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The
Constructive Problems
of
World Democracy

BY

WILLIAM E. BARTON, D. D., LL. D.

Delivered before the Men's Bible Class of the
First Congregational Church in Oak Park,
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ing the Signing of the Armistice.

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Foreword and Invitation

The Men's Bible Class of the First Church presents this booklet with an invitation to all men in Oak Park who have no membership in an organization of this character, and who are interested in the application of Christian principles to the work of world-reconstruction, to join this class and participate in its discussions. The class is just beginning a new course of study under the inspiring leadership of Dr. F. B. Moorehead, whose high standing in his profession and notable service to his country are equalled by his zeal as a Bible student and his ability as a teacher.

As introductory to this course of study, the Class invited Dr. Barton to deliver an address on the Sunday following the signing of the Armistice, outlining the essential problems of our country and the world in the period of reconstruction. Dr. Barton's address followed immediately after a sermon on "The Rebuilding of the World," in which he had treated the more definitely religious aspects of the subject. By request he has included in this pamphlet one or two paragraphs from his sermon, especially that relating to the Congress of Vienna, which seemed to suggest an instructive parallel and to be in direct line with this study.

We commend this address to the thoughtful reading of those who shall receive it. In our judgment it is worthy of serious consideration. But the particular purpose of the Class in printing it, and one to which we wish to call special attention, is its use in suggesting themes for discussion and points of departure for the work of the Class. The address was not intended to indicate the order of discussion, but only to suggest the wide range of topics now calling for the serious attention of all men whose face is toward the dawn and who believe in the application of Christian principles to the problems of business, political organization and international relationship. To all such the invitation of this Bible Class is extended.

The Class meets in its own room in the north end of the Church House each Sunday at five minutes after twelve o'clock.



JOSEPH R. NOEL, President.

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The Constructive Problems of World Democracy

By William E. Barton.

In his suggestive book, "The Soul of America," Stanton Coit relates that he was leading a discussion in a group of boys in New York and was surprised to find how little idea they had of the world's past. Addressing one of them, he asked, "When do you think this world was made?" The boy replied, "Wasn't it made in 1776?" The boy was not far from right. Two monumental events occurred in 1776. In that year the Declaration of Independence was written, and in the same year Adam Smith published his book entitled, "The Wealth of Nations." In that book he endeavored to relate political economy to natural theology and to ethics. He succeeded at least in this that he set forth unmistakably the truth that commerce between either nations or individuals must be mutually advantageous or it cannot be durable. No man can trade permanently with another man who invariably loses money by the transactions, for he will ultimately have nothing with which to trade. No nation can engage permanently in commerce with another nation unless the relation is mutually advantageous. This simple principle came nearer to revolutionizing political economy than any other one utterance since the Golden Rule, and it will remain both ethically and commercially sound to the end of time.

The old Europe is dead. So for that matter is all the old world, including America. We cannot hope and we need not desire to escape our share in the process of reconstruction which is going on over all the world. Democracy has come in with a flood. The dam has broken and all the old channels are overflowed. It is a time of peril and of hope. We shall be sadly misguided if we conceal from our thinking either the hope or the peril.

Democracy came to France in 1793 with fire and blood, and it did not remain. Democracy came to America in 1776, and is with us still. But it is almost a miracle that it survived in America. John Fiske affirms that the thirteen colonies could not have been held together in one nation had not the birth of the new republic synchronized with that of the steam engine. Just before the assembling of the first Continental Congress, James Watt made his revolutionary discovery; and in 1787, two years before the Constitutional Convention, John Fitch launched his steamboat on the Delaware. Iron bands welded into something approaching unity colonies as remote as Maine and Georgia, and ultimately made one nation of a territory that stretched across the continent. He who supposes that democracy was domesticated in America by any automatic process may well read John Fiske's "The Critical Period in American History." The perils that followed the Revolutionary War were so many and so formidable, it appears from this distance that the survival of democracy in this, its home, was almost the result of a long series of fortunate accidents, rather than the legitimate product of prevenient wisdom.

Mighty perils confronted our country also at the close of the War of the Rebellion. It is hardly too much to state that the war itself was less perilous to the permanent life and well being of the United States than the period of the Reconstruction. The South can remember the surrender of Lee without any very great bitterness, but how it feels about the events that followed that surrender we are taught in such spectacles as "The Birth of a Nation." It is an old and trite saying, that "Peace hath its victories as well as war." No one has ever dared put into a proverb the correlative truth that peace following war hath as terrible disasters as war itself, and that these have their peculiar peril to the victor.

I am indebted to Thayer's Life of John Hay for a summary of the benefits and the evils that followed our Civil War. He enumerates three benefits and twice as many evils. Without attempting to follow his language or the precise order or content of his thought we may summarize these benefits and evils, as follows:

The three benefits are:

- (1) The preservation of the Union, with its definition as one nation and not many.
- (2) The abolition of slavery
- (3) The prompt return of a million soldiers to civil life without peril either to our political structure or our industries; thus establishing the pre-eminence of democracy over militarism and the ballot over the bayonet.

The six evils are:

- (1) A bitter sectionalism, with lingering animosities, which half a century has scarcely eliminated.
- (2) A diminished respect of the citizen for the state.
- (3) The commutability of patriotism into pensions, and the menace of a class vote, known as the soldier vote.
- (4) The preferment of soldiers to civil offices for which many of them were quite unfit and for which their military experience afforded no assurance of preparation, so that appeal to a sham patriotism could be relied upon to outweigh solid merit.
- (5) The centralization of the power of the national government.
- (6) The beginning of the era of national extravagance.

To these might be added the revelation of shameless profiteering, and the shocking disclosures such as we have known not merely in America, but as were revealed in Great Britain after the Boer War, and which are apparently inseparable from opportunities of expenditure when vast sums must be collected and disbursed through financial and administrative machinery either extemporized for the emergency or devised for the more modest purposes of peace and wholly inadequate to the strain of war and the events which follow.

With such warnings before us, we shall be most unwise if we suppose for a moment that the world's perils have passed with the signing of the armistice, or even that they will be over with the conclusion of the treaty of peace.

We are facing problems of our own, and problems which will come to us through our relation to other nations. Let us consider what some of these problems are.

I. AMERICA'S OWN PROBLEMS.

We have escaped from the war with so little of sacrifice compared with other nations, that we shall be in serious peril of supposing that we have no very large problems to face. That would be about the worst possible mistake for us to make. Let us consider a few of the difficulties which immediately confront us.

(1) The Problem of National Politics.

If this had been a presidential year, Woodrow Wilson would probably have been re-elected, even though his election involved a third term, which up to this time no American president has secured. It would hardly seem likely that he will be re-elected in 1920, and it is by no means certain that his party will find a man strong enough to succeed him. The country will feel under no obligation to elect Mr. Marshall or Mr. Bryan or Mr. McAdoo or any other Democrat in order to avert the possibility of discrediting our chief magistrate while the war is in progress, for the war is over. Even with that war in progress, the country felt entirely free to elect a Republican Congress, and that in the face of the President's own earnest and very unfortunate appeal. The problems of reconstruction in America are to go forward in the midst of the heated discussion of a national political campaign, in which a sweeping change is well within the bounds of possibility.

It is interesting to ask, On what principles will the next presidential election be won? President Wilson won his present seat at the last election on the slogan, "He kept us out of war." Manifestly he cannot win again, nor can his party, on that score; nor will that be anything to be ashamed of. But is there anything which that party, or the party in opposition, can claim of positive excellence which will convince the voters two years from now of its right to control national affairs during the formative years that are to follow the war?

Neither of our great political parties now represents any definite principle, or has represented it for twenty years. In 1891 James Bryce, our friendliest critic and one who understands us best, said in his "American Commonwealth,"

"Neither the Republican nor the Democratic party has anything definite to say on any of the twenty issues which one hears discussed in the country as seriously involved in its welfare. Neither party has any principles, any distinctive tenets. Both have traditions, both have certainly war cries, organizations, interests enlisted in their support. But those interests are in the main the interests of getting and keeping the patronage of government. Points of political doctrine have all but vanished. All has been lost except office or the hope for it."

That statement was true in 1891; it is more true today. Neither party issues a platform in which it does not make an honest effort to straddle every issue that can lose it any considerable group of votes. If either of the great parties will honestly think out a program for the future, a constructive, state-building program, and will incorporate in its platform a clear and honest declaration, of a policy to make our nation great and strong, that party will win the next election, and will deserve to win.

(2) The Problem of National Finance.

We are now able to state approximately what the war has cost America and the Allies. Up to November 1, 1918, it has cost the United States \$19,541,000,000. Of this amount, \$7,000,000,000 was loaned to the Allies. The amount expended by all the allied nations, including the United States, is approximately \$180,000,000,000 to date. Higher figures than the foregoing are sometimes given of governmental appropriations, but the above are furnished to me as the actual expenditures. I have no data that I count reliable of the expenditures of the Central Powers.

These are huge sums; but we do not owe all of the \$19,541,000,000 which the United States has expended: for already we have paid a part of it in taxes.

Our net national debt when the war began was approximately \$1,000,000,000. It is now not far from \$17,000,000,000. We owe approximately \$160 per capita as against Great Britain's \$600 and France's \$678. The interest on our national debt amounts to only about \$6.50 per annum per capita. If it were necessary to wipe out our entire indebtedness in a single year, we could do it by the drastic and unwarrantable effort of devoting about one-third of our income to this purpose. Our national wealth is supposed to be about \$300,000,000,000; our debt is not far from $5\frac{2}{3}$ per cent of that.

If we were to compare our resources and debt-paying capacity with our condition at the time of the Civil War, we should be starting with the necessity of raising \$74,000,000,000 in four years, and that with Wall Street more than apathetic and Europe hostile. The resources of our banks in 1861 amounted to one and one-half billions. Yet within seven years after the Civil War ended we had paid off \$4,000,000,000, being three-eighths of the entire cost of the war. The resources of our banks in 1917 totaled \$37,000,000,000, which is almost twenty-five times their resources in 1861. Moreover, at the close of the Civil War the South was impoverished and the West undeveloped. Any comparison of our situation now and then, together with the history of our financial recovery from the Civil War must make it plain that America's financial condition is healthy and sound. There should be no financial panic.

The case may be put even more strongly. Our annual savings in normal years prior to the war were between \$5,000,000,000 and \$6,000,000,000 annually; in 1917 they were nearly \$14,000,000,000—some authorities say \$15,000,000,000. Our savings which have been rising since 1914 from five to fourteen billions annually have been added to

our national wealth. While our debt is about equal to $5\frac{2}{3}$ per cent of our wealth, our wealth itself has increased more than $5\frac{2}{3}$ per cent. We have probably made enough money during the war to offset all our war costs and war losses and loans to the Allies. The war may really not have cost us a cent.

Furthermore, as Ruskin so well pointed out, the value of a dollar in my pocket depends upon whether the man from whom I wish to purchase labor or commodities has a dollar of his own. If he has a dollar already, my dollar loses a large part of its purchasing power. Our losses as a nation are so small as compared with those of other nations that relatively our wealth has greatly increased. We have passed from the class of a debtor nation to that of a creditor nation within five years.

In coming months we must face a considerable readjustment. There will be reaction and shrinkage of values, and ought to be; but our bankers and capable men of affairs ought to be able easily to protect us against financial disaster. Our nation has a sound commercial basis. We have immense productivity and enormous national credit. We shall have to practice some economies, but the war has not impoverished America. Nothing but monumental folly can make us poor.

(3) The Problem of the Democratization of Industry.

We had learned before the war the secret of vast productivity. The war has taught us some things which we did not know before. We have learned that under stress of necessity our industry can be enormously speeded up, and though already productive can be made far more productive. But we have not yet learned the secret of equitable distribution of wealth. We need not delude ourselves with the idea that industry is going to resume its former status. The government will have a mightily increased share in the ownership and management of industry, and the government as yet has no sufficient experience to justify the hope that this will be done without serious perils, but the situation does not end there. It will go farther, and with it will come imperative demands from other sources that industry itself shall be put on a more democratic basis.

We shall face serious problems on account of the demoralization of some forms of production by reason of the war, and problems still more serious in the adjustment of wages to selling prices and market values; but these when compared with what other countries must face, should not involve insuperable difficulties to America.

Our industry has the special problems which come from greatly increased wages and from the introduction of women into many kinds of labor to which they have hitherto been strangers. This, however, should not precipitate any insoluble problems. We have our man power still undiminished, and an outlet for all its productive energy and our national wealth unimpaired. We shall have a legitimate place in the complex of our national industry for every kind of production which flourished here before the war, and for some others.

(4) The Problem of Our Own Bolsheviks.

This is a two-fold problem. We had it before the war in the alarming numbers and desperate devices of the I. W. W. There is more than a possibility of our meeting it in the immigration that is to follow the war. There is a third source of peril which is that of our own army. It is a dangerous thing to put a gun into the hands of almost any man.

Mr. David R. Forgan sent to the ministers of Chicago for their use in pushing the Y. M. C. A. campaign today the following significant statement, which suggests a degree of apprehension lest our own soldiers come back to us infected with the spirit of lawlessness:

"Anarchy in its most violent forms has broken out all over Europe. Its ugly head was raised in Russia a year ago, and since then all the institutions of society in that land have fallen in a heap of utter ruin. In Germany and Austria the armies apparently are rapidly going over to the dark doctrines of Bolshevism. This poisonous growth seems at this moment to be finding a fertile soil in practically all of the European countries. Even England apparently is not wholly free from its contamination.

"From those who have studied the situation it seems to be clear that where the soul has been starved and all spiritual and moral sustenance taken away, populaces at large have given way to a pessimism and a sense of oppression which has caused them to place no value at all upon established social institutions. We have over in Europe at this moment in our own army over two million men, practically surrounded by these false prophets. It is generally taken for granted that the returned United States army will dominate American society for the next two decades. The leaders chosen by them may very likely be our political leaders, and the political and social thoughts that they advocate will in all probability be those accepted by the American people. What are those thoughts and ideas to be? Are they to be polluted with poison—the hate and the blackness of Bolshevism? Or are they to be kept free, pure and responsive to humanitarian and democratic doctrines?

"During the long winter days and nights to come when our men will have practically nothing to do save policing the border lines of Germany and the bleak provinces of Russia, their minds must be occupied with healthy thoughts. If they are not given special and continued instructions in American ideals and concerning the benefits of American institutions, you may be sure that the bolshevist will be able to find an insidious way of planting the seeds of his own theories. Bolshevism has flourished on oppression, homesickness and spiritual sterility. For our own sakes as well as for our soldiers we must provide the right means of keeping them happy and optimistic. We must see to it that their spiritual, mental and moral needs are provided for by those who preach love and know how to spread sweetness and light.

"It is the seven agencies represented by the United War Campaign that have been and are continuing to do this. If the people of America, and especially of Chicago, will stand behind those agencies with sympathy and cash they will keep the vision of our soldiers and continue to instill in their minds the idealism of America. Your dollars today may save us from Bolshevism tomorrow.

"We ask you with all the emphasis at our command to present this thought to your congregation tomorrow and urge each member to give as liberally as possible to the campaign now under way."

(5) The Problems of Private Ownership and Inheritance.

Recent legislation, both state and national, has made good use of the discovery that the easiest and most popular source of money for the expense of government is to be found in the taxation of large incomes. While it is not at all certain that a graduated income tax is legal under the last three amendments of the Constitution, such taxation has been accepted as valid law, and there is no likelihood that it will end with the war.

Besides this, however, there is certain to be an increasing demand for the abolition of all inheritance.* No government has ever admitted that the right of inheritance is a natural right. A man's right to the product of his own labor while he lives carries with it no certain right to direct the control or ownership of it after his death. Thoughtful books are now appearing, demanding that as hereditary titles are being abolished abroad, so hereditary wealth shall be abolished at home. There will be increased protest against the idea that of two children, born in the same city on the same day, subject to the same laws and supposedly heir to the same rights, one who happens to be a descendant of Marshall Field shall inherit a great store and enormous property of the loop district of Chicago, while the other shall be doomed to struggle against almost hopeless disadvantages before he can fairly enter into life.

II. AMERICA'S SHARE IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD.

Beside these problems are those which America must face because of her share in the problems of the world. There never has been a time when she could have shut herself wholly away from them, and if there ever had been such a time it is now passed away forever. We shall have a minor share, but still a very considerable share, in the financial depression, the social chaos, and the political calamity through which the world will have to pass through clouds and thick darkness to the dawn of the new day. Even to enumerate these problems would now be next to impossible; but if we cannot make a complete catalogue of them we can at least be assured of their general character and of the necessity that America will have to participate in the sacrifice which those problems involve.

We shall have to assume a share, and it may not be a small or unimportant share, of responsibility in the determination of the destiny of—

a. The colonies which formerly belonged to Germany in Africa and the Pacific;

b. Internationalized waterways such as the Dardanelles;

c. Certain new or reborn nations which will now begin their perilous experiments with free government, such as Poland and perhaps Bulgaria, and very possibly Germany itself;

d. Certain territories that have right to a name and a place on the map, but no present opportunity for self-government, including Armenia, oldest of Christian peoples, and especially related to America through missionary institutions that have educated their future leaders; and Palestine, which must be rescued from the Turk, and presumably governed under the direction of an international protectorate for the preservation of interests very sacred to America and to the world.

In alignment with her international colonial policy, America will have to formulate a colonial policy of her own. Our possession of Hawaii, of the Philippines, of the Panama Canal, our control of the West Indies and our Monroe Doctrine, all will call for a larger definition of our relation to peoples under our care and not yet fit for statehood.

*See "The Abolition of Inheritance," by Harlan E. Reed. Macmillan, \$1.50.

Furthermore, we shall have to formulate a policy with regard to Mexico, and it should not continue to be one of watchful waiting. We have waited long enough.

At the close of the Civil War we discovered, what we have had occasion to discover in the last four years, that we had immediate business with Mexico. We had a good sized army with its occupation gone, and we sent a portion of it into Mexico, hanged Maximillian and did a few other picturesque and necessary things, and made that part of the world for a time safe for democracy.

We have business with Mexico again. It is a good time for Mr. Wilson, commander in chief of our armies and navies, to ask from Mexico three pointed questions and to obtain completely satisfactory answers.

First, why did Mexico refuse to permit us and the nations associated with us to buy oil even from wells owned by our own citizens when we needed the oil in our war for the welfare of the world? Was it because Mexico was filled with pro-Germans, whose hostility to the United States found governmental expression through this ungracious act?

Secondly, What reason had Zimmermann to believe that his note would be welcome in Mexico suggesting that Mexico join with Germany in war against the United States? Is the United States to anticipate that in any time when it may be in trouble in matters relating to Europe, Mexico will be holding herself in sympathetic readiness to receive such communications?

Thirdly, What assurance can the de facto government of Mexico now give to us that the conditions of anarchy which have led to loss of life and continual unrest along the Mexican border and have resulted in great loss to American investors in Mexico are completely at an end, so that no policy of watchful waiting will longer be required on our part?

At the present moment we have something like four millions of vigorous young men, all dressed up and with no place to go. Before distributing them back among the farms and shops and offices, we could very well afford to let them get a little more wear out of their new uniforms, and Mexico is not an unpleasant place to spend the winter. We have no selfish designs upon Mexico, but we want to be assured that she regards her interests as identical with ours in all matters relating to world complications, and that the Monroe Doctrine works both coming and going.

Those gentlemen in Washington who are soon to consider the modified uses of our army and navy may well consider the problem of the permanent pacification of Mexico, and her alignment with those policies to which the United States stands committed for her own safety and the welfare of the world. There will never be a better time to raise this issue and settle it permanently than just now.

America must have her share in the coming league of nations that is to guarantee the peace of the world. So far as I know the suggestion of such a league came first from America; certainly I think such a league could never be brought into existence without her, and would be doomed to fail if she were not a member of it. Virtually, such a league is already in existence; for that was what we went into war for. But now we have the problem of organizing our national might into international efficiency to make the peace which has been won the durable possession of mankind.

We must not fail to take account of the tremendous undertow of human life, and the inevitable reaction which follows every war. The failure to take this into account seems to me to have been the cause of many a disaster in the past, disaster more sad to contemplate because it grew directly out of military success and the failure to make that success permanent.

Of historians of this generation none is more certainly to be classed as a progressive than Frederic Harrison. Yet there is no more notable passage in all his historical writings than that in which he calls attention to the conservative tension which accompanies all progress. Startling is the list he gives of changes that appeared at the time to have been permanent but which yielded to inevitable and often to swift reaction. Speaking of this conservative force, he says:

"We are indeed able to transform it, to develop it, and to give it new life and action; but we can only do so as we understand it. Without this all efforts, reforms, and revolutions are in vain. A change is made, but a few years pass over, and all the old causes reappear. There was some unnoticed power which was not touched, and it returns in full force. Take, for instance, Cromwell and his Ironsides, who made the great English Revolution, swept away Monarchy, and Church, and Peers, and thought they were gone forever. Their great chief dead, the old system returned like a tide, and ended in the orgies of Charles and James. The Catholic Church has been, as it is supposed, staggering in its last agonies now for many centuries. Luther believed he had crushed it. Long before his time it seemed nothing but a lifeless mass of corruption. Pope after Pope has been driven into exile. Four or five times has the Church seemed utterly crushed. And yet here in this nineteenth century, it puts forth all its old pretensions, and covers its old territory.

"In the great French Revolution it seemed, for once, that all extant institutions had been swept away. That devouring fire seemed to have burnt the growth of ages to the very root. Yet a few ages past, and all reappear—Monarchy, Church, Peers, Jesuits, Empire, and Praetorian Guards. Again and again they are overthrown. Again and again they rise in greater pomp and pride.

"The experience of everyone who has ever engaged in any public movement whatever reminds him that every step made in advance seems too often wrong back from him by some silent and unnoticed power; he has felt enthusiasm give way to despair and hopes become nothing but recollections.

"What is this unseen power which seems to undo the best human efforts, as if it were some overbearing weight against which no man can long struggle? What is this ever-acting force which seems to revive the dead, to restore what we destroy, to renew forgotten watchwords, exploded fallacies, discredited doctrines, and condemned institutions; against which enthusiasm, intellect, truth, high purpose and self-devotion seem to beat themselves to death in vain? It is the Past. It is the accumulated wills and works of all mankind around us and before us. It is civilization. It is that power which to understand is strength, which to repudiate is weakness. . . . Let us not delude ourselves into thinking that new principles of policy or social action can be created by themselves or can reconstruct society about us."—"The Meaning of History," pp. 16-18, *passim*.

It may well give us pause when we remember how often the world has believed itself to be ready for universal peace before and how narrowly it has missed of securing it. Why did not universal peace follow the fall of Napoleon? The answer is instructive. It shows that peace can be maintained only by the attainment of a spirit of international good will. Peace is something more than the absence of war. The perils of peace are perils that menace both sides, but especially the side of the victor.

The fall of Napoleon was brought about by the alliance of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia. These nations held that Napoleon was a world menace, and that there could be no neutrality. The world was practically invited to be present at the peace table, even France being represented, and far more effectively than any one supposed possible, by the astute Talleyrand. The Four nations, however, did not trust all the issues of the convention to the deliberations of the open meeting. As they had bound themselves by the treaty of Chaumont, March 10, 1814, to continue in the war and make no separate peace, so they made a secret treaty with respect to the terms of peace.

Had the Four stood together, they would have been invincible; but they suspected each other's motives and all other nations had good reason to suspect theirs. England was represented by Lord Castlereagh, and Russia by its own emperor, Alexander, and these two thoroughly distrusted each other. Austria was represented by Metternich, and Prussia by Frederick William III, who was weak, and subordinate to Austria. Prussia was determined to gain, and did gain, territory on the Rhine, and Austria was determined to cripple Italy. England was determined not to let Russia gain dominion westward, and Russia was determined to get as far west as she could. So, with the battle of Waterloo still to be fought (June 18, 1815), and Napoleon still to be defeated, the powers that were to have saved the world from the evils of his dominion met at Vienna in the autumn of 1814, and signed their final treaty, inclusive, as was supposed, of all the earlier and separate treaties, on June 9, 1815, nine days before the battle of Waterloo.

But two outstanding events followed among the multitude of other and less significant events. The first was, that France, though defeated, improved through the diplomacy of Talleyrand, the opportunity created by the mutual distrust of Great Britain and Russia. France posed, and with some reason, as the representative of the smaller nations, and the defender of public rights. Talleyrand was astute enough, if not sincere enough, to see and set forth, the peril not only to France but to Spain and the Netherlands and the Balkans and Italy of the domination of Europe by the great Four. He won to his side not only these smaller nations but much of the public sentiment of Europe: and thus the defeated nation came to a new leadership. Europe knew that the Four great powers were all rapacious conquerors and not defenders of the liberties of Europe.

Thus the Congress of Vienna that was to have settled the peace of the world sowed the seeds of subsequent war through the rapacity of the conquerors, and gave the future to the conquered.

Then followed the so-called Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia and Russia, supposedly an alliance for religious purposes, but soon appearing as an unholy conspiracy to defend at all hazards the power of absolute and irresponsible monarchy. It was a new lining up of the old Four, with Great Britain out; for Great Britain, while selfish as any of the countries involved, had these two considerations to attend to; first, she was having a harder time than she expected with her American war of 1812; and in the second place, Great Britain had

these two saving merits, that she stood for a limited as against an absolute monarchy, and that she was determined to secure if possible the ending of the slave trade.

So the Congress of Vienna did not result in the securing to the world of a league to compel peace, but resulted in the unholy compact of three autocracies in the Holy Alliance, and prepared the way for the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the great World War of 1914-1918.

From such a collapse may God deliver us as we enter upon negotiations that may secure the durable peace of the world. I dare to hope that our own country will be a strong influence for constructive and righteous decision when the plenipotentiaries of the world powers meet next month at Versailles. We shall stand, thank God, for open covenants and against all secret treaties, and I believe that America's presence in the Congress of Nations is the world's best guarantee of international altruism and of lasting justice.

America's greatest peril, as I see it, is that she may lose the noble spirit of idealism with which she entered the war, and suffer from boastfulness, materialism and the lust of power. Trade is coming to us, and we are glad of it, but we did not fight this war to secure trade. A large share of the little money which the world has will flow to our already full coffers, but we did not fight this war to gain money but to give it. Our problem is to maintain in peace the idealism which carried us into war.*

It is possible for us to be overtaken by the very spirit which we have been fighting; it is possible that we may send the Kaiser to St. Helena and his successor to Washington. As I read history, there is no more insidious danger than that the conqueror may be snared into accepting for himself the very evils which he has successfully resisted in his enemies and courageously overthrown.

It is entirely possible that we should have gone out to defeat autocracy and that we should now come back autocratic. We may call our autocracy by another name; we may call it efficiency or co-ordination; we may support it by all kinds of illustrious examples, as for instance, a reminder that we all worked at cross purposes until we submitted all the armies to the single command of Foch. But we shall then be demanding that we have a Foch in business and a Foch in religion and a Foch in politics.

It is possible for us to go out in a war whose purpose is to end war but to come back war-like in spirit. It is possible to go out to put a stop to cruelty and to come back cruel. It is possible to become barbarous in our conflict with barbarism; in short, there is no danger more real than that we shall be defeated by our own victories.

*This thought was more fully expressed in a sermon by Dr. Barton on the following Sunday evening on "Worshipping Our Captured Idols," from II Chronicles, 25:14, in which it is recorded that the brave and righteous King Amaziah, returned from his conquest of Edom and became an idolator, worshipping the defeated idols which he had brought back as trophies of his military triumph.

I have no words to express my admiration for the way our boys have fought. More than that, I believe that their spirit of sacrifice and heroism has faithfully reflected the soul of America. Entering into the war at a time when other nations that had suffered the loss of all things were bravely holding on at terrible cost, it has been given us to effect a decision in the world's contest. The world will not grudge us all the glory that we have justly earned, and we have earned it honestly. We shall not grudge to other nations the glory which is the due reward of their greater sacrifices. But now, can we match the heroism of the sons of America with a like idealism, or shall we with peace slump back into materialism?

I am not oblivious to the grave dangers that confront the world in the present hour. It is more than possible that we are to witness much of sorrow and discomfort before peace shall bring to us its full fruition of blessing. But I thank God that I have lived to see this day, and that I am permitted to have a share in the rebuilding of the world. Rejoicing with every man who is to contribute to the productivity of the soil, the output of the factory, or to the stability of government or of the financial well-being of our country and the world, I rejoice in my own privilege in this day of upholding spiritual ideals, without which I believe the world could not have come thus far toward its salvation and without which we might even now be wellnigh unto despair. The world never had greater need of political wisdom, of commercial enterprise, of financial judgment than now; but I believe that even greater is its need of faith and spiritual courage. That is why I am glad to be alive, and to be a preacher of the evangel of Jesus Christ in this day of the world's reconstruction.

If it is a solemn thought that America must face perils with other nations, it is also an inspiring reflection that America has the privilege of leading the world through them into a share in her own freedom and prosperity. America with all her faults is at this moment the world's best hope. She represents more nearly than any other nation the ideal toward which the new republics of Europe, struggling painfully to their birth, are aspiring to possess. If democracy fails here it fails everywhere. If we can show the world that democracy is sane and safe and righteous, then by the blessing of God America has come to the kingdom for such a time as this.

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