been made human and bearable under British rule. I do not believe that even the Boer farmers would choose again to reconstruct their republic if they had the opportunity, for the reorganization of South Africa was at least as quick and as liberal a piece of work as reconstruction in the Southern States after the Civil War.

British justice and generosity, in spite of its frequent shortcomings, is renowned among the peoples of the earth, be they white, black, or yellow. I know of no British or American

colony that I would like to see deserted by Britain or by this country; and in saying this I do not take into consideration our own interests but those of the natives of the colonies and the progress of mankind. Furthermore, I should like to see this country and Britain go further, take control with the other Allies of various other backward states, and impose a measure of administration upon them for the benefit of their peoples—as we both well know how to do. For I have seen the horrors of Turkish massacres, and the sufferings of interior China, where fathers kill and mothers sell their children because they are unable to raise them.

Britain and her policies have not been broadly understood in the United States. A false colour has frequently been put on them. We have often been inclined to criticize Britain unfairly, sometimes playing home politics by "twisting the lion's tail." Even at the late date of the present war some of the messages President Wilson caused to be sent to London were needlessly harsh,

couched in terms similar to those we sent to Berlin, though the offence of Britain was not the destruction of American lives but some trade delay or restriction that we have since seen we should have done well to let Britain impose.

The Persian question was an example of our failure to comprehend and sympathize with Britain in her difficulties. Russia, ten years ago, was aggressive in that wretched state, which was far less developed and organized than her own. British statesmen knew from experience and observation that the Persian Mohammedans and the Christians who live under them would be infinitely better off under the Czar's government than under that of the Shah, and they would not have opposed Russian aggression there (as they did, not five years later, when the Czar assumed a protectorate over Mongolia) except for the fact that Russia in Persia might be a grave danger to India. They had no wish to fight Russia over this minor cause, nor were they in any position to do so after the

German programme had become a menace. After the Russo-Japanese War, it was necessary for them immediately, as time has proved, to form an *entente* with Russia as well as with France. As the French and British had done, so the British and Russians came to agreements concerning their conflicting interests—one of which lay in Persia. Both countries pledged themselves to respect the independence of Persia; Russia retained an exclusive sphere of influence in the north and Britain one in the south, a neutral zone lying between. Of course the British knew that the Russian bureaucracy was not to be trusted and that they would aggress in spite of their pledge, but what could the British Government do? Could they risk losing the war against Germany by telling the Russian statesmen what they thought of them and saying they would not co-operate with them? It was Persia's business to take care of herself, as it is that of any nation, and she had not done so. All Britain could do was to adopt the best makeshift

she could devise without going to war with Russia.

The British Government never possessed the power to stand aloof and insist upon absolute justice, such as President Wilson now proposes, though there were many men —I think no fewer in Britain than here—who regretted they had not such power. British statesmen would have liked to right many world wrongs but could not do so without running the risk of creating wars which threatened to bring down the whole delicately balanced structure of European peace. They strove frequently to better conditions for the subject races of the Caliph at Constantinople. At the time of the Crimean War, waged for the purpose of preventing Russian advances in Turkey, they did what nations generally do, favoured their allies and sought to condone their crimes. In 1878 (at the Berlin Conference that followed the Russo-Turkish War and destroyed the San Stefano Treaty) the British saved a portion of European Turkey for the Sultan,

fearing that the Czar would displace him at Constantinople and endanger British control of the Mediterranean and ultimately her supremacy; but they began immediately thereafter, under the leadership of Gladstone, a campaign to bring Turkish crimes to an end. We are now witnessing the fulfilment of this policy that often flagged but never ceased.

A policy of settling every international problem on the principles of abstract justice would have entailed upon the British a constant succession of wars; and not only was Britain unable to assume such a burden, but so delicate and involved was her position throughout the world that her statesmen had to be very cautious in their criticisms of the behaviour of other states. They did not enjoy, as did America, a remote position of secure isolation which required not even the maintenance of a great navy and a first class diplomatic service. Our fleet was not always essential to our defence and we were ready to send to Berlin or to Tokyo at any time

ambassadors whose knowledge of history, to say nothing of international matters, was very scanty. Indeed, we could afford even in 1914, to have a Secretary of State who did not give his full time to the conduct of that office. But with Britain it was different. Many of her statesmen were no less high-minded than many of ours. Many would have liked to regulate the Congo, to blot out the crimes of the Turk, to adjust matters in South-Eastern Europe, and to protect states like China from aggression. But their position was not sufficiently secure and their power not sufficiently dominant. For a period covering nearly a decade I had occasion to watch and sometimes to work with British statesmen on just such problems as these, and I believe I know their minds. I like the old Bible proverb, "By their works ye shall know them." The work of British governments has not been perfect. We have the Opium War as a record of their worst behaviour in modern times (1839); but on the other hand, what nation has, on

the whole, given a greater measure of justice and more generous treatment to the world?

The British statesmen found it necessary constantly to compromise with those of other Powers. What would Britain have had to do in each of the backward countries above mentioned after defeating one or more of the Powers that opposed her? It would have been necessary for her to occupy and remain in control of each of those countries in order to prevent it from relapsing into disorders that provoke wars. In recent decades, since the menacing development of Russia's power and subsequently of Germany's, it has been necessary for British statesmen to follow at times a very makeshift diplomacy often compromising with injustice. They have had at times to defend the Turks and to aggress in China. The United States refused almost invariably to share any risks for purposes of settling European, Asiatic, or African problems. We were always ready to take up subscriptions for the relief of famines, cholera epidemics, and the like,

or to send missionaries to heathen and even to other Christian countries; but we left to Britain (which also did these charitable things) the work that armies had to perform; and we were often critical of her for employing force, though our own missionaries and merchants continually found refuge behind the British flag.

The British are more practical than we in foreign affairs. They have naturally acquired greater knowledge and experience and are not inclined to theorize so much and lay down doctrines of liberty and equality which cannot be put into force immediately. But a negro or a Chinese has long been able to count on fair treatment at the hands of the people of England. A lynching is unheard of there. The British are reluctant to talk of the equal rights of people where equality cannot be applied, and they know that the preaching of such doctrines to backward people is likely to increase discontent and encourage rebellion. How is it possible to apply such principles in countries like

Turkey, India, China, and the hundred other places where slavery exists, without entering those countries and depriving the ruling classes of the right of self-determination? All such peoples—if President Wilson could inaugurate plebiscites in order to determine their wishes—would vote overwhelmingly in opposition to any foreign control, for it is natural to people, whether ignorant or educated, to regard foreigners as a greater danger than leaders of their own nationality. But in many cases it would be wrong to withdraw such foreign control as exists or even to fail to extend international control at the present time.

With regard to the United States the policy of Britain has been, for a quarter of a century, to maintain friendly relations at almost any cost. She has striven to make it impossible that war between the two countries could occur. When President Cleveland sent his peremptory summons to London to keep hands off of Venezuela, the British received a shock which caused them subsequently to

court our friendship in a way they had not hitherto considered necessary. Apart from any friendship in the matter or any desire to maintain peace—both of which prevail with them—they realized that they could not engage again in war with this country, for, even if they succeeded in defending themselves upon the seas they would risk their empire and break up the balance of power in Europe.

In recent decades, our American administrations have generally found the British and French ready at once to enter into agreements of arbitration, understanding, and compromise; and it is common knowledge among American diplomatists who have been located in Paris and London that France and Britain would have gone further and signed more binding agreements with us than our State Department could, at any time in the past, have prevailed upon our Senate to ratify. "Of course," it may be said, "it has been to their interest to keep at peace with us." But it was not to Germany's interest;

and one good word that can be said for the diplomacy of that country is that the German Government persistently declined to engage in arbitration treaties, refusing both the Roosevelt and Bryan proposals, simple as each of them was, making reservations regarding The Hague programme, and avoiding agreements with Britain.

With the destruction of the balance of power, the position of Britain became comparatively dominant in Europe, though actually, because of her awful losses and heavy indebtedness, she is not so strong as at the beginning of the war. The most formidable nation is, of course, the United States.

CHAPTER XI

POLITICAL DESTRUCTION IN EUROPE

"We are now not only in the alliance with the greatest partnership of nations, but we are engaged in the greatest enterprise taxing the energies of mankind. All the suffering and all the great strain of our resources can be met only by the complete pooling of them. . . .

"The unity of the alliance is due to the realization that we are engaged in a great cause—fighting for justice against force, right against might. If we are merely going to restore by our victory the world to what it was before, then, I will not say this war has been fought in vain, but we shall have missed the greatest chance ever offered to a generation of men. . . .

"It is by conforming to and extending that partnership that we, perhaps, could show the way for a future organization of nations. I believe this to be the greatest opportunity

for statesmanship ever offered to mankind. It is our business not to falter. Let us proceed with the work. . . . Thus, perchance we shall and we have advanced some distance toward the great consummation of peace on earth and goodwill toward men."—LORD ROBERT CECIL, August 16, 1918.

WE see before us—as a result, first, of the German victories, then of those of the Allies—unparalleled political destruction. The Central Powers destroyed Russia, and the Allies in turn have destroyed Turkey and Austria-Hungary, and possibly Germany, which may likewise break up. The old system of balance of power has gone down at last and has taken with it much of the political organization which the Old World had constructed by a tedious piecemeal process. The destruction that has been wrought is terrific, and it is seriously to be doubted whether a stable order can be brought about promptly without a series of minor wars and rebellions. At the present time of writing, in November, 1918, Germany is still substantially intact, but

all of Europe lying east of her is taking on new political forms and is shifting into new frontiers. Numerous states promise to come out of the wreckage of Russia, a number out of Austria-Hungary, and several out of Turkey. A sort of Balkan condition is spreading from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf, but for several reasons the system threatens to be less secure than that of the former Balkan States. There will be monarchies, republics, and anarchical dictatorships like those in Russia. Disorganized economic conditions and the prevalence of famine in many regions will intensify the political chaos and may make the re-establishing of order more difficult.

If Germany were left by the Allies in the possession of military efficiency, this condition of affairs on her eastern border would prove profitable to her and would be regulated and organized to her advantage. But Germany will be crushed under a burden of war costs which will long weigh her down and may cause the break-up of that Empire.

The construction of a new state in Europe as a rule brings about a war, and sometimes a series of wars; but here we have a mass of states being organized under unprecedented conditions. The very names of them mean historic strife and contention, each state in itself having been the source, in part or exclusively, of one or more wars in the past: Finland, Esthonia, Lithuania, Courland, Poland, Ukrania, Moravia, Silesia, Bohemia, Austria, Hungary, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Armenia, Syria, Arabia, Turkey, Georgia, and others.

More than a score of new frontiers will have to be drawn. The labour is incalculable, the pitfalls innumerable. To reconcile the differences of views between many of the aspiring peoples will prove to be impossible except by force. With the probable exception of Norway, Sweden, Holland, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and one or two of the tiny states, every European border is to be readjusted. All the differences of race, reli-

gion, language, histories, geographical configuration, will have to be considered and rearranged by the five Powers that will dictate peace. Several Asiatic problems, including frontiers in China, will also have to be solved, as well as colonial questions in Africa and the Pacific archipelagoes.

Not only will the great Powers seek to protect themselves, but each small state will desire to obtain the greatest possible advantage. Each will endeavour to include within its new boundaries—unless the former spirit of peoples has been totally dissipated by the war—all of its own people in spite of the fact that its people overlap into other boundaries. Each group will desire an outlet to the sea, and in many cases the outlet can only be obtained across the territory of others. Each group will desire natural resources which others may consider their rightful belongings. Satisfactory natural boundaries will be required and can seldom be obtained without transgressing territory ethnographically belonging to others or without sacrific-

ing populations. Questions of creed will enter into the settlements.

International armies will be required to occupy for an indefinite period many of the new states and much European and Asiatic territory. They are already entering Russia, the Balkan States, Turkey, and Germany. The case of the allied entry into China in 1900 has been magnified a hundred times.

But, fortunately, there is not a corresponding proportion of increase in the danger that confronts the Allies, for amongst them at present there is no great conflict of interests or ideas. Five nations are going to arrange the terms of peace—Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan.

Seeing the situation in Europe and Asia in the light of the foregoing chapters and contemplating the grave and numerous dangers that now face the world as a result of the chaos in Europe, I have regretted to see America, under President Wilson, remain aloof from the councils of the Allies, where

complete unity is sorely needed. Men who have made it a business to study the problem of a league of nations realize the almost insurmountable difficulties of creating one; but they realize also that a league is almost the only hope of the world for bringing wars to an end, and for readjusting such a situation as we now see in Europe. We in America have been for some years the foremost advocates of a league, especially since Andrew Carnegie created the Endowment that bears his name. Yet now that we have in a practical way the reason, the incentive and the disposition, as we have never had these things before, to begin the organization of a league, we have up to the present failed to take advantage of the opportunity.

President Wilson is the arbiter in the matter and he has devised a more idealistic programme than that which is at hand. He gave as his reason for failing to consummate the league (in his speech of September 27th) that "it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a

common enemy." But those nations associated against Germany number over twenty, including the first in the world in power, advancement, and wealth. Such an aggregation is worth bringing together on any fairly honourable basis; and such a league could be formed in a day if the President would say the word.

President Wilson's programme for a league is one based on the purest idealism. No man can criticize it on the score of its abstract perfection. As outlined on September 27th it is this:

> "First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned;
>
> "Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;

"Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations;

"Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the league and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control;

"Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world."

It is unquestionably right to lay down such a programme as an ultimate goal, but to fail to take the great stride forward that we now have opportunity to take is to say the least, a mistake. America could not possibly have fulfilled her war programme without the full assistance of the Allies, and we could not reconstruct the world without their full assistance.

But fortunately, the league of nations is forming itself; and though we may not give our adherence to the Allies by pledge or written agreement, we are unlikely to withdraw our assistance and support in the work of bringing order out of the havoc that has been wrought. If this present *entente* among the Allies and ourselves continues to endure the war will not have been fought in vain, but if something more practical does not result there is danger that disintegration may develop, in which case the statesmen of this day will have lost a wonderful chance. By holding out for an ideal arrangement President Wilson may be letting the great opportunity pass.

The reconstruction of Europe will require men, arms, money, and time, and how much of each no man can say. The task may be too great for the Allies to accomplish alone. But standing apart from them, securely isolated, the United States retains supreme power and wealth, and, what is more, the spirit of desire to help the stricken nations

to rise again to a new and better order of things. This country is regarded in the most friendly light by most of the other nations of the world, who long for wise help from us. By many America is regarded as a great liberator. May the nation fulfil its splendid mission!


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