




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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO

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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO

AFTER THE PAGING OF THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPT

WITH

INTRODUCTIONS, FACSIMILES, AND NOTES

WILLIAM WARDLAW WADDELL

M. A., GLASGOW AND OXFORD

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PREFACE.

THE author first studied the Parmenides in college days long ago, as an exercise in metaphysics; but all such occupations had to be renounced when he took up the practical duties of his calling. As time passed, however, the speculative interest revived, the subject was resumed, and he found himself most unexpectedly committed to publication before he had realized what such a step involved. In the meantime he had become satisfied that the highest manuscript authority for the text was accessible at Oxford, and his leisure moments had now to be given to palaeography. With the zeal of a beginner he decided to reproduce the form of the manuscript, a resolution rendered feasible by the condition of the text. This fixed for him the size of his page; and that in turn suggested facsimiles and a regard to outward appearance. Metaphysics, palaeography, aesthetics—such was the writer's downward course: it remains to hope that the result may justify the undertaking. So far as contents are concerned the work errs both by excess and by defect, and that largely through circumstances. It was compiled in spare hours, at long intervals, while the writer was, if he may so speak, in bondage under the elements of the world. During its progress effort was occasionally misdirected, notes lost their first significance, standpoints had to be abandoned, and the literature of the subject proved unmanageable. And in the end, with no mere affectation of humility, the writer feels that he presents little upon philosophy save τὰ δεδημευμένα περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, while his contributions to palaeography have still to be tested by the


experts. At most he can but rank with the untrained boxers of Aristotle, who περιφερόμενοι τύπτουσι καλὰς πληγὰς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης.

A commentator on Plato must beware of two dangers. If he does not detect in his author the latest developments of metaphysics he may be adjudged ignorant of these; if he does he may be taxed with a want of the 'historic sense.' The dilemma is not an agreeable one. The writer is perhaps imperfectly informed upon recent metaphysical theories, but his ignorance is not proved by a failure to read all Hegel into the Parmenides. In a parallel case, he might know little of renaissance architecture in Italy, but that could not be properly inferred from his inability to find a place on the Acropolis for half the public buildings of Vicenza. On the other hand, if Plato himself escapes being a Hegelian, it must be granted that the comments of his Neoplatonic followers have a strangely modern character. It is part of the wonderful suggestiveness of Plato's contributions to philosophy that they act contagiously upon the imagination of readers; and even the Parmenides, perhaps the most 'sawdustish' among them, is no exception.

Toward previous workers in the same field, many of them critics and scholars of the highest rank, the writer is not consciously chargeable with discourtesy or disingenuousness. But if any expression should be thought wanting in respect, or any view appear to be appropriated without acknowledgment, he sincerely desires to recall the one and give up the other. Among his brightest memories will be the days of lovely autumn weather which his work led him to pass, from time to time, among the quiet and impressive surroundings of great libraries. It is no less a pleasure than a duty to acknowledge here the very great consideration and kindness shown him by the authorities of all these noble institutions. In particular, he will always remember with gratitude that at Tübingen the time of the officials was drawn upon and the rules of the library were relaxed to oblige him, and that from Venice, through the personal kindness of Count Soranzo, a photographic negative was received within a fortnight of the date on which the

request for it was posted in Scotland. His thanks are also due for obliging communications from Mr. Warner of the British Museum, and from Professor Mahaffy. While the character of the letterpress is such as to demand most attentive revision, the protracted and fitful progress of the volume made it impossible to ask assistance from friends in looking over the proofs. The printed authorities consulted are all named from time to time in the course of the work, but Professor Schanz calls for special recognition in connection with the manuscripts. The writings of some commentators could not be had separately, and are quoted from the variorum edition of Valpy. Others, cited in turn by these, could not be procured at all. Such are the disadvantages of living in a provincial town. Of English editions of the dialogue the only one used is that of Thomson, published more than a century ago. The writer remembers seeing, when a student, a small modern edition; but he did not note the author's or publisher's name, and has tried in vain to obtain a copy since. He owes very much to all these sources of information. Now that the work is ended, he is satisfied that the standard aimed at is deserving of respect; but when he thinks of the extent to which learning in all branches has latterly become specialized, and of the many pitfalls lying in the path of imprudent amateurs, his satisfaction is tempered with anxiety, and he is almost ready to say with Thomson, '*nec laudem quaero, sed pro laude veniam.*'

STIRLING, October 12, 1894.



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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION.

I.

IN writing an introduction to the *Parmenides* of Plato it is unfortunately necessary, AUTHORSHIP OF THE WORK. in view of modern controversies, to begin by discussing the authenticity of the work. So far as Antiquity is concerned, no doubt upon the subject would appear to have arisen. The best manuscripts give the dialogue without hinting a suspicion; and these can be traced back, with reasonable certainty, to a common fountain dating from the first thirty-six years of our era. Within that period one Thrasyllus or Thrasyllus drew up an arrangement of all those Platonic writings held by him to be genuine, which seems to be the source of most or all of our existing texts. According to Diogenes iii. 56-61. Laërtius this arrangement took the form of tetralogies, and was as follows:—

I. Euthyphro.	Apologia.	Crito.	Phaedo.
II. Cratylus.	Theaetetus.	Sophista.	Politicus.
III. <i>Parmenides</i> .	Philebus.	Symposium.	Phaedrus.
IV. Alcibiades I.	Alcibiades II.	Hipparchus.	Anterastae.
V. Theages.	Charmides.	Laches.	Lysis.
VI. Euthydemus.	Protagoras.	Gorgias.	Meno.
VII. Hippias major.	Hippias minor.	Io.	Menexenus.
VIII. Clitopho.	Respublica.	Timaeus.	Critias.
IX. Minos.	Leges.	Epinomis.	Epistolae.

καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὕτω διαιρεῖ καὶ τινες. It is indeed indicated by Diogenes in another ix. 37. place that Thrasyllus had doubts about one of these dialogues; but that was the *Anterastae*, not the *Parmenides*.

Immediately after giving this list, however, Diogenes goes on to record a second How far can we trace it back? of a much earlier date. *Ἐνιοὶ δέ, ὡν ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικός, εἰς τριλογίας ἔλκουσι τοὺς διαλόγους.* According, then, to Aristophanes the grammarian, called 'of Byzantium,' whose prime we may place between 220 and 190 B.C., the order of the dialogues should be this:—

I. Respublica.	Timaeus.	Critias.	III. Leges	Minos.	Epinomis.
II. Sophista.	Politicus.	Cratylus.	IV. Theaetetus.	Euthyphro.	Apologia.
	V. Crito.	Phaedo.	Epistolae.		

τὰ δ' ἄλλα καθ' ἐν καὶ ἀτάκτως. In the trilogies, it will be observed, the *Parmenides* does not appear; and we have to consider whether it was likely to be found among 'the remainder which were placed not in groups but singly.' The ordering of the Platonic

writings would seem to have been almost an industry in itself among the scholars who flourished after the founding of the great libraries. First we have Thrasylyus *καί τινες*, next *ἔνιοι* and Aristophanes; while immediately after the word *ἀτάκτως* Diogenes goes on *ἄρχονται δὲ οἱ μὲν, ὡς προείρηται (i.e. the ἔνιοι), ἀπὸ τῆς Πολιτείας· οἱ δ' ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ μείζονος· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Θεάγουσ· ἔνιοι δ'* (Thrasylyus and his followers) *Εὐθύφρονος· ἄλλοι Κλειτοφῶντος· τινὲς Τιμαίου· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Φαίδρου· ἕτεροι Θεαιτήτων· πολλοὶ δὲ Ἀπολογία τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιοῦνται.* His final remark is as follows, continuing from *ποιοῦνται*: *νοθεύονται δὲ τῶν διαλόγων ὁμολογουμένως Μίδων ἢ Ἴπποτρόφος, Ἐρυξίας ἢ Ἐρασίστρατος, Ἀλλκῶν, Ἀκέφαλοι ἢ Σίσυφος (some read ἀκέφαλοι ἢ Σίσυφος), Ἀξίοχος, Φαίακες, Δημοδόκος, Χελιδῶν, Ἐβδόμη, Ἐπιμενίδης· ὧν ἢ Ἀλλκῶν Δέοντός τινος εἶναι δοκεῖ, καθά φησι Φαβωρίνος ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων.* Thus we have got before us a complete deliverance by Diogenes Laërtius upon the canon of Plato's works. Now in the course of this connected and detailed statement he (1) gives a long list of dialogues held to be genuine and arranged by Thrasylyus: (2) a shorter list of those arranged by Aristophanes, after which he says, 'the rest' were placed one by one: (3) enumerates other arrangements; some of which as will be observed, begin from dialogues named in (1) although not named in (2): (4) gives the names of those dialogues, 'the' dialogues, which were 'declared to be spurious by common consent' (the translation is Grote's): and lastly (5) indicates the great importance which was attached to the ordering of these works by the scholars of antiquity. In a word he has the subject fully present to his mind in all its bearings. And the question comes to be—if Aristophanes had omitted from his list the Parmenides, or any dialogue included in the list of Thrasylyus, would Diogenes under these circumstances have failed to say so? That does not seem probable, more particularly since he treats the work as genuine in his Lives of Parmenides and Zeno; and we may thus infer that the Parmenides existed among 'the rest' of Aristophanes at—let us say—210 B.C. We have, moreover, the following very comprehensive decision ascribed by Diogenes to an author who lived half a century or so later than Aristophanes, *πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος*, etc. This verdict may not include the *νοθεύομενοι*, but cannot well exclude any others.

iii. 56-62.

ix. 23, 25.

ii. 64.

It may perhaps be asked at this stage—those copies of Plato's works which formed the text for all this deliberation and arrangement, where were they to be seen? to whom did they belong? Although the conclusion is not based upon positive testimony, it is very generally assumed that the copies were those contained in the Alexandrian, and perhaps in the Pergamene, library. The year 283 B.C. marks the point at which the throne of Egypt passed from the First Ptolemy to the Second; and it appears to be accepted that by this date the library at Alexandria had taken definite form. While owing its origin to the tastes and munificence of the Ptolemies, that great collection seems to have been much indebted for its actual character and contents to Demetrius of Phalerum. Of this man—born in Attica shortly after Plato's death, for years conspicuous and popular at Athens, an orator, a voluminous author, a student of philosophy, and finally a protector of Plato's successor Xenocrates—we do not indeed know, but may with every right assume, that he

was familiar with Plato's Academy when Xenocrates was its head (B.C. 339-314), and that when in later life he had the ear and support of Ptolemy Soter he would be at pains to secure for Alexandria the best copy which care, skill, and money could command of all the Platonic writings. Exclusive of Demetrius, Aristophanes the grammarian, mentioned above, was fifth curator of the Alexandrian collection; and his period of office might date from, we shall suppose, his fiftieth year—that is, from about 210 B.C.

We have just seen what an object of study the Platonic writings were to scholars of this age, and we are at the same time entitled to hold that a copy of them, and that a careful one, existed at Alexandria as early at least as 250 B.C. Plato died in the year 347 B.C., or about a hundred years before. How do we bridge over the interval? Although passages are quoted to prove that Plato despised written, as compared with oral, instruction in philosophy, he was certainly a voluminous author; and both from the style of his works and from familiar anecdotes recorded about him,¹ we are justified in saying that he was a most careful and critical one. He also in middle life founded an institution at the Academy which would have many points in common with a University. Here he lectured to numerous and enthusiastic students; and here beyond all rational doubt would be collected, as they were written, the series of his published works. This would seem to give a greater initial probability of careful transmission than could be affirmed in the case, for example, of Herodotus or Thucydides. But further: on its founder's death the institute passed under the charge of a nephew, Speusippus, and thereafter, as we have seen, of a disciple, Xenocrates; the consecutive presidency of whom brings us to the year 314 B.C. Nor does the career of the Academy seem to have been broken or its abode disturbed until the time of Sulla. On what precise material the works at the Academy when complete were engrossed may be uncertain, but there can be no extravagance in assuming that it was capable of lasting for a century; and if, as seems highly probable, the full list was made up under Speusippus by the year 340 B.C., we would thus have it carried safely down within the period during which Demetrius could have it transcribed for Ptolemy. Few who have read the vicissitudes which have been survived by the Clarke MS. would find any difficulty in accepting the assumption, that at least two well authenticated copies of all Plato's works existed at the year 200 B.C., one at Athens and one at Alexandria. Nay—to judge from the remark of Diogenes in his *Life of Democritus*, that Plato was persuaded not to burn the works of Democritus, because 'many had copies'—the number was probably much greater.

¹ Dionys. Halicarn. 'De Compos. Verborum,' ed. Schaefer, Leipz. 1808, p. 243. Also comp. Quint. viii. 6, 64.

ix. 40.

With such an argument as this—indeed it is substantially his—Grote is perfectly satisfied. He considers that few if any authors of the Greek classic age have the authenticity of their writings placed upon so substantial a foundation; and unhesitatingly adopts the entire Thrasylean series, rejecting only the works which in Alexandrian times were 'declared to be spurious by common consent.' And surely his verdict is weighty. Few have had better means of knowing the amount of evidence on which the facts of Greek history depend. It is worth adding that the Scholiast on Aristotle's

Aristotle,
Berlin Edit., vol.
iv. 786 a. top.

Metaphysics—though, of course, he is comparatively late—speaks of τὸν ἐπιγραφόμενον Παρμενίδην ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν τοῦ Πλάτωνος διάλογον. And other passages might be cited. This topic of the spurious dialogues, however, calls for some investigation. With such guarantees for authenticity, how did spurious works come to exist at all? Unless Plato himself left authoritative testimony that he had published all he wrote, or at least had destroyed anything which he did not wish published, it might well enough be affirmed after his death, if any one had an interest in advancing such an assertion, that some hitherto unpublished work had been discovered. A student in the Academy or a contemporary of Plato might do so, if either desired to attack some statement by Speusippus about his uncle's views. But even more unworthy reasons were not wanting.

Galen on Hip-
pocr. de nat.
hom. i. 92: and
Bentley, Phalar.
init.

The passage usually cited in this connection since Bentley's time is from Galen: πρὶν γὰρ τοὺς ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τε καὶ Περγάμῳ γενέσθαι βασιλεῖς ἐπὶ κτήσει βιβλίων φιλοτιμηθέντας οὐδέπω ψευδῶς ἐπεγέγραπτο σύγγραμμα λαμβάνειν δ' ἀρξαμένων μισθὸν τῶν κομιζόντων αὐτοῖς σύγγραμμα παλαιοῦ τινὸς ἀνδρὸς οὕτως ἤδη πολλὰ ψευδῶς ἐπιγράφοντες ἐκόμιζον. Galen certainly lived (130–200+ A.D.) long after the date to which he makes reference: still he was born at Pergamus, which favours the idea that he had local tradition in support of his assertion, while the motive assigned for forgery is unhappily only too probable. Later writers also, unless they derived their authority from this passage, confirm Galen's statement, and even give some details upon the subject. Thus David when commenting upon the works of Aristotle, says,

Arist. Berlin.
Ed., vol. iv. 28 a.
See also notes of
Ammonius and
Simplicius at the
foot.

ἐν οἷς ζητητέον καὶ τὸ γνήσιον διὰ τὴν γιγνομένην νοθείαν νοθεύονται γὰρ τὰ βιβλία πενταχῶς and proceeds to specify these. It will be observed that Galen dates forgeries from the time when libraries had already become recognized channels of royal expenditure. Perhaps it is on this ground that Grote would hold the rejected dialogues to have been set aside simply because of their late admission into the libraries. 'It is the transmission, the externally attested authenticity, of these works that we doubt'—so he seems to make the librarians speak—'and our doubts are based on the fact that our catalogues were completed before they appeared. With their internal character—the presence or absence in them of a "Platonisches Gefühl"—we take no concern.' And this may possibly be so. Nay, the date at which these dialogues appeared might perhaps be brought within narrower compass by the reference of Diogenes quoted above to the judgment of Panaetius. The inference from the words of Panaetius, who died before 111 B.C., would seem to be that he either did not concur in the rejection of the spurious dialogues, or else knew nothing of them—that they had appeared after his death. In this way Aristophanes also would know nothing of them, nor does Diogenes say anything to contradict this. But

i. 60, 61, 64.

on the other hand what is to be said of the following? Διεβάλλετο δ' ὁ Δίσχίνης (pupil of Socrates) καὶ μάλισθ' ὑπὸ Μενεδήμου τοῦ Ἐρετριέως ὡς τοὺς πλείστους διαλόγους ὄντας Σωκράτους ὑποβάλλοιτο, λαμβάνων παρὰ Ξανθίππης ὧν οἱ μὲν καλούμενοι ἀκέφαλοι σφόδρ' εἰσὶν ἐκλελυμένοι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιφαίνοντες τὴν Σωκρατικὴν εὐτονίαν οὐς καὶ Πεισίστρατος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἔλεγε μὴ εἶναι Δίσχίνου. καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ δὲ τοὺς πλείστους Περσαίος φησι

Πασιφώντος εἶναι τοῦ Ἑρετρικοῦ, εἰς τοὺς Αἰσχίνου δὲ κατατάξει. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθέους τὸν τε μικρὸν Κῦρον καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν ἐλάσσω καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ἐσκευώρηται. οἱ δ' οὖν τῶν Αἰσχίνου τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ἦθος ἀπομεμαγαμένοι εἰσὶν ἐπτὰ· πρῶτος Μιλτιάδης, διὸ καὶ ἀσθενέστερόν πως ἔχει· Καλλίας, Ἀξίοχος, Ἀσπασία, Ἀλκιβιάδης, Τηλαύγης, Ῥίνων. φασὶ δ' αὐτὸν δι' ἀπορίαν ἐλθεῖν εἰς Σικελίαν πρὸς Διονύσιον, καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν Πλάτωνος παροφθῆναι, ὑπὸ δ' Ἀριστίππου συσταθῆναι [others συστήναι]. δόντα τέ τινας τῶν διαλόγων δῶρα λαβεῖν... Τούτου τοὺς διαλόγους καὶ Ἀριστίππος ὑπόπτειν. ἐν γοῦν Μεγάρους ἀναγιγνώσκοντος αὐτοῦ φασὶ σκῶψαι εἰπόντα, “πόθεν σοι, ληστά, ταῦτα;”... Πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφώντος, Ἀντισθέους, Αἰσχίνου· διστάζει δὲ περὶ τῶν Φαίδωνος (Ueberweg makes the strange mistake of supposing this to be the dialogue called Phaedo, instead of the dialogues written by the person of that name) καὶ Εὐκλείδου, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἀναιρεῖ πάντας:—to which we may add for completeness *διαλόγους τοίνυν* iii. 48. φασὶ πρῶτον γράψαι Ζήνωνα τὸν Ἐλεάτην Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ ποιητῶν Ἀλεξαμένον Στυρέα ἢ Τηῖον, ὡς καὶ Φαβωρίνος ἐν ἀπομνημονεύμασι. δοκεῖ δέ μοι Πλάτων ἀκριβῶστας τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα δικαίως ἂν ὥσπερ τοῦ κάλλους οὕτω καὶ τῆς εὐρέσεως ἀποφέρεσθαι. From these passages it would seem clear (1) that dialogues existed before Plato was born: (2) that about the time of Socrates' death, there sprang up a perfect literature of them purporting to be his or to embody his teaching: (3) that plagiarism existed and was exposed at the time, in connection with these dialogues: (4) that the tests by which this exposure was effected were—both then and in the time of Diogenes—internal not external: (5) and, finally, that in comparing the list given here with that given above, of the spurious Platonic works, we find that there are certain names common to both, and that a reference to ἀκέφαλοι διάλογοι and ἐπτὰ occurs in each list. From all this it will be seen that a shadow falls upon the argument given but now for the authenticity of the writings ascribed to Plato. Accordingly, in modern times, and more especially since Schleiermacher made his great attempt to construct a self-consistent scheme of reasoned truth from those writings, the whole question of their reliability has been reconsidered. In arriving at a judgment, the tests applied have been both external or historic, and internal or literary and speculative.

On the historic side, the great question has been, Can we find evidence for the existence of Plato's works prior to the time of Aristophanes the grammarian? which again, for practical purposes, resolves itself into the other question, Can we find references to them in the works of Aristotle? It is obvious that an authentic reference gleaned from such a source would be of great authority. At the same time the subject is not without difficulties; for the text of Aristotle is less fully assured than Plato's own. Besides the facts already enumerated in support of Plato's text, we have the further circumstance, that according to the testimony of Hermann and Zeller as quoted by Ueberweg 'in der gesammten alten Literatur, soweit sie uns erhalten ist, keine gesicherte Beziehung auf ein Platonisches Werk sich findet,

Is it referred to by Aristotle?

Ueberweg, Untersuchungen ueber die Echtheit etc. Platon. Schriften, p. 131-2.

- welches heute nicht mehr existirte'; so that we now possess at least all the genuine works of Plato, whatever those may be. No such affirmation can be made in the case of Aristotle. In the Berlin Edition, among the fragments, quite a considerable list is given of works referred to in ancient writers as by Aristotle, which have not come down to us. Again a considerable quantity of what actually appears under his name is doubtful, either absolutely or else in the precise form in which we find it. Zeller gives a list of references to Plato in Aristotle which he holds to be discredited on this ground. Let us now take two cases in which clear references do occur. In De Anima we have τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ, with which compare Timaeus 35 A. Again in the Politics we find ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις, ὡς περ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, with which compare Republic, Book v. In the case of both these dialogues, references might be multiplied. For us the problem is, Can any similar reference be quoted of which the Parmenides is the object? There can not. But it might, of course, happen that Aristotle, while really having in his eye a work by Plato, might be less precise in the form of his allusion, trusting that, from the context or other circumstances, those for whom he wrote would understand his real intention. Accordingly, we find many alleged references to Plato which range through all the grades of likelihood from practical certainty downwards. Here for example is one which has given rise to discussion: in the Topics, Aristotle says, ὡς Πλάτων ὀρίζεται φορὰν τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν. No work is cited by name in this instance: but in the Parmenides we find κινούμενόν γε [τὸ ἐν] ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν, αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. Ναί... Καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἥτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας... Ἄλλα δὲ χώραν ἀμείβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;... Κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἐν ἀκίνητον. Undoubtedly the sense of the two passages is the same, but there is no verbal identity, while on the other hand there is another similar passage in the Theaetetus ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφῃται; Ἔγωγε. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκη δὲ... ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κινήσεως; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὲ λέγω τούτω εἶδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν. Ueberweg is not sure that any more is meant than a reference to some statement made orally at the Academy; but if a work is alluded to, he thinks that a reference to the Parmenides is 'etwas weniger ungenau.' Again, Stallbaum, in his copious and learned introduction to the dialogue, cites various passages from Aristotle, which clearly seem to treat of questions within Aristotle's knowledge, very closely resembling those which are discussed in this dialogue. Of these we may quote two. Controverting the distinction between λόγοι πρὸς τοῦνομα and πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν, Aristotle says, Εἰ δὲ τις πλείω σημαίνοντος τοῦ ὀνόματος οἶοιτο ἐν σημαίνειν, καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος—οἶον ἴσως τὸ ὄν ἢ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν Ζήνων ἐν οἶόμενος εἶναι ἠρώτησε, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἐν πάντα—οὗτος πρὸς τοῦνομα ἔσται ἢ
- v. 1474 etc.
- Zeller, Plato, etc., p. 54, note 22, Eng. Tr.
- i. 2, 404 b, 16.
- ii. 1, 1261 a, 4.
- iv. 2, 122 b, 26.
- 138 C-139 A.
- 181 C-D.
- Untersuch. 150, 176.
- Platon. Parmenides cura Godofr. Stallbaum, Lipsiae, 1848, pp. 339-40.
- Sophist. Elench. 10, 2. 170 b, 20.

πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου διειλεγμένος. And again, near the end of the same work, he says, Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῦτὸν σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ εἶναι οἱ δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι διὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς φάναι τὸ εἶναι λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὄν. Undoubtedly there is a strong resemblance here to the course of our dialogue pp. 127-9: but unfortunately neither the dialogue nor its author is named, and the reference is not so close as to satisfy us without that additional security. All that we can do is to point out, as Zeller is careful to do, that allusions in themselves uncertain gain in force from the circumstance that 'the Platonic writings are the only writings of the Socratic school to which he ever refers. This circumstance makes it extremely probable that Aristotle really intends to ascribe all the writings quoted by him in this form (here however the quotation is what is doubtful) to Plato.'

Admitting, however, the absence of a clear reference, we are still entitled to plead, that, as was mentioned above, we do not possess Aristotle's works in a perfect form. Thus we find in the list of lost works tabulated in the Berlin Edition τὰ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν γραφέντα αὐτῷ δύο βιβλία, ἄλλα ὄντα παρὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ τὸ καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ συντάξεως (Michael Ephesius in *Metaph. N. VI.* and others). Had we but these two books, the apparent silence of the *Metaphysics* might cause no anxiety. But taking matters at their worst—assuming that he never did refer to the *Parmenides*—we might still meet the difficulty by parallel cases. Thus Zeller, who has carefully treated the question, says, 'Aristotle is not passing judgment on Plato's works as a literary historian who is bound to furnish a complete catalogue of them, ... Nor does he deal with them as a modern writer of the history of Philosophy, whose object it is to combine their whole philosophic content ...; he only mentions them when occasion offers... He owes his knowledge of the Platonic doctrines in the first place to verbal communication and personal intercourse; in the second place only, to the writings of Plato... The metaphysical bases of the system ... are ... searchingly criticised, ... but in by far the greater number of cases on the ground of Plato's discourses ... Only one of the many passages from which we derive our knowledge of the theory of ideas is quoted by him [*Phaedo*, 100 B sq. in *Met. I. 9, XIII. 5, Gen. et Corr. II. 9*]; he makes no allusion to what is said on the subject in the *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaetetus*; nor to the explanations of the *Sophist*, *Parmenides*, and *Philebus*, though there was abundant opportunity for it... It is certainly surprising that Aristotle should assert that Plato never enquired wherein the participation of things in ideas consists; while in the *Parmenides* [130 E sqq.] the difficulties with which this theory has to contend are clearly pointed out. But it is not more surprising than that he should assail the doctrine of ideas with the question: "Who formed the things of sense after the pattern of the ideas?" [*Met. I. 9, 991a, 20*], though it is distinctly stated in the *Timaeus* [28 C sq.] that the Creator of the world did this in looking on the eternal archetypes. Nor again that he should maintain, notwithstanding the well-known explanation in the *Phaedo* [100 B etc.], often alluded to by himself,—..... that

the final cause is not touched by the ideas [Met. I. 9, 992a 29 οὐδὲ δὴ ὁ περὶ ... οὐθὲν ἄπτεται τὰ εἶδη]. We should have expected that in attacking Plato about the τρίτος ἄνθρωπος Aristotle, had he been acquainted with the Parmenides, would have referred to the fact that in that dialogue the same objection is raised. But might we not also have expected after the further stricture, "Plato ought then to assume ideas of art productions, mere relations, etc., which he does not," some such remark as this: "In his writings he certainly does speak of such ideas?" Nor is such unexpected forgetfulness confined to Aristotle. Diogenes Laërtius enumerates among certain other facts peculiar to Plato—in whose case, as has been seen, we do not hear of lost works—that πρῶτός τε ἀντειρηκῶς σχεδὸν ἅπασι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖται διὰ τί μὴ ἐμνημόνευσε Δημοκρίτου. The illustration seems very pertinent: it is impossible to suppose that Plato was not well acquainted with the tenets of a man of great celebrity who was his contemporary for some sixty years.

But something further may be urged in relation to the question. Thus in his commentaries upon Aristotle's Physics Simplicius says, τάχα λέγομεν ὅτι πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ τῷ Παρμενίδῃ παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰρημμένα ἀπετείνετο ἡν ὁ Ἄριστοτέλης, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν ὄν ὑποτιθέμενον τὸν Παρμενίδην καὶ ἀποδεικνύτα θαυμάζειν ἔοικεν ὁ Πλάτων. The words of Aristotle to which Simplicius is referring are ἡμέμενοι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτεροὶ τινὲς εἰσιν αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς γενέσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς], ἀλλ' οὐχ ἰκανῶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἢ Παρμενίδην ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Simplicius has said that the commentators regard this as a reference to the historical Parmenides, and then makes the remark which we have quoted. Certainly Parmenides rejected τὸ μὴ ὄν entirely, and contended for a being which had no γένεσις, φθορά, ἢ μεταβολή—ὡς ἀγέννητον ἔόν καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν—τίνα γὰρ γέννην διζήσεται αὐτοῦ; πῆ, πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἑάσω φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν. We may observe also that Aristotle puts the words Παρμενίδην λέγειν under the government of ἕτεροὶ ... ὁμολογοῦσιν, and that the process of becoming and change is discussed more than once in the Parmenides, particularly in the argument marked in our marginal summary, III. iii., where the language used is in conformity with Aristotle's observation. We shall venture, however, to take a wider sweep in our reflections. It is conceded that the Parmenides is a very important dialogue in connection with the characteristic Platonic doctrine of ideas. It alone has the word Ideas included in its title, and some objectors can hardly be alive to the blank which would be caused in our conception of the ideal theory had this work not come down to us. They first read into that theory all the light this dialogue sheds, and then extinguish it, but without forgetting what it has shown them. Let us now, bearing this in mind, reflect for a moment upon the character of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In composing the treatise of which that work represents all that we possess, Aristotle was perforce led to dwell at length upon the views of Plato, because Plato was in strictness the first of the metaphysicians. His predecessors, with partial exceptions, were more properly investigators of physical facts and causes. Accordingly we find that the doctrines of Plato upon ideas are discussed pointedly and in detail in a

iii. 25, ix. 40.

Berlin Ed.
Scholia 343 b, 37.Phys. i. 9, 191 b,
35.Mullach Frgm. of
Parmen. 59-64.

156 C-D-E.

passage which is twice repeated, and that they are over and over again referred to in other parts of the work. And yet, throughout the whole, only two dialogues are named—the Hippias, which is surely not of vital consequence, and the Phaedo. It will not be maintained that the Phaedo is the only dialogue to which a reference would under the circumstances be expected. Even it is referred to only in connection with a special point, and the argument which precedes and follows contains no allusion of a similar nature. Suppose the Parmenides dropt from view for the moment, still why have we no citation from the Meno, the Cratylus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Timaeus—to say nothing of the Sophistes and Politicus, which, like the Parmenides, are suspect? Surely, to repeat the contention of Zeller, with such a series of works unmentioned, the argument from silence loses much of its force. And if we consider the substance of Aristotle's criticisms in the passages just indicated, we are justified in contending that no dialogue which Plato ever wrote would form a more natural and obvious text for them than the Parmenides. Apart now from its controversial portions, what is the character of Aristotle's treatise as a whole? It is not very artistically compacted, but it exhibits several well marked features. (1) It handles repeatedly the conceptions *ἐν*, *ὄν*, *ἀριθμός*. For these we may refer to the Parmenides at large. (2) It defines or describes certain terms liable to be misunderstood, prominent among which—besides *ἐν* and *ὄν*—stand *ἀρχή*, *ταυτόν*, *ἀντικείμενα*, *iv. πρότερα* and *ὑστερα*, *πέρας*, *ἕξις*, *πάθος*, *στέρησις*, *μέρος*, *ὄλον*, *γένος*. Let any one for a moment consider the part played by these ideas in the Parmenides. (3) It emphatically presses, *à plusieurs reprises*, the vital importance of the law of contradiction to metaphysical inquiries, although the natural place for such insistence would be a treatise on deductive logic. Now a prominent objection urged by Grote against the arguments advanced in the Parmenides is, that they constantly violate this law—the one 'is and is not,' 'moves and is still,' 'is like and unlike,' 'one and many.' The law of contradiction had hardly received definite form before Plato's time; but Aristotle might feel all the more bound to give it prominence in view of the—under our supposition—conspicuous instance in which neglect of it in metaphysical investigations had been exemplified. (4) Let any one glance at the vocabulary of the Metaphysics and mark the employment of such words as *ἀκριβές*, *νόημα*, *παράδειγμα*, *πραγματεύεσθαι*, *πραγματεία*, *ἐπιστήμη*, *κίνησις*, *μεταβολή*, taking along with it the well known statement *ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας*, *i. 9. 990 b, 15.* *ὄν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν*, and then compare the text of this dialogue. It is not meant, by this line of argument, that the Metaphysics is a polemic directed against the Parmenides alone—in that case the dialogue would have been named—but it is meant that the substance of the Parmenides is distinctly included with that of such dialogues as the Republic, Phaedo, and Philebus, in Aristotle's mental picture of Plato's views, and forms a prominent feature in his controversial allusions; and that but for the existence of the Parmenides, the polemic of Aristotle would lose half its point and value.

Yet, probable as these arguments may be, so long as actual demonstration is not reached objections may be raised. The chief of these is that, while the points of relation between the Parmenides and the Metaphysics are undoubtedly striking, they are due, not to the fact that the author of the latter had the former in his mind, but rather to a very different cause, to wit that the author of the former had either read the latter or had heard Aristotle lecturing, and so could not be Plato. This objection and any answers that may be made to it rest not upon historical but upon internal evidence. In reply we may argue thus—referring to the notes for details.

1. Had the author of the Parmenides been a student of Aristotle he would in discussing, as he does, ideas of relation have naturally called them ideas *πρός τι*, which is their technical name in Aristotle's works. He does not do so. But he uses the preposition *πρός* in a less formal way—*πρός ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἶσιν, πρὸς αὐτάς, πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν*, and so on—a way which suggests that, while the technical phrase was yet unselected, we may have here the very source from which it was drawn. Again, we find scattered through the work such names for the ideas as *αὐτῆ ὁμοιότης, αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν, αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη*. But we do not find the *αὐτὸ* coalescing with the following word in the manner which is familiar to readers of Aristotle, in such words as *αὐτοάνθρωπος, αὐτοζῶον, αὐτοδιπλάσιον, αὐτοδόξα*. Here also the technical terminology of Aristotle seems unknown to the writer of this work. Similarly in the passage where *πρᾶξιον* is said to be opposed as a *διαφορότης* to *μεώτερον*, and to that alone, there is no allusion to the well-known technical phraseology of the Categories, in the chapter upon *πρός τι*, with regard to *τὰ οικείως ἀντιστρέφοντα*.

2. And as with the terminology, so with the conceptions, of the dialogue—they seem less developed and analysed than similar conceptions in the works of Aristotle. Thus the discussion of *κίνησις*, which is begun in the first argument and resumed in other parts of the work, does not reveal a logical division of the subject as clear as that which we find in the Physics. The same seems to hold good in regard to the relations of *πάν* to *ἄλλο* when compared with the treatment of them in the Metaphysics. Nor could the argument *ἐτέρωθι δὲ ἔργον ἔτερον* have been employed by anyone who was familiar with the Sophistici Elenchi, particularly chapter v.

But specific evidence is produced, chiefly by Ueberweg, which tends to show that statements in the Metaphysics are irreconcilable with the Platonic authorship of this dialogue.

1. Thus Ueberweg quotes the following remark made by Aristotle when speaking of the manner in which, according to Plato, things participate in the ideas *κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων τοῖς εἶδεσιν. Τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοῦνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τοῦνομα μεταβαλὼν. Τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν, ἣτις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφείσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.* The objection here hinges on the sense of the last clause. Ueberweg gives no verbal translation of the words: but in order to make out a case from them the rendering would need to be that Plato and the Pythagoreans

Does it look earlier than Aristotle?
133 C-E.

141 C.

Cat. 7. 6b, 36.

138. Comp.
Phys. iii. 1 etc.
Met. x. 9.
144 E-145. Comp.
Met. iv. 26, 1024^a
1. 146 C.

Untersuchungen
176.

Met. i. 6, 987 b. 9.

'were at one in omitting to investigate' the nature of *μέθεξις* and *μίμησις*. The opening part of the *Parmenides* being in express terms a discussion of *μέθεξις*, the objection comes to a bearing instantly. Now in making this statement mere inadvertent error on Aristotle's part is perfectly possible. A man busy with his own great and somewhat hostile speculations does not always keep in mind all that an opponent has said and done. Any modern philosophic controversy in a magazine might illustrate this. Again such an argument might seem effective if it stood alone, yet be perceptibly weakened by repetition. We would not willingly surrender three dialogues on such a ground; and as a fact Ueberweg has that difficulty to face. Aristotle explicitly states that Plato never investigated the genesis of concrete things, like flesh or bones, but confined himself to that of *στοιχεῖα*; which is contradicted by *Timaeus* 73—a work which Ueberweg places first on the list of those authenticated by Aristotle, because of the number of his allusions to it. Here Ueberweg extricates himself thus: 'theils betrifft dies eine Frage von geringerer Bedeutung, so dass ein Uebersehen leichter erklärlich wäre, (surely to Plato it would be a question of *μέθεξις* in both places) theils bestimmt Aristoteles im Folgenden seine Meinung näher dahin, dass mit Ausnahme des Demokrit keiner seiner Vorgänger etwas wissenschaftlich Bedeutsames darüber gesagt habe.' Again, the nature of *μέθεξις* is discussed in the *Philebus*, 'worin,' however, pleads Ueberweg, 'Aristoteles noch kein *ζητεῖν* finden mochte.' Probably he is contending for a foregone conclusion. But the argument may be attacked on closer grounds. The words *ἀφείσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν* may possibly be made to bear the meaning above given to them; at the same time one cannot but feel that another is preferable. Aristotle, if fairly understood, simply means that the Pythagoreans and Plato were not wedded to a particular view on this matter. They held the doctrine, believed that it contained the key of their problem, and tried to make their meaning intelligible; no doubt. Yet they acknowledged the overwhelming difficulty of the subject and 'left the matter as an open question to be investigated in common' by philosophers. 'In medio reliquerunt' says the Index of Bonitz under *κοινὸς* (though a different view would seem to be taken under *ἀφιέναι*), and it is satisfactory to find that Dr. Jackson in one of his very able articles translates the passage thus, 'but what this participation or imitation was to be, both Plato and the Pythagoreans left an open question.' With such a rendering there is no difficulty about Plato's discussing *μέθεξις* in the *Parmenides* or elsewhere; he may and does discuss it, but he is far from satisfied with his conclusions, and would welcome fresh light from any friendly quarter. Appeal might be made to the *Phaedo*, especially 100 D, *ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαντῶ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωνία, εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη* (he had already said *διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ*): *οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δυσχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά*, etc. The objection, in fact, cannot be sustained.

2. Again, it is contended very plausibly by Ueberweg that an argument which is put forward in the *Parmenides* against the tenability of the ideal theory is

De Gener. et
Corr. i. 2, 315 a
20.
See also Tim.
35-6. Phaedo
103 A-B. 177.

Phil. 15 B.

Berl. Ed. Index
Arist. sub voc.

Jour. Philol.
No. 20, p. 292.

100 D-101.

Read
132 A-B.

simply an adaptation of what is called the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* confutation employed by Aristotle, and must therefore have been employed by some forger who had read Aristotle—not by Plato. In Bonitz we find the following cases in which Aristotle makes use of or refers to this argument.

Index Aristoteli-
cus sub voc.

Met. i. 9, 990 b
17.

(1) Ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων (*i.e.* of those in which τὰ εἶδη are maintained) οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιούσιν ιδέας, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν.

Met. xii. 4, 1079 a
13.

(2) Which we place next as a mere repetition of the previous one—Ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστατοι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιούσιν ιδέας, ὧν οὐ φασι εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τ. τ. ἀ. λ.

Met. vi. 13,
1012 a 3.

(3) Ὅλως δὲ συμβαίνει, εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, μηθὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἶναι μηθενὸς οὐσίαν, μηδὲ χωρὶς ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, λέγω δ' οἷον οὐκ εἶναι τι ζῶον παρὰ τὰ τινὰ, οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐθέν. Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερόν ὅτι οὐθέν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι οὐθέν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ συμβαίνει καὶ ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.

Met. x 1, 1059 b
8.

(4) Τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδη ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον. Ὅμως δ' ἀπορίαν ἔχει, κἂν εἶναι τις αὐτὰ θῆ, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἔστιν εἶδη. Λέγω δ' ὅτι τὰ μαθηματικὰ μὲν μεταξὺ τε τῶν εἰδῶν τιθέασι καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οἷον τρίτα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τε καὶ τὰ δεῦρο· τρίτος δ' ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ' ἵππος παρ' αὐτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον.

Sophist. Elench.
22, 173 b 36.

(5) Ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷδ' εἰσὶ τούτων τῶν λόγων—namely, among others—Καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις τρίτος ἄνθρωπος παρ' αὐτὸν (*i.e.* the idea) καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον. This he goes on to interpret.

(6) Alexander commenting upon (1) says, after illustrating how the argument may be conducted, τῆ μὲν οὖν πρώτῃ τοῦ τ. ἀ. ἐξηγήσει ἄλλοι τε κέχρηται καὶ Εὐδήμος σαφῶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ λέξεως, τῆ δὲ τελευταία αὐτὸς (*i.e.* Aristotle) ἐν τε τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ιδεῶν καὶ ἐν τούτῳ (Met. I.) μετ' ὀλίγον.

Now by any one looking over these passages it will probably be admitted that we have not discovered the origin of the name. The fourth is the only one in which Aristotle speaks in terms which look as if he were making use of the name or the argument for the first time; yet he can hardly be doing so, for this is in the tenth Book, and we see that it already appears in the first and sixth. And in these (we may bracket I. and XII.) he speaks of 'the' τ. ἀ. as of a method of reasoning well known, while in (5) he refers to it as being used quite commonly in a sophistical manner; and finally Alexander says it was used by others as well as by Aristotle. Perhaps however Alexander, in saying it was used by others, is simply adopting the language of the passage (1) on which he is commenting. It is hard to understand how anyone reading Met. I. 9 could assume that the argument called τ. ἀ. originated with Aristotle. It is an argument of general bearing, to which a particular application has given a pithy name. The name may be due to Aristotle, although his existing works seem to give no proof that it is; but of the thing he expressly declares ἔτι δὲ

οὐ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων... τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν. True, the use of the argument in the Parmenides is a use with the eyes open to its consequences—not a use which is unconsciously self-destructive, and the destructiveness of which is left for Aristotle to point out. But Aristotle says nothing which should render that an objection; and, as we shall presently see, it applies to other works besides the Parmenides. Accordingly we may meet Ueberweg's objection thus:

a. If the τ. ἀ. argument occurs in the Parmenides it does not follow that it was derived from Aristotle, since he speaks of that argument as known independently of him.

β. We might even, as has been hinted above, find in the words οὐ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων the missing reference of Aristotle to the Parmenides—certainly no more correct description of the dialogue could be given than these words convey; and Dr. Jackson holds that there is no doubt upon the matter. In connection with the expression used by Aristotle it may perhaps be interesting to quote from the dialogue the following phrases: πολὺ αὐτὸ (τὸ γένος ἐπιστήμης) ἀκριβέστερον, ... ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην ... ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία ... ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη. In other respects also the Parmenides meets the case. Aristotle declares that these λόγοι of which he is speaking acknowledge the existence of ideas τῶν πρὸς τι, and the definition given of πρὸς τι in the Categories enables us to determine that the ideas of ὁμοιότης, μέγεθος, δεσποτεία, στάσις and κίνησις, of which this dialogue speaks, are all ideas of that class.

γ. But we may go further: if the Parmenides contains the argument in question so does the Republic. Plato is arguing about the construction of κλίνας by God and says, δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ πλείους οὔτε ἐφυτεύθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ φυῶσιν... "Ὅτι... εἰ δύο μόνως ποιήσῃ, πάλιν ἂν μία ἀναφανείη, ἧς ἐκείναι ἂν αὐτὰ ἀμφοτέραι τὸ εἶδος ἔχοιεν, καὶ εἴη ἂν ὃ ἔστι κλίνη ἐκείνη, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ δύο. So likewise in the Timaeus ἀ πρῶτος of the question whether there are several heavens or one—εἶπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται there must be but one, τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα, ὅποσα νοητὰ ζῶα, μεθ' ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη· πάλιν γὰρ ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ περιέχον δύο ζῶων, οὐ μέρος ἂν εἴτην ἐκείνω, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἐκείνῳ τῷ περιέχοντι τὸδ' ἂν ἀφωμοιωμένον λέγοιτο ὀρθότερον. Here, as before, the argument is weakened by repetition. We might surrender the Parmenides; are we to give up the Republic or Timaeus with it? Fortunately it is not incumbent on us to do so. Already a clear reference to each of them from Aristotle as genuine has been cited, and they stand at the head of Ueberweg's list as being more frequently and clearly referred to by Aristotle than any other Platonic works. And if they stand, then, so far as this argument is concerned, the Parmenides may stand with them.

Admitting, however, that the work is not proved to be of a date more recent than Aristotle, scholars still maintain on various grounds that it at least could not have been written by Plato. Thus Socher, as Stallbaum points out, considers the work spurious on the ground that while it treats of a subject eminently Platonic, it does so in a trenchantly destructive spirit. "So derb geht doch wohl kein Schriftsteller sich selbst zu Leibe!" (Socher). This is a plausible argument. To anyone who

seeks to arrange the works of Plato so as to give a complete and self-consistent scheme of philosophic reasoning, a criticism such as he is here found directing against the basis of his system cannot but cause some embarrassment. And Stallbaum's explanation of the difficulty must be regarded as unsatisfactory. According to him Plato here criticises not the actual theory of ideas but merely something which to an inattentive reader might be mistaken for it. But that Plato should allow views so like his own, yet not his, to appear as if rejected by himself, without clearly indicating their points of divergence, seems very improbable, and amounts almost to deliberate trifling with the convictions of those who were his pupils and devoted followers.

It may be pointed out that there is no exceptional keenness, nothing like *animus*, in the phraseology of the *Parmenides*. It is simply a discussion of the difficulties arising out of a theory of ideas, and an acknowledgment of their gravity. In the *Theaetetus* Plato exhibits as untenable every definition of knowledge; yet he believed in knowledge and in knowledge of ideas. In such a case we must take account of the mental detachment, the humorous sense of self-depreciation, which shows itself at intervals in all Plato's writings. We hear of the irony of Socrates; and no doubt much that Plato writes is written artistically in character. But his artistic success arises largely from personal sympathy with the feeling delineated. Moreover he had a remarkably developed dialectical faculty, and no thinker so gifted could reach middle life without being forcibly impressed by the conviction that in the last resort metaphysical questions must be dropped with a sigh, rather than argumentatively set at rest. 'I thought,' says Prof. Green, an earnest metaphysician if ever one existed, 'I had got hold of a key which I find now will not unlock so much as I fancied it would.' And just as Socrates in the course of conversation playfully made light of his own knowledge, so Plato, when impressed by a sense of metaphysical failure, gives this feeling from time to time ample but also playful expression. If, on the other hand, conviction is strong within him it asserts itself by rising above conscious defects of argument in great declamatory bursts—'I know that my redeemer liveth'—or again by taking refuge in the dogmatism of a professor. As Grote says, 'Plato is, occasionally, abundant in his affirmations: he has also great negative fertility in starting objections: but the affirmative current does not come into conflict with the negative. His belief is enforced by rhetorical fervour, poetical illustration, and a vivid emotional fancy. These elements stand to him in the place of positive proof; and when his mind is full of them, the unsolved objections, which he himself had stated elsewhere, vanish out of sight. Towards the close of his life (as we shall see in the *Treatise De Legibus*), the love of dialectic, and the taste for enunciating difficulties even when he could not clear them up, died out within him. He becomes ultradogmatical, losing even the poetical richness and fervour which had once marked his affirmations, and substituting in their place a strict and compulsory orthodoxy.' And what is here truly said of Plato's life and speculation as a whole is equally applicable to any dialogue wherein destructive criticism is followed by a constructive

Works of T. H.
Green, III. cxxvi.

Plato etc., ii.
pp. 393-4 on
Theaet.

effort. When the latter begins the drama ceases, and the conversation becomes as uninteresting as a catechism. Drop the questions from the catechism of the Westminster Divines and you leave a treatise: omit the answers from the latter portions of the Republic or Parmenides and you have a treatise likewise. Nor must we overlook the fact that while Plato's interest in philosophy was undoubtedly profound, his feeling for and delight in literary expression was a keen rival to it, and perhaps from time to time even took control of the argument. This may be called an external way of putting the case, and it may be urged that in Plato the form is the necessary counterpart of the matter, that the two compose an organism which cannot be severed into its elements. It is doubtful whether this alters the question very much. Philosophic enunciation in early times, partly from its fragmentary and inspired character, partly from the undeveloped state of prose composition, was either aphoristic or poetical. Its next form, during the generation prior to Plato, became in the main that of the dialogue. Plato with his great natural genius had almost no philosophic reading except verse, and for years witnessed the dialogue in the most picturesque and lively operation. The result in his hands was a sort of poetic apotheosis of the dialogue. Yet, soon afterwards, this form of expression ceased from the domain of speculation. That Plato was not straining his convictions when he claimed that dialogue, and even spoken dialogue, was the only true vehicle for speculation we may quite believe. But, on the other hand, Plato we can imagine was sometimes quite aware of his ability to write dialogue, and occasionally, as we cannot but think, must have felt dialogue an artificial encumbrance. At times dialogue runs away with him. At times again he gives us not dialogue but a narrative of dialogue at second, third, or even fourth hand. If at such times his expression is the essential clothing of his thought then at such times his thought must have been itself rather artificial. Let us be frank on this matter. The difficulty that is found in arranging his works may in part be due to the fact that he lectured constantly but published only portions of his views. That, however, does not meet the whole case. Professors do not usually give to the world of their worst. As a rule they publish what has been most carefully matured and has produced in their experience the deepest impression, perhaps even what old pupils urge them to put in a permanent form. Plato may not have done this; but assuredly he was no child in authorship. His works are voluminous, of brilliant ability, and carefully polished. Yet while he is often as detailed as any philosopher who ever lived, and while his works give much more than mere fragments of his views, he has seen fit to leave his writings to the world as if they were in the main mere detached and fortuitous conversations between groups of persons whom accident threw together. Socrates conversed at random. Granted: but Plato was not conversing. Yet his works are in such a state of mutual detachment, that it needs a cumbersome literary finesse in order to allude to one in the other, and after all we are left in doubt which is the referring dialogue and which the object of the reference. Surely if we are

now at issue about the order of his writings and the growth of his views, this is, at least in part, but the penalty justly incurred by Plato the philosopher to Plato the literary man. It is not meant that he was often or consciously sophistical; but it is meant that he was not infrequently artificial. Carlyle in like manner, though pronounced to be 'terribly in earnest,' had a very artificial habit of omitting to specify the persons whose views he was controverting, and of affecting to quote from Sauerteig and Our earnest friend. Leaving this slightly uncongenial argument on one side, then, and accepting Plato as also 'in earnest,' although Johnson does not admit that in regard to Greek thinkers, we have still to remember that his works do not represent even to his own mind an elaborate 'system of reasoned truth,' in which every step is a logical necessity logically made good, where there are no defects and no excrescences, known or unknown to the author, and where the end is clearly in view from the beginning: but that rather they exemplify the lifelong growth of a great mind, which had indeed a prevailing bias and aspiration, but little demonstrable certainty about systematic details, which was always feeling after the truth, yet often confessed that it had failed to find it, which sometimes contradicted itself, sometimes ironically gave up its quest, and sometimes under new circumstances lost faith in old conclusions, which was as much sceptical as it was dogmatic, which was influenced by literary as well as philosophic impulses; but which always strove to be found 'on the side of the angels.' It is a truism to say that no theory of the universe has yet met all objections. Plato might well be sensible that objections could be raised to his, yet cling to it as still on the whole the best; nay, even as an anchor of his soul, although entering into that which was within the veil. 'Behold the cloud,' and again 'behold the cloud,' says Ruskin when called on to explain the ultimate character of geological forces; but he does not therefore dispute the reality of their action. 'The true eye for talent presupposes the true reverence for it—O Heavens, presupposes so many things!' exclaims Carlyle; yet he does not therefore cease to hold that heroes are to be found, and therefore to be sought. We do not then admit that the Parmenides is spurious because it controverts doctrines elsewhere urged by Plato; on the contrary we conclude by citing, in addition to the Theaetetus, other passages indicating a similar tone of mind. In the Sophistes, he contrasts materialists with idealists as two opposing schools, each of which is extreme—the latter *μάλα ἐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται* (against the former), *νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι*. He certainly calls them *ἡμερώτεροι* than their opponents; yet all along he speaks of them critically as from without. Nevertheless, the soundest explanation of the passage is, that he is criticising his own views. The same thing recurs in the Politicus. Again, in the Phaedo he clearly shows that his arguments in favour of the ideas have not laid his doubts to rest. Having already had occasion to quote the striking language in which he there admits his speculative anxieties, we need cite here only the closing words—*οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι*

Boswell, by Hill,
iii 10.

Mod. Paint. iv.
xii.

Past and Present,
Bk. I. v. 40.

pp. 246-48.

Phaedo, 100-101.

τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά ... Τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφῆς ἂν χαίρειν, παρὲς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλούς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἂν: and so on. Hereafter we shall discuss in more detail the relation in which the self-criticism of the Parmenides stands to Plato's system as a whole. Apart from this difficulty, there appears to be no good reason of an internal character for doubting the authenticity of the work. It is a philosophical discussion bearing upon a subject intimately associated with Plato's name. In point of importance and character, it is eminently worthy of his reputation. Nor is this a small matter: we can imagine an inferior writer trying to gain currency for a second rate work by assigning it to a great author, but who that could rival Plato would consent to remain unknown? As Mr. Jowett says: 'Shorter works are more likely to have been forged than longer ones ... while, perhaps, there is no instance of an ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines great excellence with considerable length. A really great writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the "literary hack" of Alexandria or Athens, the Gods did not grant original genius.' Again, it is in Plato's style, by which are meant several things. Not only is it a dialogue—and no philosophic dialogues have come down to us with any name but Plato's—the type of dialogue likewise, and the characters, are Platonic. It begins in a lively dramatic fashion, such as might be paralleled in many of his works, then, when the theme proper has been introduced, the dramatic character, as was said above, becomes subordinate and ceases to be an essential feature of the composition. So in the Republic; when preliminaries are settled, and constructive work begins, what importance have the answers of Glauco or Adimantus? They simply confirm Socrates, give him an opportunity for restating an argument, save the work from being a mere treatise, and furnish the chief speaker with an ἀνάπαυλα. Such is the service done by Aristoteles in the Parmenides. Even the artificiality of the narrative may be made an argument in its favour. An imitator would hardly be likely to make his work a report of a report of a report.

Plato, 2nd Edit.,
vol. ii. pp. 413-15.

Having now dealt with most of the objections which are raised, let us conclude by asking whether there are any traces in Plato's other works of a reference to the Parmenides. Such references can, as we have seen, be only indirect. Bearing that fact in mind we may place side by side the following passages:—

Does Plato else-
where refer to it?

PHILEBUS, 14 C-15.

Σ. Τοῦτον τοῖνον τὸν λόγον ... τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν. ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι. Π. Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ, Πρώταρχον, ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει,

PARMENIDES, 129.

Σ. Οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον ... εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; ... ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ

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πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμέ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος ... τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία; Σ. Σὺ μὲν ... εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά ... ὅταν τις ἐκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ— ... Π. Σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα ... ἕτερα λέγεις ...; Σ. Ὅποταν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται ... ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῆ τίθεσθαι καὶ βουῖν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων ... ἢ πολλὴ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται. Π. Πῶς; Σ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἰ τις δέι τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὐσας· εἶτα πῶς αὐτὰς μίαν ἐκάστην οὐσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ... ὁμῶς εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην· μετὰ δὲ τούτ' ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπίροις εἴτε διεσπασμένη καὶ πολλὰ γεγυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρὶς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνεται ἂν, ταῦτον καὶ ἐν ἅμα ἐν ἐνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι To this might perhaps be added Sophist, 251.

What does the reader think here? Zeller holds that we have a reference directly designed. 'I have already supported this in my *Platon. Stud.* 194, by the argument that the first part of the *Parmenides* is as good as directly cited in the *Philebus*, and this reason I still think is quite valid. Schaarschmidt (*Samml. d. plat. Schr.* 277) also agrees with me; he, however, makes use of this supposition in a different direction'—to discredit both dialogues.

Again, turning to the *Phaedo* we may make a further comparison:

PHAEDO, 102 B.

Καὶ ὠμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τᾶλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν... ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφοτέρα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; ... οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων.

ἔστιν ἐν αὐτὸ τούτῳ πολλὰ ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὐτὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἐν, τούτῳ ἤδη θαυμάσομαι ... εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἶδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τὰναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων ... ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ μου ἐστίν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά ... Ἐὰν δέ τις ... πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη... εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνοι, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων.

Again 131 A, Πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὄν, ἢ πῶς; Τί γὰρ κωλύει; ... Ἐν ἄρα ὄν καὶ ταῦτον ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὐσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη.

PARMENIDES, 130 E.

Δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἶναι εἶδη ἅττα ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαμβάνοντα ὁμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα ... γίγνεσθαι. See also the previous quotation.

Under Plato's somewhat affected literary assumption, that the *Philebus*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Parmenides* are all independent colloquies between different groups of persons, could references from one to the other be more direct than these are; does not the wording seem to indicate that the reference is designed? There are but two more quotations of this nature that need detain us:—

THEAETETUS 183 E.

Σ. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοῖός τε μοι ἅμα δεινός τε. συμ-προσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνν νέος πάνν πρεσβύτη, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον.

SOPHISTES, 217 C.

Σ. Πότερον εἴωθας ἰδίον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαντοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ βουλευθῆς, ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγερόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου; also 237 A.

The parallel could hardly be more complete.

On the question of authenticity, then, our argument may be summed up thus:

1. There is good ground for believing that this dialogue existed, and was accepted as genuine, in the arrangement of Plato's works made by Aristophanes of Byzantium. Nor does any scholar in antiquity raise an objection to it.

2. While it cannot be proved that Aristotle names the *Parmenides*, it seems at least very probable that the arguments of the dialogue are controverted by him; and they appear to bear internal evidence of priority when compared with his works.

3. There is no reason to doubt the Platonic character of the views and language which the work exhibits, and there is strong reason to believe that Plato alludes to this dialogue in other portions of his writings which are admitted to be genuine.

PARMENIDES, 127 B.

Τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι σφόδρα πολίον, καλὸν δὲ κάγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα ... Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον.

137.

II. Κἀγὼ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι, πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος λόγων ... Τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἢ κίστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἂ οἶεται μάλιστ' ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλ' ἂν εἶη ἢ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις.

II.

WHEN we pass from the sufficiently complex problem of authenticity to consider the position which the work is to hold in the series of Plato's writings, the first difficulty is to conquer a feeling akin to despair. What can we say upon this question? What has not been already said? Are we to be launched upon that *πολὺ πέλαγος* the task of ordering Plato's collective works? Πῶς χρὴ διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος

λόγων; At the outset we are troubled by the consciousness that a work whose authenticity has been gravely questioned is not likely to have its date or sequence very clearly defined. We know, indeed, that it was written after 403 B.C., since the narrator describes Aristoteles, one of the interlocutors, as τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον. And as Cephalus does not mention any attempt to get from Socrates personally a verification of details—a circumstance with which the opening of the Theaetetus may be contrasted—we are left to infer that Socrates was dead. This, however, does not carry us far. Every one would be prepared to assume that the work was of later date than 399 B.C. The field for speculation being thus unrestricted, we have such a crop of theories that even their enumeration would fatigue. To take representative cases: Schleiermacher regards the Parmenides as a rude, unfinished effort of Plato's youth; Zeller holds it to be the 'Philosopher' dialogue which is promised as a sequel to the Sophist and Statesman; while, in a series of articles already referred to, Dr. Jackson contends that it must be placed extremely late, as embodying its author's final views on the ideal theory. Each of these scholars has his following, while other writers adduce reasons for choosing intermediate dates. The disturbing feature in the case is that, as Henry Esmond puts it, 'each has a story in a dispute, and a true one, too, and both are right or wrong as you will.' The various conclusions rest mainly on one or other of three argumentative foundations—that of the style and language of the dialogue, that of what may be called its scenery or setting, and that of its philosophic contents.

Arguments from
Style.

I. It is pointed out that the form of the dialogue is artificial—that of a conversation reported at fourth hand; and the inference drawn is that it is later than those which are more direct and natural; indeed one of the latest of all, inasmuch as there are none whose form deviates more from that of simple dramatic treatment. Well, the 'fourth hand' may by possibility indicate that Plato does not wish to be committed to the historic accuracy of the details, or seeks to give the work the air of an echo from the past, but it gives little clue to the date. The Symposium is at third, the Republic at second, and the Timaeus at first hand: we need say no more. Nay, one might rather ask, would an old man endure the constraint involved in writing large part of a work in complicated oratio obliqua? Again, regard may be directed to style in a stricter sense. It is maintained that as a youthful style is revealed by immaturity and stiffness, or by crude exuberance of language, and by the placing of pictorial and dramatic vividness in the foreground, the Parmenides could not be a youthful work, but might rather, from its command over language, coupled with its comparative indifference to pictorial display, be ranked among the later writings—an elderly man ceasing to think of style and attending more to substance. But answer is plausibly made that Plato is here adopting for the time the style of Zeno and the Megarians, with whose views he is dealing. Independently of that, arguments from style need tender handling. Up to at least middle life a man's mode of writing may vary pretty widely through mere temporary causes, or in conformity with varying subject matter, without any inference about age being worth serious consideration. Even the discovery

that greater conformity to scientific method is to be found, as compared with the freedom of conversational discourse, is no necessary proof of age. It testifies to the mood of the author's mind, if to anything, or may even be explained by the greater or less connection of a given work with Plato's professorial instruction at the Academy.

A further step is taken when vocabulary and turns of expression are put to the proof. Professor Campbell has gone with some minuteness into the question of vocabulary in Plato's writings. He treats the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws* as admittedly late, and tests the other works by comparison with these. As a result he gives for each 'approximately the numerical ratios... according to the number of words at once *common* and *peculiar* to each with' the works just named. In this list the dialogue which stands nearest to the three is the *Politicus*, with a ratio of $1\frac{3}{11}$. The *Parmenides*, with $\frac{1}{7}$, ranks very low, having, besides others, the *Cratylus*, *Protagoras*, *Theaetetus*, *Philebus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Sophistes*, *Phaedrus*, and *Politicus*, in that order above it. But when we perceive that the only works which are apparently less associated than our own with the three latest are the *Charmides*, *Alcibiades I.*, and the *Meno*, while the *Laches* and *Lysis* are about one-half nearer, we are constrained to conclude that the list contributes little which can be of service to us. Indeed, it is difficult even to weigh the significance of the evidence. Are we to assume that Plato began authorship with a minimum of unusual terms and gradually advanced to a maximum? Clearly the subject matter would fall to be considered. Professor Campbell himself admits that 'the position of the *Parmenides* in this list, like that of the *Phaedrus*, is partly accounted for by exceptional circumstances.' But by what circumstances?

Another attempt in the same direction is that of W. Dittenberger of Halle, who, after a few separate objections to the authenticity of our dialogue on linguistic grounds, which are referred to in the notes, seems inclined to regard it as doubtful upon a comparison of the use of a series of characteristic phrases—*καὶ μὴν*, *ἀλλὰ μὴν*, *τί μὴν*; *γε μὴν*, and others—in the various works of Plato. The result of his investigation is to throw the works into two great groups—an earlier, with few signs of these expressions; and a later in two divisions, with many. (It ought to be said that, besides rejecting ten dialogues in addition to the spurious seven, he excludes from comparison such as contain small proportions of conversation.) The *Parmenides* stands in the later division of the second group along with the *Philebus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, and *Laws*, and is very heavily weighted for its size. He follows the inquiry up in other directions with much ingenuity and learning. One result which arrests the attention of a reader is that the *Phaedo* stands in the earliest group, while the *Lysis* forms, with the *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Theaetetus*, the first division of the later. The argument has been criticised by A. Frederking, who shows that by dealing with the subject in more minute detail, while employing the same materials, individual books of the *Republic* and *Laws* may be made to stand in different groups. Further, by taking account of the isolated use of the particle *τε*—in such phrases as *σὸν τῶνδ' ἑ* *τε*

Sophistes and Politicus, General Introd. §§ 6-7.

Hermes, xvi., 327. 1881.

Fleckeisen, Jahrbücher, No. 125, p. 534, 1882.

ἔργον—he succeeds in placing the Parmenides, which has but few cases, in a very early position, while he makes the Phaedrus almost take rank with the Timaeus. A distinction of Frederking's between εἶπον and ἔφην is discussed in the notes. With results so conflicting to deal with, it must appear to most readers that the treatment of statistics in language, as in other fields, requires extreme caution, and has not thus far afforded much assistance towards the solution of the question under discussion.

Arguments from
dramatic Setting.

2. Of the argument from scenery or setting one branch is that which deals with the position assigned to Socrates in the several dialogues. It is contended that Socrates has a more prominent rôle in the earlier works, or rather that those works in which he plays such a part are earlier; while his presence tends to become less and less important as Plato's memory of him is effaced by time and by original development. Undoubtedly this seems a reasonable contention, and one in harmony with what would independently appear to be the proper order of many dialogues. But here likewise the question of subject matter might well influence Plato's action. In any case the position of the Parmenides in regard to the argument is peculiar. Socrates does not, indeed, occupy the foremost place throughout, but he does hold that position during the very important introductory part, while he is referred to by no means as a thinker whose period had gone by, but rather as one for whom great things were still in store.

Untersuchungen,
222-224.

An interesting train of inference, which deals with the Parmenides alone, is based upon consideration of the time which may be assumed to have passed between the various stages suggested to us in the construction of the dialogue—between the original conversation, that is, and the narrative of this by Cephalus, which constitutes the dialogue as we have it. This estimate of time may be viewed either, with Steinhardt, from the final point backward, as suggesting that Plato seeks to make us 'look far back into other years'; or, with Ueberweg, from the starting point forward, as involving a late date for the composition of the work. As Plato might at any period in his literary life feel the boyhood of Socrates to be remote from himself, it is clear that only the latter form of the inference has much practical bearing on our present inquiry. Ueberweg reasons thus. The point of departure is the original conversation, which, on the assumption that Socrates was twenty-five at the time, must have occurred in 446-5 B.C. This point we shall hereafter see reason for placing as early, at least, as 451 B.C. Then comes the period which comprised the repeated rehearsals of the conversation by Pythodorus to Antipho, until the latter had committed it to memory. Conjecture alone can determine the length of this interval, and Ueberweg makes no estimate of it beyond suggesting that it must be considerable. It seems unlikely that it could exceed half a century; for Pythodorus had been the host of Parmenides, so that he might have been thirty or so at the time, and fifty years more would make him an old man. This, then, may bring us to 400 B.C. Next comes the narrative by Antipho to Cephalus and his Clazomenian friends, which, as we have seen, Ueberweg places later than 399 B.C. from the circumstance that Cephalus does not think of going

direct to Socrates. Once more we have the interval which extends between that and the repetition of the narrative by Cephalus himself; and finally, says Ueberweg, the space elapsing between this last and the composition of the written work. He makes no attempt to fix the duration of either period, further than by saying that they cannot be very short, since to make them consist of one, or of a very few years 'wäre eine zu auffallende Ungleichmässigkeit' when compared with the preceding half-century. Accordingly he concludes for a 'very late date'—always assuming, which however he does not believe, that the work is genuine. This reasoning might convince, if the whole lapse of time involved were optional. But it is not. The period between the original conversation—if it ever occurred—and the death of Socrates is not subject to Plato's control. To say, therefore, that the remaining intervals must be conceived upon a corresponding scale is tantamount to saying that Plato is by some overmastering necessity forbidden to make allusion in the framework of a dialogue to such an (assumed) historic event until time has passed sufficient to form a second or third interval artistically proportioned to the first. Further, Ueberweg postulates that the narrative by Cephalus is one thing and the written dialogue another. But they purport to be the same—the narrative of Cephalus *is* the dialogue. The truth is that the period between the youth and the death of Socrates is a historical one, and one to which Plato is free to allude when and how he thinks fit. The facts before us are simple. Cephalus after 399 B.C. hears from Antipho a narrative which he on a subsequent occasion repeats, and this repetition constitutes our dialogue. That is the sum total of our information; and despite Ueberweg's ideas of proportion, 'nur eine oder ganz wenige Jahre' are sufficient to include it all. Once again, therefore, we are deprived of any authoritative basis for determining the date of which we are in search.

3. We have only the philosophic contents of the work to fall back upon, then, Arguments from Contents. as a guide in our inquiry; and, alas, it precisely is from these contents that inferences so widely divergent as those of Schleiermacher, Zeller, and Jackson have been drawn. Of the first of these, the author of which seems to have been governed by procrustian theories about the order of Plato's works, it will be enough to say with Stallbaum—'neque enim Schleiermacheri iudicio licet acquiescere, qui eum (the Parmen. Introd. dialogue) a juvene Platone paullo ante Socratis obitum vel non ita multo post ^{289.} (though this is a question of degree) scriptum esse statuit, adeoque habuit pro opere paene rudi et tantummodo inchoato.' The Parmenides certainly is not written by a mere beginner; and the probability is that it is later by several years than 399 B.C. The authority of Zeller on Platonic questions is such that greater weight may perhaps be attached to his view, in the case before us, than intrinsically belongs to it. One may go a long way with him in associating the Parmenides with the subject matter of the Sophistes and Politicus; but to say that it is the 'Philosopher' dialogue promised in p. 217 of the former, and at the beginning of the latter, is a startling pronouncement. These two works are direct and avowed attempts to discover and define the Sophist and the Statesman respectively, and each receives its title

from that circumstance. To this there is nothing analogous in the Parmenides. That Plato entertains a deep veneration for Parmenides as a philosopher is quite true; and that Parmenides is introduced discoursing of the discipline necessary to all philosophic progress, is equally so. But the method of the work differs fundamentally from that of the others, nor is any conclusion arrived at such as that to which each of them directly leads. If Plato meant this dialogue to be the promised Philosopher why should he not have said so, and coupled it as clearly with the Politicus as he does the latter with the Sophistes? In regard to subject matter one might almost as well pitch upon the Timæus as the missing work. It is possible that our dialogue represents all that Plato ever wrote as a substitute for the Philosopher; but, if so, his plan has been altogether changed. With regard to the very suggestive argument of Dr. Jackson, in which he views the Parmenides as an exposition of Plato's final and much modified views, it seems to rest in large measure upon a misunderstanding. It assumes that Socrates had held at one time that there were ideas for 'man, fire, water,' and even for 'hair, mud, filth,' just as there were ideas for 'one, like, good'; but that he had now renounced this hypothesis, and even fled from it as from destruction. The Republic and Phædo are taken as examples of the views renounced, and the conclusion is drawn that the Parmenides must be a late work. Surely this perverts the sense of the passage appealed to? Socrates in answer to Parmenides describes, not a past and discarded hypothesis, but a present belief. Parmenides tells him that by and by, when he grows older and becomes less sensitive to criticism, he will not be afraid to entertain the thought of ideas for even the most undignified objects—that he will learn to call nothing common or unclean. And this state of mind, predicted as in store for Socrates, is the one which the Republic and Phædo exemplify; so that these works are later, if not necessarily than the dialogue as a whole, at least than the state of mind depicted in the passage upon which Dr. Jackson relies. He pushes his contention even further, however, maintaining that while the Phædo reveals no sense of a difficulty about the nature of *μέθεξις*, or the method according to which objects participate in the ideas, the Parmenides which forcibly presses that difficulty must on that ground be a later work.

Is this really a possible contention in view of that remarkable passage in the Phædo, already quoted above, which contains one of the most candid avowals in all Plato's writings, to the effect that, despite the almost overwhelming difficulty which surrounds the doctrine of *μέθεξις*, he nevertheless despairingly clings to it *ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως ἐνῆθως?*

Parm. 130 c-d.

Phædo, 100.

Arguments of
Teichmüller.—
Literarische Feh-
den im vierten
Jahrhundert vor
Chr. Gustav
Teichmüller,
Breslau, 1881.

No observations upon Platonic chronology would be complete which failed to reckon with the arguments of Teichmüller in his 'Literary Feuds.' They are of a nature so striking, and are advanced with such confidence and ability, as to claim special and connected notice, in place of being distributed piecemeal under the various divisions which have just been engaging our attention. Dealing with Plato's writings as a whole, Teichmüller contends that they are for the most part directly contro-

versial, and are to be dated chiefly from a consideration of the writings of men like Xenophon, Isocrates, and Lysias to which they refer, or which in turn refer to them. And such cross references he detects in abundance. On this point much that is of great interest is advanced which it would be impossible justly to controvert, or even to appraise, without a minute and extensive knowledge of the entire literature and literary history of the Platonic era. Such a knowledge we do not possess, and accordingly can only say that all allusions, or seeming allusions, of this nature are suggestive and captivating till we see those that make against the theory. An expert could doubtless collect such. Fortunately the *Parmenides* is not one of the works which Teichmüller has dealt with by this line of argument. Another point on which, theoretically—though, in the work before us, not practically—he lays much stress, as an internal evidence of date, is the progress which may be detected in Plato's views upon the question of *μέθεξις* or *παρουσία*. Undoubtedly this is a weighty subject; at the same time our author's conclusions in regard to it appear to be of a somewhat sanguine character. He seems to find in Plato's works a very complete and satisfying elaboration of the doctrine; a result not altogether in harmony with the language just quoted from the *Phaedo*, but certainly in accord with his own finding upon the philosophic position of Aristotle—to wit, that Aristotle derived most of his conceptions complete from Plato and other predecessors, and deserves credit chiefly for his power of methodizing what these thinkers had supplied. A cardinal feature in Teichmüller's argument is the use which he makes of the statement at the opening of the *Theaetetus* with regard to the composition of that work. The 143 B.C. professed author of it, Euclid of Megara, says that he has purposely left out such phrases as *κἀγὼ ἔφην, συνέφη, οὐχ ὠμολόγει*, and adds that he represents Socrates as actually conversing with Theaetetus and others, rather than as describing his conversation with them. This course is adopted *ἵνα ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις*, and it is represented as receiving the hearty assent of Terpsion. Here, says Teichmüller (following out to some extent, it would seem, a previous hint of Schleiermacher's), we see on Plato's part a new step in authorship. Till now he had followed the method of Socrates in giving his dialogues at second hand by means of *διήγησις*—conspicuous examples of the method being the *Republic* and *Phaedo*. Hereafter there may be some brief prefatory narrative of that kind, but the bulk of each work will purport to be a first hand reproduction of the discussion as it took place. The announcement of this intended change is put into the mouth of Euclid designedly, as an acknowledgement of indebtedness in the matter to the Megarian school. Accordingly we are to understand that as the *Theaetetus* is later than all such works as the *Republic*, so all works which follow its method are in turn later than it. Among those thus marked out as later stands the *Parmenides*, 'denn dass z. B. im *Euthydem* die Disputation erzählt, im *Parmenides* aber dramatisch behandelt wird, kann doch ein Jeder leicht bemerken.' The first thing which strikes one is that the author is disposed to use this argument in too uncom-

Vol. ii. 323. * *

promising a manner. If taken as evidence of a fresh tendency in Plato's mind it may be welcomed. But if we are to accept as binding on us the idea that Plato, after so speaking in the Theaetetus, never could recede from the position thus taken up, we feel that much is expected of us. Plato might appropriate the language and doctrine of King Jamie—'We are a free King,' and not 'thirled' to any system involving mechanical uniformity of style. He was at liberty to write with variety, and to make dramatic apology, as he does in more places than one, for the tediousness of dry details. But granting the most conclusive force to this argument, even so the position of the Parmenides towards it, as towards some others, is exceptional. It is true that in the larger or second part of the dialogue the direct dramatic form is adopted, and that with no such preliminary warning as is given in the Theaetetus. But in the first part, which is nearly one third of the whole, and which consists of a very weighty and careful discussion of the ideal theory, not only are phrases such as 'said he' inserted, but they are inserted at third hand, so that they stand not in the indicative but in the infinitive mood—and, as one might say, in the second degree of that. Thus we have τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εἶ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι and οὕτω φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα. Nay, such and so embarrassing is the artificial character of the style that it sometimes fairly breaks down, and we have καὶ πῶς ἄν, εἶπεν, instead of εἶπεῖν, while every now and then the εἶπεῖν is involuntarily dropped, as in ἔοικεν: τὸ ποῖον; If, then, we are to place the Parmenides after the Theaetetus on this ground, we must assume that Plato's Socratic conscience, so to speak, is pricking him, and that he allays his qualms for abandoning his master's method by the penance of walking nearly a third of his prescribed journey with peas in his shoes. But, again, Teichmüller expressly accepts the mention made of Parmenides in the Sophistes as an allusion to the Parmenides dialogue. That being so, what is to be made of the allusion, equally specific, contained in the Theaetetus, and given at length in part I. above? The date of the Parmenides is not, however, discussed by Teichmüller in detail, as those of some other works are; all that we find are incidental allusions to the matter. Thus he holds that it precedes the Laws, and we have seen that he puts it before the Sophistes. Again, he dwells—as Ueberweg also does—upon the appearance of Aristoteles as an interlocutor, and is strongly disposed to assume that we have here an indirect but intentional allusion to the philosopher Aristotle. This leads to the inference that the work must be later than 367 B.C., when Aristotle became known to Plato; and that it was written about 365-65 B.C. With this is intended to accord his assumption that Plato refers to himself when he makes Parmenides plead age as a reason for excusing himself from entering upon a protracted argument. Such a view presents much that is attractive; and we must concede that τῶ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἄν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται. At the same time he weakens his case by going on to affirm that this is the work περὶ ψυχῆς from the reading of which by Plato all are said to have withdrawn except Aristotle. By common consent, and in accordance with the title, that work is assumed

131 A.

183 F.

176 p. XIX.

ii. 24-5.

136 D-16.

to have been the *Phaedo*, a work which Teichmüller places relatively early in Plato's life. Again, as Plato was born about 427 B.C. his age at 366 B.C. would not be very advanced; at all events his activity in authorship lasted considerably longer — on Teichmüller's own showing, he had still to write at least the *Sophistes*, *Politicus* and *Laws*, or about a fourth of his collective works. It must be admitted, however, as a noticeable circumstance, that his age would not fall far short of that assigned to Parmenides in the dialogue. But the assumption that Aristotle is glanced at in the person of the young Aristoteles is surely open to great doubt. Aristoteles is declared to have been one of the thirty tyrants, and we know that Plato introduces more than one public character of that type into his writings—Critias, for example, and Alcibiades. If, then, it had not happened that Plato's greatest scholar proved to be likewise called Aristotle, should we have found anything to attract attention in this circumstance? Had Shakespeare survived till 1645—and he would not in that case have lived much longer than Plato—who would not have maintained, in discussing moot points in his works, that the famous words 'Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition!' had a very different reference from the ostensible one? Again, if Plato meant to refer to the philosopher here, he has not assigned him a very appropriate position. Socrates, although 'very young,' plays a part of great importance in the dialogue: but Aristoteles is a mere lay figure. He elicits nothing, he maintains nothing, he controverts nothing; but merely, by interjecting formal verbal replies, prevents the dialogue from becoming an essay. How Plato could treat a young man whom he viewed as giving promise of ability, we know from the *Theaetetus* and *Charmides*; and that is not how he treats Aristoteles. Nay, it would be a fair contention to affirm that he would not so have represented anyone called Aristoteles had he known the historic Aristotle at the time.

Another argument advanced by Teichmüller is the following, 'Ich erwähne hier ^{ii. 360.} noch, dass der Timaios . . . bei der Erörterung des Begriffs der Zeit eine spätere Untersuchung verspricht, die wir im Parmenides (151 E bis 157 B) vorfinden. Es folgt daraus von selbst die Priorität des Timaios?' The *Timaeus* gives a promise which the *Parmenides* fulfils, therefore the latter is the later work. If the premises hold the conclusion is incontestable. But we are entitled to expect that the promise given should be definite and the fulfilment reasonably to the point. The passage referred to in the *Timaeus* as *pièce justificative* is one in which, after a reference to Time in ^{38 B.} various relations, the remark is made *περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων τάχ' ἂν οὐκ εἴη καιρὸς πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι*. This is all; and from this 'it follows of itself' that because time is discussed in the *Parmenides* that discussion is a fulfilment, the fulfilment, of the 'promise' made in the words just given. Surely a conclusion like this seems predetermined. And while inherently weak it has to overbear conflicting appearances of some weight. Plato has written much upon ethics and politics, and not a little upon physics and metaphysics: and if we are to take the *Laws* as his last utterance on the former, it seems at least as clear that the *Timaeus*

gives the furthest development of his views on the latter. It is one long, earnest, almost desperate attempt to elaborate *μέθεξις*, to bridge over the chasm between *εἶδη* and *αἰσθητὰ* which in the Parmenides is left yawning. Nor is this Teichmüller's only sanguine inference. He places the Phaedo, as we have seen, considerably earlier than the Parmenides. One of his arguments we have already given: here is another. Finding reason for considering the Symposium a comparatively early work he lays it down that the Phaedo follows closely upon it. Everyone will recall the inimitable humour with which the Symposium closes. All the other banqueters being 'under the table,' Socrates is left demonstrating to the almost insensible Agatho and Aristophanes that it is the function of the same poet to write both tragedy and comedy: they cannot follow him and drop asleep. Teichmüller regards this as a promise on Plato's part that as he had written a comedy in the Symposium he would supplement it by a tragedy; that tragedy is none other than the Phaedo, which accordingly we ought to place in the following year. While thus reading promises and specific statements into scraps of artistic by-play, he seems to treat very distinct declarations with but slight regard. The only specific indications which Plato personally supplies in reference to the sequence of his writings are those which mark the intimate connection between the Theaetetus, Sophistes, and Politicus on the one hand, and the Republic, Timaeus, and Critias on the other. These indications Teichmüller would appear to set almost entirely aside. No one who studies his arguments can fail to be impressed by their brilliancy and power, but his key 'will not unlock as many things as he thinks it will.'

ii. 307-9.

Must our conclusion be, then, that no satisfactory data exist from which a reasonable estimate may be formed of the position which the Parmenides should occupy among Plato's writings? Some attempt must certainly be made to reach at least an approximate solution of the question: but the undertaking is entered upon in anything but a dogmatic spirit, and with a full consciousness of the conditions—*caedimus inque vicem praebemus crura sagittis*. To enter at this stage upon a detailed analysis of the dialogue would be to anticipate the natural order of inquiry. Some reference, however, to the contents of the work is indispensable to our present object.

Reasons which
should weigh
with us.

The dialogue opens with a statement upon the ideal theory which is afterwards subjected to scrutiny. In connection with this opening statement it seems impossible to overlook the emphatic intimation of the youth of Socrates by which it is accompanied. He is described as 'extremely young,' and Parmenides treats him as a promising lad who at present is deterred, through boyish fear of established views, from accepting conclusions to which his reason seems to point, and who has, with youthful impetuosity, plunged into metaphysical speculation before passing through such a course of training as alone would fit him for the undertaking. It may, no doubt, be said that Socrates must be represented as young if any regard is to be paid to the assumed date of the meeting between him and Parmenides. But Plato

127 C.

128 B.

135 C-D.

was not tied down to such a method of dealing with the personality and doctrines of Parmenides: the method was of his own choosing. Further, as Socrates never held the views here ascribed to him, we are entitled in the youthful Socrates to perceive the youthful Plato, and to regard the opening statement of the dialogue as an intentional notification by Plato of the character of his own early theorizing upon metaphysical questions. It is consistent with this assumption that the only method urged here as a means of arriving at the conviction that ideas exist is the Socratic one, of generalization from the world of experience. That was the path which had led Plato onward, and hence the present allusion to it. Again, while the ideas are treated as realities of some kind affecting our sensible sphere, the first attempt clearly to define their nature is that in which they are called *νοήματα* whose abode is *οὐδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς*. Is not this a natural course for one to pursue who had just come from the school of 'general definitions' which Aristotle directly ascribes to Socrates—what could such definitions be but *νοήματα*? We have before us, in fact, *τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίξασθαι καθόλου* as Aristotle describes them. And when the writer, driven from this, goes on to exclaim that now he thinks he has the clue,—that the ideas are patterns set up in nature; we seem to find the decisive step taken which Aristotle proceeds to ascribe to 'those who first pronounced for the existence of ideas,' *ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν*. Looking next to this first sketch of the ideal sphere we find its scope to be at once restricted and imperfectly defined. The speaker cannot bring himself to recognize the existence of ideas for physical objects, but only for abstract mental and moral conceptions; and even these exist confusedly, without being dominated by any regulative principle. Here the new doctrine stands forth just such as it might have sprung from the unsystematic moral speculations of the historic Socrates. This then, while not the point finally reached in the dialogue, is the condition of things with which the dialogue goes on to deal; and may be described as a somewhat hasty and crude *χωρισμὸς* of the results reached in the Socratic speculation. It is the treatment which this opening statement receives, to which, if to anything, we must look for assistance in determining the problem before us. Thus far all that we have gathered is that Plato's early views were of a certain character, while we may infer from what follows that they had been exposed to some public criticism.

1. The first comment which Parmenides, or Plato in his person, makes upon the theory put before him, and he makes it indirectly in passing, is that it is incomplete. He implies that it might have been expected to include and account for physical objects, as well as moral or intellectual conceptions; that it will not be complete until it does include such objects, even the most insignificant of them; and that he looks forward to a time when Socrates will so far gain the victory over his boyish aversion as to make that important stride in speculation. If this is a just interpretation to put upon the language of the text it would seem to follow that the

dialogue can at least be no later than any of those in which ideas for physical objects are accepted by Socrates. Were we to push the argument to its utmost we might even infer that the Parmenides is prior to all such dialogues, inasmuch as it looks forward to a consummation which they embody; and it is obvious that if it be later than none of them it must of necessity be prior to the majority of them. Now all students of Plato's works are aware that those ideas are accepted without hesitation in such works as the Cratylus, Republic and Phaedo. In the Cratylus we have

Cratylus, 387 etc.
 .. 440 B-C.
 Rep. X, 596.
 Phaedo, 65 D,
 74-79, 100-106.

ὁ ἔστιν ὄνομα, κέρκις, τρύπανον, ὕφασμα, so that even objects of art and manufacture are included, which the human maker fashions πρὸς τὸ εἶδος βλέπων. In the Republic occur among others the well known cases of the κλίνη and τράπεζα; and in the Phaedo repeated reference is made to ideas for various physical objects.

2. Nothing could be more abrupt than the severance which Parmenides and Socrates agree to recognize between the ideas and the world of sense. You may be led by generalization to approach gradually towards the conception of the idea; but when you find it you also find that between you and it there is a great gulf fixed. Nor is there so much as a hint of difference in this particular between one idea and another. Here is the sensible sphere, yonder is the ideal; even God cannot bridge the chasm that yawns between them. All the satisfaction vouchsafed to us in these circumstances is the admission that such a conclusion does appear to be paradoxical, and that it will need extreme skill to deal with that and similar difficulties. It does not seem an unfair inference to assume that on this point Plato was still unprovided with a definite theory, and that any dialogue in which a positive attempt is made to deal with the problem is later than the Parmenides. This would include all dialogues which discuss or accept the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις—for example the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Meno: possibly also those that speak of 'divine madness,' as the Phaedrus and Symposium. It would include the simile of the cave in the Republic, and all those attempts to construct a sort of Jacob's ladder, or graded means of descent from the higher sphere to the lower. Such attempts are to be found in the divided line of the Republic, the construction of ὑπόθεσις above ὑπόθεσις in the Phaedo, and the declaration in the Philebus that we must not proceed at once from the one to the unlimited πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδη τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνός—whatever this description may be held to mean.

Parm. 133-135 c.

Phaedo, 72-76.
 Phaedrus, 249 c.
 Meno, 81 c-82.

3. Neither in the opening sketch nor in the criticism brought to bear upon it is there any serious attempt to introduce gradation or method into the ideal sphere. The nearest approach to that is to be found in the various groups into which Parmenides throws the ideas in questioning Socrates; and between the two groups which the latter accepts the rationale of the distinction is not very obvious. Once more, then, it would seem a fair argument to maintain that the setting up of one or more dominant or master ideas must indicate a speculative advance in the theory. Now, even granting, which is doubtful, that the 'one' of this dialogue is designed as such a master idea, it would still seem that the ἀγαθὸν of the Republic and the small group of dominant

ideas—*ὄν, στάσις, κίνησις, ταυτόν, θάτερον*—dwelt upon in the Sophistes, are much clearer cases of an attempt in that direction.

4. Near the beginning of the Parmenides we have an earnest wish expressed by Socrates to see the process 'mingle, mingle, mingle,' which prevails in the sensible sphere, made applicable to the ideal. Yet in throwing out such a suggestion there is not even a whisper of the restriction 'ye that mingle may'—the expression rather is *τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην*. Nor is any such restriction enforced in the later progress of the argument. It does not appear unnatural to contend that works in which a discrimination on this point is revealed, in which distinctions are drawn between ideas that admit communion and those that reject it, indicate a later stage in the evolution of Plato's views. Here again the Phaedo and Sophistes are at once recalled to mind.

5. The type of argument which we have just been using may be developed somewhat further. We have above seen some reason to assume that the difference between any given conception in Aristotle and the corresponding one in Plato is largely a question of greater clearness, definiteness, precision. The view of Aristotle is in 'precipitate' what the view of Plato represents in 'solution.' It would naturally follow that if in different works Plato's views in regard to any conception seem to be at variance, the view which is the more clear and definite is the later. Now, in the Parmenides we have a somewhat vague and confusing use of the correlative terms 'whole' and 'part.' It is not clear whether the two represent merely a greater and a lesser portion of extended matter, or bear a more logical relation such as that of genus to species or body to member. In the Theaetetus we find a very definite distinction drawn between that which as a mere sum of parts is called *πᾶν* and that which as something distinct from such a sum is called *ὅλον*. Theaet. 204.

6. We have seen above, and shall have occasion to see again, that faults appear from time to time in the reasoning. These faults resolve themselves largely into neglect of the law of contradiction and of logical division. We have in the Parmenides an indication of the nature of the law of contradiction, but by no means so clear a statement of it as is contained in the Sophistes—*ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς (τὰς δόξας) αὐταῖς ἄμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἐναντίας*. And while Parmenides insists strongly on the necessity of method in reasoning, the method of logical division is not consciously and persistently employed as it is in the same dialogue. Parm. 155 b. Soph. 230 b. Soph. 226 etc.

7. But on the question of reasoning a more important point arises. We have already had under review an argument by Teichmüller in which the Theaetetus was made a turning point, in consequence of a remark in it affecting the style of composition adopted. That argument is not unimportant, although it cannot be applied safely to the Parmenides. But there is a means of inference of an analogous character which will so apply. The great objection which Parmenides urges against Socrates and his action is the inconsiderate haste with which he—that is, Plato—had constructed his theory, without anything like the argumentative training which such an attempt re- P. xxv. above. Parm. 135 c-13

quired. Plato had, however, from his youth enjoyed the discipline of the 'Socratic elenchus.' Yet this was not sufficient; he must consent to sit at the feet of Zeno before he ventures upon constructive metaphysics. The point is pressed upon our attention in the utmost detail, and is obviously a question of much greater weight than that of reporting discussions at first or second hand. Here, if anywhere, we have the intimation of a new departure on Plato's part. And it comes in connection with a metaphysical problem. It would appear that while the methods of argument practised by the historic Socrates are sufficient to meet the wants of unsystematic ethical inquiries, they must be supplemented or elaborated if ethics and politics are to be built up firmly upon a basis of reason. And the inference would seem to be that such dialogues as deal firmly with these abstract questions without⁶⁶ making special reference to the necessity for preliminary training are written after the experience described in the passage under discussion—after Plato had realized the necessity which he here points out. This would give a fresh reason for placing the Parmenides prior to the Timaeus, Politicus, Sophistes, Theaetetus, and Philebus, and to the metaphysical portions of the Republic. The feeling which Plato here indicates is in harmony with the statement of Aristotle about the methods and arguments of Socrates, where he says

Arist. Metaph.
xii. 4.

διαλεκτική γὰρ ἰσχύς οὕτω τότ' ἦν ὥστε δύνασθαι καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ τί ἐστὶ τὰναντία ἐπισκοπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη. We do not contend that Plato henceforth was always just and faultless in his arguments—few even of the most expert dialecticians fail to reason badly at times—but simply that hereafter he was more searching and methodical. We could imagine the Republic, for example, begun upon Socratic principles and carried on so far as the point where advantage is taken of the argument from the analogy of a State, but thereafter becoming gradually modified and interpenetrated with fresh metaphysical matter which carried the speculation past the Socratic standpoint into regions of pure thought.

8. While Plato in this dialogue criticises his own early views, and assumes that his readers are more or less acquainted with them, he does not refer to them as matters of public notoriety. On the contrary the phrase used by Parmenides after hearing the opening statement of Socrates is interrogative—*καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ δαίρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα*; Now that is not the sort of language used under similar circumstances in the Phaedo. On the contrary we have such expressions as *ἄπερ ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε... οὐδὲν πέπανμαι λέγων.—εἴμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα*. And we have referred more than once already to the manner in which he alludes to objections which had been raised—*τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δυσχυρίζομαι* etc. It is not unnatural to view such expressions as pointing to a later date for the work in which they occur.

Parm. 130 B.

Phaedo, 100 B etc.

132 D.

9. The suggestion that the ideas consist of *παράδειγματα* or patterns would seem to be thrown out here for the first time. Where it is mentioned elsewhere the reference is hardly of such a nature, but the subject is touched upon as a thing needing no introduction.

Is it not reasonable to infer that such allusions are of later date than this one? Here again the Theaetetus and Republic at once occur to the memory. Rep. ix. 592 B.
Theaet. 176 E.

10. Finally, what has been urged thus far seems to furnish a justification for putting upon the quotations given at the close of Part I. of this introduction, from the Phaedo, Theaetetus, and Sophistes, what is after all their most natural construction—for holding, that is, that they are references, as clear as Plato's mode of authorship will permit, from those dialogues to the Parmenides as a work already given to the public.

Such are some arguments which may be adduced in favour of the view that the Parmenides takes a distinctly early position in the ranks of Plato's metaphysical writings. Whatever may be thought of their force when viewed separately, it will be observed that they are largely cumulative, and present in that light no inconsiderable body of evidence, so that one is reminded of the Aristotelian dictum τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές—Arist. Eth. Nic. i. 8. with a true theory all the facts of experience harmonize, but with a false theory the truth of fact is speedily at discord. It is true that some discover in the substance of the Parmenides evidence of very late authorship, basing their contention largely on the prominence given in the work to number, in connection with references made by Aristotle to some relation which Plato came latterly to recognize between ideas and number. Met. xii. Undoubtedly the argument contained in the dialogue is throughout of an extremely subtle character. But is it more so than that of Zeno, from which it takes its rise? It is not clear that the scope of it exceeds what might fairly be looked for from the operation of the doctrine of Parmenides and the dialectic of Zeno upon a mind at once so delicate and so powerful as that of Plato. As for the question of number, is that such an exotic in the speculation of the Greeks as to excite suspicions? 'They thought in numbers for the numbers came': long before Plato's time every recess of numerical extravagance in philosophizing had been ransacked by the Pythagoreans. And surely it is sufficiently natural to discuss many points respecting number when the basis of the whole argument is the nature of One. Nor is there anything which can be called a mixing up of number with the ideas in the course of what is said. Our contention, then, is that on the whole it seems most consonant with evidence to assign to the Parmenides a very early place among Plato's ontological speculations: to place it, for example, earlier than the Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Phaedo, Philebus, and Timaeus, and at least not later than the more abstract discussions in the Republic. If scholars are right in speaking of a specially Megarian stage in Plato's intellectual development there is nothing to prevent this dialogue forming a representative product of that period. It is correct to say, as Dr. Jackson does, that the work marks a break in the continuity of Plato's views, and a reconstruction of his ideal system. But while Dr. Jackson represents Plato here as breaking with most of the opinions which we are in the habit of associating with his name, in favour of a theory for which we have little or no documentary evidence, it seems more natural to hold that Plato here parts company with an early

and immature conception, for which we have little or no documentary evidence, in favour of those more comprehensive and connected doctrines which we are in the habit of associating with his name.

III.

CHARACTER AND CONTENTS. WE come now to consider the character and contents of the work. The Parmenides purports to be a narrative by Cephalus of a conversation which occurred between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides at a former time, in a specified place. Is that meeting historical, and is the narrative authentic? Plato's account is certainly circumstantial. The transmission, too, of the narrative would seem to be guarded with the most jealous vigilance against the intrusion of foreign matter. But no one can profess a belief that Plato's works are to be judged by a severe historic standard. They may throw light upon historic events and personages, but they are not, by many removes, themselves history. Even in ancient times this was understood, as we learn from the anecdote, whether authentic or not, recorded in Diogenes Laërtius, that Socrates on hearing Plato read the *Lysis* exclaimed, Ἡράκλεις, ὡς πολλά μου καταψεύδεται ὁ νεανίσκος οὗτος! A similar remark is ascribed to both Gorgias and Phaedo by Athenaeus. It may, however, be urged that a basis of fact should be admitted in many dialogues, and that something beyond that may be looked for in those in which a serious profession of veracity is made by the author. There is such a profession here. Plato seems quite grave as he describes the meeting, and gives the respective ages and characteristics of those who were present: nay, as we have seen, he refers to the matter again in two of his other works. But with regard to the last point some deduction must be made. It has been mentioned that in Plato direct references from one work to another cannot occur. Accordingly we do not know whether these allusions constitute a reassertion of a fact, or simply a reference, as perspicuous as the circumstances permit, to a previously-written dialogue. If the latter be the case, then we have one assertion of fact, not three. Were we dealing with a professed historian this might mean little, but we are not. Scholars, however, seem inclined to think that Plato meant to be historical here: Stallbaum, Mullach, Clinton, and Ueberweg are at one so far. But when we come to details difficulties arise. Of the three principal characters in the dialogue the only one regarding whose life we have definite information is the youngest. The birth-year of Socrates lies within the limits 471-468 B.C., with apparently a preference for 469. At the date of the meeting he is described in the several references as σφόδρα νέον, πάνυ νέος, ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, παισὶν ἡμῖν οἴσιν, and the whole setting of the dialogue accords with these emphatic phrases. Ueberweg, indeed, considers this to mean that he was young only when compared with the mature or advanced age commonly assigned to him in other dialogues, and cites—though admitting the authority to be second-rate—the statement of Synesius, Σωκράτης . . . πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς, ὀπηνίκα Παρμενίδης καὶ Ζήνων ἦκον Ἀθήναζε, ὡς Πλάτων φησί, τὰ Παναθήναια θεασόμενοι. Clinton, Mullach, and Zeller, on the other hand,

CHARACTER
AND CONTENTS.

Is the dialogue
to be regarded
as historical?

D. L. iii. 35.

Athen. Deipn.
xi. § 113 Tauchn.

Stallb. Parmen.
Introd. p. 23 ff.;
Mullach, Poeseos
Philosoph. quae
supersunt, p. 109;
Clinton, Fast.
Hell. II. Ed. 3.
1841, under dates,
and compare p.
448; Ueberweg,
Untersuch. p. 222.

Syn. Encomium
Calvitii, c. 17.

agree in rejecting this age as much too advanced: and certainly with justice. Not only does it add to the difficulties of the situation, so far as Parmenides is concerned, but it is intrinsically improbable. Even among ourselves a man could hardly, unless to serve some purpose, be called extremely young as a student of philosophy at five and twenty; and still less among the Greeks. The whole atmosphere of Plato's writings conveys the impression that many of the interlocutors are mere lads, while on glancing at Clinton's tables we find it set down that Pindar was an author at sixteen, that Demosthenes spoke at eighteen, that Epicurus took to philosophy at twelve, and that Arcesilaus, 'if the numbers are accurate,' had won a reputation at seventeen. Democritus, too, is said to have studied theology and astrology *ἔτι παῖς ὄν*. Clinton and Mullach, while extreme on the other side, are much nearer the truth in calling Socrates fifteen. He could not well have been so young—first, because the age is extremely boyish; and, second, because Aristoteles is described as still younger, which on that supposition is hardly credible. If we call Socrates eighteen—the age of the ephēbi—and Aristoteles seventeen, we strike a very reasonable mean. This will assign the meeting to the year 451 B.C., from which, as point of departure, we have to reckon the ages of the other speakers. Zeno is said to be *ἑγγύς ἐτῶν τετταράκοντα* at the time, so that he would be born about 490 B.C. Our chief external evidence upon the question is the statement of Diogenes Laërtius that he 'flourished about the nine and seventieth Olympiad,' or 464-61 B.C. It seems a fair and moderate calculation to suppose him thirty at that time, which would place his birth somewhere about 492 B.C., a result not out of harmony with Plato's language. With Parmenides the case is less satisfactory. Plato describes him as *περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα*, which would assign his birth to some date about 516 B.C. Here, likewise, our best independent witness is Diogenes, who says that he 'flourished about the nine and sixtieth Olympiad,' or 504-1 B.C. If this be correct it renders the assumption of his birth in 516 B.C., or even (as Clinton gives it) 519, absolutely out of the question. He could not 'flourish' in his teens, and the most favourable view which could be taken—519 for his birth and 501 for his 'floruit'—makes him but eighteen at the time. Even this will accord with our other dates only on the assumption that Socrates was fifteen and Aristoteles fourteen when they met him. If, as seems to be imperative, we make Socrates at least seventeen at the time of meeting, and Parmenides thirty when he 'flourished,' the result can be achieved only by a change in the text of either Plato or Diogenes. To alter texts with the view of harmonizing dates is, while a tempting, an extremely dangerous course. In this case the Clarke Ms. offers no justification for a change, and, so far as can be judged from Huebner's edition, the Mss. of Diogenes furnish no variants, although editors differ freely from the text. Moreover, Athenaeus, who seems to be at least as old an author as Diogenes, rejects the idea of the meeting, and his attitude would rather tell in favour of the text of the latter as it stands. If a change is to be made, perhaps the simplest would be the following. The words *πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα* in the Clarke Ms. are at the end of a rather crowded line. If the circumstances happened to be analogous in the case of some older Ms. from which the Clarke has descended, we might imagine some contraction being

resorted to, so that ἐξήκοντα might by possibility have resulted from the running together of ἐνενήκοντα—two N's when placed sideways very much resembling the majuscule ξ, thus ξ ζ. This would give us for the age of Parmenides ninety-five instead of sixty-five: his birth would fall in 545 B.C., and his age at his 'floruit' would be, let us say, forty-two. Nor would there be any impossibility in all this. A glance at the ages of the Greek philosophers will show that they were a long-lived generation. The description, too, of Parmenides as εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην, σφόδρα πολιόν, and his professed shrinking from the labour of discussion, agree better with the greater than with the lesser age. The change, however, is quite gratuitous; and it makes Parmenides about forty-five years older than

Athen. Deipnos.
xi. 113 Tauchn.

Zeno, which introduces fresh complications. So much for dates. Athenaeus is justified in declaring, Παρμενίδη μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς λόγους τὸν τοῦ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτην, μόλις ἢ ἡλικία συγχωρεῖ! He does not stop there, however, but regards the topics discussed as equally improbable—οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιούτους εἶπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι λόγους. He rejects the meeting as unlikely; and, in addition, he cannot believe that either Socrates or Parmenides said what is ascribed to him in the dialogue. Socrates is represented as handling familiarly and with ease, although no doubt with a suggestion of youthful hesitancy, conceptions to which, unless our whole modern view of the subject be a delusion, he could advance no claim at any time; to which, on the contrary, Plato himself found his way only after his master's decease. This point we need not labour. In regard to Parmenides something more must be said. That Plato knew what the tenets of Parmenides were does not admit of doubt; he refers to them repeatedly, and even quotes from them. And the relation of the statements here made by Parmenides to those tenets is unquestionably more than merely nominal. Great weight attaches throughout to the doctrine of the One. And we may also catch echoes of Parmenides in points of detail. Take the well-known, although somewhat uncertain, lines—

Parmenides.

Parm. 128 A,
etc.; Theaet.
152 E, 180 E,
183 E; Sophist.
237 A, 241 D, 242
C, etc.; Sympos.
195 C.

χρεὸν δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι,
 ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκέες ἦτορ,
 ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθής.
 ἀλλ' ἔμψης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
 χρὴ δοκίμως γινῶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.

Mullach, Fragm.
28-32.

(So Mullach, although *χρὴ δοκιμωθῆναι* would be a possible reading, and liker the original *δοκίμως εἶναι*.) Here we seem to find an analogy, and perhaps a hint, for Plato's antithesis between *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα*; while the last line—taken in connection with what Socrates says of the relation between Zeno's method and that of Parmenides—may contain a

Parm. 136 A-C.

suggestion of the maxim, so emphatically laid down, about the duty of testing all sides of every hypothesis. Again, the words *εὐπειθέος* and *πίστις*, when coupled with the phrases *πειθοῦς ἐστὶ κέλευθος, παναπειθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπρόν*, which immediately follow, and others at intervals, may not have been without some influence upon two passages in the dialogue

Parm. 133 B, 135

A-B.
Fragm. 40, 94.

where, in addition to the general purport, we have the words *ἀπίθανος* and *δυσανάπειστον εἶναι*. So also in two lines of the poem, *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι* and *ταῦτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκὲν ἐστὶ νόημα*, it is not impossible that we may have the original of

Plato's suggestion to name the ideas *νόηματα*. Besides such analogies as these we have various resemblances which are verbal merely, the sense of the corresponding passages being widely divergent—Parmenides speaking of what he accepts, Plato of what he criticises or rejects. It is such passages which, while externally bearing a resemblance, gradually convince us that the tenets of the historical Parmenides have in many cases little or no connection with what Plato feels at liberty to put in his mouth. Many citations might be made: let us take the following. Repeatedly Parmenides affirms that Being alone exists, and that Not-being is without existence, unthinkable, unnamable; and declares emphatically with regard to Being that

ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
οὐδ' ὄν, μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἢ δ' ἀτέλεστον·
οὐ ποτ' ἔην οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πάν,
ἐν ξυνεχές.

Parm. 132 B.
Fragm. 59-62

This description is reiterated in varying language, but with unvarying strength of conviction. We gain additional clearness from such phrases as εἴ γε γένοιτ' οὐκ ἔστι—οὐδὲ διαίρετόν ἐστιν—πάν δὲ πλέον ἐστὶν ἑόντος—ἔμπεδον αὐθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει τε καὶ ἀμφὶς ἑέργει—ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδενές—πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαιρῆς ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντη. To harmonize these numerous characteristics is no part of our duty: Parmenides is satisfied of their necessary co-relation, and explicitly lays down the dogma that whatever deviates from them, and cannot be included in their scope, is a subject of mere opinion and a branch of the non-existent, ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα. Under the head of δόξα falls, so far as can be gathered from the fragments, a general survey of physical nature, analogous to that which is met with in most systems of Greek philosophy, including those of Plato and Aristotle. Now a glance through the synopsis of this dialogue, which has been placed in the margin of the text, will suffice to show that Plato ascribes to the One every characteristic which Parmenides thus rejects, in addition, or in alternation, to those which the latter accepts. Again, while we might at first be tempted to suppose that τὰ ἄλλα of which Plato speaks correspond roughly to the Not-being, or to the domain of δόξα whereof Parmenides bids us beware; a moment's reflection will recall to our minds the fact that Plato does not assign these ἄλλα or πολλά to a sphere of δόξα distinct from the region in which the One is found, but that—so far as their truth or falsity, their knowability or unknowability, are concerned—the One and these Others stand upon a perfectly equal footing. In short, we find that Plato while putting his argument into the mouth of Parmenides, from whose thesis it begins, advances in the course of it πολλά καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ, against which the venerable speaker would at once have raised an urgent protest. To what conclusion, then, are we led upon the matter of historic veracity? It is just a possibility that Socrates may as a boy have chanced to meet Parmenides, when (or if) the latter was at Athens, as Scott tells us he met Burns at Edinburgh—'Virgilium vidi tantum.' But it is extremely improbable, all but inconceivable, that the two had any conversation upon philosophy. Plato, however, having, like all contemporary thinkers, a deep veneration for Parmenides, seeks, when

discussing his doctrines, to make that respect manifest, while at the same time giving dramatic force to his work, by dwelling upon this possible meeting, so as to suggest that his own master might advance a claim to be the other's disciple. The thesis of Parmenides is Plato's starting-point, and there is a show of adherence to it throughout; but the adherence is verbal chiefly. Accordingly we need not bind ourselves to historic fact as a test by which to try Plato's assertions, but may deal with the Parmenides freely upon the assumption that it is Plato who speaks throughout, and that the various interlocutors are but his *dramatis personae*.

- Zeno. What now of Zeno in the same connection? If we are hampered in alluding to Parmenides by the fragmentary state of his writings, our position as regards Zeno is still more unfortunate. Brief quotations which scarcely profess to be exact, and sometimes mere accounts, avowedly in the language of the narrator, are all that have reached us from this famous fountain-head of dialectic. It is generally assumed that Plato refers to Zeno in the query, τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνη ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὐτὰ καὶ φερόμενα; If that be so, and if the description be designed as historic—though it may well be but another involved allusion to this dialogue—then its resemblance to what Plato puts into the mouths of Zeno and Parmenides in the work before us is very striking. But there is no independent historical corroboration of that. Our authorities tell us that Zeno had two groups of contentions, directed, one against the existence of multiplicity, the other against that of motion. Plato's language in the Phaedrus might cover both, though principally the former. Between the accredited statements of Zeno and the argument in our dialogue the following items of correspondence may be noted. It is a well-known assumption of his that space and extended objects, if such exist, are infinitely divisible. With this we may compare the opening of what Grote calls the Second Demonstration in the Parmenides. Again, Simplicius, in his commentary upon Aristotle, represents Zeno as maintaining that if the Many exist they are both limited and limitless, which corresponds with what we find in Plato, but with a difference. Zeno seeks to make this good with respect to the Many, Parmenides is represented as demonstrating its applicability to the One. Finally, the familiar Achilles paradox, and that of the Arrow flying and at rest, are based, as Simplicius points out, on the assumption that time consists of an endless series of points *συμβαίνει δὲ* (the paradox is reached) *παρὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον συγκείσθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν μὴ διδομένου γὰρ τούτου οὐκ ἔσται ὁ συλλογισμός.* This at once recalls two striking passages of the Parmenides. At the same time these arguments of Plato, when viewed in detail, are not quite similar to those of Zeno; while we have also to remember that they are boldly attributed to Parmenides himself, and that they are applied to the One as straightforward reasoning, not to the Many as paradoxical confutation.
- Melissus. Plato makes no allusion to Melissus in the Parmenides; but he twice refers to him elsewhere, and in such a way as to indicate a knowledge of his writings—in particular of his view that motion was impossible for lack of empty space. Much of the argument in this dialogue has quite as close a likeness to the tenets of Melissus as to those of Zeno.
- Phaedr. 261 D.
- Parm. 142 B, etc.
- Berlin Aristotle, Schol. fol. 255 a, upon Phys. vii. 5. Comp. Parm. 142-145.
- As above fol. 130 b, on Phys. iv. 1, 3. Comp. Parm. 152 B, 156 D.
- Theaet. 180 E, 183 E.

Thus the reasoning of Melissus that what 'is' cannot 'become,' and therefore has no beginning; cannot 'perish,' and therefore has no end; and as having neither beginning nor end cannot be limited, therefore the One is 'limitless'; recalls at once what we find at the opening of the First Demonstration: while the fallacy of arguing thus from time to space is analogous to the ambiguous use of *ταυτόν* for the same thing and the same place in the Second. Again, the contention against motion in any form, whether as destruction, or growth, or change, or suffering, on the ground that whatever is so affected cannot be One, finds a parallel in both the First Demonstration and the Third. There is even an echo of the language, although with a difference; for example *εἰ γὰρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἐν εἴῃ τὸ γὰρ ἠντιναοῦν κίνησιν κινεόμενον ἔκ τινος καὶ ἐς ἕτερόν τι μεταβάλλει*: and *εἰ γὰρ ἕτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι* may be compared with the phrases used throughout the Third Demonstration. Yet we feel that in the case of Melissus, as in the cases already touched upon, the divergences are quite as noteworthy as the coincidences. And our general conclusion upon the evidence must be that—so far as can be ascertained from the fragments preserved—Plato treats the works of the three Eleatic philosophers rather as suggestive texts and points of departure, than as systems accepted in their entirety and containing a satisfactory answer to the questions of metaphysics. The Parmenides is after all a Platonic speculation, although resting upon an Eleatic basis. In Plato's view the One 'is and is not' all that the Eleatics ascribed to it and to the Many conjointly.

Of the two great exponents of Platonism for the English-speaking world of our generation the one, while striving to maintain a historic attitude, subjects Plato's works to a scrutiny having for basis a sensational conception of knowledge, and for weapons the laws of formal logic; the other does not shrink from hinting his distrust of metaphysics as anything more than a mental gymnastic, and regards Plato by preference as the untrammelled 'poet or maker of ideas.' The two are agreed, however, in putting aside any suggestion of system in Plato's mind, so far as that is unfolded in his writings; and in regarding each of his works as an independent inquiry undertaken to meet an independent, perhaps even a transitory difficulty. This view, while countenanced, as we have seen, by the peculiar form of authorship which Plato has thought fit to adopt, hardly seems in perfect harmony with the two important facts, that he both strove to get his views embodied in practical legislation, and devoted his best energies to professorial instruction in philosophy. It is doubtless true that he is not systematic after the conscious and pre-determined fashion of Kant or Spenser; yet he is manifestly anxious to consider all aspects of the philosophic problem, as these are successively brought under his notice. He earnestly seeks to attain philosophic certainty on all points, and if he fails, it is less from a want of systematic grasp of the subject, than because, with the means at his disposal, he finds success beyond his reach. He is a consciously unsuccessful seeker after reasoned truth, not a mere—if it be permissible to say 'mere'—metaphysical Ariel singing 'Where the bee sucks there suck I.' The Parmenides alone is sufficient to show that he sought to rectify his own mistakes and make definite progress towards truth. In it we

Mullach, *Meliss.*
Fragm. § 2.

Parm. 137 D.

Parm. 146 A.

Parm. 138, 156.

Mullach, § 4 and

§ 11.

Parm. 156 B-C.

The contents
and scope of
the work.

find, beyond dispute, an intentional review of past difficulties, and a conscious step in advance, so far as the doctrine of ideas is concerned.

Before entering upon a detailed discussion of the work, it is necessary to explain that no attempt is here made to put before the reader a complete description or co-ordination of the views of previous writers upon the question. The task of reading over all that has been written in explanation of the Parmenides becomes—where time for consideration is limited—confusing rather than helpful to the mind. As little, on the other hand, is any pretension advanced to the merit of originality; to that special information, or clearness of penetration, which might justify the setting of previous expositions aside. The object aimed at has been to acquire, so far as time might permit, a sufficiency of information from authoritative sources, and after assimilating that, to take the course which seemed marked out by personal study of the work.

Part First :
Analysis.
Zeno's problem.
126-129 E.

The dialogue opens with a reference to the speculative relation in which Zeno stands to Parmenides. The former is declared to be the negative, as the latter is the positive, supporter of the thesis that Being is One. Parmenides, as we have seen, in his poem, after setting forth this dogma in detail, feels constrained, like many expounders of the problem of existence, to admit that ordinary experience yields no support to his chosen view. Accordingly in the second part of his poem he takes up the facts of nature as we find them, and offers his explanation of them, just as the physical philosophers had done before him. But the whole of this wide field which rejects incorporation with his doctrine is classified as Not-being, and relegated to the sphere of opinion, while its votaries *φορεῦνται κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φύλα*. It is to the further refutation of the judgments of opinion that Zeno, and Melissus with him, has directed attention. He seeks to prove the doctrine of the One-Being by elaborating the contradictions latent in its counterpart, the Many-Not-Being. To his arguments Socrates is here represented as partly assenting and partly taking exception. The attitude assumed amounts in effect to a 'solvitur ambulando.' Practically Socrates says, I find no difficulty in accepting the statement that sensible objects have what you call the contradictory attributes of many and one; it represents a fact in experience of which we are daily conscious. They *are* many and one, and where is your difficulty? If it exists, is it of essential importance? One might, indeed, at first suppose that Socrates was admitting the unanswerable character of Zeno's reasoning as regards the world of sense; but really that is not so. Virtually he offers a vindication of the sensible, material world against the contention of the Eleatics, as is clear from the statement a little further on, that 'those things which we see must be accepted as existing.' Although the two chief auditors are said to have felt a little annoyed at this line of argument, they are not represented as controverting it. Yet it conflicts with their views, and can hardly be reconciled with Plato's own opinions elsewhere. It follows, however, the objective tendency common among early Greek thinkers, who are prone to reason, like the Scottish school, about an 'external world,' whatever that world may, upon examination, be found to comprise. The same feeling is behind the statement that the ideas are 'set up in nature.' Plato's verdict upon Zeno's

130 D.

130 A.

contentions would seem to be, not that they prove their point, if by proving it is meant abolishing the sensible sphere; but rather that, however ingenious, they have not been applied by their author to the sphere where the results would have greatest value, and involve real argumentative subtlety. Now that sphere can be none other than the sphere of One-Being, to which in Zeno's intention his arguments were to form a sort of phylacteries.

The next stage in the discussion—which arises in connection with the first, and partly overlaps it—is that in which Socrates brings forward the question of ideas. He invites Zeno to say whether he recognizes their existence, and whether he holds that it is from participation of some kind in them that external objects derive their characteristics. To the query it is Parmenides who replies, and he does it Scottish fashion, by putting another. He passes over the question whether he and Zeno hold such a doctrine, and asks whether Socrates himself does so. Receiving an affirmative answer, he goes on to interrogate Socrates upon the scope of his theory. It is probable that Plato designedly suffers the query of Socrates to pass unanswered. He could not truthfully ascribe his ideal theory to the Eleatic thinkers, while to have openly admitted that they did not hold it, would have given rather a shock to the series of assumptions upon which the setting of the dialogue is based. And he might feel that, if not the theory as he held it, at least a germ which could develop into that, was to be found in the views of Parmenides. For the ideal theory is put forward as a simplifying, unifying principle, and the ideas are 'apprehended by the intellect'; in both which respects its affinity to the Eleatic doctrine is obvious and close. The questions put to Socrates by Parmenides in regard to the ideas are four:—

(1.) Are ideas admitted for likeness, one, many, 'and all of the qualities of which Zeno was speaking'? It may be remarked that Zeno has specified only likeness and unlikeness, but has admitted that he is resisting the existence of Many *παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα*. Socrates answers, 'Yes.' (2.) And for all such qualities as the just, the beautiful, the good?—'Yes.' (3.) And for man, fire, water, and the like?—'There I have often felt a difficulty.' (4.) And for all such unworthy things as hair, mud, filth?—'By no means. Indeed, the case of such sometimes makes me tremble even for the others. At present I devote my attention to those just admitted.'

While the scope of the ideal world will be found to be insensibly enlarged as we proceed, it seems that we are to accept this as the original immature conception of it: and in regard to this conception several remarks suggest themselves. First, the object with which it has been referred to at all is, that the dialectic of Zeno may be brought to bear upon it. According to Socrates—that is, Plato—neither advantage nor honour is to be derived from a dialectic treatment of the sensible sphere; what he would wish to see demonstrated is, as we have said above, the existence of a conflicting series of qualities 'winding in all directions' through the ideal region. Next, it cannot but be felt that if the purpose of the ideas is to explain, and almost to create, our ordinary world, the outline here furnished is wholly inadequate. And this inadequacy is due not more to inherent difficulties than to sentiment. Ideas are rejected because of their

unworthiness; and where there is no unworthiness, ideas are readily accepted even when they would seem to be least required. It is conceded at once that there are ideas for intellectual or mathematical, and for moral or aesthetical, conceptions; which conceptions are already themselves abstract and products of the mind. And it is gravely doubted whether there be ideas for even the most important classes of objects associated with physical impressions; while the suggestion of ideas for objects that seem 'common and unclean' is rejected with something like a shudder. To put it otherwise: Plato accepts with greatest pleasure ideas for such conceptions as Socrates had been in the habit of attempting to define, and rejects with emphasis ideas for such objects or impressions as fall within the sphere assigned by Parmenides to opinion. The relation between the One and the ideas thus tends to become closer. It must be said, however, in the third place, that if the domain of ideas, as thus far mapped out, has, in the language of modern diplomacy, an 'intelligible frontier,' it can hardly boast a 'scientific' one. The mere putting of the question whether there are ideas in cases (3) and (4) shows—what the form of rejection confirms—that Plato had come to feel some further step to be a necessity.

Enlargement
of the ideal
sphere.

130 C-E.

And we have evidence that such a step is in contemplation. Parmenides plainly tells Socrates that it is his youth and speculative timidity which disincline him to accept the existence of ideas for the humblest physical phenomena, and that years will bring conviction with them. And gradually as the disputation unfolds itself, we find incidental references to ideas for 'bigness, smallness, equality'; for 'slave and slavery,' 'master and mastery'; for 'science' and 'truth.' This all increases the scope of the theory, alike on the abstract or conceptual, and on the concrete or physical side; while finally the expression *εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου*, with others like it, seems to point, although not with absolute certainty, in the direction of admitting ideas for every clearly distinguishable division into which our experience may be found to part itself. That would, of course, include ideas for man, fire, water, and even for their humbler congeners. At the same time this conclusion is one that is glanced at rather than definitively stated, a fact which, as we have urged above, makes for the view that the work ranks early among Plato's metaphysical writings. For Plato is not here drawing back from a wider conception of the ideal sphere, which he had formerly recognized, to a narrower which he now regards as more correct; but is advancing from the narrower to a wider under a sense of intellectual pressure which he cannot resist but which his fastidious feeling still renders distasteful. While, however, the horizon is undoubtedly expanding we cannot but feel that the features of the landscape are far from clearly defined, or given with a due sense of relative importance. Are we to assume, for example, that there is but a single idea of 'beauty' to which all types of beauty bear a relation—beauty of form, of colour; of man, of animal, of plant; of implement and product? If so, what are we to think of separate ideas for bigness, smallness and equality, where we might imagine a single idea of 'size' more appropriate? The parsimony in the one case hardly accords with the plethora in the other.

Let the scope, however, and the contents of Plato's ideal world be consistent or inconsistent, wide or narrow, one thing about it at least is beyond dispute, that it is a world quite apart from ours. We arrive indeed at a conception of it by means and a process familiar enough. It is clearly laid down that the ideas are 'grasped by reflection'—λογισμῶ λαμβανόμενα. These are the means, and the process is in accordance with them. We proceed by comparison and abstraction. The course of this process is not absolutely clear, and comments are made upon its character in the notes. But so long as it resembles 'abstraction and generalization,' the remark which one is most naturally tempted to make upon it is, that while the process is familiar the result is unique. The process seems quite analogous to that which Aristotle refers to Socrates as its first expositor—'for there are two things which one might ascribe justly to Socrates; inductive trains of reasoning and universal definition.' Acquired by such means, ideas ought to be what we mean when we use the term—that is, νοήματα or notions. To Plato they are something wholly different. Here again Aristotle describes the facts for us: 'Socrates, however, did not make the universals nor yet the definitions separate or transcendental; but *they* (the makers of ideas) did this, and such sorts of entities they named ideas.' Like Jack, we climb up the familiar bean-stalk into wonderland: only that his bean-stalk is itself a wonder, while ours is not. This break is mentioned repeatedly in the dialogue, and the reader can judge whether Aristotle in what we have quoted from him seems to have this dialogue in his mind. Thus *ἐὰν δέ τις ... πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη.—αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐ μετέχοντα;—εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς.* And their characteristic peculiarities are noted in three forms of expression which agree with this act of χωρισμός: we have *αὐτῆ ὁμοιότης, ὃ ἔστω ἓν*, and as above *εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά.* Socrates, then, has got (1) an ill defined and ill regulated world of ideas, which is (2) reached by an intellectual effort of abstraction, but (3) found when reached to be 'like a star that dwells apart.' Parmenides proceeds to interrogate Socrates upon the subject and to raise objections. To his mind a great difficulty is this. Postulating the two spheres, ideal and sensible, fully developed—what must we hold to be the nature of the participation or μέθεξις of the ideas by *τάδε τὰ ἄλλα* or our world of sense? First he asks, do objects of sense share in the whole or in a part of the idea? If in the whole, then is the idea many-whereas at once: if in a part, the effect upon them may be fraught with ludicrous contradictions—a twofold difficulty which Socrates frankly admits. The assumption underlying this dilemma is that the participating object represents, so to speak, a sensible material body of death ready made, into which the idea is supposed to enter. That is, of course, dualism in a pronounced form. The world of sensible objects is somehow already there, waiting for the advent of the intelligible element. And it is noteworthy that Parmenides gives point to the paradox by choosing, to illustrate his argument, the ideas of physical bigness, smallness, and equality. The anomaly resulting from μέθεξις by parts might have escaped notice had justice or

The ideas form a world apart.

Parm. 130 A.

Met. xii. 4.

Parm. 129 D.

130 B.

130 C.

129 B.

133 A.

beauty been selected. But absurdity is elicited at once when 'a portion of smallness' is 'added' to 'one of us.' Smallness should be the irreducible minimum of extent; but matter being infinitely divisible you get parts of smallness, and never reach your goal. Again, for the moment, participation is regarded as physical addition, which ought to increase the size of an object; while yet by hypothesis the object should be reduced, if things 'become small by partaking of smallness.' Having thus an easy victory over the doctrine of participation, Parmenides turns to look at the character of the ideas. These are assumed to be a series of ultimate units, each of which has the power of influencing the nature of an indefinite multitude of sensible objects: and each of which is reached, as we have seen, by the process of abstraction and generalization. We are accustomed to draw diagrams of the operation here referred to, which represent a gradual convergence from the many of sense to the one of abstraction, after the fashion of a genealogical tree or the gorgeous tassels of a cardinal's hat. That this progress leads from many to one there is no doubt. But it seems—as is further pointed out in the notes—not to be the progress or the process which Parmenides has in mind. He would appear to imply that the very first step in the generalization includes a comparison of all available physical data, so that you would hope to reach what will prove to be your idea at a single stride. This, however, says Parmenides, you fail to do. What you have now got is a fresh field for comparison—the indefinite mass of sensible things on the one hand, on the other the abstract which you have just made. Compare these two and a third is the result. This process repeats itself indefinitely—'all men,' 'man,' and a 'third man' or *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*—so that the one idea which is supposed to terminate the inquiry is never reached. Whether this contention be just or not, it seems to be a formal rather than a real difficulty. Your first act of abstraction has by hypothesis exhausted the data at command; from *a* you have extracted A. What Parmenides contends is that by comparing *a* with A a new result is obtained. Is that so? You import no new element by your second comparison. It may be that the process admits of indefinite repetition, but what does it yield? It would not prevent you from justly using your first A as a sufficient type for every participating *a*, if participation be itself otherwise feasible. The objection of Aristotle to the doctrine of ideas, that in each case it merely adds one more object to the sensible objects, *καὶ παραπλήσιον ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἑλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἷοιτο μὴ δύνασθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοῖη*, would be doubly applicable to this theory.

Met. xii. 4.

Are the ideas notions?

Parm. 132 B.

Socrates attempts to get rid of this difficulty—this, at least, seems to be what he is meeting, and not the previous question of division through participation—by urging that each idea may be simply a mental conception or notion, and so may be one. A very odd contention indeed; however faithfully it may reflect the 'universal' or 'general definition' of the historic Socrates. These endless comparisons and successive results are possible just on the assumption, and on no other, that each abstraction remains mental and is not converted by *χωρισμὸς* into an objective

entity or 'thing in itself.' If, as Plato insists, our series of comparisons serves but to point the mind's attention to an idea which is 'set up in nature' and exists *χωρίς*, manifestly indefinite comparison is by that very fact stopped off. That objective thing is wholly independent of any future comparisons into which our ingenuity may seek to inveigle it, and stands there unaffected by our subjective activity. One it is, and one it remains: our comparisons have served only to draw the veil from before it. The fact that we thus discuss it may be a sound reason for doubting that it 'stands there in nature'; but grant such existence to it and our further speculations in its regard will hardly make it uneasy. It and its peers 'still are sitting, still are sitting' like the senate during the Gallic invasion, or like 'dukes, whom we do not criticise, but only contemplate.' It is singular to note, however, that Parmenides is not represented as doubting that if the ideas were but notions his difficulty would be removed. He seeks rather to demolish that suggestion. All conceptions, he says, are conceptions of an object, and that object will in each case be the idea. If it be mental, and all things participate in it, then all things as sharing in thought should have the power of thinking—the contrary would be absurd. A modern idealist finds no difficulty in conceiving all things as built up of connected and coordinated conceptions. But it demands a Greek to urge as necessary sequel that thoughts should be able to think. Would it not be an analogous contention that words should be able to speak? How plausible soever the hypothesis, it is in direct conflict with fact: the Ego alone it is that thinks and speaks. It may be noted in passing, however, that Plato seems to have in the end come gradually round to the view that thought somehow constitutes the universe. This appears to some extent in the *Timaeus*. And the suggestion about thoughts thinking may have helped to persuade him that the universe must in that event be a creature or ζῷον.

It is admitted by Socrates that these objections baffle him; and he is thus led to propound what would seem to be his final and abiding view of the nature and function of ideas. 'They are set up as patterns in nature' after the similitude of which sensible objects are framed, 'and the participation of objects in them is none other than that of being likened to them.' It is interesting to note that—as remarked above—this important suggestion seems to be put forward here for the first time, as a novel expedient to meet a pressing difficulty. That fixes the position of the work as earlier than others in which the theory is mentioned. On this new development of the doctrine Parmenides continues his attack. The arguments put into his mouth thus far have had two tendencies. They have exposed the objections to the assumption that objects 'partake of' ideas, and likewise the difficulties besetting the attempt to construct a simplified ideal world aloof from the sensible one. He now urges what takes for a moment the appearance of a new contention, but what is in truth merely an elaboration of the former of these. Between the ideal and the sensible there is, as we know, a great gulf fixed. We are now told in regard to this gulf that God himself cannot bridge it: that he is debarred from

Parm. 132 B-C.

The ideas are in truth patterns.

132 D.

p. xxxii.

133 A.

contact with the sensible sphere, even to the extent of knowing it. And it is now clearly acknowledged that this is due to the original severance of the two spheres. Nor can the objection be rebutted. The verdict of reason is absolute—let no god join what man has put asunder. The ideal sphere pays the penalty of all privilege, even the privilege of unsullied purity, that it is out of contact with the stream which flows in the river of life: that circumstance too is emphasized just as the sphere is expanding to completeness. It is a perfect and immaculate Constitution, but like the French one it will not ‘march.’ ‘He *shall* march, cried my uncle Toby, marching the foot which had a shoe on, though without advancing an inch—he *shall* march to his regiment.—An’ please your honour, said the Corporal, he will never march but to his grave.’ It certainly will, as Parmenides declares, be the work of a man *πανὸ μὲν εὐφροῦς* to bridge over this difficulty, if he goes about it on the foundation here laid down. Yet Plato while clearly alive to the difficulty is far from making it a reason for renouncing his hypothesis. On the contrary he maintains that with the rejection of an intellectual idealistic standpoint the possibility of philosophy and all its rational activity disappears. *Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι*; he exclaims: and in a sense—though scarcely in his—he is perfectly right.

Parm. 135 B-C.

Critical
comments.

Having now reached the end of Plato’s course of self-criticism, which forms the important introductory section of the dialogue, we pause for a little to make one or two remarks upon it, in addition to any that may have been dropped in passing.

Met. i. 9.

1. Reference has been already made to certain objections on the part of Aristotle. Taken as a body his adverse comments are very comprehensive and pointed. The substance of them may be given thus. (α) We do not really reach the ideas by the methods which Plato suggests. And that statement, as we have just seen, is perfectly true, whether our reasons for accepting it are those of Aristotle or not. No advancing chain of abstraction will conduct us logically to another and absolutely separate world, to what moderns would call the sphere of the unconditioned. (β) The character of the ideas is objectionable in various ways. If we are to have, as Plato implies, ideas corresponding to every branch of knowledge we must have ideas of negations (*ἀποφάσεις*) such as ‘unlikeness,’ and of things that have perished; while a prominent feature of the theory is that which comprehends ideas of relations, such as ‘motion,’ ‘smallness,’ ‘truth.’ But if the use of the ideas is that they are to be participated in by objects of sense, they ought to comprise substances (*οὐσίαι*) alone. That we possess ideas in the modern sense, that is conceptions, of unlikeness, motion and all similar things, is quite certain. But to affirm that there is a ‘thing in itself set up in nature’ called motion or smallness, is a hard saying. (γ) The use of the ideas is to constitute, and to aid us in knowing, the world of sense; and they do not fulfil that function. The talk about their being patterns, to be partaken of by sensible objects—that and the like of it *κενολογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικός*. And we have seen that Plato himself partially suspects this to be so.—Thus Aristotle attacks at once their existence, their character and their function.

2. The world of ideas is to be reached, we are told, by abstraction. By abstraction, then, from what? From the world of ordinary experience; which is said on the one hand to partake in (*μεταλαμβάνειν, μετέχειν*) the ideas, and on the other to be apprehended by sensible perception (*αἴσθησις*), and so to lie outside the sphere of science. Suppose Socrates entering upon his course of procedure by abstracting successive ideas from some sensible object such as a man. He abstracts, we shall say, 'one,' 'limit,' 'shape,' 'bigness,' 'likeness,' 'beauty,' 'justice,' 'goodness,' 'mastery,' and so indefinitely onwards. And when the process exhausts itself what is it that remains, to be apprehended by sense but ignored by thought? Either there must be a primal unmodified matter whose function it is to 'partake of' ideas, and which remains when they are gone; or our sensible world runs serious risk of being 'abstracted' from us and becoming intellectual, or even ideal, before we are aware. Plato does not explicitly pronounce for either alternative, yet he seems to favour the former. His conception, in fact, of what the sensible world actually is resembles in its vagueness and want of consistency the view entertained on the subject by non-metaphysical reflection. He affirms that without the ideas we must sacrifice *τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν*, while again of these ideas he declares emphatically *οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν*. No proof is led that the want of ideas will do away with dialectic and philosophy: this result is assumed without discussion, and it certainly leaves us in a position of some difficulty. In favour of the opposite conclusion we have the following curious deductions from Plato's own line of reasoning—(1) *διάνοια* and *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι* both exist apart from the ideas, and are our means of discovering them: (2) in making that discovery these faculties are employed upon the world of sense, which thus succeeds in furnishing a field of exercise for the speculative intellect: (3) this world of sense contains a sort of science suited to its wants, and to which the only limit is that it cannot know a world which is expressly placed absolutely out of connection with it. In these circumstances do we need the realm of ideas? If they cannot be brought to bear upon the world of sense, and if the latter is sufficient unto itself even in the matter of science, why retain them? Has not Plato over-reached himself in this part of his argument? At the very moment when he seeks to magnify his world of ideas as unapproachably pure, rigidly scientific, without one taint of sense to sully or confuse it—when he seeks to enthrone it as the dominating influence in speculation—has he not been unconsciously enriching the world of sense to an alarming degree with qualities to which it can lay no claim, and which are assigned to it solely because they seem to him unworthy of the other sphere? The contents of the ideal world we have already collected above. What are those of the phenomenal world? They consist of Parm. 129. 'you and me, and the rest of what we call the many,' 'stones and pieces of wood and such things.' To these we add by inference—since there are ideas corresponding to them—'likeness, one, many; justice, beauty, goodness; master, mastery, slave, slavery; science, truth.' Finally, whether or no there may be ideas for 'man, fire, water; hair, mud, filth,' it is certain that they, as we accept their meaning, belong to the sensible

130.

133 D-134 B.

sphere, for Socrates says of them *ταῦτα μὲν γε, ἅπερ ὀρώμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι*. Such is the world of 'what we call the many,' the world which is 'with us,' which 'partakes, or whatever you call it, of the ideas,' which 'we handle' (*μεταχειριζόμεθα*) and 'see.' And this world we know by the senses : of some parts of it this is expressly affirmed ; while for others there are ideas corresponding, whose distinctive feature it is that they are known *λογισμῶ* and *διανοίᾳ*. Such a conception of a world of sense is manifestly untenable ; and indeed it speedily breaks down. For when Plato goes on to insist, by the mouth of Parmenides, upon the absolute separateness of the ideal sphere he announces that the latter is known by 'the idea of science,' while the ordinary world is known (not by sense, but) by 'our science,' *τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ*. And it would hardly avail to urge that this latter science is mere 'opinion,' as Parmenides calls it in his poem, or to translate *τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ* into *λογισμῶ τινὶ νόθῳ*, to quote a phrase from the Timaeus ; because it is by its means that we have discovered the ideas. The fundamental difficulty lies in the relation, or rather want of relation, which is originally assumed as existing between the two spheres. Although Plato would deny that ideas exist corresponding to individual sensible objects, such ideas after all are the goal to which things seem to be tending. He has ideas for the qualities of objects, and ideas for motion and rest ; and if he goes on, as Parmenides urges, to admit ideas for man, hair, mud, why should he not translate *εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου* in its most literal sense and acknowledge the existence of ideas for 'you, and me, and the rest of those present' ? An *εἶδος Σωκράτους* would at least not be *ἀτιμώτατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον* ; and when we have got that length we should have in the ideal world, what we can hardly help feeling as if we were intended to have, a detailed duplicate of the sensible world complete to the minutest ramification. And do we not seem to attain to this consummation in the latter part of the Phaedo ? There he launches into a rhapsody upon the future dwelling-place of the soul, which is made to appear as an idealized sensible sphere, where our world is repeated in detail with transcendental attractions. Is this the *τόπος νοητός* ? If so, then each blade of grass has an *εἶδος* or heavenly counterpart, as in the land of Beulah. Those there have *αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν* and behold the sun, moon and stars *οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα*. On this assumption our sensible One, which for argument's sake might be supposed to contain but a single quality, could be represented by *q*, and Socrates with his indefinite qualities by *qⁿ* ; while over against this would stand the idea of each, represented by *q* and *qⁿ*. And so our worlds would run side by side

$$\begin{array}{cccccccccccc}
 q & q^2 & q^3 & q^4 & q^5 & q^6 & \dots\dots\dots & q^{n-3} & q^{n-2} & q^{n-1} & q^n \\
 q & q^2 & q^3 & q^4 & q^5 & q^6 & \dots\dots\dots & q^{n-3} & q^{n-2} & q^{n-1} & q^n.
 \end{array}$$

If we are to have two worlds with the theory that the one is the model or pattern of the other—then no fitting conclusion but this seems to be possible. What advantage, now, has the world in italics over that in roman type that such pains should be taken in the elaboration of it ? 'What's *q* to *q*, or *q* to *q*, that *q* should weep for *q* ?' It is not simple as opposed to the other's complexity, it is not pure as con-

trusted with the other's unworthiness, it is not stable as distinguished from the other's mutability—there is actually an *εἶδος κινήσεως*. What then is it? Shall we say it is intellectual as contradistinguished from the other's dependence on sense? Well, after consideration, it is not that either. No: between the two there is indeed a vital distinction. The world in italics is 'The-idea-of-scientifical': the other is 'The-our-scientifical.' This is what comes of having 'made that distinction—on the one side, certain ideas; on the other, things partaking of these': and here for the present we must leave the question. Parm. 130 B.

3. The ideas as patterns are said *εἶσταναι ἐν τῇ φύσει*. What does this mean? One would at first be disposed to fancy that 'nature' could be nothing but the world as we see it: but obviously that sense cannot be the right one. As little can nature mean the human mind; for although it is by the exercise of the intellect that we reach a conception of the ideas, they are in themselves quite separated from us. He speaks repeatedly in the Republic and elsewhere of a *νοητὸς τόπος* as contrasted with the *ὄρατός*. Should we identify that with the mind of the Creator? Even this is not without its difficulties; for the ideas are patterns *πρὸς ἃ βλέπων* the Creator creates, a description which gives them a certain externality and independence even where he is concerned. The *νοητὸς τόπος*, again, and the mind of the Creator are subjects which carry a certain suggestiveness in connection with the question which Plato raises as to whether the ideas are *νοήματα*. What should occupy a *νοητὸς τόπος* if not *νοήματα*? Granting, too, that *νοήματα* must have objects, still we ask—may not such objects, and in the given circumstances must they not, be themselves *νοήματα* or *νοητά*? Nay, even the *αἰσθητά* seem not to be perfectly excluded from this intellectual influence. Granting that we perceive them by sense; do we not, even according to Plato, likewise form abstract conceptions of them, when discovering the ideas? And are they not the objects of our thought at that time, and so in his view capable of thinking? Further, of the ideas it is affirmed that they are *λογισμῶ λαμβανόμενα* and the mode of reaching them is *τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα (τὰ ὀρώμενα) ἰδεῖν*. There is also an *ἐπιστήμη* whereby God knows them. Finally we are told that if the ideal theory be abandoned man *οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέφει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει*, and so the possibility of discussion will be absolutely destroyed. Plato is, of course, committed to the position that the ideas are not mere notions in the human mind, but objective entities. We may grant him that; we may even raise no difficulty about their being 'set up in nature.' Still to admit of being discussed at all they must imperatively be either 'mental' or 'physical'; and if physical they are perceived by sense, while, if mental, he grants them the power of thinking. The subject is a supremely difficult one. Probably Plato is all along struggling to say what we also are struggling to say when we speak of things 'unconditioned,' 'in ordine ad universum,' 'seen as they appear to the creative intelligence.' In the Phaedo such expressions occur as *αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν, εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων*, and, as we have seen above, *οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα*.

4. It has been pointed out that the reason assigned by Socrates for raising the question of ideas here at all is that he may see the same contradictory qualities proved to exist in them which Zeno shows to exist in sensible objects. No proof to such effect is forthcoming. All that is said in reference to conflict between ideas has reference to ideas which encounter each other in objects of sense. Doubtless it is shown that there are difficulties in the way of our conceiving an ideal world at all; but these difficulties do not quite involve the fundamental contrariety which Plato through Socrates sees fit to suggest. The argument which most nearly supplies a result of this nature is the one in which it is pointed out that if we reach the ideas by a series of comparisons and abstractions each idea must be many and not one. But this argument is not prosecuted in such a spirit as to indicate that Plato sees in it the presentment of an internecine struggle between 'absolute one and absolute many.' We come more nearly within sight of such proof as we are looking for in the Sophistes, Philebus, and Phaedo, than here. Even in the Phaedo, however, what is pointed out is principally that there are ideas which will not inhabit the same body together, while others do not show a similar mutual repugnance. One explanation of the failure to satisfy expectation may be that the ideas are found to be beyond the sphere of 'our science.' Another seems to lie in the aversion which Plato up till now exhibits against the acceptance of ideas for 'man, fire, water; hair, mud, filth, and such things.' The ease with which contradictory characteristics are shown to exist in sensible objects arises from the complexity of those objects. The difficulty in the case of the ideas is caused by the comparative simplicity of those ideas which are accepted as existing. If Plato accepted ideas for 'man, fire, mud,' he would approximately reach the concreteness of the sensible sphere. The idea of man could readily be shown to be both one and many: and so with others, in proportion to their inherent complexity.

Phaed. 102-3.

5. Such ideas as these would be ideas of *ὀνείατα*, which according to Aristotle are the only ideas that should be admitted at all. And when their admission would be an advantage, why does Plato raise any difficulty? It is not altogether because of their physical character. Some of those which he admits most readily—'bigness and smallness' for example—are in origin physical. Probably the abstractness of the latter veils to his mind the fact that they are physical, while the concreteness of the former gives that fact full prominence. And we know from Aristotle why it was that Plato felt a distaste for ideas of a concrete physical type. 'Having from his youth become acquainted with Cratylus and the views of Heraclitus, that all objects of sense are in perpetual flux, and that in their regard, science does not exist, he ended by adopting this theory as correct. And accepting as his guide Socrates, who busied himself about ethical questions to the exclusion of nature at large—and in these sought the universal and led the way in turning attention to definitions—on some such ground as this Plato took up the view that all this applied to a separate class of facts, and not to any of the sensible objects, as one could not attain a common definition of

Met. i. 6.

any of them from their ceaseless mutation.' This gives the explanation of the dislike for physical ideas which appears in this dialogue; and it makes still clearer that such was Plato's earlier view, which he finally overcame. One can also see how much more simple it is to accept 'smallness in itself' as an abstract entity than 'man in itself'— q^6 than q^{n-6} , so to speak.

6. The expedient of calling the ideas patterns, an expedient of the utmost significance in Plato's eyes, traces, as we say, its origin to this dialogue. It occurs to Socrates as a sudden inspiration—*ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν*; and it appears to exercise in the end a potent influence in expanding the contents of the ideal sphere. It is true that in the Republic we are pointedly told that only one couch has been created as a model for all; but in the Timaeus we can observe a Tim. 28-2 change. There is, indeed, still a single pattern, but this is a pattern for the whole world, of which pattern the world is an image. Now a pattern for the world, one cannot but feel, is likely to be a much more complete and comprehensive thing than could be elaborated consistently with the assumption of solitary patterns for vast masses of phenomenal objects. It is quite unnecessary to enlarge upon the difficulties involved in this doctrine of the pattern so far as its application is concerned. But the necessity for postulating a pattern world at all seems inconsistent with philosophic parsimony. The tendency to imitation must indeed be firmly rooted in us if we cannot look at the world without regarding it as a copy, and calling into being another world whose only function it is to act as model for it. Yet like the 'scheme' or 'method' of salvation so dear to the heart of scientific theologians, such a view as this contains much that is attractive and satisfying to the uneasy lay mind. It seems so far analogous to a constitution with two chambers, and possibly on that ground may commend itself as conservative. But how does it add to our security? The world of sense is a fact which we have always with us, and somehow or other we make a shift to know it. That is our *ὄτι*; but apparently we cannot—so long at least as we hold that world to be sensible—rest satisfied without a *διότι*. And so we postulate, deduce, or hypostatize a second world, as a species of pattern-shop or *παραδειγματήριον*, whose function it is to fortify us in our convictions about the first world, by giving it the appearance of being in turn deduced and not a mere fortuitous creation. Such a pattern world is in imminent danger of becoming a museum. So far as Plato's view in this dialogue and in the Republic is concerned—that there is one pattern for many copies—it is certainly, as Aristotle puts it, a mere talking of empty poetical metaphors. All copies of a pattern ought to be exact duplicates of each other. Now the very characteristic of the copies in the case before us is that they diverge widely from each other; and the pattern, if it is to be a pattern for all, must in that very act cease to be a pattern for any. We are reminded, in this view of the subject, of the 'schematism' of Kant. 'There can never, says Kant, be an adequate picture for the notion of a triangle in general. For it would never attain to that generality which enables the notion to hold good of any triangle, right angled, oblique

Kant, Kritik of
Pure Reason.
Translated in
J. H. Stirling's
Text-book to
Kant, p. 251.

angled, etc., but would be limited always to a part of this sphere.' One cannot avoid the suspicion that it is precisely this impossible 'general picture' which Plato's pattern in its present stage aims at being; and that he has been gradually forced onward to this position as a consequence of having made *χωρισμὸς* of the 'general notion' or 'general definition' of abstract qualities like 'the good' which he received from Socrates. Perhaps a lurking sense of this difficulty may have had its influence in making him averse to admit ideas of 'man, fire, water.'

Resumption of
Analysis.

To resume, then, we see that Plato has made the mistake which later thinkers have repeated without his excuse, and which less disciplined intellects are ever prone to make. He on the one hand refers far more of our world of experience to sense or *αἴσθησις* than actually belongs to it; while he on the other hand feels constrained to place intellect or *διάνοια* in a hostile camp of observation. The result is to him, as to all men so placed, a feeling that contradictions multiply: and his aim is, as is also the aim of such men, to reconcile those contradictions without changing his original position. Mr. Archer Hind appears to contend that he did finally change his standpoint for that of a consistent idealist. Whether or not he may have done this elsewhere, it seems certain that he does not do it here. The dualistic assumption was to him the natural, traditional, unquestioned one. The reconciliation was the great problem presented for discovery: and it was sought for as was the philosopher's stone in a subsequent age—hope never died though fruition came not.

A more searching
method of
investigation
essential.

Parm. 135 D-136.

135 C

In looking about for his solution, he proceeds to advance the contention that dialectic, or discipline in following up trains of reasoning about metaphysical problems, is an essential *προπαρασκευὴ* towards success. He presses this point with much earnestness and illustrative detail, and his pronouncement upon it seems in effect to be an admission that the Socratic type of inquiry was inadequate for the present need. It is not without a certain significance that Parmenides, in now putting the subject before Socrates, chooses as examples with which to test the method the ideas of 'the beautiful, the just, the good.' Hitherto these have yielded place to others: but we know that they were topics upon which Socrates had been wont to dwell—a fact which is also hinted at in the reference to previous discussions with Aristoteles; and in the words *ὀρίξεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλὸν τε τί, καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ ἀγαθὸν* one almost recalls Aristotle's description of what 'may justly be ascribed to Socrates.' 'But to nature at large' Socrates had not turned his attention. Plato is now discovering not only that 'universal definitions' 'on the ethical virtues' must have a metaphysical basis, but that such a basis cannot be constructed at haphazard, or by taking up any question that chance may suggest, as Socrates had been accustomed to do. This is a point upon which Parmenides—so Plato was beginning to find—might act legitimately as a mentor to Socrates. 'What is the just?' may be a most instructive inquiry; but, if the answer is to be satisfactory, 'What is being?' must precede and support it. There seems no necessity to contend that Plato is discarding the reasoning used in the inquiries of Socrates on moral questions as fallacious in its own sphere, or as ill con-

ducted within its presuppositions. Rather he is feeling that those inquiries had been detached, fortuitous, wanting in system, without a secure foundation; feeling also, it would appear, that his own previous gropings in the metaphysical region had been open to the same objection; and that these defects can be removed only by making a fresh and better advised beginning. That he now proceeds to attempt. The base idea he gets from Parmenides; the method of testing his inferences from Zeno. But to the details of their historic position he is not confined. Not history but expediency leads to the compliment from Parmenides that Socrates has done well in forcing the discussion away from the physical into the metaphysical sphere. To Parmenides 'Being is One' was a faith quite as much as it was an inference, nor had Zeno's support of the doctrine been quite as detailed and many-sided as we are here led to believe. Zeno's dialectic instead of following a four-fold direction had been confined to the single contention 'if the many are, what follows to them?' It appears to be Plato's own advance upon both these thinkers, that on the one hand he applies dialectic to the One itself, and, on the other, recognizes the necessity of dealing in argument with all sides of a question.

We are now more in a position to understand the relation of the second great division of the dialogue to the first. While it is made conversationally to appear an accident, it is in reality part of the design that the argument should from this point onward be devoted to the Parmenidean doctrine or 'hypothesis' of the One. And the connection of that subject with the one hitherto under discussion has been treated as though it were more of a difficulty than it is. If we are to assume, with Grote, that the remainder of the dialogue is simply what it affects to be—an example, namely, of the mental discipline which Parmenides deems indispensable to the philosopher—then its relation to the earlier portion is determined at once beyond the need of argument. But in pressing his view with grave persistency, Grote seems rather to manifest a want of tact. Not only does he miss the literary finesse of the composition; he even raises in a gratuitous manner the question 'si un Grec peut avoir de l'esprit.' What Plato seeks is to reach his real end by apparently accidental steps, to guide the listener to a predetermined issue while seeming to let him wander at his will. The fact that much has been written upon the question is due to a belief, prevalent among students of all ages, that something more and higher is intended than a mere dialectical exercise. In very early times—among Neoplatonists, for example—the remainder of the dialogue was viewed as something allegorical, symbolical, enigmatical, in which hidden meanings lurked. Something analogous, although less credulous and whimsical, has occurred in our own time in the region of comparative mythology. The Iliad is a solar myth in which Achilles represents the sun: Antigone is the 'afterglow' of the dying day, who insists on 'burying her brother' in the west; and so in other cases. Apart from any value which may attach to such elucidations, it may be conceded that they are at once most fascinating in themselves and most plausible in their verisimilitude and adaptation to the outlines of the various stories. But they have the

Relation of the
Second Part to
the First.

serious drawback of seeming to support us in making anything out of anything. In like manner, if we are free to regard Plato's discussion as allegorical, sober criticism must quit the field. If such a conception as the ONE is spoken of 'in a mystery,' it will be found equal to any demand that is made upon it. Last century, no further gone, Thomson in his edition of the dialogue—while duly setting aside Neoplatonic extravagances—feels entitled to regard the One as synonymous with the Deity; and assigns his reasons. The One, he says, is here represented as

universitatis unica causa	sine figura
simplex ac perfectum	immobile
sine principio et fine	aeternum
non genetabile nec corruptibile.	

And is not the Deity all these? We must on the one hand begin by discarding all mythic and hidden meanings. Plato introduces myths repeatedly into his works, and when doing so he makes no secret of it. On the other hand we decline to have it exacted of us that we shall show between the two portions of the disputation a connection more precise and intimate than Plato has thought necessary in other writings. What is the proper subject of the Republic, the definition of justice or the construction of a state? How are love and rhetoric connected in the Phaedrus? Why are the Theaetetus Sophistes and Politicus so closely associated by their author? There is nothing in the sequence of parts in the Parmenides which need cause more embarrassment than any of these problems.

Certainly the second part is an exercise in dialectical inquiry, and as such its point seems to be twofold: (1) to show that the very simplest of all conceptions has many aspects from which it may be viewed; (2) to embody a type of inquiry more subtle and abstract than any with which Plato had been familiarized in the practice of Socrates. But everyone must feel that if it be this it is likewise something more. Plato had begun, as we have said, to realize that the Ethical inquiries and definitions of his master stood in the midst of nebulous surroundings. He had tried to render everything clear by the expedient of ideas 'set up in nature': but his first efforts in that direction would not bear criticism. Could any regulative or unifying principal be found which might bind all firmly and harmoniously together, and remove complications? That question seems to represent his present frame of mind. We know from the Phaedo that he had turned to Anaxagoras in search of such a principle, not with perfect satisfaction. Here we find him approaching the problem through the dogma of Parmenides. The former had said *ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος*: the latter declares *τῷτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκέν ἐστι νόημα*, and *οὐ ποτ' ἔην οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν ἐν ζυνεχές*. Neither is consistent; neither can elaborate in detail his own convictions: but each gives suggestions for constructive idealism. Plato making confession here of his own shortcomings practically approaches Parmenides with the request, Can you help me? And to whom could he more naturally go than to him who professed to have reduced

the whole problem of Being to Unity? This seems an obvious reason for discussing the nature of the One. Again, however, one of the foremost desires expressed by Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue is to see Zeno's dialectic turned upon the intelligible sphere. And here it is so turned: turned upon Parmenides' own intelligible sphere, which if not ideal in the Platonic sense is at least widely severed from the sphere of opinion, and may be said to be on the way towards idealism. Moreover Socrates was anxious to see the ἀπορία which Zeno had revealed as existing in the sensible sphere running riot ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι: and here something of the kind actually is exhibited. The One may not be a Platonic idea, but it is at least a very abstract conception, and under treatment it presents ἀπορίαι in abundance. Any reader of what remains of the work must feel the full significance of παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, while the result upon the One and the Many is such as can be described only in the complicated sentence with which the dialogue closes. This seems not an unreasonable account of the connection between the two parts. He who demands a 'truer inwardness' in the matter, and seeks for it, may possibly find it; but, if so, will he not find more than Plato is elsewhere in the habit of providing? If indeed we feel compelled to continue the search we might make the connection complete by assuming that the remainder of the work is a practical exemplification of the method according to which the ideal is to be brought into connection with the sensible sphere. The want of such connection has been strongly emphasized, and Parmenides has declared that to supply it is all but impossible. If we are to assume that in the sequel this difficulty is supposed to be surmounted, we must hold that the connection implied between the spheres—which is the question involved in the doctrine of μέθεξις or παρουσία—is one of dialectical necessity, resulting inevitably from the mere action of the laws of thought: must hold that the one factor when clearly realized by the mind postulates the other for its own completeness. 'One' and 'Many' demand each the other as poles or sides of a single complex conception, reminding us of the Unity Plurality Totality which we find in Kant. This surely would complete the connection of parts in a degree satisfactory to the most exacting, and would at the same moment solve Plato's problem for him in a novel and cogent manner. But while a tempting, it is a questionable theory. In the first place it supplies, as substitute for Platonic μέθεξις, a conception which is so modern as to be suspicious upon that ground alone. Even Aristotle's doctrine of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια must be regarded as a falling away from such a standpoint as that. Assuredly it leaves far behind anything else in Plato. In the second place it at once renders nugatory all the intellectual distress which has been lavished upon the difficulty which μέθεξις was found to involve; while at the same time not a hint is given at the close that a problem so remarkable has been deftly and completely dealt with upon a basis which changes the whole aspect of the question. Had Plato really made out such a connection between ideas and sense it seems likely that he would have announced it more explicitly. Finally

Is the One an
idea?

it renders inevitable a conclusion which finds favour with some, that the One represents an idea while the many are the sensible world. Is it the case that the One of this dialogue is to be regarded as an idea? The point is not absolutely clear, but on the whole the answer must be No. Various reasons make for that conclusion. First: the discussion upon the One is undertaken, as we see, just after the decision has been reached that the sphere of the ideas has no connection with ours, and that the science found with us is of a much less exact type than the other. To begin immediately after such a pronouncement a discussion which sets it at naught seems a questionable step. Again: the One is expressly said to be the hypothesis of Parmenides, and although he placed Being much nearer to the ideal region than any of his predecessors had placed their principles, and separated it from the sphere of opinion in a way which must have proved very suggestive for Plato; yet the actual distinction which Plato drew has never been ascribed to him. Moreover we find in Plato's discussion of the One bonds which connect it with space and time, a fact which at once parts it off from the sphere of ideas. Nor do we hear of an *αὐτὸ ἔν, ὃ ἔστιν ἔν* at this point, where, if the intention was to fulfil the expectation expressed above by Socrates, some reference to such terms seems almost essential. As little do we hear of the difficulties of knowing the One, or of the 'idea of science.' On the contrary we are told that One partakes of various ideas—*εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται*—like other *οὐσίαι*, in which respect it occupies a position identical with *τὰ ἄλλα*. The passage where this statement is made seems to leave no ambiguity, although others are less specific. Finally it is expressly said that both One and Others 'grow older and younger,' 'become and perish' and exhibit other characteristics of sensible existence. From all this the natural conclusion appears to be that the One, Many and Others are notions corresponding to physical originals, and that Plato is dealing with them *λογισμῶ* and *διανοίᾳ* but only up to the limits of 'our science.' What he seems to be aiming at is to turn the Parmenidean principle on all sides with the view of ascertaining whether he can incorporate it into his ideal system with advantage. The odd feature of the business upon the other hand is that after disparaging 'our' science as he does he should proceed to a detailed use of that science the course of which tends to enhance our estimation of its efficacy. But we must remember that Plato's theory of ideas is so exacting in its nature and conditions that to maintain a consistent attitude towards it is quite beyond his power. The exigencies of such a position compel him to fall away from his theoretic distinction between two degrees of science, and to go on reasoning with such sublunary intellect as mortals possess, upon topics with which it can deal, and to give this as the best substitute he can supply for a dissertation upon what moderns would call the Unconditioned.

Parm. 129 D-E.

In surveying the second and most important division of the work it will not be possible to enter into every detail. Certain general lines of remark alone can be pursued, lesser issues being dealt with in the notes.

1. As we have already noticed, the first step of Parmenides, on the threshold of the subject, is to insist that any topic chosen for debate must be discussed in a definite methodical manner. This he never did as a matter of historic fact; nor is there evidence that Zeno elaborated any such scheme of inquiry. We must suppose that Plato has himself methodized the investigation while appropriating from Zeno its keen dialectical character. His scheme at its fullest may be formulated thus—

The scheme of discussion adopted in treating of the One.

1. If A is what follows in regard (α) to it, and (β) to not-A?
2. If A is not " " (α) to it, and (β) to not-A?
3. If not-A is " " (α) to it, and (β) to A?
4. If not-A is not " " (α) to it, and (β) to A?

A moment's reflection will show us that this, while doubtless a symmetrical, is really a redundant form of discussion. Its results may be fully attained without our carrying it further than the first two stages. Nor does Plato, in point of fact, carry it further here. It is true he maps out an elaborate table of eight heads or, as Grote calls them, Demonstrations, which might be supposed to correspond to (1, 2, 3, 4) α and (1, 2, 3, 4) β : with an odd one thrown in after the first two. These have been arranged in our marginal summary in two groups which may be called A and B, having under A Demonstrations I. II. IV. V., and under B, I. II. III. IV.; while the odd one appears as Demonstration A III. But, as will be seen, Demonstrations A I. and II., IV. and V., B I. and II., III. and IV. really exhibit respectively contradictory discussions upon a changed hypothesis. Thus—setting on one side A III.—we have the argument reduced in reality to 1 α followed by 1 β , and 2 α followed by 2 β . Even in this reduced shape its closing divisions are hurried through in a rather perfunctory manner with the remark *καὶ πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄ διελθεῖν εὐπετέες ἤδη ἡμῖν*, or again *οὐδέ* 165 D.
ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλομεν. The discussion is indeed protracted beyond these 166 B. limits; not however from the necessity of the case, but because Plato enters upon what, while nominally a revised statement of each argument, is really a reversal of it arising from a modification in the sense of its terms. Demonstration A II., while professedly a restatement of A I., is in fact a transformation of it covertly brought about; and the same is true of A V., B II. and B IV. when compared respectively with A IV., B I. and B III.

2. The course of the discussion, when these points are cleared up, comes to present on the one hand a deductive, negative, destructive,—on the other an inductive, positive, constructive aspect. Thus

The inquiry and results are partly negative, partly positive.

- a. A I., 'if the One is,' ends by annihilating the One:
- A V., 'if the One is,' ends by cancelling the Others:
- B II., 'if the One is not,' likewise destroys the One: while
- B IV., 'if the One is not,' again does away with the Others.

On reference to the marginal summaries it will be seen that these results are reached in the two former cases through a resolute keeping of the One to its oneness, and in the two latter by an equally tenacious holding of Non-existence to its nothingness.

So rigidly is the One to remain one that it is not allowable to call it even 'the same' as itself; while 'the One is not' is defined to mean utter absence of being in the thing spoken of. And practically the reason assigned for this stern repression of all expansiveness in sense is that, unless we guard ourselves with ceaseless care, the One will reveal such diverse characteristics as to become Many while we are occupied in examining it. Put in terms of Logic, the conclusion thus reached may be called a denial of the possibility of predication, or the concession in the case before us of such predication alone as amounts to the assertion of an identity—'the One is one.' But we must be careful not to make this denial unconditional. Plato makes no declaration against the possibility of predication per se: he merely says that, if we are to be jealous in guarding the absolute unity and simplicity of our conception, the result will be that we can say nothing whatever about it. It is natural that on its way toward this consummation the One should become *ἄπειρον*, or should gradually lose all definite characterization. In terms of Metaphysic, again, our conclusion may be stated thus—that with bare uncompromising oneness Being or positive existence is unthinkable and incompatible. Existence waxes and wanes *pari passu* with complexity: do away with complexity, relationship, multiplicity, and Being is no more. The point thus reached would, were Plato in reality confining himself to the position of the historic Parmenides, form the conclusion of the work. It shows what comes of rigid adherence to a hastily assumed simplicity and unity. As Dr. Jackson says, 'when the Eleatic principle is strictly interpreted it is as complete a denial of philosophy as Heracliteanism or Cynicism.'

17 D.

Journ. Philol. XI.
No 22 p. 311.

β. In A II., 'if the One is,' the result proves that the One 'is and is not' in an indefinite number of ways:

In A IV. a similar result arises in the case of the Others:

In B I., 'if the One is not,' the same conclusion still holds of the One: while

In B III., it arises from this latter hypothesis that the Others 'seem' many contradictory things.

This is the positive or constructive limb of the argument. In it the One forms a centre for multiplex and even conflicting existence. And the principle which underlies the process is the counterpart of that which has led to the negative conclusions. We have simply to concede to the One so much of positive characterization as will save it from extinction, and to the Not-being such a sense as will allow us to speak about it. This slight concession proves to be the letting in of water. Make over but so much to the One as will let you discuss it, and this apparently rudimentary conception will develop a complexity which confounds you, and carries with it attributes as contradictory as Yes and No. For even its Not-being, if a not-being with which you can deal, proves a source of fresh predications—*omnis negatio est determinatio*. Thus, Logically, we reach the conclusion that where predication is possible it is not a mere statement of identity; and, Metaphysically, we perceive that the simplest of entities can have being only as part of a complex whole.

Let us dwell for a moment longer upon this double result: its importance in Plato's reasoning cannot well be exaggerated. In the former portion of the argument (α) we have an attempt (A I.) to think back, under Parmenidean conditions, to a One which shall prove a 'minimum cogitabile,' or an existence in a state as simple as we can conceive. While this One is assumed to 'be,' its being is suffered to retire into the background, as Plato busies himself in reducing its character to the most naked simplicity with which being may be found compatible. When he has reached this stage, however, he comes to find that being no longer is compatible with it. This minimum cogitabile has become a minimum *incogitabile*, and by the same gate whereby it passes out of thought, it vanishes from existence. When and where qualities cease then and there being leaves us. This result is attained by consistently rejecting from the conception of the One every means by which it might break away from the most rigidly unmodified oneness. He withholds it from any share in parts, whole, inner, outer, change, on the ground that it must be truly one: he will not suffer it to be denoted by the most harmless looking synonym—to call it 'same' involves a 'different.' The One must be, in Bacon's language, strictly a vestal virgin: let it but 'change its name,' so to say, and at once *pulcra faciet te prole parentem*; or, to vary the figure, it may say 'I secretly laugh at my own cenotaph. . . . I arise and unbuild it again.' Preserve it, on the other hand, immaculate in its vestal condition, and you speedily find that it cannot be, cannot be one, cannot be named, cannot be known. It is gone: and with its own has dragged all other existence (A V.). If this be so when the One 'is,' shall we fare better when it 'is not'? This case is put in B II.: the reasoning is short and has the same result. As he has shut out existence by pressing home the absence of qualities, he now excludes qualities by emphasizing non-existence. If the One is not, nothing is: existence is impossible for anything apart from association with unity. The converse view of the problem is brought out in the latter half of the argument (β), by simply urging that the One must not be pressed out of existence, since in terms of our hypothesis it 'is.' The element of existence being transferred to the foreground a revolution follows (A II.). The One is now no longer the minimum *incogitabile* but the minimum *cogitabile*—and as a consequence it has parts, is a whole, exists in time, and in a word, goes off at once conquering and to conquer in the absorption of characteristics, until we discover that it is the Many or the Others. Would all this be upset, now, should we say again 'if the One is not'? By no means necessarily. Grant but a meaning to that assumption (B I.) and all follows. Give to the non-existent One but definiteness sufficient to admit of discussion and it will give itself variety: let it but have individuality and it will not long want for multiplicity. The whole tendency of the reasoning is very prettily summarized by Plato himself in the *Sophistes*, *καὶ γὰρ, ὦ 'γαθέ, τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελές καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου. Τί δὴ; Τελευτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν*

ἡμῖν. For τῶν εἰδῶν in this passage read τῶν οὐσιῶν, and for ὁ λόγος put τὸ εἶναι: then from being logical the statement becomes metaphysical without losing any of its value. It is not at all improbable that Plato in the Sophistes has Antisthenes the Cynic in his eye, as the ἄμουσός τις καὶ ἀφιλόσοφος. Nay, the language of Aristotle in regard to him almost suggests that he may be referred to in our own dialogue, διὸ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εὐήθως μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἐνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. Certainly the phrase ἐν ἐφ' ἐνός is remarkably apposite when compared with ἀλλὰ ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἔν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἔν, at the opening of Demonstration A II.

Met. IV. 29.

Parm. 142 B.

Relation of the argument to logical rules.

p. ix.

155 B, A. III

Such is the general bearing of the discussion, a bearing which modern metaphysical theory confirms. It by no means follows, however, that each step in the reasoning is a safe one: that the details fully accord with the sketch. Of the two divisions the negative one is that which seems the more cogently put. And naturally so. It is simpler, more human, to take to pieces than to construct, to see flaws in creation than to create, to be deductive than to be inductive, to converge upon a point than to expand over a wide horizon. Such flaws in details of the argument as can be detected will be found mentioned in the notes, but there is a grave drawback to its general character which calls for notice here. This consists, as we have already hinted, in a doubtful attitude towards the logical law of Contradiction. Not only do the statements in the positive limb of the inquiry conflict with those which the negative one seeks to establish—an issue due largely to the ambiguous use of the terms One and Not-being to which we have just referred—but the repeated assertion, which marks the positive limb, that the One 'both is and is not' affected in a given way, seems to clash with what is the earliest accepted and most comprehensive dictum of all formal logic. It is not that Plato was ignorant of this principle—whether technically enunciated or not it must form the basis of all just argument—on the contrary he expressly states it both elsewhere and in this dialogue. Of the series of arguments the two first—A I., II.—are the most elaborately developed, the latter in particular, and at their close Plato seems to realize the difficulty with which he is confronted. In the opinion of Grote it is with the view of clearing this up that he inserts unsymmetrically Demonstration A III. In this he points out that when the One 'becomes' as one, it 'perishes' as many, or whatever the special feature may be; and he leaves the impression that the contradiction involved in 'both becomes and perishes' can be disposed of by this interposition of time. We are here brought into contact with a very important distinction, that between knowledge as a completed result, in which a simultaneous 'becomes and perishes' should be impossible; and knowledge as a progressive acquisition, in which the contradiction is not so easily eliminated. If we are to assume that the One, or any other entity, exists in an unchanging form like one of Plato's ideas, then it comes under the law of identity or contradiction. It is what it is, as a sum total of characteristics, which individually are what they are: time has nothing to do with the matter, and 'is or is not' must

take the place of 'is and is not.' If our knowledge of it is perfect we know it as it is, without ambiguity. But if, on the contrary, we do not actually so know the One, or any other entity; if our knowledge is a growth or activity, which advances from small beginnings towards a fulness never realized, then the One is a centre of shifting characteristics, and each time we deal with it we deal probably with a different group of these. In the main we are likely as we discuss it to be advancing from a view which includes few characteristics to one which includes more. But not necessarily. When we reason deductively we start from what for our purpose is a given sum total of knowledge, as if it were complete, and draw from that conclusions which already lie implicitly in it—we are dealing with our knowledge as if it were acquired and stored up, and are simply satisfying ourselves as to the details which it includes. Here time does not enter, and the formal rules are the sole legitimate guides. When, on the other hand, we reason inductively or synthetically, we advance from a basis confessedly imperfect and strive to enlarge our mental possessions. Here we cannot always speak in terms of 'is' or 'is not': our knowledge does not exist, but is in process of formation: time enters as an element, and the laws of formal logic must be charily applied. And if he would receive it, this is the direction in which Plato would have to look for a reconciliation of the conflict he recognises between *αἴσθησις* and *ἐπιστήμη*. In the former he is at what miners call the 'working face,' and is quarrying out new knowledge from the ungauged sum which lies before him. In the latter he is dealing with the 'bing' of coal already raised to the pit-head, which he weighs and measures as a definite quantum by definite tests and standards. It is patent at a glance that the result in the latter case might from its greater definiteness be called knowledge or science, while that in the former, from its constant incompleteness and confusion, might seem to a methodical mind unsatisfactory in comparison. As time goes on the working face advances, while for each generation the bing represents a different total. The point, for us, is that when knowledge is in process of becoming, its condition at any moment is sufficiently uncertain to render a strict application of the laws of deductive logic uncertain and unfair: and that it is not necessarily to the prejudice of a line of argument, in such circumstances, that it seems technically a little at fault. In arguing thus, however, we are not to be held as admitting that each seeming violation by Plato of the law of contradiction is in reality such. Another glance may be taken at the subject from a somewhat different standpoint. While the laws of formal logic are invaluable as tests of an intellectual conclusion, they may yet be far from conveying a just picture of the activity which leads the mind to the acceptance of that conclusion. They represent the dissecting implements of the anatomist, or the solvent appliances of the chemist, much more than they exemplify the natural process by which is produced the complex organism with which anatomist or chemist has to deal. And if an attempt be made to exhibit that process in operation, the attempt does not at once stand condemned by reason of imperfect conformity to them. That it may be inherently defective as a repre-

sentation is possible enough, but not because it happens to jar with deductive formulae.

The significance
of argument
A III. upon
'process.'

3. Grote, we have said, regards the argument A III. as an attempt on Plato's part to explain apparent violations of logical law. That is not an unfair account to give of its rather unexpected occurrence in this place; yet it is one that may be overpressed. Plato no doubt feels that his previous arguments seem contradictory, and seeks to elucidate them. But the course he takes partly tends to show that the charge of inconsistency would be in some degree out of place. What he wants us to understand is that he has been dealing with the One as in 'process,' a condition in which contradictory or seemingly contradictory affirmations about it are inevitable. And he is less concerned—though no doubt sincerely concerned—to prove himself a fair reasoner, than he is to account for this phenomenon of process or becoming with which he has to do. It is another manifestation of the influence of Zeno's dialectic upon him. 'The first hypothesis of Zeno's first argument' had been directed against multiplicity. Plato, however, has accepted multiplicity; and what he sees is that his acceptance carries with it the necessity for some theory of change in all its various manifestations. This brings him face to face with another group of Zeno's arguments, that denying the possibility of motion. Zeno endeavours to show that because of the infinite divisibility of space you cannot admit that in any given time a swift runner can overtake a slow runner, as the apparently small space which divides them can itself be so divided as to become infinite. And from this he deduces the impossibility of motion. It may be urged in an *ex parte* manner that if Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise in a limited time, having unlimited space to cover, you can evade the difficulty by dividing the limited time as you do the limited space, and so showing that he has unlimited time in which to do it. As Being and One are equally divided—

Parm. 127 D.

144 E.

οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ' ἐξισούσθον δύο ὄντε αἰεὶ παρὰ πάντα—so space and time may be equally divided, the one becoming infinite if the other is. But this is not Plato's difficulty. He accepts here the doctrine that

p. xxxviii.

time is made up *ἐκ τῶν νῦν*, and has to ask himself how the gaps between these isolated moments are to be bridged. Thus we again see the consequence of beginning

p. xlvii., xlix., lii.

130 B.

by making divisions—*καὶ μοι εἰπέ, ὡτὸς σὺ οὔτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις*;—they refuse to reunite. But Plato here offers us his theory in explanation. After the first instant or *νῦν*, during which the moving arrow is at rest, there comes *τὸ ἐξαίφνης* or the momentary suppression of time, in which timeless flash of 'unaccustomed liberty' the arrow (or the One) bridges over the barrier between the first instant and the second, thus making a start; and by similar means it retains its acquired motion through *νῦν* after *νῦν*. And what is true of physical motion is true, says Plato, of other types of change. We thus explain Becoming. This reasoning will at once suggest a comparison with Aristotle's solution of the same apparently unanswerable *λόγος*. And there cannot be a doubt that the latter is the more philosophically matured. There is something almost absurd—unless it is intentionally humorous—in the suggestion that the One

goes, as it were, behind the scenes for a moment to change its dress; and no one knew better than Plato that, however instantaneous he might make it, the period, unless he was able to alter its character by sleight of hand, would still be but a minimum of *time*. Yet when we reflect a little we may see that the two philosophers are substantially at one. Aristotle's reply to Zeno practically is that the latter puts the dividedness of time against its connectedness, so much so as to push the latter wholly out of view, and make us think of time as divided merely, while it is no less truly connected. Now Plato in speaking of time accepts Zeno's view of its dividedness; but he says the separation of moments is overcome by τὸ ἐξάφνης, a something that is not divided nor even divisible. This is but an awkward way of recalling for us the other aspect—the continuous side—of time. We are made to figure time as divided and continuous not simultaneously but alternately. We think of it as discrete—continuous—discrete—continuous, and so ad infinitum; only that he gives to the second limb of the antithesis the name of a timeless 'instantaneous.'

4. It was said above that the divergence in the results between the positive and negative limbs of the argument was due largely to ambiguity in the terms. Foremost among these ambiguous terms is the One itself. Its different meanings in this dialogue are chiefly two. It is used in a more or less logical sense as a unit of measurement, or terminus a quo in speculation: and it is used in a metaphysical sense as an entity whose existence and composition are to be comprehended gradually by research, or as a terminus ad quem. In the former of these senses it is of course quite immaterial to consider the positive character of the One: it may be concrete, it may be abstract in itself. For us it is used abstractly when used as a unit of measurement. It is more important to observe that while such is its function you cannot do with it what, as is to be feared, Plato sometimes assumes the right to do. You cannot divide it and then treat its parts as on an equal footing with itself—as new Ones. The parts of a unit are fractions, and are not to be treated as new units on a level with the whole from which they are taken. It is when viewed as a unit that the One seems to be most simple and elementary in constitution—most really one, with but the single characteristic of unity. If it be used merely as a counter we feel almost entitled to consider that we have reached a One which no argument can prove to be many. It certainly should not *be* many, but it cannot avoid implying or presupposing many. We must remember that even as so conceived it cannot be spoken of save as in relation to other similar ones in endless succession. It forms one of a multitude like itself, and it may be *any* one of that multitude. Plato may be right or wrong in his method of reaching number by 'two twice and three thrice' and 'every combination of even and odd'; but it is true that One carries number with it. To say 'one' involves the mental act of numeration; and numeration is the act of reckoning plurality. In this sense one and many, one and 'limitless multitude' are but the two factors of a single mental process. Each involves the other, and the question Whether One does not come first, is inept. When thought has reached the stage of reckoning

Ambiguous use
of terms.
The One.
p. lvii., r. lx.

Parm. 143 E!

its impressions, its consciousness that they are many and that each is one constitutes a single simultaneous decision. When it goes on to deal with any given set of impressions and seeks to find how many they are, one, in that sense, or 1, comes before two. But number and the unit of number take form together. Thus we are far removed from perfect simplicity in dealing even with the one of number. Plato admits this in practice, as well as maintains it in theory, by assuming that there are Many or Others standing over against the One from the very threshold of the inquiry.

136 A.

Nor do we mend matters on passing to the metaphysical One, the one of existence, or what we hope may prove the simplest form of Being. In that case we have still to reckon with the problem of numeration, just discussed; and we have added to it the problem of existence, which was there in abeyance. What is Being? At least it is not identical with unity: unity does not carry objective being with it. Plato is quite right in saying that the statement 'the One is' already involves something more than One. As Aristotle points out—whether with this dialogue in his mind or not, readers must decide—even when in search of an ἀρχή or first principle we cannot accept a single one: the case requires several. To judge by Plato's language, the One to him in this aspect consists of a mental picture of a physically existing One—of a One in space and in time. Now the very simplest conception which can be formed of such an entity must treat it as a homogeneous extended thing. But in that case the circumstance that it is viewed as one is not essential; it is accidental. We are in search of the smallest unit of being and have happened to stop at this point. Unlike the unit used as measure this One may be broken up, and each portion may be called One. And such divisibility is co-extensive with thinkability. You may go on dividing so long as what you divide can form an object of thought; while again it is only as an object of thought that you can deal with the matter at all. Thus multiplicity dogs this One out of the confines of existence; we cannot reach it, do what we may. But further, it is certain (unless it be pure space) to have as a physical existence various characteristics in addition to mere extension: and these characteristics will abide with it, like those of water, in the smallest part you reach. Thus in itself, and apart from its further divisibility, this smallest part is not One in the sense of having but a solitary quality or feature. Simplify as we may we cannot arrive at what we seek: to adapt the language of Edgar in King Lear, 'the One is not, so long as we can say—This is the One.' Strip it of quality after quality, as we have already stripped it of part after part: still it remains a complex so long as we can form such a conception of it as will admit of discussion. Strive to reduce it step by step to absolutely featureless Being and it vanishes at the back door of thought as Nothing, as the unthinkable. Plato is right as regards the scope of his argument, although he may take doubtful steps from time to time.

Act IV., Sc. i.

The Many.

The Many also is a term which is not very consistently used. Frequently it is transformed to the Others, a step which, in a work dealing with the most elementary distinctions of thought, it is not permissible to take. By so treating this conception

you acquire greater freedom in developing from it fresh characteristics. The One as opposed to the Many is not identical with the One as opposed to the Others. Plato himself rightly says that only the other can be other than the others: that is, in being opposed to the Others the One sinks its oneness in order to become other than they. But there is a further confusion of thought in this connection. We have noted how Plato accepts almost unconsciously at starting the view that over against the One a body of Many or Others takes its place. The whole mapping out of that model scheme of argument, which ought to form the discipline of the philosopher, is based on the assumption that the One is not all, but has Others with which it is to be contrasted. Now we have also seen that the One itself under treatment develops into Many. What difference is there between the Many into which the One thus changes and the Many originally existing in contradistinction to it? That is not a thing easy to decide. We have a many of ones, any one of which may be fixed upon as the One; this again when we examine it separates into a new Many in our hands. Have we not here, after all, the same Many or Others viewed at two separate logical moments of their existence? The development of these from a careful consideration of all that is involved in the conception of the One gives us what Kant would call the 'deduction' of the Many or Others. The contention that no argument about the One will be complete which fails to ask 'what follows to the Others,' simply exhibits us as assuming without deduction a fact which we are able if necessary to deduce. Yet Plato seems to speak as if this identity between the two sets of Many were not present to his mind. If that is really his mental position perhaps the inconsistency may be due to a cause which produces difficulty in most abstract thinking. One would suppose that discussions about abstractions would be in a sense easy, from the fact that we ourselves choose the qualities which our abstractions shall comprise, and dispense with whatever might prove superfluous. The difficulty is that, abstract as we may, we never can get the existence of these surplus qualities, and of a whole surplus world, swept clean out of our thoughts. This background of superfluous qualities and existences colours our abstraction in spite of our will. The analogies and materials of our ordinary experience, which our abstraction is supposed for the time being to have flung aside, dog our argument like the consciousness of evil deeds, and force themselves surreptitiously into trains of reasoning which purport to disregard them. We cannot keep our thinking consistently at the level of our abstractions. Could we do so we might find arguing about them to be tolerably simple and satisfactory. This line of reflection may partly explain the introduction by Plato of the conception of Others or Many even at the moment when his hypothesis seems to be that the One exists alone, the sophism being partly veiled under the plea that every side of a question must be considered.

Yet another ambiguous term is Not-being. It need not detain us. Sometimes it is used comprehensively as an absolute denial of existence to the subject under review, at other times it is used in a restricted sense as meaning a something which

is not the same with that subject. In the former case it closes the discussion, in the latter it forms in itself a fruitful theme of discussion. On this topic Plato's views are much more clearly elaborated in the Sophistes. One's first impulse undoubtedly is to think that while Being may be exhibited in many shapes and degrees, Not-being is unvarying, is always *τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ* and has but one signification. But we come to learn that in this as in the popular contrasts between the sexes great error may be committed. It is fallacious in discussing the characteristics of humanity to devote a chapter a piece to the soldier, the explorer, the lawyer, the statesman, the trader, the man of letters, the poet, the man of science, and then to round off the work with a supplementary chapter on woman. 'You clash them all in one, that have as many differences as we,' says Tennyson's prince. And so with each tint of Being a separate shade of Not-being will be found to correspond. In the Sophistes we learn that while each order of Being necessarily *μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος* yet *ἡ θατέρου φύσις* is ever standing by which *ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὄν ποιεῖ*. Nay, while *περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν*, it is not otherwise on the negative side—*ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν*. For we have on the one hand *τὸ ὄν*, but on the other *τὰ ἄλλα*, and the number of the latter whatever it be represents the exact number of times that *τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι*. Opposed to *τὸ ὄν* in its most abstract form stands *τὸ μὴ ὄν* in an equally absolute form, and the latter is the negation of existence. But for modified or definite Being you have similar Not-being. The *θατέρου φύσις*, he says, *φαίνεται κατακεκερματῖσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη*—for every 'named variety' of science a suitable variety of negation is told off as partner.

Soph. 256.

What is the One
metaphysically?
An atom?

5. What, we may ask, are the characteristics which as the work progresses come to attach themselves to the conception of the One? When viewed metaphysically it is, as we have said, an extended unit. The characteristics which distinguish it beyond this are few and simple, as will appear from the marginal summary of the text. First it has existence, parts, whole, beginning (in space), middle, end, and shape. Then it has various qualities which Aristotle would describe as *πρός τι*: thus it is same—different, like—unlike, greater—equal—less, fewer—as many—more, older—same age—younger. Again it has position relative to itself and others; thus it touches and does not touch, is still and in motion, in space (*χώρα*); while it has also all the affections incident to existence in time. It would appear then that it is one—and *any* one—of a multitude of extremely elementary homogeneous extended things existing and moving in space and time. While such a One is in certain ways much more than the One of Parmenides, we cannot but feel that in a vital respect it is much less. It has altogether ceased to symbolize the Universe. No one on the other hand can fail to see the strong general resemblance between such a picture as this and the doctrine of the Atomists. True, Plato does not specifically say that space is empty, but his discussions of touch and motion tend in that direction; nor does he set a limit to divisibility, yet neither does he allow division to swallow up the One or the Many. It is impossible to imagine that Plato was ignorant of

the views of his contemporary Democritus—though, as we have seen, he never names p. viii. him—and one is almost tempted to suppose that it was at least one among the objects of this dialogue to show how Zeno's dialectic if perfected and applied to the One would from the Eleatic doctrine develop the Atomistic. An analogy from modern speculation might be found in an attempt to affiliate the Monads of Leibnitz to the Substance of Spinoza.

But if the One is thus reduced in many respects very much to an atom, what, we may still ask, is to Plato the most fundamental requisite of existence for it, or for anything; and how to him does existence develop itself? We cannot single out any one characteristic from which all others are to be traced, but the vital features appear to reduce themselves to three at most: (α) it is in time, (β) it is in space, (γ) it has individuality. From these characteristics the others are variously deduced. Its individuality, however, is very elementary, and is more logical than physical: the One is 'different from the others' and 'one with itself.' In the course of his argument Plato adopts either of those three characteristics which suits him as the fundamental one, and from that establishes the existence or non-existence of others. From his reasoning it would appear to result that the beginning of existence to our minds for anything whatever is the acquisition by it of distinctness in some form or other. And our knowledge of it, or its existence for us, grows with the increasing number of relations in which this distinctness can be affirmed. Of the three characteristics given above we are in the habit of thinking that the order of natural priority is that in which they are named—that quantity has a more elementary character than quality. Plato does not appear to share that preconception. He would seem to imagine that a distinctness of quality or individuality might be to us the primary ground for assigning to a sensation a distinctness of quantity. From having a sensation of such and such a quality we are led to ascribe to it such and such a quantity or succession in space and time. This is not laid down as a principle by Plato, but the course of his argument rests upon a tacit recognition of it.

6. The point at which Plato looks most as if he were going to abolish his units by the process of endless division is in what we call argument B III., which deals with the condition of the Others on the assumption that the One does not exist. On that assumption this argument represents the more favourable possibility for the Others, and it reduces them to an unmanageable phantasmal chaos bordering upon annihilation. In the less favourable possibility which follows in B IV. they are actually done away with, the conclusion being that 'if the One is not nothing is.' This, however, seems rather to be a negative argument in favour of the Democritean contention that division must stop somewhere. Nor is the conclusion unsound, although both Plato and Democritus support it in a somewhat mechanical and materialistic fashion. Stated in terms of modern Metaphysics it would stand pretty much as we have put it already—that simultaneously with the removal of definiteness, numerability, clearness; of τὸ μέτρον, τὸ πέρασ, thought and existence vanish. At best there can remain that

chaotic multiplicity which carries with it the possibility of existence, and which, if we please, we may call 'sense,' or in Platonic terms that 'which seems to be One, but is not; to have beginning, middle and end, but has not.'

Summary of
results.

It may be said, then, in general terms, that the work is undertaken in the interests of the ideal theory and consists in an attempt to appropriate to the uses of that theory the doctrine and dialectic of the Eleatic school, as a unifying, regulating, harmonizing and sustaining influence. But the process of appropriation brings into relief a fact startling indeed, yet not unperceived by Plato. This dialectic, when turned upon its own dogma, demonstrates that while unity is beyond doubt a principle essential to the very possibility of thought and being, it is at the same time parent to a complexity of which its sponsors did not dream: the problem of philosophy, even when we seek to solve it with the weapon of unity, unfolds as we deal with it deeps within deeps of unexpected multiplicity and complication. To adapt a familiar and weighty judgment *εἰ οὖν τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐν σοὶ πολλά ἐστι, τὰ πολλὰ πόσα*; We must accept the One, for we cannot dispense with it. But the atomistic element likewise claims a voice in the ultimate conclusion; and, if we are to repose upon the doctrine of Unity, that unity will not be the mere absence of plurality and diversity, but a something capable of reconciling in a new whole such elements as these, and such contradictions as are formulated in the closing sentences of this dialogue. The general scope of the discussion from the beginning, with its successive exponents, may not unfairly be presented thus. ZENO: Can a sensible Many be assumed to exist without involving hopeless contradictions in thought? No: yet what we see does exist. SOCRATES: Can even an ideal Many be postulated without leading to difficulties equally insurmountable? No: yet there it is. PARMENIDES: Setting aside Manies of both kinds, can so simple a hypothesis as the existence of One be maintained without bringing in its train every complication of which its presence is expected to relieve us? No: yet without the One nothing is.

Divergences
from other
commentators.

Dr. Jackson,
Journ. Philol.,
vol. xi., No. 22.

Phileb. 16.

p. lvi.

It has been said above that no attempt is here made to reproduce in orderly sequence the views and reasoning of previous commentators. One or two points of divergence from them, however, may perhaps be referred to. A reader of Dr. Jackson's remarkably acute analysis and criticism of this dialogue will have his attention arrested by the following among other conclusions. The One is regarded as an idea, or as representing the ideal sphere, and there is assumed a graded progress—*ἐν, πολλά, ἄπειρα*—from it through 'kinds' or 'classes' to the 'limitless multitude' of sensible existence. This theory is undoubtedly attractive, especially when read in connection with the statement in the Philebus that we must not proceed at once from *πέρας* to *ἀπειρία*, from *ἐν* to *τὰ ἄπειρα*, but must interpose certain definite *πόσα* as connecting links. But reflection tends rather to discourage belief in this hypothesis. We have already given reasons for questioning the view that the One is an idea: certain of its characteristics seem to preclude that supposition. Again, Zeno at the beginning of the work places *ἐν* and *πολλά* in such contrast as to leave no doubt that in his mind

they comprise jointly all existence. At the close of the first part, Parmenides speaks of $\epsilon\nu$ and $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ in a similar sense; while throughout the dialogue $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ and $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ are used as convertible terms. Whatever may be symbolized by these expressions, it would be difficult to draw a distinction between either of them and the phrase $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\omicron\alpha$ $\tau\hat{\omega}$ $\pi\lambda\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\iota$ which occurs at intervals; nor does Dr. Jackson appear to cite any evidence that $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\omicron\alpha$ differ generically in their use. In other respects also Dr. Jackson is inclined to discover finer and more detailed distinctions throughout the work than in these pages it has been found possible to recognize. This may be natural, even perhaps imperative, from his point of view, according to which the dialogue is a late work; on the opposite supposition, such distinctions are not essential.

Throughout this introduction, the doctrine that the ideas are absolutely severed Zeller. from the sensible sphere has been emphasized, but not more so than the language of Plato, etc., the text would seem to require. Speaking of Plato's works at large, Zeller does not P. 326. regard such a doctrine with favour. He admits, indeed, that many expressions and arguments occur which point towards such a doctrine; but adds, 'We must nevertheless question its correctness.' He goes on to explain his contention by showing that the supposed sensible world is in reality Not-being, and that all Being centres in the ideal sphere. To elucidate his position would lead us far: but when all has been urged in its favour, it still lies open to the objection of not explaining the difficulty so much as explaining it away. Zeller is himself constrained to say 'whether the above-mentioned P. 328. difficulties as to the theory of Ideas do not, after all, reappear in an altered form, is another question.' From what does the necessity for philosophic inquiry, idealistic or other, arise but from a sense of difficulty? When Plato feels that difficulty, he begins like other thinkers by an attempt to solve it. But he is soon led to shake its dust from his feet and flee towards 'a city which hath foundations whose builder and maker is God,' and of which the characteristic is that it shuts the original and now somewhat despised difficulty outside its everlasting doors. Zeller urges that 'these objections P. 327. [in the Parmenides and elsewhere] to the doctrine of ideas would not have been suggested by Plato, had he not been convinced that his theory was unaffected by them,' a view with which Dr. Jackson sympathizes. But is it the case that every thinker, even every great thinker, is fully provided with a reply to all objectors? He is not driven from his position by objections: he feels, it may be, a conviction which objections fail to shake. But he may be sensible that he has not met the objections, nevertheless. Galileo was a very great man, yet when he was questioned about the fact that water would not rise in a pump beyond thirty feet, and reference was made to the doctrine that 'nature abhors a vacuum,' he could but say, half in jest, that nature seemed to abhor only a thirty foot vacuum. It was left for Torricelli to throw light upon the mystery. We must not, then, attempt to explain away what Plato actually says on the ground that it involves difficulties for which we think we have a solution after the lapse of two millenniums.

‘The difficulties reappear in an altered form.’ What difficulties? Those which to the metaphysician spring eternal: those which centre in the relation of subject and object, which are so protean, and of which the solution looks so like juggler’s work, that one almost takes refuge with laughter in Carlyle’s sarcasms about “sum-m-mjects and om-m-mjects” ‘uncertain whether oracles or jargon.’ Perhaps the sharpest form of this contrast with which philosophy is acquainted is that between Plato’s ideas and the many of sense. A less pronounced type of the difficulty is that which arises between the ‘cognitive faculties’ of more modern speculation—what Plato would call ‘our science’—and an ‘external world.’ In the latest stages of metaphysical evolution, the great problem has been to reclaim the external world from its antagonistic externality, to include it in a revised sphere of consistent idealism. But granted that we are right in taking this course, admitting that thought is the parent of all things, even of its own object; still ‘the difficulties reappear in an altered form.’ Why this persistent pronounced unmanageable sense of objectivity and separateness? We demonstrate that sense is swallowed up in thought, and yet suspect that we have achieved but a Pyrrhic victory. What is sense? That is the mystery of mysteries. We may eat away all its substance with our ‘forms of sensible perception,’ and our ‘categories,’ but we cannot lay the spectre—‘expellas furca tamen usque recurrit.’ We have been saying and have seen Plato admitting that the world as we know it cannot be a world of sense. Is it meant then to affirm that sense has no existence? Or are we not rather bound to exclaim ‘*Ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος ἦ, εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποστερήσει τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι?*’ It is, of course, granted that ‘beauty, goodness, slavery, bigness,’ and even that ‘man, fire, water, hair, mud, filth,’ in their collective sense, are not perceived by the senses. Sense lies in the sphere of ‘you and me, bits of wood and stone.’ Now while ‘beauty’ may comprise many qualities, ‘man’ comprises many more; and ‘you’ still more, more indeed than anything except another you. Do we then approach to sense as we add qualities, and recede from it as we remove them? Not properly. ‘Beauty’ and ‘man’ are simply figments of the mind and have no connection with sense other than this, that they were deduced from the observation of individual ‘sensible objects.’ ‘You’ also can become a figment of the mind when one thinks of, and does not see, you. But it is true that sense attaches only to individual things, to things with a maximum of qualities in their several kinds, in short to existing—as opposed to conceived or imagined—things. Are such things then sensible objects? If not, no other such exist. Let us take a simple case as put by a thinker of anything but transcendental tendencies. According to Dugald Stewart, when you read a letter that which can be referred to sense is—not the comprehension of the contents, but—simply the perception of ‘black marks upon white paper.’ In reality this is much too liberal an allowance. Not by sense but by judgment do we recognize the substance to be paper and the marks to be black upon white. And our judgment would not cease to operate, however visionary the distinction might become, until all distinction had vanished; that is, until sense ceased from exercise for want of any object. The

Life of Sterling,
viii., ‘Coleridge’

p. xlviii.

Parm. 134 E.

very recognition that this state had supervened would itself be a judgment, though it might be delivered with hesitation. In a word so long as consciousness lasts, thought is at work, and the more alive consciousness with a view to detect and expose pure sense may become, the more completely does it fail of its purpose. As we might say, 'had ye but seen, then had ye been without thought; but now ye say "*We see*," therefore your thought remaineth.' All that we can declare about sense is, that it is the vanishing point of knowledge—'who steals my sense steals trash, 'tis something, nothing:' while yet we feel that from that very vanishing point, the guarantee of all knowledge is given—'or hear'st thou rather pure ethereal stream whose fountain who shall tell?' Thus we may say that the world of experience, which Plato has been seeking to dominate by his ideas, is all intellectual; if by this we mean that the sensible element in it is reduced to a minimum incogitabile at the start: or alternatively that it is all sensible if by this we mean that it never becomes transcendental. Either view is an advance upon the dualistic hypothesis of a composite world, half 'mind,' half 'matter.' Yet neither solves the problem of Whence all comes, and why this absolute freedom of sense from the control of the will? The sense function is within us like a well of water springing up unto everlasting life. So we must confess: nor is it part of our duty to pursue the inquiry further.

Of the Parmenides it may be said among other things that it forms as it were Conclusion. a vestibule to those vast and mystic halls which are trodden by the metaphysician. And already while passing through it we see the corridors appear which lead respectively to the courts of Being and Becoming. So impressive and intricate are the surroundings that we pause for breath, uncertain whether the building has two great co-ordinate wings, or whether it consists of an inner court approached through an outer. Certainly there are those who have sought a home in each mansion, and the thoughts called forth by the image of either are such as may separately dominate the mind. Few can form, fewer still can convey to others, an adequate conception of the sphere of Being. It is so completely withdrawn from experience. At best we must shadow it forth to ourselves as some Hall of the Chosen, some consistory, so to speak, of Egyptian Deities who have not stirred since time began. In such a picture an 'idea of motion' is a fatal flaw: the stillness there is absolute, and may not be disturbed. But has it not the atmosphere of a museum? In the midst of Being we are in death. It is said that certain subtle poisons kill by preserving the tissues, by stopping the action of growth and also of decay. Are we thereby the gainers? Our gain is loss: our being not-being. Can anyone have in truth seen this hall of Being; or do those who depict it dream that they were there? Not even Parmenides can vivify the description. The other to us seems less remote. It is as though the well of sense bubbled upward through a chink in the floor, bursting into the air and rippling over the pavement with multiplex undulation and ceaseless sound, reflected and reechoed from the roof and walls. To that we have seen something analogous; we are in sympathy with it, if imperfectly. But always the question returns upon us—Wo kommst du her? wo gehst

du hin? And Heraclitus our interpreter cannot tell. What is this Becoming? Is it after all Being, but *κατακεκερματισμένον*? Are we to solve the enigma of Being-Becoming on the analogy of the 'continuous-discrete' in space and time? Or is the antithesis Being and Not-being, with Becoming as bridge? Is *τὸ ἐξάιφνης*, 'that odd thing the instantaneous,' another name for Becoming? Or are both awkward adumbrations of the Ego—that one among many, that whole among parts, that *πόρος* amid *πενία*? Or does reasoning perhaps end here, and do we in the language of 'divine madness' rave about things unutterable? Finally, does speech fail, and must we wander backward in the expressive silence of *ἀνάμνησις* to God who is our home? Such are among the thoughts which suggest themselves to those who have come under the influence of Platonic speculation: thoughts tinged indeed by modern currents, and pressing forward through modern channels, but not the less truly tracing their source to the great fountainhead of all metaphysics.

THE TEXT.

I.

IN an edition, even of a single dialogue, which bears a relation so unusually close HISTORICAL.
to a special manuscript, some introductory remarks upon the manuscripts of Plato in AND CRITICAL.
general, with details in regard to certain of them in particular, are not only natural
but will almost be expected. It is hoped that what follows may be of service
to beginners in palaeography and in textual criticism. At the same time it is the
work not of an expert in these branches of study but of a tolerably instructed layman.
The writer knows only six Platonic manuscripts at first hand, and these he has studied
under all the difficulties and disadvantages which attend a comparative beginner, and
with but a limited time at his disposal.

1. The earliest edition of Plato's works appears to be that of Aldus Manutius, Editions.
published at Venice in 1513—the year of Flodden—a work which must have cost
infinite labour, and in regard to which its editor says that he would wish its errors
removed, even at the price of a gold piece each. Perhaps this edition was published
too soon: at all events the one which caught the attention of the world of letters was
not it but that edited by Serranus and Henricus Stephanus, and published at Paris in
1578, in three volumes folio, with a dedication to Queen Elizabeth. This has ranked
ever since as the *editio princeps*, and constitutes the standard of reference for all
succeeding scholars. The dialogues are arranged in what the editor calls *συξυγίαι*, of
which the fifth 'ad quam contulimus Physica et Theologica,' includes the *Timaeus*,
Timaeus Locrus, *Critias*, *Parmenides*, *Συμπόσιον*, *Phaedrus*, and *Hippias Minor*. The
Greek has a Latin version running in parallel columns with it, and the lines of the
page are subdivided into successive groups by the letters A, B, C, D, E placed in the
margin. It would seem to be the intention that these letters should be placed at
intervals of ten lines; but they often stand opposite the space between two lines, and
the contents of division E vary considerably, as the Latin and Greek, according as each
happens to be the less compact, expand in turn to the whole breadth of the page
at the foot. In our text A is omitted, and the other letters are placed opposite those
lines which include what seems to be the commencement of each division, so far as
that can be determined, in the original. Ste. III. 126 means Stephanus, vol. iii.,
page 126. These great editions of Aldus and Stephanus—or of Bauldie and Steenie
as, with fond familiarity, we may say—are not 'critical editions' in the modern sense
of that term. They appear each to be based largely upon one Ms., selected partly

on grounds of convenience—Schneider considers that in the *Laws* at least the original of Aldus was the Venetian Ms. called by Bekker Ξ , No. 184, which has no special authority—and where a difficulty arose any other accessible Ms. was consulted, or resort was had to conjecture, no great care being taken in giving references. Stephanus says that he puts in the margin conjectures that occurred as the book was passing through the press. This somewhat easy-going and self-reliant method of constructing a text appears to have continued till the close of last century, the edition of Heindorf being, according to modern German authorities, a brilliant example of it.

2. Immanuel Bekker represented, if he did not inaugurate, a new era in this respect, alike for Plato and for Greek texts in general. He subordinated conjectural emendation to a thorough-going comparison of manuscript data. Personally he collated with more or less completeness some 77 Mss., and classified their readings in the apparatus criticus of his edition, which was published early in the present century. Of all the important Mss. the only one apparently which Bekker never saw was the Clarke manuscript in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. It had been brought to England a few years before, and Bekker used the collation of it published by Gaisford, saying ‘*nolui actum agere.*’ His method seems to be in some sense that of a dispassionate eclectic. He inserts in his text the reading which he considers the best, wherever he may find it, and classifies the others at the foot of the page. No manuscript which he has collated is ignored on the ground that its readings are for any reason valueless. At the same time he clearly indicates that his study of the various codices had led him to place two or three of them on a much higher level than the remainder.

1814-21.

3. Editors since Bekker have largely acted upon the result of the comparison of manuscripts at which he had arrived. They select what they regard as a pre-eminent Ms., constitute their text mainly from it, and use the remainder only in extremity or for purposes of subsidiary illustration. Hermann, for example, selects without hesitation the Clarke Ms. as his authority for all those works which it contains. While Aldus and Stephanus appear to have been guided less by critical principle than by some form of convenience in selecting one codex as their basis, editors like Hermann have reversed the process, and decide entirely upon the apparent strength of the evidence in favour of the manuscript which they elect to follow.

4. Lachmann, who comes rather earlier than Hermann, is referred to by German scholars as the forerunner of yet another method in textual criticism. Good examples of how he deals with Ms. data are to be found in his editions of the *Testament* and of *Lucretius*. There he endeavours to simplify the materials available by classifying the various codices, and affiliating them one to another. On this principle a derived manuscript is at once set aside in favour of its original. Such genealogical groupings of manuscripts may be made with some approach to certainty, and inferences even are possible from existing ones backward to their lost archetypes. According to Schanz and Jordan the critic who first adopted this method in dealing with the text of Plato

was E. Peipers in his *Quaestiones criticae de Platonis Legibus*. Since that work Götting. 186 scientific simplification of our authorities has been the prevailing tendency in constituting the text of Plato's works.

What, then, are the materials at our disposal? On the mere announcement that the known Mss. of Plato number at least 147, one would be disposed to infer that if a sound text cannot be extracted from such a collection individual conjecture will do little for us. But in reality the number mentioned gives a false view of the position. For no portion of Plato's writings are there nearly 147 independent authorities. Many of these codices consist of mere isolated and constantly varying fragments, bound up in miscellaneous collections. Others again are of very late date, and the probability that such are derived from early originals now lost is extremely remote. Even the seventy-seven collated by Bekker, supposing them to be all independent, do not all cover the same ground. The codices which contain a half or more of Plato's writings number about a score, while those which can be drawn upon to illustrate any given dialogue form an uncertain and shifting quantity. The text of the *Parmenides*, as given by Bekker, is based upon the evidence of seventeen Mss. The number noted by Schanz as available amounts to thirty-two. The number employed or discussed by scholars since Bekker varies between these two totals. From the entire number of 147 three have been pitched upon by the unanimous verdict of scholars as occupying a position of clear pre-eminence. These three, like almost all the large Mss., follow the order of the dialogues given at the beginning of this work as that of *Thrasylus*, and may be briefly described as follows:—


The Manuscripts. Martin Wohl in *Fleckeisen's Jahrbuch.* 1887.

Martin Schar Studien zur Geschichte der Platon. Texte p. 20. Würz 1874.

Designation.	Abode.	Contents in Tetralogies.
A (Bekker), or 1807.	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.	VIII., IX.
ℳ „ or Clarke 39.	Bodleian Library, Oxford.	I.-VI.
t „ or Append., Class IV., 1.	Biblioteca Marciana, Venice.	I.-VIII. (as far as Rep. iii.: the rest of the works by other hands).

It will be seen that ℳ and A contain in the aggregate, with the exception of tetralogy VI, the whole of Plato's works, to which A adds the Definitions and seven Spurious Dialogues, while t gives nearly all, but partly by later hands. The grounds upon which scholars select these three from the mass are several:—(a) Their age: the two first are clearly the oldest in existence, while the third, if younger than these, seems older than almost any other. The transmission of written works, however careful, tends at each fresh step to introduce fresh departures from the original; and the earliest copies reduce that danger to a minimum. (β) The care with which they have been written, taken in conjunction with their age (for texts admittedly late may also be careful): this is a feature which impresses the most casual observer, and tends to inspire great confidence. (γ) The evidence adduced by modern scholars with a view to show that many, if not all, of the remaining Mss. can be traced back to these. The

relative sizes of these very famous codices may be pretty accurately estimated from the following diagram, which represents them at $\frac{1}{8}$ of their actual measurements:—



Further back in the history of Plato's text we cannot go directly; but ingenious attempts are made to do so constructively. As A and X are among the earliest extant examples of minuscule Mss. it seems not improbable that any Ms. from which they may have been copied would be written in majuscules or capitals. This would tend to increase its bulk, and as each of them is a large volume, it seems very likely that their archetype or archetypes would be in two volumes. Now in t we have at the close of the Menexenus, in the original hand, the words *τέλος τοῦ α' βιβλίου*: yet this Ms. is in one volume. Schanz cites the same phrase at the same place from Ms. Angelicus C I 4, which also consists of but one volume; from Laurent. 59. 1.; and finally from the Vatican Δ-Θ, Nos. 225 and 226, where, although the Ms. consists of two volumes, the words *τέλος τῶν πρώτων βιβλίων* occur on folio 196r. of the second. The inference drawn by Schanz is that we have here an old tradition that the works of Plato had been at some time in two volumes, the first of which contained Tetralogies I-VII., and the second the remainder. To such a second volume Paris A actually corresponds, while the Clarke Ms. represents the first, save that it would appear to have been taken from a copy from which the short Tetralogy VII., which closes with the Menexenus, had dropped away. Various scholars attempt to fix the probable length of the lines in the early copy or copies now lost, on the basis of what is called stichometry. Mss. were measured by the unit or line in which the earliest copies were written, that is by *στίχοι*, corresponding to the average length of a hexameter, and Galen is quoted as giving the length of some medical definitions in this way. He says that two, one of thirty-nine, and another of eighty-four syllables, are *οὐ πλείονες τῶν ὀκτῶ ἑξαμέτρων*. This gives sixteen or seventeen syllables to the line, which is considerably less than the length of line used in the Clarke Ms., but exactly corresponds to that of the passage omitted by this Ms. on page 33 of this edition. But the subject is not without difficulties, and controversy upon it is keenly kept up. Schanz thinks he can form an estimate of the probable date of the archetype in the

† f. 197 verso,
col. 2, line 4
from foot.

Stud. p. 24, and
Hermes x, 1876.

Wachsmuth in
Rhein. Mus.
xxxiv, p. 38, 481,
1879. Galen de
placit. Hippocr.
et Plat. viii, 1.

160 D.

following manner. From the uniformity of existing Mss. in certain passages he naturally concludes that they faithfully represent in these the reading of the original. But he finds the passages in question quoted by writers like Eusebius and Theodoretus with words omitted. Accordingly he considers that the archetype cannot have been so old as to have formed the text from which these men drew their quotations, and, therefore, it is more recent than 400 A.D. That may be correct, but it postulates two things, neither of which is quite certain—that there was but one text prior to our existing Mss., and that those Christian writers quoted it with verbal precision. The first of these assumptions is altogether disputed by A. Jordan on the understanding that the second is correct; but both may be erroneous. One scholar alleges that he can detect two features of the archetype of \mathfrak{A} —that it did not belong to the most correct class, and that it was not easily legible.

Fleck. Jahrb. Suppl. Bd. 7, 1873-5.
J. S. Kröschel in Fleck. 123, p. 553, 1881.

Another statement is made by Galen which is very interesting. He refers in his fragment upon the medical passages in the Timaeus to τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἀντιγράφων ἔκδοσις and says that in the Timaeus this edition reads διὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφ' ἐαυτοῦ κινήσεως where other authorities give ἐξ for ὑφ'. Upon this has been reared a structure of very tempting hypothesis which may be thus summarized.

Our Mss. all read ὑφ' and thus show their connection with the edition of which Galen speaks. Scholars, including Cobet, are strongly of opinion that Ἀττικῶν is short for Ἀττικιανῶν, and Harpocration refers to readings of Demosthenes found ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικιανοῖς, while Dobree remarks on the resemblance between \mathfrak{A} and codex Σ of Demosthenes, and holds that they are both from Ἀττικιανά. Now we find in Lucian Πρὸς τὸν ἀπαίδευτον two references to a very celebrated βιβλιόγραφος called Atticus, whom some hold to be the person here spoken of. Others, among whom are Birt and apparently Cobet, think that T. Pomponius Atticus is meant, and regard the editions here referred to in the light of publications carefully effected by his orders, not copies written by his hand: to which opinion Birt elsewhere adds, that these Attic editions were noted as written in the στίχοι to which reference has just been made, and of which traces are pointed out in the Clarke Ms. The same view has been recently maintained by H. Usener, who constructs in this connection a theory about the transmission of our Platonic texts which is eminently fascinating, but dependent a good deal upon assumptions in excess of his data. It may be well to give on the one hand what seem to be the data, and to add on the other the assumptions.

Dräske on Philipp. ii. Fleck. Suppl. Bd. 7.

Birt, Antike Buchwesen, index, Atticus.

Nachrichten v. der König. Gesellsch. der Wissensch. Götting. No. 6, 1892.

DATA.

1. Apellicon's private library, which comprised those of Aristotle and Theophrastus, was taken to Rome by Sulla, and submitted to the editorial scrutiny of the celebrated scholar Tyrannion of Amisus.

2. Diogenes Laërtius does not really affirm that Thrasyllus invented the arrangement of Plato's works in tetralogies, but only that he adopts it: in any case Diogenes adds words (καὶ τινες) which show that others had a part in it, of whom Albinus names Dercyllides. Again, Varro, when referring to the Phaedo, says, 'Plato in quarto . . .

ASSUMPTIONS.

This library included careful if not original copies of Plato's works.

Varro knew the arrangement of dialogues by tetralogies, and his learned friend Tyrannion was its originator. (We may add that Cobet holds Thrasyllus to be quite distinct

Strabo xiii, p.

608.

Alb. Isagoge. Varro, L. L. vii,

37.

appellat': and the Phaedo is the fourth in the Thrasylean arrangement. Finally, speaking of the possible origin of this grouping by fours, Usener says (referring to his *Philologie und Geschichtswissenschaft*, p. 22), 'nun kennen wir einen bedeutenden griechischen Grammatiker, der sein noch in vielen versprengten Resten erkennbares System der Philologie mit durchgeführter *Viertheilung* aufgebaut hat. Das war Tyrannion von Amisos.'

3. Atticus was a great scholarly publisher like Aldus, and had in his service a large staff of trained copyists and assistants, either paid or bought.

from the contemporary and friend of Tiberius; so that in the case that he really invented the arrangement, it might still be as old as Varro.)

The ἀντίγραφα Ἀττικιανὰ are his editions: Tyrannion was his editor. Our Mss. of Plato descend through this channel from the library of Aristotle.

How much one desires to accept all this as historical fact! Yet even the initial assumption of an 'Attic' origin for all our Mss. rests on no broader foundation than a single ὕφ' for ἐξ.

To resume: the following are the characteristic titles and endings of the works in the three chief manuscripts.

A	℥	t
Πλάτωνος	[Πλάτωνος]	[Πλάτωνος]
Πολιτεῖαι ἢ περὶ δικαίου	Παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν. λογικός	Παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν
A'		
Πολιτείας ἢ περὶ δικαίου A'.	Παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν.	Παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν.

In ℥ t Πλάτωνος occurs in the case of the first dialogue and is then dropped: but in t it reappears at the Republic as in A, and while the first and third books of that work read πολιτείας, the second gives πολιτεῖαι. We may thus infer (1) that in the original the word Πλάτωνος appeared at the beginning, and at the Republic and Laws which have more than one book: (2) that the adjectives in -ικός, which occur in ℥ unsymmetrically, are not original, but may trace their origin to such a phrase as occurs in t after the title of the Euthyphro, ὁ λόγος ἐριστικός. The kernel of the title lies in the form Παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν both at the beginning and at the end of each work; and this exactly corresponds with the description given by Diogenes of the titles employed by Thrasylus. He says, διπλαῖς δὲ χρήται ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς ἐκάστου τῶν βιβλίων· τῆς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, τῆς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος. ταύτης δὲ τῆς τετραλογίας, ἥτις ἐστὶ πρώτη, ἡγεῖται Εὐθύφρων ἢ περὶ ὀσίου· ὁ διάλογος δ' ἐστὶ πειραστικός· δεύτερος Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, ἠθικός: and so on. Here it is quite clear that Εὐθύφρων ἢ περὶ ὀσίου is the title from 'name' and 'subject' given by Thrasylus, while the words ὁ διάλογος δ' ἐστὶ πειραστικός are explanatory words added by Diogenes in giving his account, which dwindle to ἠθικός, λογικός, etc., as the description proceeds. We thus see that the phrase ὁ λόγος ἐριστικός at the beginning of t, and the adjectives in -ικός throughout ℥, have been added to the original titles of Thrasylus by some

one who had probably read Diogenes. This circumstance strengthens the conviction that all existing texts may be traced back to the Thrasylean recension, but it does not decide the question as to whether there was numerically but one archetype. When one gets so far backwards to an original source, the chances of appreciable divergences between separate copies of it become very small, so that our existing Mss. might be due to different originals of the same edition so to speak, without our being able to detect it from their text. Nay, the evidence rather, if anything, leans that way, since A is written in pages of two narrow columns, and t in larger pages of two broader columns, while \mathfrak{A} is written in smaller pages without columnar divisions.

What now are the materials available for the construction of our text? The Mss. used by Bekker in editing the Parmenides are the following, which received their designations from him.

\mathfrak{A} , Oxford: ΓBCDEFHIQR, Paris: Δ, Rome: ΛΞΠΣΥ, Venice. To these must be added t, Venice, which Bekker does not collate for this dialogue; and others which he did not know, as those collated by Stallbaum g, a, b, c, i, Florence, Zittav., a, with Tub., Tübingen, and Ces., Cesena, which have come into notice more recently. Here then, without reckoning one or two others, we have a list of twenty-seven, and the question to be determined is the relation in which they stand to each other. As it happens only the first is dated, and while the subscriptio containing the date tells us as usual something about the writer, his employer, and his pay, it tells us, also as usual, nothing about the place of writing, and nothing of the Ms. copied, two points which for textual criticism would be more important. We are thus left to deal with circumstantial evidence, which, besides its somewhat inconclusive character, has all its value dependent upon the assumption, natural enough no doubt, but not inevitable, that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a Ms. is likely to trace its origin as a whole to a single source, and that thus proofs for parts hold good for the whole. No one can give even a glance at the collation printed in Bekker's edition without being struck by the remarkable recurrence of the group $\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi DR$ in support of the same readings. Not only do they occur together 85 times alone, but they appear in many other cases along with varying groups of other authorities. It is evident that they are a closely related family. But in that family there appears to be an inner circle. This will be clearer from a glance at the following figures:—

$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi DR$	+ various others	occur together	many times.
$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi DR$	”	”	85
$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi D$	”	”	37
$\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi$	”	”	36

Manifestly the connection between the first three of these is extremely intimate. Not only the number but likewise the character of their coincidences testify strongly on the point. Now, as is noted by Schanz, there is at the same time quite a different and equally strong bond of union between them. All three give the Theaetetus with

a gap of considerable extent, from 208 D *πάν μὲν οὖν* to 209 A *τὸν σὸν λόγον*, or nearly half a page of Stephanus. All the rest which contain the Theaetetus, however they may otherwise differ, would appear to agree in not having this gap, and accordingly Schanz here finds proof of the existence of two families tracing their origin to different sources :

α. that of which \mathfrak{A} is the chief member and which has the gap ;

β. „ t „ „ not the gap.

Tub. does not give the Theaetetus; but Schanz refers it to family *a* on other grounds. And he says in general, that while family *a* agree closely, family *β* differ widely. In this edition it has not been possible to deal comprehensively with all the existing Mss. The writer's personal study has been confined to $\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi\Pi$ Tub.t. Upon family *β* he takes the testimony of Schanz, which is that all other members can be traced back to *t* as original. Evidence of a very convincing character is given in support of this conclusion, and whether it is actually established or not, there can be no doubt at all that *t* is by many degrees the most important member of the group. In the case of a dialogue which has a text so little injured as that of the Parmenides investigation need go no further. We pass then to the consideration of family *a*. Here also—subject to the exclusion of certain dialogues in certain Mss.—the decision of Schanz is similar. All can be traced back in the last resort to \mathfrak{A} . Let us take them in the order $\Delta\Pi\Pi$ Tub.DRQg. It will be sufficient to give selected specimens of his evidence.

Schanz on the Manuscripts.

Δ. (Our dialogue occurs in vol. Δ of the Mss. Δ-Θ.) This codex, which he places in the 12th century, is, except in tetralogy 1. and the Gorgias, a transcript—though not necessarily direct—from \mathfrak{A} .

Δ 360 verso
361 rect. and
vers.
3 184 r. and v.
Steph. 34 E, 36 B.

(1) In the Philebus it has a series of short gaps, filled in by a younger hand, which correspond to similar gaps existing in \mathfrak{A} and caused by injuries to the lines at the outer edge of the leaf. The writer of Δ, or of its original, would seem to have found those injuries and to have left spaces which he thought sufficient for them, and these a later reader of Δ has filled up from another source. \mathfrak{A} itself has been similarly but very coarsely completed since the date of Δ or of its original.

Δ 433 v. 434 r.
3 236, 237.
253 E, 254 E.

(2) In the Phaedrus two similar blanks occur which have never been filled up. They represent an injury in \mathfrak{A} caused by the dropping of some dark acid upon the text. The condition of Δ shows that at the time the injury had affected only the back of the one leaf and the front of the other, since Δ gives the words which were on the other sides of these respectively. In our time the acid has eaten its way through both leaves.

(3) Δ also omits from time to time words which form complete lines of \mathfrak{A} . Examples of this are the following—though the first seems a very long line :

404 B Cratylus, *Δήμητράν τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ Ἀπόλλω καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ Ἥφαιστον καὶ Ἄρη.*

123 C Theages, *-σθα, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ὄνομα, ἦ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα; καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἔγωγε.*

198 D Laches, *γέγονεν, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων, ὅπῃ γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ*

All these statements it was intended to verify in Δ, but through unavoidable circumstances the task was omitted. Schanz concludes by giving reasons for holding that the derivation of Δ-Θ from \mathfrak{A} is mediate rather than immediate.

Philologus
xxxv, 1876.

II.TUB. Schanz held at one time that these Mss., while closely related to \mathfrak{A} , were not directly transcripts from it, but connected with it in some other manner. According to Wohlrab, however, Schanz has changed his opinion and finally holds that both could be directly traced back to \mathfrak{A} , but without stating his reasons.

DR. These Schanz holds to be closely connected with II. D in particular agrees in many ways with II, and where it differs, the difference betrays the connection. A test case occurs in the Parmenides, οὐκοῦν ἐπέπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἐστι τᾶλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός [ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἐστιν. ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός] ἦν. ^{157 B.} The words in brackets are a repetition of part of what precedes. The writer's eye, after he wrote the second ἐνός, seems, on looking up, to have caught the first, and so he repeated the words ἐστιν. οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἐστιν: then glancing up again he seems to have caught ἄλλα in place of τᾶλλα, and so he wrote ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός: finally he seems to have caught the second ἐνός, and so he went on ἦν. This mistake reappears in D, and it seems to originate with II rather than to come from some common source, for II is largely characterized by such blunders which are sometimes corrected and sometimes not. If II be indeed the source, then the younger D by reproducing so peculiar an error reveals its own origin. Now R does not extend beyond the Parmenides, and Schanz gives from this dialogue several cases in which IIDR combine to present readings peculiar to themselves, and again other cases in which the two last agree in differing from II. His inference is that D coming from II develops new features of its own, and that R being drawn from D exhibits some of the latter's peculiarities.

Q is a Ms. cited by Bekker in the Parmenides as far as to 129 A: of it Schanz merely remarks in a note, Q. .gehört zur Sippe D.

g is a Florentine Ms. collated by Stallbaum, which Schanz places in the same group with those of which we have been speaking; but as it contains only a fragment of the Parmenides, ^{Platocodex, p. 54.} and is not intrinsically very important, no more need be said of it.

Such then is an enumeration of those codices, which, according to the greatest recent authority upon the question, rank apart as the most reliable guides for the formation of our text. Does a minute study of them in so far as the Parmenides is concerned yield any further evidence tending to support, or alternatively to weaken the verdict given by Schanz? They may be dealt with in the same order.

As confirming the division into classes, we may take the following evidence:—

a. τρία δις εἶναι καὶ τρία δις; so all \mathfrak{A} ΔΠΤub.DR.

Fresh comparison.
143 E.

β. „ „ „ „ δις τρία; so \dagger and all its followers. This case is important, because the Mss. appear all to be wrong, the true reading τρία δις εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς; being preserved or suggested very faintly in the margin of \mathfrak{A} , where it has been either overlooked or inserted late. Again we have a. τίνι δῆ; β. πῆ δῆ; and a. ὀξύνοντι, β. ὀξὺν νοοῦντι—^{139 B, 165 C.} which are also noteworthy. Let us now take the members of the a family in order.

Δ. Vat. No. 225. In regard to this codex, various facts are to be noted.

1. For the word Παρμενίδης \mathfrak{A} Δ, and they alone, read throughout Παρμενείδης.

2. In \mathfrak{A} the phrases τί δέ; τί δῆ; τί δαί; all occur as questions or as parts of questions. The last is much the most frequent, occurring twenty times, and being in each case, with a single doubtful exception, a substitute upon an erasure for one of the other phrases. In everything but the erasure Δ faithfully reproduces this peculiarity of \mathfrak{A} .

3. The word αἰεὶ occurs forty-three times. In the first twenty of these it is written αἰεὶ. In the rest, beginning 147 D, the first ι is erased and the α joined to ε by a longer line than

usual, save in the solitary case 147 E where ἀεὶ looks original. Apart from signs of erasure, 158 c. this striking difference of usage is exactly copied in Δ, only that in one place the word has dropped out.

4. We find a series of patches or mistakes occurring in words at the outer ends of the first lines in the following pages of this edition.

p. 16	-σίας	Δ δ'εἶς	p. 21 μορίωι	Δ μορίων.
„ 17	δνοῖν	„ δύο	„ 25 με-	„ patched.
	περ ἄν (l. 2)	„ περ ὄ	„ 28 που	„ του.

On each of these pages there is, as on many others, a stain at the corner of the Ms. which precisely covers the letters misread.

5. The readings of ΨΔ may be compared in a number of places where they are such as to arrest attention. More examples might be quoted, but the most striking only are given, and for convenience the readings of Π and Tub. are added.

Text.	Ψ	Δ	Π	Tub.
127 C ἀναγιγνωσκομένων -κόμένων ^ο		-γιγνωσκομένων ^ο	γιγνωσκομένων	-γιν-
128 A ὁ περ σύ,	ὄν περ σύ,	„	„	„
ἐν φῆς	ἐν ἔφης	„	ἐνέφης	ἐνέφης
129 D ἐρεῖ	ἐρή	ἐρή	ἐρή	ἐρή [η for ει frequent]. in all.
διαιρήται	η -ρείται	-ρείται	„	-ρήται.
130 B αὐτῆ ὁμοιότης	αὐτῆ ἦ ὁμ.	αὐτῆ ἦ ὁμ.	αὐτῆ ὁμ.	αὐτῆ ἦ ὁμ.
τὸν—παρμ.	τόν τε παρμ.	„	(τε erased)	τόν τε παρμ.
C αὐ τῶν τῆδε ὦν	αὐτῶν. ἦ ὦν	„	(ἦ erased)	αὐτῶν. ἦ ὦν
D ταύτη ἰστῶ,	ταύτη ἰστῶ	„ (‘ patched)	τ. ἰστω	„ (a θ on τ).
E αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις	αὐτῶν ἄ.	αὐτῶν ἄ.	αὐτῶν ἄ. (ω patched)	-τὸν ἄ. changed -τῶν
131 B οἶον εἶη ἡμέρα ἦ	οἶονεἶ ἡμέρα εἶη	„	{οἶον ἦ ἦ. εἶη ἦ μ. κ. αὐ.- as Ψ save οἶ- μία	
C ἦ οὖν ἐθελ.	εἶ ὄ. ἐ.	so all	{(ἦ on eras.)	
132 A αὐ που μ.	αὐτοῦ μ.	„	αὐ [eras. = 2 letters with ὦ on it] μ.	as Ψ.
B προσήκη	-κει	„	„	„
C ἐπὸν νοεῖ	εἶπον νοεῖν	„	„	„
133 A ἐκεῖνό τψ	-νω τὸ (ψ on eras.)	-νω	„	„
D παρμενείδην	-νείδη	„	-νίδη	-ν ἰδη ^ν patched, ε erased.
E δούλου ὁ ἔστι	δούλου ἔστι	δ. ἔστι	adds ὀ later	δ. ἔστι (ὀ later).
135 D οὖτος, εἶπεν,	οὕτως εἶ-	„	„	„
136 B καὶ αὐθις αὐ	λ. αὐτοῖς αὐ	„(contracted)	„	a gap here.
C ὑπετίθεσο ἕάν τε	-θεσθε· ἄντε	„ (no ·)	„	„
διόψεσθαι	-σθε	„	„ (αι altered)	-σθε ^{αι} (αι later).
ὑποθέμενος τι ἴνα	-ος· τίνα	-ος τίνα	-ος τίνα (later τίνα)	-ος. τίνα

Text.	℣	Δ	Π	Tub.
D δεώμεθα	δεόμεθα	"	"	"
137 A διανεῦσαι	-νύσαι	"	" (a patched)	"
B πραγματιώδη	"	"	"	-τειώδη
E ἀπέχη;	ἄν ἔχη (orig.)	ἄν ἔχη	"	"
ἐπίπροσθεν ἤ;	-σθεν εἶη;	"	"	"
138 B ἑαυτὸ εἶη	-τῷ εἶη	-τῷ εἶη	" (η patched)	"
τι εἶναι μὴ	τι εἶη μὴ	"	" (εἶη changed to ν, αἰ to εἶναι)	(η changed to ν, αἰ above later).
D ἀμείβον	ἀμείβων	"	"	"
E ἐγγιγνόμενον ... νεται	ἐνγ- ... ἐν γ- νεται	"	"	"
139 B πῆ δῆ;	τίνη δῆ;	"	"	" (τῆνι divided).
E οὔτε αὐτῷ	οὔτ' ἄν αὐτῷ (or αὐ.) οὔτ' ἄν αὐτῷ	"	"	"
140 B τὸ ταυτὸν πεπονθὸς τ. ταυτὸ π.	κ. ἰσοτ-	τ. -το\ (ends line) π.	as ℣	"
E καὶ ἀνισότητος	"	"	"	"
141 B διαφέρον ...-φόρου	"	"	"	"
C ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν	ἄ. γὰρ ἄν	"	"	"
142 B φανῆ;	φανείη;	"	"	"
οὐ γὰρ ἄν	ἄν omitted	"	"	"
D []	words dotted	undotted	words omitted	words omitted.
143 C τινε ᾧ...ἀμφοτέρω: τινέω ... -τερα;	τινέω ... -τερα:	"	"	τινέω' (ᾧ added later) -τερα
D σύνδυο	οὖν δύο	"	"	"
147 B μορίων' ... μορία'	-ίου ... -ίου	"	"	" (οὔτε twice, αὐτὰ).
148 A τῷ ἀνομοίω	τῷ ὄμ.	"	"	"
149 E τι [ἄλλο]	τι ἄλλο	" (τί)	"	as Δ.
150 D ἐν ἔχετον	ἐν ἐχέτω	"	"	"
152 D τῷ νῦν	τὸ, νῦν	"	"	"
οὔπερ	οὐ περί	οὐ περ× (× erasures)	οὐ περὶ	εἰ περιεγ-
154 C νεώτερον δ' αἶ	ν. δ' οὐ:	"	" (γίγνεται above, later)	" (γίγνεται in marg., later).
155 A γὰρ αὐτῷ εἰς	γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς	"	"	"
157 C μετέχει αὐ πη:	-έχεται πη	"	"	" (πη).
158 A αὐτὸ_ἐν	αὐτο_έν (ἐ erased)	"	αὐτὸ ἐν	as Π.
160 D οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦρτον... εἶναι	γὰρ omitted	as ℣, but in text.	all omitted	as Π.
161 E μετείη	μετίη	"	" (no ')	as ℣.
162 A τῆ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει so: corr. in marg.	no corr.	"	orig. = τοῦ×ῆ εἶ. ᾧ. (×eras)	as ℣.
C μεθίστατο	μηθίστατο	" (-τὸ)	μεθίστατο (εpatched)	μηθίστατο.
163 C ἄρα εἶναι δύναιτο	εἶναι omitted	"	εἶναι in marg.	as ℣.
D οὔτ' ἄν λαμβάνοι	οὔτ' ἀναλ-	"	οὔτε ἀναλ-	as ℣.
164 E δόξει, εἴπερ	δόξειεν, εἶ.	"	"	"
165 B τούτου μέσα σμ. δὲ διὰ	τὰ τοῦ -σου and δὲ omitted	"	"	"

Text.	℥	Δ	Π	Tub.
C ὄξὺ γνόντι	ὄξύνοντι	ὄξύνοντι	as Δ	as Δ.
δεῖ φαίνεσθαι	δῆ φ.	,,	δεῖ φ.	as ℥.

Adding this to the evidence which Schanz has produced, readers will be disposed to admit that his case is established—that Δ is derived from ℥. At the same time facts exist which slightly weaken the first vivid sense of conclusiveness. Take the following:—

1. The scribe in Δ in very many cases, though not in all, omits the *ν* at the end of such forms chiefly as *ἔστιν*, *ἔοικεν* when the succeeding word begins with a consonant; although the practice in ℥ is different.

2. A few cases occur in which the verbal endings *ει* and *οι* and similar ones are transposed in the two Mss.

3. A few such divergences as *παρέχεις* for *παρέχει* (middle), *τις* for *τι*.

4. Also mere blunders such as *χρόνον* for *χρόνου*, *ἴσθη* for *ἴσθι*, *ἡδέα* for *ιδέα*, *σωκράτην* for *-τη*, *ται* for *τε*; and varieties of spelling such as, occasionally, *γινωσκ-* for *γιγνωσκ-*.

5. The following small words are left out:—

136 B ἡ [εἰ] μὴ. ὅ τι οὖν ἄλλο [πάθος] πάσ-
χοντος.

E ἐγὼ μὲν [οὖν] ᾧ Παρμ.

137 C τὸ [ἐν] ἐκ μερῶν.

D οὐτ' [ἄν] ἀρχῆν. So Π.

138 E τὸ [δέ] ἕξω part of a phrase written on an erasure.

142 C ἄλλο [ἡ] ὅτι.

145 C περιέχοιτο [τὸ] ἔν.

D Ἄδύνατον [γάρ]: ends a line.

148 B δέ [γε] πάθος. δέ γε on a cleaned space Π.

149 E ἐστόν [τέ] τινε. So Π.

152 E ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ [νῦν] ὅταν περ ἡ (a *νῦν* immediately above).

158 C ὅσον ἄν αὐτῆς [ἀεὶ] ὀρώμεν.

164 E εἴπερ ἐν [μὴ] ἔσται.

6. Two larger gaps occur:—

150 D After writing the first *ὑπερέχειν* [*καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι* ... the writer goes on at the second ... *ὑπερέχειν*] *μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι*: thus omitting nearly four lines.

158 B ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει [αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνει].

7. Two transpositions occur:—

No. 4, p. lxxxii. 142 E τὸ ὄν ἰσχει αἰεὶ for τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ ἰσχει. This ends the third line of 162 recto in ℥ (page 17 of this edition): and as shown above the ends of the two lines preceding it are also patched.

166 B Δ reads ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ δοξάζεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλὰ τᾶλλα οὔτε ἔστιν.

Of these we may say that (1) has no significance: a scribe with a bias on the question of using *ν* *ephelestikon* might give effect to his views on principle. The remainder are such slips as occur in every Ms., even the most careful. Some of them easily explain themselves, and might be paralleled from ℥ itself, and they give no suggestion tending against the idea of a derivation from ℥. With regard to the large gap in 150 D, the second *ὑπερέχειν* does not come so nearly below the first in ℥ as to give a ready explanation of the error; but the writer of Δ has, after writing the first of them, to turn his own page, which gives room for a mistake. So too at 166 B after writing *ἔστιν* he has to turn his page, besides which he is hurrying to be done. At the utmost, the errors marked (5), (6), (7) may support the theory of Schanz, that the derivation of Δ from ℥ is at second hand.

II. Ven. No. 185. This Ms. is described in the catalogue as saeculi circiter XII.: it is most carelessly written.

The following facts deserve notice in regard to it:—

1. The title, while omitting ἠθικός, has ornaments and an ornamental initial letter which bear a strong resemblance to those of \mathfrak{A} .

2. The dialogue opens with three lines which are verbatim et literatim identical with the three first in \mathfrak{A} —for the writing of π above the τ in $\tau\omicron\nu$ and the omission of ι adscript in $\tau\eta\delta\epsilon$ form no difference. The fourth line is longer by η , the fifth by $\phi\omega$; and then the lines gradually diverge. Yet in spite of gaps in the text they always tend to come back to the original identity; from which they again separate themselves. Thus, taking the paging of this edition, the following lines are identical in the two Mss. :—

PAGE.	LINE.	PAGE.	LINE.
6	12	21	24, 25 last and first of a page.
8	13, 14	22	29
9	22	25	12
10	5, 6	31	32, 33, 34
11	18	32	1, 2, 3
12	30 new page in II.	34	29 new page.
13	20	37	28, 31
17	10, 25		

The opening three and the consecutive six on pages 31-32 are very noteworthy.

3. The spelling *παρμενίδης* occurs, though in a way that might escape notice, in the title, and twice in 130 A, while the ϵ of the diphthong is erased in 127 A. Elsewhere the spelling is *παρμενίδης*.

4. The word *ἀεὶ* varies its spelling, but not with that adherence to the changes of \mathfrak{A} which is observed in Δ . We have *αἰεὶ* 34 times, *ἀεὶ* with erasure twice, and *ἀεὶ* seven times.

5. The original hand in \mathfrak{A} writes almost invariably *φᾶναι* (for *φάναι*), while a later hand corrects it. This accentuation is in Π so uniform that after a certain point it ceased to be noted in collation. Much the same holds with *ἴσον* for *ἴσον*.

6. A glance at the comparison of readings given above will show that in the great majority of cases Π agrees with $\mathfrak{A}\Delta$; and more might be given.

7. Cases occur in which Π differs from Δ but agrees with \mathfrak{A} :

138 D	ἐν τινι αὐτὸ	αὐτὸ with erasure after α	\mathfrak{A} .	αὐτῶ	Π .
139 B	οὐθ' ἔστηκεν	οὐτ'	$\mathfrak{A}\Pi$.		
143 D	συζυγία	συ ζυγι	ἀ	$\mathfrak{A}\Pi$, erasures at the gaps and after α .	
152 B	ὑπερβήσεται	ὑπερβ	ἤσεται	\mathfrak{A} eras.	Π ὑπερβοή- a line through σ from β to η .
155 E	περὶ τὰ ἄλλα	περι τὰ, ἄλλα	on erasure	\mathfrak{A} .	περιττὰ ἀ. Π .
165 B	ἐν φαίνεσθαι :	ἐμφαίνεσθαι	$\mathfrak{A}\Pi$.	\mathfrak{A} patched.	

Here again we have very considerable support for the view that Π descends from \mathfrak{A} . It is, however, not quite so strong as in the case of Δ , and the counter evidence is stronger.

1. In every case *τί δαί* is wanting, being replaced by *τί δέ*.

2. Exclusive of considerable repetitions and omissions, there are about a hundred small divergences in the text including (α) some small blank spaces or blots, (β) a good many variations in

the use of final ν (not always ephelkystikon), (γ) some transpositions, (δ) several variations in terminations as $\epsilon\upsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$ for $-\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$, (ϵ) some patchings, (ζ) some omissions of single words, (η) a number of obvious blunders, (θ) a good many deviations that do not admit of any classification. While many of these differences are of little moment and a good many suggest their own cause, not a few are not easily explicable, nor can it always be determined whether they are due to the original writer or another. At the same time few can be called suggestive or symptomatic. Here is one, however,

137 B $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\mu\omicron\iota$

$\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\ \acute{\epsilon}\mu\omicron\iota$, changed in different ink to $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}$. II.

A palaeographer will at once see that the meaningless $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$ could much more readily be derived from $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha$ (carelessly written or read) in old minuscules than in majuscules, nay, that in minuscules the two words are remarkably similar $\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega$, $\acute{\alpha}\rho\omega$. This makes it at least probable that the original of II was in minuscules, and thus at least improbable that it was older than \mathfrak{A} .

3. A disproportionately large number of important omissions occur, which will be discussed immediately. If any of these were in the original of II, it could not have been \mathfrak{A} ; and must at least have been a somewhat careless copy of \mathfrak{A} , if not from a distinct source.

4. The word $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu$, 148 E, and the phrase $\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \eta\tau\tau\omicron\nu\ \gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\ \lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\alpha\iota$, 160 D, which appear in the margin of \mathfrak{A} are entirely wanting in II, a circumstance which could hardly be accidental.

Of these arguments against deriving II from \mathfrak{A} , the first and fourth do not count. The word $\delta\alpha\acute{\iota}$ is always on an erasure in \mathfrak{A} , and the words just quoted are in the margin in an old, but not the original, hand. We have only to suppose that II or its original was copied before these changes were made in \mathfrak{A} . Arguments (2), (3) are more serious; but they may be greatly weakened by the allegation of downright carelessness in II. Its writing is of very unequal size, and to one who has seen really fine calligraphy, repulsively ill formed. Apart from that, marks of inattention are frequent.

129 D The words $\acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \dots\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\phi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ are written twice, and the two editions differ. The first has $\kappa\alpha\iota$ before $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ and $-\nu\epsilon\iota$, altered $-\nu\eta$, for the infinitive: the second omits $\kappa\alpha\iota$ and reads $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha$ and $-\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$. The second is coarsely scored out. This oscillation between $-\nu\epsilon\iota$ and $-\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ helps to explain several cases where \mathfrak{A} has the infinitive and II the other termination—as in $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \chi\rho\eta\ \sigma\upsilon\mu\beta\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$. Perhaps the writer intended to insert his ν by the familiar $\bar{\text{—}}$ above, and forgot.

130 D $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \tau\iota\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\beta\upsilon\theta\omicron\nu$ —is in II $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \tau\iota\nu\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\upsilon\theta\omicron\nu$. But the μ is carelessly written, and may quite possibly be intended for the old minuscule form of β which resembles our u.

135 A $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\eta$, $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\eta}$ appears as $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\eta$, $\pi\omicron\lambda\acute{\eta}$.

144 E $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\epsilon\nu\epsilon\mu\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ has one of the syllables $\nu\epsilon$ omitted.

147 D The words $\pi\rho\sigma\alpha\gamma\omicron\rho\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \dots\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\omicron$ which form a line in II are written twice, and then, together with half the following line to $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\varsigma$, are coarsely ruled out. This blunder rather makes p. 21. for a derivation in some form from \mathfrak{A} . It will be seen from our text that after writing $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\omicron$ the scribe's eye might very readily be caught by the $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\omicron$ above it, which would lead to the repetition.

149 E The following form lines in II:—

$\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma\ [\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\ \tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\zeta\omega\ \omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\ \tau\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omega\nu\ \eta\ \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma]\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\zeta\omega\ \eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omega$, $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \tau\omicron\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$
 $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\ \tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\zeta\omega\ \omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\ \tau\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\ \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omega\ \acute{\alpha}\nu$

Here the words in [] have obviously been inserted out of place, and the mistake was discovered. They are obliterated by a coarse line and dots. This is another case which rather supports a direct derivation from \mathfrak{A} . Let the reader look at our text. After writing to $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\varsigma$ the scribe glanced up and p. 23. his eye caught τοῦ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\varsigma$ in the following line. He then wrote on in that line till he reached $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omega$ when, looking up, his eye caught $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omicron\nu$ two lines above. He then altered $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omega$ to $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omicron\nu$ —writing ν through the ω —and went on with the words $\eta\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\varsigma$, where he completed the circle and found out his mistake. It is the double parallel of position in our text

$\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\varsigma$	$\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omicron\nu$
τοῦ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\varsigma$	$\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omega$

which speaks for \mathfrak{A} as the original.

152 C ληφθείη in Π is near an injury in the parchment and is written ληφέιη.

152 E Π has

οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν

οὐ γάρ: τὸ ἐν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ
ὄν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον

This is repeated with τὸ ἴσον, and the repetition is coarsely cancelled. Here again our text shows p. 26. how the mistake may have arisen—after writing the second οὔτε πρεσβύτερον the scribe may have reverted to the first, which is directly above in \mathfrak{A} .

157 B Here comes the case cited by Schanz in which D agrees.

p. lxxxii.

164 B For ἄλλου divided between two lines Π gives ἄ-λου.

165 A For φάντασμα Π reads φάσμα which suggests mere inattention.

165 B For πᾶν τὸ δὲ Π gives πᾶν πᾶν τὸ δὲ.

Before dealing with the cases of omission it will be convenient to speak of the next Ms. on our list.

TUB.—This codex, which is also called Crusianus from having been got by Martin Crusius, a professor at Tübingen, in 1560, contains what it calls τὰ ἑπτὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, viz., the Euthyphro, Crito, Phaedo, Parmenides, Alcibiades I. and II., and the Timæus. The writing which is very neat and carefully formed is regarded by Schanz and Fischer as belonging to the 11-12th centuries, which would make it older than Π. Its numerous omissions are supplied, when they are supplied, by a much later hand. A comparison of the readings given above will show that this Ms. stands very closely related to $\mathfrak{A}\Pi$. It is to be added that the name Παρμενίδης is always written with an erasure before the ι , so that the text had originally given the diphthong, which shows a clear connection with \mathfrak{A} . But, on the other hand, evidence may be adduced which tends to show that the connection with Π is still more intimate. Thus we have the following :—

Text.	\mathfrak{A}	Tub.	Π
128 D ἵπο νέον ὄντος	ἵπὸ νέεθ ὄ	... νεύοντος νεοντος ^δ
129 D ταῦτὰ ἀποφαίνειν	... -νειν	... -νη	... -νει changed to -νη.
130 A τὸν σωκράτη	so	... -την	... -την with ν cancelled.
130 D ταύτη ἴστω	so	... ἴστω (θ later on στ)	ἴστω (above is $\epsilon\gamma\omega$ ηκω?).
130 D τιν' ἄβυθον	τιναβυθὸν	τινα ἄβϋθον	as Tub. (but β may be μ).
133 D δούλον ὃ ἔστι	ὃ omitted	ὃ added later	as Tub.
135 E εἶας ἐν τοῖς	so	εἶασε τοῖς	letters σεν patched.
136 C ὅτι ἂν προαιρηῆ	so	ὀτιοῦν (scrape after ϵ , and below η)	ὀτιοῦν.
136 C διόψεσθε		αι put above θε later	θε changed in orig. to θαι or the reverse.

Text.	℥	Tub.	Π
136 D ὑποθέμενός τι ἵνα	... τίνα	-μενος τίνα	as Tub.
136 E συνδέομαι	συν on eras.	changed from συνδέομαι	as Tub.
137 C ἀποκρινουμένον	[^υ νομένου Δ]	-νομένου	„
138 B τῷ γάρ τι εἶναι	... εἶη	... εἶη, changed to εἶναι	„
141 D τε αὐτοῦ ἅμα	so	τε ἅμα αὐτοῦ	„ (but αὐτοῦ)
142 D [καὶ ... λέγεται]	„	omit	„
148 E κατέχον ἐκείνης ἧ	„	... ἐν ἧ	„
152 B ὑπερβήσεται	-β..η(. . eras.)	ὑπερβούσεται	„ (o patched).
154 C νεώτερον δ' οὐ :	so	γίγνεται added later in marg.	γίγνεται later above.
155 E καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα	τ on eras.	καὶ περιττὰ ἄλλα	„
158 C τὸ ὀλίγιστον	τ. -τόν	τὸ ὀλιγοστόν	-γιστόν.
159 A ὅμοι' ἂν εἶη	so	ὅμοια ἂν εἶη	„
160 D οὐδὲν ... μὴ εἶναι marg.	„	omit	„
161 B δηλονότι εἶη	„	δηλονότι εἶη	-νοτείη (ται patched and dots below οτ).
162 D τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν	τῷ on eras.	τό γε μ.	„
165 B ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη :	ἐν „	ἐμφαίνεσθαι : ἀνάγκη : ...	„

These striking coincidences are sufficient to establish an unusually close connection between the two Mss. Again, both differ in various ways from ℥ in the use of αἰεὶ, ἀεὶ : and both read τί δέ uniformly for the τί δαί of ℥. Yet if we seek to infer the derivation of either from the other we are met by very serious difficulties. These arise more especially in connection with omissions. We have found reason to regard Π as a very carelessly written codex. Tub., while much more prettily written, gives proof of similar inattention. In ℥ there are but three serious cases of error arising from this source :—a repetition, 142 D, the omission of κατέχον, 148 E, and of a considerable phrase, 160 D. What the condition of Π is with regard to repetitions has been already seen. In Tub. we find, 147 B, οὔτε αὐτὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνός μορίου, 150 B, ναί : οὔτε γε ἐν παντὶ αὐτῷ μέρει, 156 B, τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, and 161 E, ἧ οὐχ οὔτω ; twice written, not to speak of smaller signs of carelessness. It is, however, the question of omissions that is the vital one, and here the Mss. ΠTub.DR are all brought under consideration. The blanks which exist in one or more of these will, for the sake of clearness, be referred to both according to the paging of Stephanus and according to that of this edition. DR are quoted from Bekker.

P. z.	127 E [τοῦτο δὲ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια]	omitted in Tub.	added later at foot.
3.	128 CD [πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ]	„	added later in margin.
4.	129 B [τοῦ ἐνός, και θους αὐτῷ μετέχειν.]	„	added later in margin.
* 6.	131 C [ἧ οὐ τὸ ἧ οὐν ὄλον]	„	not added.
8.	133 E [ἀλλ' ἄν- ταῦτ' ἐστίν]	„	added later in margin.

8.	I 34 A	[οὐ τῆς παρ' -σπήμῃ]	omitted in Tub. II : added later in marg. of Tub.
9.	I 34 D	[οὐτ' αν ἦ δεσπόσειεν]	„ II : added later, brown, in marg.
10.	I 36 A	[μᾶλλον εἰ βούλει]	„ „ „
* 10.	I 36 B	[καὶ αὐθις αὖ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα]	„ Tub. not added.
11.	I 37 D	[ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἐληθῆ]	„ DR.
12.	I 38 A	[οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῃ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη:]	„ Tub. not added.
12.	I 38 A	[ἐν ἄλλῃ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον]	„ D.
13.	I 39 B	[οὐκ ἔοικεν: ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ]	„ Tub. added coarse in margin.
13.	I 39 B	[καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶη]	„ „ added in margin.
14.	I 40 B	[ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον]	„ „ added in lower margin.
15.	I 41 A	? [ἦ [τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲ πρᾶσβύτερον οὐδὲ]	„ „ „ „
* 15.	I 41 B	[τοῦ δὲ γεγονέναι]	„ „ not added: words patched to give sense.
18.	I 44 A	[καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις]	„ „ seems to be noted.
20.	I 47 A	[ἀλλὰ πη μὴ ἐν ἦν]	„ „ added later in margin.
20.	I 47 A	[τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἔν]	„ II added in orig. (?) in marg.
21.	I 47 D	[οὐκ ἐκένο; -λάκις]	„ D cf. II.
22.	I 48 D	[τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ ἀπτεσθαι]	„ II added, dark in margin.
* 23.	I 50 A	[ἐνείη -λου αὐτοῦ]	„ Tub. not added.

25-6.	I 52 C	[ἐπειδ' ἂν τύχη γιγνώμενον:]	omitted in Tub.	added late, rude.
26.	I 53 A	[οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν : ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα]	IID	not added in II.
27.	I 53 D	[πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι : τῶν ἄλλων]	D.	
27.	I 53 E	[ὥστ' εἰ μὴ ἔν]	Tub.	not added.
* 27	I 54 A	[οὔτε νεώτερον]	IID	not added.
* 27.	I 54 C	[οὐ γὰρ οὔν : γίγνεται :]	IID	not added.
29.	I 56 B	[ὄτ' ἂν δὲ ἀπόλλυται :]	IID	added later in margin.
30.	I 56 D	[οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς μεταβάλλει]	IID	added late.
* 30.	I 57 B	[πῶς δ' οὐ ; ἐν εἰ ἔστιν]	IID	not added.
31.	I 58 B	(a gap of three words, but ?) μήτε [ἐν μὴ τε] ἐνὸς	IID	added in margin.
* 32.	I 59 A	[αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐναντιώτατά τε]	IID	not added in margin II.
* 33.	I 60 C	The words in margin of 33	IID	added in margin II.
34.	I 61 D	[ἔστι γὰρ : σμικρότης]	II	added, brown in margin.
35.	I 62 A	[εὐθὺς ἔσται μὴ εἶναι]	R.	
35.	I 62 A	how much ? [εἰ μέλλει ὄν [μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ ὄν,] εἰ καὶ	Tub.	added later, outer margin.
35.	I 62 B	[φαίνεται μὴ ἔστι :]	IID	added later.
36.	I 63 B	δὲ οὐ [γίγνεται ἐν μὴ ὄν]	II	added brown in margin.
* 37.	I 64 A	[ἢ τὸ τοῦτο]	Tub.	not added.

From this synopsis it seems clear (1) that II cannot be derived from Tub. since it contains at intervals ten passages at least of which there is in Tub. no trace ; (2) that Tub. is not likely to have come from II since it gives three passages which are not found in II. It is conceded that 33 is much older than either ; and accordingly two conclusions are open to us as alternatives, (a) either Tub. and II both come from 33, or an early copy or copies of it now lost ; (β) or all three descend from one original now lost. In the former case indirect descent seems the more likely, because while all three closely resemble in many ways, the divergences between II and

Tub., when compared with \mathfrak{A} , do not seem easily explicable on the theory of direct descent. Assuming indirect descent, again, we may justly infer thus much—that the copy or copies from which Π Tub. come must have been taken from \mathfrak{A} at a date

- before
1. $\tau\acute{\iota} \delta\acute{\epsilon}$; was changed to $\tau\acute{\iota} \delta\alpha\acute{\iota}$;
 - „ 2. $\alpha\acute{\iota}\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ „ „ $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ from page 147 onward.
 - „ 3. $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu$ was inserted in the margin at 148 E.
 - „ 4. $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\tau\tau\acute{\alpha}$ was changed to $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota} \tau\acute{\alpha}$ in 155 E.
 - „ 5. $\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\delta}\epsilon\nu \dots \lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu \mu\grave{\eta} \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ was inserted in the margin at 160 D.

An attempt might be made to reason to the exact connection from the character of the omissions above, but the result is not clear. We should have almost positive evidence of descent from \mathfrak{A} if any of the blanks consisted of an exact line of \mathfrak{A} , not merely the equivalent of a line but a line in point of fact. We have no gap of that character. Our nearest approach to such a gap is the one common to Π Tub. at 134 A, which is the exact equivalent of a line yet not actually one. Such a gap may be suggestive but is no proof. One has only to glance at the various gaps given to see that the mistakes which the eye of a copyist may make, while very generally connected with one another by the bond of a repeated word, come under no rule as regards the relative positions in which the two cases of the repeated word stand to each other. As respects supposition β , there does not appear to be anything which makes against it. But we may say that even if it be the fact that $\mathfrak{A}\Pi$ Tub. come from a common original, the superiority of \mathfrak{A} is so undoubted and the errors in the text of this dialogue are so few and unimportant that reasons for considering the supposed independent evidence of the two latter Mss. are almost non-existent.

What then is to be our verdict upon the authority of the various Mss. of the first family $\mathfrak{A}\Delta\Pi$ Tub.DR...? Something like this:— \mathfrak{A} is far and away the best, and so satisfactory as to give little occasion for extraneous support: Δ is derived from it, and may be set aside: Π and Tub. are extremely like it, and almost seem to be derived from it, while even if not they are far less valuable: DR—whose case the student may work out for himself—are closely associated with Π but of less value: the remainder besides being of secondary value are mere fragments. Practically, therefore, we rest upon \mathfrak{A} ; but, in as much as a collation of Tub. has not yet been published we give its readings in full. Outside of this circle we appeal to t which in some ways is more careful even than \mathfrak{A} ; and as a last resource in one or two cases we resort to conjecture. Perhaps our adherence to \mathfrak{A} would have been less decided and the results as a whole more in keeping with the character of a ‘critical edition,’ but that our text is in form so closely connected with that codex. The testimony of C. G. Cobet in favour of A and \mathfrak{A} as the sole satisfactory authorities for those works which they contain is frequent and exceedingly emphatic, even exaggerated, in character. The grounds upon which he bases his decision seem to be two: that these Mss. not only give the soundest text as judged by the test of intelligibility, but likewise preserve more faithfully than others the true Attic forms of many words which scribes had a tendency to modify. Thus, speaking of A—though other passages show that \mathfrak{A} also is to some extent included—he says

Mnemosyne, ix.
1860, p. 337, etc.

Mnem. Nova
Series III. 195.

Namque non tantum locis plurimis manifesto veras lectiones *solus* servavit, sed etiam antiquae dialecti Atticae rationem et usum in iis quae constanter in caeteris scioli et inepti correctores contaminare solent intactam et inviolatam solus omnium ad nos propagavit. Quod quale sit paucis exemplis demonstrare operae pretium est.

	Parisinus.	caeteri.
Critias 108 E	βασιλῆς	-λείς.
109 A	ἀνειλλομένη	ἀνειλουμένη, -ελομένη.
109 B	νομῆς	-μείς.
109 D	σέσωται	-σται.
110 A	διασέσωται	„
111 C	σᾶ	σῶα.
112 A	πύκνα, πικνὸς	πνύκα, etc. . .
121 B	ἐμπιμπλάμενοι	ἐμπιπλάμενοι, etc.

Plusquam perfectum apud Platonem more majorum exibat in -η, tertia persona ante vocalem et in sententiae exitu in -ειν In Platonis Codicibus duobus optimis Clarkiano et Parisino A formae in -η saepe comparent, sed in Parisino futilis corrector *fere semper* -η eraso de suo -ειν substituit

Again he says when criticizing the edition of Schanz :—

Itaque speraveram fore ut in prima Tetralogia, quae prodiit, unum solum testem produceret egregium illum Clarkianum B et ex caeteris paucula quaedam sumere satis haberet sicubi boni aliquid aut lacunae supplendae aut ab acuto lectore feliciter emendatum contineret.

B = Bodleianum.
Fleck. Jahrb.
Bd. 113, 1876.

A. Jordan likewise uses this argument about old Attic forms as evidence of the superiority of A \mathfrak{A} , while he points out that Schanz on the authority of \mathfrak{A} reproduces the forms *θνήσκω*, *μιμνήσκω*, *σφῆξω*, *ζῶον*, *πρώην*, *ἄσμενος*, and others. Again, there is the much vexed question of the use of *ν* ephelestikon. What we find in regard to this form in \mathfrak{A} is a two-fold peculiarity; the *ν* is used in many cases where no hiatus would be caused by its absence, and is omitted where a hiatus is the result. This indicates a distinct absence of method when compared with many authorities, and is on that ground regarded as evidence of the age and purity of its source, the tendency of Alexandrian and other early commentators being to establish and adhere to an intelligible rule.

Fleck. Suppl.
Bd. 7, 1873-5,
and as above.

D 1xxvii.

On the other hand, the contention of Cobet that any independent readings found in less valuable Mss. are due to conjecture alone is emphatically put aside by both Wohlrab and Jordan on the ground both of inherent improbability and of the incontestable fact that blanks in the best Mss. have to be supplied from the inferior ones, which must have got the material from a source distinct from that of the others. Again, as we have seen already, it is pointed out that we find Plato cited by authors like Stobaeus and Eusebius who lived long before our earliest Mss. were written, and if the texts of these authors can be relied on, he is sometimes quoted in a form different from the text transmitted by A \mathfrak{A} . Also cases are given in which the 'old Attic forms' have been preserved in the family β when family *a*, at least as represented by \mathfrak{A} ITub. etc., give an inferior form: thus in certain places t reads *ἀλιῆς* and

ἐμπίμπλησι where \mathfrak{A} gives ἀλιεῖς -πίπλησι. On this and other grounds it is maintained by some that while most Mss. of the β family are inferior to those of the other, this does not at all hold in regard to t the best Ms. of that family, and still less does it hold when the respective sources of the two families are considered. Indeed Jordan Hermes, xiii. 1878. quite turns the tables in the following manner. He takes up the text of the Republic for which we possess as authorities both A and t: and after a comparison of these two he comes to the conclusion that t is actually a copy of A. He contends that both in text and scholia the two agree as completely as is humanly possible, while little mistakes occur which tend to show that the writer of t had A before him, but mis-read it. He goes on to infer that in tetralogies I-VII. t is a copy of the lost first volume of A, from which it seems to follow that even for these works it is on the whole to be preferred to \mathfrak{A} , if Cobet's verdict upon the authority of A is accepted. Jordan does not seem quite to accept it, but is content to place At in the same class as contradistinguished from \mathfrak{A} . There is, of course, no proof that A had a first volume.

The latest episode, and one of the most interesting and unexpected, in the his- Early papyri. tory of the Platonic text is that arising from the discovery in Egypt of the Flinders Petrie papyri, which seem to date from the third century before the Christian era. These papyri contain among other things fragments of the Phaedo in a very dilapidated condition, extending over pp. 67 D-69 A, 80 D-84 A of Stephanus. A glance at these documents at once reveals that they differ from the text of our best Mss. both by transpositions, by omissions, and by various readings, while the gaps which occur compel us to infer that the contents destroyed must have been of different extent from the corresponding passages in \mathfrak{A} . Nor are these divergences superficial; they are numerous and striking. Such a discovery tends to make students of Plato most uneasy. Is our text, preserved in three of the most valuable Greek Mss. in existence, so little entitled after all to our confidence and support? One ray of comfort appears in the fact that the differences though numerous do not affect the argument; the substance of Plato's reasoning remains as we have been accustomed to understand it. A further study of the papyrus tends rather to re-assure us. Although in some respects the sense seems slightly to gain by little omissions, the general character of the text is not such as we should be disposed to take in exchange for our own. One is tempted to consider that although an early it is yet a careless transcript, and one feels entitled to wait for much more extensive materials before deciding against the testimony of our highest authorities. Where the value of the latest discovery seems unquestionable is in matters of spelling and pronunciation. Thus we have ἀιδῆ -δές Usener, König. Gesellsch. der Wissensch. Götting. Nachrichten, Nos. 2, 6, 1892. for ἀειδῆ -δές, οὐθέν μῆθεν and their cases. For indications of sound again we find ἐμ φιλοσοφία, θεῶν γένος, τούτωμ μὲν, ὄσομ μή, τοσοῦτογ κακόν, ἄμ μάλιστα. These last show how in the writer's time and by persons among whom he moved sounds were assimilated in pronunciation. And they may, though not certainly, represent the actual speech of Plato. On this subject we may refer to Blass and Meisterhans, whose Blass, Aussprache des Griechischen, 1888. Meisterh. Gram. der Attisch. Inschriften, 1888. detailed and sometimes even statistical treatment of Greek spelling and pronunciation

as exemplified in the inscriptions of the time is most instructive. But assimilation would go further with stone-cutters and scribes than with high-born authors.

II.

DESCRIPTIVE. WE propose now, for the information of any who may take an interest in such matters, to give a more or less detailed description of the three great manuscripts to which reference has repeatedly been made, taking them in the assumed chronological order.

I. PARIS A,
No. 1807.

PARIS A. This volume is strongly and handsomely bound in red leather tooled with gold. On the back it is marked, upon a small round paper label, ^{GR.} 1807; but we find written in the middle of the upper margin of the first leaf of the text an earlier number xciv, while in the outer margin, opposite, 94.2087 appear upon an erasure. Before the text come four plain leaves of vellum. A Latin table of contents on paper is pasted on the face of the first, while near the top of the second face of the fourth is written in a very careless and late hand a *πίναξ* in Greek. The following are the contents, no attempt being made to reproduce the style of writing. The heading is invariably written in the upper margin of the column in which the dialogue begins, and the text begins with the first line of the column. Pale and rather coarse lines in red ink are made in the margin to receive the title, sometimes 3, one for each line of the title, sometimes 2, the title going above, between and below them.

Contents.

	Heading.		Ending.
Kλειτοφῶν	+ Πλάτωνος + ἡ προτρεπτικός ΚΘ	} fol. 1 recto, col. i. 3 red lines	Kλειτοφῶν ἡ προτρεπτικός small flourish } 2 vers., c. ii. l. 40. includes flourish.
Πολιτεῖαι A	+ Πλάτωνος + ἡ περὶ δικαίου scr. Λ	} 3 r., i. ,,	Πολιτείας ἡ περὶ δικαίου A } 14 r., i. 44.
B	as above exactly, including scratch ΛΑ	} 14 r., ii. ,,	as above exactly B } 24 v., ii. 12.
Γ	,, no scratch ΔΒ	} 25 r., i. ,,	,, ,, Γ } 37 v., i. 17.
,,	,, ΔΓ	} 37 v., iii. hangs from 3 red lines	,, ,, Δ } 48 v., i. 24.
,,	,, ΔΔ	} 48 v., ii. 2 red lines	,, ,, E } 61 v., i. 17.

Heading.		Ending.	
S	as above exactly, no scratch ΛΕ	} 61 v., ii. 2 red lines as above	as above exactly S } 72 v., ii. 39.
Z	" " " ΑΣ	} 73 r., i. hangs from 3 red lines	" " Z } 83 v., i. 22.
H	" " " ΛΖ	} 83 v., ii. red under first and through last	" " H } 94 r., i. 37.
Θ	" " " ΛΗ	} 94 r., ii. hangs from 3 red lines	" a scratch Θ } 102 v., ii. 15.
I	" " " ΛΘ	} 103 r., i. as in last	" " I } 114 r., i. 9.
Τίμαιος	+ Πλάτωνος + ἡ περὶ φύσεως M	} 114 r., ii. a red line above and below second line of title	Τίμαιος ἡ περὶ φύσεως } 144 v., ii. 44. is darker than others
Κριτίας	as above MA ἡ ἀτλαντικός	} 145 r., i. as above	title not repeated 151 r., ii. 31. The margin of 151 is cut off close to the text, which is slightly injured on both pages.
Μίνως	as above MB ἡ περὶ νόμου	} 151 v., i. as above	Μίνως ἡ περὶ νόμου } 154 v., ii. 30. somewhat dark
Νόμοι Α	as above MΓ ἡ νομοθεσία	} 155 r., i. hangs from 3 pale red lines	Νόμων ἡ νομοθεσία } 165 r., i. 40. as above
B	as above MΔ	} 165 r., ii. as above	as above B } 173 v., ii. 42.
Γ	" " but darker ME	} 174 r., i. as above	" " Γ } 184 v., i. 14.
Δ	as above MS	} 184 v., ii. 2 red lines	" " Δ } 193 r., i. 11.
E	" " " MZ	} 193 r., ii. as above	" " E } 202 r., i. 20
S	" " darker MH	} 202 r., ii. "	" " S } 216 r., i. 22

	Heading.		Ending.	
Z	as above, darker MΘ	} 216 r., ii. } as above	as above	Z } 231 v., ii. 24.
H	" " last word dark N dark	} 232 r., i. } "	" "	H } 241 v., i. 44.
Θ	" " " dark NA	} 241 v., ii. } "	" "	Θ } 255 v., ii. 8.
I	" " " " NB	} 256 r., i. } "	" " dark	I } 267 r., i. 43.
IA	" " " dark NΓ	} 267 r., i. } "	" "	IA } 278 v., ii. 7.
IB	" " " " NΔ	} 279 r., i. } "	" "	IB } 291 r., i. 24.
'Επινομίς	+ Πλάτωνος + NE	} 291 r., ii. } "	'Επινομίς	ἡ φιλόσοφος } 299 v., i. 18.
	as above 'Επιστολαί NS	} 299 v., ii. } "		
A	Πλάτων Διονυσίωι εὖ πράττειν·	299 v., ii. 1 ends line 25.		Letter A although on the first
B	" " "	300 r., i. 28 " 15.		line of the column has a redline
Γ	" χαίρειν·	302 r., i. 18 " 12.		coarsely drawn through the
Δ	" Δίωι συρακοῦσ σίωι εὖ πράττειν·	304 r., i. 14 " 19.		title: Δ has a red line below
E	" Περδίκκαι εὖ πράττει·	304 v., i. 22		the first and through the
S	" 'Ερμείαι κ, 'Ερά στωι κ, Κορίσκωι εὖ πράττει·	} in upper margin, 305 r., i. } 2 red lines, ends 44.		second line of the title: SZ are,
Z	" τοῖς Δίωνος οἰκεῖ οἰς τὲ κ, ἑταίροις εὖ πράττει·	} in upper margin, 305 v., i. } 2 red lines, ends 317 r. ii. 5.		like the titles of dialogues, in

Z has what seems to be an ending with the word *εἰρημένα*: on p. 317 r. as noted. But the scribe or his original seems to have had some difficulty at the point, 311 v. 34 (339 v, Hermann, vol. 6), where Plato refers to a letter of Dionysius, as to whether the letter did not there end. A gap of four lines was left which was filled up by putting ÷ ÷ ÷ ÷ *πηι φραζουσα* ÷ ÷ ÷ in line 34, giving twelve ÷ in each of lines 35, 36, 37, and beginning 38 with *Διονύσιος Πλάτωνι τὰ νόμιμα* as if it were the title of a new letter. After *εἰρημένα*, on 317, we have four vacant lines and then *ἂ δ' ἄν διανοηθέντες*, etc., which Hermann treats as the beginning of the letter H, and to which he prefixes a title which is the duplicate of that given to Z above. It is not so treated in the Ms.: nor are the numerical capitals that stand opposite the remaining letters written in the original, but by a later hand.

α δ' ἀν διανοηθέντες κ.τ.λ.	317 r. ii. 10 ends 319 v. i. 13.	Hermann gives five additional letters which are not found in this manuscript.
[H] Πλάτων, Ἀρχύται τα ραντίνωι. εὖ πράττειν·	} hang from red lines,	
[Θ] ,, Ἀριστοδώρωι εὖ πράττειν·	} 319 v. i. 16 ends 319 v. ii. 13.	
[I] ,, Λαοδάμαντι εὖ πράττειν·	} 319 v. ii. 16 ,, 319 v. ii. 32.	
[IA] ,, Ἀρχύται τα ραντίνωι εὖ πράττειν·	} 319 v. ii. 35 ,, 320 r. ii. 9.	
[IB] ,, Διονυσίωι τυράννωι συρακουσσῶν, εὖ πράττειν·	} 320 r. ii. 12 ,, 320 r. ii. 35.	
	} 320 r. ii. 38.	Πλάτωνος ἐπιστολαί } 322 r. i. 14. flourish.
+ Ὅροι + ΝΖ.	} 322 r. ii. upper marg.	* Ὅροι * } 324 v. ii. 20. flourish.

Each definition ends with : followed by a slight blank.

+ Πλάτωνος νοθευόμενοι·	Above the usual position of the title as if added later by the scribe.	
+ περὶ Δικαίου + NH	} 325 r. i. upper marg. } hangs from a red line.	περὶ δικαίου } 326 r. ii. 40. flourish.
+ περὶ Ἀρετῆς + NΘ	} 326 v. i. as above.	π. Ἀ. } 328 r. i. 32.
+ Δημόδοκος ἡ περὶ τῆς συμβουλευέσεως·	} 328 r. ii. as above.	* Δ. ἡ π. τ. σ. } 331 r. i. 23.
+ Σίσυφος ἡ περὶ τῆς βουλευέσεως·	} 331 r. ii. from } 2 red lines.	Σ. ἡ π. τ. β. } 333 r. i. 42.
+ Ἀλκων ἡ περὶ μεταμορφώσεως·	} 323 r. ii. as above.	'Α. ἡ π. μ. } 334 r. ii. be- low line 44
+ Ἐρυξίας ἡ περὶ πλούτου·	} 334 v. i. as above.	E. ἡ π. π. (ἡ ἐρασί, στρατος } 341 r. ii. 27. in outer margin).
In the middle space opposite the title are to which the words in the margin at the end correspond.		{ ἐν ἄλλῳ } { ἡ ἐρασί, στρατ.
+ Ἀξίochos ἡ περὶ θανάτου·	} 341 v. i. as above.	'Α. ἡ π. θ. } 344 v. i. 27.

So ends the Ms. on line 27 of the first column on the back of folio 344. There is no trace of a name or a date of any kind; but in the outer margin opposite there is a statement by a later hand in smaller style and yellow-brown ink as follows:—

ὠρθώθη ἡ βίβλος αὐτή·

ἰπὸ κ^ω μητροπ^ω ἱερα^ω

τ^ω εὖ ὠνησαμένδ.

= κωνσταντίνου μητροπολίτου ἱερα(σ)πόλεως

= τοῦ καὶ

Authorities differ as to whether the name of the city is one word or two, Cobet being of the former opinion. If he is right it must be the Hierapolis near Laodicea which, according to Le Quien, was erected into a metropolitan see in the 5th century. No Constantine, however, is named as in office there. But we find mention made of *Constantinus sacerdos* and calligraphist, in 1125 A.D., and of another, a presbyter and calligraphist, in 1326 A.D. The text is followed by three clean sheets of vellum, which, like those at the beginning, have probably been inserted when it was last bound.

Montf. Appendix, cf. Gardth. p. 378.

Style and details.

The codex is in fine preservation; indeed, Cobet says, 'non memini me videre integriorem librum neque emendatiorem.' It has suffered a little at the beginning by damp creeping in from behind; it has lost the margin of fol. 151, which has slightly injured the end of the Critias and the beginning of the Minos, and in various places small holes have been drilled in the sheets by insects; but for all practical purposes it is as perfect and legible as when it was written,—now more than a thousand years ago. The size of the volume exclusive of the binding is 35.5 × 24.8 × 8.8 centimetres. The material is firm yellowish vellum. The page consists of two columns, each containing 44 written lines, which are bounded perpendicularly by double lines at each side; the length of each col. is 26.5 and its breadth according as both perpendicular lines at each side, or only the inner ones are included, is 8.1 or 6.8, while the free space between the cols. from outer to outer perpendicular line is 2.3 centimetres. The breadths of the free margins are—inner 1.6, upper 3.5, outer 4.8, under 5.7. All these figures, especially the last group, are slightly variable. The vellum is made up in quaternions, that is, sets of four pieces laid together, then folded across and stitched, so as to give 8 leaves and 16 pages; there are 43 quaternions, but the 43rd wants the 8th leaf. Originally each quaternion would be lettered, but the only trace of this which seems to remain is at the outer upper corner of fol. 177 r. where \bar{K} —the following Γ having been cut off in binding—represents the 23rd; more recently they have been numbered by small figures 2, 3, 4, placed at the inner upper corner. A late reader has carelessly numbered the front side of the leaves: after 243 he puts 245, but there is no gap; and in the third hundred the hundreds figure is often corrected. Each piece of parchment before being folded as part of its quaternion has received a complete set of rulings which are colourless, being, as usual, indented on one side by some blunt pointed instrument so firmly as to project on the other. This ruling seems to have been done on the outer or hair side of the vellum. The bounding lines are the following, on each unfolded piece:—

1. 8 double perpendicular lines to mark off the sides of the four cols.
2. Single perpendicular lines near the outer edge of the two outer margins, 3.8 removed from the outer boundary of the cols.
3. A horizontal line about 1.9 above the writing.
4. Double horizontal lines of which the lower is 2.6 below the writing.
All these are carried from edge to edge of the vellum.
5. 44 lines for writing, which begin at the left side of the first col. and go right across the four cols., ending somewhat unevenly at the outer edge of the fourth.

E. M. Thompson, Palaeography, p. 63, etc.

In laying the ruled pieces together for stitching, indented side touched indented, and projecting touched projecting, or, as Mr. Thompson puts it, hair side touched hair side and flesh side flesh side.



The writing hangs from the lines, save that the upper parts of the letters $\delta \epsilon \eta \theta \iota \kappa \phi$ project above them. The text is written in dark brown ink; the titles and some of the notes are reddish. One commentator writes in dark green.

The text is written throughout by the same scribe, who seems to have added the titles after the body of the work was finished. Sometimes his ink seems to have failed, and he has retouched

letters, as on 184 r., 189 v., 190 r., after refilling his pen. After learning more of \mathfrak{A} , Bekker changed his view that this Ms. was written in the tenth century, saying 'patet Parisiensem primum (A), Index Codicum. qui omnes habet altioris vetustatis notas, perperam in catalogo Paris. ad decimum seculum referri. Conf. Bast ad Corinth., p. 81.' Bast here speaks of 'praestantissimus Codex 1807 (seculi noni),' Gregor. Corinth. ed. Schaefer, Lipsiae, 1811. After looking over the plates of the Palaeographical Society and comparing all three Mss. concerned, we have come to the conclusion that the writing which most resembles that of this codex is that of the Clarke Ms. and of the Oxford Euclid, whose dates are fixed at 895 and 888 A.D. respectively. But the Paris one seems to be older than either of these. So far as the capital letters are concerned, a judgment is difficult to form. They are small, erect, and rather stiff, but present no special feature save that A, Δ and Λ do not terminate in a point at the top, but in a short horizontal stroke. In the body of the text, which is in minuscules in all three Mss., we have a better means of reaching a conclusion. At a general glance the first observation that occurs is that in whatever order A and \mathfrak{A} may stand, the Euclid comes between them: this amounts to the verdict that A comes first. The Euclid and \mathfrak{A} differ from A in having their letters of a uniform thickness: A, while using apparently a broader pen, aims at varying his strokes to some slight extent. In all three the writing is most carefully formed and erect, but \mathfrak{A} inclines more than either of the others to round off the angles of letters, while A makes them as abrupt as a continuous stroke will permit. In all, the lines of the letters generally finish in a dot or 'blob,' but in \mathfrak{A} this seems to be often managed by carrying the pen a little back upon its stroke, while in A the scribe ends his lines with a distinctly formed dot. A and Euc. agree in writing σ, φ, as $\sigma \ \phi$; \mathfrak{A} gives $\sigma \ \phi$. In A ε is written ϵ , in \mathfrak{A} it is ϵ . The initial letters in A stand in the space between the perpendicular lines which bound the columns: like those of the Euc. they are quite plain, and differ from the text only by being considerably larger. There is an even more noticeable formality in the breathings and accentuation. While \mathfrak{A} and Euc. give these with some variety and inattention as seen in the facsimiles, A emphasizes its care by the forms $\sim \ \grave{\sim} \ \acute{\sim} \ \circ \ \grave{\sim}$; and Schanz says that while \mathfrak{A} often omit accents on prepositions before nouns, A never does. Ligature of letters is employed freely: here, for example, is the opening of the Republic, the ligatures being indicated by a closer position of the letters so treated.

Κατεβην χθες ει σπει ρ αι υ μετα
 γλαυ κω ν ο σ το υ αρ ι στω ν ο σπρ ο
 σευξ ο μεν ο σ τε τη θεω ι και α
 ματην εο ρ την βο υ λο μεν ο σ θε
 ασσθαι.

Composite names in the titles are marked by a line below the junction Κλειτροφῶν: in the text also they are marked when they are divided by the end of a line Θρασύμαχος. Ordinary words are not invariably so divided or marked in the text. There is almost nothing ornamental about the Ms. but what occurs at the conclusions of the various works, a sample of which may be given. It is almost uniform throughout.





ἦν διεληλύθαμεν εὖ πράττω
 μεν 
 ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ ἩΠΕΡΙΔΙΚΑΪΣΙ


Notes and hands
in the margin.

We pass now to the margins: i. (1) The speakers are usually named at the beginning of each dialogue, the names being placed as a rule between the columns under the heading ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ | ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ in two lines of small capitals, τοῦ διαλόγου being contracted. The names are in minuscules. Changes of speaker are marked in the text by :, and in the margin by —, between the double bounding lines of the column, while outside these lines the name is generally given, in full for the first appearance, and often, though not invariably, in contracted form afterwards, thus:—

Margin.	Col.	Margin.	Col.
θρασύμαχος *	: καὶ ὁ θρασύμαχος	λ πο	:
πολεμαρχ ^ο	.	κ σω	:

(2) The same hand, or one indistinguishable from it, also puts in the margin a number of scholia and brief notes, and synonyms for words in the text, the spaces for these being sometimes ruled in red. These are in small capitals with ordinary contractions. (3) The same hand has given at intervals various symbols and remarks in the margin. Such are those for Γρ. Πρ. and the following—

- | | | | | | | |
|----|---|----------------------------|-----------|---|--------------------------------|------------|
| 1. |  | = χρησίμη ^{-ον} ? | 82 v. ii. |  | = σημείωσαι δι' ὅλου τὸ χωρίον | 318 r. ii. |
| | ΠΑΡΑΙΝΕΣΙΣ | | | Δ | | |
| | Κ, ΤΠΟΘΗΚΗ | | | Γ' | | |
| 2. |  | ΤΗΝ ἘΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ | 16 v. i. | Δ | | |
| | „ Τὸ ΔΡΙΜὺ ΤΗΣ ἘΠΙΒΟΛ ^Σ | | 18 r. ii. | Θ | | |
| | ἌΣΤΕΙΟΝ | | 27 r. ii. | Τ | | |
| | ἘΡ ^ο ΨΕΥΔΟΥΣ | | 24 r. ii. | Ο' | | |
| 3. |  | = ὁραῖον | | Χ | | |
| | | | | Ω | | |
| | | | | Ρ | | |
| | | | | Γ' | | |
| | | | | Ο | | |
| | | | | Ν | | |

Two of these signs may be compared with their counterparts in the margin of our text, pp. 6, 15, 25; and the comparison will strengthen the evidence in favour of the greater age of this codex.

ii. Other hands also appear, but it would need considerable expertness to distinguish them accurately. There appear to be two which use dark brown ink, one small and delicate, the other somewhat larger: both of a date decidedly later than the first. We have seen that the owner of the book claims to have revised it, and there are distinct traces of corrections upon erasures in the text, which are in the same ink as his closing statement, notably a considerable sprinkling of a thin capital Η. Notes of his seem to occur on 10 r. i., 17 r. outer margin, 20 r., 25 v., 131 v. Then there is the green hand already mentioned, and one which makes a few ugly notes in pencil. Schanz points out that the Ms. after being completed has been compared with other texts, and entries appear such as—ἐν ἄλλῃ οὕτως εἶδρον, οἶμαι δ' ὅτι καὶ κρείττον τοῦτο.

While the codex is written with admirable care, one can see on turning over its pages that there are several sorts of errors in it which recur pretty frequently. (a) Omissions inadvertently

Errors and
corrections.

made are supplied by running the omitted words out into the margins either by the original or by some of the later hands: cases occur at 24 r. i. 43, 177 r., 185 r. i. 29, ii. 41, 273 r. i. (β) Other errors are corrected by erasures with or without their being replaced: (so far as linguistic forms are concerned, Cobet holds that errors are perpetrated thus:) cases occur 17r. ii., 185 r., 207 r. (apparently by Constantine), 227 v. ii. 44, 231 r. i., and others. The erasure which has most interest for us is that in which the form *τί δαί* is repeatedly substituted in neat small letters for *τί δ...*—the original being indistinguishable: cases occur 25 r. i. twice, 54 v., i. 12, 55 r. i. 21, 56 v. ii. 40, 57 r. i. 16, 184 v. ii. 20 and 35, with not a few others. We have likewise *τίς δαί*, 153 r. ii. 3 and 13, and elsewhere. (γ) In several cases space has been left for words about which for some reason the scribe was uncertain. These are filled in by a species of asterisk (÷), at the rate of twelve to a line: one case is 54 v. i., where five occur, another 227 v., ii. 22, *-μείν ÷ ÷ ÷ τίς οὐν αὐτή. καὶ*, another 240 r. i.; where lines 9, 10 have twelve each, a fourth is the one referred to above in epistle Z; in one case a line is drawn from the word before the space to that after it. The most serious patch in the codex, combining both erasures, blank spaces, and words entered on such spaces, occurs in the last of the spurious dialogues, and extends over eleven lines, the last three of col. i. and first eight of col. ii. in 342 v. It seems clear that here the writer had an incomplete text before him. There are, of course, gaps in the text which only one who has collated it carefully can discover. Schanz has done so, and finds at least the following of 15 letters—*ποία δ' ὀποίου βίου* Rep. III., 400 A, and two large gaps from Laws VI., 745 A, *θεοῖς*—745 C, *κλήρους δέ*, and 783 B, *παίδων*—783 D, *καλῶς*, which represent 674 and 699 letters respectively. Taking several of the passages omitted and afterwards supplied, he finds that they contain respectively, 17, 17 or 16, 15, 17, 18, 18 letters. He then assumes that these represent lines of A's original, and that the large gaps represent columns which at the same rate would have about 40 lines. In A the lines are about 21-3 letters, and the page has 44 lines. Schanz thinks that the original was of the same size and arrangement, but written in majuscules and so containing less per line and col. He cites omissions of 46, 41, 39, 37, 35, 39, 48, 46, 44, 35 letters, which seem to him multiples of lines. It is noteworthy that the unutilized lines in the Flinders Petrie papyri comprise 22-26 letters. It may be added that Graux, a high authority on palaeographic questions, considered that two unsigned Mss. 'savoir ... le *Palatinus* des Paradoxographes (No. 398, à Heidelberg), et le *Damascius de Venise* (*Marcianus* 246)' are by the same hand as Paris A. So far as the latter is concerned, the facsimile given in the 'Mélanges Graux' seems to leave no room for doubt. We conclude our description by giving the contents of one page of the Ms., after Cobet with very slight corrections. It represents the opening of the Critias on the face of fol. 145. At the left side the writing begins uniformly from the inner of the two perpendicular bounding lines of the column, but on the right it stops irregularly at any point between the inner and outer of these lines which may be found convenient. The same holds of all manuscripts as a rule: and the practice is exemplified in our text. But the printed reproductions, as is natural where the letters are of a strictly regulated size instead of being hand-made in each case, exaggerates the inequalities which occur. We do not undertake that the stops are invariably correct. Commas are rarely original; and while there are in use three points, upper, middle and lower (·, ·, ·), the second is not represented here. When letters are not large it is not easily distinguished from the first. In modern times we appear to have inverted what was the original significance of the first and last. The middle one, *μέση στυγμή*, is considered to have been the least forcible, and the comma, for greater clearness no doubt, gradually superseded it.

p. xcii. above.

p. lxxxii. „

p. xcvi.

Rhein. Mus. xxxiii. 1878.

Journ. des Savants, Mai 1881, p. 309.

Paris, 1884.

Mnem. Nov. Ser. iii. 1875.

+ ΗΛΛΙΤΩΝΟΣ +

145

ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ

Ἡ ἘΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΣ.

ΜΑ.

ὡς ἄσμενος ὦ σὺ κρατεσ οἶον ἐκ ΤΙΜ^ο
 μακρῶσ ἀναπεπαυμένοσ ὁ
 δοῦ νῦν οὔτωσ ἐκ τῆσ τοῦ λόγου
 διαπορείασ¹ ἀγαπητῶσ ἀπήλ
 λαγμαί· τῶι δὲ πρὶν μὲν πάλαι
 ποτ' ἔργωι· νῦν δὲ λόγοισ ἄρ
 τι θεῶι γεγονότι προσεύχο
 μαί· τῶν ῥηθέντων ὅσα μὲν
 ἐρρήθη μετρίωσ σωτηρίαν ἢ
 μῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῶν διδόναι· πα
 ρὰ μέλοσ δὲ εἴτι περὶ αὐτῶν
 ἀκοντεσ εἴπομεν δίκην τῆν
 πρέπουσαν ἐπιτιθέναι· δίκη
 δὲ ὀρθῆ τὸν πλημμελοῦντα
 ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν ἢ οὔν τὸ λοιπὸν
 τοῖσ περὶ θεῶν γενέσεωσ ὀρ
 θῶσ λέγωμεν λόγουσ, φάρ
 μακον ἡμῖν αὐτὸν τελεώτατον
 καὶ ἄριστον φαρμάκων, ἐπιστῆ
 μην εὐχόμεθα διδόναι· προσεν
 ξάμενοι δὲ, παραδίδομεν
 κατὰ τὰσ ὁμολογίασ κριτίαι
 — τὸν ἐξῆσ λόγον· ἀλλ' ὦ τίμαιε
 δέχομαι μὲν· ὦι δὲ καὶ σὺ κα
 τ' ἀρχὰσ ἐχρήσω, συγγνώμην
 αἰτούμενοσ ὡσ περὶ μεγάλων
 μέλλων λέγειν, ταυτὸν καὶ νῦν
 ἐγὼ τοῦτο παραιτοῦμαι· μείζο
 νοσ δὲ αὐτοῦ τυχεῖν ἔτι μᾶλλον
 ἀξιῶ, περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥη
 θήσεσθαι· καίτοι σχεδὸν μὲν
 οἶδα, παραίτησιν εἶ μάλα φιλό
 τιμον καὶ τοῦ δέοντοσ ἀγροί
 κοτέραν, μέλλων παραιτεῖσθαι·
 ῥητέον δὲ ὅμωσ· ὡσ μὲν γὰρ
 οὐκ εἶ τὰ παρὰ σοῦ λεχθέντα
 εἴρηται, τίσ ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειεν
 ἔμφρων λέγειν· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ῥη
 θησόμενα, πλείονοσ συγγνώ
 μησ δεῖται χαλεπώτερα ὄντα,
 τοῦτο πειρατέον πῆι διδάξαι·
 περὶ θεῶν γὰρ ὦ τίμαιε λέγον
 τά τι πρὸσ ἀνθρώπουσ, δοκεῖν
 ἱκανῶσ λέγειν· ῥῆιον ἢ περὶ

¹ Changed to
 διαπορείασ.

² Should be
 μεμμήσθαι,
 Cobet.

Τ
ΚΡΙ

θνητῶν πρὸσ ἡμᾶσ· ἢ γὰρ ἂ
 πειρία καὶ σφόδρα ἄγνοια
 τῶν ἀκούντων περὶ ὧν ἂν οὔ
 τωσ ἔχωσιν, πολλὴν εὐπορίαν
 παρέχεσθον τῶι μέλλοντι λέ
 γειν τί περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ δὲ
 δὴ θεῶν, ἴσμεν ὡσ ἔχομεν· ἴ
 να δὲ σαφέστερον ὁ λέγω δη
 λῶσω, τῆιδέ μοι συνεπίσπεσθε·
 μίμησιν μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀπει
 κασίαν τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν
 ῥηθέντα, χρεῶν που γενέσθαι·
 τῆν δὲ τῶν γραφέων εἰδωλο
 ποιῖαν περὶ τὰ θεῖα τε καὶ τὰ
 ἀνθρώπινα σώματα γιγνομέ
 νην ἰδῶμεν· ῥαιστώνησ τε πέ
 ρι καὶ χαλεπότητοσ, πρὸσ τὸ τοῖσ
 ὀρώσιν δοκεῖν ἀποχρώντωσ
 μεμνήσθαι² καὶ κατοψόμεθα.
 ὅτι γῆν μὲν καὶ ὄρη καὶ ποτα
 μὸσ καὶ ὕλην, οὐρανόν τε καὶ
 ξύμπαντα καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν
 ὄντα καὶ ἰόντα· πρῶτον μὲν
 ἀγαπῶμεν ἂν τισ τί καὶ βρα
 χὺ πρὸσ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν ἂ
 πομιμείσθαι δυνατὸσ ἦ· πρὸσ
 δὲ τούτοισ, ἀτ' οὐδὲν εἰδότεσ
 ἀκριβεσ περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων· οὔ
 τε ἐξετάζομεν οὔτε ἐλέγχο
 μεν τὰ γεγραμμένα· σκία
 γραφίαί δὲ ἀσαφεῖ καὶ ἀπα
 τηλῶι χρώμεθα περὶ αὐτά.
 τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα ὀπότ' ἂν τισ ἐ
 πιχειρῆι σώματα ἀπεικάξειν.
 ὀξέωσ αισθανόμενοι τὸ πα
 ραιεπόμενον διὰ τῆν αἰε ξύνοι
 κον κατανόησιν· χαλεποὶ κριταί
 γιγνομέθα τῶι μὴ πάσαισ πάν
 τωσ τὰσ ὁμοιότητασ ἀποδι
 δόντι· ταῦτὸν δὴ καὶ κατὰ
 τοῖσ λόγοισ ἰδεῖν δεῖ γιγνό
 μενον· ὅτι τὰ μὲν οὐράνια καὶ
 θεῖα ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ σμικρῶσ
 εἰκότα λεγόμενα· τὰ δὲ θνη

THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPT.—We pass now to what may be called our own manuscript, which is known as ‘*U*’ or ‘Clarke 39.’ Its history has a certain romantic interest. It was written, as we shall see, about a thousand years ago, to the order of a scholarly dignitary of the Eastern Church, and is believed still to bear traces of his ownership. These facts we learn from its own pages. Our first historic trace of it is many centuries later. In the Vatican library there is a codex numbered 1205, of the sixteenth century, which, it appears, contains among other things a catalogue of books with the following title, Πιναξ τῶν ἐν τῇ σεβασμίᾳ μονῆ τῆς Νησοῦ Πατμοῦ ἀξιολογωτέρων εὑρισκομένων βιβλίων. Of this catalogue Mai says, ‘confectus fuit hic Catalogus regnante Joanne Palaeologo, qui anno 1355 floruit; nec liber recentior occurrit.’ It gives the names of 58 works (*vñ.*); and among the entries is the following, the only one which corresponds to any item in Clarke’s list,

νέ. Λόγοι Σωκράτους, ὧν ἡ ἀρχή· Εὐθύφρων, ἢ περὶ ὀσίου. Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἄχρι τοῦ Μένων, ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν (sic).

There can be no possible doubt about the identity of the work, and we thus learn that the manuscript was in the library of the Monastery of St. John at Patmos in the middle of the fourteenth century, being then more than four hundred years old. In this library, sad to say, it would probably have been left to rot, had it not, like the Elgin marbles, been carried off by a countryman of our own. At the opening of the present century Dr. Edward Daniel Clarke, in the course of his long visit to the countries lying round the Levant, met with the following incident in the island of Cos:—‘A poor little shopkeeper in *Cos* had been mentioned, by the *French* Consul, as possessor of several curious old books. We therefore went to visit him, and were surprised to find him in the midst of his wares, with a red nightcap on his head, reading the *Odyssey* of *Homer* in *manuscript*. This was fairly written upon paper, with interlineary criticisms, and a commentary in the margin. He had other *manuscript* volumes, containing works upon rhetoric, poetry, history, and theology. Nothing could induce him to part with any of these books. The account he gave was that some of them were copies of originals in the library at *Patmos*, and that his father had brought them to *Cos*. They were intended, he said, for his son, who was to be educated in the *Patmos* monastery.’ The travellers went on their way to Egypt and the Holy Land; but they did not forget the *Patmos* library, and in 1801 they were again in *Cos* and making arrangements to visit it.

‘On Tuesday, *October* the *sixth*, as we were sitting with the Governor, a *Greek* officer of the name of *Riley* arrived. He conversed with great fluency in the *Turkish* language. Hearing that we intended to visit *Patmos* he requested a passage thither. On Wednesday our interpreter, *Antonio*, returned in a small *caïque*, manned by a single family of the Island of *Casos*. The vessel was old, and the large triangular sails were tattered and rotten. It was, in fact, nothing more than an open boat; a man of middle stature with his feet in the hold had at least the half of his body above the deck. [We are reminded, indeed, of Lord Dundonald shaving on board the *Speedy*, with his looking-glass on deck and his feet in the cabin.] We hired this vessel, and by the next evening we were desired to embark. At eight o’clock we were under weigh: a land breeze drove us smoothly along; and the *Casiots* began their evening hymn. This reminded us of a passage in *Longus*, who, in the very seas we were now traversing, describes a similar custom: ‘while they rowed, one of the crew sang to them:—

οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ, καθάπερ χορὸς, ὁμοφώνως
κατὰ καιρὸν τῆς ἐκείνου φωνῆς ἐβόων.’

The next morning, *October* the *ninth*, *SAMOS* appeared most beautifully in view, covered by a silvery mist, softening every object, but concealing none. At eleven o’clock A.M. we entered the port of *La Scala*¹ in *Patmos*. In order to prevent our *caïque* from being fired at, as a pirate

II. CLARKE
MANUSCRIPT.

Migne, Bibl. Pat-
rum Graeca, vol.
149, cols. 1047 ff.

Travels, etc.
E. D. Clarke,
LL.D., Fourth
Ed. vol. III. ch.
vii., p. 263 ff.,
freely condensed.

Discovery of the
Manuscript.
Vol. vi. i. Pat-
mos.

Lib. iii. *Paris*,
1778.

¹ It may have
been so called
from the steep
ascent to the
Monastery,
which begins at
the landing place.

vessel (which she probably had been), we had hoisted an *English* flag [thus drawing upon themselves the taunts of Frenchmen on their way home from the campaign in Egypt, "Pavillon Anglais! Tremblez, Messieurs!"]. The monastery of the *Apocalypse* is situate two miles and a half from the quay, upon the top of a mountain in the highest part of all the island, close to the town of *Patmos*. We set off, without further delay, for the Convent. The ascent is steep and rugged, but practicable for asses and mules. When we arrived at the monastery, we were quite struck by its size and substantial appearance.' It may be explained that *Patmos* has a west coast running pretty fairly north and south, from the extremities of which two lobes run off irregularly to the eastward, being separated by a deep bay, which almost cuts the island in two, like an ill-shaped sand glass. The very innermost recess of this bay is the harbour of *La Scala*, from which the town and monastery lie due south. Whilst the travellers are enjoying their unequalled prospect we may seize the opportunity of throwing our extracts into such divisions as will contrast the view seen from without with the circumstances existing within.

WITHOUT.—'It is a very powerful fortress, built upon a steep rock, with several towers and lofty thick walls; and if duly mounted with guns, might be made impregnable. According to *Tournefort*, it is said to have been founded by *Alexius Comnenus*, in consequence of the persuasion of St. *Christodulus*; but *Dapper* relates, that the saint himself founded the monastery, towards the end of the *tenth* century, when he retired to *Patmos*, to avoid the persecution of the *Turks*. Nothing can be more remarkable than the situation of the town, built upon the edge of a vast crater, sloping off, on either side like the roof of a tiled house. *Perry* has compared it to "*an asses back*": upon the highest ridge of which stands the monastery. The inhabitants have no space for exercise, they can only descend and ascend to the harbour. On one of the towers of the monastery, a *look-out* is regularly kept for pirates. We returned to enjoy the prospect from this place. The sight was extremely magnificent. We commanded the whole island of *Amorgos*, which is nearly forty miles from the nearest point of *Patmos*: and were surrounded by many of the grandest objects in the *Archipelago*. As we descended from the great monastery of *St. John*, we turned off, upon our right, to visit a smaller edifice of the same nature, erected over a cave, or grot, where the *Apocalypse* is said to have been written. As to the cave itself, it may be supposed that any other *cave* would have answered the purpose fully as well: it is not spacious enough to have afforded a habitation even for a hermit. There seemed to be something like a school held in the *building* erected about this cave; but the only monk who showed the place to us, and who appeared to superintend the seminary, was not much better informed than his godly brethren in the parent monastery. The women of the island, here collected as it were upon a single point, are so generally handsome, that it is an uncommon sight to meet with any who are otherwise. There are several bells at the monastery, which the monks are frequently ringing. The enjoyment of the noise is considered a great indulgence; bells being prohibited by the *Turks*. Perhaps there is not a spot in the *Archipelago* with more of the semblance of a volcanic origin than *Patmos*, the ports of the island have the appearance of craters. In the evening we amused ourselves in fishing. The harbour appeared as literally swarming with the most beautiful fishes, of all colours; the water being as clear as crystal, the fish, tempted from their haunts among the marine plants were seen distinctly whenever they took the snare. We were much struck by the extraordinary intensity of the deep blue colour of the sea, which is as much a distinguishing characteristic of the *Archipelago* as the brightness of its sky.'

WITHIN.—'We were received by the Superior and by the Bursar of the monastery in the refectory. We asked permission to see the LIBRARY, which was readily granted. We entered a small oblong chamber, having a vaulted stone roof; and found it to be nearly filled with

books, of all sizes, in a most neglected state; some lying upon the floor, a prey to the damp and to worms; others standing upon shelves, but without any kind of order. The books upon the shelves were all printed volumes; for these being more modern, were regarded as the more valuable, and had a better station assigned them than the rest, many of which were considered only as so much rubbish. Some of the printed books were tolerably well bound, and in good condition. The Superior said, these were his favourites; but when we took down one or two of them to examine their contents, we discovered that neither the Superior nor his colleague were able to read. They had a confused traditionary recollection of the names of some of them, but knew no more of their contents than the Grand Signior. At the extremity of this chamber, which is opposite to the window, a considerable number of old volumes of parchment, some with covers and some without, were heaped upon the floor, in the utmost disorder; and there were evident proofs that these had been cast aside, and condemned to answer any purpose for which the parchment might be required. When we asked the Superior what they were? he replied, turning up his nose with an expression of indifference and contempt, *Χειρόγραφα!* It was, indeed, a moment in which a literary traveller might be supposed to doubt the evidence of his senses; for the whole of this contemned heap consisted entirely of *Greek* manuscripts, and some of them were of the highest antiquity. What was to be done? We referred the matter to Mr. *Riley*, as to a person habituated in dealing with knavish Greeks; and presently such a jabbering took place, accompanied with so many significant shrugs, winks, nods, and grimaces, that it was plain something like a negociation was going on. The author, meanwhile, continued to inspect the heap; and had soon selected the fairest specimen of Grecian caligraphy which has descended to modern times. It was a copy of the twenty-four first Dialogues of *Plato*, written throughout upon vellum, in the same exquisite character; concluding with a date, and the name of the caligraphist. It was a single volume in folio, bound in wood. The cover was full of worms and falling to pieces: a paper label appeared on the back, inscribed, in a modern hand, *Διάλογοι Σωκράτους*: but ^{see ciii.} the letters of *Plato's* name, separated by stars, appeared very distinctly as a head-piece to the first page of the manuscript. After removing these volumes all further enquiry was stopped by Mr. *Riley*. He concealed two of the smaller volumes in his *Turkish* habit, entrusting to the honour of the two *Caloyers* the task of conveying the others on board our vessel. The next day we were again admitted to the Library. Some of the inhabitants of the town thought proper to accompany us. The Superior took occasion to assure us, that both he and the Bursar were willing enough to part with the *χειρόγραφα*; but that if it were known to have brought them any gain, the people of *Patmos*, acting as spies for the *Capudan Pasha*, would make it the cause of a very heavy imposition upon the monastery. This day we dined with the monks.'

The scene now changes to the deck of the *caïque*. The *Capudan Pasha* referred to, is, no doubt, identical with the *Capitan Pasha* often mentioned in *Finlay's History*. He seems to have been a sort of high admiral with charge of the islands and coasts of the *Aegean*.

'The *Capudan Pasha's* letter enabled us to order bread from the island for our voyage; and this the monks promised to see provided. . . . The whole of Sunday, *October* the eleventh, was passed in great anxiety, being the day on which the Superior had engaged to send the remaining manuscripts. Mr. *Riley* had left and we began to fear, as evening approached, that his absence might become the pretext for a breach of contract. Towards sunset, being upon the deck of our *caïque* and looking towards the mountain, we discerned a person coming down the steep descent from the monastery towards the port: presently, as he drew near, we perceived that he had a large basket upon his head, and that

he was coming towards the quay, opposite to the spot where our vessel was at anchor. Upon his arrival, we saw him making signs for a boat; and we sent to him the little skiff belonging to our caïque. As he came alongside, he said, aloud, that he had brought the *bread* ordered for us; but coming upon deck, he gave a significant wink, and told us the Superior desired that we would 'empty the basket ourselves, and count the loaves, to see that all was right.' We took the hint, and hurried with the precious charge into our berth; where, having turned the basket bottom upwards, we found, to our great joy, the manuscript of PLATO, the POEMS OF GREGORY, the works of PHILE, with the other Tracts, the two volumes containing the *Greek Musical Notes*, and the volume of Miscellanies containing the LEXICON OF ST. CYRILL: these we instantly concealed beneath a mattress in one of our cots; and making a grand display of the loaves, returned with the basket upon deck, giving a handsome present to the porter, and desiring he would inform the Superior, with our most grateful acknowledgments, that '*all was perfectly right.*' Having set him again on shore, we gave orders to our captain to have everything ready for sailing the next morning, and to stand out of the port as soon after sunrise as possible; intending to leave *Patmos*. In this design we were, however, disappointed.' When a few days later they insisted on putting to sea, they found, as their captain had predicted, that a furious storm was raging outside. 'We [ch. ii.] passed like lightning within a cable's length of some dreadful rocks, over which the sea was dashing as high as our mast head; until getting under the lee, to the *south* of *Naxos*, we ran the vessel aground, close to a small creek, upon some white sand. Like true shipwrecked mariners, wet to the skin, and without a dry thread on board, we opened all our stores upon the rocks to expose our clothes to the beams of the sun. Every article of our linen was completely soaked; but, to our great joy, the *Patmos Manuscripts* had escaped, and were safe. We had put them into a small but stout wooden box in the stern of the vessel; and had covered this with every article of canvas, etc., that could be collected.' In a note, Dr. Clarke adds, 'This manuscript [the Plato] after the author's return to England, remained in the hands of his friend the late Professor *Porson* until his death.' In 1809 it was bought by the Curators of the Bodleian Library.

Contents.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΙ Κ.Δ.	
ΕΥΘ-ΜΕΝΩΝ	
M. S.	
A. C. D.CCC.XCVI.	
<table border="1"> <tr> <td> MS. Clark. 39 </td> </tr> </table>	MS. Clark. 39
MS. Clark. 39	

The following is Gaisford's entry in the Catalogue of the Library:—

39 CODEX membranaceus ff. 418, anno 896 exaratus
 PLATONIS Dialogi XXIV. hoc ordine

then follows the list, to which the scholia are added. The book which is bound somewhat handsomely in leather of a chocolate brown has the annexed title on its back.

The boards are lined with vellum. On the lining of the first are the following interesting entries:—

1. At the top—'Clark 39. Totum hunc codicem ad edit. H. Stephani diligenter contuli. T. G. 31 Aug. 1813.'

Prof. Gaisford published this as *Lectiones Platonicae*.

2. A little lower, apparently by Porson, comes:—

'Idem scriba, qui totum codicem exaravit, tetralogias et dialogos numeravit.'

3. Near the middle, also by him (?) :—

'Numeri, atramento scripti, e registro evanuerunt.' Which seems to refer to the register of quaternions on the flyleaf opposite.

Then follow four leaves of clean vellum, the face of the first being occupied by an index of the dialogues in two columns, and below it the register just mentioned, chiefly in red but with some

black entries. These are most exquisitely written and have at the top this note, apparently by Gaisford:—

‘Tabula quae sequitur, a manu est eruditissimi viri

Ricardi Porson, A.M., Gr. L. Prof. Cant.’

After these leaves come two smaller ones terribly discoloured, and covered with some Aristotelian matter in a late hand, which is discussed by Schanz. We now reach the text, which we tabulate by title and conclusion, premising that the style may be gathered from our facsimiles and that the titles occur at all positions in the page; only the first is designedly in the upper margin, others being there by accident merely.

Title r.	Π•Δ•Α•Τ•Ω•Ν•Ο•Σ			TETRAL. I.
top		A		
	Εὐθύφρων	ἦ	^ε π' Ὄσιου πειραστικός	The title is very much faded, the first word having lost all its ink.
	[A]			The central A marks the tetralogy, the marginal A of the dialogue is gone. Below the flourish after the conclusion stands in the middle of the page a very finely formed Δ, with leaf ornament.
End 7 v. foot			Πλάτωνος Εὐθύφρων ἦ π' Ὄσι ^υ ,	
8 r. top	'Απολογία		Σωκράτους ἠθικός	B faint, ἠθικός reddish. Here also follows a beautiful Δ; for ornament see text, p. 29, top.
20 r. foot	B		'Απολογία Σωκράτους	
20 v. top			^ε π Πρακτοῦ ἠθικός	The outer margin of 20 is gone; but there is room for Κρίτων in the title, of which, however, there seems no trace, either directly or by marks of damp ink (as there is of ἠθικός and ^ε π) on next page. Δ follows again.
26 r.	[Γ] Κρίτων		ἦ περὶ Πρακτοῦ	ἠθικός is clearly later, and seems to have been touched before it was dry. Δ again.
26 r. 27 Δ	Φαίδων	ἦ	^ε π Ψυχῆς ἠθικός	
58 r.			Φαίδων ἦ περὶ Ψυχῆς	
		B		II.
58 r. 13	Κρατύλος	ἦ	^ε π' Ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητο ^ς λογικός	Contractions for want of room. Conclusion on a scrape in lower margin: below the usual ornament, whose left side is very elaborate, there is another long scrape.
82 v. 34			Κρατύλ ^ο ἦ π' Ὀνομά ^τ ὄρ ^θ	
83 r. top	Θεαίτητος	ἦ	^ε π' Ἐπιστήμης	The title on a scrape in upper margin has lines ruled for it. A patch at the outer part of the vellum hides any adjective in -κός.
113 r.	S		Θεαίτητος ἦ περὶ Ἐπιστήμης	

113 r. 21	Σοφιστής Z	ἦ	^ε π τοῦ ὄντος	^ο λογικ,	The adjective is clearly redder than the rest.
136 v.			Σοφιστής ἦ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος		
136 v. 30	Πολιτικὸς H	ἦ	^ε π Βασιλείας	^ο λογικ,	Second half of title is dark; the adjective is as in the last case.
154 r.			^ο Πολιτικ ἦ π Βασιλείας		
			Γ		III.
	Θ	See the text and facsimile.			The adjective as above.
173 r. 13	Φίληβος I	ἦ	^ε π Ἑδονῆς	^{ο'} ἠθικ,	Adjective clearly different ink.
198 v.			Φίληβος ἦ π Ἑδονῆς		
198 v. 30	Συμπόσιον IA	ἦ	^ε π Ἐρωτος	^ο ἠθικ,	The mark ^ε refers to an alternative title in the outer margin ^ε ἀγαθὸς which, like the ἠθικός, is reddish. Four leaf ornaments follow the conclusion instead of the usual flourish below.
223 v. 34			Συμπόσιον ἦ π Ἐρωτος flour.		
224 r. top	Φαῖδρος IB	ἦ	^ε π Καλοῦ	^ο ἠθικ,	Title in upper margin with a red line for it. Above it is ΓΔ. ἠθικός is faint red. The sign above καλοῦ has nothing to answer it, as the margin is cut away. No flourish below the ending.
248 r. 34			Φαῖδρος ἦ π Καλοῦ flour.		
			Δ		IV.
248 v. top	'Αλκιβιάδης α'. II'	ἦ	^ε π Φύσεως ἀνθρώπου	^{ο'} μαιεντικ,	Title in upper margin with a coarse red line through it. Above Δ is a careless IE. The conclusion is darker than the text.
263 r.			^ε Ἐ Ἐ Φύσε ἀνον		
263 r. 21	" β'. ID	ἦ	^ε π Προσευχῆς	"	The adjective differs and is redder; both title and conclusion are darker than the text.
269 v.			β' Ἐ Ἐ Ἐ Ἐ Προσευχῆς		

269 v.24	^o Ἰππαρχος	ἦ	Φιλοκερδής	ἦθικ ^o ,	ἦθικός differs and is redder.
	IE				
273 r.			^o Ἰππαρχ ^o ἦ ^s Φιλοκερδ ^s		
273 r.22	^s Ἐρασταί	ἦ	^ε π ^ε Φιλοσοφίας	ἦθικ ^o ,	In the margin is ^s ἀντεραστί ^s , which with ἦθικός differs in character from the rest. The conclusion is dark.
277 r.	IS		^s Ἐρασταί ἦ ^ε περὶ Φιλοσοφίας		
		IE			V.
277 r.9	Θεάγης	ἦ	^ε π ^ε Σωφροσύνης	μαιευτικ ^o ,	In the margin is φιλοσοφί ^s , which with the adjective is redder than the rest. The conclusion is darker.
282 r.	IZ		Θεάγης ἦ ^ε περὶ Σωφροσύνης		
282 r.27	Χαρμίδης	ἦ	^ε π ^ε Σωφροσύ ^s ν	πειραστικ ^o	The adjective differs, and is redder. The conclusion is darker.
	IH		Χαρμίδης ἦ ^ε π ^ε Σωφροσύνης		
294 v.					
295 r.	Λάχης	ἦ	^ε π ^ε Ἀνδρίας	μαιευτικ ^o ,	Title in upper margin with a red line: above it KA slightly dim, by a later hand. The adjective is faint red.
top	IΘ		Λάχης ἦ ^ε περὶ Ἀνδρίας		
307 r.					
307 r.9	Λύσις	ἦ	^ε π ^ε Φιλίας	μαιευτικ ^o ,	The adjective differs and is redder, the conclusion comes below the flourish, but is in the same ink as the text.
	K		Λύσις ἦ ^ε π ^ε Φιλίας		
317 r.					
		S			VI.
317 v.	Εὐθύδημος	ἦ	^δ Ἐριστικός	ἀνατρεπτικ ^o ,	Title in upper margin: S of tetralogy in red. This letter, Εὐθύδημος, K and initial T, all leave a clear impression on the next page. The name, whose ink is gone, is carelessly rewritten later in brown. ἀνατρ. resembles the title. The conclusion is below the flourish.
top	KA		Εὐθύδημος ἦ ^ε ἔριστικός		
336 r.					
336 r.7	Πρωταγόρας	ἦ	Σοφισταί	ἐνδεικτικ ^o ,	The adjective differs.
	KB		Πρωταγόρ ^o ἦ ^ε Σοφισταί		
368 v.					

368 v. 11	Γοργίας	ἦ	π ^ε 'Ρητορικῆς	ἀνατρεπτικ ^ο ,	The adjective differs, and is redder.
	KΓ				To get the conclusion into the line the usual preceding :~ has been erased.
405 r.			Γοργίας ἦ π ^ε 'Ρητορικῆς		
405 r. 11	Μένων	ἦ	π ^ε 'Αρετῆς	πειραστικ ^ο ,	The adjective differs, and is redder.
	KΔ				
418 v.				See facsimile	

Here follows the Colophon or Subscriptio, of which hereafter.

Then come three leaves covered with stains, and 'manibus inelegantissimis polluta in quorum secundo index dialogorum inscriptus est' (Schanz). These have been formerly bound in a reversed position, as some of the letters of the colophon are impressed upon them in that attitude. Finally three clean leaves have been inserted at the end by the binder.

Style and details. The vellum of \mathfrak{U} is distinctly less robust than that of A, and sometimes rather delicate. Setting aside the binding, the measurements of the codex are $32.2 \times 21.6 \times 7.6$ centimetres, or with the binding, $33.6 \times 23.3 \times 8.9$; in the course of binding some of the leaves have got slightly out of true line laterally or vertically. As will be seen, the writing is not in columns; the written space measures pretty exactly 20.3×14.6 . The widths of the margins are, with slight variations, inner 2, upper 4.5, outer 7, lower 7.6; the upper and still more the lower are curtailed in the facsimiles. The quaternions or, as Porson calls them, plagulae, are 52 and a half. In numbering the leaves Porson has missed two, and afterwards marked them 111*, 359*, so that the total comes to 420: in the table above, the paging is after Porson's. The twentieth quaternion, beginning after fol. 151, has got displaced, and is bound up after the forty-fifth, so as to be numbered ff. 352-59: Porson at first thought it lost, but found out and noted the facts in his exquisite hand. Thus eight leaves in our table, representing, according to Porson, Steph. II. 289D χρῆ—307A πολλαῖς, must be taken from the Protagoras and added to the Politicus. The quaternions were lettered as in our edition, page 29, but very much nearer the outer edge: Porson's list, which gives those that remain in red and those that are lost in black, no longer quite agrees with the facts, which are these:—

1. A has been renewed.
2. IA, IB, KΓ, ΛΔ, MS, MZ, MΘ, N, NA, NΓ can be read with ease.
MB, MΓ, MΔ, ME, MH can be read but not easily.
B, H, IΓ, KA, KB, KΔ, KZ, ΛA, ΛB, ΛΓ, ΛE, M show slight or all but invisible traces.
3. Γ, S, Z, H, IΔ, IZ, KE, KΘ, ΔS, ΔZ, ΔΘ, NA, NB, NΓ, with others that are legible, show a reversed trace of themselves on the previous page.
4. E, Θ, I, IH, K, KH, ΔH, MA are totally gone, and in the places where Δ, IE, IS, IΘ, KS, Λ were the vellum has become perforated or is otherwise injured. The letters which are entire closely resemble those of the second part of the subscriptio. The margin of 184 is torn away, yet KE show reversed on 183 v., which proves that the injury was later than the lettering.

p. xcviij.

The method of ruling is quite analogous to that of the Paris Ms., but simpler from the absence of columns in the page. In each page there are two double perpendicular lines bounding the written space on left and right. These and the first and last of the lines used for writing extend to the edge of the vellum, while the other lines for writing are drawn exactly on

the principle of those in Paris A. The arrangement of the four pieces in each quaternion is this. The piece containing ff. 1 and 8 is laid with the projecting lines downwards, that containing ff. 2, 7 has them upwards, and the two remaining pieces repeat this arrangement. The writing hangs a little irregularly from the lines, and is of a dark brown in the text, and in most of the marginal additions: there are, however, as we have seen, traces of red in the titles, while some scholia etc. are in black and others in green.

Of the character of the writing the examples will be the best exponents. The following letters have two forms:—

$\alpha = \omega \delta$ the latter rare and generally at the ends of lines.

$\gamma = \gamma \text{ } \text{r}$ the latter rare, sometimes marking paragraphs.

$\epsilon = \text{G } \text{f}$ the latter very rare, cursive; Plate III. foot; a third form f is used in combination.

ζ two forms analogous to those of ξ below: see Plate III. 29, 28.

$\kappa = \text{u } \text{k}$ both are found; the latter not frequent.

$\lambda = \lambda \text{ } \text{f}$ both common, singly or double.

$\nu = \mu \omega$ the latter common after ν , as in $\text{o}\nu\nu$ $\nu\nu\nu$, with which it combines: it occurs Plate III. 2 $\text{\textit{\alpha}\delta\nu\textit{\alpha}\textit{\rho}\textit{\alpha}\textit{\tau}\textit{\omicron}\textit{\nu}}$, and elsewhere. This form of ν is almost indistinguishable from β and ν in some cases.

$\xi = \text{z } \text{z}$ Plate III. 3, 5; former less frequent. Compare ζ .

$\tau = \text{T } \text{Y}$ the latter cursive, chiefly in combination. It is almost identical with γ .

In the cases of α , γ , ζ , κ , ξ , one of the forms is a survival of the older majuscule writing common up to the eighth century. Its forms gradually reasserted themselves in later minuscule Mss.

There is a considerable amount of ligature used in the writing: the connection being specially close between the letters $\epsilon\iota$, $\epsilon\sigma$, $\sigma\pi$, $\epsilon\sigma\tau$. But there is almost no contraction save the usual S for $\text{\textit{\kappa}\textit{\alpha}\textit{\lambda}}$, and that generally at the end of a line with a view to economise room. Words divided between lines are not connected in any way, and all consonant groups which can be initial are carried to the next line: even κ in $\text{o}\nu\kappa$ is so treated. Iota subscript is always postscript, and sometimes small and dark as if inserted afterwards. Both ι and ν are usually larger at the beginning of a word, and then have as a rule '' over them. The letters which project into the left margin indicate that a new paragraph has begun, either with them or in the previous line. They are not, as a rule, majuscules, but minuscules of considerably larger size than the text. While very like the text, they look in a good many cases as if patched on after an erasure; which seems to point to the idea that the constitution of a paragraph in the particular case was an afterthought. Instances are 8 r. 25, 8 v. 31, 9 r. 7, 16, 23, 74 v., 208 r. 29, 220 v. 18 (this is an 'Arethas α '), 231 v. 16, 240 r. 29, 256 v. 14, 257 v. 17, 295 r. 27, 395 v. 8, 400 v. 27. The Ms. is quite appreciably more ornamented than A: this appears not merely in the flourishes which are seen in the facsimiles, but likewise in the initial letters of the dialogues. The first of these is illegible, but most of the others are clear and handsomely formed, although in the usual brown ink of the text. The following general observations on the writing may be useful, while there are minor variations in size, colour, and such matters:—





1. The text seems to be by one hand throughout.
2. The titles, endings, flourishes, and initial letters seem to be by one hand; very likely the original one, but after the text was finished. The concluding adjectives in $\text{-}\text{\textit{\kappa}\textit{\omicron}\textit{\varsigma}}$, however, are by a different hand.

3. While the capital letters have a strong general resemblance, those which mark the tetralogies and dialogues have no ornament and bear a closer likeness to the first part of the subscriptio: those which number the quaternions always have a leaf ornament below and bear a closer likeness to the second part of the subscriptio.
4. While the impression of a letter on the page opposite, from the ink being wet, is pretty frequent, this affects the body of the text only at outer corners, probably from damp getting in; in other cases it is confined to letters of quaternions, titles, and marginal notes.

The accents and breathings are not quite uniform in character, and never, save in the titles, so carefully done as those of A: the apostrophe, if it is of equal age with the text, is always comma-shaped. A hyphen — is used at times to mark the junction in compound words, e.g., 190 r. 34, *δοξοσοφία*, 271 v. 8, *κανηφορία*, 275 v. 33, 34, *πολυπραγμονοῦν* and *πολυμαθοῦντα*. The punctuation is (:) for a change of speaker; (.), (·) and (˙) elsewhere. If (; ;,) are ever original they certainly are not always so, and in the first the comma seems laid on its back.

It is difficult to decide how many hands, and of what ages, appear in the margin. Some are clearly very old, others more or less recent: of the latter are the black hand which patches the text, as is done for instance on the closing page, and the green hand which comments; and both are *φανλεπιφανλότατοι*.

i. As a rule the antique scholia are entered in the margin, and certain corrections made in the text, either by the original hand or by one so like it as to make distinction very difficult. So far as corrections are concerned, there are two at least which seem almost certainly original. On 5 v. 31 the text gives *τονθερξαντα*, and in the margin stands Γρ. *στέρξαντα*. Again on 31 v. 32 we have in the text *-θικαθαρῶς*, opposite which and the two following lines stands in the outer margin Γρ. *ἄλλοθι δυνατὸν εἶναι καθαρῶς*. It is impossible to distinguish these from the hand of the text. On a par with these old scholia and corrections seem to stand the usual symbols for *σημείωσαι*, *ῥαίον*, etc., such as are given in the margin of our text. There they appear on too large a scale, however; and it is noteworthy that they are often, together with such phrases as *διὰ σύνταξιν* which accompany them, smaller and finer than many of the old notes, in which respect they correspond exactly with similar entries on the margin of the Lucian in the British Museum, of which hereafter. Some of these comments, like those in A, run perpendicularly. Samples are:—

	Δ ΣΤΝ ΤΑΞΙΝ	64 v.		Δ Ι' Ο Λ Ο Τ Χ Ω Ρ Ι Ο Ν Τ	107 r. Π 217 v. Ε Ρ Ι' Τ Ο Ν Τ Κ Α Λυ	'Α 317 r.	N Α Κ Ε Φ Α Λ Σ Ω Σ Ι Σ Ε Η Ι Α Ο Γ Ι Κ Η'	In some cases, as on 10 v., such a note has been neatly impressed in a reversed position upon the page opposite, 11 r.; the original being left all but blank. Some of the old scholia are disposed in ornamental shapes, and some are illustrated by diagrams.
	32 r. etc.							
	ΑΓΑΝ ΤΟ ΧΡΙΟΝ ΕΙΡΩΝΙΚ	225 r. 225 v.						

ἐν ἄλλωι, ἐν ἐτέρωι, ἐν ἄλλοις
 These last are in capitals,
 and introduce various readings.

To a very early hand belong also those letters alphabetically arranged in the margin of the Cratylus and Symposium, to which Schanz refers as measures of the contents—similar letters in the Theaetetus he regards as divisions of the argument. They occur at almost equal intervals, varying from 68 to 71 lines, but occasionally including from 72 to 75, which he says mark a uniform quantity in a previous Ms. Supposing the numbering to be at every hundredth line, then the number of letters of text included in each division yields when divided by 100 an average line of $35\frac{1}{2}$ in the Cratylus and $34\frac{1}{3}$ in the Symposium. Now all the known cases, says the late Ch. Graux on this subject, 'donnent régulièrement pour la valeur du stique (or *στίχος*) de 34 à 38 lettres environ, ce qui revient à quinze ou seize syllabes,' which forms the average length of the hexameter. And Birt considers that this was the normal length in works designed for the great literary market.

Ixxvi.-Ixxvii.,
and *Hermes*, xvi.
1881, p. 309 etc.

ii. Besides the late black and green hands (the latter of which, besides noting the speakers at the opening of the Cratylus, appears on the following pages at least 1 r., 8 r., 13 r., 24 v. 28, 53 r., 60 v., 65 v., 74 v., 83 v., then on 224 v., a long note on 225 v., and next 368 v.), there is a brutal brown hand which inserts in contracted form between the lines the names of the speakers in the Phaedo, Hipparchus, Theages; patches the words which happen to be injured at the outer ends of the top lines; supplies gaps (236-7), and makes notes. His symbols, $\mathcal{C}^{\sim}/$, etc., seem to begin at 256. It may be said that wherever the speakers are noted it is done by a late hand, which is very different from the practice in A.

iii. The last hand is that of Porson, who uses bright red ink, and adorns the page wherever he touches it. Besides numbering the leaves, he has noted at several points the corresponding pp. of Aldus. Thus, at the beginning, he enters 'PAG 1 ed. ALD.,' on p. 8 r. he has '9 ed. ALD.?'; sometimes, as in the Parmenides, he inserts the number of the page alone; finally he points out the misplaced quaternion.

There are also evidences of correction in the manuscript; and here a nice question arises. We have seen above that the dialogues of the first tetralogy are marked at the close with a very elegant Δ . It is clear that this letter is not a numeral, both because of its recurrence and because it has not the usual stroke above it. Does it represent the word *διωρθώθη* or *διώρθωσα*? Not improbably. It is a tempting thing to suppose that $\Gamma\Delta$ at the top of 224 r., which precedes the Phaedrus, means *Ἰωάννης διώρθωσα*; but this is far from likely. The Δ does not look old, and we must note that above the next dialogue in the same position stands IE , while above the Laches stands KA , all which facts point to a numerical signification in this case.

i. As in the Paris Ms., there are additions made in the margins to complete the text where omissions had occurred in transcription. We give noteworthy cases of this without pretending that they form a complete list. While the text is put on that side of the page which corresponds to its position in the original, the marginal additions are distinguished by smaller type.

4 r. 15

τοῦσιν

ἀμφισβη τοῦσιν ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδι
κοῦντα δεῖ διδόνε
δικην* ἀλλ' ἐκείνο
ἴσως ἀμφισβη

Caused by the double
ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. The ad-
dition is in small minu-
scales inclining to the
right: not original.

1. Euth.

5 v. 32 (following the correction *στέρξαντα*).

Caused by the
double *αἰδώς*.
Style somewhat
like No. 1.

÷ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτω διαφέρομαι τῷ
ποιητῇ· εἶπω σοι ὅπη; πάνυ
γε: οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἵνα δέος ἔν
θα καὶ αἰδώς*
ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς* ÷ πολλοὶ γὰρ

ἵνα γὰρ δέος*

2. "

256 r. 24 ἡ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὡς οἱ μὲν ἠρακλέους οἱ δὲ ἀχαιμένους ἔκγονοι· The ink is slightly 12. Alcib. i.
τὸ (ras?) ἀχαιμένους εἰς περσέα τὸ δ' ἠρακλέους τε γένος δ' brighter than the text,
but this looks like the
first hand.

270 v. 31 Ink tawny and 13. Hipparch.
writing slightly care-
less; last μ γ μ ν μεν ἴ· βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντας
in capitals. It
seems early. ἴ· εἶναι ὠφελεῖσθαι: τι
οὖν δὴ τοῦτο: ὅτι δ' τοδε
αὐτῷ προσωμολογή
σαμεν.

371 r., 17 14. Gorgias.
κ' ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ An addition: it is
βουλευτάς· certainly early.

398 v. 5 15. "
α μ α are ἐπισταμεθα ἴ· τὴν οἶκο
capitals. νομικὴν
Certainly early. ἴ· τὴν τέχνην
ἡ οὐκ ἐπιστά
μεθα.

2. Another form of correction is erasure. We have seen that this occurs in the titles or endings of several dialogues. It also appears in the body of the text, nor is the alteration that frequently occurs upon it always the work of the first hand. Thus in the Parmenides and also elsewhere, besides repeated changes of Τί δέ into Τί δαί, φᾶναι is very frequently altered to φάναι. Of the κ in οὐκ we have already spoken. cxi.

3. Sometimes gaps occur without erasure: thus Schanz says 'in Protagora licet videre lacunas complures manu recentissima suppletas: concludere igitur debes codicem e quo Clarkianus derivatus est hic non potuisse legi. Suppleta autem sunt p. 329 c haec: ἐν τ[η ψυχῇ]; [γὰρ ὅτι δ]; πεμ[ψειε]; καὶ [αῦ]—post δικαιοσύνην spatium vacuum; p. 329 d [ἕτερα τῶν]; [ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ]; με[γέθει].' In the same dialogue we have 341 r., 6 οὔτωσο [space of 3 letters] ἡγοῦμαι.

4. A fruitful source of difficulty is, as under the circumstances was natural, external injury. The codex has received at some time a severe squeeze which has left a bend or 'crumple' in the parchment up the middle of the pages. The outer angles also have both suffered from a 'dog-ear' fold which almost always reaches and has injured the first or last letters in the first and last two lines of the page, which letters accordingly are often patched in a recent hand either brown or black. The injury just noted, especially at the upper corners, is considerably increased by the action of damp, which is traceable all through the Ms., and has often destroyed matter written in the upper margin. From the beginning to fol. 44, and from fol. 413 to the end in particular the leaves are so injured by damp and friction—probably the boards had been lost—that a great deal of recent restoration has been necessary, as may be seen from facsimile 1. of p. 418 v. All the ink is gone from the initial word ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ and only the shapes of the letters remain. The parchment at its thinnest parts has holes which seem original, and which accordingly cause no injury to the text: but a good deal of damage to the thinner sheets has since been done, often accompanied by slight loss to the text. Thus near the foot of fol. 2 there is a hole with this result—

2 r. 32 Euthyphr. 5 B	ἐκείνωι	2 v. Euthyphr. 6 A	φήσει
33	πρεσβυτερουσ	6 B	εἰδοτι
34	διδασκοντα		ξυχωρειν

The gaps (underlined) in l. 33 are supplied in the outer margins, those in 34 below, by the ugly brown hand. Again, we have the part destroyed by a dark acid, which has been referred xxx. to in connection with Vat. Δ: this affects both sides of two leaves.

236 r. 9	Phaedr. 252 E	τοιουτοσ	236 v. Phaedr. 253 E	μετὰ κέντρων
10		τότε ἐπι		ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα
11		μετερχονται		γαργαλισμοῦτε
237 r. 9	„ 254 E	γνάθουσ	237 v. „ 255 E	παραπλησίωσ
10		ἐρείσασ		-κείσθαι καὶ
11		ὀπνηρόσ		συνκοιμήσει

Of these the second and third passages together with discoloured words in lines 8 and 12 are supplied by a later hand in the outer margin: the first and last are not supplied, which seems to show that the acid had not at the time eaten through the two leaves. Sometimes the injury is made good by adding new parchment and writing upon that. This is so in the outer margin of fol. 20, but the injury is confined to the beginnings of lines 1-17 on the back, and is greatest towards the top. Again, f. 21 (Crito 45 B etc.) is so patched, the injury being at the beginnings of lines 1-6, 8, 9 on the back: f. 35 (Phaedo 73 E etc.) on the front has lost letters at the ends of ll. 1. 3-24, and on the back letters at the beginnings of 1-11: f. 38 (Phaedo 79 c, 80 c) has a hole filled up near the ends of 1-6 on the front, and near the beginnings of 1-7 on the back: f. 83, see title of Theaetetus: f. 178 r. (Phileb. 21 E) 'schedula allita abscondit literas extremas versuum septem ita tamen ut folio contra lucem verso possint legi,' (Schanz): fol. 189 r. (Phileb. 45 E) a patch at the outer side conceals four letters in lines 1, 2, two letters in lines 3, 4, 6, one letter in lines 5, 7, 8, 9. There are also places where the margin is cut or worn away without being replaced: ff. 157, 159 are cut away in the Parmenides but no injury has ensued. The chief scene of such accidents is the Philebus: in f. 184 the text on both sides is injured for 13 lines: in f. 185 for two, 186 for one, 187 for three, 188 for two. Part of a scholium is lost by a cutting of the margin of f. 224 at the beginning of the Phaedrus. A good many yellow spots of wax, cedar oil or some such substance are scattered over the pages of the Ms.

Subscriptio, with notes, chiefly on Arethas, owner of the Ms.

We now come to the Subscriptio. The writing is small majuscules, which are clearer in the original than in the facsimile. The words are as follows, and to these notes are added:—

21. ἐγράφη χειρὶ ἰῶ καλλιγράφου
εὐτυχῶσ ἀρέθαι διακόνωι πα
τρέι· νομισμάτων βυζαντί
ων δέκα κ' τριῶν· μηνὶ νοεμ

The letters αφη χει φου
πα
ντι
οεμ

25. βρίωι ἰνδικτιῶν ἰ.δ. ἔτει κόσμου
σὺδ βασιλείασ λέοντοσ τοῦ φι
λοχῦ νιού βασιλείου τοῦ ἀειμνήστου:—
θη

β
λο are retouched: and
αφη χει, ντ, οε, β are impressed on the fly-leaf, reversed.

30. ἔυγραφῆσ νν ἰγ * ὑπεργαμ νν:

* Here are some small letters which cannot be read. There is an abrasion at the end.

21. ἰὼ καλλ. 'John, calligraphus,' the writer of the Ms. According to Montfaucon the older term γραμματεὺς was out of date in the times of which palaeography chiefly treats, 'sed passim adhibetur καλλιγράφος, *Calligraphus*, ita dictus, διὰ τὸ εἰς κάλλος γράφειν, ob scribendi elegantiam: ut habet Theophylactus Simocatta, qui sub Mauricio et sequentibus Imperatoribus florebat, lib. 8. c. 13 ubi de nece Mauricii verba facit: ἐδέησε γὰρ ἀνδράτινα τῶν εἰς κάλλος γραφόντων, ὃν ἐν συνθέσει φωνῆς καλλιγράφον ὀνομάζει τὰ πλήθη. Many calligraphi were called John: Montfaucon's list, however, does not include this one. The date of his nearest Joannes is 955 A.D. The next is in 973 A.D. Gardthausen mentions two besides our Joannes, both of whom are dated as 'saec. IX.-X.' If neither be the same as ours—and we know nothing of their writing—they would be contemporaries. Of course the Clarke Plato was not discovered when Montfaucon wrote, and it does not appear that John has signed any other Ms. so as to be identified: but on the evidence of the writing the Laurentian Aristides 60, 3 is held to have been written by him.
22. ἀρέθαι διακόνωι πατρει. 'For deacon Arethas of Patrae.' Let us go backward here. 'Πατρὲς ὁ ἀπὸ Πατρῶν. ἡ δοτικὴ Πατρει.' Patrae—in our period Patras—is a very old town on the N.W. of Achaea, a few miles west of the promontory of Rhium, which Strabo describes as ἀπέχον Πατρῶν στάδια τεσσαράκοντα, and is about half way between Corinth and Actium. One might almost suppose that the introduction of the silkworm under Justinian had a baleful effect upon Greece. It was preceded by an irruption of Slavonians and Huns, and followed by terrible earthquakes, by one of which Patras was overwhelmed. Yet the town recovered its strength so far as to repulse unaided a siege by the Slavonians in the course of their further aggressions A.D. 807, at which time it was 'the most flourishing harbour on the west coast of Greece.' Ecclesiastically it was the supposed scene of St. Andrew's Crucifixion, and had become a Christian archbishopric, with a cathedral dedicated to St. Andrew, as early at least as 347 A.D. Judging from the places in which inscriptions have been found it must at one time or other have had, besides the cathedral, at least three monasteries and nine churches, one of which was dedicated to St. Basilus Magnus. St. Andrew having visibly interposed during the siege in 807 it pleased the Emperor Nicephorus—and we must remember that Constantinople was the θρόνος ... τοῦ πρωτοκλήτου τῶν Ἀποστόλων Ἀνδρέου—to cede his own share of the spoils to the see, and to make various bishops suffragans of Patras. This was confirmed by the Leo VI. of our subscriptio, in whose ordering of the church Patras was clearly recognised as a metropolitan see. By Andronicus II. Palaeologus the rank of the see among the metropolitans was lowered—λβ' οὐσα εἰς λθ' ὑπεβιβάσθη—on the other hand its archbishop is now one of the exarchs under the patriarch of Constantinople. In this list he is classed as κθ'. ὁ παλαιῶν (there was also a New Patras) Πατρῶν, πάσης Ἀχαΐας, and is one of the ὑπέρτιμοι. Here Arethas was deacon. 'The church of the Nicene age was vexed with the peculiar presumption of the order of Deacons.' What their relations to the bishops often were we gather from Montfaucon 'In Actis vero Concilii Nicaeni secundi, quidam diaconus dicitur Νοτάριος τοῦ εὐαγοῦς Πατριαρχικοῦ σεκρέτου.' Later in life, as we shall see, Arethas had himself a deacon who copied Mss. for him; and from what we know of his own tastes he probably acted in this among other capacities when at Patras. In regard to Arethas personally, we know something of his rank, his library, and his literary work.

In the Bodleian Euclid we find in small majuscules ἐγράφη χειρὶ Στεφάνου κληρικοῦ

μ. σεπτεμβρωίω ἰν. ξ̄ ζ̄ τει κ, | στζζ' — This means, as we shall see, that it was written in

Palaeogr. Gr.
Lib. I. cap. v.
p. 34.

A. D. 582-602.

Cap. vi.

P. G. 325.

Allen, Notes on
Abbreviations in
Gk. Mss. 3.

Sui-I. s. v.

551 A. D.

Procopius, Goth.
War, iv. 25.

Finlay, Greece
under Rom. 412,
Byzant. Emp.,
122-24.

Corp. Inscr. Lat.
vol. III., part i.
95; and do.
Graec. vol. I.,
p. 715. No. 1553.
Codinus, Parisiis,
1648, p. 364.
Finlay ut sup. ra.

1282-1328 A. D.

Stanley, East.
Ch. 195.

Pal. Graec. 35.

Fol. 387 v. top.

Mélanges Graux,
745-56.

888 A.D. E. Maass, who writes with the authority of an expert, but at the same time rather too much in the spirit of a special pleader, considers that these words were written by Arethas. However that may be, there is no doubt about those which follow them,

on line 5 of the same page, *ἐκτησάμην Ἀρέθας πατρὲς τὴν παρούσαν βίβλον ἔν̄ Δ̄*. If not a native of Patras, then, Arethas was certainly a resident there in 888 A.D. and 'got' a beautiful copy of Euclid for a price which we shall not discuss. If he held any office he does not say so. As our subscriptio tells us, he had the Clarke Plato written for him in 895 A.D.: and now he is a deacon. When next we hear of him he has made a vast stride. The fine Ms. of Clement of Alexandria at Paris, commonly called Paris

Fol. 401 v.

451, bears in beautiful small majuscules the following note *ἐγράφη χειρὶ Βαάνους ἑν̄* |

Oxford, p. vi.

Ἀρέθα ἀρεπισκ̄, καισαρει | καππαδοκί· ἔτει κόσμ̄ | ςνκβ̄. The contracted words stand for *νοταρίον ἀρχιεπισκόπου καισαρείας καππαδοκίας*. Dindorf in his edition of Clement says '*Ἀρέθα ἀρχιεπισκόπῳ sic codex*,' but he is wrong. Our note of the words was copied in facsimile from the Ms. Maass also has the genitive. Here we have, in 913-14 A.D., the fact that Arethas had a notary who copied Clement's works for him when he was archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. He now occupied one of the most exalted positions in the whole Eastern hierarchy. Unless he had been made one of the four Patriarchs or had been granted some great office at court he could not have stood higher. The archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia stands first on the list of metropolitans under the patriarch of Constantinople, he has 41 bishops under him, and is styled *ὑπέρτιμος τῶν ὑπέρτιμων, καὶ ἑξαρχος πάσης ἀνατολῆς*. With regard to notaries

Codinus, 406.

p. 35.

Montfaucon says '*Aliud scribarum genus erat τῶν νοταρίων καὶ ταχυγράφων ... ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς τάχος γράφειν ... vocantur item ὀξυγράφοι eodem sensu, σημειογράφοι quasi dicas Notarium Scribae, unde vox Notarius. Erant autem Notarii arcanorum Scribae, τῶν ἀπορρήτων γραμμάτων ... Notariorum quidam numerus penes Imperatorem erat.*' He goes on to cite this case as proof that archbishops and patriarchs had private notaries. The name Βαάνης is transliterated by Finlay in another connection as Vahan, and oddly we notice in recent papers a reference to one Wahan Effendi. At Moscow there is a Ms. of dogmatic works, the subscriptio to which as given by Maass is *Στυλιανὸς διάκονος ἔγραψα Ἀρέθα ἀρχιεπισκό|πῳ Καισαρείας Καππαδοκίας ἔτει κόσμον | ςνμ̄ ἰνδικτιῶνος πέμπτῃς μηνὶ | ἀπριλίῳ συμπληρω | θέντος τοῦ τεύ|χους*. This is our last certain date in the life of Arethas, A.D. 932. He has now a deacon as calligraphus and his library seems to be taking a clerical turn. Perhaps we may quote, on the chance of its being to the point, the following passage from the subscriptio to Paris 781, a Ms. of John

Chrysostom, *ἐγράφη χειρὶ στυλν̄ (Στυλιανοῦ?) τοῦ ταλα· εὐκλεεστάτῳ Καλοκυρῳ· πρωτο*
σπ̄ (σπαθαριῳ?) τῶν παν̄ (-λαβεστάτῳ?) | νομμ̄ βυζαν̄ ξ̄ μ̄ γανν̄ ἰν̄ ἰβ̄· ἔτει κοσμ̄ ςνμ̄.

The date is now A.D. 939, and in that year we seem to have a Stylianus writing for a new master and calling himself ὁ τάλας—could it be that Arethas was dead? On the other hand, if Maass is right in reading *Στυλιανὸς διάκονος* for *στυλια ... (τ)ζαούτζ*, and ascribing the note in which it occurs in Luciani Cod. Vindobon. to Arethas, it is clear that Arethas survived a person of that name. But he is obviously in error. Du Cange under the word *Τζαούτσιοι* says '*Officiales Turcici, Transit a Turcis eadem appellatio, atque adeo dignitas, in Aulam Imperatorum Constantinopolitanorum. Nam—ut omittam Stylianum, cujus filiam Zoen in uxorem duxit Leo Philosophus, quem*

Gloss.
Graec.

Στυλιανὸν Ἰζουούτζιν vocat Leo Grammaticus (ut et Codex Regius 2023 Ζαουτζῶν Scylitzes et Zonaras) cum incertum sit an cognomen fuerit Styliani an vero nomen dignitatis—scribit Acropolita cap. 60,' etc. This clearly is the person to whom the note ascribed to Arethas refers, and, as he was father-in-law to the Emperor Leo of this subscriptio, Arethas might have alluded to him even before the date at which that was written. According to Gardthausen some 65 dated Greek Mss. have been saved to us up to the period of 1000 A.D. We have now seen that four of these owe their preservation to Arethas.

The Vatican codex contains three epigrams, marked in Anthol. p. 694. Palatina as xv. 32, 33, 34, which are entitled ΑΡΕΘΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΚΟΝΟΥ. To this title a marginal note is appended 'γεγονότος δὲ καὶ ἀρχιεπισκόπου Καισαρείας Καππαδοκίας.' If this is really an early note, based on knowledge, we not only have here three small poems by Arethas, but a strong confirmation of the supposition, on which we have thus far gone, that the person is the same in all the above Mss. It will be seen from the word deacon that these poems must have been written between the years 888 and 913-14 A.D. No. 34 is entitled εἰς φεβρωνίαν μοναχίην. The other two are epitaphs upon the author's sister Anna who is referred to as a widow of a pure character, and as dying τρεῖς πρὸς εἴκοσ' ἐποιχομένην ἐνιαυτούς. There is a family burying-place, and χόρος εὐγενέων στενάχοντες ἀδελφῶν Ἄννης (No. 32). Besides having anacreontic verses ascribed to him referring to the Emperor Leo among others, Arethas wrote or helped to write, when archbishop, at least one treatise. It is on the Apocalypse. In this treatise, of which a small Ms. exists at Oxford, when commenting on the words καὶ ἐλήφεν ὁ Ἄγγελος τὸν λιβανωτόν the author observes τοῦτω τῷ Ἀγγέλῳ, Ἄνδρέας ὁ τῆς κατ' ἐμὲ [κατ' ἐμὲ non est in B, note] Καισαρείας τῆς Καππαδοκίας ἀξίως τὴν ἐφορείαν λαχῶν, ἕκαστον ἱεράρχην παρεικάζει.

Cramer, Caten.
Graec. Patr. in
Nov. Test. 171.
Ms. Baroccianus
3, fol. 244v.

Arethas is known to have written marginal notes on the volumes in his possession. In the Ms. of Clement, Paris 451, three such notes have the word Ἀρέθα prefixed to them. 'The name of Arethas, however, is prefixed . . . also to several in the Vatican Dind. Clem. codices of Aristides, according to A. Maius . . . ' Accordingly, Maass regards—not p. xv. indeed these Vatican Mss., which are ascribed to the 11th and 12th centuries, but—the Laurentian 60, 3 of the 10th century (which contains the same note as appears in Vat. 1298) as having belonged to Arethas. Pursuing this line of investigation Maass identifies the writing of an undated Ms. of Lucian in the British Museum with that of Harleian, 5694. Baanes in Paris 451, and concludes that it also was written for Arethas. He then compares the Mss. either known or supposed to have belonged to him, and finds that while they differ in themselves, as the works of different scribes, they all contain examples of one particular hand which makes notes in their margins; this hand is very old and writes in small majuscules. Maass holds that it is the hand of the owner—Arethas. In this way he opens up quite a mine of Arethean scholia and says among other things Mélanges Graux, 'Morem sequebatur Arethas cum auctoribus suis colloquendi,' e.g. 'Ad Apologiam 27 D 758-9. Clarkiano adscripsit Arethas: καλῶς γε συ ποιῶν, Σώκρατες, ὄνοις καὶ ἴπποις τοὺς θεοὺς Ἀθηναίων παραβάλλεις.' This certainly savours of Christian authorship, and there are others like it: in particular Cobet points out that the remark, on Euthyphro, 14 E, πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἐξῆς is really a quotation of the phrase 'every good and every perfect gift,' etc., James i. 17. Although the subject is a fascinating one and treated with the greatest ingenuity, it cannot be pursued here. We may say, however, that long before we knew anything of this question we made copies of words and letters in Paris 451, and recognized on comparing these with the Harleian Lucian that the

resemblance is very strong. The scholia too in the margin of that Ms. frequently terminate with the leaf ornament, which Maass identifies with the writing of Arethas. A detailed inspection of this Ms. of Lucian, moreover, brings out a very close resemblance indeed between much contained on its margins and similar notes on the margins of \mathfrak{A} . The forms of the usual symbols $\sigma\eta\mu.$ $\acute{\omega}\rho.$ etc., the leaf ornament and certain capital letters, as the A and M, could hardly be more alike. At the same time the argument from handwriting is *periculosae plenum opus aleae*: and Maass proceeds to tie his scribes down to absolute uniformity in order to secure the necessary distinction in favour of this separate hand; while a new quill might make an appreciable difference in the writing of the same man. It may also be pointed out that the occurrence of the name *Ἀρέθα* before a few scholia is rather an argument against the same authorship in the case of those which, while resembling these, bear no signature. Finally, the leaf ornament is not confined to books owned by Arethas but appears elsewhere, e.g. in the codex Alexandrinus.

Thus far we have assumed the existence of but one Arethas: were there several? Some references on the point are given in the margin. Cave cites Coccius to the effect that Arethas, archbishop of Caesarea, flourished about 540 A.D.; but adds that he and his followers 'incertis prorsus nituntur conjecturis.' Cave, Oudin, Fabricius, and Baronius all agree as to the existence and date of our Arethas; and apparently the first three refer to his treatise on the Apocalypse and the debt which it owed to his predecessor Andreas. Cave and Fabricius with Baronius seem to hold that our Arethas may be the same with a presbyter Arethas of Caesarea who wrote homilies or orations 'de translatione Euthymii Patriarchae Constantinopolitani' (who died in 911 A.D.). In that case he must have been translated to Caesarea from Patras as deacon or presbyter. Oudin, while admitting that the dates allow of this authorship, denies that these homilies were written then—'habitaē illae sunt centum annis postea, Eustathio primo Papa novae Romae praesente; . . . sedit autem post Sergium nominis secundum ab anno 1019 ad annum 1025. Spectant ergo hae homiliae ad Aretham Caesariensis Ecclesiae Presbyterum integro seculo juniorem altero Arethae ejusdem sedis Archiepiscopo.' Accordingly he has an article on this presbyter Arethas, under date 1020, where he returns to the charge. On sentimental grounds it would be pleasant to retain all three Arethae. We should then have the picture of an Arethas family for centuries connected with the greatest see in Asia Minor, one branch or one member of which family had migrated to Patras. In Patras there were several churches called by the name of Basil, one, as we have seen, dedicated to St. Basil, the Great. As St. Basil was both a native and, in later life, an archbishop of Caesarea we catch a glimpse of a possible reason why an Arethas in ecclesiastical employment might pass back and forward between the two cities.

23. νομισμ. βυζαντ. δεκά καὶ τριῶν. 'For 13 byzants.' The νόμισμα or byzant was a gold coin weighing 'on an average 68 grains.' Finlay gives an example, having *obverse* a bust, bearded and crowned, bearing in the right hand a globe with patriarchal cross, the whole surrounded by the legend in mixed letters ΔΕΟΝ ΕΝ ΧΩ (Χρίστῳ) ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΠΟΜΩΝ (Ρωμαίων); *reverse*, a female bust with both hands held up as if blessing, and the legend + ΜΑΡΙΑ + Μ-Ρ ΘΥ (Μήτηρ Θεοῦ). As this is a coin of Leo VI., it is probable that it was the money actually used in paying for our Manuscript.
24. μηνὶ νοεμβρ. ἰνδικτ. ἰ.δ. ἔτει κόσμ. ςνδ. 'In the month of November of the 14th indiction, in the year of the world 6404.' By Byzantine writers the year of the world when

So Par. A: see
xcix. foot.

Oudin, Script.
Eccles. tom. 11.
cols. 426, 540;
Cavus, Script.
Eccles. Historia
Literaria, 1.
p. 407; Fabricius,
Bibl. Graec. vii.
p. 791; and
Baronius, xv.
512, 564, 567, 602.

Finlay, Byz.
Emp., pref.

given was given according to Byzantine reckoning, which assumed the creation to date from September 1, B.C. 5509. Now 6404, less 5509, gives as date for our Ms. the year 895 A.D. The word *indictio* is commonly held to mean the 'announcement' of taxation, but also means the year or cycle of fifteen years over which that taxation lasted. In the history of indictional dating, we may begin with the admitted fixed point 312 A.D. 'The period is calculated from 1st September, 312.' If now we count by periods of 15 from this date, we find that an indictional cycle—the thirty-ninth—closes on August 31st, 897 A.D. ($39 \times 15 = 585$; $585 + 312 = 897$). The '14th indiction' of this period will extend from 1st September, 895, to 31st August, 896, which is exactly what we require. It is obvious, however, that when dealing with Byzantine datings the month is of importance. For any date from 1st September to 31st December we subtract 5509 from the given year of the world; for any between 1st January and 31st August we subtract 5508. Failing to note the importance of *μηνὶ νοεμβρίῳ*, some scholars date our Ms. A.D. 896. As the indictional cycle here under discussion has some palaeographic interest it is given entire:—

From Sept. to Aug.

<i>ἰνδικτ.</i> α'. = 882-3 A.D.	} Ms. No. 8, Chalke, <i>Συναγωγή κανόνων</i> written 'a. 883.' Gardth.
β'. = 883-4	
γ'. = 884-5	
δ'. = 885-6	Leo VI. succeeds Basil I., March 1, -86.
ε'. = 886-7	} 'Laurent. 28, 26 Theon,' written 'a. 886.' Gardth.
ς'. = 887-8	
ζ'. = 888-9	Bodleian Euclid written September, 888.
η'. = 889-90	Ms. Paris 1470 (and 1476?) written April, 890.
θ'. = 890-91	
ι'. = 891-2	
ια'. = 892-3	
ιβ'. = 893-4	
ιγ'. = 894-5	
ιδ'. = 895-6	Clarke Plato written November, 895.
ιε'. = 896-7	

From what has been said it will appear that the dating of the Ms. written for Arethas by Baanes is not explicit to us: *ἔτει κόσμον συνκβ* might mean either 913 or 914 A.D. 26-7. *βασιλείας . . . ἀειμνήστου*:—'of the reign of the most Christian Leo, son of Basil of happy memory.' This is rather a modern rendering, but it pretty fairly gives the sense. For the persons named see *ἰνδικτ.* δ'. above and the description of Leo's byzant. On the coin the words *ἐν χρίστῳ* correspond to *φιλοχῦ* (*φιλοχρίστου*) here: both being analogous to 'most Christian king,' 'defender of the faith.' In the National Library at Paris there is a gorgeous Ms. 'omnium quotquot in Bibliotheca regia Graeci servantur ornatissimus' of Gregorius Theologus, with comments by Gregorius Nyssenus, Paris DX (= 510), which seems to have belonged to Basil I. Facing a full page painting of Christ, it has three full page figures on gold ground, representing *Εὐδοκία Αὐγουστα* with *Λεων Δεσποτης* and *Ἀλεξάνδρος Δεσποτης* on either side. On the second side of the third folio three more figures on gold appear, representing the crowning of Basil by Gabriel and Elias. A note says, 'ex his figuris apparet hunc codicem scriptum esse ante annum Christi 886 quo anno obiit Basilius Imperator cognomento Macedo, maritus Eudociae, Pater Leonis σοφοῦ et Alexandri.'

29-30. With line 27 the subscriptio was probably intended to close. A flourish extends along line 28, and goes down through lines 29-30. But something had been omitted—the price. What follows we had thought, until we saw Maass' essay, to be a discovery of ours. Maass properly rejects the reading accepted from Gaisford by Schanz, which makes the words = *ἔδόθη ὑπογραφῆς νομίσματα ιγ. ἀμήν*. both as not being clear and because he saw that more letters were there. If the page, which has long been subjected to friction until all but the indentations of the letters is in some cases rubbed away, be held up to the light and examined with 'armed eyesight,' the actual letters can be pretty clearly seen, as given above. Being in doubt as to the two last marks, which are on an abrasion of the parchment, Maass adds 'H̄ revera scriptum fuisse postea cum impetrassem, ut tinctura chemica huic codicis loco admoveretur, meis oculis vidi,' and renders the whole 'ἔδόθη ὑπὲρ γραφῆς νομίσματα ιγ, ὑπὲρ περιγραμνῶν νομίσματα—credo octo.' He believes that neither the main subscriptio nor this addition was written by Joannes, and holds that both are by Arethas. His grounds are 'At diversæ sunt non solum ab Joannis et atramento et calami ductu, verum inter ipsas certissima intercedunt discrimina. Sic igitur habeto,' he adds scornfully, 'scriba postea quam eadem scribendi suppellectile uno tenore totum exaravit codicem, bis eam mutavit ut scilicet parvulas istas notulas adjungeret.' This is strong language. The page has been much rubbed and the letters patched; under the circumstances Gaisford's remark, 'ab eadem manu sed paullo negligentius et dierum aliquot intervallo scripta,' may cover the second subscriptio in relation at least to the first. We must note, however, that the form of subscriptio—*ἔγράφη χειρὶ Στεφάνου, Ἰωάννου, Βαάνου*—is common to three Mss. which belonged to the same individual, a fact which may incline us to hold that he was the writer in each case. If Arethas wrote the subscriptio, it would almost seem to follow that he likewise lettered the quaternions of the Ms. We might add some facts about this literary archbishop's book account, as well as about other interesting matters, but space imperatively forbids.

III. CODEX
VENETUS.

CODEX t VENETUS. It remains to deal with the third of the great Platonic Mss., and after the details given in connection with the two older ones the description may be comparatively brief. It is described in the Catalogue as APPEND. CLASS. 4. COD. I. MEMBR. IN FOL. It is bound in wood covered with dark brown stamped leather which is a good deal injured on the back and at the corners. The contents fall into four portions—

1. The first which Schanz calls t_4 consists of four leaves on which are written the Timæus Locrus 1 r.-3 v. : *Πλουτάρχου ἐπιτομὴ τοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονία* 3 v.—4 r. : an index of the dialogues in the Thrasylean order, followed by the epistles and definitions, to which succeed *Νοθεύόμενοι οὗτοι πάντες*, consisting of *περὶ δικαίου, περὶ ἀρετῆς, Δημοδοκος, Σισυφος, Ἀλκυων, Ἐρυξίας, Ἀξιοχος*, and twenty more, extending from ME to ΞΔ and concluding 'ΟΜΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ ΞΔ :

2. The second and chief part, called by Schanz t_1 of which the contents are these, written, as will be seen from the specimen, in two columns. The titles are in red, the first one being double, and are repeated in black at the ends. After the first the author's name does not, with one exception, recur until the Republic. We shall give details only where there is a divergence from the titles in the other Mss.; referring to the facsimile for the general style. The dialogues are lettered in red in the margin, while the letters are repeated by a later hand at the top of the pages.

cxxii

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III. CODEX
 VENETUS.

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 the pages.

		Begins	Ends
	+Πλάτωνος Εὐθύφρων. ἢ πε —<·:· ρι ὀσίου ·:·>—	} red 5 r. i. (no Πλάτωνος) — 8 r. ii. } upper margin. black	
A	Πλάτωνος Εὐθύφρων. ἢ π ὀσίου ὁ λ, ἐριστικ':		
B	Σωκράτους Ἀπολογία	8 r. ii. 16	— 14 r. i.
Γ	Κρίτων ἢ περὶ πρακτοῦ in the margin by another hand is ἢ περὶ δόξης ἀληθοῦς καὶ δικαίου:	14 r. ii. up. marg.	— 16 v. ii.
Δ	Φαίδων ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς:	17 r. i.	— 31 v. ii.
E	Κρατύλος, etc.	31 v. ii. 34	— 42 v. ii.
S	Θεαίτητος, etc.	42 v. i. 23	— 56 v. ii.
	The ending is Πλάτων Θεαίτητ ἢ π ἐπιστη:		
Z	Σοφιστής, etc. The ending is simply σοφιστής	56 v. ii. 23	— 67 r. ii.
H	Πολιτικός, etc.	67 r. ii. 25	— 78 v. ii.
Θ	See facsimile	78 v. ii. 40	— 87 v. ii.
I	Φίληβος, etc.	87 r. i. 27	— 97 v. ii.
AI	Συμπόσιον, etc. [numerals so]	97 v. ii. 33	— 108 v. i.
BI	Φαίδρος, etc.	108 v. i. 36	— 119 r. i.
ΓI	Ἀλκιβιάδης ἢ π. φ. ἀνοῦ	119 r. i. 33	— 125 r. i.
ΔI	„ β „ „	125 r. i. 50	— 127 v. i.
EI	Ἰππαρχος, etc.	127 v. ii. up. marg.	— 129 r. i.
SI	Ἐρασταί, etc.	129 r. i. 17	— 130 r. ii.
ZI	Θεάγης ἢ περὶ σοφίας:	130 r. ii. 40	— 132 r. ii.
HI	Χαρμίδης, etc.	132 r. ii. 41	— 137 r. i.
IO	Δάχης ἢ περὶ ἀνδρείας (or -δρίας)	137 r. i. 26	— 141 v. i.
K	Λύσις, etc.	141 v. i. 20	— 145 v. i.
KA	Εὐθύδημος, etc.	145 v. i. 10	— 152 v. i.
KB	Πρωταγόρας, etc.	152 v. ii. up. marg.	— 163 v. i.
KΓ	Γοργίας, etc.	163 r. i. 43	— 178 v. ii.
[KΔ]	Μένων, etc. [numeral faded]	178 v. ii. 22	— 184 v. i.
KE	Ἰππίας μείζων ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ	184 v. i. 25	— 189 v. i.
KS	„ ἐλάττων „ „ :	189 v. i. 25	— 192 r. i.
KZ	Ἴων ἢ περὶ Ἰλιάδος	192 r. ii. up. marg.	— 194 v. i.
KH	Μενέξενος ἢ ἐπιτάφιος	194 v. i. 29	— 197 v. ii. 44
	The last four represent Tetralogy vii. which is not found in \mathfrak{U} . The Menexenus ends on line 44, then a line is missed, and on line 46 comes, in the same hand as that which gives the ending of the dialogue, τέλος τοῦ ἀ βιβλίου:		
KΘ	Κλειτοφῶν, etc.	198 r. i. up. marg.	— 198 v. ii.
Λ	Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας. ἢ περὶ δικαί	199 r. i. „	— 205 v. ii.
A	Πλάτων Πολιτεία ἢ π δικαίου	205 v. ii. 24	— 212 r. i.
B	Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας. ἢ περὶ	212 r. i. 45	— 212 v. ii.
Γ	δικαίου.		

The closing words of this part of the Ms. are σωφροσύνης ἄρα οὐ δεήσει Steph. 389 D.

The endings of the two first books are Πολιτείας ἢ περὶ δικαίου A and B.

The next portion (t_2) includes the rest of the Republic, 213 r.—255 v.; and the last (t_3) gives the Timaeus, 256 r.—265 v.: so that the Ms. does not contain all that is specified in the $\pi\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\xi$. These two portions are clearly distinguishable from the oldest by the character both of the parchment and of the writing: Schanz refers them to the 15th—16th century.

It is with the oldest portion alone that we have to do. The vellum is firm, well preserved, and of the same yellowish tint as that of the other two codices. The dimensions tested by fol. 67 are in centimetres 37.1 \times 28.5: the length of the writing space in the columns is 25.4, while the breadth of the two columns is 9.3, 9.4: the space between the columns is 2.5. The margins as usual come in the order inner, upper, outer, lower; and the breadth of the two last is considerable, more than 4, but it varies with the cutting and binding in each leaf. The ruling is done much after the fashion described in A, only that the writing lines number 50. All the perpendicular lines, which include one near the outer edge of each outer margin, and the 1st and 50th writing lines, together with two more in the upper and one in the lower margin, are drawn from edge to edge of the vellum; the other writing lines as in A. The leaves have been numbered by a late hand in the outer upper corner after the parts were bound in their present order. Our portion extends over 5.212 inclusive, or 208 leaves. This would give 26 quaternions exactly; but that is not quite how they have been arranged. Originally the 1st and 24th had been quinions but have each lost a leaf—the first and second respectively; while the 26th quaternion has its two last leaves cut away. The 208 leaves thus consist of 2 nines, 23 eights and a six. These divisions are—except where injured—lettered in the original hand both on the face of the first leaf and the back of the last in the inner lower corner, and have a small cross in the upper margin. As in the Clarke Ms. the pieces of parchment are laid indented side to indented in pairs, and two pairs are stitched as a quaternion. The lines, as will be seen from the facsimile, almost cut the writing in the middle. While the headings and numerals are, as we have seen, in red, the colour of the initial letters varies between very dark brown, as in the Parmenides, and red as in the Philebus; and the body of the work is in dark brown. Paragraphs are not marked by projecting letters. In point of ornaments and initial letters the Ms. takes a middle place between A and \mathfrak{U} . The character of the writing will be seen from the facsimile. Schanz after a careful study of all three codices is not satisfied with the date assigned in the catalogue, 12th century, and says 'wir haben ein höheres Alter anzunehmen.' The text as incomplete has no date, so that this judgment must be based on the character of the writing. There is certainly a very considerable resemblance in general style between \mathfrak{U} and t , and one may note that in both there are the same double forms for the letters α , γ , κ , λ , ν . At the same time the letters in t are much less neatly finished; while not only have we the modern printed form for π , the c form for σ , and the capitals B, Δ , H, N at intervals in the text, but in addition to the ordinary abbreviation for $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$, which is constant, many contractions are employed which never appear in \mathfrak{U} at all. Thus the facsimile alone gives examples of the following terminations

$-\epsilon\omega\varsigma = \epsilon\omega$, $-\kappa\eta\nu = -\kappa^{\lambda}$, $\tau\omega\nu = \tau^{\Delta}$, $\tau\hat{\omega} = \tau^{\sim}$, $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma = \tau\acute{\alpha}$: and of some of the following words:—

$\acute{\alpha}\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\varsigma = \acute{\alpha}\nu$	$\delta\acute{\epsilon} = \delta^{\lambda}$	$\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu = \mu^{\lambda}$
$\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\nu = \acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron$	$\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\alpha\iota = \acute{\epsilon}\iota\sim$	$\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota = \acute{\omicron}^{\cdot}$
$\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha, \acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha = \acute{\alpha}^{\cdot} \acute{\alpha}^{\cdot}, \acute{\alpha}^{\cdot}$	$\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota(\nu) = \acute{\epsilon}\sigma^{\cdot}$	$\omicron\upsilon\nu = \omicron^{\cdot}$

In the text of the Parmenides the name Socrates appears indifferently as $\mathbf{C}\omega\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\varsigma$, $\mathbf{C}\omega\kappa\rho\alpha$, $\mathbf{C}\omega^{\tau}$, $\mathbf{C}\omega^{\kappa}$, $\mathbf{C}\acute{\omega}$, and many compound contractions such as of $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \omicron\upsilon\nu$, $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\hat{\omega} \delta\nu$, etc. occur. Sometimes either

for convenience or to supply an omission a word or phrase is put below the lowest line of the column, e.g. 32 v. i., 112 v. ii., 113 r. ii. Signs of erasure and of supplements in the margin occur from time to time as in all Mss. The stops are such as in A and \mathfrak{A} , and the breathings and accents which may be seen in the example resemble those of \mathfrak{A} much more than those of A, and are not put with absolute regularity. New speakers are marked by : in the text and — in the margin, save when a double change occurs in one line when — is not repeated. In the first seven dialogues and the two last the interlocutors are named by the scribe at the beginning, either in the outer margin or in the middle space, and usually after the same system as that pursued in A, i.e. the words τὰ τοῦ διαλόγου | πρόσωπα contracted and in small uncials come in two lines, and below follow the names in succession. In the Symposium the names are entered opposite the place where each speech begins. Near the close of the Lesser Hippias, 191 v. i., abbreviated names come in succession down the outer margin. So also, as Schanz points out, contracted names appear from time to time throughout the Gorgias and Republic, while a younger hand puts them in the Sophist, 57 r. Finally, in the Menexenus, fol. 195 r. 1, inner margin, stands ἘΠΙΤΑΪΦΙΟΣ· opposite the words Ἐργωι μὲν ἡμῖν. Besides other marginal symbols we have the usual σημείωσαι and ὥραϊον in more than one early form, all more or less resembling those in \mathfrak{A} . The expression $\mathfrak{C}\mathfrak{H}$ Π̄ appears more than once, e.g. 7 r., 44 v. ii., 54 v. ii.: what it refers to we had not time to note, but it may be = σημείωσαι παροιμία (?), to call attention to a proverb. Again, we have such expressions as $\mathfrak{C}\mathfrak{H}$ ὄρος λήθης, noting a definition, 105 r. ii., and $\mathfrak{C}\mathfrak{H}$ τί λέγει· 155 v. i. The ὥρ. is usually neat and small, as 168 r. i., 204 r. i. The scholia and other notes are many, and seem, as Schanz decides, to be in most cases original. Such are the examples in the facsimile. There are other hands, one a very small neat one; and several much later, one which writes two or three notes in green. As in the Clarke Ms. some small diagrams occasionally illustrate the notes, e.g. 121 r. ii. Cases occur of numeral letters in the margin, thus in the Phaedrus they run from A to Θ on 113 r. i. in the Gorgias, from A to Δ, 166 v. i., and in the second book of the Republic, 210 r. i. Whether they represent divisions of the argument or point towards stichometry we had it not in our power to decide, but they seem too close together to warrant the latter supposition. The scholia on the Parmenides will be referred to in the notes. cxii.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

NOTE.

THE text is printed line for line, as well as page for page, with the Manuscript. The accentuation is, where necessary, adapted to the orthodox standard, and the punctuation differs to some extent from that of the original: but any divergence of reading which involves a change in letters or words is underlined. It is to be noted that : marks the end of speeches, and ; the same where there is a question. Sometimes the scribe's view on these matters has not been adhered to, and the stops have been changed accordingly. In clear or brief questions—such as $\pi\omega\varsigma \delta\acute{\eta}$:—it has not been thought necessary to put ; if : stands in the original. It will be observed that capitals are not used for proper names.

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✘ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΕΪΔΗΣ * Η * Π ΔΕΩΝ ✘ ΛΟΓΙΚ^ο

Ἐπειδὴ ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ κλαζομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνε-
τύχομεν ἀδειμάντῳ τε καὶ γλαύκῳ· καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς
ὁ ἀδείμαντος, χαίρ', ἔφη, ὦ κέφαλε· καὶ εἶ του δέη τῶν τῆδε, ὧν ἡμεῖς
δυνατοί, φράζε: ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, πάριμί γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δε-
ησόμενος ὑμῶν: λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν: καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, τῷ ἀδελ-
φῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι· παῖς δέ
που ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα δεῦρο ἐκ κλαζομενῶν, πολὺς
δὲ ἤδη χρόνος ἐξ ἐκείνου· τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, πυριλάμπης
ὄνομα: πάνυ γε: αὐτῷ δέ γε; ἀντιφῶν· ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει;
Οἶδε, εἶπον ἐγώ, πολίται μοί εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι· ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι
οὗτος ὁ ἀντιφῶν πυθοδώρῳ τινί, ζήνωνος ἐταίρῳ, πολλὰ ἐντε-
τύχηκε· καὶ τοὺς λόγους οὓς ποτε σωκράτης καὶ ζήνων καὶ παρ-
μενείδης διελέχθησαν, πολλακίς ἀκούσας τοῦ πυθοδώρου, ἀπο-
μνημονεύει: ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις: τούτων τοίνυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα
διακοῦσαι: ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· μεράκιον γὰρ ὧν αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα
διεμελέτησεν· ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον, πρὸς
ἰππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτόν· ἄρτι γὰρ

† 78 b 2

79 a 1

Cephalus.
I asked Adimantus, on meet-
ing him and
Glauco at
Athens, if I and
some philosophic
townsmen from
Clazomenae
could hope to
hear his half-
brother Antipho
repeat a discus-
sion which once
occurred between
Socrates, Zeno,
and Parmenides
and which he
had committed
to memory from
the dictation of
one Pythodorus,
an associate
of Zeno's.

Yielding to persuasion Antipho spoke as follows. Zeno and Parmenides came once to the great Panathenaea, Parmenides being about sixty-five and Zeno near forty, and stayed with Pythodorus. Socrates, then very young, and others had gone to hear Zeno's writings; and Pythodorus with Parmenides and Aristoteles entered as Zeno was nearly done reading. S. Do I rightly take you, Zeno, to say that unless existing things are at once like and unlike—which is impossible—they cannot be 'many'; that it is your aim to show thus that they are not many; and that each of your arguments is so much proof to this effect?

79 a 2

ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται· οἰκί δὲ ἐγγύς ἐν μελίτῃ. ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν· καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι χαλινόν τινα χαλκεῖ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἱ τε ἀδελφοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὦν ἔνεκα παρεῖμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέν τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καί με ἠσπάζετο. καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει, πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι· ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγείτο· ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφίκοιτό ποτε εἰς παναθήνια τὰ μεγάλα ξήνων τε καὶ παρμενείδης.

Τὸν μὲν οὖν παρμενείδην εὖ μάλα δὴ πρῆσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολυόν, καλὸν δὲ κάγαθόν τῃν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα· ξήνωνα δὲ ἐγγύς ἐτῶν τεσσαράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν· καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ παρμενείδου γεγονέναι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ τῷ πυθοδώρῳ, ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν κεραμειῷ· οἱ δὴ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι τὸν τε σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλοὺς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ ξήνωνος γραμμάτων· τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων κομισθῆναι. σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον. ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν ξήνωνα αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ παρμενείδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὄντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων ἡνίκα αὐτός τε ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη ὁ πυθόδωρος ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν παρμενείδην μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμικρὰ ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ ξήνωνος. τὸν οὖν σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεύσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι, καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, πῶς, φάναι, ὦ ξήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐσσι τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὁμοία τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια· τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον, οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια οὔτε τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια οἷόν τε εἶναι· οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; οὕτω, φάναι τὸν ξήνωνα· οὐκ οὖν εἰ ἀδύνατον τὰ τε ἀνόμοια ὁμοια¹ εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλά εἶναι, εἰ γὰρ πολλά εἶη πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα; ἄρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐσσι; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἶε σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ ἡγεῖ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι ὅσους

127

B

C

D

E

περ λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά; οὕτω λέγεις, ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω; οὐκ, ἀλλά, φάναι τὸν ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνήκας ὄλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται: μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν σωκράτην, ὃ παρμενίδην, ὅτι ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλία βούλεται φκειῶσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι ταυτὸν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινα ὃ_περ σύ, μεταβάλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἕτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν _φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὐτὸ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἐν φάναι τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἐκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν, σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταυτὰ, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρησθαι: ναί, φάναι τὸν ζήνωνα, ὃ σώκρατες· σὺ δ' οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ἤσθησαι· καίτοι, ὡς περ γε αἱ λάκαιναι^m σκύλακες, εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἵχθυεῖς τὰ λεχθέντα. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα ὥστε ἄπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὡς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον. ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι· ἔστι δέ, τό γε ἀληθές, βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμφοδεῖν, ὡς, εἰ ἐν ἔστι, πολλά καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὲ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλά λέγοντας· καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοϊότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἔστιν, ἢ ἢ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἴκανῶς ἐπεξίῃ. διὰ τοιαύτην δὲ φιλονεικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καὶ τις αὐτὸ ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλευσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἶτε μὴ. ταύτη γ' οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὃ σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας οἶει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας· ἐπεὶ, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπέκασας: ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν σωκράτην, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδός τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὐτὸ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον; τούτων δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἃ δὴ πολλά καλοῦμεν, μεταλαμβάνειν; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὁμοία γίνεσθαι, ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ το-

^mas ἢ συνήθεια λακωνικῶς /

Z. You have well caught my purpose. S. I see, Parmenides, that while Zeno has in a sense written the same thing as you, he tries by a change to make us think it different. You say 'the whole is one'; he says 'the whole is not many'. The distinction, if there be one, seems too high for such as we. Z. The ambiguity is accidental. My arguments had the humble aim of supporting Parmenides against the scoffs of opponents, who urge that many absurdities arise if it be 'one'. I say—were their hypothesis of 'many' assumed, the results if followed out must be still more laughable. But the work was written in a fit of zeal when I was young, and some one published it without my sanction. S. I understand. But do not you accept the existence of some absolute εἶδος of likeness, and again of unlikeness; and the fact that we—the many—partaking of these, are like or unlike in proportion?

Nor would there be any wonder did we partake of both; and so with all εἶδη. The strangeness would arise were the pure 'like' or absolute 'one' shown to be its opposite; but not so in the case of mere participants. Of me, for example, it were easy to prove that having left-right, front-back, top-foot I am 'many'; and again that as distinguished from the others present I am 'one.' Such a proof will hold for all natural objects: it proves that 'many' and 'one' exist. But were one first to part off the εἶδη which are apprehended mentally, and next to prove that these are equally subject among themselves to union and severance—then, Zeno, without depreciating your valuable work, I should indeed be filled with admiration. After listening carefully, with what seemed a mixture of annoyance and pleasure, Parmenides said

σοῦτον ὄσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνη, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀντὰ αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά τις ἀπεφαίνειτο ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεποιηθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι· οὐδέ γε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ενός, καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὐ μετέχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὐτὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἔν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύτως. εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἶδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τάναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλὰ, τί θαυμαστόν; λέγων, ὅτ' ἂν μὲν βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ μού ἐστιν ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὀπισθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως· πλήθους γὰρ οἶμαι μετέχω· ὅτ' ἂν δὲ ἐν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἐπτά ἡμῶν ὄντων εἰς ἐγὼ εἶμι ἄνθρωπος, μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ενός· ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. εἴαν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρῆ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῦτ' ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἔν· οὐδέ τι θαυμαστόν λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῖμεν. εἴαν δέ τις ὦν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, οἶον ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλήθος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράνυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνη, Ἀγαίμην ἂν ἐγώ, ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὦ ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάνυ ἠγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι· πολὺ μὲντ' ἂν ᾧδε μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθῆην, εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις διήλθετε, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῶ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδείξει: λέγοντος δὴ, ἔφη ὁ πυθόδωρος, τοῦ σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν οἶεσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἄχθεσθαι τὸν τε παρμενείδην καὶ τὸν ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδιᾶν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ

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παυσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν παρμενίδην· ὦ σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς
 ἄξιός ἐστι ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐ-
 τὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα χω-
 ρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί σοι¹ δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ ὁμοιό-
 της χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἐν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ
 καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δὴ ζήνωνος ἤκουες; ἔμοι γε, φάναι τὸν σωκρά-
 τη· ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπεῖν τὸν — παρμενίδην, οἷον δικαίου τι εἶδος
 αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὐ τῶν τοιούτων;
 ναί, φάναι· τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰοι ἡμεῖς
 ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτὸ τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος· ἐν
 ἀπορία, φάναι, πολλάκις δὴ, ὦ παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα,
 πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὡς περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως· ἦ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε,
 ὦ σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θριξὶ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ
 ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο ὃ τι ἀτιμώτατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ
 φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς, ὃν ἄλλο αὐ τῶν τῆδε ὦν ἡ-
 μεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή; οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν σωκρά-
 τη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν γε, ἅπερ ὀρώμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν
 οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε
 μή τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ταυτῶν· ἔπειτα ὅτ' ἂν ταύτη ἴστω, φεύγων οἴχο-
 μαι δέσσης μὴ ποτε εἰς τιν' ἄβυσθον φλυαρίαν ἐμπροσθὸν διαφθαρῶ.
 ἐκείσε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ
 ἐκείνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω· νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν παρ-
 μενίδην, ὦ σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντίληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς
 ἔτι ἀντιλήφεται, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν
 δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. τό-
 δε οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἶναι εἶδη ἅττα ὦν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα
 μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος
 μὲν μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους τε καὶ δικαιο-
 σύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι; πάνν γε, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη·
 οὐκ οὖν ἦτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἶδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον
 μεταλαμβάνει, ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο; καὶ
 πῶς ἂν; εἶπεν· πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶ-
 ναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὅν, ἢ πῶς; τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη, ὦ
 παρμενίδη, ἐν εἶναι· ἐν ἄρα ὃν καὶ ταυτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὐσιν

79 b 2

ἔθραξε ἠνωχλησε
 εἰς θυμὸν ἐκίνησε
 τὰς φρενας διέ-
 σαισε

Τ
 Ψ

Do you
 then hold that
 'one,' 'many,'
 'likeness,' and so
 on exist as εἶδη
 apart from their
 equivalents
 among us? S. I
 do. P. And
 'justice,'
 'beauty,' 'worth'?
 S. Yes. P. And
 likewise such as
 'man,' 'fire,'
 'water'? S.
 There I have often
 felt a difficulty.
 P. And even in
 the apparently
 absurd cases of
 hair or mud?
 S. Those visible
 objects I accept
 as existing, but it
 seems monstrous
 that they should
 have εἶδη.
 Indeed I have
 sometimes feared
 it might be so
 with all.
 The other
 classes form my
 present study.
 P. Years will
 strengthen in you
 the philosophic
 mind. You hold,
 then, that there
 are εἶδη, and
 that things
 around us derive
 their names from
 participation in
 these—big things,
 for example, from
 'bigness'? S. By
 all means. P.
 That which par-
 takes must do so
 in either whole or
 part of the εἶδος.
 Which do you
 choose? S. Why
 not the whole?
 P. Then while
 itself one and the
 same the εἶδος
 is wholly

in many separate things, and so becomes separate from itself. *S.* How so? Day is everywhere, yet not thus divided. *P.* What! You cover men with a sail —does the whole or a portion rest on each? *S.* A portion. *P.* The *εἶδη*, then, are divided; and thus things are big or equal when possessing a mere fraction of 'bigness' or 'equality' which cannot be equal to the whole: and when anything has a fragment of 'smallness,' 'smallness' must be larger than this part, while that to which the part accrues is thereby smaller than before! *S.* This cannot be. *P.* But again: do you reach your several *εἶδη* by comparison—'bigness,' for example, being the appearance common to many big things? If so, taking the bigness thus reached you will always get another by a new comparison; so that your *εἶδη* in each case will prove innumerable. *S.* What if each *εἶδος* be a conception existing only in minds?

80 a 1

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γ

ὄλον ἅμα ἐν ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη: οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἶον εἴη ἡμέρα, — ἢ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταῦτόν εἴη: ἠδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ σῶκράτες, ἐν ταῦτόν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἶον εἰ ἴστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὄλον. ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἠγεῖ λέγειν; ἴσως, φάναι: ἢ οὐν ὄλον ἐφ' ἕκάστῳ τὸ ἴστίον εἴη ἂν ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ; μέρος: μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ σῶκράτες, ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκ ἔτι ἐν ἕκάστῳ ὄλον ἀλλὰ μέρος ἕκαστου ἂν εἴη: φαίνεται οὕτω γε: ἢ οὐν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ σῶκράτες, φάναι τὸ ἐν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ¹ μερίζεσθαι· καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται; οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν: ὅρα γάρ, φάναι, εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φαίνεται; πάνυ γ', ἔφη: τί δαί; τοῦ ἴσου μέρους ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει ᾧ, ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου, τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῷ ἔσται; ἀδύνατον: ἀλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει· τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος. καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται· ᾧ δ' ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθῆν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐ μείζον ἢ πρίν: οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτό γε: τίνα οὐν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ σῶκράτες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοὶ τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; οὐ μὰ τὸν δία, φάναι, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκόλον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι: τί δαί δὴ; πρὸς τὸδε πῶς ἔχεις: τὸ ποῖον: οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἶεσθαι εἶναι. ὅτ' ἂν πολλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοὶ δόξῃ εἶναι μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τὸ μέγα ἠγεῖ εἶναι: ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι: τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐ ποῦ μέγα φανείται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; ἔοικεν: ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκ ἔτι δὴ ἐν ἕκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἅπερ αὐ τὸ πληθὸς: ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ παρμενίδη, τὸν σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγί-

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B

γνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἓν γε ἕκαστον εἶη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι
 πάσχοι ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο : τί οὖν ; φάναι· ἐν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων,
 Νόημα δὲ οὐδενός ; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν : ἀλλά τινος ; ναί : ὄντος ἢ
 οὐκ ὄντος ; ὄντος : οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκείνο τὸ νόημα ἐ-
 πὸν νοεῖ_, μίαν τινὰ οὐσαν ἰδέαν ; ναί : εἴτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ
 νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, αἰεὶ ὃν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ; ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται :
 τί δαὶ δὴ ; εἰπεῖν τὸν παρμενείδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ τᾶλλα φῆς τῶν εἶ-
 δῶν μετέχειν ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν,
 ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι ; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον. ἀλλ', ὦ
 Παρμενείδη, μάλιστα ἔμοι γε καταφαίνεται ᾧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἶδη
 ταῦτα ὡς περ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις
 εὐοικεῖν καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὐτῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις γί-
 γνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς : εἰ οὖν τι, ἔ-
 φη, ἔοικεν τῷ εἶδει, οἷόν τε ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ
 εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη ; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὁμοι-
 ον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι ; οὐκ ἔστι : τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἄρ' οὐ με-
 γάλῃ ἀνάγκῃ ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶδους μετέχειν ; ἀνάγκη : οὐ δ' ἂν τὰ
 ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ἦ, οὐκ ἐκείνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ; παντά-
 πασι μὲν οὖν : οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τι τῷ εἶδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος
 ἄλλω· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν
 ἐκεῖνό τῳ ὅμοιον ἦ, ἕτερον αὖ· καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶ-
 δος γιγνόμενον ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνη-
 ται : ἀληθέστατα λέγεις : οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τᾶλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μετα-
 λαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει : ἔοικεν : ὀρᾶς οὖν,
 φάναι, ὦ σῶκράτες, ὅση ἢ ἀπορία, ἐὰν τις εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ
 διορίζηται ; καὶ μάλα : εὐ τοίνυν ἴσθι, φάναι, ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐ-
 δέπω ἄπτει αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπορία, ἢ ἐν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων
 αἰεὶ τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις : πῶς δὴ ; εἰπεῖν : πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα,
 φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γιγνώσκει-
 σθαι, ὄντα ταιαῦτα οἷα φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἶδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι
 οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν τύχοι ἔμπει-
 ρος ὧν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφνής, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ
 πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεσθαι· ἀλλ' ἀπί-
 θανος εἶη ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι : πῆ δὴ ; ὦ παρμενεί-

80 a 2

It might then remain one. *P.* Yet a conception of something, and of an existent something ; in short, of some one feature common to all. *S.* Yes. *P.* Then that feature is an *εἶδος*. And we have this dilemma—all things have conceptive power as sharing in conceptions, or may be conceptions and yet want this power ! *S.* I think I have it ! The *εἶδη* are patterns set up in nature, and things partake of them simply by resemblance to them. *P.* But thus the *εἶδος* must also resemble the resemblance—must itself be a resemblance—and what they both resemble will now be the *εἶδος*. As this calls up an infinity of *εἶδη* participation by resemblance is hardly possible. *S.* It seems not. *P.* So hard is it even to hold that such *εἶδη* exist ! Yet are there difficulties greater far if we emphasize their separateness. *S.* How ? *P.* Why, one might say that in such a case they cannot even be known. To answer this objection needs extreme skill. *S.* In what way ?

P. Of course Being which is absolute has no place in our world. Even those *εἶδη* whose very essence is co-relation are related in their own world, having no connection with so-called resemblances of themselves here. And the case is parallel with these resemblances. Human slave implies human master; mastery *per se*, slavery *per se*; and the converse. No crossing of worlds. S. I understand.

P. Will not absolute knowledge then, and all its sub-divisions, deal with absolute truth and all its branches? S. Of necessity. P. The *εἶδη* or *γένη* accordingly are known by the *εἶδος* of knowledge; this have not we; hence absolute 'beauty,' 'goodness' and all such *ιδέαι* are unknown to us. S. I fear so.

P. Worse still. Absolute knowledge is more accurate by far than ours.

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C

δη, φάναι τὸν σωκράτη: ὅτι, ὦ σῶκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογήσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδὲ μίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν: πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν σωκράτη: καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν. οὐκ οὖν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἶ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν εἶτε ὁμοιώματα εἶτε ὅπῃ δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα: τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ὁμόνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις, αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἶδη· καὶ ἐαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζονται οὕτως; πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν σωκράτη: οἶον, φάναι τὸν παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δούλος ἐστὶν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότητος δῆπου, ὃ ἔστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δούλος ἐστὶν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὃ ἔστι δούλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης· ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὧν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτ' ἐστίν. αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστὶν ὃ ἐστὶ, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως, αὐτὴ δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας· ἀλλ', οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς αὐτά. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω; πάνυ γ', εἰπεῖν τὸν σωκράτη, μανθάνω: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη; πάνυ γε: ἐκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἢ ἔστιν, ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη· ἢ οὐ; ναί: ἢ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὖ ἐκάστη ἢ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη: ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὰ γε τὰ εἶδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ οὖν: γιγνώσκεται δὲ γέ που ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα; ναί: ὃ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν; οὐ γάρ: οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν: οὐκ ἔοικεν: ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν: κινδυνεύει: ὅρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε: τὸ ποῖον: φαίης ἂν ἢ οὐ, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτὸ τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην; καὶ κάλλος καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω;

ναί: οὐκ οὖν, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην: ἀνάγκη: ἄρ' οὖν οἴός τε αὐτῷ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν γινώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων;

Τί γὰρ οὐ: ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ παρμενίδης, ὠμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ σῶκρατες, μήτε ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἶδη πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢ ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα: ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα: ὠμολόγηται γάρ: οὐκ οὖν, εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἢ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡμῶν γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν. ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γινώσκουμεν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐκείνοί τε αὐτὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γινώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες: ἀλλὰ μὴ λῖαν, ἔφη, θαυμαστός ὁ λόγος εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσειε τοῦ εἰδέναι: Ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ σῶκρατες, ἔφη ὁ παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὀριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος· ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὐτε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴτε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα: καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τι λέγειν καί, ὅ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστός ὡς δυσανάπειστον εἶναι: καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφροῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἐκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτῆ καθ' αὐτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον: συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ παρμενίδη, ὁ σωκράτης: πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις: ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ τις δῆ, ὦ σῶκρατες, αὐτὴ μὴ εἴσει εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὀριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέφει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει μὴ ἔων ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασιν διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιοῦτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἠσθησθαι: ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι: τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ Τρέφει ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι: πρῶτ' ἄρα, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ σῶκρατες, ὁ-

Now who should have such knowledge if not God? But having it can he know things as they are with us, any more than by absolute mastery he can rule things with us? S. This is too preposterous a conclusion! P. Yet, if we insist upon absolute *εἶδη*, there are countless such difficulties—very hard to meet, and needing a most gifted opponent. S. I admit it. P. Nevertheless, as you of all men must have realized, he who in consequence denies the *εἶδη* will have nought to which his intellect can turn, and will thus annihilate the possibility of discussion. S. You speak truth. P. Yes, Socrates; you have been precipitate.

While still young you must rack yourself with the type of training which Zeno has illustrated. Yet I admired your forcing the question away from the sensible to the intelligible sphere. S. I did so because it seems so simple to show contradictory qualities in the former. P. Yes; but, if your training is to be thorough, you must follow up the consequences not of one hypothesis alone but of its opposite. Thus you must, in the case of Zeno's hypothesis, ask not only 'if the many are' but 'if the many are not' what follows to them and to the one, both severally and reciprocally. And so with likeness and unlikeness, motion and rest, existence itself and non-existence: in short, with every possible hypothesis.

S. Pray, do you illustrate by some hypothesis of your own.

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ρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τε τί καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν· ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρῶην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὐ ἴσθι, ἡ ὀρμὴ ἦν ὀρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια: Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὧ παρμενείδῃ, τῆς γυμνασίας; οὗτος, εἶπεν, ὄνπερ ἤκουσας ζήνωνος. πλὴν τοῦτό γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἡγάσθην, εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐκ εἶας ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστα τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἶδη ἂν ἠγήσαιο εἶναι: δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταῦτη γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοία καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι οὖν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν: καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη· χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι: πῶς λέγεις; φάναι: οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἦν ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλὰ ἔστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν, καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ· καὶ αὖ, εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλὰ, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ αὐθις αὖ ἐν ὑποθῆ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθείσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· καί, ἔνι λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅ τι οὖν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅ τι ἂν προέλθῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τὰλλα αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν προαιρῆ αἰεὶ, ἐάν τε ὡς ὄν ὑποθῆ ὁ ὑπετίθεσο· ἐάν τε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές: ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὧ παρμενείδῃ, πραγματίαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω· ἀλλὰ μοι τί οὐ διήλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι,

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D

ὦ σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε : ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν σωκράτη, ξήνων, τί οὐ διήλθες ἡμῖν : καὶ τὸν ξήνωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι, αὐτοῦ, ὦ σώκρατες, δεώμεθα παρμενείδου· μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον ἦ ὁ λέγει. ἢ οὐχ ὀρᾶς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις ; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἡμεν οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι, ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν ἔχειν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ παρμενείδη, σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου : ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ ξήνω-
 Νος, ἔφη ὁ ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν πυθόδωρον, αὐτόν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ παρμε-
 νείδου καὶ τὸν ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι, καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν : τὸν οὖν παρμενείδην, ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καὶ τοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναί, ᾧ ἐκεῖνος, ἀθλητῆ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφ' ἄρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἐμπει-
 ρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάξων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ-
 τω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἵεναί· καγὼ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβείσθαι πῶς χρή τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοι-
 οὔτων τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλήθος λόγων. ὅμως δέ· δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὁ ξήνων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξώμεθα, καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα ; ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγμα-
 τιώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἑμαυτοῦ ὑ-
 ποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴ τε ἓν ἔστιν εἴ τε μὴ ἓν, τί χρή συμβαίνειν : πάνυ μὲν οὖν· φάναι τὸν ξήνωνα : τίς οὖν, εἰπέιν, μοι ἀποκρινεῖται ; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος ; ἦκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμο-
 νοῖ, καὶ ἂ οἶεται μάλιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαντα ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐκεῖνου ἀπόκρισις : ἔτοιμός σοι, ὦ παρμενείδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν ἀριστοτέλη· ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων. ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου : εἰεν δὴ, φάναι· εἴ ἓν ἔστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἓν : πῶς γὰρ ἂν· οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι : Τί δὴ : τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἐστίν· ναί : τί δαὶ τὸ ὅλον ; οὐχὶ οὐδ' ἂν¹ μέ-
 ρος μηδὲν ἀπῆ ὅλον ἂν εἴη ; πάνυ γε : ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὃν καὶ μέρη ἔχον : ἀνάγκη : ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄ-
 ρα οὕτως τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἴη ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν : ἀληθῆ : δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἀλλ' ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι : δεῖ : οὐτ' ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἔξει, εἴ ἓν ἔσται τὸ

P. It is a pro-
 digious task, and
 I am old.
S. Zeno, then?
 —But Zeno
 laughing said
 ‘No; we must
 ask Parmenides.
 He is old: but
 we are few and
 he need not
 mind.’ As the
 others all joined
 in the request
 Parmenides con-
 sented.—*P.* I
 may well recall
 the saying of
 Ibycus when
 venturing thus, at
 my years, to swim
 through such a
 mass of argu-
 ment.

Let me start,
 then, from my
 own hypothesis
 —the one exists
 and, again, does
 not exist: what
 must follow?—
 and Aristoteles,
 as the youngest,
 shall reply? So.

A I. If the
 one is, then,
 i. The one can-
 not be ‘many’:
 ii. it cannot have
 a ‘part,’ nor be
 a ‘whole’; as
 both these imply
 many. A. It
 cannot.

P.
 iii. Nor can it have 'beginning' 'end' or 'middle,' these being parts. A.
 Right. P.
 iv. Therefore it is 'limitless'; and also
 v. 'shapeless'; since shape, whether round or straight, needs a middle and ends. A. Right. P.
 vi. Now if it were in another, then were it enclosed in a circle and touched at many points; and if in itself, it would both inclose and be inclosed, thus becoming two. Accordingly it cannot 'be anywhere.' A. It cannot. P.
 vii. Can it then 'be still' or 'be in motion'? If in motion it would be either changed—thus ceasing to be one—: or borne along, in which case—1) if it moved in a circle it would turn on a centre—and 2) as for going from place to place,

ἐν: οὐ γὰρ: οὐκ οὖν, εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη: ὀρθῶς: καὶ μὴν τελευτὴ γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρασ ἐκάστου: πῶς δ' οὐ: ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἐν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει: ἄπειρον: καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα οὔτε γὰρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχοι: πῶς; στρογγύλον γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο οὐδ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχη; ναί: καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε οὐδ' ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν ἐπίπροσθεν ᾔη; οὕτως: οὐκ οὖν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἂν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι: πάν μὲν οὖν: οὔτε ἄρα εὐθύ οὔτε Περιφερές ἐστιν, ἐπέπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει: ὀρθῶς: καὶ μὴν τοι οὐτόν γε ὃν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἴη οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη: πῶς δὴ; ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὃν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἐν εἴη, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο πολλοῖς: τοῦ δὲ ἐνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῆ κύκλῳ ἄπτεισθαι: ἀδύνατον: ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν καὶ ἑαυτὸ εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη: ἐν τῷ γὰρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον γὰρ: οὐκ οὖν ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταῦτόν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει: καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἐν ἄλλὰ δύο: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἐν, μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐν ὃν: οὐκ ἐστιν: ὅρα δὴ οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἶόν τε ἐστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι: τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ: ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἂν· αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις: ναί: ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἐν ἔτι εἶναι: ἀδύνατον: οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἀλλοιώσιν γε κινεῖται: οὐ φαίνεται: ἀλλ' ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι; ἴσως: καὶ μὴν, εἰ φέροιο τὸ ἐν, ἢ τοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας: ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν Κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ᾧ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; οὐδὲ μία: ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμείβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται: εἴπερ γε δὴ: οὐκ οὖν εἶναι μὲν που ἐν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; ναί: ἂρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνα-

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τώτερον; οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅτι: εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, ἢ μήτ' ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴπερ ὁ ἔγγιγνεται; ἀνάγκη: εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκείνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὐ μέρη εἴη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἂν τι αὐτοῦ ἦδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἴη ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἶόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινὸς μήτε ἔξω: ἀληθῆ: οὐδὲ μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήτε ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαι που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον; φαίνεται: Οὗτ' ἄρα ποι ἰὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ γιγνόμενον χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὗτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον, οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον: οὐκ ἔοικε: κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἐν ἀκίνητον: ἀκίνητον: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι γέ φαμεν ἐν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον; φαμέν γάρ: οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν: τί δὴ: ὅτι ἦδη ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἶόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: οὐκ ἔοικεν: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὐθ' ἔστηκεν: οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε: τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐθ' ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται: οὐκ οὐκ δὴ φαίνεται γε: οὐδὲ μὴν ταυτὸν γε οὔτε ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, οὐδ' αὖ ἕτερον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἐτέρου ἂν εἴη: πῆ δὴ; ἕτερον μὲν που ἑαυτοῦ ὄν ἐνός ἕτερον ἂν εἴη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν: ἀληθῆ: καὶ μὴν ταυτὸν γε ἐτέρῳ ὄν ἐκείνο ἂν εἴη, αὐτὸ δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἐν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐνός: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ταυτὸν μὲν ἄρα ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται: οὐ γὰρ: ἕτερον δὲ γε ἐτέρου οὐκ ἔσται ἕως ἂν ἦ ἐν· οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἐτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ: ὀρθῶς: τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· ἢ οἶε; οὐδὴτα: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ οὕτω, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῆ ὄν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον: ὀρθῶς: οὐδὲ μὴν ταυτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται: πῶς δ' οὐ: οὐχ ἢπερ τοῦ ἐνός φύσις, αὕτη δὴ που καὶ ταυτοῦ: τί δὴ: ὅτι οὐκ ἐπειδ' ἂν ταυτὸν γένηται τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται: ἀλλὰ τί μὴν: τοῖς πολλοῖς ταυτὸν γενόμενον Πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐν: ἀληθῆ: ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ταυτὸν μηδαμῆ διαφέρει, ὅποτε τι ταυτὸν ἐγίγνετο αἰεὶ ἂν ἐν ἐγίγνετο· καὶ ὅποτε ἐν, ταυτὸν: πάνυ γε: εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταυτὸν ἔσται, οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· καὶ οὕτω ἐν ὄν οὐχ ἐν ἔσται: ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀ-

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only that which has parts can come to be in a thing into which it has not yet quite got, and wholly outside of which it is no longer. Thus it has no type of motion. But we showed that it was not in anything, therefore it is never in the same thing. Consequently it cannot be still. A. So at least it would seem. P. viii. Nor will it be 'different from itself'—else were it not one: or 'the same as the different'—else were it that different thing: or 'different from the different'—since the different alone can have difference: or 'the same as itself'—for if same were identical with one, what of things that are same with the many?

So the one is neither 'different' from, nor 'the same,' as, either itself or the different. *A.* No indeed. *P.* ix. Nor will it be 'like' either to itself or the different. For that is like which has been affected by the same, and as the same is distinct from the one, if the one were like it were more than one. Again, since that is unlike which has been affected by the different, the one—being in no way so affected—is in no respect 'unlike' either itself or the different. *A.* So it appears. *P.* x. Now:—if equal to anything it will be of the same measures with that thing, but it has no part in 'the same'; and if greater or less, then, however measured, it will have as many parts as measures, and so will not be one: while if it has but one measure it will— which is impossible—be equal to that. Being such as it is, then, it is neither 'equal' nor 'unequal' whether to itself or another. *A.* Clearly so. *P.* xi. Recalling now

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δύνατον: ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἢ ἐτέρου ἕτερον εἶναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ ταυ-
τόν: ἀδύνατον: οὕτω δὴ ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταυτόν τὸ ἐν οὐτ' ἂν αὐτῷ οὐτ' ἂν
ἑτέρῳ εἴη: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοίον τινι ἔσται οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε
αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐτέρῳ: τί δὴ: ὅτι τὸ ταυτόν που πεπονηθὸς ὁμοιον: ναί: τοῦ
δέ γε ἐνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταυτόν: ἐφάνη γάρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν
εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἐν
τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον: ναί: ¹ οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταυτόν πεπονηθὸς εἶναι
τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδὲ ὁμοιον ἄρα δυνατὸν
αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέ-
πονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν: καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἐν: πλεί-
ω γάρ: τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονηθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη
ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταυτόν πεπονηθὸς ὁμοιον: ὀρθῶς: τὸ δέ γε
ἐν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονηθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἔστιν
οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐτέρῳ: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον
οὔθ' ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν: οὐ φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε
ὄν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἀϊσον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ: πῆ; ἴσον μὲν
ὄν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ὧ ἂν ἴσον ᾗ; ναί: μείζον δέ που ἢ
ἔλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν σύμμετρον ᾗ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα
ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω: ναί: οἷς δ' ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν
σμικροτέρων τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται: πῶς γὰρ οὔ: οὐκ οὖν ἀδύ-
νατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὄν-
τινων οὖν τῶν αὐτῶν; ἀδύνατον: ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὐτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε
ἄλλῳ εἴη, μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν: οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γε: ἀλλὰ μὴν πλει-
όνων γε μέτρων ὄν ἢ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσων περ μέτρων τοσοῦτων καὶ με-
ρῶν ἂν εἴη: καὶ οὕτω αὐ οὐκ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσα περ καὶ τὰ
μέτρα: ὀρθῶς: εἰ δέ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἴη, ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ
τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη ἴσον αὐτῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι: ἐφάνη γάρ: οὔτε
ἄρα ἐνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων οὔτε τὸ παρά-
παν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ποτέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔ-
τε ἄλλῳ: οὔτε αὖ μείζον οὐδὲ ἔλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἐτέρου:
Παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν οὕτω: τί δαί; πρῆβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν
ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι; τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ: ὅτι που
ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἴσότητος χρόνου καὶ
ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἐνὶ, οὔτε ὁμοιότη-

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τος οὔτε ἰσότητος : ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν : καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότη-
 τός τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν : πάνυ μὲν οὖν : πῶς
 οὖν οἶόν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἶναι, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡ-
 λικίαν ἔχειν τῷ, τοιοῦτον ὄν : οὐδαμῶς : οὐκ ἄρα ἂν εἴη νεώτερον
 οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἐν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔ-
 τε ἄλλῳ : οὐ φαίνεται : ἂρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύναίτο
 ἂν εἶναι τὸ ἐν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη ; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴαν τι ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ αἰεὶ
 αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίνεσθαι ; ἀνάγκη : οὐκ οὖν τό γε πρεσβύ-
 Τερων αἰεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον ; τί μὴν : τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἐ-
 αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλ-
 λει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται : πῶς λέγεις ; ὦδε. διαφέρων
 ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἤδη ὄντος διαφορῶν ἄλλα τού
 μὲν ἤδη ὄντος ἤδη εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ
 μέλλοντος μέλλειν τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλ-
 λειν οὔτε εἶναι πῶς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι :
 ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν : ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεωτέ-
 ρου ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου : ἔστι γάρ : τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ
 γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἅμα ἑαυτοῦ γίνεσθαι : ἔ-
 οικεν : ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίνεσθαι χρόνον μήτε
 ἐλάττω : ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ
 γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι : ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα : ἀνάγ-
 ἴκη ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιού-
 του, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν, καὶ πρε-
 σβυτέρων τε αὐτοῦ ἅμα καὶ νεώτερον γίνεσθαι : κινδυνεύει : ἀλ-
 λά μὴν τῷ γε ἐν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν : οὐ γὰρ
 μετῆν : οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν τινι χρόνῳ :
 οὔκουν δὴ, ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ : τί οὖν ; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ
 ἐγίγνετο, οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονό-
 τος ; καὶ μάλα : τί δαί ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσε-
 ται, οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μέλλοντος ; ναί : τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνε-
 ται, οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν : εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν μηδαμῇ μη-
 δενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ' ἐγίγνετο οὔτ' ἦν
 ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτ' ἔπειτα γε-
 νήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτε ἔσται : ἀληθέστατα : ἔστιν οὖν οὐ-

82 a 1



ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ.

what we have said about likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality—can it, compared either with itself or aught else, be 'older' 'younger' or 'the same age' ; since these imply equality etc in time? *A.* It cannot. *P.* xii. Hence it will not be 'in time' at all : for so it must always get older—and if so then likewise younger—than itself ; while yet it must ever be the same age as itself. *A.* No ; according to the argument. *P.* xiii. But those states of being—was, has become, will be, is, becomes, and so on—all indicate some participation in time. That, therefore, which in no way partakes of time has no share in these.

Thus the one will not 'be.'
A. It appears not. *P.*
 xiv. Neither, then, can it 'be one.'
A. I fear not. *P.*
 xv. As there can be nothing either of or for the non-existent, so there can be 'no name for,' 'no science, perception, opinion of' the one. *A.* It seems not. *P.*
 Now are all these things possible? *A.* I, at least, do not think so.

II. *P.* Shall we then take a second survey from the beginning? Our hypothesis was that the one is. Now this involves the separate existence of being, for 'the one is' and 'the one one' are not identical. *A.* Quite so. *P.*
 i. But if 'is' be said of the one-existent and 'one' of the existent-one—the two elements being distinct—clearly one and is are 'parts,' and the existent-one a 'whole.'
A. Undoubtedly. *P.*
 ii. But neither part ever lets the other go.

Σίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετᾶσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; οὐκ ἔστιν: οὐδαμῶς ἄρα τὸ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἐν: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἐν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὄν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δέ τῷ τοιῶδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν: κινδυνεύει: ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἂν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; καὶ πῶς; οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομά ἐστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα, οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γινώσκειται, οὐδὲ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται: οὐκ ἔοικεν: ἢ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἐν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; οὐκ οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ: βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴαν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανοιῶσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῆ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι: οὐκοῦν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποιά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα: οὐχ οὕτω; ναί: ὄρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἶόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; οὐχ οἶόν τε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνός εἴη ἂν, οὐ ταυτὸν οὐσα τῷ ἐνί; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν· ἀλλὰ ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν εἶναι. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτω; πάνυ μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; ἀνάγκη: ἄρα οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἐν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδ' ἂν τις συλλήβδην εἴπη ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν: πάνυ γε: πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν τί συμβήσεται; σκόπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὄν τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν οἶον μέρη ἔχειν: πῶς; ᾤδε. εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος λέγεται [καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος λέγεται] καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου, οὐ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὄλον ἐν ὄν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι; ἀνάγκη: πότερον οὖν ἐκότερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσερούμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὄλου μόριον τό γε μόριον προσρητέον: τοῦ ὄλου: καὶ ὄλον ἄρα ἔστι ὃ ἂν ἐν ἦ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει; πάνυ γε: τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἐκότερον τούτων τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος, τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἄρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἐν τοῦ εἶναι μόριον, ἢ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνός μορίου: οὐκ ἂν εἴη: πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων

142

B

C

D

E

ἐκάτερον τό τε ἐν ἰσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν
 αὐ μορίων τὸ μόριον· καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως αἰεὶ, ὃ τί περ ἂν
 μόριον γένηται τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ αἰεὶ ἰσχει· τό τε γὰρ ἐν τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ ἰ-
 σχει καὶ τὸ ὄν τὸ ἐν ὥστε ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἐν
 εἶναι· παντάπασι μὲν οὖν· οὐκ οὖν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλήθος οὕτω
 Τὸ ἐν ὄν εἶη· ἔοικεν· ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῆδε ἔτι· πῆ; οὐσίας φαμέν μετέ-
 χειν τὸ ἐν, διὸ ἔστιν· ναί· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἐν ὄν πολλά ἐφάνη;
 οὕτω· τί δαί; αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, ὃ δὴ φαμεν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῆ δια-
 νοία μόνον καθ' αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὐ φαμέν μετέχειν, ἀρὰ γε
 ἐν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλά τὸ αὐτὸ τούτου; ἐν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε·
 εἰδῶμεν δὴ· ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι ἕτερον δὲ
 αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἐν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μετέσχευ; ἀνάγκη· οὐκ οὖν
 εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἢ οὐσία ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν, οὔτε τῷ ἐν τὸ ἐν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτε-
 ρον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἢ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ
 ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων· πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ὥστε οὐ ταυτὸν ἐστὶν οὔτε τῷ ἐν
 οὔτε τῆ οὐσία τὸ ἕτερον· πῶς γάρ· τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν
 εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἐν, εἴτε τὸ ἐν
 καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀρὰ οὐκ ἐν ἐκάστη τῆ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθά τι-
 νε ὡ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρῳ· πῶς; ᾧδε. ἔστιν οὐσίαν
 εἰπεῖν; ἔστιν· καὶ αὐθις εἰπεῖν ἐν; καὶ τούτο· ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ ἐκάτερον
 αὐτοῖν εἶρηται; ναί· τί δ'; ὅτ' ἂν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἐν, ἀρὰ οὐκ ἀμφο-
 τέρῳ· πάνυ γε· οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον, ἢ ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἐν,
 καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἀμφω λέγω· ναί· ὡ δ' ἂν ἀμφω ὀρ-
 θῶς προσαγορεύσθον, ἀρὰ οἶόν τε ἀμφω μὲν αὐτῶ εἶναι δύο δὲ
 μῆ; οὐχ οἶόν τε· ὡ δ' ἂν δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἐκάτερον αὐ-
 τοῖν ἐν εἶναι; οὐδὲ μία· τούτων ἀρὰ, ἐπεὶ περ σύνδυο ἕκαστα συμ-
 βαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἂν εἶη ἕκαστον· φαίνεται· εἰ δὲ ἐν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν
 ἐστί, συντεθέντος ἐνὸς ὁποίου οὖν ἦτινι οὖν συζυγία οὐ τρία γί-
 γνεται τὰ πάντα; ναί· τρία δὲ οὐ περιττά, καὶ δύο ἄρτια; πῶς δ' οὐ;
 τί δαί; δυοῖν ὄντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δῖς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς,
 εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δῖς ἐν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρίς ἐν; ἀνάγκη·
 δυοῖν δὲ ὄντων καὶ δῖς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δῖς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐ τρία τρίς εἶναι; πῶς δ' οὐ; τί δαί; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ
 δῖς ὄντων, καὶ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ τρίς ὄντων, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δῖς

✓

✓

✓

Ba b 1

After whatever
 subdivisions the
 two still keep
 fast hold of each
 other. Now that
 which always
 becomes two
 must be—not
 one, but—a
 'limitless num-
 ber.' A. So
 it seems. P.
 iii. Think now of
 the one apart
 from being—
 it and its being
 are then diffe-
 rent. They
 differ, however,
 not as being and
 one, but as differ-
 rent. If so, the
 different has in
 turn a distinct
 existence other
 than both. Take
 any pair of these,
 being-different,
 being-one, one
 —different :—
 they must be
 spoken of as both,
 or two. But of
 two each is ne-
 cessarily one.
 Now if to any of
 these pairs some
 one be added
 the result is
 three : and three
 are odd, while
 two are even :
 and two give
 twice, and three
 thrice ; so there
 will be two twice
 and three thrice,
 and three twice
 and two thrice.

δυο τρις

Having, therefore, by the existence of one every combination of even and odd, we have number; and so limitless multitude, whose every portion partakes of existence, which is thus endlessly subdivided into parts. *A.* That is so. *P.* iv. But of necessity each of these parts is one. Thus the one clings to every single portion of being, and has as many parts as there are division:—is, in short, not a whole but a limitless multitude. Accordingly we show not merely the one-existent, but the one itself through the action of existence, to be 'many.' *A.* Entirely so. *P.* v. But parts are parts of a whole, which circumscribes them:

82 b 2

εἶναι καὶ τρία^ς δίς; πολλή γε: ἄρτια τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκεις ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττὰ περιττάκεις, καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκεις καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκεις; 144
 ἔστιν οὕτω: εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον τινὰ ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι
 ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; οὐδαμῶς γε: εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἓν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶ-
 ναι: ἀνάγκη: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πολλὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ πλῆθος ἄ-
 πειρον τῶν ὄντων. ἢ οὐκ ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐ-
 σίας γίγνεται; καὶ πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει,
 καὶ τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχει ἂν αὐτῆς; ναί: ἐπὶ πάντα B
 ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἢ οὐσία νενέμηται, καὶ οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄν-
 των οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου· ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐ-
 ρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν ὄντων του ἀποστατοῖ: οὐδαμῶς:
 κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὡς οἶόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ παν-
 ταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα
 τῆς οὐσίας: ἔχει οὕτω: πλείστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς: πλείστα C
 μέντοι: τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας οὐδὲν μέντοι μέ-
 ρος; καὶ πῶς ἂν τοι τοῦτο γένοιτο: ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη
 αὐτὸ αἰεὶ, ἔωσπερ ἂν ἦ, ἓν γέ τι εἶναι· μηδὲν δέ, ἀδύνατον: ἀνάγκη:
 πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἐκάστῳ τῷ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρόσσεστιν τὸ ἓν, οὐ-
 κ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε
 ἄλλου οὐδενός: οὕτω: ἄρα οὖν ἐν ὃν πολλαχού ἅμα ὅλον ἐστί; τοῦτο D
 ἄθρει: ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ, καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον: μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ
 μὴ ὅλον· ἄλλως γὰρ πως οὐδαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασιν τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας
 μέρεσιν παρέσται ἢ μεμερισμένον: ναί: καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλή
 ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη: ἀνάγκη: οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθῆ ἄρτι
 ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες ὡς πλείστα μέρη ἢ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἴη· οὐδὲ
 γὰρ πλείω τοῦ ἐνὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ' ἴσα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ ἐνί· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ E
 ὃν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἐξῆσουσθον δύο
 ὄντε αἰεὶ παρὰ πάντα: παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται: τὸ ἐν ἄρα αὐτὸ
 κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλὰ τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆ-
 θός ἐστιν: φαίνεται: οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὃν ἐν πολλὰ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ
 τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι: παν-
 τάπασιν μὲν οὖν: καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμέ-
 νον¹ ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν· ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια
 α; ἀνάγκη: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρασ ἂν εἴη: πῶς δ' οὐ: τὸ 145

ἐν ἄρα ὄν ἐν τέ ἐστὶ που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὄλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερα-
 σμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει: φαίνεται: ἄρ' οὐκ, ἐπεὶ περ πεπερα-
 σμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; ἀνάγκη: τί δαί; ὄλον οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ
 μέσον, καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὄλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; κἄν του ἐν
 ὄ τι οὐκ αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὄλον εἶναι; οὐκ ἐθελήσει: καὶ
 ἀρχὴν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν τὸ ἐν; ἔχοι: ἀλλὰ μὴν
 τό γε μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἶη: οὐ
 γάρ: καὶ σχήματος δὴ τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον δὲ μετέχει ἂν τὸ ἐν,
 ἢ τοι εὐθέος, ἢ στρογγύλου, ἢ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν: μετέχει γὰρ
 ἂν: ἄρ' οὐκ οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ; πῶς;
 τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὄλου;
 οὕτω: πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄλου περιέχεται; ναί: καὶ μὴν τά
 γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ, καὶ οὔτε τι πλεόν οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ
 πάντα: οὐ γάρ: οὐκ οὐκ καὶ τὸ ὄλον τὸ ἐν ἐστὶν; πῶς δ' οὐ: εἰ ἄρα πάν-
 τα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὄλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάντα τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄ-
 λον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄλου τὰ πάντα: ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἂν περι-
 ἔχοιτο τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη: φαίνεται:
 ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὄλον αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστὶν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔ-
 τε ἐν τινί· εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί· ἐν τινὶ γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄν οὐ-
 κ ἂν ἔτι που δύναίτο ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάν-
 των ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ὄλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἐν, πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐν ἔσται:
 οὐδαμῶς: οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὄλον εἶη
 Τὸ πλεόν ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττωνι εἶη, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον γάρ:
 μὴ ὄν δ' ἐν πλέοσιν μηδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ μηδὲ ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς μέρεσιν τὸ ὄλον,
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὐκ
 μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὄν οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη· ὄλον δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν,
 ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι: πάνυ γε: ἢ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ὄλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶν·
 ἢ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν
 ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ: ἀνάγκη: οὕτω δὲ πεφου-
 κὸς τὸ ἐν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι: πῆ; ἔστηκε μὲν που,
 εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστὶν· ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ ὄν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαίνειν
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἶη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ: ἔστι γάρ: τὸ δὲ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ὄν
 ἐστὸς δὴ που ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι; πάνυ γε: τί δαί; τὸ ἐν ἐτέρῳ αἰεὶ
 ὄν οὐ, τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀνάγκη μηδέποτε ἐν ταῦτῳ εἶναι; μηδέποτε δὲ ὄν

and what circum-
 scribes is a limit.
 One, then, is
 (one-many,
 whole-parts,
 limitless and)
 'limited.' *A.* It
 seems so. *P.*
 vi. Thus it must
 have extremities,
 and, as a whole,
 possess 'begin-
 ning' 'middle'
 'end.' *A.* It
 must. *P.*
 vii. And so will
 have a 'shape'
 —straight,
 spherical or
 mixed. *A.* It
 will. *P.*
 viii. Thus 1), as
 all the parts com-
 pose the whole
 and are contained
 in it, the one
 which is both
 whole and parts,
 is 'in itself' ·
 2) as the whole
 is not in the
 parts—whether
 all or some or
 one—if it is to be
 anywhere it must
 (viewed as a
 whole) be in the
 different, or 'in
 another.' *A.*
 Inevitably. *P.*
 ix. But 1) if
 always in itself it
 is always in the
 same, or 'is
 still': while 2)
 if always in the
 different it is
 never in the
 same,

and so is 'in motion.'

A So. P.
 1. Everything is to everything either the same or different, or is part or whole to that which is so: now
 1) as the one is not part of itself, nor a whole to itself as part, nor different from the one, it is the same as itself:—
 but 2) the one was both in and not in itself, so it differs from itself:—but 3) that which differs differs from the different; the one, then, differs not from itself but from the others:—4) the different, again, cannot be in either the not-ones or the one, else it were the same with them: will not these, then, escape altogether from differing? Nay the not-ones, to be truly such, must be without all share in the one—they cannot even be number for that reason—nor can they be parts of the one, or the whole of it, nor the converse.

83 a 1

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; οὕτως: ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ ἓν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, αἰεὶ κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἐστάναι: φαίνε-
 ται: καὶ μὴν ταυτὸν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταυτὸν τε καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέ-
 πονθεν: πῶς; πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει· ἢ ταυτὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἕτερον·
 ἢ, εἰ μὴ ταυτὸν ἢ μηδ' ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς
 πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη: φαίνεται: ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν;
 Οὐδαμῶς: οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἐ-
 αὐτὸ μέρος ὄν: οὐ γὰρ οἴόν τε: ἀλλ' ἄρα ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐνὸς τὸ ἓν; οὐ δῆτα:
 οὐδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕτερον ἂν εἴη: οὐ μέντοι: εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερον μήτε ὅ-
 λον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ταυτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ
 ἑαυτῷ; ἀνάγκη: τί δαί; τὸ ἐτέρωθι ὄν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος
 ἑαυτῷ, οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἔσται;
 ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ: οὕτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἓν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν ἅμα
 καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ: ἐφάνη γάρ: ἕτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ταύτη ἂν ἑαυτοῦ
 τὸ ἓν: ἔοικεν: τί οὖν; εἰ τοῦ τι ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἕτερου ὄντος ἕτερον ἔσται;
 ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν ὅσα μὴ ἐστὶν ἅπανθ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἓν;
 Πῶς δ' οὐ: ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων: ἕτερον: ὅρα δὴ· αὐτό τε ταυ-
 τὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἄρα οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις; πῶς δ' οὐ: ἢ οὖν ἐθελή-
 σει ταυτὸν ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ποτὲ εἶναι; οὐκ ἐθελή-
 σει: εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ταυτῷ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ
 ἐστὶν τὸ ἕτερον χρόνον οὐδένα· εἰ γὰρ ὄντων οὖν εἴη ἐν τῷ, ἐκείνον ἂν τὸν
 χρόνον ἐν ταυτῷ εἴη τὸ ἕτερον· οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτως: ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέπο-
 τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕτερον: ἀληθῆ:
 οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐνείῃ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐ-
 κ' ἄρα τῷ ἐτέρῳ γ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἓν, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνός, ἕτερα:
 οὐ γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἕτερον ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐτέ-
 ρου: πῶς γάρ: εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς ἕτερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ ἐτέρῳ, οὐ πάντη
 ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων; ἐκφεύγοι: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ
 τοῦ ἐνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἓν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἐν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πῃ ἂν ἐν ἦν: ἀλη-
 θῆ: οὐδ' ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἓν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἐν ἦν παντά-
 πασι, ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: τί δαί; τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνός ἄρα
 μόρια ἐστίν; ἢ καὶν οὕτω μετείχε τοῦ ἐνός τὰ μὴ ἓν; μετείχεν: εἰ ἄρα πάν-
 τη τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐστίν, τί δὲ μὴ ἓν, οὐτ' ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν τὸ ἐν εἴη οὔτε ὅλον

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E

ὡς μορίων· οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς μόρια· οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ
τῷ ἐνί· οὐ γάρ· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μίτε μόρια μίτε ὅλα μίτε ἕτερα
Ἀλλήλων ταυτὰ ἔσσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις· ἔφαμεν γάρ· φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν
πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς; φῶμεν· τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ταυτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑ-
αυτῷ· κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἕκ γε τοῦ λόγου· ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὁμοίον τε καὶ
ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; ἴσως· ἐπειδὴ γ' οὖν ἕτερον τῶν
ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τὰλλα που ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη; τί μὴν· οὐκ οὖν οὐ-
ως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὡσπερ καὶ τὰλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε
ἦττον; τί γὰρ ἄν· εἰ ἄρα μίτε μᾶλλον μίτε ἦττον, ὁμοίως; ναί· οὐκ οὖν
ἦ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτη
ταυτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὰλλα τῷ ἐνί·
πῶς λέγεις· φῶδε· ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε·
γε· τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκεις ἢ ἄπαξ; ἔγωγε·
Πότερον οὖν, εἴαν μὲν ἄπαξ εἴπης, ἐκείνο προσαγορεύεις οὐπὲρ
ἐστὶ τούνομα, εἴαν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκείνο; ἦ, εἴαν τε ἄπαξ εἴαν τε πολ-
λάκις ταυτὸ ὄνομα φθέγγῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταυτὸ καὶ λέγειν αἰεὶ;
τί μὴν· οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπὶ τινι; πάνυ γε· ὅτ' ἂν ἄρα
αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, εἴαν τε ἄπαξ εἴαν τε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι
ὀνομάξεις ἢ ἐκείνο οὐπὲρ ἦν ὄνομα· ἀνάγκη· ὅτ' ἂν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι
ἕτερον μὲν τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, οἷς τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόν-
τες, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ αἰεὶ λέγομεν,
ἢσπερ ἦν τούνομα; πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἦ ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν καὶ
τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός· κατὰ τ' αὖ τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ
ἂν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· τὸ δὲ που ταυτὸν πεπονθὸς ὁμοι-
ον· οὐχί; ναί· ἦ δὴ τὸ ἐν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦ-
το ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὁμοιον ἂν εἴη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἔοικεν·
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὁμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον; ναί· οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον
τῷ αὐτῷ; καὶ τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο γ' ἐφάνη ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἐν τοῖς
ἄλλοις ταυτόν· ἐφάνη γάρ· τούναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταυ-
τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων· πάνυ γε· ἦ γε μὴν ἕτερον,
ὁμοιον ἐφάνη; ναί· ἦ ἄρα ταυτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τούναντίον πά-
θος τῷ ὁμοιῶντι πάθει· ὁμοίου δέ που τὸ ἕτερον· ναί· ἀνομοιώσ-
ει ἄρα ταυτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἐτέρῳ· ἔοικεν· ὁμοιον ἄρα καὶ

83 a 2

But whatever
was neither part
nor whole nor
different was the
same; so the one
and the not-ones
are the same.
Thus the one is
both 'different'
from and 'the
same' as itself
and the others.
A. The argument
would make it
seem so. P.
xi. Will it not
also be both
'like' and 'un-
like' to itself and
the others? For
1) the one and
the others mutu-
ally differing to
the same degree
are like by this
equal difference
—difference hav-
ing the same
meaning whether
used of the others
or of the one.
And 2) if dif-
ference give
likeness same-
ness must yield
unlikeness; now
the one was the
same as the
others, therefore
it is unlike them.

But 3) it was also different from itself, so it is 'like itself'; and 4) the same as itself, therefore finally it must be 'unlike itself.' A. Necessarily. P. xii. Since the one was in itself as whole it touches itself; but being also in the others it touches them likewise. Now to touch itself the one must lie next itself. But this makes it two: as surely as it is one, so surely can it not touch itself. And, as between two things which touch no third can come, two things will yield one touch, and three two touches —always one touch fewer than the things: one thing, no touch.

§ 3 b 1

"κατέχον ✓

ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἢ μὲν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον, ἢ δὲ ταυτόν, ἀνόμοιον: ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον: καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει: τίνα; ἢ ταυτόν πέπονθε μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δὲ Πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι ἢ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ ὄν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι: ἀληθῆ λέγεις: ταυτόν τε ἄρα ὄν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ κατὰ ἐκότερον ὁμοίον τε ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις: πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπεὶ περ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταυτόν ἑαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ ἐκότερον, ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται: ἀνάγκη: τί δαὶ δὴ; περὶ τοῦ ἄπτεσθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι πέρα, πῶς ἔχει, σκοπεῖ: σκοπῶ: αὐτὸ γὰρ πού ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄλῳ τὸ ἐν ἐφάνη ὄν: ὀρθῶς: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἔν; ναί: ἢ μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτοιτο ἄν· ἢ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἄπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν: φαίνεται: οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἄπτοιτο ἂν τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: ἄπτοιτο: τί δαὶ τῆδε; ἄρ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κείσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν ἢ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ἢ ἔδρα, ἢ ἂν κέηται ἄπτεται; ἀνάγκη: καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κείσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἢ αὐτὸ ἔστιν: δεῖ γὰρ: οὐκ οὖν, δύο μὲν ὄν τὸ ἐν ποιήσειεν ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο· ἕως δ' ἂν ἢ ἔν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἢ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ: ἢ αὐτὴ: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄψεται: τί δὴ: ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι χωρὶς ὄν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ εἶναι οὐ μέλλει ἄψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι: ἀληθῆ: δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλιγοστόν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι: δεῖ: ἐὰν δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ὅροιον τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται αἰ δὲ ἄψις δύο; ναί: καὶ οὕτω δὴ αἰ ἐνὸς προσγινομένου μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ὧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς ἄψις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἄψεων πλεονεκτεῖ: ἥδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἅμα ἔν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄψις ταῖς ἄψεσιν: ὀρθῶς: ὅσα ἄρα ἔστιν τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, αἰ ἐν μιᾷ αἰ

C

D

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B

C

ἄψις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν : ἀληθῆ : εἰ δέ γε ἐν μόνον ἐστίν, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη : πῶς γάρ : οὐκ οὖν, φαιμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν : οὐ γάρ : οὐκ ἄρα ἐνεσθιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐνὸς μὴ ἐνότος ἐν αὐτοῖς : πῶς γάρ : οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν ἔστι τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε δύο, οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὀνομα οὐδέν : οὐ : τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἐστίν ἐν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη : οὐ φαίνεται : ἄψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν, δυοῖν μὴ ὄντων : οὐκ ἔστιν : οὔτ' ἄρα τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπεὶ περ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν : οὐ γὰρ οὖν :

Οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπτεταί τε καὶ οὐχ ἀπτεται : ἔοικεν : ἂρ' οὖν καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον, αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ; πῶς ; εἰ μείζον εἴη τὸ ἐν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα ἢ ἐλάττων, ἢ αὐτὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἄρα οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι [ἄλλο,] ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις : ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἴσον πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἐκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχουεν ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἄλληλα : εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος τὰ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἐν σμικρότητα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, ὀποτέρω μὲν τῷ εἶδει μέγεθος προσείη μείζον ἂν εἴη, ᾧ δὲ σμικρότης ἐλάττων : ἀνάγκη : οὐκ οὖν ἐστὸν τέ τινα τούτω εἶδη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης : οὐ γὰρ ἂν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίω τε ἀλλήλοι ἐῖτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἐγγιγνοίστην : πῶς γὰρ ἂν : εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται ἢ τοι ἐν ὄλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη : ἀνάγκη : τί δ' εἰ ἐν ὄλῳ ἐγγίγνοιτο ; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δι' ὄλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό ; δῆλον δὴ : ἂρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὐσα ἢ σμικρότης τῷ ἐνὶ ἴση ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων : πῶς δ' οὐ : δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἴσην τῷ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς ; ἀδύνατον : ἐν μὲν ὄλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη σμικρότης, ἀλλ', εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει ; ναί : οὔτε γε ἐν παντὶ αὐτῷ μέρει : εἰ δὲ μή, ταῦτα ποιήσει ἄπερ πρὸς τὸ ὄλον, ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζων τοῦ μέρους ἐν ᾧ ἂν αἰετὶ ἐνῆ : ἀνάγκη : οὐδ' ἐνὶ ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων σμικρότης, μήτ' ἐν μέρει μήτ' ἐν ὄλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη : οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος : οὐκ ἔοικεν : οὐδ' ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ. μείζον γὰρ ἂν τι εἴη ἄλλο, καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκείνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὐ ἀνάγκη

Now the others have no connection with the one. The one stands solitary with no two. Touch therefore vanishes : and the one cannot touch the others. It thus both 'touches and does not touch itself and the others.' A. So it seems. P.

xiii. Again ; if the one be greater or less than the others, or they than it, this must arise solely from the possession by either of the *εἶδος* of bigness or smallness. Now 1) smallness cannot appear in the one : for if it extended through the whole it would be equal to it, while if it surrounded it it would be greater ; and so likewise if it appeared in a part : but smallness is never equal or greater. Again, if bigness appeared in the one then were the one bigger than it, and that without any smallness to surpass : which is impossible.

83 b 2

✓

Since, then, neither bigness nor smallness exists in it the one cannot be either bigger or smaller than the others, nor they than it: hence the one must be equal both to itself and the others. 2) As, however, the one is within, it must also be around, itself; so it must be bigger and smaller than itself. Again: outside of the one and the others nothing exists; and that which exists must be somewhere; and being somewhere it is a smaller within a greater. Clearly, therefore, the one and the others are reciprocally each in the other, and alternately bigger and smaller each than the other. Accordingly the one is 'equal to, greater and less than' itself and the others. A. It seems so. P. xiv. But, if so,

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ὑπερέχειν ἐάν περ ἢ μέγα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἐνι: ἀληθῆ: ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μείζον ἢ αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ μεγέθους: οὐ γάρ: οὔτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζω τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδ' ἐλάττω, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχοντα· οὔτε αὐτῶ τούτω πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἔχεται τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλων. οὔτε αὖ τὸ ἐν τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μείζον ἂν οὐδὲ ἔλαττον εἴη, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον: οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γε: ἀρ' οὖν εἰ μήτε μείζον μὴτ' ἔλαττον τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλῇ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὄν ἴσον εἶναι: πῶς γὰρ οὔ: καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτὸ γε τὸ ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον· οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἴσου ὄν ἴσον ἂν εἴη ἑαυτῷ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἴη: φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν αὐτὸ γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἂν εἴη ἔξωθεν· καὶ περιέχον μὲν μείζον ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον. καὶ οὕτω μείζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐν: εἴη γὰρ ἂν: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τότε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἐνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: πῶς γὰρ οὔ: ἀλλὰ μὴν¹ καὶ εἶναι που δεῖ τό γε ὄν ἀεὶ: ναί: οὐκ οὖν τό γε ἐν τῷ ὄν ἐν μείζονι ἔσται ἔλαττον ὄν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἴη: οὐ γάρ: ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἐνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι; φαίνεται: ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστιν, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἔλαττον τῶν ἄλλων περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ, τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μείζον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἐλάττω; ἔοικεν: τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἴσον τε καὶ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων καὶ μερῶν: πῶς δ' οὔ: ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὄν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῶ ἔλαττον ἂν καὶ πλέον εἴη αὐτὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ἴσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταῦτά: πῶς; ὦν περ

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B

C

Μείζον ἔστι, πλείονων που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν· ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ με-
 ρῶν· καὶ ὧν ἔλαττον, ὡσαύτως. καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταῦτά· οὕτως·
 οὐκ οὖν ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον ὄν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ
 πλείονων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῶ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν· πῶς
 δ' οὐ· ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὄν αὐτῶ ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶ εἴη,
 πλείονων δὲ πλέον, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ·
 φαίνεται· οὐκ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα ὡσαύτως ἔξει τὸ ἔν. ὅτι μὲν μεί-
 ζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι
 δὲ σμικρότερον, ἔλαττον· ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος
 εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἀνάγκη· οὕτως δὴ αὐ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἔν καὶ ἴσον
 καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων·
 ἔσται· ἄρ' οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἔν, καὶ ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίνεταί νεώτε-
 ρόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ οὔτε νεώ-
 τερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον·
 πῶς; εἶναι μὲν που αὐτῶ ὑπάρχει εἴπερ ἔν ἔστιν; ναί· τὸ δὲ εἶναι
 ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος; ὡσπερ τὸ
 ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος, καὶ αὐ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὐσί-
 ας ἐστὶ κοινωνία· ἔστι γάρ· μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ
 εἶναι· πάνυ γε· οὐκ οὖν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; ναί· ἀεὶ ἄρα
 πρεσβύτερον γίνεταί ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον· ἀ-
 νάγκη· ἄρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτε-
 ρον πρεσβύτερον γίνεταί; μεμνήμεθα· οὐκ οὖν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύ-
 τερον ἑαυτοῦ γίνεταί τὸ ἔν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρε-
 σβύτερον γίνοιτο· ἀνάγκη· γίνεταί μὲν δὴ νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρε-
 σβύτερον αὐτοῦ οὕτω; ναί· ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἄρ' οὐχ ὅτ' ἂν κατὰ τὸν
 νῦν χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον, τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πο-
 ρευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν· οὐ γάρ·
 ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ἐπειδ' ἂν τῶ νῦν
 ἐντύχη, καὶ οὐ γίνεταί ἀλλ' ἔστι τότε ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προῖον γὰρ οὐ-
 κ' ἂν ποτε ληφθεῖν ὑπο τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προῖον οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμ-
 φοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα· τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμε-
 νον, τοῦ δὲ ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον· μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμε-
 νον τοῦ τ' ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν· ἀληθῆ· εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν
 τὸ νῦν, πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδ' ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο ἦ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γί-
 ν

the one will have
 as many
 measures as the
 others and itself,
 and more, and
 fewer; and if
 measures then
 parts, and
 numbers also.
 So it will be
 'equal in num-
 ber' to itself and
 the others, and
 also 'more' and
 also 'fewer.' A. It
 will. P.
 xv. That the one
 'is' means that
 it shares in ex-
 istence with the
 time that is at
 any moment
 present. Hence
 1) partaking of
 time, and of
 time as it passes,
 it 'becomes,' as
 we argued, at
 once 'older' and
 'younger' than
 itself. But it
 'is' both only
 when, in process
 of becoming, it
 alights at now—
 a point which in
 passing from
 past to future it
 cannot skip.
 Thus, when at
 now, it pauses in
 its becoming

and is both older and younger than itself. And this process it repeats through its whole existence. But it must always be and become the same length of time as itself. Hence the one is neither older nor younger than, but has 'the same age as' itself—whether being or becoming.

2). The others, again, as plural, are more than one—possess more number than the one. But the fewer comes earlier, and the fewest first. So the one, as earlier, is older than the others, and they are younger than it. Again, however, the one had parts, and so a beginning end and middle: and by its nature the beginning comes first, and the end last;

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γενεσθαι, καὶ ἔστιν τότε τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχη γιγνόμενον: φαίνεται: καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὅτ' ἂν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχειν τοῦ γιγενεσθαι, καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν οὐπερ_ ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν; ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ; ναί: ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον; ἔστιν: καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ὅτ' ἂν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ νῦν: ἀνάγκη: τό γε μὴν νῦν αἰὲ πάρεστι τῷ ἐνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι: ἔστι γὰρ αἰὲ νῦν ὅτ' ἂν περ ἦ: πῶς γὰρ οὐ: αἰὲ ἄρα ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἐν: ἔοικεν: πλείω δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον; τὸν ἴσον: ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ ὃν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει; πῶς δ' οὐ: τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν; οὐ γάρ: τὸ ἐν ἄρα, τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὄν, οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν οὔτε γίγνεται: οὐ μοι δοκεῖ: τί δαί, τῶν ἄλλων: οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν: τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, εἴπερ ἕτερα ἔστιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἐνός. ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὃν ἐν ἂν ἦν ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἐνός ἐστι, καὶ πλήθος ἂν ἔχοι: ἔχοι γὰρ ἂν: πλήθος δὲ ὃν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἐνός: πῶς δ' οὐ: τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγενῆναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω: τὰ ἐλάττω: τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα Πρῶτον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἐν. ἢ γάρ: ναί: πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐχόντων· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἀριθμὸν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστὶν: ἔχει γάρ: πρῶτον δέ γε, οἶμαι, γεγονὸς πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον· τὰ δ' ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος· καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα νεώτερα τοῦ ἐνός, τὸ δὲ ἐν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων: εἴη γὰρ ἂν: τί δαί τόδε; ἄρ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον: ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἐν· εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον: ναί: οὐκ οὖν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα μέχρι τέλους: τί μὴν: καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ' εἶναι πάντα τὰλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνός· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγενῆναι ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον: φήσομεν γάρ: τελευ-

D

E

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B

C

τῆ δέ, οἰμαί γε, ὕστατον γίγνεται· τούτῳ δ' ἅμα τὸ ἐν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι· ὥστ', εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἶη γίγνεσθαι· φαίνεται· νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν ἐστίν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα· οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται· τί δαὶ δὴ; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὅτι οὖν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὅτου οὖν, εἴαν περ μέρος ἢ ἄλλὰ μὴ μέρος, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν; ἀνάγκη· οὐκ οὖν τὸ ἐν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὅ τί περ ἂν προσγιγνηται ὅτῳ οὖν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διεληθὸν ὄλον ἐν γένηται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει· ἀληθῆ· πᾶσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἀλλοῖς τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει τὸ ἐν· ὥστ', εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἂν εἶη, ἀλλ' ἅμα· καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν εἶη, οὐδὲ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως· πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός· ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός· καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἄρα ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἐτέρως· οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε· εἰ καὶ ἔστιν ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἐτέρου, γίγνεσθαί γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύναίτο, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὄν ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι· ἀνίσσοις γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτῳ οὖν, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν αἰεὶ ὅσῳ περ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ· πῶς γὰρ οὐ· οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὄν τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος γίγνοιτ' ἂν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει αἰεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον τόδε, νεώτερον δ' αὖ· ἀληθῆ· καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα ὄν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται· οὐ γὰρ οὖν· ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῆδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται· πῆ δὴ; ἢ τό τε ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός· τί οὖν· ὅτ' ἂν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον ἢ πλείω

and only when the end has come has the one come; consequently the one is younger than the others, and they are older than it. But the beginning, being one part, is one—thus the one becomes with the first, and with each successive part; and so maintains the same age with all the others. It must, then, *be* and *have* become of the same age with them and different, and the converse—but does it become so? If it was older—or younger—at first it cannot become more so; for if equals be put to unequals these always differ by as much as at first: and equal times are added here. But when the one is older

than the others
it has existed
longer than they,
and if to these
unequals we add
equal times the
wholes will differ
by a less part
than at first.
The one, then,
would always
become less and
less older than
the others ;
that is, would
become younger
in respect to
them, while they
grew older rela-
tively to it. But
though always
having this
tendency they
never *are* so,
since they con-
tinue to differ
by the original
interval, albeit
that interval
forms an ever-
lessening part of
their respective
ages. Thus the
one 'is' and 'is
not,' 'becomes'
and 'does not
become,' 'equal
in age' and
'older' and
'younger' in
regard to the
others—and
they to it. *A.*
Perfectly so. *P.*
xvi. As partaking
of time

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που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα: ναί: πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ
ἐλάττωι χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἄρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ
διοίσει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττωνος, ἢ σμικροτέρῳ: σμικροτέρῳ: οὐ-
κ ἄρα ἔσται ὃ τί περ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τὰλλα ἡλικία διαφέρον τὸ ἐν
τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλατ-
τον αἰεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρότερον. ἢ οὐ: ναί: οὐκ οὖν τό γε
ἔλαττον διαφέρον ἡλικία πρὸς τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτο ἂν
ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον:
νεώτερον: εἰ δ' ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν
πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον; πάνυ γε: τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς
Πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον
οὐ· ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνου πρεσβύτε-
ρον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτε-
ρον. τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως.
ἴοντε γὰρ αὐτῶ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν, γίγνεσθον τὸ μὲν νεώτερον
πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νε-
ωτέρου. γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἶω τε εἶτην· εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γί-
γνοιτο, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἂν. νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νε-
ώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἐν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφά-
νη ὄν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός· τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός πρεσβύτερα ὅτι
ὑστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἴ-
σχει, ἐπειδὴ περ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα:
φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω: οὐκ οὖν ἢ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πρεσβύτε-
ρον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων αἰεὶ δια-
φέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτε-
ρον, οὔτε τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός· ἢ δὲ ἄλλῳ αἰεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ
πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὑστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύ-
τη δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβυτέρά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι, τὰ τε
ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων: πάνυ μὲν οὖν: κατὰ δὴ πάντα
Ταῦτα τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον
ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε
γίγνεται οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων: παντελῶς μὲν οὖν: ἐπειδὴ δὲ
χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνε-
σθαι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ

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νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; ἀνάγκη: ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἐν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται, καὶ
 ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται: τί μὴν: καὶ εἴη ἂν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ
 ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται: πάνυ γε: καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ
 Καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα
 πράττομεν: ὀρθῶς λέγεις: καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ,
 καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται: καὶ ὅσα περὶ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιού-
 των τυγχάνει ὄντα καὶ περὶ τὸ ἐν ἔστιν: παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὐ-
 τως: ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἐν, εἰ ἔστιν οἶον διεληλύθαμεν,
 ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἐν τε ὄν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἐν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ
 μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔ-
 στιν ἢ μὴ μετέχειν αὐ ποτέ οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη: ἄρ' οὖν ὅτε μετέχει οἶόν τ' ἔ-
 σται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει μετέχειν: οὐχ οἶόν τε: ἐν ἄλλῳ
 ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ
 αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι: ὀρθῶς: οὐκ οὖν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρό-
 νος ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς
 οἶόν τ' ἔσται τοτέ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτέ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ ποτε καὶ
 λαμβάνη αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφίη: οὐδαμῶς: τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν
 ἄρα οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε: τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐ-
 σίας ἄρ' οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; καὶ πάνυ γε: τὸ ἐν δὴ, ὡς εἴοικε, λαμβά-
 νον τε καὶ ἀφίεν οὐσίαν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται: ἀνάγκη: ἐν δὲ
 καὶ πολλὰ ὄν καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ἄρ' οὐχ ὅτ' ἂν μὲν
 γίγνηται ἐν τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅτ' ἂν δὲ πολλὰ τὸ ἐν εἶναι
 ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε: ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη δια-
 κρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλή γε: καὶ μὴν ἀνομοιόν γε καὶ
 ὅμοιον ὅτ' ἂν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι; ναί: καὶ
 ὅτ' ἂν μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰ-
 σοῦσθαι; οὕτως: ὅτ' ἂν δὲ κινούμεμον τε ἴσθηται καὶ ὅτ' ἂν ἐστὸς ἐπὶ
 τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλη δεῖ δὴ πού αὐτό γε μὴδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι;
 πῶς δὴ: ἐστὸς τε πρότερον ὑστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινού-
 μενον ὑστερον ἐστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἔσται ταῦ-
 τα πάσχειν: πῶς γὰρ: χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ τι οἶόν τε
 ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἐστάναι; οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλ-
 λει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν; οὐκ εἰκός: πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ
 ἐστὸς οὖν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτ' ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν: οὐ γὰρ οὖν:

85 a 1

the one 'was'
 'is' 'will be'
 'was becoming'
 'becomes' and
 'will become.'
 A. How should
 it not? P.
 xvii. And there
 will be 'science,
 opinion,' and so
 on, 'of it.'
 xviii. and 'a
 name' and other
 things 'for it.'
 A. Entirely so.

III. P. But
 thirdly:
 i. The one, being
 such, must, when
 one, partake of
 existence; and,
 when not, not.
 Nor can it do
 both at once.
 Thus there will
 be a time at
 which it takes
 hold on existence,
 and one at which
 it lets go. The
 one, therefore,
 'becomes' and
 'perishes.' A.
 Of necessity. P.
 ii. Being both
 one and many,
 when it becomes
 as one it perishes
 as many, and the
 converse. In
 which process it
 must 'be separ-
 ated and
 united'; 'grow
 like, and un-
 like'; 'wax,
 wane and grow
 equal.'
 A. Yes. P.
 iii. But in pass-
 ing to rest or
 motion it suffers
 change. When
 changing it is
 neither in motion
 nor at rest, and
 this it cannot be
 in time.

When changing, then, it must be out of time, and in that odd thing the instantaneous, which lurks between motion and rest apart from time. And when it is out of time it 'neither is in motion nor at rest,' 'neither becomes nor perishes,' nor possesses any other such characteristic. So fares the one, if it is. *A.* How could it be otherwise?

IV. *P.* But now, if the one is, what of the others? i. They are not the one. *P.* *A.* Right. ii. Yet as others they must have parts, else were they completely one: and parts are parts of a whole—a whole which must be one. For they cannot be parts of a many which includes themselves, else were each part part of itself and of each of the others.

85 a 2

✓

ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δὴ: τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἕκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι ἐστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ στάσεως ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδ' ἐνὶ οὐσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι: κινδυνεῖ: καὶ τὸ ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ ἔστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα· μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφότερα ποιοί. μεταβάλλον δ', ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει· καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει ἐν οὐδ' ἐνὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη· οὐδὲ κινεῖτ' ἂν τότε οὐδ' ἂν σταίη: οὐ γάρ: ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅτ' ἂν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξὺ τινων τότε γίγνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; ἔοικε γ' οὖν: κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὁμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε ἀξινόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἂν: οὐκ ἔοικε: ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἐν, εἰ ἔστιν: πῶς δ' οὐ: τί δαὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρ' οὐ σκεπτέον; σκεπτέον: λέγωμεν δὴ, ἐν εἰ ἔστι τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς τί χρή πεπονθέναι: λέγωμεν: Οὐκ οὖν, ἐπεὶ περ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἔστι τᾶλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἦν: ὀρθῶς: οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἐνὸς τᾶλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει αὐ̄ πη: πῆ δὴ: ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἐν εἴη: ὀρθῶς: μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὁ ἂν ὄλον ἦ; φαμέν γάρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὄλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρή εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὄλου: πῶς τοῦτο: εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δὴ που μόριον ἔσται, ὃ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων· ἐνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὄν μόριον πλὴν τούτου τῶν

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ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἐνὸς ἐκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόνιον, μὴ ὄν δὲ μόνιον ἐκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὄν, πάντων τούτων τι εἶναι ὦν οὐδ' ἐνὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόνιον καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι οὖν, ἀδύνατον εἶναι: φαίνεται γὰρ δὴ: οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόνιον μόνιον· ἀλλὰ μίᾳ τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἐνὸς τινος ὃ καλούμεν ὅλον, ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόνιον ἂν τὸ μόνιον εἴη: παντάπασι μὲν οὖν: εἰ ἄρα τὰλλα μόνια ἔχει κἂν τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνὸς μετέχοι: πάνυ γε: ἐν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόνια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός: ἀνάγκη: καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος: καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός. εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόνιον ἐστι τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἐν δὴ που σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται: ὀρθῶς: μετέχοι δὲ γ' ἂν τοῦ ἐνός ὄλον ὅτι ἄλλο ὄν ἦεν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετείχεν ἄλλ' ἢ ἂν αὐτὸ ἔν. νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀδύνατον που: ἀδύνατον: μετέχειν δὲ τοῦ ἐνός ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὄλω καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὄλον ἔσται οὐ μόνια τὰ μόνια: τὸ δ' αὖ ἕκαστον ἐν μόνιον τοῦ ὅλου ὃ ἂν ἦ μόνιον ὄλου: οὕτως: οὐκ οὖν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἐνός μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ: πῶς δ' οὐ: τὰ δὲ ἕτερα τοῦ ἐνός πολλά που ἂν εἴη: εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἐν' μήτε ἐνός πλείω εἴη τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἐπεὶ δὲ γε πλείω ἐνός ἐστι τὰ τε τοῦ ἐνός μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐνός ὄλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἦδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτὰ γε ἐκεῖνα τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα τοῦ ἐνός; πῶς; ᾧδε εἰδῶμεν. ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἐν ὄντα, οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐνός, τότε ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνει; δηλαδή: οὐκ οὖν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔνι: πλήθη μέντοι: τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλομεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἰοί τ' ἐσμὲν ὅ τι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ τοῦ ἐνός μὴ μετέχοι, πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἔν; ἀνάγκη: οὐκ οὖν, οὕτως αἰετὸ σκοποῦντι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἶδους, ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς αἰετὸ ὀρώμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει: παντάπασι μὲν οὖν: καὶ μὴν ἐπειδ' ἂν γε ἐν ἕκαστον μόνιον μόνιον γένηται, πέρασ ἦδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόνια: κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν: τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τοῦ ἐνός συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὲ πέρασ παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλ-

Being parts of one whole, then, they are in fact a perfect whole made up of parts. *A.* Of necessity. *P.* iii. So of each part; for 'each' implies oneness, and each is one separate part of the whole. Thus each part of the others partakes of the one, while yet distinct from it. *A.* So. *P.* iv. But being more than the one, and distinct from it, they are 'unlimited in number.' Since, if we cut off in our mind even the smallest portion of that which has no share in one, it will be a multitude. *A.* Quite so. *P.* v. Yet as all parts in turn become one they possess a limit towards each other and the whole, and conversely. So, as related to the one, the others become different in themselves

and produce a
'limit' even
while their
nature is un-
limitedness. *A.*
Quite so. *P.*
vi. And as being
all limited and all
unlimited they
are 'like'—
while, as being
both at once,
they are 'un-
like'—to them-
selves and each
other. *A. I*
fear so. *P.*
vii. And so we
shall find same-
ness and differ-
ence, and all
other contradic-
tory qualities in
the others. *A.*
Right.

V. P. Yet again:
i. The one and
the others are
quite separate,
as there is
nothing to con-
tain both. *A.*
Yes. *P.*
ii. The true one
has not parts;
nor is it, as
whole, connected
with the others.
Hence the others
have 'no one'
in them at all.
A. No. P.
iii. Nor are they
'many'—for
having no one,
neither have they
two, three. *A. So.*

85 b 2



ληλα· ἡ δὲ αὐτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρία; φαίνεται: οὕτω δὴ
τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέ-
ρατος μετέχει: πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλ-
λήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς; πῆ δὴ: εἰ μὲν που ἄπειρά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαν-
τῶν φύσιν, πάντα ταυτὸν πεπονθότα ἂν εἴη ταύτη; πάνυ γε: καὶ
μὴν εἴ γε ἅπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτη πάντ' ἂν εἴη ταυτὸν
πεπονθότα; πῶς δ' οὐ: εἰ δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπει-
ρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πέ-
πονθεν: ναί: τὰ δ' ἐναντία γε ὡς οἶόν τε ἀνομοιότατα; τί μὴν:
κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὁμοί' ἂν εἴη αὐτὰ τε αὐτοῖς καὶ
ἀλλήλοις· κατὰ δ' ἀμφοτέρα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀ-
νομοιότατα: κινδυνεύει: οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτὰ τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλ-
λήλοις ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοι' ἂν εἴη: οὕτω: καὶ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἕτερα
ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκ ἔ-
τι χαλεπῶς εὐρήσομεν πεπονθότα τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ
ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα: ὀρθῶς λέγεις: οὐκ οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν
ἤδη ἐῶμεν ὡς φανερά ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν· ἐν εἰ ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἢ οὕτω μόνον: πάνυ μὲν οὖν:
λέγωμεν δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός πεπον-
θῆναι; λέγωμεν γάρ: ἄρ' οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων χωρὶς
δὲ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός εἶναι; τί δὴ: ὅτι που οὐκ ἐστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον,
ὃ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστι τοῦ ἐνός ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτ' ἂν
ρήθῃ τό τε ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα: πάντα γάρ: οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἔστιν ἕτερον τούτων,
ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἐν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τᾶλλα: οὐ γάρ: οὐδέποτε' ἄρα ἐν
ταυτῷ ἐστὶν τὸ ἐν¹ καὶ τᾶλλα: οὐκ ἔοικε: χωρὶς ἄρα; ναί: οὐδὲ μὴν
μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμέν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν: πῶς γάρ: οὔτε ἄρα ὅ-
λον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρὶς τέ ἐστι
τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει: πῶς γάρ: οὐδ' ἐνὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχει
ἂν τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέ-
χοντα: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδαμῆ ἄρα ἐν τᾶλλά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς
ἐν οὐδέν: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: οὐδ' ἄρα πολλά ἐστι τᾶλλα. ἐν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκα-
στον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου εἰ πολλά ἦν· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐν οὔτε πολ-
λά οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μόριά ἐστι τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδα-
μῆ μετέχει: ὀρθῶς: οὐδ' ἄρα δύο οὔτε τρία οὔτε αὐτὰ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα.

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D

οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς πανταχῆ στέρεται: οὕτω: οὐ-
 δὲ ὁμοία ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτὰ ἐστὶ τῷ ἐνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν
 ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης. εἰ γὰρ ὁμοία καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐ-
 τὰ εἴη, ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἶ-
 δη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοισι ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός: φαίνεται:
 ἦν δέ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν ἢ μὴδ' ἐνός μετέχει; ἀδύνα-
 τον: οὔτ' ἄρα ὁμοία οὔτε ἀνόμοιά ἐστὶν οὔτ' ἀμφοτέρα τᾶλλα. ὁμοία μὲν
 γὰρ ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἐνός ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἶδους μετέχει, ἀμφοτέρα
 δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίων· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐφάνη: ἀληθῆ: οὐ-
 δ' ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἐστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνό-
 μενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα, οὐδὲ
 ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων· εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι ὑ-
 πομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἐνός καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτί-
 ου μεθέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη μετέχειν, τοῦ ἐνός γε πάντη
 πάντως στερομένοις: ἀληθέστατα: οὕτως δὴ ἐν εἰ ἔστιν πάντα τέ-
 ἐστι τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τᾶλλα ὡσαύτως:
 παντελῶς μὲν οὖν: εἶεν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν ἄρ' οὐ
 σκεπτόν μετὰ ταῦτα; σκεπτόν γάρ: τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἢ ὑπόθεσις,
 εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; ἄρα τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν: διαφέρει μέντοι:
 διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τούναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ
 εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; πᾶν τούναντίον: τί δ' εἴ τις λέγει εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν
 ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν, ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρα ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἂν δη-
 λοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγει τὸ μὴ ὄν; πάνυ γε: οὐκ οὖν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅ-
 τι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅτ' ἂν εἴπη ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν
 ὃ λέγει: ἴσμεν: πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν
 ἄλλων, ὅτ' ἂν εἴπη ἐν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεῖς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον γινώσκειται τί
 καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὐ: ἀνάγκη: ᾗδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρ-
 χῆς, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τί χρὴ εἶναι; πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρ-
 χειν δεῖ, ὡς ἕοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μὴδὲ ὅ τι λέγεται γιγνώ-
 σκεσθαι ὅτ' ἂν τις εἴπη ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν: ἀληθῆ: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ἕτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μὴδὲ ἐκείνου ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι: πά-
 νυ γε: καὶ ἑτεροῖότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῆ ἐπιστήμη. οὐ γὰρ
 τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτεροῖότητα λέγει ὅτ' ἂν τὸ ἐν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέ-
 γη, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου: φαίνεται: καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῖ

P.
 iv. Nor are they
 'like or unlike'
 to the one,
 or in themselves.
 For had they
 likeness and
 unlikeness they
 would have in
 them two oppos-
 ing εἶδη; now
 they have no
 two. *A. True. P.*
 v. Nor are they
 'same or differ-
 ent,' 'in motion
 or at rest,' 'be-
 coming or perish-
 ing,' 'greater less
 or equal' or any
 such thing:—all
 these needing
 one, two, three,
 odd and even;
 which the others
 have not.
A. Most true. P.
 vi. Thus the one
 is at once every-
 thing and
 nothing, to both
 itself and the
 others. *A. Entirely so.*

B. I. P. But now
 'if the one is *not*'
 what follows?
 To begin with,
 the phrase must
 indicate some-
 thing separate
 and knowable.
 Hence
 i. there must be
 a 'science of it.'
A. True. P.
 ii. The others
 also must be
 different from it,
 else were it not
 different from
 them; so it has a
 'differentness' of
 its own. *A.*
 It seems so.

P.
 iii. It must likewise partake of 'that' 'some' 'for this,' and so on, if we may speak of it at all: iv. and so, while non-existent, it partakes of 'many.' A. Undoubtedly. P.
 v. It must have 'unlikeness' toward the others—the different are unlike—; and, therefore, 'likeness' to itself. A. It must. P.
 vi. It is not equal to the others—else it would both exist and be (so far) like them—; so partakes of 'inequality, towards them. A. It does. P.
 vii. It, therefore, has 'bigness' and 'smallness': but, viii. having these, it must have 'equality,' which lies between them. A. It appears so. P.
 ix. Hence it must somehow partake (even) of 'being':

τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων, καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ ἂν τι ἦν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων: ὀρθῶς: εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἐνὶ οὐχ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστιν· μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἐν ἐκείνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε ἐκείνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι: καὶ πάνυ γε: καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ Πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα, τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα, ἕτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἂν: ναί: τὰ δ' ἕτεροῖα οὐκ ἀλλοῖα; πῶς δ' οὐ: τὰ δ' ἀλλοῖα οὐκ ἀνόμοια; ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν, εἴπερ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τὰ γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη: δῆλον: εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀνομοιότης πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστίν: ἔοικεν: ἦ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; πῶς; εἰ ἐνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἐστὶν τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ ἂν Που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οἴου τοῦ ἐνὸς, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἐνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐνός: πάνυ γε: οὐ δεῖ δέ γε: οὐ δῆτα: δεῖ ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι: δεῖ: καὶ μὴ οὐδ' αὐ ἴσον ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἴσον, εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὁμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα: ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρα ἀδύνατα εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἓν: ἀδύνατα: ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι; ἀνάγκη: τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα; ναί: τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα; πῶς δ' οὐ: Καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἐν πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἄνισα: μετέχει: ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γ' ἐστὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης: ἔστι γάρ: ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνὶ: κινδυνεύει: μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλων: πάνυ γε: μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν ἀεὶ ἐστὶν: ἔστιν: ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα; οὐκ: ἀλλὰ τοῦτο: ὅτῳ ἄρα ἐστὶν μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστιν καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ μεταξὺ τούτων οὐσα: φαίνεται: τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετεῖη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος: ἔοικεν: καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ; πῶς δὴ: ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ

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οὕτως ἔχει οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἐν μὴ εἶ-
 ναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω; οὐ-
 τω μὲν οὖν: ἐπειδὴ δὲ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι
 Καὶ ὄντα λέγειν: ἀνάγκη: ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ
 μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τῆ¹ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι,¹ εὐθύς ἔσται
 ὄν: παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν: δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶ-
 ναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι,
 ἵνα τελέως αὐ εἶναι ἦ. οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ
 ὄν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ
 τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι: τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ
 μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐ τελέως μὴ
 ἔσται: ἀληθέστατα: οὐκ οὖν ἐπεὶ περ τῶ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῶ μὴ
 ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῶ ἐνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη με-
 τεῖναι ἐς τὸ μὴ εἶναι: ἀνάγκη: καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῶ ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν:
 φαίνεται: καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι: πῶς δ' οὐ: οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ
 ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτως, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως;
 οὐχ οἷόν τε: πᾶν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω
 τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχη: πῶς δ' οὐ: μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις, ἢ τί φήσο-
 μεν: κίνησις: οὐκ οὖν τὸ ἐν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐφάνη; ναί: οὕτως
 ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται: ἔοικεν: καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα
 τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ
 μὴ εἶναι ἔχον: κινδυνεύει: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων,
 ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίστατό ποθέν ποι: πῶς γάρ:
 οὐκ ἄρα τῶ γε μεταβαίνειν κινεῖται ἄν: οὐ γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῶ αὐτῶ
 ἂν στρέφοιτο, ταυτοῦ γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ ἄπτεται: ὄν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ταυτόν, τὸ
 δὲ μὴ ὄν ἐν τῶ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι: ἀδύνατον γάρ: οὐκ ἄρα
 τὸ ἐν γε μὴ ὄν στρέφεται ἂν δύναται ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν: οὐ γὰρ οὖν:
 οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται που τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὄν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴπερ ἠλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ
 περὶ ἄλλου τινός: ὀρθῶς: εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταυτῶ στρέ-
 φεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἄρ' ἂν πῆ ἔτι κινεῖται; πῶς γάρ: τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον
 ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἐστάναι: ἀνάγκη: τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὄν ἐστηκέν τε καὶ κινεῖται: ἔοικεν: καὶ μὴν, εἴπερ γε κινεῖ-
 ται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν τι κινήθῃ κατὰ το-

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for it has these qualities which, unless we believe ourselves, exist. So it is non-existent. You find that being, in order to exist, must partake of not-being; and the converse: and that the non-existent one, if properly such, must partake alike of being and not-being. A. Necessarily.

P.

x. Now—) this involves change from one state to the other; the non-existent one, therefore, has 'motion': but *ε*), as non-existent and nowhere, it cannot change its place; no, nor revolve in the same place, for the same exists; nor yet change its nature, or we should cease to talk of the one; so it must 'be still.' A. Of necessity. P. xi. The non-existent one, then, both moves or changes,

and is still or changes not; and, as changing, it 'becomes' another, and 'perishes' from its former state; while, as not changing, it 'neither becomes nor perishes.'
A. Inevitably.

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II. P. Let us revise from the beginning.
i. When we say 'is not' we mean utter absence of being in the thing spoken of; therefore the non-existent one 'cannot become or perish.' A. It appears not. P.
ii. It 'cannot change' in any way:
iii. it 'cannot move,' nor yet 'be still':
iv. it 'has not bigness, smallness, or equality':
v. nor 'likeness or differentness' either towards itself or others.
A. Clearly not.

σοῦτον οὐκ ἔθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως: οὕτως: κινούμενον δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται; ναί: καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἂν ἀλλοιοίτο: οὐ γάρ: εἰ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν ἀλλοιοῦται· εἰ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται: οὐ γάρ: τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται; φαίνεται: τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μῆτε γίγνεσθαι μῆτε ἀπόλλυσθαι; ἀνάγκη: καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν μὴ ὄν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται: οὐ γάρ οὖν: αὐθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν, ὀψόμενοι εἰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανείται ἄπερ καὶ νῦν, ἢ ἕτερα: ἀλλὰ χρὴ: οὐκ οὖν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, φασί, τί χρὴ' περὶ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν; ναί: τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅτ' ἂν λέγωμεν, ἄρα μὴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι; οὐδὲν ἄλλο: πρότερον οὖν, ὅτ' ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναι φασί αὐτὸ πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ πη μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν; ἀπλούστατα μὲν οὖν: Οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναίτο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν: οὐ γάρ: τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μὴ τι ἄλλο ἢ ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο: ᾧ δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν οὔτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό: πῶς γάρ: τῷ ἐν ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὔτε ἐκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς: εἰκός: οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπεὶ περ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας: οὐ φαίνεται: οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῇ· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τοῦτο πάσχον: ἀληθῆ: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι; ἀνάγκη: οὐδὲ μὴν ἐστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ ἐστός ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινὶ δεῖ αἰεὶ εἶναι: τῷ αὐτῷ· πῶς γὰρ οὐ: οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν μῆτε ποτὲ ἐστάναι μῆτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν: μὴ γὰρ οὖν: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν τούτου μετέχον ὄντος οὐσίας μετέχοι: δῆλον: οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης οὔτε ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν: οὐ γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοιότης γε Οὔτε ἑτεροειότης, οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλα, εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ: οὐ φαίνεται: τί δαί; τἄλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι;

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οὐκ ἔστιν: οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοία οὔτε ἀνόμοια, οὔτε ταῦτά οὔτε ἕτερα ἔστιν αὐ-
 τῷ τὰ ἄλλα: οὐ γάρ: τί δαί; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τοῦτο
 ἢ τὸ τούτου, ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ, ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν, ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δό-
 ξα ἢ αἴσθησις, ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα, ἢ ἄλλο ὃ τι οὖν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ
 μὴ ὄν ἔσται; οὐκ ἔσται: οὕτω δὲ ἐν οὐκ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῆ: οὐκ οὖν
 δὴ ἔοικέν γε οὐδαμῆ ἔχειν: ἔτι δὲ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τὰλλα τί χρὴ
 Πεποιθέναι: λέγωμεν γάρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ
 ἄλλα ἔστιν οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο: οὕτω: εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ὁ λόγος τά γε ἄλλα ἕτερα ἔστιν· ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο
 καὶ τὸ ἕτερον; ἔγωγε: ἕτερον δὲ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἕτερου, καὶ
 τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου; ναί: καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι,
 ἔστι τι οὐ ἄλλα ἔσται: ἀνάγκη: τί δὲ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐνός οὐκ ἔσται
 ἄλλα μὴ ὄντος γε: οὐ γάρ: ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἔστιν. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λεί-
 πεται, ἢ μηδενός εἶναι ἄλλοις: ὀρθῶς: κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἕκαστα ἄλ-
 λήλων ἄλλα ἔστιν· κατὰ ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἶά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἐνός. ἀλλ' ἕ-
 καστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἀπειρός ἐστι πλήθει· κἂν τὸ σμικρό-
 τατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβη τις ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὑπνῷ φαίνεται ἐξαι-
 φνης ἀντὶ ἐνός δόξαντος εἶναι πολλά, καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμ-
 μέγεθες, πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ: ὀρθότατα: τοιούτων
 Δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τὰλλα, εἰ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἔστιν: κο-
 μιδῆ μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἰς ἕκαστος φαινόμε-
 νος ὧν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται. καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει,---
 εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἕκαστον πολλῶν ὄντων: πάνυ γε: καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια,
 τὰ δὲ περιττά, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ
 ἔσται: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς
 ἐν εἶναι. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν
 πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων; πῶς δ' οὐ: καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς
 Καὶ σμικρὸς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαι-
 νεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἕλαττον φαινόμενος πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δό-
 ξειν ἐλθεῖν· τοῦτο δὲ εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος: εἰκός: οὐκ οὖν
 καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρασ ἔχων αὐτός τε πρὸς αὐτόν, οὔτε ἀρχὴν
 οὔτε πέρασ οὔτε μέσον ἔχων: πῆ δὴ: ὅτι αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ὅτ' ἂν τίς τι λά-
 βη τῆ διανοία, ὡς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη αἰεὶ φαίνεται ἀρ-
 χή, μετὰ τε τὴν τελευταίην ἕτερα ὑπολειπομένη τελευταίη, ἐν τε τῷ μέσῳ

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P.
 vi. Nor are the others either 'like or unlike' it, or the 'same or different' from it.
 vii. Nor has it 'of that' 'something' 'once' 'science' 'name' or,
 viii. in a word, characteristics at all. A. It does not seem to have.

III. P.
 Now 'if the one is not' what of the others?
 i. They must be 'others'; which, ii. as there is no one, must be 'other than each other.' But each iii. must be so 'by multitudes,' even the smallest breaking into countless number and acquiring boundless size.
 iv. These will 'seem to be one, delusively';
 v. and to 'have number, odd, even,' falsely.
 vi. A 'seeming smallest' will 'appear big,' while a phantasmal 'equal will seem' to come between.
 vii. Each bundle will 'seem to have a limit,' yet have no beginning or middle;

since these persistently reverse their nature on closer mental scrutiny.

viii. They will also, as regards both themselves and each other, 'seem like or different' according as they are seen far off or at hand.

ix. They will, in short, 'seem the same and different, touching and separate, moving in all ways and standing, becoming perishing and neither'; and all such things; if they exist while the one does not.

A. Most true.

IV. P. Once more and finally: 'if the one is not' while the others are

i. they will 'not be one,' nor 'many,' which involves one.

ii. Nor will they 'seem either,' having no connection with the non-existent.

iii. There will be 'no opinion or semblance of the non-existent' in them.

iv. They will neither 'seem nor be one or many,'

v. 'like or unlike'

ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τούτου μέσα, σμικρότερα δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνὸς αὐ-
 τῶν ἐκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνός: ἀληθέστατα:
 Θρύπτεσθαι δὴ, οἶμαι, κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν ὃ ἂν τις λά-
 βῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἐνός λαμβάνοιτ' ἂν: πάνν μὲν
 οὖν: οὐκ οὖν τό γε τοιοῦτον, πόρρωθεν μὲν ὄρωντι καὶ ἀμβλύ, ἐν φαίνε-
 σθαι ἀνάγκη· ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὀξύ γινόντι, πλήθει ἄπειρον ἐν ἑκαστον
 φανῆναι· εἴπερ στéρεται τοῦ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος: ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν:
 Οὕτω δὴ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκαστα τᾶλ-
 λα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός: δεῖ γάρ: οὐκ οὖν καὶ
 ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι: πῆ δὴ: οἶον ἐσκιαγραφημένα
 ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταυτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονημένα
 καὶ ὁμοια εἶναι: πάνν γε: προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα, καὶ
 τῷ τοῦ ἐτέρου φαντάσματι ἕτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτοῖς: οὕτω:
 καὶ ὁμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτούς τε αὐτοῖς ἀ-
 νάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις: πάνν μὲν οὖν: οὐκ οὖν καὶ τοὺς
 αὐτούς καὶ ἐτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ
 κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἐστῶτας πάντη, καὶ γιγνομέ-
 νους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦ-
 τα ἃ διελεθὲν εὐπετές ἦδη ἡμῖν· εἰ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν:
 ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν: ἔτι δὴ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν
 εἴπωμεν· ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τᾶλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός, τί χρῆ εἶναι: εἴπωμεν
 γάρ οὖν: οὐκ οὖν ἐν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται¹ τᾶλλα: πῶς γάρ: οὐδὲ μὴν πολ-
 λά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνεῖη ἂν καὶ ἔν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτῶν
 ἐστὶν ἔν, ἅπαντα οὐδὲν ἐστίν· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν πολλὰ εἶη: ἀληθῆ: μὴ ἐ-
 νόντος δὲ ἐνός ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ἔν ἐστι τᾶλλα: οὐ
 γάρ: οὐδὲ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά: τί δὴ: ὅτι τᾶλλα τῶν μὴ ὄν-
 των οὐδ' ἐνὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲ μίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει· οὐδέ τι
 τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς
 μὴ οὖσιν: ἀληθῆ: οὐδ' ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ
 ὄν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων: οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται τι
 τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἐνός πολλὰ δοξάσαι
 ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον γάρ: ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τᾶλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε
 δοξάζεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά: οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐδ' ἄρα ὁμοια οὐδὲ ἀνό-

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μοια : οὐ γάρ : οὐδὲ μὴν τα αὐτά γε οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ
χωρίς· οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμε-
να αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τἄλλα, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν : ἀληθῆ:
: οὐκ οὖν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἵπομεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὀρθῶς
ἂν ἔπομεν : παντάπασι μὲν οὖν : εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι,
ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν εἴ τε ἔστιν εἴ τε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἄλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτά καὶ
πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἔστι τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ
οὐ φαίνεται : ἀληθέστατα : — ΠΑΡΜΕΝΕΪΔΗΣ Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ἸΔΕΩΝ —

vi. 'same or
different,'
vii. 'touching or
separate'; or
anything else
already men-
tioned.
viii. In a word, if
the one is not,
nothing is. *A.*
Entirely so.

P.
Thus we may say
that, whether the
one is or is not,
it itself and the
others, alike
toward them-
selves and each
other, all and in
every way, both
are and are not,
and seem and do
not seem. *A.*
Most true.

NOTES.

I. TEXTUAL.

THE following is a detailed presentation of the readings in the Manuscripts \mathfrak{A} TUB. t, given line for line with the printed text. The readings of \mathfrak{A} t show the points, including punctuation and accentuation, in which these Mss. differ from the text. Those of Tub. give the particulars, not including punctuation but including every divergence of a letter, in which that Ms. is at variance with \mathfrak{A} . The readings of Tub. are in different type from those of the other two. Erasures are shown by a *; while c. after a word means that it is contracted in the Ms. For the usual contractions see pp. cxi. cxxiv. above.

\mathfrak{A} .	TUB.	t.	
-κοθεν, ¹ -κόμεθα·	—	-μεθα. κατάγοράν	St. 126 l. 1.
—	[small on * -τωτε	καὶ c. -κωνι. ¹ λαβομενος	
-μαντος· χαίρ' ἔφη ᾧ ¹ τῆδε, ἰδ dark,	δέη τῶν τῆδε	-μαντος. χαίρ' ἔφη ᾧ ¹ δέει ¹ τῆδε ὄν	
-τοῖ. ¹ μεν δὴ εἶπον ἐγὼ, ¹ τοῦτο.	-ζε. ¹ μὲν	-τοῖ. ¹ δὴ ¹ ἐγὼ. ¹ τοῦτο δε-	
ἂν ἔφη τῆν ¹ εἶπον·	ὑμῶν. c. ¹ -σιν. ¹ τῶ	ἂν ἔφη ¹ εἶπον·	
-τρίψ. τί ἦν ὄνομα,	no ι subs.	τῷ c. ὁμομητρίψ. τί ἦν ὄνομα·	B
ἦν. ¹ -μενῶν·	τοῦ πρότ. ¹ -μησα ἐκ κλαζ-	ἦν. ¹ -μενῶν·	
ἐκείνου κ το ν wide, ¹ τῷ acc. patched. ¹	τῶ ¹ πατρὶ c. ¹ -λαμπη	ἤδη χρόνος. ¹ πατρὶ δοκῶ. [-θάνει :	
δέ γε : ¹ -θάνει :	[III. ¹ τε, γε αὐτῶ δέ γε ¹ -θάνη :	πάνυ γε ἔφη. αὐτῷ δέγε ἀντιφῶν ¹	
οἶδε εἶπον ἐγὼ, πολίται πολ rough, Pl.	πολίται μοι εἰσι	οἶδ' εἶπον ἐγὼ πολίται τέ μοι εἰσι	
-φῶν. ¹ τινί, ¹ ἑταίρω.	no ι subs.	ἀντιφῶν. ¹ τινὶ ¹ ἑταίρω.	
-γους, ¹ -κράτης. ¹ ζήνων·	—	καὶ c. [out). C	
-δώρου.	[a little, darker.	-νίδης-θησαν. ¹ -δώρου (νίδης through-	
-θῆ ἔφη ¹ εἶπον. δεόμ- ¹ πον. δε ¹ patched	—	-θῆ ἔφη λέγεις : τούτων c. τοίνυν εἶπον.	
-λεπὸν ¹ ᾧν. αὐτοὺς εἶ last two words	—	ἀκοῦσαι : ἀλλοῦ χαλεπὸν ἔφη. ¹ ᾧν.	
-νυμον.	[patched a little.	γε κατὰ ¹ -νυμον.	
βει· ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ.* ἴωμεν last ε curs., see	-κῆ	-τρίβει· ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ. ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτὸν·	
-θένδε, ¹ -γὺς. ¹ -λίτῃ· [Pl.	μελίττῃ· ταῦτ'	μελίτῃ : ¹ -πόντες. δὲ c.	P. 2.
οἴκοι.	-τα. οἴκοι·	οἴκοι. ¹ τινα	127
-άσαι ¹ -λάγη.	—	-ασαι. ¹ -λάγη.	
παρεῖμεν·	-τῶ ¹ παρήμεν ¹ σε τέ	παρεῖῆμεν ¹ -σεν τέ	
-μίας. ¹ -ζετο·	δι ¹	μίας. καὶ ἡσπάξετο·	
λόγους. ¹ -νει.	ελθεῖν δι later.	λόγους. ¹ ὠκνεῖ. ¹ εἶναι· ἐπ-	
-τοι. ¹ -φῶν, tall and narrow. ¹ -δωρον·	—	ἔφη ¹ -δωρον.	

	Υ.	ΤΥΒ.	τ.
	μεγάλα.¹ -νειδης²	-θήνεα¹ -νίδης²	-κοντό¹ -γάλα.¹ -νίδης²
B	-δην.	-νίδην.	-ίδην.¹ μάλα ἤδη¹ εἶναι. c.
	πολιόν.¹ ὄψιν.	ἔξηκοντα	πολιόν.¹ κάγαθ¹ ὄψιν.
	δε.¹ εἶναι.	_____	δε.¹ ἐτῶν c. τεττ.¹ εἶναι. c.
	_____	ιδεῖν¹ -νίδου	ιδεῖν¹ αὐτὸν.
	-ναί.¹ -χους.	πύθοδῶρω	-ναί.¹ ἔφη.¹ -δώρω
C	-μεικῶ.¹ εἰ had been ι, paler, tall, nar-	-μεικῶ.	-μικῶ.¹ -κράτη.
	-λοῦς, [row.¹ -κέσθαι.¹ κράτη,	-τας c.	πολλοῦς.
	-μάτων.¹ -θῆναι.	_____	γὰρ c.¹ ὑπέκείνων -σθῆναι.
	τότε,¹ νέον.¹ -τοῖς,	-γινώσκ-	τότε.¹ νέον.¹ ἀναγινώσκειν οὖν c. αὐτοῖς.
	αὐτὸν.¹ -δην, [neat, and fainter.	αὐτὸν.¹ c.¹ νίδην	αὐτόν.¹ -νίδῃ¹ ἔξω ὄντα.
	λόγων,¹ -κόμένων¹ first¹ and o small,	-γινωσκομένων¹	-χὺ.¹ λοιπὸν των c.¹ -μένων¹
D	-θεν.	-ν*ιδην	-ωθεν.
	-τοῦ.¹ -τέλη,¹ -μενον.	ἔττα	-τοῦ.¹ τὸν τῶν c.¹ -μενον.¹ σμικρῶ ἄττα
	γε.	_____	τῶν c. γραμμ.¹ γε.
	ζήνωνος.¹ -σαντα,	_____	ἀκηκ.¹ -ωνος.¹ -σαντα.
	-γνώναι.	_____	-γνώναι.
	-θείσης. πῶς φάναι ὦ ζήνων.¹ λέγεις, φάναι	_____	-σθείσης πῶς φάναι ὦ ζήνω τοῦτο λέγεις.
	ὄντα.	_____	ὄντα. [εγ very like ει, so next case.
E	δῆ. ἀδύνατον.¹ ὁμοια.	gap, see p. lxxxviii	-α.¹ -νατον.¹ ὁμοια.
	ἀνόμοια,¹ λέγεις; οὕτω φ.	_____	οὕτω φάναι τὸν c. fainter.
	εἶναι.	ζήνωνα :	ὁμοια εἶναι.
	ἀνόμοια. ἀδύνατον.¹ εἶναι.	_____	ὁμοια ἀνόμοια.¹ εἶναι. c.
	εἶη.¹ -νατα.	ἄρα	εἶη.¹ -νατα. ἄρα¹ σοῦο*ἰ σ has been τ?
	-λότι.¹ -μενα,	πάντας τὰ	λόγοι. οὐκ ἄλλο τι. [= τῶνο οἱ?
	ἴστι.	αὐτοῦ οἴσει changed to οἴεσοι	ἔστιν.
	λόγων. γ = Γ¹ ηγεῖ,¹ -σθαι.	ἠγῆ	τῶν λόγων¹ both c., end a line¹ -χεσθαι.
p. 3. 128	πολλά.¹ -γεις. ἦ¹ faint.	-λά.¹ ἦ	-γραφας.¹ ἔστιν πολλά. οὕτως λέγεις.
	-θάνω; οὐκ ἀλλὰ¹ -νωνα.	-νω.¹ φάναι changed to ῶ	-θάνω; οὐκ ἀλλὰ¹ -νωνα [ἦ
	-μα, δ¹ -θάνω	γρᾶμμα [orig. on *	-νηκας.¹ -θάνω
	-τη¹ -νειδῆ.¹ ὄδε, , faint [τὸν	-ν*ιδῆ¹ no ι subscripts.¹ φιλ-	-τη ὦ -νίδῃ.¹ ὄδε. [ταυτὸν
	ῶκειῶσθαι. ὠικ patched, darker¹ ταυ-	οικειῶσθαι, later ὦ. [later.	ῶκειῶσθαι. ῶ had been οἱ?¹ τῶ c.¹
	δνπερ σύ.¹ δε.¹ -τᾶν, faint.	δν¹ περ σύ. so but altered	τινὰ. ὄ*περ σύ. μεταβαλὼν δε.¹ -τᾶν.
	λέγων.¹ -μασιν.¹ ἔφης¹ πᾶν.	ἐνέφης so but altered later.	λέγων.¹ -μασιν. ἐν φῆς¹ πᾶν.
B	αὐ*¹ -λὰ φησὶν εἶναι.	ὄδε δε (* = 2) αὐ*οῦ changed	-έχει. καλῶσγε καὶ εἶ. γε οἱ τε? liker
	-πολλα,¹ -χεται.	later to δε αὐ οῦ [on *.	[former.¹ αὐ,¹ εἶναι
	φάναι,¹ -λὰ καὶ ακ close and faint.¹	πάνν πολλά. καὶ παμμε- παμμ	δε καὶ c. αὐτὸς.¹ -χεται.¹ μὲν
	_____	φάναι changed ῶ¹ δε μὴ on	φάναι.¹ πολλά.¹ τῶν c.
	ταῦτὰ.	[λέγειν, same * as above.	
	λους,¹ ναὶ φάναι¹ -νωνα ὦ	-τας ταῦτα	-τῶν c.¹ δοκεῖν.¹ ταῦτὰ.
	-ματος. [faint, reddish, near edge	σωκρατ¹ ends line.	-λους.¹ ναὶ φάναι τὸν ζήνωνα, ὦ σῶ; lat-
C	ὥσπερ γε¹ -λακες. The marg. note is	ἦσθησαι. σαι c.	-ματος.¹ ἦσθη- [ter half of first¹ darker.
	-θέντα.¹ -θάνει.	ῶ- on *¹ σκῦ.¹ -θείς τε¹ ιχ-	καίτοι¹ γε¹ λακες.
	γράμμα.¹ -θὲν, stops faint.	_____ no note in marg.	-θέντα.¹ -θάνει.¹ οὐπαν-
		γρᾶμ-	γράμμα.

A.	TUB.	t.
ναι.¹ -μενον.¹ -τόμενον.¹ [-θές. άνωσ		-ναι.¹ -μενον.¹ -μενον.¹
μέν. has been a blot over word.¹ δέ¹	-θές.	είπες.¹ δέ¹ άληθές.
-ματα.¹ λόγφ, , faint.	no ι subs.¹ -νείδου	λόγφ c.
κωμωδείν.¹ ώς ει έν έστι.	gap.	-μωδείν.¹ ώσει έν έστι. D
λόγφ, , faint.¹ αύτφ.	αύτφ.¹ γράμ-	τφ λόγφ. both c.¹ αύτφ.¹ c.
-μα, , faint.¹ -γοντας.¹ ταύτα, , faint.	-δωσι.¹ και πλει-	-γοντας.¹ -διδωσι και [erased.¹ αύτφ.¹ c.
-ω. τουτο.¹ faint.¹ δηλουν.	—	-ω. τουτο* βου-λουν.¹ βpatched. qu. v
-θεσις¹ έστιν. ή¹	ή	-θεσις.¹ εστιν.¹ είναι,¹ ικ-ξίσι.
-κίαν,¹ νέδ όντος X light and close on	ή τοδ ή later.¹ ικ-	-κίαν.¹ έγράφη.
[*¹ -φη.¹ αύτφ.¹ had been-τὰοr-τὸν?	ήτὸ νέοντος¹ αύτφ.	
-φέν.¹ -γένετο, , faint.	—	-ψεν γραφέν.¹ -νετο. E
φώς,¹ μή.¹ -θάνει.¹ -κρατες.	ταύτη γοῦν	φώς.¹ μή.¹ ταύτη οῦν¹ -θάνει ω σω, ότι
-φθαι. , faint.	-κίας οf- orig. on *	-φθαι. άλλύπὸ
έπει όπέρ γ' είπον. , faint. [είπέ.	—	έπει είπον.¹ άλλάπο-
-μαι μsmall¹ -κράτη.¹ faint.¹ έχειν.¹	είπέ.¹ later.	-μαι¹ -κράτη.¹ έχειν. [c.
αὐτὸ, , faint.¹ -ότητος.	no ι subs.	καθαυτὸ¹ -τητος.¹ και τφ τοιούτφ both 129
αὐ, άλλό¹ -τίον.¹ ό έστιν άνόμοιον; , ,	-μοιον.¹ όντων > και	(αὐ om.) άλλό τι.¹ άνόμοιον.¹ όντων.¹
[faint¹ δέ,¹ έμέ και		[λουμέν. -βάνειν.
σέ και τάλλα¹ -λουμέν	τάλλα	τὰ άλλα ά* δή (ά widely spaced on *)¹
-βάνοντα.¹ -σθαι.¹ τε.	no ι sub.	-βάνοντα.¹ -νεσθαι¹ κατατο-
-βάνη.¹ -τητος.¹ -μοια.	-βάνη.	-βάνη.¹ -τητος. άνόμοια. P. 4.
-τέρων. -τερα.	—	-τέρων. -τερα.
έστί,¹ άμφοίν, , , faint.	έστι τῶ	-βάνει.¹ έστι¹ άμφοίν. B
αὐτοίς. -στών.¹ τις	αὐτοίς,¹ later.¹ -ατίς	αὐτοίς.¹ -στον.¹ τις, άπέφαινεν
-μενα, , faint.¹ όμοια.¹ αν οίμαι	—	-μενα.¹ όμοια.¹ αν οίμαι ήν.
-θότα. last half of a on *	—	-τέρων.¹ -θότα. , faint.
έμοιγε¹ ζήνων. [ι faint.	—	γε ω ζήνω άποπον δοκεῖ. οὐδέγε
τις, , faint.¹ ενός.¹ ταυτὰ¹ πολλά. τφ	άπο-¹ patched¹ τῶ¹ gap.	τις.¹ ενός.¹ πολλά. [αὐτὰ
-χειν.¹ ό έστιν έν,¹ -δείξει και αυτὰ	αὐτὰ.¹ later?	-έχειν.¹ άλλεῖ ό* έστιν έν,¹ -δείξει. και
έν.¹ -μαι. [ι, faintish	περὶ.¹ later?	έν.¹ -σομαι.¹ τῶν άλλων άπάντων. all c.
-αύτως.¹ αύτοίς¹ ταν-	είδη.¹ έτῶν.¹ νοι τάν.¹ later?	-αύτως.¹ είδη. έν αύτοίς
-χοντα.	έντ.¹ ends line.	-σχοντα.¹ δέ με [στόν. λέγων
πολλά.¹ -στόν. λέγων	δταν με.¹ ends line.	και c. πολλά όντα. (" = transpose)¹
-φαίνειν.¹ μου έστιν.¹ -τερά.	έπαριστέρα.	-φαίνειν.¹ δεξία μου έστιν.¹ επ' άριστέρα.
πρόσθεν.¹ -ισθεν.¹ άνω, , very faint.	—	πρόσθεν.¹ -σθεν.¹ κάτω,
ότ' αν.¹ faint.¹ έν έρη. , faint.	δταν.¹ έρη	πλήθους c. γαρ οίμαι μετέχω.¹ έν. έρεί.¹ D
όντων, , faint.¹ -πος.¹ ενός.	άνος.¹ ενός.	-των c.¹ ανθρωπος c. [ήμῶν c.
-τερα.¹ -χειρη, [· · · and¹ on τὰ faint.	-χειρη.¹ πολλά.	-φαίνοι -τερα.¹ -χειρη.
ταύτα-νειν. λίθους.¹ ξύλα.¹ τα τοιαύτα.	-φαίνη.¹ λίθους no stops till	-φαίνειν.¹ αυτα.
-νύται.¹ το¹ πολλά.¹ έν.	-νύται.	-νύται.¹ πολλά.
λέγειν. η [ι, faint	—	λέγειν. άλλάπερ.¹ -γοῦμεν.
νύν.¹ έλεγον,¹ -ρείται.¹ καθ' αυτὰ	-ρήται.¹ καθ' άντὰ	έλεγον.¹ μέν c.¹ καθαῦ-
είδη.¹ -τητα, και πλήθος. stops faint.	—	είδη.¹ άνομοιότητα.
έν.¹ -νησιν.¹ -αυτα.¹ · · · faint and	-νησιν.¹ orig.?	έν.¹ κίνησιν.¹ τοιαύτα.
[crowded.		

	21.	TUB.	t.
	φαίνη dots note an error? cp. -ρείται ^η -κρίνεσθαι ^η -φαίνη ^η [above. Written to dictation?]		-φαίνη.
	ἔγωγ' ἔφη-τως ὦ ζήνων' [subs.all faint. γέφην -σθαι. ¹ μὲν τ' ἄν ὦδε -λον ¹ and ι πολὺ ¹ ὦδε ¹ λέγω -θείην ¹ -ρίαν, (, faint,) ἐν αὐτοῖς _____ [a crowded. _____		ἔγωγ' ἔφη θανμαστῶς ὦ ζήνων ¹ δέ, μὲν τ' ἄν ὦδε μάλλον λέγω ¹ αὐτὴν ταύτην -μένην. [later.
x30	-ήλθετε ¹ δὴ. ¹ -δωρος ¹ ταῦτα ¹ οἴεσθαι, , faint. ¹ -νωνα. δὲ, , faint. ¹ -νοῦν. -κράτη ¹ αὐτοῦ. ¹ -είδην ¹ -κρατες ¹ φάναι ¹ dark.	-μῶ _____ ν ¹ ἰδην τοῦσδε, ¹ -τω -κράτην ¹ οὖν c. -ν ¹ ἰδην ¹ φάναι	-ήλθετε. οὕτω ¹ ἐπιδείξαι: / looks δὴ ¹ -δωρος ¹ ταῦτα. ἐφεκάστου ¹ -νωνα δὲ ¹ πάνυγε αὐτ ¹ (γε οἱ τε?) ¹ νοῦν ¹
p. 5.	αὐτοῦ. ¹ -είδην ¹ -κρατες ¹ φάναι ¹ dark. B εἰπέ ¹ ἄττα. ' or ' doubtful: probably ' διήρη· i subs.?' ἄττα	_____	αὐτοῦ. ¹ -νίδην: ὦ σωκ φάναι ὡς λόγους. ¹ εἰπέ ¹ οὕτως ¹ λέγεις ¹ ἄττα
	μετέχοντα; , faint. ¹ καὶ τί ¹ αὐτῆ ¹ ἢ [ὁμοιότης ¹ ἢ rather faint χωρὶς ¹ -ομεν ¹ -λά ¹ second faintish. -oves ¹ γε φάναι [τί ¹ ἢ last half of ^ darker ¹ -αὔτα ¹ τόν τε ¹ ἢ ¹ -ν ¹ ἰδην ¹ τι καθ' αὐτὸ ¹ -θοῦ ¹ αὐ ¹ , -των; , , faint. καθ' αὐτὸ ¹ orig.?' αὐτῶν	_____	τούτων c. ¹ -χοντα, ¹ αὐτο ¹ ὁμοιότης (ἢ [majusc. -ότητ ¹ ἔχομεν. ¹ πολλὰ. ; ἔμοιγε φά ¹ , differs. [-νίδην. ¹ τί -τη: ἢ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε c. εἰπεῖν τὸν c. καθ' αὐτὸ ¹ παντων αὐ ¹ τῶν τοιούτων; [all -ων c.
c	ναὶ φάναι: τί δ' ¹ _____	τιδ' ἀνοῦ ¹	ναὶ φάναι: τί δ' ἀνθρωπου c. εἶδος. ¹ [ἡμῶν c. a second half of ^ added.
	ἐσμέν ¹ πάντων αὐτὸ τί -ρία φά ¹ δὴ ¹ -νείδην ¹ -γονα ¹ [fainter. -νων. ἢ ἄλλως: ἢ ¹ τῶνδε ^ on both ἢ -κρατες ¹ εἶναι ¹ θριξ ¹ πηλός. ρύπος ¹ -λότατον ¹ -ρεῖς ¹ χ.ρῆ φά ¹ εἶναι, χωρὶς ὄν ἄλλο αὐτῶν. ἢ ὄν	ἢ ¹ ὕδατος: ἀπορία ¹ -ν ¹ ἰδην -νων ἢ εἶναι: ἢ θριξ _____	πάντων. αὐτό τὸ ¹ ἀνθρωπου c. ¹ ὕδατ ¹ ; ἀπορία φά ¹ εἶναι ¹ δὴ ¹ γέγονα ¹ [, differs. φά ¹ εἶναι ¹ -νων. ¹ ἢ καὶ ¹ τῶνδε σῶ, ἢ ¹ εἶναι ¹ πηλός. ρύπος ¹ ἢ ἄλλοτι ¹ -λότατον. φά ¹ εἶδος. ¹ χωρὶς ὄν ἄλλο αὐτῶν ¹ c. [ἢ ὄν
D	-ζόμεθα, , very faint ¹ μῆ: φά ¹ -τη ¹ γε ¹ -μεν. εἶναι. ¹ -πον ¹ μέντοι ¹ -ξε. Note near [marg.: -ον, -as and -ε(4) all c. ταυτὸν ¹ ὕστῳ.	θ -ζομ end of line ¹ μῆ: φά ¹ φά ¹ φά ¹ _____	φά ¹ φά ¹ φά ¹ usually patched, with 'dark. -τη ¹ ταῦτά γε ἄπερ ὀρώμεν, ¹ αὐτῶν c. εἶναι. ¹ ἄτοπον ¹ μέντοι ποτέμει καὶ [ἔθραξε,
	-μαι ¹ -σας, ¹ τιναβυθὸν, ¹ -ρῶ ¹ last, -μενος ¹ ἔχειν. [faint. E φά ¹ -δην ¹ -τες ¹ -φία ¹	δοῦν εἰ ἔτι εἰ on *. -ν ¹ ἰδην	[πολλῆν in mid. marg.?' -φθαρῶ ¹ -μαι ¹ εἰς τινα ἄβυθὸν ^ points to gloss -κόμενος. ἔτι φά ¹ -νίδην ὦ σωκ. ¹ -σοφία ¹
	-ψεται ¹ -ξαν ¹ -τον ¹ fainter. δὲ. fainter. ¹ -ξας. ¹ την -ίαν	-τίληψεται. ¹ ἄντων ο to ὦ later. ἀνῶν	-ψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν. ¹ αὐτῶν c. -κίαν

X.	TUB.	t.
ειπέ· [†] σοι· φῆς, [†] ἄττα, , fainter. -νοντα, , fainter. [†] -χειν· -βόντα, ὁμοια· [†] δέ, μεγάλα· , , faint. -νης, [†] γε φά·ναι commas very faint. -δους. ἡ μέρους, [†] -βάνον. ·, faint. -βάνει. ἡ [†] τίς [†] -ψις, , faint [†] -οιτο: ἀν· οὖν, , very faint. [καὶ c. ἐν ὄν. ἡ [†] faintish. [†] -λύει φά· [†] -ράτη -ν* [†] δη [†] ταυτὸν [†] -λοῖς, [†] οὖσιν· very [faint. ἔσται. (or is . meant as a mark over [†] εἴη below ?) [†] αὐτοῦ [†] ἀν· φά· οἶον εἰ (` darker, ν patched at foot —had been '?) ἡμέρα εἴη μία καὶ ἡ αὐτή, [†] -χοῦ, [†] ἐστὶ. , , faint. αὐτῆς [†] -τον· [†] ' ` on αὐτῆ faint.	ειπέ· [†] φῆς '· [†] ἄττα ἰσχειν· — φά·ναι οὐκοῦν [†] ἡ μέρους· ἡ [†] -το: εἶπε· [†] -στω -λων ἐνὸν ἡ πῶς: [†] φά·ναι -ν* [†] ιδῆ ἐν εἶναι· [†] πολλ· ends [line. ἅμα ἔσται· [†] αὐτοῦ [†] εἴη: [†] φά·ναι Same as X throughout, save [εἰ and μία· αὐτῆς [†] later. ταυτὸν [†] γε φά· [†] ρατες· ἐν, ταυτὸν, [ἅμα, , , faint. ποιεῖς. οἶονεἰ (as in 2) ἰστίω ι subs. yellow, squeezed. [†] -σας* [†] -πους· ὄλον· ἡ [†] -ειν: ἴσως φά· ἡ [†] ἀν· ἡ [†] ἄλλω: ἄρα φά· [†] -ρατές ἐστίν· εἴδη· αὐτῶν [†] ἔτι ' faint. [†] ὄλον. εἰ οὖν -σεις -ρες· φά· [†] ἔσται; , , faint. -μῶς εἰπεῖν: [†] γὰρ φά· [†] -ριεῖς· lower [point in : and last . faint. -λων, [†] μέρει, [†] αὐτοῦ , , faint. ἔσται· ἄρα, latter half of ~ with , [faint: [†] πάνυ γ' ἰ δαί. -στον, [†] τι· ἔξει, φῆ , , faint. τῶ, ἔσται; , , faint. τίς [†] τούτου δὲ [†] -κρὸν, , faint. ἔσται; -θῆ, [†] -θὲν· [†] ἔσται· , faint. [faint. πρίν; [†] ἀν -το φά·ναι [†] -πον εἰπεῖν , τί ends line, να forgot? -ρες· [†] μέρη· -μενα: οὐ (' faint) [†] δία φά·ναι· ' faint. -οὔτον, [†] δαῖ δῆ, , , faintish.	σοι ὡς φῆς εἴδη εἶναι ἄττα, αὐτῶν c. [†] ἰσχει*. [μεγάλα· [†] δὲ καὶ 131 -βόντα, ὁμοια· μεγεθους δέ. -οσύνης, [†] -νεσθαι: [†] γε φά·ναι τὸν c. σω- οὐκοῦν * ἡτοι [κρατ: -βάνει· ἡ ἄλλη [†] τούτων c. γένοιτο: ἀν εἶπεν: [†] ὄλοντο τῶν c. πολλῶν c. ἐν ὄν. [†] σωκρατ -νίδη [†] ταυτὸ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ c. χωρὶς B οὖσιν. [Had been ἔνεσ- and αὐτοῦ ἐνέσται· [†] αὐτοῦ. [†] οὐκὰν εἶναι φά·ναι. p. 6. οἶον εἰ ἡμέρα εἴη μία [†] οὔσα. [†] ἐστί. ἐστί· [†] τῶν c. εἰδῶν. ἐν ἐν ἡδέως γε φά·ναι ὦ σωκ. [†] ἅμα. ποιεῖς· [†] ἰστ· [†] ἀνθρωπους, c. ὄλον· ἡ οὐτὸ [†] λέγειν: ἴσως φά· c -ναι: [†] ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ c. τὸ ἰστίῳ εἴη ἀν· [†] φά·ναι, ὦ σῶ [†] εἴδη· [ἄλλω: αὐτῶν c. [†] μετέχοι· [†] -στω c. ὄλον. ἀν ἐνεῖη: [†] ἡ [†] -σεις ὦ σωκ, φά·ναι τὸ [†] -ξεσθαι· [†] ἔσται: -δαμῶς εἰπεῖν: [†] γὰρ φά·ναι· [†] -ριεῖς· -στοντῶν c. [τί δαὶ ' on ἄλ inserted. D ἔσται· ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανείται: [†] γ' ἔφη: ἴσου μέρους ἑκάστῳ [†] τι· φῆ ἔλ- os [fainter. ἴσου. [†] ἴσον τῷ μέρος τίς [†] ἔξει· [†] συμκρὸν. [†] ἔσται· ὄντος· [†] συμκρὸν. -ρεθὲν τούτο. [†] -ρότερ' ἔσται· [†] ἡ on * E [and also put in marg. γένειοτο φά·ναι. [†] τρόπον εἰπεῖν ὦ σῶκ. [†] τὰλλα -ψεται· -μενα: [†] δία φά·ναι. τί δὲ δῆ πρὸς

X.	TUB.	t.
-βάνει· ¹ -τείν, , faint. ¹ οὖν	ἀλλὰ τί· ¹ -νε; ¹ ὄρα ^s	-βάνει· delicate ¹ ζητείν· ¹ ἔοικεν : [ὄρα ^s οὖν
φάναι· ¹ -τες· ¹ καθάυτὰ ¹ ' faint.	φά· ¹ καθ' αὐτὰ	φάναι ὡ σωκ. ¹ ἀπορία· ¹ τις ὡς εἶδη· [ὄρα ^s οὖν
ἴσθαι φάναι· ὅτι ¹ εἰπεῖν, , faint.	-ται : ¹ -νῦν ἴσθι φά·	ἴσθι φάναι· ὅτι ὡς ¹ εἰπεῖν·
αὐτῆς, ¹ -ρία· ἦ ¹ ὄντων, , faint.	ἄπτη ¹ ἦ ἐν	ἀπορία· εἰ ἐν ¹ τῶν c. ὄντων. B
δὴ εἰπ- ¹ ἄλλα	-ρίξ-	αἰεὶ τι -ζόμενος ¹ δὴ ¹ ἄλλα.
φάναι· ¹ δέ. τόδε· ¹ μὴ δέ .· ¹ (ἦ) faint.	φά·	φάναι· ¹ δέ. τόδε· ¹ φαίη. [λέγοντι.
-σθαι ¹ -αὐτα, οἶα φαμέν ¹ εἶδη· ¹ λέ-	-γοντί	-σθαι ¹ ταιαὐτα. οἶα φαμέν ¹ εἶδη· ¹
-ξασθαι, ¹ -δεται· , faint. [γοντι.	στῖ	ἀν ἔχοι ¹ -δεται· ¹ πολλῶν μὲν τύχοι
ἀφυῆς·	ἀφύῆς.	-φισβητῶν. c. ¹ ἀφύῆς·
εἶη, ¹ δὴ	πῆ ¹ -ν* ¹ (will note now only where no patch.)	-θανος ἀν εἶη ¹ αὐτὰ ἀναγκάζων ¹ δὴ C
δὴ ¹ ὅτι ¹ -τες. ¹ σέ. Stops all faint	-τη·	-δη. ¹ -κρατη ¹ ; ὅτι ὡ σῶ, ¹ ἄλλο. p. 8.
καθάυτην ¹ εἶναι. ¹ ἀν, , faint. [here.	καθάυτην ** later.	καθάυτην αὐτοῦ ἕκ· ¹ εἶναι·
μὲν.	μὴ δέ ¹ αὐτῶ ¹ εἶναι ν later. ¹	μὲν. μηδεμίαν ¹ καθ [οὐκοῦν
εἶη φά· ¹ -γεις εἰπεῖν·	φά· ¹ -τη ¹ οὖν [καθ' ' later.	ἐτι εἶη φάναι ¹ -κρατη ¹ ; ¹ λέγεις εἰπεῖν·
εἰσίν, ¹ -σιν· αὐτὰ ¹ , faint.	ἰδέων ^ later. ¹ ἀνται, ' later. πρὸς αὐτὰς c.	τῶν c. ἰδ· ¹ εἰσίν. αἶ εἰσίν ¹ αὐτὰς
ἦμῖν, , faint.	ὁμοί* ¹ τατα line ends at *	έχουσιν· ¹ -ματα. D
δὴ ¹ -ται· ¹ -τες, , faint.	ἔπηδῆ	δὴ ¹ τις ¹ τίθεται· ¹ -χοντες.
-μεθα· (a cursive maj.) ¹ ταῦτα·	ταῦτα. ταν οη **	ταῦτα. ¹ ἐκείνους. [οὐκ
ἐστίν· ¹ εἶδη; ¹ -τῶν, , faint.	αὐτὰ ἐστίν. ¹ εἶδη καὶ εἶ patched	πρὸς αὐτὰ ¹ ἀλλοῦ ¹ εἶδη· ¹ ἐαυτῶν. ἀλλ
-κείνων· ¹ λέγεις, φάναι , faint.	φά· Will not note again.	-κείνων. ¹ οὕτως· ¹ λέγεις φάναι
οἶον φά· ¹ -νειδῆ· ¹ τοῦ, ¹ -λός. , . faint	δη ¹ ν later ¹ τοῦ ἐκείνου δεσ·	-νίδην c. εἰ ¹ τοῦ ¹ δοῦλος
ἐστίν· ¹ δὴπου ὅ ἐστι -της	ἀντοῦ first ^ added; same	ἐστίν. ¹ δὴπου ὅ, ἐστι -πότης. E
[της· next line. [paler.	ἀντοῦ δούλου ὅ ἐστι ὁ added	ἐστίν. ¹ δούλου. ὅ ἐστι ¹ ἀλλαν- (next
ἐστίν· ¹ δούλου ἔστι δούλος ¹ ὁ δεσπό-	gap. αὐτῆ δὲ changed to	-ὄs c. ὦν. ¹ ταῦτά ἐστίν· αὐτῆ ¹ -εἶα. η
ῶν. ¹ ἐστίν· ¹ -τεία.	[αὐτῆ	looks like ι, latter part very faint.
ἐστι· καὶ δουλεία, ὡσαύτως. , faint	ἐστίν ὁ	ὅ ἐστίν· ¹ -τως.
ἦμῖν, , faint.	ἀλλ' ὀλέγω ** added. ¹ αὐτῶν·	ἀλλοῦ ¹ πρὸς κεῖνα
-χει· ¹ ἐκείνα, ¹ ἦμας· ¹ λέγω. ¹ αὐτῶν·	αὐτὰ ἐκείνατέ ¹ πρὸς αὐτά· ἦ	-χει· ¹ ἦμας· ἀλλ ὀλέγω· ¹ αὐτῶν. (I
αυτὰ ¹ ἐστι. ¹ προσαυτά· ἦ	-θάν ^{ss} ends line. ¹ -γω; ¹ οὖν	αὐτὰ ἐκείνατέ ἐστι· ¹ ὡσαύτως ¹ ἐαυτά· ἦ ¹³⁴
λέγω· ¹ γ' εἰπ- ¹ -άτη ¹ οὖν ' faint.	δεστιν twice. ¹ -θαια.	λέγω· γ' εἰπ- ¹ -κράτη. ¹ οὐκοῦν c.
-μη φάναι· ¹ μὲν, ὅ ἐστι ¹ -μη. ¹ ὅ ἐστιν	-μη : ¹ αὐ τῶν first ^ added.	-μη φάναι. ¹ ὅ ἐστίν -μη ¹ τῆς ὅ ἐστίν
ἀλήθεια* (= -θειας?) , , faint.	ἦ οὐ :	[-θαια.
ἦ ἐστίν· commas here faint.	εἶναι, ·:	-μη : ¹ αὐτῶν -μῶν. ἦ ἐστίν
-των ὅ ἐστίν, ¹ -μη. ἦ οὐ : . faint.	ἀλλὰ	-των ὅ ἐστίν. ¹ -μη ἦ οὐ :
-μη, ¹ εἶη; , , faint.	οἶόντέ εἶναι; 3 upper marks	-στήμη. ¹ εἶη·
μη, ¹ -στου.	later. ¹ οὐγαροῦν : ¹ δεγέ	-στήμη. ¹ -νοι εἶναι c. : B
-λαμῆν ¹ εἶδη ¹ -γείς· ¹ -μεν, , faint.		εἶδη ὡς -γείς· ¹ ἔχομεν·
· οὐ , ' and next ` faintish.		ἦμῖν οἶονται εἶναι : οὐ γαρ οὖν c. :

	α.	ΤΥΒ.	τ.
	-μης. ¹ ἄ ἐστιν	—	-μης.
	ὄ, -μεν; , , very faint.	-μεν : οὐ γάρ : ¹ γνώ-	ὄ. ¹ ἔχομεν : ¹ ἡμῶν c.
	οὐδὲν	ειδῶν	τῶν c. ¹ οὐδὲν. ¹ αὐτῆς ¹ μετέχομεν : οἱ κ
	ἡμῖν, ¹ ὄ ἐστι. , faint.	—	ἡμῖν ἐστι c. καὶ ¹ ὄ ἐστι. ¹ αγαθὸν
C	πάντα. [¹ ἦ faint.	ιδέας ¹ μεν, :	ιδ. ¹ οὐσας,
	-τερον. ¹ ἄν. ἦ ' and first half of ^ on ἦ	—	φαίης ἄν που (then follows next line).
	οὐ' εἰπέρ ἐστιν αὐτὸ τί " . and ' of	εἰπέρ ἐστι τί γένος	εἰπέρ ἐστιν ¹ -στήμης.
	[¹ faint. ¹ -μης	—	
	-ναι, ¹ -μην* ¹ -λος. ¹ τὰλλα πάντα οὐ-	—	-ναι. ¹ -μην. ¹ καὶ c. τὰ ἄλλα ¹ οὕτω :
	τω; first (,) faint : second = other		καὶ τὰ ἄ rewritten in other ink on
	hand and ink.		stain.
P. 9.	οὐν εἰπέρ ¹ -ον at end amid brown stains.	οὐν	οὐκοῦν εἰπέρ τι ἄλλη αὐτῆς ¹ -χει. ¹
			μᾶλλον, ἦ αὐτῆ written over in
			other ink.
	ἄρ' οὐν. ν stained [(,) original.	—	ἔχειν. ¹ -τάτῃ ¹ ἄρ'
D	θεός, ¹ -σκειν. ¹ ἔχων; ν stained. The	—	-σκειν.
	ὅτι ... to end : no stops.	—	ὅτι ¹ ἡμιν ὦ σῶ,
	ἔχει	—	ἡμῖ ¹ ἔχειν ¹ ἔχει.
	—	ἀλλὰντὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ last ' πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. ἀλλὰντὰ ¹ αὐτὰ breathing	
	οὐν ¹ ἐστίν ¹ -τεία.	οὐν ¹ θῶ [changed later ' οὐν ¹ -τεία. [patched, had been ' .	
	-μη' οὐτ ἄν ¹ -νων, , faint.	οὐτᾶν ' ' later? ¹ ἐκει-	-στήμης. ¹ -νων,
E	ἄν -σειεν' οὐτᾶν -μη, ¹ γνοίη.	οὐτ' ἄν	-σειεν. οὐτ' ἄν ἐπιστήμη ¹ γνοίη
	ἡμῖν. ¹ -μοίως, , faint.	—	ἡμῖν. ¹ τε* ἐκειν- * at end of a line. ¹
			[-χομεν. τῇ παρ
	-χιῖ ¹ οὐδὲν, , faint. ¹ -μη. ¹ had been	—	-χιῖ ¹ οὐδὲν. ¹ -στήμης
	-μη. ¹ then ι put and a new stop.		
	λόγον, ¹ εἰσιν.	—	λόγον. ¹ εἰσιν.
	-ματα, , faint. ¹ λίαν	—	λίαν
	ἔφη ¹ -γος.	θῶ	ἔφη ¹ λόγος.
	-τοι ¹ -τες.	—	μέντοι ὦ σω, ἔφη ὁ παρμενιδῆς c.
135	-λά, , faint ¹ εἶδη. ¹ εἰσιν	εἰσιν ¹ ιδ.	ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη' εἰ εἰσι* ν αὐται αἰ ιδέα
			ν patched, a very close, ν changed
			from ν, ^ had been \. = εἰσι ... ἄν ?
	ὄντων, , faint.	—	τῶν c. ὄντων.
	-βητεῖν, so in my notes : , very faint. ¹	-βητεῖν	-οντα. ¹ -βητεῖν. ¹ ταῦτα
	ὡς οὐ τέ ἐστι ταῦτα. εἰ τε τε τε		
	stand separate.		
	— [-γομεν	—	εἶη.
	-γοντα, , faint. ¹ τέ τι λέγειν. καὶ ¹	—	τέ τι λέγειν καὶ ¹ -γομεν.
	ὡς, , very faint.	ὡς -πειστον patched from πσ	δυσανάπειστον ¹ -φουῦς
B	-θεῖν, ¹ -σία, ¹ -τῆν, , , faint.	καθ' αὐτήν. " have been added	μαθεῖν. ¹ ἕκαστ' ¹ καθ' αὐτήν
	-τέρου, ¹ -σοντος, , , faint.	-τότερον	-τέρου. ¹ -σομένου ν on * had been ν
	-ξαι. . faint. ¹ σοι ἔφη	-νῶς c. ends line.	-ξαι πάντα ταῦτα ἱκ. ¹ σοι ἔφη
	— [faint.	—	νίδη ¹ -κράτης. [αὐ μὴ ἕαση
	-τοι ¹ -νείδης. ¹ δὴ ¹ -τες αὐ ¹ ἕαση ε	εἶγε τις	μέντοι ¹ -μενιδῆς. c. εἰ δὴ γέ τις ὦ σω

α.	ТУВ.	t.
εἶδη ¹	—	τῶν c. ὄντων c. εἶναι
-ψας ¹ μὴ δέτι ¹ -στοι.	μηδέτι	-βλέψας ¹ μὴδ' ὅτι ὄρ- ¹ -στοι.
ἔξει ¹ ἔων ¹ faint.	ἔων 18-	ιδέαν τῶν c. ὄντων c.
εἶναι ¹	—	εἶναι
-ρεῖ ¹	—	-ρεῖ ¹ δοκεῖς
-γεις φᾶ ¹ πέρι ¹	—	λέγεις ¹ τί ¹ πέρι.
-ψει, ἀ τούτων ¹ -ράν, , , faintish.	τρέψη	τούτων ¹ γε τῷ c.
γὰρ εἰπεῖν ¹ -ναι ¹ -τες ¹	—	παρόντι ¹ πρῶτ ¹ γὰρ εἰπεῖν ¹ -σθῆναι ὦ σω. In in. marg. γρ. πρώτῃ, sugg. by πρωιην below?
-λὸν τέ τι ¹ -καιον ¹ -θὸν, , , , faint.	—	-χειρεῖς. καλοντέτι ¹ -θὸν.
-ριζ stained. [outer corner. [even in vbs. or advbs.)		
τῶν τ stained, stain creeps in from πρώην (no ι. Cease to note		
-θάδε, faint. ¹ τῷδε ¹ μεν ¹ θεία ¹ -θι θεία ¹ orig. ¹ ισ-		
-γους. ¹ σαυτὸν, ¹ -λον, , , faint.	—	γύμνασον μάλλον,
εἶναι, faintish.	—	τῶν c. πολλῶν c.
αἶδ-ι subs. dark ¹ μῆ. σε	ἀδολ- (ι held as subs.) ¹ σέ	έως ¹ εἰ δέ c. μῆ, σε [εἶπεν.
-πος φάναί ¹ -σίας : οὕτως εἶπεν	—	τρόπος φάναί ὦ -νίδη ¹ -νασίας : οὕτως
—	—	-ωνος ¹ πρὸς
-σθην -τος, ¹ εἴασεν ¹ -νοίς, , , faintish.	εἴασε τοῖς	-σθην. ¹ -μένους.
-πεῖν ¹ -να, ¹ -βοί, , , faintish.	—	-σκοπεῖν ¹ λάβοι.
μοι ¹ γε. faintish. [faint.	—	εἶδη ¹ μοι ἔφη ταύτη γε.
ναι ¹ -μοια, ¹ -μοια ¹ , and 'on οὖν ὅτι οὖν	ὅτι οὖν	ἀνόμοια ¹
γ' ἔφη ¹ -εῖν ¹	πρὸς τοῦτο π-	γ' ἔφη. ¹ ποιεῖν ¹
—	εἴεστιν	-μενον.
-σεως ¹ ἐστὶ, , faint. ¹ -θαι ¹	μὴ ἐστὶ	-θέσεως c. ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -θεσθαι.
-γεις φᾶ ¹ οἶον ἔφη, faint.	—	λέγεις φάναί : οἶον ἔφη.
-λά ἐστὶ.	—	-θέσεως c. ¹ ὑπέθετο ¹ εἰ πολλά ἐστὶ.
-νειν ¹ το ἔν ¹	αὐτὰ ¹ patched ¹ τὸ	-βαίνεῖ ¹ πολλοῖς ¹ αὐτὰ ¹ ἔν ¹
πρὸς γε αυ ¹ αὐ ¹ -λὰ ¹ πάλιν	αὐτὸ ¹ added. μὴ ἐστὶ πολλά ¹	-νὶ ¹ πρόστε ¹ αὐ ¹ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ πολλά.
-πεῖν, ¹ -λοῖς ¹	αὐτὰ ¹ patched.	πολλοῖς ¹
-λα ¹ αὐτοῖς αὐ ¹ -της ¹ ἔστιν. . .	προς ἀλληλα gap	ἀλληλα ¹ αὐθις ¹ ὅτης ¹ ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν. B
-σεται ¹ [faintish.	gap [had been πρὸς	ἐφ ¹ -σεται.
-θεῖσιν. ¹ -λα ¹	gap πρὶ π patched, ι on ;	-τεθείσι ¹ ἄλλοις ¹ αὐτὰ ¹ -ληλα ¹
-μοίου, faintish. ¹ -σεως. ¹ περι -σεως ¹	περὶ twice	-σεως ¹
-ρᾶς ¹ -ναι, faintish.	γενέσεως ω rough	-νεσεως c. ¹ -ρᾶς ¹
καὶ ¹ λόγῳ, had been . ¹ -θῆ ¹	αἰε ¹ καὶ οὐκ	καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ¹ ὕτου οὖν αἰεὶ ¹ καὶ ὡς
-κόντος ¹ -τος ¹	ὅτι οὖν	ὄντος ¹ καὶ ὅτι
-νοντα, very faint. ¹ αὐτὸ. ¹ -έλη ¹	αὐτὸ.	αὐτὸ. ¹ ἄλλων. ¹ προέλη ¹
τᾶλλα faintish.	ξυμπαντα ¹ -τως και τᾶλ-	πλείω. ¹ ὡσαύτως ¹ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐ ¹ πρὸς
τε. ὅτι οὖν ¹ αἰεὶ ¹	αὐτὰ ¹ ὅτι οὖν ¹ αἰεὶ so.	αἰεὶ προαιρη ¹ .
-θεσθε ¹ ἄντε ὡς μὴ δι, , faint. ¹ -μενος ¹	ὑποθεσθε.	-θεσο ¹ ὄν. ¹ -σαμμενος.
-ψεσθε ¹ -χανον ἔφη λέγεις ὦ	διόψεσθε ¹ ai added.	-ψεσθαι ¹ ἀμήχανόν γ' ἔφη λέγεις ὦ

X.	TUB.	t.
το ἐν. ἔχῃ: ε subs. faintish	ἐχῃ:	ἐν. ἔχει:
-λου. faintish.	εὐθέως	ἄρα. ἔχου. [οὐ* ἄν] ὄρος στρογ Ε
πῶς: τούτο	που	πῶς: γέπου ἐστι τούτο. γύλου.
-ταχῆ ἰ fainter. ἄπεχῃ; altered from	ἴσον ἂν ἐχῃ:	ἴσον ἀπέχῃ: γε. ὄρος εὐθέως.
ἂν ἔχῃ, fainter. καὶ μὴν εὐθύγε.		(Note in outer
μέσον, εἴη; οὖν. , , and ὄν οὖν	οὖν (will not note again).	μέσο. marg. 1st hand.)
[fainter.		ἐσχάτοις ἐπίπροσθεν ἦ: οὕτω: οὐκ οὖν
		c. τοῖν had been τοῖς
ἐν. εἴη. -ματος	ἐν.	ἐν. καὶ πόλλ' ἂν εἴη. εἴη' -ματος.
εὐθὺ.	_____	εὐθὺ.
ἐστιν.	ὀρθῶς	ἐστιν. 138
ὄν. -λω.	gap.	ὄν. εἴη. εἴηη;
δῆ: ὄν. περιέχειτο, faint. -νου.	-έχειτο	δῆ: ὄν. κύκλω ᾧ (ὄν had been ἂν)
εἴη. fainter.	_____	ἂν εἴη' ἂν
-ρούς, faint. -χοντος.	_____	-χοντος.
μῆν, fainter. ἐν * after' ὄν. κὰν	ἐν ἐ- κὰν	ὄν. κὰν
ἑαυτῷ εἴη περιέχον, ἢ αὐτὸ, fainter.	ἢ	ἑαυτὸ -χον. αὐτὸ εἴη ἐν B
τῷ γὰρ τι εἴη μὴ περιέχον, τὶ ἰ subs.	εἴη μὴ περιέχοντι, η changed	τῷ γὰρ τι εἶναι c. -χοντι. οὖν c.
[and, fainter to ν and αἰ put later.	_____	
εἴη -έχον	_____	-έχον. -μενον:
ἄμφω, ταυτὸν, faint.	ταυτὸν	γε.
ἐν οὐκ ἂν ἐν οὐγαροῦν: ἐν, faint.	ἂν οὐ γὰρ οὖν: ἔστι	ἐν. οὐκ ἂν ἐν. οὐ ἔστιν πουτὸ ἐν.
αὐτῷ. δῆ.	ὄν; ἔστιν. εἰοῖ- etc.	ἑαυτῷ c. ἀλλῶ ἐνόν: ἔχο.
κινουμένον * γε, had been ὄντε, τ	ἑστά- μόνον τε, ἢ	οἰόντε ἐστὶν ἐστάναι ὅτι c. κινούμε-
-ροῖτο. [changed to Γ, faint.	ἂν.	-ροῖτο. ἂν γλ (= γὰρ). [νόντε c
ἑαυτοῦ	_____	ἑαυτοῦ. c. ἔτι που εἶναι: ἄρα c.
κατ' ἄρα τῷ ἰ squeezed in. ὄν, of ;	φέρεσθαι: φ neat dark on *	καταλλοίωσίν' ἀλλᾶρα
μῆν' ἐν. [faint.	ἦτοι	ἴσως: μῆν' ἐν.
κύκλω. -λάττοι, , faint. οὖν	_____	κύκλω. οὐκοῦν c.
-μενον. -γκη	_____	-μενον. -κέναι c. ἀνάγκη.
το' ᾧ, faint. μεσου	ἀλλὰ δδε	-μενα. ἑαυτοῦ D
-σῆκει. -χανῆ* τούτο,	_____	-σῆκει. ποτὲ ἐπὶ
-θῆναι: ἀμείβων	_____	-χθῆναι: ἀμείβων.
-νεταί. εἰπέρ' οὖν faint.	εἰπεργε δῆ: ON *	γίγνεται. οὐκοῦν
αὐτὸ ο on * ἐφάνη: ἄρ' οὖν.	αὐτῷ ἔφ ἄνη: φ neat dark	αὐτῷ. c. ἐφάνη: ἄρ' -νεσθαι.
-τερον: ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται. ἰ subs.	δπη: ο on * μῆτε	-τώτερον: ἐν τῷ τί γίγνεται. μῆδέπω p. 13.
squeezed and faint τὲ πω ω on a		
stain.		
ετι, ἐν γιγ. μῆτέτι -πασιν	_____	ἐγγιγνόμεν. μῆτίτι -πασιν.
ἐν γίγνεται; faint. τὶ τούτο.	ἐν γιγ. later? τὶ	περ ἥδη ἐγγίγνεται: τί -σεται. τούτο E
πάσχοι, το' -νψ' το	τὸ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἥδη τὸ	πάσχοι. εἴη. αὐτοῦ ἥδη -νψ'
μέρη.	εἴη που ἐστι τρ.	δὲ ἔξω μέρη. οἰοντέ' ἔσται.
-ναί τινος	ἄμα	ἄμα. εἶναί τινος
εἰσὶ, ὄν. -τώτερον, , faint.	-χάνει εἰ large, ε on *	εἰσὶν ὄν.

	ῥ.	ΤΥΒ.	t.
	πou ¹ μέρη, ¹ ; , faint.	_____	πou ¹ μέρη. μήτε όλον
139	ποῖ ἰδὼν ἰον same hand, neat on * ¹	ποῖδων.	ἰδὼν ¹ τῶ -μενον. ¹ -λάττει.
	τῶ -μενον, ¹ -ττει. ¹ τῶ both ι subs.	_____	
	added, yellow, squeezed. , , faint.	_____	
	-όμενον.	_____	-μενον. ¹ ἔοικεν : ¹ ἄρα c.
	το ¹ ἀλλα ¹ γεφामέν	ἀλλὰ	ἐν. ¹ γε φამέν
	; , faint ¹ ἔστιν :	_____	αὐτὸ. ¹ ἄρα c. ποτέ, ¹ ἔστιν :
	εἴη. ¹ ἔστιν :	τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι : πᾶν ὄ	εἴη ¹ ἔστι : [οὔν : c.
	αὐτῶ. ¹ αὐτῶ ἐν εἶναι : ι subs. inserted,	αὐτῶ ¹ αὐτὸ ἐν εἶναι :	ἐν εἶναι αὐτῶ ¹ ἀλλῶ. ¹ αὐτῶ c. ¹ ἐν εἶναι :
B	μὴ δέποτε [pale and squeezed. ¹ οὔ	ἔστι ¹ gar.	ἔστιν τὸ ἐν. ¹ αὐτῶ c.
	αὐτῶ ι subs. added. ¹ ἄγει.	-κεν	ἐντῶ c. αὐτῶ c. ὄν οὔτε ¹ ἄγει. οὔτε
	[in pale ink. ¹ οὐκ οὔν	_____	[first τ. [ἔστηκεν : ὄν crowded in.
	-ρα ¹ οὔτ ἔστηκεν. first τ has 0 on it	οὔτ ἔστηκεν. later θ ¹ pale on	-ρα ὡς ἔοικεν. οὔτε ἔστη-
	δεμῆνταντόνγε, , faint. ¹ ἐτέρω. ¹ εἶναι	μῆ = ν.	γε. οὔτε ¹ ἔσται. ¹ ἔτερον.
	[(ι added?) ἔσται. ¹ ἔτερον	_____	
	αὐτοῦ. ¹ τίιν δῆ : ¹ ὄν.	αὐτοῦ orig. = ' τίιν δῆ : τί	αὐτοῦ ¹ πῆ δῆ : ¹ ὄν. had been αὐτοῦ
	εἴη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ καὶ ἄ fainter. ¹ ταυτόνγε	gar. ¹ καίμην	εἴη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ ὄν.
	ἐτέρω ὄν. ι subs. squeezed.	_____	
C	εἴη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ ὄπερ ἔστιν	οὐκὰν	εἴη. ¹ οὐκὰν ¹ εἴη ¹ ὄπερ ἔστιν
	ἐν. ¹ οὔγὰρ οὔν : ταυτόν ¹ ἐτέρω, ἣ ἔτε-	οὐ γὰρ οὔν : ταύ- ¹ ἦ	ἐν. ἀλλῆτερον ¹ οὔ γαρ
	[ρον. ' on ἦ is dark at the turn.	_____	
	οὔ γὰρ : ¹ ἔσται.	οὔγὰρ :	-αυτοῦ. ¹ ἔσται. ἔως ¹ ἐν :
	-σῆκει, ¹ εἶναι. ¹ ἐτέρω ἀλλῶ δέ. last ι	_____	-σῆκει. ¹ εἶναι. ¹ ἐτέρω ἐτέρου ¹ ἀλλῶ
	[subs. fainter and squeezed.	_____	
	εἶναι. ¹ ἔσται ἔτερον ¹ ἦ (had been ¹) οὔει :	ἔσται ¹ ἦ	εἶναι.
	ἀλλὰ μῆν, ¹ οὔτω. ¹ αὐτῶ. οὐδεῶν , and	εἰ δὲ μῆ αὐ- εἰ orig. = οὐ	μῆ τούτῳ. c. ¹ μῆ αὐτῶ.
	last part of + faint, ι subs. fainter	_____	
	and squeezed. [οὔδε	_____	
D	-δαμῆ ι fainter and squeezed. ¹ ἔτερον. ¹	δν ¹ οὐδὲ	ἔτερον.
	ταυτόν ¹ οὐχ ¹ ἦ, περ , faint. ¹ φύσις.	δοῦ : ¹ ἦπερ	ταυτόν
	ταυτοῦ ; ¹ οὐκέπει δᾶν ταυτόν γένηται	-δᾶν	αὐτῆ ¹ καὶ τοῦ ταυτοῦ : ¹ ὅτι c.
	[, and last ¹ faint.	_____	
	τῶ ¹ ἀλλα ¹ ταυτόν γενόμενον.	ὦ τῶ ἐγγίγνεται : ἀλλὰ clear,	τῶτί. ¹ ταυτόν -μενον.
	-σθαι ¹ ταυ-	τ ω in one, patched later.	
	-φέρει ¹ ὀπότέτι ταυτόν ἐγγίγνεται. αἰεὶ	οὐχ ἔν	-νεσθαι.
	[has been αἰεὶ, changed on a *	ὀπότε τι ταυτ ¹ ends line.	-φέρει. ¹ -γνετο.
E	ἐν ταυτόν : ¹ το ¹ ταυτόν ἔσται. , faint.	τὸ	ἐν. ¹ ταυτόν ἔσται.
	_____	ὀχ ἔν twice second ¹ added.	ἔσται* c. ¹ ὄν. ¹ γε.
p. 14.	ἐν ¹ , , faint. ¹ εἶναι. ¹ ταυτόν :	_____	ἐν ¹ . ἔτερον c. εἶναι c.
	ταυτόν ¹ οὔτᾶν αὐτῶ. last ¹ blurred.	οὔτᾶν αὐτῶ	ταυτ ¹ τὸ ἐν, ¹ αὐτῶ.
	ἔσται. ¹ -μοιον ¹ οὔτᾶν	-οντιν ¹ οὔτᾶν ¹ ' added ?	οὔ ¹ -μοιον. οὔτ ¹
	αὐτῶ. ¹ ταυτόν ¹ -θδς, ὅμοιον ; latter	αὐτῶ	εἶναι ¹ ταυτόν ¹ -θδς.
	[part of + and , , faint.	_____	
140	ἐνδς, ¹ φύσις, ¹ ταυτοῦ ¹ -λαμῆν, , , ,	_____	φύσις.
	[faint.	_____	

X.	TUB.	t.
μὲν, οὖν, , very faint. ἰ ἐνδς. ἰ ἄν ταυτὸν ἐνί· οὐγὰρ ἐκείνη ἰ -σία· οὐδᾶν ἰ ἐν, , λέγειν ἰ εἶναι. καὶ ἐνευ· [faint.	ἄρα οἶοντε οὐχ'οἶόντε: 2nd' added. ὁὖν οὐδ'ἄν 2nd' added. καὶ ἐν, ἔν· ends page, ν added later: orig. ξ·?	ἔστιν· ἄρα οὐκοῦν ἰ ἄν. ἐνί· ἄν ἰ ἦν. ἰ οὐσία· οὐδᾶν ἰ ἐν. -χεν· ἀλλόμ- ἰ -λέγειν. ἰ εἶναι· καὶ ἐν· C [ἐν·
δὲ. ἰ -θεσις εἰ ἐν εἰτι ἰ -νευν ἰ ἐν ἔστιν ἰ ἀλλότι ἰ ἐστὶ ἄρα οὖν, ἄλλο. ἰ το ἐν, , faintish. ἐπειδᾶντι συλ- ἰ εἴπη ἰ subs. seems squeezed in afterwards. ἰ ἐν ἔστιν: -μεν ἰ ἔστιν. ἰ -σεται· -νευν·	ἔστιν· εἰ ἐν ἐντι last' had been' ? οὐκοῦν ἰ ἔστι ἐν: ἀνάγκη: last: crowded ἔστι; [in later. ἰ τὸ	-θεσις εἰ ἐν τί ἰ -νευν. ἀλλεῖ ἐν ἔστιν ἰ μὲν οὖν: both c. ἰ οὐκοῦν ἄρα ἰ ἄλλο. ἰ ἐν. -μενον. ἰ τις ἰ ἐν ἔστιν:
πῶς: ἰ ἐστὶ ἰ -γεται· καὶ το ἰ from be- gin. to πῶς: scratch above line. No injury. Dots over text = dele: [] added by me.	λέγομεν ἰ ἔστι· — ᾤδε: εἰ τὸ ἔστι : later? ἰ τὸ	λέγωμεν ἰ ἔστι. ἰ -σεται· ἰ οὖν οὐκ -θεσιν. ἰ -νευν· πῶς: ᾤδε ἰ ἔστι. ἰ ἐνδς (ἐcurs.) ἰ -γεται· D [] contents omitted.
ὄντος -γεται, , faint. ἰ το ἰ ἐνδς· το ἐν ἰ -νου ἰ -μεθα ἰ ὄντος. -κη, , faintish. ἰ ὄλον· ἰ αὐτὸ· μόρια, ἰ οὖν, , and the other faint. τούτων ἰ -ροῦμεν ἰ ἦ ἰ ὄλου μόριον, [seems a faint * at ἰ on ὄλου ἔστι ἰ ἐν ἰ latter part fainter—hesita- [tion between text and ἐνῆ].	no repetition here. τὸ ἄρα εἶναι; , added. ἦ ἰ -ρίον (2nd)	ἐνδς· ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐν ἰ -νον οὐ -μεθα τοῦ ἐνδς ὄντος. ἄρα ἰ αὐτὸ· μόρια· τό, ἰ οὖν. ἐκάτερο τῶν c. τούτων· c. ἰ -ροῦμεν. ἰ μόριον·
οὖν ἰ τούτων, ὄν· -ον: ἦ το ἰ οὐκὰν εἴη πάλιν	προσῆρτέον: ἰ ἔστιν ἰ ἐνῆ altered [later " ? . — ἄρα τὸ ἰ οὐκὰν	ἄρα c. ἔστιν ὁ ἐὰν ἐν ἦ ἔχει: ἰ τί οὖν τῶν c. μορίων c. ὄντος· τό, ἰ ὄν· ἄρα ἰ -πεσθον. ἰ μόρι- E ον. ἰ μορίου; οὐκὰν εἴη: ἰ τῶν c. μόριον * had been μορίου? A \ through εἴη likely by accident.
ὄν, , fainter. The οἶν at end and the [ἄν of next line on a stain. αἰεὶ ὅτι περ [and on * -ται· -τω τῶ-ρίω ἰ αἰεὶ (2nd) αἰ smaller μῆδέποτε — τῆδε ἰ seems squeezed in. ἰ πῆ: ἐν, διό ἔστιν; ἰ το ἰ ; , , fainter. δαῖ· αἰ on * same hand. ἰ and com- mas fainter. ἰ ἐν ἰ δὴ φαμὲν ἰ αὐτο, καθ'αὐτὸ ἰ -έχειν· -σεται· ἦ ἰ το ἰ τοῦτο: ἐν εἰδῶμεν δὴ, ἄλλότι ἰ εἶναι, , , fainter. αὐτὸ, ἰ ἐν, , , and the others fainter. οὐσία, ἰ ἐν ἰ ἐν, τῆς ἰ , , fainter. -ρον ἰ ἄλλο·	ισχ· ἰ τὸ αἰεὶ αἰε ἰσ- twice. αἰεὶ εἶναι: stop later. ἦ ἐν: δι' ὅ ἔστι, ναῖ: τίδε αἰ· καθ'αὐτὸ ἰ added? ἰ ἄραγε ἦ [later. εἰδῶμην δὴ. ἄλλοτι εἰ shakes, slightly above in outer marg. οὔτε τὸ ἐν, το ε· ends l. [is ∴ ἄλλο· ἰ later.	-τερον. τό, τεῖν ἰσ- ἰ ὄν· -χιστον. never p. 17 ἰ: will not be noted further. αἰεὶ ὅτι περ [* had been ἰ ? -νηται, τούτω c. τῶ c. μορίω* ἰ τό, ἰ ἐν. -σχει ἰ -μενον. μῆδεπ- 743 μὲν οὖν: (both c.) οὐκοῦν ἀπ- ἔοικέγε: ἰ πῆ: ἐν. διό ἔστιν; ἰ ὄν, ἰ ἐφάνη: τί δὴ ἰ ἐν. ὁ δὴ -βωμεν c. τούτοι. ἰ -χειν. ἀράγε -σεται ἰ τοῦτο: ἐν δὴ ἰ εἶναι [οὐκοῦν B αὐτὸ ἰ οὐσίας τὸ ἐν. ἀλλά ἰ -σχευ: ἰ οὐσία ἰ ἐν, ἰ τῶ ἐν [καὶ -ρον ἰ εἶναι. ἰ ἄλλο. ἰ τῶ c. ἐτέρω c.

	91.	TUB.	t.
	ἄλλω.¹ ταυτόν ἐστιν.¹ ἐνι. οὖν.¹ αὐτῶν, , faint.	————	ἄλλω.¹ μὲν οὖν: (both c.)¹ ταυτόν οὐσία.¹ οὖν ἕτερον.¹ ἐν. ἕτερον: ἄρα *ὦ*¹ σθς¹ -τέρω; πῶς: ᾧδε.
C	-σίαν,¹ το ἕτερον.¹ -σίαν,¹ το ἐν.¹ το το ἕτερον. [ἐν, , , faint. νέω¹ -τερα: πῶς: ᾧδε. ἐστίν:¹ ἄρ' commas fainter. τί δ' ὄτ' ἂν¹ ἐν. οὖν,¹ ἐν. commas fainter.	τὸ 3 times τὸ νέω.¹ "later.¹ ᾧδέ ἐστιν ἐστίν:¹ ἄρ' οὖν (last ' later) ὄτ' ἂν¹ τε¹ ἄρα [οὐχ' ἐ- χ on * οὖν ᾧδ' ἂν last ' added, and so ἄρα¹ αὐτῶ [line 25. οὐχ' δ' οὖν τε: 2nd ' added?¹ [ἐστίν τις¹ οὐχ' ἐκ-	ἄρ' -ρηται; τίδ'¹ ἐν ἄρα -τέρω;¹ οὐκοῦν¹ ἕτερον.¹ ἐν. ἐφ' ἕκαστ'¹ λέγω;¹ ᾧ δ' ἂν -σθον. ἄρα¹ εἶναι. [μὴ οὐχ μῆ:¹ ᾧ δ' ἂν¹ ἦτον. ἐστίν τις μηχανή, [ἐστίν τις¹ οὐχ' ἐκ-
D	δᾶν [mas fainter. -ησθον.¹ οἰόντες,¹ αὐτῶ εἶναι, com- οἰόντε ᾧ δᾶν¹ ἦτον. ἕστί τις μηχανή, [οὐχ, -τερον εἶναι:¹ ἄρα¹ περ οὖν δύο εἶναι.	δύο εἰμῖα: ————	ἄρα c.¹ σὺν δύο εἶναι.¹ ἕκαστον: written under low- [est line of 82 a 2.
	ἐστι,¹ ἦτινι latter half of +, the ' and the commas fainter.¹ συ*ξυ- γία, first * = ι let., ι subs. orig.? δὲ,¹ -ριττὰ;¹ δύο, all commas faint. [; seems changed from :	ὅποιον.¹ ἦτινι οὖν συξυγία. [___ faint.	ἐστίν.¹ ὅποιον οὖν ἦτινι οὖν -γία. ** had been ' , as for separate words.
E	δαί αι on * same hand¹ -τοιν,¹ δις;¹ [-των.¹ τρις; commas fainter. ἐν.¹ τῶ ι paler and squeezed in.¹ [ἐν:	τί δὲ¹ δις.¹ τρις ———— δις ἐν. [ἐν:	ριττὰ. δαί¹ -τοιν.¹ δις.¹ τρις. εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῶ¹ ἐν.¹ τῶ¹ ἐν; The first three words have scratches.
	δὲ.¹ και τριῶν και τρις. αὐ,¹ δαί.¹ αι first hand on *, ' fainter.¹ [ὄντων, commas fainter. ὄντων.¹ ὄντων.¹ -γκη τε, , fainter.	τριῶν.¹ και τρις τί δὲ τ. -κητρία addition later.	δὲ.¹ εἶναι¹ τρις. δαί¹ ὄντων. ὄντων¹ ὄντων.¹ twice¹ τρία τε δις¹ ὄντων = ὄντων? my notes dub. εἶναι.¹ και δις τρία;¹ -τιακίς¹ εἴη. -τάκίς.¹ -τάκίς.¹ -τὰ ἀρτιάκίς: ἕστί¹ οὖν c.¹ ἔχει.¹ -σθαι. ἐστίν ἐν. ὄντος. πόλλ' ἂν εἴη.¹ και πλήθος c. -πειρον τῶν c. ὄντων.¹ c.¹ ἄπειρον -σίας¹ οὐκοῦν¹ χεῖ.
p 18.	ἄρα ἀρτιάκίς¹ εἴη. A stain over εἶν. 144 -τάκίς.¹ twice. [, . fainter. οὖν¹ ἔχει.¹ -πείσθαι, , fainter. ὄν¹ ἀνάγκη¹ ἐν. -ναί:¹ μῆν,¹ ὄντος.¹ εἴη. ἦ¹ -θει, -σία -ται:¹ οὖν,¹ -έχει, commas fainter, latter had been a period.	καὶ τρία δις:¹ ἄρα ἀρτιάκ. -ρίττα (1st) -τάκίς. (gap.) ———— ὄν ———— ἦ ————	-μοῦ,¹ αὐτῆς: -μηται.¹ οὐδενὸς -τῶν. -ρῆσθαι.¹ γε.¹ του, ἀπουσάται:¹ , ink? oi
B	-θμοῦ ἄρα,¹ ὄντα,¹ -μηται.¹ commas fainter. -των.¹ -τάτου¹ ἦ [mas fainter. -σθαι.¹ δῆ,¹ ὄντων, του -τατέ: com-	———— οὐδενὸς ἦ¹ ἄλογον -τατεῖν:	

X.	TUB.	t.
-όντε, ¹ -γιστα, commas fainter.	_____	_____
ὄντα ¹ -λιστα·	καὶ μάλιστα	ὄντα ¹ πάντων c. -λιστα·
ἐστὶ ¹ fainter. [fainter. ¹ οὐσίας,	ἐστὶ ¹ αὐτῆς·	οὐτω(s): c. [on last ἐστὶ = acc.? C
οὖν· ἐστὶ τι αὐτῶν, ' and commas	ἐστὶ τι (a leaf out here; no	οὖν· ¹ ἐστίντι αὐτῶν c. ὃ ἐστὶ ¹ οὐσίας.
γε οἶμαί ἐστιν. [γέτι ¹ δὲ	_____	[gap.] -ρος ¹ ἀλλεπέπερ γε οἶμαι
αἰεὶ first ι on * and darker. ¹ ἦ ἐν	αἰεὶ ¹ ἐνγετι	αἰεὶ ὡσπερ ¹ ἦ. ¹ μῆδὲν δὲ.
ἐν.	πρόσεστι	μέρει. πρόσεστι τὸ ἐν
-μενον, , faintish. ¹ μέρους·	_____	μέρους.
ἄρα οὖν, ἐν ὄν, ¹ ἄμα, ¹ ἐστὶ; ¹ and	ἐστι τοῦτο	ἄρα ¹ ὄν. ¹ ἐστίν. D
-θρῶ· καὶ ὄρῶ. [all stops faintish.	_____	ἀλλάθρῶ καὶ ὄρῶ. ¹ ἄρα
γὰρ πῶς	γὰρ πῶς ¹ ἄ μα ἀπ. μα wide	ὄλον· ¹ που (so my notes).
-σαι. ¹ -σδὸν, , fainter.	-ρεσι	[on a * μέρισι παρέσται. c. ¹ -σδὸν.
-σαῦτα, , fainter.	_____	-σαῦτα.
_____ [altered.	_____	-γομεν λέγοντες.
-μηται. ¹ ἴσα ὡς εἶκε accent on ἴσα	ἀλλ' ἴσα " retouched.	-μηται ἀλλ' ἴσα ὡς εἶκεν τῷ ἐνί· E
-πεται. ¹ ὄντος· ¹ -σθον.	οὔτε τὸ (ν erased) ¹ -σοῦσ-	-πεται. ¹ ὄντος· ἀλλεξισουῦσθον.
παραπάντα : dot accidental?	παρὰ	_____
-σίας.	_____	οὐσίας.
ἐστίν· ¹ ἐν, ¹ ἐστιν.	_____	τὸ ἐν ¹ ἐστιν.
-μένον.	_____	-μένον.
ὅτιγε ¹ μόρια. πε-	οὖν·	μὲν οὖν: both c. ¹ μόρια. πεπερασμς
ἐν· [faintish.	_____	ἐν· [(= μένον ?) 145
-α: ¹ μῆν, ¹ -έχον, ¹ εἴη; commas	_____	-έχον.
ὄν. ¹ ἐστὶ που καὶ (dots ink ?) πολλὰ· ¹	ἐντέστι	ὄν. ¹ τε ¹ πολλά· ¹ -λον. ¹ -ρια· P. 19.
ὄλον. ¹ -ρια· -ρα at end, and a,	_____	_____
l. 2 on stain.	_____	_____
-σμένον. ¹ ἀρ' οὖν· οὐκ	ἀρ' οὖν ¹ altered.	-μενον· ¹ ἀπερ' ¹ ἀρ' οὖν c. οὐκ
-σμένον· ¹ δαί· αι· orig. on * ¹ ἔχοι· καὶ c.	τί δὲ	-σμέν· ¹ ἔχον: ¹ τί δ' εἰ ὄλον. οὐ καὶ
μέσον· ¹ ἦ ¹ εἶναι· ¹ τούτων κὰν τοῦ	ἦοιόντι τι ¹ κὰν	τούτων· κὰν τοῦ [ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ
ἐτι commas faint. [faint.	ἐτι	ὅτι ι on an ο. ¹ -στατη· ¹ ἐτι
δὴ ¹ -τῆν, ¹ -σον, ¹ ἀλλα commas	ἔοικε ¹ ἀλλά	δὴ ὡσεῖοικεν ¹ μέσον. ¹ ἐν; ἔχει: B
μέσον. ἴσον ¹ faint. ¹ εἴη: οὐ	ἴσον ¹ οὐ (2nd)	μέσον. ¹ τῶν c. ἐσχάτων c. ἀπέχει·
τινος ὡς εἶοικε ¹ ἐν·	ἐν·	τινος ὡσεῖοικεν ¹ ὄν. ¹ ἐν·
-θέος· ἦ -λου· [πῶς: commas faint.	ἦτοι	-θέος ¹ -γύλου.
ἔχον. ¹ ἐν twice, had been ἐν ¹ -σαι, ¹	ἀρ' ¹ ἐν ἑαυτ· ¹ ἐν ἄλλω :	ἀρ' ¹ ἔχον. ¹ ἀλλω: πῶς:
-στον, ἐν ¹ ἐστίν, commas faint.	ἐν ¹ ἐστι	ἐκαστον, ἐν τῷ c. ὄλω c. ἐστίν. ¹ ὄλου:
μέρη, ¹ καὶ μῆν commas faint.	μῆν	μέρη.
αὐτοῦ ¹ ἐστι· ¹ οὔτε π- ¹ -τον. ἦ	μέρη τοῦ αὐτοῦ ¹ τὸ πλεον ¹ ἦ	αὐτοῦ ¹ ἐστίν· ¹ οὔτε τι πλεον. ¹ -ττον. C
οὐ γάρ:	οὐ ¹ ἐστι ¹ δδν:	οὐκοῦν ¹ ἐν ἐστι: c.
ὄντα· ¹ ἐν, , faint.	_____	ὄντα·
-λον·	_____	-λον. ¹ πάντα.
ἐν, , faint.	_____	ἐν· καὶ οὗτος ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἐν· ¹ ἑαυτῷ c.
-τοι, , faint. ¹ αὐ. ¹ ἐστιν· ¹ -σιν.	_____	αὐ. ¹ μέρεσιν ἐστιν· ¹ πᾶσιν.
ἐν τινι· ¹ -σιν. ¹ ὄν.	ἐν τινι	ἐν τινι· ¹ πᾶσιν. ¹ ἐν τινὶ ¹ ὄν. D
-κὰν ¹ ἐνγε ¹ εἶναι	κὰν ¹ ἐνγε	-κὰν ¹ εἶναι· ¹ μὲν c.

	Ξ.	TUB.	τ.
	ἐστὶ· ¹ μὴ ἐνὶ·	ἐστι· ¹ πᾶσι ἐν	-των c. ἐστὶ· ¹ ἐνὶ·
	ἐντισι twice ¹ εἴη·	—	ἐν τισι τῶν c. μερῶν· c. ¹ ἐν τισι ¹ εἴη.
	—	—	τῷ c. ¹ εἴη. ὅ ἐστιν ¹ ἀδύνατ' γάρ:
	μῆδὲ twice, but ὄν μὴ faintish ¹ ὄλον·	πλέοσιν	πλείοσιν. μῆδ'· ¹ μῆδ'· ¹ ὄλον.
E	commas faint.	—	εἶναι. c. ¹ εἶναι: c. ¹ οὐκοῦν
	ὄν ¹ αὐτῷ ἐστίν.	—	ὄν. ¹ ὄν. ¹ αὐτῷ ἐστίν.
	ἦ*· ¹ το ἐν, ὄλον. ἐν ¹ ἐστίν· ¹ faint.	ἦμεν ¹ τὸ ¹ ἔν altered to ¹ ἐστι·	ἐν. ὄλον. ¹ ἐστίν·
	ἦ*· ¹ -νει. ¹ ἐαυτῷ	ἦ	μέρει ¹ -χάνει· ¹ ἐαυτῷ ¹ ἐν.
	αὐτό ¹ ἐαυτῷ	αὐτὸ ¹ ἐαυ·	ἐαυτῷ c. [που.
	ἐν· ἄρ ¹ · ¹ -κη, ¹ -σθαι, ¹ πῆ:	ἄρ ¹ ^ altered.	ἐν. ἄρα ¹ -τάναι; πῆ: ἔστηκεν μὲν
146	ἐστίν· ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ ὄν,	ἐνὶ	ἐστίν· ¹ ὄν· ¹ -βαίνον.
	εἴη ¹ αἰ· ¹ ἐὶ ὄν, * slight. , fainter.	ἐν τῷ αἰ ἐν	εἴη ἐν ἐαυτῷ: c. ¹ αὐτῷ c. ¹ ὄν.
	που; δαί· αι on * [εἶναι·	ἐστὸς δῆπου, ἀν· ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ τίδῃ	εἶναι: τί δὲ
	ὄν, οὐτὸ -τίον ¹ μῆδέπ- twice. ¹ ταυτῷ	μῆδέπ- twice.	ὄν. οὐτὸ -τίον ¹ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
p. 20.	μῆδὲ ἔστάναι· ¹ -σθαι: ¹ το ἐν ἐν at	μῆδὲ ἔσ- patched? twice. ¹	αὐτῷ. c. μῆδὲ -τάναι· ¹ -σθαι: ¹ ἐν.
	[beginning and α of 2 on stain.	τὸ [been ¹	
	ἐτέρωι αἰεὶ ι of ai on *	-τὸ τὲ ¹ αἰεὶ twice ¹ ἔστ- had	ὄν· ¹ -σπάναι: c.
B	καὶ μὴν ταυτόνγε ¹ faint. ¹ -τοῦ·	—	ἐαυτῷ c. ¹ -τοῦ.
	-τως· ταυτόντε ¹ εἶναι.	—	ὡσαύτως ¹ εἶναι.
	πῶς: ¹ πρὸς ἅπαν, ¹ ταυτόν ἐστίν. [ὡς	-πονθε: ¹ ἄπ. ὄδε	πῶς: ¹ ὄδε ἔχει ¹ ἐστίν. ¹ ἔτερρ·
	ἦ ¹ ταυτὸν ἦ, μῆδέτερον* ¹ -του, ¹ ἔχει,	μῆδ' ἔτερον	ἦ ἔτερον. ¹ ἔχει. ἦ
	μέρος. ¹ ἄρ ¹ ὄν, το ¹ ἐστίν; , , fainter.	τὸ ¹ αὐτοῦ patched ¹ ἐστίν:	ἄρ ¹ ἐστίν; [αὐτοῦ?
	μέρος, ¹ εἴη , fainter.	οὐδ' ἄρα αὐτοῦ patched	αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ¹ εἴη. αὐτὰ had been
	ἄρα	ἄρα	ἄρα
C	εἴη; ¹ -ρον, , , fainter. [fainter.	—	οὐκ ἄρα
	-λον, ¹ -ρος* ¹ ἐστίν· ¹ -κη, ¹ ταυτὸν , ,	αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἐαυτό [αὐτοῦ ¹ ὄντος	-λον· ¹ ἐστίν. ¹ εἶναι c.
	δαί· ¹ -τοῦ ¹ αὐτῷ ὄντος. αἰ· and ῶ	τίδῃ ¹ ἐτέρωθι· ¹ pale, 'blotted. ¹	ἐαυτῷ: ¹ τί δὲ ¹ αὐτῷ c.
	-τῷ ¹ εἶναι [on *	∴ in outer marg.	ἐαυτῷ ¹ εἶναι.
	ἐν, ¹ ἐν ¹ ἄμα.	αὐτὸ τὲ ἐν ¹ ὄν 'patched	ἐν. ¹ ἐαυτῷ c.
	ἄρα ὡς ἔοικεν [ἐστίν· ¹ -τος,	ἐαυτοῦ c. ends line.	ἄρα ὡς ἔοικεν ¹ -τοῦ,
D	ὄν· εἰ τοῦ τὶ and commas fainter. ¹	τουτὶ ¹ οὐχ' ἐτ- 2nd ¹ added.	ἐν: ¹ ὄν εἰ τουτὶ [c. μὴ ἐν:
	ἐστίν· ¹ ἐνδς, ¹ το several accs. and	οὐν ὄσα μέρη ἐστίν, ἄπανθ ¹ τὸ	οὐκοῦν ¹ ἐστίν. ἄπανθ ¹ ἐνδς· ¹ ἐν. τῶν
	breaths., as well as commas, fainter.		
	δῆ· ¹ fainter. ¹ ταυ-	τῶν ἐν τῶν ἄλλων; ἔτερον.	τῶν c. ¹ δῆ ¹ ταυ-
	ἄρα	ἄρα ἢ [∴ dark added. ¹ δῆ αὐ-	ἔτερρ· ἄρα ¹ -λοις: [c.
	ταυτὸν ¹ ποτέ	ποτέ	ἔτέρωθι. ἦ ἔτερον ἐν ταυτῷ c. ποτέ εἶναι:
	ταυτῷ ¹ -ται· οὐδένεστι	—	ταυτῷ c. μῆδέποτ' ἔσται. οὐδέν ἐστι ¹
F	ἐστίν ¹ εἴη, ἐντῷ , fainter.	ἐστι ¹ ὄντιν'	ἐστι ¹ -ρον. ¹ εἴη. ἐν τῷ [ὄντων c.
	ταυτῷ ¹ -ρον·	—	χρόνον. ¹ -τερον· οὐχοῦτω; οὕτω:
	ἐστίν.	—	τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν. ¹ τῶν c.
	ἐν· ¹ ἐν εἴη ¹ οὐγὰρ	οὐτ' ἄρα 2nd ¹ pale. ¹ ἐν εἴη ¹	ἐν. ¹ ἐνὶ εἴη ¹ οὐ
	ἔτερω ι subs. faint. ¹ μὴ ἐν· ¹ faint. ¹	γὰν ¹ ἐν· (2nd) ¹ μὴ [οὐγὰρ	τῷ c. ἔτέρω c. ¹ ἐν. τῶν c. μὴ ἐν. ¹ ἐν,
	ἀν [τάμη α at end = maj. curs.	-ρ' ἄν	ἀλλήλων. [ἔτέρωθι.
147	ἐστι, , fainter. ¹ -ρω·	αὐτοῖς	ἐαυτοῖς ἔτερα ἐστίν· ¹ patched. ¹ τῷ c.
	-γοι, ¹ -λων: ¹ ἄλλα	ἐκφύγοι ¹ -φεύγ- ἄλλα	ἄν ἤδη ἐκφύγοι ¹ εἶναι c. ἀλλήλων:
			ἐκφ- last κ patched—had begun φ?

Ἰ.	TUB.	t.
ἦν· ἀλλὰ πῆ̄ ' on ἐν before ἦν fainter	ἦν gap.	ἦ. ἀλλὰ πῆ̄ last faint.
οὐδᾶν ¹ τὰ μῆ ¹ οὐδεγὰρ ¹ ἦν ¹ [twice.	οὐ γὰρ οὖν : τί δὲ	οὐ γὰρ οὖν : τί δὲ ¹ ἄρα
-πασιν ¹ οὐ γὰρ ¹ δαί·(ῆ) ¹ ἐνδς· ἄρα	οὐ γὰρ οὖν : τί δὲ	ἐστίν· ἦ κὰν ¹ ἐνδς· ἐν : ¹ παν- [όλον.
ἐστίν· ἦ κὰν ¹ ἐν : [, fainter.	ἦ κὰν	-τὶ ἐστίν· ἐν· ¹ τῶν c. μὴ ἐν· ¹ εἴη ¹ B
-τη ¹ ἐστίν· ἐν· ¹ μῆ· ἐν ¹ εἴη· ¹ ὄλον,	μῆ (2nd)	μορίου ¹ ἐν· ¹ μόρια· ¹ ὄλα. last a p. 21.
μορίου twice. -φι and -α ending ll.	οὔτε αὐτὰ . . . -νδς μορίου	μορίου ¹ ἐν· ¹ μόρια· ¹ ὄλα. last a p. 21.
ι and 2 on a stain.	repeated. [marg. ∴	very like ou.
-ρια· ¹ ὄλα·	between line 1 and 2 in outer	τῶ c. ὄλα.
-λων. ταῦτὰ	ταῦτα c. ends line.	τὰ αὐτὰ
τὸ ἔχον, το ¹ αὐτοῖς; ἄρα , , fainter.	πρ̄ ends line. ¹ ἔχον τὸ αὐ-	τὰ μὴ ἔχον. ¹ -τοῖς : ἄρα ὡς
-τοῦ· καὶ ταυτὸν	ἔουκ· ¹ ἐστὶ [τοῖς :	ἔουκεν· ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ἐστίν. ¹
-νεύει, ¹ ἄρ' οὖν , fainter.	—	ἄρ' [-τοῦ· ¹ τὲ c
-μοιον.	ἴσως : ἴοῦν	ἄλλοις : ¹ τῶν c.
-νη· καὶ τᾶλλά accents on τᾶλλά	—	ἄλλων c. ἐφάνη. καὶ τᾶλλάπου. ἔτερ ¹
		εἴη : ¹ οἰκοῦν 7 = δὲ, after τᾶλλα?
		ἴσως is above—thus ἴσως :
		τῶν c. ἄλλων. c. ¹ τᾶλλα -νου·
		ἦττον : τί γαρ : εἰ ¹ -τον· ὁμοίως : ¹
		[οὐκ οὖν c.
-λων· ¹ τᾶλλα fainter.	—	έτερον ¹ τῶν c. -λων· ¹ ὡσάυτως.
μάλλον, ¹ ἦττον , , fainter.	ἦττον ὁμ-	ταυτὸν ¹ τό, ¹ -λοις. D
		ᾶδε· ¹ τῶν c. -ματων c. ¹ καλείς : ἔγωγε :
		7 again, smaller. Marks the stop
		to which a — refers in marg. ?
ἦ ¹ εἶναι. ¹ τᾶλλα -νου, -τως , fine.	ἦ ¹ -θε	οὖν ¹ -κίς. ἦ ἀπαξ :
ταυτὸν ¹ εἶεν· ¹ -λοις. ¹ τᾶλλα	-θότα· εἰ ἐν ¹ τᾶλλα	οὖν ¹ εἴπῃς.
-μάτων,	ᾶδε	οὖν ¹ εἴπῃς.
		-νομα· -κίς. οὐκ ἐκείνο· ἦ
οὖν· ¹ ἦ ἀπαξ :	ἦ	[εἰν
οὖν· ¹ εἴπῃς.	οὔπερ	-ξῆ· ¹ τὸ αὐτὸ ¹ αἰεὶ :
τούνομα· εἰαν· λάκις ¹ ἐκείνο· ἦ ¹ ἀπαξ,	ἐστὶ τούνομα· 2nd 'patched. ¹	οὐκοῦν ¹ ἔτερον ¹ τινι :
ταυτὸ ¹ -ξῆ· ¹ σεταυτὸ ¹ ἀ·εἰ :	ἀεὶ :	-γγ· ¹ -κίς.
; , differs. ¹ ὅτ' ἂν	τινι· ¹ ὅταν	-ζεις, ἦ κείνο
-γγ· ¹ -παξ, ¹ -κίς. ¹ -λω, ¹ -λότι	φθέγγῃ·	ετερον ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἐνδς· ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων c.
-ζεις· ¹ -γωμεν,	ὅταν	-τες. ¹ ἄλλῃ· ¹ αἰεὶ -μεν·
τᾶλ- patched ¹ ἐνδς. ¹ το ¹ -λων·	τᾶλλα ¹ τὸ 1st.	-νομα : ἦ ¹ ἔτερον τῶν c. ἄλλῶ
-τες. ¹ -λῆ, ¹ -γομεν	ἐπεκείνη	τᾶλλα ¹ ἐνδς. καταταιτὸ ἔτερον πε- ¹⁴⁵
τούνομα; ἦ ¹ ἐν , , differ.	τούνομα :	πονθέναι. ἄλλο. In outer marg.
τᾶλ- ¹ ἐνδς, κατὰ ταιτὸ ἔτερον -θῆναι,	τάλλα ¹ (in marg. later hand	faint and careless πεπονθεν εἶναι
[οὐκ ἄλλο. , , differ.	gives πέπονθεν εἶναι)	ταυτὸν -θδς,
		-ᾶ. οὐχί : ¹ ἄλλων c. ¹ εἶναι. c. κατὰ τὸ
ταυτὸν	—	γὰρ. -τῶν c.
-ον οὐχί : ¹ ἦ ¹ 'patched ?	οὐχί; 'later ¹ ἠ δῆ	ἀλλῆ ¹ ὁμοῖᾶ. τῶν c. ἀνομοίων c.
	ἀπάντων. τὸ ἐτ-	-τίον : (not τῶ-οίφ) ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ -ρον.
ἄλλα ¹ τῶ ὁμοίφ ¹ οὖν 'dark.	ἄλλὰ μ̄ ends line.	τῶ αὐτῶ ¹ : ¹ -νη. ¹ τὸ ἐν τοῖς. ¹ ταιτ
		[by same hand in margin.
ἀλλαμῆν, ¹ -φάνη· ¹ ἐν.	ἄλλὰ τὸ ἐν	ἐστίν. ¹ τὸ αὐ-
ταιτόν : ¹ τουν· ¹ ταυ-	ταυτὸν : ¹ τοῦν· ¹ ἐστὶ	

p. 24. κη -έχειν. δὲ. -νατον' remains of κη
 of ἀνάγκη on a stain and tear.
 ἀλλα' -γεθος. -ζον.
 -τητος' οὐδὲ' -τον.
 οὐγάρ' : ἐνδς. -τω' [τω
 D -θος' ἔχοντα' αὐτῶ. τούτω. το' ἔχέ-
 -σθαι
 -λω' αὐτῶ ἐν τούτοι. ἄν' εἴη
 ὄν' ἄρ' ὄδν.
 -ζον' -λων. νων, , , fainter.
 -έχειν. -σθαι :
 -χον' -μενον. -κη' εἶναι' ὄν.
 E ἴσον
 ἔχοι, , fine.
 -χοιτο. -του' ἴσον
 ἄρα. ἴσον
 καί* αὐτό τε' ὄν, , fine.
 μὲν. εἴη' δὲ.

151 -κη.
 ἀλλα' δεῖ, ἀεί' : ἔν
 τῶ, ὄν, ὄν.
 οὐ' ἐνδς
 τῶ, εἶναι. εἶναι
 B -λα, ἐνι. το' εἶναι :
 ἔνεστιν. ἐνδς.
 αὐτό. το' -λων
 ἐνι' -λων' -γον,
 εἴη' -λα' -τω; : on *' το' ἴσόντε,
 -ζον' ἔστιν. -του. καί
 -ζον' -τον, ἴσον' -τρων, , , fine.
 C -νων, -τόνων αὐτῶ. -τρων.
 ὄν, -όνων, , , fine.

-νων. αὐτοῦ
 -λων' ἴσον' ταῦτα : πῶς :
 p. 25. ἔστι' που. -τρων. με on stain.
 ἴσον. ταῦτα :
 ἴσον. -τρων, , faint.
 D πλειόνων, , faint. αὐτῶ. -τρων.

αὐτῶ ἴσον' αὐτῶ
 δὲ πλεόν' δὲ. αὐτοῦ :

TUB.
 ἀλλὰ
 οὐδὲ
 οὐγάρ' οὐδ' ἐλ.
 ἔχοντα' αὐτῶ τούτω C. (end)
 οὐδε ἐλ.
 οὐν ἄρ' patched.
 μήτ' ἄλάτ. ist' added?
 ἐξίσου twice
 ἴσον' καί μὴν
 οὐτ' ἄν 2nd' added?
 οὐτ' ἄν "added? ἐξίσου ἴσον
 [and next line.
 περτ' added?
 αὐτῶ* from orig. τοῦ, later.
 αἰεῖ' ἐν' patched from "
 τῶ ? so : later ὄν.
 οὐ' ἔστι' ἐνδς :
 τῶ εἶναι ;
 τὸ μῆδ.
 ἐνέστι.
 τὸ δὲ ἐλατ.
 ἐλάττω. ἔοικε : τὸ ἴσ.
 αὐτοῦ had been '
 ἴσον. ἴσως ἄν
 αὐτῶ
 δοῦ : ἴσον
 αὐτοῦ had been '
 ἴσωναῦ.
 ποῦ
 ἴσ.
 ἴσον ἴσων
 ἴσ. ἴσ.
 ἴσ. ἴσ.

t.
 -έχειν. εἰάνπερ' μέγα. -νατον.
 μεῖζ'.
 -τητος' -της. -ττον.
 -θους : οὐ' τᾶλλα' οὐδὲ -τω.
 -τα, τούτω, ἔχετον
 [τὸ -μιν. -σθαι' c. ἀλλὰ [εἴη.
 -λω' τούτοι. τῶν c. ἀλλων c. οὐδ'
 οὐκοῦν' ἄρ'
 τῶν c. ἀλλων, c.
 -σθαι : οὐκοῦν
 -μην. -κη. ἴσου εἶναι' ὄν.
 ἔαυτῶ. οὕτω c.
 ἔχοι' -τῶ. ἔχον. [-τῶ :
 -χοιτο. -του' ἀλλ' ὄν. ἴσον αἰεῖ εἴη
 ἔαυτῶ c. -λοις.
 -ται : c. αὐτόγε' ὄν. ἐξέθ' ὄν.
 μὲν. εἴη. -χόμενον c. -τον.
 εἴη. ἔαυτ'. οὐκοῦν
 τόδε. -κη' -τὸς. τῶν c. ἀλλων : c.
 δεῖ. αἰεῖ : οὐκοῦν' ἐν ἐν τῶ had been
 [ἐν τῶ, signs of change but no *.
 τῶ' ἐλαττον ὄν.
 ἐπειδὴ ᾗ' τῶν c. ἀλλων c. ἴδς.
 ἐν τῶ (as above) εἶναι. εἶναι
 ἐνι. -λοις' εἶναι :
 -στιν. τᾶλλα' ἐνδς
 αὐτῶ. ἐν. -λων -μην'.
 τᾶλλα' ἐνι. αὐτ'
 εἴη. -ττω : ἔοικεν : c.
 ἔστιν. τῶν c. ἀλλων : c.
 ἴσον.
 αὐτῶ c. -λοις. -τρων.
 πῶς δ' has been πωσο and put above
 [o, ends line. ἴσων ἄρα
 εἴη. τῶν c.
 ἀλλων' c. ἴσον. πῶς :
 ἔστιν. -τρων καί
 -τον. ὡσαύτως' ἴσον.
 οὐκοῦν' -ζ' ἴσον
 ἐλαττόν αὐτῶ. from ατ to αυ a stain
 scraped, v very faint. -τρων' πῶς δ'
 (as above c).
 αὐτῶ. πληθῶ αὐτῶ εἴη
 δὲ. πλεόν' ἐλαττόνων c. δὲ c. αἰεῖ.

	91.	TUB.	t.
	-μενον· ε curs. ὄν· -ωτερον.	—	ὄν· -τερῷ
153	ἔστιν· τί δαίτων· αιΠ on * darker.	τί δέ	ἔστιν· τί δέ τῶν c. ἄλλων : c.
	τόδέγε· -γειν· ἐνός, ἔστιν,	τό δεγε	λέγειν· τᾶλλα· ἐνός· ἔστιν.
	ἕτερον· ἔστιν ἐνός ; , differs. μεν	ἐνός· μέν	ἀλλά· -ρον· ἐνός· ὄν· ἕτερα
	[γὰρ ὄν· ε curs. γ maj.	—	
	ὄντα· γὰρ ἄν·	—	ὄντα· ἔστι·
	ὄν· ἔχοι. ἦ first half darker.	ἦ	ὄν· -χοι.
	οὖν ἄρ· -μεν ε curs. [γιστον	δοῦ :	οὖν
	-τερον. ἦ ^ first half darker. ὀλί-	ἦ ὀλιγοστὸν	-τερον.
B	δεσστιν τὸ ἐν· ἐν , fainter.	δέσσι ἦ	-τον· ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἦ πάντων c.
	τᾶλλα ^ second half darker. -θμὸν.	τᾶλλα	-γονεν. τῶν c. τᾶλλα· -μὸν.
	ἄλλα, ἄλλο ἔστιν : γε οἶμαι γεγονός.	—	ἄλλα· ἄλλο· ἔχει· γε οἶμαι -νός.
	-νε· -λα· -νότα.	—	-νε· ἄλλα· ὕστερα -νότα.
	-τερα,	—	εἶη τὰ ἄλλα.
	ἐνός· ἐνπρε-	—	ἐνός· ἐν· τῶν c.
	τί δαίτ'ό δε; αιΠ on * : traces of ἐτό·	τί δέ ἄρ· αὐτοῦ· ἦ	τί δε. τόδε : ἄρ· -νός
	[ἄρ· -γονός. ἦ both ^ patched.	—	
C	μῆν· ἔχον, -μέρη.	ἀλλὰ μῆν c. ends line.	δὲ μέρη·
	-χῆν· -τῆν· οὖν, -τον,	—	τελευτῆ καὶ μεσον· οὐκοῦν c. πάντων c.
	-ται· ἐνός, , tail added ? -την	τῆν	-νεται· ἐνός· τῶν c.
	-χῆν· τᾶλ· καί ' fainter.	τᾶλλα ^ patched. μῆν : καί.	ἀρχῆν· τᾶλλα πάντα. μέχρι τοῦ τ : τᾶλλα· ἐνός· δέ c.
	-μεν ε curs. τᾶλ-	—	φήσομεν c.
	-νέαι.	εἶ	δέ γε οἶμαι. ἄμα· -κεν
p. 27.	δέ· γε νε at end on a stain.	-φυκε ε large on *	-σθαι. ὥστ'εἴπερ· γίνγεσθαι. γινγ so my notes, first ν patched: γίνε- σθαι had been first meant.
D	ὥστ' το· -σθαι.	—	-γονός. τῶν c.
		—	τῶν c. ἄλλων. ἔστινιτὰ last i a letter?
	-νός, -λων,	—	τί δέ δῆ
	ἔστι· -λα.	ἔστιν·	ἐνός. οὖν c. μέρη.
	δαί δῆ· αι darker on *	τί δέ δῆ	εἶναι c. ὄν : οὐκοῦν· ἐν.
	ὄτου οὖν· μέρη·	εἶν	τῷ c. ἄν· -τέρω· [s ends line.
	; , differs.	ὄν :	τῶν c. ἄλλων c. -μένων. ὅτι προσγί-
E	ἄν, -τέρω	-τᾶν	οὖν· -λθόν. ὄλον ἐν
	-μένων ὅτιπερ [ἐγγένη-	—	-ται· οὔτε ἐσχάτου. οὔτε πρώτου.
	ὄτφοῦν. ι darker and squeezed. -λον	—	ἄλλοις.
	-ται· -σου, -του, -του.	—	ἔν· ὥστ'εἰ μὴ παραφύσιν [line).
	—	—	ἐν· τῶν c. ἄλλων c. εἶη. ἀλλ'ᾶ (next
	ἔν· ὥστ'εἰ	—	μα· τῶν c. ἄλλων, c.
	ἐν· -τερον· -τερον, εἶη.	—	εἶη· -σθεν.
154	-μα·	—	-τερον· τᾶλλα· ὡσαύτως :
	εἶη· τᾶλλα· δε	gap· εἶη, τᾶλλα and next	-νός·
	-ρον καὶ τᾶλ-	—	τῶν ἄλλων· c. c.
	-νός·	—	τᾶλλα· ἐνός·
	-λων	—	
	τᾶλ· ^ dark. ἐνός· -ώτερον·	τάλλα	

X.	TUB.	t.
-σθαι· ἄρα ¹ εἶναι.	—	-σθαι ¹ εἶναι.
ἔχει· ἦ ¹ first half dark. ¹ -σόνδέγε,	ἦ ¹ ·-γειν ¹ · ἔγω	ἔχει ¹ · ἀλλ ¹ · γε ¹ ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστι ¹ B
-ρου -σθαίτε	—	έτερον -ρου ¹ γε might be τε. ¹ ἔτι·
-μενον,	-κία : οὐκ	-γκεν ¹ -κία ¹ οὐκὰν
-το οὐδ' αὐτὸ, ὄν, ¹ -σθαι· [squeezed.	ἔτι γίγναιτο· οὐδ' αὐτὸ	-αιτο ¹ -τερ ¹ ὄν, ¹ -σθαι·
ἴσα-μενα ¹ -λψ ὅτψ οὖν ι ι darker and	—	-μενα ¹ ὄν ἴσψ.
ἀ*εὶ ὅσψ ι darker and closer. ¹ -κη;	ἀεὶ so, and line 29.	αἰεὶ.
ὄν on *, had been ἐν? ἔνδς	ἐνδς so. ¹ -τᾶν	γὰρ c. ¹ τοῦ. ἐνδς ὄντος.
-τερον ¹ -τερον. ¹ ἴσψ δ- all on *, same	—	οὔτε -τερον. ¹ αἰεὶ ¹ ἀλλ ¹ C
[hand. ¹ ἀ*εὶ ¹ -κίαν	[(γίγνεται late in marg.)	
τόδε· νεώτερον δ' οὖν :	τό δέ· νεώτερον : δ' οὐ ¹ ' later.	γεγονε-τερον ¹ τὸ δέ νεώτερον ¹ γίγνεται
ὄντων, ¹ ποτε.	—	τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων. all c. [δ' οὐ ¹ :
οὐ ¹ δέ. ¹ α at end maj. curs.	γίγνεται : gap.	δέ.
ἦ ¹ τᾶλ accents retouched.	ἦ ¹ τάλ-	τό, ¹ τῶν c. ¹ -τερον. καὶ τάλ-
ῆ ¹	δταν	τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ ἦ
first π on stain.	-εἰονι	γέγονεν c. ἦ τᾶλλα : σκόπει. D p. 28.
ἴσον 'darker. ¹ χρόνον·	ἄρα	ἐλαττονι ¹ χρόνον· ἄρα
-τονος. ἦ	ἦ	-τονος.
ὅτιπερ ¹ τάλ- ¹ το ἐν·	τᾶλλα ¹ τὸ	ὅτιπερ ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἔν.
το ἔπειτα ¹ ἴσον ¹ -λους·	—	τὸ ἔπειτα ¹ ἀλλοις.
ἀ*εὶ ¹ -τῶν, ¹ -τερον. ¹ ἦ	ἀεὶ so. ¹ ἦ οὐ ¹ ; last ' added.	αἰεὶ ¹ αὐτῶν c. ¹ -τερον ¹ οὐκοῦν
ἄν.	—	ἐλαττον διαφέρσ ¹ τι. ¹ -τερον ¹ ἄν. E
ἦ ¹ first half darker. ¹ -τερον ¹ ;	ἦ ¹ -βύτερα -τερον :	—
νεώτερον ¹ · ¹ -νο, νεώτερον.	-τερον : 1st.	εἰ δέ ¹ -τερον ¹
πρότερον : ¹ -γονδς.	—	-σβύτερα ¹ -γονδς.
-νεται, προστδ	—	-νεται. ¹ -τερο ¹ τε ¹
δέ. ¹ -τερον ¹ · ἀ*εὶ	δν ¹ · αἰεὶ	-βύτερον ¹ · αἰεὶ
-δωσιν. ¹ το πρ-	-δίδωσι ¹ τὸ πρ-	-ρο ¹ · γὰρ. ¹ -σιν.
-ρον ¹ · -τερον. ¹ -τερον, ¹ -τως·	δαδ	-ρον ¹ · -τερον. ¹ ὡσαύτως· 155
αὐτοῖν ¹ · -λοιν· -σθον. ¹ -τερον, , fainter.	ἰοντε	αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον. τὸ ἐναντίον
	—	ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθ ¹ · ¹ -τερον.
-τερον ¹ · -βυτερον.	—	-τερον ¹ · -τερον,
-τέρον ¹ · δέ. ¹ -νοιντο·	οἷωτε	-τερον ¹ · δέ. οὐκὰν ¹ εἴτην ¹ · -ντο. οὐκὰν
-γνοινο ¹ · ἄν ¹ · δέ,	ἔν·	-νοιντο. ¹ ἄν·
-ται,	—	τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ -ται·
-βύτερα.	—	δν. ¹ δέ ἄλλα ¹ -τερα. E
-γονε ¹ · τάλ- ¹ · -το	λόγον· καὶ τάλ· ¹ τὸ ἴσ-	γεγονεν ¹ · τᾶλλα. τούτψ
-σχει.	—	-σχει.
ἦ* ι removed? so below.	ἦ	φαίνεται c. ¹ οὐκοῦν ¹ έτερον
-ται ¹ · -τερον ¹ · ἀ*εὶ	ἴσ· ¹ αἰεὶ	ἀριθμ ¹ · αἰεὶ
-ρειν ¹ · ἄν,	γίγνοιτ' ἄν· " later? dark.	-φέρειν. ¹ τῶν c.
-ρον. ¹ τάλ- ¹ ἦ* ἀ*εὶ μορίψ. ¹ -κη,	τᾶλλα ¹ ἦ ' later ¹ αἰεὶ	-ρον. ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ ἀεὶ (sic).
-μενα, ¹ -τέρων·	—	τῶν c. ¹ -μενα. ¹ τῶν c. προτερων ¹ c. C
-κη, ¹ -σθαι·	—	-σθαι,
ἐνδς.	—	ἐνδς. ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων : c.

α.	TUB.	t.	
ἀρ' faint, yellow. ἔστι	ἔστι τοτάν	ἀρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἀτοπό ~ ποιοῦ δῆ:	p. 30.
-φνης. ἴ -φνης.	τοιοῦδέτι	-νης. ἴ -νης. τοιοῦτόντι ἔοικε -νειν.	
-τερον. ἴ -ναι,	-ον. ἴ οἰκῶν: ἐκ injd., fol. 175	-τερον. ἴ -έκτε. ἴ -ναι.	
-λει. twice. ἴ -σεως,	-λει. gap [ἔστ. twice.	-λει. ἴ -σεως. ἴ -λει.	
φύσις. ἴ -θηται,	αὐτῆ below the injury	φύσις. ἴ -θηται.	
-σεως,	οὐδενί	-σεως. ἴ οὐδενί οὐσα.	E
-της, faint. ἴ -ναι.	ἔστ. twice	-της, τό, ἴ -ναι.	
δῆ ἴ -ται.	-πὲρ ἔστηκέ	δῆ ἴ ἔστηκέ ἴ -ται.	
ποιοῦ.	-βάλοι μῆσις inj.	ἐφ' οὐτῶς. ἴ -οί.	
δ' ἐξ. ἴ -λει. ἐν	-λλαι, ἐν οὐδενί; late. erased.	δ' οὐδενί	
τότε. ἴ ἀρ' οὖν,	-νοιτ' ἀν' οὐδ' ἀν' 2nd. added	τότε. ἴ ἀφ'	
ἔχει ὅτ' ἀν	ἔταν λ	ἔχει.	
-βάλλη. ἴ dark and small. ἴ -ναι,	-βάλλη. ἴ λ added orig.	-βάλλη. has been -βαιη, altered 157	
[σθαι. ἴ -ξὺ τινῶν	οὔτε ἔστι	[at once? ἴ εἶναι. ἴ -σθαι. -ξὺ τινῶν	
ται, ἴ στάσεων καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε. ἴ	-λνται. ἴ : added. ἴ γοῦν	-σεων. καὶ ἴ ἔστιν τότε. ἴ -τιν.	
-γνεται. ἴ -λνται. ἴ -γον, [ἔστιν.	ἴδν [crowded into line.	-λνται. ἴ λόγον.	
ἔνδς, ἴ ἴδν. ἴ ἐν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ -λδ.	οἰμοί ἐπὶ ἀνόμοι. dark on *	ἴδν. ἴ ἐφ' ἐν. ἴ πολλὰ.	
-νεται. ἴ -νεται. ἴ -ον, ἴ -ον.	ἴδν. ἴ altered to, ἴ ἀνόμ.	-ται. καὶ ἴ -μοιον. καὶ	
-ου, had been. ἴ ἴδν. ἴ -ον. ἴ -ον.	ἴσον. ἴ altered to, ἴ ἴσον.	ἐξ ἴδν. ἴ ἀνόμοιον.	
-μενον. οὔτε	φθίνον. ἴ ἴσον. ἴ ἴσον.	μέγα. [ἴσον. B	
ἴσον. twice. ἴ ἴδν. ἴ -κρδν. ἴ -γα.	φθίνον. ἴ ἴσον. ἴ ἴσον.	ἴσον. ἴ τάναντία ἴδν. ἴ ο has been ω? ἴ	
φθίνον [part of T small on *	ἔστιν. gap	φθίνον οὔτε ἴ -κεν:	
-ματα, fainter. ἴ ἐν. ἴ δαιτοῖς αἰ and	ἔστιν. gap	-ματα, ἴ ἐν. ἴ τί δέ	
-λοισ, ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ ἀρ' ἴ of darker. com-	ἴδν οὐ σκεπτόν. ἴ ἴ patched	-χειν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ ἀρα c. ἴ -τέον: -τεον.	
δῆ ἴ ἔστι. ἴ τᾶλ. ἴ ἐνδς. [masall fainter.	δῆ ἴ ἔστι. ἴ τᾶλλα. ἴ -θελαι: ε	δῆ ἴ -τι. ἴ τᾶλ. ἴ -θελαι;	
οὖν ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα: οὐ γὰρ ἄν:	ἔνδς ἔστιν, ἴ τᾶλλα:	οὐκοῦν ἴ τᾶλλα.	
ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνδς ἴην; , differs. [er.	τᾶλλα. ἴ added. ἴ -χεται πῆ:	ἄλλα	C
τᾶλλα. ἴ ἀλλὰ μετέχεται πῆ: ἴ of dark-	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	τᾶλλα. ἴ μετέχει πῆ: ἴ τᾶλλα. ἴ ἐνδς.	
-τα. ἴ ἀλλὰ ἔστιν. ἴ ἔχει.	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	-τα. ἴ ἀλλὰ ἔστιν.	
γε φαμὲν ἴ ἔστιν ἐὰν ὄ-	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	δέγε φαμεν τουτου ἔστιν. ἴ ἴ: ἴ γὰρ: c.	
δλον, ἴ εἶναι.	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	ἴδν. ἴ πολλῶν c. ἴ εἶναι. ἴ οὐ ἔστιν c.	
-ρίων. ἴ εἶναι.	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	τῶν c. μορίων. οὐ πολλῶν c. ἴ εἶναι.	
εἴη ἴ εἴη.	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	πολλῶν c. ἴ εἴη. ἴ εἴη.	
-σται. ἴ δῆ,	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	ἔσται. ἴ τῶν c.	D
στου. ἴ -ριον, ἴ -του.	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	-στου. ἴ -των. ἴ -του. τῶν c.	
ἔσται. ἴ -στου, ἴ -ριον. ἴ μῆ ριον at end	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	ἔσται. ἴ -του. ἴ μόρι.	p. 31.
[on a stain.	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	[πάντων c. τούτων c.	
-στου. ἴ ἔσται. ἴ ὄν. πάντων. ἴ fainter.	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	-στου. ἴ τῶν πολλῶν c. ἴ ἔσται. ἴ ὄν.	
τί εἶναι, ὄν ἴ ἐνδς. ἴ ἔστι. ἴ -ριον, ἴ οὖν.	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	τί εἶναι. ἴ ὄν οὐδενός ἴ ἔστιν ἴ ὄν.	
λῶν.	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	δῆ: ἴ τῶν c. πολλῶν c.	
-Ον. ἴ τινος -ας. ἴ τινος. ἴ ὄλον. ἴ -των,	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	-ον. ἴ τινος ἴδεας. ἴ ὄλον. ἴ απάντων c. E	
-νδς. ἴ ἄν,	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	-νδς.	
τᾶλ. ἴ seems patched. ἴ ἔχει, κᾶν	ἴδν. ἴ ἔστιν. ἴ τᾶλλα:	τᾶλλα ἴ ἔχει.	

X.

ταῦτα
 -μενα, ¹ -στῶτα, ¹ πάθη. 3 , , , all
 τᾶλ- ¹ of ¹ darker. ¹ ἐνός.
 οὖν εἶ ¹ of ¹ darker.
 -νερά· -ποιμέν ¹ -λιν, ¹ ἔστιν, ἄρα.
 ἐνός. ἦ ¹ seems patched.
 -χῆς. ¹ ἔστιν τί,
 το ¹ -λων·
 τᾶλ- ¹ dark. ¹ ἕτερον.
 ἐνός. ¹ -λων·

ἐν, ¹ τᾶλ- ¹ of ¹ dark. ¹ τουτων,
 αὐτῷ ¹ crowded. ¹ τᾶλ-as above ¹ οὐ
 ταυτῷ ¹ ἔστιν, ¹ τᾶλ- ¹ ἄρα; ¹ of ¹
 [darker. ¹ ; seems uniform.

φαμέν,
 ἄν, ¹ -λοις. ¹ -του·
 -λων. ¹ ἔχη;
 -τᾶλ- ¹ ἐνός. ¹ -του.
 τᾶλλά ¹ ἔστιν·
 τᾶλλα·
 ὄλου. ¹ δέ, ¹ ἐν·

-λά. ¹ ὄλου. ¹ τᾶλ- ¹ ἐνός.
 δύο. ¹ τρία. ¹ αὐτά ¹ ἔστι τὰ ἄλλα·
 ἐν ἔστιν ¹ αὐτοῖς. ¹ -ταχῆ ¹ ε squeezed.
 [Final οὐ on a stain.

ἄρα. ¹ -μοια. ¹ ἄλλα·
 -της· εἶ
 εἴη. ¹ -τα· δύο
 -τοῖς, , fine.

δνοῖν dots very fine. ¹ -χειν, ¹ μηδ'
 ὁμοία. ¹ ἔστιν ¹ τᾶλλα·
 -μοια. ¹ -χοι·
 ὄντα.
 οὐδέτερα, ¹ -μενα,
 -μενα, ¹ -λύμενα. ¹ -ζω. ¹ -τω·
 -θέναι, [τριῶν. ¹ -του·
 ἄλλα· dots meant? ἐνός. ¹ δνοῖν. ¹
 -ου* μεθέξει.
 ἔστιν. ¹ τέ*
 ἐν. ¹ ἔστι. ¹ τᾶλλα
 εἶεν. ¹ ἐν. ¹ ἄρ' acc. patched?

TUB.

-μοιό-τατα: ¹ αὐτοῖς * very
 ἀνόμοια ἄν [dark.
 ἔστῶτα. ¹ dark patched.
 τᾶλλα ¹ added. ¹ ἐνός·
 ———
 ἄρα
 οὐχ' οὕτως 2nd ¹ added ¹ ἦ
 ἔστι.
 γὰρ: ἄρ' ¹ τὸ
 τᾶλλα
 ὄτῃν

τάλλα: ¹ ἔστιν
 τάλλα: οὐ γὰρ:
 ἄρα; ναί:

οὐτ' ἄρα
 ———
 ἔχη, ¹ οὐδενί
 τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός·
 -δαμῆ ¹ τᾶλλα ἔστιν· οὐδὲ [ἐκ-
 οὖν· οὐδ' ἄρα ¹ τᾶλλα· ἐν γὰρ ἦν
 ——— (no σημ. in marg.)

ἔστι τᾶλλα
 οὐδ' ἄρα 2nd ¹ ad. ¹ τᾶλλα·
 ἐν ἔστιν ἑαυτοῖς·

ἐνί τὰ ἄλλα. οὐτε ἐν ἔστιν on *
 ——— [or pchmt. rough?
 ἔχει
 ἄν upper half of α on * ¹
 ἔν· ends line.

μηδεν ends line.
 οὐτ' ἄρα ¹ οὐτ' ἄν. ¹ τᾶλλα·
 ———
 -νηἀληθῆ:
 οὐδέτερα·
 ἴσα.
 -μενε. ¹ ἐνός. * = 'cancelled
 ———
 ἔστι·
 ἑαυτο· ν erased. ¹ τὰ ἄλλα
 οὖν εἶ δε μή ἔστι ¹ ἄρ'

t.

τᾶλλα, ταυτὰ τε
 -λοις.
 -λων· c. ¹ -τῶτα. ¹ -θη·
 τᾶλλα ¹ ἐνός: : wide.
 οὐκοῦν εἶ
 -ρά. -ποιμέν ¹ -λιν ἐν εἶ ἔστιν, ἄρα
 τᾶλλα ¹ -νός.
 -χῆς ¹ -τιν. ¹ τᾶλλα ¹ -νός.
 -Ναι: c. ¹ ἄρ' ¹ τῶν c. ἄλλων. c. and
 τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός; τί [so below.
 -νός. ¹ γὰρ c. εἴρηται. ὄτ' ἄν my notes c
 [have near this -ῶν (? ἐάν).

τό, ¹ τᾶλλα: ¹ γὰρ: c. ¹ ἄρα ἔστιν
 τό, ¹ εἴη τῷ c. αὐτῷ, c. καὶ τᾶλλα:
 ἔστι τὸ ¹ τᾶλλα: ¹ -κεν: ¹ ἄρα: c.

-μὲν, ¹ ἄρα c.
 -λοις. ¹ -του. ¹ -ρις. [οὐδενί ἄρα c.
 τῶν c. ἄλλων c. ¹ ἔχη: πῶς γὰρ οὐ:
 τᾶλλα ¹ -νός. ¹ -του. ¹ κατὰ c. ¹

ἔστιν. ¹ ἔχει
 οὐ ¹ οὐδ' ἄρα ¹ ἔστι τᾶλλα·
 αὐτῶν c. ¹ -λου. ¹ ἐν.

-λά. ¹ -λον. ¹ ἔστι τᾶλλά ¹ ἐν.
 τρία, ¹ -τιν τὰ ἄλλα·
 ἐν ἔστιν ¹ -τοῖς.

[ἐνέστιν

δὲ c. ¹ -μοια, οὐ. ¹ -στιν τῷ c. ¹ τᾶλλα·
 -της· εἶ
 εἴη. ἦ ¹ -τα. δύο
 ἐν' ¹:

-τον, ¹ -χειν. ἄ μηδενός -χοι:
 οὐτ' ἀνόμ. ¹ -τερα, τᾶλλα·
 γὰρ ἄν ὄν-μοια. ἐν' ¹ -χοι·
 -τα. ¹ -τίοιν. ¹ δὲ, ἀδύνατον [-τα·
 δ' ἄρα ¹ -τὰ οὐδέτερα. ¹ -μενα. οὐδὲ c. ¹
 -μενα. ¹ -μενα. οὐ ἦ μείζω, οὐδέ λάττω, ¹
 -θεν τῶν c. ¹ τοιούτων c. [ἴσα.

-λα.
 -ξεἶ ¹ μετεχειν.
 ἔστιν.
 ἐν. καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν ἔστι. c. ¹ τᾶλλα
 μὲν c. οὖν: c. ¹ εἶέν. ¹ ἐν. ¹ ἄρ'

οὐδαδ̄ ἴσον^ο -λοις^ο ἴσον^ο. ἦδη,
 -τα. ἴσον.
 ἄρα, τὰλ^ο ἴσα in ~ the darker.
 ἴσα ἄνῳσα: ἄνισα, οὐ
 ἐν. προς
 μέντοι. ἔστι

 ἀεὶ^ο -λοις; , lighter.
 τί^ο ἀεὶ^ο τί
 -τητα: οὐκ^ο -θος.
 -της ἔστιν^ο οὐσα; , small fine.
 ὄντι ὡσέοικεν^ο μετέη, , small fine.
 -θους^ο
 πῆ; δει, οὐτως. -μεν^ο
 ἔχη. -μεῖς, εἰ at end on a stain.
 -θη^ο -μεν^ο ἦ of ~ dark. -τω:
 δέφαμέν^ο -γειν. φάνα
 ἄρα ὡσέοικε τὸ ἐν. οὐκὸν^ο

 ὄν, προστὸ εἶναι.

 ὄν. εἶναι ὁμοίως, , fine. μῆ ὄν^ο -ναι
 αὐ εἶναι ἦ ἄν, εἶη. Nothing in
 [marg. corresp. to mark above ἦ.
 ὄν. ὄν, ὄν^ο
 μῆ ὄν, twice.
 ὄν^ο μῆ ὄν^ο εἰ

 ἐνί^ο ἔστι τοῦ εἶναι
 μῆ ἐνί, εἰ μῆ ἔστιν; last, differs.
 μῆ ἄρα. ὄν,
 πω οὐτως
 -οὔτων,
 τε, δέ, κίνησις. ἦ of ~ darker.
 τὸ ἐν ~ patched.
 -μενον ἄρα
 ὄν ἐμπέφανται^ο εἶναι, ἐπι

ΤΥΒ.
 ἰσόν ἔστι ἰσον. τε
 ἰσ. δάμ-
 ἰσ-
 ἄρα τὰλλα ἰ.
 ἰσαοὐκάνισα; δ' ἄνισα ἰσ. ἰσα.
 -ισ- [-ισα: ἐν, τὰλλα αὐτῷ ἔστιν. 1)
 -ισ. γέστι. . . . καὶ injured
 μεγ . . . do. -ικρο- [but = 2)

 αἰεὶ
 τί αἰεὶ ὄντι
 ἰσ. ἔστι
 ἔστι ἰσ. οὐσα.
 -κε. καὶ ἰσ-
 -κε:

 ἔχει.
 -λονότι ἦ . . . -τω: written
 ----- [twice.

 τῆ τοῦ no note in marg.

 οὐν δεῖ [μῆ ὄν ἔχει μῆ εἶναι
 -ναι τὸ μῆ ὄν^ο τ covers a μ^ο
 ἴνα (will note only use of ") ἦ ἦ no mark.

 μῆ ὄν, 1st. gap.

 τὸ μῆ ἦ ἔστι.
 gap. πῶς δ' . . . -τε injured,
 ----- [seems = 2)

 τὲ ἦ
 ἐνόντε
 ἔοικε: ἄρα

 ἐπι

t.
 οὐδαδ̄ ἴσον γ' ἔστιν^ο -λοις^ο ἴσον^ο. ἦδη.

 -τα. ἔστι(ν) c. ἐν: ἴσον.
 ἄρα τὰλλ' [the , is later.
 ἴσα. -σα, οὐτῷ c. ἄνισω c. -σα; In ;
 ἐν, τὰλλα αὐτῷ c. ἔστιν c. 1)
 γέ ἔστι.

 ἔστί^ο -κρότ.

 -κρότ^ο αἰεὶ ἀφιστ-
 -τοῖν. αἰεὶ ἄλλο

 -τοῖν^ο -τητα: οὐκ. ἀλλὰ ('or' ?
 -της ἔστι^ο -τῷ c. [patched] ἔστι
 ἐνί^ο -τι ὡσέοικεν. μετέη^ο 1)
 καὶ μῆν οὐσίαςγε.
 πῆ: -τως. -μεν^ο
 ἔχη. οὐκὰν^ο -μεῖς.

 -θη^ο -μεν^ο

 δὲ φαμέν^ο -γειν. [γὰρ c.
 ἔστιν ἄρα ὡσέοικεν τὸ ἐν. οὐκ ὄν^ο εἰ 162

 ὄν. ἀλλὰ τί ἀνήσει^ο εἶναι. c.
 (S: ἀφήσει ἦ ἀναπέσει opp. foot-line,
 inner marg., small majcs.)

 In lower marg. $\frac{\wedge}{\Gamma \Delta}$

 οὐν: c. δεσμ^ο -ναι.
 ὄν^ο -ναι ὁμοίως. c. ὄν^ο εἶναι. c.

 ἦ^ο τό, εἶη.

 οὐκὰν εἶη^ο -τα. τὸ μὲν οὐσίας. ὄν^ο δέ.
 ὄν^ο ὄν^ο μὲν.
 ὄν^ο δέ, ὄν^ο

 -θεστατα: οὐκ οὖν c. εἶναι. c.
 -στι^ο ἐνί^ο ἔστί^ο εἶναι c.
 -ναι εἰς^ο εἶναι: c. τῷ c. ἐνί^ο ἔστι;

 ἔστιν:
 πωσ. -τω^ο
 -τον. -ναι^ο

 -σις.

 οὐκ οὖν c. -νη:
 ἄρα c. twice ἔχον.

 ἐνπεφανται^ο μ orig., sugg. εμπ?

P. 35.

X.	TUB.	t.
-θος·	————	-τος· ¹ δῆλ·
-κρότης· ¹ ἔστιν· ¹ γε.	————	οὐ γάρ· ¹ -της τε τε clear. 164
-ότης· ¹ αὐτὸ· ¹ ἄλλα [dark· ¹ -τῶ εἰ	αὐτῶ οὐ no ;, slight stain.	-της· ¹ τᾶλλα· ¹ αὐτῶ· c.
δαὶ τᾶλλα· αι darker on *, ` of ᾗ	τίδὲ τᾶλλ· ¹ ἔσθῃπ-	δὲ ¹ αὐτῶ· c. ¹ -τῶ c.
ῥμοια· ¹ -μοια ¹ ταυτὰ.	ταυτὰ	-μοια οὐτε ταυτὰ· ¹ ἔστιν P. 37.
οὐ γάρ· τί δαιτὸ all after δ on *	οὐ γάρ· τίδὲ ¹ τί gap.	-τῶ c. ¹ τί δὲ ¹ -νου· ¹ -νφ· ¹ τί· ¹ -το·
[-νου, ¹ το ¹ νφ, ¹ τί, ¹ τοῦτο·	τούτου· ¹ ἢ last, ` patched.	-του· ¹ -λου· ¹ -λφ· ¹ -τὲ· ¹ -τα· ¹ -νῦν· ¹ -μη· B
-του· ¹ -λου· ¹ -λφ· ¹ ποτέ· ¹ -τα· ἢ	τούτου· ¹ ἢ last, ` patched.	-του· ¹ -λου· ¹ -λφ· ¹ -τὲ· ¹ -τα· ¹ -νῦν· ¹ -μη· B
[νῦν· ¹ -μη·	————	-ξ· ¹ ξ over a smaller ζ, ¹ -σις· ἢ λόγ· ¹
-ξ· ¹ -σις· ¹ -μα· ¹ το Scratch oblique-	ὄνομα· ¹ ὄτιον· ¹ τὸ	[-μα· ¹ τῶν c. ὄντων· c.
ly down from r. to l. on ἄλλο.	————	ἔσται· ¹ ὄν· ¹ πῶς ¹ οὐκοῦν
μη ὄν, ¹ ὄν· ¹ πῶς· ¹ οὐκοῦν	————	-μεν· ¹ -τι· τὰ ἄλλα χρῆ
δῆ· ¹ γε, ¹ -μεν· ¹ τᾶλλα· τί ` of ᾗ dark.	ἔοικέγε, ¹ λέγωμέν ¹ μὴ ἔστι, τάλ-	μέν ¹ μὴ δὲ
μῆν· ποῦ	μῆν ¹ μὴ δὲ	ἔστιν c. οὐκάνπ ¹ τῶν c.
ἄλλα ἔστιν.	ἄλλα ἔστιν.	-γος· ¹ -λα· ¹ -τιν· ¹ -τῶ c. [-ρου.
-γος· ¹ ἢ ` of ᾗ dark. ¹ τῶ ¹ ἄλλο,	ἢ	-ρον· ¹ ἔγωγε· ¹ δέγε ποῦ ¹ φαμέν· c. ¹ C
-ρον· ¹ που φαμέν, ἔτερον	δέγεπον	ἄλλο δῆ· ¹ ἄρα· c. ¹ ἄλλα εἶναι· c.
το ¹ δῆ, ¹ εἶναι. [εἶη· ¹ ἐνδς· ¹ -σαι·*	τὸ	ἔστιντί· ¹ -ται· ¹ εἶη.
ἔστίτι, ¹ ἄλλα second λ blotted, ¹	ἔστιτι· ¹ εἶη·	ἄλλα· ¹ -λων ἄρα c. ἔστιν.
ἄλλα ¹ ὄντος· ¹ ἔστιν.	ἄλλα μὴ ὄντοςγε· ¹ ἔστι	-ται· ἢ ¹ -τα.
-ται, εἰ μηδ· ¹ ἄρα,	κατα τὰ οη *	-λων c. ¹ ἔστι c. ¹ οἰκάν ¹ εἶη· ¹ -νός·
-λων· ἄλλα ἔστιν· ¹ γάρ· ¹ ἐνδς·	ἄλλα ἔστί· ¹ ἀνοιάτῃ	-τος ὡς ἔοικεν ¹ -τῶν· c. ¹ ἔστι c. ¹ -θει·
-στος ¹ -κεν ¹ -τῶν· ¹ -θει, κἀντὸ	κἀν	δοκοῦν c. εἶναι c. ¹ τις· ¹ -ται. [κἀν D
τίς ¹ -νεται,	τις	-τος· ¹ -λά·
-λά·	ἀντισμ-	-θες· ¹ αὐτοῦ· ¹ -τατα· c.
-μέγεθες· ¹ dark.	-θες	-κων· c. ¹ -λων c. ¹ τὰ ἄλλα· ¹ εἶν ¹
-κων· ¹ τάλ· ` of ᾗ dark. ¹ ἄλλα ἔστιν:	τάλλα ¹ ἄλλα ἔστιν:	οὐκοῦν ¹ -ται [ἔστι(ν): c.
-μιδῶ ¹ dark, ι subs. added later.	————	-νος, ¹ οὐ ¹ ἔσται: οὕτω· καὶ ¹ αὐτῶν c. E
νος· ὦν δὲ οὐ· ¹ -ται· ¹ δὲ, ¹ δόξειεν.	ὄνδεον	-λῶν c. -τῶν; c. ¹ -τια [δόξει·
————	————	δὲ -τὰ ¹ -τα· ¹ -ται.
-ριττὰ ¹ ὄντα· ¹ -ται·	————	οὐ ¹ μῆν ¹ γε φαμέν δόξειεν αὐτοῖς
οὐ γάρ * ` and next ` with some	οὐ γάρ οὐν: καὶ μῆν	(πο ἐν) εἶναι· c. ¹ -τῶν c. τῶν c.
letters, retouched. ¹ γεφαμέν δόξειεν	————	-λῶν c. -των:
-ναι·	————	-κροῖς· ¹ εἶναι· c.
ἴσος ¹ -λοις·	δῶν:	-νος.
εἶναι·	γάρ c. ends line.	-ξείεν ¹ δ ¹ ἄν, ¹ οὐκοῦν c.
-μενος.	————	αὐτὸν.
οὐν,	————	ὅτι c. αἰεὶ -τῶν c. ὄτ' ἀντις λά-
ἔχων, ¹ αὐτὸν, ¹ -χῆν.	αὐτὸς τὲ ¹ αὐτὸν·	-νοία ¹ -των c. ὄν· ¹ -χῆς· ἄλλη αἰεὶ B
-ρας, ¹ ἀ·εἰ ¹ λά	ἀεὶ so· ¹ ὀτάντις λα· } so. ιson*	-χῆ ¹ τῆν c. τελευτῆν· ¹ -τῆ ¹ τῶ c. μέσφ.
-νοία ¹ ὄν ¹ ἀ·εἰ	λεῖν τῆ διανοία ὡς τί ¹ αἰεὶ	-τερα τοῦ μέσου. -τερα δὲ· c.
χῆ· ¹ -ευτῆν· ¹ -ευτῆ	ἐν τε	-τῶν c. ¹ -σθαι.
-τερα τὰ τοῦ μέσου σμικρότερα, διατὸ	-ρα διατὸ	δὲ οἴμαι ¹ ὄν,
————	ἐνδς:	-νοία· ¹ ἐνδς· αἰεὶ λαμβάνοιτο ἄν:
δῆ οἴμαι ¹ -νον· ἀνάγκη· ¹ πάντο ὄν,	-νον· ἀνάγκη· ¹ τὸ	
————	-τ' ἄν: one ` seems added.	

91.	TUB.	t.
ὄρωντι,* ¹ -βλδ. ἐν* φαίνε- = ἐμφ-?	οὖν : ¹ ἐμφαί-	οὖν : c. οὐκοῦν c. ¹ -ρωθεν ὄρωντι καὶ [ἀμβλδ ἐμφαίνε- (next line).
C σθαι* ἀνάγκη : δέ, ¹ ὀξύνοντι.	-σθαι : ἀνάγκη : ὀξύνοντι	-σθαι : ἀνάγκη : ὀξὺ νοοῦντι.
-ναι, ἔχοντα ¹ τάλ- `dark.	—— τάλ-	-ναι. ¹ ἐν [ἄπειρά is loosely written ὀ -τα ¹ -λά ¹ ἔκαστα : c. τὰ ἄλ- first a of
-λα δὴ φαί- ¹ ἔστιν, ¹ ἐνός; ¹ οὖν. ἀνόμοια, ¹ -μένα ¹ μὲν. ¹ -μενα, ταυτὸν ε curs. , fine.	μη ἔστιν a faint `on η? οὖν —— —— -θόντι δεγέ ` ad.? φαντάσματι : some marks above 1st a ¹ αὔτοις ` al- tered and doubtful.	δεῖ-θαι. ¹ ἔστιν. ¹ ἐν : ¹ οὐκοῦν ἀνόμοια. ¹ εἶναι : μὲν. ¹ -μενα, δέγε. ¹ -ρα ¹ -ματι. ¹ ἑαυτοῖς :
D γε, ¹ ἔτερα ¹ -σματι.	αὐτοὺς τὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀ- νάγκη φαί- οὖν ἄπτο- had been ' ἔστῳτ had been ' μηδέτ- some stains on 188 scraped, —— [but text clear.	ὁμοίους c. ¹ -κους. ¹ ἑαυτοῖς οὐκοῦν c. -λων ¹ c. ¹ -νους ¹ -τῶν ¹ c. -σεις ¹ -τας πανταχῆ. -νους ¹ -μένους. c. ¹ μηδ'έτερα. -τα ¹ -θεῖν, εὔπετες ἡμῖν ἡδη. ¹ -λά -θόντες ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ. [ἔστι(ν) : c.
—— -σθαι, a fine . in marg. ἑαυτῶν -σεις, ¹ ἐστῶτας πάντη ¹ -νους ¹ -μένους ¹ -τερα E τα, ¹ ἡμῖν, ¹ -λά ἔστιν ; ἄπαξ, ¹ -χῆν. μῆ ¹ `darker ¹ ἔστιν τάλ- ¹ ἐνός, τάλ- `dark.	μη ἔστι. τάλ- οὐκοῦν ¹ τάλλα :	-τιν. ἄλλα ¹ ἐν. ¹ εἶναι : c. οὐκοῦν ¹ ἔσται c. τάλλα :
γε. ¹ οὖσιν ἐν εἴη ¹ ἐν ¹ μῆδὲν ἔστιν ἐν. ἄπαντα* ¹ -ὰν -λοις ¹ -λά. ¹ οὐτ' ἐν ¹ τάλλα : ου 166 ἐν, ¹ τάλλα `darker. των, ¹ οὐδέ ¹ ἔτι τῶ, ¹ ἔστι	οὐδ' ἄν 2nd ' ad.? οὐτ' ἔνεστι τάλλα : τάλλα οὐδενί ¹ οὐδέτι οὐδέ γὰρ	οὐσι. εἴη ¹ ἐν ¹ ἔστιν ἐν. ¹ οὐδ' ἄν -λοις. ¹ τάλλα : -λά : ¹ τάλλα -των c. οὐδενί. ¹ -μῶς. οὐδεμίαν ¹ ἔχει ¹ τῶν c. ¹ ὄντων c. ¹ τῶν c. ¹ -τῶ -τιν
—— ἔστιν. ¹ -σμα ¹ οὐ γὰρ ¹ ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ¹ B εἶναι. ¹ ἐνός. μῆ ἔστιν. τάλλα οὐτέ ἔστιν. ἐν, ¹ ὅμοια ¹ γε. οὐδέτερα ¹ -μενα ¹ -ρίς ¹ -λα. ¹ -μεν ¹ [. ? ¹ ἄλλα ¹ ἔστιν : αὐτὰ τούτων, οὐτετί ἔστιν , had been C -μεν ¹ ε curs. ¹ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἔστιν. -ποιμεν; ¹ τοῦ, τότε. ¹ ὅτι [καὶ c. εἶτέ ἔστιν, ¹ ἔστιν ¹ τάλλα, ¹ αὐτὰ,	οὐ γὰρ οὖν : ἐν ἄρα ἔστι πολλά : 1st ἔστι τάλλα. ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -δ' ἄρα οὐδέτερα ¹ ἄλλα ἔστι : μῆ ἔστιν —— ἔστιν ¹ εἴτε ἔστιν ¹ μῆ ἔστιν ¹ αὐτὸτὲ ¹ τάλλα 'faint ¹ αὐτὰ ' ad. ἔστιτε ¹ ἔστι ¹ ἀληθέστατα :—No title.	-τίν ¹ -μα ¹ ὄν. ¹ τῶν c. -λων : c. ¹ -τιν -ναι. ¹ ἐνός. -τιν. τάλ- οὐτέ ἔστιν οὐτε πολλά : ¹ οὐδὲ ¹ ὅμοια. γε. οὐδέτερα. οὐδὲ -μενα. χωρίς. ¹ -μεν. αὐτὰ -των. c. οὐτετί ἔστιν ¹ τάλλα οὐκοῦν ¹ -μεν ¹ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἔστιν. τε. ¹ ὅτι -κεν ἐν εἴτ ¹ ἔστιν ¹ ἔστιν. ¹ τάλ- ¹ αὐτὰ ἔστιν τε ¹ -τιν.
-ληλα, ¹ ἔστιτε ¹ ἔστιν ¹ -τατα last a curs.	—— ἀληθέστατα :—No title.	—— ΠΑΡΜΕΝΪΔΗΣ. Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΪΔΕΩ̄ : Slight flourish.

II. EXPLANATORY.

BESIDES the various medieval or modern commentaries and translations available for the elucidation of the Parmenides, the writings of succeeding Greek thinkers, more particularly Aristotle, furnish many apt notes and illustrations. But there are likewise works of a very early date devoted specially to the explanation of the dialogue. Of these two have been cited in this edition. One is the commentary by Proclus, which is printed, somewhat inaccurately, along with Stallbaum's text, and is here referred to according to the paging of Cousin. The other, entitled *Δαμασκίου διαδόχου ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην*, has been more recently edited, with the greatest care, by C. E. Ruelle (Paris, 1889). This latter is less a commentary than a discursive consideration of speculative questions more or less connected with Plato's work, which it has not been possible for us to study with sufficient thoroughness. It is a strange compound of physics, metaphysics, and mythological theosophy; extremely subtle and provokingly confused. The nature of the ἀπορίαι will be gathered from the following examples:—What is an ἀρχή, and what is its relation to that of which it is ἀρχή? Is it knowable; is it one; is it ἀντάρκης? Is it ἀρχή κινήσεως, and how are we to advance downwards from it to concrete things? What constitutes existence; has it phases; and are these represented by ὑπαρξίς, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή? Do we ever really attain to the ἀπόρρητος ἀρχή and ἀπλῶς ἔν, or do we stop short at a lower, more concrete, phase of each? How know τὸ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ? At what point in development does νοῦς, and with it γνώσις, appear—ὄν, ζωή, νοῦς?—or is γνώσις even further removed from the πρώτη ἀρχή? Does knowledge not involve division, as opposed to simple oneness? What is μέθεξις, and what is comprehended in τὸ μικτόν? How things go in triads—εἶναι, ζῆν, γιγνώσκειν—μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή—ἀκίνητον, αὐτοκίνητον, ἑτεροκίνητον—στοιχεία, μέρη, εἶδη? How the last triad stand related? What is the relation of ὅλον-μέρη, ἔν-πολλά, πολλά-στοιχεία and the like? How the order of development is ἕνας, οὐσία, ζωή, νοῦς, ψυχή, σωματοειδὲς ἅπαν, to which series, excluding the first, correspond τὰ ἀδιάκριτον, διακρινόμενον, διακεκριμένον, αὐτοκίνητον? Whether ψυχή is one, or as numerous as bodies? How ἔν produces not ἔν but πολλά; and how there are both ἀμέθεκτοι ἑνάδες, and ἑνάδες which are μετεχόμεναι by all the grades of existence just specified? How (apparently) a process ideal moves pari passu with a process phenomenal? How νοῦ ἴδιον ἢ ἐπιστροφή? Whether the ἀρχή must not be in fact complex if it causes the complex? What is the character of χρόνος and αἰών (discrete *v.* continuous?), of τὸ νῦν and τὸ αἰεί, and how ὁ χρόνος μερίζει τὴν γένεσιν? And so on. Through all which runs on the one hand a disjointed reference to special passages of the dialogue, and on the other a strange artless appeal to mythology and the old poet-seers—would like to combine faith and reason.

The Title has been already discussed. The spelling *παρμενίδης* is used throughout the dialogue except in one case (131 B) where the *ι* is on a scratch. Cp. 127 C, *κεραμεικῶ* where the *ει* is patched, apparently by the first hand: also 137 B,

πραγματιώδη for the usual *-τειώδη*: and e.g. *δέη* St. 126: *μ.* side by side with *πυνθάνει* on this page. Cp. Plato himself, *Crat.* 418 B. The forms *ει* *ι* trace their origin to different sources in different words, and may have been differently treated by later writers

in consequence. But there is no doubt that these and other vowel sounds showed a strong tendency to approximate under certain circumstances, as time went on; and Blass (*Aussprache des Griechischen*, 1888), p. 58, says: Diese Schreiber des 2 Jahrhunderts [B.C.] wussten durchaus nicht mehr, wo sie *ι* und wo sie *ει* setzen sollten, sondern schrieben, *Εἶρις*, *τειμάς* [for *Ἴρις*, *τιμάς*], und wiederum *παραμινάτω* und *ιερῖς*, etc. Again, Meisterhans (*Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*, 1888), p. 30, says: Dieses *ει* nimmt dann in der römischen Zeit, wie verschiedene Versehen in der Orthographie zeigen (*Αἰγίς*, *Ἐρεχθίς*, *Οἰνίς*, *χολλίδης*, *λιτουργία*), die Aussprache *ι* an. Gleichwohl ist die gewöhnliche Schreibweise, wenigstens bei den Eigennamen auch in der Kaiserzeit, die mit *ει* (*χολλείδης*). That the quantity need not trouble us is clear from Meisterhans, 54: Dass in der Kaiserzeit die Quantität der vokale sich mehr und mehr vermischt, geht hervor aus Messungen wie, *Κῶς μὲν μοι πατρίς ἐστίν, ἐγὼ δ' ὄνομα Νεικομήδης*. For us the point of interest is—does this spelling indicate that at any stage of its transmission our Platonic text had been written to dictation?

ἐκ κλαζομενῶν. κλαζόμενα! πόλις Ἴωνίας says a Schol., *†* and Rhunken's collec. Anaxagoras was born here. Stallbaum says fuerunt igitur haud dubie Anaxagorei, and seems to find in that a point specially appropriate. Possibly. Yet perhaps the town is mentioned merely to give an air of reality to the work. Cp. *Ion* 530 A, Τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν. πόθεν τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἐπιδεδήμηκας; ἢ οἴκουθεν ἐξ Ἐφέσου;

ἀδειμάντω etc. The question of the identity of the interlocutors cannot be clearly determined. Plato's brothers and the Cephalus of the Republic naturally suggest themselves; and perhaps we may claim it so far as an evidence of the authenticity of the work, that the difficulties connected with such an identification must have been present to a forger's mind and yet cause no concern. To go no further—the Cephalus of the Republic is described by Socrates as resident in Piraeus, as an intimate acquaintance of his, and as considerably his senior; while our Cephalus is now on his second visit (*τὸ πρότερον*) from Clazomenae, and his own language would convey the idea that

he is younger than Socrates. It is objected, too, by Stallbaum, Hermann, and others that Antipho, Plato's youngest brother, could hardly be old enough to have learned the conversation from Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno; and Hermann assumes a set of three brothers of Plato's mother, called by these names, as the true interlocutors both here and in the Republic. Antipho, the brother of Plato, could hardly have been born much before 420 B.C., neither could he have learnt this dialogue much sooner than 404 B.C.: so that Pythodorus must have been an old man when the two met. On the other hand we cannot well place the arrival of Cephalus in Athens earlier than 399 B.C., since, had Socrates been alive, the inquiries might have been addressed to him, in which view an older Antipho seems to be rendered unlikely. See Zeller's *Plato*, and his references: also Stallbaum's *Parmenides*. For Pythodorus, Proclus iv. 13, refers to *Alcib.* i. 119 A, *εἰπέ ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνοουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγόνεναί, ὡςπερ ἐγὼ [Σωκρ.] ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν διὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου καὶ Καλλιᾶν τὸν Καλλιᾶδου, ὧν ἑκάτερος Ζήνωνι ἑκατὸν μῶς τελέσας σοφός τε καὶ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν.*

μου λαβόμενος τ. χ. Does *μου* depend upon the participle 'taking me by the hand,' or the noun 'taking my hand'? For the former we have *Laws* i. 637 C, *ταχὺ γὰρ σου λάβοιτ' ἂν τις τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμνημόμενος*, although the sense of the verb is different. Parallel passages are *Charm.* 153 B, *Χαιρεφῶν δέ, ... ἔθει πρὸς με, καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ δ' ὅς;* *Rep.* i. 327 B, *καὶ μου ὀπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη,* where *ὀπισθεν* seems to be the adverb, as *ἄνωθεν* in v. 449 B, *λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου ἄνωθεν αὐτοῦ*, although here the pronoun depends upon the noun. But *Cratyl.* 429 E, gives *οἶον εἴ τις ἀπαντήσας σοι ἐπὶ ξενίας λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἴποι* which makes for the view that *λαβ. τῆς χειρὸς* is a phrase. We have no means of translating neatly the force of the aorist in these cases; 'after taking' 'having taken' are too formal. We do not usually associate this form of greeting with Greek life; *ἀσπάξασθαι*, as in 127 A, is more common and more suggestive of southern feeling.

εἰ του ... δυνατοί, It seems to be accepted that *του* and *ὧν* are neuter. Yet *τι τῶν τῆδε* is a peculiar

expression, which Ast, Müller, and the Engelmann and Didot translators all give loosely, avoiding the plural in spite of τῶν and ὧν, while it appears that Ficinus gave no equivalent for τῶν τῆδε. It are clear and united as regards the text—though II suggests πον—so that any change would be very rash. It may be just possible that τῶν τῆδε means ‘belonging to those here.’ But is there any objection to our taking του as masculine, and translating ‘if you are seeking for any one of those belonging to this place with whom we have any interest’? It will be observed that δεησόμενος ὑμῶν follows.

φράζε. The use of the present imperative as contrasted with the aorist is said to suggest ‘the notion of permanence, as in general precepts, advice, rules, etc.’ (Jelf), but it can hardly do so here. If we are to see any special purpose we must suppose that the explanation by Cephalus will be an act occupying some time: cp. Theaet. 143 c, Ἄλλά, παῖ, λαβέ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε, where λέγε may be taken as present; Phaed. 61 b, Ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κ., Εὐνῶ φράζε. But Polit., 263 c, gives φράσον δὴ μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, where time enters more clearly than here.

ἀλλά ... ὑμῶν: We may render thus ‘Why in point of fact I am *here* (γε) for this very purpose.’ Τοῦτο may be used here, rather than τόδε, as referring backwards to του δέη etc. no less than forwards to δεησόμενος; cp. ἀρα τοῦτο, 127 E. Stallb. cites Euthyd. 274 A, Ἐπ’ αὐτό γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐπιδείξοντέ ... , and cp. Gorg. 447 B, Ἐπ’ αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν. εἶπον ἐγὼ is inserted parenthetically as compared with καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον below, which forms an integral part of the narrative. This parenthetic use occurs again in b and c and in the form ὅπερ γ’ εἶπον, 128 E. Arthur Frederking (Jahrbücher für Philologie—Fleckeisen, cxv., 1882, p. 534 sqq.) treats of this use, whether in the mid. or at the end of a sent., as an evidence of date. While not over confident he urges that this usage is unknown in Protag., Charm., Phaedo, and occurs only once each in Lysis and Euthydemus, while greater liberty is taken in other works such as Sympos. and Repub. In the Phaedo, he points out, the case is striking, as it is a narrative at second hand. Here are the statistics for

the Parmenides as far as 137 c, where the construction stops:

εἶπον mid. 4 end 0

εἶπεν ,, 2 ,, 1

εἶπεῖν ,, 8 ,, 4 ὅπερ γ’ εἶπον is in-

cluded; ὡς ἔπος εἶπεῖν not. The number is considerable: yet we must weigh the exigencies of the narrative at fourth hand. Plato also requires in the same space a liberal parenthetic use of ἔφη and φάναί.

ἔφη mid. 16 end 1

φάναί ,, 29 ,, 12

All five words occur non-parenthetically likewise. Sometimes εἶπεῖν comes between two cases of φάναί (130 B, 131 c). Little can be inferred except that Plato’s ear required variety; and possibly a later work might have fewer instances simply because no need arose for the usage. For δεησόμενος ὑμῶν cp. 136 D, αὐτοῦ δεόμεθα Παρμενείδου. We may complete the construction by τι with or without an infin., unless Plato intends to suggest δέησιν, which is not essential where it stands. Cp. for somewhat analogous passages, Hipp. Min. 373 A and Crat. 391 c.

λέγοις ἄν. Both Heindorf and Stallb. cite instances of this polite imperative. Thus λέγοις ἄν alone occur Phaedr. 227 c, Polit. 267 D, 268 E, 291 B. λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλ’ ἠδίων ἀκούοντι, Rep. x. 614 A. So ἀκούοις ἄν, Rep. x. 608 D, Polit. 269 c. Also λέγοις ἄν τὴν διαίρεσιν ὅπῃ, Polit. 283 D. They seem unfinished conditional sentences.

καὶ ἐγὼ ... διακοῦσαι: Construc. easy and conversational: παῖς δέ που ... αὐτῷ δέ γε; being a parenthesis needed only from a picturesque point of view. The speaker, seeking to strengthen his claim to attention, lets the sentence get so broken up that the important ἀκηκόασι becomes formally a mere adjunct. Strictly we should have καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, οἶδε ἀκηκόασιν ὅτι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν Ἀντιφῶν τοὺς λόγους, οὓς ... διελέχθησαν, ἀπομνημόνευει. τούτων δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι. Cp. Apol. 21 A, where the parts bracketed, although conversationally very natural, really confuse the construction, Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἵστε που[. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ’ ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ] οἶος ἦν [Χαιρεφῶν,] ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ’ ὅτι ὀρμήσειε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι [καί,

ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ,] εἰ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος.

Ε τί ἦν ὄνομα; It would seem that ὄνομα is used predicatively here, 'what was name to your brother, what had he as name?' Cp. Crat., opening Κρατύλος φησὶν ὅδε ... οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἄν τινες ξυνθήμενοι καλεῖν καλώσι ... ἐρωτῶ σὸν αὐτὸν ἐγώ, αὐτῷ πρότερον Κρατύλος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἢ οὐ. Unless we are to take it as = τί ὄνομα ἐπῆν τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν; Had Plato said τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ὑμῶν τί ἦν τοῦνομα; the sense would have been much the same, but τοῦνομα the subject.

παῖς δέ που ἦν Is ἦν 1st or 3rd person? Probably, though not certainly, the latter: ἦ being the more likely form in Plato for the 1st. Cp. Prot. 310 E, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός εἰμι, ἄμα δὲ οὐδὲ εὔρακα Πρωταγόραν πρόποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἔτι γὰρ παῖς ἦ, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. The constant use of που with no reference to place bears some analogy to that of 'there': 'A time there was, ere England's griefs began,' etc. We might trace the original sense perhaps by saying 'he was somewhere in his boyhood.'

τὸ πρότερον Cp. ἐξ ἐκείνου and 127 A, τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας. C. had been only once at Athens, years ago. Stallb. raises the question whether τὸ πρῶτον may not be the reading. Apart from the fact that it appears only in ΞΣ, Mss. of no authority, this reading would injure the sense; for what matters the length of time since the first visit, if C. had had later opportunities?

ἐπεδήμ. could stand alone; the add. of δεῦρο may be compared with τῶν τῆδε above for insistence on the place; while ἐκ κλ. may just possibly be an early gloss upon the other two words.

πολὺς ... ἐκείνου. Here, as with ὄνομα, the article is omitted, the sense being πολὺς δὲ ἤδη χρόνος παρελήλυθε. Are we to understand τοῦ χρόνου after ἐκείνου; or to assume a neuter construction, either absolute 'from then,' or having reference to τὸ πρ. ἐπεδ. as a sort of neuter equivalent for τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας?

δοκῶ, used thus parenthetically is rare, the phrase being usually ὡς (ἐμοῖ) δοκῶ (or δοκεῖ); Ast gives a case from Laws III. 687 E, τότε, δοκεῖς, παῖς πατρὶ συνεύζεται. This is no evidence that the Parm. is late; Stallb. cites a like use in Theages 121 D,

δοκῶ γὰρ μοι, τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τινὲς ... διαπαράττουσιν αὐτόν.

πάνυ γε: αὐτῷ δέ γε; ἀντιφῶν· ἀλλὰ So Ψ: giving πάνυ γε: to Adimantus; αὐτῷ δέ γε, which we make interrogative, to Ceph.; and the rest to Adim. This gives excellent sense; but t disagrees, inserting (as the printed texts do) ἔφη after πάνυ γε, and giving the whole to Adim. It may be said that the upper point of the second: in Ψ is weaker than the lower. γε ... γε = 'quite so,' 'And his?'

Οἴδε. The ο placed in the margin indicates a new paragr., as δ below marks one at τοῦτων.

πολιταί μοι ... ἀκηκόασί τε. So Ψ reads: t gives πολιταί τέ μοι, and this or τε μοί, τ'έμοι (= mei) τι μοί (strangely) appears in most texts. It may be right, yet the τε may have crept in to balance the following one. If the text is as here given the latter τε is an illustration—the only other in Parm. occurring 131 A—of a use which Frederking (as p. 77) cites as a mark of lateness. He counts 200 cases of it in Timaeus—e.g. at the opening, ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν σὸν τῶνδ' τε ἔργον etc.—and argues, but with hesitation, that its rarity in Parm. suggests an early date for the work. Cp. on 127 A.

πολλὰ ἐντετύχηκε 'has had many a meeting.' Ast cites Phaedo 61 C, πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί: and Crat. 396 D, ἔωθεν γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆν καὶ παρέιχον τὰ ὄντα. Naturally we find also πολλάκις, e.g. Sophist. 251 C, and Menex. 249 D.

διελέχθησαν. The tenses of this verb used by Plato in this sense seem to be διαλέγομαι, διαλέξομαι, διελεγόμην, διελέχθην, διείλεγμαί: the form διελεξάμην never occurs. In Alcib. I. 129 C we have the definition τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταῦτόν που καλεῖς: but this is modified in Gorg. 448 D-E, and again Rep. V. 454 A, from which we see that it is not rhetoric, nor yet wrangling. Later we find, 135 C, τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν, and in Theaet. 161 E, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιεντικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. In short, it is methodical conversational argument on philosophic questions. For the language here compare Theaet. 142 C, δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι (ὁ Σωκρ.) ... συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγους, οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ, διηγῆσατο.

πολλάκις ... ἀπομνη. Comp. the course taken by Euclides in reconstructing the discussion between Socr. and Theaet., Theaet. 143 A. He took notes of what Socrates told him, expanded these carefully from memory, consulted Socrates whenever he had an opportunity and corrected his narrative. ἀπομνη. = 'has them by heart' 'is able to repeat'—Euclides was not able διηγῆσασθαι οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος—as Critias says, Tim. 26 B, ὡς δὴ τοι, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὰ παίδων μαθήματα θαυμαστὸν ἔχει τι μνημεῖον ... καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτου προθύμως με διδάσκοντος, ἅτ' ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἐπανερωτῶντος, ὥστε οἶον ἐγκαύματα ἀνεκπλήτου γραφῆς ἔμμονά μοι γέγονε. Cp. Phaedr. 228 B, D. The word also means 'to repeat from memory' as Critias had already said (id. 20 C), ὡς ἀπεμνημόνευεν αὐτὸν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ γέρον· cp. Phaedr. 227 E, οἷέ μοι ἂν Λυσίας ... συνέθηκε ... ταῦτα ἰδιώτην ὄντα ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἀξίως ἐκείνου;

τούτων ... διακ. τούτων must mean τῶν λόγων: the accusative would have been equally natural, as in Tim. 26 B and Rep. I. 336 B, βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον. Perhaps the construction is varied designedly, ἀκούσας being so far associated with the accus. so recently. τοίνυν, as in Gorg. 454 B, ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω = 'well' 'well then': it refers back to λέγοις ἄν, this forms τὴν δέησιν. † reads ἀκοῦσαι, but Proclus διακοῦσαι.

μειράκ ... διατρ. μειρ. etc. explains οὐ χαλεπὸν: and ἐπεὶ etc. explains μειρ. διεμελέτησεν seems to occur only in Critias and Laws, which may perhaps speak for a late date. πρὸς ἵππικῇ—Proclus iv. p. 13. Ἀθηναῖος δὲ οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν, τῶν ἐπ' εὐγενείᾳ φροούντων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἵππικὴν σπουδάζων, ὡς τοῖς γενναίοις ἦν Ἀθηναίων πάτριον. To explain the absence of τῇ Stallb. says 'non opus articulo ante artium nomina, ubi significatur quempiam eas attingere tantum, non omnem earum vim et ambitum complecti.' Is this likely? Like other such adjectives ἵππικῇ would require the article so long as τέχνη, παιδιὰ, or some such word was supposed to follow, but when used as a naturalized noun it might take it or want it like other nouns; μουσική, γυμναστική, ἰατρική are frequently so used, and Plutarch, Mus. c. 2, speaks of ἀνδρας μουσικῆς ἐπιστήμονας, which does not mean attingere tantum. For the language here cp. Lach. 180 D, ἅτε κατ' οἰκίαν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβοντες ὑπὸ τῆς

ἡλικίας. Rep. VII. 540 B, τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας.

εἰ δεῖ, Stallb. seems quite right in rejecting Heind.'s proposal to read εἰ δοκεῖ, both because this has no authority, and because δεῖ is read by Procl. iv. 73 and 78, and finally because δεῖ Ionem quandam habet recusationis significationem, quandoquidem Adim. ad eum, qui omne tempus equitandi studio transigat, non statim vult una cum hospitibus accedere.

ἐνθένδε ... μελίτη. Surely Plato's ear must have been at fault in the collocation of the first four words. Μελίτη δῆμος Κεκροπίδος says Schol. † given by Rhunken. Suidas s.v. quotes Harpocr. δῆμός ἐστι τῆς Κεκροπίδος, ὀνομασθεὶς ἀπὸ Μελίτης τῆς κατὰ μὲν Ἡσίοδον θυγατρὸς Μύρμηκος, κατὰ δὲ Μουσαῖον Δίου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος. It seems to have lain to the N. of the Areopagus, and to the E. of Ceramicus. From the Agora they would walk north, E. of Areopagus, W. of the Propylaea.

ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἔβ. Proclus in his overstrained manner says, iv. 78, τὸ σύντομον τοῦ λόγου καὶ σαφὲς καὶ καθαρὸν ἔξεστι καὶ διὰ τούτων ὄραν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκαλλώπισε τὸν λόγον εἰπὼν, 'ταῦτα εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες,' ὡς εἴωθεν, ἡδύνων τὴν συγγραφὴν, ἢ τι ἄλλο προσθεῖς, ἀλλ' ἀμέσως 'ταῦτα εἰπόντες.' αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ τε εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες. 'Having said this we began walking'; unless (spite of aor.) it means 'we were walking as we said these words.'

χαλινὸν τινα ἐκ. 'some bit or other,' 'a bit or some such matter.' Ceph. is not a horsey man. ἐκιδ. is tech., as Heind. and Ast note, 'locare faciendum,' the correl. being, though not in Plato, ἐκλαβεῖν.

ἐκείνου might refer either to the χαλκεῦς, or to the important χαλινός, or in a general way to 'that weighty matter.'

τε. A case of τε used as introductory with no καὶ (Introd. xxi.) which Frederking has overlooked.

παρέιμεν. So Ὡ: † gives παρέιήμεν, which seems to mean that παρέιήμεν was first written, then η was dotted for ejection, and the circumflex put as for εἶμεν: optative in either case. The apodosis begins at ἀνεγνώρ.

δεομ. ... διηγ. The full constr. would be δεομένων αὐτοῦ ἡμῶν διελθεῖν αὐτὸν τοὺς λόγους. ὤκνει = 'began to make excuse,' 'showed a disposition to decline.' With πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι we must

supply τὸ διελεῖν as subject. Stallb. notes the tenses from ἐβαδ. to διηγ. The impfs. are descriptive, and suggest continuance, as of acts going on under the eye: the aorists merely record necessary facts without dwelling upon them as filling time: ἐκδίδ. = 'in the act of ...': ἀπηλλάγη for plupf.: we also say 'was done' as well as 'had done.' The language of this introduction may be compared with that of Protag. 310 E, 311 A, some of which has been already quoted. We may add ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλάβομεν ... ἀλλ' ἴωμεν ... καταληψόμεθα αὐτὸν ... ἔνδον. Cp. also Rep. I. 328 B, ἦμεν οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Λυσίαν τε αὐτόθι καταλάβομεν καὶ Εὐ. ... εὐθύς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετο τε.

ἔφη δὲ etc. From here to the beginning of Part II. 137 C, the construc. is involved, and not always consistent; the reason being, as Proclus says, IV. 13, that ἔστιν αὕτη δηλαδὴ τρίτης τῆς συνοουσίας ἔκθεσις ταύτη τοίνυν παρὼν τις Κέφαλος ... ἀφηγηματικῶς καὶ οὐδὲ πρὸς ὠρισμένα πρόσωπα λοιπὸν τοὺς λόγους διατιθεῖς, κατὰ γε τὴν ἔκθεσιν παραδίδωσι τὴν συνοουσίαν ... (1) Πρώτη τοίνυν ἔστιν συνοουσία ἢ αὐτὰ περιέχουσα τὰ κύρια πρόσωπα καὶ τὴν πρώτην σκητὴν τῶν λόγων (2) δευτέρα δὲ ἢ παρὰ Πυθοδώρου διαμνημονεύοντος τῆς πρώτης συνοουσίας καὶ οἶον ἰστοροῦντος τὰ κατ' ἐκείνην πάντα (3) τρίτη δὲ ἢ παρὰ Ἀντιφώντος, οὗς ὁ Πυθόδωρος διηγῆσατο λόγους ἀπαγγέλλοντος τῷ τε Κεφάλῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, φιλοσόφοις (4) τετάρτη δὲ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ Κεφάλου τῶν ὑπ' Ἀντιφώντος αὐτῷ λόγων παραδεδομένων ἀφήγησις, εἰς ἀόριστον τελευτήσασα θέατρον. We have a change from ὅτι ἀφίκοντο τὸ τὸν μὲν οὖν ... εἶναι instead of καὶ ὅτι ... εἶη. Plato gives us dialogues at first hand, such as Crito, Cratylus, Philebus, Phaedrus; at second, as Phaedo, Theaetetus, Republic; at third, as Symposium; and here at fourth hand. The reason seems rather literary than philosophical. Here the repeated transmissions suggest that remoteness which Plato desires to set up for the original conversation. The Theaet., 143 C, alludes to the difficulty of sustaining a second-hand narrative—copied by Cicero—which seems to imply that Plato had already tried that method, although it may be simply another literary artifice to secure variety. Some light would be thrown on the matter, no

doubt, if we possessed any of the dialogues composed by Plato's contemporaries.

παναθηναία. Ἡ τῶν Παναθηναίων ἑορτὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν ἐτέθη μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ Ἐριχθονίου τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τῆς Ἀθήνης, ὕστερον δὲ ὑπὸ Θησέως συναγαγόντος τοὺς δῆμους εἰς ἄστν. ἄγεται δὲ ὁ ἀγὼν διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν καὶ ἀγωνίζεται παῖς Ἰσθμια οὐ'πρεσβύτερος, καὶ ἀγένειος [καὶ] ἀνήρ· τῷ δὲ νικῶντι διδόσασιν ἔλαιον ἐν' ἀμφορεύσιν, καὶ στεφανοῦσιν αὐτὸν ἐλαίᾳ πλεκτῇ. Schol. t, with contracs., top, 79 a 2, and Rhunk. What connection has the last sentence? διττὰ παν. ἤγετο Ἀθήνησι, τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν, τὰ δὲ διὰ πενταετηρίδος, ἃ καὶ μεγάλα ἐκάλον. ἤγαγε δὲ τὴν ἑορτὴν πρῶτος Ἐριχθόνιος ὁ Ἡφαίστου. τὰ δὲ παναθ. πρότερον Ἀθήναια ἐκαλοῦντο (Harp.) Suid. s.v.

ζῆνων τε ... γεγον. See the histories of philos. etc. We may quote Diog. Laert. IX., Parm. 21-23, Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης διήκουσε Ξενοφάνους ... Εἰς τοῦτον καὶ Πλάτων τὸν διάλογον γέγραφε, Παρμενίδην ἐπιγράψας ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν. ἤκμαξε δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ ἐξηκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα (B.C. 504-1). 25-29, Ζήνων Ἐλεάτης. τοῦτον Ἀπολλοδώρος φησιν εἶναι ἐν Χρονικοῖς φύσει μὲν Τελευταγόρου, θέσει δὲ Παρμενίδου· περὶ τούτου καὶ Μελίσσου Τίμων φησὶ ταῦτα· Ἀμφοτερογλώσσου τε μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδὸν Ζήνωνος πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος ἢ δὲ Μελίσσου ... Ὁ δὲ Ζήνων διακήκοε Παρμενίδου καὶ γέγονεν αὐτοῦ παιδικά. καὶ εὐμήκης ἦν, καθά φησι Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Παρμενίδῃ, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ καὶ Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην αὐτὸν καλεῖ. (261 D.) φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ εὐρετὴν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι διαλεκτικῆς, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλέα ῥητορικῆς (seems a lost dial. cp. D. L. VIII. 57 under Empedocles, and Bekk. Arist. v. 1484). γέγονε δὲ ἀνὴρ γενναϊότατος καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ ἐν πολιτείᾳ ... οὗτος τὴν πρότερον μὲν Ὑέλην, ὕστερον δὲ Ἐλέαν ... πόλιν εὐτελῆ καὶ μόνον ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθοῦς τρέφειν ἐπισταμένην ἠγάπησε μᾶλλον τῆς Ἀθηναίων μεγαλαυχίας, οὐκ ἐπιδημήσας τὸ παράπαν (which need not be taken too literally) πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀλλ' αὐτόθι καταβίου. ... ἤκμαξε δ' οὗτος κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ ἐβδομηκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα (B.C. 464-1).

εὐ μάλα δὲ is not a usual combination. We find εὐ μάλα frequently, both in regard to age (Euthyphro 4 A, with πρεσβύτης: Tim. 22 B, with παλαιόν) and otherwise. Again, Sophist. 217 C, we have μάλα δὲ used of Parmenides—ἐκείνου μάλα δὲ τότε ὄντος

πρεσβύτου. In Charm. 154 B Socr. says νῦν δ' οἰμαί πον εἶ μάλα ἄν ἤδη μειράκιον εἶη: and Ast in his Lex. and text reads εἶ μάλα ἤδη here with t, which may be correct. But δὴ need not go too closely with εἶ μάλα, it may = 'you are to observe.'

περὶ ἕτη The only analogy which Ast quotes is Rep. x. 602 c, Πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμείσθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτον μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; Stallb. renders 'circiter (περὶ) quinque et sexaginta annos et quod excurrit (μάλιστα) natus' citing authorities. But L. and S. quote Thucyd. I. 118, ταῦτα δὲ ... ἐγένετο ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα, μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου, where the time is 480-431 B.C. or 49 years at most. So VII. 68, the constitution of the 400 at Athens is said to have occurred ἔτει ἑκατοστῶ μάλιστα ἐπειδὴ οἱ τύραννοι κατελύθησαν, that is 510-411 B.C., or 99 years. Although (Introd. xxxv.) the text here is certain, one cannot but think that there is something wrong. εἶ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι σφόδρα πολίον, together with the phrases from Sophist. above and Theaet. 183 E, πάνν νέος πάνν πρεσβύτη, suggest an age decidedly beyond sixty-five. ἑξήκοντα may be a very early corruption of ἐνεήκοντα. Or may it have crept in from some early reference to the ἐνάτην καὶ ἑξηκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα of Diog. Laert. ?

αὐτὸν ... γεγόναι is subject to λέγεσθαι. καὶ ἐπὶ θηλειῶν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀρρένων ἐρωμένων ἢ λέξις εὐρηται, κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν σπουδαζομένων πάνν ἢ καὶ ἐν Φαίδρῳ λέγεται. ἴσπουδάκας, ὦ Φαίδρε, ὅτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμεν, ἐρεσχηλῶν σε. ἢ δὲ λέξις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολλὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσελγῶς ἐρωμένων. Sch. t, with contrs. foot of 79 a, Rh. It is clear that Diog. Laert. took the statement literally. So does Athenaeus, Deipn. xi. 505 end, τὸ δὲ πάντων σχετικώτερον, καὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν, οὐδεμιᾶς κατεπειγούσης χρείας, ὅτι παιδικὰ γεγόναι τοῦ Παρμενίδου Ζήνων ὁ πολίτης αὐτοῦ.

καταλείν ... νέον. ἔφη breaks the constr. Its next use in D, ἔφη ὁ πυθόδωρος is still more irregular, following λέγειν τὸν π. above. Note the absence of the article with the nouns τείχους and κεραμεικῶ contrasted with the use of it with the names of the various persons. ἐν κεραμεικῶ corresponds with ἐν μελίτῃ above, and ἐκτὸς τείχους may be compared with our 'out of town,' 'out of doors.' We have

τόπος ἀθήνησιν ἔνθα καὶ οἱ πόρνοι προειστήκεσαν. εἰσὶ δὲ δύο κεραμικοὶ· ὁ μὲν ἔξω τείχους, ὁ δὲ ἐντὸς: Sch. t, foot of 79 a, Rh. The use of οἱ with infin., like that of ἡνίκα below, is not unusual in orat. obl., cp. 130 A, and Timae. 21 E, οἱ δὲ Σόλων ἔφη πορευθεὶς σφόδρα τε γενέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐντιμος, καὶ ... , and has parallels even in Latin. Thus Tac. Ann. vi. 2 has the relative 'sed quos omitti posse, quos deligi? ... quam deinde speciem fore?'

ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς, Here τινὰς must be taken closely with ἄλλους, much like χαλινόν τινα, otherwise it seems to clash with πολλούς: we may render 'a number of less important persons.' Still the phrase is odd, and inconsist. with 136 D-137 A which closes with ἐπειδὴ ... αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν. One could fancy the text standing ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ and some early reader writing in the marg. οὐ πολλοῖς with a ref. to the above passage, then οὐ πολλοῖς getting incorporated, and finally losing the οὐ after αὐτοῦ. Socrates says, 129 D, that they were seven.

τότε γὰρ Here we have the first introduction of διαλεκτικὴ into Athens, about 450 B.C. according to Plato. For Socrates' age, see Introd. xxxiv.

ἀναγιγ. ... τοῦ ζήν. τὸ τοῦ ζήνωνος ἢ ἐπιχ. εἰ πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, τὸ αὐτὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιον· οὐκ ἄρα πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα. Sch. t, with contractions, top, 79 a 2. αὐτὸν, 'himself.' Is τῶν λόγων practically the same as τῶν γραμμάτων before and after it? The point would be clearer if the altern. reading in A -κόμενον (agreeing with βραχὺν) were adopted (Stallb. translates 'sermonum, vel potius disputationum quum recitarentur,' which itself is ambig.); but τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι in D seems to decide for the identity. Verti potest 'litterae,' says Ast, 'very little was still left of the arguments as they were being read.'

ἡνίκα ... ἔφη The constr. becomes irreg. again, shaking off the gov. of λέγειν, 127 A. It should have been ἡνίκα αὐτόν τε ἐπεισελθεῖν τὸν πυθόδωρον ... οὐ μὴν αὐτόν γε. As it stands it gives a good illustr. of the nom. before the infin., when the subject of the principal verb is referred to, in contrast with the accus. (τὸν παρμενείδην) of any other person. μετ' αὐτοῦ throws Pythod. once more into the background; the ἔφη ὁ π. almost, as Heind. says, demands μεθ' αὐτοῦ. τὸν γενόμ. seems to be used as

a hist. ref. to something in the past, but has little weight in fixing the date, since (Introd. xx.) the dial. must be supposed to be written after the death of Soc. If special force lies in the prefix of *ἐπακούσαι* it may be contrasted with *διακούσαι*, 126 C. οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε (sc. οὕτως τὸ πρῶτον ἐπακούσαι). The constr. of the thing heard with *ἀκούειν* varies throughout between acc. and gen.

1) τὸν οὖν σωκ. ... δ βούλ. It does not appear that any fragments of Zeno's writings are left. We know them only by reference and description, ancient historians and commentators giving in many cases descriptive summaries which may or may not include the actual expressions of their author. According to Grote (Plato, Parm.) Zeno is here confuting the assumption that 'the self-existent and absolute *ens* is plural.' This seems a rather unfortunate account of the matter. Opponents of Parmenides did not, as a rule, set up a 'self-existent and absolute' plurality, but rather that every-day plurality of sense which his absolute unity of being was vainly put forward to account for: 129 A, καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν. In dealing with the question Zeno composed several *λόγοι*, and each of these, it would seem, had more than one *ὑπόθεσις*. This may perhaps refer to such an argument as that in which he shows that the many must be both (1) infinitely small, and (2) infinitely great; where 'the first hypothesis' would be the working out of No. 1. According to this view each *λόγος* would be likely to have two *ὑποθέσεις*, each setting out one side of the contradiction. But in the case before us, *ὁμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια*, not *ὁμοια εἶναι* alone, seems to be the *πρώτη ὑπόθεσις*. This would necessitate a different view of *λόγος*, according to which the *πρῶτος λόγος* would be perhaps the whole argument against multiplicity, of which the contention from likeness and unlikeness would form the first *ὑπόθεσις*; while the next *λόγος* might be the whole argument against motion, of which the 'Achilles' would rank as one *ὑπόθεσις*. *ἀναγνωσθείσης* sc. *αὐτῆς*. *πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις*; must be read along with *οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις*; *οὕτω*: below. It seems compounded from *πῶς λέγεις*;—*ἢ τοῦτο*; and *πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις*;—*ἢ οὕτως*; or = *ὡς τί διανοούμενος τοῦτο λέγεις*;

εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ δ. Zeno assumes this as the popular view (*τὰ λεγόμενα*, E below) in opposition to the view of Parmenides (Introd. xxxvii.). Immediately below the constr. is *οὔτε γὰρ οἶδόντε (ἐστι) τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια ... εἶναι*.

οὐκοῦν is usually two words in \mathfrak{A} and most codices vetustissimi. With our punctuation the word may be made to explain its origin *εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον ... οὐκ ἀδύνατον δὴ ...*; But we might also take *οὐκοῦν* as the beginning of an inference resumed at *ἄρα*, the words *εἰ ἀδύνατον ... τὰ ἀδύνατα* coming in as what is inferred, *οὐκ οὖν—εἰ ἀδύνατον ... πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα—ἄρα τοῦτό ... λόγοι*; the purport of this inferential query being yet further explained by *οὐκ ἄλλο ... ἐστι*; In the sentence *εἰ γὰρ ... εἴη πάσχοι ἂν*, the condition is as clearly held to be denied as if the form had been *εἰ γὰρ ... ἦν ἔπασχεν ἂν*.

παρὰ ... λεγόμεν. Heind. treats this on the analogy of *παρ' ἐλπίδα*, *παρὰ δόξιν*, *παρὰ φύσιν*, 'beyond, contrary to, in opposition to, all received views'; but it seems better to say with Stallb. 'to fight the matter out along the whole line of popular opinions,' or 'from front to rear of their array' as in 144 E, where of *ὄν* and *εἶν* it is said *ἐξισοῦσθον δύο ὄντε αἰεὶ παρὰ πάντα*: so too Rep. VII. 514 A, *ἐν καταγείφ οἰκῆσει ... τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούσῃ μακρὰν παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον*. A pron. is omitted in *ἦγεὶ τσαυτα [σε] τεκμ. παρέχ.*

ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά; It may be doubted whether 128 p. 3. this means *ὡς 'πολλά' οὐκ ἔστι*, or whether the sense intended is, as above, *ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστι [τὰ ὄντα]*. For the κ of *οὐκ* see Introd. cxi.

καταμανθ. may be compared with *κατελάβομεν*, 127 A, and *καταφαίνεται*, 132 D; where, if the prep. has a definite purpose, it seems to recall our 'come down upon,' 'drop upon,' whether what is so 'dropped upon' be a person or the sense of a statement.

οὐκ—negatur τὸ '*οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνειν*' says Heind., and compares Gorg. 453 D, *πότερον ὁ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὐ*; *Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σ., ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει*. Stallb. adds other cases. We may simplify the sense to ourselves by putting *κακῶς* or *εἰηθῶς* for *οὐκ ὀρθῶς*.

ὄλον τὸ γράμμα Partly under each verb: the phrase is not simply *συνήκας ὁ βούλεται ὄλον τὸ γράμμα*, but includes *συνήκας ὄλον τὸ γράμμα—ὁ βούλεται*. We have the former constr. alone in

Crat. 414 D, *συνείναι δ τί ποτε βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα*, where note the modified relative. *γράμμα* is questionable in the singular for a writing. We have first τῶν τοῦ Ζ. *γραμμάτων*, the plural being used so in e.g. Xen. Memor. iv. 2: to it corresponds τῶν λόγων, where the arguments are regarded without reference to their written form. Then comes τοῦ πρώτου λόγου, ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων—to which corresponds τὸ γράμμα. Finally ὅσους περ λόγους γέγραφας, when viewed as a whole, are called up by τῷ συγγράμματι with which we are familiar in Thucyd. G. Kaibel (Hermes xxv. 103, 1890) holds that Zeno introduces the word as a local idiom, which Socrates quietly corrects once by τῷ συγγράμματι. But it is not Zeno who first uses the word (127 C), so that, if the argument is to hold, we must assume that γράμμα was the accepted title of Zeno's work, and used as such. Kaibel adds that a mutilated gloss. of Phrynicius gives ... καὶ (leg. αἰ) ἐπιστολαὶ δὲ γράμματα καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα, ὡς Δημοσθένης.

τῇ ἄλλῃ φ. The whole might be arranged thus οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ φιλίᾳ σου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι βούλεται ψικεῖσθαι [σοι]. Heind. would read σοι for σου: Stallb. rightly objects: 'non modo in universum amicitia erga te cupit se insinuare (better insinuasse, gratum tibi fecisse)' is Ast's rendering: 'desires to have secured to him a place in your affection, not merely by his general friendship towards you.' In both \mathfrak{A} and \mathfrak{t} the first syllable of ψικ. seems to have been originally οἰκ.

ταῦτόν ... σύ, τρόπον τινὰ is of course parenthetic. \mathfrak{A} reads ὄν περ, and in \mathfrak{t} there is a scratch between ο and π in ὄπερ: no doubt an early scribe was led astray by τρόπον τινά. For the expression cp. Theaet. 152 A, λόγον οὐ φαῦλον ... ἀλλ' ὄν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἶρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

μεταβάλλον 'Twisting it about under our very eyes' so to speak: but \mathfrak{t} has μεταβαλόν. We have a different constr. of this word, Phaedr. 241 A, μεταβαλόν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ ... νοῦν ... ἀντ' ἔρωτος: cp. mutare sententiam with mutat quadrata rotundis.

ἐν φῆσι ἔφησι Procl. and \mathfrak{A} ; was he or his orig. thinking of the poems as already finished, without noticing παρέχει? \mathfrak{t} has ἐν φῆσι. Ast prints ἐν φῆσι.

τούτων Germans translate 'dafür': strictly it should be τούτου, 'of this assertion.'

δὲ ... δὲ δὲ without μὲν is common enough; but double δὲ is unusual. οὐ π. φ. εἶναι, it would seem that the οὐ is to be tacked to πολλὰ like the μὴ which follows.

τεκμ. δὲ αὐτός \mathfrak{t} reads δὲ καί, the καί being a contrac. whose form (Introd. cxi.)—if we suppose the archetype of \mathfrak{A} written in minuscule—would help to explain how \mathfrak{A} may have omitted καί, i.e., by mistaking it for a superfluous δ' = τεκμήρια δὲ δ' αὐτός. The whole would be simplified could we read τεκμήρια καὶ αὐτός ... παρεχόμενος.

παμμεγέθη—this form occurs once oftener, according to Ast, than the form παμμέγας, two of the three cases being in this dialogue (164 D). We also find παμπληθής though much more rarely than πάμπολος; and παμμήκης without any πάμμακρος. The following sentence is loosely constructed. It is not absolutely certain whether μὴ is to go with πολλὰ or with φάναι understood, nor whether ἑκάτερον is masc. and subject, or neut. and object to λέγειν. Again, while σχεδόν τι may in a vague way qualify λέγοντας ταῦτα it would be better if written λέγοντας σχεδόν τι ταῦτά. And while the whole down to ταῦτά is begun as subject to φαίνεται with perhaps an εἶναι added, he suddenly introduces a sort of résumé of the subject in the words ἡμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα (= τὰ ἡμῖν εἰρημένα), which again prompts him to replace εἶναι by εἰρήσθαι. Stallb. compares Rep. i. 331 B and Theaet. 144 A, the latter being very good, τὸ γὰρ εἰμαθῆ ὄντα, ὡς ἄλλω χαλεπόν, πρᾶον αὐ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρείον παρ' ὄντινούν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν ὀόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὄρω γιγνομένους. For the language cp. Crat. 429 1, Κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἡλικίαν, ὧ ἑταίρει; and Arist. Met. II. 4, 1000 a, 15, Καίτοι περὶ ... τούτων ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἰρήκασιν.

ναί, φάναι ... ἀπ. What is it that ναί confirms? Stallb. says 'recte quidem nos fere idem dicere arbitraris etc.' and refers to ε. But the σὺ δ' ὄν would be clearer if we take ναί as affirming ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς (nous autres) etc., 'Quite true: our position does seem to transcend the comprehension of you outsiders. You at least, for one, have not in all points perceived the true purport of the writing.' As to the dogs Suidas quotes Soph. (Aj. 8), κύνος c

Λακκαίνης ὡς τις εὔρινος βάσις. Aristotle says Περὶ τὰ Ζῶα, p. 607 a 3, καὶ ἐξ ἀλώπεκος καὶ κυνὸς οἱ Λακωνικοί. I. 608 a 27, καὶ αἱ Λάκαιναι κύνας αἰ θήλειαι εὐφρέστεραι τῶν ἀρρένων εἰσίν. Περὶ Ζῶων γενέσεως, E 781 b 9, διὸ ὅσων οἱ μυκτῆρες μακροί, οἶον τῶν Λακωνικῶν κυνιδίων, ὄσφραντικά. The σκύλαξ suits the age of Socrates. So Rep. II. 375 A, οἷε οὖν τι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς; where see the comp. in detail: and VII. 539 B, οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γέωνται, ὡς παιδιᾶ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ... χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἔλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον αἰεί. For the action of the dogs, cp. Politic. 263 A, ταῦτα δὲ εἰσαυθίς κατὰ σχολὴν καθάπερ ἰχνεύοντες μέτιμεν. The actual words occur Xen. Cyneg. IV. 9, ἄγειν δὲ ἄμεινον τὰς κύνας εἰς τὰ ὄρη πολλάκις ... τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄρη οἶόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἰχνεύειν καὶ μεταθεῖν καθαρῶς. In these the order of the two verbs is better than in Parmen. Stallb. quotes several examples in Plato of καίτοι followed by ἀλλά: Symp. 177 E, Euthyphro 3 C, Phaed. 68 E, 69 A. Here, however, the καίτοι rather answers σύ δ' οὖν etc., or comes in as a parenthesis, ἀλλά referring back independently.

πρῶτον μὲν has no second objection answering to it, and E seems to admit that it is the only one; but so one begins a defence. τοῦτο, used like τόδε, of what follows.

ὄτι ... διαπραττ. may be freely rendered 'that the writing takes no airs whatever to itself as though it were written with the aims which you mention in its head, while at the same time (ἐπι-) keeping people in the dark, as if that were some great achievement.' The context (A-B, ταῦτόν γὰρ ... εἰρήσθαι) suggests that ὡς τι μέγα δ. mean chiefly, if not entirely, the success of the concealment; and these words can hardly be the object of ἐπικρυπ., the thing which is to be concealed, though some translators seem so to take them. Cp. Gorg. 511 C-D, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν ... αὐτὴ ... οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη. Here the γράμμα and the art of seamanship are personified, as below λόγος.

τῶν συμβεβ. τι is one of the accidental circumstances attaching to it, opposed to τό γε ἀληθές, the true aim: we come very close here to the technical Aristotelian sense of τὸ συμβεβ.

αὐτὸν is τὸν λόγον not τὸν Παρμενείδην. Cp.

Symp. 193 B, καὶ μὴ μοι ἰπολάβῃ Ἐρυξίμαχος κωμωδῶν τὸν λόγον, ὡς Πανσανίαν καὶ Ἀγάθωνα λέγω, and D, μὴ κωμωδῆσθαι αὐτόν: Theaet. 164 C-E, περιγεγόμενοι τοῦ λόγου—καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἄμα ... εἴπερ γε ὁ πατήρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη ... νῦν δὲ ὄρφανόν αὐτόν ... προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ ἐπίτροποι ... βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν ... ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἔνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν; also Phaed. 88 E, and for personification of ὁ λόγος, id., 87 A and 89.

κωμωδεῖν. In Symp. 193 B the constr. is much as D here, where ὡς means 'to the effect that.' Ast would seem to supply λέγοντες ὡς; but it is simplest to suppose οὕτω κωμωδεῖν ὡς, as below τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν ὡς.

πολλά καὶ γ. Heind. says, 'i.e., πολλὰ γελοῖα, ut semper fere Graeci dicunt πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, π. καὶ πονηρὰ, π. καὶ χαλεπὰ, π. καὶ ὄλβια.' Are π. καὶ γ. nom. to συμβαίνειν as a personal verb, or acc.; and, if the latter, how are they related to πάσχειν? συμβ. seems to be so far imperson., and the constr. συμβαίνειν τῷ λόγῳ πάσχειν πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ, the arrangement being a Platonic hyperbaton.

αὐτῷ. So Ἄ and τ: neither it nor αὐτῷ seems satisfactory. We must read τῷ ἐν into τῷ λόγῳ, and render ἐναντία αὐτῷ = ἐναντία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει, antagonistic, as πολλά, to its inherent nature.

τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα seems to be accepted as one phrase; yet τὸ γρ. might stand alone, and τοῦτο might be object of ἀντιλέγει, 'retorts this difficulty.' It would, however, strengthen the case of those critics who wish to read ταῦτά, immediately following, against the Mss.

τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγ. 'the asserters of The Many.' Above, ἐν and πολλὰ are predicates of τὸ πᾶν; here the πολλὰ are used in substantive independence; and perhaps the last εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ with the following εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶν, ἢ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι are to be regarded in the same light, τὸ πᾶν having dropped away. For the language, cp. Arist. Met. I. 3. 984 b 1, τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ... τοῖς δὲ δὴ πλείω ποιοῦσι.

ὑπόθεσις. An anchor to the agitated thinker, according to Phaedo 101 D, σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σκιάν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως οὕτως ἀποκρίναι

ἀν. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἔφης ἄν: and if asked for a reason ὡσαύτως ἄν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἦτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις. One expects an obj. to ἐπεξίαι, as Rep. IV. 437 A, πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐπεξιόντες. So one expects βουλευσασθαί (μοι) ἐξεγένετο below, as Euthyd. 275 E, ὥστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαί μοι ἐξεγένετο εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ.

ταύτη Stallb. and Ast render hactenus, but we get hactenus in κατὰ τοσοῦτον, 129 A, which differs from ταύτη. Is not δὲ rather in Plato's mind with λανθάνει? Stallb. and others supply τὸ πρᾶγμα as nom. to λανθάνει, and σε τοῦτο λανθάνει ὅτι—above accords; yet Heind. better suggests τὸ γράμμα.

προσβν. Relative to νέου: Zeno wrote 'from an eagerness for controversy pardonable in a youth, not from a desire for notoriety undignified in a mature man.' ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, probably 'as I said above'—128 A, καλῶς ... ὁ βούλεται: yet it might be 'the actual purport of my argument' as opposed to its motive. Can Plato be writing historically when he puts this apology into Zeno's mouth? He certainly conveys that Zeno's contribution to philosophy has been overrated.

ἡγοῦμαι ... ἔχειν. Is the construction ἡγοῦμαι (τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχειν) ὡς λέγεις (αὐτὸ) ἔχειν: or ἡγοῦμαι 'I adjust my belief,' ὡς λέγεις (τὸ πρᾶγμα) ἔχειν 'in accordance with your account of the matter'? The question οὐ νομίζεις, etc. is not answered by Zeno, and Plato can hardly be serious in ascribing such doctrines to him. If we are to hold that Parmenides, and even Socrates as a lad, had got so far in speculation, what is left as Plato's own contribution to the subject? Cp. Introd. xxx.-xxxii., xxxiv.,¹²⁹ and ff. The full sense of εἶδος must grow upon us; but its strongest feature is that it is τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ or, 130 B, χωρὶς. Death is described in similar language, Phaedo 64 C, ἄρα μὴ ... εἶναι τοῦτο τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι;

ὁ ἔστιν ἀνόμ. Stallb. 'H.e. ὁ ὄντως ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον, unde retracto accentu ἔστιν scripsimus.' in which editors follow him. We have ὁ ἔστιν ἐν below B, and the classical passage is Phaedo 75 D, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγίσμεθα τοῦτο ὁ ἔστι καὶ ἐν ταῖς

ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι—where he shows his whimsical insistence on the importance of question and answer. And throughout Socrates' speech, cp. Diog. Laert. Plato III. (9)-(13): also Phaedo 78 D, 92 D.

πολλὰ The world of sense with its multiplicity. **ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ τ.** 'In the way and to the degree in which.'

ἐναντίων Note the change from δυοῖν. δυοῖν brings out the idea that there are two opposites to partake of; now his mind dwells on them as opposites and more than one. Immediately ἀμφοῖν recalls the dual idea, which is again merged in the plural.

αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, He does not, probably, mean that any single object is like and unlike itself—though that might be taken as a sort of transcendental completion of the case—because the sharing in 'likeness' makes it like another thing which also shares likeness; and if that thing agrees with it further in sharing 'unlikeness,' the two will be at once like and unlike. If αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς is to be pressed, then it would seem to mean 'among themselves as a world of sensible objects' as against αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια, etc. which follow.

τί θαυμαστόν; Thus far he readily accepts a world of sense so sharing in εἶδη. In αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια he is speaking of εἶδη; does he assume numerous εἶδη of ὁμοιότης? Probably not. But μετάληψις among the εἶδη, which he would like to see thought out, must lead to complications. There will be as many ὅμοια among the εἶδη as there are derived ὅμοια with us. And due to the same cause?

εἰ ... ἀπεφαίνετο ... τέρως ἄν ἦν rejects the supposition as hopeless; εἰ ἀποφαίνει ... οὐδὲν ... ἀτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι, speaks as of a thing actually going on; εἰ ἀποδείξει ... θαυμάσομαι takes a hopeful view; εἰ ἀποφαίνοι ... ἄξιον [ἄν εἶη] θαυμάζειν is quite impartial; εἰ ἀποδείξει ... τί θαυμαστόν; is back in the region of fact, cp. εἴπερ καὶ νῦν πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν, 155 D.

μετέχοντα In treating of participation he uses two verbs μεταλαμβάνειν and μετέχειν, each of which gives a noun μετάληψις, μέθεξις. No theory on the kind of relationship is implied in either word; at present he does not seem to think any necessary. Phaedo, 100 C-E, directly states that any theory is renounced and gives παρουσία, κοινωνία as alterna-

tives. ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὄψωδὸν ἄλλω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίνονται καλά' ... καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα. In other respects the views of Socrates on μέθεξις seem much clearer in the Phaedo. Here he draws no distinctions as to compatible and incompatible combinations, but speaks of μέθεξις as though anything might share in anything; in Phaedo 102 D ff. he shows not only that there are (104 B) ἐναντία which are ἀλλήλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τάναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσῇ ἐναντία ἦ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἦτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιον πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομῆναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; So too 103 A and Sophist. 253 B-254.

δ ἔστιν ἐν Note the emphasis in this and in τὰ πολλὰ δὴ. These latter are of course quite other in sense from ἀ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν above, which mean 'the many of sense,' whose real existence Zeno rejects. Socrates assumes that these draw with them as real counterpart an abstract ideal many which he here calls τὰ πολλὰ δὴ and πλήθος. C ἦδη θαυμάσ. 'When you are as far as this, I shall be at the wondering point,' 'by this time I shall have begun to wonder.' Of the future of θαυμάζω Ast cites no other case in Plato but Euthyphro 15 B, θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων.

γένη τε καὶ εἶδη In the fully elaborated Aristotelian terminology these differ as the more general and the more specific, as genera and species. Even A., however, does not always adhere to this use, nor does Plato speak in such a sense here. The two words are merely a comprehensive phrase for the world of ideas. If there be a distinction, perhaps γένη brings out the generality of the ideas, and εἶδη their outward aspect so to speak.

πάθη πάσχοντα, Cp. Apol. 22 C, τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες: and for Socrates' language about his own plurality, Phaedo 102 B; also Soph. 251 A, Λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δὴ που πόλλ' ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τὰ τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς ... καὶ τὰλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἐν ἕκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν, and Phileb. 14 C, ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρώταρχον ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει,

πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

ἐρεὶ is in Ἄ wrongly ἐρῆ. The form may have arisen partly from a mistake in dictation, and partly from an association with ὅτ' ἂν. It enters as a conversational relief, but breaks the construction. The passage should grammatically run εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ... πολλὰ —λέγων, ὅταν μὲν ... ὡς ... ὡσαύτως, ὅταν δὲ ἐν, ὡς ... ἄνθρωπος—τί θαυμαστόν; καὶ γὰρ πλήθους οἶμαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς μετέχω, ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφοτέρω.

ἐπτά We can name only five—Parmenides, Zeno, Pythodorus, Socrates, Aristoteles.

ἐὰν οὖν ... ἀποφαί. = ἐὰν οὖν τις ἐπιχειρῆ ἀποφαίνειν ταῦτα ὄντα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ καὶ τοιοῦτον ἓν, 'that many and one of this type, in this sense of the terms, are the same.' We have here another series of conditional sentences whose shades of thought the reader can work out. Of the form ἐὰν ... ἀποφαίνειν ἀγαίμην ἂν Jelf (854, 2b) gives a case, Phaedo 93 B, ἂν (ἐὰν) μὲν μᾶλλον ἄρμωσθῆ καὶ ἐπὶ πλεόν, ... μᾶλλον τε ἂν ἄρμονία εἶη καὶ πλείων εἰ δ' ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων; where note also the change to εἰ.

λίθους καὶ Cp. Phaedo 74 A-B, φαιμέν πού τι εἶναι ἕσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλω οὐδὲ λίθον λίθω οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πάντα ἕτερόν τι αὐτὸ τὸ ἕσον. The verb ἀποδεικνύμαι means 'gives us examples of'; in the next clause it is understood in the sense of 'prove that the one is many,' etc.

ὦν νῦν δὴ So Ἄ and t—δ rc. II.—Stallb. says Vett. editt. ὦν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον quod Heindorfius interpretans per τὰ εἶδη τούτων ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, i.e. τοῦ ὁμοίου, τοῦ ἀνομοίου, κ.τ.λ., duriorem amplexus est explicandi rationem quam quae cuiquam placere possit. Recte aliquot codices δ, quod etiam Bekkerus restituit. Heind. adds—Ita recte habet hoc ὦν, quod jam nolim mutari in ὡς, quum manifesto opponatur praeced. λίθους καὶ ξύλους καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, and he refers to 130 C-D, where εἶδη for θριξ etc., are rejected. The reading δ may be suitable, but we have shown that 'rc. II.' is no authority; it is likely a conj. of a reader of II. H. seems right in saying that ὦν does not refer to λίθους, etc., and the tense of ἔλεγον confirms him, 'which I was speaking about just now,' i.e. before I referred to stones and wood. Cp. Gorg. 485 D,

ὁ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κἄν πᾶν εὐφύης ἦ, which refers to 484 C-D, ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πᾶν εὐφύης ἦ, etc., and 135 A, where ὁ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν refers to 133 B below.

διαιρῆται Ἄ has διαιρεῖται, which cannot go with εἶν. Was this a dictation error—see on 126 A? It seems not to have been detected till the writer came to ἀποφαίνῃ, the *η* of which is inclosed in three dots. He would see that *-η* disagreed with *-εῖται*, then seeing that *-εῖται* was wrong he corrected it *-ῆται*. In διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη we have the most characteristic step in Plato's theory. What the unphilosophic mind daily has to do with is the πολλὰ of sense. Philosophic thought may be said to have begun for Plato with the general definitions which Socrates extracted from these πολλά. What Arist. says on this point has been seen (Introd. xxix. ; cp. xxxii., xliii., 1.) ; Xen. (Mem. iv. 6, 13) says something similar, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπάνηγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον. The special Platonic contribution was the χωρισμός.

Ε ἀγαίμην Why the speedy change to ἀγασθείην? ταῦτα δὲ sc. ἃ σὺ λέγεις ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι.

πεπραγμ. The perf. inf. of this verb is again used Apol. 22 B, ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματοῦσθαι αὐτοῖς—both are passive, although the verb is what would be called in Lat. a trans. deponent : cp. 130 E.

ᾧδε Such is the spelling of Ἄ (not so in *t*), and if the word be formed from ᾧδε on the analogy of τῆδε, ταύτη, οἷ, ἦ, it seems reasonable. Stallb. punctuates so as to make ὡς λέγω parenthetic, 'as I say.' But it might equally be ᾧδε ὡς λέγω = 'in the way I mention.' The expression is careless for πολὺ μὲντ' ἂν τόδε μᾶλλον ὡς (or ὁ) λέγω ἀγασθείην, cp. 135 D. Perhaps he would have preferred τοῦτο μᾶλλον and felt that he had used ταῦτα already.

εἰ τις ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν *t* inserts ταύτην, and so most editors. **πλεκομένην** would suggest that the εἶδη are in space, but cp. νοητὸς τόπος, Rep. vi. 508 C, vii. 517 B, and λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις below.

οὕτως καὶ ... λαμβ. break the constr., but add a further detail to our knowledge of the ideas. For the language cp. Rep. vi. 496 D, ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβῶν ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων, also Phaedo 79 A, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχόντων οὐκ

ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰεὶ δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά ; This λογισμὸς (which—see Ast—is constantly coupled with ἀριθμός, γεωμετρία, ἀστρονομία ; and with νοῦς, νόησις) is as it were the mental telescope by means of which διαιρούμεθα χωρὶς each successive εἶδος in the νοητὸς τόπος or intellectual firmament.

ἐπιδείξαι. From B to E we had two words used to signify 'prove, show, demonstrate'—ἀποφαίνεῖν (he begins with the middle) 8 times, and ἀποδεικνύειν 3 times. Here the prefix is changed, as though Socr. were now looking at the proof for the ideal world as something added on—as an œuvre de surcroît for his special satisfaction—to the proof for the physical world. Note that while Zeno advances his proofs in regard to the latter as a reductio ad absurdum, Socrates takes them up seriously and wants similar entanglements carried into the sphere in which the one of Parmenides is supposed to be supreme (Introd. xl.). For it seems clear that he does desire it ; the θαυμαστόν, θαυμάζειν, τέρας change to ἀγαίμην θαυμαστῶς, and merely indicate his consciousness that the topic involves great difficulties. One cannot help contrasting this whole passage with Phaedo 102-4, Sophist. 248-52, Phileb. 14-16. In the two latter dialogues the service to philosophy here spoken of in such terms as ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πᾶν ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματοῦσθαι, is ridiculed as an occupation for children—Soph. 251 B, ὅθεν γε, οἶμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλάβεσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ που χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐὼντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον, etc. ; Phileb. 14 D, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, ... παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥᾶδια καὶ σφύδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια, etc. (Introd. lx.). And in all three the carrying of the matter into the world of ideas is treated very differently (Introd. xxxi., and on 129 B above). Thus Socrates old repudiates Socrates young. In Sophist. he makes distinctions, 251 D, 252-53 A—finding that to deny all forms of mingling, and to affirm all, lead equally to absurdities, and that the true course is to admit certain combinations and to reject others.

ἐφ' ἐκάστου Cp. 160 c and Theaet. 204 c, οὐκ οὖν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως τὰ πάντα ἐξ εἰρήκαμεν ; But these are not quite parallel, and our phrase refers to a cause, while there is a feeling of locality in them. The dat. is more general, as Rep. v. 457 B, ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυμναῖς γυμναίξί ... οὐδὲν οἶδεν ... ἐφ' ᾧ γελᾷ οὐδ' ὅ τι πράττει. ἄχθεσθαι, at the invasion of the sphere of the one by a crowd of εἶδη. Stallb. and Heind. would prefer the future, 'on the brink of being annoyed'; but is that better?

τοὺς δὲ = αὐτοὺς δέ, a known usage: here αὐτὸς precedes and αὐτῷ follows. How steadily Plato uses the article with the proper names.

μειδίαν etc. Cp. Phaedo 62 E, ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σ. ἡσθηναί τε μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, αἰεὶ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κ. λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ. 86 D, διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σ., ὡς περ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας. Ὁ ἀγαμένους cp. Phaed. 88 E, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πρότερον μᾶλλον ἡγάσθη ἢ τότε παραγεγόμενος ... ὡς ἡδέως ... τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο.

ὅπερ οὖν sc. αὐτοὺς ἀγασθαι τὸν Σ. as Heind. points out, 'which in point of fact (οὖν) Parm. declared they did.' Here again we have relat. with inf., 127 c.

p. 5. εἰπεῖν φάναι This Frederking regards as the normal usage of these verbs in such cases; εἰπεῖν part of the narrative, φάναι parenthetical.

B ἄξιός ἀγασθαι θαυμάζεσθαι c., Schol. t outer marg. 79 b 1, and Rh. Yet the verb seems active 'worthy to wonder at'; cp. Lys. 207 A, οὐ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἄξιός ἀκούσθαι, etc. Donaldson in a like case cites Waverley, 'a Prince to live and die under.' Still we have Alcib. 1. 105 B, ὅτι ἄξιός ἐστι τιμᾶσθαι, etc. We may take the inf. as in the gen., both from the ordinary govt. of ἄξιός, and from e.g. Phileb. 14 A, ἀρα ἄξιός ἄν εἶην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν;

τῆς ὀρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους, cp. 135 D. Probably 'your zeal for discussion' (τοὺς λόγους = τὸ διαλέγεσθαι): but it might also mean 'your eager attack upon Zeno's λόγοι.'

αὐτὸς σὺ 'Is this distinction your own?' says Grote; but does it not mean 'You ask if Zeno has done this: have you yourself done it?' What follows upon the ideas comes clearly under the criticism of Aristotle, Met. A. 9, 990 b 15 (Introd. xlv.) who defines τὰ πρός τι thus: Cat. 7, 6 a 36, Πρὸς τι ὁ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν

ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον τὸ μείζον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρου λέγεται. τινὸς γὰρ λέγεται μείζον· καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ... Again, ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον ... Again, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρός τι· ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόμοιον μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον λέγεται. Once more, πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότητος δοῦλος ... καὶ τὸ μείζον ἐλάττωτος, etc. In a word τὰ πρός τι are what we call 'qualities' as opposed to those complexes which are called 'things' or 'objects.' And it may be observed that Socrates feels most confidence in the εἶδη which are πρὸς τι, and least in those which are objects or οὐσίαι.

ἄττα Sophist., 255 E, speaks of 5 as a minimum. In A the breathing is patched (Notes 1). t reads ἄττα. Authorities say ἄττα = τινά, ἄττα = ἄτινα. But the latter form alone is found in Attic inscriptions. (Gramm. der Att. Inschr., p. 123, Meisterhans.) 'Recte Stephanus καὶ τί σοι δ. scribendum vidit pro vulgato καὶ τί σοι δ.' Stallb. I.e. the τι = aliiquid, not quid? The constr. is καὶ σοι δοκεῖ αὐτῇ ὁμοιότητι εἶναι τι χωρὶς τῆς ὁμοιότητος ἣν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν, καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ ἐν καὶ ... ἠκούετε, χωρὶς ὧν ... ;

αὐτῇ ὁμοιότητι This seems to have been the orig. from which the variants come. Stallb. thinks the want of the article led to all the changes. Notes 1.

ἴσα νῦν δὴ ζήνωνος Zeno has urged only that the sensible many must be 'like and unlike, which is impossible.' Even if we suppose Parm. to allude to all the λόγοι or γράμματα he can only mean—'Do you assume εἶδη for those qualities which Zeno was proving to be inseparable from a sensible many, with a view to disproving the existence of this latter?' From Phaedr. 261 D, τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμῆδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνην, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ (1) ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, (2) καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, (3) μένοντά τε αὐτὰ καὶ φερόμενα; we see that the only remaining εἶδη to be covered by πάντα ὅσα would be στάσις καὶ κίνησις—if the list in Phaedr. is exhaustive. For the general vagueness and absence of order and gradation in the ideal sphere as here embodied cp. Introd. xxx., xlii. Damasc., § 95, p. 237, speaks of a διπλὸς μερισμὸς—ὁ μὲν κατὰ βάθος τῆς καθ' ἕφεσιν ἀπορροούσης ὄλης σειρᾶς, ὁ δὲ κατὰ πλάτος τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχομένων εἰδῶν, but we have here rather a refer-

ence to the concretion of a single idea, so to speak, from pure *αὐτοάνθρωπος* to our *ἄνθρωπος* in a *σειρά*, than to a succession of ideas.

τοιαῦτα, τ has *τοιάδε*, more usual in ref. to what follows; but cp. Jelf 655, 6.

δικαίου Adjs. as nouns without art. beside τὸν *σωκ.*, τὸν *παρμ.* It is hard to give a rationale. See *Phaedo* 76 D-77 A.

πάντων αὐ This list is separate from Zeno's *πάντα ὄσα*. Is it a series of *εἶδη* bearing on conduct?

C *καὶ τῶν οἰοί ... πάντων* 'i.e. *καὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων τοιούτων οἰοί ἡμεῖς* (ego, tu, ceterique qui adsunt) *ἔσμεν*, s. *πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων ἀνθρώπων.*' Heind. 'Sed grammaticae rationi convenientius ita potius interpretaberis: *καὶ χωρὶς τῶν πάντων, οἰοί ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν*, h.e. ... *speciem se junctam a nobis et ab omnibus iis, quae talia sunt, quales nos sumus.* Ex quo clarum est, cur deinde adiiciatur *αὐτό τι ... ὕδατος*; Etenim *Parm.* vult non tantum homines, sed omnia, quae sub sensus subjecta sunt intelligi.' Stallb. This is better, except as to *χωρὶς τῶν πάντων*. The sense seems to be *χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰοί-ἡμεῖς-ἔσμεν* (i.e. *τῶν ὄρατῶν*) *πάντων*, and Stallb. so translates. Failing this it would be better to read *καὶ τῶνδ' οἰοί*. The constr. would be improved by omitting *ἀνθρώπου εἶδος*, or transposing *τί δ' ἀνθρώπου εἶδος—αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος, χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰοί ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν πάντων.* See *Phileb.* 15 A, *ὅταν δέ τις ἓνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βούν ἓνα, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ πολλῇ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.* We have got ideas of physical qualities and of moral qualities; we now take the important step of assuming ideas for sensible things or complexes of qualities. Such *Arist.* calls (*Met.* II. 2, 997 b 10) the same with the sensible objects but eternal. *παραπλήσιον ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεοῖς μὲν εἶναι φάσκουσιν, ἀνθρωποειδῆς δέ· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκείνοι οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἐποιοῦν ἢ ἀνθρώπους αἰδίους, οὐθ' οἱ τοῖς τὰ εἶδη ἄλλ' ἢ αἰσθητὰ αἰδία.* He adds (XI. 3, 1070 a 18) that such ideas according to Plato *ἔστιν ὅποσα φύσει, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἶδη ἄλλα τούτων, οἷον πῦρ, σάργξ, κεφαλὴ.* Cp. *Damasc.* § 102, p. 263, *τὰ πολλὰ εἶδη φαινόμενα τῶν πολλῶν ἀληθινῶν εἰδῶν ἔστι τεκμήρια*, etc. That ideas for 'things' are an advance upon ideas for single qualities is the view implied in *Arist. Phys.* II. 2, 193 b 36, *τὰ γὰρ*

φυσικὰ χωρίζουσιν, ἦττον ὄντα χωριστὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.

ἢ πυρὸς etc. Ficinus 'et ignis etiam et aquae,' qua si legisset ἢ καὶ πυρὸς ἢ ὕδατος, non male. Heind. Such is the sense clearly.

αὐτῶν for *τούτων*, so in E.

ἀ ... δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, sc. *εἴ τις φαίη καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς*: more simply (*ὁ καὶ γελοῖον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι*).

οἷον θριξ What is the rationale of the nom.? Is it = ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε οἷον (*ἔστὶ*) *θριξ*, helped by the intervening *δέ*? Is *ρύπος* only here in Plato?

αὐ τῶν τῆδε ὦν Both *Μ* (Notes 1.) have *αὐτῶν ἢ ὦν*, which can hardly be right. Editors with *Π* drop ἢ; even so *αὐτῶν* is rather unsuitable. 'Sed *αὐτῶν* hoc vide an rectius mutetur in *αὐ τῶν*. Ut *Theaet.* 204 D, *ταῦτόν ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὄσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστὶ*,' etc., Heind. But Stallb. defends *αὐτῶν* positum pro *τούτων* quanquam paullo alia vi et significatione. We have had this above, and it occurs in E below. But this rather makes against a third case so near. Yet *αὐ τῶν ὦν* seems harsh, and ἢ is unexplained. Our *τῆδε* justifies both the ἢ and the *αὐ τῶν*, and makes excellent sense; see *Phaedr.* 249 D, 'Ἔστι δὴ ὄν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἡκῶν λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης *μανίας*, ἣν ὅταν τὸ τῆδε τις ὄρων κάλλος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμυνησκόμενος, περῶται τε καὶ etc.; and 250 B, *οὐκ ἔνεστι φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῆδε ὁμοιώμασι.* Proclus, too, repeatedly uses *τὰ τῆδε* as an expression for *τὰ ὄρατά*, e.g. V. 5. ON 130 B, *πῶς μετέχεται (τὰ εἶδη) ὑπὸ τῶν τῆδε, καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς μεθέξεως*; So, too, *Damasc.*, § 91, p. 226, *ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὁ τῆδε ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ ἐκεῖ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος*, and elsewhere. A palaeographer will know that a contracted *τῆδε* in majuscules might be very like *Η*. The class of things here discussed is merely another type of *ἄπερ ὀρώμεν*; if an *εἶδος πυρὸς* be granted so may an *εἶδος πηλοῦ*. The only difference is the greater unworthiness (*Introd.* xli. ff.).

οὐδαμῶς appears to deny the question ἢ ... ἀπορείς; D

ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι 'sc. *οἶμαι, φημί*,' Heind. This of course occurs even to a Zeno; indeed were it otherwise there would be no problem.

οιηθῆναι εἶναι Although a passive sense would be quite good, the active is meant. See *Ast.* One might supply (*ἀπορώ*) *μὴ λίαν*, or *δέδοικα*, which is to hand. Grote refers here to the note

of Alexander on Arist. Met. i. 991 a 23, Bekker iv. 575 a 30, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶν τινῶν γενέσεις τεταγμένα μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς ἰδέαν, οἷον σκωλήκων ἐμπίδων τερηδόνων. Proclus expands on the question of what ideas are to be admitted; but his views, incorporating all that appears in Timaeus, and indeed in generations of commentary, are far in advance of Plato's present stage. He explains the hesitation of Socrates about an idea of man by urging that man as known to us is at the lower end of a series of which the idea is the upper (cp. on B), οὐ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτως μετασχὼν ἀνθρώπου ἐρῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐσχάτως, and thus εἰκότως παμπόλλην ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν διαφοροτήτητα καθορῶμεν (v. 41). Again he rejects hair as being a mere part of that which comes from a rational pattern; and πηλὸς as a σύμμιξις δύο στοιχείων ἀόριστος, οὐ κατὰ λόγον γενομένη; and finally ῥύπος because all κάθαρσις is removal of ῥύπος, and while there is an idea of the former there is none of the latter as being a κακία to be cleared away: of κακίαι there are no ideas (v. 61) he affirms.

ἤδη μέντοι ... ἔθραξε Heind. would read μέν τι, after Phaedr. 242 c, ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔθραξε μέν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον. With which cp. Phaedo 86 E, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὐθράττον, and 103 c. But he has to admit that Theaet. 187 c differs, Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ ... γεγονέαι, etc., where there is no specific nom. to the verb. Stallb. objects that the change does not improve the sense, and also that the subj. is contained in the words μή ... ταῦτόν, which on Heind.'s assumption would be in appos. with τι. In place of our Schol. † gives ἐτάραξεν, 'ἠνώχλησεν,' ἔνυξεν: so Rhunk. Suidas gives the same meanings, and adds δυνωπέισθαι καὶ ὑφορᾶσθαι. The glossary of Timaeus also gives ταραττει κινεῖ.

μή τι ἢ π. π. ταῦτόν 'lest something the same might be the case in regard to all,' 'ob es nicht bei allen dasselbe wäre' (Engelm. Transl.); but what sense does it convey? Heind. says 'ne idem sit in omnibus, i.e. ne eadem sit omnium omnino rerum ratio, ut suum quaeque εἶδος habeat': meaning that after all θριξ πηλὸς etc., may have each their idea (he almost needlessly guards us from reading μή τι (εἶδος) ἢ π. π. ταῦτόν). In this case the ἀβυθ. φλυαρ. would arise from the hopeless complication of the theory when thus extended. Our marginal

summary gives another view, which also seems tenable: the difficulty involved in the conception of ideas for θριξ πηλὸς etc., is so great that he is sometimes driven to think that as there are no ideas for them so there is none for anything—the μή τι ταῦτόν referring to εἶδος οἰηθῆναι ... ἄτοπον. In this case the ἀβ. φλυ. would arise from the sea of sensible perceptions unregulated by any idea. Cp. Timae. 51 c, ἄρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πάντα, περὶ ὧν ἀεὶ λέγομεν οὕτως, ... ἢ ταῦτα ἄπερ καὶ βλέπομεν ὅσα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα μόνα ἐστί, ... ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ... ἄλλα μάτην ἐκάστοτε εἶναι τί φαμεν εἶδος ἐκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος; The language seems a compromise between μή ἢ π. π. ταῦτόν and μή τι ἢ π. π. τοιοῦτον.

ταύτη ἰστώ, The reading of Ἔ is as given with the aspirate and long initial ι, and (although t gives ταύτη στῶ) an effort should be made to maintain a form so clearly given. Proclus quotes τ. ἐγὼ ἰστώ. It may be noted that ταύτη is scarcely used = ἐκεῖ or τῆδε with a verb of rest like στῶ. Even in Philoct. 1331, ἔως ἂν αὐτὸς ἥλιος | ταύτη μὲν αἶρη, τῆδε δ' αὐτὸν δύνῃ πάλιν the verb is one of motion; and so generally when used of place it means 'in this direction,' 'by this road,' with a verb of motion. Could an object be understood with ἰστώ, such as τὰ πράγματα, τὸν λόγον? The sense would be either 'when I place matters in this fashion' or 'when I weigh the subject in this manner.' In Euthyphr. 7 c we come within sight of the latter use, καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθείμεν ἂν; and Prot. 356 B, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἄνθρωπος where the context gives the meaning. For the former sense cp. Theaet. 171 D, ἢ καὶ ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον ...;

φεύγων οἰχομαι The participle with this verb is common, especially ἀπιῶν and φερόμενος. For the sense see Phaedo 98 B, ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ψυχόμεν φερόμενος. Phileb. 13 D, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχίσεται.

ἄβυθον φλυ. There is no doubt of the reading (Notes I.), though ἄμυθον is found, probably by confusion of the old minuscule u = β with a cursive μ. The sense is clear, although the adjective seems unique. 'Denique Synesius qui ad hunc locum

respexit ... et Origenes ... legerunt ipsi quoque ἄβυθον non ἄμυθον. Nam Celsus quidem dixit εἰς πέλαγος φλυαρίας ἐμπεσόντων sed verba Synesii haec sunt, καὶ κίνδυνος εἰς ἄβυσσόν τινα φλυαρίας ἐμπεσόντας διαφθαρήναι· ὃ καὶ Σωκράτης ἐφοβήθη παθεῖν, καὶ τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἀπεκρύψατο φίλους ἄνδρας, Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα. Atque his ex locis Vyttenbachius, in Notis ad Plutarch, de S. N. V., p. 72, putabat satis apparere, apud Platonem reponi debere εἰς τινα ἄβυσσον φλυαρίας. At neuter, neque Orig. neque Synes. retinuisse videtur ipsa verba Platonis, immo utrumque imitari tantum voluisse arbitror omnino formam loquendi, ita ut non dubitarint adjectivi loco substantiva ponere.' Fisch. L. and S. suggest that we should read εἰς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας, which has some support from the text of *Ἁ* and the reading φλυαρίας suggested by the words of Synes. But the text of Proclus v. 64 reads λοιπὸν καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἄβυθος φλυαρία, εἰς ἣν etc.

ἐκέεισε δ' οὖν ... εἰς ᾱ = εἰς ἐκεῖνα δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος ᾱ ... οἱ ἐκέεισε ... οὗ ἐστι τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα εἶδη ἔχειν What is the exact sense of δ' οὖν? Perhaps 'however that may be (about my fear of destruction, etc.) at all events I get back to the safer ground just referred to.' The ᾱ are probably the two groups referred to in *B* above—Zeno's group and the next. ἐλέγομεν, cp. note, 129 D.

E περὶ ἐκεῖνα There is good Platonic authority for taking this either with *πραγ.* or with *διατρ.*

νέος γὰρ So Theaet. 162 D, Νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· ταῖς οὖν δημηγορίαις ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. What does γὰρ meet?—the δέισας etc., the ἔθραξε etc., or the μὴ λῖαν ἢ ἄτοπον? Perhaps the general sense of contempt for the suggestion of ideas which are common and unclean; this would appear from ἀτιμάσεις which follows.

οὕτω σου ἀντίελ. So Phaedo 88 D, θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ On the whole passage see Procl. v. 65-7, Ταῦτα ὁ Π. ἐπιπλήττων ἀποροῦντι τῷ Σ. δόξειεν ἂν τισιν αὐτὸς ἰδέας ἀποτίθεσθαι πάντων, καὶ ὅσα σμικρὰ καὶ ὅσα ἐνυλότατα καὶ ὅσα παρὰ φύσιν ... ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ μὴ πρὸς τοῦτο πεποιήσθαι τὴν ἐπίπληξιν, ἀλλὰ ... τὸ ἀναίτιον οὐδαμῶς προσιέμενος (meaning all has a cause, but that cause is not necessarily an idea? Questionable.), πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου

τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι φησὶ καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος· ... οὐδὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὕτως ἄτιμον καὶ φαῦλον, ὃ μὴ μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κάκειθεν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν ... ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαι τὰ σμικρὰ καὶ εὐτελεῖ τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἐξάπτειν ἐξαισχύονται ... οἱ δὲ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι πάντα ὅσα περ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μέγιστα καὶ σμικρὰ προνοίας ἐξάψαντες οὐδὲν ἄτιμον οὐδὲ ἀπόβλητον ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ Διὸς ὀρώσιν ... ὅτι δὲ ὁ Σ. ἀναιρῶν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ἐνυλοτάτων τὴν ἐδηγτικὴν αἰτίαν ἀνῆρει καὶ πάσαν αἰτίαν ἔλαβεν ὁ Π. ... ἡ θριξὶ μὴ ἐχέτω μὲν παράδειγμα νοερόν, ἐχέτω δὲ φυσικὸν λόγον αἰτίου. ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὴ ταύτην εἶναι τρίχα μόνον ἣν ὀρώμεν, ἀλλὰ κάκεινην τὴν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως; δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ τρίχας ποιούσα ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ οὐ μάρτην οὐδὲ ταύτας ὑποστήσασα καὶ ἡ ἔκλειψις ἡ τούτων παρὰ φύσιν, διατιθεῖσα τὰ δεόμενα τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν βοθηθείας. ... καὶ εἰ ἀπορήσειας δὲ τῶν προσεχῶν αἰτίων, ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀνάδραμε τὴν μίαν τοῦ ὄντος αἰτίαν ἀφ' ἧς πάντα τὰ ὄντα προελήλυθε, καὶ ἐκείνην φάθι καὶ τούτοις παρέχειν τὴν γένεσιν, ὡς μὴδὲ τούτων ἀναίτιον εἶναι τὴν ὑπόστασιν. καὶ ἴσως ἔπρεπε τῷ Π. τῷ τὸ ἐν ὄν τὸ πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν ὀρώντι τὸ "κατ' αἰτίαν" προτιθεῖναι τοῦ "κατ' εἶδος" καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιπλήττει τῷ Σ., μετὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀναιροῦντι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πάσαν αἰτίαν, δέον μὴ κατ' εἶδος μὲν αὐτὸν νοερόν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὴν γένεσιν, κατ' αἰτίαν δὲ πρὸς βυτίαν τῶν εἰδῶν (better, not worse, than ideas?) ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἡμεῖς τὰ τεχνητὰ ποιῶμεν, ποιεῖ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ νοῦς ...

αὐτῶν See Notes I and above c. The observation οὐδὲν ᾱ. ἀτιμάσεις, etc., must be for the Platonic Socrates, not the Socrates of history, who had little regard for the conventional dignity of philosophy, and who did not touch these inquiries—οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἦπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλοῦμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφην ... αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων αἰεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές ... Xen. Mem. I. i. 11-16. We are to hold not that Plato draws no distinctions between diverse objects, but that he sets any such distinctions aside in the interests of philosophy. Thus in Polit. 266 D, Νῦν, ἐκεῖνό ἐστι καταφανὲς μᾶλλον ... ὅτι τῇ τοιαύτῃ μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὕτε σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν ἢ μή, τὸν τε σμικρότερον οὐδὲν ἡτίμακε πρὸ τοῦ μείζονος, etc.; cp. Soph. 227 A. On the other hand when looking at them from the standpoint of

character he speaks—Theaet. 174 C-D—of ‘practical’ matters with scorn,—οὐ προσποιήτως ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν, etc.

¹³¹ ὄν ... ἴσχειν. Ὅν εἶναι εἶδη ἅττα, see for variants Notes I. For constr. cp. 127 c. Stallb. well cites Phaed. 102 B, ὁμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τὰλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, and Symp. 210 E-211 B, κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν ... αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς αἰεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα. For the language see Soph. 257 C, ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσιν φαίνεται κατακεκερματισθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη ... μία μὲν ἐστὶ πον καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν. Herodt. VII. 121, Θέρμη δὲ ... ἀπ' ἧς καὶ ὁ κόλπος οὄτος τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει. Dam., § 86, 205, says ἀλλ' ὅμως τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὀνόματά τε καὶ νοήματα—noteworthy. μεταλαμβάν. the present is descriptive—you see the process going on, and with the process comes the name: μεταλαμβάν. is a narrative reference to the description given, the participation has now taken place, whence the likeness. It is clear that the εἶδη are much fewer than τὰ ἄλλα. “Because there is only one idea for each class of things (Rep. VI. 493 E, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ, ἢ αὐτὸ τι ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα, ἔσθ' ὅπως πλήθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι;) ideas are also termed ἐνάδες or μονάδες (ὅταν δὲ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῆ τίθεσθαι καὶ βούν ἕνα ... περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ πολλῇ ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται ... πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τις δὲ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὐσας, etc.), Phileb. 15 A.” Zeller.

μεγέθους. This, with σμικρότης, ἰσότης, and others is fairly hit by Arist. Phys. IV. 1, 209 A 17, ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα σώματα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν οὐδὲν γίνεται μέγεθος—if the idea in such cases is an entity.

χωρὶς τούτων ‘h. e. praeter haec,’ Stallb. Symp. 211 B gives a vague suggestion of the μετάληψις—τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιούτον, οἷον γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων μηδὲν ἐκείνου μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον γίνεσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν. It may be true even of a conception that you must possess either the whole or a part of it if you possess it at all; yet

one feels instinctively that Plato is here somewhat governed by physical analogies, and tends to think of the idea as extended. On ὄλου τοῦ εἶ. we may use a phrase of Dam. § 87, 207—individuals differ, he suggests, only by place; the idea is the same, ὡς εἴ τις ἀφέλοι τὴν ὕλην ἐν ἄν τὸ ὄλον εἶδος ἐφάνθη. At § 90, 225, he distinguishes ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρωθεν τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ζῶον, ταύτη μεθέξις· ἢ δὲ συμπληροῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ταύτη ὑπαρξίς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Also § 126, ii. 2, without actually dealing with participation of ideas, he discusses the meaning of the word and the possible varieties of the fact—ἐνωσις, σύγκρισις, πάραθεσις, and finds difficulties on all sides; but adds Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεινὸς ὁ λόγος, εἰ διεσπασμένα πάντα ποιήσει ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ... καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν διαφθερεῖ ὁ λόγος. Οὐ γὰρ ἐξέσται αὐτῷ λέγειν κεχωρισθαι ἀλλήλων τὰ πράγματα· μεθέξει γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τοῦ πρὸς ἀλλήλα χωρισμοῦ. In fact we are back at the negation of predication (Intro. lx.), for, he says elsewhere, § 70, 152, τὸ ἡνωμένον εἰ γινώσκουτο, οὐκ ἔσται μόνον ἡνωμένον ἀλλὰ καὶ γνωστόν,—which makes it two at least.

πότερον ... ἐν εἶναι: πότερον preceded by ὄλου ἢ μέρους and followed by ὄλον leads one to expect ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ; in place of ἢ πῶς; But the context might suggest that πότερον is superfluous; and that he means to begin δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, and is for the present taking up only the former alternative of ὄλου, and dwelling not on that alternative but on the question of the idea remaining one in the process (ἐν ὄν=ita ut unum sit. Heind.) This view is enforced by ἐν εἶναι, which, again, Schleiermacher changes to ἐνεῖναι against ἄτ. Stallb. agrees; Heind. dissents, giving as the meaning τί γὰρ κωλύει ὄλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν πολλῶν ἐνδὸν ἐν εἶναι; of which Stallb. says (why?) contorta est Heindorfii interpretatio.

ἐν πολλοῖς χ. t has καὶ c. before χωρὶς, which adds B force.

ἐν ἔσται. So ἄ; t also, but on eras. “Ἐνεσται might p. 6 be better; but Plato may be purposely harping on the ἐν εἶναι—if there is nothing to prevent it being one, at least it ‘will be one’ in such a way as to be separate from itself.

εἴ γε, φάναι etc. As to the text, setting aside stops, ἄτ agree on the following—οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα εἴη μία καὶ ἢ αὐτῇ οὐσα πολλαχού ἅμα ἐστὶ, while t begins with

οὐκάν εἶναι φάναι followed by a stop. Some change seems needed, and εἶ γε seems preferable to εἶναι. The phrase οἶον εἶ lacks Platonic authority, and has been changed by some to οἶον ἦ. Again the εἶη following has been omitted so as to give οἶον ἦ ἡμέρα, μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔσα: this ἦ seems superfluous, while the ommiss. of εἶη is questionable. Yet some omission is called for; and we may note the repeated use of εἶ, ἦ, and the collocation εἶημι in quick succession. Any text involves a somewhat broken construction which is picked up at εἶ οὕτω. In Proclus' comments the phrase εἶ γε οἶον ἡμέρα εἶη without article occurs v. 12. The text given demands little change, and yields a satisfactory sense, the break in constr. being as follows—οὐκ ἂν εἶ γε, φάναι, οἶον εἶη ἡμέρα (ἦ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔσα πολλαχού ἅμα ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν)—εἶ οὕτω, 'not if it were some such thing as day, which, etc. ... if in such a fashion as this, I say, each of the ideas preserved its identity in all things.' Procl. says δι' ὑπερβατοῦ τὸ ὄλον συναπτέον· φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σ. μὴ ἂν συμβῆναι τοῦτο ὄν ἄτοπον, ὃ φησιν ὁ Π., "εἶ γε οἶον ἡμέρα εἶη, οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταῦτὸν εἶη" (where the interpretation differs a little from ours). δεύτερον δὲ τὸ "εἶ οὕτω" διὰ τὴν ἐπανάληψιν οἰητέον ἔχειν τὸ "εἶ τοῦτο" προκείμενον, ἐν γὰρ ταῖς διὰ πλείονος ἀποδόσεσιν αἱ ἐπαναλήψεις χρήσιμοι· τρίτον δὲ τὸ "μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔσα πολλαχού ἅμα ἐστὶ" μεταξὺ ῥηθὲν κατὰ ἀποστασιν ἀκουστέον. In illustrating he reminds us, though without referring to the Rep., of the analogies ἥλιος—ἀγαθόν, φῶς (ἡμέρα)—τὰ εἶδη, σκότος—ἕλλη (τάδε τὰ ἄλλα). And he adds (v. 101) καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγου τὸ παράδειγμα εἴληφε, δῆλον· (on what authority?) ἐκείνος γὰρ δηλώσαι βουλόμενος, ὅπως τὰ πολλὰ μετέχει τινὸς ἐνὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἔρημα ἐνὸς κἂν διεισθήκει πορρωτάτω ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, εἶπεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ μίαν οὔσαν τὴν λευκότητα παρεῖναι καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἀντίποσιν οὕτως ὡς τὴν εὐφρόνην καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ... ἀλλ', οἶμαι, Ζ. ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνύλου εἶδους τὸ παράδειγμα θεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐν καὶ οὐχ ἐν μεριστώ μετεχόμενον ... τῷ... παραδείγματι τοῦ τοιοῦτου εἶδους ὀρθῶς ἐχρήτο καὶ ἀνελέγκτως· ὁ δὲ Σ. ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ ἀμερίστου ὄντος καὶ ἐνὸς ἅμα παρόντος τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. Arist., Phys. III. 6, 206 a 30, says of the ἄπειρον—οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς τὸδε τι, οἶον ἀνθρωπον ἢ οἰκίαν,

ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀγών, οἷς τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς οὐσία τις γέγοιεν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν γενέσει ἢ φθορᾷ, εἰ καὶ πεπερασμένοι, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ γε ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον.

ἡδέως ἀντὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν νῦν. σημαίνει δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὸ εὐήθως καὶ τὸ γελοίως. Schol. Rhunk. 'Male Schol. ... Ironice hic quoque adhibetur hoc verbum' Heind. = lepide, 'that is a pleasant conceit of yours, to prove your case by, as it were, putting men under a sail and saying,' etc.

οἶον εἶ etc. The οἶον εἶ here are separate, not as they would have been above οἶονεἶ (or as Plato puts it, οἶονπερὲ στοιχεῖα, Theaet. 201 E). The phrase ἰστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρ. seems an odd reversal, and recalls αὐτοὺς ὕβρει περιέθηκε, Diog. Laert. VI. 3 3, and still better Choeph. 576, νεκρὸν θήσω ποδώκει περιβαλὼν χαλκεύματι.

τὸ τοιοῦτ. One almost wishes τι τοι., but cp. E. C ἡγεῖ λέγειν as 127 E without the pron. as subj. to the inf.; see Rep. I. 338 A, σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναί καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, and a little lower ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην. Although Parmenides makes merry over such an idea, does not his own ἐν συνεχῆς bear some colourable resemblance to it?

ἦ οὖν ἢ h.l. idem est quod πότερον. Heind.; but it means rather more, 'would the whole really be present then, or only a part?' Immediately below it recurs, but this time suggesting the improbability of the other alternative. οὐκ ἔτι So ᾿ for οὐκέτι. ἐν ἐκάστῳ Note the change of reference in the next ἐκάστου—οὐκ ἔτι ἐν ἐκάστῳ (τῶν πολλῶν) ὄλον (τι εἶδος εἶη), ἀλλὰ μέρος ἐκάστου (τοῦ εἶδους ἐν ἐκάστῳ) ἂν εἶη. οὕτω γε 'according to this reasoning?'

ἦ οὖν—᾿ εἶ οὖν, τ ἦ οὖν: another error by dict? φάναι Is this word parenthetic? If so, one of two things follows; (1) either the phrase τὸ ἐν ... μερίζεσθαι as a whole is an object to ἐθελήσεις, while that verb generally governs, at least in Attic, a mere infinitive (ἐθέλω πείθεσθαι, ποιῆν, etc.); (2) or μερίζεσθαι must be used in an active sense; which is rare, although if taken with ἡμῖν it might yield a good sense—'Do you wish then to be in very truth a party to our splitting up the one idea among us?' But we have parallels to the use of φάναι governing an inf. and itself governed by a verb like ἐθέλειν—Rep. VI. 510 A, ἦ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διηρησθαι ἀληθεία τε καὶ μῆ;

Theaet. 171 E, ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον... ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὐτό. Polit. 276 B, ἐπιμέλεια δὲ ... οὐδεμία ἂν ἐθελήσειεν ἑτέρα μᾶλλον ... φάναι καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς εἶναι τέχνη. The only objection to this construction is the other use of φάναι so repeatedly; and there is a further argument in its favour that it gives a definite sense to ἡμῖν (to divide among us all the one εἶδος ἀνθρώπου) which in the other case would seem a mere adjunct to τὸ ἐν εἶδος = 'our one εἶδος.' Yet for such a use see E below, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι etc.

καὶ ... εἰπεῖν: We may make καὶ ... ἔσται; a fresh interrog. sent.; but it is as likely to be part of the previous one with the constr. varied—see Riddell's Platonic idioms, § 277 b (Apology, Clar. Press)—while οὐδαμῶς gives a denial to both φάναι etc. and ἔσται. We bring out the force of γὰρ thus—καὶ καλῶς γε, ὅρα γάρ.

D καὶ ἕκ. ... ἔσται 'and each of the many objects which rank as "big" will be such in virtue of a portion of bigness which is smaller than "bigness" proper.' φαίνεται—ἴ better, φανείται: but the point is small. δαί; See Intro. lxxxi. and Notes I.

τοῦ ἴσου μέρους etc. So Ἄτ, though ἴ has os above -ous. The reading is rather difficult, and it is just possible that an orig. os has been changed through the ambiguities arising from ἕκαστον and σμικρόν. If retained the phrase must mean 'the "equal" section of our ideal kingdom.' The order of words is ἕκαστον (των πολλῶν) ἀπολαβὸν σμικρόν τι τοῦ ἴσου μέρους, τὸ ἔχον (τοῦτο τὸ σμικρόν) ἕξει (τι) ᾧ, ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου, ἴσον τῷ ἔσται; As Heind. notes τὸ ἔχον might be omitted.

τούτου ... ὄντος. i.e. τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ μέρους αὐτὸ) τὸ σμικρόν μείζον ἔσται ἄτε (τούτου) μέρους ἕαντοῦ [sc. τοῦ σμικροῦ] ὄντος.

καὶ οὕτω 'smallness' will become bigger thus—a change which should be impossible to it—in one of two ways: (1) either by being, as we have seen, greater than its part, (2) or by having something taken from it, for like a negative quantity it grows by deductions—as he goes on, the addition of a bit of smallness (i.e. of a negative quantity) lessens the size of that which receives it. This is partly jocular. Plato knows that if 'smallness' proper be indeed greater than its part, then the part cannot reduce the size of that to which it accrues; while if the

latter is the case it follows that 'smallness' itself would reduce the object still more, and is therefore smaller than its part. τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν is the μέρος just E referred to. Cp. Ar., Phys. I. 4, 187 b 35, εἰ ἅπαν μὲν σῶμα ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἔλαττον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ σαρκὸς ὄρισται τὸ ποσὸν καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, φανερόν ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἐλαχίστης σαρκὸς οὐθὲν ἐκκριθήσεται σῶμα· ἔσται γὰρ ἔλαττον τῆς ἐλαχίστης. Proc. v. 115, ἄποπον ἄρα διαιρετὸν ἠγείσθαι τὸ σμικρόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μέρος, διότι μὲν ἔλασσον ἔστι τὸ ὅλου, μείζον ἐκείνου πάντως ἀποφαίνει, διότι δὲ τῷ λοιπῷ προστίθεται, μείζον αὐτὸ τὸ τὴν προσθήκην λαβὸν ἀπεργάζεται ... ὁ καὶ ἔδοξε τισὶν οὕτω δυσδιάθετον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῖς [αὐτὰ, Bekk.] καταλέξει τινὰς καὶ περιγράψαι τῶν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὁρημάτων.

τίνα οὖν ... διορ. Proc. (116) dwells on the conditions of the problem here with great point, but without answering this question. ἀδιάστατα (without dimensions) ἄρα πάντα τὰ εἶδη ἐστὶ· κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τόπου παντὸς ὑπερίδρυνται· πᾶσι γὰρ πανταχοῦ τοῖς μετέχουσιν ἀκωλύτως πάρεστι. τὰ δὲ ἐν τόπῳ κρατούμενα τῆς ἀκωλύτου ταύτης παρουσίας ἄμοιρα πέφυκε. ... ὡσαύτως γε καὶ χρόνου παντὸς ὑπερήπλωται· πάρεστι γὰρ ἀχρόνως ἅπασι καὶ ἀθρόως· ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ γενέσεις προπαρασκευαίαι τινές εἰσι τῆς ἐκείνων μεθέξεως ... μὴ τοῖνυν ἀπὸ τῶν μετεχόντων ἐπὶ τὰ μετεχόμενα μεταφερέτω τις ἢ τὸν χρόνον ἢ τὴν τοπικὴν περίληψιν ἢ τὸν σωματικὸν μερισμὸν, μηδ' ὅλους συνθέσεις ἢ διαιρέσεις σωματοειδεῖς ἐν ἐκείνοις ἐπινοεῖτω. πόρρω γὰρ ταῦτα διέστηκε τῶν εἰδῶν τῆς ἀπλότητος τῆς αὐλοῦ, τῆς καθαρότητος τῆς ἐν αἰῶνι συνεχομένης ἀμεροῦς ὑποστάσεως. We have learnt above so far that the ideas are certain moulding formative entities existing apart, and grasped by reason. Their function is to introduce method, form, meaning into the many of sense (but how πολλὰ without ἐν etc.?), and we see that this is done by their entering into these, or giving the latter a share in them, and that either κατὰ ὄλον or κατὰ μέρος, if at all. The whole argument suggests physical conditions and analogies, none the less so because of the special ideas selected for treatment; and Proc. enters a caveat that such physical conditions as space, time, dimensions are out of place. He adds an elucidation of the difficulty, which amounts to this, that the many may be ranged in

grades, the more exalted of which come close in character to the ideas, and may partake of them with practical completeness; the others tail off towards matter, and partake of less and less, or of mere εἰδῶλα, of the ideas. Parmenides, he says, ἀνακινεῖ τὸν Σ. καὶ προκαλεῖται τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ νοῦν εἰς τὴν τῆς κυριωτάτης μεθέξεως εὔρεσιν By those who understand the whole and part μὴ σωματικῶς, ἀλλὰ προσφόρως ταῖς ἀύλοις καὶ νοεραῖς οὐσίαις, ὀφθήσεται τὰ τῆδε καὶ ὄλων μετέχοντα τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ μερῶν . . . καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα τῶν μετεχόντων πλείους ὑποδέχεται τοῦ παραδείγματος (we have not got this length yet in the text) δυνάμεις, τὰ δὲ κοιλότερα ἐλάσσους. He even supposes men in other parts of the universe μάλλον ἔγγυς ὄντας τῆς ἀνθρώπου ιδέας, and so partaking of it κατὰ πλείους δυνάμεις, and adds οὕτως ἢ μία ιδιότης ἀνωθεν καθήκει μεχρὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων . . . σειραὶ γάρ τινες ἀπὸ τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καθήκουσι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶνδε πάλιν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, καθ' ἕκαστον στοιχείον ἐξαλλαττόμεναι καὶ μέχρι γῆς ὑφικάνουσαι. τούτων δὲ τῶν σειρῶν τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα μειζόνως μετέχει τῶν παραδειγμάτων, τὰ δὲ χαμαιζηλότερα ἐλασσόνως, τῆς ιδιότητος ἐπὶ πάντα τῆς μίας ἐκτεινομένης, ἢ καὶ ποιεῖ μίαν τὴν ὅλην σειράν. And so Dam. § 206 II. 89, ἢ σειρά προποδισμός ἐστιν οὐσίας ἀπὸ ἐνὸς εἰς πλῆθος ἐκμηρουμένης. Pl. has nothing of this.

ἐν ἕκαστον The latter is part of subj., the former of pred. ἐκ. εἶναι ἐν.

¹³² **ιδέα** 'h. l. non est idem quod εἶδος sed potius conspectus sive species quaedam menti objecta.' Heind. But we get here the origin of the technical term, as we do that of the idea it represents. ἐπὶ πάντα with ιδεῖν does not seem to be a common phrase with Pl.; L. and S. quote Iliad xxiii. 143, ιδῶν ἐπὶ οἶνοπα πόντον.

τί δ' . . . φαίνεσθαι; He seems at first to have meant αὐτὸ . . . μεγάλα to be subj. to some such verb as παρέξει, to which ἐν τι would be the obj.: as he wrote he made the latter the subj. and replaced παρέξει by φανείται as though he had begun τί δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ . . . μεγάλων. But again, φαίνεσθαι with its relative would more naturally be ψ . . . φανήσεται or φανείται. Either there is suggested dependence on the sense of the clause ἐν . . . φανείται, or a lapse into orat. obl. Either way the fact that φανείται precedes and ἀναφανήσεται

follows may help to explain the change. While we reason back to the ideas they, of course, prove to be the causes or rational elements of the things through which we reach them. In this case of μέγεθος the remark of Arist., Met. xi. 10, 1075 b 29, applies—ἐτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; τῆ ψυχῆ is here identical with τῆ διανοίᾳ.

αὐ που is the smallest change which yields a meaning from the text of Ἠ αὐτοῦ: † has αὐ μέγα.

ἀναφανή. Will start up beyond the end of the row. ἔτερον, Has no meaning here distinct from ἄλλο. B This idea is not 'different' in kind from the others, and it can be called a 'second' only if we arbitrarily call ἄλλο the first of the series.

ἄπειρα should in strictness be sing. to agree with ἐν ἕκαστον, but is attracted into the plur. by its mean. and by τῶν εἰδῶν. Having dealt a blow at the idea of μέγεθος or μετάληψις Parmenides now takes up the nature of the ideas themselves as apprehended by reason. Cp. Phaedo 74 B-C, ἀρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταυτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται τῷ δ' οὐ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. . . ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννεονόκας τε καὶ εἴληφας; ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Symp. 211 B, τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά ἰεναί ἢ ἐπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ αἰεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὡς περ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἐνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυεῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωματίων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, ἕως ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκείνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτήσῃ ὃ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γινῶ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἐστὶ καλόν. Phaedr. 249 B, δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρώπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῶν καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἰναί φαμεν καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄν ὄντως. In all these generalization is regarded as a certain and fruitful method, not a hopeless one: also the objection that we merely read into sensible objects what we wish to find there is parried in a fashion by the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις and the walking of the soul with God. It will be felt that they are in advance of our passage. In particular the rising gradations

of the Sympos. from *καλὰ σώματα* through *ἐπιτηδεύματα* and *μαθήματα*, while resembling roughly the *ἄνθρωπος, πῦρ—καλόν, ἀγαθόν—ἔν, πολλὰ* of our 130 B, in crescendo abstractness, show a much firmer grasp of the subject. In the Parmenides the process is treated almost hopelessly—as a chasing of the rainbow. Nor must we mistake the content. Our ideas of generalization are not what Plato has in his mind here (Intro. xlv.) though they do seem to be something like what he assumes in the dialogues just quoted. His meaning would be better suggested thus—

ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι then come successive generalizations.

τὰ τῆδε	+	1	+	2	+	3	+	4	+	etc.	+	n

τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα				τὸ μέγα		ἄλλο μ.		ἄλλο		ἄλλο		ἄλλο

Here the new *μέγα* does not arise in each case from a fresh generalization based on a new set of *τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα*. The latter are supposed to be exhausted in the first view—*ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι*—and the only new element at each step is the *τὸ μέγα* just previously reached. In this way not only does the process never end, but it is unfruitful in another sense. Each fresh judgment is what Kant calls analytic, not synthetic. All the evidence was led when the first was formed; in going on to a second and a third you add to that evidence merely a synopsis of itself. We may compare here—although it is used rather of the countless types of *εἶδη* than of the countless replicas of one—the language of Arist. already quoted, Met. I, 9, 990 b 1, *ζητοῦντες τῶνδὲ τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἶοιτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη.*

ἀλλὰ... μὴ 'What if... Should we perhaps say...?' So in Dam. often *μήποτε*, as § 42, 84, *μήποτε οὖν ἀσφαλέστερον λέγειν...* "Ἰδωμεν, ἄθρει, or so is omitted.

ἢ τούτων... προσήκη See Notes 1.: the order of the text is the more euphonious, and, so to say, distinguished. Is -κει of both Mss. due to dictation? p. 7. *ἐν γε ἰ ἐν τε.* But Heind. says 'prius propositionis membrum οὕτω γὰρ... εἶη explicatur per posterius hoc καὶ οὐκ... ἐλέγετο, sc. τὸ ἀπειρα εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος, ut parum hic apta videatur vocula τε.' He adds (not knowing \mathfrak{L}) scripserim ἐν τι ἔκ. With

regard to the whole passage—which has so struck some reader (Arethas?) that he has marked it with a *σημείωσαι* 'N.B.'—note that the process of reaching *εἶδη* by the method *ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι*, and the treating of them as *νόηματα* is much in accord with the *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* and the *ὀρίεσθαι καθόλου*, ascribed by Arist. to Socrates (Intro. xxix., xliii.). Plato does not accept the theory; but it is the first point at which the conception of an extended idea is definitely excluded. Grote refers to Simplicius on Arist. Categ. 8 b, 25, *τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνήρουν τὰς ποιότητας τελέως, τὸ ποῖον συγχωροῦντες εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἀντισθένης, ὅς ποτε Πλάτωνι διαμφισβητῶν ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη ἔππον μὲν ὄρω, ἰππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὄρω* etc. Here *ἰππότης* would be a *νόημα*, or with Porphyrius Simplicius etc., a *ψιλλὴ ἐπινοία* or *ἐννοία*. Referring to *ἐν ψυχαῖς* Grote says 'Here we have what Porphyry calls the deepest question of philosophy explicitly raised; and so far as we know for the first time.' Porph.'s words (Isag. to Categ. begin.) are *αὐτίκα περὶ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν τὸ μὲν εἶτε ὑφέστηκεν εἶτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κείται, εἶτε καὶ ὑφέστηκότα σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα, καὶ πότερον χωριστὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ὑφεστώτα, παραιτήσομαι λέγειν, βαθυτάτης οὐσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας καὶ ἄλλης μείζονος δεομένης ἐξετάσεως.* Grote refers to Simpl. on Categ. 8, 8 b *οἱ ὑπὸ τῆς Ἐρετρίας ἀνήρουν τὰς ποιότητας ὡς οὐδαμῶς ἐχούσας τι κοινὸν οὐσιῶδες, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ συνθέτοις ὑπαρχούσαις, and after referring also to Dicaearchus and Theop. he adds οὕτε γὰρ σώματα οὕτε ἀσωμάτους ἔθεντο εἶναι τὰς ποιότητας, ψιλὰς δὲ μόνως ἐννοίας αὐτὰς ὑπελάμβανον διακένως λεγομένας κατ' οὐδεμιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, οἷον ἀνθρωπότητα ἢ ἰππότητα.*

οὐδενός; etc. See Theaet. 163 E, *Τί δέ; μνήμη οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι; Ναί. Πότερον οὐδενός ἢ τινός; Τινὸς δὴ που.* That the *νόημα* must be *τινός* is clear: it is not clear that it must be *ὄντος*: so Arist. Met. I, 9, 990 b 25, *καὶ γὰρ τὸ νόημα ἐν οὐ μόνον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐστί, καὶ ἐπιστήμη οὐ μόνον τῆς οὐσίας εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέρων.* And what Proc. urges against the advance by generalization from *κοινότητες* (v. 131) is true here *λήσομεν ἀπὸ πάντων εἰς ἐκείνας ὁμοίως ἀνατρέχοντες, οὐ μόνον ὄν εἰσὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὄν οὐκ εἰσὶν, οἷον τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, τῶν παρὰ τέχνην, τῶν παρὰ λόγον, τῶν ἀνοσιῶν,*

αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνυποστάτων, τραγελάφων λέγω καὶ ἵππο-
κενταύρων· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτων κοινότητες· καὶ οὕτω
τῶν οὐκ ὄντων θήσομεν ιδέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τούτοις
τῶν ἀπείρων, οἷον τῶν ἀλόγων γραμμῶν, τῶν ἐν τοῖς
ἀριθμοῖς λόγων... ὧν εἰσὶ κοινότητες. That Plato
had no doubts as to the separate existence of these
objects of νοήματα is clear. Cp. Rep. v. 476 C, ὁ
οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κἄλλος μήτε
νομίζων μήτε, ἂν τις ἠγγῆται ἐπὶ τὴν γνώσιν αὐτοῦ,
δυναμένος ἔσθαι, ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; etc.

C δ ... ιδέαν; The words should be taken thus [ένός
τινος ὄντος] ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ—μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ιδέαν
—ἐκείνο τὸ νόημα νοεῖ; For the text see Notes I.
t seems here nearer the orig—νοεῖ may have be-
come νοεῖν by a confus. with either the μ of μίαν or
the πάντα νοεῖν below (which in t is nearly under-
neath, and may have been so in the archet.); and
this corrup. would tend to produce εἶπον to govern
the infin. Again οὖσαν is probably rightly explained
by Heind.—‘legitimo modo positum est pro ὄν (agree-
ing with ὅ) propter praecedens μίαν’: failing that it
must have the same sense as ὄντος above, and be
taken closely with ιδέαν,—οὖσαν-ιδέαν = existent ιδέα.
Of transls. we may give Ast ‘Nonne unius cujusdam
rei quam in omnibus exstantem cogitatio illa cogitat,
ut quae una quaedam sit species?’ Heind. ‘Quod
tanquam omnibus rebus inditum cogitatio illa cogi-
tat?’ ‘of some one existent thing, which resting upon
all objects—being in fact some single visible charac-
teristic of them—that thought dwells upon.’ For
the language see Theaet. 203 C, φέρε δὴ, τὴν συλλα-
βὴν πότερον λέγωμεν τὰ ἀμφοτέρα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν
πλείω ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν γεγονυῖαν
συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;

ιδέαν... εἶδος ἔσται Stallb. ‘Itaque ex ταῖς ιδέαις
liquet τὰ εἶδη existere.’ It seems to be the fact
that when these two words are not used as synonyms
the former has more of the sensible in it. Heind.
adds ‘ita rursus εἶδη existunt, a νοήμασι diversa.’

νοοῦμ. ἐν εἶναι, ‘this object perceived by thought
to be one.’

ἀνάγκη ἢ so read for ἀνάγκη ἢ, to save altering
with editors to ἀνάγκη εἶ... δοκεῖν. The sense
seems good, and the language may be compared
with Phaedr. 264 B, σὺ δ’ ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογο-
γραφικὴν, ἢ ταῦτα ἐκείνος οὕτως ἐφέξῃς παρ’ ἄλληλα
ἔθικεν; Phaedo 76 E, ἀρ’ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη

ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς
γεγονέναι;... ὑπερφνωῶς... δοκεῖ μοι ἢ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη
εἶναι.

ἐκ νοημάτων... εἶναι; See Tim. 30 B, οὕτως οὖν δὴ
κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον
ζῶν ἐμψυχον ἔννοιν τε... διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι
πρόνοιαν. Dam., § 26, 46, says of the one, ἔτι εἶ,
ὅτι πάντα, διὰ τοῦτο γνωστόν, ἔσται καὶ γνωστικόν·
καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τῶν πάντων, and certainly if one is
All it must ‘know even as also it is known.’ Our
passage recalls the historic Parm. (Intro. xxxvi.)
who holds that thought is identical with being, or
certainly that being includes thought as part of
itself. Of a much later date we have Plotin. Enn.
v. 4, 2, νοῦς δὲ καὶ ὄν ταῦτόν· οὐ γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων
ὁ νοῦς ὥσπερ ἢ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν προόντων,
ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πράγματα etc. But in our passage
Plato assumes that a thought has itself the power of
thinking (Intro. xlv.). For the language cp. Tim.
30 B, λογισάμενος οὖν (ὁ θεὸς) εὔρισκεν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ
φύσιν ὄρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὄλον
ὄλον κάλλιον ἔσθαι ποτε ἔργον, νοῦν δ’ αὖ χωρὶς
ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῷ: also in another
connection, Arist. Phys. III. 3, 202 a 30, ὥστ’ ἢ πᾶν
τὸ κινεῖν κινήσεται, ἢ ἔχον κίνησιν οὐ κινήσεται.

καταφαίν. Cp. with note on καταμανθ. 128 A; D
and contr. with ἀναφάνη. 132 A and E. The ob-
server detects as it were by looking from above,
while the new object will emerge from below. See
Phileb. 16 C, θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε
καταφαίνεται ἐμοί; and 16 D, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν
αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδη, and Crat. 401 B followed by
402 A. Proc., v. 160, notes the sudden boldness
of Soc., καὶ διὰ τοῦ καταφαίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ φαίνεσθαι
μόνον εἰπεῖν ἐνδειξάμενος, ὅτι διαφερόντως περὶ ταύτης
τεθάρρηκε τῆς ὑποθέσεως. But is this accurate?
Rep. x. 596 A has—after a reference to those who
ἀμβλύτερον ὄρωντες πρότεροι εἶδον—ἀλλὰ σοῦ παρόν-
τος οὐδ’ ἂν προθυμηθῆναι οἷός τε εἶην εἰπεῖν εἴ τι μοι
καταφαίνεται· ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ὄρα.

παραδείγματα... φύσει, Two difficulties arise here,
that of holding on to the intelligible character of
the ideas when called models, and that of distin-
guishing between Plato’s concep. of φύσις here and
our own. We would naturally think of physical
patterns to be found in the sensible world, in spite
of the warning of Proc., εἴωθε γοῦν ὁ Πλάτων καὶ

ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ φέρειν τοῦτο τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα. Stallb. well cites Rep. x. 597 B, οὐκοῦν τριτταί τινες κλίνειν ἀδται γίνονται· μία μὲν ἢ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐσα, ἣν φαίμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι, and so on till 598 A, and Phaedo 103 B. Arist. Met. I. 3, 984 b 15, again, comes nearer our conception when he says of Anaxag. Νοῦν δὴ τις εἰπὼν ἐνεῖναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει, etc. We may also cite Theaet. 176 E, παραδειγμάτων, ᾧ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστῶτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου (N.B.) ἀθλιωτάτου. Suid. says of παράδειγμα—εἰκῶν, ἣ χαρακτήρ ἔννοιαν ἔχων αἰσθητοῦ πράγματος. ... παράδειγμα μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅταν ἀντιπαρῶν τις ὁμοιον ὁμοίω, οἷον λογικῶ λογικόν. He quotes Alex. Aphrod. on Top. 254, παράδειγμα δὲ γίνεται τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ γνωριμώτερον τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ ἦττον γνωριμῶν. To apply in our case, the word γνώριμον must not be rendered 'familiar' but as = γνωστόν. For the reading ἐν τῇ φύσει as opp. to τῇ φύσει we have early testimony in favour of the Mss., as is noted by Fischer: the passage ἀλλ' ᾧ Παρμ. ... εἰκασθῆναι being quoted by Stobaeus, Eclogg. Phys. p. 31, who is put roughly at the beginning of the 6th century A.D. On ἐστάναι Proc. says, v. 161, εἰ οὖν τὰ εἶδη καὶ ὁ Σ. ἐστάναι λέγει, τὰ δὲ ἐστῶτα (as he mentions above) κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἐν Σοφιστῇ γέγραπται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναι τὰ θεϊότατα τῶν πάντων ἐν Πολιτικῶ διώρισται, δηλον ὅτι τὰ εἶδη θεϊότατα ἄν εἴη καὶ οὐκέτι νοήματα αὐτὰ ψυχῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξηρημένα πάντων τῶν τοιούτων. τὰ δὲ ... ὁμοίωμ. This closely corresponds with Rep. x. 595 etc., where there is but one *ιδέα* of each class *μία μὲν κλίνης μία δὲ τραπέζης*, and ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας, ὁ δὲ τὰς τραπέζας· but he adds, 597 A, οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὁ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι ὁ ἔστι κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά, which being so οὐκ ἄν τὸ ὄν ποιοῖ ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ ὄν, ὄν δὲ οὐ. Against this hypothesis Arist. urges Met. I. 9, 991 a 20 (Introd. xlvii.), τί γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον; ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ὁμοιον ὀτιοῦν καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε καὶ ὄντος Σ. καὶ μὴ ὄντος γένοιτ' ἄν οἷοσπερ Σ. That is, apparently, A. admits that sensible objects—κλίνειν τινές—might be modelled after ὁ ἔστι κλίνη, but sees nothing to necessitate this as the only expl. But does A. make as much as he

assumes by his argument? He does remove the necessity for ideas, which is much; but his own contention is not a *disproof* that two separate and apparently unconnected like objects were by some divine δημιουργὸς moulded consciously upon a divine pattern known to him. Alexand., in commenting on A. (574-5, Berlin), admits the connection which exists in nature—διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπον γεννᾷ,—but says to deduce παραδείγματα therefrom τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἔχει τὸ δὲ ψευδὲς τι γίνονται μὲν γὰρ πάντα τὰ φύσει κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ καὶ ἀριθμούς τινας ὀρισμένους καὶ οὔτε ἀπὸ τύχης οὔτε αὐτομάτου, οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς παράδειγμα. οὐ γὰρ ἐννοοῦσα [so far as we know] ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ ἢ ποιεῖ (ἄλογος γὰρ αὕτη δύναμις ἐστίν), ἀλλ' ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ἐν τεταγμένη κινήσει ... ἕως ἄν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος αἰ κινήσεις προέλθωσιν, οὐ χάριν ἐγίνοντο. ἣν τάξιν ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶ μιμουμένη· κατὰ τὸν λόγον γὰρ ταῦτα συντίθησι καὶ ποιεῖ ἢ ποιεῖ. διὸ ἡ μὲν τέχνη δύναμις ἐστὶ λογική, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἄλογος. He rejects the idea of calling the action of nature *θεῖαν τινὰ τέχνην*.

καὶ ἡ ... αὐτοῖς: Are τὰ μὲν εἶδη and τὰ δὲ ἄλλα above also noms. before their infins. like μέθεξις? or is this the begin. of a new direct constr. which relapses into the form of the previous sent.? The sense is clear, 'and this participation of the ideas accrues to the other existences in no other form than that of resembl. to them,' 'this particip. by the others in the ideas proves to be a simple resembl.' 'Et communitas ipsa qua ceterae res cum formis teneantur alia nulla esse nisi similitudo cum ipsis,' Ast. The form which would be grammatical with least change would be καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν εἰδῶν γίνονται οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ὅτι ἠκασθῆ αὐτοῖς. Note the difference between εοικέναι, a mere fact, and εἰκασθῆναι, a fact with its producing cause. What is modelled on the παραδ. is called here a *ὁμοίωμα* and it is said εἰκασθῆναι; but the word εἰκῶν found in e.g. Tim. 29 B, δεδεῶν περὶ τε εἰκόνας καὶ περὶ τοῦ παραδ. αὐτῆς διοριστέον, does not occur. Yet this latter is the term which was accepted finally as the technical one: thus Dam. § 83, p. 190, οἷον εἰκῶν καθ' ἣν τὸ παραδ. εἴσεται, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὸ παραδ. τὴν εἰκόνα· καίτοι πολλῇ τῆς εἰκόνας ἢ πρὸς τὸ παραδ. τὸ οἰκείον διάκρσις; and § 93, p. 231, παραδ. γὰρ καὶ ὁ Σ. τῆς οἰκείας εἰκόνας. Is this not another evidence

that we are here at the beginning of Pl.'s theory on the subject? *ἔφη* Parmen., not Pythod., this time.

οἶόν τε... εἶναι Proc. maintains the possibility of such a one-sided connection even in the case of participation proper—οὐκ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἐκείνους ἀλλὰ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῖς ν. 129 : and Dam. § 37, p. 77, draws distinctions καὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἡλίου μύσαντες ἀφιστάμεθα μὴ ἀφισταμένον... καὶ τῆς ὕλης αὐδ διακέκριται τὸ εἶδος οὐκ ἐχούσης τὴν διάκρισιν, εἶδος γάρ τι καὶ ἡ διάκρ. ... καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν τῷ παραδ. ὁμοία οὐκ ὄντι ὁμοίῳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνι : again εἰ δὲ ὅτι ἡ εἰκὼν ὁμοιοῦται τῷ π., καὶ ταύτῃ ὁμοία κατὰ ἔλλειψιν, καὶ τὸ π. ὁμοιοῖ τὴν εἰκόνα πρὸς ἑαυτό, καὶ ταύτῃ ὁμοιον [καθ' ὑπεροχὴν] ;

αὐτῷ [τῷ εἶδει] ἀφωμοιώθη [τὸ εἰκασθέν] ; ἡ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὁμοιον [sc. τὸ εἰκασθέν] μὴ ὁμοίῳ [sc. τῷ εἶδει] ὁμοιον εἶναι ; μηχανὴ with the simple inf. seems to be just as common in Pl. as it is with ὥστε or ὅπως. Note the want of the art. in *μη-ὁμοίῳ*. Is it because these words are part of the predicate?

τὸ δὲ... μετέχειν ; The connection is *ἄρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη τὸ ὁμοιον μετέχειν ἑνὸς εἶδους τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῷ ὁμοίῳ*, where however the last words are still condensed for *μετέχειν ἑνὸς εἶδους τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνῳ οὐ τὸ ὁμοιον μετέχει*. The first τὸ ὁμ. is τὸ εἰκασθέν, the second which we have extracted from τῷ ὁμ. is the original εἶδος on which τὸ εἰκ. was modelled, while the two cases are combined in the τὰ ὁμοια which immediately follows. Jackson (Jour. Philol. xii. 291) would bracket εἶδους 'as a premature anticipation of Parmenides' next question.' Certainly the word might be dropped, if we are always to assume that an author said what centuries of criticism discover that he should have said.

εἰ δὲ μὴ, An odd neg. ; it denies the previous one οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τε. We must take the εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐχ οἶόν τε = εἰ δὲ οἶόν τε and transl. with Stallb. 'sin aliter,' or with Ast 'alioquin.'

παρὰ τὸ... ἀναφ. etc. The same reasoning and in the same language as above A. The idea seems to be similar to what we observe when a company of soldiers forms 'from column into line' ; as each new file comes up and takes his place and dressing, the officer at the pivot can say of him *ἀναφαίνεται παρὰ τὸν πρότερον*, and if he is not sufficiently visible the officer will bid him 'dress up.' The

difference is that in this case the movement starts from zero and has a definite end, while with Plato it starts from τὰ πολλὰ ὁρατὰ and is endless. There is, as we have hinted, another difference—the successive files are each a 'living man of mortal mould' contributing new strength to the formation, though no one claims to be better than the last : Pl.'s endless εἶδη are mere 'men of buckram,' each one being but a reflection of those before, with *no* substance of his own. In this view they resemble still better perhaps the reflections of a figure in two opposing mirrors ; the figure is τὰ πολλά, the reflections are the successive εἶδη—they are endless, yet none of them contributes an atom of new information to justify its existence. This ἀπορία seems to be very much upon the analogy of Zeno's ἀπορίαί on motion : Zeno would prevent a man going from A to B not by adding to the distance but by dividing the given space into an endless succession of smaller and smaller parts. Or, as we have said, it resembles an analytic judgment which brings more clearly before us all the possibilities latent in the distance from A to B, or from πολλά to εἶδος, but does not synthetically increase our acquaintance with the unexplored region beyond. As to the mutual likeness, it is plain that an εἰκὼν (such as the copy of a picture) has been made like the original, without the other having been made like it—the likeness here is all on one side. But Pl.'s view is that the original must, not so transparently yet really, be itself a copy of some idea which was its model ; and that both are like that, and so on.

καὶ ἂν It is striking to find *ἂν* and *ἂν* interchanged within twenty words. Probably the *καὶ* has something to do with the difference ; yet Ast gives Polit. 292 E, *ἐπιστήμη, ἂν τ' ἄρχῃ καὶ ἂν μὴ*, which reverses the case. Are we certain that such uses are not sometimes due to the scribes?

ἐκείνῳ τῷ So *ἡ*, which seems clearly the better : see Notes I. The question throughout is whether the εἶδος is like the εἰκασθέν, and here ἐκείνο is the new εἶδος which is assumed to be ὁμοιον τῷ ; that being so, both are like some other thing which becomes εἶδος ἕτερον αὐδ.

καὶ οὐδέποτε... αἰεὶ etc. The language is a little odd, καὶ καινὸν εἶδος οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον,—it might have been οὐδὲ παύσεται ποτε καινὸν

εἶδος αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον, omitting καί,—‘and never at all will a fresh εἶδος desist from always turning up.’

μέτεχοντι As the sole μέθεξις here is that of ὁμοιον γίγνεσθαι, it would be more correct though grammatically confusing to say τῷ ἐαυτῷ εἰκασθέντι. Here comes a pause in Par.’s ἀπορίαι to Soc.’s assumption of the ideas. Soc. gives up the argument, and does so because he cannot conceive how the ideas can influence the many, while yet remaining ultimate absolute entities νοητά, χωριστά, ἐστῶτα ἐν τῇ φύσει. The μέθεξις cannot be physical else the ideas get broken up; nor can it be by resemblance else we have a progressus in infinitum—ἄνθρωπος + εἶδος ἀνθρώπου yielding a καινὸν εἶδος or τρίτος ἄνθρωπος and so on indefinitely. Introd. xii.

ὄρεῖς ὄν, etc. It is not clear whether ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ form an attribute to εἶδη or, with ὡς understood, a part of the predicate with διορίζηται. Engelm. ‘wenn Jemand die Begriffe als an und für sich seiend gesondert hinstellt.’ t reads ἐάν τις ὡς εἶδη and so most texts; but it does not seem a gain, and may have arisen from a confusion of the eye with ὡς ἔπος below.

B οὐδέπω ἄπτει etc. Of course the verb is 2nd sing. mid. Stallb. says ‘h.e. αὐτῆς τῆς ἀπορίας, ὅση ἐστίν,’ while Heind. quotes as analogous Apol. 20 E, τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεόν. Cp. as odd Crat. 413 C, ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγὼ ... πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορία εἰμὶ ἢ πρὶν ἐπιχειρήσαι ... and Ar. Met. VI 14, 1039 b, ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτά τε συμβαίνει καὶ τούτων ἀτοπώτερα. ἦ is given from a strong desire to follow ἄ wherever it yields a meaning. But the constr. is unusual, and t reads εἰ ἐν which also corresponds with ἐάν τις above.

ἐν εἶδος ἕκαστον ... θήσεις: The most natural understanding of this would be that of Heind. who arranges thus εἰ ἕκαστον εἶδος τῶν ὄντων ἐν τι αἰεὶ, ‘if you are always going to set up each several εἶδος of those which exist, as an exclusive isolated entity.’ This is quite clear, but it is a mere repetition of εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ διορίζηται, strengthened by ἐν ἕκαστον αἰεὶ. Can the words mean then that that former phrase admitted intercommunion of εἶδη which by this amended form is disallowed? If so, they are at variance with the whole purport of the following argument, which admits co-relations in the ideal sphere, and is directed to destroy only the

relation which Soc. assumed that sphere to have with the world of sense. If again we are to assume that the insistence upon the ἀπορία which arises out of the ἐν ἕκαστον αἰεὶ τι ἀφορίζμενος is meant to suggest that some εἶδη may be in connection with our world while others admittedly are not—then, while this would be in harmony with the constant contention of Proc. that there are ascending or descending grades in the ideality of the εἶδη, and that the solution of the problem is that there are σειραὶ—Jacob’s ladders, as it were—between the ideal and sensible spheres, it would place us under the necessity of assuming that Plato really was inclined to believe that οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, that you do ascend from sense to εἶδος by a graduated series of existences; a supposition which is not only at variance with the whole tone of his reasoning above, but is in absolute antagonism to what he advances for the next page. It would however have some affinity with his later views, Phileb. 16 D, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ιδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδη τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· τότε δ’ ἤδη τὸ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἀπείρου μεθέντα χαίρειν ἔαν. As to language, τῶν ὄντων seems to mean the ideal not the sensible sphere, while ἀφορίζμενος would be simpler if changed to ἀφωρισμένον. πολλὰ etc. is as if he had said ὅσα ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπορία or ἀπορήματα.

εἰ τις φαίη ... εἶναι: The persons here are not easily kept distinct. It is clear that τις φαίη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι, ψεύδεται, and ὁ ἀναγκάζων are the same; and equally so that ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξις is another. Which is ἔμπειρος ὢν ... μὴ ἀφυῆς? Heind. says ‘is qui contendit ne cognosci quidem haec posse’: Stallb. says ‘potius is qui istius rei sententiam in dubium vocat et impugnat.’ So again on ἐνδεικνυμένου Heind. says ‘sc. ὅτι ψεύδεται ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, manifesto enim hoc ἐνδεικνυμένου spectat ad praecedens ἐνδείξασθαι’: while Stallb. contends ‘τοῦ ἐνδεικ. quod prave Heind. refert ad adversarium, intelligendum est de illo ipso qui cognitionem ea ratione sublatam esse contendere fingitur.’ Stallb. sees the necessity for acuteness on the part of him chiefly who undertakes to prove the error of saying that the εἶδη cannot be known, and neglects in urging this necessity the clear connection of ἐνδεικνυμένου with ἐνδείξασθαι, which Heind. points out.

There can be little doubt that Heind. is right. Both men require to be acute, and if the man who denies the possibility of knowing the εἶδη is to be convinced of his error it will only be by arguments which come πρόρωθεν and which it will tax his intellect to follow. Arist. himself could not see the force of the argument in favour of knowing εἶδη which were χωριστά: and Pl. clearly points out, 135 A-B, that the cleverness of τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν on this point is second only to that of τοῦ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι. The parallelism of the passages is complete ἀμφισβητεῖν—ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν, εὐφροῦς—μὴ ἀφνής, ἐνδεικνυμένου—δυνησομένου διδάξαι, μαθεῖν—ἔπεσθαι, δυσανάπειστον—ἀπίθανος. As regards language πραγματευόμενος is gen. absol. and ἔπεσθαι is used without a case. ἀπίθανος, though generally meaning 'unpersuasive' rather than 'unpersuaded,' clearly corresponds to δυσανάπειστον, 135 A, and Ast renders it 'is cui non persuaseris,' while Müller gives 'unwiderlegbar': the Rhunk. Scholiast too has ἀντὶ τοῦ δύσκολος καὶ μὴ βραδίως πειθόμενος, and Stallb. agrees. For expressions cp. Phaedr. 229 D, ἐγὼ δέ... ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός. Phaedo 70 B, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δέεται καὶ πίστεως.

C ἀναγκάζων Cp. Soph. 241 D, βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι etc.; 246 B, νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι.

p. 8. οἶμαι ἄν 'I should suppose': ἄν recurs in place after ὁμολογ.

ἐκάστου The usual reading is αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου, and so t. It seems to make the passage tautological, and may have crept in from a zeal for exaggerated abstractness 'a separate existence, apart, of each separate εἶδος.' The text makes οὐσίαν = ἰδέαν, and ἐκάστου = 'each several class of beings in the sensible world.' Cp. 135 B, also Phaedo 78 D, αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι, and 92 D, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς (τῆς ψυχῆς) ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος.

τίθεται is habitually used in this sense, as some English writers use 'posit'; but εἶναι rarely appears with it. The phrase is not similar to e.g. Phaedo 93 C, τῶν ὄντων θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι, where the last three words are the judgment ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἁρμονία put as object of θεμένων: nor to Crat. 385 A,

ὁ ἄν θῆ καλεῖν τις ἕκαστον, which but varies the ὁ τι ἄν τις τῷ θῆται ὄνομα of 384 D. Our passage means 'assumes or posits as existing,' and comes nearer to Rep. v. 458 A, θέντες ὡς ὑπάρχον εἶναι ὁ βούλονται, where ὑπ. εἶναι seem connected with such other phrases as ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῶ εἶναι.

ἐν ἡμῖν: So again εἰ for the more usual παρ' ἡμῖν.

πῶς γὰρ Pl.'s interlocutors cease raising difficulties when he wishes them to cease; see 137 B.

πρὸς ἀλλήλας etc. Introd. xlvi. and on 130 B above. αἰ is fem. in both Mss., where we would rather expect ἄ or ὁ ἔστιν: but the sense is clear, as in Phaedr. 243 E, ἔωσπερ ἄν ἧς ὅς εἰ. Stallb. seems to think that the alternative to αἰ must be not ἄ or ὁ but οἶμαι, and that clearly this would be wrong. The full phrase would be εἰσὶν αἰ ἰδέαι εἰσὶν, as in Rep. v. 533 D, χρωμένη αἰς διήλοθμεν τέχναις, and 130 B, ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν.

αὐταὶ 'scripserim αὐται pro αὐταὶ' Heind. There is no need; still there is a scratch over αὐ in A. πρὸς αὐτὰς combines the sense of καθ' αὐτὰς and πρὸς ἀλλήλας. We may cp. Dam. § 93, p. 231, ἀρα ὄν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα ἔστι, τὰ δὲ εἰκόνες, καὶ ταῦτα εἶδη ἔστι καὶ ἑκατέρωθι ἔστι; πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἄν εἶη, εἴπερ ἡ εἰκὼν ὁμοιωμά ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ὄμ. ἀποτέλεσμα ὁμοιότητος· ὁμοιοῦται δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἕτερον ἕτέρῳ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὡσαύτως· π. γὰρ καὶ ὁ Σ. τῆς οἰκείας εἰκ.

τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ... ἕκαστα 'Quorum dum nos partem D habemus, singulis appellamur nominibus—v.c. magni parvi similes etc. Trahendum hoc εἶναι ad ἐπονομαζόμεθα' Heind. 'Sive simulacra sive quo quis alio modo ea statuat quorum dum participes sumus, singulis appellamur nominibus' Stallb. Our idiom would omit the first εἴτε. See for the idea and lang. Phaedo 100 C-D, more than once referred to: Stallb. also cites Crito 50 A, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, and others. One would suppose that the ὁμοιώματα were the individual things of sense which, as we have learnt to think, partake of and are called after εἶδη. But they are ὁμοιώματα ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες, which throws us back on the explanations of Proc. already quoted, 131 E etc., to the effect that there are grades of abstractness in the εἶδη, some εἶδη being φυσικὰ or αἰσθητά, which must be understood here. Plato must be held as saying—all our discussions on εἶδη thus far turn out

to be discussions upon spurious semi-sensuous models; for the more clearly we grasp the separateness which we ascribe to the εἶδη, the more clearly we see that they have nothing to do with our world.

ἐκείνοις, 'Ceterum ἐκείνοις dixit quia jam τὰ εἶδη in mente habebat' Stallb. These are the real εἶδη.

πρὸς αὐτὰ include the sense πρὸς ἄλληλα, for we are dealing with ὁμοιώματα which πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔστιν ἃ ἔστιν.

ἔστιν 'Temere aliquis inserendum conjectabat ἃ ἔστιν (after ἔστιν), quum ἔστιν hoc loco idem sit quod τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει' Heind.

καὶ ἑαυτῶν ... οὕτως; The transl. deal loosely with this; closest comes Engel. 'und von sich selbst, nicht von jenen, erhält gleichfalls den Namen, was benannt wird.' All seem to suggest that the genitives are equivalent to ἐπ', ἐξ, ἀφ', ἑαυτῶν ... ἐκείνων = 'and all things again in our world which are so named (large, small, like etc.) are named after themselves (i.e. each other), and not after those abstract εἶδη.' Is there any justification for this construction? It seems better to extend the passage thus—καὶ ἑαυτῶν αὐ [i.e. ἀλλήλων] ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὁμοιώματά ἔστιν ὅσα παρ' ἡμῖν ὀνομάζεται οὕτως [i.e. τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ὀνόμασι sc. μεγάλα, ἴσα, μικρά, δεσπότης etc.]: unless we prefer καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων μετέχοντα ἐπονομάζεται ὅσα αὐ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως: It will be observed that Engel. severs οὕτως from ὀνομάζεται, and puts it as gleichfalls in another connection.

παρμενίδην ν wanting in A: in Σωκράτη ν is often added by scribes.

δεσπότης ἢ δούλος The example chosen by Arist. Categ. 7, 6 b 28 on πρὸς τι. ὁ δούλος δεσπότου δούλος λέγεται καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης' he adds διπλάσιον—ἡμίσεος, μείζον—ἐλάττονος: but τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἶον ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη ... Sometimes οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν ... οἶον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος: ... but ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οἶον τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτῶν πτεροῦ πτερωτόν. We even coin to get the antith.: if we say τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πλοιοῦ ... οὐκ οἰκεία ἢ ἀπόδοσις: but with τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πηδαλιωτοῦ we are right τὸ γὰρ πηδαλιωτῶν πηδαλιῶ πηδαλιωτόν. We must be careful

then not to make the ἀπόδοσις πρὸς τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων as δούλος—ἀνθρώπου. See on 130 B.

αὐτοῦ δεσπότου ... ὁ ἔστι We may note here these E usages of αὐτὸς and ὅς. The originals we find in 134 B, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὁ ἔστι [καλὸν], where concord is accurately observed, and we have throughout concords of αὐτὸς and ὅς taken separately. The rel. seems to have been fixed in the neuter first, for Pl. often uses ὁ ἔστι absolutely, e.g. Phaedo 75 D, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τούτο ὁ ἔστι: and we have here ὁ ἔστι δεσπότης—δούλος. This phrase must be distinguished, as Stallb. says, from e.g. πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσὶν above and αὐτῇ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἔστιν ὁ ἔστι below, which mean 'are what they are,' 'is what it is.' Again we have had, 130 B etc., such expressions as δικαίον τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ and αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου which, with the constant neuter forms such as αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν and τὸ ἔν, serve as bridges to phrases like Prot. 360 E, σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος ... τί ποτ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀρετή, where Herm. puts a comma after αὐτό, and Crat. 411 D, εἰ δὲ βούλει αὐτὸ ἢ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἔστιν ἔσις. In Arist. the phrases have advanced beyond themselves: for αὐτὸ ὁ ἀνθρώπος we get αὐτο-ἀνθρώπος and beyond ὁ ἔστι—τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

δούλου ὁ ἔστι δούλος No ὁ in A, but τ gives ὁ ἔστι, and clearly this is wanted. On these two phrases Heind. says 'Epexegesis referunt praecedentium αὐτοῦ δεσπότου et αὐτοῦ δούλου, in quibus commode abessent haec δεσπότου et δούλου.' ἀνθρώπος ὦν = εἰς ὦν τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, τῶν τῆδε.

τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει (sc. ἦν ἔχει), like ἔστιν ὁ ἔστι above.

πρὸς αὐτὰ again involves καθ' αὐτὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα: 134 καθ' αὐτὰ = in our (or the other) world πρὸς ἄλληλα = towards each other, δεσπότης πρὸς δούλον and the converse. τῆς ὁ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη [= εἴη ἢ ὁ ἔστι]. In order the words would be εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς ἐκείνης ἀληθείας ὁ ἔστιν (ἀλήθεια). Cp. Arist. Met. xi. 7, 1072 b, νόησις ἢ καθ' αὐτὴν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ ἔστιν: Stallb. is prob. right in saying that ἦ so closely after ὁ in regard to ἐπιστήμη is to point the distinction between ἐπιστήμη ἦ and τῶν ὄντων ὁ. He adds 'τὰ ὄντα sunt τὰ ὄντως ὄντα ut sexcenties.'

ἐκάστη ἢ ... συμβαίνοι εἶναι; Steph. notes that ἐκάστη ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι ἂν εἶναι ἐπιστήμη might equally

be συμβαίνοι ἂν ἐκάστην τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐπιστήμην. A desire for antithesis has entrapped Pl. into using ὄντων of sensible things. He had ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων ὃ ἔστιν above, and so he uses τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου here, where his usual guarded phrase τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, or τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, would have done. ἀλλὰ μὴν ... εἶναι; = ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὡς ὁμ., οὔτε ἔχομέν γε αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, οὔτε οἶόν τε (ἔστιν αὐτὰ) παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι;

γένη εἶδη, ιδέαι and γένη are, or may be used as, equiv. when that is desirable. Here γένη is used probably because τοῦ εἶδους has preceded—the power of knowing being for the moment an εἶδος the objects of knowledge are for the time γένη. In a sentence we return to τῶν εἶδων οὐδέν: and after passing ιδέας αὐτὰς come to αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστ.

Ἔ γε etc. Grote cites here Arist. Met. VIII. 8, p. 1050 b 34, εἰ ἄρα τινές εἰσι φύσεις τοιαῦται, ἢ οὐσῖαι οἷας λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ιδέας, πολλὸν μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμον ἂν τι εἴη ἢ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ κινούμενον ἢ κίνησις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνέργειαι μᾶλλον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ δυνάμεις τούτων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρότερον ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς, φανερόν.

C ἄ δὴ ... ὑπολαμβάν. Heind. says 'i.e. ἄ δὴ ὡς ὄντα ιδέας αὐτὰς ὑπολ.' perhaps rightly: but perhaps we should take ιδέας-αὐτὰς-οὐσῖας closely 'abstract existent ιδέας.' There may be point in ὑπολαμβάν. after the argument that the εἶδη cannot be known. We only assume their existence after all.

δεινότερον—τὸ δεινότερον οὐχ ὡς ἰσχυρότερον ἄπορον, ὡς εἰώθασι δεινοὺς λέγειν τοὺς κρατοῦντας τῇ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, ἀλλ' ὡς μείζονος δείματος καὶ εὐλαβείας τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν ἄξιον. Schol. Rh. from Proc. v. 220, who adds τὴν γὰρ ἔνωσιν τῶν ὄντων διασπᾶ καὶ διοικίζει χωρὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου τὸ θεῖον etc.

τὸ ποῖον: The punctuation is left as in ᾤ. This is clearly a question; and so in other cases.

ἀκριβέστερον as we talk of 'the exact sciences.' The sense is very clear in Phileb. 23 A, οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτῇ [ἡδονῇ] ἔῃν ἢ δὴ καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν; So Nubes 130, πῶς οὖν ... λόγων ἀκριβῶν σκινδαλάμους μαθήσομαι; cp. 153, ὃ Ζεὺ βασιλεῦ τῆς λεπτότητος τῶν φρενῶν. Ar. Met. XII. 3, 1078 a, ὅσφ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπλουστέρων, τοσοῦτφ μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰκριβές. From our context αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμη = ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστ., ναί = φαίην ἂν:

εἴπερ τι ἄλλο ... ἐπιστήμην; Sense as clear and constr. as faulty as Milton's 'loveliest pair That ever since in love's embraces met, Adam the goodliest man of men since born His sons, the fairest of her daughters Eve' (P. L. IV. 321). Pl. seems to mean 'If any other thing [than science?] possesses science, you would say that no one was more entitled to possess it than God': what he does mean would be clearer thus—οὐκοῦν θεόν, εἴπερ γέ τι, φαίης ἂν ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην; The very tenses are jumbled.

παρὰ τῷ θεῷ In the νοητὸς τόπος as contrasted D with the ὄρατὸς or ὀρώμενος τόπος, Rep. VI-VII. 499-532 etc., Introd. xlix. Whatever may be meant by this, it is clear that God is closely associated with it. Thus Rep. X. 597 B, οὐκοῦν τριτταὶ τινες κλῖναι αὐταὶ γίνονται· μία μὲν ἢ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐσα ἢν φαίμεν ἂν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι. Proc. v. 238, ὃ μὲν ὅλος συλλογισμὸς τοιοῦτός ἐστι τῶν προκειμένων· οἱ θεοὶ τὴν αὐτοεπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αὐτοδεσποτείαν ἔχουσι· τὰ τὴν αὐτοεπ. καὶ τὴν αὐτοδ. ἔχοντα οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ τὴν δεσποτείαν· οἱ ἄρα θεοὶ οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστ. καὶ τὴν δεσποτ., οὐ γιννώσκουσιν ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ δεσπόζουσιν ἡμῶν. (οἷ, οἱ οὐκ ἄρα γ.) This holds only if we transl. the major (here second) premiss 'whatever has absolute science and power has a science and power which have no connection with us.' Dam. § 70, p. 154, doubts if even God can know the real One: τότε πρὸ τοῦ ἡνωμένου ἐν ἔτι μειζόνως ἄγνωστον. It comes before νοῦς.

οὐτ' ἂν ... ἂν δεσπόσειεν οὐτ' ἂν The hypothetic form even redundant, and that after εἰ ... ἐστίν. The cond. is assumed as true—God has perfect knowledge: the consequence is felt to be questionable—he surely cannot be ignorant of our world. While Plato raises the question apropos of knowledge he soon makes it co-extensive with the whole scope of the two worlds. Indeed his language is elastic throughout—even θεὸς becoming θεοί.

ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε etc. Observe the precision of E the inference. If the one assumption holds the other holds. Is that a fact? 'Our science' may be powerless to know the divine, though in conjuring up and discussing all this it seems to do pretty well; but does it follow that the perfect divine science

must fail in knowing us? The greater includes the less, though not the less the greater.

θεοὶ ὄντες: Might be either because, or although, they are gods: we may say 'gods though they be.' ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ 'θεοὶ ὄντες' προστεθὲν πολλήν τινα τὴν ἐνδειξιν τῆς ἀπορίας· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ θεῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ βούλεται πάντα πληροῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ... ἐπήνεγκε μετὰ πολλῆς βαρύτητος 'θεοὶ ὄντες.' Proc. v. 237-9. ἀποστ. τοῦ εἰδέναι: not 'to say that God is without knowledge' but 'to rob God of some knowledge—make his knowledge less than universal—minish ought of it.' καίτοι (Proc. v. 240) πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἔδει στέρησιν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ' ὑπεροχὴν γνώσεως· εἴρηται γὰρ ἢ γνώσις ἐκένη πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβεστέρα πασῶν· ἔπειτα εἰ καὶ στέρησιν ἔδει λέγειν, τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων πραγματείας (-τειῶν?) γνώσεως ἔδει τίθεσθαι τὴν στέρησιν ἀλλ' οὐχ ἅπλως γνώσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο συνήγαγεν ὁ λόγος. This recalls the Phileb. as to the relative dignity of νοῦς and ἡδονή. Here the knowledge of αἱ ἡμέτεραι πραγματεῖαι is put in the position of ἡδονή, and seems in the judgment of Proc. to merit the same rejection. 'The inference here drawn by Parmen. supplies the first mention of a doctrine revived by (if not transmitted to) Averroes and various scholastic doctors of the middle ages, so as to be formally condemned by the theological councils. M. Renan tells us "En 1269 ... Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia" etc. (Ren. Avrr. p. 213). The acuteness with which these objections are enforced is remarkable. I know nothing superior to it in all the Platonic writings.' Grote Pl. II. 275. Of course ἦ must be supplied mentally with μὴ λίαν θαυμαστός. Heind. wishes to write it, and well cites 132 B and 136 D with others.

¹³⁵ εἰ εἰσὶν ... τῶν ὄντων etc. Once again we have the distinction noted in 133 A-B—if the εἶδη exist, and if each of them is to be held as separate from the others. Here τῶν ὄντων probably, though not certainly, = τὰ καθέκαστα. The order of the next words is ὀριεῖται τις ἕκαστον εἶδος (ὡς) αὐτό τι.

ἀμφισβητῶν ὡς etc. L. and S. give examples of this constr., and Stallb. cites Rep. v. 476 D, καὶ ἀμφισβητῆ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, and VI. 502 A-B, οὗ τε ... εἴ τε the copulative force is shown here by separating τε 'both that they do not exist and if they did exist ever so much.' Cp. L. and S. οὔτε 4. Stallb. raises difficulties, and proposes εἰ δέ. 'Sub-

jungere in altero orationis membro volebat haec οὔτε τῆ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει γνωστά. Sed mutata verborum structura' etc.

λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε Several cases here of τε-καὶ run together. Stallb. rightly says we are not to expect τὸν λέγοντα because we have τὸν ἀκούοντα above. Τὸν ἀκούοντα is the subject of both ἀπορεῖν and δοκεῖν, while ταῦτα λέγοντα = ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃ, καὶ ἀνδρῶς etc. 'Ficinus: et viri admodum ingeniosi esse, percipere posse etc. Bene si legeremus καὶ ἀνδρ. πάνν ... εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι. Nunc nihil adest unde genitivi hi pendeant, neque structurae ratio constat, nisi post εὐφροῦς excidisse putemus δεῖν. ut Charm. 169 A' Heind. A better case is Stallb's., Menex. 235 D, ἀγαθοῦ ἂν ῥήτορος δεῖο τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὐδοκίμησοντος. The δεῖν may have been left out by his change of struct. He meant to put εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι after εὐφροῦς, but having got so far wrote τοῦ δυνησ. after passing the proper point for δεῖν.

ἔτι θαυμαστ. Another irreg. He mentally re-^B calls θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσ. when the constr. is no longer parallel. He should have said ἔτι δὲ εὐφροῦς-τέρου. εὐρήσοντος, Proc. v. 240, says ὅτι γόνιμος καὶ εὐρετικός ἐστι περὶ τὴν διδασκαλίαν: we must add some such phrase as τὴν προσήκουσαν διδασκαλίαν. So Sophist. 253 C, πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδόν γε ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης;

διεκρινῆσ. The Mss. agree: yet one would expect the genitive. † shows traces of having at first reversed this and written δυνησόμενον, which is obviously wrong. As it stands, this part. must agree with ἄλλον whilst one would expect it to agree with τοῦ εὐρήσοντος. It gives, however, a good sense: the hearer (ἄλλον) has so profited and has so clear a conception of the case that he believes, after 'having sufficiently analysed or investigated.'

μὴ ἔασει εἶδη ... εἶναι, Notes 1. Ἄτ agree in reading ἔασῃ, which is due probably to dictation and is impossible, as εἰ precedes and ὀριεῖται follows. The phrase is counterp. of ἄγνωστα ἀναγκ. ... εἶναι 133 C.

ἀποβλέψας, Looking away from favourable points and confining his view to objections; cp. 130 E. μηδέ τι cp. the repeated use of τι in αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος A, and γένος τι ἕκαστου B above; yet Ἄτ might suggest μηδ' ἔτι, Notes 1.

τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστου seems to decide that τῶν ὄντων C

all through are the sensible world 'of each natural group of sensible, or at least of sublunary, existences.'

τὴν τοῦ διαλ. δύν. διαφθ. This means strictly metaphys. discuss. See above on 126 C; for the phrase Stallb. cites Phileb. 57 E, ἡμᾶς ... ἀναίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγ. δυνάμ. which is described as being περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταύτων αἰεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως. also Rep. VI. 511 B, οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἄπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλ. δυνάμει, which becomes in C ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ. The reason of its complete destruc. is clearly given in Arist. Met. I. 6, 987 a 32 (Intro. i. etc.) οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν (ὁ Πλατ.) ... ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὄρον (ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἐξήτει) τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός, αἰεὶ γε μεταβαλλόντων. In Theaet. 161 E, ξύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγ. πραγματεία becomes μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία—εἰ ἀληθῆς ἡ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου. Ar. Met. X. 6, 1063 b 10, μηθὲν γὰρ τιθέντες ἀναιροῦσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ὅλως λόγον. For the object of philosophical discussion you need an οὐσίαν or ἰδέαν τὴν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ οὔσαν. Proc. V. 253-58 discusses the question as regards ἀπόδειξις, ὀρισμός, διαίρεσις, and ἀνάλυσις, and finds that all require τὸ ἀκίνητον τὸ μόνιμον τὸ τέλειον τὸ μοναδικὸν τὸ αὐτὸν etc. for their action, δοξαστικῆς γὰρ ἐστὶ διαιρετικῆς τὰ ὑστερογενῆ (= τὰ αἰσθητὰ) διαιρεῖν, διανοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἐπιστημονικῆς τὰς οὐσιώδεις τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ λόγων διαφορὰς θεωρεῖν etc.

καὶ μᾶλλον ἠσθῆσθαι: Stallb. quotes Ficinus 'tu praecipue sensisse mihi videris' but suggests that μᾶλλον may also mean justo magis, nimis. In the former case we must understand μᾶλλον ἑτέρου—does he allude to the search for general definitions on the part of the historic Socrates as the reason?—in the latter case he may be supposed to have shown signs of being very much impressed by the force of Parmenides' argument.

τί ὄν ... περὶ; for dialectic and philosophy are one, Sophist. 253 E, ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλω δώσεις ... πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι. For the language see Rep. VII. 539 C, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας περὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται. Cp. Met. I. min. 2, καὶ τὸ γινώσκειν οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ γὰρ οὕτως ἄπειρα πῶς ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν; XII. 10, 1086 b, there is a difficulty both with and without the ideas εἰ μὲν γὰρ τις μὴ θήσει τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι κευχωρισμένας, ... ἀναι-

ρήσει τὴν οὐσίαν ... ἂν δέ τις θῆ τὰς οὐσ. χωριστάς, πῶς θήσει τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν;

ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; Does τούτων mean τῶν εἰδῶν (ἀγνώστων ὄντων)? or does the phrase mean 'these matters being undetermined'? Probably the latter; denial of the existence of the εἶδη has interposed since they were pronounced unknown, and a new paragraph begins here.

The following are the cardinal points in the discussion, thus far. 1. The terms εἶδη γένη ἰδέαι represent certain intellectual entities influencing essentially the world which we apprehend by the senses. 2. This latter is not subjective in the sense of being a mere series of impressions: it is objective, but as γινόμενον it cannot be known. 3. The εἶδη are totally separate from it and, if known, are known not by αἴσθησις but by λογισμὸς διάνοια νοῦς ἐπιστήμη. 4. After some efforts the best conception of the influence exerted by these εἶδη upon our world is found to be that they act as models after the pattern of which its several constituents are framed. 5. We advance to a knowledge of the εἶδη from our side by a process of inference and comparison; and it seems to be suggested that there may be stages in this advance—an early one being the sensible picture or what Proclus calls the αἰσθητὸν or φυσικὸν εἶδος, whilst a more adequate one is the νόημα or ψυχικὸν εἶδος. 6. But in the end we are baffled:—for (a) the process runs on ad infinitum—and naturally so, the εἶδη being given as χωρίς: (b) the εἶδη if reached would thereupon cease to be what they are—χωριστά, which it is their duty to remain, and would become tainted with a sensible flavour. However far we prosecute our 'victorious analysis,' or rather synthesis, the result when attained will remain at best an object of 'our science.' The world of εἶδη is the unconditioned, to know it would be to condition it. 7. This χωρισμὸς follows its own course of victorious analysis—will not 'burn so high and no higher.' After separating the εἶδη from our sphere it enters the νοητὸς τόπος itself and runs riot there, parting the ideal sphere into as many isolated units as will match the divisions of the sensible world. This involves an ideal knowledge which we don't possess, and whose possessor does not know us. 8. Thus to solve the riddles of world α, of which we know

little, we call up world β , of which we cannot know anything, and are left plantés là. While if we refuse to call up the latter, rational reflection is denied us.

We may note several facts in passing:—1. Although we have spoken of two worlds here, Plato does not so speak: he says merely τὰ πολλά, τὰ εἶδη. We must go to the Timaeus for the two worlds—for the κόσμος or ζῶον ὄρατὸν whose model is a ζῶον νοητόν (30-31 etc.). This may be an advance. At least it organizes the two spheres. Is Plato leading to this theory by his present ἀπορία? 2. We have not a whisper of ἀνάμνησις as a bridge between the spheres. For that and the immortality of the soul we must go to the Phaedo and Philebus. Is not it an advance also? 3. There is no suggestion that the world of sense has any worth—philosophic worth, at least—in itself. Yet it is a vast series of individual objects with an ἐπιστήμη of its own! When contrasting νοῦς and ἡδονή in the Philebus he presses the point that all trace of the former which may lurk in the latter must be eliminated, and has no difficulty then in degrading the latter completely. But here we have the world of sense consisting of such objects as ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλα as these are understood by us, and yet we need another world in order to make such a one an object of thought. Or does he mean that what knowledge we have here is due to that other world, whether we can explain it or no? 4. Science or knowledge can have only τὸ ὄντως ὄν for its object, and has no proper sphere in a world such as ours—τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν: not only must it have something unchangeable for its object, but it is something essentially ἀκριβὲς or exact in itself. Does not this look too exclusively at science as a result, forgetting science as a process? Knowledge starts from ignorance and does not reach perfection per saltum. However immutably existent its object may be, how does that object look in the process of becoming known? It can appear only as a γιγνόμενον—that is, under the character assigned to an object of sense in a sensible world. Then how can we be sure that it is not such? Alternatively, if science is always a fact or result and not a process, does not that make it a mere analytical thing, and deprive it of the power of advancing synthetically into the unknown? See *Intro.* xli.-li.

πρωί It is not always clear in the Mss. whether an ι is subscript or not—all being postscript. Here it is clearly a separate syllable: while in *πρώην* immediately below it must be meant as subscript for the accent is upon the ω . This in each case accords with Curtius, s.v. But what of ἀδολεσχίας, ν , where the ι is inserted on a scratch? See L. and S. On *πρωί* Heind. says vox haec rariore significatu h. l. sonat 'nimis mature,' and aptly quotes Sophoc. Trach. 631, δέδοικα γὰρ | μὴ πρῶ λέγοις ἂν τὸν πόθον τὸν ἐξ ἐμοῦ, πρὶν εἶδέναι τὰ κείθεν εἰ ποθοῦμεθα, which also supports his preference for *πρῶ*. καλόν τε τί so from the Mss. reading καλόν τέ τι with most editors. But cp. Heind. 'Vulgo καλόν τε τί καὶ. Sed καλόν τι h. l. est i. q. εἶδος seu γένος τι τοῦ καλοῦ. De pulchri justique et boni definitione in his non est sermo.' That is, although ὀρίζεσθαι is the verb used, Pl. does not here speak of defining τί τὸ καλόν; the phrase corresponds to ὀριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος in 135 A. And yet there is room for doubt, as Parm. refers to what Soc. had been attempting in another discussion and the attempt to define is the great characteristic of the historic Soc. Proc. too assumes a ref. to definition, v. 261, καὶ πῶς, φαίη ἂν τις, ὅπως δυνατὸν ὀρίζεσθαι τὰ εἶδη; τὰ γὰρ ἀπλᾶ καὶ ἀμέριστα ποικιλίαν λόγων οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται καὶ σύνθεσιν etc.

ἔκκυσον δὲ etc. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τῆς λέξεως τὸ μὲν D p. 10. 'εὐ ἴσθι' προσκείμενον βεβαιοῦν αὐτῷ τὸν ἔπαινον, ὃν ἐπήνεσε, τὸ δὲ 'ἔκκυσον' δεῖξιν ἔχειν τῆς συμπαθείας αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς πτοίας τῆς περὶ τὸ ὄν. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τινῶν δυσἀποσπάστων καὶ δυσμεταθέτων, οὕτως εἶπε τὸ 'ἔκκυσον,' ἔλξιν προσειπῶν τὴν ... περὶ τὰ διαλεκτικὰ θεωρήματα μελέτην καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα μετὰστασιν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὄντως ὄντων θεωρίας. Proc. v. 267. But does the word mean 'to drag himself away from his present studies to preliminary exercises'? It means rather, as we say in Scotch, 'rax yourself' 'pull yourself about' as a gymnast in training must do. K. J. Liebhold (*Fleckeisen's Jahrb.* 123, 1881, p. 561) objects to ἔκκυσον as always involving resistance, which no doubt it does to some extent; and proposes ἔκκυσον, citing Lach. 194 C, ἡμᾶς τε τῆς ἀπορίας ἔκκυσαι etc., and Tim. 22 D, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σώζει λυόμενος. This is ingenious, but it disturbs the metaphor.

τῆς δοκοῦσης ἀχρήστ. etc. We can hardly suppose

that ἀδολεσχίας is the subst. meant here, as that would not seem, but actually be, useless; probably some such word as μελέτης, πραγματείας, γυμνασίας was designed. ἀδολεσχίας, 'useless prosing,' Grote.

οὗτος, so t, no doubt rightly; ὤ gives οὕτως.

πλὴν τοῦτό γε etc. 'You have been injudicious save in this one point with which I was struck': as if τοῦτο μέντοι γε. For the sentiment see Phaedo 89 A, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, and above 129 E. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον, 'and that in regard to Z. himself, of whom I am speaking.'

Ε τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκ. 'dass man ... dem Irrthum nachspüre' (Müller), 'den Irrthum zu erforschen' (Engelm.), and Stallb. says πλάνη, i. q. ἀπορία ἐν τοῦτοις παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένη. This makes the words run οὐκ εἶας (ἡμᾶς) ἐπισκοπεῖν τὴν πλάνην ἐν τοῖς δ. Proc. again, v. 274, says δεῖ τοίνυν τῆς πλάνης τῶν διαλεκτικῶν πρὸς τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν τῶν εἰδῶν ... τὴν ὄλην τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, ἣν θριγκὸν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐκάλεσεν, ἐν λογικαῖς ἡμᾶς ἀνελίξεοι καὶ διεξόδοις γυμνάζουσαν ... πλάνη γὰρ τὸ μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ σκοπεῖν, ὅπως ἀποδεκτέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν μεθόδων ἐκπεριτρέχειν ἐλέγχοντα ... καὶ ἔοικεν ἢ πλάνη τέτταρα δηλοῦν ἢ ... ἢ ... ἢ πλῆθος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα χωροῦν, ἢ ... τούτων δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων ἢ διαλεκτικῆ λέγεται γυμνασία πλάνη κατὰ τὸ τρίτον, ὀδεύουσα διὰ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ὑποθέσεων. So in 136 E we have ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης, 'libera disputatio' Ast calls it, while ἐπισκοπεῖν has the same sense as in 159 B. The words would thus run ὅτι οὐκ εἶας τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα. 'You would not suffer the argument to investigate merely in the' etc. In α ... λόγῳ ... εἶδη ... εἶναι: Heind. says that λόγῳ = λογισμῶ, and argues for ἦδη (the read. of E) in place of εἶδη, but ὤ and t agree on the text.

ταύτη γε οὐδὲν etc. ταύτη γε = εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα ἐπισκοπῆ. Cp. 129 C-D etc., where he showed ἐμὲ λίθους ξύλα to be one in their collective capacity, many as having numerous qualities. Now, he rejects ideas for stones etc., and to that extent the world of ideas is less open to this treatment than the world of sense. But he holds that there is an αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου, and this is one and many in its degree. It has not as many qualities as ἐγώ,

but it has very many, all that he directly assigns to ἐμὲ and more, and as having these it is many, while it is one in its character as εἶδος ἀνθρώπου. Plato as creator of ideas dwelt strongly on their character as simplifiers of phenomena, that was their raison d'être; but they grow under his hand until their simplicity is not their most marked feature.

οἶον, The general sense is clear, but some words ¹³⁶ must be mentally supplied. The following may represent fairly Plato's thought—οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν ζήνων ὑπέθετο [μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι (unless εἰ βούλει be taken parenthetically), χρὴ σκοπεῖν ὑποτιθέμενον] εἰ πολλὰ etc. The inf. has been held over to πάλιν σκοπεῖν. The antitheses seem almost needlessly elaborate; τί συμβήσεται καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς αὐτά, καὶ τούτοις ἀμφοῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα would suffice.

αὐθις etc. See Notes 1. ὑποθῆ, 2nd sing. of B ὑποθῶμαι, cp. βούλει above and μέλλεις below c. On τί ἐφ' ἐκάτερας Stallb. cites 160 c and Sophist. 251 E, τί οὖν οὐ ... ἐφ' ἐκάστου τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω; τοῖς ὑποθεθείσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις = to the things postulated and to their antithesis in the given case.

καὶ περὶ στάσεως 'Posterius περὶ elegantius abeset,' Heind., and editors omit it,—yet its retention is quite reasonable. Hitherto we have had some details, here begins a summary statement. That statement is introduced by καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος—the first step in the descent; the second comes in the repeated περὶ; then follows the bald enumeration.

δεῖ ... ὡσαύτως It is not easy to think out the details of this dictum. Take the case actually selected in this dialogue. If you 'posit' the 'one,' then its antithesis—the others which you don't posit—is certainly 'many'; and what he seems to say is that you must institute an inquiry in which you compare this one with 'each one of the others, and with several, and with the whole mass of them,' and the converse. But the dialogue, although it is pretty detailed, does not fulfil the pledge. Yet the statement is sound. We do not truly know any thing, however small, until we have viewed it in relation to all other things whatsoever. And the extent to which we fall short of that standard of knowledge is what divides us from omniscience, and

makes 'our little systems' 'but broken lights.' Cp. *Introd.* lii.-lx.

C *ὑπερλέεο* is probably correct: *t* gives it, while *Ἀ* is corrupt. Heind. wishes the aorist, but he might as well change *προαιρή* to *προέλη*. The aorist simply notes an item; the present or imperfect gives to that pictorial reality. 'Whether you assumed as existing what you actually were assuming in the given case or whether as not existing.' *κυρίως διόψεσθαι* is no doubt correct: *t* gives it, *Ἀ* is corrupt, 'to see through and through the truth with the eye of a master,' so to speak, who has finished his apprenticeship. See Notes I.

ἀμήχανον ... πραγματίαν, etc. 'A work of awful magnitude,' Grote; 'an undertaking with which my resources cannot cope.' We might perhaps have printed *-τείαν*, as *Ἀ* is corrected and *t* so writes; yet *Ἀ* gives *-τιώδη* 137 B. *σφόδρα μανθ*. 'I do not completely understand.' So *Phaedr.* 263 D, *εἶπε καὶ τόδε ... εἰ ὠρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου. Νῆ Δί' ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα*: *Phileb.* 58 D, *καὶ νῦν δὴ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἱκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι. τί οὐ διήλθες*, so *Sophist.* 251 E, quoted above on *τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας*. The aorist seems to be part of the phrase. Thus *Gorg.* 468 C, *ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὐ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις*; has an entirely different sense 'why do you make no reply?' While *Protag.* 310 A, *τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν*; *Symp.* 173 B (similar); *Phileb.* 54 B, *τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνωσαντῶ ὦ Σ.*; and *Phaedo* 86 D, *εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο*; are all a form of imperative—'why have you not done it? pray do it at once.'

P 17. D *προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε*: Several parallels occur in *Sophist.*, e.g. 226 C, *Ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις*. 234 E, *ὡς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῶδε ὄντι κρίναι*—spoken by *Theaet.* a youth. *Polit.* 263 A, *οὐ φαῦλον προστάττεις, Σώκρατες*. Of the demons. *τηλικῶδε*—*τηλικούτῳ* (below), it often happens that the former stands like *ὅδε* for the 1st pers., the latter like *οὗτος* for the 2nd—'a man of my, of your, years.' Yet see *Apol.* 25 D, *Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὢν, ὥστε* etc.

δεώμεθα So *t*, clearly better than *Ἀ*. Notes I.

μη γάρ οὐ φαῦλον ἦ We have a double parallel, *Rep.* II. 368 B-C, *δέδοικα γάρ, μη οὐδ' ὄσιον ἦ παραγε-*

νόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν etc., where we have the rationale of *μη ἦ*: and *εἶπον οὖν ... ὅτι τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον, ἀλλ' ὄξυ βλέποντος*. *Stallb.* gives others, e.g. 374 E, *οὐκ ἄρα φ. πρᾶγμα ἠράμεθα*. Cp. *Polit.* 263 A above.

εἰ ... πλείους ἡμεν οὐκ ἂν ἦν A model *condit. sent.* where the *conclus.* is *ἀλλ' οὐ πλείους ἐσμέν*. It seems to clash with 127 C, if we are to press that as alluding to the auditors of this discussion and not the visitors of *Parmen.* *ἀπρεπῆ ... τοιαῦτα ... λέγειν*, 'such things are unbecoming to utter.' *ἀπρεπές* would have been simpler.

ἐντυχόντα ... νοῦν ἔχειν. 'Die Wahrheit zu treffen *ε* und Einsicht zu erlangen.' *Engelm.* 'ut quis verum adipiscatur et intelligentiae compos fiat.' *Ast*, who reads with *t* *σχεῖν*: and others take *νοῦν ἔχειν* or *σχεῖν* in a similar sense. *Proc.* too, v. 311, uses such phrases as *ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς πλάνης ταύτης ἢ ἀλήθεια καὶ ὁ νοῦς ... τοῦ χωριστοῦ νοῦ μετουσίαν. ... μόνη δὲ ἢ κατὰ νοῦν ζωὴ τὸ ἀπλανές ἔχει*. The last words however, with *καὶ θόρυβον αὐτῇ* (sc. *τῇ ψυχῇ*) *παρέχειν ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι* point to the reasonableness of taking *νοῦν ἔχειν* as 'to keep one's head' on discovering the truth, as opposed to *ἰλιγγίαν*. Thus *Phaedo* 79 C, the soul when contaminated by *αἴσθησις* etc., *αὐτῇ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὡς περ μεθύουσα*, all which is altered *ὅταν ... αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ*; so *Prot.* 339 E, *καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡς περὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθητε τε καὶ ἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα*—he needed ἦ διὰ πάντων διέξοδος. This view is at least worth considering. On this passage *Proc.*, v. 311, says, beyond *Pl.*, *οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄλλως ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα μη διὰ τῶν μέσων πορευθέντας ὁδῶν τῆς ζωῆς, ὡς γὰρ ἢ κάθοδος ἡμῖν διὰ πολλῶν γέγονε τῶν μεταξὺ ... οὕτω καὶ ἢ ἄνοδος διὰ πολλῶν ἐστὶ μεσοτήτων*.

διὰ χρόνου: This cannot be historical. For the phrase, we also sometimes say 'through time,' not in the sense of 'after a long interval' but in that of 'as time goes on.'

ἐνδείξ. 8 λέγοι, Indirect for *τί οὐκ ἐνεδείξω ὃ λέγεις*; Cp. *Rep.* I. 338 A, *μη οὖν ἄλλως ποίει· ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μη φθονήσης καὶ Γλαῦκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους*: and so elsewhere. Why is the first inf. aorist and the second present? τὸ του Ἰβ. *πεπονθέναι*. The perf. inf. slightly differs 137

from *πάσχειν*, 'to have met with an experience like that of.' τὸ τοῦ μελοποιοῦ Ἰβύκου ῥητόν: 'Ἔρωσ αὐτέ με κνανέοισιν ὑπὸ βλεφάροις τακερὰ. ὄμμασι δερκόμενος κηλήμασι παντοδαποῖς, εἰς ἄπειρα δίκτυα κύπριδος βάλλει.' ἢ μὰν τρομέω ἴν' [νιν] ἐπερχόμενον' ὥστε φερέζυγος ἵππος ἀεθλοφόρος ποτὶ γήραϊ ἄσκῶν, [ἀεκ-]' σὺν συνοχέσι [ὄχουσι?] θεοῖς εἰς ἄμιλλαν ἔβα. Sch. t 81 a 1. Proc. omits νιν and reads ὡς τις, ἄσκῶν, θεοῖς. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici, reads Ἔρωσ, τακερ', ἐς twice, γήραι, and divides into lines ending δερκόμενος, βαλλει, γήραι, ἔβα. Ibycus belonged to Rhegium but lived at Samos, γέγονε δὲ ἔρωτομανέστατος περὶ μειράκια.—Suidas. Quis est enim iste amor amicitiae? cur neque deformem adolescentem quisquam amat, neque formosum senem? ... maxime vero omnium flagrasse amore Rheginum Ibycum, apparet ex scriptis etc. Cic. Tusc. iv. 33. μεμνημένος Does this refer to times when Z. formerly heard the discussion?

διανέσσαι... λόγων. Sch. t, in mg. 81 a 1—περαιωθῆναι, and Rh. Ἄ has -νύσαι: even this is used of the sea by Hesiod, as L. and S. show; but the text makes the metaphor clearer. Ficinus 'quo pacto tam grandis natu tam profundum disserendi pelagus transnatare queam' has suggested to many that he had *πέλαγος λόγων*. He may be merely pointing the metaphor. If he had this, where did he get it? Stallb. well quotes Phaedr. 264 A, ὅς ... ἐξ ὑπέρτας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον. Rep. iv. 441 C, ταῦτα μὲν ἄρα ... μόγις διανεύκαμεν, with others. Thus *πέλαγος* is not needed; nay, *διανεῦσαι* may itself be an early error suggested by such passages as an improvement. But if *διανύσαι* be correct it is the sole case of this word in Pl.

ὄμως δέ' ... δ etc. This seems the best solution—*ὄμως δέ'* = 'but however,' with an aposiopesis, and *δ* as relative. 'However (let us proceed), for I needs must comply, and moreover, as Zeno says, we are by ourselves.' The only difficulty in the way is that *Ζήνων* will have no article, which is unusual hitherto. On *δαί γάρ* Heind. says 'ut bene monuit Heusd. (Spec. Crit. p. 10) post *ὄμως δέ'* elliptice omissum est *διανευστέον* vel simile quid, ab eoque vim suam accipit hoc γάρ,' and he very aptly quotes Charm. 175 B, νῦν δέ—πανταχῇ γὰρ ἠττώμεθα καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὐρεῖν etc. We may add for an aposiop., resumed by breaking the constr. later, Theaet. 143 D,

νῦν δέ,—ἦττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλωῶ, and for lang. Alicib. I. 118 B, ὀνομάζειν μὲν ὀκνῶ, ὄμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν, ῥητέον. Stallb. cites Pind. Pyth. I. 164, and better Aristoph. Lysistr. 144, ὄμως γε μάν' δεῖ τὰς γὰρ εἰράνας μάλ' αἶ.

ἄρξόμεθα... -θησόμεθα; So Ἄt. A 2nd hand in t 11 alters to *ἄρξόμεθα*, erasing the first half of ω. The cause of the change is clear; but the words do quite well: 'whence then are we to begin, and (if we do begin) what shall be our first assumption?' In this connec. we have a good illustr. of the danger of assuming that commentators had certain readings because of expressions which they use. Proc. says (quoting), v. 320, δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ 'πόθεν ἄρξομαι' καὶ τὸ 'τί πρῶτον ὑπόθωμαι' etc., while, 326, he says what we quote below. Probably neither represents his text.

πραγ. παιδ. παίζειν, 'Operosum ludere lusum' Stallb., 'to amuse ourselves with a laborious pastime' Grote. 'Nihil viderunt, qui ex hoc loco voluerunt demonstrare, universam, quae deinceps agitur, disputationem nihil esse nisi dialecticum aliquod artificium, quo artes Eristicorum, imitatione scilicet delusae exagitarentur.' Stallb., and rightly; but the phrase detracts from the seriousness of the issue. We never quite allow metaphysics to overwhelm us, feeling that the laws of nature will continue to act until our system is ready. And yet, as Pl. says, Polit. 307 D, παιδιὰ τοίνυν αὐτῆ γέ τις ἢ διαφορὰ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· περὶ δὲ τὰ μέγιστα νόσος ξυμβαίνει πασῶν ἐχθίστη γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν. In Laws VII. 803 C he speaks of man as θεοῦ τι παίγνιον ... τοῦτῃ δὴ δεῖν τῷ τρόπῳ ξυνεπόμενον καὶ παίζοντα ὅ τι καλλίστας παιδιάς πάντ' ἄνδρα καὶ γυναικα οὕτω διαβιῶναι, τοῦναντίον ἢ νῦν διανοηθέντας. Perhaps the point is that referred to in Theaet. 168 E, where Soc. says to Theod. that they may have to dispute together, ἵνα μὴ τοι τοῦτό γε ἔχη (ὁ Πρωταγόρας) ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὐ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. Parmenides' auditors are mostly young.

ἀπ' ἐμ. ἄρξομαι etc. Proc. v. 326, δοκεῖ δ' ἐμοί γε τοῖς προειρημένοις συμφώνως ἀποδοῦναι τὰ προκείμενα, τῷ μὲν 'πόθεν ἄρξομαι' τὸ 'ἀπ' ἐμαντοῦ,' τῷ δὲ καὶ 'τί πρῶτον ὑποθήσομαι' τὸ καὶ 'τῆς ἐμαντοῦ ὑποθέσεως' καὶ οὐ ταῦτὸν ἐνδείκνυσθαι δι' ἀμφοῖν· οὐ μὲν γὰρ τὸν τρόπον ἀφορίζεται τῆς ἐνεργείας ... ὅπου δέ

τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτῇ πρᾶγμα περιποιήσεται τὴν διέξοδον τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου. Whatever we may think of this, his next remark is suggestive, if overstrained—θεοειδῆς καὶ ὁ τρόπος ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν θείων ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχεται ἐνεργεῖν. Parm. imitating the divine says this καὶ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον ἀλλὰ κάκεινο, τὸ πραγ. παιδ. παιζ., θεῖον γὰρ διὴ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο, τὰς ἐμφάσεις καὶ πολυμερίστους ἐνεργείας παιδιὰς καλεῖν· παίγιον γὰρ θεῶν καὶ ἄνθρωπον [text gives -πων, but see above, Laws VII. 803 C, which is clearly referred to] καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅποσα κατὰ τὰς ἕξω προϋούσας αὐτῶν ἐνεργείας ὑφέστηκε· παιδιὰ μὲν διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς ὀξὺς λόγος πρὸς τὴν ἡρεμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἠνωμένην τοῦ ὄντος νόησιν etc. There may be in fact a playful allusion to Homer's Ἀτρεΐδῃ ... σέο δ' ἄρξομαι, II. IX. 97, and Pindar's ἤμνησαν Διὸς ἀρχόμεναι, Nem. V. 45. The constr. βούλεσθε ... ἄρξομαι has ample parallels, e.g. 142 B; also Phaedr. 228 E, ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνώμεν; repeated 263 E; and others.

περὶ τοῦ ... συμβαλεῖν: Proc., V. 322, says one may ask πῶς ὁ Παρ. ὁ περὶ τὸ ἐν οὐ διατρίβων ἑαυτοῦ κέκληκεν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἐν; and says some suggest that like Gorgias Protagoras etc., Parm. becomes in Pl. φιλοσοφώτερος καὶ ἐποπτικώτερος ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ὀρώμενος. Pl. sees that τὸ ἐν ἐπέκεινα καὶ ὄντος καὶ οὐσίας πάσης ἐστὶ etc. Stallb., again, says that while Parm. does not seem to have called his ὄν ἐν—tamen quoniam τὸ ὄν volebat omnem omnino completi οὐσίαν, praeter quam nihil esset, a Platone narratur docuisse omnia unum esse; and cites Theaet. 180 E ὅσα Μέλισσοι τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διῶσχυρίζονται ὡς ἔν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ἣ κινεῖται, and Sophist. 242 D, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Proc. raises a difficulty too soon: Plato clearly holds this to have been historically the case, and ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἐν ξυνεχές are Parmenides' own words. But we should probably be nearer the truth if we understood εἴτε ἐν ἐστὶ (τὸ πᾶν) εἴτε μὴ ἐν, as in 128 B, which would modify the argument a good deal.

μοι ἀποκρινέται; etc. For the position of the pron. Stallb. cites e.g. Clitoph. 409 D, τελευτῶν ὑπεκρίνατό τις, ὦ Σ., μοι τῶν σῶν ἐταίρων: to which

add 407 A, ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Σ., σοὶ συγγιγνόμενος (but here σοὶ is emphatic), and above 135 D, εἰ δὲ μή, σε διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ... ἀπόκρισις:—see Sophist. 217 C-E, the passage which alludes to the meeting that is assumed in our dialogue, Introd. xix. It is too long to quote, but should be read: there is a strong resemblance. That Plato was serious in his insistence upon the importance of dialogue must be presumed, both from these passages and from such phrases as ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος: yet the value of it could hardly be put lower than here; and Aristoteles certainly acts up to the description. Hitherto we have had dialogue: henceforward we have the ἡκιστα πολυπραγμανεῖν and the ἀνάπαυλα. And if dialogue is important, why should it be laboriously told at fourth hand?

ἔτοιμος ... φάναι, τοῦτο etc. The text, including stops, is that of Herm.: and but for the stops (t has none, ῥ none but τοῦτο,) it is that of the Mss. with perfect clearness. As it stands it seems to mean ἔτοιμός σοί εἰμι—τοῦτο, φάναι τὸν Ἄ. 'I am at your service in that capacity'; or ἔτοιμός σοί ἐστὶ τοῦτο, 'this is at your command,' where we may assume τοῦτο to refer to the whole descrip. given by Parm. of what he wants, and the adj. to be attracted into concord with the nouns ἀνάπ. ἀπόκρ.—he starts in agreement with them and then finds the neuter better. Both, however, are forced interpretations. Another course is to read φάναι τοῦτο τὸν Ἄ. = 'I am at your service': Aristotle said this. But Stallb. is right in calling this a strange use of the parenthetic φάναι—to give it an object in a sort of apposition to the object-clause, as he seems to mean when he says λέγειν would be required. The next step is to read τοῦτον (sc. τὸν νεώτατον) with one or two Mss., 'said the one in question, Ar.' This gives a good meaning, although Heind. fails to see the force of τοῦτον. Two Mss., Δ H, read τούτω—the former with ° above the line—which must mean φάναι τούτω (sc. τῷ Παρμ.), not a good solution. Another possible change would be ἔτοιμόν σοι ... τοῦτο, and the change would be easy enough if the ν were the small one like υ, and were coupled to σ in σοι—νσ might then be mistaken for σσ. Here ends the bridge between part I. of the dialogue and part II. (135 C-137 C). For the nature of the relation between these parts see

Introd. xxxi.-ii., lii.-v. Does Plato now go on to talk metaphysics in a mystery, does he refute Parmenides' doctrine out of its author's own mouth, or does he merely give a lesson in dialectic? Such are some of the suggestions. Except that the second might better run, does he develop what is latent in the doctrine of Parmenides?—there is no inconsistency in supposing that he does all these at once, and advances his own conception of the ideal problem at the same time. Among the thoughts which succeed each other in his mind as he writes, one is that there is complexity within the ideal world analogous to that in our sensible one: a second is that the ideas having so far been held to be isolated, as a *sina qua non* of their purity, hopeless contradictions thus arise which cut at the very roots of philosophy: a third is that some such trenchant dialectic as that exemplified by Zeno's writings is essential if these difficulties are to be overcome; and that a laborious discipline in it is the sole training adequate for him who would deal with the ideal theory, or (which to Plato is the same thing) with metaphysical problems at all. It is clear from the detail given that Plato has this last subject deeply at heart. As upshot, Parm. is, as it were, put to revise his own doctrine in the light of more recent developments. And the result seems to be that even the simple idea of 'one' has indefinite possibilities latent in it, and that, so far from its being possible to regard any idea as isolated, an almost Heraclitean complexity in the ideal sphere arising through dialectical necessities is now the real problem to be faced. Dialectic, says Aristotle (Met. I. 6; XII. 4), did not exist before this; and the more Plato looks into it as a factor in speculation the more impressed he is with its transforming powers—in physical matters it has infinitely divided the space between Achilles and the tortoise, so that we can hardly think of the one overtaking the other: in the intellectual sphere it converts even the simple unity of being as put forth by Parmenides into endless multiplicity. It is curious to observe, however, that the 'idea of science' quietly drops out of sight. Nothing has expelled it, for the separateness between the ideas and our world continues, though that between idea and idea does not; but somehow it has served its

turn, and we get on with our human science not so badly. It is said by some that what follows of the work is an imitation of Zeno's dialogue as well as of his dialectic. This may be so, though it would not be easy to prove it; but if so it is no isolated case of such imitation in Plato. The greater part of the Republic, for instance, is analogous.

εἰ ἐν ἑστίν The first step is to make us realize that one is one, by freeing it as far as may be from everything extraneous. That is what this division of the argument does—it asks τί χρῆ συμβαίνειν τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς αὐτό; Grote says of Unum and Ens 'both words are essentially indeterminate ... are declared by Aristotle to be not univocal or generic words'; and of the same words and Idem Diversum Contrarium etc. (his equivalents for Pl.'s terms) 'Plato neither notices nor discriminates their multifarious and fluctuating significations ..., the purpose of the Platonic Parmenides is to propound difficulties; while that of Aristotle is, not merely to propound, but also to assist in clearing them up.' (Pl. Parm.) Of Gr.'s many references to Arist. and his Schol., it may be enough to cite Met. iv. 6 sqq., 1015 b 16, ἐν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτό, in the former case Coriscus, musician, Cor. the musician, Cor. the just musician, etc. are all 'one'—as it happens. True, these words are indeterminate, but only in the sense in which all words are so, unless we define them and stick to that. In speaking of Cor. many might refer only to his appearance; many (never having seen him) only to his fame; others, who knew him, to both etc. That Pl. does not notice or discriminate the senses of 'one' etc. is true only in a sense. He is not explicit, as we have learned to count explicitness; but he sees, and means us to see, much both of the different senses of the words and of the results of the inquiry. His intention clearly is to treat of one καθ' αὐτό and as an οὐσία, but he tries (Introd. lvii.-lxiv.) to simplify it so much that he overpasses the possibilities of the case—consciously. As Dam., § 48, 98, says κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθ. τὰ πάντα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ ἀνελών, καὶ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς ἅπασιν, αὐτὸ μόνον ἀφήσῃ τὸ ἐν γεγυμνωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. It is a ἀπλῶς ἓν, and (§ 108, 280) δεῖ δὲ πρὸ τῆς τινὸς εἶναι τὴν ἀπλῶς ἐνάδα· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀμέθεκτόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεθεκτόν οὐδέποτε ἀπλῶς. § 117, 304, ἔστῳ

γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀνάριθμον, καὶ εἰ χρὴ φάναί σαφέστερον, ἀτρίαστον καὶ ἀμονάδιστον. In such an undertaking *τολμῶμεν* (§ 119, 307) *τά τε ἀνάριθμα ἀριθμεῖν καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ πάσαν τάξιν ὄντα* (Dam. speaks also of *ἀπλῶς πολλὰ*) *τάττειν, καὶ τὸν ὑπέροκσον τῷ ὄντι βυθὸν ὅμως διακοσμεῖν*: for (309) *ἀφανίζει τὴν τριάδα τὸ ἐν, καταπίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ* [N.B.] *ἅπας διορισμός*. It is a *ὑπαρξίς* or *ἀρχή*—*δεῖ δέ* (§ 121, 312), *εἰ μέλλοι σύνθεσις τις εἶναι, προὔποκεῖσθαι καὶ προὔπαρχειν ἀτεχνῶς τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀπλοῦν, ὡς ἄνευ γε τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο προέλθοι εἰς ὑπόστασιν ὑπαρξίς ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάσης τὸ ἐν καὶ ἡ πρώτη ὑπόθεσις*. ἄλλο *τι*—as if *ἡ* were dropped; so Theaet. 203 C, ἄλλο *τι* ὁ γινώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γινώσκει;

οὐδ' ἂν ... ἀπῆ ὄλον *ἂν εἴη*. We look for *ἀπείη* or for ὄλον *ἔσται*: neither this nor above *εἰ ἐν ἔστιν* etc. being normal; below D, *αὐτε ἕξει εἰ ἔσται* is.

... 12. D *εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος*, *Ἄ* has *ἔχη* which cannot be right without *ἐάν*, *τ* gives *ἔχει*. Thomson recalls that Pl. quotes Parmen. in Soph. 244 E, *πάντοθεν εὐκίκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκω, μισσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντη* etc., and must therefore know that what he gives is not the view of Parm.; and he refers to Simplicius' comm. on Arist. Phys. "pag. 12" (cannot verify), in which it is said that Pl. must be practically refuting Parm. in this part of the work: and quotes Dion. Halic. 'ita de Platone scribens αὐτός τε ὁ Πλάτων Παρμενίδην, καὶ Πρωταγόραν, καὶ Ζήνωνα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φυσιολόγων οὐκ ὀλίγους, ἡμαρτηκότας ἀποδεικνύει βούλεται, quae confirmat Eusebius Praeparat. Evangel. l. xiv. c. 4.'

E: *οὔτε γὰρ ... μετέχοι*: Herm. adds *ἂν*—'vel contra Oxon. cum VS retineri structurae concinnitas jubebat, eidemque mox, 138 A, debebatur ἐνείη ... circumscripto ἂν, cujus ut omnino vel optimi codices leges ignorarunt, ita nunc ne conjunctis quidem editorum omnium auctoritatibus concedi poterat.' *ἂν* is a delicate subject. If it be imperative here, we might urge that it may be understood from *οὐτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν* above; or alternatively that *μετέχοι* might be *μετέχει* like *ἔχει* above. It is sometimes hard to decide when a statement is meant to have a conditional element; while again as *ἂν* is often redundantly repeated it may sometimes be repressed. *στρογγύλου* etc.: it can have no boundaries whether curved or straight; here the curved boundary is

circular or spherical, *περιφερές*. Cic., N. D. II. 18, eulogizing these as more perfect than all other forms, says his *duabus formis contingit solis, ut omnes earum partes sint inter se simillimae*.

εὐθύ γε ... ἡ; i.e. if you put your eye at either end and look towards the other the middle will lie right in the way. Or as Heind. puts it—'cujus media pars extremae utriusque ita objacet, ut tegat quasi utramque et obumbret.' Euclid says *γραμμῆς δὲ πέρατα, σημεία. εὐθεία γραμμὴ ἔστιν, ἣτις ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς σημείοις κείται*. In *Ἄ* *εἴη* stands for the *ἡ* of *τ*; wrongly: perhaps from confusion with the *εἴη* below.

οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει: The *δὲ* has a force of its own here, 138 not easy to render: it might be put *ἐπέπερ καὶ μέρη οὐκ ἔχει*. 'It must be without both straight and round, since it is also without parts,' would be our way of putting it. He dwells on the convertibility of these qualities. For the language cp. Arist. Phys. III. ii. 201 b 26, *οὔτε γὰρ τόδε οὔτε τοιόνδε οὐδέμια αὐτῶν [τῶν ἀρχῶν] ἔστιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν*.

ἐν φ' ἂν ἐν εἴη, etc. So *Ἄ* without doubt: and it is perfectly admiss. We oftener find a subjunct. when *ἂν* goes with the relat.: Heind. would prefer that, or to drop *ἂν*. But Jelf cites Thucyd. III. 59, *φ' τινί ποτ' ἂν καὶ ἀναξίῳ ξυμπέσοι*. and Xen. Mem. II. i. 22, *ἐσθῆτα δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ὦρα διαλάμποι*. and others. He does indeed lay down that in such cases the *ἂν* goes in sense with the vb. not with the rel.: but it is difficult to draw such a line precisely. See also Riddell, Digest of Idioms, § 68. *τ* reads *ἐν φ' ἂν εἴη*: possibly *ἂν* may have arisen from *ἐν*. *ἐν εἴη* is quite clear, and is one among many cases in which it is open to doubt whether *ἐν* or (as Heind. and Herm.) *ἐν*- should be used. Each case has been viewed apart and *ἐν* kept wherever it gives sense: cp. on 131 A, B. Pl. when discussing *ἐν* might sometimes strain his language to emphasize the word. *αὐτοῦ ἀπτοῖτο πολλοῖς ... ἀπτεσθαι. περιέχοιτο* has τὸ ἐν for subj.: has *ἀπτοῖτο* the same subj.—*αὐτοῦ* being = *ἐκείνου*—or does the subj. here change to *ἐκείνο*—*αὐτοῦ* being = *τοῦ ἐνός*? The former is the more grammatical; but, as Heind. notes, *ἀπτεσθαι* has the surrounding *ἐκείνο* as subj. and *τοῦ ἐνός* as quasi-obj. Either way there is a hitch, although the sense is clear. It is hard to see

a distinc. between *πολλαχού* and *-χῆ*. *πολλοῖς* = *multis partibus, multifariam*. Heind. As to the argument he seeks to move step by step, deducing each conclusion from the one preceding; otherwise he might have proved that the one cannot 'be anywhere' from the original assumption that it is not many, or from the second that it has no parts—he shows that these are in his mind by repeating *ένός τε*, and *ἀμεροῦς*.

ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν κἄν ἑαυτῷ etc. *κἄν ἑαυτῷ* \mathfrak{A} , and it admits of transl. as the instr.: *καὶ εἴη ἂν περιέχον ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό*, the last words being obj. of *περιέχον*. But \mathfrak{t} gives the text, and it is on the whole better, *ἑαυτῷ* being nom.; unless we exactly reverse and read *καὶ ἂν οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό εἴη περιέχον ἑαυτό*. Some—e.g. Stallb. and Bekk.—seem to take *ἑαυτῷ* so, and read *περιέχον, ὄν οὐκ ἄλλο*, without apparent Ms. auth. for *ὄν*. The redundant looking *εἴπερ ... εἴη* are after all significant. The words *αὐτό γε ἐν ἑ. ὄν* merely put the altern. suggested above, while the repet. brings out its inherent impossibility in view of what is seen to flow from it. 'Put the case that it is within itself: then it itself will be in the position of surrounding what—if it really is within itself—can be nothing but itself after all.' So D, *εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται ... εἴπερ δὴ ἐγγίγνεται. εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι* is \mathfrak{t} and seems correct. 'I say surrounding itself—for it is impossible that anything can be within a thing which does not surround it.' The *εἴη* of \mathfrak{A} may be due to a confus. with the same word above and below. This is the more likely as a confus. has arisen about *περιέχοντι*, written *περιέχον τι*, cp. lines above and below.

αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον etc. So \mathfrak{A} . Heind. thinks *αὐτὸ* tautological: yet that which surrounds needs a little emphasis, for it is impalpable. It is the mere rim of what is surrounded—not even so much, it is an imaginary line, the whole *ἐν* (whatever it may be) being that which is surrounded. Heind. leans to Schleiermacher's *αὐτοῦ* 'that of the one (*αὐτοῦ*) which surrounds is one thing, that of which is surrounded is another'; which, if a change be needed, is a good one. Stallb. retains *αὐτό*, making it the obj. of *τὸ περιέχον*, 'that which surrounds it is one thing'—a very good idea, but involving, he thinks, the mental add. *ἕτερον δὲ τὸ (ὑπ' αὐτοῦ) περιεχόμενον*; while at the same time the colloc. *αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον*,

if that is its meaning, tends to mislead. But he gives instances. For the arg. cp. Arist. Phys. iv. ii. 209 b 32, *δοκεῖ δὲ αἰεὶ τὸ ὄν που αὐτό τε εἶναι τι καὶ ἕτερόν τι ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ*.

οὐ γὰρ ὄλον γε ἄμφω etc. Ficinus says 'nunquam enim idem ipsum totum utraque haec simul pate-retur et ageret.' This Heind., rightly, approves; but adds that it seems to assume as text *ἄμφω τούτω ταῦτόν (τούτω sc. τὸ περιέχειν et τὸ περιέχασθαι)*; and Stallb. agrees. Is that necessary? It seems merely a hyperb. of *ἄμφω*—*οὐ γὰρ ὄλον γε ταῦτόν πέισεται ἅμα καὶ ποιήσει ἄμφω*. Stallb. would take *ὄλον ἄμφω ταῦτόν* as 'the single identical whole consisting of these two aspects,' and leave the verbs with no obj. One feels throughout the diff. of keeping the language faultless when describing what is so very liable to confusion. Cp. Arist. Phys. III. i. 201 a 20, *ἐπεὶ δ' ἕνα ταῦτὰ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν, οὐχ ἅμα δὲ ... πολλὰ ἤδη ποιήσει καὶ πέισεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· ἅπαν γὰρ ἔσται ἅμα ποιη-τικὸν καὶ παθητικόν*.

ἐστίν που που here is strictly local, referring to *οὐδαμοῦ* A above; not as below *ἀδύνατόν που*.

ἔρα ... ἔχον ... οἰόντε ἔ. ἢ κ. οἰόντε must be personal to give a subj. to the verbs; *ἔρα δὴ εἰ (τὸ ἐν) οὕτως ἔχον οἰόν τε ἐστίν*, 'has it in its power to' etc., see 141 A. *τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ*: 'sic et infra (140 E); nam alias fere in hac formula omittitur illud δὴ.' Heind. *κινούμενον γε* from \mathfrak{A} it would seem that their orig. had *τε*. Fischer says of *γε* 'posterior emendatio haud dubie vera est. At etiam in Stobaei Eclogis Physicis, p. 30, ubi verba *ὅτι κ. ... ναὶ* laudantur, legitur *τε*.' Heind. would reject *τε*.

αὐτὰ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. See Introd. vi. Thoms. c says that Galen calls these kinds of motion *τὴν τοπικὴν κίνησιν* and *τὴν φυσικὴν*. Here are some phrases from Arist. Phys. III., *ἀνευ τόπου καὶ κενού καὶ χρόνου κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι. —οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κ. παρὰ τὰ πράγματα. —ὥστε καὶ τὸ κινεῖν φυσικῶς κινητόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον κινεῖ κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό. —ᾧ γὰρ ἢ κ. ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἢ ἀκίνησία ἡρεμία· —ἢ κ. ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινήτου, ἢ κινήτόν. —οὐδ' ἢ ποίησις τῇ παθήσει τὸ αὐτὸ κυρίως, ἀλλ' ᾧ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, ἢ κ.* Dam. § 101, 262, says *τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἄρξει μεταβολῆς τῆς τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἕτεροκινή-του. ἀνάγκη ἄρα πρὸ τοῦ ἐτ. τὸ αὐτ. ὑποτίθεσθαι· καὶ μὴν τὸ κινεῖν, ἢ κινεῖ, πάντως ἀκ.· εἰ γὰρ καὶ*

τοῦτο κινεῖτο, ἐπ' ἀπειρον ἤξομεν—yet here too arise difficulties.

ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ ... ἑαυτοῦ ... εἶναι means, as Heind. and Stallb. suggest, ἄλλο s. ἀλλοῖον ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλοῖον ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν, γιγνόμενον. This constr. recurs 162 D, 163 C, where also he urges the unity of ἀλλοιώσις and κίνησις. To say that the one, whilst passing through the process of change, cannot remain one, is to use the word 'one' in two senses—that of one numerically, and of one or the same in appearance. S. called himself 'one as distinguished from those present'; he does not cease to be so by growing older or stouter or balder. He remains one numerically, but to the extent to which the change goes he ceases to be the same S. We can assent to Plato's concl. rather than to his argument, and our assent is based on the understanding, obviously ruling his mind at this moment, that the one is to be one not in number alone.

ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας: This illustrates, and may have helped to suggest, the argument 139 C, that only the different can differ from the different. He could say μεταλλάττειν χώραν ἐκ χώρας, but if he uses one ἑτέρα he needs two. Phileb. 13 C, σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ τινὰς—ἑτέρας αὐτῶν—κακάς; is not an exception. τὰς μὲν τινὰς balances τὰς δὲ τινὰς, while ἑτέρας αὐτῶν comes in parenthetically—'some good, some (distinct from them) bad.' See ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι below. In Latin too we have alia-alia: but in English we can say 'change to one place from another,' and the German is 'einen Ort mit einem anderen vertauschen.'

ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι 'It must be that in being carried round in a circle the one has gone off upon motion which leans upon a centre.' In the equivalent which follows, ἐπὶ τοῦ μεσ. ἐν., the centre has become definite. καὶ ... ἑαυτοῦ 'and possess as other parts of itself those portions which are being carried round the centre.'

D χώραν ἀμείβον etc. -βον is the reading of t. and can hardly be wrong: Ἄ has the masc. ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται are one phrase.

εἴπερ γε δὴ: sc. κινεῖται. 150 B, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει.

ἄρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι sc. ἐν τινι. If it cannot be in anything, still less can it 'come to be' so.

p. 13. μήτε πω ... δὴ ἔγγ. It is not yet (πω) in, while

still (ἔτι) entering; nor is it any longer (μήτ' ἔτι) wholly without, if it is actually (δὴ) passing in. Ἄ = ἐγγιγνόμενον, ἐν γίγνεται: t rightly gives ἐγ- in both cases. Both give μήτέτι, which Heind. rightly divides as in the text, saying egregie hoc ἔτι respondebit praegresso πω. Cp. Arist. Met. x. 6, 1063 a 17, ἔτι δ' εἰ κίνησις ἐστι καὶ κινούμενον τι, κινεῖται δὲ πᾶν ἔκ τινος καὶ εἰς τι, δεῖ ἄρα τὸ κινούμενον εἶναι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐξ οὗ κινήσεται καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰς τοῦδ' κινεῖσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ.

τι ἄλλο πείσεται though idiomatic—cp. 134 C—F. ἄλλο seems specially de trop here, where μόνον follows. The fut. is a little odd, 'if anything at all is to have such an experience.'

ἔμα. Heind. would expect a reply after this.

τὸ δὲ ... ὄλον ... ἐντὸς ... ἔξω. Suppose the case of a thing 'coming to be inside'—passing into—any other thing. Arrest it at any moment and part of it will 'be' inside, part outside. But here the thing has no parts, and cannot take that position. The only course open to it, if it is to pass inside something else, is that in the process it must 'be' wholly in and also wholly out. This he here says is impossible. 'There is no possibility at all that a thing which lacks parts can as a whole be at the same moment neither in nor out of another thing.' οὐδὲ ... εἰσὶ ... ἐγγιγνόμενον—and if that be so 'is it not much more impossible that what has no parts, and is no whole should come to be anywhere, since it comes to be neither part by part nor whole by whole?' The argument is a controversialist's luxury, it slays the slain. The lang. is a little peculiar. Both Mss. have μήτε before an aspirate, so κατὰ ὄλον below. Both have εἰσὶ where ἐστὶ is normal. Heind. puts the latter: Stallb. supports the former, as put quo clarius vis multitudinis emergat. The construction would be simpler thus, ὁ δὲ μήτε μέρη ἔχει μήτε etc.

οὐτ' ... ἀλλοιούμενον: In 138 C we have change and circular + linear-motion: here he puts linear-motion and circular-motion + change. Heind. says κινεῖται is to be understood, or even inserted, after ἀλλοιούμενον from χώραν ἀλλάττει.

γέ φαμεν Ficinus transl. 'asseveravimus' whence Heind. thinks he read γ' ἔφαμεν, the ref. being to 138 B, οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἐν etc. But this would need ἔφαμεν γὰρ below; both Mss. = γε φαμέν.

ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν : 'ἐν ᾧ scil. τῷ αὐτῷ, ἐστίν' Heind., or 'ἐν ᾧ tanquam τῷ αὐτῷ inest' Stallb. H. cps. Gorg. 483 A, ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις : so 159 C below, ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἐν ἄν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τᾶλλα. This seems very probable : yet the sense might possibly be rather different—viz. that we should print 'τῷ αὐτῷ' as repeating literally the τῷ αὐτῷ just before, instead of changing it to τὸ αὐτὸ as gram. requires. Οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, ὅτι ἤδη ἄν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη ἐν ᾧ 'τῷ αὐτῷ' [= τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ] ἐστίν.

οἶόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι : So editors print : but both Mss. read ἐν εἶναι, and it is far from certain that this is not correct. Pl. thinks it 'impossible for it (the one) to be 'one' in itself or in another.' What is nothing save 'one' cannot be localized, 138 A etc. B οὐτε ἡσυχίαν Proc. elaborates the arg. here in syllogs. VI. 163, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἐστίν ἐν τινί· τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν τινὶ οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστὶ (he has said above πᾶν γὰρ ἐστὼς ἐν τινὶ ἐστὼς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζωτικῶς ἐστὼς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ σωματικῶς ἐν ἄλλῳ)—these are the premisses to Pl.'s concl. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Proc. goes on ἔπειτα δεύτερος λόγος τοιοῦτος· τὸ ἐν οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστὶ· τὸ μὴδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄν οὐχ ἔστηκε· τὸ ἄρα ἐν οὐχ ἔστηκεν. ὁ δὲ (Pl.) προσέθηκεν 'οὐδ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγει'—δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐστάναι μὲν καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἰδρυμένον, ἡσυχίαν δὲ ἄγει τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένειν δυνάμενον. ἀμφοτέρω δὲ ἀπέφησε τοῦ ἐνός. Although Pl. has treated of motion with sufficient care for his purpose, and sees clearly its two great divisions ; it seems very unlikely that he would have made no allus. to the more elaborate classification which Arist. gives—e.g. Phys. III.—had that been known to him. In this the Parm. agrees with the Theaet.

πῆ δῆ ; So t ; X has τινὶ δῆ which in uncials, if written closely, is very like πῆ. Introd. lxxxii.

ἕτερον ... ἐνός ἕτερον etc. The concep. of the ἐν is here much more abstract than it was above. Refs. to physical conditions, such as size and position, are now pointless : the 'one' has been driven from the physical sphere and is now a pure logical entity. The args. used will apply if we regard their terms as terms merely, or the one as a thing having no positive content. 'This part of the argument is the extreme of dialectic subtlety,' says Grote. Of the four parts of the argument Proc., VI. 172, points out that he

begins ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων [read πορωτέρων] τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἡμῖν εὐληπτοτέρων—καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ταῦτόν τοῖς ἄλλοις (Pl. says ἐτέρῳ) οὐκ ἐστὶ, δῆλον καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἐστὶ—the latter of the two, being clearest of all, comes first : καὶ γὰρ ἐστίν ... τὸ ταῦτόν ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ἐνός, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον πορωτέρον· τὸ δὲ ἐγγύτερον χαλεπώτερον ἀφαιρεῖν.

ταῦτόν γε ... ἐκείνο ἄν εἴη, Sound, as words are generally used : but we shall soon see it contradicted ; and shall then learn why in elucidating his present position his args. do not run in the order given above (Proc.). The reasoning holds, moreover, only from the standpoint of the 'one' ; changing that standpoint we can see that ἐκείνο would in turn cease to be itself and would be ἐν. Cp. Dam. § 42, 85, οὐτε ἦνωται αὐτῷ· εἴη γὰρ ἄν ἐκείνο ἦνωμένον.

ἄλλ' ἕτερον ἐνός : This too is right in ordinary usage : but the words have scarcely been uttered when he shows that he should not have used them—οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἐτέρῳ τινός εἶναι. θαρρεῖ δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο, says Proc. 174-176, τῷ μὴδὲν εἰσδέχασθαι τὸ ἐν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ... οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ιδιότητος ἀναπιμπλάσαι δυνάτον ... ἦν γὰρ ἄν τι πρὸ τοῦ ἐνός· ἢ γὰρ ἀνοδος ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος ... τὸ δὲ πρῶτως ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐφετὸν πᾶσι τοῖς ὄνσιν ἀμέθεκτον προϋπάρχει τῶν ὄλων, ἵνα μένη ἐν ἀπλήθηντον ... οὕτω δ' ἄν ἀποδείξειας καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα αὐτῆν ἐστίν ὅπη ταυτότητα μὴ οὖσαν, εἴπερ εἴη πως τῇ ἑτερότητι ταῦτόν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων παρ' ἑαυτῆν ... τὰ μὲν [N.B.] πρὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντα γένος ἢ εἶδος οἶον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος ... ταῦτὰ ὄντα κατὰ τὸ γένος ἢ εἶδος οὐκέτι ἀλλήλοισι ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ ταῦτά· μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἀνάγκη πρὸ τοῦ ἐνός γένος ἢ εἶδος ... τὸ γὰρ μετέχον τοῦ γένους ἔχει τι παρὰ τὸ γένος ... καὶ καθόλου πᾶν τὸ μετέχον τινός ἔχει τι παρὰ τὸ μετεχόμενον· εἰ γὰρ μὴδὲν, αὐτὸ ἄν ἐκείνο εἴη παντελῶς καὶ οὐ μετέχον ἐκείνου μόνον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἐν μήτε ἐν γένει ἐστὶ μήτε ἐν εἶδει, ταῦτόν δὲ ἢ ἐτέρῳ τινί, αὐτὸ ἄν ἐκείνο εἴη ᾧ ἐστὶ ταῦτόν οὐκ ἄλλο ὄν.

οὐ γὰρ ... ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ, etc. How far may this arg. be due to the Greek idiom alluded to in discussing χώραν ἐτέραν ἐξ ἐτέρας, 138 C? Our idiom says 'the one is larger than the other,' but the classic idiom is ἕτερον ἐτέρου μείζον ἐστὶ alterum altero majus est. And this is the truer statement, a clearer perception of which may have fixed the

idiom. When we compare one with another the act places the former in a position of otherness to the latter, even if the result be that the two are pronounced similar. We may use a physical illustration which, though not quite fair, may help to explain the idea. Two similar pith balls are magnetized in the same way: place them together and polarization occurs, when each becomes 'other than the other,' while yet 'the same as the other.' † has *μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου*, which Stallb. and Heind. defend. The former says 'Nimirum quod unum est, hoc, ob id ipsum quod est unum, ab altero differre nequit. Quocirca post ἑτέρῳ deinde rursus infertur ἑτέρου quo magis urgeatur notio diversitatis quae in Unum infinitum cadere negatur.' The latter translates 'Neque enim ei quod unum est convenit diversum ab aliquo esse, sed huic soli id convenit quod ab altero diversum est,' adding 'quippe h. l. unum illud per se sine ulla alia qualitate intelligendum,' and giving a very acute reason for the ἑτέρου—'ἑτέρου illud post ἑτέρῳ si deleas vereor ne quis haec falso ita interpretetur: neque enim uni convenit diversum ab aliquo esse, sed tantum diversum aliud autem nihil.' That is, the one has no title to be 'other than something,' but only to be 'other' and nothing more. But the context renders such an error unlikely; and would not the Gk. have been *ἀλλὰ μόνον ἑτέρῳ ἄλλον δὲ οὐδενός* to bring out the meaning? Proc., 177, points out that this third arg. takes more discussion than the first two as being *μᾶλλον τοῦ ἐνός ἐγγύς ... διὰ τὴν ἐξηρημένην τοῦ ἐνός ὑπεροχήν*. Of *ταῦτὸν* and *ἕτερον* he says *λέγεται γὰρ ταῦτὸν (1) καὶ ἡ ταυτότης (2) καὶ τὸ μετέχον τῆς ταυτότητος, καὶ ἕτερον ὁμοίως*. Thus far the 'one' is not 'other than' anything *διότι οὐ (179) μετέχει ἐτερότητος*. *μόνῳ γὰρ ἑτέρῳ εἶναι προσήκει τῷ ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ*, which phrase may perhaps support ἑτέρου. Dam., § 72, 159, says *τὸ διακεκριμένον διακεκριμένον διακρίεται, εἰ καὶ ἄλλος ἑκατέρου ὁ τῆς διακρίσεως τρόπος*. *καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἕτερον, ἑτέρου καὶ τούτου ὄντος· ἄλλ' ἡ ἐτερότης οὐχ ἡ αὐτῆ πλὴν τῷ γένει τῆς ιδιότητος*. We may cp. Theaet. 158 E, *ἀδύνατον τοῖνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄψον, ὅταν ἦ κομιδῇ ἕτερον*. With such cases of *πρός τι* we must guard, as Arist. says, Categ. 7, 6b 35 etc., against giving *τὸ ἀντιστρέφον* otherwise than *οἰκείως*. *ἕτερον ἑτέρου* is given *οἰκείως*, but not (Polit.

283 D) *δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μείζον μηδενὸς ἑτέρου δεῖν μείζον λέγειν ἢ τοῦ ἐλάττωνος*; Pl. has to put *τὸ μέτριον* between, and even that hardly meets the case. He is right if he means that the sole antith. to *μείζον τινός* is not *ἐλαττόν τινος*, but wrong if he thinks that anything can be inserted between the terms when saying *τὸ μείζον μείζον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλάττωνος*. Can he be thinking of *μέγα* and *σμικρόν*?

τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἐν εἶναι ... αὐτό τῷ ἐν εἶναι 'by the fact of being one': after *οὐδὲ αὐτό* underst. *ἕτερον ἔσται οὐδαμῶς*. We have seen that Proc., VI. 177, speaks of 'one' as not 'other' in two ways. He holds, 179, that here we have the proof that it is not itself 'otherness,' *εἰ γὰρ μὴ καθὼ ἐν ἕτερόν ἐστι, οὐκ ἔσται τῷ ἐν ἕτερον*· *εἰ δὲ μὴ τῷ ἐν ἕτερον, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἐτερότης ἐσται*. *πάνν δαιμονίως· ἢ γὰρ ἐτερότης ἑαυτῆ καὶ δι' ἑαυτῆν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἐν οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἕτερον ... καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅπερ αὐτὸς εἶπε συντόμως*· *εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ ἑαυτό, τουτέστιν εἰ μὴ ἑαυτῷ ἐν ὄντι ἕτερόν ἐστι, διότι ἐν καὶ ἐτερότητος διέστηκεν, οὐδὲ αὐτό ἐστιν ἐτερότης*· *ἦν γὰρ ἐν ταῦτὸν φάναι τῷ ἐν ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἐτερότητι ἕτερον εἴπερ τὸ ἐν ἐτερότης, ὅπερ ἀνείλεν ὁ λόγος*.

αὐτὸ δὲ ... ἔσται ἕτερον: etc. He has said that only the other can be other than anything; he has next shown that the one is in no way other; he now infers that thus it cannot be other than anything. *ταῦτὸν ἑαυτῷ* this comes, says Proc., more closely home to the one than even the last arg.—*διὰ τὴν ἄρρητον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἐνός) καὶ ἄφραστον ὑπερένωσιν*.

οὐχ ἥπερ ... τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον. Proc., VI. 182-186, says that here (1) the one is proved not to be 'the same':—to be 'one' and to be 'same' would need to be rigidly convertible, but that which becomes the same as the many becomes so by becoming many, not by becoming one; so that 'same' and 'one' are not rigidly convertible: (2) *τούτῳ δὲ δειχθέντι συνήψε* (Pl.) *καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ ταῦτὸν οὕτω τὸ ἐν, ὡς ταυτότητος μεταλαβὼν ... ἄλλης οὔσης, ... ἔσται γὰρ τῷ μεταλαβεῖν ταυτότητος ἐν τε καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ μὴ ἐστι, καὶ οὐκέτι φυλάξει τὴν ιδιότητα τοῦ ἐνός, πλήθος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνός γενόμενον*. Pl. may give the purport of these separate arguments in his text, but Proc. rightly adds that he does it briefly. Assuming that Pl. has proved one not to be convertible with same on the ground that, if it were, then *ὁπότε τι ταῦτὸν ἐγίγνετο αἰεὶ ἂν ἐν ἐγίγνετο*, Proc. asks what right he has to go further and say *καὶ ὁπότε ἐν, ταῦτόν*? The addition is justifi-

fied if the two are convertible; but Proc. rather suggests an alternative which interposes, ἔν γάρ τι γιγνόμενον ἕτερον γίγνεται τῶν πολλῶν· καί τοι γε... ἔδει τὸ ἐν γιγνόμενον εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ταυτόν. He adds, by way of marking the priority and purity, so to speak, of the one as here viewed, τῶν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ-ἐν διὰ τὴν ἀντίθεσιν [ἕτερον v. ἕτερον is present to the mind] ἕτερον γίγνεται (τὸ ἐν)· καθὸ δὲ ἐν τὸ ἐν ἐστὶν ἐν, οὐκ ὄν τῶν πρὸς τι· καθ' αὐτὸ γὰρ, ... τὰ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ προϋπάρχει πανταχοῦ τῶν πρὸς τι... τὸ δὲ ταυτόν τῶν πρὸς τι λεγομένων ἐστίν. This is how we must, if possible, conceive of the one in our present course of argument—οὐ γὰρ ἀποστατεῖ τοῦ πλήθους ἢ ταυτότης [we can say something is ταυτόν τοῖς πολλοῖς], τὸ δὲ ἐν [he also says ἐνότις δὲ] ἔξω τῶν πεπληθυσμένων ἐστίν· ἐκάστη γὰρ τάξις συνεισφέρει τι ἑαυτῇ πάντως ὁ μὴ ἦν πρὸ αὐτῆς. And so we are to think of the following hierarchy of existences, each step downwards (or, if we treat the first as lowest, upwards) bringing in its own special characteristic ὁ μὴ ἦν πρὸ αὐτῆς:

τὸ ἐν—	ἔχει ἀπλότητα	κρίττονα	ταυτότητα	
τὸ ὄν—	ἔχει τὴν ταυτότητα	καὶ ἐτερότητα	ἢν οὐκ εἶχε τὸ ἐν	
ὁ νοῦς—	,,	τοῦ νοῦ ὄρεξις	,,	,, ὄν
ἡ ψυχὴ—	,,	μεταβατικὴν νόησιν	,,	ὁ νοῦς
ὁ οὐρανός—	,,	κύκλω κίνησιν τὴν τοπικὴν	,,	ἡ ψυχὴ
ἡ γέσεις—	,,	κατ' οὐσίαν μεταβολὴν	,,	ὁ οὐρανός.

In this difficult section Pl. does convince us that same and one are not rigidly convertible, that οὐκ ἐπειδὴν ταυτόν γέννηται τῷ τι ἐν γίγνεται. We may by popular usage say 'what becomes the same as anything becomes one *with it*' but not 'becomes one'; and that being realized, when we say one is the same as itself, we add a fresh quality to one. So of εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταυτόν ἐστὶ οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστὶ· popular language says that a thing is the same as itself. But Proc. truly holds that 'same' is a πρὸς τι, and that our duty here is to think of 'one' as καθ' αὐτὸ if we can, as an entity rigidly unmodified by extraneous comparisons. If we do, then when we call it ταυτόν ἑαυτῷ—innovent as the act may seem—we have caused it to be no longer ἐν ἑαυτῷ—καὶ οὕτω ἐν ὄν οὐχ ἐν ἐστὶ. Proc. accounted for the order of the args. by their relative difficulty, the hardest coming last. But there seems to be another reason at work. The second contention, above B,

is ταυτόν γε ἐτέρῳ ὄν ἐκείνο ἄν εἴη. This we now see is a popular use of language, which dialectic rejects; otherwise ταυτόν γε ἑαυτῷ ὄν ἐκείνο ἄν εἴη would hold, and the one, when the same with itself, would be itself, and so necessarily one with itself. He could not, then, have put his second arg. after his fourth, which cuts away its basis. On the other hand if we accept the latter we may be supposed not to need the former. As to language Heind. justly says on γέννηται 'Rectius fuerit γίγνηται, ac deinde γιγνόμενον pro γενόμενον': unless we are to fall back upon the distinc. between mere narrative or argumentative forms (aorist) and pictorial forms (present), 'when it passes into sameness with anything, it is in that very process becoming one before our eyes.' Heind. adds that διέφερε would be preferable to διαφέρει, while a διαφέρει οὖν would be an improvement before πάνν γε. Proc., vi. 185, asks, why say τοῖς πολλοῖς ταυτόν instead of ἴσον, and answers by saying that we don't here deal with a τι ποσὸν existing ἐν τοῖς ἐνύλοις πράγμασιν, but with an οὐσιῶδες πλήθος or ποσόν, and that ἢ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν κοινωνία ταυτότης ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τι ποσὸν ἰσότης. He probably gets this partly from the language in 140 B.

οὕτω δὴ... ἐτέρῳ εἴη: 'Malim οὕτω δὴ ἢ ἕτερόν' E p. 14.

Heind. A smaller change would do, οὕτω δ' ἢ. From the dats. gov. by ταυτόν we supply gens. for ἕτερον. The statement is a condensation of the one with which the arg. began 139 B.

οὔτε... ἐτέρῳ are an enlargement of τινι above. We might have had εἴτε εἴτε, and also οὐδενὶ for τινι.

ὅτι τὸ ταυτόν σου etc. 'Because to be affected anyhow in the same way is resemblance,' 'because what is similarly affected in any way is like'; or as Jowett translates 'Because likeness is sameness of affections.' Plato exposes his arg. to needless danger by resting its further progress upon this assertion. The reasoning used about 'same and different' would amply cover 'like and unlike': but he seems to wish each step to lean, as far as may be, on its predecessor. If we are to define likeness this def. will do very well. Arist., Met. iv. 9, 1018 a 15-19, says ὁμοία λέγεται τὰ τε πάντη ταυτό πεπονθότα, καὶ τὰ πλείω ταυτό πεπονθότα ἢ ἕτερα, καὶ ὄν ἢ ποιότης μία· καὶ καθ' ὅσα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται τῶν ἐναντίων, τούτων τὸ πλείω ἔχον ἢ κυριώτερα

ὄμοιον τούτῳ. ἀντικειμένως δὲ τοῖς ὁμοίοις τὰ ἀνόμοια. He says briefly, id. 15, 1021 a 10-12, κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν λέγεται πάντα. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὄν μία ἢ οὐσία, ὅμοια δ' ὄν ἢ ποιότης μία, ἴσα δὲ ὄν τὸ ποσὸν ἐν. In IX. 3, 1054 b 5-11, he speaks of things as like which κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ταῦτα ἢ ... ὅτι ἐν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν, where εἶδος seems to mean appearance. We must note throughout the adherence to the perfect tense—never πάσ-
χον πάσχει—the thing has been so affected, and thus is like. Cp. τὸ αὐτὸν which occurs, with our 'the t'other' and the Scottish 'the t'ae ane and the t'ither.' τοῦ δέ γε ἐνός etc. 'jungas hunc in modum τὸ δέ γε αὐτὸν ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν χωρὶς (ὄν) τοῦ ἐνός.' Stallb., who cites for abs. of ὄν 165 D, οὐκοῦν ... χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, and 166 οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρὶς.

¹⁴⁰ εἰ τι πέπονθε etc. = εἰ τὸ ἐν πέπονθέ τι χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, πεπόνθοι ἂν εἶναι πλείω ἢ ἐν. The strict balance of moods is broken. πλείω ἢ ἐν 'This is the main point of Demons. I. and is stated pp. 139 D, 140 A compared with 137 C.' Grote.

οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν etc. = οὐδαμῶς δυνατὸν ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἐν εἶναι ταῦτον-πεπονθὸς οὔτε ... οὔτε, οὐ φαίνεται is a little ambiguous: 'non videtur' Ast, 'clearly not' Jowett. οὐδὲ μὴν if not ταῦτον 'still less' ἔτερον. One is tempted to relapse and hold that the one must be either ταῦτον π. or ἔτερον π. and that it cannot be at once οὐδαμῶς ταῦτον π. and οὐδαμῶς ἔτερον π. But the objection lies in the πεπονθός: to be one, as we are striving to regard that, it must be οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς πεπονθός, χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι: if indeed τὸ ἐν εἶναι is τι πεπονθέναι, and not αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι.

^B οὔτε ἄρα ... ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν: The dats. are luckily suited to both adjs. this time; not as 139 E. Ἄ reads ἑαυτῷ here. We are not far past the argt. ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί, 139 C, and already we lapse and mingle ἄλλος with ἕτερος, and even speak of ἕτερον πεπονθός ... ἄλλου.

τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων With likeness and unlikeness physical features recur; and with equality and inequality they come to the front. We may recall what Proc. said (above) about τι ποσόν, and Arist.'s defin. (also above) ἴσα δὲ ὄν τὸ ποσὸν ἐν. He says, Categ. 6, 6 a 26, ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι: when not used strictly so it is still used κατ' ἀναλογίαν of τὸ ποσόν. Pl. regards all ποσά as estimated by units, and does not here

ask whether the measure is of length, capacity, or weight. οἷς ... σύμμετρον, those with which it is commensurable, or has a common unit. Cp. Arist. Met. 1. 2, 983 a 15, we begin, he says, by wondering e.g. περὶ ... τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσυμμετρίαν· θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν εἶ τι τῷ ἐλάχιστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται, and end by reversing our wonder.

τῶν μὲν μικροτέρων τῶν δὲ etc. In the previous sentence the τῶν μὲν, τῶν δὲ belonged to the foll. adj.: here they are separate, referring to the things (οἷς) with which the one is incommens., while the adjs. qualify μέτρων. It might have read μικροτέρων μὲν καὶ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται ἢ ταῦτα ἐστί. He assumes, as dealing now with equality, that a standard is chosen in each case which will measure the objs. the same number of times; but this—as these objs. have not a common measure—will vary in absolute size. That which measures the 'one' a given number of times will in the cases of larger things be smaller, in the contrary case be larger, than that which measures those things an equal number of times. We may note the use of μὲν—δὲ throughout.

ἴσον μὲν	δὲ	οἷς μὲν ἂν	τῶν μὲν
μειζόν	δὲ	οἷς δ' ἂν	τῶν δὲ

τοῦ αὐτοῦ ... τῶν αὐτῶν This argt. depends on that regarding 'same and different,' while the orig. admits that the one had no parts would cover the whole. τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ is the conditional part; the rest the consequent. οὐτ' ἂν ... οὔτε one would look for the repet. of ἂν or for e.g. οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη, οὔτε ἄλλῳ. οὐκοῦν φαίνεται γὰρ 'well (οὐν) it does not seem (γε) so.' τοσοῦτων καὶ μερῶν is true D throughout. καὶ οὐτωαὐ the hiatus clear in both Mss.

τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ... 'quoniam ita ei accedat aliud quiddam, videlicet mensurae ratio, quum tamen ipsa (unitas) ab omni ratione libera sit atque immunis,' Stallb. Proc. says here (VI. 210-12), ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἴποι ἂν τις ἀπορῶν, ἀλλὰ ἴσον μήτε ἐλαττόνων ἔσται μέτρων μήτε πλειόνων ἀλλ' ἐνός, ἵνα μὴ πλήθος ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ καταλίπωμεν, αὐτῷ ὄν ἔστω ἑαυτοῦ μέτρον· διὰ δὲ τούτων λύων τὴν ἀπορίαν ταύτην ἐπήνεγκεν, ὅτι ἄρα εἴ τις τοιοῦτον ὑπόθοιτο τὸ ἐν, ἔσται ἴσον τινὲ πάντως—τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μέτρῳ· καὶ εἰ μὴ αὐτῶν (το ὄν ?) τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἐν, διότι τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι, δῆλον ὡς ἴσον ὄν τὸ ἐν ἔσται καὶ οὐχ ἐν διὰ

τὸ ἴσον οὐχ ἔν ὄν. ... ἀνέκφατον ἔσται μετροῦν ἑαυτὸ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ μετρούμενον, καὶ ἔσται οὐχ ἔν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀλλὰ δυοειδές. ... εἰ οὖν μηδὲ ὄλον ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἵνα μὴ πεπονθὸς ἦ τὸ ἔν, ὡς ἐν Σοφιστῇ δέδειχε, πολλῶ μᾶλλον μέρος οὐκ ἔστιν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀτελὲς ἦ πρὸς τῷ καὶ πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἔν. ἐκ δὲ τούτου φανερόν (N.B.) ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔν τῶν εἰδῶν τι ἔν πᾶν γὰρ εἶδος μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ παντός, ἀλλ' ἐξήρηται καὶ τοῦ ὄλου νοητοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδῶν μερῶν ὄντων. ... καὶ πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη μέτρον, ἐπέκεινα παντὸς πέρας ὄν καὶ ὄρου καὶ ἐνόητος; πᾶν δὲ μέτρον πέρας ἐστὶ τοῦ μετρούμενου καὶ ὄρου.

ἴσον αὐτῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι : So \mathfrak{A} , retained as intelligible. But \mathfrak{t} gives **ἴσον τῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι** : which (if read as **ἴσον τῷ**) is preferable. And the reading **ἴσον αὐτῷ** may perhaps be an error from **ἴσον ἂν** above. τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι—γρ. αὐτῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι. Sch. Rh.

οὔτε αὐ μείζον etc. Proc., VI. 213, says διείλε δὲ τὸ ἄνισον ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι, μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον εἰπὼν, ἅπερ ὠνόμαζεν ἐν τῇ προτάσει κοινῶς διὰ τοῦ ἄνισου παραλαμβάνων. His first statement was (B) οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον, but he followed it by μείζον δὲ που ἢ ἔλαττον ὄν.

Ἐ δοκεῖ τῷ The τῷ, as Stallb. says, depends on τὴν αὐτὴν : the passage in full might run τὸ ἔν δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι (or δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ ἔν) πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερόν του εἶναι, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν τῷ ἔχειν; as in 141 A; Stallb. cps. 151 B-end.

χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος etc. It is not clear if χρόνον belongs to ὁμοιότης or only to ἰσότης. Proc. however rightly says that likeness in time is as much to be weighed as equality (VI. 226) πρεσβύτης γὰρ ἀνθρώπος ὑπὲρ πρεσβύτη δῆλον ὁμοίος ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰσηλιξ· ἢ γὰρ οἶμαι χρόνον ἰσότητος οὐ ποιεῖ ταυτότητα τῆς ἡλικίας... διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰσηλικὸν ὀνομάζεται, τὸ δὲ ὁμήλικον. The ὄν does not include χρόνον.

p. 15. 141 **πῶς οὖν ... τοιοῦτον ὄν** : Proc., after saying that what has no equality or inequality in time may still have these of a non-temporal kind, adds (VI. 228) προσέθηκε τὸ ' τοιοῦτον ὄν' τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιότητος καὶ ἀνομοιότητος ἐπέκεινα πᾶς ἂν μετέχει τῶν ὁμοιότητος καὶ ἀνομοιότητος μετεχόντων (such as time); καὶ τὸ ἰσότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος ἐξηρημένον πῶς ἂν συντάττοιτο τοῖς μερικῶς τούτων μετεληφόσι; τὸ γὰρ κατὰ χρόνον ἄνισον καὶ ἴσον οὐ πάσης μετέσχε τῆς τοῦ ἄνισου τε καὶ ἴσου δυνάμεως.

ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ... εἴη; οὐδὲ might be dropped.

νεωτ. πρεσβύτερον; Here two ideas πρὸς τι may be B said οἰκείως ἀντιστρέφειν as he notes, c below. τὸ πρεσβύτερον ... γιγνόμενον, the article goes not, as above, with πρεσβ., which is part of the pred., but with γιν. A similar case in c.

καὶ νεώτερον ... γίνεταί : Apelt (Parm. des Plato, Weimar 1879) regards this argt. as unjust and due to the idiom, which occurs above, αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίνεσθαι, and which of course involves the element of time. A thing becomes older than itself was, not than itself is. But we are probably to think of the one as caught in the instant of changing its age (on the analogy of 138 D, where it is arrested at the moment of passing from one thing into another): at that instant it may be regarded as becoming both older and younger than itself. εἴπερ μέλλει etc. 'if it is to have anything than which it grows older.' Not only is this clause curtailed by the want of a proper object to ἔχειν; but it is odd in the use of the pres. indic. γίγ. This tense would be natural if the clause stood εἴπερ ἔχει; but with μέλλει one expects γενήσεται or ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται.

διαφέρων \mathfrak{A} clear and admissible, although \mathfrak{t} has διάφορον as below. οὐδὲν δεῖ γίνεσθαι 'premit notionem τοῦ γίνεσθαι.' Stallb. And so we see immediately. If οὐδὲν is nom. ἕτερον is tautol. Perhaps it is = κατ' οὐδὲν, οὐδαμῶς.

ἀλλὰ ... ἤδη εἶναι, short for e. g. ἀλλὰ δεῖ μὲν αὐτὸ ἤδη εἶναι διάφορον τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος διαφόρον : and so below, μέλλειν needing also the word ἔσεσθαι as in c. After pointing out (VI. 235) that Pl. lays down here κοινόν τινα κανόνα περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἅπαξ ἀπάντων, Proc. urges that this affects παραδείγματα, which must 'become' as their image becomes etc. If this is so, and if παραδ. are not to be affected by τὸ γίνεσθαι, then οὐκ ἀποδεξόμεθα τοὺς πραγμάτων ἐπικλήρων (mortal) παραδείγματα ποιούντας· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ παραδ. τῆς εἰκότος οὐκ οὔσης,—unless the latter does not itself partake of becoming, but is of the same nature as its model.

οὖν : so \mathfrak{t} , \mathfrak{A} has ἂν : the two words, however written, C might easily be interchanged. διαφορότης νεωτέρου—on διαφ. Fischer and Heind. cite Moeris Atticista Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ· παρ' ἄλλῳ οὐχ εἶρον. Fischer adds 'scilicet apud nullum veterem scriptorem Atticum Platonique aequalem. Phileb. 3 et 4 est διαφορότητα.' At Theaet. 209A he quotes Thomas Magister

διαφορά, πάντες λέγουσι· διαφορότης δέ, Πλάτων μόνον ἐν Θεαιτήτῃ. These statements might appear to discredit the authenticity of the Parm.; but probably the case in Theaet. was better known than the others. Besides ours, Ast gives the foll.—Theaet. 209 A, D, E, 210 A; Phileb. 12 E, 14 A (the passages referred to by F.); Rep. IX. 587 E: a list which sets aside any argt. as to authenticity. The word does not seem to occur in Arist., who uses *διαφορά*. Would any Aristotelian, familiar with the latter word, go back, even when writing in imitation of Plato, to this rare word, when *διαφορά* is likewise habitually used by Plato? If not, then the Parm. is not likely to have been written by a later imitator.

νεώτερον ἄμα The adv. is important. He has been narrowing the question to the very instant of the change. But to such an argt. we may apply the lang. of Arist., Poet. 7, 1450 b 39, when discussing a brief plot—*συγγείται γὰρ ἢ θεωρία ἔγγυς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη*. Has Pl. in mind the reasoning of Zeno upon space? Proc. says, VI. 231, *δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀπορώτατος εἶναι καί, ἔν' εἶπω, σοφιστικός πως οὗτος ὁ λόγος*. He points out (233) that there are two views of participation in time, τὸ μὲν οἶον εἰθεῖαν ὀδεῦον καὶ ἀρχόμενόν τε ἀπὸ τινος καὶ εἰς ἄλλο καταλήγον (in which case the object sharing in time would not become both older and younger)—τὸ δὲ κατὰ κύκλον περιπορευόμενον καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τὴν κίνησιν ἔχον, ὃ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρασ ἐστὶ ταῦτόν καὶ ἢ κίνησις ἀκατάληκτος, ἐκάστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ πέρατος ὄντος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀρχῆς καὶ [ἢ?] πέρατος. τὸ δὴ κυκλικῶς ἐνεργοῦν μετέχει τοῦ χρόνου περιοδικῶς, καὶ (ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πέρασ τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστι καὶ ἀρχή,) καθόσον μὲν ἀφίσταται τῆς ἀρχῆς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται, καθόσον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ (which is the ἀρχή) ἀφικνεῖται νεώτερον γίγνεται· γιγνόμενον γὰρ ἔγγιον τοῦ πέρατος ἐγγύτερον γίγνεται τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς. This is ingenious: but had Pl. meant it he surely would have been more explicit. Besides, when life is advancing, *περιπορευόμενον ἐνιαυτῶν, ὡς* we grow younger as the end of the year brings round our birthday? Does the explanation explain? Proc. goes on to urge that whatever becomes ten years old becomes older than itself—as nine-years-old; ἐν ᾧ δὲ γίγνεται τοῦτο, νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἐνναετές—by

instantaneous transition to ten years, which makes its still-at-that-instant-subsisting-age-of-nine younger than its at-that-instant-emerging-age-of-ten. This is just what has been urged above; but it has no necessary connection with circular motion.

ἀνάγκη ... ταῦτα: For this abbreviated express. Heind. quotes parallels, Gorg. 475 B, οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; and Rep. VII. 519 B, Laws X. 899 A.

ἐν χρόνῳ ... τοῦ τοιούτου, What does *τοιούτου* refer to? 'Quae in tempore sunt atque hoc tali participant,' Ficinus: 'quaecunque in tempore sint huiusque partem habeant,' Ast: 'Was in der Zeit besteht und deren theilhaftig ist,' Müller: 'things which are in time and partake of time,' Jowett. These agree more or less in referring *τοιούτου* to *χρόνῳ* directly. 'Was in der Zeit ist und an so etwas Theil hat,' Engelm.: this is less definite and may refer the word to the process of becoming older and younger just described. We might then supply mentally *παθήματος*, which occurs in the plural just below. But perhaps the former view 'and partakes of such a thing as we have shown time to be' is the more correct, considering what follows.

οὐδὲ ἄρα ... χρόνῳ: On this Proc., VI. 215 seqq., has much to say, e.g. *καὶ μοι προσέχειν ἀξιώ τὸν νοῦν ἐκείνους, οἱ ψυχὴν ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιούτον εἰρήκασι τὸ πρῶτον, ὅπως αὐτῶν περιαιρεῖ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὃ Παρ. δεικνύς ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἄδεκτον χρόνου, τὸ δὲ ἄδεκτον χρόνου ψυχὴν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· πᾶσα γὰρ μετέχει χρόνου, καὶ χρῆται περιόδοις ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρούμεναις. ... τοῦτο δὴ τὸ δοκοῦν ἄπιστον εἶναι πολλοῖς καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυσιολόγοις, οἱ πάντα περιέχεσθαι ᾤοντο ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ εἴ τι αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸν ἄπειρον εἶναι χρόνον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀκαταμέτρητον ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν πάντων εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τόπῳ πάντα ᾤοντο εἶναι, σώματα οἰόμενοι πάντα ὑπάρχειν ἀσώματον δὲ μηδέν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ πάντα εἶναι, κινούμενα ὄντα ἀκίνητον δὲ μηδέν. ... ὥστε διὰ τούτων εἶναι δεδειγμένον πάντων, ὅτι οὔτε σῶμα τὸ ἐν οὔτε ψυχὴ οὔτε νοῦς, τὸ μὲν διότι μὴ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ διότι μὴ μετέχει χρόνου, τὸ δὲ διότι μὴ κινεῖται καὶ ἔστηκε. He goes on to raise the question what manner of time Pl. here refers to, and decides apparently that it is *χρόνος ὁ πρῶτιστος, οὐχ ὁ προελθὼν εἰς τὸ ἐμφανές, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀπόλυτος καὶ ἄσχετος καθ' ὃν αἱ περίοδοι πᾶσαι μετροῦνται τῶν ψυχῶν*. But into this we cannot follow him, both because Pl. says nothing about*

time which does not apply to the time which we know, and because, in the meantime at least, he declares the one to have no connection with it. For this concl. Proc., vi. 223, gives a reason *δεῖ γὰρ δειχθῆναι τὸ ἐν ἐπέκεινα καὶ τῆς θείας πάσης ψυχῆς πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν, ὡς δέδεικται πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ αἰτίων πάντων.* But we must not forget that this severance from time speedily costs the one its existence. He further points out that a thing may, so to speak, be 'in time yet not of it,' may exist contemporaneously with time yet not be temporal (241) : *τὸ εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ* is not the same as *τὸ εἶναι τότε ὅτε χρόνος ἐστίν*, any more than *τὸ εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ* *τουτέστι τὸ εἶναι ὅτε τόπος ἐστίν, ἢ οὕτως πᾶν τὸ ἀσώματον ἐν τόπῳ φήσομεν εἶναι, διότι τόπου ὄντος ἐστίν.* Nay *τὸ 'ὅτε' χωρᾶν ἐπὶ τούτου [τοῦ ἐνός] παντελῶς οὐκ ἔχει πρὸ αἰῶνος ὑφεστῶτος ὅς ἐστι παράδ. τοῦ χρόνου.* *πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τις τὸ ὅτε ἐπὶ τοῦ μήτε ἐν αἰῶνι μήτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντος, ἀναινομένου δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἄμφω κοινωνίαν; ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ ἐν, ὅτι μὴ ἐν κινήσει, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐν αἰῶνι, ὅτι μὴ ἐν στάσει· μένει γὰρ ὁ αἰὼν, ὡς ὁ Τίμαιός φησιν.* Any further discussion of these problems may be deferred.

ὡς ... αἰρεῖ : So *Al*, and there are several instances of the phrase. Crit. 48 c, *ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ.* Phileb. 35 d, *διψῆν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ... οὐδαμῆ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ.* Rep. x. 604 c, *ἔπη ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν :* see also 607 b etc. This need be said only because *εἰρεῖ* was an early reading, and seems to be transl. by Ficinus 'non sane, ut ratio dictat.' Cp. Phaedr. 274 A, *ὡς ὁ λόγος φησίν.* It will be seen that a reader of *Al*, (Arethas?) struck with the text, makes a note of it in the marg.

καὶ τὸ γέγονε etc. Cp. Rep. vi. 499 c-d, *εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροισ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ... ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἢ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστι καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὕτη ἢ μούσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται.* Proc., vi. 242, cites Rep. vi. 617 b, where *Σ.* *τὰς Μοίρας διαιρεῖσθαι τὸν χρόνον φησί, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄδειν τὰ παρεληθόντα, τὴν δὲ τὰ παρόντα, τὴν δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα :* and says *πρόεισι πρῶτον μὲν τριαδικῶς εἰς τὸ παρὸν καὶ παρελθὸν καὶ μέλλον, ἔπειτα ἐννεαχῶς ἕκαστον τῶν τριῶν τούτων εἰς τρία πάλιν ὑποδιαίρων.* But in the case of *τὸ παρὸν Pl*, has only two subdivisions *ἔστι* and *γίγνεται.*

He rectifies this by including in his summary *νῦν γέγονε*: but he thus repeats *γέγονε* twice and has to add *ποτέ* to the first one. Proc. classifies thus:—

τὸ παρελθὸν = ἄκρον, ἦν μέσον, γεγονέναι τελευταῖον, ἐγίγμετο τὸ παρὸν = κυριώτατον, ἔστι ,, γέγονε ,, γίγμεται τὸ μέλλον = ὑψηλότατον, ἔσται ,, γενήσεται ,, γενηθήσεται

but (243) has doubts as to the main divisions, *μέχρι τίνος γὰρ ἦν τὸ παρὸν ἢ τὸ παρελθόν, καὶ πόθεν ἄρξεται λοιπὸν τὸ μέλλον; ἀλλ' ἴσως ἄμεινον λέγειν ὅτι πᾶσαι μὲν κατὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἐνεργοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἔχοντος τοῦ ὅλου χρόνου τριπλᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεις—τὴν μὲν τελεσιουργὸν πάσης κινήσεως, τὴν δὲ συνεκτικὴν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν βασιλευσμένων καὶ φρουρητικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐκφαντορικὴν τῶν θείων.* Proc. speaks throughout as of *ὁ χρόνος τῶν ψυχῶν*, not of *οὗτος ὁ ἐμφανῆς χρόνος*, though this is constituted on the same analogy, or rather *κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα ὁμοιότητα* which comes between. This is probably suggested by Tim. 37 d, *εἰκόμ' ἐπινοεῖ κινήτῳ τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν—*and so on; but *περὶ μὲν τούτων τάχ' ἂν οὐκ εἴη καιρὸς πρέπων ἐν τῷ παρόντι διακριβολογεῖσθαι.* One would like an excuse for changing *τὸ γέγονε* into *τὸ ἐγεγόνει* and *ποτέ γέγονεν* into *ποτ' ἐγεγόνει.* This would furnish *τὸ παρελθὸν* with past tenses and remove the double use of *γέγονε.* But the text is certain, and Proc. goes on to comment upon it:—*τὴν δὲ πρώτην τριάδα τέως ἐπισκεπτέον. αὕτη δὴπου κοινὸν ἔχει πᾶσα τὸ ποτέ... τῶν τριῶν τούτων τὸ μὲν σημαίνει τὴν ἀκρότητα τῆς τριάδος—τὸ ἦν—κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἀφορίζον· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀθρόαν τελείωσιν—τὸ γέγονε· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῷ τελειοῦσθαι παράτασιν—τὸ ἐγίγμετο· μιμήματα ταῦτα τῶν νοητῶν—τὸ μὲν ἦν τοῦ ὄντος, τὸ δὲ γέγονε τοῦ αἰῶνος, τὸ δὲ ἐγίγμετο τοῦ πρώτως αἰωνίου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ ὁμοῦ πᾶν καὶ ὅλοι ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, τὸ δὲ πληθύνεσθαι καὶ ἐκτείνεσθαι ὅπως οὖν ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου. τούτοις δὲ τοῖς τρισὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐστὶν ἀνάλογον τρία.* Of the second *γέγονεν* he says *ἕτερον γὰρ παρ' ἐκείνο τὸ γέγονε, τὸ μὲν ὡς παρελθόν, τὸ δὲ ὡς παρόν... ἐπειδὴ ὄν διττὸν ἐσήμαινε τὸ γέγονεν, ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος δύο μόνον εἶπε—τὴν πρώτην τὸ ἔστι, καὶ [τὸ] γίγμεται, ἵνα μὴ παράξῃ τὸν λόγον· ὕστερον δὲ προσθήσει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ γέγονε. γενηθήσεται, 'inter γενήσεται et γενηθήσεται quid intersit non video. Vere, opinor, Schleierm. correxit γεγε-*

νήσεται, quod in textum recepissem, si aliud usquam in promptu esset formae hujus exemplum.' Heind. Proc. views it as parallel with *ἐγίγνετο* and *γίγνεται*, regarding it as giving the continuance of a process—*τὴν ἐν τῷ τελειοῦσθαι παράτασιν*. He adds *σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν γενήσεται τὴν ἄχρονον ἀθρόαν εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὑπαρξίν, οἷον ἀστραπὴ γενήσεται*; τὸ δὲ γενηθήσεται τὴν παρατάσεως πρόοδον, γενηθήσεται ἄνθρωπος· ἐπὶ δὲ ἀστραπῆς εἰπεῖν τὸ γενηθήσεται ψευδὸς ἐστίν. This must apply here; but that the form in *-θήσομαι* is not always strictly so used appears from Theaet. 158 D, *τί οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου ... τὸ ἀληθές ὀρισθήσεται*; But perhaps the form *ὀριεῖται* is confined to the mid., as in 190 E, *εἴ τις ὀριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδῆ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν*. Stallb., overlooking what Proc. says and the demands of the case, renders *γενήσεται* 'es wird im Werden sein' and *γενηθήσεται* 'es wird werden.' He cites cases of verbs possessing both forms—such as *ἀδικεῖν, τρέφειν, παιδεύειν*—in which (Gorg. 509 D, Crito 54 A etc.) the shorter form is used, and that (we must assume) in the sense of continuance. But there is no importance attaching to time in those instances: they are cases of statement merely.

τοῦ μέλλοντος; So *Ἄτ*, and the sense is clear. Still Heind. says with reason 'Articulum τοῦ ante μέλλοντος male intrusit librarius. Τοῦ ἔπειτα μέλλοντος respondebit praegresso τοῦ ποτε γεγονότος et subsequenti τοῦ νῦν παρόντος. Thucyd. 1. 123, *τὰ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένα ... περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μελλόντων*' ... Stallb. agrees, but adds 'nisi forte praestat ratio G. Hermanni ad Eurip. Iphig. Taur. 1234, *corrigentis τοῦ ἔπειτά που μέλλοντος, ut ποῦ ad solum ἔπειτα referatur.*'

ἔστιν οὖν ... τούτων τι; 'But are there any forms of being other than these?' Jowett: 'Num potest quidquam essentiâ aliter quam secundum istorum aliquod participare?' Fic.: and others clearly take *τούτων* of the phases of time just noted. This seems the natural sense; in which case Pl. imagines here no existence save one in time, and time such as we know it. Proc. has no basis for his repeated reference to a time other than *ὁ προελθὼν εἰς τὸ ἐμφανές*. Yet he regards *τούτων* as referring to the entire series of aspects in which the one has been thus far considered (vi. 249 etc.), *πάν φησὶ τὸ*

μετέχον οὐσίας κατὰ τι τούτων ἐστὶ μετέχον, ... οἷον ἢ ὅλον ἐστὶν ἢ μέρη ἔχον ἢ ἀρχὴν ἢ μέσον ἔχον etc.

οὐδαμῶς ἄρα etc. It seems clear that this argt. is p. 16. meant to banish the one from existence, to annihilate it: but Proc. (vi. 250) regards it as raising the one 'above' existence. *οὕτω δὲ που καὶ ὁ ἐν Πολιτεία Σ. τὸ πρῶτον ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ἔλεγεν εἶναι, ... ἐνταῦθά φησιν ὅτι οὐχ οἷον τε εἶναι μὲν τι μὴ μετέχειν δὲ οὐσίας καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ διαλόγῳ καὶ ἐν Τιμαίῳ παραπλησίως. ... καὶ ταύτῃ διέστηκεν ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Παρμ. τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐν ὄν βλέπει, καὶ τοῦτό φησιν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, ὁ δὲ ... εἰς τὸ μόνως ἐν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἀναδραμών.* The passage in the Rep. is vi. 509 B, *καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοῖνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεισθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρῶβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος, the spirit of which is totally distinct from that of ours, where the assumption is that the one has been logically abolished. Proc. adds ἀποφύσας δ' ὄν τὸ μετέχειν οὐσίας τὸ ἐν ... προσέθηκεν 'οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν,' οὐκέτι τοῦτο δι' ἀποδείξεως λαμβάνων· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀποδείξαι δυνατὸν τοῦτο αὐτόθεν διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ ἐν συγγένειαν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποφάσεσι τὰ συγγενέστερα. δυσσποδεικτότερα ... ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ὄν δείξει τῆς δευτέρας ἀρχόμενος ὑποθέσεως.* But the argt. in the text seems quite a case of ἀποδείξις—Nothing that is apart from time has any being: the one is apart from time, therefore the one has not any being = Ferio of the first figure!

εἴη γὰρ ... μετέχον. The text and meaning both quite clear, 'denn dann wäre es doch seiend und des Seins theilhaftig,' Engelm. Heind. would prefer *εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ἐν ὄν, καὶ οὐσίας μετέχοι,*—neat but needless.

τῷ τοιῶδε λόγῳ Our idiom is the indef. art. in ¹⁴² such cases; and so 'wenn man einem solchen Schlusse vertrauen darf,' Engelm. It would agree with our ideas to explain the usage thus, *εἰ δὲ πιστεύειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιῶδε ὄντι*. The demonstr. is probably used *δεικτικῶς*, the *λόγος* being personified as one of the company: otherwise *τοιούτος* would be more in place.

δ δὲ ... ἢ αὐτοῦ; literally = but what does not exist—could there be to this non-existent thing

anything either 'for it' or 'of it'? We might simplify thus—*μη ὄντος δέ τινος, εἴη ἂν τι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ*; e.g. *οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομά ἐστιν αὐτῷ οὐδέ λόγος [αὐτοῦ]*. So Alcib. I. 128 A-B, *δακτύλιον ἔστιν ὄτου ἂν ἄλλου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίης ἢ δακτύλου*; What has no οὐσία can have no ποιότης or πρὸς τι.

οὐδέ τι 'neque ab aliquo ex iis quae sunt senti- tur,' Fic., who must take the words thus, *οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων* (subject of sent.) *αἰσθάνεται αὐτοῦ*: and similarly Jowett, 'nor does anything that is perceive one': and Müller and Ast. But Engelm. 'noch (wird) etwas von dem Seienden an ihm wahrgenom- men' clearly assumes *αἰσθάνεται* to be passive; and very naturally in view of the connection. Stallb. without remark renders 'nec quidquam eorum, quae reuera sunt, in eo percipitur et animadvertitur.' Pl.'s point seems to be that nothing which is can perceive what is not.

ἢ δυνατόν ... δοκέ: Here we have a conclusion; and it is unsatisfactory. Proc. (VI. 241) thus traces back the argt., *ἀπέφησε πάντα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐν τάξει*: (10) *τὸ χρόνον μετέχειν ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε πρῶτον εἶναι μήτε νεώτερον*, (9) *τοῦτο ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε ὁμοιότητος μήτε ἰσότητος μήτε ἀνομοιότητος μήτε ἀνισότητος μετέχειν*, (8) *τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε ταῦτον εἶναι μήτε ἕτερον*, (7) *ταῦτα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μή εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐν*, (6) *τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μή κινεῖσθαι μηδαμῶς*, (5) *τὸ δὲ μή κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἐστάναι ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ*, (4) *τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μήτε περιέχειν ἑαυτὸ μήτε περιέχεσθαι*, (3) *τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρη μή ἔχειν*, (2) *τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ μή εἶναι ὄλον*, (1) *τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ μή εἶναι πλήθος*. At 251 he asks, *διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔστιν ἤρξατο τῶν ἀποφάσεων*, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, and answers *ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐναντίως εἶχεν ἢ τῆς οὐσίας ἀποφάσις*: ἢ μὲν γὰρ λέγει τὸ ἐν ὡς ἔστιν, ἢ δὲ ἀπόφασις ὡς οὐκ ἔστι. πάντων οὖν γελοιώτατον ἦν εὐ- θὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγειν εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, αὐτὸς γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἔδοξεν ἀναιρεῖν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο τῷ ἔστι καταχρησάμενος, καὶ ὡς μηδὲν διαφέρον λέγων εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, εἰδεν ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ μάλιστα ἀντικεισθαι πῶς δοκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐν· καὶ ἄλλως τῷ Παρμ. δοκοῦν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ὄν καὶ οὐ πολλά. ἀρξάμενος οὖν ἀπὸ τούτων ὡς γνωριμωτάτων, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ἀποφύσας, κατείδεν ὡς ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔννοια καὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ἀναινεῖται συνάρτησιν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔστιν. He gives, then, two reasons for the order; that to begin by

saying 'the one is not many' is to approach the subject from a distance and lay siege to it in due form, and that this falls in with the dictum of Parm.—as stated by Z.—that 'the whole is not many.' It certainly adds greatly to our conviction that the truth should seem to be reached gradually by cumulative evidence. Grote says 'As far as I can understand the bearing of this self-contradictory demonstration, it appears a *reductio ad absurdum* of the proposition—*Unum is not Multa*. Now *Unum which is not Multa* designates the *ἄντὸ-ἔν* or *Unum Ideale*; which Pl. himself affirmed and which Arist. impugned. If this be what is meant, the dialogue Parm. would present here, as in other places, a statement of difficulties understood by Pl. as attaching to his own doctrines etc.' Plat. Vol. II. Without at present discussing Pl.'s views upon the *αὐτοῦν* we can only repeat that the argt. here says nothing upon the question of a 'one' which should be 'super-sensible' and *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*: it simply shows how by pressing the 'oneness' of the 'one' we press it out of existence. One might quote many phrases from Dam.:—§ 5, 7, *τὸ γὰρ δὴ ἐν ... εἰ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν ἔστιν· εἰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ λόγος ἀρμόσει, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις ... ὄνομα ... δόξα ... ἐπιστ. ... οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐταὶ ἀπλαῖ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦς, ὥστε πάντῃ ἀγνωστον καὶ ἄρρητον τὸ ἐν.* § 7, 15, *καὶ τί πέρας ... πλὴν σιγῆς ἀμυχανοῦ καὶ ὁμολογίας τοῦ μηδὲν γινώσκων ...* § 25 bis, 43, *διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἀπογυμνῶν ἡμῶν ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν ἣν τελειῶν οὐδὲ εἶναί φησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐν τοῦ εἶναι ἀμέτοχον· ἀπ' αὐτῆς γὰρ τὸ εἶναι.* § 27, 48, *εἰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνο πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ πᾶν ... τὸ δὲ 'πάντα εἶναι' οὐκ ἐστὶ 'τόδε τι εἶναι,' τὸ δὲ 'γνωστὸν εἶναι' 'τόδε τί ἐστιν εἶναι'—δηλον τὸ συμβαῖνον ὅτι τὸ πάντα ὄν οὐκ ἐστὶ γνωστόν.* § 29, 55, *ὡς γνωστῷ πόρρωθεν ἐντυγχάνομεν καὶ ... ὑπερβάντες ἡμῶν τὸ γνωστικὸν τοῦ ἐνὸς εἰς τὸ ἐν εἶναι περιστάμεθα, τουτέστιν εἰς τὸ ἀγνωστον εἶναι ἀντὶ γνωστικοῦ.* He like Proc. treats the one here as transcendental.

βούλει οὖν ... φανῆ; So *τ*, which seems essential: βούλει φανείη. Cp. Phaedr. 263 E, *βούλει πάλιν ἀναγινώμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ*; Tim. 17 B, *ἐξ ἀρχῆς διὰ βραχείων πάλιν ἐπένελθε αὐτὰ ἵνα βεβαιωθῇ μᾶλλον παρ' ἡμῖν.* Arist. Met. I. end, *ἐπανελέθωμεν πάλιν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν* etc. We must suppose something like *ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶμεν ἂν* etc. (Riddell's Digest, § 64, γ):

'Considerantes si quid forte redeuntibus (Stallb. 'a principio repetentibus') nobis aliter se habere videatur.' Fic. † marks this by ∴ opp. οὐν.

οὐκοῦν ... ταῦτα. 1. 'Nonne, si ipsum unum est, confessi sumus, quae circa illud eveniunt, cujusmodi esse oporteat?' Fic., which Heind. says would imply ἔφαμεν with a ref. to 137 B, ἢ βούλεσθε etc., but that a similar case recurs 163 C. We need not press Fic. too closely, who almost omits διομολ. ταῦτα. 2. Müller, 'Behaupten wir nicht (οὐκοῦν φημέν) es liege uns ob vollständig darüber uns zu verständigen (διομολογ. ταῦτα) was etwa (ποῖά ποτε) wenn das Eine ist (ἐν εἰ ἔστιν), in Bezug auf Dasselbe daraus folgt (τυγχάνει ὄντα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ);?' This is very literal, and gives the same interpretation as (3) Jowett, who is very brief, 'We say that we have to work out all the consequences that follow, if one exists.' 4. Engelm., 'Also "Eins, wenn es ist" sagen wir, und müssen das was dasselbe trifft, von welcher Art es auch immer sein mag, bestimmen.' This makes ἐν εἰ ἔστιν the object of φημέν, 'this is our hypothesis "if the one is," and we are bound to follow out the consequences of it whatever they may be.' This yields excellent sense (though ταῦτα is treated as needless); but it inserts καὶ after φημέν. 5. Ast, 'Nonne, unum si esset, diximus quae consequerentur ratione ipsius, qualia ea cumque essent, oportere inter nos convenire haec?' This seems partly like (4). 6. Stallb. rearranges, and says 'quod dictum est per attractionem pro: οὐκοῦν [ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, φημέν] διομολογητέον, ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτό; Etenim ταῦτα ... ex abundantia adjectum est. Ex his vero intelligitur etiam alteram Heindorfii conjecturam, qua ὁποῖα pro ποῖα legendum statuit, minime necessarium esse. Ceterum cp. Rep. VII. 527 B, οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον; τὸ ποῖον; ὡς etc.' There is room for still another rendering, which would be brought out by arranging the words thus, οὐκοῦν φημέν ἐν εἰ ἔστιν διομολογητέα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα [εἶναι]—ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα; and by the following paraphrase—'let us review our hypothesis again in the light of our conclusions—and do we not maintain in it that if the one exists we must perforce agree that the conclusions flowing from it are those which we have just stated, whether

we like their character or not?' The weak point here lies in ποῖά ποτε τυγ. ὄντα for καίπερ ὄντα τοιαῦτα: it would be met if we read for περὶ αὐτοῦ ποῖά—περὶ αὐτό, ὁποῖά.

ἐν εἰ ἔστιν ... οὐσίας δὲ etc. 'In primo supposito unum supra ens efferebat et a rerum universitate eximebat Parm.; in hoc secundo vero unum vult cum essentia conjungi.' Thoms. He professes to have just discovered a grave blunder, and to be astonished at the consequences which flow from it. He said the one existed; and this time he won't forget it. Introd. lviii.

οὐ ταῦτὸν οὐσα τῷ ἐνί; The point is vital to what follows. Yet had he made it ταῦτὸν τῷ ἐνί he might have contended—as above—that this did not make it ἐν τῷ ἐνί. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ... μετείχεν so † but not Ἄ: ἄν seems essential. The protasis might be either (1) εἰ γὰρ ταῦτὸν ἦν ἢ οὐσία τῷ ἐνί, or (2) εἰ γὰρ ἢ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐκ ἦν—if it were one with the one, or if it did not belong to it, in either case—οὐκ ἄν ἐκείνη ἦν ... οὐδ' ἄν μετείχεν' ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἄν ἦν. That the sentence is normal we see by νῖν δὲ οὐχ αὐτῆ c ἔστιν ἢ ὑπόθεσις: where further note the αὐτῆ referring to what follows; but that repeats what precedes.

οὐκ οὐν ὡς ... τοῦ ἐν; is irregular. Fic. 'nonne ita dicitur tanquam aliud significet ipsum est, aliud ipsum unum?' But this would need οὐκ οὐν οὕτως ὑποτιθέμεθα ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαίνοντος τοῦ ἔστι or οὐκ οὐν (εἰ αὐτῆ ἔστιν ἢ ὑπόθεσις) ἄλλο τι σημαίνει τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; or yet again οὐκ οὐν ἄλλο τι δὲ σημαίνουσα [ἢ ὑπόθεσις] τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; as we have it a little below. That ὄν is all but as primitive as ἐν is granted by all the ancients, οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἔστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· πάντα γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται. Ar. Phys. I. 2, 185 a 31. Yet we ask πότερον ποτε τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἐν οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, ... ἢ δεῖ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστι τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἐν ὡς ὑποκειμένης ἄλλης φύσεως. Met. II. 4, 1001 a 5. In making distinctions we are beginning 'process,' for (Dam. § 32, 62) ἢ ἀρχὴ ἔστιν ἢ πρόληψις τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, and we get a compound which (§ 66, 144) Pl. calls οὔτε ἐν οὔτε ὄν, ἀλλ' ἐν ὄν τὸ ὅλον δι' ἀπορίαν τοῦ προσρήματος οἰκείου. We see (§ 67, 145) οἷον προποδισμὸς εἰς τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνός: while next comes (§ 108, 280) μετὰ τὸ ἐν ὄν εὐθὺς τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀντιπαρεταγαμένα κατὰ δύο στίχους. The one is not a mere single quality of a thing—(§ 117,

300) τὸ γὰρ ἐν οὐκ ἰδιότης μία, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον οἶον πάντα. Our sent. implies that the preceding one ran νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ὑποτίθεται τὸ ὑποτιθέμενον. Probably the change arose partly through οὐχ οὕτω; coming between οὐχ αὐτῆ and οὐκ οὖν ὡς, and partly to avoid the colloc. τοῦ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; ἔστι and ἐν are, as it were, in inverted commas.

ἀρα ... τις ... ἔστιν: Ἄ τι, ἰ τις. One can easily see how s may have dropped out before συλ-. The order which would best give a value to each would be ἐπειδ' ἂν οὖν συλλήβδην εἴπη τις ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν, ἀρα ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἐν;—as Stallb. suggests. ἂν εἴη is softer for ἔσται. The text should read τις not -δην.

τοιοῦτον ... ἔχειν: i.e. τὴν ὑπόθεσιν σημαίνειν τὸ ἐν τοιοῦτον ὃν οἶον [= ὥστε] μέρη ἔχειν. Might we not also have μέρη ἔχον?

D εἰ τὸ ἔστι ... ὄντος ἐνός, After writing τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, John on glancing up let his eye rest on the first ὄντος, and wrote λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι etc. If he corrected the mistake by inserting points above the words to be omitted (there are no brackets) he must have gone on at least to ἔστι before noting his error, otherwise he need have cancelled only the 2nd λέγεται. The Ms. from which he copied could hardly have had lines of the same length as ours, for in that case the second ὄντος would not be likely to cause confusion. But if we assume what is primâ facie probable, that the archetype had two cols., then the words might have stood in some such form as

εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος λέγεται
καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι

or ᾧδε· εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος

λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος so that
a mistake might easily happen. Stallb. rightly renders thus, 'si οὐσία tribuitur uni illi quatenus est, et vicissim unum τῷ ὄντι quatenus in se suscepti unum.'

ἔστι δὲ οὐ ... ἐνός ὄντος, Fic. 'est autem idem essentia et unum, eodem existente uno quod supposuimus' which differs from the text (1) by omitting οὐ, and (2) by treating τοῦ αὐτοῦ ... ὄντος as genitive absolute. The οὐ is needed, although ἰ omits it; and the τοῦ αὐτοῦ depend upon ἔστι: so in B above, οὐκ οὖν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνός εἴη ἂν, οὐ ταυτὸν οὐσα τῷ ἐνί; Stallb. 'sed ad ipsum illud pertinet [ἡ

τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἐν] quod sumsimus, videlicet ad τὸ ἐν ὄν.

τὸ μὲν ὄλον ... αὐτό, Thoms. reads αὐτοῦ and conjcs. αὐτό, which agrees with Ἄ, which he had not seen. The sense is as if the words stood αὐτό—τὸ μὲν ὄλον—εἶναι ἐν ὄν 'dass das Ganze das seiende Eine sei.' Müller. But the emphatic word should be ὄλον, which the text, naturally interpreted, hardly gives. Jowett boldly puts it as we would wish it, 'must not the being or existence of unity be a whole?' For this we must view τὸ μὲν as adverbial, not followed by τὸ δέ: the words would then stand (τὸ μὲν—) αὐτό εἶναι ὄλον-ἐν-ὄν with the emphasis on ὄλον = 'is it not imperative first that the thing itself should be a whole-existent-one, and [second] that the "one" and "being" become parts of this?'

ἡ ... τό γε ... προσηγέτον: γε italicises the noun, 'or is this part ['part,' observe] to be called part of the whole?' προσρ. is tautol., cp. Theat. 204 E, Μέρος δ' ἔσθ' ὅτου ἄλλον ἔστιν ὅπερ ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ ὄλου; Τοῦ παντός γε... Δοκεῖ μοι οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὄλον.

μόριον ἔχει; 'Sed ne illud quidem μόριον... sanum est, quod mutandum in μόρια, nisi quis Platonem scripsisse conjiciat μορίω δύο.' Heind. But the singular is probably due to the vis inertiae, so to speak, of the three immediately preceding cases of the same word. It has a part, whatever more.

τῶν μορ. ... μόριον, The noun is not hitherto in the dual, while the verb is. μόριον, so Ἄ and ἰ, but the latter is altered μορίου. Bekker reads ἡ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μόριον [Stallb. μορίου], which gives a good sense: but then he says, 'ὄντος om. mei omnes,' and Heind. 'non sane τὸ ἐν est pars τοῦ ὄντος sed τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος, neque τὸ ὄν pars τοῦ ἐνός est, sed ejusdem τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός.' Perhaps the ὄντος before εἶναι may have been an early marginal substitute for εἶναι. It is more symmetrical to say τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος μ. than τοῦ εἶναι μ., when τοῦ ἐνός follows. There would be less diffic. if the following words were ἡ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνός μόριον, but here both Mss. read μορίου. The sense is ἀρα ἡ τὸ ἐν ἀπολείπεται τοῦ εἶναι, ἡ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνός; and Schleierm. would omit μόριον (as Bekk., or μορίου as Stallb.) in each case. Stallb. rejects B.'s μόριον, but adds 'nunc suffragari dubito sententiae Schleierm., Heind., et Bekkeri, qui istud μόριον et post εἶναι et post ἐνός tanquam insitium delendum censuerunt. Nam quod Fic. illud inter-

pretatione sua omisit, vereor ne id non tam deliberato consilio quam propter inertiam quandam ita ab eo factum sit. Quod autem codices omnes eam vocem constanter utroque loco tuentur [they are equally decided in omitting ὄντος], id ejusmodi est ut summam suadeat prudentiam et cautionem. Sed dicam quod sentio; legendum est μορίου, genitivo casu, quod jam in ed. Basil. 2. evulgatum nuper codicum quorundam egregiorum auctoritate confirmatum est.' He interprets 'perinde ac si scriptum esset τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ὡς μορίου et τοῦ ἐνδὸς ὡς μορίου.' This seems to mean that the sense is ἄρα ἢ τὸ ἐν ἀπολείπεται εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ὡς μορίου etc., and to be designed as a reply to Heind.'s remark above. εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος ὡς μορίου is intelligible, but it does not meet Heind.'s objection: and is there authority for using both ἀπολείπ. and εἶναι with τινος? The chief diff. in the text is μόριον—μορίου. Were both μόριον the form would have justification: were both μόριον all would be clear. Herm. defends the text—'Mihi librorum lectio idoneum sensum praebet: ex duabus unius-entis partibus neque unum, quia pars est [= μόριον, i. q. ? μόριον ὄν], essendi notione caret [= ἀπολ. τοῦ εἶναι], neque ens, quia unum est, parte sui uno.' That is the meaning; but to reach that should we not need ἄρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἐν τοῦ 'εἶναι' [μορίου] μόριον [ὄν], ἢ τὸ ὄν τοῦ 'ἐνδὸς' μορίου [μόριον ὄν]; why then the capricious omission? And the natural meaning of ἀπολ. ἢ τὸ ἐν τοῦ εἶναι μόριον would be 'does either the one recede from being a part' or 'is either the one deprived of being a part,' which does not balance τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνδὸς μορίου. On the whole, unless some serious error lurks in the text, the simplest correc. would be to read either μόριον or μόριον in both cases; and the former is simpler and has t in its favour. Perhaps 144 C, E

17. decide that ἀπολείπεσθον is passive? τὸ ἐλάχιστον is adverbial, 'ex duabus saltem particulis.' Fic.

τούτω τὸ μορίω Notes 1. Does μόριον form part of the subj. with ὃ τί περ (quaecunque particula occurrit—Fic.) or is it pred. with γένηται?

143 δὲ αἰεὶ γίγν. sc. αὐτό, i. e. τὸ μόριον. On the elis. cp. 143 D δύο ἦτον, δύο ἄρτια 149 A δύο εἶναι, δύο ἄρα B δύο ἐπλεο- etc. Leichtere Elisionen werden mit der grössten Inkonsequenz bald vorgenommen, bald nicht. Meisterhans 54, § 23, 1.

ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλήθος 'This is exactly what S. ...

(p. 129 B-D) had pronounced to be utterly inadmissible. [Had he? He desired to see Z. carry the discussion into that field.] The essential characteristic of the Platonic Idea is here denied. ... Pl. here reasons upon two contradictory assumptions: first that *Unum Ens* is a total composed of two parts separately assignable ...; next, that *Unum* is not assignable separately from *Ens* ... Proceeding upon the first, he declares *Unum Ens* to be divisible: proceeding upon the second, he declares that this division must be carried on ad infinitum, because you can never reach either the separate *Ens* or the separate *Unum*. But Pl. must make his election: either he takes the first, in which case the total *Unum Ens* is divisible, and its two factors, *Unum* and *Ens*, can be assigned separately; or he takes the second, in which case *Unum* and *Ens* cannot be assigned separately ... so that *Unum Ens* instead of being infinitely divisible, is not divisible at all.' Grote, Pl. II. Thoms. cps. this passage with the poem of Parm. (l. 81 Mullach) τῷ ξυνεχῆς πᾶν ἐστίν, ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει: which seems to show that (Is it also Grote's view?) a physical turn is given to the division of ἐν and ὄν. Simpl., on Arist. Phys. 1. 2, 185 b 5, illustrates the division of a *συνεχῆς ἐν* by that of a line: and if that is the division which is meant in our text, then you cannot take up the first half of the line and maintain that it contains the ὄν of the second. Now Pl.'s repeated use of the word μόριον does suggest physical analogies; but his detailed argt. for the relation of the μόρια to a ὄλον which is a ἐν-ὄν show that he means a logical not a physical division. 'One' and 'being' are the two distinguishable 'moments' of a single complex but indissoluble conception. Yet this does not remove Grote's difficulty about the second half of Pl.'s argt. Pl. seems to hold that when he has established the separateness of being and one in his existent-one he introduces thereby into the latter a capacity for indefinite sub-div. which was not there before. Grote seems right in rejecting the argt. as thus put: and perhaps the argt. which immediately succeeds (143) shows that Pl. was not quite satisfied, and sought to secure divisib. otherwise. But again—granted that ἐν ὄν are distinct and essential elements in the concep. ἐν ὄν, are they co-ordinate as Being

and Nothing are in the Hegelian concep. of Becoming? Pl. must regard them so, since every sub-div. of one still retains being as factor. Proc.-Dam. vi. 258 becomes transcend. *αὐτὰ τὰ μόρια τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔχουσι, καὶ αὐθις ἐκάτερον τῶν μορίων ... καὶ αὐθις ἐκεῖνα, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐπ' ἀπειρον· πλὴν ὡσπερ ἐλέγομεν ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἐνός, ὅτι καὶ οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ ὑπερούσιόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ὄλον ὄν ἀμερές ἐστι ... ἐν γὰρ τῷ λεγομένῳ μορίῳ τὸ ὄλον ἅπαν πληροστάτως, καὶ ἀνελλιπῶς.*

Ὡς ἔστιν; 'and therefore is' Jowett. This seems correct; yet translators forsake the sense from a feeling that it should be the converse. Our assumption was *εἰ ἐν ἔστι*, not *εἰ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει*: on the contr. we reached the latter from having assumed the former—142 B *ἐν εἰ ἔστιν ἄρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν*; Fic. gives 'Diximus unum essentia participare in quantum est?' Müller, 'Behaupten wir nicht, das Eine sei des Seins theilhaftig, weil es ist?' and so Engelm. But can *ὡς* = because?

ἔν ... μόνον καθ' αὐτὸ The context suggests that *μόνον* goes with *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*, not with *τῇ δ.*—*τούτου*: yet *οὐσίας μετέχειν* has scarcely left his pen. *τὸ αὐτὸ τούτο*; the sense would not suffer if the article were absent. The separation of *τὸ ἐν* from *τὸ ὄν* here is put with emphasis: yet we must take with us the caution of Stallb. 'Fallitur igitur, Heind. mirifice, hoc jam Parmenidem docere velle existimans, etiam τὸ ἐν, quatenus absque τῷ εἶναι per se intelligatur, multa esse numeroque infinita. Licet enim τοῦ ἐνός natura per se spectetur tamen ea ab τῷ ὄντι minime prorsus sejuncta est aut divulsa, quod vel propter sumtionem ἐν εἰ ἔστι nullo modo poni licuit.' The position is complicated. The one has been assumed as existent; that at once confers upon it a more definite nature than was the case previously, and the definiteness clings to it even when we consider it apart from the element of existence which we have added to it. And definiteness is all that we require to work upon in order to transform one altogether. Stallb. urges that if there be any want of clearness it arises 'apertorum vocabulorum penuria'; which is likely, and makes for the authenticity of the work.

B *εἰδόμεν* Notes I. *Ἄ εἰ, δῶμεν* and eds. generally *ἴδωμεν*. Confus. may have arisen from dict.; but

the form in the text is quite legit.—Veitch cps. Frogs 322, *ἡσυχίαν τοίνυν ἀγεῖν¹ βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἂν εἰδῶμεν σαφῶς. ἄλλο τι ἕτερον* etc.: Ridd. Idioms § 22. Reference to ellipsis is out of date, yet the full thought here would need e.g. *ἄλλο τι [συμβαίνει ἢ ὅτι] ἕτερον* etc. Heind. rightly rejects the punct. of *Ἄ, ἴδωμεν δὴ ἄλλο τι ἕτερον. εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία*—the old read. was *οὐσίας*: Heind. sugg. *οὐσία* without knowing *Ἄ*. Stallb. 'Nonne prorsus necesse est aliud quid esse ejus οὐσίαν aliud ipsum per se (αὐτό), siquidem τὸ ἐν non est οὐσία, sed tanquam unum, quod suam sibi propriam naturam habet, οὐσίαν participat?'

οὔτε τῷ ἐν ... καὶ ἄλλῳ etc. *ἐν* and *οὐσία* are in the nom., connected by subst. verb with *τὸ ἐν* and *ἡ οὐσία*. 'τῷ ἐν sc. εἶναι, quod etsi statim infertur post illa οὔτε τῷ οὐσία, tamen illud et hic accurata sermonis ratio requirebat. Commodius certe post οὐσία quam h. l. abesset.' Heind. For the promiscuous use of *ἕτερον* and *ἄλλο* Stallb. cites ample auth., e.g. Il. ix. 472, *οὔτε ποτ' ἔσβη πῦρ, ἕτερον μὲν ... ἄλλο δ' ἐνὶ προδόμῳ*, and Soph. 245 F, *συναπτεται γὰρ ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου*. Phileb. 57 B, *ἀρά ἐστὶ τις ἐτέρας ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη*. In the argt. Pl. reverts to the line taken in Dem. i. and introduces plurality into the one more legitimately than in 142 E. Stallb. speaks of the 'notio differentiae, quae tamen neque in uno neque in essentiae natura continetur, sed accedit extrinsecus. Est enim quasi negans quaedam utriusque illius copula:' cp. Soph. 257 B-C, *ὅποταν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὡς εἴκεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον ...* namely *ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τι μὴν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ ... τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἅττ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα*. But why exclude the *ὄν* involved in *εἰ ἐν ἔστι* and then create another *ὄν* after that? Would he not have got his *ἕτερον* with the original *ὄν* as well? Proc. or Dam. vi. 259 says *διὰ μικροῦ δὲ ἐφοδεύει τὰς ἀποδείξεις καὶ προηγουμένως κατασκευάζει· εἰ ἐν ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς ἔσται· τούτῳ δὲ ἔπεται τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι*, and goes on *τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ ἕτερον οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐτέρῳ, δηλονότι τῇ ἐτερότητι, καθὼς ἐν Φαίδωνι ἔλεγεν, (100 E etc.) ... τούτων οὖν ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων, τῆς τε οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἐνός, παρειαγεται τὸ ἕτερον, καὶ τρία γίνονται. οὐ ταῦτόν ... τὸ ἕτερον*: here the dat. is used in connec. with the idea of

compar. ; not, as above, to express the instrum. or material. *ἐὰν προελ.* etc. our idiom would choose e.g. *ἐὰν προελ. αὐτῶν δύο τινὲ ἢ βούλει, εἴτε ... εἴτε.*

^C ὦ ... -τέρω Notes 1. : so *τ* (ὦ patched), and it seems to be required : *Ἄ τι|νέω ... -τερα.* We have seen (142 E) a similar confus. of dat. sing. and accus. dual. The *a* is often almost indisting. from *ω*. For the express. cp. Crat. 392 A, *γνώναι ὅπη ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκείνον τὸν ποταμὸν Ξάνθον καλεῖν*, and *ὄσω ὀρθότερόν ἐστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκίς κυμίνδιδος*; Laws v. 744 D, [*νοσήματος*] *ὁ διάστασιν ἢ στάσιν ὀρθότερον ἂν εἴη κεκλήσθαι.* So Arist. De Coelo I. 1, *τὰ γὰρ δύο ἄμφω μὲν λέγομεν καὶ τοὺς δύο ἄμφοτέρους, πάντας δ' οὐ λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν προσηγορίαν φαμὲν πρῶτον*—he has said above, quoting the Pythagoreans, that *τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὄρισται. ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν*; cp. nom. below *ὅτ' ἂν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἕν*, and again : the constr. seems free and capricious, e.g. Theaet. 147 A, *ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός*, Prot. 317 C etc.

οὐκ οὖν καὶ ... καὶ the second *καὶ* ('likewise') resumes the first. Stallb. quotes De Corona p. 317, *ὥστε καὶ ὦν αὐτὸς ὡς ἀτυχημάτων ἐμέμνητο, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖ, et sic centenis locis. ἐφ' ἐκάστων ἔκ. est 'quodcumque simul commemoratur,' ut non opus sit numero duali ἐκάστων quem desiderabat Heind. De formula ἐπὶ τινος λέγειν v. ad Remp. v. 475 A, εἰ βούλει ... ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν.* Stallb.

ῶ seems necess. : *Ἄ φ, τ δ. μηχανὴ οὐχ ... ἐν εἶναι*; so *Ἄ*, but it can hold only if the constr. is *οὐχ-ἐν* or *οὐκ-εἶναι*, which from the position is very unlikely. *τ μὴ οὐχ*, and *μὴ* may easily have fallen out after *μηχανή*.

σύνδυο Ἄ οὖν, τ οὖν as first syll. This would perhaps be one of the cases relied on by Kröschel (Introd. lxxvii.) as proof that the source of *Ἄ* was ill written. *οὖν* as in *τ* might be suggested by the later Hellenistic use of this word separately—see L. and S. *ἕκαστα* = each group, *ἕκαστον* = each factor, 'now in as much as our selections each prove binary, surely of these factors each must be one.'

ἐν ἕκασ. etc. *ἔκ.* subj. *ἐν* pred. as 131 E. *συντεθέντος ... τὰ πάντα*; = 'if to whichever couple we please be added whichever factor we please, does not the total become three?' or alternatively 'do not three arise in all?' Stallb. cites Prot. 317 C,

καὶ γὰρ τὰ ξύμπαντα [ἔτη] πολλά μοί ἐστιν. Proc. or Dam., vi. 260, seems to take the second altern., as he says *ἧτινιοῦν δὴ συζυγία προστεθέντος τοῦ ἐνὸς τρία φαίνονται.*

τῷ τε δύο ... τῷ τρία He chooses now to speak of E two and three as singular and in inverted commas; he might almost as well have put *δύο ὄντος, τρία ὄντος* above and below.

ἀνάγκη τε τρία etc. So *Ἄ*: the *τε* might quite well be misplaced, as we often misplace a word like 'both'—'both as regards time and space.' Pl. might wish to associate *τρία δις* as closely as *δύο τρίς*. *τ* reads *τρία τε δις*. *δις τρία* is the text of *Ἄ*, p. 13. but *Ἄ* has *δυο τρις* very small and neat in marg. The correc. may have been very old without being seen, as the Ms. is both stained and creased there. Schleierm. anticipated the change; and all admit its necessity. Stallb. says 'veram lectionem habuisse videtur Dam., aut quisquis Procli commentarium inde ab secundae sumtionis exploratione continuavit, T. vi. 260, ἐναλλάξ συνδύαζει τὸ δις τοῖς τρισὶ καὶ τὸ τρίς τοῖς δυσίν.' The words are merely for symmetry, as *τρία δις* = *δύο τρίς*.

ἄρτιά τε ... ἀνάγκη εἶναι; After noting that we have 4 (*δύο δις*), 9 (*τρία τρίς*), and 6 (*τρία δις* = *δύο τρίς*), Proc.-Dam. goes on, vi. 260, *καὶ δὴ γίνονται ὁ μὲν τέσσαρα [sc. ἀριθμὸς?] ἀρτιάκις ἄρτιος, ὁ δὲ ἐννέα περιττάκις περιττός, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἄρτιοπέρισσος. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις, ὁ λεγόμενος περισσάρτιος, ζητητέον δὲ πόθεν καὶ οὗτος συνάγεται ἢ, ἐπεὶ ὁ δις συνήχθη ἐκ τῶν δύο καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐκ τοῦ τρίς δύο, πάντως ἐκ τοῦ δύο αὐθις καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ὁ δώδεκα, ὅς ἐστι περισσάρτιος. Is not six περισσάρτιος when = *τρία δις*?*

εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἕν, ἀνάγκη etc. Yes: a definite, 144 thinkable, usable 'one' is such only as having number, or many ones, for background.

ὄντος ... τῶν ὄντων. The subst. verb is important throughout: he sets up multitude on the basis that *ἐν* is *ὄν*. *καὶ* here seems = *μᾶλλον δέ. ἢ οὐκ ... γίγνεται*; a hyperb. for *ἢ οὐκ ἀριθ. γίγνεται—πλήθει ἄπειρος καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας*; = 'or is it not so, that number boundless in amount and sharing in existence arises?' Thoms. says 'Numerus Platonis et Pythagoreis denotabat essentiam, ὁ ἀριθμὸς inquit Damascius ἀποφαίνει οὐσίαν.' That may be so (though the language of Dam. does not necessarily express it, but may merely mean quot numeri tot

essentiae), but Pl. makes no such assump. here. He is at pains to prove the connec. of existence with one; thereafter he infers the connec. of existence with number or many.

οὐκ οὖν εἰ πᾶς ... τὸ μόριον etc. 'quod si totus ipse numerus est essentiae particeps unaquaqueque etiam particula numeri essentia participabit.' Fic. The argt. seems curious. He began by establishing the connec. of ὄν with εἶν, next he built up the existence of number by 2, 3, 4, 9, 6, odd, even, etc., reaching πᾶς ἀριθ., number as a whole, last of all. He now argues εἶν has ὄν, therefore πᾶς ἀριθμὸς has it, therefore τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον (2, 3, 4, 9, 6 etc. etc.) has it. This assumes that Fic. is right; and Jowett agrees with him. But if πᾶς = every, then in τὸ μόριον ἕκ. we must deal with fractions; a view which finds some support in σμικρότατον, μέγιστον.

ἐπὶ πάντα ... ἔχει οὕτω. 'Exscripsit haec ... (whole of 144 B) Stobaeus in Eclogg. Phys. p. 30.' Stallb. 'Sed legitur ibi οὐσία τῶν ὄντων τοῦ ἀποστατοῖη—κατὰ κεκερμάτιστα—καὶ μεριστὰ πάντων, μάλιστα δ' ἔτι—ἔχει οὕτως. Et ἀποστατοῖη quidem placet: caetera sunt manifesta librariorum vitia.' Fischer. B ἀποστατοῖ. Notes I. The optat. is necess.; but clearly a very old error has to be dealt with. If in some very early copy ἀποστατοῖ stood as closely under ἀποστατέ, two lines above, as in A, the mistake might be due to misreading. It might also have come through dict.—'ei für oi kommt auch im Jungattischen sporadisch vor: οἴκει = οἴκοι bei Menandros, δνεῖν häufig, τοῖς λοιπεῖς auf einer Inschrift des Jahres 100 v. Chr.' Blass, p. 56-7. For the sense Thoms. says 'Dionysius, vulgo Areopagita dictus, de Div. Nom. c. 5, Τὸ εἶναι οὐδέποτε ἀπολείπεται τῶν ὄντων, ὅτε γὰρ ἀπολείπει τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν.' κατακε. ἄρα ὡς οἶόν τε σμικρ., in full = κ. ἄρα ἢ οὐσία εἰς μόρια ὡς οἶοντε σμικρ. etc. Stallb. cites Rep. III. 395 B, καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, δ' Ἀδ., φαίνεται μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις. 'Accusativi autem pendent a verbo κατακε. quae constans prope structurae est ratio in verbis *divisionem* significantibus: velut [D] λέγοντες ὡς πλεῖστα μέρη ἢ οὐσία νενομ. εἶη.' Heind. See Jelf § 583, 48 on δαίω. L. and S. cite Symp. 191 D, ἕκαστος οὖν ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ξύμβολον, ἅτε τετμημένος ὡσπερ αἰ ψήτται ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο. πανταχῶς 'quomodocunque' Fic.,

'utique' Heind. A part must either be small or large, so that this merely emphasizes the completeness of the division. μέρη ἀπέραντα with the whole cp. Sophist. 256-7 on τὸ μὴ ὄν etc.; thus 256 E, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν. 257 A, καὶ τὸ ὄν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσα πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τᾶλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτ. 257 C, ἢ θατέρον μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη—μία μὲν ἐστὶ πον καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν διὰ πολλὰ τέχνηαι τ' εἰσὶ λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι. etc. μέντοι: ... μέντοι 'plurimae certe ... non tamen pars etc.' Fic. τοι τοῦτο 'πῶς ἂν τοιοῦτο dedi pro πῶς ἂν τοι τοῦτο, quia τοι in interrog. ferri non poterat; quanquam fateor etiam τὸ τοιοῦτο vel πῶς τι ἂν τοῦτο rescribi licuisse.' Herm. He surely means πῶς ἂν τι? μῆδὲν δέ, ἀδύνατον: = ἀδύνατον δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι μῆδέν.

πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἕκαστῳ etc. So A: but ἄπ. ἕκ. is a strange phrase; though it may be compd. with such early expressions as everilk or everich, and even everichone, as in Kings Quair, stanza 64, And efter this, the birdis everichone. Heind. says 'Fic.: non solum ergo universae essentiae, sed illius etiam singulis partibus unum adest. Quasi legerit πρὸς τῷ παντὶ ἄρα (i.e. πρὸς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπάσῃ) καὶ ἕκαστῳ τῷ τ. οὐσ. μέρει ... neque satis integrum ἅπαντι hoc cum ἕκαστῳ junctum videtur.' i.e. πρὸς τῷ π. = 'in addition to the whole.' But cannot this be got from the text? Cp. Rep. VII. 514 A, εἴσοδον ἐχούση μακρὰν παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον; and Laws I. 637 D, ἔτι γὰρ οὖν εἴπωμεν πλείω περὶ ἀπάσης μέθης, which is explained below—λέγω δ' οὐκ οἴνου ... μέθης δὲ αὐτῆς πέρι. Stallb. 'itaque suspicari licet aut ἕκαστῳ ex glossemate natum esse—quod vocabulo ἅπαντι nunc *unumquodque* significanti additum esset; aut corrigi oportere ἕκαστοτε, quo facto haec eodem modo dicta erunt atque antecedentia illa ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αἰεὶ εἶναι γέ τι εἶναι.' This would do; but the change cannot be at once accounted for. In οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον ... οὐδενός: the verb is middle, 'partem nullam deserens.' Fic.

ἄρα οὖν ... ὅλον ἐστὶ; Transl. divide differently. D The pith of the question lies in the last two words. Phps. the best grouping is ἄρα οὖν ἐν—ὄν πολλαχού ἄμα—ὅλον ἐστὶ; but ἄμα might be taken with ὅλον

ἔστι; 'Can one be in many places at the same time and still be a whole?' Jowett. 'Kann nun das vielerwärts befindliche Eine zugleich ein Ganzes sein?' Müller. Some divide thus ἄρα οὖν ἐν ὄν (= ἐπέπερ ἐν ἔστι)—πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἔστι; = 'Ist es nun, indem es Eines ist, an vielen Orten zugleich ganz?' Engelm. ἄθρει: ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ Stallb. cps. 148 D, σκόπει. σκοπῶ. and Soph. 268 A, "Ὅρα σύ. Σκοπῶ καὶ μοι διττῶ etc. So βούλει οὖν ... πάνν μὲν οὖν βούλομαι 142 B above, also Crito 49 B, φαμέν ἢ οὐ; φαμέν. Phileb. 25 B, εὐχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει. σκοπῶ καὶ μοι δοκεῖ etc. Rep. VII. 523 A, δείκνυ, ἔφη. δείκνυμι δὴ, εἶπον and many others.

ἅμα ἅπασιν. 'Malim ἅμα πᾶσι. Certe alius vix usquam reperias ἅμα ἅπαντες.' Heind. ὅσαπερ μέρη: one would expect ὅσαπερ τὰ μέρη [ἔστι]. λέγοντες ὡς etc., see c above. On the construc., on which something has been said above, Fischer says, 'aliud est ἢ οὐσία νενέμηται ἐπὶ πάντα' aliud ἢ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἶη πλείστα μέρη. Nam hoc quidem in genere, quum totum in partes dividi dicitur, verbis divisionem declarantibus additur fere simpliciter, activis quartus casus, primus passivis, ita ut πλείστα μέρη nominativi sint, non accusativi. Quod quum non animadvertissent grammatici et veteres et recentiores, tentare hujusmodi locos scriptorum veterum temere ausi sunt. vid. ad Politic. § 24 [283 D διέλωμεν τοίνυν αὐτήν (τὴν μετρητικὴν) δύο μέρη—where he quotes Herod. VII. 121, τρεῖς μοίρας ὁ Ξέρξης δασάμενος πάντα τὸν περὶ στρατὸν] Sic apud Xenoph. Cyrop. VII. 5. 7 (? 13), recte legitur in libris editis antiquis omnibus τὸ στράτευμα κατένευε δώδεκα μέρη' sed Hutchinsonus edere ausus est εἰς δ. μ. temere.' He is right about the prep., but surely not about the nom. case? νενέμηκε τὴν οὐσίαν πλείστας μοίρας being the act., the pass. would be νενεμημένη εἶη or νενέμηται ἢ οὐσία πλείστας μοίρας, the sense being εἰς πλείστας μοίρας with either voice. In the examples chiefly cited of the pass. the case cannot be determined.

Ξ. ἔπισοῦσθον ... παρὰ πάντα: It is, as it were, 'canto fermo' and 'counterpoint,' 'note against note' all through the compos.—quot et quanta ὄντα, tot et tantae ἐνάδες. We may understand ἀλλήλοις with ἔξις., a verb which Pl. seems to use only twice elsewhere (Rep. VIII. 563 A, Laws XI. 927 E) and never in the act. Eds. give δν' ὄντε, not so Ἄτ.

ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας strong, when he excluded the οὐσία contained in ἐν εἰ ἔστι. Even after that is in thought removed the influence of its original presence can revolutionize the nature of the one.

οὐ μόνον ... ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος 'Then not only is the unity-of-being many, but absolute unity, divided by existence, must also be many.' Jowett. This refers to 143 A, where after showing that τὸ ἐν ὄν is πολλά, he proceeds to discuss τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ μόνον καθ' αὐτό. This latter one it is which has now been made an innumerable multitude, and that too ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος (= ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας). Thoms. would read as in 143 A, τὸ ἐν ὄν—the text is very well as it is, and the language of Proc.-Dam. VI. 262, would seem to show that he had it, ἐν τῷ κερματοῦσθαι ἄρα τὴν οὐσίαν κερματίζεται καὶ τὸ ἐν. εἰπόντος δὲ ἐκείνου (Ἀριστοτ.) τὸ 'φαίνεται,' συμπεραίνει λέγων οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐν πολλά ἔστιν etc. Stallb. would read τὸ ἐν alone, which seems to be a missing of the sense. ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος might have been ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν or τοῦ εἶναι. πολλά ἀνάγκη εἶναι: for ἀνάγκη εἶναι πολλά, the adj. in this and the previous case is not gov'd. by διανενομ. or κεκερμ. after the anal. in B-D. With the assertion that τὸ ἐν alone becomes ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος cp. Rep. VII. 524 E-525 A, where the study of ἀριθμὸς τε καὶ τὸ ἐν is called one of those which are ἐγερτικά τῆς νοήσεως because αἰεὶ τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὀρᾶται ἐναντίωμα, and we are compelled to ask τί ποτ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἶη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἢ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις ... ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτ' ὡς ἐν τε ὀρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. πεπερασ. ... κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν' 'terminatum, secundum totum, unum erit' Fic., or (Heind.) 'finitum fuerit ratione τοῦ ὄλου, i.e. quatenus totum est.' Pl.'s statements here and above on whole and parts may be cp'd. with those of Arist. (1) The most comprehensive def. of a whole by A. is Phys. III. 6, 207 a 9, οὕτω γὰρ ὀρίζομεθα τὸ ὅλον, οὐ μὴθ' ἄπειρα, and just below he says τὸ ὅλον οὐ μὴθ' ἔστιν ἔξω. With this cp. above 137 C, οὐδ' ἂν μέρος μὴθ' ἀπὸ ὄλου ἂν εἶη. (2) In Polit. III. 1, 1274 b 40, A. speaks of a city as being καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄλων μὲν συνεστῶτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων; with which cp. our ὄλου τὰ μόρια μόρια etc. (3) Yet again, Poet. 7, 1450 b 26, ὄλον δ' ἔστι τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν, with which cp. 145 B, τί δαί; ὄλον οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι

καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; (4) But Arist. Met. iv. 26, 1024 a 1, draws a distinction *ἔτι τοῦ ποσοῦ ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ ἔσχατον*, ὧν μὲν μὴ ποιεῖ ἢ θέσις διαφορὰν (such as units), πᾶν λέγεται, ὧν δὲ ποιεῖ (e.g. members of a body), ὅλον· ὅσα δὲ ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ὅλα καὶ πάντα—ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ὧν ἢ μὲν φύσις ἢ αὐτὴ μένει τῇ μεταθέσει ἢ δὲ μορφῇ οὐ, ὅλον κηρὸς καὶ ἰμάτιον ... ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ ὅσα ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ' ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἂν μὴ μεταφορᾶ ... πᾶς οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς, πᾶσαι αὐταὶ αἱ μονάδες. A clear and good distinction. Now our whole passage and all that has gone before shows that Pl. knows no such. He is speaking of parts ὧν οὐ ποιεῖ ἢ θέσις διαφορὰν, yet he calls their sum ὅλον. But we are not left to inference. In Theaet. 204 A-205 B, after directly raising the question τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταῦτὸν καλεῖς ἢ ἕτερον ἐκάτερον; (which is a marked advance upon anything we find here—Intro. xxxi.), he declares *δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον*: and after asking *ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονός ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν*; (which would correspond to *ποιεῖ διαφορὰν*) he concludes for *οὐδ' ἂν μέρη ἦ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται*. No doubt he deals with numbers to some extent, but he also discusses the *στοιχεῖα* of the *συλλαβή*; and one finds no distinc. between πᾶν and ὅλον, and this largely because he never raises A.'s point of divers kinds of *μέρη*.

p. 12 145 τὸ ἐν ἀρα ὄν ... ἄπειρον πλήθει: 'Quum h. l. jam non τὸ ἐν ὄν, sed ipsum τὸ ἐν a Parm. intelligi superiora illa declarent (i.e. 143 A, 144 E), istud ὄν expungere non dubitavi' Heind. It is true he excludes the ὄν of his ἐν εἰ ἔστι in the passages cited, but his having first of all emphasized the ἔστι has in his view given a new character to the ἐν which, even when he proceeds to dwell on ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, does not forsake it again. It still is the ἐν of his ἐν εἰ ἔστι, and he reminds us of that in here summing up—ὄν is to be retained therefore.

142 B-145 A. (1) Thus far his first result is that ἐν ὄν is ἐν καὶ πολλά: and so he has made it to appear, not unjustly. Yet if he still speaks of it as the ἐν of which we speak in arithmetic, his division of it into many is open to objection on Arist.'s ground (Intro. lxiii.) that, in number, 'one' is an indivisible minimum, a unit of measurement. Phys.

III. 6-7, 206 b 31, 207 b 7, ἢ γὰρ μονὰς ἐλάχιστον—ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ἓνα πλείω καὶ πῶς' ἄττα ὥστ' ἀνάγκη στήναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον; Met. IX. 1, 1052 b 16-34, διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαίρετῶ ἐστὶν εἶναι ... πανταχοῦ γὰρ τὸ μέτρον ἐν τι ζητούσι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον. XII. 9, 1085 b 33, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀδιαίρετων σύγκειται, τὰ δὲ μεγέθη οὐ. If Pl. divides a numerical unit he makes fractions of it. If it is the most elementary *thing*, or idea, with which thought can deal, then he may plead, as he does here, that this very condition makes it a thing admitting of further and ever further division, whose parts (and not the assumed whole) must be the 'one'—and so on *εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον*. To be justly divisible it must be an existent ἐν συνεχές. (2) And this is equally true if his second contention is to hold—that it is ὅλον καὶ μόρια, for, if the ἐν is to be an arithmetical unit, its μόρια must be fractions alone, in no sense units in and by themselves, but parts, whose sole *raison d'être* is to be joined in one. (3) As to his third concl. *πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει* we may quote Arist. (as above 207 a 14), *τέλειον δ' οὐδὲν μὴ ἔχον τέλος· τὸ δὲ τέλος πέραις· διὸ βέλτιον οἰητέον Παρμενίδην Μελίσσου εἰρηκέναι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ (M.) τὸ ἄπειρον ὅλον φησὶν, ὁ δὲ τὸ ὅλον πεπεράνθαι μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές*. This refers to Parm. 102-4 Mullach, *Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πείρας πύματον τετελεσμένον ἐστίν, πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ¹ μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντη* etc. Parm. however, here speaks of τὸ ὄν, while in the dialogue he strives as far as may be to speak of τὸ ἐν, ignoring τὸ ὄν. Without discussing the question raised by Arist. whether *οἶόν τε εἶναι ἄπειρον ἐντελεχείᾳ σῶμα αἰσθητόν*, we may note that Pl. holds the one here as *ἄπειρον τῇ διαιρέσει*, to quote A.'s lang.—cp. *De Coelo ad init. συνεχές μὲν ὄν ἐστὶ τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά*.—i.e. as admitting of indefinite sub-div. And if it is *ἄπειρον* in this sense it cannot, says Arist., be a mere numerical unit. On the other hand Arist. points out that the latter unit is, like a moment of time, *ἄπειρον κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*—you can add on successive units ad infinitum—while this cannot be said of an *αἰσθητὸν σῶμα*. It is to be noted in conclusion that we have here a single antithesis under three forms—ἐν v. πολλά, ὅλον v. μόρια, *πεπερασμένον* v. *ἄπειρον πλήθει*. For the rest we have no duty laid on us to

discuss Pl.'s doctrine on the development of number—whether it grows by ‘two twice etc. and every combination of even and odd,’ or, as in what Arist. (Met. xii. 6, 1080 a 30) calls mathem. number, by units, ὁ μὲν μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμεῖται μετὰ τὸ ἐν δύο, πρὸς τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἐνὶ ἄλλο ἐν, καὶ τὰ τρία πρὸς τοῖς δυὶ τούτοις ἄλλο ἐν, καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς δὲ ὡσαύτως. He wants to develop multitude; the special device he tries is indifferent to us. If he gets the length of thinking ‘this is one, that two’ he has multitude already: as Dam. says § 96, 240, πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τῆς μονάδος ἐστὶ προποδισμός. As there is no question above of ideal time, there is none here of ideal number, or of number in connection with the ideal theory.

ἄλον... ἀρχήν etc. This feature of a whole has already been noted. It involves a σῶμα αἰσθητὸν (or mental picture of one), or ἐν συνεχές. It seems natural to say that a whole has beginning, middle, and end, yet it is rather pedantic. The sort of whole to which it applies strictly is that to which Arist. especially applies it (Poetics), viz. an action. To an action, occurring as it does in time, beginning and end are not convertible terms, but represent an inherent distinction. To an object, on the other hand, extended in space, beginning and end—so long as organic structure lies out of the question—are very much what you please to make them. Such objects would be more simply described as having a μέσον or ἐντός, and a περιφέρεια, περιέχον, πέρασ or σχῆμα (τὸ γὰρ σχῆμα πέρασ, Proc.-Dam. vi. 263). Why then is this triple distinction dwelt upon (cp. 137 D)? Possibly Pl. may be thinking of the ἄλον as in motion, or in process of growth or change—as 138 C-E—in which case the side which entered another position first, or with which change began, would be the beginning and the other side the end. This idea appears clearly in 153 B-D. At the same time the Greeks often exhibit a tendency to dwell upon the number three, and Thoms. may be right in referring here to Oriental and other mystical speculations. He cites ‘Iambl. sect. ii. c. 7, ἐν δὲ τούτοις τοῖς τρισὶν ὄροις τριπλῆς τάξεως, ἀρχῆς καὶ μεσότητος καὶ τέλους, ὅλα τὰ γένη κατενεύματο. Ideo veteribus deus dicebatur ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτήν ἔχειν apud Plat. lib. iv. de Leg. quae autem desumpta sunt ex Orpheo.’

The ref. is iv. 715 E, ὁ μὲν δὲ θεός, ὡς περ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων. The words as given by T. are thus seen to be misleading, and more clearly so when we turn to ‘Orpheus’ Mullach Frag. II. line 33 etc. ἔστι δὲ πάντως ἁυτὸς ἐπουράνιος, καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ πάντα τελευτᾷ, ἁρχὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μέσσατον ἡδὲ τελευτήν ὡς λόγος ἀρχαίων, ὡς ὕλογενῆς διέταξεν—that is, God accomplishes all things upon earth, having their beginning, middle, and end in his own hand. If this be really old it may be the source of the phrase in both Pl. and Arist.

κᾶν του ἐν ὄτιον ‘ita scripsi cum Schleierm. pro κᾶν του ἐν (so Ἄt) ne opus sit corrigere ἐνός, quod vertit Fic.: “et si quid ipsorum ab eo, quod unum, distat” etc. Heind. Perhaps this is best, the sense being καὶ ἐὰν ἐν ὄτιον αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ τινός, as in 144 B, τῶν ὄντ. του ἀποστ. Still we have concords neglected above—e.g. 143 B, τῷ ἐν, and E, τῷ τε δύο ... καὶ τῷ τρία—and the Mss. reading as turned by Fic. is quite good, being = καὶ ἐὰν ὄτιον αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ του ἐν. For ἐθελήσει ἔτι Bek. represents Ἄ and other Mss. as reading ἐθελήσειέ τι. But Ἄt both give ἐθελήσει ἔτι, which may justify either reading. Heind. cps. 149 begin. For ἔχοι ἄν ... ἔχοι: he also cps. 148 E, ἄπτοιτο ἄν τὸ ἐν ... ἄπτοιτο: Stallb. adds, 147 A, ἄν ἡδὲ ἐκφεύγοι ... ἐκφεύγοι, and ἡ κᾶν οὕτω μετέχε ... μετείχεν: But where more than the verb is repeated we have the ἄν given, e.g. below, μετέχοι ἄν τὸ ἐν ... μετέχοι γὰρ ἄν. ἡ τοι εὐθέος, ... ἡ τινος etc. τοι with the first ἡ emphasizes the fact that it must have some shape, the special one being indiff. Had τοι gone with either of the other cases of ἡ the emph. would have fallen on that particular shape: cp. 131 A. For εὐθέος see 137 E. ἐν ἄλλω; Stallb. notes the want of the art. here and 145 E, and, contrasting this with τοῖς ἄλλοις etc., 146 B and D, says the art. is omitted ‘quia non significatur id, quod omnino ac simpliciter ab ipso uno discrepat, while τὰ ἄλλα significant ea quae formis unitatis intelligibilis, h.e. ideis, plane opposita sunt.’ That is, he takes ἐν to represent the unity or unifying principle involved in the ideas, and τὰ ἄλλα as the many of sense, and declares that ἄλλο in this passage means something different from the many of sense. It may be so: the variation as to the art. is a fact, and occurs often—e.g. 138, 140, 141—

but it is doubtful if such a distinc. is meant by it. Cp. with this variation that between ἄλλο and ἕτερον—e.g. 140 B—and again that between τὰ ἄλλα itself as used largely through the work, and τὰ πολλὰ so distinctly specified in 136 A, which distincs. convey no change of meaning. It is just possible that ἐν ἄλλῳ here may = ἐν ἄλλῳ τόπῳ. But what does Stallb. gain by his view? No doubt τὰ πολλὰ and τὰ ἄλλα are terms often used of the multiplicity of sense—e.g. in the opening of the dial.—but Soc. there wishes to see that distinc. shown to exist within the ideal world, and we were told that the ideal world could not be known by our faculties, so that in any case our course has not been rigidly consistent. Nor is anything said throughout which should distinguish τὰ ἄ. from τὸ ἐν as sense is divided from the ideas. We are simply bringing our mental faculties to bear upon the relations of ‘one’ with ‘many’ or ‘others,’—these ‘one,’ ‘many,’ and ‘others’ being all such as are λογισμῷ λαμβανόμενα, and being understood to exhaust existence between them in the same way in which A and not-A do so. If ἐν ἄ. refers to something different from τὰ ἄ. it must refer to another εἶδος such as Stallb. holds τὸ ἐν to be; but in that case there should be a great gulf fixed between its character and theirs. Where is that gulf? The only difference is the omis. of the art. It would seem that Pl. having started with the antithesis ἐν—τὰ ἄλλα (τὰ πολλὰ), does not always thrust that distinc. forward in his argt., but occasionally forgets the art. without giving up any feature of the antithesis in doing so. Arist. Phys. iv. 3, init. reckons the various ways in which one thing may be in another—τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ—τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν—εἶδος ἐν γένει—γένος ἐν εἴδει—εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ—ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ—ἐν τῷ τέλει—ἐν τόπῳ. Pl. has nothing so clear as this.

- C τῶν μερῶν ... περιέχεται; We have seen that the ἐν as ὅλον was ἄπειρον in the sense of being endlessly divisible. The fact that all its parts are rigidly circumscribed by its πέρας as a whole precludes the idea of its being ἄπειρον in the sense of being of unlimited extent: οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ μὴδὲν ἔξω, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ αἰεὶ τι ἔξω ἐστί, τοῦτο ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. Arist. Phys. III. 6. καὶ μὴν...τὸ ἐν ἐστιν; The art. here with both subj. and pred. indicates (Clyde Greek Synt., Art. § 9)

‘the convertibility of the terms of the proposition’—τὰ πάντα μέρη ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν = τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα μέρη. So just below ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ τε πάντα τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον. In both cases it is doubtful if τὸ ἐν is subj. or pred. Whichever it be it is not to be coupled with αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον in the last case. οὔτε τι πλέον ἔσται, ἢ οὔτε τι. The text as printed seems needless. The frequent use of the art. hereabouts may have misled Ἄ or his orig.

ἐν ὅλῳ Why no art.? One could better understand his beginning with ‘a whole’ and afterwards speaking of ‘the whole’—he has already spoken so, 145 A—but here he has used the art. four times in the same connec. before thus omitting it.

αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη: Not within itself as the centre is within the circle, but only as ‘the rectangles contained by the whole and each of the parts are together *within* the square on the whole line.’ The argt. would be more just thus ἀρ’ οὐδὲν (see B above) οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐσται καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ;

οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρ. ... ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι. Pl. has just urged that πάντα τὰ μέρη = τὸ ὅλον = τὸ ἐν, and has thence inferred that πάντα τὰ μέρη are ἐν ὅλῳ. He now denies the converse. This would be correct were the whole something other than the sum of the parts. But that distinc., as we have seen on 144 E, Pl. does not recognise, and here it is expressly excluded. Κάιτοι γε—Proc.-Dam. vi. 264,—εὔρηται καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος τρόπος τοῦ ‘ἐν τινι,’ ὅτι περιεκτικόν ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν μερῶν· τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου οὐ. The text of this comment in Stallb. seems unsound and the argt. is obscure; but we get a sugg. from it. We must remember that τὸ ὅλον = τὸ ἐν, and that each part is also ἐν: and D. says τὸ γοῦν ἐν ἐνὶ μὴ τηρηθὲν ἐν πῶς ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐν τηρηθήσεται; Can he mean ‘as a whole which is “one” is not found in *one* part, how can you expect to find it, being “one,” in a *number* of parts (which are not one)?’ That is, after first viewing the several parts of one as mere parts whose sum makes the one or whole, Pl. it seems now turns round and regards each part as ‘one,’ and therefore more likely to contain a whole which is one than a plurality of them is—each was a mere portion of a ἐν συνεχές, now each is ἀριθμῷ ἐν. This, while sophistical, would be intelligible. And two lines of argt. do seem to be used. A word

on the text. If there were any authority in \mathfrak{A} t for doing so, one could almost read with Schleierm. οὔτε ἐν τισί. Pl. would thus state a general concl. that 'the whole is not in the parts either in all or in some' and then proceed to prove the first half of his concl. in εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ... οὐδαμῶς: and the second in οὐδὲ μὴν ... ἀδύνατον γάρ: But besides the want of authority, the succeeding words, after γάρ, make for the text, ἐν πλέοσιν ... ἐν ἐνὶ ... ἐν ᾧπασιν. As to the whole not being in all the parts, he proves this by saying—'if it were in all it must needs be in one,' and leaves us to add the other limb of the argt., 'but it is not in one therefore it is not in all.' One can understand how it is not in one, as he next declares that it is not in some, because the greater would thus be in the less. But if the only reason for its not being in one or in some of the parts be that it is bigger, then, as it is expressly said not to be bigger than all the parts, why may it not be in them? Because, according to Pl., if in all it must also be in each. But if that is so the character of the 'whole' is quite altered. After treating it like the day and the sail—131 B—part of which rested on each portion of space covered by them, and the whole upon all the portions collectively, he now implies that it is not extensive but intensive, that the whole has an essence which is imparted perfectly to each of its portions.

¹⁾ εἰ δὲ τοῦτο... οὐδαμῶς: This he regards as clear proof of his contention. 'Si autem haec una pars aliqua est de his omnibus' Refertur hoc τοῦτο τὸ ἐν ad praecedens illud ἐν τινι ἐνὶ, ad ἀπάντων autem splendendum est τι, more pervulgato. Heind. 'Vulgatum ἐν ἔσται jam Thoms. vidit in ἐνέσται mutari oportere. Pro ἐνὶ autem Heind. restituit ἐνι,' Stallb. \mathfrak{A} t both read ἐν ἔσται, while \mathfrak{B} gives ἐνὶ and τ ἐνὶ. The change to ἐνι is a great improvement. With regard to ἐν ἔσται see on 131 A etc. Here it is poss. that ἐν may have been confused with the ἐν above; but it is also poss. that this very juxtaposition and the fact that ἐν and ἐν recur, may have put the scribe (either John or a predecessor) on his guard. And one may even sugg. that the constr. is τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐν 'the entire number of ones,' as τῶ ἐν 143 B. He could hardly say τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐσίν: and in 146 E etc. he speaks of τὰ μὴ ἐν. Arist. again has got the length of τὰ ἕνα—Phys. III. 7, 207 b 7, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἐστίν

ἕνα πλείω καὶ πῶς' ἄττα. Met. XII. 8, 1083 a 25, ἀποπον γὰρ τὸ ἐν μὲν εἶναι τι πρῶτον τῶν ἐνῶν ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνοί φασιν... Such a remark gives a force to τῶν ἀπάντων, and marks his line of argt.:—If this one is but a sample of the entire number, and the whole is not in it, how after that will it be in all the ones together? He seems to be back for the moment at the old argt. on the particip. of εἶδη. Has he made out his contention? It would have been more to the point to have urged that a whole when reached is a new creature, and that to speak of it as in all its parts is to disintegrate and destroy it.

εἰ γὰρ ... ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον: The 'which is imposs.' would have justified ἦν for εἶη. The lang. recalls Euclid, e.g. I. 39, τὸ ΔΒΓ ἄρα τρίγωνον τῶ ΕΒΓ ἴσον ἐστίν, τὸ μείζον τῶ ἐλάσσονι, ὅπερ ἐστίν ἀδύνατον.

μὴ ὄν δ' etc. One would almost expect another step in the argt. Thus μὴ ὄν δ' ... τὸ ὄλον [οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν: οὐ γάρ: μὴ ὄν δ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ] οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ etc.

μηδαμοῦ μὲν etc. Thus the ἐν ὄν as ὄλον exists ^E under conditions of space and (as we shall see 151 E) time, and is not an εἶδος. See also 151 A. ἐν ἄλλῳ is repeated twice and is preceded and followed by ἐν ἑτέρῳ with no diff. of meaning.

τὰ πάντα... (sc. τὸ ἐν) τυγχάνει. One would look for ὄν: but 'cave corrigas ὄν. Sic solent Graeci et verba et participia praegresso proxime nomini accommodare. Menon. p. 91 c, οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορά τῶν συγγιγνομένων.' Heind. He also cps. 153 A below, which is cited Jelf § 389, 2, ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὄν which is said of τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

αὐτό τε... ἐν ἑτέρῳ: As Stallb. says, the order would be better ἐν ἑαυτῷ τε αὐτὸ εἶναι καί. But he adds that αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ form a phrase such 'ut unam notionem efficiant nec commode possint divelli,' and cites 151 B, E, 155 C, and 159 A.

ἕστηκε μὲν που It is stationary in the sense that οὐ μεταλλάττει χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας, but (so far as this argt. goes) it is quite free, as τὰ πάντα μέρη, περιφέρεισθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ ὄλῳ)—to use his own lang. 138 C. It might even be maintained, in view of its double char. as τὰ πάντα μέρη and τὸ ὄλον, that κατ' ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται.

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ... αἰεὶ εἶναι; We have admitted that it ¹⁴⁶ may be stationary if αἰεὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, but in truth it need not. Admitting that such a thing as motion

exists—which Pl. here assumes in spite of Z.'s dialectic—then Achilles is in motion when chasing the tortoise, but all the while he is ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ if that means ἐν ἑαυτῷ. He is far from being ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, however, if that means ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ—a meaning which Pl. must give it in his second use of it in order to infer of the 'one' that ἐστὸς δὴ πον ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι. Pl., as the Theaet. shows, knows what the Eleatics think, and is for the moment in accord with them. Thus the verses of Parm. after saying αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν ἔστιν etc. go on thus, 85 etc., τῷτόν τ' ἐν τῷτόν τε μένον καθ' ἑωυτό τε κείται: ὡς ἔμπεδον αὐθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἰπείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει τε καὶ ἀμφὶς ἔεργει. Parm. does not prove this dialectically: he lays it down as his view. Pl. seeks to prove that the ἐν ὄν is bereft of motion, and he has not done it. The neuter ἐστὸς for ἐστὼς seems, from Veitch, to be confined to Pl. It occurs in this dial., in Theaet. 183 E, οἱ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, said of the Eleatics, and Sophist 249 D, where Herm. reads τὸ πᾶν ἐστηκός. Note further εἶναι ἐστὸς in the sense ἐστάναι first above; its sense is ἀκίνητον εἶναι.

p. 20. τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ... ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; Another sophism. If the one is ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ it cannot indeed be ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ; but it can be ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἑτέρῳ, and if it is 'always there' it is as much motionless as it would be if 'always in itself.'

B τοῖς ἄλλοις ... εἶναι, The dat. need not be under the govt. of ταῦτόν, for then τῶν ἄλλων must be underst. after ἕτερον, but is rather a dat. of gen. ref. 'and as regards the others.' Stallb. says of τοῖς ἄλλοις here 'non esse ideas ab aliis ideis diversas aut iis contrarias, sed potius res sub sensus subjectas.' Yet if the argt. hitherto in regard to ἕτερον and ἄλλο does not refer to sens. objects but to the ideal world, how do we get from it any infer. as to sameness or difference of the one in regard to the sensible world? The whole argt. moves on just as it did previously—the only change being the art. Proc.-Dam. vi. 266 says, ποιέται δὲ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τι· ἐπεὶ τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστίν· ταῦτόν γάρ τι (ταῦτόν) ταῦτόν, καὶ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἕτερον.

πᾶν πον πρὸς ... ἢ ἕτερον· Thoms. well cps. Arist. Met. ix. 3, 1054 b 15, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ἀντικειμένως

[λέγεται] καὶ τὸ ταῦτό, διὰ πᾶν πρὸς ἅπαν ἢ ταῦτό ἢ ἄλλο and below πᾶν γὰρ ἢ ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτό ὅτι ἂν ἢ ὄν.

ἢ ταῦτόν ... ὄλον ἂν εἴη. This seems to mean that in speaking of any two things we may say that they are related either (1) as A - A, or (2) as A - not-A, or (3) as A - $\frac{A}{n}$, $\frac{A}{n}$ - A, (not-A - $\frac{\text{not-A}}{n}$, $\frac{\text{not-A}}{n}$ - not-A).

'Nam quod partem vel totum cuiuspiam rei conficit, id nec ταῦτόν est, nec omnino ἕτερον.' Stallb. This depends on our adopting his further note 'verba πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει referas ad praegressa ἐὰν μὴ ταῦτόν ἢ μὴδ' ἕτερον,' in a very definite sense. A moment's thought will show that these might conceivably and grammatically mean that the second thing stood to the first in either of the following relations A - $\frac{A}{n}$, A - $\frac{\text{not-A}}{n}$, since it is only A - A and A - not-A that represent accurately the cases of ταῦτόν and ἕτερον, Pl. having chosen to raise the ques. of part v. whole. At the same time what Pl. means is that anything, whether ὄλον or μέρος, having the marks of not-A will be ἕτερον to A; and that it is only where there would be ταυτότης but for difference of size that the question of ὄλον and μέρος enters at all. This appears from the following words. But how again does this square with his argt. 145 D, ἐν τινι γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πον δύναίτο ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι? If a 'whole,' regarded even in its extended sense merely, must be in each of its parts under penalty of not being in all of them taken together, much more must this hold true if the 'whole' be regarded as the 'same' intensively, i.e. in character, as its part irrespective of area. In that view of it size has nothing to do with the question. Arist. Met. ix. 3, 1054 b 15 (see above) continues as follows: τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτό διὰ τοῦτο πᾶν πρὸς πᾶν λέγεται, ὅσα λέγεται ἐν καὶ ὄν. ... διαφορὰ δὲ καὶ ἑτερότης ἄλλο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτ. καὶ οὐδ' ἔτ. οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τινι ἔτ., πᾶν γὰρ ἢ ἔτ. ἢ ταῦτό ὅτι ἂν ἢ ὄν· τὸ δὲ διάφορον τινὸς τινὶ διαφ., ὡστ' ἀνάγκη ταῦτό τι εἶναι ὃ διαφέρουσιν. As regards text Ὡ reads οὕτως ἔχει ὡς πρὸς; but t has ἢ ὡς which is clearly required, and the ἢ might easily have dropped if dictated — ἔχ-ει ἢ representing three very similar vowel sounds.

οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς... μέρος ὄν: This is perfectly clear; and (although Cornarius suggested πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος μὴ

ὄν, which yields a good meaning of its own 'since it is not a part towards itself') the reading is not doubtful. But the intricacy of the statement may cause confus., and the constr. may be disputed. Pl. has all he needs when he has reached εἴη, the words reading as if they stood οὐδ' ἄρα αὐτὸ εἴη ἂν ὄλον αὐτοῦ ὡς πρὸς μέρος, the last three words being equal to ὡς μέρος, as in 147 B, ὄλον ὡς μορίων. It is just poss. that the αὐτὸ may not be the subj. of εἴη, but may be in the acc. as part of ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτό. But this is unlikely, both because αὐτὸ would have been the better reading, and because the αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ of the prev. sent. makes for the parallel use of αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ in this one. Pl., as we say, might have stopped here; but, wishing to be very emphatic, and to bring more clearly forward the contrad. involved in the case, he adds πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν. The constr. here might be = οὕτως ὄν μέρος πρὸς ἑαυτό, or as Heind. puts it redundantly, οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ἂν εἴη, 'since it would thus be a part towards itself—which we have just declared in the previous sentence that it could not be.' It might also be taken in close expegetic connec. with the prev. ὡς πρὸς μέρος thus—αὐτοῦ ὄλον ὡς πρὸς μέρος, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ-μέρος-ὄν. 'It could not be whole of itself as towards a part, rather towards itself turned for the moment into a part.' So Stallb. following Schmidt, in which view μέρος ὄν is in the acc. agreeing with ἑαυτό. Either way there is some awkwardness.

αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ... ὄντος ἑαυτῷ, ὄντος agrees with ἑαυτοῦ, not with αὐτό, which is really redundant, and is present only in obedience to the Greek idiom. The sense is 'If a thing be elsewhere than itself when that self is in the same place with itself, is not that thing of necessity other than itself?'

οὕτω μὴν ... τὸ ἓν = ἐφάνη μὴν τὸ ἓν οὕτως ἔχον. οὕτω refers both back and forward, what follows being but a restatement of what has just been said. He points back to 145 E, ἧ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ὄλον, ἐν ἄλλω ἐστίν. Here μὴν = attamen: Ast. gives several cases, e.g. Soph. 217 D, συμβούλω μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τινὰ αἰρήσει with which cp. 216 B, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἀνὴρ οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μὴν. In all the sense would be brought out by using δὲ μὴν.

ἕτερον ἄρα ... ταύτη ἂν 'Non sine causa ταύτη dicit. Significat enim huius tantum rei habita ratione unum

a semet ipso diversum esse.' Stallb. We may cite Arist. Soph. Elench. 5, 167 a 11, οἶον εἰ, λαβὼν τὸν Αἰθίοπα εἶναι μέλανα, τοὺς ὀδόντας ἔρουτ' εἰ λευκός· εἰ ὄν ταύτη λευκός, ὅτι μέλας καὶ οὐ μέλας, οἷοιτο διειλέχθαι συλλογιστικῶς τελειώσας τὴν ἐρώτησιν. Proc.-Dam. vi. 267 puts the present argt. thus, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀπεφάνθη. τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄν, ἐτέρωθι γεγονὸς ἕτερον ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ· ἐτέρωθι γὰρ γέγονεν ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος—οὕτω γὰρ ἀπεφάνθη· ἕτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ. But he prefixes this ἔστι δὲ σοφιστικὴ ἢ ἐπιχειρήσις. ἔλεγον γὰρ οἱ σοφισταὶ Κορίσκος ἕτερος ἑαυτοῦ· ὁ γὰρ νῦν μὲν ἐν Ἀκαδημία, νῦν δὲ ἐν Στοᾷ, ἕτερος· ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐξελέγχει Ἀριστ. Arist. Soph. Elench. 5, 166 b 28, gives among the παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς παραλογισμοὶ—ὄον εἰ ὁ Κορίσκος ἕτερον ἀνθρώπου αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἕτερος· ἔστι γὰρ ἀνθρωπος. ἢ εἰ Σωκράτους ἕτερος, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνθρωπος, ἕτερον ἀνθρώπου φασὶν ὁμολογηκέναι διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκέναι, οὐ ἔφησεν ἕτερον εἶναι, τούτον εἶναι ἀνθρωπον. How to meet these he shows chap. 24. Proc.-Dam. means that Pl. here proves a thing to be different from itself παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς—by a mere difference of place—while according to Arist. this is no ground of difference. Ἔτερα δὲ λέγεται ὄν ἢ τὰ εἶδη πλείω, ἢ ἡ ὕλη, ἢ ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας· καὶ ὄλως ἀντικειμένως τῷ ταῦτῷ λέγεται τὸ ἕτερον. Met. iv. 9, 1018 a 10. εἴ τοῦ τι τί εἰ τουτί.

ἄρα μὴ ἓν... τῶν ἄλλων: Thoms. speaks here of τὰ ἄλλα and τὰ πολλὰ being used for the objects of sense, which is quite true (as Stallb. says and said above); and quotes appositely Proc. (in Parm. Ms. Lib. v. fol. 32) Ἔθος γὰρ ἦν περὶ (1. παρὰ) τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἐν μὲν προσαγορεύειν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀσώματον καὶ χωριστὴν οὐσίαν· ἄλλα δὲ τὴν σωματικὴν καὶ ἐν σώμασιν ὑφεστηκυῖαν [N.B. he does not say τὰ ἄλλα]. But what evidence is there throughout of a distinc. between ἐν and πολλὰ or τὰ ἄλλα of this fundamental kind? The one and the many are contrasted, but as correlatives and, to use a modern phrase, on the same platform: if the one is an εἶδος the many are other εἶδη, if they are sensible objects the one is such. He does better when he says "differunt hic τὰ ἄλλα ab uno uti ἢ διάκρισις differt ab unitate. Ita Dam. de hac quam Parm. statuit differentia aperte scribit. ἦδε ἢ ἐτερότης οὐκ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὴν ταυτότητα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἓν, ὡς διάκρισις πρὸς ἕνωσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἓν πάντα ἔστι κατὰ τὸ ἓν, ὅτι πάντων ἔστιν ἕνωσις, οὕτω

καὶ ἡ ἕτερότης αὕτη τὸ πάντων πλῆθος ἔστιν τὸ διωρισμένον.'

146 D-E. We may note the complications of the passage:—(1) The 'different' is 'different from the different': (2) the 'not-ones' are 'different from the one' and the converse: (3) the 'one' is 'different from the others': (4) the 'same' is 'opposed to the different' and vice versa: therefore (5) the 'same' is never 'in the different' and vice versa: therefore (6) the 'different' is never 'in any existent thing': therefore (7) the 'different' is never 'in the not-ones or the one': therefore (8) the 'one and the not-ones' do not 'differ by the different': and as (9) the 'one and the not-ones' cannot differ 'by themselves without the different' it follows that (10) the 'one and the not-ones escape from differing' (and are therefore 'the same'). Why this series of rather sophistical statements? His aim being to infer that the one does not 'differ' from the not-ones, he might have founded at once on the concession that Only the different differs, and differs from the different. As neither not-ones nor one is the different these do not differ. Possibly because this might seem abrupt he chooses a widely different course which is itself startling. After the admiss. that It is the different that differs, he flies off at a tangent, affirming that The not-ones differ from the one—and the converse; and that the one differs from the others. Next he finds that the 'same' will be of use, and declares that the same and the different are *ἐναντία* which obviously means that they differ, since he has assumed above that, setting aside the possibility of whole versus part, everything is either same or different relatively to everything else. The truth seems to be that one, other, many, different, whole, part, not-one etc. are all different: but that when we speak of them as differing each becomes for the moment the different, relatively to that from which it differs, and so only the different differ mutually. Returning now to No. 5 above we see Pl. quibbling with 'the same' as he has done before. If the same and the different are two entities, no doubt it may follow that the one of them will never be in the other; but it does not follow that either of them is never in the same or a different position. It would be quite fair to retort upon him thus, If the different is never in the same,

then the different is always in the different: the different therefore is always in that same thing the different: accordingly the different is always in the same: or The same differs from the different: but only the different can differ: the same therefore is the different. It is not clear whether Pl. is throughout consciously sophistical or partly confused. His views on this relation of contraries seem clearer in the *Phaedo*, although expressed in terms of his ideal theory. There he says, 102 etc., that if Simmias is taller than Socrates he is so not qua Simmias but τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων, and if from being taller he becomes less, it arises from *σμικρότης* expelling *μέγεθος*—οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὄν ὅπερ ἦν [ἐθέλει] ἅμα τοῦναντίον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Applying this here we may say, if the one is different from the not-one it is so, not qua one but τῷ ἐτέρῳ ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων and so on. The same percep. of possible and impossible combinations with a like crudeness of lang. appears in the *Soph.* 252 C-260.

εἰ γὰρ ὄντιν' [χρόνον] etc. *Proc.-Dam.* VI. 268^E says οὐδέποτε ἐν ταύτῳ χρόνον τινά. Pl. mixes up pres. and abs. in space and time with logical agreement and difference. We have here an accurate condit. sent. εἰ γὰρ εἶη ... ἐκείνον ἂν ... εἶη τὸ ἕτερον. A less accurate one precedes εἰ ἄρα ... ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι, and a still less careful one follows ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ... ἔστιν, οὐδέποτε ... ἂν εἶη. Throughout there are several only the apod. of which appears.

οὐδέποτε ἐν τινι etc. He quibbles again. The different is not in the 'same' so it can be in nothing; for if it were in anything for so much as an instant it would thus be in the same. 'The same' at first is a thing so called; it changes to ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος or τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα. *Proc.-Dam.* explains—πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἑκάστὸν ἔστιν ἐν ταύτῳ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τινι.

τῷ ἐτέρῳ ... ἑαυτοῖς 'by reason of the different ... of themselves.' We must, as Heind. says, suppose ἕτερον after τὸ ἐν from τὰ μὴ ἐν ... ἕτερα.

οὐ πάντη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ A question to which the answer is—Yes ἐκφεύγοι [ἂν]. 'Recte, quantum parum Latine, Cornarius: "penitusne jam effugerint, ut ne inter se alia sint." Frequens hic usus est voculae μὴ post verba *fugiendi abstinendi* et similia illatae. *Soph.* 235 B, ὥστε οὐκέτ' ἐκφεύξεται

τόδε γε ... τὸ μὴ οὐ ... εἶναι etc.' Heind. He adds examples, and Stallb. cites Crito 43 c, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν. A better case is Phaedo 117 c, οἱ πολλοὶ ... οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν. Proc.-Dam. vi. 268 says κἀντεῦθεν ἐκφεύγοι ἂν ταῦτα, τό τε ἐν δηλονότι καὶ τὰ μὴ ἔν, τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἕτερα.—δηλονότι 'τὸ εἶναι ἕτερα.' πλεονάζει γὰρ ἀπτικῶς τὸ 'μὴ' εἰς 'τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἕτερα.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν ... ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα: Again we have variety in the condit. sents. By strict rule we should have οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἔν—(εἰ γὰρ μετεῖχεν) οὐκ ἂν μὴ ἔν ἦν ἀλλά ... : ἀληθῆ: οὐδ' ἀριθμὸς ἔσται ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἔν—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἔν ἦν παντάσῃσιν εἰ ἀριθμὸν γε εἶχεν. The first sent. is the basis of his premiss That the not-ones have no connection with the one, and the result is naturally a foregone conclusion (ἂν ἦν). Having fortified his premiss he draws as inference That the not-ones will not be number; but puts that in a politely problematic form (οὐδ' ἂν ... εἴη). But he at once clinches it by a reason which he holds as unanswerable (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ... ἦν). The οὕτω refers back to the οὐ γὰρ ἂν just above. They can no more be not-one if they possess number than they can if they share in one. We may put his syllog. in Aristotelian form, τοῦ ἐνός γε οὐ μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἔν· ἀλλ' ὁ ἀριθμὸς μετέχει τοῦ ἐνός· οὐδ' ἀριθμὸς ἄρ' ἂν εἴη τὰ μὴ ἔν. τὰ μὴ ἔν not τὰ οὐχ ἔν is the form throughout: he speaks hypothetically.

ἢ κἀν οὕτω μετεῖχε = ἢ καὶ οὕτω (= εἰ μόρια ἦν τὰ μὴ ἔν τοῦ ἐνός) μετεῖχεν ἂν. The answering μετεῖχεν like the ἐκφεύγοι omits ἂν. Above on 145 p.

p. 27. B μορίων ... μόρια· Ἄ μορίου ... μορίου, ἰ μορίου ... μόρια. The text seems clearly needed. Whether in majusc. or in early minusc. μορίου and μόρια have a strong likeness. It is less easy to explain the corrup. of μορίων. Perhaps an early scribe had omitted the ω, and after writing MOPIN had placed a diminutive ω above. A little ω in majusc. might easily be taken for ου (or α), and a later scribe—e. g. Joannes—might so read it and think that it was to be put in place of the N, thus giving μορίου. The repeated use of the same word in different constr. might naturally cause difficulty. The note of Proc.-Dam. vi. 269 reads ἐπεὶ γούν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν οὕτε μορίου τῶν μὴ ἔν ἔστιν οὕτε ὄλον ὡς μορίου.

πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἔν So ἰ, and the sense requires it. Ἄ

has τὸ for τὰ, and Proc.-Dam. also reads ὥστε τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἔν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα ... τοῦ λόγου. Common sense, as well as Pl.'s reasoning, tells us that the one is the same with itself and different from the others. But the others here must stand for the different, and as the argt. advances, another synonym is the not-ones. That the one is different from itself has been made out above only sophistically, apart from the objection that, on Pl.'s own showing, only the different and not the one can differ. His final thesis that the one is the same with the others requires much argt. He starts by laying down four possibilities (practically three) as open to two things when under comparison—they may be the same, or they may stand related as whole to part, or they may be different. He then aims at reaching the truth by elimination. First the different must have no connec. with the one and the others (or, as the latter are now called, the not-ones), and thus the one and the not-ones 'escape altogether (he feels how narrowly) from differing.' Next he takes up the question of whole and part. He gets rid of the possibility that the not-ones or others can be simply a number of ones instead of a single one—it is noteworthy that they are never called τὰ πολλὰ or πλῆθος here. They must have no connec. with one—a curious preliminary to their being the same with it. But the absence of connec. is needed to prevent their standing related as whole and part; there is no one in the not-ones, no not-ones in the one, so they cannot be whole and part. It remains then that they must be the same. No wonder Aristoteles says 'from the course of the argument there is a risk of their appearing so'—which is but another way of saying that Pl. knows how narrowly he has escaped failure. We may meet his reasoning in several ways. 1. The one and not-ones are different. It is a παραλογισμὸς παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς to say that the different has no connection with them, and that they cannot differ. The term 'different' is applied to two objects as a result of their comparison. They are found not to have the same qualities, and to express that fact they are called different—a term which is applied to them κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς and adds nothing to their characteristics save the accidental circumstance that they have been compared. 2. Pl. would

have made out a better quartette of tests for distinguishing two objects if he had said they may be (a) the same, (b) different, (c) part v. whole, or (d) parts of a whole. In fact one and not-ones are both parts—not extended but logical parts—of one complex concep. Give what name you please to this concep. it is certain that they are the two necessary factors in it, that you cannot think the one of them without the other to help you. 3. And we may, if we choose, call them in *this* sense the same, because they play the same part or have the same function in the thought in which they occur. But our calling them the same because of the function they fulfil does not prevent them from differing when compared each with the other.

ἰσως: ἐπειδὴ γ' οὖν 'Very likely,' says Aristoteles, like one who does not really see his way but gives up courting controversy. 'Well, at all events,' replies Parm., 'they both differ equally.'

τί γὰρ ἄν: The meaning of this answer will be seen if we put the passage differently. οὐκ οὖν οὕτως ἕτερον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων εἶη... καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον ἕτερον οὔτε ἦττον; Τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἢ ἦττον ἂν εἶη;

ἦ ... τῶ ἐνί: = ἦ [τὸ ἐν] πέπονθεν εἶναι ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτη τό τε ἐν πεπονθὸς ἂν εἶη ταύτων τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ τᾶλλα τῶ ἐνί. 'In the way in which the one has the experience of being different from the others and the others likewise than it, in that way the one would have an experience identical with (that of) the others and the others with (that of) the one.' Fic.: 'Porro si uni contingit' etc.; so he read εἰ for ἦ, which would need other changes. The two are sometimes interchanged; but the Mss. agree here.

D ἕκαστον ... καλεῖς; We find in this connec. καλεῖν τινὰ ὄνομα (or τι). = to call one a name, something: καλεῖν ὄνομά τινι which is much the same, but resembles our 'to call names to one': καλεῖν ὄνομα ἐπὶ τινι which Jowett renders here 'You give a name to a thing?' Heind. also gives 'Unumquodque nomen nonne rei cuiuspiam tribuis?' And L. and S. seem to agree. Would it not be better thus, with Ast and Engelm. 'Of the names in use you employ each on some ground?' Thus in Soph. 218 c, of the name Sophist he says νῦν γὰρ δὴ σὺ κάγω τούτου πέρι (sc. τοῦ σοφιστοῦ) τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχομεν (= καλοῦμεν) κοινῇ· τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐφ' ᾧ καλοῦμεν ἐκά-

τερος τάχ' ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν. Neither this nor the other cases cited (e.g. Cratyl. 433 E, Rep. v. 470 B etc.) nor the case in E seems to clash with such a meaning, though the other sense is quite possible. Cp. Proc.-Dam. vi. 270, πᾶν ὄνομα ἐπὶ σημασίᾳ τινὸς λέγεται. Arist. Met. x. 5, 1062 a 13, δεῖ τοίνυν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι γινώριμον καὶ δηλοῦν τι, καὶ μὴ πολλά, μόνον δ' εἶν' ἂν δὲ πλείω σημαίνῃ, φανερόν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ᾧ φέρει τοῦνομα τούτων.

πλεον. ἢ ἅπαξ; Fic. 'vel saepius vel semel,' and so Thoms., Ast, Engelm., and Jowett. But would not this need ἢ πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ;? As it stands the choice seems exclusive, in which case ἔγωγε has no meaning, and the answer would be πλεονάκις. Müller gives 'mehr als einmal' = 'oftener than once,' with which cp. Rep. III. 409 D, πλεονάκις δὲ πονηροῖς ἢ χρηστοῖς ἐντυγχάνων (ὁ δικαστῆς) σοφώτερος ἢ ἀμαθέστερος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις. This seems preferable, the important thing being that a name may be given oftener than once. Perhaps the transl. incline to the other because ἅπαξ and πολλάκις are contrasted in what follows. But that is met in the latter rendering—if you use a word oftener than once you must use it once also, which gives the material for contrast.

οὔπερ ἐστὶ τοῦνομα, Cp. οὔπερ ἦν ὄνομα and ἦσπερ ἦν τοῦνομα in E. Taking these in order Fic. gives 'cujus est nomen, cujus hoc nomen est, cujus proprium nomen est'; Ast repeats 'cujus est nomen,' and others treat the phrases as identical. Substantially they are; yet one feels a difference in mental attitude, although it is hard to define. Should not τοῦνομα be the subj. and ὄνομα part of the pred.? Cp. on 126 B; and contrast the following, τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ἐκείνος οὔπερ τὸ ὄνομα ἐστὶ and τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ἐκείνος οὔπερ ἐστὶν ὄνομα. The formula might be completed thus, τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ἐκείνος οὔπερ τὸ ὄνομά ἐστὶν ὄνομα, which gives material for both expressions. Heind. would read τοῦνομα in all three cases. ταὐτὸ ὄνομα the use of ταὐτὸ and ταὐτὸν seems capricious. Here if anywhere ταὐτὸν might be expected. ἐὰν φθέγγῃ cp. ὅταν φθέγγῃ below. So in Proc.-Dam.'s notes, vi. 270. The common distinc. between aor. and pres. is that the former makes a passing allus. in narrat., the latter rather a pictorial allus. in descrip. If there be any distinc. here it may be shown by the

conjuncts.—ἐὰν 'should you utter,' ὅταν 'whenever, as often as, you are uttering.'

καὶ τὸ ἕτερον = καὶ 'τὸ ἕτερόν' ἐστὶν ὄνομα. Proc.-Dam., ἔστιν οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων (ὀνομάτων) καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα ἐπὶ τινὶ σημασίᾳ ... ὅταν τοίνυν φθέγγῃ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦτο ὄνομα, εἰ μὲν ἀπαξ, ἀπαξ δηλοῖς τὸ πρᾶγμα σὺ τὸ ὄνομα ἦν ... δις εἰπόντες τὸ ἕτερον ἐπ' αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει περὶ ἧς ἀποφαινόμεθα, ἐπ' ἐκείνη ἀεὶ λέγομεν ἧς ἦν τὸ ὄνομα. Is the precisely similar ταῦτὸ ὄνομα above = τὸ ὄνομα 'αὐτό'? Prob. not, and the sense is clear otherwise.

Ε ὀνομάζεις ... λέγομεν, A number of more or less synonymous verbs have been used in the course of this illustration from names, and it is not easy to preserve the distinctions in translating. λέγειν wavers in sense as it repeats itself; εἰπεῖν and φθέγγεσθαι both apply here to physical utterance.

ἦ etc. Here and in 148 A, B ἦ wavers, reading ἦ here and ἦ in the three following cases, the first of them having an eras. above, and the second one after. † reads ἦ here and ἦ in the others. ἦ seems necess. Fic. and editions before Steph. seem to have had εἰ, between which and ἦ, ἦ, ἦ, confus. is easy. In ἦ ἄρα ἕτερον ... τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἦ reads ἦ ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν, καὶ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, κατὰ ταυτὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀνπεπονθὸς εἶη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις which needs alteration: † reads ἦ ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός. κατὰ ταυτὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι [in the margin a later and fainter hand writes carelessly πεπονθεν εἶναι], οὐκ ἄλλο. ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀν πεπονθὸς εἶη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Except as regards ἦ for ἦ and the marginal read., the two agree. The words as printed show less change from Mss. than is usual. Their construc. is ἦ ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν, καὶ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός [ἕτερα]· κατὰ τ' αὐτὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀν πεπονθὸς εἶη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις 'in the same way therefore in which the one is different from the others they likewise are different from the one; while again to the extent of this experience of difference the one would have, not another but, the same experience with the others.' This gives the proper course to the argt. and that with virtually no change—for the iota subscr. (ἦ) is often omitted, while accents (ἦ, αὐ) and word division are matters in which scribes vary. The editors and Dam. regard ἦ ...

τοῦ ἐνός as a single supposition from which some other conclus. follows, not as containing both suppos. and conclus. They have thus to alter from 148 κατὰ onward. Thoms. says 'Melius legeretur κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι. Nec dubitandum veram hanc esse lectionem, maxime cum Dam. (in Ms. at Oxford) eam suo comprobet suffragio': Bek., following Heind. and followed by Ast, reads κατὰ τὸ ταῦτὸν ἕτερον πεπονθέναι 'to the extent of experiencing the same difference': Stallb. κατὰ ταῦτὸν τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι 'secundum id ipsum quod videlicet τὸ ἕτερον habet etc.' After all, accepting their view of what goes before, the Ms. reading κατὰ ταῦτὸν ἕτερον πεπονθέναι in the sense κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ 'ἕτερον-πεπονθέναι' might almost do as it is.

τὸ δέ που ... ὅμοιον may mean either τὸ δέ που 'ταῦτὸν-πεπονθὸς' ὅμοιον ἐστὶ, or ὁ δέ που ταῦτὸν πεπονθεν ὅμοιον ἐστὶν.

ἦ δὲ ... ἕτερόν ἐστιν: Everything is like everything because everything is different from everything. Any two things mutually differ; and this sameness of difference makes them pro tanto like each other. This may be so, but it is not the conclus. proposed 147 c, εἰαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. That implied that there were but two sides to the antith., ἐν v. τὰ ἄλλα as a group. If we are to speak of ἅπαν ἅπασιν we must apply the same reasoning to one in its relations to each part of the others and to each of these in relation to every other. His one becomes a selected atom, and his others are the remaining infinity of atoms, which may each in turn be chosen as the one. At this point he does look as if he would carry out in detail the original scheme of 136 c. τῷ ἀνομοίῳ so †; ἦ = ὁμοίῳ, and in the paradoxical state of the argt. there is some excuse for it. τῷ αὐτῷ; (sc. ἐναντίον) so ἦ†, but the latter has in the marg., by a similar if not the same hand, τῷ ταῦτῷ. This would suit the repeated use of ταῦτὸν above; but τῷ αὐτῷ may mean that. Cp. Arist. Met. iv. 9, 1018 a 11, ἀντικειμένως τῷ ταῦτῷ λέγεται τὸ ἕτερον.

τοῦναντίον ... τῷ ἕτερον etc. = τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦναντίον γε πάθος ἐστὶ τῷ εἶναι ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων.

ἀνομοιώσει This word, 'praeter analogiae leges et propter oppositionis rationem formato' (Stallb.), seems peculiar to Pl. Rep. viii. 546 B, ὁμοιοῦντων

τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων is the only other case of the act. in Ast.; but there are several cases of the pass. Stallb. however refers to Lobeck Phrynich. 563. By praeter analogiae leges does he mean that you don't have privative verbs formed from affirmative ones? If so, it may be that ἀνομοιόω is not from ὁμοιόω but from ἀνόμοιος as the other is from ὁμοιος. ταῦτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται (sc. τοῦτο τὸ ταῦτόν) τῷ ἐτέρῳ—† has τὸ ταῦτόν, as above τῷ ταῦτῳ, in marg.

p. 22. C ἔχει γὰρ ... λόγον: From the τόνδε it seems that τοιοῦτον λόγον form one express. and that τοιοῦτον is not a neut. nom. descriptive of the argt. just closed. But the expression is odd. 'Talem ut videtur rationem habet' Fic., whom Thoms. copies; and this is the best rendering. The force of the particles might be brought out thus: 'I agree; for, strange as it may seem, it is true that the statement has some such reason in its favour.' Instinct bids one expect τὸν or τινὰ with τοιοῦτον. In this passage, ἔχει...ἀνόμοιον εἶναι, Proc.-Dam. seems, vi. 27 1, inclined to take ἔχει...ἔχει as spoken by Parm., leaving only τίνα; to Aristoteles; and if we may judge by his words he seems to have read ἔχει μὲν οὖν δὴ here. οὐκ ἐνέμεινε τὴν συγκατάθεσιν τοῦ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐπικρίνει καὶ τὸ πᾶν λέγει, ὡς θαρρῶν καὶ ἄλλως ἀποδείξαι. ἢ τὸ 'ἔχει μὲν οὖν δὴ' ἀπολογία ἔστι καὶ κατάνευσις τοῦ προσδιαλεγόμενου καὶ ἐκ τότε ἐπιφέρει ἀποδεξάμενος οἶον τὴν ἀπόκρισιν 'καὶ γὰρ καὶ τόνδε ἔχει'. εἴτε οὖν οὕτως εἴτε ἐκείνως, ἢ ἐννοια σώζεται. The ἔχει has no very definite subj. here or above. We may supply 'your contention.' Then we must add some words, e.g. τίνα; τὸ ἐν, ἢ ταῦτόν πέπονθε, μὴ ἀλλοῖον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἀλλοῖον δε πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον εἶναι, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δ' ὄν ὁμοιον εἶναι· ἢ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν ἀλλοῖον, ἀλλοῖον δὲ ὄν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι: ταῦτόν τε ἄρα ὄν ... καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, the particip. constr. is exactly parallel to ὅτι or ἐπεὶ as below, with the indic. giving a reason. κατὰ ἐκάτερον so both Mss. as μετὰ ἑαυτὸ E. The editors give καθ'. Note this insistence on the clear recognition of each method and both, repeated also below. 'Secundum ambo haec et secundum horum utrumque' Fic. καὶ ἐκάτερον so A; † repeats the κατὰ, probably rightly.

147C-148D. Here we have a demonstr. that the one is like and unlike itself and the others. How does he reason? 1. He takes pains to establish

that the one is like the others (147C-148A). The argt. ends by proving that everything is like everything; and that because all things differ by difference—that is, by the same thing. Were he speaking as in the first part of the dial. and in the Phaedo he would say they differed by having the εἶδος of difference, which of course is always the same thing. But one is tempted to think that Pl. wants us to confound this with the idea of differing to an equal extent. One, two, and three are alike in differing each from the other, but one and two are not alike in the extent of their difference from three. Arist. as usual does a service when he notes that in practice the word 'different' has several senses. Now, while Pl. proves likeness through sameness of difference, and recalls his own remark that τὸ ταῦτόν πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον, save for his wish to make each new quality of the one spring from its predecessor, is there any need for the argt.? One would say that sameness includes likeness, and, as he proved sameness, he might infer likeness. We may also ask, supposing one and not-ones (or others) are like, how like are they? Pl. would lead us to fancy that they were so like as to exclude divergence—although, of course, unlikeness is proved very soon. And there is something to justify such a view in this case, for, when speaking of mere existent oneness and comparing it with mere existent otherness, and proving these like or unlike, we feel that the latter qualities may rank on the same level with the former, and that we say as much about a monad when we call it 'like' as we do when we call it 'one.' On the other hand he has been speaking about one and not-ones now for some time, and we have had a sense of growing complexity in these as the argt. has advanced. One has become One-being-whole-parts-different-same-in-itself-possessing-shape etc., and if to all these qualities we add but one more—likeness—we add little, something that might be called a mere separable accident, not an essential feature. Of course if likeness were the outcome of all combined—if one were like not-ones παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα, then likeness would be a very important feature in its character. 2. He next proves unlikeness between one and others very briefly—it was in virtue of difference that they appeared to be like, that being so they must in

virtue of sameness be unlike (148 A-B). This would be unanswerable if we were sure of our terms. Pl. has said that all words retain the same sense through all uses. Now when we speak of two things as different we think of the characteristics in which they don't agree—one is square-white-flat, the other round-black-solid, and that is the sense in which Pl. uses the word at present. On the other hand we have used the word 'different' in regard to both these things, and not a bit more or less in regard to the one than in regard to the other, and to that extent the two things resemble—by the *μήτε μάλλον μήτε ἥττον* of their difference. It was in this latter sense that Pl. used the word when he proved by it that one and others were like. In other words he proved them like by difference not qua difference but qua the sameness which it suggests. If then they were like in virtue of the sameness of their difference they need not necessarily be unlike through sameness. 1 + 2. Having now sought to show that one and others are both like and unlike, he shows his doubt as to the result by re-proving it on the converse ground (148 C). The two are 'like' ἢ ταῦτον πέπονθε (leaving the ἕτερον out of sight), and 'unlike' ἢ ἄλλο πέπονθε (leaving ταῦτον out of sight): a proof which is assented to with much greater readiness than the previous one—*ἀληθῆ λέγεις*.—*ἰδοὺ καὶ οὕτως ἀποδείκνυται τοῦ ἐνὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸ τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον*. Proc.-Dam. VI. 272. But he won't give up the former proof: on the contrary he maintains (*ταῦτόν τε ἄρα ... ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις*) that the case is made out by the two methods jointly (*κατ' ἀμφότερα*) and severally (*κατὰ ἑκάτερον*). 3 + 4. In proving that one is both like and unlike itself he says merely—See previous argts. jointly and severally (148 D). One is like itself both by equality of difference from itself—which must be held as proved 146 C—and by *ταῦτον πεπονθέναι ἑαυτῷ*; and unlike itself by sameness with itself (146 B-C), and by *ἄλλο πεπονθέναι*. Proc.-Dam. VI. 272 says *κατὰ ἑκάτερον—κατὰ τε τὸ ταῦτόν, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς προτέρας ἀποδείξεως*. But when he adds *καὶ κατ' ἀμφότερα—ὁμοιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ὁμοιον ἄλλοις· οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον—κατὰ τε τὸ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τὸ (?) ἄλλοις*, he surely mistakes.

1) *περὶ τοῦ ἄπτεσθαι* etc. We must take *ἄπτεσθαι ...*

ἄλλων, as a phrase equivalent to a noun whose art. is *τοῦ* and which is gov'd. by *περί*, = *περὶ τοῦ* 'τὸ ἐν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων' = *περὶ τοῦδε*, sc. *εἰ τὸ ἐν ἄπτεται αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴτε μή, σκόπει. αὐτὸ γὰρ ... ἐφάνη ὄν ... τὸ ἐν*; See 145 B-E. Heind. objects to the repetition of *τὸ ἐν*. But it may be due to the fact that when the one was shown to be in itself as whole it was so as *πάντα τὰ μέρη*, while when it was shown to be in the others it was again *ὅλον ἐν ὄν*.

ἢ μὲν ... *ἑαυτῷ ὄν*: Thoms. refers to the opp. conclus. reached in Dem. I. 138 A and cites Proc. in Theol. Plat. Lib. 2 Cap. 1, 'ubi tandem ita concludit ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ἢ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἔστιν, ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπτόμενον· εἴη γὰρ οὕτω πεπονθὸς τὸ ἄπτεσθαι καὶ τὸ χωρὶς· τὸ δέ γε ἐν πέπονθεν οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρ' αὐτό.' But this refers to the one in whose case existence was not pressed. We deal now with the one which 'is.' Again he points out that 'alia est ratio materialium alia immaterialium. Sic Porph. Sent. τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀσώματα, αὐτὸ δὲ κρείττον παντός ἐστι σώματος καὶ τόπου πανταχῆ ἔστιν, οὐ διαστατῶς ἄλλ' ἀμερῶς. Ita in Phaed. de Anima ὅταν μὴ προσομιλοῦσα τῷ σώματι ἢ ψυχῇ, ἄπτεται τοῦ ὄντος.' Which is of course true, and the *ἄπτεται* in the Phaedo is a metaph. And so of any *ἄψις* among the *εἶδη*? Whether the one is here to be material or not is hard to say; but if it is not material it is at least a mental picture of an extended thing to which the idea of touch has a natural application. Proc.-Dam. VI. 273 says *περὶ τοῦ ἄπτεσθαι ... οὐκ ἀνεσκέυασεν ἐν ταῖς ἀνασκευαῖς, οὐδ' ὅλως ἐμνήσθη* (but see 138 A): *διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν τίθησιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὴν ἀνασκευὴν· πλὴν προτέραν τὴν κατασκευὴν* (positive side, *θέσις*) *διὰ τὴν τῶν λοιπῶν κατασκευῶν συνέχειαν, καὶ ἔπειτα τὴν ἀνασκευὴν* (negative side, *ἀναίρεσις*) *ποικιλωτέραν*. As to lang. in *τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἄπτεσθαι* the position of *τῶν μὲν ἄλλων* would suggest that they depend directly, as they might, on *ἀπείργοιτο, ἄπτεσθαι* being = *ὥστε μὴ ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν*. But the constr. is probably *ἀπείργοιτο ἄπτεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων*: yet here we miss a neg. with the vbs. But both usages are found: cp. Laws XI. 929 C, *ἕαν τις ... υἰὸν βούληται θέσθαι, μηδεὶς νόμος ἀπειργέτω ποιέσθαι*, and VIII. 837 D, *δεῖ κωλύειν τὸν νόμον ἀπείργοντα μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν. ἄπτοιτο*: as 147 A, *ἄν om.*

ἄρ' οὐ πᾶν ... ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν: The lang. is peculiar. First the usage of the verb to touch is uncertain throughout, 148 E-149 A. In \mathfrak{A} we have τὸ μέλλον ἄψασθαι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψασθαι, τὸ μέλλον ἄψασθαι, οὐ μέλλει ἄψασθαι; and the future is usual, as 141 C; but with this we have οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι 148 E, and εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι 149 A, which also is a recognised construc. † corresponds in the three cases 148 E, but reads as follows in 149 A: τὸ μέλλον ἄψασθαι, οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι. Thus all possible construcs. appear, and in the order of their normal frequency—fut., pres., aor.: this last, however, is probably wrong considering its surroundings. Of course μέλλει here means purpose rather than futurity. Some would change οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι to fut.; but μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι still remains, while Proc.-Dam. in his note uses οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι thrice. Next we have the words ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἢ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ἢ ἔδρα, ἢ ἂν κέηται ἄπτεται. (Cp. Dam. § 14, 28, ἕκαστα μένει τὰ εἶδη, κατέχοντα τὴν ὑποκειμένην τοῦ σώματος ἔδραν) Notes 1. The text shows that κατέχον had been omitted; nor does it seem to have been soon supplied—Introd. lxxxvi., xci. Otherwise the text is as in \mathfrak{A} , save that ἢ has a smooth breath. as well as the rough. † agrees, having κατέχον and ἢ in the text: and the remainder of the sent. also corresponds, with ἐν added before ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν: in \mathfrak{A} this last ἢ has the acc. above a scrape. As \mathfrak{A} has omitted κατέχον, † seems in this place the better authority, and probably ἐν should be read. But granting this, the words quoted above still contain some ambiguity. Their general purport is clear, and corresponds to what follows about the one. Fic., as Stallb. says, seems to render correctly, the crux of the passage being in ἢ ἂν etc. 'Nonne quodcumque tacturum aliquid est, prope illud quod tacturum est jacere oportet, atque eam sedem occupare quae sequitur illius sedem—in qua cum primum fuerit, tanget?' The descrip. of the position ends with ἔδρα, and the sent. might end there. But Pl. chooses to add 'if it assumes *that* position it touches.' This surplusage has parallels, e.g. 146 B, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν, and 146 C, εἴπερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἔσται; The only difficulty in the way of this interpr. is the use of ἐκείνην where one would rather look for μετ' ἐκείνο or μετ' ἐκείνου ἔδραν referring to τινος above. Nec tamen

opus est corrigere μετ' ἐκείνου says Stallb. The nom. ἔδρα is a little harsh, but may be part of the pred. to ἢ. Those who find the text incomplete do so because they assume these last words to be an integral part of the descrip. of the position necessary for the thing that intends to touch something. Corrections usually follow Heind., ἢ ἂν κέηται οὐ ἄπ., and with this they either change ἔδρα to accus. or omit it. Heind. reads ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἢ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ἢ [ἔδραν], ἢ ἂν κέηται [ἐκείνο] οὐ ἄψεται. This gives a good meaning, and the οὐ might have been om. through confus. with the one above. But Heind. sees what others seem not to notice, that ἄπτεται must in that case be made fut. The pres. is an addit. argt. for the text as it stands, and for the interpr. Fic. puts upon it, notwithstanding his tanget. Pl. says virtually 'if one thing is going to touch another it must take up a position by the side of that in which the other is—when there it *touches*.' Heind. makes it 'by the side of that position in which lies the thing which it is *going to touch*.' It is just possible that the text may once have stood ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κείσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι—ἢ ἂν κέηται ἄπτεται and that an early reader, not being certain of its meaning, added a gloss borrowed from the lang. of the foll. sent., which gloss after being itself patched has been inserted in the text in the form ταύτην ... ἔδρα. And it is worth noting that in the passage which follows χώρα, not ἔδρα, is used twice. ἐκείνης ἢ Bek. and Stallb. read ἐ. ἐν ἢ though neither collated † in this dial.

χωρὶς ὄν ... εἶναι: Clear but irreg. The first half ¹⁴⁹ might be χωρὶς δεῖ εἶναι ἐφεξῆς δὲ ἐκείνῳ. The second introduces τρίτον as a new subj. To be regular we should have either τρίτον δὲ δεῖ etc. or else τὸ μέλλον ἄψασθαι ἐφεξῆς μὲν δεῖ εἶναι, τρίτον δὲ ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν ἔχειν.

ὀλιγοστόν So \mathfrak{A} , Notes 1. Bek. after Gais. wrongly puts the accent on ι. τοῖν δυοῖν ὄρουν ... ἐξῆς, \mathfrak{A} oddly writes ἐξ ἧς; but both Mss. give B τοῖν δυοῖν ὄρουν, of which Heind. says 'Istud ὄρουν quis ferre potest, quum de rebus ipsis non de earum terminis hic agi appareat?' After the 2nd Bâle ed. he omits τοῖν and reads ἐὰν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοι, while Bek. and Stallb. bracket ὄρουν. Herm. says 'ὄρουν librorum consensu traditum nec cum Tur. in

ὁμόρου mutare nec cum Stallb. cancellis notare libuit; ὅροι nunc opponuntur ἄψει, ut Phileb. c 7, διαστήμασι, Rep. VIII. 3 et Tim. c 8 διαστάσει, quarum ipsarum absentia ἄψεις oriuntur; nec neutrum τρίτον offendit, quia tertium illud non tanquam ὅρος accedit, sed accedendo demum ὅρος fit. Immo ipsos ὅρους pro numeris accipi ostendunt sequentia καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μὴ ἐλάττους εἶναι, ubi recte jam Stallb. Heindorfii conj. τὸν ἀριθμὸν a BT receptam abjecit.' We retain ὅροι, although Herm. is not quite clear. The τρίτον refers to τρίτον above and means τρίτον τι. Observe that ὅροι is introduced only after the suggest. of a τρίτον coming ἐν μέσῳ. May not this convert the previous δύο into the two ὅροι of a row of three? Pl. wishes us to see that he means those two, so he uses the dual and calls them ὅροι (below he calls them τὰ πρῶτα δύο), that we may not suppose one of them and the τρίτον to be meant—for if we did the conditions of ἄψεις would not be violated, only another than the original δύο would be meant. That ὅροι existed at an early date is made prob. by Proc.-Dam. VI. 275, ἣ δὲ ἄψεις τὸ ἐλάττον (?) ἐν δυοὶ καὶ μεταξὺν τρίτον οὐκ ἔσται,—εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐξῶθεν, καὶ τότε δύο ἄψεις εἰσὶ τριῶν ὅρων ὄντων [he uses it as = terms?], καὶ αἰεὶ οὕτως παρὰ μίαν αἰ ἄψεις πρὸς τοὺς ὅρους, καθὼς Ἀριστ. ἔλεγε περὶ τε τῶν ὅρων καὶ τῶν προτάσεων τὰ γὰρ δύο πρῶτα τὸ ἐν [sense = τὰ γὰρ δύο πρῶτα παρὰ τὸ ἐν] πρὸς τὴν μίαν ἄψιν ἐπλεονέκτησε καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτω γίγνεται. After quoting this Stallb. adds 'ex his verbis origo glossematis explicari poterit,' i.e. ὅροι crept into the text from this passage? In that case Dam. must have written prior to the date of the archetype of both our Mss. Do we know that? And if he is to account for glosses can we cite him as corroborating the text?

τὰς ἄψεις ... ἐλάττους εἶναι. 'ipsos tactus a numerorum multitudine uno exsuperari.' Fic. That is, ἐλάττους gov. τοῦ πλήθους, and that τῶν ἀριθμῶν, which word means the δύο, τρία etc. that touch. 'Non opus est cum Heind. et Bek. praeter fidem omnium librorum corrigere τὸν ἀριθμὸν [i.e. κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν on the analogy of the phrase which follows].' Stallb.

ῥ γάρ etc. Notes 1. So Ὰ with ΔΠDR, t reads ἐπλεον. τῶν ἄψεων. The latter is universally adopted

(though by editors who had not collated t) while no one discusses ἄλλων at all. ἄψεων certainly makes the sense obvious, but does it not also suggest the probability that εἰς τὸ πλείω ... τὰς ἄψεις is a gloss, explaining ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἄψεων? Alternatively, in view of the fact that the conflict arises over τῶν ἄψεων, may that not have been put in the margin, the text having been τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι etc., a reading which would account for Ὰ having ν at the end of the verb? But again, what of the repeated plural, when from the nature of the case only one touch can be meant; and what of the lang. of Proc.-Dam. above, τὰ γὰρ δύο πρῶτα τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὴν μίαν ἄψιν ἐπλεονέκτησε καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτω γίγνεται? It would not meet this last objec. but it would simplify matters otherwise if some such view as the following were adopted. He is all the while discussing the relation of ἐν to τὰ ἄλλα and he wishes to bring out two facts of the case, if the one touches the others—(1) that there will always be one touch less than the whole number (of others, let us say), (2) that number does not exist in the others; on both of which grounds, but chiefly on the second, the idea must be abandoned. Suppose now that some early reader had put in the margin τῶν ἄλλων as a gloss on τῶν ἀριθμῶν to show that, so far as the present argt. goes, the latter must mean the former. Without following the argt. one would not see the point of this, and at the same time one might note that ἐπλεονέκτησεν had no case. Assume further that ἄλλων was in old minuscule, but written small and with a slight running of the ink at the λλ. Now when λ occurs double it closely resembles ψ, both being approximately a +. When then this τῶν ἄλλων comes to be read and copied both scribes think it belongs to ἐπλεονέκτησεν; one of them reads it correctly and puts it down, the other sees no sense in it and takes it for a blotted ἄψεων, which he thinks more suited to the context. In any case this paragraph on touch has been somewhat tampered with. τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ refers back to ῥ. Fic. 'quanto, tanto'; but 'by this equal amount' seems an odd phrase. Might τούτῳ be gov'd. by τῷ ἴσῳ, and alone refer to ῥ, 'by an amount equal to this, by the equal of this amount'? The amount of course is one. ἔπειτα like λοιπὸν

carries out the idea of starting at one and adding C on numbers in a row. $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ τε τῶ so \mathfrak{A} ; t $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ τετῶ c.

$\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ l μῆ implies that the units follow in a line.

p. 23. οὐκοῦν ... οὐ γάρ: Fic. alters the tense of φαμέν, makes it govern the sent., and assumes φαμέν in the answer. φαμέν is so far parenth. as to leave the constr. independent, and the sent. is neg. in sense but interrog. in original form. 'Is it not the case then, we say, that the others-than-the-one neither are one nor have part in it?' = But as a fact, we say, the others neither are nor have? In τὰ ἄλλα-τοῦ-ἑνός as one, the τοῦ ἑνός are intentionally added to fortify the concl.

$\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ εστιν ... ἐνότος So \mathfrak{A} , but with 'and' patched. Notes 1.: t gives $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ ἐστιν and ὄντος. One can sympathize with the uncertainty. The feeling that the sense might be οὐδ' ἄρα εἰς ἐστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις may present itself. Fic. 'Ex iis conficitur ut non sit in aliis numerus unus quippe cum unum illis minime adsit'; and Thoms. adopts $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ 'non ergo unum numerus est in aliis'—both apparently meaning 'the number one.' On the purport of the statement Thoms. refers to Plotin. Enn. v. 5, 4, and quotes Hierocles in Aur. Carm. xx., ἡ μὲν γὰρ μόνος ὡς ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ τὰς πάντων δυνάμεις ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνέχει. He further quotes Sext. Emp. Contra Phys. Lib. x., following the Pythagorean μόνος and ἀόριστος δύας, and finally cps. 147 A. It must be remembered that if number even to the extent of 'one' crept into the others the argt. is upset, for that one with 'the one' = 'two,' and two give touch. But if Pl. had meant $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ he would have worded his statement more clearly.

D οὔτε ἄλλου ... οὐδέν: The constr. is οὔτε [ἐστιν τὰ ἄλλα] ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν ἄλλον ἀριθμοῦ = οὔτε ἔχει ὄνομα etc. Exspectabam οὐδενός. Heind.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα ... ἐν, καὶ etc. Heind. and Bek. following Schleierm. reject the second $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ referring to c, εἰ δέ γε ἐν μόνον ἐστίν. Stallb. seems right in objecting: but he seems to treat the words as = τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἐστίν ἐν μόνον. Why not 'only the one, therefore (and not the others), is one; and thus two cannot exist'? In c on number Pl. declared that if we had only one and no two, touch vanished. He now applies this to the one and the others, and finds that, so far as they are concerned, (1) the necessary one exists only in the one, (2) the absence of one and

of number from the others shuts out the existence of two also. If, after directly referring to the others, he said, τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἐστιν, would he not deny existence as well as number to them?

148 D-149 D. The question of touch was mentioned 138 A, but only to prove that the one could not be either in itself or in another. Here we have the one in itself and in the others, therefore it touches in each case. Thus far touch is dealt with from the point of view of one thing inside and one thing outside another, and in 138 A the phrase used is πολλαχῆ κύκλω ἀπτεσθαι. 1. Now he urges that the one is in 'the others,' and therefore touches them, 148. He does not prove that it is, but assumes it from what has gone before. In Dem. 1. 138 A he speaks of the one being ἐν ἄλλω, and in II. 145 E he says ἐν ἄλλω and ἐν ἑτέρω: in 146 D-E we have ὅσα μὴ ἐν ἐστιν ἅπανθ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνός, ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν ... ἐνείη ἂν τὸ ἕτερον, but that seems to be the utmost that can be urged as proof that it is in the others. We must assume that ἐν ἄλλω, ἐν ἑτέρω, ἐν ἄλλοις, mean the same thing: and the touch is that of neck and necklace. 2. Next the one is in itself, and touch of the same kind occurs. 145 C affirms that one as parts is within itself as whole: which is true in the sense that the bricks are in the wall. But the wall does not touch the bricks, nor they it. To get touch we must have at least a film in addition to the parts, as we have in the roe of a fish. But at once the objection urged in 138 B applies—οὐκ οὖν ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον. 3. So far his case is not strong. He now chooses a way of his own to subvert it. Touch, it seems, is external only: and if one is to touch itself δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κείσθαι—ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν. The touch is now that of two beads: and one cannot touch itself. 4. But the stress comes when he seeks to show that the one cannot touch the others. Touch being external, it is immaterial to say that the one is in the others locally: his cue now is to prove that it is not in them logically. Three ideas run through his argt.—touch is external: it needs number as far at least as two: it goes in a straight line, so that there is one touch less than the things touching. He then shows that the others have no number in them, on the logical ground

that the idea 'others' excludes 'one'—see 147 A. If this holds, his case is made out. 'The one' gives 1, and if 'the others' yielded even another 1, then 1 + 1 = 2 and touch may exist. Why then the idea of a straight line? There seem to be two reasons. 1. If touch went in a circle, as we have it in a rosary, there would be as many touches as there are things touching, and this would seem to him somehow to clash with the idea that two things are needed to make one touch, while he must have 'two' or his argt. from number fails. 2. If he can make out that—given a number of 'ones'—there will be a touch less than that number; then in the event of the others being such a collection of ones, touch will fall short of overtaking them. If these do not account for the introd. of this bizarre idea it is hard to explain its presence. We might ask, Would the one touch the others as a body or as individuals? But this is shut out by his line of argt. Thoms. says 'Unum quatenus est supra omnia tactus omnis est expers, quatenus autem cum aliis conjungitur tangere dicitur et tangi Procl. in Theol. Plat. Lib. 6, cap. 24, τὸ δὲ ἀπτόμενον τῶν ἄλλων ἐκ, καὶ οὐχ ἀπτόμενον, καὶ συνέζευκται πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὑπερίδρρηται αὐτῶν (l. -δρρηται). Super and ὑπερ imply something above argt.; but Pl. professes to argue throughout.

ἴσον ἐστὶ In 11 (Notes 1.) the gap between ἴσον and ἐστὶ represents an eras. of several letters. Some early blunder had been made. As to the statement Thoms. says 'in semet ipso esse, i.e. stare Pythagoraei aequalitati tribuebant, in alia autem transire seu moveri inaequalitati competere credebant. Sext. Empir. Lib. x. adv. Phys., Τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐναντιώσιν ἔλεξαν ἄρχειν—γένους τάξιν ἐπέχον—τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐναντιουμένων θεωρεῖται φύσις· οἶον μόνης μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι, κινήσεως δὲ ἐν ἀνισότητι, ἐπιδέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥσσον.' τὸ ἐν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα ἢ ἔλαττον, it is odd to find ἢ τὰ ἄλλα thus followed by ἢ ἔλαττον, espec. when the genit. of comp. occurs immediately, τοῦ ἐνός. ἢ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα, Notes 1.

ἄρα οὐκ ... ταῖς οὐσίαις οὐκ here goes with what follows and is strengthened by οὔτε οὔτε: ἄρα begins to tell at εἰ μὲν, and the whole might stand ἄρα (οὐκ ἂν ... οὐσίαις· ἀλλ') εἰ μὲν πρὸς ... ἔλαττον; ἄρα indicates interrogation; but, to make the interrog.

form expecting an affirm. answer correct, we must understand οὐκ twice—ἄρα οὐκ (οὐκ ἂν ... ἀλλ') εἰ μὲν etc. Both Mss. read ἄρα, which would be better but for its position. Considering the repetition of ἂν and the awkward turn of the sentence, the reading οὐκ ἄρα τῷ μὲν would be welcome if there were any authority for it. And all objcs. would vanish if we simply omitted ἄρα here as an early confus. with ἄρ' οὖν above; or alternatively read εἰ ἄρα μείζον εἶη ... οὐκ ἂν ... As Stallb. says, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός = καὶ τῷ τὰ ἄλλα εἶναι ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός. The words τῷ μὲν ἐν ... τοῦ ἐνός, and αὐταῖς γε ταύταις οὐσίαις explain each other: the one and the others are not equal or unequal καθ' αὐτὰ or in virtue of their own nature, but by receiving into themselves equality etc. [ἄλλο] is bracketed as having no meaning. It may be due to confus. with the τὰ ἄλλα above. For ἐκάτερα one would almost expect the sing.; but τὰ ἄλλα are themselves plural, which may decide the writer's bias. The word goes with ἔχουεν not with τοιαῦτα εἶναι. τὰ δὲ σμικρότητα, so both Mss., and the τὰ may be used carelessly in antith. to τὰ μὲν, though it refers to the one, and edd. read τὸ δέ. Phps. it is a feeling of this diffc. as well as a sense of the repeated use of μὲν δὲ in the sent. that leads t to write τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ as a guide to the connec. The relation of the particles throughout seems to be as follows:—

οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι—ἀλλ' εἰ ἔχουεν [= ἀλλὰ τῷ ἔχουεν, οἱ τῷ δὲ ἔχουεν]

εἰ μὲν [= τῷ μὲν ἔχουεν] ἀλλήλα· εἰ δὲ [= τῷ δὲ ἔχουεν]
 [ἢ] τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν—σμικρότητα δὲ
 ὁποτέρῳ μὲν ... φῶ δὲ ...

and the whole might stand εἰ τὸ ἐν μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον εἶη τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ—τῷ ἐν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἶναι—μείζω ἢ ἔλάττω ἂν εἶη ἀλλήλων· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ἐκάτερον ἔχουεν πρὸς τούτῳ ἰσότητα ἴσα ἂν εἶη, τῷ δὲ τὸ μὲν μέγεθος ἔχουεν τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα τὸ μὲν μείζον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον ἂν εἶη. μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἐν is his second altern., but it is one which would not apparently be thought of by a Pythagorean. Thoms. quotes Sext. Emp. as above, ἀλλὰ ἢ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἢ ἔλλειψις κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀορίστου δῦαδος λόγον τέτακται: also Auctor Theol. Arithm.

ἐκάλουν δὲ τὸ ἴσον τάξιν συμφωνίας ἐν μείζονι καὶ ἐλάττωι οἱ περὶ Ἐμπεδ. καὶ Παρμ. καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν, φάμενοι τὴν μοναδικὴν φύσιν ἐστίας τρόπον (like the hearth) ἐν μέσῳ ἰδρῦσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἰσόρροπον φυλάσσειν τὴν αὐτὴν ἕδραν. τῷ εἶδει so both Mss. and the word is quoted by Proc.-Dam., ὁποτέρῳ μὲν εἶδη (-ει?) ἐκ τούτων, ἢ τῷ ἐνὶ ἧ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγεθος προσείη (vi. 276). Yet we have the word in the next line. There it is used in its well-known ideal sense of αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος and αὐτῇ ἢ συμκρότης: here it is used of τὸ ἐν and τὰ ἄλλα in which these ideas are to be found. Thus (1) if the sense is the same in both cases then we have quite unexpectedly and in isolation a practical illustr. of μέθεξις of εἶδη by εἶδη such as S. spoke of at the beginning, which disposes at once of the view which pervades Stallb.'s commentary that τὸ ἐν is an εἶδος but τὰ ἄλλα not: these are on the same footing in that respect—both or neither: (2) if we have not this μέθεξις then τῷ εἶδει must be used in a different sense from εἶδη, and as a fact Ast classes the expression with such as ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει, τὸ τῶν Ἰπποκενταύρων εἶδος; while Jowett calls it 'class.' But why choose this particular place to speak of τὸ ἐν as an 'appearance' or 'class' or 'shape'? It is certainly as little reasonable as the use of ὄροι (B) which troubles edd. Yet ἐν τοῖς ἀσυν ἐγγιγνοίσθην below makes for this view. εἶδη entering into τὰ τῆδε is sound Platonic doctrine; but if τὰ τῆδε are in this case to be themselves εἶδη the fact is broached with little ceremony, while it is as well worthy of elucidation as the question whether one is equal to the others.

ἔστων τέ τινε etc. Both Mss. give τε, yet edd. naturally prefer γε. Heind. wishes τὸ before εἶδη and in τ a τω is erased and εἶδη written. The article however would throw the whole stress upon ἔστων = do not these two εἶδη exist?, while its absence makes the noun part of the predicate = οὐκοῦν τούτω ἔστων τινε εἶδη. Below he says μὴ ὄντε γε = εἰ μὴ εἶτην, which in turn rather makes for ἔστων in the sense of existence. Nothing would be lost to the present argt. if οὐκοῦν ... πῶς γὰρ ἄν: were dropped. It is a mere aside, to justify once again the existence of εἶδη. If it does anything more it adds to the unlikelihood of the view that ἐν and τὰ ἄλλα are meant here to be εἶδη, by its

leaving them—the principals in the discussion—unmentioned.

οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ... μέζων: This alternative of sup-¹⁵⁰ posing that when one thing is in another the two may be equal, or one may be bigger and contain the other, is not dwelt upon when ἐν is called ὅλον and πάντα τὰ μέρη (145). These are indeed regarded as two views of the same ἐν, yet the whole contains all the parts and not the converse, so that it must be the bigger of the two. It is noteworthy that he here reverses the view of μέθεξις of the εἶδη given in 131. There the diffic. was how to divide the εἶδος among many partakers: here he asks whether the partaker receives the whole εἶδος in the whole or part of itself. Contrad. arises under both views.

πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους etc. = to assume the rôle of, perform the function of. Does he mean playfully to bid smallness mind its own affairs καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμανεῖν? Rep. iv. 433 A, ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμανεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ.

οὔτε γε etc. The οὔτε is unusual standing alone. B The sense of course is (ἀλλ' ... ναί scarcely breaking it) οὔτε ἐν ὄλῳ, οὔτε γε ἐν ὄλῳ τῷ μέρει. t reads οὔτι, which has good parallels in Pl., e.g. Phaed. 81 D, εἰκὸς μέντοι, ... καὶ οὔτι γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ... ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων. So Bek. reads; while Heind. says 'Malim οὔ τοι γε = neque tamen.' Herm. says 'οὐδέ γε Herm. ex Oxon. vestigiis ubi est οὔτε γε: editi οὔτι γε, quod foret certe non ut Phaed. c. 30 [the passage quoted above]; cf. nos ad Lucian. Hist. Conscr. p. 183.' If he means that ὕ shows signs of patching he seems wrong. Perhaps οὔτε may stand, as showing the orig. design of the sent., which was found to need ἀλλ' ... μέρει as it went on. L. and S. cite a case of οὔτε alone, Arist. Phys. III. 8, 1, οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἡ γένεσις μὴ ἐπιλείπη ἀναγκαῖον ἐνεργεῖα ἄπειρον εἶναι σῶμα αἰσθητόν. With ἀλλ', εἶπερ Stallb. cps. 138 D, εἶπερ γε δὴ: and Heind. quotes many cases of ellipse with εἶπερ; we may add Arist. Met. vi. 1, 3.

εἰ δὲ μὴ for this phrase after a neg. (= otherwise), Heind. cps. 132 E, and we may add Arist. Met. vi. 5, 1030 b 34. Διὸ ἄποπον τὸ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις τό τι ἦν εἶναι: εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν. ταῦτὰ ποιήσει, Notes I. ποιήσῃ must be wrong,

τῶν ὄντων The proof really is a general one, although he deals only with τὸ ἔν.

C μείζον γὰρ etc. He overstrains: he has admitted above A that when one thing is in another it may be ἐξ ἴσου αὐτῷ τεταμένον. The argt. holds, however, as μείζον cannot be ἴσον any more than σμικρότης can. In ἄλλο, καὶ πλήν Heind. wants καὶ first. καὶ gives emph. in either case, and where it stands it may point the anal. to πλήν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος which precedes: καὶ ταῦτα just below is still stronger; ἐκείνο, i.e. τὸ ἔν. καὶ ταῦτα ... ἢ μέγα. The ταῦτα is idiomatic, we use the sing. Heind., Bek., and Stallb. all take αὐτοῦ to be the read. here, and Heind. shows acuteness in changing it to αὐτῷ [= ἐκείνῳ τῷ μείζονι]. But see Notes I. The sense is 'nor will bigness be in it either. For thus there would be something else bigger—ay, independently of bigness itself—that namely within which bigness was; and this moreover when it is not furnished with smallness, the thing which it is essential that it should surpass if it really is big.' Of course a plea might be urged for αὐτοῦ, which Stallb. reads. He rightly notes that smallness is not here annihilated, but only excluded from meeting bigness within the one.

D. 24. αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου etc. Stallb. justly cites I 33 C. In οὔτε ἄρα ... οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἔν P! chooses to begin with τὰ ἄλλα on which he has led no explicit proof, and end with τὸ ἔν on which the whole proof has turned. We would expect οὔτε ἄρα τὸ ἔν ... οὔτε αὐτὸ τούτω ... οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ ἄλλα (which are included but by implication only—see οὐδ' ἐνὶ ... τῶν ὄντων B). This freedom of order is common in Pl., and still more that of passing from one illustr. to another analogous. So Arist., e.g. Met. vi. chap. 7, after μέρος τῆς οἰκίας· οἶον οἱ λίθοι, gives ἡ οἰκία πλινθίνῃ ἀλλ' οὐ πλίνθοι, and again ὁ ἀνδριάς οὐ λίθος ἀλλὰ λίθινος [usually χαλκοῦς] followed by οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἀνδριάς ξύλον ἀλλὰ παράγεται ξύλινος: so χαλκῆ σφαῖρα and χαλκοῦς κύκλος are interchanged. Note the negs. here. First οὔτε οὔτε οὔτε: then within D the sphere of the first and last of these μήτε μήτε: finally within the sphere of the last τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων and μείζον οὐδὲ ἔλαττον. The inference may be that had he been using μὴ in the last cases he would have put μήτε τούτοις μήτε τῶν ἄλλων and μήτε μείζον μήτε ἔλαττον. But he cannot use οὔτε

τούτοις οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων etc., lest confus. should arise with the main οὔτε αὐτὸ. αὐτὸ τούτω so t. Notes I.

ἔχετον So t. Ἄ ἐχέτω. There is a small final ν like a υ which if written after an ο might be taken for the latter half of a careless ω, p. cxi.

οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τούτοις So t. Ἄ οὔτε αὐτῷ ἐν τούτοις which cannot be right. Notes I. He deals with three entities, ἔν, τὰ ἄλλα, and τούτω, i.e. smallness and bigness.

ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ etc. Thoms. quotes Porphyr. Sent. 36, τὸ ὄντως ὄν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν ἐστι—τὸ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρόν κυρίως ὄγκου ἴδια.

οὐκ οὖν καὶ τόδε etc. Notes I. We must supply 151 mentally something with τόδε. Stallb. justly cps. 141 C: there are many examples.

μηδὲν εἶναι ... τῶν ἄλλων: This is explicit. He uses, as we have seen, several antith. to the one, τὰ πολλά, τὸ ἔτερον, τὰ ἄλλα, ἄλλο and τὰ μὴ ἔν. The last is best here; for ἐν—μὴ-ἐν, = A—not-A, include all possibilities. Arist. indicates in various places that τὸ ἔν is used in different senses, generally giving four. Thus Met. iv. 6, 1016 b 10, καὶ γὰρ ἀριθμοῦμεν ὡς πλείω ἢ τὰ μὴ συνεχῆ, ἢ ὄν μὴ ἐν τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ὄν ὁ λόγος μὴ εἶς: and below εἶτι δὲ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμόν ἐστιν ἐν, τὰ δὲ κατ' εἶδος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν,—ἀριθμῶ μὲν ὄν ἢ ὅλη μία, εἶδει δ' ὄν ὁ λόγος εἶς, γένει δ' ὄν τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας, κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ὅσα ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. So again Met. ix. 1, 1052 a 34, λέγεται μὲν οὖν τὸ ἔν τοσαυταχῶς—τό τε συνεχῆς φύσει, καὶ τὸ ὄλον, καὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου.

καὶ εἶναι που ... ἐν τῷ ὄν We have more than one condit. of exist. laid down in the dial. for τὸ ἔν. Here we have apparently the condit. of space (we have τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν 148 E), and although he speaks metaphor. of α νοητὸς τόπος he can hardly be held as speaking so here. If he speaks literally then τὸ ἔν cannot be an εἶδος. But Stallb. interprets καὶ εἶναι που as 'aliquam habere cum alio necessitudinem et conjunctionem,' which is a logical 'being in somewhere,' not a spacial one.

ἐπαθῆ δὲ οὐδὲν etc. The one has been proved somehow or other to be in another, or in the different. This is the first case in which it is proved—per imposs.—to be ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. The argt. is—all that exists must be somewhere: the one and the others are all that exists: therefore the

one and the others are in each other. Here too Stallb. holds his ground: 'Meminerimus enim necesse est haec omnia ita disputari ut rerum sub sensus cadentium rationes ad ipsas ideas transferantur.' Thoms. argues, 'Unum quidem est in aliis sed omnia implet et nusquam est. Plotin. Ennead. 3, Lib. 9, cap. 3, πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς πλήθος; ὅτι πανταχοῦ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅπουοῦν. πάντα οὖν πληροῖ. πολλὰ οὖν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα εἶδη· αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰ μόνον πανταχοῦ, αὐτὸ ἂν ἦν τὰ πάντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ γίνεται, τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτό, ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἐκεῖνο. Conf. Procl. in Theol. Plat. Lib. 1, cap. 2. Patebit ex his quomodo respondendum fuisset ad propositam quaestionem anae aequale sibi sit unum et aliis et inaequale, quae his praemissis nititur, quod unum in se sit et in aliis, quod majus sit et minus se ipso et aliis.'

149 E-151 B. The stages of the argt. upon equality and inequality are as follows:—*a.* (1) The one and the others, if equal or unequal between themselves, are so only through having in them the ideas equality, bigness, or smallness—for there are such ideas in existence. (2) But the existence of these ideas in the one and the others leads to a series of contrads., and the conclus. is that (149 E-150 D. 3) the one and the others cannot be equal or unequal one towards the other, because they have not equality, bigness, or smallness in them, and because those ideas have their respect. relats. only towards each other. Here we have an almost startling return to the argt. of the first sect. of the dial. In Dem. 1. the present conclus. was reached without this machinery. There (140 B-D) the argt. which immediately succeeds this did effective duty—equality meant the same number of measures, and so of parts, and the one had no parts. Here that argt. will not apply, because the one as existent has already been proved to have parts. Now it may be granted—although this is not how Pl. uses the argt.—that the concepts. of one and others in themselves do not involve ref. to size; and that if size is to enter it does so κατὰ συμβεβηκός. To Pl., for the present, it seems that the only means by which size can come in is by the entrance of three ideas; and as these cannot enter, size remains out. But note that he does not argue out the case as regards *ισότης*—perhaps for the reason that there is no

absurdity in fancying equality as occupying the whole of the one, and so being equal to it. The absurdity here would arise only if μέγεθος also occupied the same ground and became equal to equality. If we read the whole argt. fairly over from εἰ μείζον 149 E to φαίνεται γε 150 D, we can hardly help feeling, notwithst. the express. ὁποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἶδει (149 E), that *ισότης μέγεθος σμικρότης* as *εἶδη* stand in one class, and that τὸ ἐν and τὰ ἄλλα are grouped together as co-ord. members of a totally diff. class (if Stallb. is right in thinking τὸ ἐν an *εἶδος*, then again τὰ ἄλλα must go with it, for they are treated alike); and for the second time it is proved that *εἶδη* have no useful function in metaphys. In arguing that the one and the others are not equal or unequal because they don't possess the ideas of equality etc., Pl. seems to make two mistakes. He fails to see that he should have a single idea of inequality, though this is a small matter: and he fails to ask—how then are the one and the others 'one' and 'others' without the interpos. of suitable *εἶδη*? He speaks of their being such τῷ ἐν εἶναι and τῷ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶναι—is this then what Arist. would call their ὕλη, the ὑποκείμενον which is postulated as a substance whereof size in its various forms is to be predicated by the aid of *εἶδη*? ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, as he would say.

b. (1) The one and the others, not having in them bigness and smallness, cannot exceed or be exceeded. (2) Two things which mutually neither exceed nor are exceeded must be equal: so (150 D-E. 3) the one and the others are equal. Here we have the argt. by exclus., as we have had on several occasions: but it will scarcely serve in its present position. Why does he not say—Things which, viewed in regard to size, possess neither 'bigness' nor 'smallness' must possess 'equality'? And if they are equal merely by not possessing bigness or smallness, are they not equal τῷ ἐν εἶναι and τῷ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶναι, which was impossible? It is true that the one and the others when viewed as the two factors of a compound concep. may be called equal, in the sense of being co-ord. or equally essential. But Pl. is speaking of equality not logically but spacially.

c. (1) The one, being in itself, is also around itself: so (150 E. 2) the one is bigger and smaller than itself. Here we get clear away from the

εἶδη again. The process began with the absence of exceeding and being exceeded as steps to prove equality, and now it is complete. We may talk of the one and the others as being equal and unequal without reference to εἶδη at all. But his conclus. is reached by falling back on the view which he took in 138 A and 145 C, and which he adheres to in what remains of the argt. (d), that if one thing be in another, or in itself viewed as another, bigger and smaller are the only terms which can be used in describing the situation. Now he has just contended (150 A) that 'smallness' might, if in the one, 'play the part of equality,' because of being ἐξ ἴσου τῷ ἐνὶ δι' ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη. If then smallness might thus be equal to the one, it seems still more natural that the one might in the same way be equal to itself, and not bigger or smaller.

d. (1) The one and the others represent all that exists. (2) Whatever exists must be somewhere: so (151 A-B. 3) the one and the others must be in each other, and thus (4) must be greater and smaller than each other. This cancels the idea of χώρα, which was assumed in the argt. on touch (148 E), where the one and the others lay outside of each other and the latter occupied τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν to the former. Or alternatively the one and the others must include space between them. Yet he adheres to the view indicated at several points that existence is spacial—whatever is must be somewhere—and as this is contrary to the nature of the εἶδη which are in a νοητὸς τόπος, the one and the others cannot be εἶδη. If they are, we must suppose Pl., as Stallb. does, to be speaking figuratively throughout—yet what would be his motive? But again he does not prove his conclus. The one and the others comprise all that is; but they are not necessitated to be in each other unless they are first precluded from being each in itself, while the one has been expressly declared to be in itself. It must be admitted that the lang. throughout Dem. II. is ambig. and confus. Before leaving the subj. we may raise another point on this reappear. of the εἶδη of smallness, bigness, and equality. Since mentioning these before he has talked freely of the infinite divisib. of the one. Now, as Arist. points out (Met. IX. 1 and elsewhere), if you speak of one as a starting point, a unit of measurement, ἀδιαίρε-

τον τὸ ἐν ἧ ἀπλῶς ἧ ἧ ἐν: it is your terminus a quo. But if you are searching for that which you may call one because it does not admit of being made smaller—for one as your terminus ad quem, as an atom—you will fail to find it; φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι πᾶν συνεχὲς διαίρετον εἰς ἀεὶ διαίρετά (Phys. VI. 1 etc.). Now this has a bearing on Pl.'s idea of σμικρότης. That is an idealized minimum of extens. At 132 the process by which εἶδη are reached is said to be comparison—smallness then should be gradually attained by compar. of smaller and smaller things. He admitted there that this was an endless process. Since then he has (144) exhibited the one as ἄπειρα τὸ πλήθος. And smallness is by the nature of it to be smaller than the smallest part of one—how is it then to be got at? Again when got at it is *not* to be smaller than anything save bigness, which in turn is bigger (?) than the biggest of sensible objects.

καὶ ἀριθμῷ Heind. would change this to ἀριθμόν, C to accord with τὸ πλήθος and τὸν ἀριθμόν in D: but Ἄτ are clear, and to be consist. he needs τόν.

καὶ ἴσον ἴσων etc. As Stallb. notes we must underst. p. 25. εἰ αὐτῷ with ἴσον from the preceding εἰ αὐτοῦ, and conversely extract αὐτοῦ for πλείονων and ἐλαττόνων from αὐτῷ, the last construc. being (Heind.) ident. with ἴσων ... αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις above. Just before that in B we have the other altern., ἴσον τε καὶ μείζον ... αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, and again in the summing up below E.

151 B-E. This argt. may be compd. with that at 140 C. He uses the concep. of μέτρον or μέτρα solely as a lever to prove something else, not as a separate attrib. of the one, and brings it in quite incidentally as a thing of course. But if he possesses a 'measure' without assistance from the εἶδη, can he not determine equality and inequality without reference to them? And does he not perceive that in a well-regulated world of εἶδη an εἶδος of 'measure' would be much more useful than one of 'bigness,' 'smallness,' and 'equality'? Again, is not a measure simply a unit, a one? Is it a suspicion of this that causes Pl. to insert (140 D) εἰ δέ γε ἐνὸς μέτρον εἶη ἴσον ἂν γίγνεται τῷ μέτρῳ—for he is measuring a one? When he speaks of one as the source of number (148 E-149 D), he is treating his one as itself a μέτρον: and when again he speaks of his one as divisible into parts he is

treating it as a *μετρητόν*, as a *ἐν συνεχῆς*. The quest. naturally arises why in both cases Pl. mentions measures after he has referred to equality and inequality. An extended thing will contain measures whether we know that it is equal to any other thing or not. Phps. he does so because equality and inequality more than any other terms apply to extension—as Arist. says, *Met.* iv. 13, 1020 a 23, *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλληλα λεγόμενα, τοῦ ποσοῦ πάθη καθ' αὐτά*. When Pl. extends his inference about measures and numbers etc. to the others, he of course turns his back upon the contention in 149 B-C that the latter had no one and no number.

E *εἶναι μὲν που* The *που* here has not the local sense which it had A, *καὶ εἶναι που δεῖ*. It means 'I presume,' as in *οὐ γάρ που* 152 B below. *τὸ δὲ εἶναι ... τὸ ἦν ... τὸ ἔσται*. Analog. would require infin. throughout. There is of course no infin. for *ἦν*: but he comes nearer to uniformity in 141 C, *καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσσεσθαι*.

152 *κοινωνία*: The Mss. on which Aldus, Stephanus etc. relied have *κοινωνίας*: but Steph. said 'substituendus nomin.', and so *Ἄτ.* *μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνον*, t and others read *μετέχειν*, which apparently has led to a reading *μετέχειν μὲν ἄρα ἔστι χρόνον*. Heind. does not doubt 'quin post ἄρα textu exciderit ἀνάγκη quod expressit in vers. Fic.: "ergo si ipso esse participat, necesse est temporis quoque esse particeps." Nisi quis scribere maluerit: *μετέχον μὲν ἄρα ἔστι*.' A good case of conjecture going wrong.

πορευομ. τοῦ χρόνον; Thoms. 'Strato tempus compositum esse dicebat ἐκ μερῶν μὴ μενόντων apud Dam. fol. 280.' *μεμνήμεθα* refers to 141 A-B.

B *αὐτοῦ οὕτω*; Had the pron. been ill-formed in the archet.? *Ἄ ἂν του*, and t *αὐτοῦ* *.

ἔστι δὲ ... τὸ νῦν: The *ἔστι δὲ πρῶτον* gains force from preceding *ἄρα*. Ast cps. 147 A above, *τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῦ ἐνδὸς ἄρα μόριά ἐστιν*; and cites other cases of the usage. *ἦ γιγνόμενον*, the part. is predicative = *ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι*, *ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ*; being a stage more indep. of *ἦ* than it is of *τύχη* in *ὅ τι ἂν τύχη γιγνόμενον* D below. It is only to onlookers that this is an isolated act on the part of the one, as he says below D, *τό γε μὴν νῦν αἰεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἐνὶ* etc. Carlyle is fond of calling the present time the meeting point

of two eternities, but this too is a judgment from without. The one if conscious knows of the future only that it is the next moment, and of the past that it is the sum of the moments up to the passing one.

ἐπίσχει τότε etc. 'Hoc significat Parm., praesentis C temporis articulum a futuro esse se junctum ac separatum, ita ut τὸ ἐν, dum in eo versetur, nondum temporis particeps sit futuri.' Stallb. The present moment is a punctum saliens: we must think of it in both its capacities. Unless we can seize it as a separate entity, being in the sensible world does not exist: *οὐκ ἂν ποτε ληφθείη*. That is the aspect of the question on which Heraclitus and his followers dwelt, in so much that Cratylus *τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἑρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δις τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι*: αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἄπαξ. Arist. *Met.* III. 5, 1010 a 12. Of course as a fact the present is a good deal more than τὸ νῦν: our memory unconsciously extends it. Proc.-Dam. vi. 282 says *μεταφέρει δὲ λεληθότως τὸ γίγνεται εἰς τὸ ἔστιν, ὃ ἔστι μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν καὶ ἔσται*: τὸ γὰρ γιγνόμενον κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον 'ἔστι' λέγεται ... εἰ γὰρ πρόεσι κατὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι πάντως οὐ κρατηθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. It does not occur to Pl., either here or above 141, to discuss what time is: he merely treats of one as influenced by an accepted conception called time. We gather incidentally that time is to him a something which may be partaken of, which passes, and which has a present moment of brief duration called now. The one, again, while passing through time, becomes; but when at now, is. We shall hear of this later, 156. The passage seems to have struck some reader—perhaps Arethas—as 'seasonable' and suggestive, for he has marked it with the usual contr. for *ῥαῖον*.

προῖον ... ληφθείη (= *κρατηθείη* in Dam.) i.e. *εἰ γὰρ προῖον οὐκ ἂν* etc.: he does not use the indicative, though he must assume the condit. as denied.

πάν τὸ γιγνόμεν. may be either in the acc. as subj. to *παρελθεῖν* while understood in the nom. as subj. to *ἐπίσχει* and *ἦ*, or the exact converse. In favour of the former view is the point that *παρελθεῖν* would have to wait for its subj. and be left unprovided: in favour of the latter it may be urged that in its present position, following *ἀνάγκη* and *μή*, the phrase should rather have been *μηδὲν τῶν γιγνομένων*. The grammar would have been safer had he written *πάν*

δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον εἶ γε ἀνάγκη etc. Our pointing makes the phrase nom. to ἐπίσχει.

p. 16. D ἐντύχη τῷ νῦν, etc. So τ, and it is clearly necess.: Ἄ τὸ, νῦν. If the passage were dictated τῷ might be confused with τό, and νῦν taken momentarily as going with ἐπεσχειν. This last is a sudden appearance of the aorist, and may be used both in its momentary and in its iterative capacity. It is an odd instance of the difficulty we have in expressing τὸ ληφθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν: the present tense is too continuous, and whilst we are using the instantaneous aorist the present has become the past. The present moment is a present moment; but if we are to realize it and think of it as such, we do that in the next moment, and retain this one in the memory to be dwelt on as an atom of the past. οὐκοῦν οὐπερ ἐγένετο so τ, and it can hardly but be right: Notes 1. τό γε μὴν νῦν αἰεὶ etc. Thoms. 'Hinc illud Platonicum "aeternitas manet in uno." Quod enim nec futuro nec praeterito tempori est obnoxium, sed semper in praesenti est, id demum est aeternum. Plotin. Ennead. 3, Lib. 7, cap. 2, ὁ οὖν μήτε ἦν μήτε ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἔστι μόνον, τοῦτο ἔστὼς ἔχον τὸ εἶναι, τῷ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ ἔσται μηδ' αὐτὸ μεταβεβληκέναι, ἔστιν ὁ αἰών. Hinc τὸ νῦν τὸ ἔχνος αἰώνιον dicitur. Dam. fol. 282.'

E πλείω δὲ... ἢ τὸν ἴσον; Fic. 'Quin etiam longiusne vel brevius tempus est aut fit quam ipsummet; an potius aequum?' From this appearance of vel brevius and from the general use of 'more, less, and equal' in the work, Cornar., followed by Steph., suggested ἢ ἐλάττω alter χρόνον; and Heind. would agree but finds no authority. The words occur neither in Ἄt nor in any of Bekker's Mss.; and Proc. - Dam. vi. 283 says ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ πλείω χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαινόμενον, ἴσον ἄρα. Stallb. thinks Pl. gets all he needs by the words as they stand, and cps. 157 B, ἐκ σμικροῦ ... εἴη ἄν for needless meddling by Cor.

οὔτε νεώτ. ... οὔτε γίγνεται: So both Mss. But scholars find a diffic. in the last οὔτε and give altern. changes. (1) If οὔτε is to stand we must have οὔτε ἔστιν to balance it, and Heind. cps. 155 C, κατὰ δὴ etc., while Stallb. quotes Rep. II. 382 E, οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ. (2) If no οὔτε precedes ἔστιν we must read οὐδὲ γίγνεται,

for while τε has a coupling power and is repeated, δὲ has a disjunctive power and may stand alone. Heind. cps. 155 B where the connec. is οὔτε τὸ ἐν ... οὔτε τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός ... γίγνεται' ἄν πρῶτον οὐδὲ νεώτερον. And cp. further 150 D, where we have on the one hand οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὔτε, and μήτε ... μήτε twice repeated, and on the other a single οὐδὲ twice repeated, τοῦτοι οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων, μείζον οὐδὲ ἔλαττον. Certainly as a rule οὔτε requires οὔτε, and it is οὐδὲ which can be used singly. But does this rule hold αἰεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (Arist.) or only ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ?—If the latter it may have exceptions κατὰ συμβεβηκός: and while we often have οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ for οὔτε ... οὔτε, we may perhaps have a single οὔτε in the sense of a single οὐδέ. We have it in poetry, see L. and S. οὔτε II. 5 B. If the text is to be changed it seems all one as to sense which change is adopted: 'neither is nor becomes' will suit as well as 'is neither younger etc. nor yet becomes so.' Edd. read οὐδέ.

τί θαί, τῶν ἄλλων: 'quo autem modo ad alia se¹⁵³ habet?' Fic. A loose rendering: Ast's is better, 'Quid vero? num ceteris? (i.e. junius aut senius est vel fit).' Gen. gov. by compar. underst.

εἴπερ ἕτερα ... ἄν ἔχοι: 'Nusquam Parm. τὸ ἄλλο aut τὸ ἕτερον in hac disput. sua memoravit, sed constanter numero plurali usus est. Cujus rei causa posita est in eo quod ideae natura sua unitatem habent, res adspectabiles autem per se omni carent unitate, quam per idearum demum vim accipiunt.' Stallb. as usual. It may be that Parm. does not say τὸ ἄλλο or τὸ ἕτερον, but we have seen that he says ἄλλο and ἕτερον while meaning apparently the same thing. As for ὄν agreeing with ἕτερον, not with τὰ ἄλλα, Heind. contrasts 145 E where τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα is said of τὸ ἐν. The concord recurs in πλῆθος δὲ ὄν. Note the change of form in the cond. sents. ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὄν [= εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἦν τὰ ἄλλα] ἐν ἄν ἦν and ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα [= εἰ ἕτερα ἔστι] πλείω ἐνός ἔστι, καὶ [εἰ πλείω ἐνός ἔστι] πλῆθος ἄν ἔχοι. In (1) the suppos. is held as denied and the concl. as one to be rejected: in (2) the suppos. is held as true and a very obvious concl. is directly drawn: in (3) from that concl. as a suppos. a new concl., to which exception has formerly been taken, is drawn but not dogmatically. This last again is followed by another in the same form.

πλήθος δὲ ... τοῦ ἑνός: This one is not, of course, the one of the dial. but the one of number. Yet he might equally have said ἢ τὸ ἕν, where the one of the dial. would have been meant. Proc.-Dam. (vi. 284) is less distinct, πλήθος δὲ ὃν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος τοῦ ἑνὸς μετέχει ἄν.

ὀλίγιστον Notes I. Ψ has a scratch over -ον which recalls the ὀλιγοστὸν of 149 A; but there seems to be no eras. in the second ι. Proc.-Dam. has τὸ ὀλιγοστὸν δέ. Thoms. says—'Dam. περὶ Ἀρχ., Ms. fol. 2, invehitur in Speusipp. quod unum omnium rerum duxerit esse minimum, cum Parm. nihil uno esse majus defenderit. Sic Parm. in versibus apud Simpl. et Platon. in Soph. Sed vocat h. l. Parm. unum minimum utpote primum, cujusque magnitudo non sit ex mole metienda. Ita Auct. Theol. Arithm. ἐκ μονάδος πᾶς ἀριθμὸς, ἢ δὲ μονὰς τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἔστιν ἀριθμοῦ ἐκάστου. Et ut evincat Parm. unum esse omnium primum, supponit hic alia numero constare, quod antea sustulerat,' i. e. 149 B-C. The passage quoted, Sophist. 244 E, does not say of τὸ ὃν nihil uno esse majus, but that as regards shape it is σφαιρῆς ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, and οὔτε τι μείζον οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἔστι τῆ ἢ τῆ.

B πρῶτον δέ γε ... γεγονὸς refers back to πρῶτον γέγονε as if nothing had intervened to interrupt. τὰ δ' ὕστερον so Ψ with ΠΔ, but τ (whence the other Mss.) has ὕστερα which also occurs in Proc.-Dam. with τοῦ προτέρου γεγονότος.

τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν Proc.-Dam. vi. 285 says of this proof προσχρᾶται δὲ τῷ λήμματι τῷδε ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν τὸ ἐν οὐ γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἵνα εἰς οἰκείον τέλος κατανήσῃ τὸ ἐν ... διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τέλος οἰκείον λαμβάνει τὸ πῦρ ἅμα κινούμενον τὴν αὐτοῦ (?) κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν· εἰδοποιηθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἴσταται καὶ κινεῖται πρὸς τὰ ἄνω, καθὼς Ἀριστοτέλης φιλοσοφεῖ. προσχρᾶται δὲ πρὸς τῷ λήμματι τούτῳ ... καὶ ἄλλω ὅτι μέρη ἔχει, καθὼς καὶ πρότερον ἀπεδείκνυε—144 B etc. As to the natural order of the one Dam. § 86, 201 says πᾶν γὰρ ἐν πρὸ τοῦ οἰκείου πλήθους (whether μέρη, στοιχεῖα, or εἶδη) ἔστι τῆ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ... χαλάται τὸ ἐν εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν πολλῶν ... χώραν καὶ τούτοις παρεχόμενον εἰς ὑπόστασιν etc.

C πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ Heind. would like ἢ here, but the statement is in general terms, and it may simply resume the word ἀρχὴν immediately before. Do π. πρ. mean as we say 'first of all' or 'in the

case of all things first'? Probably the latter. So Proc.-Dam.—he also has ἢ—οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πρότερον ἢ ἀρχή.

καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα Heind. would omit καί; but the Mss. give it, though Stallb. notes that Fic. does not.

καὶ μὴν ... ἑνός: The order here is καὶ μὴν φήσομεν ταῦτα πάντα τᾶλλα εἶναι μόριά γε τοῦ ... ἑνός. He repeats the τᾶλλα πάντα of the previous sent. = these aforesaid, 'all the rest.' Stallb. seems almost annoyed at the presence of τᾶλλα—'quid enim? estne ipsum quoque initium pars τοῦ ἑνὸς atque totius? Cur igitur Parm. de iis solis loquitur quae principium excipiunt?' He is right about the ἀρχή. The lang. is a little careless. But is not Stallb. thinking that he would rather not see 'importunum istud τᾶλλα' standing for anything but sensible objects?

αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν Heind. would make τὸ ἐν a gloss p. 27. D wrongly included. It is the only use thus far of αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, and its natural sense is not τὸ αὐτὸ-ἐν but 'the one itself' as distinct from the parts whose genesis he describes. ἅμα τελευτῆ ἄν ... ἄν probably the repeated ἄν is to enforce the nat. order of growth for the one—it follows the two important words. His argt. has been—Every whole must come into being in its natural order; i. e. cannot have come till all of it has come; i. e. must come last in order. He applies this in condensed form ὥστε ... γίγνεσθαι: 'Thus, assuming that the one itself (the whole one) must come into being in its natural order alone (εἴπερ ... γίγνεσθαι), [it would arrive simultaneously with the end, and] if it has come into being simultaneously with the end, it would be its nature to come into being last of all.' The Greek would be εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῆ ἄν γεγονὸς εἴη, ὥστε, εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἅμα τελευτῆ γεγονέναι, πεφικὸς ἄν εἴη γίγνεσθαι ὕστατον τῶν ἄλλων. This should be ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων or ὕστατον πάντων: but Pl. wishes ὕστατον to make sure of its being last, and he wishes τῶν ἄλλων to say νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων.

νεώτ. ... πρεσβύτερα: Proc.-Dam. vi. 285-6 says ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐτέθη ὅτι οὐ παρὰ φύσιν [εἶναι], ἀλλ' ἅμα τῆ τελευτῆ (ὡς κατὰ φύσιν κινούμενον) γέγονε, ὕστερον ἄν τῶν ἄλλων μορίων—ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστι τὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἄλλα, πρὸς ἃ συγκρίνεται τὸ ἐν—ἔσται. πρεσβύτερα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα· καὶ οὕτως εὐρέθη ἀνάπαλιον τὰ ἄλλα

τοῦ ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα. He sees the double dealing with τὰ ἄλλα.

ἀρχὴν ... μέρος γε ὄν; ἀρχὴν put first rhetorically. The order is οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον—ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὃ τι ὄν ... ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν;

Ε οὐκ οὖν ... ἐν τῇ γενέσει: Note the growing confidence in the change from γίγνοιτ' ἄν to ἀπολείπεται. Or are we to make a break in the sense, as though the words were καὶ οὕτως οὐδενὸς ἀπολ. ? The ind. in Proc.-Dam. vi. 286 takes preced. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἐν καὶ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ μέρει ἐν διατηρηθήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολειφθήει τινὸς τῶν μερῶν ἕως οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον, τὰ πάντα διελλθόν, γένηται. For the sense of ἀπολ. see L. and S. c. II. The following words mean 'the others as they come into being, whichever it be that in each case succeeds which.' The sent. is redund. for emphasis: it might end with γένηται. So also ὅτῳ ὄν might be omitted, since, of course, if the one chosen be the sixth it must follow the fifth, if the ninth the eighth, and so on. ἐν γένηται t: Α and its family ἐγγένηται, with which contrast 138 D, Notes I. Here we have a glaring double use of ἐν, first as any part, then as ὄλον ἐν. The end of Proc.-Dam.'s note just cited shows that he sees this change. ἐπεὶ γοῦν διερχόμενον τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἅπερ ἐστὶ μέρη ἐκείνου καὶ ἐν ἐκάστῳ τούτων γιγνόμενον ἐξισιάζει.

154 περὶ τοῦ γίγ. ... γίγνεσθαι; The words between the two infins. inclus. form a noun gov'd. in the gen. by περὶ: αὐτὸ and τὰλλα are subjs. to the infins.; τοῦ ἐνός might in the circs. have been αὐτοῦ. In ἄρα ... ἔχει the sent. divides at οὕτω, an ἔχει being underst. B after εἶναι. εἰ καὶ ... ἐτέρου, is quite clear, only we must understand a second ἐστὶν after πρεσβ. which II. supplies at the wrong place—εἰ καὶ ἐστὶν καὶ ἐστὶν ὅτι. t places the ὅτι before εἰ and so the edd., Notes I. It is to be said for Α that its reading is the less likely to have been invented, and that the ὅτι from its position in the line—marking a new paragr.—could hardly have been the subject of a blunder. ἔτερον ἐτέρου make the statement general, as ἅπαν ἅπασιν 148 A. γίγνεσθαί γε Α has τε, t seems to have γε. Notes I. Herm. defends τε, 'at respondent inter se πρεσβύτερον et νεώτερον, quanquam gradatio structuræ ad posterius οὐδ' αὖ addidit.' This would seem to mean that οὐδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον stands for τό τε νεώτερον. It is difficult to

accept this; and γε gives emphas. to γίγνεσθαι which suits the passage. It has an exact antith. in οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὄν below.

πρεσβ. ἔτι ... ἔτι δύναίτο, πρεσβ. ἔτι means 'still older,' as ἔτι νεώτ. means still younger, and is explained by ἢ ... τῇ ἡλικίᾳ; the second ἔτι goes with οὐκ and means it would no longer be able—could not go the further length of becoming still older. The clause ἢ ... τῇ ἡλικίᾳ makes the constr. awkward, = ἢ τὸ πρότον, ἢ πρίν, ἢ κατ' ἀρχάς.

χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ The close connec. here almost gives a plural sense such as may agree with ἀνίσους; yet we need two times, and two of everything in the circs., which makes it more likely that the dat. is used in the sense of ἐν or ἐπὶ χρόνῳ = in the case of time and of everything else. For διαφέρειν why not διενεγκεῖν, with διήνεγκε διενέγκη? οὐκ ἄρα ... τοῦ ἐνός ... νεώτερον, edd. after Schleierm. reject ἐνός here: but the Mss. are clear. On the other hand the preceding ὄν is upon a scratch in Α, and suggests an orig. ἐν. The sense is οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὄν πρεσβύτερον τοῦ ὄντος νεώτερον καὶ γίγνοιτ' ἄν πρεσβύτερον ἔτι, οὐδὲ νεώτερον. For οὐδὲ here cp. οἷ οὔτε γίγνεται 152 E; and here t gives οὔτε. τὴν ἡλικίαν does just the same duty as τῇ ἡλικίᾳ above.

πρεσβ. τότε, νεώτ. δ' αὖ: Α πρεσβ. τότε νεώτ. δ' οὐ: t γεγονε πρεσβ. τὸ δὲ νεώτερον γίγνεται δ' οὐ: And so the edd., supplying mentally τὸ μὲν before πρεσβ., as is not rarely done. This is quite satisf., and is very likely the true reading. The text is an attempt to adjust Α so as to yield a satisf. meaning. After pointing out the scope of the argt., Proc.-Dam. vi. 287-8 says ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ ἔφοδος ἧδε—τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον τότε τοῦδε ὄν, καὶ ἔτι πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι (παρὸ ὡς πρότερον γέγονε πρεσβύτερον) χώραν ἔχει [it is possible for what is older to become relatively older still!], καὶ γίγνεται ἔτι πρεσβύτερον καὶ πρεσβύτερον τὸ δὲ νεώτερον οὐ χωρεῖ καὶ ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ὥστε τὸ εἶναι μὲν καὶ γεγόνεσθαι τι νεώτερον ἄλλου τινὸς ἐστὶ λέγει [λέγειν?], αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὄν νεώτερον νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου [οὐ] χωρεῖ [yet this is but the correlative of the previous statement!]. This can hardly mean that he had the reading of Α in 154 C, νεώτερον δ' οὐ; for he soon adds εἶναι μὲν καὶ γεγόνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον δοτέον ἕως κατὰ τὴν προτέραν διαφορὰν καθ' ἣν εὐθὺς διήνεγκε, γίγνεται δ' οὐ [the reading of t]—

κατὰ τὸ ἕψ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὡς ἴσα ἔχοντα μέρη ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἴσα ὄντα etc.

D καὶ τοῦ προσβ. ... γίνεσθαι, He has just inferred this in χρόνου μετέχει—it ranks with the succeeding infs. For the repet. εἶπερ χρόνου μετέχει; Stallb. cps. 138 A, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν ... εἶπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη.

p. 29. καὶ εἶη ἄν ... τὸ ἐν ἔστιν: Here are general statements followed by partic. illustrs.; but in the reversed order of χιασμός. ἐκείνῳ is exemplified in ὄνομα and λόγος, and ἐκείνου in ἐπιστήμη δόξα αἰσθησις. Proc.-Dam. says (291) εἶη μὲν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἔσται· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἐκείνου τι ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ προσόντα [so O. Apelt for ἐκείνου πεσόντος and other variants] ὡς ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντι. ἐκείνου δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη etc., περὶ ἐκείνου γὰρ ταῦτα ὡς ἐπιστητοῦ etc.—πλὴν οὐχ ἅμα τὰ τρία ταῦτα. Nothing he says would preclude the idea that ὄνομα and λόγος are ἐκείνῳ. It is true that the preds. ἦν ἔστι ἔσται are also ἐκείνῳ; but is that sense conveyed here? Dam. seems to hold that the constr. makes καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται explanatory of εἶη ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ. Perhaps his reason is the diffic. noted by Heind. that (if we construe = καὶ εἶη ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου) we really repeat εἶη ἄν in ἔστι. But Heind.'s explan. seems sound, 'verba εἶη ἄν in universum τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι, illa ἦν ἔστι ἔσται temporis rationem designant,' i.e. if the one (or the others) be in time there would be something for it and of it, and that something was and is and will be of it and for it according as the one itself was or is or will be; or as Fic. 'Esset quoque illi aliquid et illius,—eratque et est et erit.' Any diffic. in the way of this interp. arising out of the use of εἶη ἄν and ἔστι is much less than would arise if we take Dam.'s view. Pl. expressly says that ἐπιστήμη etc. are αὐτοῦ (= ἐκείνου), and that ὄνομα and λόγος are αὐτῷ (= ἐκείνῳ): the passage is thus balanced as we said by χιασμός. Now if ἦν ἔστι ἔσται are to be taken as Dam. takes them, not only is the balance disturbed, but there is nothing save infer. to decide whether they are examples of αὐτοῦ or αὐτῷ.

εἶπερ ... πράττομεν: i.e. εἶπερ ἐπιωτάμεθα καὶ δοξάζομεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα says Heind. rightly. This is rather a bizarre argumentum ad hominem: Parm.'s argts. against the existence of the one would fall equally well under the categ. πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν. But does not this frank admiss. that the one is

a subj. of δόξα and αἰσθησις no less than of ἐπιστήμη tend to support the view that the one is not an idea? ὅσα περ τῶν τοιούτων go together 'et quotecunque ejusmodi in aliis reperiuntur' etc. Thoms. It does not seem as if τὰλλα were used in a technical sense here: rather it means that the one is named, discussed etc. just like any other thing.

142 B-155 E. Here closes what Grote calls Dem. II. He points out that while I., starting from a neg. propos., proceeds (like the second figure in the syllog.) to prove double negs.—Unum is neither ... nor—in II. the concls. are all both ... and. Of two contrads. first both are false, next both are true. 'This offends doubly against the logical canon, which declares that of two contradictory propositions one must be true, the other must be false. We must remember that in the Platonic age there existed no systematic logic ...'—Prantl (in his Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. 3, 3, pp. 70-73) maintains, if I rightly understand him, not only that Pl. did not adopt the *principium identitatis* ... but that one of Pl.'s express objects was to demonstrate the contrary of it, partly in the Phileb. but especially in the Parm. ... I understand these Antinomies as ἀπορίαι to be cleared up, but in no other character. Prantl speaks (p. 73) of "die antinomische Begründung der Ideenlehre im Parm." etc. This is the same language as that used by Zeller ...' Introd. lx.-lxiii. The ancients are clear for the priority of one to being. After arguing the point with special reference to ἀπλότης, Dam. says, § 21, 37, πανταχῶς ἄρα τὸ ἐν πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος: this is the ἀπλῶς ἀμέθεκτον ἐνιαῖον ἐν. Proc. speaks in the same sense. Compared with this ἐν the ἐν-ὄν of Dem. II., or ἐν ἡνωμένον, is markedly less abstract in their eyes. While to later students the materials for this distinc. may appear in Pl.'s text, it is not drawn by him, and we may doubt if, as thus formulated, it was even present to his thought. In Hegel the distinc. is transposed. There Being comes first, and 'process' has advanced appreciably before One is reached: and if the latter be as abstract as ἐν the former must be more abstr. not only than ὄν but than ἐν itself—Dam. sometimes in a sort of despair admits that the ἀρχή is too elementary to be grasped or defined. We may note that H., constructing ab intra, says No thought no being: these ancients, surveying ab extra, hold

that process has 'crept gently crusting' past both $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ and $\delta\acute{\nu}$ ere $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ emerges. Is their $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ his Self-consciousness? Lastly of this $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ - $\delta\acute{\nu}$ —When Arist. (Met. IX. 2-end) says $\delta\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\epsilon$ $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ $\sigma\eta\mu\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$ $\pi\omega\varsigma$ $\tau\delta$ $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\delta$ $\delta\acute{\nu}$, $\delta\eta\lambda\omicron\nu$ (1) $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\kappa\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ $\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\chi\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ $\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\mu\eta$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$, ... (2) $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ $\mu\eta$ $\pi\rho\sigma\kappa\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\nu$ $\tau\iota$ $\tau\delta$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$, $\acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$ $\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\tau\delta$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\delta$ $\tau\acute{\iota}$ η $\pi\omicron\iota\delta\acute{\nu}$ η $\pi\omicron\sigma\acute{o}\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\iota}$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\omega$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ —he seems to be speaking of both as a logician and $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\sigma\upsilon\mu\beta\epsilon\theta\eta\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$, not as a metaphys. and $\kappa\alpha\theta'$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$. Now of Pl.'s argt. It was said in the Introd. that Dem. II. v. Dem. I. = synthet.-construct. v. analyt.-destruct. This is true; and Pl., either consciously or half so, shows it by his efforts to make each step lean on the previous one. But the great constructive step is the first, that of adding $\delta\acute{\nu}$ to $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$. All else might almost be called an analysis of what that synthesis implies. And while much is extracted from it, the $\epsilon\acute{\nu}$ - $\delta\acute{\nu}$ even at the close remains a very abstract concep., in no way more advanced than atoms and the void. When Dam. talks (§ 88-89, 214-17)—not as a commentator—of a $\sigma\epsilon\iota\rho\acute{\alpha}$ through $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$, $\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$, $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta$, $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$ towards $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\nu$ he is far beyond this dial. As Pl. goes step by step, and secures progress by $\delta\iota\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, it may be assumed that his first distinc. is as primary as he can make it. We shall not seek to determine what is the most elementary difference from one—not one, many, others, or what not. Dam. (§ 104, 270) speaks in this connec. of $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\delta\iota\eta\rho\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ $\tau\delta$ $\delta\acute{\nu}$, $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\eta\nu$ $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\eta\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\tau\alpha$ $\phi\alpha\nu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\alpha\nu$. $\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\iota\kappa\epsilon$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ η $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta$, $\chi\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\sigma\alpha$ $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\delta$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, $\acute{\delta}\phi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ $\pi\rho\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ — $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\alpha}\delta\alpha\varsigma$, $\mu\epsilon\theta'$ $\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\phi\epsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\chi\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\varsigma$ $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\delta$ $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\zeta\acute{\omega}\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\epsilon\tau\epsilon$. $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'$ δ $\Pi\lambda.$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\alpha}\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\kappa\rho\iota\tau\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\delta\acute{\nu}$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\delta\varsigma$ $\delta\upsilon\omicron$ $\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\chi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta\kappa\epsilon\nu$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\mu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\kappa\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\alpha}\delta\omega\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\mu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\kappa\tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$ etc. at greater length than we can quote. This is an early form of Grote's objec. to Pl.'s course at 143 A, and seems to mean that if Pl. took that course he should have gone from $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ (without $\delta\acute{\nu}$) to $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\iota$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\varsigma$ then to $\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\chi\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$, in place of running $\delta\upsilon\omicron$ $\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\chi\omicron\iota$ downwards $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$. Pl.'s course indeed seems almost to refute the importance of the addition of $\delta\acute{\nu}$, and to make us ask, Does he really add a vital new predicate to $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ which

advances it to greater concreteness, or does he merely mean in a loose way that he will not push the one so hard as in Dem. 1.? Dam. can justly say (§ 91, 226) $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ $\acute{\omicron}\pi\epsilon\rho$ $\kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\upsilon\mu\epsilon\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\iota$ $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\tilde{\omega}$, $\omicron\upsilon$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi'$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ $\pi\rho\omicron\eta\lambda\theta\epsilon$ —elsewhere he gives (§ 33, 63) the dialectical reason, which Pl. does not, $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ $\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$... $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ $\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ $\tau\iota\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$... $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$. He makes a further direct comment (§ 98, 253), $\acute{\omicron}$ $\Pi\lambda.$ $\tau\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\delta\acute{\epsilon}\delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\nu\omicron\eta\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\omicron\nu$ $\Pi\alpha\rho\mu.$ — $\tau\eta\nu$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\eta\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ - $\delta\acute{\nu}$, $\tau\eta\nu$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\eta\nu$ $\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta$, $\tau\eta\nu$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\tau\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\eta\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma$: with which cp. 142 B-143 A. Dam. (§ 122, 314) says again $\acute{\omicron}$ $\Pi\lambda.$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ [$\tau\delta$ $\eta\nu\omega\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$?] $\delta\iota\alpha\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\varsigma$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\acute{\nu}$ $\delta\mu\omega\varsigma$ $\epsilon\upsilon\rho\iota\sigma\kappa\epsilon\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ $\tau\delta$ $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\phi\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ $\gamma\iota\gamma\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$, $\tau\delta$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$ $\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\omicron\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$. But when he goes on to say of $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ — $\acute{\alpha}$ $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ $\pi.$ $\pi\rho\delta$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\omicron\upsilon$ $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, $\acute{\omicron}\theta\epsilon\nu$ $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ (cp. 143 A), $\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\omicron\nu$ $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\pi\rho\delta$ $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ $\acute{\omicron}\rho\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\eta\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon$ $\omicron\upsilon$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\acute{\omicron}$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta.$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$... $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\delta$ $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta.$... $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ —we must qualify his words. It is true that Pl., 143 A, speaks of $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ before he elaborates number; but this does not isolate the one from the other. On the contrary the culmin. of the deduc. of number is stated thus (144 A) η $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\epsilon\iota$... $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\upsilon\eta\tau\alpha\iota$;

$\xi\tau\iota$... $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta$: As he does not qualify $\omicron\delta\omicron\nu$ $\delta\iota\epsilon\lambda\eta\lambda.$ we must hold that he refers to the whole course of the argt. up to the present stage. Of this he assumes that every aspect has been established and is to be accepted: he does not regard Dem. II. as abrogating I.

$\acute{\alpha}\rho'$ $\omicron\delta\acute{\nu}$... $\acute{\omicron}\rho\theta\acute{\omega}\varsigma$: From the answering $\omicron\upsilon\chi$ $\omicron\delta\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\tau\epsilon$ it seems that $\omicron\delta\acute{\omicron}\nu$ τ' does not agree with $\tau\delta$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$, but means 'will it be possible' not 'will it be able.' He here suggests an explan. of the contrad. involved in his conclusions regarding the one. Grote has urged that they imply disregard or ignorance of the law of contrad. Now, men reasoned before they wrote logical treatises; and, although the dialectic of Zeno was a great advance, yet in practice they were always guided by innate feeling for logic, so that this law would be accepted in fact before it was formulated by Arist. And his formula is, Met. III. 3, 1005 b 19, $\tau\delta$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha$ $\acute{\iota}\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$

τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό. We thus see that καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ is all that Arist. adds to the argt. which Pl. here employs. Pl. knew in principle the law of contrad., and is here applying it, although when in 'his altitudes' he does not always regard it. Cp. *Introd.* lx. etc. There is a diff. between science in process of becoming, and science when checked by tests in its results. As Arist. says, *Met.* III. 5, 1009 a 35, *δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ' οὐ.* But there is a flaw in the reasoning of a different kind. He has said that the one is one and many, and neither one nor many. Now, although this may exclude the possibility of existence for the one, he does not actually say that the one is and is not, unless we interpret the words *ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν ... ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν* in that sense, in spite of their manifest reference to what has just preceded. Yet with this limitation of his language he, as *Proc.-Dam.* (293) points out, goes on to infer non-existence absolutely from non-existence as one, though the latter may merely mean existence as many: *πλὴν ὄρα τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ 'μήτε ἐν' δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ 'οὐχ ἐν ἔστι,' τὸ 'οὐκ ἔστιν' ἀπλῶς λαμβάνει [-ναι Ms.], καὶ μὴ μετέχειν αὐτὸ οὐσίας κατὰ τοῦτο φησίν.*

¹⁵⁶ οὗτος χρόνος *Stallb.* explains the want of the art. by saying that οὗτος is loco subjecti while χρόνος is instar praedicati. This would justify the omiss.; but is οὗτος thus subject? The sense is 'is there not then also this point of time, viz.' etc.—which in better Eng. becomes, as in *Jowett*, 'is there not also a time?' *Fic.*, 'numquid est id tempus?' *Jelf* says of the art., § 453, 1, 'In prose it is sometimes omitted when the substantive is ... a collective noun used as a proper name; as *Thuc.* II. 74, *ἐπὶ γῆν τήνδε.*' This comes nearer what we need. For the lang. cp. *Arist. Phys.* VI., 10, 241 a 17, οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἔσται χρόνος ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται διὰ τὸ πᾶν ἐν χρόνῳ κινεῖσθαι.

ἐν δὲ καὶ ... πάνυγε: Just above ἐν is the subj. of both γίγνεται and ἀπόλλυται: here it is the subj. of γίν., but is it of ἀπόλλ.? *Fic.*, 'desinit esse multa' and 'desinit esse unum,' which might seem to favour the view that it is the subj. What then are we to make of the τὸ πολλά εἶναι of *Plt*? *Fic.*, one would think, must have read τὰ, the constr.

being ἀπόλλ. εἶναι τὰ πολλά, if even that be a possible one. But on the suppos. that ἐν is the subj. we would need to treat τὸ πολλά εἶναι as a phrase in the accus. of descrip., 'dies so far as being many is concerned.' The altern. is to make that subj. to ἀπόλλ.—as *Jowett* and *Müller* do—the only objec. to which is the sudden change in that respect. *Stallb.* seems to take this view, 'posteaquam Unum ipsum et oriri et interire docuit, etiam singula ejus attributa eandem subire vicissitudinem ostendere instituit.'

ἐν δὲ ... ἰσοῦσθαι; Two examples of χιασμός occur here in the arrangement of the infins. *Proc.-Dam.* 293-4, διακρίνεσθαι δ' αἰθῆς ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἐνὸς πολλά γίγνεσθαι κατασκευάζει and καὶ ἐκ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ὁμοιον, ὡς ἔλεγε κατὰ τὰς προτέρας ὑποθέσεις (πλὴν ἀορίστως, καὶ οὐ λέγει 'ἐαυτῷ' ἢ 'τοῖς ἄλλοις,' ὡς ἐκεῖ ἔλεγε· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἐαυτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ δοκιμάζει καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὰ πολλά, ὅπερ μετὰ ταῦτα ποιήσει), ὁμοιοῦσθαι· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἀνόμοιον, ἀνομοιοῦσθαι· ὄρα γὰρ, πῶς προσβιβάζει συνάπτων τὸ γίγνεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις, καὶ ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι ὅπερ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἐθήρασεν. ἔλεγε γὰρ ἐν τῷ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν γίγνεται, ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι γοῦν ἢ μείζον ἢ ἑλαττον ἢ ἴσον κατὰ τὰς προτέρας ὑποθέσεις αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι. He urges two points here: (1) that Pl. gets in all his predications in the wake of τὸ γίγνεσθαι, (2) that these are here used abstractly—the one becomes like, equal etc., but not to anything.

ἔτ' ἂν δὲ κινούμε. ... εἶναι; etc. As *Proc.-Dam.* has said, and says in his next note, Pl. has carefully developed everything thus far through γίγνεσθαι· he adds καὶ ταῦτα πάντα διὰ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἐν χρόνῳ—note the last words. Pl. now assumes motion abruptly, without reference to becoming, or to any other source. It is not even certain at the moment what sort of motion he means. The lang. suggests φέρεσθαι (138 B), but the associations would favour ἀλλοιώσις. Not till we reach ε is the ref. to motion in space established. *μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ* is very emphatic. The expression τὸ νῦν, used in 152, is not adequate, and must be replaced by a better. πῶς δῆ: does not seem to mean 'how should it?' implying acquiescence—as πῶς γὰρ: seems to do—but rather 'how can that be?' implying doubt, which the foll. sent. clears up. In ἐστὸς τε ... ταῦτα πάσχειν: the

last two words are (Stallb.) superfl. The constr. is, as it were, broken at ἐστάναι, which might be followed by a dash. Stallb. seems right in objecting to Heind.'s sugg. ἀνευ μῆν, and in saying that the μὲν is taken up by χρόνος δὲ which follows. Proc.-Dam. 295 says οὐδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐστὼς κινεῖται καὶ κινούμενον ἴσταται καὶ οὐδέποτε μένει, and again ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐν τινι χρόνῳ οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐστάναι ἐστὶν οὔτε ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι.

πότ' οὖν μ. This opening use of πότε is not frequent, and rather arrests attention.

D οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς οὖν etc. Ἄ ἐστὸς ὄν, which makes ἐστὸς an adj. such as ἀκίνητον. No one seems bold enough to take this view, yet we have a fair analogy in 157 B, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον ... φθίνον ... ἰσούμενον εἶη ἄν: and in e.g. ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα ἄν εἶη 158 E; indeed in 159 A καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστῶτα are directly under the infl. of the preced. ἄν εἶη. t seems to give ἄν for ὄν, and the accepted course is to adopt this and read μεταβάλλοι. We hesitate to make a double change in Ἄ and so read οὖν, not with any great conviction, the position being strained and the word occurring four times rapidly. Possibly the orig. might be οὔτε γὰρ οὖν ἐστὸς?

ἀρ' οὖν ἔστι ... τὸ ἐξαίφνης. ἔστι seems to express existence here. τοῦτο may naturally be used for τὸδε as some descript. precedes, back to which τοῦτο partly refers. It is hard to disting. τὸ ἐξαίφνης from τὸ νῦν, save so far as the latter refers to the τὸ ἐξαίφνης of the present, while the former is a νῦν not necessarily contemporaneous with our sensations. Yet a distinc. is necessary, both because τὸ ἐξ. is assumed not to be in time, and because you construct time out of successive τὰ νῦν, which you cannot do if these have individually no time. 'Differt hoc ἐξαίφνης a νῦν, cujus ante aliquoties mentionem fecerat Parmen. τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐ. ἀμερές ἐστὶ τῇ ιδιότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρονον, ἐκείνο δὲ χρόνον μέτρον ἦν καὶ διάστημα, scribit Damasc., Ms. fol. 295.' Thoms. Proc.-Dam. 295 describes the instantaneous as πάντως ἐν ἀκαρεί, and τὸ ἐν ἀνεπιστήτῳ χρόνῳ—but this last, which comes from Arist., gives up the point. Even when speaking of that which must have no time, Pl. is forced to say ἐν ψ τότ' ἄν εἶη ὅτε.

ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου ... εἰς ἐκάτ. This is not easy to transl. The meaning would be got better from ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ

μετ. τὸ ἐν εἰς ἐκάτερον, or still better from τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν ἐξ οὗ μετ., or again ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ ἐνός: 'certum quiddam significat ex quo in utrumque transitur.' Fic. The meaning is that the one (or anything), whatever state it may be in, passes through τὸ ἐξαίφνης into the corresponding counter-state—'No pause the dire extremes between, He made me blest—and broke my heart.'

οὐ γὰρ ... κινδύνουσι: This brings out the full agony of the crisis. The one is stock-still until instantaneously motion is in full swing. Proc.-Dam. points the paradox by showing that, in order to effect this sudden transfor., motion and rest must themselves not be in time (295), ἐν μηδενὶ γὰρ χρόνῳ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα ἐκ τούτου εἰς τὸ ἴστασθαι μεταβάλλοι, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἴστασθαι ἵνα ἐκ τούτου εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλοι, and again on the other types of trans. (296), οὐ γὰρ ἐν τινι χρόνῳ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε κατὰ τὸ ἐξαίφνης καὶ τούτων γιγνομένων οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται. Pl. begins by assuming that τὸ γίγνεσθαι in all its forms is in time; he is now eager to effect the change from motion to rest with absolutely perfect abruptness, and says that the point at which the one is in *neither* state cannot be in time. Thus rest endures in full force until the one is already in the instantaneous, while motion has acquired perfect action before it comes out: in other words, motion and rest, which we might infer were in time, are now shown to be in the instantaneous and therefore out of time, i.e. non-existent. And with the disappearance of time disappear all the characteristics just assigned to the one διὰ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἐν χρόνῳ.

οὐδ' ... οὐδὲ ... οὐδ' The sense of οὔτε ... οὔτε is not quite given here in the last two cases; the first of course coalesces with ἐνί. The sense of the whole would, if accurately stated, stand thus: εἰ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐξαίφνης ἄν μεταβάλλοι καὶ οὕτως ἐν οὐδ' ἐνὶ χρόνῳ ἄν εἶη· εἰ δ' ἐν οὐδ' ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶη οὐδὲ κινεῖτ' ἄν τότε οὐδ' ἄν σταίη, 'and if it were in no portion of time, neither would it move then, nor yet stand.' We have learned, 152 A, that a thing μετέχει μὲν χρόνου εἶπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι.

πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μ. ἔχει, He introduced motion and rest abruptly without any statement that they resembled the characteristics already assigned to the

one; here he assumes that they do, and are but one type of μεταβολή. He seems to think that he can reach τὸ ἐξαίφνης more readily through them.

157 οὔτε ἔστι ... οὔτε, οὔτε ... οὔτε etc. These seem to constitute two pairs, and may without violence be rendered strictly; 'and neither is then nor is not, neither becomes nor perishes.' The same arrang. is continued. Contrast ἐφ' ἐν with ἐπὶ ἀνομ., ἐπὶ ὄμ., 18 ἐπὶ ἴσον, and the repeated cases of οὔτε unelided. εἰς τὰ ἐναντία He does not say ἐπὶ τά, the phrase being used apparently much like τούναντίον, 'towards big and towards equal, and the converse—and vice versa.' οὐκ ἔοικε. Steph. reads ἔοικε saying 'alia est lectio οὐκ ἔοικε quam et Fic. agnoscit': and Bek. says 'οὐκ om. ΔΕΦ.' Does this give us the Ms. authority on which Steph.'s edition rests?

155 E-157 B. We have seen Dem. II. conflicting with I., and within itself containing contradictory proofs that the one 'both is and is not' something or other. Pl. in Dem. III., while not giving up any previous conclus., calls in a reconciling element. If the one 'is' it 'partakes of time and πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου (152 A),' and we have only to understand that 'is and is not' apply to different portions of time in order to comply with the law of contrad. and to save every characteristic of the one. But Pl. seems to be possessed by the concep. of 'is and is not,' and he has already dealt with that very small portion of time called τὸ νῦν. Apparently under these two influences he proceeds to prove even here that the one 'both is and is not,' the medium of proof being a refinement upon τὸ νῦν. The more one thinks of τὸ νῦν the less one is able to distinguish it from τὸ ἐξαίφνης. Pl. describes τὸ νῦν as the point at which the one οὐ γίνεται ἀλλ' ἔστι—which seems clearly to assume that at τὸ νῦν we have a μεταβολή: and τὸ ἐξαίφνης is simply τὸ νῦν reduced to so fine a point that time vanishes. But can τὸ νῦν itself be other than a timeless instant? If it can, then it has duration, and before we reach its end its beginning is past, has ceased to be τὸ νῦν and become τὸ παρεληλυθός. 'Some of the Stoics,' says Grote, 'considered τὸ νῦν as μηδὲν—and nothing in time to be real except τὸ παρωχηκός and τὸ μέλλον (Plut. De Commun. Notitiis contra Stoicos, p. 1081 D).' He adds 'The doctrine (of τὸ ἐξαίφ.) served the purpose of the

Platonic Parmenides, as ingenious, original, and provocative to intellectual effort, but it did not acquire any permanent footing in Grecian dialectics.' Something must be said here, but within modest limits, on Time and Change.

TIME.—I. Both Pl. and Arist. accept the popular idea of time. Pl. hardly discusses it now: A. after disc. decides thus, τούτων δ' ὄντων ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν χρόνον συνεχῆ εἶναι· λέγω δὲ συνεχῆς τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά (Phys. vi. 2). Both are influenced by the analogy of space; but A. notes (what Pl. assumes) that while space has six (our three) dimensions (iv. 1), time has but two (our one) πρότερον and ὑστερον, and that neither of these exists while we speak (iv. 10 etc.). He also raises the question whether if motion and souls observant of it ceased time would remain (iv. 14)—a step towards the Kantian standpoint. Of time Pl. assumes that it 'passes,' the one μετέχει πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου, 152—quite a popular view. A.'s may come to the same, but it involves much deeper analysis: he says time is our measure of change—τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ χ., ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότ. καὶ ὑστ. (iv. 11). 2. Over against this both elsewhere speak of αἰών, our eternity. A. draws a fine distinc. in this connec.—οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν-χρόνω-εἶναι τὸ εἶναι-ὅτε-ὁ-χ.-ἔστιν ... ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα, ἢ ἀεὶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνω ... σημείον δὲ τούτου ὅτι οὐδὲ πάσχει οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ χ. (iv. 12). Thus the law of contrad. exists during the writing of this note and the discuss. of Supply in the House of Commons, but is unaffected thereby—it is ἀεὶ ὄν. Of αἰών Dam. says (§ 150, ii. 31) συνελίπτειν ἐθέλει καὶ συναρεῖν εἰς ἐν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὅλον τὰ μέρη, ὡς ὁ χρ. διαιρεῖν. 3. To both the effective existing portion of time is τὸ νῦν. Popularly Now may include a good deal, but Pl. and A. agree in treating it technically as a part of time, but an extremely small part. A. says—and Pl. would probably agree—that νῦν may be infinitely small, time being divisible εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά, and makes this play a part in his reply to Zeno (vi. 6 etc.). 4. Pl. makes a further step in τὸ ἐξαίφ. It is not easy to say whether he means by this merely a generalized and infinitely reduced νῦν, or whether he creates a timeless time, so to speak: probably the latter, as he calls it φύσις ἀτοπὸς τις ἐν χρόνω οὐδ' ἐνὶ οὐσα. A. uses the term, but in the other sense, τὸ δ'

ἐξαιφ. τὸ ἐν ἀνασθήτῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν (IV. 13).

CHANGE, again, is the insoluble crux, the vital question in the philosopher's brief. 'If, indeed, you are able to instruct *that* point, Mr. Fairbrother—' 'If I am indeed able to instruct that point, my Lord, I trust not only to serve my client, but ...' We cannot instruct that point. Pl. does not even treat it in a strictly metaphys. manner. Metaphys. explanations do not so much explain it as explain it away. Pl. is directed by Zeno towards physical becoming or change, whether in the form of *κατὰ τόπον κινήσεις* or of *ἀλλοιώσεις*: he does not admit Z.'s reduction of it to impossibility: he seeks to construct a physical theory which will explain the physical facts. He said (152 B etc.) that in past time the one has been becoming older and younger than itself, but that when it reaches 'now' it 'ceases to become and is' older and younger—for if it went on becoming it 'would not be caught by now.' And this now holds on to it as long as it 'is,' which seems to mean that to us at each successive now the one 'is,' while when we look back, from each to all that have passed, it seems to have been 'becoming' all the while. There is the crux: it is conceded that change is gradual and takes time (e.g. 138 C, and A. Phys. IV: passim), but when you put that time under the microscope you find that at each instant the changing thing 'ceases to become and is.' To put it in terms of A.'s dictum (I. above), if 'now' as a 'measure of change' reveals change going forward, it eo ipso breaks up into as many nows as the stages of change which it reveals, and at each of these the thing 'ceases to become and is.' From one 'now' to the next we find, it may be, different being; but being, not becoming, is what we find: we *can* not catch change in the fact. Pl. then in despair says Change is *extra*-temporal: time advances thus—*νῦν, ἐξαιφ., νῦν, ἐξαιφ., νῦν, ἐξαιφ.* εἰς ἀπειρον: at each *νῦν* the changing thing 'is' in some phase (not the same phase, yet not more than one phase), and at each *ἐξαιφ.* the change from phase to phase (or from place to place) is effected. It would need a minute knowledge of A.'s works to ascertain clearly his final view on change, but he seems to be driven to the same conclus. as Pl. He says *μεταβολή δὲ πᾶσα φύσει ἐκστατικόν* (IV. 13), and again *ἐν ᾧ δὲ πρῶτῳ*

(hunting change into a corner) *μεταβέβληκε τὸ μεταβέβληκός, ἀνάγκη ἄτομον εἶναι* (§VI. 5). Here *ἄτομον* conveys the same idea as Pl.'s *ἐν οὐδ' ἐνὶ χρόνῳ*, and might even prompt a wrong-headed critic to read *φύσις ἄτομός τις* for *ἄτοπος* at 156 D. To Pl. then change is resolved into the series 'is, is-not, is, is-not ...,' and perhaps one influence that leads him to such a concep. may be that while Heraclitus (Introd. p. 1.) had taught him that 'becoming' is not a subject of science, 'is and is-not' may be subjects of science. Another influ. is of course to hand in the fact that, when Pl. lands the changing thing in that which is not time, he may—having made time a condition of being—declare that it 'is not' in an absolute sense. He is thus able to say in Dem. III. as in II. that each attribute of the one both is and is not.

τί δαί ... σκεπτόν; For *τί δαί* see pp. lxxxī., xci. But this case is peculiar. Elsewhere the *τί δαί* either stands alone, or is coupled with *δή*, or again with *τῆδε* or *τόδε*, to form a brief prelim. question introducing a longer one which is complete in itself. The only apparent excep. seems to be *τί δαί, τῶν ἄλλων*; (153 A). This however does not mean 'but what of the others?' *τῶν ἄλλων* is gov'd. by *πρῶτον* in the line above and corresponds with *ἑαυτοῦ*. In the present case *τί* is an integral part of the main quest., in close connec. with *προσῆκοι ἂν πάσχειν*. Had it been like the others the lang. might have been *τί δαί: ἄρ' οὐ σκεπτόν τί τοῖς ἄλλοις προσῆκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν*; This case seems to show that *δέ* was the orig. word rather than *δή*, and so t.

οὔτε So *Ut*; but nothing responds; whence Buttm. (Heind. agreeing) reads [*οὔτε τᾶλλα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν*] *οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ τᾶλλα*, which may perhaps have been in Pl.'s mind, but is surely redundant. Stallb. reads *οὐδέ*. May not the following *οὐδέ* meet all requirements—the intervening *ὀρθῶς*: being a mere *ἀνάπαυλα* to Parm., and no interrup.? Engelm. suggests *οὔτι* referring back to 150 B. The note of Proc.-Dam. 297—which as usual reflects the text while commenting upon it, contains *οὔτε ... οὔτε*: but the lang. seems to need correc., which takes from its value as evid. For the sense Thoms. cites Plotin. Ennead. 5, lib. iii. cap. 15, *Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ὅτι εἴ τι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ἄλλο δὲ παρ' αὐτό· ἄλλο δὲ ὄν,*

οὐχ ἔν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνο. With οὐ γὰρ ἄν ... ἦν suppl. τὰλλα, εἰ ἔν ἦν.

C οὐδὲ μὴν ... πῆ δὴ: Notes I. † gives μετέχει πη. The text is as near Ἀ as possible: it assumes that αῶ—not unsuitable to the context—had been in the orig., that it had been overlooked and inserted in the marg. or above, and that the writer, influenced by στέρεται, had supposed the intention to be that μετέχεται (αν = αι) should be the reading.

τοῦ ἐνὸς seems to go closely with τὰ ἅλλα, and yet it may be a case of hyperbaton: the sense in any case would be given thus: ὅτι που τὰ ἅλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς μόνως ὡς μόρια ἔχοντα ἅλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶη.

δ ἄν ὄλον ἦ; So †; and the sense needs it.

ἄλλα μὴν etc. This intricate argt. is meant to show that ὄλον-μόρια are strictly correl. He seemed to find no diffic. before (145 A), and his argt. now is not easily followed. If a part is not part of a 'whole' (τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὁλότητος, Proc.-Dam. 297), it must be part of a 'many' or 'all': that is, if it is not part of a many in their collective sense it must be so in their distributive and individual sense—must be part of each, including itself. For if so much as one be excluded then it cannot be part of 'all,' and by hypothesis it is not part of the 'whole.' If the argt. is sophistical (Stallb.) it is so mainly because it undertakes to prove that which hardly admits of proof, or needs it. The sophistry arises in the statement that 'if it is not part of each it will not be of any.' Proc.-Dam. takes (298) a different view. He says the parts must be part of some 'one' thing—τινὸς μόριον ἂν εἶη οὐ δὴ πολλῶν, τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ διακεκριμένα ἐστίν—if therefore it is to be part of 'all' which are not a 'whole,' it must be so by being part of each 'one' of the all. This it cannot be—ὅτι, φησὶν, ... ἔσται μόριον ἑαυτοῦ [τὸ] μόριον, ὃ ἀδύνατον. It thus is not part of each one, ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντων τῶν πολλῶν οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ μόριον εἶναι

D τὸ ἐν ἐκεῖνο οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἐκάστου (ἔσται) τῶν ἄλλων' and so can be part only of the whole-less many en masse—πλὴν γὰρ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ μόνου τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται ἅμα, καὶ οὕτως ἀναιρέται τὸ ἐκάστου εἶναι μόριον, μὴ ὄν δὲ ἐκάστου μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν
P. 37. ἔσται. In the closing sent. μηδενὸς δὲ etc. ὄν (†) seems essential. Heind. and Stallb. object to εἶναι after ἀδύνατον as useless, and as probably due to the previous εἶναι. It would be easy, with a slightly

different length of lines to imagine the second nearly below the first, and so to account for the presence of the latter; but the Mss. agree, and (as Stallb. adds) Proc.-Dam. agrees with them. The sent. may be rendered 'and to be something of all those things, of none of which it is anything—whether that something be a part or what else you please—is a thing which cannot happen.' (φησὶν) ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι. Proc.-Dam.

ἰδέας This does not seem to be used technically. E Thoms. quotes here his Dam., 'ἔστι μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὄλον ἔν ἐν τῇ γενέσει μεριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐν πεπληθυσμένον, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἦ ἐν καὶ ἦ ὄλον, τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ περιείληφεν. Inde Pythagoraeis Monas dicebatur ἀρρηνοθήλυ test. Macrobr. ... Totam rem vero aperit Plut. in Quaest. Platon. οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ, inquit, Μόνας ἀριθμόν, ἂν μὴ τῆς ἀπείρου δυνάδος ἀψηται· ποιήσασα δὴ οὕτως ἀριθμόν, εἰς στιγμάς, εἶτα γράμματα, ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς ἐπιφανείας καὶ βάθη καὶ σώματα πρόεισι, καὶ σωματίων ποιότητος ἐν πάθει γιγνομένων.'

ἐν ἄρα So †, and rightly. On μόρια ἔχον Proc.-Dam. 298 says καὶ συνέγραψε ταῦτα εἰς τὸ ἔχειν μόρια ἵνα μὴ, ἐν ὄντα, οὐκ ἦ [Ms. ἦν] ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐδείκνυν τὰ μόρια ὄλον καὶ τελείον μόρια—καὶ οὔτε ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν οὔτε τῶν πάντων τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ, i.e. he calls none of these others τέλειον? αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν μορίων. τό γε So 155 †: Ἀ τό τε, less good. τ γ easily confused, p. cxi.

οὐ γὰρ ... αὐτὸ ἔν = εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἦν οὐκ ἂν μετείχεν etc. The ὀ suggests that some writer or reader thought the form αὐτοῦ—like αὐτοέκαστον in Arist.—the proper one. Notes I. The word, however, would convey the idea of an εἶδος τοῦ ἐνός, which is not meant here, but rather that the others 'in place of being partakers of the one would be the one itself.' Proc.-Dam. 299 says τὸ μετέχον τοῦ μετεχομένου ἄλλο τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ... μετέχει γοῦν ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων τοῦ ἐνός καθὼ ἐν μόριον, καὶ ἄλλο τι ὄν μετέχει τοῦ ἐνός. In νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ ... που the first ἐνὶ is a notable case of attrac. We expect ἐν with εἶναι; yet the dative is used through the action upon the writer's thought of the succeeding constr. ἀδύνατον μὲν που παντί, πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ, ἐνὶ εἶναι. The δὲ of νῦν δὲ answers to a suppressed μὲν in οὐ γὰρ, while the ἐνὶ μὲν is answered by μετέχειν δέ.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ... μόριον ὄλον: Heind. is prob. right in taking τὸ μὲν as separate from the following ἐν,

and τὸ δ' αὖ as corresponding—only it seems better to couple ἕκαστον with the latter. The sense will thus be 'for the former (the whole) will be one whole of which the parts are parts, while again each of the latter, i.e. whatever is part of a whole (ὁ ἂν ἦ μόνιον ὅλου) will be one part of the whole.' This is quite intellig.; but excep. is taken to the clause in brackets, although ἄt agree. As it stands, Heind. renders it 'quaecunque tandem est pars illa totius sive magna sive parva—sive ei commensurable est τὸ ὅλου, sive non commensurable,' and this gives excellent sense, although no ref. to size has been made hitherto. Bek. again, following ΞΣΥ and followed by Ast and Herm., reads οὐδ' ἂν ἦ μόνιον ὅλου 'will be one part of the whole—of that whole of which it is a part,' but there is no such gain as to justify the change. And so of the suggest. of Schleierm., ὁ ἂν ἦ μορίου ὅλου (altered to μορίων and called egregia by Stallb.), 'one part of the whole, of that one which happens to be whole of the part (or parts).' The clause, like some we have met, is redund., but neither of these changes helps much.

B οὐκ οὖν ... αὐτοῦ: Steph. (leaning, as Fischer says, on Fic.) wishes ἐνός twice, the former being gov'd. by ἕτερα, the latter by μεθέξει, but (Heind.) the art. also must in that case be repeated, while there is no diffic. in treating αὐτοῦ as gov'd. by both part. and verb.

αὐτά γε ... τοῦ ἐνός; This might end at ἐκεῖνα or even αὐτά, but his argt. seeks to emphasize the paradox that this is their nature, while yet it is they that partake of the one. The tense of the part. is import. and is dwelt on in what follows. The sent. contends that, as both in the whole of the ἄλλα and each portion of them turns out to be more than one, we may well say they are πλήθει ἄπειρα. Proc.-Dam. (300) puts it differently—ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλο τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἐνός μορίου (ὃ ἦν τὸ μόνιον), καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μετέχον τοῦ ἐνός ὅλου (ὃ ἦν ὅλου) πλείω ἄρα τοῦ ἐνός ἐστίν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι τὰ τοῦ ἐνός ἐκείνου μεταλαμβάνοντα.

εἰδόμεν. So both Mss. as in 143 B. Edd. give ἰδόμεν and so Dam. ἄλλο τι might be replaced by τί δαί or the like: it introduces the quest. and assumes what the answer will be, but does not otherwise interfere. So Theaet. 159 D, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενούντα [με λάβῃ] ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀλη-

θεία οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; and others. Proc.-Dam. differs—ἄλλο τι καὶ οὐχ' ἐν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐνός τότε μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνός, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει, ἄλλο τι ὄντα ἢ ἐν.

πλήθει ὄντα, each severally is a πλήθος.

εἰ ἐθέλομεν etc. An exaggerated superlat. of dimin. It might take various simpler forms: εἰ ἐθέλομεν ἀφελεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ (μόριον) τῶν τοιούτων ὡς οἰοί τ' ἐσμὲν—οἱ ὡς οἰόν τε—οἱ ὅτι—ὀλίγιστον. Proc.-Dam. explains ἐπεὶ εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρετόν ἐστι διανοεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ὡς ὅλου τι διανοεῖσθαι ἄξιον. On ὀλίγιστον, Notes I., ὀλιγοστὸν has prob. been the orig. as in 149 A, unless indeed that case may have influenced this one. Ἀφαιρεθὲν following thus upon ἀφελεῖν is a neat illustr. of the fact that no 2 aor. pass. of the verb was in use.

οὐκ οὖν ... πλήθει: The constr. changes between σκοποῦντι and ὀρώμεν, while ἔσται will suit either. Thomson's Dam. reads σκοποῦντες, Proc.-Dam. has σκοποῦντί σοι. Here τοῦ εἶδους means the concep. of τὰ ἄλλα, and τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν is that aspect of it which is separate from the one—'quatenus πολλά sunt τοῦ ἐνός μὴ μετέχοντα.' Heind.

μόριον μόνιον The former goes with ἐν ἕκαστον, but it is (by linguistic necessity) used prematurely. ἐν ἕκαστον μόνιον cannot properly apply to any element of τὰ ἄλλα before it comes into connection with the one, nor even τότε ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει, but only ἐπειδὴν μόνιον γέννηται. He does not say whether this transform. occurs ἐν τῷ ἐξαίφνης.

καὶ τὸ ὅλου etc. This is the ὅλου τέλειον μόρια D ἔχον of 157 E: and of course it does not, any more than the μόρια, exist until the latter are thought of as μόρια. In the phrase τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός the ἐν is of course the ἐν of the dial. Does ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐνός refer to that also? Perhaps so, in view of the prev. express. and also of the ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων which could cover his recent argt.: yet it really is diffic. to say. He has not been speaking of τὸ ἐν for some time, and the ἐν ὅλου τέλειον, or even the ἐν ἕκαστον μόνιον of which he has been speaking—any ἐν, in fact—would do. We must remember too, though he chooses to forget, that even τὸ ἐν only gets its πέρασ when thought of in connec. with τὰ ἄλλα, and that the nature of either, if we strive to think of it out of such connec., is

ἀπειρία—so much so that the very names he gives would not be permissible. Κοινωνησάντων is seldom used in this absolute manner to mean ‘in uno communicantibus’ (Fic.). Proc.-Dam. puts τοῦ ἐνὸς under the govt. of κοινωνων. (301):—τοῖς ἄλλοις γούνη τοῦ ἐνὸς συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐπερ ἐκοινωνήσαν, γίγνεσθαι τι ἕτερον, ὅπερ αὐτοῖς πέρασ παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλλα. We might expect ὁ δὴ πέρασ αὐτοῖς πάρεσχε, but ἑαυτοῖς immediately precedes. In t we have

p. 32. ἀπειρίαν, for which a verb must be sought from παρέσχε.

E δμοιά τε... ἑαυτοῖς; A formula with which cp. the familiar οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον (οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται) οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων.

εἰ μὲν So Ẅ: t ἦ, which certainly suits ταύτη. The same diverg. occurs in εἰ γε, εἰ δέ below. In this sent. Heind. would read πάντα twice, one with ἀπειρα the other with εἶη, to corresp. with the ἅπαντα—πάντ' following. In ἐναντία... πεπονθεν the force is as if it read ἀρ' οὐκ ἐναντία πάθη ἄλλήλοις ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἃ πέπονθεν;

159 κατὰ μὲν... ἀνομοιώτα: i.e. so long as we consider them all either as ἀπειρα or as πεπερασμένα in both cases they are like; but when we regard them all in both lights at once—both κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν and as τοῦ ἐνὸς μετέχοντα—then they are as unlike as possible. Here (Heind.) ἀμφοτέρως = αὐτὰ τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλήλοις. Stallb. is brief, ‘Itaque ex quaque ratione similia erunt sibi ipsis et inter se, ex utraque autem utrinque maxime contraria et dissimilia.’

καὶ ταῦτα δὴ etc. Up to ἐστῶτα this preserves the connec. with the ἄν εἶη above, and ἐστῶτα should have had a colon.

157 B-159 A. In pursuance of the dictum 136 A-C, Parm. has now entered upon his consideration of τὰλλα αὐ πρὸς αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅ τι οὖν (i.e. πρὸς τὸ ἐν). But we find that the discuss. becomes more and more a recapit. of argts. dealt with at length in Dems. I., II.—οὐκ ἔτι χαλεπῶς εὐρήσομεν is its key note, and inevitably. He cannot define his ἄλλα save in relation to τὸ ἐν, but he has already set forth the nature of τὸ ἐν by continuous ref. to τὰ ἄλλα: a complete discuss. of the one, however it may be formally isolated, involves so much ref. to others and many as to make a separate treatment

of these perfunctory. His difficulties here, as formerly, are that he must make ordinary lang. express abstruse ideas, and that he must treat as successive, thoughts that are correlative and simultaneous. We see still more clearly now that ‘the one’ is but a counterpart of each of ‘the others’ or ‘the many.’ Stallb. persists in regarding the latter as the sensible world and the former as the ideal; there is no distinc. in the treatment of them to justify this.

εἰ... ἐπισκοπῶμεν Both Mss. εἰ... ἐπισκοποῖμεν, of which the former seems diffic. to explain and the latter must be wrong, unless we assume that some words have dropped out, which would account for both. It will be seen that εἰ has an -εἰ nearly above and an εἰ nearly below it; if this was so in the archet. one of these might explain this one. To account for -ποῖμεν some would read ἐφῶμεν. But we have λέγωμεν below; and the subjunc. is employed in 142 B and 155 E. It is curious that in the former case ἐπανελέθωμεν is followed by φανείη in Ẅ. It is just conceivable that εἰ may point in some way to a lost βούλει—οὐκ οὖν βούλει or βούλει οὖν. But Heind. suggests τί οὖν εἰ, which of course carries the optat. in both verbs. In ἄρα... μόνον the order seems inverted: it would at least be equally clear thus, ἄρα οὕτω μόνον [i.e. ὡς ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν] ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα ἢ καὶ οὐχ οὕτως. Proc.-Dam. (303) says ἐπισκοπεῖ δ' αὐθις περὶ τούτων αὐτῶν—τοῦ τε κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι, τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πεπερασμένου... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων παθῶν—εἴπερ οὕτω μόνον ἔχει ταῦτα ὡς φανῆναι τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπόμενά τε καὶ οὐχ ἐπόμενα. Cp. 163 B, εἰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανέται ἄπερ καὶ νῦν, ἢ ἕτερα:

εἶναι; is under χρῆ or χρῆ πεπονθ. in the prev. sent.

ἐν ᾧ... τῷ αὐτῷ Hyperbaton for effect: = ἐν ᾧ καθάπερ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ = ‘in quo velut in eadem sede’ Fic.

ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις This is hardly proved. He has urged that they are not, as separate things, in one third thing; and he has added that the one has not parts which could be in the others; but he has not said till now that the one as a whole may not be in the others, and he gives no reason that could justify it till he says οὐδαμῇ ἄρα... ἐν οὐδέν:

μὴ ἔχει: Both Mss. ἔχῃ—phps. shows that the archet. had been partly written to dict.

τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, Not in this case one phrase, τοῦ ἐνός is gov'd. by μετέχοι. In ref. to this and what

follows Thoms. quotes his Dam., fol. 23, οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνο [τὸ ἐν] μόνον ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μετ' ἐκείνο, πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα. καὶ ὅτι μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνο, φανερόν· ὥστε διακρίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθόσον ἐν ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ καθόσον οὐχ ἔν. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ οὐχ ἔν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόφασις, ἀλλὰ θέσις τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἐν.

ἐν γὰρ ... πολλὰ ἦν. Is it the form of this sent. which has led to the marg. note? If we are to regard the words as complete they are oddly assorted. A better arrang. would be ἐν γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἦν ἂν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου. Yet that hardly gives the sense required, which demands (as in Fic.) that ἐν should be the pred. We must then read thus: ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν ἦν ἂν ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου: or as Proc.-Dam. (304) ἕκαστον ἂν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου ἐν ἦν which omits αὐτῶν. Τοῦ ὅλου must be regarded as = τῶν ἄλλων or πάντων τῶν ἄλλων.

νῦν δὲ ... μετέχει: Here again the lang. is diffic. Fic. does not injure the sense and aids the grammar by neglecting αὐτοῦ, and mentally arranging the last words as ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδαμῇ μετέχει. Possibly we should treat τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς as one phrase, since it has often been used as such, and hold αὐτοῦ as sufficiently explained by the occurrence of ἐν and ἐνός.

οὐδ' ἄρα ... ἐν αὐτοῖς, Stallb., neatly, 'Ergo τὰ ἄλλα neque ipsa sunt duo vel tria neque hos numeros in se complectuntur.' The simplest order would be—οὐδ' ἄρα (1) οὕτε αὐτὰ τὰ ἄλλα δύο οὕτε τρία ἐστὶ (2) οὕτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς (τὰ τριαῦτα). Here οὐδ' ἄρα connects a new neg. sent. to previous ones, as above; and οὕτε is left out before δύο.

17-33-E οὐδὲ ὁμοια ... ἀνομοιότης is another sent. on the same plan. But the correl. nature of ὁμοια-ἀνόμ. and the corresp. nouns makes it easier than in the case of δύο τρία to use καὶ for οὕτε.

εἰ γὰρ ... τοῦ ἐνός: τ has ἦ ἔχοι which makes the apod. begin here instead of at δύο που. The text is better. The contention is—where you have not 'two' you cannot have two of anything, and we saw that there could be no two where there was no one. εἶδη may or may not be used technically. Below δυοῖν is, of course, gen. by μετέχειν: we expect a τούτοις gov'd. by ἀδύνατον as anteced. to ἄ.

οὐτ' ἄρα ... στερομένοις: We have here three successive cases of οὕτε followed by ten successive cases of οὐδέ. Do the former three suggest the connec. 'neither-nor,' while the others are a

string of strong independ. negations to be rendered by a series of 'no nor' or 'not yet'?

ὁμοια μὲν γὰρ ὄντα μόνως, (Proc.-Dam. 304) ἢ ἀνόμοια μόνως, ἐνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἐτέρου εἶδους μετέχοι, ἢ τῆς ὁμοιότητος ἢ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος: ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοις μετέξει: and again εἰ γὰρ ὁμοιότητος μετέξει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ ἀνομοιότητος, ἔσται ἢ ὁμοιότητος ἢ ἀνομοιότητος τι καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός: and again (305) εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν πῶς κινήσεται; πῶς στησεται; ... τοῦ δ' ἐνὸς ἀνααιρεθέντος κατὰ τὰς ἀνωτέρας ὑποθέσεις καὶ ταῦτα ἀνααιρεθήσεται.

οὕτως δὴ ... μὲν οὖν: This summing up seems rather a non-sequitur. It may state facts, but if so they are not the facts on which the argt. has dwelt. Dam., cited by Thoms., says this concl. is similar to that of Dem. I. But to make it the same the very important words πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἐν, which really refer to Dem. IV., must be omitted. The remainder forms a comprehensive negative pronouncement which corresponds with that of I. But granting it to be true it is not relevant. We are speaking now of the others, and the natural concl. would have been πάντα τέ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστι, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ὡσαύτως: It is very natural, then, that Heind. should expect καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως: the introd. of καὶ τὰ ἄλλα being but a modest acknowledgment of their prominence in this last Dem. He also points out that this summary comprehends the argts. in both IV. and V. Indeed Thomson's Dam. says that it amounts to a summary of the whole five. οὕτω δὲ ἐν ἐστι κοινὸν τοῦτο συμπέρασμα τῶν πέντε ὑποθέσεων. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, (1) καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστίν, ὡς ἢ πρώτη καὶ πέμπτη—(2) καὶ πάντα ἐστίν, ὡς ἢ δευτέρα καὶ τετάρτη—(3) καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἢ τρίτη καὶ μέση τῆς ὅλης πεμπτάδος. Proc.-Dam. (305-6) observes at this stage πεπλήρωκε τὰς προτέρας δώδεκα ὑποθέσεις τοῦ εἰ ἐν ἐστι, (1) τίνα ἔπεται καὶ (2) τίνα οὐχ ἔπεται, καὶ (3) τίνα ἔπεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἔπεται:—καὶ ταῦτα τετραχῶς: τίνα ἔπεται αὐτῷ (α) πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ (β) πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις (γ) πρὸς τε ἄλληλα καὶ (δ) πρὸς τὸ ἐν καὶ τίνα οὐχ ἔπεται ὁμοίως τετραχῶς, καὶ τίνα ἔπεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἔπεται ὁμοίως τετραχῶς [i.e. 3 x τετραχῶς = 12]. λοιπὸν εἰσβάλλει καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἐν οὐχ ἔστιν, ἐξ ὧν τὰς ἐτέρας δώδεκα ὑποθέσεις συστήσει.

c ἢ καὶ etc. Gram. requires either that εἰπεῖν should be om. or that it should be underst. after τοῦ.

ὅτι ἕτερον ... τὸ μὴ ὄν; may be rendered (1) 'that he speaks of non-existence as something distinct in its nature' or (Müller) 'dass er unter dem Nichtseienden etwas Verschiedenes versteht.' But this would rather require τὸ μὴ εἶναι—(2) 'that (in each case) he says that this which is not is something distinct,' or (Ast) 'se diversum ac proprium quid dicere hoc quod non sit.' This is the better. In the case before us the thing which is spoken of as μὴ ὄν is τὸ ἔν, and to it we must attach an intellig. and separate meaning as compared with τὰ ἄλλα. Upon ἕτερόν τι Heind. cps. Theaet. 153 D, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, (ἰπόλαβε) μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἕξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὀμμασι. Proc.-Dam. (306) says ἕτερον γοῦν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ μὴ ὄν καὶ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὅταν οὖν εἴπη ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔν, ἴσμεν δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν καὶ [μὴ] ἔν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ὅτι ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν κατάστασιν. With this argt. cp. Soph. 257 etc., where he not only brings out the definite exist. of what in each case is described as being μὴ ὄν—τὸ μὴ καλόν, μέγα, δίκαιον—but clearly shows that he is aware of his divergence in this from the views of the historic Parm. by quoting his well-known words: οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε τοῦτο δαμῆς—εἶναι μὴ ἔοντα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα.

1) εἶπε τὸ μὴ εἶναι ... τῶν ἄλλων. There has been an omiss. here in A, cp. pp. lxxxiii., lxxxvi., lxxxviii., xc., xci. It probably arose from a confus. in connec. with the double μὴ εἶναι. A reader of the Ms. at a later date supplied the blank but omitted γὰρ and the second γ in γιγνώσκειται. The γὰρ is also absent from t, and no doubt it would be from the second family which t represents that the passage would be supplied. The word seems necessary. Heind. refers to a reading γιγνώσκειται τι τὸ λεγόμενον, and says that it probably points to γιγνώσκειται ὡς τι. The text seems better.

πρῶτον μὲν ... μὴ ἔστιν: τοῦτο refers forward to εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, but the substance of this is already given in ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει and γνωστόν τι λέγει. We must get a governing word for γιγνώσκ. etc., from ὑπάρχειν δεῖ: Stallb. suggests ἀναγκαῖον which would cover the following infins. also.

καὶ μὴν etc. An extens. of 142 A, 155 D-E. E Proc.-Dam. (307) says τί δὲ διαφέρει τὸ ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ τούτου; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκείνου ἀναφορικόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ τούτου δεικτικόν; οὐδ' ἂν τι ἐλέγετο etc. = NOR p. 34. would it be called or spoken of as 'something' if it had no share in 'something.'

εἶναι μὲν δὴ ... μὴ ἔστιν. Stallb. says 'quum formula εἰ μὴ ἔστι significet negativa habere praedicata, non est difficile ad intelligendum, εἶναι nunc esse aientibus gaudere attributis. Itaque sententia verborum haec est: ubi τὸ ἐν sumserimus non nisi negantibus notis esse determinatum, aientibus s. positivis utique carere. Quod autem addit Parm.—μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν ... ἀνάγκη—his verbis significat 161 ideam negando finitam cum ideis aientibus eatenus negando determinetur.' But is the one here defined by negative qualities? On the contrary, having made the single stipulation that we must 'know what we are talking about' when speaking of the non-existent one, Pl. proceeds to affirm for it all the qualities ascribed to the existent one. Does he then mean that when he says 'the one is,' a definite thing with the characteristics claimed for it exists ἐν τῇ φύσει; while when he says 'the one is not' (in his present acceptation of the term) he means that this same thing has no exist. in nature and exists only as a subject of our thought? I assume, he says, on the one hand a definite set of qualities which I call 'one' to enter into the sum of things as pictured by me, and on the other hand that same set of qualities to be withdrawn from the sum of things; and in each case I ask—What follows?

εἰ μέντοι ... οὐδέν. After insisting that 'that one,' and no other thing, is non-existent, he goes on, 'For if the thing which is to be non-existent be neither one nor that, but rather the talk is about some other thing, then we have not a word to say.' And so Proc.-Dam. (308), εἰ γὰρ ἐκείνο τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἐστι λέγομεν, ἐκείνο λέγομεν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο· ἐπειδὴ, εἰ μήτε τὸ ἐν ἐλέγομεν μήτε ἐκείνο μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τίνος ἄλλου ὁ λόγος ἦν ὅτε ἐλέγομεν τὸ ἐν μὴ εἶναι—οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι ἔδει ... καὶ ἐνδὸς μὲν—τοῦ εἶναι—οὐ μεθέξει, πολλῶν δὲ μεθέξει καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τούτου καὶ τοῦ τούτῳ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Stallb. finds a diffic. here, and says that what we require from the passage is this, 'Si vero praeter unum

etiam τὰλλα negando determinarentur facile apparet (sublatis affirmantibus notis omnibus) futurum esse ut ne verbum quidem crepari oporteret? Undoubtedly if both one and others were negated there would be little to speak about, but this seems hardly what the passage requires. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ... ἄλλοια; It seems odd that ἕτερα and ἕτεροια should have to be called in before we can admit that ἄλλα are ἄλλοια. He makes a much bolder step immediately. If (εἴπερ τῷ ἐνὶ etc.) he can infer that τὸ ἐν is ἀνόμοιον because τὰ ἄλλα are ἀνόμοια τῷ ἐνὶ, why not infer at once that it is ἄλλο τῶν ἄλλων because τὰ ἄλλα are ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός? This comes directly under 146 D that the different differs only from the different, and so below C τὰ δὲ ἄνισα etc.

B εἰ αὐτοῦ ὁμοιότητα Cp. 147-8 on this argt. The words below, οὐκ ἂν ... τοῦ ἐνός, admit of two senses differing slightly—(1) about such a thing the argt. could not be conducted as if it were the one (= ὡσπερ εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐν). This seems to be Müller's view, 'so könnte wohl nicht von so etwas die Rede sein, wie von dem Einen': (2) the argt. could no longer be held as dealing with such a thing as the one. The latter suits οἶον τοῦ ἐνός better. Both Mss. and edd. seem agreed that in τοῦ τοιούτου we have the art.: yet it might be του. Does not this argt. cancel the preceding one? If the one must be like itself, it must equally be unlike the others, and so ἄλλα ἕτερα ἕτεροια ἄλλοια are unnecessary.

C With δεῖ ἄρα ... εἰ αὐτῷ cp. ἄρα οὐκ ... αὐτῷ εἶναι; above. In the former the dat. εἰ αὐτῷ is wanting, in the latter the εἶναι—the full constr. being δεῖ ἄρα [ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη] εἶναι τῷ ἐνὶ [αὐτῷ] ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῦ εἰ αὐτῷ.

εἰ γὰρ εἴη ... ἀδύνατα: The odd part of this argt. lies in the εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη—if the one were equal it would already have acquired being, which it has not. Stallb. points to this as coinciding with his view that the non-existent one has only neg. qualities—equality being positive. But surely likeness to itself is a positive quality, to say nothing of the others referred to 160 E. Besides Pl. has not yet decided whether the others exist or not, and yet has brought them into compar. with the non-existent one, a course which ought to involve diffics. Again he infers immediately that if one and others are not equal they must be unequal; but that altern.

holds only if they exist; at least if they exist to an equal extent, are on the same terms as to existence. And if they are equally related to existence are they not equal and like to that extent? The εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη seems one of those captious freaks of sophistry exemplified already in 155 D, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι ... σμικρότης: 'It is, however, in connection with inequality that we have bigness and smallness.' 'Jam vero ad inaequalitatem referuntur magnitudo et parvitas' Ast.

ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ... ἐνὶ: This first καὶ refers to the whole express. μ. τε καὶ σ. and means 'moreover, in addition (to what has already been conceded).' ἀφέστατον is a syncopated perfect form with a present sense. One almost feels as if μεταξὺ τι below were one word and αὐτοῖν a dative. But the following words contradict the idea.

τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ ... μετεῖη Heind., and with him most F. edd. read τῷ δὲ 'In his, quibus conclusio praecedentium continetur, δὴ scripsi pro δέ. Fic.: *Unī igitur* etc.' A good change; but it deserts both Mss. μετεῖη comes from t: for the μεῖη of ᾠ cp. πραγματίαν 136 C and πραγματιώδη 137 B.

ἔχεν αὐτὸ δεῖ ... ἀνάγκη: Both Mss. read οὕτως ἔχῃ which cannot stand. Edd. change to ἔχοι: p. 35. The text gives a form which usage justifies and which is closer to the Mss. The subject to λέγειν is omitted. The contention here recalls that of Descartes, that the concep. of God postulates his existence; but it is more extrav. both because of the less vital nature of the concep. and because of its neg. charac. The fallacy lies in the sense put upon ἀληθῆ. We were told that τὸ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι is a ὑπόθεσις, and we now learn that it is not, but a statement of a fact, because our veracity hangs upon that issue. If that is so then any hypoth. which we may set up about Hippocentaurs, Chimaeras, and the other πλῆθη τε καὶ ἀτοπία τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων referred to in the Phaedr. (229), carries with it objective validity. The only truth with which we have to deal in arguing from an assumpt. is the truth involved in consistent adherence to the terms and conditions it imposes upon us—a truth which does not carry us into the region of objective reality. No doubt Pl. and still more Parm. set great store by the one, and would not place it in comparison

with a Pegasus or Gorgon: but the argt. 'If the one does not exist, what follows?—The objective existence of the non-existent one follows' seems a circle of rather contracted radius. The οὕτω μὲν οὖν and ἀνάγκη illustrate the unreal character of the discuss. If Parm. wishes to push on or to change the subject Aristoteles will say ἀνάγκη to the most paradoxical assertion; if Parm. would like to enlarge a little, he will say πῶς δὴ; in a much simpler case. And this in detail, though not always in the main outline, is largely the character of Platonic dial.

162 ἔστιν ἄρα ... μὲν οὖν: The first sent. here may have two senses (1) ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν ἔστι, but this jars with the context; (2) τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστιν οὐκ ὄν 'The one is non-existent, then, as would appear.' It is diff. to form a theory of what underlies the correc. of τῆ in the marg. In † the text is τι, so that the error does not go back to the archetype. Perhaps some scribe had been writing to dictation, and after confusing the sound τι with that of τῆ (an easy matter) had decided for the latter, from some odd passing notion that ἀνήσει was the dat. of a fem. noun. As to the corrector: there is no sign of correc. in Π or Δ, whence we infer that it was not in the marg. of Ξ at the time when Δ or its orig. was copied. But there is another possibility. Proc.-Dam. (below) seems to have read τοῦ πῆ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, and 161 ε gives οὐσίας μετέχειν πῆ. Does πῆ explain τῆ, and is τι the missing accus. to ἀνήσει added, and was the orig. τι τοῦ πῆ εἶναι or πῆ τι τοῦ εἶναι? On ἀνήσει we have in the marg. of tΠ (Notes 1.) the schol. ἀφήσει ἢ ἀναπέσει. 'Scholiastes Augustanus interpretatur a. ἢ a.—ut Hesychius: 'Ανήσει' ἀναπέσει, ἀφήσει. Quae quidem interpretamenta docent, librarium Codicis Augustani perperam ἀνύσει scripsisse pro ἀνήσει.' Fisch. Why ἀνύσει? The only diffic. lies in ἀναπέσει, and it is not easy to see how that suits ἀνύσει better than ἀνήσει. May not the sense be 'if it shall let loose a portion of being against non-being'—like a dog? (L. and S. ἀνίημι, III. 2). To this ἀφήσει would be a suitable equiv., while ἀναπέσει might mean 'hound on,' 'urge forward': unless by chance it is an error for -πέμψει. Proc.-Dam. (310) has ἀπολύει τοῦτο τὸ πῆ εἶναι πρὸς which seems an equiv. for ἀνήσει. On the substance

of the argt. he says ἔστιν ἄρα ὡς ἔοικε τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν κατ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο—ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν. ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν ἔστιν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀντίφασιν τεθῆ (ὅπερ ἔστιν, οὐκ-ἔστι-μὴ-ὄν) καὶ οὕτω τοῦ πῆ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, μᾶλλον εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν. ὡς ἂν εἰ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν, λέγομεν τὸ ἐν [Ms. ὄν] οὐκ ὄν ἔστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὸ πῆ εἶναι τούτω παρέχομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀπόφασιν τεθείη (τὸ οὐκ-ἔστι-μὴ-ὄν), καὶ ἀπολύει τοῦτο τὸ πῆ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι εἰς δῆλωσιν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, μᾶλλον εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν. ὅταν γὰρ τις λέγῃ τὸ ἐν οὐκ-ἔστι-μὴ-ὄν, ἀποφαίνεται [=ἀπόφασιν here?] τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐκείνου, καὶ γίνεταί ἔστιν-ὄν. This means that Pl. gets round to the doctrine that 'the non-existent one exists in a sense' by two paths. (1) If we speak truth then the non-existent one *is* non-existent, and so we show that it οὐσίας μετέχει πῆ. (2) If we reaffirm the more strongly that 'the non-existent one does not exist,' we by our double neg. let existence at the one again.

δεῖ ἄρα ... μὴ ἔσται: The first statement is this δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ [i.e. τὸ ἐν] ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν (ὡς) δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι: and the second ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν (ὡς δεσμὸν) ἵνα τελέως αὐ εἶναι ᾗ. In the third οὕτως refers to these two assumed necessities, and is explained by the following μετέχοντα which (Heind.) would be clearer as εἰ μετέχει. For the modern reader (whatever might be the case for the ancient one) this complicated statement is rendered still more trying by the introd. of Chiasm—τὸ μὲν ὄν ... τελέως εἶναι referring to the second statement, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν ... τελέως μὴ ἔσται to the first: and additionally so by the closing redundancies εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι and εἰ καὶ ... μὴ ἔσται. We feel also the want of abstract terms, which leads to the use of parts. and infins. in a confusing manner. As regards grammar ἵνα τελέως αὐ εἶναι ᾗ would be clearer were εἶναι omitted, or if it had τὸ before it. The whole means much the same as ἵνα αὐ ἐξῆ αὐτῷ τελέως εἶναι. Again the phrase οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν etc. = 'of the actuality of being existent, and of the non-actuality of being non-existent.' The whole might run thus—εἰ ἄρα τὸ μὴ-ὄν-ἐν μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν ὡς δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν ἵνα τελέως ᾗ. τό τε γὰρ ὄν εἶη ἂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν

οὐκ ἂν εἶη οὕτως μάλιστα, εἰ μετέχοι τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι-ὄν μὴ-οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ-ὄν μὴ-οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν. 'Accordingly if it is to prove non-existent it must have the being-non-existent as a bond of its non-existence, just as the existent must, in order to perfect its existence, have as bond the non-existence of not-being; for in this way best would both the existent be, and the non-existent not be, namely, where being shares the actuality of existence and the non-actuality of non-existence, if it is to prove truly existent, and where not-being shares the non-actuality of the absence of non-existence and the actuality of non-existence, if not-being also in turn is to be completely such.' After paraphrasing, Proc.-Dam. (310, 311) says τὸ γὰρ εἶναι οὐσιοὶ τοῖτο τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔμφασιν ἔχει τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. τέτταρα γάρ τινα λαμβάνει ὄν πλέον οὐχ εἴρηται—ὄν ἔστιν, ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ πάλιν μὴ ὄν ἔστι, μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι ... εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τελέως οὐκ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ὁμως τὸ εἶναι οὐσίαν [Ms. -σίας] παριστᾶ, ὥστε τοῦ ὄν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὄν εἶναι οὐσίας μέθεξις ἔστιν· ἔτι [Ms. ἐπὶ] δὲ τοῦ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐσίας μέθεξις ἔστιν.

οὐκ οὖν ... πῶς δ' οὐ: Heind. supplies mentally τοῦ μὴ εἶναι [μὴ ὄν], καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι [μὴ ὄν]. The phrase ἐς τὸ μὴ εἶναι corresp. to εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι above. Heind. suggests εἶναι as underst. with φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί. This Stallb. rejects, giving 'also erscheint auch ein Sein für das Eins, wenn es nicht ist.' In either case the sense is clear. When Pl. wishes to say that the non-existent one has being he presses the ἔστι in εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστι, when he wishes to say that it has not he presses the μὴ. Proc.-Dam. goes on (311) οὐκοῦν ἐπέειπερ τῷ τε ὄντι μέτεστι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι [Mss. μετά τι τοῦ εἶναι] διὰ τὸ [τοῦ] μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι, καὶ τῷ ἐνί ἄρα—ἐπειδὴ λέγομεν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι—τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ οὐσία φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ αἰθις μὴ οὐσία καθ' αὐτὸ μὴ ἔστι καὶ μόνον. This commentary as printed by Stallb. seems to have many errors; the last clause has probably something wrong.

οἴον τε οὖν ... ἔχῃ: It is not clear whether οἴον τε οὖν is impers., followed by an accus. and infin. clause, or personal with τὸ ἔχον as subj. to the understood ἔστί. πῶς is from t; ἔ πω wrongly.

Ast turns the first sent. thus: 'Num potest autem fieri ut id quod aliquo modo se habet (ἔχον πῶς) non se habeat ita, nisi transeat ex hoc habitu?' There seems to be no special tense-meaning in μὴ μεταβάλλον, which = εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλει, ἄνευ μεταβολῆς. In the second sent. we look for μεταβολὴν σημαίνει at the close; and for some such word as πάσχει rather than σημαίνει. The latter would imply the form 'every such case, in which we have the presence and the absence of a quality, etc.' Proc.-Dam. says (311) ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔχειν ἔξιν δηλοῦ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν στέρησιν, ἐξ ἔξεως δὲ εἰς στέρησιν μεταβολὴ τις ἔστιν, ἰδοὺ καὶ μεταβολὴν αὐτῷ προσμαρτυρεῖ. Here again Pl. accepts in subst. the law of contrad.

καὶ κινούμ. ... εἶναι ἔχον: Notes 1. It would seem as if the archet. had not been quite clear on ἐν πέφανται: and we have many cases of hesitation between ἐν and ἐν in the dial. If ἔ is right this would appear to be the only case of the perf. of ἐμφαίνω in Pl., while πέφανται and other parts of the tense occur repeatedly. No doubt that very rarity might suggest a change here. Again we might expect to find τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν here, as it is the subj. of discuss. and occurs just above. Yet the very expect. of it might cause the scribe in t to write it wrongly (i.e. he expected the form and put it, but afterwards corrected himself); while on the other hand we find τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν without ἐν, and following τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν in 162 A above. ἐμ and ἐν differ much less in Ms. than in print. ἔχον corresponds with κινούμ., and yet one almost looks for ἔχει after ἐπέειπερ. In ἀλλὰ μὴν ... ποι: both Mss. read τε for γε, and ἔ has blundered in μηθίσταιτο. The clause εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν stands as it were in brackets.

οὐδὲ μὴν ... ἀδύνατον εἶναι: If all three forms for 'the same' here were in the same case they would read ταὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸν τὸ ταὐτόν. Perhaps the last may mean 'the same of which we are speaking.' Both Mss. read ἐν τῷ. What is the marginal mark like a small 5 here? μὴ ὄν ... μὴ ἔστιν: the former neg. keeps up the hypothetical nature of the case; the latter is as it were a quot. of the former, and is as if in inverted commas.

τό γε μὴν ... ἐστάναι: If the reason for absence of motion be non-existence that reason will equally exclude the idea of rest. Pl. draws no distinction of a def. kind between ἡσυχάζειν and ἐστάναι, but

his terms *κινεῖσθαι*, *ἑστάναι*, *ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν* imply a distinction. Prob. the last corresponds to Arist.'s *ἡρεμείν*, which is the true antith. to *κινεῖσθαι*. It is the state of being unmoved on the part of a thing which admits of being moved; both *κίνησις* and *ἡρεμία* imply duration—*χρόνον τινά*. It would seem that *τὸ ἵστασθαι* is included in motion, and means its momentary arrestment with the expectation of renewal; on the other hand—*οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν ὅτε πρῶτον ἡρέμησέν ἐστιν· ἐν ἀμερεὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἡρέμησε διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ἐν ἀτόμῳ· ... οὔτε γὰρ κινεῖσθαι οὔτ' ἡρεμείν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ νῦν*. Phys. IV. 8, and elsewhere.

163 ὅπη γὰρ ... ἂν ἀλλοιοῖτο: One expects *καθόσον* in place of *ὅπη*, or *ταύτη* in place of *κατὰ τοσούτον*. The words used show that the orig. meaning of each form had been so far modified. The two presents p. 36. *ἔχει ὡς ἔχει* are retained as intelligible; but the *ὡς εἶχεν* of *τ* is better. Both Mss. read *κινούμενον δέ*. Edd. prefer *δή*, and Fic. renders 'ergo unum dum movetur,' which is more approp. *Ἄ* has no *ἂν*: *τ* gives it, and it seems necessary. On the argt. Proc.-Dam. (312) says *σοφιστικὸς φανερώς ὁ λόγος (οὐ γὰρ εἰ κινεῖται ἀλλοιοῦται φασί, ἀλλ' εἰ ἀλλοιοῦται κινεῖται)· ἢ γὰρ κίνησις καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, οὐ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν*. The brackets are put to bring out what must be the sense: the last statement being (necessarily, if it is to hold) the ground of the charge. He no doubt refers to 138 B, *ὅτι κινούμενον γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἂν*, where *κίνησις* is the genus of which *ἀλλοίωσις* is one species; and his charge is that this is here reversed in order to establish *ἀλλοίωσις* from a conceded *κίνησις*, while all that can be inferred is either change or motion in space. Despite Stallb. the charge is just, if Pl. adheres to his terminology: and he has just renewed that by saying, 162 D, *μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις*, and then treating of its kinds; cp. Arist. Phys. III. 1, 201 a 8, *ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἐστὶν εἶδη τοσαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος ... οἶον ... ἀλλοίωσις, ... αὔξεισις καὶ φθίσις, ... γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά*. *Εἰ μὲν ... ἀλλοιοῦται: Ἄ εἰ ... εἰ*, and it does quite well: *τ ἢ ... ἦ*, which also satisfies the passage. If this conversion is to hold *ἀλλοίωσις* and *κίνησις* must be convertible. In any other case the lang. must have been either *εἰ κινεῖται ἀλλοιοῦται, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται οὐ κινεῖται* or *εἰ ἀλ-*

λοιοῦται κινεῖται, εἰ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται—the latter being the form which would agree with Pl.'s former definitions.

τὸ ἀλλοιοῦμ. ... ἀπόλλυσθαι; Here again *ἀλλοίωσις* stands for *ἀπόλλυσθαι-γίγνεσθαι* if the conversion is to hold. But if so *ἀπόλ.* and *γίγν.* are used to mean (1) any change (even one of place), (2) the very special change implied in death-birth.

ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν ... οὐ γὰρ οἶν: Here while the positive *τε καὶ* are repeated twice, the negs. vary from *οὐ ... οὔτε* to *οὔτε ... οὔτε*. Of the negs. the latter form is the normal one. On the former cp. on 150 B. Jelf rightly says, 775, Obs. 2, that *οὐ ... οὔτε* is often ident. with *οὐδὲ ... οὔτε*, the *δὲ* merely linking the sent. to a previous one. The want of symmetry here is often paralleled in English—'Does not become nor perish' might well be followed by 'neither becomes nor perishes.' *τ* gives *οὔτε ... οὔτε* in both cases.

160 B-163 B. Dem. B I. is to the hypoth. 'if the one is not' what A II. was to the hypoth. 'if the one is.' It is synthet. or construct., being based upon such a concep. of the hypoth. as admits of discussion. Grant that the subject admits of being clearly discussed, and it has in it a capacity for endless antithetic development, it 'both is and is not' many things. But like A II., B I. is much harder to work out than is the corresponding analytic one. The author makes his points in various ways—(1) by stipulating for definiteness, (2) by pressing the 'is' in 'is not' as he did in 'if the one is,' (3) by attempting determination through negation, (4) by claiming that the object of thought if you are 'truthful' exists, and withal (5) by sophistry. These various methods run into each other. With regard to the fourth, while the proposition that thought and existence are one may be strongly and legitimately defended, it is not easy to feel that Pl.'s statement of it is legitimate. One is reminded of the statement 132 C, which he regards as sufficient to refute itself, about 'thoughts that are without the power of thinking.' What he seems rather to contend for is that if any persons choose to lay down a hypoth. and reason seriously about it, their reasonings, if just, will lead to conclusions possessing objective reality. In that sense thought and being are not identical. Even Arist.'s strong assertion, Phys. III.

4, 203 b 30, 'Ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἢ εἶναι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἐν τοῖς αἰδέοις, is guarded by the closing words. Grote says 'The meaning of the predicate is altogether effaced (as it had been before in Number 1): we cannot tell what it is which is really denied about Unum ... the proposition *Unum non est* is so construed as to deny nothing except *Unum non est Unum*, yet conveying along with such denial a farther affirmation — *Unum non est Unum, sed tamen est aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis* (160 c). Here this *aliquid scibile* is assumed as a substratum underlying Unum, and remaining even when Unum is taken away: contrary to the opinion—that Unum was a separate nature and the fundamental Subject of all—which Arist. announces as having been held by Pl. (Met. B, 1001 a 6-20). There must be always some meaning (the Platonic Parm. argues) attached to the word Unum, even when you talk of *Unum non Ens*: and that meaning is equivalent to *Aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis*. From this he proceeds to evolve, step by step, though often in a manner obscure and inconclusive, his series of contradictory affirmations respecting Unum.' As regards terminol. the close association between the ideas *κίνησις ἀλλοίωσις* and *γένεσις* is derived from the old physical philosophers. Πάντα ρεῖ etc. suggest the first, while Arist. Phys. I. 4, 187 a 29, οὕτω λέγουσιν, ἦν ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοιούδε καθέστηκεν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, couples the others.

εἰ ταῦτα So both Mss. Edd. may be right in reading ταῦτά: but there is nothing to call for the change. For ἀλλὰ χρή: one would expect some such echo of the previous statement as ἴωμεν δὴ.

C ἀρα μή etc. The query = ἀρ' οὐ τὸδε σημ.

πότερον ... τό γε μή ὄν; μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον corresp. so far to μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν above, and phps. it is used for mere variety after the repeated φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι: μὴ ἔστι is in inverted commas. As to the sense; we are, it may be hoped, speaking as truthfully here as at 161 E, yet we can banish the one from existence with some success. The εἶναι below is found in t, and seems necessary.

D μὴ τι ἄλλο ἢ ἡ etc. So both Mss.; yet Heind. can justify ἦν, 'Ita correxī vulgatum ἦ, quoniam μὴ h.l. interrogandī vim habet non dubitandī.' The ἦν would (Stallb.) refer to 156 A. Certainly μὴ interrogans in Ast goes always with the indic. As for the

colloc. of sounds cp. Phaed. 69 A, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὐτῆ ἢ ἢ ὀρθῆ ἀλλαγῆ. The close of the sent. might equally have run τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μετάληψις τὸ δ' ἀπόλυσις οὐσίας.

μηδὲν τούτου The fem. might be looked for, and Heind. would read μηδὲν του: but αὐτὸ confirms the neuter. Cp. 157 D, μηδενὸς δὲ ὄν etc.

οὐτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι So t: Ἄ οὐτ' ἀναλαμβάν. There is something to be said for the compound verb, but ἂν can hardly be spared. Proc.-Dam. (315), however, in paraphrasing gives οὔτε γοῦν ἀναλαμβάνει οὔτε ἀπολλύει. Was his text that of the Ἄ family? If he is on the right track we would have an un-Attic form in ἀπολλύει. Notes I.

τῷ ἐνὶ ... εἰκόσ: It is hard to bring out the distinc. between οὐδαμῆ and οὐδαμῶς as used throughout this passage. 'Auf keine Art und Weise' Stallb. above: 'dass das Nichtseiende keineswegs irgendwärts ist und nirgendwie an dem Sein Theil hat' Müller: 'nullo prorsus modo usquam est' Fic.: 'in no sort or way or kind' Jowett, including πη. Is οὐδαμῶς = nohow, and οὐδαμῆ = nowise? As to the argt., Proc.-Dam. (314), after saying that the previous Dem. discusses τίνα ἔπεται τῷ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι, goes on ἐκ τούτου δὲ ἀποδείκνυσι τὰ μὴ ἐπόμενα (an odd but intelligible phrase) ... τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι, φησί, τότε λέγομεν ὅταν οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ προσμαρτυρῶμεν φ' ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι. οὐκ εἶναι γοῦν φαμέν αὐτὸ πῶς, πῶς δ' εἶναι, ἢ ἀπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ... ; καὶ ἀπολογεῖται ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος οὐ μόνον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ ἀπλοῦστατα. etc. Thoms. quotes his Dam., Ms. fol. 8, τὸ μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς ὄν ἀπόπτωσις ἔστι τῆς οὐσίας. In οὔτε ἄρα ... πάσῃσιν he carries out his remarks in B.

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ... πῶς γὰρ οὐ: The assigning of the second τῷ αὐτῷ to the reply is t, not Ἄ, and it seems essential, while Stallb. gives ample authority for the omission of the prep.—e.g. Crat. 408 D, ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν. Τῶν γε τοιούτων, ὦ Σ., εἰ βούλει. Μῆτε ... μῆτε ... μὴ γὰρ οὐν, a neat illustr. of the compound character of μῆτε as = 'both not, and not' rather than 'neither, nor.' The μὴ in the ans. takes up the double μὴ of the statement, and leaves the τε ... τε as mere copulatives.

ἦδη γὰρ ἂν ... ὄντος So Ἄ, and it seems quite satisf. It is as if he said ὄντος γὰρ ἂν τούτου μετέχον, the ὄντος being predicative. τούτο t can hardly be right.

Bek. adopts *ἄν του* from 'rc. Σ'; while Stallb. inserts *του* before *ὄντος*, which seems to take from the significance of the passage.

164 οὔτε ἄρα... ἄν αὐτῷ: In the first sent. the triple οὔτε is reg.: in the second there would be two cases of a double οὔτε, but in the former of them the first οὔτε becomes οὐδὲ so that the δὲ may couple the second sent. to the first. *τ* balances this οὐδὲ by a second before *ἕτεροι*: and gives *τε* for *γε* and *τᾶλλα* for *ἄλλα*. *τᾶλλα... εἶναι*; 'Is it possible that there should be a *τᾶλλα* for it at all, if it be necessary that there should be nothing for it?' 'is there any respect in which it can have *τᾶλλα* if it behoove to have nothing?'

p. 37. B *περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν* A variety from *τῷ μὴ ὄντι*. So 155 E and often. Thoms. cps. Soph. 238 c for a series of negations, *συννοεῖς ὄν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτόν τε καὶ ἄλογον*;

163 B-164 B. These two Dems., marked B I. and II., under the hypoth. of *ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι* correspond to Dems. A I. and II., under the hypoth. *ἐν εἰ ἔστι*, but in a reversed order. The present II. corresponds to the former I. Both are analytic or destructive, and attain their object, the present one by pressing the *μὴ*, the former by pressing the *ἐν*. And the result is much more easily and satisfactorily got at than in the corresponding synthetic or constructive cases. Indeed the course of reasoning merely tends to give clearness to the conception with which we begin. In this case *μὴ εἶναι* = *οὐσίας ἀπουσία*; and there is an end. Grote says 'These two last counter-demonstrations (6-7), forming the third Antinomy deserve attention in this respect—That the seventh [i.e. this one] is founded upon the genuine Parmenidean or Eleatic doctrine about Non-Ens, as not merely having no attributes, but as being unknowable, unperceivable, unnameable: while the sixth is founded upon a different apprehension of Non-Ens, which is explained and defended by Pl. in the Sophistes (pp. 258-9) as a substitute for, and refutation of, the Eleatic doctrine... The negative results of the 7th follow properly enough from the assumed premisses: but the affirmative results of the 6th are not obtained without very unwarrantable jumps in the reasoning, besides its extreme subtlety.'

It was said, Introd. lxvi., that not-being is as diverse as being; and that Pl. assumes this in part here, and more clearly in the Soph. Arist. as usual has the advant. in scient. clearness when he says that not-being *ἰσαχῶς ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγεται* (Met. XIII. 2). If your Categs. are properly deduced the statement is complete. In this Dem. we deal with not-being in the Categ. of *οὐσία*, in the prev. one we did not—this corresp. with Grote above. The most import. declar. in Dems. B. I-II. is that (162) being and not-being imply each the other. If we speak of being in the popular phenom. sense this holds even under the Categ. of *οὐσία*, while of course it holds in the sense of the dictum *Omnis determinatio est negatio*. It does not hold (Grote above) in the Parm. sphere of being; hence the abortive char. of that system. Pl. in this dial. has a presentiment that it will have to hold in the ideal sphere—*ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδει παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην*—if his system is to succeed where the other failed.

ἀλλὰ μὴν που... λέγοιτο: *τ* μὲν which (Heind.) would suit *εἰ δὲ περὶ*. The *που* has probably not a local meaning, though occurring thus it suggests such at first. To be consist. Pl. should say *δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι πη*. He has proved, or assumed, that this alone is needed 161 E-162.

ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ Cp. on 147 D 'on the same ground.'

ἕτερον δέ... ναί: The *τὸ* (*t*) seems needed to mark the subject. For the terms see 143 B. The argt. is that 'others' as a *πρός τι* must have a correl.

μὴ ὄντος γε: In this Dem. then the sense of *μὴ εἶναι* applied to the one is the same as in the preceding—*οὐσίας ἀπουσία*.

ἀλλήλων... ὀρθῶς: Proc.-Dam. (316) *τὸ ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς τι ἔστιν... ἔστιν ὄν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τι (εἰ μέλλοι [sic] ἄλλα εἶναι) οὐδ' ἄλλα ἔσται... ἐπεὶ νῦν τὸ ἐν φαίνεται ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἔστί*. It seems to be idiomatic to use the pres. *λείπεται* in this sense of *λοιπόν*, cp. Ast. So *τὰ σωζόμενα* for the literary remains of an author: cp. Arist. Phys. III. 6, *λείπεται ὄν δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον. κατὰ ἐν... ἀλλ' ἕκαστος* give a sharp contrast of hiatus and elision.

ὁ ὄγκος... ἐξ αὐτοῦ: *δόξαντος εἶναι* is one of Pl.'s D redundancies for emph.; while *καὶ ἀντὶ μικροτ. παμμέγ.* is surely a confus. of ideas. It grows

numerous, and exhibits a case of what Arist. calls *ἄπειρον κατὰ διαίρεσιν*, but surely it does not increase in bulk. No doubt Arist. says, Phys. III. 6, 206 b 27, Πλ. ... δύο τὰ ἄπειρα ἐποίησεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξὴν δοκεῖ ὑπερβάλλειν καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον ἵέναι, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαίρεσιν' and very likely he may regard τὰ ἄλλα collectively as ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξὴν ὑπερβάλλοντα, but he can hardly mean that τὸ σμικρότ., because it is divisible indefinitely, becomes indefinitely large. His words are probably to be qualified by πρὸς τὰ κ. ἐξ αὐτοῦ—it becomes infinitely big by comparison. On the other hand we have the extraord. paradox, as Arist. Phys. III. 6, 206 b 5, points out, of a limited bulk divisible infinitely, and then (as regarded from the divided state backwards) augmentable infinitely—ἧ γὰρ διαιρούμενον ὁρᾶται εἰς ἄπειρον, ταύτῃ προστιθέμενον [ἀντεστραμμένως' he says above] φανείται πρὸς τὸ ὠρισμένον. Thoms. quotes 'Procl. Inst. Theol. cap. 1, Πᾶν πλήθος μετέχει πῆ τοῦ ἐνός' εἰ γὰρ μηδαμῆ μετέχει οὔτε τὸ ὅλον ἐν ἔσται, οὐθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ἐξ ὧν τὸ πλήθος, ἀλλ' ἔσται καὶ τι ἐκ τούτων πλήθος καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον' καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων τούτων ἕκαστον ἔσται πάλιν πλήθος ἄπειρον. Democr. must have believed in the ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξὴν, or as Arist. also puts it, οὐ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἰεὶ τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἐξω, since starting with ἄτομοι he held καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους δ' ἀπείρους εἶναι κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ πλήθος. Diog. Laert. IX. 44.

τοιούτων δὴ... τᾶλλα, Fic. 'talibus, inquam, acervis diversa invicem alia praeter unum erunt,' where invicem rather avoids the difficulty. Heind. wishes we had ὄντων after ὄγκων. Stallb. objects and says the order is τᾶλλα δὴ εἴη ἂν ἄλλα ἀλλήλων τοιούτων ὄγκων, but does not transl. Jowett 'And in such aggregations the others will be the others of one another,' which gives the gist but does not explain the structure. Pl. has already said that the others are other than one another, and he does not wish to part with the phrase, but he seeks to add his elucidation of the true character of the ἄλληλα. What we seem to need is either a mentally repeated ἄλλα—τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα, ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἂν εἴη τᾶλλα—or a different case for the first words—τοιούτοι δὴ ὄγκοι ὄντα τᾶλλα, ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἂν εἴη.

E καὶ ἀριθμὸς ... ὄντων: Ἄ δόξειεν may be a reminisc. of the εἴη ἂν which has occurred more than once,

or may be due to δόξει ἐν below: † δόξει. Heind. would supply οὐκ ὦν to ἀριθμὸς δόξει εἶναι. That is the sense, carried on from ὦν δὲ οὐ, and recurring in οὐκ ἀληθῶς. The argt. shuts out his use of πολλὰ above.

φαίνεται, From 'would' (εἴη ἂν) through 'will' (δόξει) we reach 'does.' 'Mallem φανείται,' Thoms.

καὶ μὴν ... εἶναι. Ἄτ δόξειεν αὐτοῖς, while † reads εἶναι for ἐν εἶναι. The edd. prefer δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι, which may possibly be best, but ἐνεῖναι and ἐν εἶναι are debatable throughout the dial. Proc.-Dam. in his note follows Ἄ, δόξειεν ... ἐν εἶναι.

καὶ ἴσος ... ἰσότητος: Without knowing that † has ¹⁶⁵ σμικροῖς here Schleierm. (whom edd. follow) suggested that for σμικρός, and it is very taking. But we must note that if we have not this direct statement that the ὄγκος from having been big becomes small, after passing through equality, we can only infer that it does from the following words which assume it. Proc.-Dam. (317) says καὶ ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται καὶ ἴσος τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικρός. The form δοξασθήσεται occurs Theaet. 209 c, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, and this passive voice is much more frequent in Pl. than one would infer from L. and S. When the ὄγκος passes from little to big it is being closely observed and becoming many; when it passes from big to little (Heind.) each of the many is being momentarily viewed as one. The constr. of φαινόμενος partly recalls the idiom προτεραιός for τῆ προτεραιά. The words οὐκ ἂν μετεβ. φαιν. are fairly equiv. το οὐκ ἂν μεταβαίνειν ἐφαίνετο, but we might bring out the force of the part. by rendering 'for it could not cross over in its phantasmal course, in its progress of make-believe': unless indeed we are to suppose that by some strange whim the words ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἕλαττον φαινόμενος are meant for ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος εἰς τὸ ἕλαττον φαίνεσθαι. Edd. do not comment upon πρὶν δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν, yet the express. is peculiar. How many cases are there of πρὶν with the fut. infin.; and why the fut.? If again we take πρὶν ἐλθεῖν, still how deal with δόξειεν? † gives δόξειεν, which would do very well but that one would then expect μεταβαίνοιοι, the whole sent. being = οὐ γὰρ ἂν μεταβαίνοιοι ... εἰ μὴ πρότερον ... δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν. It is worth asking whether the orig. may not have been δόξαν, the part. balancing φαινόμενος so far, but agreeing with τὸ μεταξὺ = πρὶν ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξαν.

οὐκοῦν ... μέσον ἔχων : Heind. would understand *δοξασθήσεται εἶναι* with the first ἔχων, while Stallb. assumes it with the latter only. Heind. seems right ; yet it is hard to make any distinc. where all is seeming. But if, with Stallb., we assume that each *ὄγκος* has a limit towards every other, a considerable step has been taken towards making each 'one.' Yet Proc.-Dam. (318) takes this view, *ἐντεῦθεν δέικνυσιν ὅτι ἕκαστος ὄγκος πρὸς ἄλλον πέρασ ἔχων* (εἰς γὰρ ἕκαστος περιορίζεται πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον) αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἕξει ταῦτα. If we take this view we must remove the comma from αὐτὸν and place it before πέρασ ἔχων and also perhaps with Herm. put γε for τε against both Mss.

ἄτι ἀεὶ ... τοῦ ἐνός : What is αὐτῶν ? It might, so far as form goes, like the following *τούτων* refer to *ἀρχὴν πέρασ μέσον* preceding, but it is better to refer it to *ὄγκων* = 'as often as one takes hold mentally of any part of them (the groups), as being one of these parts (i.e. as being beginning, middle, or end), so often does another beginning appear before the beginning [if it is as a beginning that we have viewed our part] etc.' The reading of \mathfrak{A} is *ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τὰ τοῦ μέσου* from which edd. omit the unintelligible τὰ leaving what is the reading of t. The text gives a reading which, with a very slight change indeed, both accounts for the τὰ and yields a much better parallel to the two previous expressions. For the lang. cp. Arist. Met. IX. 4, 1055 a 20, οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐσχατώτερον εἶη ἂν τι. The δὲ is added from t as apparently necessary. For the closing words from *διὰ* Fic. gives 'quia nequit unum aliquid in his accipi etc. ;' but would not this require *διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον λαμβάνεσθαι* ? If it stands as in the text *λαμβ.* must be mid., as Ast assumes, and we must borrow mentally a subj. for *δύνασθαι* from *τις* at the beginn. of the sent. = *διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι αὐτόν*.

θρύπτ. ... τῇ διανοίᾳ. There seems to be in Pl. but another case of *θρύπτεσθαι* used for 'break to pieces,' viz. Crat. 426 D-E, where he is speaking of the ρ-sound as indicating movement or *φορά*, and cites *ῥεῖν ῥοῆ*—*εἶτα ἐν τῷ τρώμῳ, εἶτα ἐν τῷ τραχεῖ, ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε ῥήμασιν οἷον κρούειν, θραύειν, ἐρείκειν, θρύπτειν, κερματίζειν, ῥυμβεῖν* πάντα ταῦτα τὸ πολὺ ἀπεικάξει διὰ τοῦ ῥῶ. *ἑώρα γὰρ, οἶμαι, τὴν γλωτταν ἐν τούτῳ ἦκιστα μένουσαν μάλιστα δὲ σειομένην*.

Thus we might render it 'crumble away': which the group does, as Proc.-Dam. (319) says *διὰ τὸ μὴ θέλειν ἵστασθαι ἐν τῷ ἐνί*. He twice uses the phrase *λαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ*, cp. 130 A. Does he mean that the *ὄγκοι* are not physical ? Whether so or not they are at least mental pictures of physical objects. "Ανευ ἐνὸς λαμβάνοιτ' ἄν : so \mathfrak{A} , while t gives *ἀνευ ἐνὸς αἰεὶ λαμβάνοιτο ἄν*, and so Fic. 'semper enim acervus unius expers accipitur.'

ὄξυ γνόντι, \mathfrak{A} ὄξύνοντι, where the small mark ϵ looks like a small aspirate. Although Proc.-Dam. has *ὄξύνοντι*, it can hardly be right. Pl. does not use the word at all elsewhere, and in the sense required here it does not seem to be used anywhere. t gives *ὄξυ νοοῦντι*. Perhaps the little sign is all that is left of a misunderstood γ or Γ which had been omitted and was placed above, or else it may be a sign of a lost marginal correction. The aorist seems better too in this connec. as we have the parallel *ὀρώντι : φαίνεσθαι : γνόντι : φανῆναι*. For the lang. cp. Rep. x. 596 A, *ἐπεὶ πολλὰ τοι ὄξύτερον βλέπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὀρώντες πρότεροι εἶδον*, and Theaet. 165 D, *ἴσως δέ γ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἔπαθες, εἰ τίς σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὄξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πόρρωθεν δὲ μῆ*.

δεῖ φαίνεσθαι. So t. \mathfrak{A} has *δη*: wrongly—explained by *δη* above, or by dictation.

οἷον ... ἀλλήλοισ : The πάντα (τὰ ἄλλα) are identical with τοὺς ὄγκους or πάν τὸ ὄν. The sense is that as outlined roughly to one at a dist., they have a sketchy resemblance to units, and that as thus affected similarly they are also like ; but that when one goes up to them they split into differentiated multitudes, and by an appearance of difference become unlike. *ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα* is subj. to *φαίνεσθαι* and *ταῦτὸν πεπονθένα* is pred.; *καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι* is the conclus. drawn in conformity with 139 E. We must assume *δόξει* from above to gov. the infins., which changes as we go on to *ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι*. Heind. cps. Theaet. 208 E, Arist. Rhet. III. 12, to show that *σκιαγραφήματα* were meant to be seen at a distance. In *οὐκ οὖν ... πολλὰ ἔστιν* the parts. and adjs. seem throughout to be gov. by *ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι*. In *κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις* we have an allus. to the distinc. in 138 B-C, 139 A, *φορά, περιφορά, ἀλλοίωσις*, while *πάντη (t πανταχῆ) = πάσας*

Ε *στάσεις* to correspond. **Ἦδη* = by this time, after the practice we have had.

164 B-165 D. The result of this argt. is that in the absence of 'one' we may affirm or deny anything about the others with equal truth. But in his anxiety to make sure that the latter cannot be one he permits himself to speak as if they were many, which he has no right to do. They are simply undefinable as lacking τὸ μέτρον. But he saves himself from self-contrad. by urging that all this is only apparent, and does not stand investigation. If you are to have others without one the result is a wild phantasmagoria or chaos. 'This Dem. 8 with its strange and subtle chain of inferences, purporting to rest upon the admission of Caetera without Unum, brings out the antithesis of the Apparent and the Real, which had not been noticed in the preceding Dems. Dem. 8 is in its character Zenonian. It probably coincides with the proof which Zenon is reported ... to have given (p. 127 E, cp. 165 E) against the existence of any real Multa ... Zenon probably showed ... that Multa under this supposition are nothing real, but an assemblage of indefinite, ever-variable, contradictory appearances: an ἄπειρον ... : relative and variable according to the point of view of the subject.' Grote.

ἐν εἰ μὴ ... καὶ ἔν. The opening means εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστι τὰλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔστι. The πολλοῖς οὖσιν is an echo of ἔσται τὰλλα and πολλὰ ἔστιν, we might view it as equivalent either to ἐν γὰρ αὐτοῖς πολλοῖς οὖσιν or ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς εἰ ἔστιν. Proc.-Dam. (320) says of this Dem. εἰπὼν τοίνυν (in the last) τίνα τὰ ἐπόμενα, τίθησι καὶ τίνα τὰ μὴ ἐπόμενα, and one sees what he means, though as above his lang. is odd.

166 ὅτι τὰλλα ... μὴ οὖσιν: The order here is ὅτι τὰλλα οὐδ' ἐνὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων etc. and παρά τῶν ἄλλων. The argt. rebuts the assumpt. both by whole and part; the ἄλλα have 'nothing whatever' to do with what is non-existent, nor has any part of either any connection with any part of the other. Stallb. would read οὐδὲ γὰρ for οὐδέν, but the Mss. agree. Heind. in order to justify μέρος, which he thinks superfluous, suggests that δόξα etc. which follow may be regarded as μέρος. And so Proc.-Dam. (321) εἰ γοῦν τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρά τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστίν etc.

οὐδ' ἄρα ... ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων: As Proc.-Dam. says, νῦν ταῦτα δὴ, ἄπερ ἐφαίνοντο εἶναι (in Dem. B III.) οὔτε εἰσὶν οὔτε φαίνονται. Cp. Rep. v. 478 B, ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν; etc. From 155 D we may infer that φάντασμα is a result of αἰσθησις. It is a startling thing to be told that the δοξάζειν is supposed, if it exists, to be carried on ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων: no such sugg. has hitherto been made. On the contrary we have been permitted to assume that ἡμῖς ... πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν, and edd. follow Schleierm. in reading ἐπὶ against the Mss. Yet it is not more startling than that νοήματα should have νόησις, in 132 C; and if we change ὑπὸ we cannot stop there, the same sense being contained in δόξα παρά τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστίν.

οὐδ' ἄρα Note the series of similar negs. meaning B 'no, nor,' 'nor yet' etc. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, i.e. 165 D. p. 39. The sent. = ὅσα ἐν τ. π. εἴπομεν αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι. † gives τὰλλα, and it seems better. ἐν εἴ τε ἔστιν etc. This summarises the dial.: Proc.-Dam. (321) says καὶ εἰ ἐν ἔστι καθὼς ἐν ταῖς πρόσθεν ὑποθέσεσιν ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ ἐν οὐκ ἔστι καθὼς ἐν ταύταις δὴ ταῖς παρούσαις. As in Dems. B I. and II. he had treated of the result to the one if it is not, first after a fashion and second absolutely; so he deals in Dems. III. and IV. with the fate of the others under similar conditions. That is, I. corresponds with III. and II. with IV. With regard to the last sent., summarising the whole, it must be regarded as held subject to the conditions indicated in Dem. A III. 156 A-B, viz. that the law of contrad. operates at least roughly. As Grote points out that Dem.—which breaks up the harmony of the antinomies A I.-II., IV.-V., B I.-II., III.-IV.—must so far apply to each pair of contrary proofs as these occur. Of the conclus. he says 'The close of the Parmenides as it stands here, may be fairly compared to the enigma announced by Plato in his Republic v. 479 C, [ἔοικε καὶ τῶ τῶν παίδων αἰνίγματι τῶ περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου τῆς βολῆς περὶ τῆς νυκτερίδος, ᾧ καὶ ἐφ' οὗ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν] ... This is an enigma propounded for youthful auditors to guess: stimulating their curiosity and tasking their intelligence to find out. As far as I can see, the puzzling antinomies in the Parmenides have no other purpose ... There is however this difference ... The

constructor of the enigma had certainly a preconceived solution to which he adapted the conditions of his problem: whereas we have no sufficient ground for asserting that the author of the antinomies had any such solution present or operative in his mind. How much of truth Plato may himself have recognised, or may have wished others to

recognise in them, we have no means of determining. We find in them many equivocal propositions and unwarranted inferences—much blending of truth with error, intentionally or unintentionally. The veteran Parmenides imposes the severance of the two as a lesson upon his youthful hearers.' Surely this is too pessimistic.

ERRATA.—The following errors have been observed: no doubt there are others, although much care has been taken. It should be noted that, in giving the punctuation in Notes I., no attempt has been made to give the 'middle stop' where it seemed to occur. This is due partly to doubts as to the facts, partly to the trouble which would have been caused in printing. The upper or lower stop has been used according as the position in the Mss. seemed to incline.

Page xxvii.,	line 30,	for premises	read -isses
„ liv.,	„ 31,	„ principal	„ -ple
„ lxxv.,	„ 30,	„ VI.	„ VII.
„ ci.,	„ 38,	„ reproductions	„ -tion
„ 16,	„ 22,	„ <i>τις συλλήβδην</i>	„ <i>τις -δην</i>
„ 32,	„ 14,	„ <i>ἔστῶτα,</i>	„ <i>-τᾶ</i>
„ 115,	„ 1,	„ <i>πορωτέρρων</i>	„ <i>πορρωτέρρων</i>
„ 139,	„ 29,	„ than	„ from
„ 8.—	The 80 b 1 and 1	belong to δ ¹ λέγω	in line 17.

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