


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CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

CONDITIONS AMONG THE POLES

IN THE

UNITED STATES

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JOHN DEWEY

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CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF CONDITIONS AMONG THE POLES IN THE UNITED STATES

BY JOHN DEWEY

INTRODUCTION

Occasion of Report

I RECEIVED a telegram signed General Churchill on August 15, 1918, requesting me to come to Washington to place at the disposal of the Military Intelligence Bureau any information in my possession on conditions among the Poles in this country. At various conferences held on August 17 and some days of the ensuing week I met Captains Uterhart and Dalrymple and Lieutenant Horgan. During these conferences it appeared that the information which I had to report covered a variety of the branches of service and also a number of matters that fell primarily within the province of the State Department. Accordingly, Major Hunt asked me to make out a written report of the whole situation.

Two preliminary reports covering more urgent phases of the matter have been handed in, one on August 19, regarding the Detroit Convention, and another on August 23, on publicity for Polish affairs. It will be found necessary to traverse some of that material in the following report.

In preparing this report it has been necessary to choose between such condensation as might fail to bring out the significance of the material and restatement of historical and other facts which are already familiar as matter of record. In view of the diversity and complexity of interests concerned, it has seemed better to err, if at all, in the direction of undue explanation.

Sources of Information

Mr. Albert C. Barnes, of Philadelphia, spoke to me in New York City last April regarding the possibility of securing some well-trained post-graduate students from Columbia University to undertake a study during the summer months of conditions among an immigrant group in Philadelphia. The Poles were selected. The main object of the inquiry was to ascertain forces and conditions which operate against the development of a free and democratic life among the members of this group, to discover the influences which kept them under external oppression and control. To quote from a letter written by Mr. Barnes: "The idea would be to work out a practical plan, based upon first-hand knowledge, to eliminate forces alien to democratic internationalism and to promote American ideals in accordance with the principles announced by President Wilson in his various public communications." As to method, he emphasized simply the importance of competent scientific impartial inquiry. Neither then nor at any other time did Mr. Barnes give any instructions as to specific points to be investigated, much less as to any particular kind of results to be attained.

In accordance with his request the following persons were selected and after about a month's preliminary study on their part of conditions in Philadelphia the following assignment of topics made:

Mr. Brand Blanchard, religious conditions and the activity of the church; Miss Frances Bradshaw, educational conditions, including both public and parochial schools; Mrs. A. Levitas, conditions affecting family life and women; Mr. Irwin Edman began with a study of general intellectual, esthetic and neighborhood activities, but in connection with developments related below gradually diverted his energies to a study of conditions as affected by international politics. In May, Mr. Barnes asked me to act as adviser and general supervisor of the undertaking. The inquiry itself was set on foot on the fifteenth of May, 1918. In addition to the persons mentioned above one of whom, Mrs. Levitas, is

herself a Polish immigrant, persons were engaged both permanently and for stated periods to act as interpreters and translators. Other persons have been engaged in library research from time to time. All of the active investigators lived in a house in the Polish district during the study of the immigrants.

Quite early in the inquiry a number of facts were discovered which were blind and confusing. In spite of the unity among the Poles in support of the war, there were marked symptoms of strife and unrest which nothing on the surface accounted for. Briefly stated, we discovered much fear and intimidation in a certain part of the Polish population, much manipulation and exploitation in another part, together with much criticism of leaders whom they were nominally following with much enthusiasm. An attempt to get at and understand these conditions obliged us to extend our investigations to New York City and to Washington. What was there discovered necessitated an extension of the study to European and international conditions which were reflected upon this side. It will be understood that this extension was not originally contemplated and was entirely an outgrowth of local facts and events unexpectedly encountered.

During the course of the inquiry various members of the organization have talked with scores of Poles, including leaders and important persons of all factions so far as they were within geographical reach. Owing to the attempts spoken of below, which were largely successful, to represent the Progressive and Democratic party among the Poles as pro-German, the data used in the following report have been derived from the conservative or Paderewski-Smulski faction or confirmed from that source unless otherwise indicated. In studying the European situation we have relied as far as possible upon books and documents of an independent source and upon English, French and Swiss periodicals and newspapers. In dealing with the European side we have had to rely more upon the statements of the radical than of the conservative faction because of the admittedly greater learning of the former. Material from the radical source has, however, been used only where it was possible to check it up by independent documentary material.

The order of statement in the following Report reverses the course taken in our inquiries and discoveries. The Report begins with European conditions and then takes up American conditions as influenced thereby, and finally takes local, specific and immediate conditions among the Poles in America which have a bearing upon the disposition and morale of the Poles with respect to the war, in that they breed dissension and disturb the unity which is desirable for efficient prosecution of the war.

In brief, the European aspect of the matter is the record of a struggle which originated long before the war between a party of the Poles whose chief policies were monarchical, reactionary and clerical and a party which was radical, often revolutionary and socialistic, anticlerical and republican. As will appear below, neither of the parties is especially favorable to the cause of the Jews but the record of the conservative party is much the more aggressively anti-Semitic. Both parties share the tendency among all Poles to exaggerate territorial claims based upon events of past history, some of them as old as the twelfth century, but the conservative party is the more imperialistic and extreme, being "Pan-Polish." Since the Russian Revolution particularly, the radical party has moderated its claims.

Upon the American side what we discovered was an alliance, avowed and active, between that portion of the Polish clergy which is opposed to and admittedly afraid of Americanization along with a political group centered in Chicago, in the past chiefly interested in the finances of Polish organizations, with the conservative European group. The prominent heads of this alliance were Mr. and Mrs. Paderewski and the people immediately associated with them.

On the other hand, there was a much smaller group of radicals affiliated with the revolutionary socialistic group in Europe which had been discredited by accusations of pro-Germanism to such an extent that the Intelligence Bureau of the Government was practically shut off from receiving information from it and precluded from using its influence in industrial centers to allay industrial unrest.

The local conditions observed in Philadelphia were found to have their origin in the conflict between these two factions and in discontent under external show of harmony with the Chicago-Paderewski leadership. The bad conditions were accentuated by the campaign of misrepresentation, public and private, carried on against the members and adherents of the radical party.

A. GENERAL EUROPEAN CONDITIONS AS AFFECTING THE POLES IN THE UNITED STATES

1. It is unnecessary to recite the effects of the partition of Poland between Russia, Germany and Austria except insofar as a statement of the much more favorable condition of affairs in Galicia under Austrian control throws light upon events related below. Bearing in mind then that four million of Poles are German subjects, four million Austrian and twelve million Russian, we have the following marked contracts between Austria and Russia:

In Austria every group of Poles has its own public schools, supported by public taxes, where the teachers are Poles, the Polish language is used and Polish history, geography and literature are regular school subjects. This holds of both elementary and high schools, while Cracow has its own Polish university. In Russian Poland there is not a single public Polish school and no Polish language or literature is allowed in any school. Polish universities once existing have been closed, and when the Russians conquered Galicia the Polish university at Lemberg was changed over into a Russian one. In Galicia wherever the Polish population predominated, the judges in the civil courts are Poles and witnesses are allowed to use the Polish language. The civil service throughout Galicia consists of Poles or Ukrainians. Polish political clubs flourish freely. There is complete manhood suffrage and many delegates were elected to the Austrian Parliament. Moreover, Galicia had its own provincial legislative Assembly which in turn elected its own executive officers for the province, generally four Poles to one Ukrainian. All of these features contrasted sharply and almost absolutely with the conditions under

which the Poles lived in Russian Poland. The first Duma had a parliamentary representation of Poles consisting of 36 members, but in the third this was arbitrarily cut down to 12. Moreover, the whole policy of Austria was to cater to the Poles. In so doing it was following its traditional policy of setting the various nationalities in the Dual Kingdom over against each other. Thus the Poles were doubtless favored at the expense of Bohemians, Ukrainians, and Jugo-Slavs. Almost every Austrian ministry had at least two Poles in it. In fact, excepting for a certain amount of economic exploitation and oppression, Poles under Austrian rule enjoyed practically complete autonomy while in Russia they were subjected to the most exacting repressive measures. In addition there was religious harmony between Poles and Austrians, while in Russian Poland there was sharp religious and ecclesiastical discord. In this connection it should be noted that the so-called Constitutional Government in Russia was little more favorable to the Poles than strict autocracy had been and that the Constitutional Democrats under Miliokov had no intention of granting Poland political independence or freedom, contenting itself with assurances of Home Rule under Russian control.

2. There was considerable economic and political friction between the Poles and other subject nationalities. Germans and Russians alike played the Lithuanians off against the Poles while, as already indicated, the Austrian Government stimulated antagonism between the Ukrainians and the Poles. Even before the war Germany had favored the Ukrainians wherever possible against the Poles and had built up a strong pro-German party in Ukraina which fact was later taken advantage of in the separate treaty with Ukraina.

The Jewish question is particularly acute in the Kingdom of Poland—that is, Russian Poland. Poles claim that the Russians had systematically used the Jews to foment internal discord and that after the Jews were expelled from Russia great masses of the Jews took advantage of their migration into Poland to bring about an economic exploitation of the Poles, especially in the country districts. Even the liberal Poles claim that some Jews

are not contented to agitate for personal and civil rights but wish distinctive political rights as a national group on Polish territory. They also claim that Russia has instigated them to this policy and that the older generations of Jews born on Polish soil are entirely loyal to the political cause of Poland. The Jews complain not merely of economic boycotts and civil disabilities but also of actual persecution modeled after the Russian pogroms.

Up till recently there has been friction between Poles and Bohemians. The Bohemian radicals have directed their revolutionary activities against Austria and have pursued upon the whole a pro-Russian and pro-Slav policy. In so doing they have frequently argued against the independence of Poland, saying that Poland should become united under the domination of Russia. It is a matter of much grief and considerable resentment among the Poles that Professor Masaryk, now the leader of the Czecho-Slovaks, formerly expressed himself in this sense. Since the Russian Revolution and since the pronouncements of the Italian Conference at Rome and of Secretary Lansing, the relation between the Poles and the Bohemians, in this country at least, have undergone great improvement, and Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs and Poles seem now to be united in demanding political independence and freedom for all three nationalities.

3. Aside from the ordinary division of political parties into conservatives and progressives or liberals, the party situation in Poland, especially the Austrian part, was complicated by parties whose main interest was in looking after the economic interests of certain groups. In Galicia the peasants were especially well-organized. Aside from these divisions, the important one and the one which has affected American conditions was that into Activists and Passivists. Up to the time of the war, or at least two or three years previously, practically all the population in German Poland, much the greater mass in Russian Poland and a considerable majority in Galicia were Passivists—that is to say they had practically given up all hope of political independence and were concerned simply with obtaining from their respective governments concessions regarding the use of language, educational facilities,

economic improvements and nationalistic cultural development in general.

For a long time practically the only Activist Party was that headed by a group which started in Paris a revolutionary movement in 1892. This party combined moderate socialism with aspirations for a free and independent Poland. Their main activities were directed from the start against Russia as the country which was most reactionary and which held the largest part of Poland in subjection. Their socialism was of a nationalistic, not an internationalistic, character because the party aimed first at securing first a new national state for Poland. It was of a moderate progressive rather than an extreme radical character as may be seen from the platform adopted in 1892 to which this radical party has since adhered.

“An independent Polish Democratic Republic based on the following principles: Direct, general and secret suffrage; legislation by the people, including the initiative and referendum; equality of all citizens, regardless of sex, race, nationality and religion; progressive income tax; an eight hour working day, minimum wages, equal pay for men and women, prohibition and child labor; gradual socialization of land, of the means of transportation and production and of communication.”

The first factor in their strictly political program was attack upon Russia. This group was very active in the abortive revolution of 1905-6. They allied themselves with the revolutionists in Russia proper and finally succeeded in stirring up an agitation in the Kingdom of Poland which extended far beyond their own group. When the revolution was crushed this manifestation of dislike of Russia by Poland was used to increase the oppression of Poles and was also taken advantage of by the conservative and Passivist Party to discredit the radical faction. The revolutionary activities of the latter were pointed to as evidence of political immaturity and bad judgment which, in turn, were declared to be the causes of the failure of Russia to yield a greater amount of political freedom and local self-government to the Poles.

The second item in their policy was the utilization of the great amount of intellectual, civil and political freedom granted the Poles by Austria to secure a jumping off place for the future struggle for the freedom of Poland. They thus made Galicia, especially after 1906, the headquarters of their revolutionary propaganda, extending even to the training of young Poles in the manual of arms and military tactics. They also used Galician autonomy to foster the idea of a new Poland consisting of Russian and Austrian Poland which, while independent, should be friendly to Austria and a buffer state against Russia. There were and are various things in the internal policy of Austria-Hungary which made such a policy not impossible of realization. It constitutes even now the basis of one of the so-called Austrian solutions of the Polish problem as over against the German solution.

The third item of the program was the addition of Prussian Poland to the new state. This was especially desired for economic and industrial reasons on account of the mines in Prussian Silesia. The fourth and final aim was the formation of a federation which should extend from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Lithuanians and Ukrainians were to be encouraged to be self-determining, as were also the Esthonians and Letts, and then all were to be encouraged to join a federation which should extend clear from the north to the south of Europe, making a complete barrier between Russia and all the country to the west. Poland would be the largest and naturally the dominating state of this federation. This entire program was planned, of course, to cover a very long period of years in its realization. Its comprehensive scope caused this party to be attacked as theorists and dreamers, while its gradual step-by-step nature lent it to the opposite charge that the party was exclusively devoted to the interests of Austria, or even of Germany. This latter charge was based upon ignoring all phases of the movement excepting one, namely, the use of Austria as a basis of attack upon Russia so as to secure the independence of Russian Poland.

B. EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WAR

I. RELATIVE TO RUSSIA BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. Immediately upon the outbreak of the war the conservative or Right Wing Polish parties in Russia adhered enthusiastically to the cause of Russia. The National Democrats, Realists and Polish Progressives issued on August 7, 1914, a manifesto calling upon all Poles to rally to Russia against Germany. After the proclamation of the Russian Grand Duke in favor of the autonomy of Poland under Russian sovereignty, members of this group issued a manifesto on November 25, 1914 in which the following language is used:

“One object confronted the nation: the unification of Poland under the sceptre of the Russian Monarchy. Upon this object our nation concentrates itself; toward this end turn all its endeavors. . . . Therefore the undersigned this day unite to form a Polish National Council, thus laying the foundation of Poland’s political organization.”

Partly because of the prevalence of the Passivist attitude in Russia, but even more because of the thoroughness of Russian conscription, a very large army, said to amount to 700,000 soldiers, was recruited in Russian Poland.

The renunciation of a completely free and independent Poland in favor of home rule under Russian sovereignty naturally placed the conservative parties which joined in signing it in good favor not only with the Russian Government but with the Entente Allies, especially Great Britain and France. It aroused, however, the distrust of the Polish parties of the left. The latter constantly pointed out that the proclamation was a purely military one, being issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, and had no political sanction or authority. They pointed also to instructions sent from Petrograd to local Russian authorities in Poland indicating that the Grand Ducal proclamation was to make no difference in the methods of dealing with Polish subjects. At the beginning of 1906, Mr. Maklakoff, who was later the Russian

Ambassador in France, declared in the Duma that the promise of autonomy for Poland was a hypocritical farce. The treatment of the Poles in Galicia after the Russian conquest of that country strengthened the conviction of a large number of Poles that the Russian pretensions were insincere and that at most it was intended to give even autonomy only to German Poland.

This belief affected the attitude of the Poles, who wished for a completely free Poland, through the Allies. There was general discontent with the failure of the statesmen of the Allies in their speeches claiming that the Allies were fighting for the freedom of oppressed nationalities to make any specific reference to Poland. This discontent was strengthened by the official reply of the Allies of January 10, 1917 to President Wilson's request for a statement of war aims, since the reply merely referred to the attitude of Russia in the matter. In the French press a complete censorship was exercised as to any discussion of the Polish question. This and other facts made the Independent Poles believe that there was a definite understanding on the part of the Allies to leave the settlement of the Polish question wholly to Russia. This belief was of course confirmed upon the publication by the Bolsheviki of the so-called Secret Treaties in which the Entente Allies committed themselves to an agreement with Russia that the problem of Poland should not be raised at the Peace Conference. The critical attitude thus developed toward the Entente Allies is largely responsible for the misrepresentation of the Poles who wish a completely free Poland as pro-German. It is generally claimed that it was the failure of the Entente Allies to make an unambiguous proclamation in favor of a free Poland which gave Germany its opportunity to institute the Council of State and later the Regency in Russian Poland and to carry on its propaganda to persuade the Poles that the Central powers were the truest friends of an independent Poland.

II. RELATIVE TO AUSTRIA. The Radical Poles in Austria were persuaded in the first years of the present decade that a war between Austria and Russia was inevitable. Because of the favorable status of Poles in Austria, the extreme Russian oppression

of the Kingdom of Poland and the larger population and size of the Kingdom, they decided to favor Austria against Russia. An anti-Russian propaganda was carried on, young Poles were instructed in military tactics and the nucleus of a Polish Army formed. In 1912 a delegation was sent from Galicia to London stating that in the case of a European war the Polish Independents would favor Austria against Russia, and a delegation was sent to the United States to enlist the support of the Polish migration in this country. (See the paragraphs below regarding the formation of the K. O. N.) When war was declared, Polish military companies were among the very first to cross the boundary line and attack Russia. Of the Legions, the more radical were grouped under General Pilsudski, the more conservative under General Haller. The further fortunes of the Legions are related below, but at this point it may be remarked that it was until very recently the policy of the National Democratic group in Europe and of the clerical Paderewski-Smulski party in this country to denounce Pilsudski as a German agent in spite of the fact that he is the idol of very large numbers of Poles and that his name is acclaimed with that of Kosciusko. Since, however, General Haller has found his way to Paris and has become a member of the Paris Committee, these earlier tactics have become embarrassing, so that they have been dropped and there is a tendency to speak more enthusiastically of General Pilsudski. At the same time his supporters both in this country and abroad are still denounced as essentially pro-German.

III. EFFECT OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. There were three stages in the development of the international politics of Poland as affected by the Russian Revolution. In the first stage there was a much more generous and sincere recognition of an autonomous Poland than the Tsar's government had ever given expression to. This was coupled, however, with two conditions:

First, that the boundary lines of the new state of Poland were to be fixed by the Constituent Assembly of Russia without any representation of the independent state of Poland; second, that there should be a military union for the future between Russia

and Poland. The Council of state of Poland (see below) issued a proclamation welcoming the new Russian Government and its recognition of the principle of independence for Poland, but protesting strongly against the two conditions attached. The Committees of the parties of the Center and the Left also protested.

The second stage of development was constituted by the Social Revolutionary Government under Kerensky. This government made an out and out pronouncement in favor of a free, united and independent Poland, made arrangements for a joint commission between Russia and Poland to liquidate outstanding affairs, and began a movement to influence the Entente Allies to change their former attitude and come out for a free and independent Poland.

The third stage was constituted by the Bolshevik Government. The parties of the Left in Poland were highly sympathetic with the Kerensky Government. Exactly the opposite is true of their relations with the Bolshevik Government. This is accounted for on the following grounds: (1) As just stated, the radical parties in Poland were sympathetic with the Kerensky party. They were national socialists, not international socialists of the type represented by Lenine. There had been much previous friction between the leaders of the socialist party in Poland and the international socialists. (2) There was and is still a general belief that the Bolshevik leaders were directly under the control of Germany, and a universal belief that the disintegrating social condition into which Russia was thrown was playing directly into the hands of Germany. (3) The Bolsheviks conspicuously ignored the cause of Poland and its leaders in their peace negotiations with Germany. With reference to the other oppressed nationalities in whose self-determination the Bolsheviks professed great interest, it agreed in article three of the peace treaty with Germany, that as respects territory occupied by German troops: "Russia undertakes to refrain from all interferences in the external affairs of those territories and leaves it to the Central Empires to determine their future fate in agreement with their populations." Poland was of course one of these occupied states and the Poles regard this

article of the treaty as a cynical betrayal of their own interests. (4) The Poles regard the Bolsheviki as largely responsible for the cession of the province of Chelm to Ukraina.

The following quotations from the official protest indicate its general tone and show how far the Regency is from acting as a mere subservient instrument of German interests. "The independent existence of Poland, her political life, her political and economic vitality are made empty phrases. Her interests and rights are ignored and her territorial integrity is not respected. We swore to God to stand guard over Poland's happiness, liberty and power. Conscious of our oath we today raise our voice in protest before God and the world, before mankind and the tribunal of history, and before the peoples of Austria and Germany, against the new partition of Poland, refusing to sanction it and branding it as an act of brutal violence." In the resignation of all the ministers headed by Mr. Kucharzewski, constituting the Cabinet as a protest against the same measure the following language is used: "We judged it our duty to do everything in our power to gain some influence on the course of the peace parleys, but we must state that it was beyond the power of the Polish Government to overcome the forces which were hostile to Poland, forces which combined to deal a blow against Poland by means of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In view of the peace treaty concluded by the two Central Powers with Ukraina, a treaty which effected a new partition of Poland, it is impossible for us to remain any longer in our respective offices. . . . Today is the moment of greatest urgency for the people of Poland to consolidate itself and to rally around the supreme national authority because of the blow which has been dealt the Polish people. That supreme authority basing itself upon the broadest masses of the people will mark out the road for the nation to follow."

These statements are not meant in any way as a defense of the Regency as a genuinely representative government of Poland. Under German occupation it is clearly impossible for it to be completely a government of a free and independent Poland. But the facts, which could be multiplied almost indefinitely, raise a ques-

tion as to the motives which prevent the Polish Agencies under the control of Messrs. Dmoski and Paderewski from making known to the world the gallant struggle which the Regency has put up under extremely hard conditions and still more the motives for insinuating that any attachment whatever to it is proof of pro-Germanism. In the end, these facts get back to Poland and this gratuitous misrepresentation perplexes the loyal Poles and reacts to the advantage of Germany. Those who engage in these insinuations are playing a part Germany would have play.

In spite of the antagonism of the Poles to the Bolsheviki which is so extreme among all factions, conservative and radical alike, that all have been in favor of strong, Allied, and even Japanese intervention, the Russian Revolution marks a turning point in the evolution of Polish international politics. It put an end to the distinctly anti-Russian policy of the radical group and made them ready to turn against Germany. It freed Austrian liberals, including the Poles, from fear of Russia and made them willing to change from their advocacy of Trialism (Poland as a third state of the Empire on the same level as Austria and Hungary) to an independent Polish state consisting of the Kingdom of Poland and Galicia. Its influence upon the Polish socialists and radicals in the Austrian Parliament can best be brought out in connection with the next topic, for its effect was closely combined with that of the address to the Senate of President Wilson of January 22, 1917.

IV. EFFECT OF PRESIDENT WILSON'S DECLARATION OF JANUARY 22, 1917. The effect of the statement of President Wilson, that he assumed that the statesmen of all nations were agreed upon the necessity of a free, autonomous and united Poland, may perhaps be judged from a paragraph from the telegram to President Wilson of the Temporary Council of State of Poland under German occupation: "For the first time in the present war the head of a mighty neutral power who is the supreme representative of a great nation declared officially that an independent Polish State is the only just solution of the Polish question and an indispensable condition of a lasting and just peace. For this wise and noble suggestion the

Temporary Council of State, as the nucleus of a state which is again coming to life, brings you, Mr. President, in the name of the Polish nation and its own name expression of its most profound gratitude and respect." The Municipal Council, the Polish National Council and the associated democratic parties all telegraphed from Warsaw to the same effect. Demonstrations took place in Warsaw before the United States Consulate. The demands of the Council of State upon the German Governor-General were more urgent and positive from this time.

A still more marked effect (in conjunction with that of the Russian Revolution) was that upon the Polish Parliamentary Club in Galicia, an organization consisting of all of the Polish representatives in the Austrian Parliament. Up to this time the Poles had voted for the budget and in general, in return for concessions, had supported the Austrian policy. Early in May Mr. Dascynski, the head of the Polish Socialist Party, stated that the Polish Parliamentary Club was losing the confidence of the public and that it must now either openly declare for the government or for the opposition and declared that no timidity must prevent the Poles from safeguarding the honor and dignity of the Polish nationality. On May 16 and 17 the Polish Parliamentary Club held a meeting in Vienna at which three motions were presented, the first from the conservative party in favor of a free, independent and united Poland under the Hapsburg dynasty; the second, that, since the government had declined to unite Galicia with the Kingdom of Poland, the Polish Parliamentary Club would no longer support the government. Neither of these motions passed. The third was a general resolution in favor of a free and united Poland with access to the sea and declaring that the Polish Parliamentary Club would no longer support the government unless there was a larger participation of Poles in the administration of Galicia. Shortly afterward, demonstrations were held in Cracow and resolutions passed in favor of the re-establishment of an independent Poland with access to the sea and declaring that the re-establishment of the Polish state with the help of Austria would secure for the latter a natural and enduring ally. In spite of the

fact that access to the sea could be obtained only at the expense of Germany the Austrian Government took no steps to interfere with the demonstration. Since this time the radical party under the head of Mr. Dascynski has become even more active in opposition to the Austrian Government demanding that the latter should coöperate in the formation of a free and independent Poland. The cession by Austria-Hungary of the Polish province of Chelm to Ukraina accentuated the antagonism of the Polish parties against the Austrian Government.

V. THE GERMAN OCCUPATION, THE COUNCIL OF STATE AND THE REGENCY. On November 5, 1916, the Central Powers issued a proclamation in favor of the independence of Poland, meaning of course Russian Poland. At the same time they began an active effort to get Poles enrolled in the German army. This was immediately opposed by a proclamation of the parties of the Left demanding that the new independent state have its own government and its own army under its own control and headed by General Pilsudski. In January the secret military organization of Pilsudski placed the Polish National Legions, which previously had been fighting with Austria against Russia, under the control of the Council of State. In February the Council of State sent a telegram to the Emperor of Austria demanding the transfer of the Polish Army. When, in March, there was a rumor that Austria intended to recall the Polish Legions into Austria, the Council of State threatened to resign in a block on the 30th of March. The Russian Revolutionary Government recognized the independence of Poland and the Council of State replied as mentioned above. In April an Imperial Austrian decree was issued placing the Legions under the command of the German general Von Bessler. Soon after the Council of State demanded the nomination of a regent and suspended its activities until a reply from the Central Powers should be received. At the same time the Congress of the National Council demanded a government and a national army together with a convocation of a parliament. In July the agitation for the Regency increased and also the demands for a less ambiguous attitude on the part of Germany. The representatives of the

parties of the Left (that is to say—the parties more directly connected with General Pilsudski—see the section on the K. O. N. below) resigned. On the 9th and 10th of July the Polish Legions under Pilsudski refused the oath of brotherhood with the German army and were interned, while on July 20 Pilsudski was arrested and has been in a German prison ever since, in spite of the frequent demands of the radical parties that he be released as proof of the good faith of Germany. In view of the constant accusations of pro-Germanism brought against this radical party, the following quotation from the proclamation of the parties of the Left of August may be quoted:

“This new violation of our rights by the Central Powers is only one link more in the chain which has been forged by their Polish policies. Our belief will none the less persist in spite of everything and will not permit this terrible war to strengthen its chains. The will of the nation will triumph over the tactics of the invaders. During the war the nation has learned to appreciate better than ever before the value of an independent existence. It will oppose with all of its energy a policy of annexation which violates its rights. We salute therefore the Legions, stolen from the country by the brutal force of the Austrian-German alliance and cry aloud: “Long Live Independence, long live Pilsudski and down with the invader!”

The Legions which did not threaten to revolt were withdrawn into the Austrian Empire and for a time fought on the Italian border. Subsequently they also first declined to obey orders and later on actively revolted because of the treaty by which Chelm was ceded to Ukraina. Some who revolted were shot, others put into prison, while a small remnant under General Haller fought its way through, and General Haller is now a member of the Paris Committee, associated with the factions which accused General Pilsudski of pro-Germanism and are still making the same accusation against the political party which is following Pilsudski. There is no reason to doubt the honesty and patriotism of General Haller and his followers. But the fact that they took the oath when

the more radical element refused it, shows lack of sincerity on the part of the conservative faction which is now pointing with great pride to the hero, General Haller, as one of its own members.

After much hesitation and temporizing, the German authorities under the pressure of the threat of the Council of State to resign in a body, consented on the 12th of September, 1917, to the formation of a Regency. The three members were the Archbishop of Warsaw, whose position placed him outside all party strife, Prince Lubomirski, a representative of one of the aristocratic families of Poland who up to the time of the war had belonged to the Passivist Party but who had become an Activist under the stress of the war, and Mr. Ostrowski, a distinguished jurist, one of the former six Polish members of the Russian Council of State and the first president of the Conservative Realist Party, connections with which, however, he severed upon becoming a member of the Regency. The Prime Minister was Mr. Kucharzewski. He belonged to the liberal Activist section, having left the National Democrat Party in 1908 when the leader of the latter, Mr. Dmowski, adopted a policy of conciliation toward the Russian Tsarism.

In order to quiet the constant use of insinuations concerning the pro-German character of the Regency and of all who give support to it, it would be well to ask from Mr. Paderewski and his leading supporters a written statement as to whether they regard the Regency as other than loyal to Poland, doing the best it can under difficult circumstances, and what evidence they have of its being pro-German or consciously or unconsciously a German tool. Such a written statement would make the issue one of ascertainable facts and take it out of the realm of vague insinuations and personal attacks. It should be noted that the National Democrats in Petrograd who have been in close contact with the Regency sent their congratulations to the Regency "saying that it hails with joy the taking into your hands of national affairs."

In spite of irresponsible rumors and insinuations to the contrary, no responsible authority has ever charged the Regency with

ever being pro-German or as interested in anything else than an independent and free Poland. Mr. Seyda, a recent delegate from the Paris Committee to this country, expressly relieved the Regency from any accusation of pro-Germanism. The Regency, however, is attempting to maintain a government in a territory which is under the military occupation of German forces and is subject to constant pressure from the German authorities. Under its conditions, it has pursued a balanced and somewhat compromising policy. It has devoted itself mainly to matters of internal improvement and education, reconstruction and civil administration, and while claiming for itself the right to maintain its own foreign department, sending ambassadors to other countries, and the right to maintain a national army, it has not pressed these claims with any great vigor. While regarding itself as a nucleus of the future government of the Polish State, it has not been accused by any party of attempting to usurp the rights of the future government.

All Polish parties in Poland welcomed the formation of the Regency as furnishing at least the basis for the development of a future free state. The radical parties soon withdrew from active support in all domestic matters and in the main have abstained from any participation in politics under the Regency. At the same time they recognized the Regency as a nucleus of Polish sovereignty in distinction from any party group which is formed in non-Polish soil. They justify their refusal to cooperate with the Regency upon the ground that this policy enables the Regency to bring greater pressure to bear upon the German authorities and wring more concessions from them. If the report is correct that the Regency has recently protested against the action of the Versailles Council, it looks as if the Regency had yielded more to German pressure than it had done earlier. On the other hand, it is claimed that vacillating policy of the Regency has largely grown out of the failure of the statesmen of the Allies to make a joint proclamation repudiating in effect their previous policy of entrusting the future of Poland to Russia and putting this squarely beyond the policy of President Wilson for a free, united and inde-

pendent Poland. Meantime the press reports from Europe show increasing friction between Germany and Austria over the future of Poland and an increasing willingness on the part of Austria to consent to a union of Galicia with the Kingdom of Poland as an independent state whose king, presumably, would be the Austrian archbishop, Charles Stephen, who is regarded as having distinctively Polish sympathies. It is not likely that Germany will consent to this move as it will render the Dual Empire much less amenable to German control in the future, and will also stir up a continually increasing desire of the inhabitants of German Poland for secession and union with the new state. Should, however, Germany be forced to yield, the new kingdom would reinforce the demand for a definite official statement on the part of all the allied governments regarding the future of Poland in order to maintain the loyalty of Poles in Poland to the Allies.

C. THE PARIS COMMITTEE AND ITS POLICIES

I. THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. This party which constitutes the backbone of the Paris Committee described below, had branches in all three parts of divided Poland. After an early period in which its aspirations conformed more closely to its name it became in each of the three divisions a party of accommodation whose purpose was, through a good understanding with the governments of the respective countries, to secure concessions regarding language, education and religion, a betterment of economic conditions, etc. In short, it was a leading Passivist party. Mr. Dmowski was the intellectual and practical leader of this party in Russian Poland. Their general politics were also monarchical and distinctively conservative in all internal and economic matters. The following from Leroy-Beaulieu's *Empire of the Tsars* is an impartial statement from an authoritative French writer having much sympathy with the views of this party. Speaking of the National Democrats elected to the Russian Duma, he says that they were—

“the most conservative of all the parties assembled at the Taurida Palace. In a notorious article, Bjorson, in the *Courier European*, even accused them of being secretly in the service of the Russian Government. There are of course Socialists, Radicals, Progressives, and Revolutionaries in Poland as in all other countries, but in this case they had boycotted the elections and the electors were loyal and Catholic Poles. Almost alone in the first Duma they opposed the new agrarian laws, passed in the interests of the moujiks, while in the second they acted with the parties of the center. Thanks to their agreement, the Budget was seriously considered and its passage rendered certain. They explained that they voted for a large army, because they believed in a strong Empire.”

Between the second and third Dumas the National Democrats under Dmowski's lead became so conservative that they ceased even to work with the Russian “Cadets” for constitutional reform, and became allied with the Octobrists. This affiliation with Tsardom was so extreme that it led to the secession spoken of above. At the beginning of the war Mr. Dmowski and others of his party came out for a Poland under the control of the Tsar in the manifesto referred to above. After an earlier period in which the center of Mr. Dmowski's political activities was in Austria, he stood consistently for a pro-Russian and anti-German policy, endeavoring to persuade the Russian authorities that the German menace was such that it could best be met by concessions to the Poles that would make them strong adherents, political and military, of Russia. This policy met with practically no success. It is universally believed that Germany and Russia had a common understanding with reference to the treatment of Poland, namely, that neither country should make any concessions to its Polish subjects and would use all its influence to discourage agitation, even among the Polish subjects of its neighbor. Many believe that this understanding continued even during the war, up to the time of the Russian Revolution.

Mr. Dmowski was also well known in connection with anti-semitic activities in Poland. His enemies claim that he promoted

the introduction of Russian methods of persecuting the Jews, including the organization of Black Hundreds and pogroms. His supporters indignantly deny the latter charge and claim that aside from literary attacks upon the Jews, he has confined himself to the organization of an economic boycott. In connection with the German occupation of Russian Poland there was a general exodus of politicians to Switzerland and Paris.

II. FORMATION OF THE PARIS COMMITTEE. In May, 1917, the Lausanne Agency of the National Democrats and allied parties sent a memorandum of instructions to the affiliated group in Warsaw, in which there is sketched the plan for the organization which later developed into the present Paris Committee. The occasion for the formation of this group is stated in the memorandum as follows:

“In Paris, unfortunately, there are certain Poles who are working political mischief there, since they have the greatest influence. They are called ‘franc-tireurs’ by some representatives of the French Government but they have openings everywhere and enjoy a good repute. To counteract their obnoxious activity it is planned to organize in Paris a Polish representative body which will, as a group, take upon itself the work carried on by individuals. This collective body will be known as the Polish House. Its director in Paris will be Count Zamoyski.”

It is understood that the influential body of Poles whose mischief-making activities had to be counteracted were the Union of Polish Democrats, who constituted the least extreme branch of the Republican Left among the Polish parties. Dr. Motz and the distinguished scientific woman, Mme. Curie, were among the leaders of this group. The politician with whom they are said to have too great influence is understood to be Clemenceau, who at that time was outside the Government. The memorandum of May, 1917, contains a general survey of the politics of the Polish situation, including the relations of the various governments of the Allied Nations to the Polish question. The report boasts particu-

larly of the great influence of the National Democrats with the British Government and says

“The center of gravity of the Polish cause lies in London.”

It deplores the fact that Lloyd George is not yet won over to the Polish cause and claims that he is under the influence of Liberal Jewish circles. Regarding the United States, it says that the United States is pursuing a bold and far-seeing policy in Russia and is thinking of commercial expansion there. With reference to domestic politics it says:

“The Poles here voted for Wilson at the last election and he is grateful to them for it and values them highly. PaderwŃski has considerable influence on him and when conversing with him the President called the Act of November 5th a “dirty German trick.” From this incident arose the famous and sincere declaration of the President; the influence of the United States in view of its entrance into the war will be predominant. . . . The Polish Central Council has elected a National Department which works hand in hand with the Lausanne Agency (see below). This department has declared that the Polish Nation is its first leader and after that the Lausanne Agency. It demands the creation of a powerful national government outside the boundaries of Poland to whose authority it wishes to submit itself. Mr. Smulski, who possesses great influence, is the President of the National Department. Here, as everywhere, the Jews harm all work done for the benefit of Poland. Fortunately, a strong anti-Semitic movement is under way here.”

In view of the attacks of the conservative party affiliated with Dmowski’s group both in Europe and in this country upon the radical party for criticizing the Allies’ subordination of the Polish question to Russian interests, it is interesting to note the following:

“The attitude of the Quadruple Alliance to Poland is not based upon the ideals of the freedom of Peoples, the rights of nations, etc., but upon national egotisms, the interests of the states of the Alliance, individually and collectively.”

III. COMPOSITION OF THE PARIS COMMITTEE. The efforts of Mr. Dmowski and his associates were successful to the extent of gaining a certain official recognition of the Paris Committee on the part of the French and British Governments and through them of the United States Government. Although, as will appear below, the recognition so far extended is much less than that desired by the Paris Committee itself. Beside Mr. Dmowski and General Haller, who was also a National Democrat, the following are among the more important members of the Committee: Mr. Seyda, who was for a long time the editor of the National Democratic organ in Posen, in German Poland, and who, in conformity with the policy of the National Democrats, used the paper to bring about better relations between German Poland and the German Government. His brother, at last reports, was at the head of the Polish Parliamentary Club in Berlin, which has stood for the same policy. Mr. Piltz was, in the 80's and 90's, not merely a political supporter of the Russian Government, but is said to have been directly in the pay of Russia. At all events, in 1901, a pamphlet was issued in Russia under the auspices of a group with which Mr. Dmowski was at that time associated which reprints freely from the pages of a memorial submitted by Mr. Piltz to the Russian Government in which he recites the services which he and his journal had rendered to the Russian cause, including attacks upon Poles who had dreams of the reëstablishment of Poland. Mr. Piltz is the member of the Paris Committee upon whom most bitter personal attacks are made because of his prior record. Mr. Skermunt who, in earlier days, was a member of a party of Compromisists with Russia of such an extreme type that in 1908 they were criticized even by Mr. Dmowski. Count Zamoyski, a National Democrat, not previously active in politics, but one of the richest men in Poland and indeed in Europe, Mr. Kozciski, a former editor of the organ of the National Democrats in Lemberg, Galicia. Mr. Rozwadowska, a cousin of a former Austrian Consul in New York, also a National Democrat from Galicia and a landed proprietor. Major Franczek is a representative from the United States, formerly a health commissioner in Buffalo, but not other-

wise especially prominent in American or Polish-American affairs. Mr. Paderewski, the great musical artist, is also a member of the Committee and its official delegate in the United States. He had earlier relations with Mr. Dmowski and his associates in Switzerland, and is charged by his enemies with having shared Mr. Dmowski's anti-Semitic proclivities, especially through ownership of an anti-Semitic journal in Warsaw. This he denies.

In view of the ten or a dozen different political parties in Poland, and the fact that the National Democrats are only one of the several parties of the Right Wing, the very large number of National Democrats on the Committee is striking. When followers of the Paris Committee, including Messrs. Paderewski and Dmowski, were asked about the apparently one-sided nature of the Committee and their attention was called to accusations that it was unrepresentative, the replies took the following form: First, a denial that it was unrepresentative and a statement that but four or five of the eleven members of the Committee were National Democrats. This calculation seems to be based upon including only National Democrats from the Kingdom of Poland and treating National Democrats from Galicia and Prussian Poland not as National Democrats but as representatives of these two parts of Poland. After a general denial it was admitted that members of the parties of the Left and even of the Moderate Democrats of the Center were not found upon the Committee.

This lack of representation was said to be due to the fact that these parties had no statesmen of sufficient prominence or else had a pro-German record. When attention was called to politicians of considerable prominence outside the National Democratic Party, the third and final position taken was that the present Committee had made an attempt to become more representative by including persons from groups not now represented but that (a) groups invited had refused to send delegates unless they had a sufficient number to control the Committee and (b) that the suggestion of representatives like Dr. Motz of the Union of Polish Democrats and Mr. Dascynski, the leader of the Austrian Socialists, had been turned down either by the British Government or by the General

Staffs of the British and French Armies. The radical groups on the other hand claim that every effort has been made to keep them from having any membership on the Committee and, more than that, to carry on a malicious campaign of misrepresentation which would shut them out from any hearing and influence with the Allied Governments. It is obviously impossible for anyone excepting a person having some official authority to get at the truth of these varied statements and counter-statements.

In view, however, of a war waged in behalf of democracy and the freedom of oppressed nationalities, the query naturally persists as to why a group which is monarchical, representative of conservative economic interests and largely anti-Semitic should occupy such an important semi-official political status? The inferences which occur on the face of the matter and apart from official knowledge are that the pro-Russian interest of this group before the war and in the early years of the war gave them a somewhat privileged position as long as Russia was one of the Allies and in a position to dominate the attitude of the Allies on the Polish question. This group had access to the Russian ambassadors in Paris and London denied to the representatives of the Democratic, to say nothing of the radical and socialistic groups. This privileged position, having once been obtained, it naturally persisted in spite of the changes brought about by the Russian Revolution and the entrance of America into the war.

In this connection it may be noted that Mr. Paderewski is quite indignant because the radical press harps upon the fact that he invited Mr. Iswolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris and a well known enemy of the Polish cause, to act as Chairman of the French Committee of Relief for Polish Sufferers. He says that Mr. Iswolsky is a personal enemy of his and that he did not invite him until numerous and high French political authorities had told him that it would be practically impossible for a committee to be formed under the sanction of the French Government until it had first received the sanction of Mr. Iswolsky. Moreover, any committee once formed, which has received any official acknowledgment whatsoever tends, from the very conveniences of the situa-

tion, to have its powers enlarged. Especially is this true on the military side. The Polish Army made it necessary to have someone who would speak with some official weight on Polish matters, and the military authorities would not be particularly interested in the political constitution of the committee as long as the committee existed with which it could do business. I do not know of any reason for attaching especial weight to the claims of the instructions of the Lausanne Agency, that Messrs. Seyda and Horodyski, at present an official in the English Foreign Office and formerly connected in some way with the National Democrats, have had a predominant influence in London. The same memorandum states, however, that the Posen Journal, edited by Mr. Seyda, is carefully read at the Foreign Office and is one of the British chief sources of information about Polish affairs.

In case any Continental power is persuaded that a monarchy of some sort is to be restored in Russia, and that a conservative regime is to emerge from the present chaos, the interest of such a power in the independence of Poland might be subordinate to its interest in a Poland which should be in quasi-military vassalage to Russia in order to secure a stronger opposition to the pretensions of Germany in the east. Considering, however, the understanding that there has always been in the past between Germany and reactionary Russia over the Polish question, and considering the great probability that a reactionary Russia would sometime in the future become an ally of an imperialistic Germany, this would be a short-sighted policy in comparison with the policy of encouraging a number of federated free states which should come between Germany and Russia and which would be the natural allies of western democracies.

In any case, the ambition of this Paris Committee to become the Foreign Office and the War Department of the new government of Poland is established through the utterances of representative members of the Committee, especially through an authoritative interview with Mr. Seyda when in this country. The furtherance of this ambition through securing the support of the American Poles was one of the chief reasons for the calling of the Detroit

Convention. Although Mr. Seyda disclaimed the desire of the Committee to be itself the government of the new state of Poland, the Polish press agencies spoke of it during the Detroit Convention as the Polish Provisional Government. The effect of this ambition and claim has been to accentuate factional animosities. The representative character of the Paris Committee has been denied by a great majority of the Polish groups in Poland, by the Poles in Russia proper, by the majority of Polish societies in France and by the largest Polish Club in London. The democratic and radical groups accuse the Paris Committee of taking advantage of the somewhat accidentally won privileged position to favor their own political ambitions and the fortunes of a faction which is ultra-conservative. It is argued that if the group realizes its ambition to be recognized by the Allied Governments as the Foreign and War Departments of the new State of Poland it would logically entitle this group to take its place at the Peace Conference as the official representatives of the new State of Poland, and that this fact explains their great present activity, particularly their violent denunciations of all those who will not render them full allegiance. As is stated below, an alliance consummated in 1915 at Lausanne between this group and the representatives of the clerical party among the American Poles has given this Paris Committee great prestige and influence on American soil and is largely responsible for the bitter dissensions which now exist. While opinion which is not *ex parte* is difficult to get, there is good ground for believing that any further recognition of this Paris Committee would weaken the cause of the Allies in Poland proper and produce an alienation which would be particularly disastrous in case Germany should accede to the Austrian proposition of an independent Poland under Charles Stephen.

D. POLISH CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

I. CHARACTER OF POPULATION. The census does not of course list Poles as Poles. Consequently there is a great variation in the estimates of the population, of Polish birth and descent in the

United States, the figures running from three and a half to four and a half and even five millions. A fair estimate puts the number at 3,800,000. Polish immigrants are largely of peasant origin and although now largely located in industrial centers, continue their prior devotion to owning land. One of their chief ambitions is to own their own houses, and while they come to this country in large measure intending to return, as a rule they change their minds and settle down after becoming household owners. There is general agreement among the Polish leaders that the change from peasant conditions to congested city life has a deteriorating effect, intellectual and moral, upon the immigrants, especially the children of the first generation. Any governmental or semi-governmental agency which would secure a distribution of Polish peasants through the rural districts of the United States with the opportunity of owning their own farms would be generally welcomed. The Poles are especially represented in the mining and steel industries, and at the present time they are prominent in ship-building and munition making. So far as the great mass of the Polish population is concerned, the question of origin in Russian, German or Austrian Poland respectively is of no special importance. The unity of language, of religious worship and of devotion to past national history outweigh the differences of origin. At the present time, however, this latter difference is a source of considerable friction because Austrian and German Poles are, technically, alien enemies. The number of German Poles is comparatively small, but the Austrian Poles who feel themselves as patriotic as the Russian Poles feel that they are being discriminated against, especially in important war industries, without justification.

II. ORGANIZATION AMONG AMERICAN POLES. Preliminary to a brief sketch of the main organizations which will be given below, in the next section, it may be said that Poles in this country are not well organized. They compare very unfavorably in this respect with the Jews, Bohemians, Russians and even Italians. Considerably less than 10 per cent. of the Poles belong to any organization having a national membership of any kind, beneficiary, ecclesiastical or political. This fact makes it easier for the leaders of the

small number of organized Poles to manipulate the Poles as a whole and to profess to speak in their name. The history of Polish organizations in this country is very complicated. It presents a series of secessions, alliances, splits and fights within organization. Three factors seem to have chiefly operated in bringing about the succession of changes.

1. *Financial.* The largest and most important organizations have had to do with beneficiary funds. The primary aim was to assist newly arrived Polish immigrants in facing their strange and difficult economic conditions. These beneficiary activities include building and loan associations, protection against sickness, death, etc. In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, an organization was formed for raising and sending funds to Europe to be used there for propaganda and in behalf of a free and independent Poland and for military training in connection therewith. The war itself has of course added the raising of funds for Polish relief.

2. *Clerical.* This head cannot be strictly separated from the previous, for the first great split, that between the Polish National Alliance and the Polish Roman Catholic Alliance came about through dissensions concerning the control of finances which led to the formation of the Roman Catholic Alliance as a new organization. In general, these organizations are clerical in the sense of interesting parish priests rather than involving general church policies or the activities of the hierarchy. In fact in domestic matters there is a good deal of friction between the Polish priests, the Irish priests and the hierarchy. Poles point to the fact that they have but one Catholic bishop and claim that Irish and Germans are constantly favored at their expense. There is also a good deal of friction between the Polish clergy and the Irish on the subject of Americanization which the latter favor, and the former, especially the parish priests of the older generation, who were themselves born in Poland, oppose. So far as any general statement can be made on such a complicated matter, the fear of Americanization is not directed at American political and social life as such but is due to the belief that Americanization would lessen the

personal and direct control of the parish priests over their own flock. While there is a numerous and powerful Protestant group in Prussian Silesia, the Protestants are not represented in any number among the Poles in this country. This has the unfortunate effect of encouraging factional strife along religious lines for, there being nothing which might be called a religious middle class, there is a sharp division into clericals and anti-clericals, running through the whole intellectual and moral life of the Poles, including the Polish press.

3. *Political.* This, upon the whole, has been a decidedly subordinate factor; especially so far as domestic politics are concerned. Upon the whole the Polish population has given its votes to the Republican Party. The headquarters of Polish affairs in general are in Chicago, and Mr. Smulski, who has been very influential in Polish affairs, has been closely affiliated with the local republican machine. In the Philadelphia district, with the exception of a socialistic group, the Poles were practically entirely under the control of the Penrose machine until some of the Polish clubs recently went over to the Vare faction. In the campaign of 1912 the advertising agent of the daily which was the organ of the Polish National Alliance took the sum of \$5000 for backing the republican candidate for president of the United States. Although a motion was passed at the convention of the Alliance that the money should be returned, it is stated that the Polish National Alliance never complied with the resolution, due, it is charged, to the influence of Smulski.

III. CHIEF ORGANIZATIONS. The Polish National Alliance was the first formed and is still the largest. It was formed in the 30's to promote the general interest of the immigrants which, for a long time, it did very successfully. During the Civil War it made a fine patriotic record. The next largest organization is the Polish Roman Catholic Alliance or Union, which, as already stated, split off, due primarily to a dispute as to whether laymen or priests should have primary financial control. For a number of years a fierce struggle was carried on between the National Alliance and

the Roman Catholic Alliance, until, under considerations related shortly below, the Roman Catholic Alliance virtually got control of the National Alliance. Up to 1912, the only organization of Poles in the United States which took an active interest in European Polish politics was the Alliance of Polish Falcons or Sokols. The original purpose was the military training of youth with an ultimate view for the struggle for Polish independence. As the prospects for Polish independence became more and more remote the societies became more of the nature of the German turnverein. The athletic interest was not very strong and the societies did not prosper. Moreover, about 1905, there was a split between the so-called free Falcons whose headquarters were Pittsburg and the old line Falcons, whose headquarters were Chicago and who were pretty closely affiliated with the Polish National Alliance. In 1912 the development of a revolutionary movement in Galicia began to have its reflex effect upon this side and a convention was called to meet at Pittsburg to reunite the two branches for the purpose of again engaging in active support of the revolutionary movement abroad. At the same dates a meeting was called, also to convene at Pittsburg, under clerical auspices, to represent all the Poles of America. Meantime representatives of the Pilsudski radical party in the United States came to an understanding with the more nationalistic part of the Polish National Alliance and with a minor group, the Polish Young Men's Alliance, to attempt to bring about a union not merely between the two groups of Falcons but between them and the larger convention of Poles. The aim was to unify all immigrant groups in America whatsoever in support of the European movement for a free and independent Poland. Mr. Debski, a naturalized American citizen, represented General Pilsudski at the convention and so great an enthusiasm for an independent Poland was created that a new and unified organization was formed. This was the Committee of National Defense generally known from the initials of the corresponding Polish words, K. O. N. This organization was created then in Pittsburg, December, 1912, and was the first general organization in this country having the

independence of Poland as its object. The following resolution was passed:

“Since we are thousands of miles away from our native country and cannot actively participate in the national policy, we submit to the direction of the united independent parties in Poland who were represented at Zachopane in the fall of 1912 by their delegates and who are now creating a military fund for the Polish Army. In accordance with the political program of the above mentioned parties, we pledge ourselves to assist by all means the revolutionary movement against Russia, the greatest enemy of Poland, the representative of oppression, barbarism, darkness and absolutism in Europe and of de-nationalization. For the purposes of giving our help to this movement we herewith create the Committee of National Defense. Long live the armed struggle, long live liberty. Long live the independent Republic of Poland.”

The above resolution was accepted with a sworn oath by representatives of all Polish parties in America. The president of the Polish National Alliance was elected president, the president of the Polish Catholic Alliance treasurer, and Bishop Rhode was made its honorary president.

In view of these facts, which can easily be substantiated by reference to historical documents, it appears either that those who now represent the K. O. N. as having been formed under Austrian auspices and through the activities of Austrian delegates in this country, and even financially supported by the Austrian Embassy, are guilty of wilful falsification, or else that the representatives of the Polish Alliance and of the clerical organizations who are now making these statements about the K. O. N. were themselves in 1912 wilfully guilty of representing a movement undertaken in behalf of Austria as one undertaken in behalf of a free and independent Poland. As between these two alternatives, choice is easy.

In June, 1913 the clerical members of the K. O. N. seceded. Their opponents claim that the secession was due to inability to control the new organization for their own purposes. At the same

time the National Council was formed. The character of this National Council is seen in the following words taken from their own official report: "The National Council has been created by organizations at whose head stands the Polish Roman Catholic Alliance under the protection of the holy heart of Jesus." Meantime, the Polish Alliance found itself between two fires, that of the more radical element among the immigrants together with those most interested in the revolutionary struggle for free Poland, and the Catholic Alliance on the other hand. In the years of 1913 and 1914 it practically surrendered to the Roman Catholic Alliance and in the latter year also seceded from the K. O. N. The subsequent official report of the Roman Catholic Alliance congratulates itself upon the virtual surrender of the National Alliance.

Meantime, in the spring of 1914, representatives of the more reactionary groups went to Europe and there formed the connection between the Polish National Alliance and the National Democratic group which is referred to in the Lausanne memorandum of May, 1917, as stated above. The foreign politics of the Alliance then ceased to be anti-Russian and became pro-Tsar. The existence of this affiliation is confirmed from American as well as European sources. The report of the National Council uses the following language:

"We address ourselves to those who represent in all three partitions the decisive majority of the nation and who are united in their aims, the National Councils in Galicia and in German Poland and the National Democracy in the Kingdom. Our press bureau is in close contact with the corresponding institutions of the National Council in London, Paris, Rome and Zurich."

Omitting the flourish about the "decisive majority," this passage shows clearly the conservative affiliations of the National Council. Although it became under these auspices pro-Russian, it did not take a stand in favor of the Allies. It warned the Polish immigrants from sending their hard-earned money for relief purposes to any of the countries visited by the war excepting Poland.

The National Council came out at the same time openly and avowedly against Americanization.

“The Poles from the fourth part of Poland, the Poles in America, must above all struggle against the abuse of American liberty. From this grows an indifference toward Poland and, at last, total Americanization.

“We have here English-American educational institutions which blind us with their official status and perhaps appeal to our pocketbooks by means of their free education. Thus they kill the voice in the depth of our conscience which causes us to sacrifice ourselves for our native country.

“We give our children to be guided by strangers; we transplant them into a strange soil where they unfortunately assimilate strange fluids, lose their Polish elements and gradually are lost. American-Poland thus loses her children and if the movement goes on that terrible moment will finally come when the Poles in this country will cease to be called the fourth part of Poland, for they will be finally lost.”

After the Polish Victims' Relief Committee was formed (see below), under the direction of Mr. Paderewski, it was combined with the National Council and constituted the so-called National Department, which has since then arrogated to itself the control of Polish affairs in this country. For a short time this National Department was a sub-branch of the National Council and the Polish Victim's Relief Committee, but later on the relationship was suddenly reversed and these two societies became branches of the National Department. So far as we have been able to discover the new organization was formed at the desire and wholly by the action of a few leaders. In any case, it brought about that hopeless mixture of different lines of Polish activity which is largely responsible for the present difficulties and harmful factors in the Polish situation. For it combined without any definite division of labor or proper coördination relief activities due to the war, general philanthropic and insurance activities of domestic concern among the Poles, political activity, both domestic and, through the relation of Mr. Paderewski to the Paris Committee, foreign, and

the ecclesiastical organization of the Roman Catholic Alliance. It would be difficult to have invented an organization more calculated to introduce confusion and one more fitted to lend itself to purposes of manipulation from the top. This "Holding Company" constituted the basis for calling and managing the Detroit Convention and for the organization for the permanent control of the Poles which developed therefrom. (See below.)

We thus have the definite cleavage of Polish parties in America lined up in association with the cleavage in European politics. On the one hand the remnant of the K. O. N. which remained true to the principles of a struggle for Polish independence directed primarily against Russia and laid down in 1912, is associated with the political policies of the radical group headed by General Pilsudski, now in a German prison. On the other hand is the priestly and conservative faction which, since 1914, has been directly connected with the National Democratic party in Europe and engaged in endeavoring to mould the mass of the Poles in this country in support of that faction, an arrangement which was consummated at the Detroit Convention of August, 1918, described below.

To clinch its control upon the American situation, the conservative faction has consistently denounced the K. O. N. as either actually pro-German in desire and principles or, in their more guarded statements, as pursuing a policy which is pro-German in effect. These denunciations are based in part upon ignoring the historical European facts related above, in part upon falsification of facts regarding the formation of the K. O. N. in 1912 and in part upon mistakes in policies of the leaders of the K. O. N., although it must in fairness be stated that those now opposing the K. O. N. shared earlier in many of these mistakes. These mistakes as to policy have to do with the Polish Army (spoken of below); the attitude toward the Regency, and the criticisms of the Allies, especially Great Britain.

1. The K. O. N. has taken a too favorable view of the Regency as a legitimate provisional government of an independent state of Poland, glossing over too much the effects of the military occupa-

tion of Germany. This mistake has lent itself to misrepresentations on the part of the enemies of the K. O. N., based partly upon insinuations of the definitely pro-German character of the Regency and partly upon misstatements of the motives of the K. O. N. The extent and nature of the attachment of the K. O. N. to the Regency have been much exaggerated. In domestic policies, the K. O. N. in common with the parties of the Left in Poland itself are strongly opposed to the Regency, because of its clerical, monarchical and aristocratic constitution, as well as a matter of strategy in enabling the Regency to bring greater pressure to bear upon the German authorities. In foreign relations, they have claimed that being on Polish soil the Regency had a claim for recognition possessed by no body of immigrants on foreign soil. This claim is due partly to matters of historical consistency. Because of the number of past Polish insurrections and rebellions, the issue as to whether the provisional governing body should be on Polish soil or not is an old one. On this position, the K. O. N. has maintained the former position of the radical wing, while Mr. Dmowski has shifted. The other and probably the chief reason of the claim is that the radical parties preferred the Regency in spite of its conservative character to the domination of the group controlling the Paris Committee. While individuals have at various times unwisely urged the official recognition of the Regency by the Allies, the May, 1918, convention of the K. O. N. in Philadelphia went no further than the declaration:

“We express our highest respect for the Regency of the Kingdom of Poland, the only present authority in Poland, for its dignified protest and struggle in counteracting German aggression against Polish independence and its struggle against so-called attempts to form so-called Polish Governments abroad without the authorization of the Polish Nation.”

The last clause is clearly aimed at the Paris Committee.

At the present time the issue of the Regency so far as Poles in America are concerned is a dead one. The K. O. N. leaders have recognized the unwisdom of their former policy and ask now only

for a commission of representatives of the different parties among the Poles under the control and supervision of the United States and the Allies to get into contact with all groups in Poland, including the Regency. Members of both the conservative and the radical parties have stated to us that through various underground channels via Switzerland and Stockholm such contact is entirely feasible.

The criticisms of Great Britain and France are due to two causes. In the first place, there is strong emotional sympathy between Poles as representing an oppressed nationality and the Irish. The radical Poles have thus associated themselves to an undue extent with the extremists among the Irish in this country. The other cause is the committal by the Allies of the cause of Poland to Russia, the great historical enemy and oppressor of Poland. This source of friction was largely removed by the entrance of America into the war and the belief that American influence would dominate in the Peace Conference the influence of any European country, and by the pronouncements of the Versailles Council. There is a tendency not confined to the radical element to criticise the Allied Governments for not reinforcing the declaration of the Military Council. The leaders of the K. O. N. at the present time have agreed to forego all further criticism of the Allied Governments and to use all their influence with their adherents throughout the country to discourage such criticism.

Much has been made by the enemies of the K. O. N. of their socialism. The purpose was to link up the K. O. N. with the unpatriotic attitude of the official socialist party of this country as stated in the St. Louis Platform, and thus strengthen the accusation of pro-Germanism, or at least of indifference to the war. In fact the K. O. N. in this country, like the radical party with which it is affiliated in Europe, is not in orthodox socialistic standing because it puts nationalism before internationalism. The adherents of the K. O. N. in this country have been officially expelled from the socialist party. Before the United States entered the war, Polish socialists in Pennsylvania were disciplined because

they collected money and sent it to General Pilsudski, the orthodox socialists objecting that this showed a militaristic and nationalistic spirit. While in Chicago in the last municipal election the radical Poles mainly supported the socialist candidate for mayor, in New York City, where the loyalty issue was more definitely raised, they supported Mr. Mitchell and denounced Hilquit bitterly.

While there may be individuals among the K. O. N. who were distinctively pro-German in their sympathies and while there may even be German agents among them as among other elements of our population, I cannot speak too strongly of the malicious campaign of insinuation, misrepresentation and personal attack carried on against the leaders of the K. O. N. These leaders in New York are three, Mr. Kulakowski, who is evidently the scholar and intellectual leader of the group, Mr. Debski, an editor and man of action, and Mr. Sosnowski, whose European associations were more distinctly military, I have had no personal contact with the last named, but it is striking that the stories about him concern matters of personal character not matters of loyalty, and that disparaging personal reports are then used to insinuate a probable pro-Germanism. The stories reflecting upon Mr. Sosnowski's personal and financial integrity are denounced as maliciously false by his friends including reputable Americans, and I am credibly informed that a Pole from Warsaw who (when in this country) was the source of these reports declined to meet Mr. Sosnowski to make his charges face to face. In my judgment if these reports are deemed relevant to the situation, as they are by Mr. Paderewski's associates, the charges should be put in writing and Mr. Sosnowski and his accusers brought together under impartial auspices.

I have seen personally enough of the first two named to be convinced of the falsity, the malicious falsity of reports disseminated—such as that Mr. Debski owes a farm which he owns in New Jersey to the assistance of Mr. Dumba, the former Austrian minister to the United States, a story so demonstrably lacking in any basis of fact that only malice can account for its circulation; also that a photograph exists of him “in an Austrian uniform,”

in spite of the fact that the uniform is one of the Polish Army and was taken when Mr. Debski at the risk of his life visited Warsaw when it was under German occupation to strengthen the hands of the Polish Nationalists against German intrigue. Both of these men were engaged in struggles for the independence of the Poles in Europe, both of them have risked imprisonment, their fortunes and even their lives in behalf of the cause of free Poland, in a period when those who are now bitterly attacking them were making no sacrifice at all and were living in ease and prosperity and on good terms with the oppressors of Poland. In spite of this and of the fact that Mr. Debski is the official representative of General Pilsudski in this country, no insinuations are too base to be made against these men.

I add merely one illustration of the methods employed because a number of the officers of the Military Intelligence Bureau were witnesses of the episode. At an interview in Washington on August 17 with Messrs. White and Wedda of the Polish Press Bureau, Mr. Stalinski, a civilian agent of the M. I. B. and former chief dragoman of the American Embassy in Petrograd, was present at the invitation of the M. I. B. Mr. White made insinuations against the nature of Mr. Stalinski's interest in the Polish question and in this connection, as if it were a final proof of the unworthiness of Mr. Stalinski, asked if it were known that he had been associated with Mr. Lednicki in Petrograd. When I told him that I knew nothing whatsoever about Mr. Stalinski's relation to Mr. Lednicki, but would Mr. White please explain in what way that reflected upon Mr. Stalinski, in case he had been associated in any way with him, Mr. White replied "We will not go into that now." Now it happens that Mr. Lednicki is the leader of the Polish Democrats among the Poles in Russia; that, like others of this group, he was in very good relations with the Kerensky Government; that he was appointed by the Regency as the chairman of a commission to come to some settlement of matters between Poland Russia under the Kerensky regime; that the Bolsheviki declined to recognize him, presumably because of pressure from the German Government—that Mr.

Lednicki is, in short, a man of integrity, force and character, the only thing to be said against him being that he is a radical, though not an extreme one, instead of a conservative. I mention this incident not because it compares with the accusations of graft, high living, personal crookedness, etc., brought against Mr. Kulakowski and Mr. Debski, but because it offers an excellent illustration of the method of innuendo and insinuation which has been used, and in dealing with Americans ignorant of foreign politics, used very successfully, to discredit all individuals and activities which would not supinely surrender themselves to the Syski-Paderewski-Smulski combination in this country.

The methods are such as to invite scrutiny and cross-examination of the motives of those who employ them in such a way as to close, so far as they are efficacious, to the United States Government important channels of information and influence; and to breed strife and dissension among Poles in this country at a time when the maximum of unity is indispensable. There is considerable reason for thinking that in addition to personal and partisan motives, some of the leaders of opposition to the K. O. N. have been unconsciously used by German influences, for nothing would help the German propaganda among the Poles here and abroad more than to discredit the radical group of the Poles by attaching to it the stigma of pro-Germanism. While the K. O. N. group is numerically smaller among the organized Poles than the National Alliance or the Roman Catholic Alliance, it contains, by the common consent of its adversaries, the "ablest and brainiest" among the Poles in this country and has the greatest influence among all of the more intelligent and skilled workingmen. The only reason greater harm has not been wrought by these malicious persecutions is the thorough-going loyalty of the leaders of the K. O. N. to the American Government. They are so persuaded that the hope of a future free and independent Poland lies with the United States that they have submitted with unusual calm and patience to a campaign of misrepresentation. The critical attitude taken toward the allies already spoken of has its other side in an intense belief in the unity of the cause of Poland and the

United States in the present war. This belief in the United States and the policies of President Wilson has been represented by their enemies as an attempt at a belated camouflage of their pro-Germanism. The somewhat extended study of the material put forth by the K. O. N. throughout the war has completely convinced me that this charge is a falsehood, whether due to ignorance or deliberate malice.

It can be established by sufficient documentary evidence that the K. O. N. is less responsible for the present strife and dissension than its opponents. The latter have been in the position of greater advantage and began the attack. In addition, the K. O. N. has repeatedly in the interest of the unified waging of the war made advances for a truce and combination of forces, and these advances have been ignored or turned down by the Smulski-Paderewski faction. In October, 1917, such a proposition was made by representatives of the K. O. N. to officers of the National Department provided the latter would agree to the condition that the United States should "take over the matter of Poland and direct it on behalf of the Allies." In an "Open Letter to Mr. Roman Dmoski" under date of September 9, 1918, it is proposed that the "Committee of Paris should join in with the representatives of the party of the Left, organize a consulting body which should assist with its wealth of information and its various connections an Inter-allied Commission for Polish affairs, with headquarters at Washington." It also proposes meetings for the joint discussion of methods of bringing about the realization of common national aims, a representative of the United States Government to be present at all the parleys, "since it is the United States Government which has the exclusive right of control over any and every political activity undertaken and conducted on American soil." It sometimes seems as if in addition to personal quarrels and cut-throat factional methods, the devotion of the K. O. N. to American leadership in dealing with the Polish question were one of the motives for the attempts to discredit its leaders by means of false statements.

IV. METHOD OF UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING POLISH CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. In dealing with activities

among the Poles, whether in the press, conventions, public discussions or private rumors or reports, the following considerations need to be borne constantly in mind.

1. The mass of the Poles are unorganized and have no articulate means of expression. The war has brought about a sharp cleavage among the organized Poles into the clerical and conservative party on the one hand and the anti-clerical and radical on the other. Since the mass of the Poles are good Catholics, it is comparatively easy for the priestly party to profess to speak for them and to manage matters so that this profession will seem to be substantiated by the facts (see section on the Detroit Convention below).

2. Conditions and activities among the Poles in this country cannot be understood excepting as they are projected upon the European background. As previous statements show, three factors are of chief importance in this background: First, the division among Poles into the relatively liberal policy of Austria and the almost absolutely illiberal policy of Russia; second, the division into Activists, who are in favor of keeping up the revolutionary struggle for the independence of Poland, and the Passivists, who are in favor of giving up the struggle and reaching a *modus vivendi*; third, the conflict between the monarchical and economically conservative party and the democratic, radical and anti-clerical party—a division largely coinciding with the last, namely, that between the Activists and the Passivists.

3. The historic sequence of events must always be borne in mind. No statements about any person, condition or activity can be correctly interpreted unless it is placed in its proper historic sequence. The important dates are, the abortive revolution of 1905-06 and the developments in connection with the constantly increasing withdrawal of constitutional government in Russia; 1912, as the time when revolutionary activities came definitely to a focus in Galicia; the beginning of the war in 1914 and the Russian attitude toward Poland together with its acceptance by the Entente Allies, and 1917, with the speech of President Wilson, the Russian Revolution, and the entrance of the United States

into the war. To ignore the changes and re-alignments brought about by this succession of events is to lose the clue to understanding the events in question.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Owing to the long duration and the intensity of the factional struggle between the conservative and radical parties, all statements, charges, accusations, etc., proceeding from one side against the other should be made in writing, and the statements made so specific and definite, together with the evidence therefor, that the authors of them can be held definitely responsible in case further inquiry shows that there is ignorance or misrepresentation. In every case the past record of any person or movement mentioned should be fully investigated, and all statements made cross-examined and motives for making them carefully scrutinized. If this course is followed, the various details thus presented will be found gradually to fit together and to give a fairly complete and accurate picture of the course of events among the American Poles. I have attempted in this report to give an outline which is fairly comprehensive and as correct as possible in its main features. The course which I have just recommended would serve to fill this outline and, in fact, to test its correctness. If additional details brought to light by the method suggested fit into the outline, that fitting in will establish its accuracy, if they do not, it will prove that we have been misled. I gladly submit the report to such a test.

2. There is not the slightest doubt that the great mass of Poles in this country, including those who are nominally following the Paderewski-Smulski leadership, are firmly convinced of the importance of American leadership in the war and peace policies regarding Poland. This point of view has been repeatedly stated to us, even by those who at the Detroit Convention voted in favor of committing the Poles in this country to direction by the Paris Committee. This conviction is due both to President Wilson's attitude on the Polish question when the statesmen of the other Allied Nations

were silent and to the fact that historical conditions and geographical position make the United States disinterested in a sense in which no European country can be. There is good reason for believing that both the Poles and other oppressed nationalities regard the question of American leadership in exactly the same light and are perplexed and discouraged by the apparent subordination of American leadership to that of a group of exiles in Paris. When this general issue was raised with Mr. Paderewski, he took in the course of the conversation the following positions: First, that there is no need of accentuating American leadership, because there is complete harmony and agreement at the present time; secondly, that he himself made this proposition in connection with the formation of a Polish Army almost a year and a half ago and was turned down; that the leadership of the Paris Committee is now an accomplished fact and that the recognition of this committee by France is so definite that it would create friction even to have an American Commission on Polish Affairs; third, that the United States is the natural guardian of the interests of not only Poland but of all of the oppressed nationalities of Europe, but that he as an official plenipotentiary to this country of the Paris Committee could not suggest any change in the present arrangement; that any change would have to come from the initiative of the United States, and that if it came, he would "in principle" accept it. In his public speeches and private conversations, Mr. Dmowski also emphasized the great importance of the United States in connection with the future of the Polish question. The willingness of Poles to accept a distinctively American commission which should bring about a unity among the different factions of the Poles, make a special study of the Polish question and get into relation with Polish conditions abroad, would seem to be a fair test of whether any Pole or group of Poles put foremost their personal and factional interest or their desire for a free and independent Poland. The notion that such a commission need in any way interfere with the Paris Committee and the status which it now officially possesses is, of course, absurd. An American commission would naturally cooperate with the Paris Committee and

with all other Polish organized groups. The only things that an American commission would interfere with is the ambition of the Paris Committee to become a provisional government for Poland and to be its representative at the Peace Conference; and the desires and activities of those Poles in America who are so afraid of Americanization that they actually prefer allegiance to a group on foreign soil to an active interest in the Polish question on the part of the United States embodied in a distinctly American commission.

E. THE DETROIT CONVENTION

A brief account of this convention will exemplify in a specific, concrete instance the operation of the forces which have been described.

I. THE OBJECTS OF THE CONVENTION. There were three closely intertwined causes for calling this convention to meet in the city of Detroit in the week beginning August 26. The first, the financial one, is described at greater length below. It involves at least four factors: the funds of the Polish Victims' Relief Fund, of the Military Commission, of the Chicago headquarters and of the local Citizens Committees and parish groups immediately concerned in raising funds; second, a triangular quarrel carried on under an external show of complete harmony so far as the American public and press are concerned, between Mr. Paderewski and his immediate associates, the Chicago group of which Mr. Smulski is representative, and thirdly the group of priests of which Bishop Rohde and Father Syski are said to be the more prominent leaders. The execution of the plan formed in 1914 to have the Poles in this country work under the direction of the conservative National Democratic party of Europe is the feature to which attention will here be directed.

In July, Mr. Seyda, a highly conservative member of the Paris Committee and the one reputed (as stated above) to have very great influence with the British Foreign Office, was sent to this country with a definite mission. Whether or not he reported to any of the governmental authorities in Washington I have no way

of knowing. On July 16, 1918, the Executive Committee of the National Department held an official interview with Mr. Seyda. After this, it passed the following resolution:

“The Executive Committee sees in the National Polish Committee the political organization which controls Polish affairs. Under its direction it will work, as it has done heretofore, for the Fatherland. The Executive Committee recognizes this Polish National Committee as the only competent authority in all matters of national Polish politics and the National Polish Army.”

The context shows that this resolution was passed in connection with the preparation of the National Department for the Detroit Convention. At the same meeting a telegram was sent to Mr. Dmowski, inviting him to come to the convention.

Fully to understand this resolution and the cable to Mr. Dmowski in its bearing upon the convention reference should be made to contemporaneous events in Washington. Some of the American daily papers of the date of July 18 carried an account of a bill to be introduced in the Senate by Senator Hitchcock. This proposed bill, in addition to recognizing a free, independent and united Poland, carried a clause which expressly recognized the “Polish National Committee whose headquarters are in Paris, France, as the official representative of the Polish people.” The bill expressly gave this Committee the power to send diplomatic representatives to this country. Its representatives here were among other things to have the power to determine whether Poles having technically the status of enemy aliens should be continued in that status or should be regarded as citizens of a friendly state. (It later appeared that the draft of the bill was not intended for publicity and was given to the press only through the carelessness of a clerk in Senator Hitchcock’s office.) At the same time it came to our knowledge that representatives of both the British and the French Government in this country expressed the desires of the British and French Government to have the Paris Committee officially recognized by all the Allies as the Foreign and War

Departments of the new State of Poland and that some of these representatives in private were criticizing the American Government quite freely for obstructing the execution of this desire. These facts appear to establish beyond question the purport of a resolution which was prepared, as was acknowledged by Mr. White at the joint interview at Washington, for introduction at the Detroit Convention: a resolution strongly recommending the recognition of the Paris Committee *as the Foreign and War Departments of the new free and independent state of Poland*. It is in the light of these facts that the affiliation of 1914, the visit of Mr. Seyda, the resolution of July 16, the cabling of Mr. Dmowski and his appearing in this country to attend the convention, have to be understood. (It should be added in this connection that according to information coming from Senator Hitchcock's office, the draft of the bill was sent to him through the medium of the Polish Press Bureau in Washington which represents the interests of Messrs. Paderewski and Smulski respectively.) During the visit to Washington previously referred to, it was urged upon Mr. White of the Polish Press Bureau that this resolution was open to construction as an attempt to bring pressure to bear upon the American Government to do what up to the present time it had declined to do voluntarily. I was informed by Captain Uterhart that in view of this consideration, Mr. White informed him that the proposed resolution would not be offered.

II. THE CONTROL OF THE CONVENTION. In order to give the resolutions due weight, the convention was represented in the call issued for its convening as "the greatest possible political and national occurrence for all Poles in America without exception, a visible, external embodiment of the external will of the whole immigration." As a matter of fact, the convention was kept wholly within the control of the small committee constituting the National Department. The means of securing this control were twofold.

1. The rules for electing delegates. These rules were so vague and complicated that they were freely criticized during the month of August by a majority of the Polish daily newspapers in the

United States, including those which have been in the main hearty supporters of the Paderewski-Smulski faction, as well as the independent or so called business Polish press. The clerical papers were the only ones which unanimously and heartily defended the rules. In the first place, very generous provision was made for honorary or *ex officio* delegates. In addition to two organizations mentioned by name, "the presidents of all clerical groups and all secular national organizations having groups in different Polish communities" are included. Also local Citizens Committees and the local centers of the National Department which pay dues are entitled to *ex officio* delegates. Again, the organizations which are entitled to elect delegates were not stated by name. What was the object of leaving the provision vague and ambiguous cannot well be determined, but there is no doubt that the effect was to increase the control of the Executive Committee in Chicago. In Philadelphia, for example, an organization having a state-wide membership had its elected delegates refused credentials on the ground that this organization was not one of those entitled to send delegates. This ruling was later reversed because of pressure brought to bear, but it showed the powers which the Central Committee took upon itself even before the Convention had met and appointed its own committee on credentials. It is noteworthy that there had been friction between the Pennsylvania organization and the Chicago committee over the handling of funds and that in Philadelphia this refusal of credentials was regarded as a disciplinary measure.

The control of the Roman Catholic Alliance is seen in the following regulations. The boundaries of election districts for local delegates are to follow closely the parish boundaries. The electoral meetings of societies and local communities were to be called by the parish priest and were to be presided over by him unless he delegated the office to somebody else. In the rules for the conduct of the convention it was expressly provided that priests' societies should not be called upon to render an account of funds collected for public purposes. While, nominally, provision was made for mass meetings, these were conspicuous for their absence in Phila-

dephia, as well as in other places from which we had direct reports, the delegates chosen being practically self-elected by a very small group of persons who were directly affiliated with the organizations calling and controlling the convention.

2. The care taken to control the convention is even more obvious in the rules laid down in advance by the National Department for the conduct of the convention. With the exception of one day, the general meetings of the convention were devoted to listening to speeches and to hearing general reports, financial and otherwise, from different Polish organizations. In each case the rules specified that the speeches should be heard and reports listened to without discussion. That the actual business of the convention was put in the hands of seven sectional meetings. For six of these, the important ones, clerks were appointed at least four weeks in advance by the Executive Committee of the National Department and these clerks drew up the topics and projects to be considered by these sections. Rules made it difficult for any delegate to present new material. The members of these sections were not elected but appointed by the chairman of the convention. While the general convention took final action on resolutions, etc., at the last day of the meeting, rules provided that nothing could come before this full meeting excepting what had been previously passed upon at one of the sections. Moreover, no discussion could be had by the general convention of any of the measures thus presented excepting at the written request of at least one-third of the voting delegates of the section.

The rules were obviously designed in the first place to exclude the possibility of any adequate representation of the K. O. N. and of the dissenting non-clerical factions in general. They were also designed to keep under cover the various elements of friction and dissatisfaction which existed within the more conservative party on account of the triangular quarrel already referred to. In conversations with the leaders of the factions, they justified the rules for electing delegates and conducting the convention on the ground first, that they were at all events no worse than those frequently employed in American political conventions and secondly that the

situation was so delicate and "explosive" that it was in the interests of Polish unity and harmony to keep control in strong hands and to keep public discussion and criticism down to a minimum.

III. DECISIONS OF THE CONVENTION. It is not possible to report the activities of the convention in any great detail. An air of secrecy, or at least privacy, rather than of publicity hung about the convention. The reports in the Detroit newspapers were meagre and for the most part general, being to a considerable extent of the nature of press agency notes. The *New York Evening Post* and the *Christian Science Monitor* were the only American newspapers having correspondents present. Requests to a news clipping bureau for all items regarding the convention have brought forth only notices from Pittsburgh, Pa., and Utica, New York, papers, both mainly occupied with speeches of Mr. Paderewski. Up to the present not even the Polish press has, so far as our inquiries extend, made any adequate report of the actual conclusions of the convention. So far as information is accessible, the following are the chief results of the convention:

1. The control of the present organization of the National Department was confirmed, Mr. Smulski of Chicago being elected permanent chairman of the National Department. All Polish affairs were confided to this organization having five branches, military affairs, relief, financial, press and educational. To some extent, the demand for greater supervision of funds was met by providing for the election of a supervisory body composed of one delegate from each state to meet annually. The control of the present organization was clinched by a provision that the credentials of the delegates to the Detroit Convention should be good for all other assemblies and conventions held during the next four years. According to the report in the *Christian Science Monitor* there was friction between the representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and the Independent Polish Catholic Church. "The main point of contention between the clericals and the loyalists is the domination or attempted domination of the Poles in the United States by the priests. The main objection and indeed the only objection to the Polish Legions is the domination of its

organization by the clericals." According to the same paper, about one-third of the thousand delegates were Roman Catholic priests and the rest of the delegates were so largely Roman Catholics that the priests dominated the convention.

2. With reference to the war, it was planned to raise an army of half a million, forty thousand or fifty thousand to come from this country and the great bulk of the remainder from Siberia and Russia. It was voted to raise a million dollars a month for relief funds, funds for insurance, etc., in connection with the army. How this was to be done, in view of the small amount raised in the past, public reports have not made clear.

3. Mr. Dmowski was present as representative of the Paris Committee and according to press reports dominated the convention. Some reports state that, according to Mr. Dmowski, consulates are to be formed in the various cities of the United States which shall issue certificates of Polish Nationality to Poles in this country who are not American citizens. The press reports that he stated that this plan has already the authorization of the State Department of the United States. The resolutions, besides calling for a free, united and independent Poland including Dantzic, were less imperialistic than previous utterances of the National Democrats in that they welcomed the "freedom of Poland's sister, Lithuania." Pains were also taken both by Mr. Dmowski and the final resolutions to assure the Jews that they would not be oppressed in the new State of Poland.

F. SPECIFIC POINTS OF FRICTION AND DISCORD

I come now to the particular sore points and causes of dissatisfaction and dissension, the local evidences of which in Philadelphia first led to the inquiries whose results have been stated above. I have included only such points as tend to produce conditions which slow down activities connected with the war or introduce such strife as is generally unfavorable to the morale of the Polish population and which lends itself thereby to carrying on of anti-American and even pro-German propaganda. While

different heads are treated separately, most of the matters touched upon cut across each other. This is particularly true of the relation between the first head, that of personal differences, to financial matters, relief funds, White Cross and publicity for Polish affairs.

I. PERSONAL. Personal differences center very largely about Mr. and Mrs. Paderewski on the one hand, Mr. Smulski and the politicians allied with him in Chicago on the other, and a few of the priests whose ambition for personal control and prestige are said to be disturbing factors. We personally have come into contact only with the first and accordingly that is the only one discussed and with regret that the situation makes it necessary to repeat what under ordinary circumstances would be gossip of an objectionable sort. But at present, these personal matters have crystallized into public opinion which is a material and influential fact.

No one questions the eloquence, personal charm and influence of Mr. Paderewski nor his ability in handling in a diplomatic way matters which are brought to his personal attention. The value of his name and high standing as a musician are also recognized as constituting him the best known of all Poles in American circles. In fact it is generally said that he owes his prominence primarily to the fact that his is the only Polish name which is widely known among the American people. This position of his personality is said even by those who criticize his methods and regret his influence to make him an inevitable figure-head for Polish politics and relief activities in the United States. The gist of the criticisms might be said to be that he would make an admirable constitutional monarch who should reign but not govern and reign on condition only that he be surrounded by a strong cabinet of competent advisors and efficient executives. This condition, however, is very generally stated not to be fulfilled—and it should be understood that the criticisms here related come from persons who are outwardly devoted followers of Mr. Paderewski, many of them delegates to the Detroit Convention. It is said that his vanity is such that he can be easily played upon and used for personal ends by those who surround him. There is

evidently considerable competition among members of the different circles who have access to him, for in private conversations they freely deprecate the influence of others over Mr. Paderewski and not infrequently refer to those in some other circle as crooks. It is also generally recognized that, while a great artist, he is not a business man and that he has not insisted upon the development of strictly business-like methods on the part of those about him.

The strongest criticisms and the most general ones are directed against Mrs. Paderewski. It is pointed out in the first place that she is not a Pole, but the daughter of a Russian father and Roumanian Jewess mother. It is stated that her influence over Mr. Paderewski is inordinate, and that he is given to yielding in important matters of general policy to her personal desires; that she is a very strong and energetic person who insists upon having her finger, directly or indirectly, in every form of Polish activities, and that where she cannot rule she attempts to ruin. The mildest criticism of all those made against her that we have heard is that she is hysterical and lacks business sense; the strongest that she has an insane egotism which stops at nothing to secure personal prominence for herself. The alleged anti-Semitic activities of Mr. Paderewski so far as they do not follow from his connection with the National Democratic party are said to be due to her influence.

The criticisms directed against her are shared by her son and Mr. Paderewski's step-son, Mr. Gorski. He is President of the Polish Victims' Relief Fund. It is said that there is nothing in his past record or present activity to justify his holding this position, which he is said to hold simply through the personal influence of his mother. His lack of energy, influential acquaintances and executive ability is freely criticised as one of the causes of the comparative failure of the Polish Victims' Relief Fund. Reports are freely circulated to the effect that he draws a very large salary, variously stated at from \$150 to \$300 a week, \$200 being the usual statement, for acting as President of the Relief Fund, although giving but an hour or two to its affairs. In reply it is stated that his salary does not come from the Relief Funds but from his mother's own funds. Then there is the counter-

charge that Mme. Paderewski pays him herself from a fund of \$20,000 transferred to her from the finances of the Polish Military Commission. I cannot too strongly state that we have no evidence whatsoever regarding any of these charges or countercharges, but that the effect of their constant circulation is extremely undesirable and that some authoritative investigation and statements which would put them all to rest once for all is much needed.

Leaving out of account the pettier personal matters, the criticisms of Mr. Paderewski are that he is so easily influenced by persons who have at a given time his ear that he does not pursue a consistent and comprehensive policy but shifts unaccountably from time to time; that he has been too closely affiliated with pro-Russian and pro-Tsar persons and influences—in this connection the Iswolsky incident related above being referred to and also an interview which he gave to the British press before coming to this country in which he spoke in fulsome terms of the “divine clemency of the Tsar’s soul” toward Poland; and that up to comparatively recently he had too many sympathizers with Germany in his immediate surroundings and that he was, in ways in which he was not himself aware of, made use of by German influences. His former close relations with Mr. Knaap, the owner of the *Wolna Polska*, which is popularly regarded as his personal organ, are cited in this connection.

II. FINANCIAL MATTERS, RELIEF FUNDS, ETC. There is very general dissatisfaction with the financial side of Polish affairs in this country. This dissatisfaction concerns the amounts raised, the methods used in raising funds, the way in which funds are managed, expended and accounted for, and the attempts which have been made to retain a monopoly of the prestige, publicity, etc., connected with war and relief funds in the hands of the Paderewski family.

1. The published statement in the *New York Times* for September 8th of the amount of money received by the Polish Victims’ Relief Fund is somewhat less than \$1,100,000. Considering the number of Polish immigrants in this country, the prosperity of their wage earners during all of the recent years of the war and the

fact that they have not been able to send money home as they were accustomed to doing before the war; considering, also, the enormous suffering in Poland and the sentimental interest of Americans in Polish affairs, together with their sympathy with all European sufferers, this sum is regarded as pitifully small. Its meagerness is compared with the amount raised for the relief of other nationalities who have suffered from the war, especially the Belgians, Jews and Armenians. The smallness of the net amount has led to criticisms and recriminations which are directed not merely against the Paderewskis but against Americans. The tendency is for those who are criticised to defend themselves by laying blame on American citizens for indifference to Poland. There are even claims made of covert antagonism on the part of Americans, an antagonism which is said to have worked constantly against Polish interests. The friction between the Paderewski group, the Smulski group and the Polish priests previously referred to seems to be connected in large measure with diversity of opinion about financial matters and methods, but it would be difficult for anyone not having official authority to determine the exact nature of this friction. Aside from lack of energy and executive ability and aside from a tendency to subordinate an interest in Poland to the public prominence of various groups of individuals, the real causes for the comparatively small amount of money raised seem to be found in the considerations which are stated in the other paragraphs of this section.

2. There is considerable disgust and resentment at the methods used in raising funds, since these are said to cheapen the whole Polish cause. It is particularly objected to Mme. Paderewski's activities that instead of presenting the importance and significance and the real sufferings of Poland, she diverts attention to secondary, trivial and often personal matters. Her devotion to bazaar methods and to the sale of dolls is cited in this connection. More serious are the criticisms passed in connection with the so-called May Drive conducted under the auspices of the Paderewskis for the sake of raising funds to be used in connection with the support of the National Polish Army. Great preparations were

made and much attention given to the matter in the Polish press and pulpits. Up till at least the Detroit Convention, no public statement of funds received in this drive had been made. The charges and countercharges in connection with these funds played a large part in the financial reasons previously alluded to for calling the Detroit Convention. It was repeatedly stated to us that the local Citizens' Committees and the priests who were influential in raising the funds declined to send their money to the Chicago headquarters because funds previously sent were still unaccounted for, the reason being that these funds had been spent for secret diplomatic and political purposes which it would not do to make public. The local organizations holding funds said that such expenditures might be perfectly legitimate, but they ought to have the right to send and keep delegates in Chicago who could oversee this use of secret funds so as to avoid abuse. Rather, so it is reported to us, than to consent to this supervision, the Chicago headquarters proposed a convention which should arrange for a new and more satisfactory method of handling funds. The specific criticism of Mme. Paderewski in connection with the May Drive relates to concerts which were organized under the Paderewskis' auspices and given under the direction of a Pole named Vronski. It is said that he was paid the very high salary of \$350 or \$400 per week which, of course, had to come out of the funds raised and which used up a large part of the funds, and that these concerts were conducted after the amounts raised did not even cover expenses including his salary. The subject matter of the talk or lecture accompanying the concert in which the appeal for funds was made was, to put it mildly, of a trivial and undignified character. Of the twenty slides shown, not one had to do with conditions in Poland or even directly with the Polish Army. In addition to slides of the Paderewski, the caption for Mr. Paderewski being "Our Pride, Our Glory, Our Leader," most of the slides had to do with a so-called Golden Book to be taken by Mr. Paderewski and deposited in the Royal Castle in Cracow after the war. The slides told of the various diplomas that would be granted by the parish priests for gifts to the fund and the ways in which the name would be written in the book.

3. Method of managing and expending funds. It is claimed that there is unnecessary duplication of offices and salaries through a multiplication of organizations; that there is neither a sharp line of division between the activities of these different organizations nor yet a coördination among them; that this duplication and overlapping not merely increases expenses but also lends itself to looseness in financial methods and to a crossing or switching of accounts between the various societies. This last charge is the most serious one which we have heard made on the financial side. In support of the charge of unnecessary duplication it is pointed out that in New York City alone there are expensive offices at the Hotel Gotham, the Aeolian Hall and at 70 Fifth Avenue, and it is said that the work could be done not only more cheaply but much more efficiently if the different offices were adjacent to each other. It is asked why, since, by an order of the War Trade Board, funds can be sent to Europe only through Mr. Paderewski, local organizations should have to transmit their funds first to Chicago. This lack of unity and organization and accompanying publicity is, discounting the charge that there is actual graft and misuses of funds, the chief reason for the various rumors and charges which are afloat.

It is unfortunate that no sharp line of division exists between the distinctively relief activities and funds, those connected with the Military Commission for the support of the Polish Army, the political and propaganda funds and those used for publicity regarding Polish affairs in general and Mr. Paderewski and Mme. Paderewski in particular. This lack of definite organization gives rise to charges that funds raised ostensibly for relief purposes are devoted to other uses, military or political or press publicity. In a particular instance, a gentleman who gave one thousand dollars to the Emergency Aid fund to help Polish sufferers was asked afterward if he were willing to have the money given for Polish army purposes. He consented, but the impression left was not a favorable one since the whole matter was handled through the Polish Victims' Relief Fund which was supposed to concern itself only with the relief of victims. The organ of the National Polish

Alliance, in connection with the funds regarding the funds of the May Drive already referred to, publicly announced that instead of the funds being used in connection with the army—the ground on which the appeal was made—they will be reserved for use in connection with the Peace Conference. Local societies in Philadelphia had been accustomed to send their funds direct to the relief committee in Vevey, Switzerland, because, as they explained, they got prompt and satisfactory accountings and also were given due local credit. Finally they were directed to cease sending their funds direct to Switzerland, although the committee there was formed with Mr. Paderewski himself as one of its sponsors, and to send their money to Chicago. The refusal to conform to this order was said by Philadelphia Poles to be the cause of the refusal, referred to in connection with the Detroit Convention, to accept certain delegates. These and other similar incidents which we ran across quite incidentally illustrate both the current dissatisfaction and discontent and the cause of this friction in the absence of proper unification and coördination of the societies raising, handling and expending funds.

4. Perhaps the most serious stories that have come to our notice in connection with relief funds concern the alleged jealous desire of Mr. and Mrs. Paderewski to monopolize all of the glory connected with the raising of funds and to keep things quite strictly under their own control. A brief history of the organization connected with Polish relief since the outbreak of the war may throw light upon this matter. At first the Central Polish Relief Committee was established in Switzerland to send money to the starving population in Poland. This Committee consisted of Messrs. Sienkiewicz, Osuchowski and Paderewski. In America the National Polish Alliance collected money through its section called the Independent Section, the Roman Catholic Alliance through its section the National Council, and the Polish Falcons through the Kosciusko Fund. In 1915 these societies consolidated and established the Central Polish Relief Committee in America. Mr. Paderewski was at that time in Paris and was cabled to to permit his name to be put among the honorary members of the

Committee. He replied by cable that it would be inadvisable for him to do so. He was then in Paris and this was the period in which he formed the Committee under Ambassador Iswolsky previously referred to. When he arrived in New York the American Committee sent him a telegraphic greeting to which he did not reply, claiming afterward, when the matter was brought to his attention, that he had never heard of the Committee.

Mme. Sembrich had been elected president of an organization for Polish relief formed in New York City including in its membership a number of Americans with important banking and social connections. This society was succeeding in raising money and at one entertainment at the Biltmore raised something like \$10,000. Mr. Paderewski was repeatedly urged by Mme. Sembrich and others to join this committee and help. He declined on the ground that he had been sent by Poland and that representing the whole of Poland he could not take the place of merely a member of an American Committee and that a committee on which he served must be national in its composition. He also announced that on a reorganized committee no Poles excepting himself and those whom he might name could serve and that instead of sending funds to three organizations in Poland, as well as to a relief committee in Switzerland, all funds must be forwarded through "his" Swiss Committee. He particularly objected to sending funds through the Supreme National Committee of Cracow on the ground that the military branch of that committee was responsible for the Legions fighting under Pilsudski against Russia. It was in this connection particularly that charges were made against General Pilsudski as a German agent, Mme. Paderewski claiming, so it is stated, that he got a mark from the German Government for each Polish soldier who joined the Legions. Mr. Paderewski then set out to organize a committee of his own, diverting, so far as possible, the influential members of the committee of which Mme. Sembrich was the head to his own rival organization. About the same time insinuations were made against Mme. Sembrich of pro-German sympathies and even that she was a paid German agent. Soon after this Mme. Sembrich suffered a nervous collapse and in conse-

quence thereof withdrew from connection with Polish relief. A number of influential Americans, disgusted with the general turn of events, withdrew also and have not since given any attention to Polish sufferings. A few members in protest attempted to form a Polish-American relief commission, but it did not live long.

A somewhat similar story concerns the activities of Miss Naimska. Miss Naimska is a modest and unassuming woman and has suffered so much in connection with her endeavors to aid sufferers in Poland that she personally declined to talk, as did her brother, Dr. Corwin Lewinski. Dr. Corwin Lewinski is Secretary of the New York Academy of Medicine and the author of "A Political History of Poland" which is spoken of in the July, 1918, number of the American Historical Review as the best history of this phase of Poland yet published. In spite of the high character of both of these people, when they declined to subordinate themselves to the Paderewski interests they were reported as pro-German sympathizers and engaged in pro-German activities. The story which follows was obtained from friends and, I have every reason to believe, is reliable. Miss Naimska went to Poland to help in work for Polish women and children in the early summer of 1916. She was invited by the Women's League in Poland, which was the largest women's organization there, to represent them in America and to collect money for the orphans and the starving children of Poland. She returned to America with the proper credentials and in a very short time cabled \$2000 for Poland and formed branches of the Polish Women's League in fifty-three different cities. In spite of Miss Naimska's credentials and of the fact that she had proper vouchers for every cent collected and sent to Poland and that in addition her accounts are audited and sent to the Charity Organization Society in New York, her work suffered constant opposition and she herself underwent constant persecution. The organs of the Paderewski interests stated that she had never been in Poland, that her authorization papers were forged and that the money collected was sent not to Polish children but to German children. At the present time the organization to which she belongs is holding the sum of \$17,000 because the money was largely given by people who distrust Mr. and Mrs.

Paderewski and who made it a condition of their gifts that the money should not pass through the Paderewski channels. There seems to be no reason to doubt the statement that a very much larger sum of money could easily have been raised among the Polish women in this country together with American sympathizers if so much time and energy had not had to be spent in overcoming accusations and rumors started by opposing factions.

The Countess Turchynowicz is an American woman married to a Polish gentleman and has also published a book, *When the Prussians Came to Poland*. When she began independent activities under the auspices of the American Y. W. C. A. for Polish reconstruction work, she encountered opposition from Mrs. Paderewski. Countess Turchynowicz's first activity was to raise money for Polish sanatoriums. This was to have been done under the Polish Military Commission, and Mrs. Turchynowicz was made a member of the Polish Sanitary Commission, but suddenly Mrs. Paderewski ordered the Polish Military Commission not to permit the Countess to have any more meetings. She was, however, offered a position with a salary of \$500 a month and travelling expenses to work under Mme. Paderewski and raise money. Upon asking what would be done with the funds she would raise she was told that that was none of her affairs. She was also told to turn over all the money she had already raised, or otherwise the Military Commission would warn the Polish people against her and she would not be allowed to do any further work, and soon after this personal attacks appeared upon her in the papers allied with the Paderewski faction. This story may be found in some detail in the *Kuryer Polski* of Milwaukee, Wis., of June 9, 1918. So far as we can learn the essentials of the story have never been denied, and the main features Countess Turchynowicz has confirmed to us. Mrs. Turchynowicz, being an American woman and of a different temperament from some other persons who have engaged in Polish relief work, has not been intimidated and is continuing her activities. She is, however, so far as we can learn, the only exception to the statement that the Paderewskis and the people immediately associated with them have attacked and in the end driven out

of activity every organization which they could not personally dominate.

Other instances of the attempt to maintain a monopoly are said to be shown in such instances as the following: President Wilson proclaimed January 1, 1916 as a Polish Day. The money raised was, however, to be sent through the Red Cross and not through the Paderewski committee. The result was such antagonism that only a few thousand dollars were collected throughout the whole country. In the early part of 1916 reports were current that it was impossible for money and clothing to reach Poland, and the Paderewski committee in this country took no steps to contradict the reports which were having an injurious effect on the raising of funds. In reply to a cablegram to the Vevey Committee (of which, it will be recalled, Mr. Paderewski was one of the original members), a message was received on March 7, 1916, stating: "We are able to forward money and supplies to Poland without impediment."

Independent organizations that attempted to have Tag Days in Polish communities for raising funds were antagonized in ways which often were obscure or even secret. In some cases the police were asked to interfere. In one case, that of Newark, a direct connection was established between one Miukowicz and Mr. Gorski in New York. This Miukowicz, having been rebuffed by the Poles in Newark when he tried to get the collection of funds stopped, reported to Mr. Gorski and then returned with a number of Poles to Newark and drove about the city doing what they could to discourage the collection of funds. The following letter signed W. A. Pawlowski, Los Angeles, Calif., dated Aug. 3, 1918, is characteristic of the methods everywhere employed. The letter is addressed to the treasurer of the Polish Women's League of Los Angeles and reads:

"In reference to our recent conversation regarding raising funds on the streets some time in September, I wish to advise you that your society will have the heartiest endorsement from the Allies' committee in this work as soon as it has procured the proper credentials from the official Polish representative, His Excellency, I. J. Paderewski."

Not only do the followers of Paderewski speak freely of him as ambassador, plenipotentiary and excellency, but, as will be seen from the quoted letter, his official status as representative of the Paris Committee is used to maintain the monopoly of his own relief society when other means fail.

III. THE WHITE CROSS AND THE RED CROSS. The creation and activities of the so-called White Cross appear to afford another case of the ill-advised activities of Mrs. Paderewski undertaken with the support of her husband. In the month of April of the present year the Polish press in this country which support the Paderewski leadership announced that a Polish Red Cross was to be organized in the United States as a branch of the Polish Red Cross in France which was working in connection with the Polish National Army, and that Mrs. Paderewski had been named as the President of the Polish Red Cross in France and would accordingly act in a similar capacity in the United States. Mr. Helinski of the Polish Military Commission was even named as the authority for this statement. Since, of course, no such action had been taken, the inference is that the statements were made in order to prepare the way for some such action. The scheme, however, came up against certain obvious insuperable obstacles, such as that there could be a French Red Cross and an American Red Cross, but until Poland was an independent state there could be no Polish Red Cross, and even if there were, its sphere of activities would have to be confined to Poland. The scheme was, however, soon revived in another form. About the middle of the month of July the friendly Polish press announced that a Polish White Cross had been formed in France and received the official sanction of the French Government and that Mme. Paderewski had been appointed its American head. In France, however, it was announced that a White Cross had been formed in America and would work in connection with the Committee for Aid of the Polish Wounded which operated under the auspices of the French Red Cross. The fact that the French Government has not permitted on its own soil any organization which did not work under the French Red Cross appears clearly in the cablegram from Paris of the date of July 12,

which gives the authorization under which the White Cross in this country is operating.

“The French-Polish Military Commission, coöperating with the Polish National Committee, have formed a Committee known as the ‘Aid for Polish Wounded.’ This Committee will work in close connection with the affiliated societies of the French Red Cross and also directly with the Polish organization in the United States of which Mme. Paderewski is president.”

The statement of July 29 of the French Ambassador in Washington, M. Jusserand, is to the following effect:

“The French Ambassador takes pleasure in stating that he has been informed that the Polish White Cross (having the same aims of the Red Cross in other countries) organized in the United States by Mme. Helene Paderewski, president, has been accorded full recognition in France and is acting in conjunction with the Committee for the Aid of Polish Wounded in Paris of which Count Potocki is head.”

These official documents make it clear that Mme. Paderewski first formed a society in this country of which she made herself president and then secured for it recognition from France, a recognition, however, which is absolutely confined to America and does not give a Polish White Cross any official status whatsoever on French soil. Under such circumstances, the misleading statements published in the Polish press and practically universally believed among Poles and especially the Polish women in this country who are immediately affected, is, to say the least, very unfortunate. In this connection it should be noted that efforts are being made wherever sewing circles or other organizations of Polish women exist which have been working for the Polish wounded to turn them into Helene Paderewski Circles of the White Cross. In some communities, at least, these organizations are being informed that they cannot continue unless they become Helene Paderewski branches of the White Cross.

There is no reason to think that the facts as we found them in Philadelphia are at all exceptional. Judging from these facts, the formation of the White Cross, which is operating practically as a rival of the Red Cross, was most undesirable. The Polish women were working mostly under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Emergency Commission which was officially constituted in order to take care of suffering which might arise in connection with any families speaking foreign languages which were represented by the allied armies in France. The women of the weaver district in Philadelphia where the men largely belong to the K. O. N., were working directly under Red Cross auspices. We found absolutely no trace of any desire anywhere for any new organization; in fact a great preference for existing organization and positive resentment at having a new one forced upon them.

In addition, certain specific evils have shown themselves: (1) There is an increasing belief that interest in Poland is being subordinated to personal glorification and ambitions. (2) Polish women are being more and more segregated to work independently of American interests and of American women, when the war would naturally have otherwise thrown these women into closer contact with Americans and with the cause of America. Thus the war is being used to arrest instead of to facilitate the process of Americanization. (3) Much ill-advised and harmful criticism and misrepresentation of the Red Cross has been aroused. The cause was the necessity of justifying the White Cross against criticism and answering questions as to the necessity of a new and duplicate organization having new offices, officers, and, presumably, salaries. In order to answer these questions and show that the White Cross was necessary, a campaign of misrepresentation of the Red Cross has been carried on, in a veiled way in the Polish press, in a more open way in personal and private conversations. It has been variously stated that the American Red Cross would only look after American soldiers in France and that the White Cross was necessary to see that the wounded in the Polish National Army were cared for. It has been stated that the Red Cross would not support the hospitals for the soldiers of the Polish National Army.

Since the American Red Cross especially offered to support such hospitals but naturally made the condition that the hospitals be under its own management and not under that of an independent organization, the animus of this accusation is clear. Reports have also been circulated that the American Red Cross is not as much interested in general Polish relief as it is in the relief of other oppressed nationalities; it is insinuated that an official now connected with the Red Cross but formerly connected with Paderewski's relief organization has used his influence against the interests of Polish victims and of Polish wounded. Finally, it is charged that since the White Cross has received official recognition the Red Cross is so jealous and antagonistic that it refused to permit surgical and other relief material to be sent to France if shipped by the White Cross for the Polish National Army. Judging from analogous episodes, it is safe to say that if the White Cross does not become a marked financial and social success, such accusations as these will increase in number and intensity.

IV. THE POLISH ARMY. On the face of it, the importance of the issue of the Polish National Army in this country is due to the attitude of opposition formerly taken on the part of the K. O. N., and the order of the United States Government through the Military Intelligence Bureau after the Philadelphia Convention of May, 1918, that the K. O. N. should disband unless it ceased its opposition. Beneath this question, however, there are a number of matters of greater importance as indications of fundamental conditions and as influencing the attitude of Poles toward the war and toward the United States.

1. The chief military argument for the existence of a distinctively Polish Army is the effect of the existence of such an army upon the efforts of the German authorities who are occupying Poland to recruit Poles for the German Army, as well as to arouse enthusiasm in Poland and among Poles everywhere for the cause of the Allies. These reasons are accepted by all parties as making desirable the existence of a Polish Army. Differences and disputes concern the location of authority over the army. The National

Democratic Party, having secured its recognition by means of the Paris Committee, has pushed an army under the French Military Commission and under the Paris Committee as a means of furthering the recognition of the Paris Committee as the War Department of the New Kingdom of Poland and thereby improving its own position in the future struggle for the control of Polish politics. In the public press members of this party talked in large terms of a Polish Army of half a million to be recruited largely from the United States. In more sober official communications they appear to have committed themselves to a claim that a Polish Army could be raised consisting of 100,000 to 150,000—a claim which, as will appear below, has effected in an unfortunate way the nature of the recruiting campaign in the United States.

On the other hand, the opposition to the Polish Army by the radical party in Europe and by the K. O. N. in this country is due to the fact that this army is now virtually under the control of what the radical party regards as a one-sided and unrepresentative faction and that this control so increases the prestige of the National Democratic Party as to give it an unjustifiable advantage in the determination of the question whether the future Poland shall be a monarchy or a republic and whether it shall be economically imperialistic and reactionary or democratic and progressive. It is freely asserted that the virtual control of the Polish Army by the Paris Committee has been the chief factor in retarding the formation of an effective army to fight on the side of the Allies out of the Poles who previously fought on the side of Russia. It is estimated that there were 700,000 Poles on the side of Russia. But it is generally claimed that the great majority of these Poles, owing to previous sentiment and still more to the recent rapid growth of radical sentiment in Russia, so distrust the National Democrats that they are unwilling to fight under its auspices. The claim is freely put forth that with a more official recognition of a free, independent and united Poland by the Allies and the formation of a comprehensive and representative commission of all parties, it would be comparatively easy to enroll a large army from Russian Poles. We have not of course been in any position

to investigate the merit of these claims, but they are made so positively that they would appear to be worth looking into by those who are in a position to ascertain the real facts.

In any case, the claim to control of the former Polish soldiers in the Russian army is becoming a matter of increasing interest. On account of the relative failure of recruiting of Polish legions in this country, the party of Paderewski and Dmoski is now making great claims concerning them—see the section on the decisions of the Detroit Convention—in spite of the fact that evidence available (which is not adequate for a full judgment) tends to show that the soldiers are upon the whole radically inclined. General Dowber-Musnicki, the Commander of a Brigade in the First Polish Army Corps who is himself a National Democrat, has issued the following statement which seems to put at rest the claims of any persons—like those of some young officers who have recently come to America—to speak officially for the Polish Army of Russia: “Since the dissolution of the first Polish Army Corps, no organization in Poland or outside of Poland, or any individual or group of individuals has the right to represent or to express any opinion in the name of the Army Corps or to speak or to act in its name.”

2. Friction in the United States. The opposition of the K. O. N. to the recruiting of a large National Polish Army under the auspices of the Paris Committee and the secession of this opposition at the request of the United States Government are well known facts. It should be understood in connection with these facts that the leaders and press of the K. O. N. and the radical parties in the United States were at the same time carrying on a very active campaign for enlistment in the United States Army. According to our investigations there is not the slightest justification for the assertion freely made that these efforts to recruit for the United States Army were an insincere camouflage. They appear to have been undertaken in good faith and carried on very energetically. The facts show that quite independently of any opposition of the K. O. N., the cause of the Polish National Army has not been popular with the Poles in the United States, Instead of the large numbers talked about (Polish recruiting officers and one branch

of the Polish press talks loosely about an army of fifty or sixty thousand), only about fifteen thousand have been recruited. Too much has been made of the alleged fact that enemy aliens in Class Five who were not eligible to enlist in the United States Army constitute a natural reservoir for the Polish Army. As a matter of fact, statistics regarding Poles recruited in New York for this army show that over 80 per cent. come from the Kingdom of Poland and would therefore in any case have been eligible as volunteers in the United States Army. It is noteworthy that the same statistics show that less than 6 per cent. of the same recruits belong to the National Polish Alliance; three times that number to the Polish Falcons who, while they have recently broken loose, were earlier affiliated with the K. O. N. The comparative unpopularity of the cause of the Polish Army seems to be due in the main to the natural preference of the great majority of Poles to ally themselves with the American Army. There is, however, a great deal of dissatisfaction among the Poles, including the officers of the Polish National Army, with the character of the local recruiting stations in the United States. Charges of incompetency, lack of energy, etc., are freely made. Dissatisfaction with the management of the Military Commission located at 70 Fifth Avenue has also been much in evidence. Some of the army men have claimed that they seem more interested in politics and in maintaining their affiliations with the Paderewski-Smulski group than in disinterested work for the Polish Army. Such evidence as we have been able to gather indicates that this so-called Military Commission has spent much more of its time and energy in trying to collect funds to be used in connection with the army, insurance, relief of dependents, etc., than in stimulating recruiting and a direct interest in the army. The dissatisfaction with its failure to make a public statement of funds collected has already been referred to. The methods of the Military Commission in dealing with the local recruiting officers are also criticized. It is claimed that the Military Commission compels the local officers to advance funds out of their own pockets. This charge is not made in connection with accusations of graft but as indicating a desire on the part of the

Military Commission to keep the local officers under their own political management.

In order to make good the extravagant promises made in France regarding a Polish Army to be raised in the United States, Messrs. Paderewski, Seyda and many of the officers of the Polish Army in the United States have agitated in favor of the following:

(a) That all declarants, all who have not completed their full naturalization, should be compelled to go into the Polish army instead of the United States Army; (b) that all Poles who are citizens but who did not speak and understand English freely, should be taken out of the American Army and turned over to the Polish Army; (c) that the large number of persons who, under pressure or enthusiasm, enroll in the Polish Army and then do not report for duty should be treated as military deserters.

While, naturally, the American Government has not acceded to any of these claims, their constant urging has created more or less friction among the Poles. While this does not usually culminate in physical violence, cases have been reported to us from Chicago where the ill-feeling became so great that Poles in the American Army and in the Polish Army beat each other up and strife was produced among the civilian members of their respective families. Additional friction has been caused because the American adherents of the Paris Committee, in order to justify themselves for their meager success in getting recruits, have freely criticized the United States Government for failing to accede to the three requests spoken of above.

The somewhat curious greater devotion of the civilian Military Commission of 70 Fifth Avenue to raising funds rather than to raising an army has been associated with some misrepresentation of the actual status of the soldiers in the Polish National Army. In order to stimulate the raising of funds, the pay of soldiers by the French Government, the amount of protection afforded their dependents, etc., have been much understated. In this connection, a full page advertisement in the periodical *Free Poland*, for the month of June, which misstates the facts in such a way as to throw discredit on the French Government, is pointed to.

3. The United States shares of course the interest of all the Allies in the maintenance in Europe of Polish troops sufficient to neutralize German efforts in Poland and actively to attach the interests of the Poles everywhere to the cause of the Allies. There are good reasons for doubting whether the present methods are the best for this end. A somewhat aggressive Polanizing and de-Americanizing campaign has been carried on in connection with efforts to secure recruits for the Polish Army in this country—in order, that is, to get those in Class Five who are eligible to enter the American Army to enter the Polish instead. Polish officers in speaking to us have made no attempt to conceal the fact that they are first and always Poles and that they regard it selfish of the United States not to encourage the transfer of Poles from the American Army to the Polish Army. No such Americanizing campaign is possible in Camp Niagara as is effectively carried on in American camps such as Camp Gordon. The small number recruited for the Polish Army makes this de-Americanizing movement of comparatively slight importance, although it tends to spread to the families and friends of those concerned.

If for this de-Americanizing tendency there could be substituted conditions which would appeal to the American sympathies of the mass of the Poles, recruiting for the Polish Army would, in my judgment, be greatly stimulated. The great industrial importance of Polish labor in this country must be borne in mind and the fact that there will be a shortage of labor after the war and that there is already a movement under foot (which should be carefully looked into) to stimulate the return of Poles and others of foreign birth in Southeastern Europe to their native lands after the war. With the sharp commercial competition that will necessarily take place after the war, any tendencies which on the one hand de-Americanize and on the other hand strengthen the allegiance of those of foreign birth to the United States deserve careful attention. The question may be raised whether, in view of the change of the draft age and the great number of new recruits for the American Army thus made available, and in connection with the comparative ease with which an American commission could handle the

question of Poles who are enemy aliens, technically, a readjustment of the Polish Army question might not be advantageous. Without interfering in any way with the existing Polish Army under French Military Control, Poles from this time on might be encouraged to join a Polish Army under directly American control. These new Polish Legions could easily be affiliated with the proposed Slavic Legions under American control. There is every reason for thinking that the better pay, provision for insurance and allotments for dependents, together with the much better educational conditions at American camps, would soon bring about the recruiting of a large Polish Army and thereby make up for the comparative failure of the present Polish Army.

V. Polish publicity in the United States. There is much dissatisfaction with both the amount and the quality of the publicity given to the cause of Poland in the United States. Intelligent Poles feel, and apparently with great justice, that the cause of Poland is, after that of Belgium, the most important of the issues of oppressed nationalities for which the war is waged—that, in ulterior importance, it ranks even higher than the cause of Belgium because of the greater extent and larger population of Poland and its extraordinary strategic position as the key to future war and peace issues of Europe. In spite of this importance, the cause of Poland receives comparatively little publicity. The responsibility for this is placed pretty directly upon the Polish Associated Press, of which Mr. James C. White is the director, located in Washington. It is said that this press bureau is more interested in acting as a press agency for Mr. and Mrs. Paderewski and other prominent individuals than it is of securing public discussion of forces and facts about Poland and that instead of acting as a just medium of communication and expression for all Polish interests, it is rather a center of gossip, tittle-tattle, and intrigue of one faction against another. (For additional matter on this subject see the second preliminary memorandum handed in August 23, 1918.) The veil of privacy and secrecy which was thrown about the doings of the Detroit Convention and the absence of any reporting of this convention which purported to represent the interests of four

million Poles in America shows, so it is argued, either their complete inefficiency, or else that the Polish Associated Press is not really interested in publicity for Poland at all but simply in serving personal private ambitions and the interest of a faction.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

There is unity among the different groups of Poles regarding the war and regarding the purpose of establishing a free, united and independent Poland with access to the sea. Differences among them concern primarily the means and methods to be employed in attaining this end. But these differences as to method go back to different conceptions of the nature of the new state of Poland. One party is Pan-Polish and talks freely about a population of thirty and even thirty-five million—a number which could not possibly be reached without annexing non-Polish elements in large numbers. It desires a strong monarchy and conceives of Poland largely as a buffer state between Russia and Germany; looks forward to the reëstablishment of a monarchy though not a Tsardom in Russia and expects to be, if not directly under the influence of Russia, at least closely allied to it. In the main it is Pan-Slavic as well as Pan-Polish. By access to the sea it understands a breakup of eastern Prussia by the insertion of an actual continuous wedge of Polish territory. This party has, chiefly through its prior good standing with the Russian Government due to its Russophile policy, established very friendly relations in Paris and London and has through its Paris Committee, the so-called Polish National Council, acquired up to a certain point an official status.

The other party, while inclined to extend the boundaries of Poland on the basis of the ancient historic territories of the State of Poland, yet contemplates the probability of independent states of Esthonia, Livonia, Lithuania, Ukrainia, etc., looking forward to voluntary federation later. While it would doubtless like to see Dantzic completely Polish territory, it would be contented with some kind of neutralization or internationalization which would make it a genuinely free port for Poland. It looks forward to a

Republican State with a democratic form of government and a moderate socialistic policy in industrial matters. Owing to its strength with the peasants as well as with the skilled laborers in Poland, it is much stronger in Poland than any other single party, though not as strong as all of its opponents combined. In foreign politics it has in the past been strongly anti-Russian and inclined toward Austria; in the future its relations in case the Dual Empire were broken up would probably be closer with Hungary than with the German portion of Austria. Outside of Poland and Russia this party has no official status nor any great influence in Europe although in France the majority of Poles who belong to the Moderate Democrats are more friendly to it than they are to the National Democrats and the Paris Committee. This faction has the great prestige that comes from the name of General Pilsudski, the present National hero of Poland.

The causes of discord carried over on American soil from these European conditions have been much intensified by the struggle between clericals and anti-clericals for supremacy in American Polish organizations and affairs and by the campaign of misrepresentation carried on by the majority faction against the radical party. The causes of this campaign are, for the most part, past quarrels, many of them going back many years before the war, and which are both personal and partisan. The effect of this campaign of misrepresentation has been threefold: (a) To create discord and intensify strife; (b) by discrediting a number of men of great vigor, intelligence and learning to close important channels of communication and information to the American public and even the government of the United States; (c) to deprive the government of the most active aid which the leaders of this group are capable of giving the Government in the Liberty Loans, Red Cross Drives, and particularly in allaying industrial unrest and speeding up factory, mining, shipwork, etc., connected with the war. For it must be remembered that while this group is a minority of the organized Poles, it possesses by common admission of its opponents the ablest Poles in this country, is stronger with the organized and more skilled Polish workers than the conservative

faction, and that large numbers of Poles who are not nominally affiliated with it are sympathetic toward it—namely, those Poles who, without having broken from the church, are opposed to the activity of priests in politics. Intelligent Poles outside of both factions inform us that while the K. O. N. is under a cloud at present, due mainly to the campaign of misrepresentation spoken of, the extremely exclusive and autocratic methods pursued by the conservative party are in reality giving added strength to the K. O. N. and that it is only a question of time when a very marked reaction in its favor will take place. Should the republican parties in Europe get the better of the conservative and monarchical in the new State of Poland, these independent observers believe that the K. O. N. will, as in 1912, again become the nucleus of the political organization of Poles in this country.

The mass of Poles who, as it has been repeatedly stated, are unorganized, are also indifferent to European party strifes, and would not have been drawn into the corresponding American dissensions were it not for two causes: First, the control of Polish organizations by the affiliation worked out in 1913-14 and consummated at the Detroit Convention between the Smulski political group and the non-Americanizing group of the priests. The mass of the Poles, being Catholics, the influence of the priests upon them is naturally, and, when exercised outside of politics, properly, strong. One of the most unfortunate features of the whole situation as we have found it by personal contact is that, because of conditions described above, the war has had the effect of increasing instead of decreasing anti-American influence among the Poles. Second, the influence of the prestige and standing of Mr. Paderewski among Americans. This influence has been constantly reinforced by the money at the command of people immediately associated with Mr. Paderewski and by vigorous press agent work has imposed itself as a Polish press and publicity bureau. It is clinched, however, by the quasi-official position occupied by Mr. Paderewski as "ambassador" of the Paris Committee, constantly represented to the Poles as the Provisional Government of the new State of Poland. Many influential Poles, including men who as

delegates to the Detroit Convention voted to sustain the present state of affairs, have personally deplored Mr. and Mrs. Paderewski's influence on the ground that it tended to subordinate the interests of Poland to personal glorification, but have stated that they were powerless to do anything as long as Mr. Paderewski presented himself to them as having the official support of Great Britain, France and the United States. Just as Mr. Dmowski's control of the Detroit Convention came, on one hand, from his alleged influence in Europe and will, on the other hand, be used to strengthen his power in Europe by enabling him to claim that the four million Poles in this country are unanimously behind him, so Mr. and Mrs. Paderewski constantly use their hold on Americans to discourage and suppress criticism among the Poles and then, on the other hand, employ their supposedly universal popularity among the Poles to function more prominently among Americans.

American repute, prestige and influence are definitely involved in this Polish situation, in addition to the concern due to the bad influence of the Polish dissensions upon the morale of the Polish civilian population. At home this bad reflex effect is seen in everything that has to do with relief work, with the White and Red Cross and with the army. The pains taken by the conservative faction to exclude the radical from representation on committees having the Liberty Loan in charge would have had a harmful influence were it not that the loyalty of the leaders of the K. O. N. is so great that their exclusion from official committees has only stimulated them to greater voluntary activity. The bad reflex effect in Europe is due to the representations of the conservative faction that the United States is completely tied to its cause. This not merely increases dissension among Poles abroad but it enables German propagandists to cast discredit upon the purposes and aims of the United States in the war. It tends directly to strengthen the influence of that party of the Poles in Poland who, short of some guarantee of a free, united and independent Poland, would welcome one of the two "Austrian solutions," particularly if it took the form of the union of Galicia to the Kingdom of Poland under the rule of Charles Stephen.

It is the general impression among the intelligent and independent Poles as well as of Americans who have observed the situation that the Polish factions are now so bitterly opposed to each other that they can be really united only under outside American pressure. It is also the conviction that they would not remain united excepting through American mediation and under American auspices. An American Commission for Polish Affairs which had representative Americans upon it would be able to secure and maintain also in its membership a union of the Poles. Refusal of any faction or important Pole to join would indicate that he put personal ambitions or partisan interests before the cause of Poland, or else that he put allegiance to some foreign group before his allegiance to the United States. In our judgment, this test should be applied impartially to the representatives of all factions whatsoever and their final status should be determined by the way in which they respond to this test. In addition to putting an end to dissension and accelerating the civilian preparation for war, such a Commission could undertake also to great advantage activity in some or all of the following directions:

1. Bring about a financial organization or unification which would command the confidence of Poles and Americans alike.

2. Institute machinery under proper legislation by which Poles who are really loyal to the cause of America and the Allies could be relieved of the technical status of enemy aliens.

3. Stimulate recruiting from Class Five for Polish regiments under distinctly American control.

4. Form a basis for considering the problems of labor, immigration and emigration, which will be immediately urgent after the war.

5. Provide methods by which information from all Polish sources can be secured and organized and by which the causes of industrial unrest can be immediately detected and the unrest allayed.

6. Get in contact with all organized Polish groups abroad, including Poland, and thereby also make clear the active and directive influence of the United States in the Polish problem,

quieting German and Austrian propaganda and keeping the Poles in Poland faithful to the cause of the Allies.

For reasons sufficiently indicated in the body of the report, the United States is the one country which is universally regarded as disinterested and the one country therefore which would unqualifiedly win and retain the confidence of Poles in Europe.



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