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


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CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

ADDRESS OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

AT THE OPENING OF THE
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT
AT WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 12, 1921

TOGETHER WITH THE

ADDRESS OF CHARLES E. HUGHES
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES
AND AMERICAN COMMISSIONER

ALSO

THE PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR A
LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT



PRESENTED BY MR. LODGE

NOVEMBER 14, 1921.—Ordered to be printed

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ADDRESS.

MR. SECRETARY AND MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It is a great and happy privilege to bid the delegates to this Conference a cordial welcome to the Capital of the United States of America. It is not only a satisfaction to greet you because we were lately participants in a common cause, in which shared sacrifices and sorrows and triumphs brought our nations more closely together, but it is gratifying to address you as the spokesmen for nations whose convictions and attending actions have so much to do with the weal or woe of all mankind.

It is not possible to overappraise the importance of such a conference. It is no unseemly boast, no disparagement of other nations which, though not represented, are held in highest respect, to declare that the conclusions of this body will have a signal influence on all human progress—on the fortunes of the world.

Here is a meeting, I can well believe, which is an earnest of the awakened conscience of twentieth century civilization. It is not a convention of remorse, nor a session of sorrow. It is not the conference of victors to define terms of settlement. Nor is it a council of nations seeking to remake humankind. It is rather a coming together, from all parts of the earth, to apply the better attributes of mankind to minimize the faults in our international relationships.

Speaking as official sponsor for the invitation, I think I may say the call is not of the United States of America alone, it is rather the spoken word of a war-wearied world, struggling for restoration, hungering and thirsting for better relationship; of humanity crying for relief and craving assurances of lasting peace.

It is easy to understand this world-wide aspiration. The glory of triumph, the rejoicing in achievement, the love of liberty, the devotion to country, the pangs of sorrow, the burdens of debt, the desolation of ruin—all these are appraised alike in all lands. Here in the United States we are but freshly turned from the burial of an unknown American soldier, when a nation sorrowed while paying him tribute. Whether it was spoken or not, a hundred millions of our people were summarizing the inexcusable causes, the incalculable cost, the unspeakable sacrifices, and the unutterable sorrows, and there was the ever impelling question: How can humanity justify or God forgive? Human hate demands no such toll; ambition and greed must be denied it. If misunderstanding must take the blame, then let us banish it, and let understanding rule and make good will regnant everywhere. All of us demand liberty and justice. There can not be one without the other, and they must be held the unquestioned possession of all peoples. Inherent rights are of God, and the tragedies of the world originate in their attempted denial. The world to-day is infringing their enjoyment by arming to defend or deny, when simple sanity calls for their recognition through common understanding.

Out of the cataclysm of the World War came new fellowships, new convictions, new aspirations. It is ours to make the most of them. A world staggering with debt needs its burden lifted. Humanity which has been shocked by wanton destruction would minimize the agencies of that destruction. Contemplating the measureless cost of war and the continuing burden of armament, all thoughtful peoples wish for real limitation of armament and would like war outlawed. In soberest reflection the world's hundreds of millions who pay in peace and die in war wish their statesmen to turn the expenditures for destruction into means of construction, aimed at a higher state for those who live and follow after.

It is not alone that the world can not readjust itself and cast aside the excess burdens without relief from the leaders of men. War has grown progressively cruel and more destructive from the first recorded conflict to this pregnant day, and the reverse order would more become our boasted civilization.

Gentlemen of the Conference, the United States welcomes you with unselfish hands. We harbor no fears; we have no sordid ends to serve; we suspect no enemy; we contemplate or apprehend no conquest. Content with what we have, we seek nothing which is another's. We only wish to do with you that finer, nobler thing which no nation can do alone.

We wish to sit with you at the table of international understanding and good will. In good conscience we are eager to meet you frankly, and invite and offer cooperation. The world demands a sober contemplation of the existing order and the realization that there can be no cure without sacrifice, not by one of us, but by all of us.

I do not mean surrendered rights, or narrowed freedom, or denied aspirations, or ignored national necessities. Our Republic would no more ask for these than it would give. No pride need be humbled, no nationality submerged, but I would have a mergence of minds committing all of us to less preparation for war and more enjoyment of fortunate peace.

The higher hopes come of the spirit of our coming together. It is but just to recognize varying needs and peculiar positions. Nothing can be accomplished in disregard of national apprehensions. Rather, we should act together to remove the causes of apprehensions. This is not to be done in intrigue. Greater assurance is found in the exchanges of simple honesty and directness, among men resolved to accomplish as becomes leaders among nations, when civilization itself has come to its crucial test.

It is not to be challenged that government fails when the excess of its cost robs the people of the way to happiness and the opportunity to achieve. If the finer sentiments were not urging, the cold, hard facts of excessive cost and the eloquence of economics would urge us to reduce our armaments. If the concept of a better order does not appeal, then let us ponder the burden and the blight of continued competition.

It is not to be denied that the world has swung along throughout the ages without heeding this call from the kindlier hearts of men. But the same world never before was so tragically brought to realization of the utter fatality of passion's sway when reason and conscience and fellowship point a nobler way.

I can speak officially only for our United States. Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war. Wholly free from guile, sure in our own minds that we harbor no unworthy designs, we accredit the world with the same good intent. So I welcome you, not alone in good will and high purpose, but with high faith.

We are met for a service to mankind. In all simplicity, in all honesty and all honor, there may be written here the avowals of a world conscience refined by the consuming fires of war, and made more sensitive by the anxious aftermath. I hope for that understanding which will emphasize the guarantees of peace, and for commitments to less burdens and a better order which will tranquilize the world. In such an accomplishment there will be added glory to your flags and ours, and the rejoicing of mankind will make the transcending music of all succeeding time.

ADDRESS OF
CHARLES E. HUGHES

SECRETARY OF STATE OF
THE UNITED STATES

AND

AMERICAN COMMISSIONER TO THE CONFERENCE ON LIMITATION OF
ARMAMENT, ON ASSUMING THE DUTIES OF PRESIDING
OFFICER AT THE CONFERENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C., NOVEMBER 12, 1921

ADDRESS.

GENTLEMEN: It is with a deep sense of privilege and responsibility that I accept the honor you have conferred.

Permit me to express the most cordial appreciation of the assurances of friendly cooperation, which have been generously expressed by the representatives of all the invited Governments. The earnest desire and purpose, manifested in every step in the approach to this meeting, that we should meet the reasonable expectation of a watching world by effective action suited to the opportunity is the best augury for the success of the Conference.

The President invited the Governments of the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan to participate in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions would also be discussed. It would have been most agreeable to the President to have invited all the Powers to take part in this Conference, but it was thought to be a time when other considerations should yield to the practical requirements of the existing exigency, and in this view the invitation was extended to the group known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, which, by reason of the conditions produced by the war, control in the main the armament of the world. The opportunity to limit armament lies within their grasp.

It was recognized, however, that the interests of other Powers in the Far East made it appropriate that they should be invited to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and, with the approval of the five Powers, an invitation to take part in the discussion of those questions has been extended to Belgium, China, the Netherlands, and Portugal.

The inclusion of the proposal for the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions was not for the purpose of embarrassing or delaying an agreement for limitation of armament, but rather to support that undertaking by availing ourselves of this meeting to endeavor to reach a common understanding as to the principles and policies to be followed in the Far East and thus greatly to diminish, and if possible wholly to remove, discernible sources of controversy. It is believed that by interchanges of views at this opportune time the Governments represented here may find a basis of accord and thus give expression to their desire to assure enduring friendship.

In the public discussions which have preceded the Conference, there have been apparently two competing views; one, that the consideration of armament should await the result of the discussion of Far Eastern questions, and, another, that the latter discussion should be postponed until an agreement for limitation of armament has been reached. I am unable to find sufficient reason for adopting either of these extreme views. I think that it would be most unfortunate if we should disappoint the hopes which have attached to this meeting by

a postponement of the consideration of the first subject. The world looks to this Conference to relieve humanity of the crushing burden created by competition in armament, and it is the view of the American Government that we should meet that expectation without any unnecessary delay. It is therefore proposed that the Conference should proceed at once to consider the question of the limitation of armament.

This, however, does not mean that we must postpone the examination of Far Eastern questions. These questions of vast importance press for solution. It is hoped that immediate provision may be made to deal with them adequately, and it is suggested that it may be found to be entirely practicable through the distribution of the work among designated committees to make progress to the ends sought to be achieved without either subject being treated as a hindrance to the proper consideration and disposition of the other.

The proposal to limit armament by an agreement of the Powers is not a new one, and we are admonished by the futility of earlier efforts. It may be well to recall the noble aspirations which were voiced twenty-three years ago in the imperial rescript of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. It was then pointed out with clarity and emphasis that "The intellectual and physical strength of the nations, labor, and capital are for the major part diverted from their natural application and unproductively consumed. Hundreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which, though to-day regarded as the last word of science, are destined to-morrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field. National culture, economic progress, and the production of wealth are either paralyzed or checked in their development. Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each Power increase, so do they less and less fulfill the object which the Governments have set before themselves. The economic crises, due in great part to the system of armaments a Poutrance and the continual danger which lies in this massing of war materials, are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden, which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then, that if this state of things were prolonged it would inevitably lead to the calamity which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every thinking man shudder in advance. To put an end to these incessant armaments and to seek the means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the whole world—such is the supreme duty which is to-day imposed on all States."

It was with this sense of obligation that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia proposed the Conference, which was "to occupy itself with this grave problem" and which met at The Hague in the year 1899. Important as were the deliberations and conclusions of that Conference, especially with respect to the pacific settlement of international disputes, its result in the specific matter of limitation of armament went no further than the adoption of a final resolution setting forth the opinion "that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind," and the utterance of the wish that the Governments "may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets."

It was seven years later that the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Elihu Root, in answering a note of the Russian Ambassador suggesting in outline a program of the Second Peace Conference, said: "The Government of the United States, therefore, feels it to be its duty to reserve for itself the liberty to propose to the Second Peace Conference, as one of the subjects for consideration, the reduction or limitation of armaments, in the hope that, if nothing further can be accomplished, some slight advance may be made toward the realization of the lofty conception which actuated the Emperor of Russia in calling the First Conference." It is significant that the Imperial German Government expressed itself as "absolutely opposed to the question of disarmament" and that the Emperor of Germany threatened to decline to send delegates if the subject of disarmament was to be discussed. In view, however, of the resolution which had been adopted at the First Hague Conference the delegates of the United States were instructed that the subject of limitation of armament "should be regarded as unfinished business, and that the Second Conference should ascertain and give full consideration to the results of such examination as the Governments may have given to the possibility of an agreement pursuant to the wish expressed by the First Conference." But by reason of the obstacles which the subject had encountered, the Second Peace Conference at The Hague, although it made notable progress in provision for the peaceful settlement of controversies, was unable to deal with limitation of armament except by a resolution in the following general terms: "The Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure; and inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume the serious examination of this question."

This was the fruition of the efforts of eight years. Although the effect was clearly perceived, the race in preparation of armament, wholly unaffected by these futile suggestions, went on until it fittingly culminated in the greatest war of history; and we are now suffering from the unparalleled loss of life, the destruction of hopes, the economic dislocations and the widespread impoverishment which measure the cost of the victory over the brutal pretensions of military force.

But if we are warned by the inadequacy of earlier endeavors for limitation of armament, we can not fail to recognize the extraordinary opportunity now presented. We not only have the lessons of the past to guide us, not only do we have the reaction from the disillusioning experiences of war, but we must meet the challenge of imperative economic demands. What was convenient or highly desirable before is now a matter of vital necessity. If there is to be economic rehabilitation, if the longings for reasonable progress are not to be denied, if we are to be spared the uprisings of peoples made desperate in the desire to shake off burdens no longer endurable, competition in armament must stop. The present opportunity not only derives its advantage from a general appreciation of this fact, but the power to deal with the exigency now rests with a small group of nations, represented here, who have every reason to desire peace and to promote amity. The astounding ambition which lay

athwart the promise of the Second Hague Conference no longer menaces the world, and the great opportunity of liberty-loving and peace-preserving democracies has come. Is it not plain that the time has passed for mere resolutions that the responsible Powers should examine the question of limitation of armament? We can no longer content ourselves with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with the circumlocution of inquiry. The essential facts are sufficiently known. The time has come, and this Conference has been called, not for general resolutions or mutual advice, but for action. We meet with full understanding that the aspirations of mankind are not to be defeated either by plausible suggestions of postponement or by impracticable counsels of perfection. Power and responsibility are here and the world awaits a practicable program which shall at once be put into execution.

I am confident that I shall have your approval in suggesting that in this matter, as well as in others before the Conference, it is desirable to follow the course of procedure which has the best promise of achievement rather than one which would facilitate division; and thus, constantly aiming to agree so far as possible, we shall, with each point of agreement, make it easier to proceed to others.

The question, in relation to armament, which may be regarded as of primary importance at this time, and with which we can deal most promptly and effectively, is the limitation of naval armament. There are certain general considerations which may be deemed pertinent to this subject.

The first is that the core of the difficulty is to be found in the competition in naval programs, and that, in order appropriately to limit naval armament, competition in its production must be abandoned. Competition will not be remedied by resolves with respect to the method of its continuance. One program inevitably leads to another, and if competition continues, its regulation is impracticable. There is only one adequate way out and that is to end it now.

It is apparent that this can not be accomplished without serious sacrifices. Enormous sums have been expended upon ships under construction and building programs which are now under way can not be given up without heavy loss. Yet if the present construction of capital ships goes forward other ships will inevitably be built to rival them and this will lead to still others. Thus the race will continue so long as ability to continue lasts. The effort to escape sacrifices is futile. We must face them or yield our purpose.

It is also clear that no one of the naval Powers should be expected to make these sacrifices alone. The only hope of limitation of naval armament is by agreement among the nations concerned, and this agreement should be entirely fair and reasonable in the extent of the sacrifices required of each of the Powers. In considering the basis of such an agreement, and the commensurate sacrifices to be required, it is necessary to have regard to the existing naval strength of the great naval Powers, including the extent of construction already effected in the case of ships in process. This follows from the fact that one nation is as free to compete as another, and each may find grounds for its action. What one may do another may demand the opportunity to rival, and we remain in the thrall of competitive effort. I may add that the American delegates are advised by their naval experts that the tonnage of capital ships may fairly be taken

to measure the relative strength of navies, as the provision for auxiliary combatant craft should sustain a reasonable relation to the capital ship tonnage allowed.

It would also seem to be a vital part of a plan for the limitation of naval armament that there should be a naval holiday. It is proposed that for a period of not less than 10 years there should be no further construction of capital ships.

I am happy to say that I am at liberty to go beyond these general propositions and, on behalf of the American delegation acting under the instructions of the President of the United States, to submit to you a concrete proposition for an agreement for the limitation of naval armament.

It should be added that this proposal immediately concerns the British Empire, Japan, and the United States. In view of the extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the existing strength of the navies of France and Italy, it is not thought to be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the tonnage allowance of these nations, but the United States proposes that this matter be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.

In making the present proposal the United States is most solicitous to deal with the question upon an entirely reasonable and practicable basis, to the end that the just interests of all shall be adequately guarded and that national security and defense shall be maintained. Four general principles have been applied:

(1) That all capital-ship building programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned;

(2) That further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships;

(3) That in general regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned;

(4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

The principal features of the proposed agreement are as follows:

CAPITAL SHIPS.

United States—

The United States is now completing its program of 1916 calling for 10 new battleships and 6 battle cruisers. One battleship has been completed. The others are in various stages of construction; in some cases from 60 to over 80 per cent of the construction has been done. On these 15 capital ships now being built over \$330,000,000 have been spent. Still, the United States is willing in the interest of an immediate limitation of naval armament to scrap all these ships.

The United States proposes, if this plan is accepted—

(1) To scrap all capital ships now under construction. This includes 6 battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and in course of building, and 2 battleships launched.

The total number of new capital ships thus to be scrapped is 15. The total tonnage of the new capital ships when completed would be 618,000 tons.

(2) To scrap all of the older battleships up to, but not including, the DELAWARE and NORTH DAKOTA. The number of these old battleships to be scrapped is 15. Their total tonnage is 227,740 tons.

CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

THE PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR A
LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT

PRESENTED WITH THE ADDRESS OF

CHARLES E. HUGHES

SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND
AMERICAN COMMISSIONER TO THE CONFERENCE ON
LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT ON ASSUMING THE DUTIES
OF PRESIDING OFFICER AT THE CONFERENCE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., NOVEMBER 12, 1921

PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT.

The United States proposes the following plan for a limitation of the naval armament of the conferring nations. The United States believes that this plan safely guards the interests of all concerned.

In working out this proposal the United States has been guided by four general principles:

(A) The elimination of all capital ship building programs, either actual or projected.

(B) Further reduction through the scrapping of certain of the older ships.

(C) That regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the conferring powers.

(D) The use of capital ship tonnage as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

PROPOSAL

“For a limitation of naval armament.”

CAPITAL SHIPS.

UNITED STATES.

1. The United States to scrap all new capital ships now under construction and on their way to completion. This includes 6 battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and building and 2 battleships launched.

NOTE.—(Paragraph 1 involves a reduction of 15 new capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 618,000 tons. Total amount of money already spent on 15 capital ships, \$332,000,000.)

2. The United States to scrap all battleships up to, but not including, the *Delaware* and *North Dakota*.

NOTE.—(The number of old battleships scrapped under paragraph 2 is 15; their total tonnage is 227,740 tons. The grand total of capital ships to be scrapped is 30, aggregating 845,740 tons.)

GREAT BRITAIN.

3. Great Britain to stop further construction of the 4 new *Hoods*.

NOTE.—(Paragraph 3 involves a reduction of 4 new capital ships not yet laid down, but upon which money has been spent, with a total tonnage when completed of 172,000 tons.)

4. In addition to the 4 *Hoods*, Great Britain to scrap her pre-dreadnaughts, second-line battleships, and first-line battleships up to but not including the *King George V* class.

NOTE.—(Paragraph 4 involves the disposition of 19 capital ships (certain of which have already been scrapped) with a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons. The grand total of ships scrapped under this agreement will be 583,375 tons.)

JAPAN.

5. Japan to abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, viz, the *Kii*, *Owari*, *No. 7*, *No. 8*, battleships, and *Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8*, battle cruisers.

NOTE.—(Paragraph 5 does not involve the stopping of construction on any ship upon which construction has begun.)

6. Japan to scrap 3 battleships: the *Mutsu* launched, the *Tosa* and *Kaga* building; and 4 battle cruisers: the *Amagi* and *Akagi* building, and the *Atago* and *Takao* not yet laid down but for which certain material has been assembled.

NOTE.—(Paragraph 6 involves a reduction of 7 new capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 288,100 tons.)

7. Japan to scrap all pre-dreadnaughts and capital ships of the second line. This to include the scrapping of all ships up to, but not including, the *Settsu*.

NOTE.—(Paragraph 7 involves the scrapping of 10 older ships with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons. The grand total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down, or for which material has been assembled is 448,928 tons.)

FRANCE AND ITALY.

8. In view of certain extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the existing strengths of the navies of France and Italy, the United States does not consider necessary the discussion at this stage of the proceedings of the tonnage allowance of these nations, but proposes it be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.

OTHER NEW CONSTRUCTION.

9. No other new capital ships shall be constructed during the period of this agreement except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter.

10. If the terms of this proposal are agreed to then the United States, Great Britain, and Japan agree that their navies, three months

after the making of this agreement, shall consist of the following capital ships:

List of capital ships.

United States.	Great Britain.	Japan.
Maryland.	Royal Sovereign.	Nagato.
California.	Royal Oak.	Hiuga.
Tennessee.	Resolution.	Ise.
Idaho.	Ramillies.	Yamashiro.
Mississippi.	Revenge.	Fu-So.
New Mexico.	Queen Elizabeth.	Settsu.
Arizona.	Warspite.	Kirishima.
Pennsylvania.	Valiant.	Haruna.
Oklahoma.	Barham.	Iii-Yei.
Nevada.	Malaya.	Kongo.
Texas.	Benbow.	
New York.	Emperor of India.	
Arkansas.	Iron Duke.	
Wyoming.	Marlborough.	
Utah.	Erin.	
Florida.	King George V.	
North Dakota.	Centurion.	
Delaware.	Ajax.	
	Hood.	
	Renown.	
	Repulse.	
	Tiger.	
Total..... 18	22	10
Total tonnage.. 500,650	604,450	299,700

Disposition of old and new construction.

11. Capital ships shall be disposed of in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

Replacements.

12. (a) The tonnage basis for capital ship replacement under this proposal to be as follows:

United States	500,000 tons.
Great Britain	500,000 tons.
Japan	300,000 tons.

(b) Capital ships 20 years from date of completion may be replaced by new capital ship construction, but the keels of such new con-

struction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is 17 years of age from date of completion. Provided, however, that the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until 10 years from the date of the signing of this agreement.

(c) The scrapping of capital ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of new construction; or if the date of completion of new construction be delayed, then within four years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

(d) No capital ships shall be laid down during the term of this agreement whose tonnage displacement exceeds 35,000 tons.

(e) The same rules for determining tonnage of capital ships shall apply to the ships of each of the Powers party to this agreement.

(f) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to inform promptly all of the other Powers party to this agreement concerning:

- (1) The names of the capital ships to be replaced by new construction;
- (2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage;
- (3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;
- (4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down;
- (5) The actual date of completion of each new ship;
- (6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(g) No fabricated parts of capital ships, including parts of hulls, engines, and ordnance, shall be constructed previous to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all Powers party to this agreement.

(h) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of capital ships they may be replaced by new capital ship construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT.

13. In treating this subject auxiliary combatant craft have been divided into three classes:

- (a) Auxiliary surface combatant craft.
- (b) Submarines.
- (c) Airplane carriers and aircraft.

(A) AUXILIARY SURFACE COMBATANT CRAFT.

14. The term auxiliary surface combatant craft includes cruisers (exclusive of battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers, and all other surface types except those specifically exempted in the following paragraph.

15. Existing monitors, unarmored surface craft, as specified in paragraph 16, under 3,000 tons, fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships, tugs, mine sweepers, and vessels readily convertible from merchant vessels are exempt from the terms of this agreement.

16. No new auxiliary combatant craft may be built exempt from this agreement regarding limitation of naval armaments that exceed 3,000 tons displacement and 15 knots speed, and carry more than four 5-inch guns.

17. It is proposed that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers allowed each power shall be as follows:

For the United States.....	450,000 tons.
For Great Britain.....	450,000 tons.
For Japan.....	270,000 tons.

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in auxiliary surface combatant craft on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

Limitation of new construction.

18. (a) All auxiliary surface combatant craft whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new construction in auxiliary surface combatant craft except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter shall be laid down during the period of this agreement, provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the auxiliary surface combatant craft tonnage allowances hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

Scrapping of old construction.

19. Auxiliary surface combatant craft shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

(B) SUBMARINES.

20. It is proposed that the total tonnage of submarines allowed each power shall be as follows:

For the United States.....	90,000 tons
For Great Britain.....	90,000 tons
For Japan.....	54,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in submarines on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of submarines for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

Limitation of new construction.

21. (a) All submarines whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new submarine tonnage except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter shall be laid down during the period of this agreement; provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the submarine tonnage allowance hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

Scrapping of old construction.

22. Submarines shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

(C) AIRPLANE CARRIERS AND AIRCRAFT.

23. It is proposed that the total tonnage of airplane carriers allowed each Power shall be as follows:

United States -----	80,000 tons
Great Britain -----	80,000 tons
Japan -----	48,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in airplane carriers on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of airplane carriers for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

Limitation of new construction.

AIRPLANE CARRIERS.

24. (a) All airplane carriers whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new airplane carrier tonnage except replacement tonnage as provided herein shall be laid down during the period of this agreement; provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the airplane carrier tonnage hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

Scrapping of old construction.

25. Airplane carriers shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT.

REPLACEMENTS.

26. (a) Cruisers 17 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels for such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 15 years of age from date of completion.

(b) Destroyers and flotilla leaders 12 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 11 years of age from date of completion.

(c) Submarines 12 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new submarine construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which the new tonnage is to replace is 11 years of age from date of completion.

(d) Airplane carriers 20 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new airplane carrier construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is 17 years of age from date of completion.

(e) No surface vessel carrying guns of caliber greater than 8 inches shall be laid down as replacement tonnage for auxiliary combatant surface craft.

(f) The same rules for determining tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft shall apply to the ships of each of the powers party to this agreement.

(g) The scrapping of ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of the new construction, or, if the completion of new tonnage is delayed, then within 4 years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

(h) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to inform all of the other Powers party to this agreement concerning:

(1) The names or numbers of the ships to be replaced by new construction;

(2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage;

(3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;

(4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down;

(5) The actual date of completion of each new ship;

(6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(i) No fabricated parts of auxiliary combatant craft, including parts of hulls, engines, and ordnance will be constructed previous to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all Powers party to this agreement.

(j) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of ships of this class they may be replaced by new construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

AIRCRAFT.

27. The limitation of naval aircraft is not proposed.

NOTE.—(Owing to the fact that naval aircraft may be readily adapted from special types of commercial aircraft, it is not considered practicable to prescribe limits for naval aircraft.)

GENERAL RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER OF COMBATANT VESSELS OF ALL CLASSES.

28. The Powers party to this agreement bind themselves not to dispose of combatant vessels of any class in such a manner that they later may become combatant vessels in another navy. They bind themselves further not to acquire combatant vessels from any foreign source.

29. No capital ship tonnage nor auxiliary combatant craft tonnage for foreign account shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any one of the powers party to this agreement during the term of this agreement.

MERCHANT MARINE.

30. As the importance of the merchant marine is in inverse ratio to the size of naval armaments, regulations must be provided to govern its conversion features for war purposes.

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