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University Library e, Wi With 3 1 024 755 385 im 924 MAN WHERE, WHENCE, & WHITHER ? “In examining the history of mankind, as well as in examining the phenomena of the material world, when we cannot trace the process by whieh an event has been produced, it is often of import- ance to be able to show how it may have been produced by natural eauses, Thus, although it is impossible to determine with certainty what the steps were by which any particular language was formed, yet if we can show, from the known principles of human nature, how all its various parts might gradually have arisen, the mind is not only to a certain degree satisfied, but a check is given to that indolent philosophy which refers to a miracle whatever appear- ances, in the material and moral worlds, it is unable to explain.”— DvuGaLp STewarr. MAN WHERE, WHENCE, AND WHITHER BEING A GLANCE AT MAN IN HIS NATURAL-HISTORY RELATIONS BY DAVID PAGE, LL.D. F.R.SE. F.GS. AUTHOE OF ‘ PAST AND PRESENT LIFE OF THE GLOBE,’ ‘PHILOSOPHY OF GEOLOGY,’ ‘ GEOLOGY FOR GENERAL READERS,’ ETC, ETC, EDINBURGH EDMONSTON AND DOUGLAS 1867 ce UNIVE, owt? The FSipy \ President White | Printed by CLARK Edinburgh. PREFACE —_4+—— A SKETCH of the thoughts expressed in the following pages was given in two lectures to the Members of the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution in November 1866. Exciting considerable interest at the time, and receiving through the newspapers a wider audience than that to which they were originally addressed, these lectures, as might have been ex- pected, met with a somewhat varied reception. By many the views they contained were adopted without reserve ; by some, though not adopted, they were received in a spirit of candour and inquiry ; while by a few the whole argument was met with the most vehement and_unreasoning opposition. Had the last contented themselves with merely opposing—every man having a right to the free utterance of his opinions—the argument on the author’s part might have terminated with the lectures; but as they re- vi PREFACE. sorted, either ignorantly or intentionally, to misrepre- sentation, he has been constrained, in justice to himself and his subject, to prepare the following extension, and seek for his views a wider, and he trusts also a fairer consideration. If the reader has not hitherto directed his attention to the natural-history relations of Man—to his origin, antiquity, and destiny—what follows may assist him in his considerations ; if he has made the question a subject of research, and his views should coincide in the main with those of the author, he may glean from these pages some new facts to strengthen his convictions ; and if, on the other hand, he has been led by early training to entertain opinions at variance with those herein expressed, a thoughtful perusal may induce him, if not to forego his precon- ceptions, at all events to review the evidence upon which they have been founded. This is all the author desires—the most he hopes for ; his wish being to contribute his mite to that modern movement of mind which seeks to substitute inquiry for dogma- tism, comprehensible methods for miracles, and rational convictions for traditional beliefs. Though cursory—and intentionally so—these PREFACE. vil chapters are given in strict connection, and the author would solicit from those who may turn to them the same sequence in perusal—a following of the argu- ment from beginning to end and in the order enunci- ated. What appears unsatisfactory under one section may receive further elucidation under another, and what startles at the outset may be accepted without reserve at a future stage of the exposition. MAn’s WHERE, WHENCE, and WHITHER, are inseparably linked together, and there can be no intelligent appre- ciation of the one without a competent knowledge of the others—no successful dealing with one problem unless studied in connection with the other problems that arise from a philosophical consideration of the whole question of Man’s place in nature. EpinsurcH, September 1867. CONTENTS. PAGE IntRopUCTORY . : : j : : ‘ 15 Nature and Importance of the Inquiry. General Unwillingness to approach it. Theological Opposition and Misrepresentation. Its Treatment as a Question of Natural History. Ultimate Object, Truth and Rational Beliefs. Bearing of the Inquiry on other Subjects of Re- search, Man : WuHERE ? His ZoonogicaAL RELATIONS . «wt 35 Community of Life-Conditions. Structural Affinity to other Animals, Ascent through Adaptive Modification. Principle of Variation ever Operative. Mental Affinity to other Animals. Man Improvable and Progressive. Theory of Spiritual Community of Life. Our First Proposition. His GEOGRAPHICAL RELATIONS . ‘ é ‘ 60 Influence of External Conditions on Life. Their Influence on Civilisation. x CONTENTS. Variation through Physical Surroundings. PAGE Power of Locality on Mental Characteristics. External Conditions merely Co-factors in the Law of Variation. Our Second Proposition. His EranoiocicaL RELATIONS : ‘é z 72 Distribution and Varietal Distinctions. Question of Species or Varieties. Plurality or Unity of Origin ? Higher and Lower Varieties. Relations of these in Time and Space. Lowly Origin of the Human Race. Question of Extinct Varieties. Our Third Proposition. His Functional RELATIONS . ‘ : ‘ 87 Physical and Mental Functions in common with other Animals. Man Improvable and Progressive. Influence and Results of this Progression. Man a Modifier of Nature. Spread and Ascension of the Higher, and Decline and Extinction of the Lower Varieties. Our Fourth Proposition. Man : WHENCE ? His Historican RELATIONS ‘ é 7 105 Tradition Uncertain and Unreliable. All History Recent and Partial. Discrepancies in Chronological Systems. CONTENTS. xi Inferences as to Man’s Antiquity from the Pace known rate of Progress in Civilisation and Re- finement. Our Fifth Proposition. His GroLoeicat RELATIONS . : . 118 Relative Chronology of Geology. Nature of Geological Evidence. Ages of stone, bronze, and iron. High Antiquity of Man in Western Europe, as evidenced by his Pre-historic Remains. Higher Inferential Antiquity in Asia and the East. Our Siath Proposition. His Genetic RELATIONS : 189 Order and Succession of Life in Time. Hypothesis of Development or Derivative Descent. Its Proofs and Probabilities. As applicable to the Human Race. Not necessarily Degrading. Manner in which it should be received. Our Seventh Proposition. Man: WHITHER ? His PROGRESSIVE RELATIONS ; i ; 163 Natural Tendency to be interested in the Future. Incessant Change and Progress in Nature. Extinction and Creation ever coincident. Higher Physical Developments. No Abatement of Cosmical Forces. Intellectual and Moral Ascension. Xil CONTENTS. Newer and Higher Varieties of Man. PAGE This Progression in Obvious Operation. Effect of Geological Changes. Differences among Men lessened but not obli- terated by Higher Developments. Our Eighth Proposition. ConcLuUsION 185 Summary of the Argument. ‘ Its Practical and Scientific Bearings. Opposition Unavailing, Prospect of its Adoption. INDEX 195 INTRODUCTORY. INTRODUCTORY. ——>—— Nature and Importance of the Inquiry—General Unwillingness to approach it—Theological Opposition and Misrepresent- ation—Its Treatment as a Question of Natural History— Ultimate Object, Truth and Rational Beliefs—Bearing of the Inquiry on other Subjects of Research. AT the present moment there are few scientific ques- tions exciting so much interest as the origin and antiquity of man. And yet, general as the interest is, there is no subject so furtively studied and so un- fairly dealt with. Impressed with certain theological notions, a large section of inquirers approach the in- vestigation with restraint and distrust, while even in many of our learned societies an uneasy tenderness prevails the moment it is announced for discussion. Plant-life and animal-life in its lower phases may be investigated and generalised upon with any amount of freedom ; but, strangely enough, the study of man, who at present crowns the biological system, is shirked as if it were impiety to approach it. It is true that anatomically most important knowledge has 16 MAN: been arrived at, but this more on account of thera- peutic considerations than for biological conclusions, Physiologically too, great advances have recently been made in the determination of organic functions ; and psychologically, writers are beginning to hazard some- thing like a scientific opinion as to the relations that subsist between physical organisation and mental manifestations. But with regard to man’s relations to the great scheme of life—his where, whence, and whither in the cosmical plan of continuity and pro- gress—few have made them the subjects of earnest study, and still fewer have ventured to give expres. sion to their convictions. It is only of recent years that the study of man has been recognised as an in- dependent branch of natural science, under the title of Anthropology, and the only British institution for its furtherance—the Anthropological Society of London —is but a thing of yesterday. If not ignored in certain quarters, the investigation has at least been discouraged ; and where not ignored it has been too much held in abeyance to popular prejudices and pre- conceptions. Such weakness, however, is far beneath the dignity of science; such restraints on free and rational inquiry can never be conducive to the interests of religion, Man in all his relations is intimately connected with external nature ; and these relations, as bearing on his physical, intellectual, and moral INTRODUCTORY. 17 welfare, become not only legitimate but imperative subjects of research. The more man knows of nature and nature’s methods, the less will he be inclined to disregard these methods ; and the more he knows of nature and_nature’s laws, the higher his conceptions of creative wisdom and perfection, These laws and methods may be studied in connection with the in- organic world, or with the lower forms of organised existence ; but they assume a higher interest and leave a deeper impress when viewed in relation to man— the place he holds, and the place he is destined to hold, in the great progressional scheme of creation. “Know thyself,” is an injunction, physically and morally, as imperative on the race as it is on the individual. It is of no avail to tell us, as some would vainly do, that man’s chief business is with the present and the duties which lie before him in daily life, and that it is of little moment to him whether his race has inherited this globe for six thousand or for sixty thousand years, or whether he shall con- tinue to inherit it in increasing or decreasing variety. We are compelled, by an irresistible im- pulse of our nature, to look backward to the past as well as to look forward to the future ; and neces- sarily so, since the main business of the present is to draw from the past, that it may be prepared for the Cc 18 MAN: future. The present is thus intimately connected with the past, as it is inseparably interwoven with the future, and cannot be fully understood unless in relation to what has gone before as well as to that which must inevitably follow. The great business of life—even that which lies most immediately before us—will be more fully understood and more rationally ‘performed the better man knows the place he holds and the relations he bears to the plan of creation. .Man’s where has descended from his whence, and his whence and his where must indicate his whither. Where are we? Whence are we? and Whither are we going? are questions which incessantly force them- selves upon our attention ; and science merely seeks, with all humility and reverence, to arrive at a satis- factory answer. We cannot stem this desire for knowledge, because nature has made it necessary that we should know ; and whatever light can be reflected from the past on the path of the present is a guide to the existing, just as every indication of the future, from a study of the past and present, must be an in- centive to compliance with its requirements. Man has no intuitive knowledge of his natural- history relations more than he has of other subjects. The beliefs by which he is influenced are ever relative to his knowledge, and the fuller his knowledge the more harmonious, therefore, the discharge of his rela- INTRODUCTORY. 19 tions. It is true we may not be always able to com- prehend the relations which the Creator has estab- lished between us and the surrounding world; but this we can only ascertain after we have made the effort, and there were an end to all knowledge did we believe there was aught in nature incomprehen- sible or placed beyond the range of reason. Indeed, man’s incessant efforts to know belie this conviction; and generally the more mysterious the phenomenon the more intense the curiosity to resolve it. How- ever much it may be misrepresented and opposed, this is all that science aims at in the present inquiry. Its object is truth and rational beliefs ; and unless our beliefs be founded upon reason, they are unworthy of the name, and become the mere crudities of ignorance and prejudice. The revelations of science may, and in the nature of things must, often be at variance with popular preconceptions ; but variances of this kind need not give rise to hostility nor preclude con- viction. Theologians may be startled by new dis- coveries in science, just as their predecessors were by the assertions of astronomy, but they are not on that account entitled to accuse men of science of scepticism and infidelity ; nor, on the ‘other hand, have men of science any right to retort on theologians the charge of dogmatism and bigotry because they are not pre- pared all at once to accept the new deductions. The 20 MAN: ‘sceptic and infidel is he who refuses: facts and rejects the conclusions of enlightened reason ; the dogmatist and bigot is he who, overestimating his own opinions, undervalues those of others and obstinately resists all conviction. What may be accepted by one mind under the bias of early training, may be insufficient to induce belief in another differently trained but equally earnest to arrive at the truth. “To faith,” says Bunsen, “it is immaterial whether science dis- cover truth in a spirit of scepticism or belief; and truth has been really found by both courses, but never by dishonesty or sloth.”* Arguments may prevail ; abuse never wins over converts. Bad words never make good arguments ; and we may rest assured that he who is in the habit of using them is by no means in a fitting spirit to enter as a worshipper into the great temple of truth. The subject to be considered in the following pages is one purely of natural history. We intend to inquire into the zoological, geographical, ethnological, and functional relations of man, which constitute his present position in nature, or his where; we go on to his historical, geological, and genetic relations, which indicate his origin or his whence ; and knowing his past and present, science is surely entitled to speculate with some degree of certainty as to man’s future, * Egypt's Place in Universal History, vol. i. p. 164. INTRODUCTORY. 21 which forms his whither in the great cosmical scheme of continuity and progress. Man has his natural- history relations—of that there can be no gainsaying ; and we merely seek to apply to the determination of these the same methods of research which by common consent are applied to the determination of the relations of other creatures. It is surely of some interest to man to know something of the origin, antiquity, and destiny of his race ; of some importance to conform his practice in life to the relations which God has evidently established between him and the rest of creation. We have no intuitive knowledge of these ; we seek to know them ; and no statement will satisfy that fails to recommend itself to rational dis- cernment. In dealing with topics such as these we have nothing to do with preconceived opinions. Sci- entific research must abide by scientific methods ; scientific convictions must rest on scientific investi- gations. We appeal unto Cesar, let us be judged by Cesar’s laws. It is true the subject is a delicate one, and requires delicate handling; but the interests of truth are always best secured by a candid utterance of beliefs, and whatever may be the value of these beliefs, there should at least be no faltering or hesi- tation in expressing what they are, or in stating the grounds upon which they arefounded. In the words of Bishop Tait to the Edinburgh Philosophical In- 22 MAN : stitution in 1863, “The man of science ought to go on honestly, patiently, diffidently, observing and storing up his observations, and carrying his reasonings un- flinchingly to their legitimate conclusions, convinced that it would be treason at once to the dignity of science and religion if he sought to help either by swerving ever so little from the straight rule of truth.” And, once for all, let it be observed, that if there be any irreverence in dealing with such questions as man’s origin, antiquity, and destiny, that irreverence must rest with those who would circumscribe the range of reason, and seek by unworthy clamour to deter the human intellect from arriving at some con- ception, however faint, of those laws by which the Creator has chosen to sustain the phenomena of this marvellous universe. Man’s relations to external nature, his relations to his God, and his relations to his fellow-men, determine at once the range of his knowledge and the sum of his obligations ; and un- less these relations be understood—and this is what science is always striving after—there never can be fulfilment of the duties they involve. It thus be- comes truly pitiable to hear from certain quarters their misrepresentations of scientific aims and scien- tific conclusions. In fact, it is easier to bear than to hear them; and one can scarcely avoid the conviction INTRODUCTORY. 23 that those who can misrepresent the opinions of others in order to strengthen their own arguments, would have little hesitation in falsifying facts to subserve a similar purpose. They talk of religion and infidelity. There is no profession of religion more offensive than that which, under the assumption of superior piety, attempts to vilify the honest convictions of others; the “ stand aside because I am holier than thou art,” is in general as void of reality as it is wanting in Chris-: tian humility and charity. They talk of reconciliation between the utterances of science and religious beliefs, as if true religion and sound science ever have been or can be at variance. If religion means belief in certain dogmas and adherence to certain ritualistic forms, science and religion may often be in conflict ; but if, on the other hand, the exercise of religion con- sists in search after truth, regard to the relations in which we are placed to the universe, and devotion to the Great Author of all, then science and religion are at one, and need no reconciliation. We are anxious at the outset to place the ques- tion on a fair footing as regards its religious aspects, because men of science have hitherto been too much deterred from giving expression to their opinions through fear of incurring accusations of scepticism and infidelity. There is nothing more frequent than de- nunciations from the pulpit and platform against the 24 MAN: tendencies of modern science by men who are not only ignorant of the rudiments of science, but who have bound themselves by creeds and formulas before their minds were matured enough, or their knowledge sufficient to discriminate between the essentials and non-essentials of these restrictions. And here it may be remarked, once for all, that no man who has sub- scribed to creeds and formulas, whether in theology or philosophy, can be an unbiassed investigator of the truth, or an unprejudiced judge of the opinions of others. His sworn preconceptions warp his discern- ment; adherence to his sect or party engenders in- tolerance to the honest convictions of other inquirers. Beliefs we may and must have, but a belief to be changed with new and advancing knowledge impedes no progress, while a creed subscribed to as ultimate truth, and sworn to be defended, not only puts a bar to further research, but as a consequence throws the odium of distrust on all that may seem to oppose it. Even where such odium cannot deter, it annoys and irritates ; hence the frequent unwillingness of men of science to come prominently forward with the avowal of their beliefs. Jt is time this delicacy were thrown aside, and such theologians plainly told that the scepticism and infidelity—if scepticism and infidelity there be—lies all on their own side. There is no scepticism so offensive as that which doubts the facts INTRODUCTORY. 25 of honest and careful observation ; no infidelity so gross as that which disbelieves the deductions of com- petent and unbiassed judgments. There can be no reverence more sacred than that which springs from a knowledge of God’s workings in nature ; no religion more sincere than that which flows from the enlight- ened understanding of the methods and laws of the Creator. The more intimate our acquaintance with the works of God, the stronger our convictions of his power, wisdom, and goodness. The holiest beliefs are those founded on informed reason ; all besides is little better than superstition and mechanical for- mality. It is of no use, then, when new questions like the present are mooted, for certain minds to work themselves into a frenzy of “ orthodoxy”—to savagely smear themselves with theological war-paint, and raise the old war-whoop of the Bible in danger. These questions, whatever they may be, will be agitated and discussed, and men’s convictions will ultimately take their hue from that which most commends itself to their understanding. Be it then clearly understood that in investigating the natural history relations of man, we are dealing with a question of science, and striving to ascertain what light zoology, ethnology, geology, and the allied sciences, can throw upon his origin, antiquity, and destiny. We are merely seeking to apply to man 26 MAIN. the same methods of research that are applied to the natural-history relations of other animals, What is the place he holds in the zoological scale? what is his distribution over the earth’s surface? in what varieties does he appear? what are the functional duties he has to perform? how long does he seem to have ténanted this world? and, looking at his past and present relations, what seems likely to be the future destination of his species? Such are the problems which man’s position naturally involves; such are the questions to which science is called upon to furnish a rational reply. Every assertion must be deduced from ascertained facts, and as such is a mat- ter of probation which any qualified intellect can determine for itself. There is no mystery in scientific methods ; nothing beyond the comprehension of honest and patient endeavour ; nothing that earnest minds may not receive, and honest words fail to convey; and if it were otherwise, the bulk of scientific research would be in vain, and its dissemination hopeless. In the present case we shall endeavour to deal with matters of fact, and content ourselves with simply indicating the necessary deduction ; and if this should recommend itself to reason, it becomes a truth—a belief as sacred as any other that may be entertained, and as such deserving the respectful consideration even of those who may hold a contrary opinion. [If it be truth and INTRODUCTORY. 27 rational belief, no amount of opposition, from what- ever quarter, can prevent its ultimate reception. As astronomy triumphed over the earlier notions respect- ing the earth’s planetary relations, and geology over the views of its limited antiquity, so will science, so long as it is true to right methods, establish ere long more rational beliefs as to the origin, antiquity, and progressive ascension of mankind. In the meantime the battle has to be, fought against prejudices and preconceptions ; but the warfare will the sooner ter- minate the sooner that science gives unmistakable utterance to its convictions, and hurls back upon its opponents the unworthy weapons of their unavailing attacks. As already mentioned, our object in the following pages is to discover what light modern science can throw on the relations which man holds to the rest of the universe. What the position, physical and intellectual, he now occupies? What the functions he has to perform? How or in what manner does he appear to have originated? What, geologically speak- ing, may be the measure of his antiquity? and : what, deductively from the history of the past, seems to be the nature of the course that lies before him? These are clearly legitimate subjects of research ; and so long as science abides by scientific methods, she is entitled to a fair hearing and respectful consideration. 28 MAN: The data may be few and doubtful and the results uncertain, still if they have been earnestly sought after and honestly interpreted, they are not to be despised. All knowledge is merely relative, and the more cordial the reception of the narrow information of to-day, the surer and speedier the attainment of the wider knowledge of to-morrow. Where the conelu- sions are sufficient to produce conviction, let the conviction be avowed ; and where failing to induce belief, let them be received at least as well-meant and honest endeavours. Nor is the investigation of man’s where, whence, and whither without its importance to other subjects of scientific research. Archeology, ethnology, and history will derive confirmation or correction accord- ing to the conclusions arrived at; and much in the rise and progress of our race which is now irreconcile- able under the ordinary views of chronology, may become easy of explanation under the establishment of a higher antiquity. Where history ceases, geology may assist the archeologist in the determination of primeval remains ; and where ethnology is puzzled in tracing connections, paleontological discovery may sometimes contribute the necessary information. The establishment of a higher antiquity for the human race, and of an ascent from lower to higher varieties, would give ample scope to views on civilisation, the INTRODUCTORY. 29 development of new nationalities, languages, and religions, and lead to more satisfactory results in ethnology and history. Under a chronology of six or seven thousand years the rise and progress of the human race, with all its varieties, families, and nationalities—with all its languages, customs, and religions, seem impossible, perplexing, and confusing : under a wider range of time, the whole evolution becomes natural, comprehensible, and in accordance with what is now taking place around us. On these grounds, even if on no other, the subject would be worthy of research, and the results entitled to a fair and candid consideration. We have said in accordance with what is now taking place around us; for, be it observed, there would be an end to all reasoning regarding either past or future if we did not believe in the general harmony, the even uniformity and permanence of the methods of creation. This belief is all essential to our inquiry ; it lies, in fact, at the foundation of all satisfactory reasoning respecting the appointments of the universe, and without it we cannot proceed a single step in security. “Tt is true,” says a recent writer,* “that this view of the government of the universe does not accord with the feelings of those who desire to have their atten- tion directed in a definite manner to the repeated and * Physical Geography, by Professor Ansted, pp. 442-3 ; 1867. 30 MAN: i systematic personal intervention of a Divine Power, and who cannot recognise the power without being able to trace what is called the finger or the hand of the Creator in all his works. In a certain sense, no doubt, every contrivance, or in other words, every arrangement in the universe may be made to yield evidence of this. But we would venture to suggest that the noblest view of creation, and a knowledge of the real greatness of the Creator, can only be learned by those who seek to discover the much higher and nobler intelligence that designed the whole system. That there should be an interfering hand is a mark of weakness in the original plan. If the structure be perfect, interference is not necessary.” And again, “ All true science has for its object not only the observation of facts, but the investigation of methods and the discovery of laws. These laws can only be binding and unalterable because they cannot be changed with advantage; in other words, because they are perfect, as being instituted by One who is himself perfect.” But, independently of scientific considerations, archeological or ethnological, the subject has most direct and important practical bearings. Nations, like individuals, have their idiosyncracies and apti- tudes. As one man has a genius for poetry and painting, and another a talent for mathematics and INTRODUCTORY. 31 mechanics ; so one race has an aptitude for adventure and commerce, and another for the industrial arts ; while a third may be incapable of rising beyond the lowest stages of nomadic existence. Clearly such races cannot be dealt with alike, and the more we know of national characteristics the better will we be prepared to direct our energies and shape our rela- tions towards them. It is greatly for want of this knowledge that missionary and ameliorating schemes so often fail in their efforts, and that nation misunder- standing the character of nation drifts insensibly into contention and warfare. It is also for want of this knowledge that the civilisation and amalgamation of certain races has been tried in vain, and that the higher race has not unfrequently been absorbed into and debased by that which it sought toimprove. In fine, the study of man—call it Ethnology, Anthro- pology, or what you will—is fraught with innumer- able utilities ; and whatever leads to more rational views of the duties and relations of race to race, and of nation to nation, is deserving of our warmest encouragement. To some the treatment of the subject, within the limits I have assigned to myself, may seem cursory and inexhaustive ; but to have exceeded these limits would have been to run the risk of defeating my object. It is an old saying that a big book is a great 32 MAN: evil; and an elaborate treatise on a matter as yet so little familiar might have been to deter from, rather than excite to, its study and comprehension, What I have aimed at is an outline rather than an array of details ; a review for the general reader, and not ah exhaustive argument for the man of science; a thing rather suggestive of what the question involves than instructive of truths already arrived at. My object has been to write as I would reason in conversation with a friend, earnestly and unreservedly ; convinced that subjects of this kind will never be fully under- stood nor generally accepted till they are dealt with as great truths, which it is the business of every edu- cated mind to endeavour to comprehend, and the duty of every man to explain to his less-informed neigh- bour. Where I have failed in disarming opposition, my plainness and directness of speech may prevent misrepresentation ; and where I have not been suc- cessful in convincing, I trust at least that doubt has been awakened and a desire excited for fuller and more detailed information. And this, in matters at variance with olden opinion, is often all that can, at the outset, be attained. Men are in general slow to accept new views, and the first and most hopeful step towards this end is to induce them to question the soundness of their previous convictions. WHERE? ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS, Community of Life-conditions — Structural Affinity to other Animals—Ascent through Adaptive Modification—Principle of Variation ever operative—Mental Affinity to other Ani- mals—Man Improvable and Progressive—Theory of Spiritual Community of Life—Our First Proposition. Man’s connection with the great scheme of animated nature is intimate and inseparable. The physical con- ditions under which life exists are the same to him as to other animals. Air, land, and water, heat, light, and moisture, are as essential to him as to the other forms and grades of vitality. He originates like other animals, embryologically passes through the same stages, and when launched on the field of independent being is subjected to the same functional round, and to the same struggle for existence. Life, growth, re- production, and decay, are phases of being characteristic of all that lives. There may be differences in degree, as there are differences in form and function, but there is no exemption from these conditions and re- quirements. Man suffers thirst and hunger, heat and cold, pain and pleasure, much as other animals do. If he is stronger than some, he is weaker than others ; 36 MAN: if in some of his senses he excels many, in this respect also he is inferior to others; and if in his general adapt- ations he is far superior, there are special instances in which he is greatly inferior. As a mere animal, then, man, like other animals, has his place in nature. It may be higher, but this is difference in degree not difference in kind ; and it would be setting aside all philosophy in science to shrink from applying to him the same methods of research that are applied to the other forms that constitute with him the great brother- hood of vitality. And yet, influenced by preconceptions as to man’s origin and destiny, there are zoologists who would assign to the human species a place apart, and alto- gether of its own kind, in their schemes of classifica- tion, forgetful that the essentials of existence are the same to man as to other living beings, and forgetful also that almost all the great physiological laws and therapeutic considerations of modern times have been arrived at more perhaps from the investigation of vital phenomena in the lower animals than from their study in the human race. The truth is, the immense progress recently made in biological science has arisen chiefly from researches among the lower forms of vitality, and any attempt to separate man from the general scheme of life is stultified at once, and alto- gether apart from scientific considerations, by the HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 387 practical connection upon which anatomy and medicine are every day founding their procedure. All our views of comparative anatomy, of respiration, circulation of the blood, muscular and nervous action, embryology, and the like, are based upon the idea of oneness in the vital plan; and surely we cannot consistently separate in theory what the necessities of our every- day existence compel us to combine in practice.* If, then, we are compelled to regard man as belonging to the same brotherhood of life, we cannot, in dealing with his relations, adopt other methods of research or * This oneness of plan, and its bearings on physiology and therapeutics, are well brought out in the following passage from the Natural History of the European Seas, by Edward Forbes and Godwin Austen :—‘“ A great part of the animals that live beneath the waters consists of beings in a manner rudimentary—creatures exhibiting the elements of higher creatures, living analyses of higher organised compounds, the first draught of sketches afterwards finished, the framework, as it were, of many-wheeled machines. By an exa- mination and study of them we get ata clearer conception of the nature of the structures which, in combination, constitute the com- plicated bodies of vertebrated animals, and in the end are enabled to throw light upon the organisation of man himself, learning thereby much concerning the wonderful construction of the microcosm, and at the same time, through our better knowledge of the nature and capabilities of our organisation, acquiring a lesser though more practical gain in the placing of the science of medicine on a surer and sounder foundation. The day has gone by when a medical student was taught the anatomy and physiology of man, with little reference to that of inferior beings.” 38 MAN: follow any other than the ordinary line of biological argument. “But it is not upon structural similarity or difference alone,” says the most experienced of living naturalists,* that the relations between man and animals have to be considered. The psycholo- gical history of animals shows that as man is related to animals by the plan of his structure, so are these related to him by the character of those very faculties which are so transcendant in man as to point at first to the necessity of disclaiming for him completely any relationship with the animal kingdom. Yet the natural history of animals is by no means completed after the somatic side of their nature has been thoroughly investigated ; for they too have a psycho- logical individuality which, though less studied, is nevertheless the connecting link between them and man. I cannot therefore agree with those authors who would disconnect mankind from the animal kingdom, and establish a distinct kingdom for man alone.” The slightest glance at the vital world is sufficient to convince that there is a great structural plan to which the whole of its component members are con- formed, and that this plan is applicable alike to the extinct forms revealed by geology and to those still existing. One phase of this plan belongs to the globu- * Essay on Classification. By Professor Agassiz, London, 1859. HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 39 lar or Protozoan forms, another to the rayed or Radiate forms, a third to the jointed or Articulate forms, a fourth to the soft-bodied or Molluscan forms, and a fifth to the backboned or Vertebrate. Whether these subdivisions are of equal zoological value we will not stop to inquire. It is enough for our present purpose to know that they form portions of the same biological scheme, and are bound together in plan by certain structural characteristics as well as by certain func- tional performances: by structural plan in the posses- sion of corresponding organic parts, and by functional duty in the work of assimilation, growth, reproduction, and other processes peculiar to vitality. As man be- longs to the highest, or Vertebrate section, it is with this that we have more especially to do; though we must not lose sight of the fact that section is connected with section by affinities which become closer and closer as we ascend from the lower to the higher and more specially organised, and that all really and truly belong to one great but multiform plan. Zoologically, indeed, it would not be difficult—were this the proper place—to show that the Radiate is but a permanent development of the temporary functional form of the Globular ; the Articulate of the Radiate; the Mol- luscan a more concentrated expression of all three ; and the Vertebrate a higher specialisation of the Mol- luscan ; while each section is linked to the other by 40 MAN: intermediate forms which are either still existing or belong to bygone geological periods. Man’s structural connection with the vertebrate plan is inseparable; and while he is admittedly the highest form in the scale of created being, yet he is physically possessed of nothing that is not typified and existing in degree in the lower animals. Homo- logous parts of the vertebrate skeleton are common to fish, reptile, bird, and mammal—the fin to swim, the limb to creep, the wing to fly, and the hand to grasp. As we ascend the mammalian scale, the resemblance becomes closer and closer, till at last, in man and the forms immediately below him, we find organ for organ, bone for bone, muscle for muscle, and nerve for nerve—the resemblances, in fine, far more striking than the differences. There may be a process on a bone of the one more prominent than the process on the corresponding bone of the other; or there may be a section of the brain of the one less conspicuous than that in the brain of the other ; but no honest and competent anatomist refuses on grounds like these to admit the identity of parts or the oneness of the plan upon which both are constructed.* Differences there * “Not being able,” says the most distinguished of British anatomists, “‘to appreciate or conceive of the distinctness between the psychical phenomena of a chimpanzee and of a Boschisman, or of an Aztec, with arrested brain-growth, as being of a nature so HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 41 undoubtedly are, but these are merely differences in degree—modifications of parts common to the whole rather than the creation or introduction of what is new and essentially original. Comparing the various orders and families of the vertebrate class, the lower with the higher, and the higher with those next above them, it seems that adaptive modifications, rather than independent and repeated creations, have been the governing method in structural advancement. As a skilful engineer models the primal idea of the steam- engine so as to adapt it for stationary, locomotive, or marine purposes, and this without inventing a new machine, so the original conception of the vertebrate skeleton is merely modified to suit it for the respec- tive requirements of the fish, the reptile, the bird, and the mammal. And so in like manner it happens with the ordinal and generic differences that take place within the respective classes: they are modifica- essential as to preclude a comparison between them, or as being other than a difference in degree, I cannot shut my eyes to the significance of that all-pervading similitude of structure—every tooth, every bone, strictly homologous—which makes the determina- tion of the difference between homo (man) and pithecus (monkey) the anatomists’ difficulty.”—(Professor Owen “On the Characters, etc., of the Class Mammalia,” in the Journal of the Linnean Society for 1857.) And to the same effect the great Swedish naturalist admitted, now more than a century ago— Nullum characterem ad- huc eruere potui, unde homo a simia internoscatur.’”—(Linneus, Fauna Suecica.) 42 MAN: tions of existing parts rather than the creation of new ones. Take, for example, the mammalian neck, which in all the orders consists of seven vertebral pieces. If this has to be lengthened for functional purposes, as in the camel and giraffe, the result is accomplished not by the insertion of additional vertebre, but simply by a lengthening of each of the normal seven. If, on the other hand, it has to be shortened, as in the case of man, this is done not by the abstraction of one or more pieces, but simply by the compression of each of the normal number. Or take the mammalian fore-limb, with its shoulder-blade, arm-bone, forearm- bones, wrist-bones, and fingers. In this organ, whether it be the hand of man to manipulate, the claws of the tiger to tear, the foot of the antelope to spring, the hoof of the horse to run, the paddle of the whale to swim, or the wing of the bat to fly, it is clear that all are but modifications of the same primal parts— alterations for functional purposes, and not the creation of new and different members. As with the fore- limb, so with other organs. The plan upon which the mammalian type has been diversified, so as to produce its numerous orders, genera, and species, has been the modification of component parts, and not the creation of essentially new ones. And as with the mammalian, so with the other types that constitute the great scheme of life. In each, the respective HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 43 members are but modifications of the original type- forms, just as those type-forms themselves are modi- fications of a wider and more comprehensive plan. It is true that modification of any important organ implies a corresponding modification in all the other organs which constitute the entirety of any living being. This is the great physiological doctrine of the “co-relation of parts” by which, for instance, the simpler stomach and shorter intestines of the carnivore is co-adapted to the trenchant tooth and seizing fore- limb, and the more complicated stomach and longer intestines of the ruminant co-adapted to the grinding tooth and the harmless fore-foot. No important modification, then, can take place in one member without affecting the others, and hence the numerous forms in nature according to the function to be performed and the element to be occupied.* But difference in form and function does not necessarily imply a separate origin, and seeing the gradual shading of form into form in nature, it is easier, and indeed more rational, to believe in modification of original type-forms than in the creation of new forms for every * “Fivery organised being,” says Cuvier, “forms a whole, a single circumscribed system, the parts of which mutually correspond and concur to the same definite action by a reciprocal reaction. None of these parts can change without the others also changing, and consequently each part, taken separately, indicates and gives all the others.” 44 MAN: slight variation in habits and mode of life which the physical forces of the universe are ever producing, As external conditions are ever changing under the operation of physical forces, and this in conformity to established laws, so we may rest assured that variations in life-forms are equally the orderly results of secondary causation, though we may not in the present state of knowledge be able to indicate either the time when or the mode in which such causation may operate. Every anatomist, every breeder of animals, and every propagator of plants, knows that variations do take place—every paleontologist and fossil-collector per- ceives that similar variations have taken place; but neither in the existing nor in the extinct has the process been traced far enough, nor have sufficient data been accumulated to enable science to determine the full efficiency of this principle as a cause of specific and generic distinctions. But though observation has not yet been enabled to complete the argument, there can be no doubt of the existence of the principle of variation, or of the important part it plays in the modification of life- forms; and we may safely’ accept it as one of the main factors in the law of biological development. Variation takes place so slowly, and by stages so minute, that ages may pass before it rises into what we are in the habit of calling “ specific” distinctions ; HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 45 and even where it may have culminated in species, observation has been so recent and so imperfect, that if no argument can be drawn from this source in favour of the doctrine of development, none, on the other hand, can be honestly advanced against it. If then there be a plan of diversity by modification running throughout the whole of nature—no matter what the causes—man, so far as his animal structure is con- cerned, can claim no exemption. He may stand higher, but his place is one merely of degree ; and if he possesses any gift not participated in by his fellow- animals, it is to this specialisation, and not to his mere structural adaptations, that we must look for the difference that subsists between him and the rest of vitality. However averse some may be to accept this process of modification, as applicable to the evolution of the human race, there can be no ques- tion, at all events, that whatever the process, the same structural idea was in the Creative Mind in the formation of man as in the formation of other mam- mals, and more especially as in the production of those that stand next beneath him in the scale of zoological advancement. Nor be it forgotten that’ every progressive modification implies the addition of something new—the introduction through secondary processes, and in conformity with a great aboriginal plan, of higher adaptations, and consequently of 46 MAN. higher functional performances. In fact, the idea of development involves that of superaddition—no mat- ter by what process the superaddition may be effected, and it is the oversight of this truth which apparently leads to the misconception of the theory of vital progression. Call it progressive modification, ad- vancement, development, or what you will, there is clearly at each successive stage something new evolved ; and as all physical means and processes are but im- plements of the Divine will, the new evolution must, in each.case, be accepted as tantamount to a new creation. If it should be argued, as it is sometimes done, that it would be as easy for the Divine Author of the universe to create a form of new as to modify the structure of a pre-existing one, then to such an argu- ment there can be only one answer. No one doubts it ; no one having enlightened conceptions of a Creator ever doubted it. But the question is not one of possibility but of probability. We perceive a certain order and certain method in nature ; we see that under new conditions certain variations do take place in vegetable and animal structures; and by an irre- sistible law of our intellect, we associate the variations with the conditions in the way of cause and effect. Of such a method we can form some notion, and bring it within the realm of reason; of any other plan, HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 47 however it may be received, we can form no rational conception. Again, should it be advanced, as is some- times done, that the creation of a monad is as incom- prehensible as that of a man, then to this we decidedly answer, No. To argue otherwise were to maintain that the comprehension of a complex machine, com- posed of many wheels and levers, were as easy as the understanding of a single wheel or of a single lever. Scientific research on the cell-growth of vegetable and animal structures has made us acquainted, in some measure, with the development of these primary organisms, and how they are influenced by heat, light, electricity, and other forces. We can form some conception, however faint, of the simple uni-cellular germ, under the operation of these subtle forces ; but of the complex structure of man by a similarly direct process, the human reason is utterly unable to con- ceive. We can follow, however, the successive stages of ascent, under a plan of development, and if we cannot fully explain the cause, we can indicate at least the process through which the modification was effected. And this, be it observed, is something gained—a step, however short, towards the solution of the problem of vital development. We say vital deve- lopment, for in this place we are not called upon to offer any opinion as to the origin of life, which may ever lie darkly and far beyond the discrimination of science. 48 Nor are we, in associating the manifestations of life with the operation of external forces, required to dis- cuss the nature of the so-called vital force as distinct from other forces, though we cannot help remarking that hitherto too broad a line of demarcation has been drawn between it and the other operating forces of the universe. Whatever the vital force may be, it never manifests itself save in connection with, or under the operation of, other forces. If it be some- thing per se, it clearly can neither assert its presence nor continue its existence independent of other forces ; and seeing the vast progress that has been made during the current century in our knowledge of the subtlest powers in nature—heat, light, actinism, magnetism, galvanism, and electricity—-we cannot suppress the hope that science will ere long be enabled to do something more than merely give a name to the most interesting of natural phenomena. It has also been argued—and the argument is by no means foreign to the inquiry—that if there be a process of modification in nature, by which the higher is developed from the lower, the process must embrace the mental as well as the physical organisation of the creature so developed. This argument embodies, of course, the old question of instinct and reason, or in other words, whether the guiding power of the lower animals be a thing swi generis, and distinct from HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 49 the reason or directing intelligence of man? It is almost needless, at this stage of science, to discuss the question. In the animal classes next to man— the birds and mammals—we perceive a growing con- centration of the great nervous centres, the existence of a more convoluted brain, the possession of similar senses, acting through similar organs and influenced by similar causes. By the impressions made on these organs of sense animals are impelled to certain actions; and nothing more can be said of the causes affecting the senses of man. Colours, sounds, odours, and tastes, which are agreeable or disagreeable to man, are equally gratifying or distasteful to them ; mimetic disguises in nature are alike deceptive to both ; and even the very lures which men employ for their cap- ture, prove beyond doubt that their senses and their faculties of perception and emotion are essentially the same in nature. Perception, memory, reflection, hope, fear, affection, and other mental attributes, are charac- teristics of the lower animals as well as of man, as may be amply studied in the conduct and docility of our domesticated species ; and the only difference is that of degree, with the superaddition of other intel- lectual gifts (to be afterwards noticed), which are necessary concomitants of his higher development. If, then, instinct means the unreflecting impulse to certain actions, man has his instincts as well as other E 50 MAN: animals ; and if, on the other hand, reason means the power to discriminate between certain courses of action, and to choose one in preference to another, then are the lower animals, and especially many of the higher mammals, by no means without it. And here, while on the subject of mind, we may be par- doned for hinting to psychologists, that as anatomy and physiology have derived incalculable aid from the study of the structure of the lower forms of life, so may psychology obtain important assistance from a more intimate study of mental manifestations in the lower animals. If, as Edward Forbes has well re- marked, the lower forms of life be “ living analyses of higher organised compounds,” as far as regards their somatic side, they are equally so as concerns their intellectual nature ; and what often baffles on account of its complexity in man might be rendered comprehensible by a study of its simpler manifesta- tions in the lower orders. If as zoologists we cannot possibly dissociate the physical structure of man from the great scheme of life, neither as psychologists are we entitled to attempt a severance of his intellectual nature, unless as a matter of degree, and for the mere convenience of provisional arrangement. The main difference seems to be that the in- tellectual principle in the lower animals soon reaches its climax and remains stationary, while in man it is HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 51 ever improvable and progressive—improvable in the individual, and progressive in the race. And this improvability seems to arise chiefly from his power of generalising his ideas, or, as metaphysicians term it, “the faculty of abstraction,” in conjunction with the power of expressing these ideas in articulate language. Indeed, on these endowments some reasoners found the main distinction between man and the lower animals ; but we must not lose sight of the fact that there may be difference in degree without there being any difference in kind, and that without the higher structural adaptations—the erect gait and the hand to manipulate—these mental gifts would of themselves be of comparatively little value. “This,” says Locke, in his Essay on the Human Understanding, “IT think I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to.” And Dr. H. Bischoff, in his Essay on the Difference between Man and Brutes, says, “It is impossible to deny to animals, qualitatively and quantitatively, as many mental faculties as we find in man. They possess consciousness. They feel, think, and judge; they possess a will which determines their actions and motions. Animals possess attachment: they are 52 grateful, obedient, good-natured; and again false, treacherous, disobedient, revengeful, jealous, ete. Their actions frequently evince deliberation and memory. It is in vain to derive such actions from so-called instinct, which unconsciously compels them so to act. But though we cannot deny to animals consciousness—we assert that man alone possesses self-consciousness, that is, the capacity of meditating on himself and his connection with the rest of creation.” And again, a recent writer—Mr. C. Wake—in the Anthropological Review, vol. i., contends “that the true explanation of the inferiority of the lower animals is, that their mental powers, though not imperfect either in their constitution, develop- ment, or operation, and though containing in them- selves the germ of all truth, are yet limited in their very nature, and incapable, without the assistance of a higher principle, of reaching beyond a certain range of knowledge. The soul is essentially instinctive ; but superadded to instinct it possesses the power of storing up its sensational experiences, of recalling them by memory, and of reasoning from them and forming judgments as to their relations. It is observable, however, that although brute-reason enables its subjects to reason from past experience as to the proper conduct under particular circumstances, it never enables them to get further. The lower HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 53 animals have no power of abstraction or generalisation, in the proper signification of these words. They do indeed sometimes act as though they exercise such a power, but they do not in reality ; the appearance of it arising from the intimate connection which always continues in the brute-mind betwixt instinct and reason. However perfect may be their reasoning about particulars, it never leads them to the know- ledge of general truths, nor even to the remembrance of particular ones, except so far only as they may be influential over present action.” And lastly, Max Miller, in his Science of Language, after admitting that brutes have five senses like ourselves, that they have sensations of pleasure and pain, that they have memory, that they are able to compare and distinguish, have a will of their own, show signs of shame and pride, and are guided by intellect as well as instinct, goes on to ask—‘“ What then is the difference between brute and man? What is it that man can do, and of which we have no signs, no rudiments, in the whole brute-world? I answer without hesitation : the one great barrier between the brute and man is Language. Man speaks, and no brute has ever uttered a word. Language is our Rubicon, and no brute has ever crossed it.” To all such averments as the preceding, however plausibly or decidedly put, there is still the question : 54 Are not these powers of abstraction and language a matter of degree rather than of kind? Do not the actions of many of the lower animals sufficiently indicate that they reason from the particular to the general? And have they not the power of communi- cating their thoughts to one another by vocal sounds which cannot be otherwise regarded than as language } No one who has sufficiently studied the conduct of our domestic animals but must be convinced of this power of generalisation; no one who has listened attentively to the various calls of mammals and birds can doubt they have the power of expressing their mental emotions in language. Their powers of abstraction may be limited, and the range of their language restricted ; but what shall we say of the mental capacity of the now extinct Tasmanian, which could not carry him beyond individual conceptions, or of the monosyllabic click-cluck of the Bushman, as compared with the intellectual grasp and the inflectional languages of modern Europe? If it shall be said that these are matters merely of degree, then are the mental processes and languages of the lower animals, as compared with those of man, also matters of degree —things that manifest themselves in the same way ‘and by the same organs, but differing in power according to the perfection of the organs through HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 55 which they are manifested.* This inferiority of in- tellectual adaptation, which soon reaches its climax in the lower animals, limits the improvability in the individual and prevents progression in the race ; whereas the superior adaptation of man secures, under favourable conditions, at once the improvement of the individual and the progress of the race. It is this improvability, taken in its widest sense, that places man in new relationships to nature—relationships which involve at once the consciousness of right and wrong and the idea of moral responsibility. Psycho- logically this is all that can be fairly advanced, and all that in a natural-history point of view need be contended for; though we are aware that many * Of these opinions, which have been arrived at by a long and intimate study of the conduct of the lower animals, we find the fol- lowing pointed corroboration in the Introduction to Agassiz’ Con- tributions to the Natural History of the United States :—“ The in- telligibility of the voice of animals to one another, and all their actions connected with such calls, are also a strong argument of their perceptive power, and of their ability to act spontaneously and with logical sequence in accordance with these perceptions. There is a vast field open for investigation in the relations between the voice and the actions of animals, and a still more interesting subject of inquiry in the relationship between the cycle of intonations which different species of animals of the same family are capable of utter- ing, which, so far as I have yet been able to trace them, stand to one another in the same relations as the different, so called, families of languages.” 56 biologists, and some of them of the highest reputation, believe in a much closer, and to some minds a more startling relationship—namely, that of an immaterial and spiritual community between man and the lower animals. “For the most part,” says Professor Agassiz,* “the relations of individuals to individuals are un- questionably of an organic nature, and as such, have to be viewed in the same light as any other structural feature ; but there is much also in these connections that partakes of a psychological character, taking this expression in the widest sense of the word. When animals fight with one another—when they associate for a common purpose—when they warn one another in danger—when they come to the rescue of one an- other—when they display pain and joy—they mani- fest impulses of the same kind as are considered among the moral attributes of man. The range of their passions is even as extensive as that of the ‘human mind, and I am at a loss to perceive a differ- ence of kind between them, however much they may differ in degree and in the manner in which they are expressed. The gradations of the moral faculties among the higher animals and man are moreover so imperceptible, that to deny to the first a certain sense of responsibility and consciousness, would certainly * Essay on Classification, pp. 96-99 : London, 1859. HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 57 be an exaggeration of the differences which distin- guish animals and man. There exists, besides, as much individuality, within their respective capa- bilities, among animals as among man, as every sports- man, every keeper of menageries, and every farmer or shepherd can testify, or any one who has had large experience with wild, tamed, or domesticated animals. This argues strongly in favour of the existence in every animal of an immaterial principle similar to that which, by its excellence and superior endowments, places man so much above animals. Yet the principle unquestionably exists, and whether it be called soul, reason, or instinct, it presents in the whole range of organised beings a series of phenomena closely linked together ; and upon it are based not only the higher manifestations of the mind, but the very permanence of the specific differences which characterise every organism. Most of the arguments of philosophy in favour of the immortality of man apply equally to the permanency of this principle in other living beings. May I not add, that a future life, in which man would be deprived of that great source of enjoyment and intellectual and moral improvement which results from the contemplation of the harmonies of an organic world, would involve a lamentable loss? And may we not look to a spiritual concert of the combined worlds and all their inhabitants in presence of their 58 Creator, as the highest conception of paradise?” For views like these, biology, as we have elsewhere ob- served,* is by no means responsible. Science knows nothing of Life save through its manifestations. With the growth of physical organisation it comes, with the decay of organisation it disappears. While life endures, mind is its accompaniment; when life ceases, mental activity comes to a close. Thus far we can trace ; beyond this science is utterly helpless. No observation from the external world—no analogy, ‘ however plausible—no analysis, however minute— can solve the problem of an immaterial and immortal existence. They may be received as possible or pro- bable auxiliaries; but in the main our faith on this point must rest, as it has hitherto rested, on an alto- gether different foundation. What we have to deal with in the present inquiry are zoological relations which admit of probation, and we only complicate the question by the unnecessary introduction of the still more difficult problem of a spiritual community. Our first proposition then is, that man in his structural relations belongs to the same zoological plan as the lower animals; and that, while it this plan there are obviously higher and lower members, adaptive modification of pre-existing structures, rather * Past and Present Life of the Globe, pp. 206-7: Edinburgh, 1861. HIS ZOOLOGICAL RELATIONS. 59 than | independent creation of new ones, seems to have been the 1 the method of nature in the production of the newer and higher forms. And further, that this principle of adaptive modification, inferred from the study of existing life-forms, receives ample confirma- tion from the science of extinct forms, in which the ascent from lower to higher is marked, not by the superaddition of new parts, but simply by the change or further specialisation of those pre-existing. The whole scheme of vitality, from the earliest known formations up to the present day, being clearly a de- velopment of the same typical ideas, shall we regard the newer forms as created stage after stage, in accord- ance with this aboriginal plan, or shall we regard their introduction as provided for and brought about, like other phenomena, by the operation of law and secondary causation? This is the whole question at issue. Need we indicate which view is most in accordance with the known operations of nature, or which recommends itself most forcibly to the accept- ance of the educated intellect ? GEOGRAPHICAL RELATIONS. Influence of External Conditions on Life—Their Influence on Civilisation—Variation through Physical Surroundings— Power of Locality on Mental Characteristics—External Conditions merely Co-factors in the Law of Variation— Our Second Proposition. ON surveying the surface of the globe—whether the land or waters—we perceive that plants and animals are not universally or indiscriminately dispersed, but that certain groups are restricted to certain areas, and that the range of some groups is more extensive than that of others. In this distribution, climate, food, geological changes of sea and land, and other physical conditions, are the main factors; for as soon as any important alteration is made on these conditions, a corresponding change takes place in the distribution of the vital organisms. And not a change in the distribution merely, but often a modification of the plants and animals themselves, by which they adapt themselves to their new conditions—thriving and spreading, or declining and dying out, according to the power of adaptability with which they are en- MAN: HIS GEOGRAPHICAL RELATIONS. 61 dowed. It is true the ranges of certain groups may suffer no perceptible change for ages, yet no truth in geology is more thoroughly established than that every portion of the earth’s surface is, and has been, subjected to variations ; and hence we naturally associate ex- ternal conditions and vital changes, whether of dis- tribution or of character, in the way of cause and effect. It is by no means contended that external conditions are the sole causes of vital variation, but merely affirmed that they are important and obvious causes, and, as such, must ever be taken into account in all our reasonings on the diversity and distribution of plants and animals. Like the lower animals, man is also amenable to the influences of food and climate, but being possessed of the power of clothing himself, of storing up food, and of using fire, he has acquired an almost cosmopolitan range—few tracts of the earth being untenanted by him, save the snow-clad mountain- tops or the ice-bound solitudes of the polar regions. Though having a wider range than other animals, and less influenced by latitude and altitude, man in all his relations—physical, social, and industrial—is still intimately affected by his geographical surround- ings. Under the tropics, where warmth and the means of subsistence are easily procured, he is chiefly a vegetable-feeder, improvident and little progressive ; under temperate latitudes, where the means of sub- 62 sistence are procured with greater difficulty, and seasonal changes have to be studied, he is partly a vegetable and partly an animal feeder, more industrious, provident, and progressive; while within the polar regions, where warmth has to be sustained by diet, and where his whole time is spent in securing a pre- carious subsistence, he is solely an animal-feeder, toilsome but stationary. As man now subsists under these broad climatic distinctions, so he must have sub- sisted in former ages; and thus he may have been in turns chiefly a vegetable-feeder or chiefly an animal- feeder, according to the distributions of sea and land, and the climates thereby engendered. As the Esqui- maux, in virtue of their position, are strictly animal- feeders, and have even no name for the fruits and grains, so during the Glacial Epoch in Europe a race of men may have subsisted by hunting and fishing among the glaciers on land and the icebergs on water. We mention this, in passing, to show how futile the arguments of those who contend that man was only called into being with, and could not have subsisted without, the fruit-bearing and grain-yielding plants of the present day, and thus would limit his antiquity to a chronology of their own creating. The limits of man’s endurance, and the conditions under which he can subsist, are vastly wider and much more multi- farious than civilised reasoners are generally prone to HIS GEOGRAPHICAL RELATIONS. 63 believe. Indeed, so far as mere geographical con- ditions are concerned, he may have been an inhabitant of this earth for untold ages, and the lower the variety, the greater apparently his chances of subsistence. Following the influence of geographical conditions, we find it affecting not only man’s form and features, but determining his habits and industry, and even more intimately pervading his whole intellectual and moral nature. The inhabitants of the plains become tillers of the ground and builders of cities, while those of the mountains remain herdsmen and shepherds. The dwellers on the sea-board are naturally drawn to adventure and trading and commerce ; while those of the interior as naturally abide by their homesteads and husbandry. A country of uniform soil, climate, and production, must tend in the long run to uni- formity of industry as well as to a limited and stationary civilisation. No matter what the race, if the natural means of progress—vegetable, animal, and mineral—lie not within a country, its inhabitants can never rise, without extraneous aid, beyond the lowest stages of advancement. The civilisations, for example, capable of being evolved in Europe and in Australia could never have been the same, even had the abori- gines of both continents been naturally equal. The fruits and grains, the horse, ox, sheep, pig, dog, and the like, which characterise the one country, and have 64 contributed so much to its civilisation, were totally wanting in the other, and had no analagous produc- tions to represent them.