


OLIN
DT
108
.3
A67+
1887a
V.2





Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

<http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924064122512>

Production Note

Cornell University Library produced this volume to replace the irreparably deteriorated original. It was scanned using Xerox software and equipment at 600 dots per inch resolution and compressed prior to storage using CCITT Group 4 compression. The digital data were used to create Cornell's replacement volume on paper that meets the ANSI Standard Z39.48-1984. The production of this volume was supported in part by the Commission on Preservation and Access and the Xerox Corporation. Digital file copyright by Cornell University Library 1991.



GENERAL GARNET JOSEPH WOLSELEY G.C.B.
1ST VISCOUNT WOLSELEY

ENGRAVED BY J. H. COOPER. PRINTED BY W. & A. G. BARNES, 21, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C. 4.

THE WAR
IN
EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN

AN EPISODE IN
THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE;

BEING
A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE SCENES AND EVENTS OF THAT GREAT DRAMA,
AND SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN IT.

BY

THOMAS ARCHER, F.R.H.S.,

AUTHOR OF "FIFTY YEARS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROGRESS,"
"PICTURES AND ROYAL PORTRAITS," ETC.

VOLUME II.



LONDON:
BLACKIE & SON, 49 AND 50 OLD BAILEY, E.C.;
GLASGOW, EDINBURGH, AND DUBLIN.
1886.



GLASGOW:
W. G. BLACKIE AND CO., PRINTERS,
VILLAFIELD.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

	PAGE
GENERAL GARNET JOSEPH WOLSELEY, G.C.B. (first Viscount Wolseley),.... <i>frontispiece.</i>	
MAP OF THE DELTA OF THE NILE to illustrate Campaigns of 1882,..... <i>to face</i>	20
PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF KASSASSIN, Aug. 28, 1882,.....	44
PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF TEL-EL-KEBIR, Sept. 13, 1882,.....	”
BATTLE OF TEL-EL-KEBIR—the Final Charge,.....	84
TEWFIK PASHA, Khedive of Egypt,.....	112
DARB-EL-AHMAR, CAIRO,.....	198
BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF SUAKIM,.....	218
HICKS PASHA, Commander of Egyptian Army destroyed in the Soudan, Nov. 1883, ..	232
HICKS PASHA AND HIS ARMY ON THE MARCH AGAINST THE MAHDI,.....	242
PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF EL-TEB, Feb. 29, 1884,.....	270
PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF TAMAI, Mar. 13, 1884,.....	”
THE NAVAL BRIGADE AT EL-TEB,.....	276

CHAPTER IV.

	PAGE		PAGE
Calling out the Army Reserves—Troops despatched from England and India—Sir Archibald Alison in the Field—Arabi's Position at Kaft-Dowar—Skirmishing with the Enemy—Captain Fisher's Iron-clad Train—Bravery of the Blue-jackets—Arabi's Intrenchments approached—The Railway repaired—Signs of Panic among the Enemy,	I	ceived—The Fleet off Aboukir—Skirmishing around Alexandria—The Iron-clad Train—A brave Officer,	21
A Night-attack—A Reconnaissance in Force—Some sharp Fighting—Lieut. Vyse killed—A Mistake retrieved—Losses of the Egyptians—Attempts to destroy the Railway frustrated,	11	The Fleet leaves Aboukir at night for the Suez Canal—Preparations at Port Said and Ismailia—Engagement by the Naval Brigade at Chalouf,	29
Sir John Adye, the Duke of Connaught, Sir Garnet Wolseley, and the Guards arrive at Alexandria—A Reconnaissance—Lieut. Smith-Dorien's Adventure—The Positions inspected,	19	The Canal occupied by the British Fleet—General Wolseley's Proclamation—Landing at Ismailia—Attack by the Egyptians—A splendid Shot,	30
Embarkation of Troops at Alexandria—A grand Procession of Ships—Arabi de-		The Rise of Ismailia—M. de Lesseps' Mansion—The Town occupied by the British—A Skirmish,	32
		Advance on El Magfar and Kassassin—Failure of the Transport Wagons—Importance of securing the Fresh-water Canal—Fight at Mahsamah Station—Services of the Sailors,	37
		Arrival of part of the Indian Contingent at Ismailia,	40

	PAGE		PAGE
Positions of the Army—Arrival of a Railway Engine—An important Capture—Mahmoud Fehmy, Arabi's Second in Command—An Artillery Duel,	40	Europeans in Cairo—Treatment of the Fugitives from Tel-el-Kebir—The Household Cavalry occupy Cairo—Surrender of the Garrison—Arabi and Toulba Pashas delivered up to the British,	86
The Fight at Kassassin—A magnificent Cavalry Charge—The Enemy routed—Our Losses,	43	Murder of Professor Palmer,	89
Life in the Camps—Unsuitable Food and poisoned Water—Deficiency of the Transport Service,	48	Debates in Parliament on Egyptian Affairs—Mr. Gladstone on purchasing the Egyptian Tribute,	90
Arrival of the Indian Infantry—Sultan Pasha and Ferrid Pasha join the British—Their Proclamations,	50	The Suez Canal—Beginning of the Work—Rise of Port Said—From Port Said through the Canal to Ismailia—The Excavations in Lake Menzaleh—Kantarrah, the first Station—Hand Labour by the Fellaheen—Lake Timsah—Ismailia, its Climate and Environs—Tel-el-Kebir,	94
A Retrospect—The Dual Control—Financial Resources of Egypt—Difficult Position of the Khedive—The Sultan's Question—Prince Halim's Agreement—Intrigues to restore Ismail Pasha—His Régime portrayed,	50	The Railway from Suez to Cairo—The ancient Rameses,	106
Policy of the British Government—Declaration of Mr. Gladstone—The Self-denying Protocol—Lord Granville on Armed Intervention—Discussion in House of Commons—Mr. Bright's Withdrawal from the Cabinet—Mr. Chamberlain defends the Ministry,	56	The Indian Contingent occupy Zagazig—Sir Garnet Wolseley in Cairo,	108
Diplomatic Conferences at Constantinople—The Sultan urged to proclaim Arabi a Rebel—Resolution respecting the Canal—The French Ships withdraw from active Co-operation—Attitude of the French Government—Prince Bismarck's Move,	63	Affairs at Alexandria—Reception of the News of Tel-el-Kebir,	109
Our Camp at Kassassin—Negotiations for Supplies—Marching through the Sand—Feeding of the Troops—Arabi's Efforts to block the Canal,	69	Proceedings of the Egyptian Army—Their Intrenchments—Dashing Reconnaissances by the British,	109
An Egyptian Attack repulsed—Five Regiments dispersed—Effects of Horse-artillery Battery,	73	Surrender of Kafr-Dowar—Break-up of the Egyptian Force—Strength of their Intrenchments—The Camp visited by General Wood—Final Surrender of the Egyptian Army—Honours conferred on the British Officers and Men—Want of "Special Correspondents,"	112
Appearance of Kassassin—Muster of Troops there—Preparing for Battle—A Night-march—Advance on Tel-el-Kebir—The Enemy's Position—The Charge of the Highland Brigade—The Egyptians routed—British Losses in the Battle—A useful Capture,	75	Future Policy towards Egypt—M. de Laveleye advocates a British Protectorate of Egypt—Views of English Statesmen—French Claims—Position of the Anglo-French Controllers—Proceedings of our Government,	117
		The Army of Occupation in Egypt—Sir Archibald Alison on the good Conduct of the British Soldiers—Establishment of a Native Force—Lord Dufferin sent to Cairo,	127
		Evidence against the Rebels—Mr. Blunt favours Arabi—Rules for the Conduct of the Trials—Popular Feeling regarding Arabi,	134

	PAGE		PAGE
State of the Egyptian Prisons,	145	The Bedouin Tribes—Their Employment by Mohammed Ali,	204
Trial of the Prisoners—Case of Professor Palmer—Need for sifting the Evidence—Cruelty and Bribery—Effects of delaying Trials,	147	General Baker appointed Inspector-general of Egyptian Gendarmerie—Count della Sala Commandant of Urban Police,	206
The Trials are pushed on—Arabi and his Companions plead guilty, and are sentenced to Death—The Sentences commuted to perpetual Exile—They are banished to Ceylon—Complaints of the Exiles—Suleiman Sami executed,	157	Military Forces required for the Soudan and Darfûr—Extent of the Territory—Difficulties of holding the Soudan,	207
CHAPTER V.			
Lord Dufferin's Scheme for Reconstruction of Egyptian Government—Who are the Egyptians?—Earl Granville's Circular Note—Proposals affecting the Suez Canal—Financial Arrangements—New Courts of Justice—The Military and Police Forces—Electoral Institutions—The "Corvée" or Forced-labour System—Disposal of the "Daira Sanieh" and "Domain" Territories,	167	Affairs in the Soudan—Anxiety of Abd-el-Kader the Governor—Progress of the Insurrection—Mahomet Achmet the Mahdi—His Birth and early History—Father Dichtl's Sketch of the Prophet—Raouf Pasha's futile Expedition—Points threatened by the Rebel Forces,	209
British Claims on Egypt for Military Expenditure—The Egyptian Budget of 1883—Arrangements with the Suez Canal Company,	183	El Obeiyad the Capital of Kordofan—Khartûm and its Environs—Suakim described—Transport in the Soudan—Camel-drivers and Camel-breeders,	215
Employment of Europeans in Egyptian Civil Service—Returns by Mr. Gerald Fitzgerald and Sir Edward Malet—Nationality of European Employés and their Salaries—How the Appointments were made,	186	Review of the Events in the Soudan after August 1881—Victorious Progress of the Mahdi—Raouf Pasha recalled, and Abd-el-Kader appointed Governor-general of the Soudan—Expedition against the Mahdi,	221
Sultan Pasha's Expression of Gratitude—The Difficulties of Reorganization—Lord Dufferin's Hopes for Egypt,	192	Sennâr is threatened—Giegler Pasha starts for its Relief—An invincible Shereef—The Prince of the Shukuries—Salah Aga relieves Sennâr,	223
Outbreak of Cholera at Damietta—Unsanitary Condition of Eastern Cities and Hospitals—The Quarters of Grand Cairo—Spread of the Disease in that City—Efforts of Surgeon-general Sir W. Guyer Hunter and his Medical Staff—Devotion of English Officers—Abatement of the Disease,	197	Abd-el-Kader arrives at Khartûm—Extension of the Rebellion—Yussuf Pasha's Expedition destroyed,	227
General Baker Pasha's Scheme for Reorganization of Egyptian Army—Major-general Sir Evelyn Wood appointed Chief of the Staff,	202	The Mahdi takes the Field in Person—His Attack on El Obeid—Obeid obliged by Famine to surrender,	229
		Abd-el-Kader defeats the Rebels near Dai,	231
		Colonel William Hicks Pasha—He starts with his Expedition for the Soudan—The March through the Desert—They reach Berber and Khartûm—Difficulties of Drill—The Bashi-Barouks portrayed—An ancient Warrior,	232
		Hicks Pasha attacks and defeats the Rebels—He sets out for Kordofan—The Route selected—Difficulties of the March—His last Despatch—A fatal Decision,	237

	PAGE		PAGE
Mahmoud Pasha's Attempt to relieve Tokar		Affairs at Suakim—An important Proclamation—Admiral Hewett's Administration	
—His Force defeated and Captain Moncrieff killed,	244	—The Fall of Sinkat—Arrival of Troops at Suakim—Treacherous Surrender of Tokar,	264
Destruction of Hicks Pasha and his Army		Preparations for an Advance upon the Rebels	
—The Slave Boy's Story,	245	—The Naval Brigade—The Force under General Graham—Position of the Enemy	
The Gendarmerie ordered to Suakim—A Battalion of Black Troops nearly exterminated—Colonel Sartorius' Efforts to fortify the Town,	250	—The Battle of El-Teb—British and Arab Losses,	270
Dangerous Position of Sinkat—Efforts to relieve it,	252	Tokar reached, and Booty recovered—News of Osman Digma—The Prefect and Commandant of Tokar,	279
Baker Pasha arrives at Suakim—A Message from Sinkat—The Commandant encountered—Defection of Arab Tribes,	253	Proclamation to the Arab Tribes—Mission to the King of Abyssinia,	281
Baker meets with a slight Repulse—His Advance to relieve Tokar—The Egyptian Force attacked and defeated—Slaughter of British Officers—The Retreat to Trinkatat—Results of the Fight,	255	Troops marched out to a Seriba—Skirmish with the Enemy—Commander Rolfe's Reconnaissance—The Battle of Tamai—Defeat of Osman Digma—Return of Troops to Egypt,	283

THE WAR

IN

EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

CHAPTER IV.

Calling out the Reserves. British Forces sent to Egypt. Sir Archibald Alison. Reconnaissance. Skirmishing. Arabi's Camp. Events in Alexandria and the District. Arrival of the Guards. Duke of Connaught. Lord Wolseley. Suez. Port Said. Ismailia. The Suez Canal. Conduct of M. de Lesseps. The Struggle. Fight at Kassassin. Battle of Tel-el-Kebir. Opinion in England, France, and Italy. Defeat of Arabi. His Trial and Sentence.

IN spite of the protests of M. Gambetta and his friends, the French government still hesitated to follow the English initiative. The majority of the chamber, shrinking from intervention, which it was supposed might be prejudicial to French interests in Tunis, gave a hostile vote on M. de Freycinet's demand for funds to provide for the protection of those interests in the Suez Canal. England was still left to act alone; the powers did not interfere; the delays at the Porte as to entering the conference and settling the terms of military co-operation left English policy practically unfettered. The despatch of an expeditionary force to secure British interests and to restore order was resolved upon with scarcely a show of opposition, though Mr. Bright, who had sanctioned the despatch of the fleet to Alexandria, left the cabinet on the ground that he could not consistently promote further intervention. Mr. Gladstone asked on the 24th of July for a vote of credit for £2,300,000, which he proposed to meet by an increase of the income-tax. The vote was passed, and consent to the employment of an Indian contingent was also granted. The prime minister denied that Arabi was a national leader, and charged the ruin of Egypt upon "lawless military violence, aggravated by

wanton and cruel crime." The war office and the admiralty prepared for the campaign with unusual energy and promptitude. It was impossible, however, to crush Arabi at once; the insurgent army, encouraged by the delay, threatened Alexandria, the khedive, and Sir A. Alison's force.

On July 25th a message from the queen called out the first Army Reserves. On the 27th the first instalment, consisting of the royal marines, left Portsmouth, and before the end of the month the guards had sailed from London, and by August 15th two divisions, each divided into two brigades of infantry, and cavalry, and artillery, were on their way. A staff corps of the three squadrons of the household cavalry, two regiments of dragoons with artillery and other reserves, a siege train, commissariat, transport, and medical department, were despatched from this country. The nominal force conveyed to Egypt from England, and irrespective of the troops, British and native, ordered from the garrisons in the Mediterranean or brought from India, was given in the official return as follows:—Cavalry, 118 officers, 2174 sabres, and 2006 horses; artillery, 56 officers, 1514 men, 1214 horses; engineers, 30 officers, 876 men, 222 horses; infantry, 270 officers, 6958 rank and file; medical, transport, and commissariat branches, 38 officers, 1384 men. These were the preparations made for retaking Egypt for the khedive. The troops despatched from India were two English battalions, the 1st Seaforth Highlanders and the 1st Manchester, two Bengal and one Bombay battalions of native infantry, with one 9-pounder field-battery and one mountain-battery, each of six guns, and three regiments of Bengal cavalry with some sappers and miners from Madras. The force was accompanied by about 3500 followers, including transport drivers, 1700 horses, 840 ponies, and nearly 5000 mules, some regimental and others for general transport purposes. They carried with them a month's provision for the sea-voyage, and three months' for the land-campaign. The first battalion despatched from India was the 1st Seaforth Highlanders, which left Bombay on the 22d of July, and landed at Suez on the 8th of August; the rest of the force received their orders about July 24th, and began

to leave Bombay on August 5th. The bulk of the Indian contingent arrived in the Canal by degrees, while the operations for securing the base at Ismailia were in progress. The total of all troops from England, the Mediterranean, and India amounted to 40,560 officers and men of all ranks for the expeditionary force. Sir Archibald Alison was the first general officer to reach the seat of operations. He had been sent out with the advanced guard of the army, and was in command at Alexandria, having reached the city when he had only a small force at his disposal, while the town was still burning, and the insurgent populace had to be held at bay at the same time that the army of Arabi was outside the gates. Sir Archibald, who was afterwards in command of the Highland Brigade, had with him the 60th, now the King's Royal Rifles, and the South Staffordshire Regiment; he had also a fine battalion of marines and a large force of sailors. His first act was to push out reconnaissances in all directions to discover the whereabouts and the strength of the insurgent forces. In these duties an iron-clad train, invented by Captain Fisher and manned by sailors, did very important service; the railroad being the only practicable road towards the east, where it was subsequently found that Arabi was entrenching himself in force at Kafr-Dowar.

There was no longer any mistake about his intention or ours. Other massacres had taken place in other places, and it was necessary that we should pursue the work we had undertaken with prompt vigour. At this stage skirmishes and outpost engagements were of almost daily occurrence along an extended line, having the result, at all events, of retaining some 20,000 Egyptian troops in position, instead of permitting them to scatter over the country, and thus indefinitely to prolong the war.

The first skirmish took place on the 22d, when 300 rifles under Colonel Ashburnham went six miles out by rail in support of a small body of mounted infantry under Captain Sutton. After the train halted, the mounted infantry went six miles further until they encountered some fifty of Arabi's cavalry. A few shots were exchanged on both sides, and the mounted infantry then returned, after pulling up several rails to break the line of the railroads.

A peasant whom they found at the furthest point they reached reported that Arabi was receiving great reinforcements, and that he had upwards of a hundred cannon. His position at Kafr-Dowar was unquestionably exceedingly strong; the ground in front was flooded, its flanks were covered by the canal and lake, and his men were at work entrenching the positions.

On the same evening a body of his infantry and cavalry, with a gun, advanced as far as the water-works, within a mile of Ramleh, and reconnoitred that neighbourhood. A large body of his troops were also seen reconnoitring the country towards Aboukir. On the evening of the 23d the *Malabar* arrived with the 46th Regiment and a wing of the 38th, and Admiral Seymour, thus reinforced, determined at once to move out and occupy Ramleh, a position of the greatest importance. Standing as it does at the northern end of the spit between Lake Mareotis and Aboukir, its possession effectually prevented Arabi from taking the offensive against Alexandria. Moreover, at Ramleh were the water-works which supplied the city, a palace of the khedive, and a large number of houses belonging to the European merchants of the city, Ramleh being indeed the summer suburb of the better class of residents in Alexandria.

The fresh-water canal sweeps round at the foot of the sandhills of Ramleh, and is spanned by only one bridge, the swing-bridge of the railway. This bridge Arabi had not destroyed, intending no doubt to return and complete the destruction of Ramleh. At an early hour of the 24th a wing of the 60th Rifles and a squadron of mounted infantry, taking with them a Gatling-gun and a light field-gun, advanced to Ramleh. The mounted infantry were in the advance, and after reconnoitring the place and finding it unoccupied by the enemy, they placed vedettes along the canal. When the rifles came up parties were posted along the canal, and a company took possession of the railway bridge.

The enemy had by this time discovered the approach of our troops, and a body of the enemy's cavalry were seen galloping along the line of railway towards the canal. When they were within five hundred yards of the bridge the rifles fired a volley, but

their aim was so bad that only one horse was hit. The cavalry turned and rode back for some distance and halted out of rifle range, while some of the party galloped to Arabi's camp with the news of our presence.

Ere long two guns were seen approaching from Arabi's camp. These at once unlimbered and opened fire with shell. Our men replied with their rifles. The enemy's fire was by no means effective, the shells for the most part singing over the heads of our troops, while, so far as we could see, the fire of our rifles was in no way more deadly. The scene from the top of the water-works hill was exceedingly pretty. Behind lay the sea with the magnificent vessels of war scattered along the coast watching Aboukir forts and other points. In front was the low flooded country, with palm-trees rising above the morning mist, which still lay over the flat, with the tiny puffs of smoke spurting out from the side of the broad canal at our feet, and the larger wreaths rising from Arabi's guns.

In the distance the smoke of locomotives was visible; and as it was probable that Arabi might be bringing up reinforcements, the general flashed a heliograph message for additional troops. The rise from which the general was viewing the scene was the highest ground within a radius of ten miles from Alexandria, and is memorable for the fact that Sir Ralph Abercromby used it as his headquarters at the battle of Alexandria.

At nine o'clock the fire ceased, and soon afterwards a portion of the 46th Regiment who had just landed from the *Malabar*, arrived by train with two 9-pounder guns, one from the *Sultan*, the other from the *Alexandra*, with parties of sailors to work them. The troops were now set to work to fortify the position, the bridge was stockaded, rifle-pits were dug, and entrenchments thrown up. Arabi, however, made no advance, but from the hills the glitter of bayonets and the white cotton uniforms of a large body of his troops could be seen in advance of his position, while swarms of figures moving about actively behind them showed that he, on his part, was entrenching his end of the neck. Thus the rival forces were now fairly face to face, within artillery range of each other.

Late in the afternoon six 40-pounders, brought out by the *Malabar*, were taken by rail to Ramleh, and placed in position on the heights. Their fire completely commanded the neck of sand between the two positions, and they could, indeed, have easily plumped shell into the middle of the camp of Arabi himself. The work of getting them into their place was severe, as they had to be dragged by hand over the loose sandy soil thickly mixed with pebbles. Long cables were attached to them, and every available man lent his aid. It took two days before the four 40-pounders, the two light guns, and two Gatlings were fairly in position in the battery on the sandhills.

The face of the hill was lined with sheltered trenches, and was now in a position to resist an attack by the whole force of the enemy. The 60th Rifles and the 38th Regiment were quartered in the palace and barrack, a short distance in rear of the hill. There was still a good deal of looting carried on in Ramleh.

The troops from Aboukir forts made their way along the shore at night and sacked deserted houses, and were aided in their work by parties of wandering Bedouins. The position of the Aboukir forts was anomalous. The troops there were known to have joined Arabi, and bodies of men were seen constantly moving between them and his camp. The fleet could easily have silenced these forts and driven out the garrison, as from the fortifications of Alexandria; but they were restrained by orders from home, the fiction being still maintained that Arabi and his army were simply mutineers against the khedive, and that we were only at Alexandria to protect the lives and property of the European population there.

In the afternoon of the 25th Sir Archibald Alison and his staff rode forward along the road of railway, a few yards beyond the canal. The enemy were on the alert, for from the heights a line of white specks could at once be seen moving forward, while parties of cavalry advanced on their flanks. As there was no intention to bring on an engagement the general retired on their approach.

On the morning of the 28th Arabi in turn made a reconnais-

sance, the enemy's vedettes advancing to within five hundred yards of our outpost. They were driven back by a volley from our piquets, as were a body of cavalry who afterwards reconnoitred on our side of the channel. The khedive sent the Egyptian corvette *Shackha* to Aboukir with two officers to communicate to the garrison of the forts the khedive's proclamation declaring Arabi a rebel.

The two officers approached the shore in a cutter, escorted by the pinnacle of the *Minotaur*, which was lying at anchor watching the forts. When they arrived within speaking distance, the khedive's officers addressed the officers and the men on the walls of the forts, promising a full amnesty on their submission. They then began reading the proclamation, but an officer on the ramparts shouted to them that unless they retired at once fire would be opened upon them, and they therefore rowed back to their ship.

From the tops of the *Minotaur* trains were seen arriving behind the forts with large reinforcements, while large numbers of men were at work mounting guns and in preparing for defence. For some days Captain Fisher, R.E., with the assistance of Lieutenant Poore, had been at work constructing an iron-clad train, similar to those used by the Americans during their civil war—and already referred to. It consisted of six trucks protected with iron shields, the engine being in the centre, a Nordenfeldt gun looked over the bows of the leading truck, three Gatlings over the stern of the last truck, two field-guns were carried in one of the other wagons, and later on a heavy siege-gun was also mounted. Breast-works of sand-bags ran round the side of the trucks. The train was manned by two companies of the *Alexandra* blue-jackets and one company of those of the *Inflexible*. It was provided with mines, electric batteries, and appliances for taking up or destroying the line of railway, and was intended for making reconnaissance towards Arabi's camp, or to support any body of troops advancing in that direction.

Sir Archibald Alison himself, speaking at a banquet held in his honour at Glasgow after his return (in October, 1883), referred in

interesting terms to the operations which were carried out for the purpose of discovering what were the movements contemplated by Arabi. He said: "On one occasion I considered it right to press the enemy pretty hard to find out their intentions. I placed the Rifles and the South Stafford, and a regiment which had just joined me, under a gallant officer in whom I had every confidence, and left that column to itself. I went out with the troops which I knew had not been in action before. I went out in an armour train with the sailors and with the marines. I wanted to see how they would get on when they were first in action with the Egyptians, and I also wanted to see how the Egyptians fought. I never saw a finer body of troops in my life, or men who behaved more magnificently than the marines did on that occasion. A reconnaissance is the thing that tries a soldier more than anything. You have first to drive back the enemy, then halt and maintain your position, and last of all, you have to retire in the face of the enemy. That tries a soldier in every possible way. The marines were tried in that on that occasion, and they behaved in a way that the most veteran soldiers could not have excelled. I had also with me a large detachment of blue-jackets in the armour train. When we got the train as far out as we could get it—out to where the railway was broken—we left a 40-pounder to fire over our heads. The blue-jackets went with us with a couple of 9-pounders, and, advancing alongside of us, yoked themselves as horses into their own guns. They were exposed to a tremendous fire, because they could not get shelter on the top of the embankment. One of my staff, Major Hutton, told me an anecdote that he himself heard of these men. He heard one of them say to the other, 'Bill, they calls this a reconnaissance; I believe it's a jolly lark.' That shows what sailors are. I look back upon the period when I was in charge at Alexandria with the utmost pleasure. So much for the navy, or rather for the marines, and so much for those regiments I have mentioned to you as being as fine as any in the whole of Her Majesty's army. There was one officer there, Captain Fisher, of the *Inflexible*, who was in charge of the sailors, and he is one of the finest officers I have ever met in my life. I used to send for

him when there was anything difficult to do, and ask him if he could do it. He never said no, and I always knew that it would be done."

Arabi had cut the line beyond the Mihalla station, and in order to discover how serious was the damage, and how long a time it would take to repair it, a reconnaissance was made with the new train on the 28th. The expedition left Fort Gabarrie at five o'clock in the afternoon. General Alison and Colonel Duncan accompanied it, and the train was closely followed by another with three hundred marines on board; a small party of mounted infantry, composed of men of the 60th Rifles, under Captain Hutton, accompanied the train—gliding along the margin of Lake Mareotis, disturbing the wild fowl, which rose in clouds from its shallows as the train passed slowly along. It continued its way until it reached the spot where the line had been broken. Two railway engineers who accompanied the train inspected the damage and found that it could not be repaired so that the train could proceed, for it would require a full day's work to place it in order.

The news caused intense disappointment to those in the train. It had been hoped that they would be able to steam forward right up to Arabi's lines and to effect a lodgment there, for which purpose entrenching tools had been brought with them. The general, however, determined to take advantage of the protection afforded by the guns of the train to push forward another reconnaissance to a point beyond that which he had reached on the previous day.

A score of the blue-jackets left the train and advanced with the mounted infantry. General Alison, accompanied by Captain Dormer and Lieutenants Lambton and Erskine, advanced with their escort to within 800 yards of Arabi's entrenchments, and from the railway embankment took notes of the details of the works. The enemy's infantry now began to show in force upon the left of the line, while a body of some fifty cavalry formed up on the line of railway and appeared to be about to charge.

Upon the mounted infantry and blue-jackets opening fire both the cavalry and the skirmishers fell back at once. A battalion of

infantry now advanced in extended order. Had they pushed forward rapidly they might have cut off the general and his party. The sailors in the iron-clad train prepared for action, the men at the machine and field guns stood ready to open fire at once, while the rest, rifle in hand, prepared to leap out when the order was given, and to run forward to attack the approaching enemy.

The Egyptians, however, had apparently no desire for fighting, for they advanced so slowly that the general and his officers were able to complete the notes they were taking and to return to the train unmolested. As they approached it a white cloud of smoke rose in front, a sharp report was heard overhead, followed by the whiz of shrapnel bullets, showing that the enemy's artillerymen had at last got to work. Then two rockets flew harmlessly over the train. In reply a sullen boom broke out from Ramleh heights, a shell from one of the 40-pounders sung overhead and burst among the advancing Egyptians. These at once took the hint and fell back, two more shells following them in their retreat. As the distance was over four thousand yards no damage was done by the shell, but it enabled the gunners to find out the range, a knowledge which would be useful in further operations.

On the following evening the iron-clad train starting from Gabarrie and a train with a company of 60th Rifles and of marine artillery with a working party of engineers left the Ramleh station to go forward to mend the break in the line. It was necessary to do this, not only in order to make reconnaissance towards the enemy's positions, but to obtain communication between the two lines in order to be able to shift engines and rolling-stock from one to the other.

The junction of the Ramleh line with that of Gabarrie to Cairo was a short distance beyond the point where the line was torn up, and as, in case of a forward movement, it might be necessary to have all the engines and rolling-stock on one line or the other, it was a necessity to mend the line, and to hold the station at Mihalla, at which was the junction of the two lines.

The force was commanded by Colonel Newson. On arriving at their destination the train came to a stop, the troops alighted,

the mounted infantry advanced, followed by the marines and 60th in skirmishing order, while a strong body of engineers set to work to repair the break. Although the moon shone brightly, and the train must have been visible to the enemy, the Egyptians made no signs of an advance. The engineers worked splendidly; in two hours the repairs were effected, and a train of sixty trucks was passed from the Ramleh line on to the Gabarrie section, along the line of which the rebel army had retired from Alexandria.

There were many signs of the disorder and demoralization which had prevailed among them. Broken carriages lay by the road; many dead bodies, apparently those of occupants of the carriages who had been dragged out and murdered, lay by the side of the railway; arms and accoutrements were scattered about in all directions, showing how great was the panic among the enemy; and there could be no doubt that if at that time 1000 or 1500 men could have been promptly landed from the fleet and sent off in pursuit, Arabi's army would have disbanded and fled in all directions, and the rebellion have been extinguished at a blow.

At two o'clock in the morning, having completed their work, the trains returned to Alexandria. There was no fear of the enemy returning and again breaking up the road at this point, for it was now under the protection of the guns of the Ramleh batteries, and our vedette close up to the spot would at once have detected any movement by a body of men in that direction. There was the less chance of this, as it was seen in the morning that Arabi's outposts had been withdrawn from time to time to a point much nearer to his line of entrenchment.

On the night of August the 2d the enemy for the first time took the offensive, and attacked a small post some distance in advance of our lines. This post consisted of a small building and a clump of palm-trees on the bank of a canal a short distance of the isthmus leading to the enemy's camp, and was not intended to be held in case the enemy showed in force. It was that night held by a company of the 60th Rifles under Major Ward. The moon was nearly full and the night bright overhead, but near the ground the light mist, rising from the marshes and shallow lakes,

hung over the country, and prevented objects from being seen at a short distance off.

Under cover of this mist a body of Arabi's cavalry advanced towards the post; the sound of the horses' footfalls was muffled by the deep sand, and they had approached close to the advanced sentry when he first made them out. As he perceived the dark body through the mist he challenged and at once fired. The sergeant and four men in support behind him ran up at the sound of the rifle, but the enemy's horse came on at a gallop, and the little party, after firing upon them, ran back to the main post, where the men had at once turned out on hearing such a fire.

The cavalry halted and opened fire with their carbines upon the clump of palm-trees. As Major Ward was ignorant of the force advancing against him he retired from the palm-trees and fell back upon a ditch behind, and opened a steady fire upon the cavalry. These soon fell back, and the piquet then, in accordance with the orders issued for the conduct of outposts in case of night attacks, fell back along the canal until they reached the pumping station, which was fortified and strongly held, and formed, in fact, our first defensive position.

When the cavalry were first seen coming down, four of the piquet had caught up their rifles and run to the rear, with the sudden panic common among young soldiers when first exposed to night attack. They were placed in arrest for retiring without orders. The matter would not have been worth a moment's notice had not a grossly exaggerated account of the affair been telegraphed to England by a correspondent, who was, in consequence, at once recalled.

No more was seen of the enemy that night. They had hoped, no doubt, to catch the little party off their guard, and on finding a stout resistance opposed to them retired at once. A dead horse was found in front of the post, but any of the enemy who may have been disabled or killed by our fire were carried off by their comrades. The post was reoccupied at daybreak. Rumours were current among the natives in the city that Arabi intended to make a great attack upon the town, and every precaution was taken at

Ramleh, while the troops in the town were held in readiness to turn out at a moment's notice, and the ships prepared to land strong bodies of men in order to aid in suppressing the rising which would almost certainly have taken place in the city if Arabi had attacked.

The iron-clad train went out on the morning of the 3d to see if any signs of activity on the part of Arabi were observable, but on arriving at the point where the line had been before broken they found the rails had again been pulled up, this having no doubt been done under cover of the cavalry attack. The 38th Regiment, the 60th Rifles, and the naval brigade advanced some distance along the isthmus, and the general with a small escort went on ahead; but it was seen that the Egyptian infantry were drawn up six miles away, and that there were no signs of any unusual activity on their part.

Skirmishes went on almost daily between our mounted infantry and parties of mounted Bedouins, who were constantly attempting to come along the shore from Aboukir for the purpose of plundering at Ramleh. On the fifth a reconnaissance in force brought on some sharp fighting. Its object was to discover whether there was any truth in the reports current among the natives that the great bulk of Arabi's force had been withdrawn.

The force consisted of the iron-clad train, seven companies of marines under Colonel Tewson, six companies of the 60th Rifles, four of the 38th, and four of the 46th. The marines were to march with the iron-clad train along the line of railroad; the 38th and 46th, with a gun, were to advance on the left bank of the canal; while the 60th, also accompanied by a gun, were to cross the canal by a wooden bridge which the engineers had thrown over it at the foot of the Ramleh heights, and were to advance along the right bank of the canal. The forces were to unite at the point where the canal and railway approached closest to each other, near the enemy's end of the isthmus.

The iron-clad train was made up of a truck with the 40-pounder gun in front, followed by another with its ammunition, a Nordenfeldt, some Gatlings, and two 9-pounders being carried by the other

wagons. From a flag-staff on the front wagon flew the Union Jack, a pennant streamed from another on the centre truck, while the white ensign flew from the last wagon; so the sailors went into action with all their colours displayed.

The eight hundred marines were carried in a train immediately behind. The infantry of the line had started first, and when the train arrived at the break, close to the Mihalla junction, the 60th were already advancing in skirmishing order along the embankment of the canal, to the left of the line. The 38th and 46th were spread out on the other side of the canal. The enemy were visible in front occupying a long ridge on the other side of the canal towards the village Kamshid Pasha. To the left of the village were two guns mounted in an earthwork, while on the extreme right large masses of the white-coated soldiers of Arabi could be seen moving among clumps of trees.

As soon as the train reached the break in the line the marines left their trucks and advanced along the embankment. The sailors got the two 9-pounders out of the train and placed them in readiness for action. Scarcely had they done so when a puff of white smoke broke out from the Egyptian battery, and a shell fell close to the line of rails. This, a few seconds later, was followed by another, which fell among the piled arms of a party of sailors who had, on arriving, at once set to work to repair the breach in the line.

The enemy had evidently laid their guns so as to command the spot where they knew that the train would be brought to a standstill. The sailors were not long in replying, and in a few moments shells from the 40-pounders and the two field-guns answered the fire, and the artillery duel was continued until the Egyptian guns were silenced. In the meantime the 60th Rifles were engaged with the enemy.

As soon as they had crossed the canal a large force was seen extending in skirmishing order about a thousand yards ahead, the rifles similarly extended. When the latter had advanced a hundred yards further the enemy disappeared from sight, and were seen to have taken up their position in a ditch running across their

front, and behind which extended a thick cover of bush. The Egyptians were the first to open fire. The 60th advanced by rushes, half of each company running forward and then lying down and firing, when the other half ran beyond them and in turn lay down and fired. The gun which accompanied them, and which was worked by sailors, kept pace with them along the towing path of the canal, the tars advancing with the greatest coolness, and from time to time sending a round of shrapnel against the enemy, to whose fire they were exposed without shelter.

The Egyptian fire was wild in the extreme, the men aiming far too high, and the bullets whistling harmlessly over the heads of the advancing rifles. When within two hundred yards of the enemy's position Colonel Ashburnham formed his men for attack. Two companies were in the first line, two in support a short distance behind, the other two in reserve. The rifles worked their way forward towards the long line of white smoke which marked the position of the enemy. The movement was made by small parties leaping to their feet, running a short distance forward, and then lying down quietly until the whole line was brought up, when the movement was repeated.

When the 60th arrived within a hundred yards of the ditch the Egyptians could be seen in parties of twos and threes creeping up from the ditch into the bush behind. When the order was given to advance to the attack, the 60th leapt to their feet with a cheer, and, fixing their bayonets as they ran, dashed forward. This was too much for the Egyptians, who rose like a great covey of partridges from their place of concealment, and diving into the bush, fled in panic, many of them throwing away their arms and accoutrements. A party took refuge in a hut in the middle of the jungle, but a well-aimed shot from Captain Morrison's gun on the embankment plumped into the hut, and those within it instantly fled after their comrades.

On the other side of the canal the 46th and 38th had also been engaged; they were preceded by the mounted infantry under Captain Parr and Lieutenants Piggot and Vyse. These officers with six men went ahead to reconnoitre, and suddenly found themselves

in front of a large body of the enemy, who opened fire upon them. The little party dismounted and returned the fire, expecting support from behind, but by some error, instead of support being sent forward, an order came to them to retire; but by this time two of the little band were dead and two wounded.

Lieutenant Vyse, a most popular young officer, was struck in the thigh with a bullet, and the arteries being severed he bled to death in a few minutes. His comrades would not leave his body behind, the other two officers and the two unwounded men carrying it off under a tremendous fire of the enemy, while the two wounded men, who were still able to use their rifles, brought up the rear, firing upon the enemy as they retreated. Had it not been for the extreme inaccuracy of the enemy's fire the little party must have been annihilated. The 38th and 46th were now engaged in a distant fire with a body of the enemy's infantry, but they ceased to advance further, and the 60th, as they were preparing to follow up the retreating Egyptians, were also halted by the order of Colonel Thackwell, commanding the 38th, the senior officer in this part of the field.

This order, which deranged all the plans of the operations, was caused by one of those errors which often mar the success of the best-designed military movements. Colonel Thackwell had been ordered to halt at a white house on the embankment, the house intended being situated at the point where the railway and canal were closest together.

There was, however, another white house on the embankment, a mile short of this point, and Colonel Thackwell, supposing that this was the house alluded to, halted the whole of the left attack, thus leaving the marines, who were still advancing steadily along the railway embankment, exposed to the whole brunt of the enemy's attack. The main position of the enemy at this point of their line was a large house surrounded by entrenchments where they had some guns in position; they had, too, a very strong force on the embankment of the canal whose fire took the marines in flank.

The sailors had dragged one of their field-guns along the railway with the marines, and with this they opened a brisk and well-

directed fire against the guns in the battery by the house, and they were aided by their comrades in the iron-clad train, now more than 2000 yards in their rear, as these sent shell after shell from the 40-pounder into the enemy's battery. The marines, seeing that they were not supported by the other column, left the railway and charged across the low intervening ground against the enemy on the bank of the canal, and after firing a volley charged them with fixed bayonets.

The Egyptians did not await the attack, but fled in terror along the canal. Many were shot down, and numbers in their panic leapt into the canal and were drowned, or shot as they swam across. From the fortified house a very heavy fire was now poured into the marines. The enemy had been strongly reinforced, and although their guns had been silenced by the sailors' field-gun and the 40-pounder, their musketry fire was extremely heavy. Large reinforcements of the enemy were now seen coming up from their camps, and these opened fire at long ranges, aided by the fire of some field-guns and the discharge of rockets.

The sailors' two guns admirably directed kept these bodies of troops from advancing; but as trains were seen coming up from the camp with fresh troops, and the object of the reconnaissance had now been gained both by ascertaining the position of the enemy's front line of defences and by proving that Arabi's army still occupied his camp, the order was given to the marines to retire. The movement was performed in admirable order, and was covered by Major Donald, who, with fifty men, advanced boldly close up to the enemy's position by the white house, and prevented them from assuming the offensive by a steady and well-directed fire until the main body had crossed the low ground and regained the railway embankment, when the covering party fell back and joined them.

The marines had retired slowly and steadily in alternate companies, one line facing the enemy while the other retreated; this in turn then halted, and the other passed through it. There was no hurry or confusion. Whenever a man fell, the one next to him called for a stretcher and waited, rifle in hand, until the

carrying party came up and took him to the rear. The sailors had by this time repaired the breach in the line, and the iron-clad train coming up, its fire effectually checked any inclination the enemy may have felt to press the retiring marines. With the greatest promptitude the 9-pounders were hoisted into the truck, the marines scrambled into their train, and the force fell back. The marines and sailors lost two killed and twenty-two wounded; the left attack had only five wounded, in addition to those of the little party of mounted infantry.

The Egyptians suffered heavily, large numbers having been killed or drowned by the marines, while a good many had fallen to the fire of the 60th. Fifteen dead and six wounded were found lying in the ditch, all hit in the head and shoulders, which alone had been exposed when they raised them above the bank to fire. Seven men were found killed by the shell which exploded in the hut in the jungle, and some forty others were found dead among the bushes.

The Egyptian soldiers had fought but poorly, refusing to advance to the attack although towards the end of the day they were in overwhelming numbers. Their officers, however, had behaved with courage and spirit, and could be seen with sword and gesture endeavouring to get their men to go forward. Six prisoners were made by the marines, among whom two were officers. According to their statement Arabi had with him at Kafr-Dowar 12,000 men of the regular army and 4000 Bedouins. One of the officers also reported that a large force consisting of 5000 regular infantry, 5000 Bedouins, 1000 cavalry, and 12 Krupp guns were entrenching themselves on the sweet-water canal near Ismailia.

On the 6th the enemy could be seen scattered over the scene of the fight collecting and burying their dead. On the afternoon of the 7th a train was seen approaching from Kafr-Dowar. It had an engine in front and another behind, the latter being probably added to take the train back should the leading engine be disabled. It came to a standstill about 1000 yards beyond the Mihalla junction, about six miles from Alexandria on the Cairo line, where that line divides for goods and passenger traffic.

Blocking parties then alighted and began to pull up the rails. The 40-pounders on the Ramleh heights at once opened fire. Their aim was accurate, for, although the distance was 4400 yards, the first shot just passed over the heads of the working party on the embankment. The men at once threw down their tools and fled from the exposed position, and after ten rounds had been fired the train was withdrawn. On this day the 75th Highlanders landed at Alexandria.

On the 10th of August Sir John Adye, chief of the staff, arrived at Alexandria with the Duke of Connaught. The whole of his brigade of Guards arrived within the next two days, and astonished the people of Alexandria by their martial appearance. On the 11th a cable to Port Said was completed, and telegraphic communication made with the entrance to the canal.

Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had been ill with fever before leaving England, and had been advised to make the journey by sea, arrived at Alexandria on the 15th of August, five days after his staff, and the khedive then issued decrees giving full power to the British to undertake operations and occupy the country. It was time that prompt and effectual measures should be taken, and fortunately the Seaforth Highlanders, having arrived at Suez on the 8th, were able at command to move rapidly northwards. Other troops soon began rapidly to arrive at the canal, where on landing they found that the supply of water had been cut off by the erection of dams across the canal.

On the 9th the enemy again attempted to tear up the rails, but were again driven back by the guns at Ramleh. The *Superb* went down and fired a few shells at the enemy's working parties engaged on the fortifications at Aboukir.


For some days little was done; the Highlanders and Guards were now encamped at Ramleh; the Egyptians could be seen busily fortifying the ground on which the last fight had taken place; reports constantly came in from the canal of large gatherings of troops between Ismailia and Zagazig. On the 15th the mounted infantry, forty strong, under Captain Parr, made a dashing reconnoissance towards the enemy's lines. The party was accom-

panied by Colonel Gerrard, brigade major of General Graham's division.

They started at three o'clock in the morning and rode quietly across the sandy desert on the margin of Lake Aboukir, and reached the cultivated land in front of Kafr-Dowar just as the morning light began to steal over the sky. They were then halted, and Colonel Gerrard with Lieutenant Piggott and six men rode forward for a near inspection of Arabi's position. Taking off their helmets, which would at once have attracted the attention of the Egyptian sentries, they hung them to their saddle-bows, and rode forward bare-headed, passing along the flanks of the enemy's position within hailing distance of the Egyptian sentries.

It was not until broad daylight that the suspicion occurred to the enemy that the little mounted party so close at hand were English. By this time many valuable notes and sketches had been taken; and when a scattering fire was suddenly opened upon them the party were ready to return, having accomplished their work. They, therefore, turned and started at a canter towards the main body. As they did so a party of the enemy's cavalry, apparently aroused by the fire, issued from a clump of palm-trees in the desert and endeavoured to cut them off; they seemed, however, but half awake, as it was doubtful whether the little party were really enemies, and did not gallop at full speed. Colonel Gerrard and his escort were thus able to reach the main body of the mounted infantry before they were overtaken. Captain Parr gave the order to retire by sections of fours. Seeing them retiring, the enemy, who had halted, galloped on in pursuit. Captain Parr at once halted his men and dismounted. Twelve of them opened fire upon the pursuers, who numbered about sixty men and were led by a striking-looking Bedouin chief. The first four shots flew high, but they sufficed to check the speed of the pursuers; the men then got the range, the Bedouin chief and one of his followers fell dead, and the rest, wheeling abruptly round, galloped off, and the mounted infantry returned quietly without further molestation to camp.

While this reconnoissance was proceeding, another of a very



MAP OF
 THE DELTA OF THE NILE,
 TO ILLUSTRATE
 THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS OF 1882.

English Miles
 0 5 10 20 30 40 50

different description was being made upon the other side; Lieutenant Smith-Dorien of the *Invincible* obtained permission to reconnoitre the enemy's position alone. Starting in the darkness, he made his way along the edge of Lake Mareotis until he neared the enemy's lines, then, stooping low on the sands so that his figure should not show against the water, he again made his way forward.

He succeeded in finding out the nature of the entrenchments upon which their working parties were engaged, and so close was he to them that they heard the sound of his footfall on the sand. There was a shout, and the light of a lantern was turned in his direction. He lay still among the bushes. One or two of the Arabs moved out a few paces towards where he was lying, but, seeing nothing, concluded that they had been mistaken. Lieutenant Smith-Dorien then crawled away; but on his way back glimpses of him were more than once caught by the sentries, and several shots were fired in his direction, and it was with the greatest difficulty that, keeping among the bushes bordering the lake, he made his way back to the lines.

On the 16th Sir Garnet Wolseley, Sir Evelyn Wood, and Sir E. Hamley landed; and the next day the general rode out to Ramleh, accompanied by the Duke of Connaught and the other generals, and inspected the British positions, and the formidable entrenchments which Arabi had now raised there.

On the 17th orders were issued for the troops to prepare to embark; and it was given out at headquarters that it was the intention to effect a landing by a great portion of the troops at Aboukir Bay, and after the forts there had been silenced by the fleet, that a movement would be made round Lake Aboukir upon the rear of Arabi's position, while the troops at Ramleh would simultaneously attack the enemy in front. This report gained little credence among the officers: the distance along the shore to Aboukir was short, and, were the forts silenced by the ships, the force could have moved along the spit of sand between Lake Aboukir and the sea in a far shorter time than it would take them to embark and disembark from the transports. The cavalry

especially could have trotted round from Ramleh in less time than would have been occupied in disembarking their horses.

The news, however, deceived those whom it was intended to keep in the dark. Arabi was known to be kept thoroughly well informed of all that passed in Alexandria by Bedouin spies who were constantly moving in the vicinity of the town, or by the villagers who came in with provisions; therefore the report that the British troops were embarking on board ship would be carried out, and it was very important that Arabi should be kept in the dark as to the intended operations.

Having the railway behind him he could have telegraphed to the forces gathered on the sweet-water canal to advance at once to Ismailia, and could have planted batteries on the banks of the canal, and have sunk merchant steamers passing along it, and so have blocked for a long time its passage to the fleet and army. This danger was not chimerical, for it was known that preparations had been made for blocking the canal, and twenty-four hours' notice would have been ample for Arabi to carry this operation into effect had he been aware that the fleet and army were about to advance by that route.

The greatest animation and bustle prevailed in Alexandria. The bands of the English regiments and the pipes of the Highlanders rose high in the street as the columns of troops marched down towards the harbour, while the population, European and native, looked on in astonishment at the preparations made for the sudden departure of the army which had so lately arrived there. The troops themselves were in the highest spirits; those who had been longest there were weary of their inaction in the face of a foe they could, they were convinced, sweep before them like chaff. Even the troops left behind, the division of General Hamley, consisting of the brigades of Generals Alison and Evelyn Wood, were not disappointed at being thus left, for they believed that they would have their full share of the fighting.

The movement of Sir Garnet Wolseley upon the Suez Canal may be said to have opened the Egyptian campaign, though the troops had not all been landed and the transport was incomplete.

Sir A. Alison, in charge of the Mediterranean contingent, and afterwards of the troops first landed from England, had held Alexandria, but could not advance from it against the series of entrenchments, one behind another, which had been thrown up by the Egyptian army, dexterous in spade-work as it had always been. The small English force was, however, doing most useful work in preventing Arabi from moving his forces to a more favourable point, such as Ismailia, for the purpose of destroying the Suez Canal or the fresh-water canal. As soon as the general commanding in chief appeared, further action took place. On the 18th of August the whole of General Willis's division embarked in the transports in the harbour, and were on board in a few hours, so admirably did the military and naval force combine in embarking, not only the troops, but horses and guns.

All day on the 18th the work of embarkation had gone on; the huge troop-ships lay along by the quays. Cordons of sentries of the Guards, looking like old campaigners now with their bronzed faces and faded serge tunics, kept back the crowd of spectators while the troops marched on board. The horses, screaming and struggling, were swung up in the slings over the bulwarks, while strong fatigue parties were busy shipping ordnance and stores. The fleet which was preparing to start consisted of seventeen troop-ships; the 60th and 46th Regiments embarked in the *Euphrates*, the *Rohsina* and *Nerissa* took the marines, the *Nevada* the 84th, the *Catalonia* the 50th, the *Batavia* the Grenadier Guards, the *Iberia* the Coldstreams, the *Orient* the Scots Fusileers, the *Osprey* the commissariat, the *Calabria* and the *Holland* the Household Cavalry, the *Tower Hill* and the *Palmyra* the Artillery, the *Viking* the transport corps, and the *Egyptian Monarch* the 7th Dragoons.

As the evening came on, the great ships, clustered with red-coats, moved one by one out of harbour and dropped anchor outside, in readiness for the start which was expected to take place at ten o'clock. The despatch-boat *Salamis* which still lay at the quay was to take Sir Garnet Wolseley and his staff, who were not to start till a later hour. Sir Beauchamp Seymour was on board the *Helicon*.

The signal for starting was not given. The night passed quietly, and in the morning the transports were still lying in two long lines off the port with the iron-clad fleet beyond them. The morning was fine, but, as usual on that coast, a long, quiet, regular swell was setting in upon the shore, causing the vessels to roll at their anchors to an extent which would have somewhat interfered with accurate shooting, had they been called upon to engage the forts of Aboukir.

During the morning minute inspections were made of the troops on board the different ships to see that each man had all his kit and appliances ready for landing. On board each vessel the order for the regulation of the troops was posted up, the following being the details as to disembarkation.

“Previous to disembarkment the men are to eat a good meat meal, they will each carry in their haversacks a day and a half’s rations, and will take a hundred rounds of ammunition per man. Each battalion carries two hundred spades of the Wallace pattern; the men will carry the valises in their hands, these will be deposited upon the beach under a guard. Besides the provisions carried by the men, two days’ rations will be carried by the regimental transport. The commissariat will take a further supply. All heavy kits will be left on board the ship, which will form the base of operations.”

At twelve o’clock all was in readiness; the men-of-war had sent down their top-masts in readiness for action. The Nordenfeldts had been hoisted to the tops, and among the great proportion of the troops the question whether a landing at Aboukir was not after all intended was still a matter of doubt. At noon precisely the signal was made, and the *Euphrates*, with the 60th Rifles on board, started at the head of the procession.

Then in a grand procession the ships moved off. The iron-clads went first in fighting trim, with every stick lowered that could be, looking ugly and terrible. Then followed the more graceful transports, moving swiftly through the blue water ruffled by a rising breeze. The fleet arrived off Aboukir in the afternoon, and made some delay, sufficient to confirm the belief, if any existed,

that their destination was the bay, and their object the capture of the forts. The war-vessels anchored in a line nearest to the shore, the transports outside. As night fell—the quickly falling night of southern skies—and darkness obscured land and sea, the fleet passed eastward to its real goal—the Suez Canal.

The procession of the line of fifty vessels to Aboukir was a fine spectacle, as it included twenty ships of the first class, and the sight of the squadron at anchor in the red sunset, which was almost momentarily succeeded by pale moonlight, amidst which the various coloured lights of the ships shone out for miles on either hand, was still more imposing. However, while messengers were galloping fast to bring Arabi to the defence of the forts which they supposed were going to be attacked, the squadron was quietly got under way again, and filed off into the darkness.

The ruse seems to have succeeded admirably. Nobody expected that we should seize Ismailia, and take possession of the canal. M. de Lesseps, who was in a condition of anglophobia even greater than that which was afterwards displayed by a portion of the French press and some of the people of Paris when we had accomplished the enterprise, had actually given a dinner on the 18th to the troops at Ismailia in honour of Arabi, and no British troops had arrived up to that morning.

The arrogant, but rather impolitic gentleman was, of course, exceedingly enraged at the subsequent occupation, not only of the chief port, but of the canal itself, and gave expression to several denunciations of our bad faith in taking possession of what had been declared to be a free international canal.

At Alexandria the day had not passed off quietly, the enemy were seen in unusual numbers at work upon their entrenchments, and emboldened probably by the knowledge that a large portion of our force had embarked upon the ships, they showed unusual daring and courage, several parties pushing along the railway embankment until within rifle shot.

Upon a couple of volleys being fired they fell back, but upon Sir Evelyn Wood going round to inspect the outlying piquets he was fired upon by a working party among the bushes, and it

was therefore determined to send out a reconnaissance to discover their intentions. At half-past three in the afternoon a wing of the 49th advanced from a point below the waterworks, moving along both sides of the canal. When they reached the clump of palm-trees forming an advanced post, and which had been the scene of more than one skirmish with the enemy, the troops on the left side of the canal were thrown out in skirmishing order, while those on the right kept along under cover of the embankment.

A few shots from the advanced line of skirmishers sent the enemy's vedettes to the right-about, but almost immediately afterwards a brisk fire broke out from a considerable force of the enemy concealed in ditches in front of a maize field on the left. Their fire was as usual wild and high, and the troops being ordered to lie down on the sands, the bullets whizzed innoxiously overhead, while a cool and steady fire was opened upon the line where the Egyptians were concealed. At half-past four the Egyptian batteries, at the bend of the canal, opened a heavy fire with several 18-pounders, 9-pounders, and rocket tubes.

Their infantry did not show out of cover, but from the heaviness of their musketry fire it was calculated that about a battalion and a half of their infantry were supporting the batteries. The Egyptian guns were well worked, and their shell continually burst in very unpleasant proximity to the troops, while the rockets erratically rushed across the fields, causing more mental discomfort than bodily harm.

The effect of rocket firing is indeed at all times, except when directed against cavalry, moral rather than physical, the rushing noise of the missiles, the extreme uncertainty of their direction, and the effect, when one actually strikes, are calculated to shake the nerves of young soldiers, but they soon learn that the danger is in no way proportional to the noise; but upon cavalry the effect of rockets is disconcerting in the extreme, the horses cannot be got to stand steady under the fire, and offering, as cavalry do, a much fairer mark than infantry, who can lie down under fire, there is to them a real danger from the rockets, which, on striking, either explode with great effect or, turning perhaps at right angles,

may rush along a line, overturning and injuring all they happen to strike.

The Egyptians, finding that the fire of their light batteries did not succeed in driving in our little force, opened upon them with a 64-pounder and a 4-ton gun in position at their centre post at Kindji-Osman, while a large body of cavalry and three battalions of infantry extended beyond the embankment on the sands on the left. General Wood accordingly ordered the troops to fall back slowly for about a hundred yards, and although the enemy's fire was extremely severe the movement was executed in perfect order, notwithstanding the fact that the vast majority of the soldiers were now for the first time in their lives in action.

While the movement was going on a welcome relief was afforded by the guns at Ramleh opening fire upon the enemy's batteries, while a few minutes later the iron-clad train steamed up from Gabarrie and at once engaged the enemy, the first shot from the 40-pounder plumping into the enemy's position on the right, whence a galling fire had been kept up on the 49th. The attention of the enemy's artillerymen was speedily diverted by these new assailants; the infantry sheltered among the palm-trees on the left, and from the windows of a farmhouse on the right of a canal, checked the advance of the Egyptian cavalry.

The order was now given to retire. As no advantage was to be gained by a continuance of the skirmish the iron-clad train steamed back close along the embankment, keeping parallel with the retiring infantry, while a few well-aimed shells from the guns at Ramleh sent the Egyptian cavalry, who were manifesting an intention to charge the retiring troops, to the rear.

Singularly enough, in spite of the heavy fire of the enemy but one man of the 49th was wounded. This was owing partly to the fact of the extremely bad aiming of the Egyptians, partly to the fact that the troops on the left were lying down in extended order, while those on the right were sheltered by the embankment. One man of the 49th had an extraordinary escape. A shell passed between his legs, and it exploded and carried away the seat of his trousers, he was knocked over by the explosion and covered

with mud, but upon being picked up was found to be entirely uninjured.

Early the next morning (the 20th of August) the 42d and 74th arrived and marched out at once to Ramleh, where, encamping with the Cameron and Gordon Highlanders (the 79th and 75th), they completed the Highland brigade. At half-past four in the afternoon General Wood pushed forward the 49th and 38th to the point which was occupied the day before on the embankment of the canal, the 79th and 75th simultaneously advancing on the left. The advance was supported by two field-pieces and the iron-clad train, the enemy's infantry at once fell back, but a duel was carried on for some time between the guns of Ramleh and their batteries; when some of the Egyptian guns had obtained the range of the infantry the advance was halted, General Wood rode forward along the canal and examined the earthworks at a distance of 600 yards.

Two squadrons of the Egyptian cavalry threatening a charge, Captain Rathbone's company of the 49th was sent forward against them. The Egyptian guns were turned on the little party and eight shells burst among them, but the ground being soft the shells penetrated deeply before exploding, and although covered with mud, only four of the men were wounded. General Wood having completed his observations the reconnaissance fell back to Ramleh, having discovered that Arabi's force of infantry appeared to have been materially weakened since the preceding day. No doubt a considerable proportion of these had been marched to Aboukir to oppose the expected landing, for large bodies of men could be seen working in the vicinity of the forts there.

On the 21st of August a correspondent of the *Times* recorded a characteristic incident. Sir A. Alison led out of the works at Ramleh four companies of the Black Watch to reconnoitre. He pushed them out in the open, while Sir Evelyn Wood was directed to cling to the canal bank with two companies of the Berks. After a time the demonstration drew the enemy from his sullen attitude, and rifled projectiles were sent to meet the English troops. Two of them dropped near the men, and then the Egyptian gunners became attracted by the appearance of a one-

armed officer sauntering along with the easy pace of one trained in the ways of Pall Mall. That officer was selected as their mark, and plied with shell, one of which dropped forty yards in front of him, another just beyond him. The officer sauntered slowly in the direction of cover, but would by no means quicken his pace. Five projectiles plunged into the ground or dashed the dust around him within a few yards. The practice was not bad, for a single figure is a small mark. The English 40-pounders then came into action, and soon dominated the fire of the Egyptian guns. No more is reported of the officer, who was Sir Archibald Alison; but he probably continued to saunter, pondering on the question of the value of artillery fire in the field, and perhaps wondering why it is said to be so demoralizing. The men were settling down to the same coolness. In the skirmish of the day before the shell fell around and among the troops, one projectile actually knocking off the helmet of a private of the Gordon Highlanders. Human instinct of self-preservation generally causes a line to sway on such occasions like corn before a strong wind, yet the young British soldiers did not so much as bend their heads.

All the afternoon of the 20th the great fleet of transports and men-of-war lay facing the forts of Aboukir. The little *Cygnets* steamed inshore; but, although the heads of the Egyptian artillerymen could be seen through embrasures crowded round their guns in readiness for action, they were apparently unwilling to commence the encounter, and the *Cygnets* returned to the fleet. Later in the afternoon the transport officers were signalled to go on board the men-of-war for orders, and upon their return the suspicions which had all along been entertained became certainties, and it was known that the fleet was after dark to proceed to Port Said, and then down the canal to Ismailia.

As soon as the darkness fell the fleet left its anchorage and steamed away in two lines, the lights showing each vessel its appointed station as before. Morning found the long lines of steamers making their way quietly across the tranquil sea at a distance of forty miles from Port Said.

While the army was thus moving towards the canal the British

vessels of war in the canal were preparing the way for them, Rear-admiral Hoskins being in command of the force there. At three o'clock in the morning of the 20th Commander Edwards with the boats of the squadron occupied the canal dredges, barges, &c., as far as Kantara. Captain Fairfax occupied Port Said, and Captain Fitzroy landed his troops in Ismailia, and at once proceeded to shell the enemy out of Nefiche, two miles from the station. At the same time the naval brigade, under Captain Hastings, *Euryalus*, advanced from Suez and attacked a force of the rebels who were encamped at Chalouf. The Egyptians fired heavily, but wildly, for a short time, but the sailors and Highlanders rushed on with such vigour that they at once abandoned the position they held and tried to escape across the sweet-water canal. Two of their guns were captured, and some two hundred of their men killed or drowned in crossing the canal; the English loss was only two men wounded and two drowned. As soon as the leading vessels of the fleet arrived at Port Said they began to enter the canal, the ordinary traffic being at once arrested.

Thus on the 20th we occupied Port Said, and the same afternoon the transports were in the canal and on their way to Ismailia. Before ten o'clock at night the fleet and transports had entered the canal, and before his departure from Port Said Sir Garnet Wolseley had caused a proclamation in Arabic to be posted up declaring it to be the intention of the British army to restore order and strengthen the authority of the khedive, while no harm would be done to those who respected that authority, but that those who resisted it by arms would be treated as rebels. The traffic on the canal was only temporarily suspended that the British vessels might have a free passage; and the company, or M. de Lesseps, having refused to allow pilots to go on board these, they made the transit without such assistance, leaving a force to occupy Port Said, and occupying a building at the entrance to the canal, formerly the Dutch hotel, which we had purchased for £78,000. Very soon the canal officials and others who were about to evacuate the town remained, as order was quickly established,

Arabs using threatening language being arrested, and about fifty soldiers captured by our men being sent to Alexandria as prisoners. Thus it was observed that the whole English force was made available against the enemy, and could be picked up in four-and-twenty hours and concentrated either at Suez, Ismailia, Port Said, or Alexandria.

As soon as the leading vessels reached Ismailia the disembarkation commenced. The Egyptians were known to be but a short distance away. When on the morning of the 20th the British sailors had landed from the *Orion*, the Egyptian troops in the town, anticipating no such movement, were surprised and almost surrounded, but just managed to make off after firing a volley, by which Commander Kane was slightly wounded.

In the course of the day a railway train had been seen from the tops of the *Orion* approaching. The trucks were crowded with the white-jacketed troops; a shot was fired from the 25-ton gun, sighting at four thousand yards. The aim was accurate, the shot struck a truck in the centre of the train and smashed it in fragments, several of the carriages following ran off the line, and the train was brought to a stand-still. The Egyptians at once retired along the line of railway.

This shot was a triumph of scientific gunnery, for it was fired without the gunner seeing the enemy. The high ground behind the fresh-water canal prevented any view of the line of railway being obtained from the decks of the ships, but Lieutenant Carysfort of the *Orion*, foreseeing the probability that the enemy would bring up troops by train, had laid the 25-ton gun upon a point of the railway out of sight, the elevation and erection being determined by calculation and by the use of the azimuth compass, the line of the direction in which the gun was laid being accurately marked down in the main-top of the ship. Lieutenant Carysfort took his station here, and when he saw that the train was passing across the line indicated he shouted the order to the gunners below. In an instant the cannon was fired, and Lieutenant Carysfort had the satisfaction of seeing the accuracy of his calculation verified, and the train instantly disabled and brought to a stand-still.

All night the ships of war held themselves in readiness to land and defend Ismailia should the Egyptians return, but the night passed quietly, and early the next morning the leading vessels of the fleet from Alexandria, having on board the marines, 60th Rifles, and 46th, arrived, and at once began to land the troops. Every hour the force received additions, as one by one the great transports steamed from the canal into Lake Timsah, until a mighty fleet had gathered in its usually quiet water, for, as soon as the transports with troops were fairly under weigh, the ships laden with stores and munitions of war in Alexandria harbour were sent off to them, and in two days after the arrival of the first ship in Lake Timsah upwards of fifty transports and store vessels were lying there.

As soon as the transports had entered the canal was again thrown open to the ordinary traffic, and after the temporary stoppage of three days the merchant steamers began to pass up and down as usual, crews and passengers looking with wonder as they passed across the eastern end of Lake Timsah at the mighty preparations which had been made by England to crush the Egyptian mutiny.

Ismailia afforded no accommodation for the quartering of troops. The place, indeed, although spoken of as a town, is really but a small village, consisting principally of the houses of M. de Lesseps and some of the principal officials of the canal standing in well-kept gardens, a palace of the khedive, the railway-station and adjoining buildings, a small settlement of canal and railway employés, and a native quarter with two or three thousand inhabitants.

Ismailia owes its existence solely to the construction of the canal. Ten years before a barren waste of sand had extended alike where the village with its bright green foliage stood, and the amphitheatre bordered by low sand-hills, in whose breast the waters of Lake Timsah glittered in the sun, but the construction of the canal and the letting in of the waters of Lake Timsah had given it importance. It was the nearest point on the canal to Cairo, the railway between Alexandria and Suez passed within two

miles of it, and a short branch from Nefiche was constructed to the place.

The fresh-water canal passed along some two hundred yards back from the lake and between it and the station, and its waters afforded the means of transforming the sandy waste into an oasis of green foliage. M. de Lesseps had, directly he commenced the work of the canal, perceived that Ismailia would be the central point, and had spared no pains to prepare it for the important position it was to occupy. He named the embryo town after the khedive, and persuaded the latter to build a palace for himself there.

De Lesseps had erected a handsome mansion for himself and many others for the chief officials under him. Stores and buildings had grown up apace, and the work of beautifying the desert commenced at once. Wide roads were laid down, rows of young trees were planted and kept carefully watered. An arm was laid out from the railway across the bridge over the canal down to the water, the slopes between the canal and the lake were planted and irrigated without difficulty, while the water was raised by machinery for the fertilization of the gardens of the palace and mansions. So that at the time the English fleet arrived there Ismailia appeared to nestle in a wilderness of bright green foliage.

The means of landing were sadly deficient, for hitherto there had been no traffic whatever at Ismailia, which, lying at the western end of the lake, lay far out of the course of vessels passing along the canal. Occasionally, when a vessel ran aground and was delayed for a day in crossing the eastern end of the lake, passengers, glad to escape for a few hours from the monotony of the sand-hills, would land at the little pier and spend a short time there, while many of the pilots who took the vessels up and down the canal made it their headquarters when off their term of duty; but with this exception Ismailia lay quiet and apart from the great wave of traffic which used Egypt as the highway between the East and the West, presenting an appearance of life only for the few weeks in the year when the khedive stayed in his palace there, and the pashas, who, in imitation of their ruler, had also built

mansions in Ismailia, took up their residence there during his stay.

A few groups of Arab children at play in the bare inclosure in front of the station, a troupe of laden camels making their way along with the crops from the irrigated grounds to the distant cities, the white sails of the boats in the sweet-water canal, and the smoke of the distant steamers as they crossed the eastern end of Lake Timsah, were the only signs of life, save that here and there the black tents of some encampment of wandering Bedouins, rose among the sand-hills, and little groups of dark-robed men could be seen sitting in the shade in the heat of the day, smoking their long pipes and discoursing on the doings of the infidels.

In the early hours of the morning and late in the afternoon the air of Ismailia quivered with the incessant song of the countless cicadæ in the trees and bushes, but when the sun was high and poured down with his full power even these ceased their song, and nought save the occasional whistle of a passing train as it swept along through the junction at Nefiche broke the silence of the place.

But within a few hours of the arrival of the British fleet the aspect of the place changed, the lake was alive with boats laden with stores for the shore, and as fast as they arrived at the landing-place groups of sturdy sailors and fatigue parties of troops landed the contents and dragged them up the avenue across the bridge over the canal to the level ground beyond. The carts and transport animals were soon landed and at work, and the streets of the little town were thronged with soldiers of every branch of the British army, gazing with wonder and interest at the little Arab tenements and the occupants who stood scowling at their doors, and who, in their turn, wondered at the tall figures of the Life Guardsmen, the stalwart forms of the Guards, the picturesque dresses of the Highlanders, and the busy energy and activity of this army of unbelievers which had, as if by magic, descended upon Ismailia.

There was no lack of noise now; the sound of music filled the air as the regiments marched from the landing-place to the spot where they were to encamp. The arrival of the transport-wagons

and guns was unceasing. Officers shouted commands to the teamsters and transport men. The soldiers and sailors laughed and joked as they laboured at their heavy work, while every half-hour the bells of the transports came across the water. General Wolseley and his staff at once took up their quarters in the palace, which the khedive had placed at their disposal; the troops erected their tents; the transport and cavalry animals were piqueted in long lines, and in two days the quiet town was transformed into a large and busy camp.

The water in the canal was found to be falling, and the natives reported that it had been cut near Tel-el-Kebir, where Arabi, with as was said 40,000 troops and sixty guns, had strongly entrenched himself. It was, therefore, determined to push a reconnaissance ahead to occupy as long a strip of the canal as possible, so as to command so much fresh-water. The force told off consisted of the Household Cavalry, thirty men of the mounted infantry, a detachment of the 19th Hussars, the 46th, and the marines.

They were to be commanded by General Graham. A portion of this force were already stationed at Nefiche, these were to be relieved by the 50th Regiment, which was to occupy that station. No opposition was expected, for the enemy were supposed to have but a small body of men between Ismailia and Tel-el-Kebir. Three guns of the horse-artillery accompanied the force, and General Wolseley with his staff rode out with them. It was still dark when the Horse Guards rode out from Ismailia, the 84th were stationed at Nefiche, the 50th Regiment joined the column as it passed.

The morning was faintly breaking now, but from the sand-hills near the station no sign of the enemy was visible. Behind, on every hummock and eminence, right and left, stood the British sentries guarding Ismailia from attack, but in front the dreary waste of sand showed no signs of life. The morning breeze was raising the fine particles of sand, and as these swept over the ground they blurred the details and outlines, and the stunted patches of scrub here and there seemed to rise from the surface of an impalpable yellow fog rather than solid ground.

Following the line of the railway, the force advanced until it neared Ramses, eight miles from Ismailia. As the column came near enough for a view to be obtained of the sand-hills round Ramses the field-glasses of the officers enabled them to perceive dark bodies of men on every eminence right and left of the station at Ramses, and almost immediately guns placed in batteries opened fire upon the column.

The infantry advanced in skirmishing order and took possession of the dam which the enemy had constructed across the canal between the villages of El Magfar and Mahuta. The enemy's guns had now opened. The 84th and the marines at once set to work to throw up sheltering trenches. The three guns took up their post on a lofty mound, while the Household Cavalry, after making one charge and driving in the enemy's skirmishers, drew up behind a sand-hill ready to advance should the enemy move forward to attack the little force. General Wolseley at once sent back to Nefiche for the 46th, and to Ismailia for the brigade of Guards and a battery of artillery.

All day long the cannonade was kept up between the two forces. The enemy were constantly receiving reinforcements from the rear, trains could be seen coming up in rapid succession laden with troops from Tel-el-Kebir. Two regiments of cavalry were seen drawn up in readiness to charge; at one time these swept round upon our right flank, but they refused to come near enough to give the Guards, who were burning to be at them, a chance of charging them, for the fire of their numerous artillery was too heavy for them to ride far out on to the plain to attack them.

The enemy's guns were well served, and their shell fell fast in and around the British force. Little harm was done, however, the percussive shells sunk deeply into the sand before exploding, while the time-fuses of the shrapnel were cut so badly that they exploded high in air. Captain Parr of the mounted infantry and Lord Melgund were wounded, five men were killed and nine men wounded. No less than forty-eight cases of sunstroke occurred.

The day was a trying one for the men, the sun blazed down upon them with terrible force as they lay on the sand behind the

low entrenchments they had thrown up. They had no water, and as the enemy would not advance there was nothing to do but to suffer the heat and thirst doggedly. Late in the afternoon the brigade of Guards arrived upon the ground, and the firing ceased upon both sides. Some hours earlier four guns had arrived to the assistance of those which, under the command of Lieutenant Hickman, R.A., had so long sustained a duel with the vastly superior force of the enemy. It was the brilliant manner in which these guns were fought, and the extreme accuracy of their fire, which had deterred the enemy from advancing.

In the course of the evening the 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards came up. Two Gatling guns manned by sailors had accompanied the column in its advance, and had been all day in readiness to give an efficient support to the infantry should the enemy advance upon the position, and these were now reinforced by a detachment of their comrades from the fleet in a steam-launch which came up the fresh-water canal with a Nordenfeldt gun.

As morning broke the troops prepared for an advance against the Egyptian position at El Magfar, but as they moved forward they found, to their intense disgust and disappointment, that the enemy had withdrawn their twelve guns from the positions which they had occupied on the previous day, and had altogether disappeared. The general now determined to push forward as far as Kassassin; here there was a lock on the canal, whose possession would ensure a supply of water for the troops as far as that point, and would enable stores and provisions to be carried up by the ships' launches and boats.

It had already been discovered that the carts sent out with the expedition were wholly unfitted for the country. Their wheels sunk deeply in the sand, and the horses and mules, which had not yet recovered from the effects of the voyage, and were unaccustomed alike to the extreme heat and to the soft unsteady ground, were unable to drag along anything like heavy loads. Unfortunately the troops on their landing at Ismailia had not succeeded in capturing any of the railway-engines, and very few trucks or carriages had fallen into their hands, consequently, so far the

railway was not available as a means of transport; the possession of the canal, therefore, so long as sufficient water remained in it for the passage of steam-launches and boats, was simply invaluable.

The enemy had not fallen back far, and the general determined to pivot his force, whose left rested on the canal, by sweeping the right round across the desert and then bringing them down upon the canal,—a movement which, if successful, would have caught the whole of the enemy's troops behind El Magfar as in a net. The 84th were on the left, next to them was a battalion of marine artillery, and beyond these the 38th. The next to the 38th was a battery of artillery, then came the brigade of Guards, while the 60th Rifles formed the right of the infantry lines, the battalion of marines being in reserve.

On the extreme right were the cavalry and a battery of horse-artillery; these were commanded by General Drury Lowe. The movement commenced by the advance of the cavalry and horse-artillery far out in the desert, while at the same time the battery between the 38th and the Guards began to throw its shell into the enemy's position, while the infantry advanced slowly up on the left, more rapidly on the right.

The enemy's artillery opened at once, but they fired only a few rounds. The sight of the cavalry, which, far out on the plain, were already bearing somewhat down towards the canal, was altogether too much for them. They perceived at once that their line of retreat was menaced, and would in a few minutes be cut. They at once limbered up their guns, while the infantry rushed into the trains which had brought them from Tel-el-Kebir, and these immediately began to steam away, the cavalry and artillery galloping off at the top of their speed, raising great clouds of dust as they went.

When our force approached the enemy's position they found that the village of Tel-el-Mahuta was deserted. Behind it the enemy had with great labour erected a formidable series of entrenchments. One earthwork completely barred the railway, and if defended could not have been carried without heavy loss. Behind this many store-tents full of provisions were found. While

the infantry were marching without opposition into the village, the cavalry made a wide circuit among the sand-hills and came down upon the railway near the Mahsamah station.

The horse-artillery at once became engaged with an enemy's battery of seven Krupp guns near the station, while the cavalry were at work to the rear of the Egyptian camp there. The infantry were drawn up to defend it, but after firing a hasty volley, which caused some twenty casualties among the cavalry, they broke and fled wildly as the long line of horsemen charged down upon them. Another minute, and the cavalry were among them cutting them up in all directions. A party of Egyptian cavalry drawn up in order made a show of charging down upon the flank of our men, but a squadron of the Life Guards wheeled round in readiness to meet them, and the Egyptians at once galloped off. When our cavalry were first seen charging down upon the Egyptian camp a train in the station had at once started, and as soon as the charge was over the dragoons started in pursuit. It had not yet got up its full speed, and they came up to it and endeavoured to arrest its course by firing at the driver. The man, however, stooping low by his fires, escaped their shots, and gradually, to the intense mortification of the men, the train drew away from them, and they brought their panting horses to a stand-still.

The train would have been an invaluable capture, as the engine would have enabled us to utilize the railroad. The cavalry had, however, good reason to be satisfied with the result of the morning's work; the seven Krupp guns which had been engaged with the horse-artillery were captured, 120 standing tents, a large number of Remington rifles, and an immense amount of stores and ammunition fell into their hands, and seventy-five railway wagons loaded with provisions were found in the station.

The infantry went into camp at Mahuta, while a battalion of Guards went on to Mahsamah to enable General Lowe to hold that position should the enemy take heart and endeavour to recapture it. As the troops had passed over the ground which the Egyptians had held the previous day signs were evident of the terribly destructive fire of shrapnel-shell when burst at exactly

the right spot. One of the first of these shells, fired by Lieutenant Hickman, had burst over two of the enemy's guns, and had killed the whole of the men working them and every horse in the teams. During the rest of the day not another shot was fired from these two guns.

The services of the sailors were at this time invaluable. Not only did all the hard work of landing the stores fall upon them, but owing to the complete failure of the transport the advance troops were wholly dependent upon their efforts for food. The obstructions which the Egyptians had thrown across the canal were removed, and the ship-launches towing boats laden with provisions and stores plied unceasingly up and down the canal, of which some twenty miles were in our hands. The Indian contingent were now coming up from Suez, and on the 25th, the day on which the second fight took place, the Bengal Lancers, 19th Hussars, and the artillery of the contingent landed at Ismailia.

These light and active cavalry, horses and men both accustomed to heat, were infinitely better suited for the work and climate than were the heavy horses and men of the Household Cavalry. For a charge nothing can be finer than the heavy cavalry of the British army, but they are wholly unsuited for the constant and fatiguing duties of scouting during a campaign, more especially across deep and heavy ground.

On the 26th of August a reconnoitring party of the 7th Dragoon Guards occupied Kassassin lock on the fresh-water canal, and the York and Lancashire Regiment (the 84th), the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment (the 46th), the royal marine artillery, and two guns of the royal horse-artillery also moved out there. The Household Cavalry, the 4th and 7th Dragoons, the 3d Bengal Cavalry, the 30th Bengal Lancers, and the mounted infantry were all on that day gathered at Mahsamah. At Mahuta were the three regiments of Guards, the 60th Rifles, a company of royal engineers, and eight guns of the royal artillery. The West Kent Regiment were at Nefiche, while at Ismailia were three companies of royal engineers and seven guns.

An armoured railway truck, with a 40-pounder and a Gatling gun, went up to the front drawn by sixteen horses. Sir Garnet Wolseley and his staff had returned to Ismailia.

On the afternoon of the 27th a most important arrival took place. An engine with nine trucks steamed in from Suez. The Egyptians before evacuating that town on the landing of the blue-jackets and marines from the men-of-war had carried off with them all the engines and railway stock, and no assistance could therefore be obtained from that quarter.

The engine which had arrived had been shipped at Alexandria and brought down the canal. As there was no possibility of landing it at Ismailia it had been taken on to Suez and there put on shore. The train was made up and filled by sailors from the *Euryalus* and *Ruby*, who brought with them a Gatling and a 7-pounder. A half company of Madras sappers and miners accompanied them in order to repair the road should it be found that the wandering Bedouins had at any point pulled up the rails. The line, however, was found to be in fair working order, and the journey from Suez to Ismailia was performed in five hours.

While General Drury Lowe was surveying the village of Kassassin a respectable-looking man came up and entered into conversation with him in French. While they were talking an Egyptian officer who had been taken prisoner passed under an escort. As he went by the Egyptian officer exclaimed: "That man is Mahmoud Fehmy—Arabi's second in command." The man was at once arrested, and acknowledged that he was Mahmoud Fehmy. His capture was of the utmost importance.

Mahmoud Fehmy was the most distinguished pupil whom the military school at Cairo had produced. Before the commencement of the military movement he was inspector-general of fortifications. When Arabi rose to power he supported him warmly, and was appointed by him minister of public works. He designed the lines of entrenchment at Kafr-dowar and at Tel-el-Kebir. At the latter place he was nominally the adviser of Rached Bey, who commanded the troops there, but practically he was in command of the force.

He had been charged with being one of the authors of the massacres and incendiarism at Alexandria. His capture had been the result of accident. He had come out from Tel-el-Kebir in a train to reconnoitre, and when near the village had stopped the train, alighted, and ascended a hill. While he was absent the engine-driver caught sight of our soldiers, and at once turned on the steam and retired with the train. When Fehmy came down the hill with the servant who had accompanied him, ignorant of the reason of the sudden retirement of the train, he walked on the line until he came to the village, which he expected to find occupied by Egyptian troops. When he discovered the position of things, with great coolness and presence of mind he at once walked up to the English general and entered into conversation with him in the character of a resident proprietor of land in the neighbourhood of the village, and had he not been detected by the Egyptian officer he would doubtless have passed unsuspected, and would have been able to retire from the village and make his way back to Tel-el-Kebir.

After his capture he chatted freely with our officers. Among other matters they learned from him that there were five field-batteries of Krupp guns, besides three batteries of guns in position.

Soon after daybreak on the 28th heavy firing was heard in the front, and the troops at Mahsamah at once saddled up and fell in in readiness to march to the assistance of General Graham at Kassassin. An officer, however, presently arrived from him with news that the firing was in the enemy's camp, and could only be explained upon the supposition that either the Egyptians were fighting among themselves, or that they were having a sort of field-day, practising defensive operations in case of attack.

At eleven o'clock, however, the flags of the signaller on some sand-hills above Kassassin were seen in motion, and the news was telegraphed that the enemy were approaching. The Household Cavalry and the 7th Dragoon Guards at once moved forward to Kassassin, and the 19th Hussars were sent forward by General Willis to Mahsamah from Mahuta, while the Guards fell in under

arms and prepared to march should they be required. This, however, was not the case.

The enemy's force consisted of two regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery of artillery. They halted at a distance from the camp, and an artillery duel was kept up all day between the Egyptian battery and General Graham's two guns. The enemy then fell back. Their conduct appeared to our men to be inexplicable, but the probable intention of Arabi was to keep our men under arms the whole day in the blazing sun, and so to fatigue and exhaust them before he delivered the attack in force which he had prepared.

The cavalry returned to Mahsamah. Their horses were unsaddled, but they and their riders had scarcely begun to eat when, from the place from which they had just returned, the roar of guns again broke out. It was late in the afternoon, but the sun was still beating down fiercely, and the hot withering wind was raising the sand-clouds so high in air that it was impossible to see what was going on, but through the dust and haze white smoke wreathing up from many points showed where the guns of the enemy were hard at work.

Heavier and heavier grew the cannonade, and to this was now added a steady and continuous roll of musketry. It was evident that the camp at Kassassin was this time attacked in earnest. The trumpet sounded again, there was a hasty putting on of jackets and accoutrements, a last mouthful of food and drink of water were taken, and then the saddles were replaced on the backs of the weary horses, the bits forced into their unwilling mouths, and the cavalry and artillery are again on their way out into the desert.

General Drury Lowe was ignorant of the strength with which the enemy were attacking the camp, but that they were in force was certain from the heavy and continuous firing, and he determined to repeat the tactics which had succeeded so well in the previous fight, and to work round into the rear of the enemy. It was a bold step to take with men and horses already weary with a long day's work in heavy sand, under a blazing sun, but in this way, far more than in any other, could efficient aid be given to the little force defending itself against tremendous odds. If successful



a stroke here would disorganize the whole attack, and the general had sufficient confidence in his men to make the attempt, backed though the enemy might be by a vastly superior force of cavalry, with men and horses fresh and ready for work.

The little force in Kassassin were indeed hard pressed, some 13,000 picked troops of the enemy, with forty guns, were attacking them, Arabi's plan being to crush one after another of the little British posts which were strung out one beyond the other in a manner which, against a European foe, would have entailed certain disaster, but though sorely pressed, Graham's little force held firmly to their positions.

On the left, next to the canal, were the marine artillery, then came the 46th (the Duke of Connaught's) light infantry, next to them the 84th (York and Lancaster), the slight earthworks sweeping round again in a semicircle to the canal. The mounted infantry under Lieutenant Piggott were out in front. Hundreds of shells burst in the little camp, and the Egyptians fought steadily and well, for knowing their immense superiority in numbers, and fighting under the eye of Arabi himself, they were this time confident of victory.

The cavalry were still making their way round over the desert. They were screened by sand-hills from the sight of the enemy, and although they occasionally broke into a trot, the tired horses sinking fetlock deep in the sand could not be kept at that pace. Nor indeed could they be pressed, for it was above all things necessary to have a reserve of strength when the time came to hurl them against the enemy, but none the less did the men fidget with anxiety and impatience to aid their comrades at Kassassin. The sun had sunk now, and the red angry glare in the west had grown dim and faded away, and now the moonlight streamed palely over the gray sand which rose in such clouds under the horses' hoofs that each squadron could scarce see that before it. Still the rattle and roar of the combat on the left never ceased, and the horsemen knew that the infantry were still stoutly holding out against the enemy.

By 7 o'clock the cavalry were fairly in rear of the firing, and



wheeled in that direction, advancing very slowly to allow the artillery to come up. Now they could see the flashes of the enemy's guns on the low sand-hills around Kassassin gleaming on the horizon like the flicker of excessive summer lightning. Slowly they approached the scene of conflict; it was almost dark, but as they crossed a low sand-hill the black mass showed up against the bright moon-lit sky, and the sharp crack of a field-gun followed by a sudden rush of a shell through the air and an explosion far away in the distance showed that the enemy had at last discerned the approaching squadrons.

Almost instantly nine flashes broke out one after another from the Egyptian guns fifteen hundred yards away, and almost simultaneously the sky above the cavalry seemed to be torn in pieces as by a mighty hurricane as the nine shells screamed on their course and burst, sending the showers of hissing shrapnel in all directions. As yet, however, the Egyptian gunners had not got the range. The cavalry moved down a slight hollow to the right, and the next salvo of shells flew harmlessly to their left.

Again they moved forward, and the gunners kept sight of them, another volley of shells burst over them, but the iron storm swept over and around the troops, and but few were struck down. Now tiny flashes flickered over the sand-hills, and the sharp ping of bullets told that the enemy's infantry were at work. Our battery had now come up, and in a few seconds after taking up their ground our guns spoke out their answer to the enemy's fire, and their shells could be seen to explode in quick succession among the guns of the Egyptian batteries.

The cavalry now advanced from the left, the 7th Dragoons, who were in front, opened out right and left to allow the Household Cavalry to advance between them. Already Herbert Stewart Drury Lowe's brigadier major, had passed down the line the word, "The cavalry are to charge the guns." Sir Baker Russell was in front, and gave the word "charge."

Colonel Ewart led the Life Guards, and as the trumpet sounded the horses, wild with excitement, and seeming, like their riders, to have forgotten all their fatigue in their impatience to get at the

foe, broke into a gallop at the well-known signal, and like a thunderbolt the Household Brigade with the 7th Dragoons on either flank dashed forward through the darkness and hurled themselves upon the foe.

The Egyptian infantry opened a wild fire as they saw the dark wave thundering down upon them with the sabres gleaming in the moonshine like a white crest above them. Then, panic-stricken at the onslaught, they broke and fled. In an instant the horsemen were among them cutting and slashing. Many were cut down, more threw themselves on the sand and let the tide sweep over them. The advance was unchecked, and, passing over the remnants of the infantry, the Household Brigade charged in among the Egyptian guns. The gunners were sabred as they stood, the guns were captured, but there was no pause. Breaking up into squadrons now the cavalry broke up the masses of flying infantry and pursued them far across the desert, until, utterly worn out and exhausted, the horses came to a stand-still, and the men dismounting flung themselves down on the sand beside them as wearied as they.

The magnificent charge had decided the fight. No sooner had the guns of the horse-artillery opened upon their rear than the Egyptian attack on the camp began to waver. The thought that the British were upon their line of retreat to Tel-el-Kebir struck them with something like a panic, and even before the horsemen were in motion the infantry on the slopes above Kassassin had begun to fall back, but not unmolested. The defenders, too, had heard the outburst of fire which told that the long-looked-for aid was at hand, that the British cavalry and guns were in the rear of the enemy, and, leaping to their feet with a cheer, the British marines and infantry sprang over the low sheltered trenches which they had for hours stubbornly defended, and advanced upon the enemy.

The Egyptians did not await the attack. The deep dull thunder of the cavalry charge, followed by the cessation of the fire of their own battery, told its tale, and at once the thirteen thousand men, who had advanced a few hours before confident in their power to

crush the little force at Kassassin, were hurrying away a mere horde of fugitives, intent only upon regaining their lines at Tel-el-Kebir. Their losses in the retreat were small. The numerous hollows between the sand-hills shrouded them from the view of the cavalry, who, indeed, were now incapable of further pursuit. Some, indeed, pressed the fugitives close up to their entrenchments, but the greater part, after resting their horses, made their way back to Kassassin weary and exhausted, but in the highest spirits over their successful charge.

From their ignorance of the country they were unable to find the guns they had captured; and when in the morning a search was made for them it was in vain, for it afterwards turned out that the Egyptian cavalry as they fell back came across the guns, and, finding no foes near them, harnessed up and carried them off to Tel-el-Kebir. Unfortunately the cavalry, in their haste to press forward and complete the rout of the enemy, omitted to spike the guns before advancing.

This decisive blow so shook the confidence of Arabi's soldiers that it was some time before they again ventured out of their entrenchments. Indeed there is little doubt that had General Graham had two or three more infantry regiments at hand he might have advanced at once upon Tel-el-Kebir, which he could have carried with scarce a shadow of resistance by the dispirited Egyptians.

Our losses were comparatively slight. Sergeant-major Shaw was the only officer killed; Major Forster and Captain Reeves, and Lieutenant Cunningham of the Duke of Cornwall's Infantry were slightly wounded, as were Lieutenant Piggott and Lieutenant Edwards of the mounted infantry, and Major Townshend of the 2nd Life Guards. Some seven or eight men were killed, and about seventy wounded.

In the morning the enemy's dead were found scattered over the space of a mile and a half of ground. Our wounded were taken into Ismailia by boats along the canal, thus avoiding the pain and exhaustion of the long journey across the sand. During the day parties of troops went out and brought in the Egyptian wounded

lying scattered over the plain. The news of the fight had been passed along the line, and the Duke of Connaught got the brigade of Guards at Mahuta under arms and marched towards the scene of the engagement, until met by the news that the victory was already won and the assailants of the garrison of Kassassin in full retreat.

The cavalry had returned before daybreak to Mahsamah as there was no forage for their horses at Kassassin. When they paraded it was found that Lieutenant Tribble of the 7th Dragoon Guards and seven men of the Life Guards were missing, having in the darkness and in eagerness of pursuit become separated from their comrades. Most of their bodies were subsequently found.

The Indian cavalry now came on and joined the Household Brigade. The force at Kassassin was strengthened by another infantry regiment. The time passed heavily while the force waited until the supplies of provisions and ammunition should be accumulated in readiness for the advance.

Life was not pleasant at the camps along the canal. The food of the men and officers was tin-meat, rice, and bread, an inappetizing fare in a climate where the heat renders men indisposed to eat. Swarms of flies harassed the men and horses terribly, but the greatest privation of all was the want of good water. For this they were entirely dependent upon the canal. This was muddy and thick from the work required to be done in it to remove the dams which Arabi had thrown across, and what was worse, it stank from the numerous putrid carcasses of animals and bodies of men which floated in it.

The troops firmly believed that the enemy had tried to poison the water by throwing corpses into it, but this was highly improbable as the Khoran commands that those killed in action shall be buried with proper ceremonies, and the throwing of their dead into the canal would have created the strongest feeling of resentment among the Egyptian soldiery. It is probable that the bodies of dead found in the canal were those of the men wounded in the first action, who had endeavoured, but in vain, to make their retreat across the canal.

Almost daily reconnaissances were now made by the light and active Indian cavalry brigade under General Wilkinson, nearly

to the enemy's entrenchments. On the 29th, and again on the 30th, they pushed out. In each case Arabi's piquets retired as they advanced. The Egyptians were seen working busily at their entrenchments, and sketches were made of these. On the 31st the enemy's cavalry, after our own had retired, returned the visit by galloping up close enough to see what was going on at Kassassin. The work of getting forward supplies proceeded with extreme slowness. Only one of the engines which had now been brought was available for work on the railway, the others having broken down, and there being no means of repairing the machinery, even the one at work was constantly getting out of order and coming to a stand-still.

The troops in the advance camps were indeed almost entirely dependent for their food upon the navy, whose launches plied up and down the canal, which was, however, so shallow in many places that there was great difficulty in getting past, and only lightly laden boats could be taken up. For two days the horses of the cavalry were entirely without corn. Those of the Indian cavalry fared far better than the horses of the English troopers, for they had brought with them from India their usual following of grass-cutters, and these foraging assiduously over the country found in little hollows where in the rainy season pools had been formed, and on the outskirts of the few little villages along the line, sufficient green food to keep their horses in fair condition.

Practically the expedition was without transport of its own. The carts brought with them were useless. No steps had been taken to collect transport animals, and had it been required for the force to move away from the line of the railway and canal, they could not, however urgent the need, have advanced a day's march in any direction. The difficulties arose to a great extent from the fact that the advance had been made with much greater rapidity than had been expected.

It had been originally intended that the army as it landed should remain massed around Ismailia until ready to advance in a body; but the early successes had led to a small force being pushed on, and the attacks on the enemy had compelled the general

greatly to strengthen these posts, thus necessitating the feeding of a great number of men and animals at a distance from the base, an operation for which no provision had been made, and which necessarily threw a very heavy strain upon the transport.

The infantry of the Indian division, with their artillery and commissariat corps, landed at Ismailia between the 28th and 31st of August. Some relief was afforded by the arrival at Ismailia of Sultan Pacha and Ferrid Pacha, two Egyptian officials of high standing and influence. They had at first embraced the cause of Arabi, but had now come over to us. They at once opened negotiations with the Bedouins, and sent out proclamations to them inviting them to come in and to bring in their camels for transport and sheep and cattle for provisions, promising them good pay and treatment at our hands.

It may be convenient to pause here for a moment to cast a backward glance at some of the events and occurrences which preceded this stage of British intervention, but which we have necessarily left unnoticed during the heat and conflict of battle.

In England, the government, while necessarily endeavouring to carry out the financial scheme of their predecessors, had been committed to armed intervention against a rebellion, which, its promoters had, truly or falsely, declared to have been due in a great measure to the assumptions of the European controllers of a right to deal with the revenue and the internal government of the country. Most people in England had become aware that the policy of the western powers in relation to Egypt had been mainly grounded on the indebtedness of that country to the subjects of these powers who had become bondholders or otherwise creditors, but few people were informed of the actual amount owed by Egypt to Europe and of the work undertaken by the Dual Control. In 1881 the capital of the Egyptian debt was returned as—

Unified 4 per cent debt,	£57,776,340
Privileged debt,	22,608,800
Domain Loans at 5 per cent,	8,500,000
Daira Sanieh Loans at 4 to 5 per cent,	9,512,880
	<hr/>
	<u>£98,398,020</u>

To these was to be added the unsecured floating debt, amounting in round numbers to £5,000,000, so that the total reached a little over £103,000,000. The principal part of this debt had, as we have seen, been contracted by the khedive Ismail, and it was because of his appeal to England and France to help him out of his difficulties that the Dual Control was appointed, Lord Salisbury having agreed to it at the pressing solicitation of France. The authority and functions of the controllers have already been noticed—they were, as we have seen, defined by a decree of the khedive in 1879; and in April of the following year another decree appointed an International Committee of Liquidation, composed of seven members, who were required to examine into the financial position of Egypt and to draft a law of liquidation regulating the relations between Egypt and her creditors, the creditors of the issue of the Domain Loan being, however, excluded from the conferences of the committee. This commission estimated the normal resources of Egypt at £E.8,319,292,¹ and divided the sum into £E.3,799,262 for the service of the debt, and £E.4,520,000 for the administrative service. It was calculated that receipts would increase, and that this increase with the customs and the sum saved each year from the decrease in the capital of the debt would allow an annual increase in the sum set apart for administrative purposes; but the Commission of Liquidation, having made a reduction of about £2,000,000 sterling in the interest on the debt, decided:—

1. That all surplus derived from the revenues of the assigned administrations (customs, railways, and four mudiriehs²), to whatever figure it might amount, should never be used except for the redemption of the debt.

2. And that even, in certain cases, the revenue of non-assigned administrations should contribute to this service, to complete an annual redemption equal to one-half per cent of the nominal capital of the unified debt.

Thus the revenues of the assigned administration could not be used for the endowment of the administrative service, and the only normal resource justifying the increase of the budgetary

¹ About £8,500,000 sterling.

² Prefectures or provinces under mudirs.

expenses beyond £E.4,520,030 was the disengaged surplus from the unassigned administrations. The disengaged surplus in 1880 was only £E.140,000; but it was found possible to add to this amount, in order to augment the resources of the extraordinary budget, a further sum of £E.394,000, because moneys voted to the department of public works were not spent. The surplus for 1881 fell to £110,551, and in preparing their budget for 1882 the controllers-general estimated that the surplus expenses would considerably exceed the probable resources of the extraordinary budget. The budget of the ministry of war for 1881 stood at £E.368,000. During the year it was increased by an annual surcharge of £E.54,000, and Arabi, as minister of war, insisted upon a further increase of £120,000 for 1882, making the total of the budget of the war department £542,000.

This was at the commencement of 1882; but after that, as we have seen, the control virtually ceased to exist; and in July, *after the intervention* of the British fleet and the bombardment of Alexandria, Tewfik had proclaimed the dismissal of Arabi Pasha from office as minister of war, and subsequently gave authority to the British forces to occupy and defend the country against the army of the rebels. This determination was deferred as long as there was any probability of Tewfik regaining authority in conjunction with Arabi, and there were many reasons for doubting the good faith of the khedive even at the time that he was obliged to rely on the protection of our marines against the insurgents and against the emissaries of the man who had been permitted to retain the office of minister of war and to control the government of the country.

It must be remembered, however, that the position of the khedive with regard to the sultan was an uneasy one. There were not wanting evidences of a desire on the part of the government at Constantinople to take advantage of the revolt and the condition of anarchy at Cairo, to send not only a commission but an armed force, the result of which might have been so to reduce the authority of the khedive as to eventually abolish the engagements which had been made with the viceregal family, and to rescind the

guarantees which had placed Egypt in a position of comparative independence of Turkish domination. The sultan energetically opposed the despatch even of one vessel of war from England and one from France to Alexandria for the reception and protection of Europeans, who would, it was believed, be in serious danger, in case of the hostilities which were expected to take place there. The situation was very difficult, and but for the judicious diplomacy of the Earl of Dufferin, who represented the British government at Constantinople and was ably supported by Sir Edward Malet, that difficulty might have been insuperable.

The sultan, however, fully appreciated and professed his readiness to recognize the large interests which Great Britain possessed in Egypt, and regarding England as a great Mussulman power he thought that we ought to pursue the same policy as, and to co-operate with Turkey, instead of persistently adopting the French view. On being assured that England had no other desire than to maintain the *status quo*, which amply secured to us all we wanted, namely, the freedom of the Isthmus of Suez and reasonably good government for the Egyptian people, with the maintenance of his own sovereign rights as already defined in international arrangements, he inquired of Earl Dufferin whether the English government objected to Tewfik Pasha, or if they wanted to remove him.

It was a suggestive question; but in reply Earl Dufferin said that he was not aware of any such desire. Apart from political dangers, another deposition would have borne hardly on Egyptian funds, for though by his own request Tewfik's allowance had been limited to £E.100,000 a year, the ex-khedive and all the family had to be provided for, and there was also Prince Halim, a son of Mohammed Ali, who in 1870 had agreed with the ex-khedive in consideration of an allowance of £60,000 a year for forty years to abandon all rights of succession, to give up all property belonging to him in Egypt, and to renounce for himself and his family and dependents the right of inhabiting or returning to Egypt. On the conclusion of this contract bonds had been deposited in Prince Halim's name with the Bank of England each for £30,000 payable

half-yearly for forty years, and with a right reserved to his highness for discounting two years' bonds, or £120,000 in advance. As in 1866 the prince had sold the bulk of his properties in Egypt to the Egyptian government for £1,210,000, and the engagement had been made on political grounds, the Commission of Liquidation, when they came to consider it, regarded the money value of the consideration given by the prince as altogether out of proportion to the allowance, which represented a capital of £2,400,000. They therefore in 1879 recommended that the allowance should be reduced to £E.10,000 a year, and by a decision of the Egyptian government it was reduced to £E.15,000 a year, and all the bonds except the four which the prince had the right of discounting were declared null and void.

Prince Halim, of course, protested, and tried, though unsuccessfully, to show that the value of the properties he had surrendered was greater than the sums he had received. This was proved to be very far from the truth, the lands and houses which he had given up having been of comparatively small value, and the calculations made by the prince of the value of successions which had fallen in, being entirely erroneous. The commission, however, restored to him the right to any future successions, relieved his children from the renunciation which he had made to their prejudice, permitted his allowance to date from the 1st of January, 1880, instead of the 1st of January, 1882, as had been proposed by the government, and provided a sum of £E.150,000 for the payment under the general conditions of the liquidation of bonds which to that extent the prince might have discounted.

These particulars may be found suggestive in the future consideration of Egyptian difficulties; and it should be noted that during the military revolt and the subsequent conspiracy and rebellion, there were grave suspicions that both the ex-khedive Ismail and Prince Halim were behind the scenes, and had prompted disaffection and resistance to authority.

With regard to Ismail, it is quite certain that his friends were then, and have since been, vigilantly waiting for an opportunity to promote his restoration to the khedivate, and his friends were

numerous and influential. A writer in a leading daily newspaper puts the case emphatically in the following words:—"He was a great borrower; we cannot wonder, therefore, that he has devoted champions on every European bourse. He was a patron—a liberal, a lavish patron—to all whose calling it was to minister to pleasure or add external magnificence to a state. Naturally he was popular with those whom he employed. We may say more: he was a speculator, a prince of boundless enterprise, a promoter of public works, an agriculturist on the largest scale. Therefore he earned the good-will, and, no doubt, retains the confidence of all who find interest or profit where great engineering work is to be done, or commerce to be invited to new channels. Many foreigners made fortunes in Egypt during the reign of Ismail Pasha; many more found employment, at any rate, of a remunerative kind. Is it surprising that these, and others who would fain fare as well, should wish to see on the throne once more the prince who was so prodigal of good things?

"Unfortunately it is not in the diaries and account-books of the French or English colony that the records of the Egyptian people are to be sought. In the history of the fellaheen the gloomiest pages must be devoted to the days when Ismail held sway. He had grand ideas, to be sure. He appreciated the advantages of European skill and honesty in developing the resources of his dominions. Still more acute was his perception of the magic that lurked in the employment of European capital. But what good came of it all to the toilers of the Delta and the Nile Valley? Did it lighten the pressure of their poverty to know that the new opera-house at Cairo was one of the prettiest in the world, and that *Aïda* was produced there for the first time in a style to move the envy of La Scala? Did it mitigate the tortures of the kourbash for the victim to learn that palace after palace was rising at the capital, and in all kinds of out-of-the-way spots up the Nile, as monuments of the unscrupulous ostentation of the prince? We shall be told of the railways, of the canals, and, above all, of the part played by an enlightened khedive in the accomplishment of M. de Lesseps' great work. We admit, of course, that the outlay

in these departments contrasts favourably with the utter waste in various forms of court display. But when the advantage to the people is in question, the test to be applied is a very simple and a very conclusive one. Man for man, were the people of Egypt better off under the europeanized Ismail than under the feeble Said or the vigorous but comparatively unenlightened Mehemet Ali? Everyone knows that their condition was infinitely worse, and that when the sultan issued his firman deposing Ismail it had reached the breaking point of wretchedness. Or, apply another test. Did the expenditure on public works pay? The bankruptcy of the exchequer is sufficient answer. A business that yields no dividends is obviously a losing concern to all involved, and in the Egyptian copartnership the many suffered for the follies of one man. The one European accomplishment which the khedive thoroughly and absolutely mastered was the art of borrowing; and his triumph is seen in the suffering and decrepitude of Egypt as we have known it in recent years. If good finance is good policy, bad finance is the sum and substance of national disaster. Every evil of Egypt dates from the unhappy time when Ismail gambled—and gambled in the most reckless manner—with the resources of the state.”

It need scarcely be said that the suspicions of an attempt to restore Ismail and of a coincident plot by Hamil were additional causes for intervention, and early in the year 1882 it had become evident that the responsibility of that intervention would fall upon England.

We have already seen with what difficulties our government had to contend in consequence of the objections of the new French ministry to follow the previous policy of M. Gambetta, and act in concert with England; or, on the other hand, to support the proposal of our foreign office that the sultan should be called upon temporarily to occupy Egypt under the control of France and England, and with definite guarantees and conditions.

During the delay and indecision caused by the difficulty of obtaining any decided concert with France the English ministry were reticent on the subject of their policy in Egypt, and the

pressure and taunts of the opposition failed to produce any expression of their intentions. It was not till the second week in June that Sir Charles Dilke laid on the table of the house the first instalment of the papers relating to Egypt, and they referred only to events which had occurred in the early part of the year. We have seen that in the next stage of negotiations the European powers were invited to a conference at Constantinople where we were ably represented by Earl Dufferin. The French cabinet reluctantly assented to the presence of a Turkish man-of-war at Alexandria, and repeated efforts were made to induce, first the khedive, then the sultan, and finally Dervish Pasha (who had been on a special mission from the sultan to the khedive) to put a stop to the military works which were being pushed forward on the fortifications of Alexandria. These latter representations remained without result, and yet so unwilling was our government to undertake the responsibility of acting alone that it was not till every effort had been exhausted to secure the alliance of France, and Alexandria was in a state of lawless riot, that our fleet prepared to take active measures.

Mr. Gladstone had declared in the House of Commons that the government would protect Tewfik's life and position against any pretender, and would oppose to the uttermost the substitution of Halim Pasha, whom Arabi was supposed to support. There was a strong feeling in some quarters that our government was too submissive to French influence, or too considerate of French susceptibilities. The English government had, in fact, endeavoured to sustain three principles, by which they sought to guide any action that might be taken:—To retain the co-operation of France, and fully to carry out the system of dual control which had been instituted by their predecessors, also with a view to propitiating French interests. To respect the claims and the position of the Sultan and the Porte, and at the same time to refuse to allow them to act independently in Egypt:—a difficult matter, because the sultan, as chief of the Mohammedan religion, was of importance in relation to many of the native rulers in India as well as to those in Algeria and in Tunis, where the French had, by their persistent demands, caused an irritable and resentful feeling. Lastly, it was

necessary for us to do our best to maintain something like a settled and regular government in Egypt, that we might thereby secure our predominating influence on the highway to India, and also guard against the imposition upon the country of an international control, which would inevitably lead to European discord and ultimate confusion.

For the latter reason our government was ready at the first meeting of the conference at Constantinople to adhere to what was called the self-denying protocol, first suggested by the French. By this abstinence from undue claims to interference the two western powers were afterwards able to ask for the co-operation of the sultan, and while inviting him to send troops to restore order in Egypt, could impose restrictions which would have made such an expedition little more than, if as much as, a police force under the Dual Control. Of course there were delays. The sultan did not readily consent to the terms on which his interposition would alone be accepted, and while the conditions were being discussed and settled the riots and massacres in Alexandria, the bombardment of the forts, and the withdrawal of the French fleet from active co-operation, left England the sole representative of "the united action and authority of Europe."

In reviewing the events of the first half of the year, Lord Granville, writing to Lord Dufferin on July 11, the day of the bombardment of the Alexandria forts, thus summed up the situation:—

"The record of events in Egypt during the last few months shows that the whole administrative power has fallen into the hands of certain military chiefs, devoid of experience and knowledge, who, with the support of the soldiers, have set at naught the constituted authorities, and insisted on compliance with their demands. Such a condition of affairs cannot fail to be disastrous to the welfare of any civilized country. There seemed to be a moment when a firm assertion of authority by the khedive with the countenance of the sovereign power, backed by evidence of the support of England and France, and with no uncertain prospect of material intervention if the necessity arose, might suffice to

produce submission on the part of the officers, and to bring the movement within bounds. The attempt was made and unhappily has failed.

“ Her majesty’s government now see no alternative but a recourse to force to put an end to a state of affairs which has become intolerable. In their opinion it would be most convenient, and most in accordance with the principles of international law and usage, that the force to be so employed should be that of the sovereign power. If this method of procedure should prove impracticable in consequence of unwillingness on the part of the sultan, it will become necessary to devise other measures. Her majesty’s government continue to hold the view expressed in their circular of February 11th, that any intervention in Egypt should represent the united action and authority of Europe. They have, in fact, no interests or objects in regard to Egypt which are inconsistent with those of Europe in general, nor any interests which are inconsistent with those of the Egyptian people. Their desire is that the navigation of the Suez Canal should be maintained open and unrestricted; that Egypt should be well and quietly governed, free from predominating influence on the part of any single power; that international engagements shall be observed; and that those British commercial and industrial interests which have been so largely developed in Egypt shall receive due protection and shall not be exposed to outrage—a principle which is not applicable only to Egypt, but is essential for our national progress in all parts of the world. The policy pursued by them has been consistent: they have loyally acted up to their engagements with France; they have been anxious also that the other powers should be informed and consulted in all matters affecting the position of the country. The action to which their admiral has been compelled to resort has not altered their views in this respect.”

The action of the government in ordering what was represented to be an armed intervention in the affairs of Egypt was denounced by some speakers both in and out of parliament; and questions were asked whether the bombardment of Alexandria had been

for the purpose of protecting British interests or to protect the interest of British and French bondholders; but the majority of members in the house, and a still larger comparative majority of the people outside it, did not take this view of the case, and approved the definite though tardy decision that had been come to. Mr. Gourley moved an adjournment of the house for the purpose of obtaining some explanation of the government policy, and Sir Wilfrid Lawson, on seconding the motion, characterized the intervention and the bombardment as a national crime, declaring that we were at war, having no distinct information what we were fighting for, and without there having been any declaration of war. He protested against what had taken place as "an act of international atrocity," and "a cowardly, and cruel, and criminal act." Like most violent statements this carried few people away with it, and Mr. Gladstone's reply was received with considerable satisfaction, though he declined to discuss the reason of the withdrawal of the French fleet, or our exclusive exercise of our responsibility. He would not admit that we were at war with Egypt. Our action there was to break down a military tyranny which the government knew was in defiance of the orders of the sultan and of the wishes of the khedive. The government had abjured every selfish object, and it was not against the people of Egypt, but against those who were oppressing the people, that operations were being directed. The measures taken at Alexandria were strictly measures of self-defence, and the sufferers by them were those who sought to establish a system of military violence in spite of the wishes and against the interests of the Egyptian people.

Even the withdrawal of Mr. Bright from the cabinet did not in the slightest degree influence the conclusion at which Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues had arrived. Mr. Bright's explanation of the reasons for his retirement were brief enough. In fact he began by saying he had no explanation to make. "There seems nothing to explain, and I have nothing to defend. The simple fact is, that I could not agree with my late colleagues in the government in their policy with regard to the Egyptian question.

It has been said, Why have I not sooner left the government? Why have I postponed it to this time? I may answer that by saying, that my profound regard for my right honourable friend at the head of the government, and my regard also for those who now sit with him, have induced me to remain with them until the very last moment, when I found it no longer possible to retain my office in the cabinet. The fact is, that there was a disagreement to a large extent founded on principle; and now I may say, that if I had remained in office it must have been under these circumstances—either that I must have submitted silently to many measures which I myself altogether condemned, or I must have remained in office in constant conflict with my colleagues. Therefore, it was better for them and better for me—the house will, I am sure, unanimously agree to that—that I should have asked my right honourable friend to permit me to retire, and to place my resignation in the hands of the queen. The house knows—many members at any rate who have had an opportunity of observing any of the facts of my political life know—that for forty years at least I have endeavoured to teach my countrymen an opinion and doctrine which I hold, namely, that the moral law is intended, not only for individual life, but for the life and practice of states in their dealings with one another. I think that in the present case there has been a manifest violation both of international law and of the moral law, and, therefore, it is impossible for me to give my support to it. I cannot repudiate what I have preached and taught during a rather long political life. I cannot turn my back upon myself and deny all that I have taught to many thousands of others during the forty years that I have been permitted at public meetings and in this house to address my countrymen. Only one word more. I asked my calm judgment and my conscience what was the part I ought to take. They pointed it out to me, as I think, with an unerring finger, and I am endeavouring to follow it.”

Mr. Gladstone had also, no doubt, inquired of *his* calm judgment and his conscience, and probably felt that this country was justified in interposing between the revolted troops and the

rebellious followers of Arabi on the one hand and the Europeans and the people of Egypt on the other, even though a large proportion of those people were believed to be ready to support the revolt which would end in anarchy, succeeded by tyranny and oppression. The premier commented but briefly on Mr. Bright's statement, expressing the regret of those who were, and still desired to be, Mr. Bright's colleagues. He declared that he agreed with that gentleman in thinking that the moral law was as applicable to the conduct of nations as to that of individuals, but he differed from him in this particular application of it.

It was then that we were committed to a military intervention, and the decision of the government was supported by public opinion. It was expected, however, that the delay which subsequently occurred was for the purpose of effectually suppressing the revolt, and—when after the bombardment of Alexandria no troops were landed, and it was known that the forces of Arabi had been able to retire unmolested and take up a defensive and offensive position—great dissatisfaction was expressed in many quarters at a hesitation which appeared to be inexplicable, and was believed to be unnecessary. Thus the opposition to the government consisted both of those who contended that it was impolitic, if not criminal, to have done anything at all, and those who declared that we had not done enough, and had lost the opportunity of interposing effectually, first by waiting on France, and afterwards by permitting weak and unimportant scruples to cause delay, which would be followed by more serious consequences than if we had at once occupied Alexandria, and not only prevented the destruction of a large part of the city and the loss of many lives, but cut off the troops of Arabi from retreat, forced them to surrender, and crushed the revolt.

In the debate on the vote of credit all shades of opinion were expressed. The government was severely blamed by many members of the opposition, as well as by a few of those who in general supported it; but the ministry was strong enough in its following to obtain the support both of parliament and the country; and, as we have seen, when once it was determined to call out the

reserves, and send an adequate force to Egypt, the troops and all the equipments were despatched with remarkable promptitude and almost unexampled efficiency.

Doubtless one reason for the complacency with which the long-delayed but now determined attitude of England was regarded both here and abroad, was the emphatic declaration of Mr. Chamberlain on behalf of the ministry, that the government had done all in their power to enlist the action of the sultan on their side, and that they had at no time shown any distrust of the Chamber of Notables. This was in reply to Mr. Gorst, who had accused them on both points. Mr. Chamberlain also dwelt with emphasis on the danger to Europeans all over the East, if Arabi were to be allowed to defy the powers; and he repeated the assertion previously made, that the Egyptian ex-minister of war was a mere military adventurer and opposed to the national party. It was only for the purpose of putting down the revolt, and liberating the true exhibition of national feeling, that the government had undertaken armed intervention. When this object should be effected they would recall the forces without attempting to carry out any selfish purpose.

All the time that these discussions were going on, the diplomatic conferences were being held at Constantinople, where the difficulty was at once to secure the support of the sultan, and to prevent his influence from taking the form of an armed occupation of Egypt. He was urged to proclaim Arabi a rebel, and to countenance the occupation of the country by a force under the command of French and English generals. After apparently interminable delays and adjournments that each representative at the conference might consult his government upon every proposal, and upon verbal alterations suggested for insertion in the protocols, the difficulty was solved by the successive events which made decisive action necessary for the preservation of the country from anarchy. On the 28th of July the German ambassador in Paris notified to the French government the resolution, agreed to by Austria, Russia, Germany, and Italy, of placing the canal under the joint protection of the six great powers. It was on the following day that the

French ships withdrew from all active co-operation, and on the 2d of August Admiral Hewett occupied Suez on behalf of the khedive, while at the same time it was agreed—on the proposal of the Italian ambassador—that a purely maritime service for the police and supervision of the canal should be established, with the proviso that the land police service should be only temporary. The next business was the arrangement of the military convention, and the text of the proclamation against Arabi. Drafts of these documents were constantly passing between the powers, and again numberless alterations and suggestions occupied many days. Although it had been authoritatively stated that on the 10th of August Ottoman troops would start for Egypt, the month passed without a single Turkish soldier being landed there, and as we know, the campaign was concluded and the rebellion suppressed without Turkish intervention or co-operation.

To understand the attitude of the French government and their withdrawal from active co-operation with England after the combined fleets had reached Alexandria, it is desirable to glance briefly at the course of events in relation to the policy of the ministry of M. de Freycinet, which had succeeded that of M. Gambetta.

In the early part of the year, when the English and French controllers-general were protesting that if their powers were restricted by the Egyptian Chamber of Notables so that they would have no control over the budget, they would be unable to prevent national bankruptcy, fears had arisen in France that the cabinet of M. de Freycinet might be led by England to consent to an armed intervention. On the 23d of February that minister stated that he firmly hoped no intervention would be necessary, and that the result would be obtained by the attitude of the government. "The chamber must hope that we shall not take part in any military intervention. The chamber may be certain that as long as we are on these benches no adventure need be feared." This was all very well; but only six weeks had then elapsed since it had become evident that there would be a struggle between the khedive and the military party who had joined Arabi, and the consuls of France and England had been instructed to assure Tewfik of the

support of both powers. It was but five weeks since the Porte had thereupon remonstrated, declaring the action of France and England to be unnecessary and contrary to precedent. The effect of this declaration of the sultan's government had encouraged the Egyptian ministers to menace the European control, and to compel the khedive to sign the decree conferring on the Chamber of Notables the right to vote the budget, and thus to abrogate the powers assigned to the controllers by the decree of 1879, which gave them the right to investigate every part of the Egyptian financial system, and made them rank with ministers, having a voice in all questions concerning the financial situation of Egypt.

When the report of the controllers was presented to the khedive it showed a surplus of revenue over expenditure of £600,000 yearly for 1880-1881, a surplus which was devoted partly to public works and partly to the redemption of the debt; but the budget of the chamber for 1882 had imperilled the liquidation scheme by exceeding the amount of the allowances fixed by the Commission of Liquidation, and by increasing by nearly one-half the military estimates. At the same time the execution of reforms in provincial administration and all other projects of improvement had been arrested by the military disturbances.

Then came the defiance of the khedive's authority by his ministers, and the events already referred to in these pages, the result of which was that M. de Freycinet—who, in February had firmly hoped that no intervention would be needed—telegraphed on the 15th of May to M. de Noailles, the French minister at Constantinople, saying that the governments of France and England had decided to send to Alexandria a squadron then in course of formation at Suda, and instructing him so to communicate with the sultan, by means of a moderate hint, as to aid in preventing all Turkish meddling in Egypt. It will be remembered that the English government had been anxious to secure the restricted co-operation of the Porte, and that France resisted it, not perhaps without good diplomatic reasons if we regard the subsequent intrigues of the Turkish government. Now that there appeared to be an intention actively to co-operate with England, and the

English and French ambassadors were to act in concert, the Porte, as we have seen, declared that there was no necessity for the despatch of a French and English squadron, and even went so far as to assert that order had been restored in Egypt. When the Egyptian ministry had refused to resign, or to banish Arabi, and endeavoured to compel the khedive to reply to the demand of the French and English representatives by affirming the incompetence of England and France to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt, M. de Freycinet suddenly changed his opinions, and after having for three months refused to consent to the English proposals for a limited Turkish intervention, declared that if such intervention took place at the request of England and France it would be unobjectionable. A council held at the Elysée, on May 29th, agreed on a proposal for a conference in which France, England, and a Turkish delegate were to take part, in order to arrive at a provisional settlement of the existing crisis, but not for the purpose of preventing the conference, then in preparation, at Constantinople, and in which the other powers were to be represented.

Then followed the application made to the sultan by the Marquis de Noailles and Lord Dufferin to declare in favour of the khedive. Dervish Pasha was sent to Alexandria as commissary by the Porte and the riots broke out in Alexandria. The situation was again changed, the conference at Constantinople met on June 22d, and in the French chamber M. de Freycinet said that after the exchange of views which had just taken place, the great powers had recognized, on the invitation of France and England, the expediency of deliberating on the present situation in Egypt; the government of the Republic and the English government had consequently prepared to convene the representatives of the six great powers in conference.

It was then that the hand of Prince Bismarck began to be seen in the operations. The French people thought that they were in a dilemma: that they were being drawn by England into an enterprise which, if they actively prosecuted, would leave them exposed to the attack which they believed would then be made on

them by the German chancellor. This apprehension was sufficient to embarrass the French ministry, and the result was that the French men-of-war at Alexandria took no part in the bombardment, but steamed off to Port Said, leaving only two small gun-boats.

The position of the French ministry was precarious enough before; it now became disastrous. M. de Freycinet made an effort to maintain its existence by assuming that the protection of the Suez Canal was a question entirely separate from that of affairs in Egypt, and in this our government assisted him by joining in a representation to the conference that as all action should receive the sanction of Europe the conference itself should designate the powers who in case of necessity should protect the canal. Bismarck, however, was reluctant that France should, even in conjunction with England, be appointed conservator of European interests in the canal, and persistently refused to join in any such arrangement. A last effort was made by the French minister, and again the English government joined him in informing the conference that France and England were ready to protect the canal, and inviting other powers to join them. This was on the 24th of June, but some days elapsed and none of the other powers accepted the invitation.

It became evident that the De Freycinet cabinet could not much longer retain office; and Bismarck, who, though he wished to have them in his grasp, had no desire to replace them by a less vacillating or a stronger and more determined government, thought he saw a way out of the difficulty by inducing Turkey to accept the invitation of the powers to send troops to Egypt. He had not, perhaps, counted on having to deal with England, but the aspect of affairs had changed. We had been rapidly gathering our forces, and our government now demanded, that before Turkish troops should be landed in Egypt the Porte should conclude a military convention. The other powers had left the work to France and England. England had been deserted by France and left alone. Alone she would stand, but her position must be recognized by the powers who had promised their moral support. By requiring this convention before a Turkish soldier should be permitted to land in Egypt, we practically took the matter of intervention out of the hands of the

conference. Prince Bismarck had now to effect a diplomatic change of position, especially as he appeared desirous of saving the De Freycinet cabinet; and it was understood that he therefore instigated Italy to propose what he had before been instrumental in preventing, namely, a joint European protection of the canal by France and England with the consent of the other powers.

When the debate on the naval credit was opened in the French chamber on the 19th of July, it was believed that the powers represented in the conference would comply with the request of England and France and issue a mandate giving them the joint-protection of the canal. The alliance and co-operation with England was warmly commended by M. Gambetta, who said, that even at the cost of the greatest sacrifice that alliance should not be broken off. The position of France was, it seemed, to be ensured by the mandate of the conference conferring upon her the joint-protection of the canal, and the naval credit passed the chamber by a very large majority. But when the bill came before the committee of the senate, the minister had to repeat the intelligence that the conference had not consented to give the mandate. This was so serious a change, that on the motion for raising a second credit for the purpose of the protection of the canal, the debate was turned against the ministry; and M. Clemenceau said, that in contemplating the possibility of English, French, Italian, and German troops side by side on the banks of the canal he could distinguish the handiwork of a man who was preparing a conflagration in Europe. Almost as large a proportional majority voted against the credit as had supported the government in the former vote of the chamber; the De Freycinet cabinet resigned, and France had practically no more connection that year with affairs in Egypt or with the subsequent campaign.

It was believed by astute politicians that this was the aim of Prince Bismarck, who, being anxious to avoid any European complications, opposed the endeavour to form an Anglo-French alliance for the occupation of Egypt, which, he said, might lead to a conflict similar to that which had followed the Austro-Prussian occupation of Schleswig-Holstein; and when England took the

matter into her own hands, though it was in apparent opposition to his proposal for Turkish intervention, he gave our government the support of Germany.

Having thus given a backward glance at the conditions which had ended in the intervention of England—who commenced active operations with the decision and promptitude which were alike necessary for the successful suppression of the rebellion and the compensation for previous delays—we may return to the prosecution of the campaign and its operations after the fight at Kassassin to the final victory at Tel-el-Kebir.

We left our troops resting after the battle at Kassassin, with the people of the country bringing provisions into camp, in consequence of the assurances of the two pashas who had joined our forces, and were using their influence to negotiate with the Bedouins for the purchase of provisions.

The first result of their negotiation was that on the 1st of September the nomads brought in 200 sheep, which furnished a welcome ration of fresh meat to the troops. On the same day a large number of labourers arrived from Cyprus. This afforded a vast relief to the over-worked men at Ismailia; hitherto no native labourer had been available, and the whole work had fallen upon the sailors, the Royal Engineers, Indian Sappers, and the men of the regiments last landed. The sailors had, indeed, been doing the chief work of the expedition. Upon them fell the enormous labour of landing all the stores for the expedition. It was they alone who had supplied the troops along the canal with food, and some soreness had been felt that, whereas the toil of the expedition fell upon their shoulders, they had hitherto been unrepresented at the front. This feeling was, however, allayed by the invitation by the general to the admiral to furnish a naval brigade of 200 men with machine-guns to go to the front.

Two more engines had now arrived, and on the 2nd of September Sir Garnet Wolseley and Admiral Seymour went up with Admiral Hoskins, the Duke of Teck, and several others, to inspect the situation in front. They started early in the morning

from Ismailia in a steam-launch. At Mahuta they took train to Kassassin, but on the way down the engine, as usual, broke down, and the engineer officer in charge reported that it could not be repaired on the spot. There was nothing to be done but for the party in the train to make their way on foot to Mahuta, and soon the generals, admirals, and staff were tramping along through the sand.

At Mahuta the steam-launch was ready, and the party were taken back; the distinguished officers having had some feeble taste of what marching through the sands in the sun meant, and this hour's work no doubt enabled them to appreciate all the better the continuous labour of the men at Mahsamah. The Household Cavalry had now established a hospital. No medicines whatever had been sent up from Ismailia; but Dr. Hume-Spry impounded the contents of one of Arabi's field hospitals, which was captured at Mahsamah, and established a hospital for the Guards. The beds were made out of materials found in Arabi's camp together with all appliances, no conveniences whatever for the sick being forthcoming from Ismailia.

Large numbers of men were treated in this impromptu hospital for wounds, dysentery, sunstroke, and ophthalmia. The canal continued to fall steadily at the rate of an inch a day, and the large ships' launches could no longer be taken up. The heat, contrary to expectations, was increasing rather than diminishing, and the men suffered severely from the glare on the shadeless desert. In front the cavalry vedettes of both parties watched each other vigilantly night and day, and whenever an attempt was made on our side the enemy's cavalry appeared in such force that nothing short of a serious engagement would have enabled the reconnoissance to be carried out.

Colonel Tulloch, however, made one or two daring rides close up to Tel-el-Kebir and ascertained the general disposition of the enemy's camp. But although the line of railway and canal as far as Kassassin was completely in our hands it was by no means safe for small parties, still less for single individuals, to proceed from one camp to the other. The wandering Bedouins, although ap-

parently friendly and ready to bring in sheep and other provisions for sale, could seldom resist the temptation of taking a shot at any single man whom they might see. Several of our sentries were killed in this way, as well as men strolling a short distance from the camp.

An effort was made to punish these people; and a party of the Royal Irish, with the 13th Bengal Cavalry, went out from Mahsamah on the 4th to a village a mile distant on the other side of the canal. They started before daybreak and surprised the village asleep. It was found, however, to be inhabited only by peasants, who declared that they had been robbed of everything in the way of stores and supplies by Arabi's troops when stationed on the canal.

The work of accumulating stores went on slowly. No railway men had been sent out from England, and although the Royal Engineers are supposed, in addition to all their multifarious accomplishments, to possess a knowledge of locomotive work, that knowledge was so slight that the delays and stoppages were perpetual. For some time only two trains could be despatched daily with supplies, and these took five hours to do the twenty miles to Mahsamah.

The troops were poorly fed, "tin meat" being the staple of their food, impure water from the canal their drink; nor had they the alleviation of the two small luxuries of which soldiers think so much. Although the carriage of tobacco is so light that a camel load would have supplied the whole troops for two or three days none was sent to them, nor did they receive the allowance of rum, which, mixed with water and taken before bed-time, would have at once acted as a restorative after the fatigue of a day's work under a blazing sun, and would have corrected the effect of the poisonous decaying matters of all kinds in the water.

Arabi used every effort at this time to induce the Bedouins to block the Suez Canal, but his success was small; a few ships were fired at by wandering parties, and the pipes conveying fresh water from Ismailia to Port Said were once cut, but nothing further was done; nor, indeed, could the Arabs, had they been allowed

unmolested to gather upon the canal and endeavour to obstruct it, have effected anything in that direction.

The canal is of great extent, being large enough for two vessels of a large size to pass each other. Nowhere is it much above the level of the surrounding country, and at these places the bank is of great width and slopes so gradually down that an enormous quantity of earth would have to be moved to enable the water to escape. The only way in which the canal could have been blocked would have been by sinking a large and heavily-laden vessel across it. This might have been managed by a well-placed torpedo or possibly by a battery of field-guns; but as the Arabs possess neither torpedoes nor cannon they were impotent to arrest the stream of vessels which passed up and down the canal.

Arabi, on his part, was taking every advantage of the long delay in our advance. He was constantly strengthening his intrenchments at Tel-el-Kebir, had brought up all the troops from Cairo, and had fetched from Damietta the black regiments which formed the *élite* of the Egyptian army. His troops made frequent reconnaissances to endeavour to discover what we were doing, and several trifling skirmishes took place between them and our mounted infantry and cavalry. The frequent appearances of strong bodies of Arabi's cavalry within sight of our outposts kept the troops continually on the alert; for although the enemy seldom ventured within gun-shot distance of our pickets, they might at any moment sweep down in force, and the troops were therefore obliged to stand to arms whenever large bodies of the enemy's cavalry were in sight.

Some engines arrived from England at the end of the first week in September, and thenceforth the work of accumulating stores at the front progressed more rapidly. The troops were now moving gradually forward. The regiments which had hitherto remained on board ship were landed, and it became evident to the impatient troops that the end of their sufferings was approaching, and that the attack was soon to begin. The initiative was, however, taken by the Egyptians.

Early on the morning of the 9th a long line of Egyptian soldiers was seen marching down towards Kassassin from west and north-west, their white uniforms showing clear in the horizontal rays of the rising sun. Towards the north the ridges were crowded with them, and heavy masses could be seen on the south bank of the canal. At six o'clock the Bengal Lancers, stationed above the camp, were suddenly driven in by a large body of the enemy's cavalry, while columns of steam arising in the misty air behind showed that several trains were coming up from Tel-el-Kebir. Two of the Indian vedettes galloped off to camp to give warning of the approaching attack.

False alarms, however, had been so frequent that the news was received with languid disbelief, and the troops proceeded to fall in slowly and reluctantly. Trooper after trooper came galloping in from the front; and General Graham was at last convinced that the enemy this time were in earnest, and the infantry and guns were ordered to move out of camp. But the 13th Bengal Lancers, who had smartly turned out at the first alarm to support their vedettes, were now being driven back by the advancing masses of the enemy. The circle of sand-hills round Kassassin were already in their hands, and just as the column was marching out of camp thirty pieces of artillery opened fire in a semicircle upon it.

Their shells plumped in numbers into the camp, exploding among the tents and throwing the dust high in the air. Horses and cattle, panic-stricken at the sudden din, broke their fastenings and piquet ropes, and careered wildly through the camp, while the Indian followers shouted and ran and tried in vain to arrest the stampede of the animals. The attack of the enemy was, indeed, skilfully and well arranged, and it was not the fault of their leaders if the assault turned out a failure. Our infantry were in imminent danger of being outflanked. The commanding positions were all in the enemy's hands, and line after line of his infantry and cavalry could be seen coming up across the sand-hills.

But General Graham's force was now vastly larger than it had been on the occasion of the previous attack. He had under him six battalions of infantry, the Household Brigade, and Indian cavalry,

and two batteries of artillery; and the aspect of affairs changed as soon as we took the offensive. General Drury Lowe, with the cavalry, rode out far to the right of the camp, and, threatening the enemy's left, forced them to desist from continuing their flanking movement against us on that side.

The enemy's cavalry rode out parallel with our own, and both parties went far out into the desert, each endeavouring to get round the other, occasionally halting, while the horse artillery on both sides opened fire. In the meantime our artillery at the camp had come into play, and although inferior in numbers to that of the enemy they were not long in obtaining the mastery over them. Their infantry had advanced on either side of the canal and railway and on the slopes of the sand-hills, and at a distance of 800 yards opened a continuous rifle-fire.

The marines and the 60th Rifles advanced to meet the enemy coming by the lines of the railway and the canal, while the 84th Regiment moved forward against those descending the slopes, and while the rest of the infantry now formed in support, three regiments came into action and opened fire. The roll of musketry on both sides was heavy and continuous. The Egyptians, however, numerous as they were, could not withstand the advance of our troops, and before they had covered half the intervening distance the enemy hesitated, fell back, and were soon in full flight.

The collapse was sudden indeed. The enemy had, as was learned from a wounded prisoner who fell into our hands, eighteen battalions, and these armed with breechloaders and occupying the commanding positions should have committed tremendous destruction upon the six English battalions advancing against them. Their fire was, however, so wild and hurried that we had only two men killed. So hasty was the retreat of the enemy that they left three guns behind them, two of which fell into the hands of the marines and the third was captured by the 60th.

So incessantly did the Egyptians retire when our troops advanced that it was difficult to believe that a serious attack had ever been intended, and it was for some time supposed that Arabi had only intended to make a reconnaissance in force; but the

statements of all those who fell into our hands were distinct that Arabi's orders were that Kassassin was to be carried, and the failure arose simply because the Egyptians would not face our troops.

The effect of this affair was naturally to inspire our troops with the most profound contempt for the Egyptians, and there can be no question that had General Graham's force at once moved forward Tel-el-Kebir might have been taken at once and without the loss which afterwards attended the assault on that place. Our infantry pursued the enemy right up to his works and the artillery engaged the guns there, while General Buller, who accompanied the cavalry, was actually in consultation with General Drury Lowe upon the expediency of the column pushing forward to Zagazig and so entirely cutting off the retreat of Arabi's army, when a messenger arrived from General Wolseley, who was still at Ismailia, ordering the troops to return to Kassassin.

During its turning movement the cavalry came in contact with five regiments, each a thousand strong, coming from Salahieh with the intention of coming down upon the right rear of the camp and so entirely surrounding us. They made, however, no resistance to our cavalry, but broke and ran at once, their retreat being hastened by the magnificent practice of Borrodaile's horse-artillery battery. Whenever the enemy made an attempt to stand, the guns opened their fire, bursting shell after shell over them, while the cavalry pushed round on the Egyptian flank, and thus 5000 infantry were driven off the field and hustled into Tel-el-Kebir by the cavalry and horse-artillery only, an occurrence almost without precedent in war.

During the long advance the cavalry captured one gun with its entire team, which was abandoned by the enemy in consequence of one of our shells bursting just overhead as they were limbering up. At one spot twelve bodies of men, killed by a single shell, were counted, while at another twenty-five lay dead, killed by the explosion of three shells; altogether from sixty to seventy men had been killed by the horse-artillery battery, and the vast superiority of shrapnel over percussion shells was again

proved, for although the enemy's fire was exceedingly accurate its results had been almost nil.

Our own infantry fire had not been so effective, indeed the enemy fell back before our men were near enough for anything like accurate shooting, and only some five-and-forty dead were left on the ground over which the infantry advanced. It was fortunate for the enemy that when they ran our cavalry was so far away on the right; had they been near at hand they would have cut up the flying Egyptians with great effect.

At the sound of firing the Guards started from Mahuta and arrived at sunset, greatly disappointed to find that they were again too late to take share in the fighting. The following morning the Highland Brigade, of four regiments, also marched into camp. Kassassin now presented a very animated appearance. The little village had rapidly grown into a tented city three miles long by half a mile broad, whose streets swarmed with guards, rifles, Highlanders, infantry of the line, marines, blue-jackets of the naval brigade, artillerymen, men of the Household Cavalry, Indian cavalry, Indian sepoy, and camp-followers.

Of artillery there were now gathered there sixty guns, and the storm which had been so long gathering was about to burst upon Tel-el-Kebir. On the evening of the 11th Sir Garnet Wolseley and his staff arrived, and the next morning at daybreak reconnoitred the enemy's position. In spite of all the efforts that had been made but five days of reserve provisions for the whole force had been accumulated, but it was certain that great stores would be found in the enemy's camp, and the country beyond Tel-el-Kebir was known to be rich and fertile.

The 87th arrived that morning, and the pontoon train also came up, so that the force would now be able to cross the canal at any point at will. On the afternoon of the 12th orders were given that the force would march that night to attack the enemy. All tents were to be struck by half-past six, and all baggage piled up along the railway opposite the camps of the respective corps, ready for transport in the rear of the army. When this work was completed the regiments were to form up and march to the spots pointed out

to them, where they were to halt and bivouac till ordered to fall in for the advance.

Each soldier was to carry a hundred rounds of ammunition and two days' rations, with the exception of meat. The water-bottles were to be filled with tea. The regimental transports were to carry two days' full rations and thirty rounds of reserve ammunition per man. The naval brigade were attached to the 40-pounder on the railway truck. This gun had rendered good service in the fight two days before. The seven batteries of Royal Artillery were formed into one artillery brigade under General Goodenough. The two horse-artillery batteries were attached to the cavalry, who were to make a detour and come down in the rear of the enemy's position.

A deep sense of satisfaction and relief pervaded the army on the issue of the order. The long period of inactivity, discomfort, and hardship was at last at an end, and the battle was at hand. No one entertained the slightest doubt as to the result, although it was generally felt that an attack upon the position which the enemy had for weeks been engaged in fortifying and intrenching was by no means the trifling matter which it would have been had they pushed in on the rear of the panic-stricken Egyptians after their repulse at Kassassin.

The camp soon presented a busy scene. From end to end the men were at work. Round the commissariat stores were parties of men from each regiment drawing the rations to be carried in the haversacks and by the regimental transports. Line by line the long rows of tents fell to the ground, and as fast as they did so they were rolled up, stowed away in their bags, and carried down to the side of the railway. The men laughed and joked at their work in the highest spirits, and in a marvellously short time the tented city was gone. The spot where it had stood was again a sandy desert swarming like an ant-hill with moving men, and marked here and there by the long lines of the cavalry and artillery horses.

Before dusk the last meal was eaten, and the troops formed up in front of their respective camping grounds. Staff officers rode here and there, and as each brigade was ready one of these officers

led it out across the desert to the place which it was to occupy in the line. No martial music regulated the time of march, no trumpet or bugle calls rose in the air, for the order was that all orders were to be conveyed by word of mouth, and that no bugle was to be sounded until the work was done.

The first move was a short one, being only to the sand-hills above the camp. There each battalion as it arrived in its place halted and piled arms until fourteen thousand men were ranged in their formation ready to advance. Then the order was given that the troops might lie down, and it was soon understood that the movement forward would not commence until one in the morning. For a time the low hum of voices sounded along the line. Here and there rose a flash of a match as the soldiers lit their pipes, each flash being followed by the voice of a sergeant or officer, "Put out that light there," for the orders were that no matches were to be struck. The order was by no means strictly enforced, as it was felt that it did not really apply until the force began to advance.

In an hour the hum of voices died away, the men stretched themselves on the sand, and for a while silence reigned in the desert. At one o'clock the word was passed round, and the men rose and fell in. Never did an army get more quietly under arms. The very orders appeared to be given in lower tones. There was a low stir with the clinking of metal as the men unplied their arms and fell in, and then the great line moved forward, its footsteps deadened by the sand. There was no striking of matches now, no talking in the ranks. Every man was braced up to tension point by the excitement, for at any moment the challenge of the Bedouin horsemen scattered far out on the plain in front of the enemy might be heard in the still air.

The night was very dark, and the march was directed by the officers of the intelligence department, who rode ahead of the line and who steered their course by compass, for in no other way could the direction be kept across the sand-hills. None who took part in that strange night march were likely ever to forget it. An occasional clash of steel and the deep rumble of the guns and of

the transport animals in the rear, the jingling of the chain-harness, and the crunching of the wheels over the pebble-strewed sand, alone broke the silence. There were frequent halts to enable the regiments to keep touch with each other, for in the darkness it was next to impossible that all the component parts of the long line should march in exactly the same direction.

The cavalry and the two batteries of horse-artillery had moved north with orders to sweep round the enemy's line at daylight. Graham's brigade were on the right of the line. Next to these came the Guards under the Duke of Connaught, who were to act in support of Graham's brigade when the fighting began.

On their left were the seven batteries of the royal artillery, forty-two guns moving in line with a brigade in support. The Highland brigade extended between the artillery and the canal on the line of railway. The naval brigade moved along with their 40-pounder gun on a truck. South of the canal, and somewhat in rear of the general line, the Indian brigade moved forward. After two hours' marching the troops were halted. They were now not far from the enemy's intrenchments. So far no challenge had been heard. Nothing betokened that the Egyptians had any idea that the British army had left its camp. The line was again formed, and when all was in readiness the troops on the right moved forward. They had further to go than had the Highlanders to reach the position assigned to them.

The enemy's intrenchments formed a vast square whose front stretched across the canal. It consisted of lines of solid intrenchments bound together by wattles, the front face being four miles long and the flanking face two miles. At intervals were bastions mounting guns, and protected in front by series of deep trenches. Towards the canal on the right strong works had been erected in advance on some sand-hills, and had the attack been made here the loss of life would have been very great. This part of the line was, however, avoided, the Highlanders leaving these positions on their left.

The Highlanders would attack the front face north of the canal, and as soon as their attack was successful the Indian brigade

would fall upon the line south of the canal. Graham's brigade and the Guards were to attack the north face of the square, and had therefore to continue their march for some distance, and then swing round to face the point of attack.

Daylight was just breaking when the troops arrived within a thousand yards of the enemy's lines. Another short halt was made to enable the fighting line to be formed and the last preparations to be completed. A perfect silence still reigned over the plain, and it was difficult to believe that some fourteen thousand men stood in a semicircle round the enemy's lines ready to dash forward at the low sand-heaps in their front, behind which twice as many men slumbered unsuspecting of their presence.

Swiftly and silently the Highlanders moved forward to the attack. The 74th were next to the canal. On their right were the Cameronians. The Gordon Highlanders continued the line and the Black Watch were on the right flank. The 46th and the 60th formed the second line. General Hamley was in command of the division. No word was spoken, no shot was fired, until the line was within three hundred yards of the enemy's earthworks; nor up to that time did a sound in the enemy's camp betray that he was conscious of our presence. Then a single shot was fired from the line of sand-heaps, and almost instantly a terrific fire flashed along the whole line, and a storm of bullets whizzed over the heads of the advancing troops.

Reference has already been made to the occasion when, after the return of the troops from Egypt, Sir Archibald Alison was presented by the citizens of Glasgow with a sword of honour. That ceremony took place in October, 1883, and in acknowledging the great compliment that had been paid him, the gallant commander of the Highland Brigade, reminding his hearers that the honour conferred on him arose from the desire of the citizens to honour the national regiments of Scotland,—told in brief but eloquent narrative the story of a night—that of Tel-el-Kebir—as it fell to the lot of the Highland Brigade. "The orders of Sir Garnet Wolseley were to march, covered by the darkness of the night, straight over the desert on the enemy's

works—some five miles distant, and to storm without firing a shot the moment we reached them. My division leader, Sir Edward Hamley, agreed with me in thinking that any change of formation in the darkness must be avoided, and therefore the brigade formed for the march in the order in which it was to attack—two lines two deep. The rifles were unloaded, the bayonets unfixed, and the men warned that only two signals would be given—a word to ‘fix bayonets,’—a bugle sound ‘to storm.’ When we had got over the longest part of the way a halt took place to rest the men, and now an incident occurred which shows the extreme difficulty of a night march, and tests the discipline of a force. When the word ‘to halt’ was passed in a whisper from the centre, it took some time to reach the flanks, which thus halted considerably thrown forward, something in a crescent shape. In the darkness of that moonless night none of us observed this, and thus it came about that when the march was resumed the two horns of the crescent swung round so as almost to meet. The instant this was noticed a halt was quietly ordered, and as quietly made. The company of direction was re-dressed, the other companies of the battalion of direction silently formed upon it, the other battalions upon them, and the march was resumed. Such a formation in such circumstances, and so carried out, was a fair test of the discipline of the brigade. I never felt anything so solemn as that night march, nor do I believe that any one who was in it will ever forget it. No light but the faint star, no sound but the slow measured tread of the men on the desert sand. Just as the first tinge of light appeared in the east a few rifle shots fired out of the darkness showed that the enemy’s outposts were reached. The sharp click of the bayonets then answered the word ‘to fix’—a few minutes more of deep silence, and then a blaze of musketry flashed across our front, and passed far away to each flank, by the light of which we saw the swarthy faces of the Egyptians, surmounted by their red tarbooshes, lining the dark rampart before us. I never felt such a relief in my life. I knew then that Wolseley’s star was bright, that the dangerous zone of fire had been passed in the darkness, that all had come now to depend

on a hand-to-hand struggle. A solitary bugle rang out, and with a cheer and with a bound that would have done your hearts good to see, the Highlanders rushed in one long wave upon the works. Then came an anxious moment—the roll of the Egyptian musketry was ceaseless. The first line went down into the ditch, but for a time could make no way. Then first one, then a few, then more figures were dimly discerned reaching the summit and jumping down behind it, and then the battle went raging into the space beyond. While this befell on the centre and right of the brigade, the left—where the Highland Light Infantry were—had a more chequered fight. They came right upon a very strong redoubt. No front attack could succeed—the ditch was too deep, the ramparts too high. The men filing off to each side endeavoured to force a way in on the flanks; and here a long stern hand-to-hand fight, attended with heavy loss, ensued, which was not finished until Sir Edward Hamley reinforced them by a part of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry and some of the King's Rifles. On the right of the brigade also the advance of the Black Watch was arrested in order to detach some companies against a strong redoubt, the artillery from which was now in the breaking light playing heavily on General Graham's brigade and our own advancing guns. So earnest were the Egyptian gunners here that they were actually bayoneted after the redoubt had been entered from the rear whilst still working their pieces. Thus it came about that from both the flank battalions of the brigade being delayed, the charge straight to their front of the Gordon and Cameron Highlanders in the centre caused these to become the apex of a wedge thrust into the enemy's line. The advance of these battalions was stoutly opposed by the Egyptians of the 1st or Guard Regiment, who fell back sullenly before them, and our men also suffered heavily from a severe flank fire from an inner line of works. Here one of those checks occurred to which the troops are always liable in a stiff fight—and a small portion of our line, reeling beneath the flank fire, for a moment fell back. It was then a goodly sight to see how nobly Sir Edward Hamley, my division leader, threw himself amongst the men, and amidst a very storm of shot led them back

to the front. Here, too, I must do justice to the Egyptian soldiers. I never saw men fight more steadily. Retiring up a line of works which we had taken in flank, they rallied at every re-entering angle, at every battery, at every redoubt, and renewed the fight. Four or five times we had to close upon them with the bayonet, and I saw these men fighting hard when their officers were flying. At this time it was a noble sight to see the Gordon and Cameron Highlanders now mingled together in the confusion of the fight, their young officers leading with waving swords, their pipes screaming, and that proud smile on the lips, and that bright gleam in the eyes of the men, which you see only in the hour of successful battle. At length the summit of the gentle slope we were ascending was reached, and we looked down upon the camp of Arabi lying defenceless before us. The fight was won—for by this time our cavalry was circling round the rear of the Egyptian position, and the smoke and cheers upon our right showed where Graham's noble brigade was working its victorious way. One word more, and I have done. My late chief and kind friend, Lord Clyde, left me on his death-bed that sword of honour which you presented to him by my father's hands, to mark your appreciation of his great military services in command of the Highland Brigade and Division in the Crimea. I do feel proud this day to think that I can now lay down beside it that sword which you have just conferred upon me, as the officer in charge of the Highland Brigade in Egypt, and that I can do so without feeling that the reputation of our national regiments has been tarnished in my hands, or the glory they won under him dimmed."

For a short time the fight had been very severe between the troops who charged the intrenchments and their defenders. Well led by some of their officers the Egyptian troops gathered on the edge of their intrenchments, and with the bayonet strove to oppose the rush of the Highlanders. Here Lieutenant Brooks of the Gordon Highlanders was killed; Major Colville and Captain Underwood and Lieutenant Somerville of the 74th; Sir Graham Stirling and Mr. Neill were killed; Captain Keppel, Lieutenant Medwood, and Lieutenant Cary were wounded; Lieutenant


Edwards of the 74th, Captains Coveney, Cumberland, Fox, Park, Livingstone, and Speid of the Black Watch, and Lieutenants Blackburn, Malcolm, and M'Dougal of the Cameron Highlanders, were wounded.

So steady was the Egyptian resistance, so thick the hail of bullets which swept from the redoubts, that for a moment the advance of the Highlanders was checked, but it was for a moment only. The troops dashed in through the intervals between the redoubts and opened a heavy fire upon the flank and rear of their defenders.

There was a moment's irresolution among the Egyptians, thus taken between two fires, then the Highlanders in front dashed up the slopes, and in an instant the Egyptians broke and fled, throwing away their arms in all directions—a mob of disorganized fugitives—and the intrenchments of Tel-el-Kebir were won. The battle was almost over at this point, when Graham's brigade and the Guards made their attack upon the other face of the square nearly a mile away. The light was now more distinct, and the distant firing had roused the Egyptians, and as our troops advanced a heavy fire broke out along the line.

The marines, the York and Lancaster Regiment, the Royal Irish, and the Royal Irish Fusiliers advanced with the greatest steadiness and resolution under the heavy fire, followed closely by the Guards. For a time the enemy stood their ground; but the British rush was irresistible, and the British burst over the line of intrenchments, and the Egyptians, without further thought of resistance, fled and joined the crowd of fugitives who were already making their way at the top of their speed from the other end of the camp.

Lieutenant-colonel Balfour of the Grenadier Guards was wounded, as was Lieutenat-colonel Stirling of the Coldstreams; Captain Jones of the Connaught Rangers, attached to the Royal Irish Regiment, was killed, and Lieutenants Chichester and Drummond-Wolf wounded; Major Strong and Captain Wardell of the Royal Marines were killed, and Lieutenant M'Causland wounded. Colonel Richardson of the 46th was severely wounded.



BATTLE OF TEL-EL-KEBIR—THE FINAL CHARGE.

13TH SEPTEMBER, 1882.

BLACKIE & SON: LONDON, GLASGOW, AND EDINBURGH.

The fighting was now practically over, but the troops continued to pour volleys into the mob of fugitives, while the shells from our artillery, flying far overhead, burst among them and added to the confusion and panic of the retreat. The whole of Arabi's camp, with its immense stores of forage and provisions, fell into our hands, and an enormous number of prisoners were taken; for General Drury Lowe with the cavalry had cut across the enemy's line of retreat, and the few Egyptians who had carried away their arms now threw them down, and the fugitives in thousands surrendered.

In twenty minutes from the commencement of the engagement the lines which Arabi and his engineers had so carefully prepared, and which they regarded as impregnable, were carried, and the army of 26,000 men were either killed, wounded, or prisoners, or broken into scattered bands of unarmed and panic-stricken fugitives.

Never was a victory more complete and decisive. The rebellion of the Egyptian army had collapsed at the first attack of the British, and Egypt lay at the mercy of the conquerors of Tel-el-Kebir.

The total loss to the English was 11 officers and 43 men killed, 22 officers and about 320 men wounded; but the precise number was never officially published, as owing to the immediate advance which took place the returns were not regularly made out, and several days elapsed before Sir Garnet Wolseley received and sent in the regimental returns. The loss of the Highland Brigade considerably exceeded that of the rest of the army. The Indian Brigade had met with but little resistance; the enemy on the south side of the canal, seeing the defeat of their comrades on the north by the Highland Brigade, hastily abandoned their position and fled on the approach of the Indians. As the canal intervened between them and the English cavalry the fugitives on this side for the most part were able to make their escape.

No computation was ever made of the loss of the Egyptians. They lay dead in hundreds where the Highlanders had broken into their intrenchments, and numbers fell when the same brigade

had stormed their lines, while for upwards of a mile the dead lay thickly scattered along the line of retreat of the fugitives. Their loss in killed was estimated at from 1500 to 2000. Upwards of 50 guns were taken, and sufficient tinned provisions for 20,000 men for a month fell into the hands of our troops. Not an instant was lost in organizing the pursuit. General Macpherson with the Indian contingent at once started for Zagazig.

As the Indian cavalry, pushing on ahead, approached Zagazig they overtook large numbers of fugitives, and as the steam from several engines could be seen they were ordered to gallop forward at full speed. Outpacing the rest, two officers and three troopers dashed into the station. Five trains crowded with thousands of fugitives were just getting into motion; but without hesitation the officers rode up alongside the engines and threatened to shoot the drivers unless they instantly brought the trains to a standstill. This was done. In another minute the cavalry poured into the station, and the whole of the fugitives were taken prisoners.

This was a most useful capture; for although it was now certain that there could be no more general resistance, it was, above all things, desired to prevent any large numbers of the beaten Egyptian soldiers reaching Cairo before the arrival there of our troops, as not only would their coming have reinforced the strong garrison already there, but it was more than probable that they would have incited tumult in the city, and might have brought on a general massacre of the Europeans there.

These were very numerous, and had ever since the commencement of the outbreak been living in constant and extreme peril. The authority of the governor, aided by that of the council, had so far kept the populace from rising against them; but the news of Arabi's defeat and the appearance in the town of large numbers of fugitives might well have excited the passions of the mob to a point beyond all control. The great masses of prisoners taken on the field and at Zagazig were not retained; they were no longer formidable, and would only have hampered the movements of the army.

After being stripped of their military accoutrements and regimental tunics they were permitted at once to scatter to their

respective villages, where their tales of the utter rout of their army would be sure to put an end to any idea of further resistance to the English power, which might be stirred up by the emissaries of Arabi, who had fled from the field of battle mounted upon a speedy horse, and had made his escape, as was known, in the direction of Cairo, and might possibly give further trouble.

The Household Cavalry followed in support of the Indian cavalry; and the mounted force reached Belbeis that evening, and after a slight skirmish took possession of the place and halted there for the night. In the morning they started early and pushed straight on to Cairo, keeping on the borders of the desert. As they passed along, the villagers came out of their houses with white flags, all proclaiming themselves faithful to the khedive.

Large numbers of fugitives, principally those who had been on the south side of the canal when the position was attacked, were overtaken. They threw away their arms as soon as they caught sight of the British cavalry, and surrendered as prisoners. To their surprise and satisfaction they found that the English had no desire to capture them, and went on their way rejoicing.

Towards evening the cavalry arrived in front of Abbassiah barracks outside Cairo. Their march had been a remarkable one. It was but forty-eight hours since they had moved out from the camp at Kassassin, and they were now, after the defeat and dispersal of the rebel army and the entire suppression of the rebellion, in front of the capital of Egypt. The promptitude with which the cavalry were sent off from the field of battle to seize Cairo, the length of the march accomplished, and the boldness displayed in pushing on a comparatively small body of cavalry against a city known to be held by ten thousand infantry, and containing a great fanatical population, was greatly admired by continental military critics, who regarded this feat as being even more creditable to British arms than the assault of Tel-el-Kebir itself.

On approaching Abbassieh the troops were met by an officer in command of a squadron of cavalry who were placed in extended order across the plain with white flags tied to their carbines. The

officers informed General Drury Lowe that the town and garrison surrendered, and that no opposition whatever would be offered. He said that arrangements would at once be made for the supply of rations for the men and for obtaining horses for the cavalry.

What perhaps afforded greater gratification to the British general and his officers was the statement that no tumults had taken place, and that the city had remained perfectly quiet. This was indeed a great relief. For some time no news had been obtained as to what was taking place in Cairo, and after the massacres and destruction which had been wrought at Alexandria when the Egyptians were driven thence, it was but too likely that Arabi's arrival there, and the news of the disasters that had befallen his army, would have given the signal for similar disturbances at Cairo.

But although the commanding officer expressed himself so peaceably, the situation was for a short time critical. Ten thousand infantry were drawn up on parade, and had but a single fanatic called upon them to fire, a desperate conflict might have ensued. The firmness and confident bearing of the British, however, had its effect. At General Drury Lowe's command the Egyptian officers ordered their men to pile their arms and to retire to their quarters, a command which was quietly obeyed; while a body of the cavalry entered Abbassieh barracks and summarily disarmed two thousand men within.

In the meantime the general had sent for the governor of the city. Upon his arrival the general told him that he was aware that Arabi was in Cairo, and demanded his surrender. He offered to send a body of troops to surround his house. The governor, however, said that this was unnecessary, and that he himself would deliver him up.

He then returned into the city, and at ten o'clock came out with Arabi and Toulba Pashas. Arabi's manner was very dignified and composed. He said to General Lowe that he had at first no intention whatever of fighting the English, for whom he had always entertained great respect, but that the war was forced upon him, and for this he blamed the khedive. Being a soldier, after fighting began, he went on fighting. Now that all was over the Egyptians

and English were brothers again, and he trusted himself to English honour as a soldier whose army had been defeated.

General Lowe replied that he could not enter upon the subject of the war, his only mission being to arrest him. In the meantime Captain Watson of the Intelligence Department, escorted by mounted infantry and two squadrons of dragoons, made a detour round the city to the citadel and summoned the commandant to surrender. This he did at once. There was a grave discussion how the evacuation of the place by the Egyptians could be managed with the least chance of trouble between the troops, and it was arranged that the Egyptians, after piling their arms, should march out by one gate while the British entered by the other.

In mentioning the losses sustained by the British in this campaign and during the previous disturbances at Alexandria, we must not omit to notice the murder of Mr. Palmer, a gentleman who from comparatively humble beginnings had risen to the position of Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge, and was one of the foremost Oriental scholars of our time; well known as the author of a splendid monograph upon Haroun el Raschid. Professor Palmer, a man of very retiring manners and in delicate health, had been prevailed upon to accept from the government an appointment that he might endeavour to propitiate the Bedouin tribes, who at the time of the rebellion and subsequent hostilities were threatening the canal. He left Suez on the 10th of August with Lieutenant Charrington, R. N., and Captain Gill of the Royal Engineers, who had orders to cut the telegraph wires in Arabia to prevent communications between the rebels and the tribes. Professor Palmer had with him a large sum of money in gold for the purpose of purchasing camels for the Indian troops. None of the party returned, and rumours were afloat that they had perished, or had been made prisoners. Various articles which had belonged to them were afterwards discovered, and on close inquiry it was declared that they had been murdered by order of the governor of Nakl, who offered them only the horrible alternative of jumping from a precipice or being shot. Professor Palmer, it was averred, chose the former, and his two companions

the latter. The statement was followed by a strict inquiry, which left no doubt of the guilt of the governor of Nakl, and he with some half-dozen of his followers, who were proved to have been directly concerned in the murder, were pursued, arrested, and executed. An inquiry was again set on foot in February, 1883, by Colonel Warren, who was engaged in tracing the criminal acts of the rebellion to their real perpetrators. It was then found that the money carried by Professor Palmer and his companions had never reached Arabi or the rebel leaders, as the sheikh who conducted Palmer's party had hidden it while the Arabs, who had made the Englishmen prisoners, were discussing whether they should take their lives. The fact of not being able to find the money exasperated the fanatical hatred of the Arabs, and the prisoners were condemned to leap from the brink of a high precipice, and were shot as they fell. Thirteen of the culprits who were engaged in the affair were arrested and tried, and five of the actual perpetrators of the crime were hanged at Zagazig on the 28th of February, 1883.

It need scarcely be said, that when the news reached England of the prompt and decided victory at Tel-el-Kebir the discussions on Egyptian affairs were considerably influenced by that intelligence. It did not in any way alter the intentions of the government, for, as we shall see, when the work of pacification and the formation of a more settled government in Cairo and Alexandria had been organized, our troops began to return to England.

Mr. Gladstone continued to hold the same opinions which he had forcibly expressed in August, 1877, when, writing on the subject of various proposals for the occupation of Egypt, he said: "It is most singular that the propagandism of Egyptian occupation seems to proceed principally from those who were always thought to be the fastest friends of the formula of independence and integrity, and on whom the unhappy Turk was encouraged to place a blindfold reliance. I have heard of men on board ship thought to be moribund whose clothes were sold by auction by their shipmates, and thus in the hearing of the Turk we are now stimulated to divide his inheritance."

Speaking of a proposition to purchase the Egyptian tribute Mr. Gladstone said: "I admit that we thus provide the sultan with abundant funds for splendid obsequies; but none the less would this plan sever at a stroke all African territory from an empire likely enough to be also shorn of its provinces in Europe. It seems to me, I own, inequitable, whether in dealing with the Turk or with any one else, to go beyond the necessity of the case. I object to our making him, or any one else, a victim to the insatiable maw of these stage-playing British interests; and I think we should decline to bid during his lifetime for this portion of his clothes. It is not sound doctrine that for our own purposes we are entitled to help him downwards to his doom."

These views had not been changed by the course of events in Egypt in 1882. On the debate upon the vote of credit at the time that it was determined to send a squadron to Alexandria, Sir Charles Dilke, in defence of the foreign policy of the government, had urged the history of our connection with and obligations to Egypt since the substitution of the joint Anglo-French control in 1879 for the previously existing dual control (of a merely administrative character) established in 1876. He contended that it was by the joint control and European concert left them by their predecessors that the government found itself hampered; but they were, nevertheless, anxious to try every means before adopting an individual policy, however much they may have felt that British interests would thereby be more advantageously defended. The government did not regard the anarchy in Egypt as the result of national feeling, but as the consequence of the pressure of military tyranny, and when that yoke had been broken from the neck of the Egyptians they might fairly be left to manage their own affairs. The desire of the government was to see the growth and spread of a truly national movement, the fruits of which would be as beneficial to this country as to Egypt; and with this view they had looked favourably upon the political movement of the preceding year until it became tainted with militaryism. At various times the government had proved their readiness to support any truly national development; had shown no personal

hostility to Arabi Pasha, although no attempt had been made in the early stages of the revolution to gain him to our side. When Arabi became dictator the time was past; for he was then guilty of complicity in the preparation for the attack upon the Europeans in Alexandria on the 11th of June, and, therefore, his soldiers could not be regarded as the friends of freedom. Moreover, the paramount duty of the government was to protect the canal, and, whilst avoiding any attempt to crush Egyptian nationality, to maintain the influence and credit of England and of all Europe in the East. This was the statement of the position taken by the government, and it was evidently addressed to those members of the Radical party who were opposed to an intervention, and represented that we were suppressing, not a revolt, but a national effort to secure freedom and independence. Mr. Richard, who was one of the opponents of an interposition in Egyptian affairs, and who represented that the deplorable events which had happened were the results of the policy of interference in the internal affairs of Egypt, initiated by the preceding government and adopted and perpetuated by their successors, contended that non-intervention was a cardinal point of the Liberal creed. The opposition, however, supported the view that intervention was necessary, and contended, not only that duty, national interests, and treaty obligations furnished a justification for the war, but that the government, having wasted their influence at the outset for the pacific settlement of affairs, were not sufficiently in earnest when they had determined to have recourse to arms; that the plea of self-defence was an attempt to make war while professing peace principles. Sir R. Cross even went so far as to say, that when the Liberal government took office Egypt was in a satisfactory and flourishing condition, and that the disastrous change which had occurred was due to want of foresight, to division in ministerial councils, and to consequent weakness in their action. For the sake of working with the other powers the government had suffered delays which were most prejudicial; and yet, after all, we found ourselves isolated from all the powers, and refused even the assistance of France in the restoration of order in Egypt. He

pronounced the dual vote and the ultimatums to be insincere, and blamed the government for not having originally sent a stronger force to Alexandria, and for proposing a vote, the amount of which was so insufficient as to convict them either of miscalculation or of misleading the house.

Mr. Gladstone, however, pointed to the modifications which had been made on the control in 1879 as having already established an intervention in the internal affairs of Egypt which was certain to end in mischief. In answer to the charge that the government had not sent a sufficient force to Alexandria to prevent the massacres after the bombardment he urged as the principal among many arguments—the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. By the course that the government had pursued they had removed every trace of international jealousy and had obtained the moral support of the powers; but to break with France, as some had recommended, would have been to provoke a sharp conflict in Egypt, to divide Europe into two camps, and to lead to a general war.

With the passing of the vote of credit the important debates on Egyptian affairs may be said to have closed, except that on a motion for permitting the revenues of India to be applied to defray the expenses of the auxiliary forces despatched from that country, ministers were charged with inconsistency for proposing that which they had a few years previously denounced as unpatriotic and unconstitutional. It was contended in reply that the difference lay in the employment of Indian troops beyond the boundaries of the empire, with parliamentary sanction, instead of despatching them upon the prerogative of the crown. Moreover, the Indian contingent would, as on a previous occasion in 1806, under Sir James Baird, limit its operations to Egypt, whereas Lord Beaconsfield, in the case referred to, had brought them to Malta, a distinctly European country. The discussion ended with the adoption of a proposal, suggested by Mr. Stanhope, to the effect that the share of the burden to be laid upon Indian revenue should be subjected to any future decision of parliament.

When the report of the prompt measures taken at Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir was almost immediately followed by the news

of the brilliant victory at the latter place, a sense of satisfaction pervaded the country, and adverse criticisms of the government were for a time, if not silenced, at least listened to with considerable reserve. The short parliamentary recess left little opportunity for members to address their constituencies, and those who did so and spoke adversely of the government in regard to recent events in Egypt seldom made much impression. Whatever might have been the mistakes or shortcomings of the ministry, the minister of war had been prompt when the time came, and the generals and the men under their command had achieved a success which resulted in increasing the support given to the government by the opposition, and elicited the admiration of foreign critics, though certain French and German correspondents, of whom nobody took much notice, respectively attributed our success to bribery, and to a lucky conjunction of circumstances ending in the utter inefficiency of Arabi's army.

These insinuations, however, weighed nothing against the general expression of the best military authorities in Europe, who gave unstinted praise to the courage and efficiency of our troops. In England the general satisfaction was increased in proportion to the surprise that was felt at the comparative celerity with which the campaign had been effected, and by the decisive manner in which, being once determined on active measures against Arabi and the rebel forces, we occupied the Suez Canal and established our head-quarters at Ismailia.

As a matter of fact comparatively few people knew much about the Suez Canal or Ismailia, except that there had been a good many disputes with M. de Lesseps, and that England had a very important interest in keeping this water-way of 100 miles from Suez to Port Said in the condition of a neutral passage for ships of commerce. To England this highway to India was of course known to be of the greatest importance, though it may easily be understood that France and other European nations and the United States of America had considerable interest in its being maintained. This will be obvious when it is considered that the voyage from England to Bombay by the Cape of Good Hope is

10,860 nautical miles, while by way of the Suez Canal it is but 6020, the saving of distance being 4840 nautical miles. From Marseilles to Bombay by the old route is 10,560 nautical miles, by Suez Canal only 4620, so that 5940 miles are saved. From St. Petersburg to Bombay by the Cape is 11,610 miles; by Suez Canal, 6770, saving 4840, the same as in the voyage from England. From New York to Bombay is, by the respective routes 11,520 and 7920 miles, the latter saving 3600 miles.

We have already gone pretty carefully into the financial story of the canal to the end of the chapter which, at the close of 1875, left England representing about half the capital of the whole enterprise, our government having acquired the original shares at a cost of £4,000,000 which were to carry no interest till 1894, though the Egyptian government was to pay seven per cent on the amount till 1886. When to this is added the fact that of above 1600 ships passing through the canal with a tonnage of about $3\frac{1}{3}$ millions, and paying dues amounting to above $1\frac{1}{4}$ millions, more than three-fourths were English, it will be seen that we had a reasonable claim on at all events the neutralization of the canal, and were justified in protecting it.

Immediately after the opening of the canal in November, 1869, when 48 ships, some drawing 18 feet of water, were able to pass through to Lake Timsah and to continue their voyage to Suez the following day, the regular traffic commenced, and the first ship to go through was an English one. By the concession of 1856 the tariff had been settled (to be equally on ships of all nations) at ten francs per ton and ten francs per passenger, beside pilot dues, charges, amount of water drawn, and other extras. Up to the 1st of July, 1872, the transit dues were levied on the registered tonnage; they were afterwards charged on the gross tonnage till the 29th of April, 1874, when an international commission restored the former rates.

A glance at the map will at once show the enormous importance of the occupation of Ismailia as a basis of operations for troops entering Egypt from the Mediterranean at Port Said or from India and the Red Sea by Suez.

We have already seen with what remarkable success the British vessels, which quietly departed from Aboukir, entered the Suez Canal at Port Said, a town now of considerable importance, with a harbour constantly the scene of the maritime and passenger traffic between Europe and the East, but which owes its existence to the project of the canal. The spot called Port Said, in honour of the Viceroy Said Pasha, was not the spot from which the shortest canal across the isthmus could be made; but it was the place chosen for the commencement of the enterprise, because it was at that point of the coast that deep water was to be found nearest the shore. Here there were eight metres or about 26 feet of water at a distance of less than two miles, and 26 feet was the proposed depth of the canal. Port Said, in fact, stands on the most eligible spot chosen by M. de Lesseps—on a long low belt of sand, from 200 to 300 yards wide, stretching from the Damietta branch of the Nile to the Gulf of Pelusium, and separating the Mediterranean from Lake Menzaleh, though occasionally when the lake is full and the Mediterranean waves are high the waters intermingle across this boundary.

On the 25th of April, 1859, M. de Lesseps, surrounded by a band of Europeans and about 100 native workmen, gave the first stroke of the spade which commenced the formation of the great "silent highway," and thereafter the work went on, at first under conditions of great difficulty, for the pioneers who dwelt on that desolate strip of sand could procure no fresh water nearer than Damietta, thirty miles distant—whence it was brought across Lake Menzaleh in Arab boats subject to delay or loss from adverse winds or storms. It was a hard life, and both provisions and water often ran short. Distilling machinery was afterwards provided, and in 1863 a pipe was laid down to the fresh-water canal, which had been completed to the centre of the isthmus. The ground on which the town of Port Said stands was made by dredging in the shallows of the lake close to the belt of sand. In this way the inner port was formed, and at the same time the area was extended and the dry land raised to a greater height. After the withdrawal of the fellaheen labourers machinery had to supply their place.

Such was the energy with which the work was carried out, however, that in the long ranges of sheds and workshops the material was being formed, and the great concrete blocks being made for the construction of the piers and harbour, while the dredging process was continued and the canal was being cut in Lake Menzaleh. In ten years Port Said became a considerable town—with regular streets, squares, docks, quays, churches, hospitals, mosques, hotels, factories, shops, warehouses, and 10,000 inhabitants; a sea-port easy of approach, and with the safest harbour on the coast, and a plentiful supply of fresh water from Ismailia, a great reservoir—"The Chateau d'Eau"—containing enough for three days' consumption in case of an accident to the service pipes. The central harbour or Grand Basin, called the Bassin Ismail, lies between the outer port and the canal, and joining it on the west the Bassin Cherif, the Bassin des Ateliers, formerly close to the busy scene where the workshops were situated, and the Commercial Basin, north and west of which the chief portion of the town is built. On the Marina close to the seashore the best of the houses are to be found, and further to the west is the Arab village, on the strip of sand between the sea and the lake.

Two great breakwaters or moles form the outer port; that on the west running out to sea at right angles to the shore and perpendicularly to the line of the canal for about 3000 yards; that on the east, commencing at about 1500 yards distance from the other, runs out towards it for 1962 yards, and so approaches it as to make the entrance to the outer port about a quarter of a mile wide, and its inclosed space of water a triangular area of some 550 acres; the depth at the entrance being 30 feet, and the channel through it to the inner harbour about 300 feet wide and 26 feet deep. The moles were constructed with concrete blocks composed of sand and lime, mixed with salt water, and each measuring 12 cubic yards and weighing 22 tons. They were dropped into the sea three at a time from lighters till the water line was reached, and then lifted into their places by powerful cranes. The great difficulty foreseen by several eminent engineers, although it has by no means proved to be insuperable, has been very obvious.

The sand from the Damietta mouth of the Nile drifting along the coast has silted through the western mole and formed a large bank along its inner side near the shore end, so that constant dredging has to be carried on; but it is said that the bank itself will eventually be a barrier against further silting in. From a similar cause the shore seaward to the west of the mole has greatly extended, especially in the angle formed by the mole and the coast, and a sandbank has grown up in the sea a little north-east of the eastern mole, caused by the dredgings from the harbour having been brought out and deposited there. A lighthouse composed of solid concrete, and nearly 160 feet high, stands on the shore close to the commencement of the west mole. The lantern, 20 feet high, contains an electric light flashing every 20 seconds, and visible for 20 miles. Three other lighthouses of the same height but of different construction occupy positions on the 125 miles of coast between Port Said and Alexandria, one being at the Damietta branch of the Nile, another at Boorlos, and a third at Rosetta.

This brief description will give some notion of the great port which forms the Mediterranean entrance to the canal, at which the British naval force entered after leaving Alexandria and Aboukir. Port Said itself is, of course, a place of considerable commercial activity on account of its maritime importance; but there is comparative stillness and solitude not far off, and the visitor who stays for a few days to make excursions on Lake Menzaleh may, if the lake be pretty full, enjoy a quiet almost unbroken, except by the guttural but not frequent remarks of the boatmen, and the cry of the wild fowl, coots, herons, spoonbills, pelicans, and flamingoes with which the water and its numerous mud-islands abound. That these birds make din enough sometimes, however, may be gathered from Mr. J. M'Gregor's account where he says: "We had been told of the enormous flocks of wild fowl to be seen on this lake, and especially in winter. I had seen thousands, myriads of these, and wondered at the multitude in the air. But I never expected to see birds so numerous and so close together that their compact mass formed living islands upon the water; and when the wind

now took me swiftly up to these, and a whole island rose up with a loud and thrilling din to become a feathered cloud in the air, the impression was one of vastness and innumerable teeming life which it is entirely impossible to convey in words. The larger geese, and pelicans, and swans floated like ships at anchor. The long-legged flamingoes and other waders traced out the shape of the shallows by their standing in the water. Smaller ducks were scattered in regiments of skirmishers about the grand army, but every battalion of the gabbling shrieking host seemed to be disciplined, orderly, and distinct."

It will thus be seen that almost at the very commencement of the Suez Canal the scene is one which is eminently characteristic of the country. It may be worth while, as we are now considering the features of the great water-way, to trace briefly the course of the voyage from Port Said to Ismailia as followed by the vessels of the British squadron.

Leaving Port Said, where the canal opens out to a width of 1000 feet before it enters the harbour, and passes the port and the town, to join the open sea beyond the breakwater, the course lies through Lake Menzaleh, and continues almost in a straight line for twenty-seven miles to within less than two miles of Kantarah. The station before reaching Kantarah is Ras-el-Ech, a little island of mud raised above the level of the inundation by dredgings from the canal, and having not far off on the right the islands of Toonah and Tennes, on which there are some ancient remains, and on the left, beyond the marshy plain, the ancient site of Pelusium, where there are a few ruins. In the whole of this portion of the journey of twenty-seven miles the banks are so little above the level of the canal that, from the deck of a large steamship, there is a view of the whole vast expanse of lake and morass with the numerous islets and the multitudinous flocks of birds—rosy pelicans, scarlet flamingoes, snow-white spoonbills, and innumerable ducks, geese, and herons.

The whole of the channel through Lake Menzaleh was almost entirely excavated by means of dredges, the soil having been not more than a foot or two above the level of the lake, and in many

parts actually below it. When it was necessary to remove some surface soil before there was water enough for the dredges to float, the work was done by the natives, whose constant practice in digging canals and making embankments to keep out the water peculiarly fitted them for the task, which was accomplished in the following manner:—The men stood in files across the channel, those in the middle of the file having their feet and ankles in the water. These men leaned forward and took in their arms large clods of earth which they had previously dug up below the water with an implement called a *fass*, which somewhat resembles a large hoe. The clods were passed from man to man to the bank, where other men stood with their backs turned and their arms crossed behind them for the clods to rest on. As soon as one of these men had a load of clods piled on his back, he walked off, bent almost double, to the farther side of the bank, and there opening his arms let the clods fall to the ground. In this way the files of naked labourers made the channel into which the dredges were floated, and various mechanical contrivances were employed to continue the work both here and elsewhere, the principal one being a *long couloir* or iron spout of elliptical form 230 feet long, $5\frac{1}{2}$ wide, and 2 deep, by means of which the contents of a dredger in the centre of the channel could be discharged beyond the bank. This great spout was supported by an iron framework which rested partly on the dredge and partly on a floating lighter. The dredgings when dropped into the upper end of the spout were assisted in their progress down it by water supplied by a rotary pump, and by an endless chain to which were fixed scrapers—large pieces of wood that fitted the inside of the spout and forced onward any lumps of stone or clay. By these means the spouts could discharge their contents at an almost horizontal line, and the water served to dilute the dredgings so that they spread over a larger surface and settled down more completely. The work effected by these spouts was extraordinary, the average discharge being 80,000 cubic yards of soil per month.

Where the banks were high an elevator was employed, consisting of an inclined plane running upward from the water line,

and supported on an iron frame, the lower part of which rested over the water on a steam float, and the upper part on a platform moving on rails along the bank. The plane carried a tramway on which ran an axle on wheels worked by the engine of the steam float. From this axle hung four chains. As soon as the lighter containing seven great boxes filled with dredgings was towed under the lower part of the elevator, the chains hanging from the axle were hooked to one of the boxes, and the machine being set in motion the box was first raised and then carried along swinging beneath the axle to the top of the plane, when by a self-acting contrivance it tilted over and emptied its contents over the bank. It was then run down again, dropped into its place in the lighter, and the operation was repeated with the next box. No such vast dredging operations had ever been undertaken before.

M. de Lesseps in one of his lectures illustrated the amount of excavation effected in one month—2,763,000 cubic yards—by saying: "Were it placed in the Place Vendôme it would fill the whole square and rise to five times the height of the surrounding houses; or if laid out between the Arc de Triomphe and the Place de la Concorde, it would cover the entire length and breadth of the Champs Elysées, a distance equal to a mile and a quarter, and reach to the top of the trees on either side."

Kantarah (which means a bridge or ford), the station first reached, stands on the highest point of the chain of low sand-hills dividing Lake Menzaleh from the small inland lakes, and was formerly the chief caravan station on the road between Egypt and Syria—that road which was the great highway for the armies of the old-world Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, and Arabs. Dr. Brugsch Bey considered that the site of the passage of the Israelites through "Yam Suf"—which means "sea of weeds," though applied to the Red Sea,—was in the neighbourhood of Kantarah, but this is only speculative.

From amidst the sand-hills the canal enters Lake Ballah, the chief of a number of shallow lakes dotted with islets, and thence through a cutting made in a sandy promontory (El Ferdane), and along the edge of a tributary of Lake Ballah to the heights of El

Guisr, the highest point in the isthmus, about six miles long, and sixty feet above the level of the sea. When the canal was being formed the upper surface of the soil at this part, consisting of loose sand interspersed with beds of hard sand and of clay, was removed entirely by the enforced labour of the fellahen. This was literally *hand* labour, for the Egyptians simply grubbed up the soil with their hands, placed it in baskets, and carried it away to the place where it was to be discharged, thus excavating a channel 25 to 30 feet wide, and about 5 feet below the level of the sea. After the withdrawal of the *corvée* or forced labour, the cutting was completed to its full width and to a depth of 10 feet below the sea-level by means of machinery, consisting chiefly of a locomotive engine working behind it a chain of dredge buckets on an inclined plane. These, on reaching the top of the plane, opened at the bottoms and the contents were received into wagons, which were drawn by locomotives to the top of the embankment along a network of railways. There then remained 16 feet more of depth to be made, and this was effected by ordinary dredging, the soil being carried away by screw steamers and discharged into Lake Timsah. While noting the depth of the canal (uniformly 26 feet), it may be worth remembering that the width at the water-line varies according to conditions; for instance, where the banks are low the width is 328 feet, while in deep cuttings where the banks are high it is 190 feet. The width of the base is 72 feet, and the slope of the bank near the water-line is 1 in 5, while at the base it is 1 in 2. From El Guisr the canal enters Lake Timsah at the north-east corner, where, on the left, may be seen the entrance of a small canal leading to the stone quarries, and on the right a branch which joins the maritime and the fresh-water canals, the difference of level (17 feet) being adjusted by two locks, one just below Ismailia, and the other near the upper part of the town. In 1865 the fresh-water transit between the two seas was begun by means of this connecting canal between the channel already dug from Port Said to Lake Timsah and the fresh-water canal; and during the war with Abyssinia, stores were conveyed by this route. Whether Lake Timsah was originally a

fresh-water lake, receiving the overflow of the Nile by means of the old canal from the branch of the river at Bubastis, or whether its name Bahr-el-Timsah—the Sea of the Crocodile—applies to the shape of the Heroöpolite Gulf, of which it forms a part, need not be discussed here. Perhaps ages ago the Mediterranean and the Red Seas were not divided by what is now the Isthmus of Suez, and the heights of El Guisr were upheaved by some convulsion and made a separation: while afterwards another subterranean shock caused the heights of Serapeum and Chalouf, and so reduced the Red Sea to its present boundary, leaving two inland lakes, the northernmost of which, being nearer the Nile, filled with fresh water, while the eastern branches of the Nile left the other nearly dry when there was no high inundation sending an overplus of water down the Wády Canal. The whole hollow area, about nine miles in circumference, judging from the mark of the old water-line, and with a depression of about 22 feet below the sea-level, was filled with water from the Mediterranean through the channel which was cut from Port Said. A weir was constructed for the purpose, and the operation lasted from the 12th of December, 1866, to the end of April, 1867. Nearly 100 million cubic metres of water were required to fill the lake, and the extra depth needed for the canal was then dredged out, a large area in the centre being also deepened to form a harbour, and the course of the canal being indicated by buoys at regular distances.

The canal skirts the eastern shore of the lake, which is five miles in length. On the western side the sojourner at Ismailia may find good sport, for the marshes abound with various kinds of water-fowl, while in the neighbouring desert gazelles are not uncommon. A visitor writing of Lake Timsah says it is “a large natural basin in the very centre of the isthmus. . . . In this midland harbour we found a fleet of large vessels, some of them men-of-war, some of them even iron-clads. A sense of surprise comes over you at seeing not only a pleasing expanse of water in the thirsty scorching waste (how one wishes it were fresh-water!) but in addition a fleet of mighty ships in the mid desert.”

It has been asserted that where the busy town or village of

Ismailia now stands with its broad road leading from the landing-place to the station, its quays, warehouses, palace, hotel, rows of houses built of the stone from the neighbouring quarries, its streets, squares, and gardens, and its fine water-works, not a breathing animal could have lived a few years ago, before the construction of the canal. This is perhaps an exaggeration, and certainly 20,000 labourers were set to enforced work there, to make the beginning of the present well-known resort of tourists and travellers, and the abode of people engaged in commercial or official occupations. It has now perhaps 10,000 inhabitants divided amongst the French, Greek, and Arab quarters, and the ordinary visitor, the sportsman, or the lover of antiquities, each finds it an agreeable place for a short sojourn. The remains of Pelusium, Arsinoë, Pithom, Rameses, Heroöpolis, the marks left by Persians, Greeks, and Romans, may be discovered at no great distance. It may be noted, too, that in this desert province, was the Goshen of the time of the Israelites, so that it must at one time have possessed something of the character which a portion of it, at all events, has been for some time in the process of recovering. Ismailia itself has evidently somewhat improved in every respect, including climate and general healthfulness, since the time that it was first formed. Mr. M'Gregor in his *Rob Roy on the Nile* said: "Ismailia is like a hothouse without the glass, and all the life in it is exotic. The sun's heat and the Nile's cool water force the arid sand into a tropical verdure. Embosomed in this are French *cafés* and *billiards*, with Arab huts and camels; the signboards on booths in Greek, Turkish, Spanish, and American, *ateliers* resounding with hammer and cogwheel, and tents full of half-dressed savages chaffering uproariously, and *boulevards* thronged by the second-rate fashion of a French town, planted, and growing fast too, in the veritable desert. Beside it lie the shores of Lake Timsah, the 'Crocodile Lake,' which had a few pools when the canal was begun, but now is filled with brackish water. Only fresh-water shells are to be found in Lake Timsah, and the crocodile does not live in salt water. These facts serve to confirm the idea that a fresh-water canal had long ago existed here, and that the town, of which

there are ruins at the end of the Bitter Lakes, may have been destroyed by the same upheaving of the land which dried the lakes themselves."

The climate has, in fact, been modified by the vast changes effected, and Ismailia is now temperate, though extremely dry, for a fresh breeze always comes from the lake to mitigate even the noonday heat, and the nights, as is usual in Egypt, are fresh and cool. The absence of dust is also a great advantage. There is excellent sea-bathing all the year round; and provisions of all kinds are fairly plentiful, as supplies come both by railway and canal, while the fish taken from the lake are abundant and of excellent quality. All this is worth noting, as it has direct reference to the enormous changes achieved by the canal, and its immense importance as a highway between Asia and Africa. In the same relation, the admirable water-works at Ismailia are of great value. In the west part of the town are the hotel, the station, the landing-quays of the fresh-water canal, with adjoining blocks of warehouses and the Arab village, beyond which a small canal leaving the fresh-water canal carries the water all round the town, to which it forms a kind of northern boundary, and being thickly planted with willows the sand from the desert on that side can neither choke it nor pass over it into the town. On the completion of the fresh-water canal to Ismailia and Suez it was necessary to provide a regular supply of water to Port Said and the line of works along the northern course of the canal. To effect this two powerful pumping engines were erected at Ismailia, and a double row of cast-iron pipes laid for the whole length of the canal (50 miles), and through these water was pumped continuously, all the principal stations being provided with reservoirs for storing water, and drinking fountains, from which any one may draw, while at every $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles are open self-filling cisterns, where the thirst of man or beast may be assuaged. The water-works at Ismailia, with their gardens, cascades, and walks bordered with choice fruits and beautiful flowers, are one of the great sights of the place; and not far off are the heights of El Guisr, whence may be obtained a grand view across Lake Timsah with the

Bitter Lakes and the heights of Gebel Geneffeh beyond, and in the far distance the dim outlines of Gebel Attakah and Sinai.

In concluding for the present these few descriptions of the various stages of the great water-way, it may be well for us to refer for a moment to the stations on the railway line from Ismailia to Cairo (the Cairo and Suez line), as they are of scarcely less importance in conveying a clear idea of the course taken by the British army, and its progress to the final engagement at Tel-el-Kebir and the occupation of Cairo.

We have already seen that the direct conflict with the rebel army of Arabi began while he was encamped at Kafr-Dowar, on the Alexandria and Cairo line, a district of cotton-fields and marshes, and a resort for sportsmen who go there to hunt wild boars. On the same original direct line to Cairo is Tantah junction, Tantah being, as we have already noted, a large and important town, with a palace belonging to the khedive and offices for the consular agents. Tantah has always been famous for its fairs or festivals, which are held three times a year, and are scenes of great excitement; and it was there that numerous attacks were made on the Europeans at the time of the disturbances in Alexandria.

After breaking up the camp at Kafr-Dowar, Arabi concentrated his forces, as we know, near Tel-el-Kebir—a very beautifully situated village in the centre of the fertile district of El Wady or Wady Toomilat, which was purchased by the Suez Canal Company of Said Pasha, greatly improved, and resold to the Egyptian government under the award of the Emperor Napoleon III., already noticed in a previous page.

From Suez to Cairo is 150 miles by railway. The stations being Chalouf, about twelve miles from Suez, where the line runs within a short distance of the banks of the canal, and where the fresh-water canal, running between the maritime canal and the railway, enters the bed of the ancient canal cut by Darius to join the Bitter Lakes and the Red Sea. Another twelve miles and Geneffeh is reached. It is named from the hills of Geneffeh, which are on the right of the line. Twelve miles further Faïd, in the vicinity

of the Great Bitter Lake, and on to Serapeum (ten miles), so called from some ruins, supposed to be the remains of an old temple to Serapis. From Serapeum a small branch canal leads to the fresh-water canal. A little more than eight miles further is Ismailia, and a branch line, two miles and a half long, runs to Nefiche, where the fresh-water canal divides, one branch going to Ismailia where the locks bring it to the level of the maritime canal, and the other branch to Suez. At Nefiche Lake Timsah is first seen. The next station, fourteen miles further, is Mahsamah, not far from a lake formerly filled with water at the time of the Nile inundations, but now serving the purposes of the fresh-water canal, which here leaves the route of the railway, and at a distance passes a place which is variously named Tel-el-Masroota, Aboo Khasheb, and Rameses, the latter having been given it by the French on the conjecture that it was the site of the store city built by the Israelites for Pharaoh, and the place from which they started on their journey into the wilderness. Though there are doubts as to the correctness of this conclusion, and the researches of Herr Brugsch would show that San or Tanis is the locality of the ancient Rameses—there can be little doubt that the place now called Rameses is in the midst of the former land of Goshen, which is biblically called both the land of Goshen and the land of Rameses, and probably extended on the west to Bubastis or Tanis. Leaving Mahsamah the line runs for fourteen miles to Tel-el-Kebir, first by the village of Ras-el-Wady (the extreme point of the Wady district, and almost the limit of the Delta on the east), and afterwards through uncultivated country to the next fertile district—El Wady—in which Tel-el-Kebir is situated. Seven miles further is Aboo Hamed, one of the stations on the caravan route between Egypt and Syria, and the point from which the railway divides the cultivated land from the desert, the vast expanse of sand and sandy mounds bounded only by the horizon and the rapid and luxuriant vegetation which the waters of the canal produces even in that arid soil. Ten miles further is the Zagazig junction, not far from the ruins of Bubastis, but not very attractive, though the ancient town has a good many fair houses, and had a considerable number of

European residents at the time of the massacres by the fanatic insurgents, when the whole population was about 38,000. Zagazig has come to importance since it was made the junction for the railways in the east of the Delta, and is a considerable trade centre for the surrounding districts. Leaving Zagazig the line runs to Bordein close to Tel Basta, on the ruins of the ancient Bubastis, and thence six miles to Belbeis, and onward seventeen miles to Shibeen el Kanater, close to the ruins called the Mound of the Jew, Tel-el-Yahoodeh, and supposed to be the site of the city founded by the high-priest Onias, and so named Onion or Onia as mentioned by Josephus. Passing westward through a well-cultivated district to Kaliob, twelve miles, and on to the main Alexandria and Cairo line, Cairo is reached by a further journey of ten miles. By thus briefly following the routes of the canal and the railway we shall note the respective localities of the places already named in the narrative of the campaign after the occupation of the canal and during the subsequent operations, to the arrival of our troops at Cairo.

We have seen how the Indian contingent, rapidly crossing the battlefield of Tel-el-Kebir, marched to Zagazig and occupied it the same day; while the main body of cavalry and mounted infantry, taking a desert road to the south-west, seized upon Belbeis the same evening. There they rested for a few hours and watered their horses, but long before dawn they were away again, and after a journey of thirty-nine miles, a great part of which was under a blazing sun, reached Cairo on the evening of the 14th of September.

The prompt and decided action of our army and the immediate capture of Arabi—followed by his quick surrender—prevented the loss of life and the subsequent troubles of which Cairo might have been the scene in case of an armed resistance. On the 15th of September Sir Garnet Wolseley with his staff and detachments of the Guards, Highlanders, and marines entered the city, and were received by the large crowds of people with many expressions of goodwill, and without any hostile demonstration even from those who may have been among the promoters of rebellion.

There were after-demonstrations, however, of a threatening character, and Sir Garnet Wolseley had to proclaim that if British soldiers were molested he would fire on the native quarter of the town. Upon this, the Ulema promised that he would do all in his power to maintain the authority of the general and prevent disorders, after which the disturbances ceased.

It is now necessary to go back to Alexandria, which, when the fleet sailed with the great bulk of the army on the 19th of August, was left under the guard of one division facing Arabi's army at Kafr-Dowar. The reconnoissance made by General Wood, just as the fleet was starting, to discover the force and intentions of the enemy, has already been described. General Hamley's division was ordered forward to join the troops under General Wolseley as soon as the latter arrived at Ismailia, and General Wood with a single brigade only remained to guard Alexandria.

The position at Ramleh was, however, now very strong. An electric-light apparatus had now been mounted there, and rendered it secure from any sudden night surprise. The enemy continued to work at their batteries, but beyond the occasional firing of shells at parties moving within range, nothing happened for some-time of any interest.

On the 27th of August two 7-inch guns were taken out and placed in position below Ramleh water-works, and a trial showed that they were able to throw shot beyond the enemy's first line of intrenchments. The Egyptians were now working in great numbers in the formation of intrenched works close to their forts in Aboukir Bay. It was supposed that they were forming an intrenched camp there in which a force could be stationed for the defence of the forts against a land attack, should Arabi withdraw his army from Kafr-Dowar to join that gathered at Tel-el-Kebir. Considerable activity, too, was being shown by them to the west of Alexandria, large numbers of Bedouins and others being seen fording the shallow end of Lake Mareotis a few miles beyond Fort Mex.

At two o'clock on the afternoon of the 27th a body of

horsemen with two battalions of infantry appeared on the crest of the hill beyond the village, near the western walls of the fort. Some of them, moving down, took possession of the farthest houses of the village.

A small detachment of the 95th under Major De Solis sallied out from the fort to dislodge them. Passing through the village the troops advanced against the outlying houses occupied by the enemy, and a sharp musketry fire was opened on both sides, until the Egyptians abandoned the houses and retired rapidly to their main body, leaving behind them twelve of their number. The English loss amounted to one killed and one seriously wounded.

The Egyptians at once began to intrench themselves on the sand-hill, and works with embrasures for eight guns were speedily constructed on the crest of the hills on the other side of the lake between the causeway and the village of El Khrei. The sand-hills around it were dotted with the white uniforms of their sentries and working parties, showing that a considerable force had moved round to that side. On the same afternoon H.M. ship *Minotaur*, lying off Ramleh, shelled the Egyptians out of some works which they were erecting near the shore between Aboukir and that place.

On the 29th Lieutenant Hancock with twenty men of the 95th made a dashing reconnaissance against the enemy's position. Leaving Fort Mex before daybreak, they crossed the end of Lake Mareotis by the abandoned railway embankment, known as the Causeway, and reached a point close to the enemy's position, which was found to be strongly intrenched, and held by regular infantry and cavalry. A 40-pounder and two other guns were seen in position in the battery on the crest of the sand-hills. As the day broke the little party were discovered, and the Egyptians poured down to attack them.

The men then fell back along the narrow causeway, checking the pursuit of the enemy by their steady fire, by which seven of the enemy were seen to fall. They regained Fort Mex without a single casualty. On the 30th General Hamley with the Highland Brigade sailed, and the same evening 800 marines were landed from the fleet to reinforce the brigade under General Wood.

The departure of so many troops caused something like consternation among the inhabitants of Alexandria.

On September 3d Lieutenant Smith-Dorien of the 95th, who had organized thirty men of his regiment as a mounted infantry corps, made a dashing reconnoissance in the direction of Kafr-Dowar, riding out with ten of his men along the banks of the canal to within a thousand yards of the enemy's intrenchments. Much fewer men were seen in the enemy's works than on previous occasions, and it was believed that a considerable number of troops had been withdrawn to reinforce Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir.

In view of the small force now at Alexandria it was resolved to cut the dyke at Mex, and to let the sea into Lake Mareotis, so as to deepen its waters and prevent any attack by the enemy on that side. The Bedouins and labourers were still working busily on intrenchments on the Aboukir side of Ramleh, and they were from time to time shelled by the *Minotaur*, while occasional artillery duels took place between the heavy guns in the Ramleh batteries and those at Kafr-Dowar. The hostility of the lower class of the population continued to be evinced by occasional incendiary fires, which were, however, extinguished by the troops before they became serious.

Beyond insignificant skirmishes and exchange of shots between our outposts and the Bedouins, no change took place in the position of the forces facing each other outside Alexandria until the day following the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. Immediately that event became known in Cairo Budras Pasha, under-secretary of the ministry of justice, and Raouf Pasha, ex-Governor-General of the Soudan, were sent off by the Council of Notables at Cairo to Alexandria to inform the khedive that the entire Egyptian army as well as Cairo were ready to surrender. They had arrived at noon on the 14th of September, and a flag of truce was at once sent in to our lines, with a request from these pashas to be allowed to come in immediately to present to the khedive an address and to ask his conditions.

Rabi Pasha, one of the chiefs of the rebel army, also signed

the letter certifying that the troops at Kafr-Dowar were ready to surrender, that the dam across the canal had already been cut, and the telegraph wire reinstated and put in working order. The khedive, in accordance with the advice of the British authorities, insisted upon unconditional surrender, which was at once agreed to by the Egyptians, and at four in the afternoon the surrender of Kafr-Dowar was formally made.

A complete change of feeling took place directly the downfall and capture of Arabi became known, and the khedive Tewfik was once more recognized not only as the ruler, but as the popular ruler of Egypt.

It was arranged that the Egyptian army should march past the English troops and lay down their arms, but no sooner were the Egyptians aware that Arabi had been crushed and that the movement was entirely at an end, than they at once began to make their way to their homes in great numbers. In the evening of the 15th the news of the exodus reached Alexandria, and at day-break the next morning Captain Slade, A.D.C., rode out to the lines and found them almost entirely deserted. General Wood and his staff at once rode out, the 49th and 53d Regiments being ordered to move forward in the afternoon and take possession of the Egyptian position.

Passing along the line of the railway, where strong parties of blue-jackets, engineers, and natives were busy in repairing the line of railway and in removing a solid platform of masonry constructed across it, they entered the line of fortifications which had so long confronted the troops at Alexandria. A fair idea was now for the first time obtained of the enormous amount of labour accomplished by the Egyptians, and of the extremely formidable nature of the works which they had erected. They consisted of three lines of earthworks parallel to each other covering the railway and the canal.

The first line was situated about a mile and a quarter beyond the Milhalla junction, and was called Kourschid Pasha; the second line was four thousand yards in rear of the first, and was called Esbat Sheikh Ibrahim. The third line, covering Kafr-Dowar, was



TEWFIK PASHA,
KHEDIVÉ OF EGYPT

six thousand yards behind the second. The first of these lines was complete, the second was less perfect, and the third was in a still more unfinished state. Had the war continued another fortnight the whole would have been finished, and would have formed a position which, if held with obstinacy, could have resisted any attacks made upon it.

On the extreme left flank of the first line, which rested on Lake Mareotis, was a redoubt mounting five guns. This was connected, by a covered way, with a formidable earthwork covering the railway. The extreme height of the face of these works was forty feet, and the thickness at the embrasures was thirteen feet. Their face was extremely steep, the loose earth being retained in position by a facing of dung mixed with chopped straw. Spacious magazines had been constructed in the thickness of the mounds. The redoubts were armed with twelve field-pieces and two heavy field-guns, and were connected by a continuous line of earthworks with two redoubts, each mounting two guns, on the bank of the canal.

The right of the position towards Lake Aboukir was defended by redoubts similar to those on the left. The front of the whole line was protected by several rows of deep shelter trenches interconnected by covered ways. The other lines of intrenchment were similar in character; and the Egyptians were, when the surrender took place, engaged in the erection of a great central redoubt armed with siege-guns. Riding through these formidable works General Wood entered the Egyptian camp. The scene was a striking one. The rebel tents were still standing in long white rows; in front of them the rifles were piled in proper manner, their polished barrels glittering in the sun.

Hundreds of horses and mules stood picketed in lines, and two batteries of 9-pounder guns were ranged side by side in perfect order; but the army which twenty-four hours before had occupied the camp had entirely vanished, its sole representatives being a group of some thirty officers, who came up and saluted the general as he rode in. Among them, in the uniform of an Egyptian artillery officer, was Lieutenant Ponlucci, an Italian

naval officer, who had a month before deserted from the Italian man-of-war *Castelfiardo*.

The general then proceeded along the line of railway to another military station, where there was another great camp with its innumerable stands of arms, its masses of ammunition, forage, and equipments. A few officers and orderlies alone remained here. Riding on, the party came upon a train crowded with peasants who had but an hour or two before been soldiers. All had left behind them the uniforms which they had, much against their will, been forced to adopt, and were on the point of starting for their homes in their long white shirts. Their departure was, however, to be delayed for a time, as there was plenty of work to be done; and General Wood accordingly ordered them out of the train and told them to go back and join the working parties on the railway.

The general and his party took possession of the train and steamed on to Kafr-Dowar. Here the open space in front of the railway station was filled with a surging mass of fellaheen—the remains of Arabi's army, who were now waiting for trains to take them to their native villages.

There was none of the sullen and downcast aspect which might have been expected among the troops of a beaten army. The dominant feeling in their hearts was evidently joy that the war had come to an end. Shouting, laughing, and jostling each other, they pressed forward with eager good-humoured curiosity to see the English general. Again and again the station-master and pointsmen, who acted as his assistants, drove them back with a few blows from their sticks; but they always pressed forward again, seeming anxious above all things to impress upon the general how welcome was his presence, and keeping up a chorus of thanksgiving to Allah that the war was over.

The Egyptian military hospital was found to be in excellent order. It consisted of fifteen large tents with all modern appliances and comforts. It was under the charge of Dr. Muhamed Bey Islim, a gentleman who had earned a title to the general respect and gratitude by having saved the lives of twenty-five Europeans from massacre by sheltering them in his house at the risk of his

life. The hospital was found empty, for all serious cases had at once been removed to the tents in the rear, and the thirty-five patients who were in hospital on the previous day had all risen and made off with their comrades when they heard that the army was disbanding.

The Egyptian positions were occupied by our troops in the afternoon, and they took possession of six thousand stand of arms, half a million rounds of ammunition, six batteries of horse-artillery, three heavy siege-guns, an enormous stock of forage and provisions, and eight hundred mules and horses. On the 17th the Egyptian forces opposite Fort Mex marched round the southern shore of Lake Mareotis and surrendered at Kafr-Dowar. The troops in the Egyptian camp were paraded—the 49th, three companies of the 53d, and a wing of the 35th forming up round the open square in front of the station.

Two companies with fixed bayonets lined the platform. The general and his staff came out by rail from Alexandria, and a crowd of the disbanded Egyptians, now working cheerfully as labourers, gathered to witness the arrival of their comrades. At half-past one the Egyptian troops arrived. Though weary with their forced march and covered with white dust, they bore themselves well and marched with regularity and soldier-like order. They consisted of five battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and three batteries of field-artillery. The soldiers went through the business of piling their arms with sullen indifference, but many of the officers showed plainly how bitterly they felt their humiliation, especially the surrender of their colours.

An hour later a battalion from Aboukir marched into Kafr-Dowar and also laid down its arms. The rank and file of the infantry were at once dismissed and allowed to return to their villages. The officers, numbering over two hundred, were taken to Alexandria, where they were kept for a few days as prisoners before being also allowed to return to their homes. The cavalry were disarmed and marched into Ramleh. The whole of the Egyptian army had now laid down their arms with the exception of three negro regiments at Damietta under Abdullah Pasha, who

had under his command 6000 negro troops, and still maintained a defiant attitude; but he did not long persist, and withdrawing his demands for terms surrendered unconditionally. The "national movement" appeared to have suddenly collapsed, and the insurrection to be at an end, though there was yet to be another scene at Cairo, to complete the strange drama of the revolt of Arabi.

The brilliant success of the campaign, and the rapidity and precision with which it had been conducted, strengthened the hands of the government, and brought no little credit to the commander-in-chief and the generals under his direction who had taken a principal part in the operations.

Sir Garnet Wolseley was elevated to the peerage under the title of Lord Wolseley of Cairo, and Admiral Seymour became Lord Alcester, each receiving a grant of money voted by Parliament. Orders of knighthood were conferred on the generals and admirals of division and the diplomatic and consular agents. Officers were honoured with decorations, and several hundreds of soldiers with medals. Lord Wolseley received a gold casket containing an address, and Lord Alcester was presented with a sword of honour by the corporation of London at Guildhall. Lord Wolseley also received a sword of honour, inscribed "From the people of Egypt;" which was perhaps scarcely so sincere an expression as that which accompanied a pair of handsomely inlaid pistols sent to General Drury-Lowe "from the notables of Cairo," who had good reason to thank the general for the rapid march on the capital, and the subsequent vigilance which saved the city from the fate that had befallen Alexandria.

In March, 1883, the khedive, with the approval of the sultan, asked permission of Her Majesty the Queen to confer a bronze star upon the men of the British army and navy who had been concerned in putting an end to the rebellion, and this decoration was added to other marks of approval already bestowed. The objection was raised by a large number of persons that there was rather too much alacrity and too great a profusion in conferring rewards, as though the impression of the undoubtedly able

achievements of the generals would be too soon effaced if any acknowledgment of them should be delayed. This feeling was probably occasioned by a certain hesitation on the part of the public to accept only the official reports of the military operations and the progress of the campaign, but it was still more to be attributed to the doubts which existed as to the policy which it might be thought necessary to pursue towards Egypt, now that the occupation of Cairo, the forthcoming trial and sentence of the rebels and conspirators, and the reorganization of a settled government, were the subjects demanding a practical solution.

With regard to the want of independent information of the events of the war during the campaign, there was some feeling of dissatisfaction with the objections of the commander-in-chief to the publication of reports of war correspondents appointed by the newspapers until they had received the sanction of the military authorities. The regular reports of "special correspondents" had come to be looked for daily, in time of war, ever since the letters which were sent from the Crimea, and it was remembered that in consequence of the revelations made in those letters many abuses were discovered and rectified. In the Egyptian campaign it may very well be understood that a too circumstantial report of the movements and supposed intentions of the generals in command, might have reached Arabi, and frustrated the intention of rapidly putting an end to the rebellion; but, whatever may have been the reason for editing or prohibiting the details of "special correspondence," considerable disappointment was manifested that the accounts of the most important events of the war were to be given only by the commander-in-chief, and a still more disagreeable result was, that some of those who claimed to have taken a prominent part in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir complained that their services had not been recognized. After a time, however, when some explanations were given, the signs of dissatisfaction gave way to a general recognition of the ability of the generals and the gallantry of the troops who had so summarily carried out their commands.

The future policy to be adopted towards Egypt remained the prevailing topic, and it was felt that the removal of British troops

altogether could not safely be completed until the administration of the laws of the country was effectually restored.

As Lord Dufferin said afterwards, when the work of reorganization had made considerable progress—a succession of unexpected events over which we had no control, and which we had done our best to avert, had compelled us to enter Egypt single-handed, to occupy its capital and principal towns with an English force, and to undertake the restoration of a settled government.

There was considerable conflict of opinion on the form that British interposition should ultimately take, and there were people who agreed with M. Emile de Laveleye the Belgian publicist, who, as long before as July, 1877, had strongly advocated the assumption by England of the protection of Egypt and the control of its government. He had cherished the idea of the English taking prominent authority in Egypt and commencing a great work of civilization in Africa, thus aiding the generous enterprise of the King of the Belgians. He called his own views Utopian, but he persisted in their possibility; the Egyptians, he said, had come to that worst of all possible combinations—oriental disorder served by European financing.—“The lot of the slave in the Southern States of the American Union was paradise compared with that of the Egyptian fellah. As I looked at these poor creatures, working all day long, and often half the night as well, to satisfy the insensate and prodigal rapacity of Cairo, I said to myself, ‘Why does not Europe, that sends cruisers to suppress the slave-trade, send hither a few good regiments to put an end to these barbarities?’ Egypt, in the hands of the English, would recover the splendour of her antiquity. With public works such as those which Mr. W. F. Thornton has described in his excellent book on *The Public Works of India*, the extent of arable land, the numbers of the population, and the revenue, would all enormously augment. Thanks to the annexations conducted by Colonel Gordon, Egypt now extends to the great lakes of Central Africa, and she has thus become, in point of territorial extension, one of the largest countries in the world. Only let her pass under the protection of England, instantly the slave-trade is suppressed, steam navigation connects the in-

terior of the continent with the Mediterranean, and civilization and commerce penetrate into an immense region of admirable fertility, and, by reason of its altitude, habitable by Europeans. By the Cape, by Natal, by the Transvaal, the English are advancing towards the Zambesi. Already they have a station on Lake Nyassa; soon they will have others on Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria. The International Exploration Society, formed under the auspices of the King of the Belgians, will send into the country travellers, emigrants, artisans of every kind. It has been shown by Lieutenant Cameron that a telegraphic line could easily be established from Cairo to Natal and the Cape, and he thinks that railways, uniting the centre of Africa to the coast, would not be long in paying their expenses. If, therefore, England consented to fix her attention in this direction, an unbroken current of civilization would speedily cross Africa from Alexandria to the Cape along the line of the high table-lands. The Anglo-Saxon race, mistress of Africa, mistress of America, mistress of Australia, would thus reach the fulfilment of its high destinies."

This, of course, was very flattering, very stimulating to British enterprise, but Mr. Gladstone was no more in favour then, than he was afterwards of absorbing a nation even for the purpose of hastening its prosperity.

"Our first site in Egypt," he wrote, "be it by larceny or be it by eruption, will be the almost certain egg of a North African Empire that will grow and grow until another Victoria and another Albert, titles of the lake sources of the White Nile, come within our borders; and till we finally join hands across the equator with Natal and Cape Town, to say nothing of the Transvaal and the Orange River on the south, or of Abyssinia and Zanzibar to be swallowed by way of viaticum on our journey."

M. de Laveleye had not abandoned his notions at the end of 1882 when he wrote, "Let Europe, let England especially, endeavour to procure for Egypt the inestimable benefit of a good government, and all the friends of pacific progress will bless them. . . . If England draw back before the long and difficult mission of being instrumental in carrying civilization into Africa, and if she will not

even guarantee to protect the true Egyptians against their foreign and native spoilers, and ensure to them the enjoyment of the soil they cultivate, it would have been better for her never to have interfered in Egyptian affairs at all, then her purchase of shares will be absolute folly, the sending of the iron-clads a mistake, the bombardment of Alexandria worse than a mistake, Tel-el-Kebir a useless act of heroism, and all the present interference at Cairo a mere series of issueless contradictions,—and Mr. Bright is right.”

Widely divergent opinions were advocated, among which were the establishment of an English protectorate in Egypt with powers similar to those exercised by a British resident at an Indian court; the formation of a European directorate representing all the great powers; or the establishment of an independent Egypt under the protection of those powers. A return to the dual control was mooted, but former experiences had not been very satisfactory and the control had come to an end, while France was still holding off from any practical co-operation. It was plain that until order was restored and a better form of government instituted, the country could not be abandoned; and as we had by the force of circumstances been led to occupy it, the duty of completing the work of intervention by securing both Egyptian and European interests, and especially by obtaining effectual guarantees for the independence and security of the Suez Canal, was left to us to accomplish. An attempt to absorb Egypt in such a way as to make it part of the British Empire would have been one which no government would have ventured seriously to propose, though even that scheme had its advocates who agreed with M. de Laveleye. The other scheme, the entire withdrawal of the troops, and the consequent revival of the power of the native pashas and the anarchy and corruption which had led us to interpose for the protection of legitimate claims, was pronounced to be intolerable. The policy determined on by the government was stated by Mr. Dodson (who was a cabinet minister) to be not to remain in Egypt a day longer than was necessary. They hoped to see native rule established, for they desired neither dominion in Egypt for their country, nor its annexation, nor the responsibility of its adminis-

tration. The government wanted Egypt for the Egyptians, but with the condition that they would neither bear the domination of any other power, nor acknowledge the preponderance of any other nation. Lord Northbrook and Mr. Fawcett also explained the views of the situation, which accorded with those of the cabinet. The apprehension of the intercourse between England and India being hindered had in a great measure determined the policy of the government, and the anarchy which had prevailed decided the moment for our intervention. As regarded the future, secret treaties and concealed obligations to other countries would be avoided. While the government had no desire to annex or govern Egypt, they were not prepared to see Egypt in the power of any other country, and were not prepared to accept the responsibility of allowing it to lapse into a state of anarchy, considering the obligations already contracted. There was no desire to acquire exclusive power over the Suez Canal; but it was not intended to allow Egypt to fall into such a condition as to make it possible that the canal could be stopped at any time against British ships, whether of peace or war. The attainment of these objects was in entire accordance with the views of all the other powers of Europe. These powers were satisfied that there were no other intentions behind those which the government had always expressed.

Mr. Courtney, the financial secretary of the treasury, had already spoken even more plainly on some matters which were being vehemently discussed, and especially in reference to the interests of the bondholders. Our conduct in Egypt and elsewhere should be that of co-operation with the other powers for the maintenance of the concert of Europe. Having restored order in Egypt and secured the neutrality of the canal for the traffic of all nations, he would, in the words of the great statesman Prince Bismarck, allow the Egyptians to "stew in their own juice." He would rid Egypt entirely from being under the control of the sultan, and he would warn the khedive that his future position depended upon his management of his own affairs, and the problem of Egypt should be worked out by its own people over the area of Egypt itself. The money spent in rescuing Egypt had been money spent in

keeping a going concern going, and therefore in the settlement of Egypt the first claim on the Egyptian revenues should be the repayment of the cost which had been incurred in keeping Egypt going. He hoped we should not extort from the poor fellaheen a single farthing more than they ought to pay. If the interest of the bondholder came between the claims of England on the one hand and the fellaheen on the other—if the fellaheen could not pay—no doubt those who would have to forego something would be the bondholders, and he confessed he should feel a peculiar satisfaction in making the bondholders realize that the war was not entered upon and concluded in their interest.

These, then, were the extra parliamentary utterances of members of the government, the policy of which had been announced in general terms at the opening of the session to be “the maintenance of the sovereignty of the sultan, the authority of the khedive, and the rights of the people,” under existing firmans and treaties, in cordial co-operation with France, and with the approval of the other great powers. We have seen that French co-operation had not proved to be a very trustworthy factor in the general scheme, but there had been a sort of acquiescence in the English occupation—which had been heartily recognized by Germany, Austria, Russia, and later by Italy, as giving authority to the English to restore order in the valley of the Nile, and to take upon herself the responsibilities which belonged to that undertaking.

The late Mr. Francis W. Rowsell, who was officially employed in Egypt by our government, writing (to the *Nineteenth Century*) from Cairo in the summer of 1883 pointed out, however, that France had, perhaps, anticipated a different result of Arabi's resistance, and was hardly ready for the surprise which the utter collapse of the rebellion after Tel-el-Kebir was for her. After specifically renouncing her positive right to intervene with us, after refusing to bear any part of the burden of the war, she claimed to be replaced exactly in the same position she had occupied in Egypt before the massacre of the 11th of June. She interpreted our assurances that our object in intervening was to restore the *status quo ante*, to mean that we would neither add to nor subtract from the condition

of things as it existed at the time when that very condition of things provoked the rebellion, or permitted it to break out.¹

This feeling led to the disagreeable relations between France and England at the end of the year 1882 in spite of the earnest endeavours on both sides to avoid them. This feeling, however, had little or no existence among the English and French colonies in Egypt. Men who before the war had become intimately associated by work, by the courtesies of social life, and by the inspiration of a common duty, found no reason for changing, in the smallest degree, their attitude, official or social, the one towards the other. Responsible, reflecting Frenchmen, in every international administration in Cairo, though naturally and pardonably sore at the conduct of their own government in placing them invidiously towards their English colleagues, had too much good sense and good feeling to charge upon those colleagues the results of a situation which they had not made. From the moment when that which was never doubtful to Englishmen, who knew the intentions of their government, became matter of certainty to the French, namely, that save the already defunct control there was no design on foot to give preponderance to English functionaries, the relations of the Anglo-French administrators became closer than before.

The position of the Anglo-French controllers before the rebellion was pointed out by M. Gabriel Charmes in the article to which

¹ Mention has been made in a previous page (p. 244, vol. i.) of the conduct of the French consul-general in encouraging the disaffection and rebellion of the military leaders at the outset of the revolt. In the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, August, 1883, M. Gabriel Charmes, who was at Cairo when the mutiny broke out, admitted that the attitude of the French consul was one of the principal causes of the revolt. "As long as France and England appeared to be sincerely united in Egypt, no one dreamt, even for a second, of the possibility of a revolt. Unfortunately, some weeks before the mutiny in February, a quarrel broke out between the French consul on the one hand, and the English consul and Riaz Pasha on the other. It must be confessed that all the blame lay with the French consul. On a very insignificant question he violently declared war against his English colleague and the Egyptian minister, exciting the whole of the consular body and the entire French colony. The report at once spread in Cairo that France was breaking with England, for in Egypt it is by the conduct of the agents that that of the cabinets is judged. There were great rejoicings in the barracks, and from this unexpected incident the colonels derived courage to revolt. So, on leaving Abdin, the colonels went at once to the French consul, asking for his support. He promised them at least his sympathy, and for several weeks he had them constantly at his house, discussing with them their constitutional theories and regaling them with coffee and cigars. He would doubtless have gone on like this had he not been recalled by the minister for foreign affairs. But the evil was done, and never from that moment did the colonels utterly abandon the hope of having France on their side."

reference has just been made. He says, in speaking of the mutiny —“ I well remember with what stupefaction I learned, on the afternoon of February 1, 1881, what had occurred that morning. The Anglo-French controllers were no better informed than myself. Under the pretext that this was a purely domestic question the ministry had actually kept them in ignorance of what was going on in the army, and of the measures that it had been deemed advisable to take for the prevention of mischief. There exists in Egypt a legend about the control. The universal opinion is that the controllers were incessantly endeavouring to direct the policy of Egypt in an arbitrary manner. But nothing could be more untrue. It would be more just to reproach them with having carried forbearance towards the khedive's government and the consuls too far. They would certainly have had the right of arresting with their own hands the military agitation that was about to destroy their work of reform little by little. But they thought that, as the khedive had acted without consulting them, and as the consuls had been asked to give their advice, it was not for them to recommend resistance when the others had counselled resignation. They left to the Egyptian ministers and to the political representatives of France and England the responsibility of what had just occurred without any warning, so far as they themselves were concerned.”

Though the opposition took every opportunity of endeavouring to elicit statements from the ministry on the policy which it was intended to pursue in Egypt they did not succeed in obtaining any definite answers, and it must be admitted, now that all the difficulties and vicissitudes of the English occupation are known, that the course of events might have prevented the realization of any settled details of a plan of procedure even if the government had determined on them. Even before the reorganization of the government of Egypt was nearly completed, the news that reached Cairo of the condition of affairs in the Soudan would at once have made the continued withdrawal of our troops, if not impolitic, at least inconsistent with the engagements into which we had entered and the promises that we had made. By what was, perhaps, a too great anxiety to show that our intervention was not dictated by

selfish motives, and to prove that no permanent occupation or domination of the country was intended, the government fell short of prompt and effectual action in the Soudan at the very time that it was needed, and by what appeared to be reluctance to extend to the insurrection in Sennâr the interposition which, in the case of Arabi's rebellion, they believed had saved Egypt, they indefinitely postponed the period at which the country might be left to stand alone. After damaging delay they entered upon a conflict which, though it vindicated the valour of British soldiers and sailors and the invincible courage and address of their commanders, achieved very little, as it now seems, for the permanent pacification of that region which has for ages been a standing problem for civilization. So they sacrificed a vast amount of money and the lives of brave and noble men in a contest with fanatic savages. Mr. Gladstone's foreign administration was too ready to hesitate between the two political forces which threatened the government, and were to be noticed on both sides of the house: those who urged a prompt and effectual assertion of authority in Egypt maintained if necessary by a military force; and those who conceived it to be our duty to get out of Egypt as quickly as possible, and having propped up the khedive to leave him to govern the country in his own way or with the materials that he could find there. The mistake seems to have been either that we interfered at all even after the first disaster to the Egyptian troops in the Soudan, or that we did not interpose with a stronger hand at the first authentic intelligence of the insurrection of the Mahdi. The reported utterances of M. de Lesseps in conversation with a friend in the autumn of 1883 might have been worth considering if he had made them earlier and they had been published. He was represented to have said:—

“Egypt was always, in my judgment, a very difficult country to defend. It is so long and so exposed that its borders may be attacked anywhere. Besides, its population is essentially agricultural—all its inhabitants are farmers, not warriors, and they are not at all the people to resist an invasion like that of the Mahdi.

“In my own opinion it will be best to let the movement alone.

It is not dangerous, and will subside of its own accord if disregarded. It is quite true that there are no forts of importance between the head of the Suez Canal and the position of the rebel army, and that Khartûm is surrounded. But Suez is, after all, a long way from Dongola, and I do not anticipate that the Mahdi will ever go so far north as to inconvenience me. He is far more likely to menace Suakim, and it is quite possible that he may be troublesome there. What I should advise would be that Assouan should be well fortified. It lies just in front of the First Cataract, and is directly in the line of the Mahdi's march if he wants to come north. Strong fortifications there will stop him, and they can easily be manned by Egyptian troops. Yes! Assouan must be well fortified! That is the important place at this juncture. I am aware that the Egyptian troops are not very good, but they are good enough for this work. Whatever you do, let me impress upon you the unwisdom of sending English troops there. They cannot stand the climate. It is too hot for them in that country I should strongly advise their not being used. As regards your suggestion for the employment of Indian troops, I should say they are not needed. The movement will, in my opinion, subside. You will have no need to employ any troops against the Mahdi at all."

This, however, was not the conclusion arrived at by our government, and it may one day be seen that the greatest mistake of all was that of suffering General Gordon to go to Khartûm with what appears to have been the same kind of doubtful support from the British government as that which he had formerly held from the khedive when he went forth to abolish slave-hunting, and found that nothing would be effectual but the continued personal rule of a British governor-general ready to sacrifice himself and provided with a well-equipped and sufficient armed force. It is even possible that some readers of Gordon's letters from Central Africa may have had grave doubts whether he was at all likely to put an end to a rebellion promoted by the pashas who desired to re-establish the slave traffic, but having at its foundation strong "religious" fanaticism. He had left behind him feelings of honour

and respect for his justice and undaunted courage, but also many bitter enmities. The fact of his having at a late period strongly urged the reinstatement in authority of the arch slave-hunter Zebehr, whom he had sent as a state prisoner to Cairo—whose son had been pursued and slain by Gessi, and between whom and Gordon there was consequently said to be a blood feud—has never been adequately explained.—But we are taking too distant a forecast, and must return to the date of our regular narrative—the parliamentary session of 1882.

It should be recorded that when decisive operations for the suppression of Arabi's rebellion in Egypt were fairly commenced, parliament was almost unanimous in refraining from hostile criticism or embarrassing inquiries.

When Sir Stafford Northcote endeavoured to obtain a promise from the government that an opportunity should be afforded for discussing the policy in Egypt before the close of the session, together with a statement of the cost of the war and the method of apportioning the charges, Mr. Gladstone objected to facilitate the discussion of a policy which was not yet complete. No further vote of credit would be asked for, and, therefore, there would be no means of challenging the government policy except by a direct motion of a vote of censure. Not even the vote of annuities to Sir Garnet Wolseley and Admiral Seymour was brought forward at that time, though the vote of thanks to the officers and men of the army and navy was proposed and agreed to. Mr. Gladstone, however, informed the house that the expenses of the war were covered by the grant already made; and, though it might perhaps be necessary to make a further demand for subsequent expenses, he considered that the cost of the army of occupation should at least be partially borne by Egypt. A few days afterwards (Nov. 14) he made a brief statement referring to the convention which it was proposed to conclude with the Egyptian government. The English army of occupation had been reduced from 30,000 to 12,000, but no definite proposal as to their cost of maintenance had then been made to the khedive. It would, therefore, be necessary to follow the precedent set in 1815, when a portion of

the English army was left in France, when the number of Her Majesty's troops employed in a foreign country was placed upon the estimates. This would be done in the ensuing session, when it would also be shown what amount would be contributed by Egypt for their support. Sir Stafford Northcote objected to this plan as unsatisfactory, but stated that, as the government had it in its power to stop discussion, he would do no more than protest against the course indicated, and wait until the House reassembled.

It will be remembered that the more arduous work of the session related to the proposed new rules of parliamentary procedure, and that at the end of a six weeks' struggle, when those new rules were adopted, the session came to an end, while the severe mental and physical strain demanded from ministers and leading statesmen in the opposition had nearly brought some of them to an end also. Mr. Childers, on whom so much responsibility had fallen in sending the first military expedition to Egypt, was almost prostrated by exhaustion, and Sir Stafford Northcote was the next to fall out of the parliamentary ranks. Mr. Fawcett was also seriously ill, though not from work within parliament, and it was afterwards known that Mr. Gladstone had temporarily succumbed. Some changes had already been made in the cabinet, however. Mr. Childers, when he had recovered, became Chancellor of the Exchequer, thus relieving Mr. Gladstone from the duties of that office in conjunction with those of Prime Minister. The Marquis of Hartington succeeded Mr. Childers at the war-office. Sir Charles Dilke, who had been remarkably successful as Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was made President of the Local Government Board in place of Mr. Dodson, who became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, an office that had not been filled since the retirement of Mr. Bright in July. Lord Kimberley took the control of the India office, and Lord Derby was made Secretary of State for the Colonies—an appointment which, while it gave him a seat in the cabinet, did not call for any emphatic declaration of his opinions on the Egyptian question, which, however, did not seem to differ very materially from those of the government of which he was a member, since he held that we should not remain

in Egypt a day longer than was necessary to restore order, that a protectorate was but annexation in disguise, and any line of policy was to be deprecated which would break up the good understanding between France and England. The question of the immediate withdrawal of our troops was necessarily modified by the urgent request of the khedive, that a sufficient force might remain, since their presence was for some time the sole guarantee of order, and the conduct of the men was for the most part so exemplary that their continued presence was desired by those who sought to establish a regular government with effectual provisions for maintaining the authority of the khedive.

On the occasion to which we have already referred, when Sir Archibald Alison addressed the citizens of Glasgow, he was able to speak with undisguised admiration of the conduct of the men left under his command at Cairo.

“Of the later phase of my command in Egypt, when I was left in charge of the army of occupation, I will only say one word. I had nearly 13,000 men left under my orders. We had just conquered the country at the point of the bayonet. Peace was proclaimed, and at once those men, from being bitter enemies of the Egyptians, sank down into peaceful English soldiers, behaving with a discipline and a restraint which they would not have done in any town in this country. It was a curious sight; but, actually, I believe I had less trouble with our English soldiers in the occupation of Egypt, in Cairo, where there was the Highland Brigade and a battalion of the 60th or King’s Royal Rifles, and another brigade within a couple of miles, than I would have had with the same number of troops in any large town at home. I think that says a great deal for the discipline of our army, which has been attacked in these days. And before I left Egypt, when Lord Dufferin was quitting that country, he paid, I think, the most beautiful compliment I ever heard paid to any body, to our army in regard to their conduct in the capital of Egypt. He said that a great part of the influence that England possessed there was owing to the admirable conduct of our troops under most trying and difficult circumstances, and to our perfect friend-

ship with the natives from the very hour that peace was proclaimed. I had the very same statement made to me by the Egyptian minister of war, and also by the Khedive of Egypt himself."

As we have seen, the re-embarkation of British troops began directly the rebellion was suppressed; Sir Garnet Wolseley considering that a force of from 10,000 to 12,000 men would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the country. By the end of March, 1883, the latest large reduction was made, leaving Sir Archibald Alison the 13,000 men to whom he alluded, and these were considered sufficient for the remaining time during which it might be necessary to continue the occupation of the country. They included one regiment of cavalry (19th Hussars), four batteries of artillery, two companies of engineers, three companies of commissariat and transport and ordnance store corps, and eight battalions of infantry. It was decided, however, that Sir Evelyn Wood should be commissioned to reorganize an Egyptian army, and that to Colonel Valentine Baker (Pasha), an officer of great ability who had previously entered the service of the Khedive of Egypt, should be intrusted the organization of a native *gendarmerie* force. It was at first supposed that this force would be composed of mercenaries, chiefly Albanians under the command of British officers, and subsequent events perhaps showed that it might have been better if this had been the case. However, such a plan would have been highly unpopular, and must have entailed enormous trouble, because of the suspicions it would have aroused, and probably also because of the turbulent character of the men who would have been enlisted. It was at any rate determined to employ a native force, with some native and some European officers. The scheme took the form of a conscription with eight years' service, and of the 10,000 men to form the entire force 6000 were to be infantry, 1500 cavalry, 1100 artillery, and 1400 gendarmes, half the officers being English, and the non-commissioned officers to be selected from the disbanded Egyptian army, supplemented by Russians, Albanians, and Bulgarians. It had been estimated by Baker Pasha that the total expense would

not exceed £368,000 a year. Of course the organization of such a force would take a considerable time, under such conditions as existed in Egypt, and it was therefore necessary to detain a British force there until the plan for the formation of a settled government had been decided upon and commenced. Our immediate difficulty was the dissatisfaction likely to arise in France if, while our troops occupied the country, we appeared to press for the abolition of the dual control, which had, of course, become inoperative, and the re-institution of which was opposed on all hands. The khedive, whether he was under the influence of Lord Dufferin (as the French press declared) or not, was exceedingly averse to the re-establishment of the control, and in fact Lord Granville had instructed Sir Auckland Colvin to resign his office of joint controller, and thus may be said indirectly to have put an end to the existing arrangement. At the same time it was exceedingly undesirable to ignore France in the endeavour to settle the government of Egypt. The situation was a difficult one, for though the duties of the controllers had virtually ceased during the disturbances in the country, the khedive was anxious for the advice and support of Sir Auckland Colvin directly peace had been restored. This was resented by the French foreign office, which protested against what was alleged to be an attempt on the part of Lord Granville to abolish the joint control by indirect means while establishing the right of sole influence in Egyptian affairs. The French minister, however, notified that his government would agree to the abolition of the control when that course was found to be desirable, to which Lord Granville replied that he was at once ready to adopt that course, and suggested that the khedive should appoint one European financial adviser, whose functions should be far less extensive and authoritative than those which had been exercised by the controllers, at the same time it was recommended that the position of financial adviser and other posts should be filled by officials nominated by the French government. This offer was, however, not accepted, and eventually Sir Auckland Colvin yielded to the solicitations of the khedive and was appointed with the consent of our government. The temporary suspension of the mixed tribunals was among the

proposals to facilitate the settlement of the country, but this was not effected for some time afterwards. One important matter which had a place in the plan laid down for the complete restoration of order in Egypt was the neutralization of the Suez Canal, which Lord Granville proposed should be opened to armed as well as merchant vessels of all countries at all times, and that, as on an arm of the sea, no special privileges beyond those of the three miles limit should be granted to the ships of one power to the exclusion of another, but that all belligerent operations within the canal should be prohibited by convention.

These, then, were the main points of the plan for the restoration of regular government in Egypt in 1883, but we shall see that other events interposed, and that the difficulties of the situation had been beyond ordinary calculation even apart from the cloud of another insurrection, which had already appeared in the distant horizon. Meanwhile the trial of the leaders of the rebellion had to be proceeded with, and the evidence that had been obtained from numerous voluntary witnesses at Alexandria and in the provinces, had already pretty well established the guilt of Arabi and his accomplices, though a great part of that evidence was offered at a time when the military tyranny of the rebels made it dangerous for witnesses to give such testimony.

Lord Dufferin having so well represented England at the conference in Constantinople, it was almost an inevitable conclusion that he should be sent to Cairo, there to take the leading part in restoring to order the tangled skein of the Egyptian government, and providing for the protection of European interests. There was no man more eminently capable of fulfilling a mission requiring united firmness, caution, and conciliatory disposition and manners; nor was there a diplomatist whose previous experiences had better qualified him for dealing with the condition of affairs in Egypt. The Right Hon. Frederick Temple Blackwood, K.C.B., K.P., Viscount Clandeboye and Earl of Dufferin, son of the fourth Baron Dufferin and Helen Selina, daughter of the late Thomas Sheridan, possesses those admirable qualities which distinguish the accomplished Irish gentleman, who has the delightful

characteristics of his educated countrymen without sharing the prejudices which detract from their otherwise inimitable social charm. Humorous, genial, sound in judgment, practical, and possessing a quiet energy which promptly accepts and steadily accomplishes difficult duties, he had already been repeatedly successful in the various high official positions to which he had been appointed. It may be surmised that the noble earl derived from his accomplished mother and her early tuition some of the literary taste and ability which has given him a recognized place in the world of letters. It is to that lady that we owe the well-known Irish songs "Terence's Farewell" and "The Lament of the Irish Emigrant;" and her son's contributions to literature, which include, beside humorous and satirical writing, some serious and thoughtful dissertations on Irish questions, have been most popularly represented by his entertaining book *Letters from High Latitudes*, a bright and pleasant account of a voyage made by the author in the yacht *Foam* to Iceland, Jan Mayen, and Spitzbergen. This pleasure-trip was made in 1855, soon after the mission of Lord John Russell in Vienna, to which Lord Dufferin was especially attached. In 1847, when he attained his majority (his father had died in 1841), the famine in Ireland had caused the most terrible distress in that country, and the young man, who had been a lord-in-waiting to the queen under Lord John Russell's administration, accompanied his friend the Hon. Mr. Boyle on a visit to the desolate district of Skibbereen, where the poverty and suffering were perhaps most conspicuous. The account of what they saw there was afterwards published in a plain statement of facts, which very emphatically called the attention of people in England to the urgent claims for relief put forward on behalf of the starving and destitute peasantry.

In 1860 Lord Palmerston sent Lord Dufferin to Syria with authority to prosecute inquiries on the subject of the massacre of the Christians, and he seemed even at that time to have some special qualification for dealing with the Oriental character, for his accounts of what he saw were striking, and his mission was so well accomplished that on his return he was gazetted K.C.B. and was

afterwards appointed Under-Secretary of State for India, an office which he relinquished in 1866 on his becoming Under-Secretary of State for War. About two years later he was made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster under Mr. Gladstone's administration, and held that office till 1872, when he was made Governor-general of Canada, and fulfilled the onerous duties of that position to the admiration of the people over whom he exercised authority. In this, as in his lord-lieutenancy of county Down, and in those social relations by which he has been so happily distinguished, Lord Dufferin owed much to the grace and tact of the lady to whom he was married in 1862—a daughter of Captain Archibald Rowan Hamilton of Killyleah Castle. Lord Dufferin may be said to have earned by steady and competent service, united to great capability and the amiable social attractions that bespeak good-will—the successive honours conferred upon him. In 1850 he received the title of an English Baron, and became a privy councillor in 1868, and an earl of the United Kingdom in 1871.

Lord Dufferin arrived in Cairo on the 7th of November, 1882, and so assiduously set about the work of inquiry and reform that he was soon able to sketch out a plan for the reconstruction of a government and the administration of the finances; but before that had been done, or rather simultaneously with his inquiries and plans, the trials of Arabi and his rebel colleagues took place. Some of these lasted for a considerable time, but that of Arabi was concluded before the end of the year.

The khedive, with Cherif Pasha, who was again chief minister, and the other officials had lost very little time in getting hold of the reins of government under British protection and advice, and one of the first things they set themselves to do was to punish those of their enemies, throughout the provinces, who had fomented the rebellion and had been guilty of crimes in their determination to support it. The examinations which had been conducted, and the evidence obtained in the presence of official representatives of this country in Alexandria and other places, left no doubt of the guilt of many of the principal persons who were accused and had been arrested.

As we have seen, it was not only in Alexandria, where the British consul had been felled to the ground and seriously injured and a large number of Europeans killed or severely wounded; but in Cairo, where the Austro-Hungarians were numerous and suffered considerably from the disturbance; and also at Zagazig, Mansourah, Damietta, Tantah, and other places, that Europeans were openly threatened, and the riotous part of the population had been known to arm themselves by the permission, if not with the connivance, of officials. With regard to Arabi himself, there was no doubt whatever that he had been guilty of mutiny, treason, and the violation of the laws of war, which were the charges eventually brought against him at his trial. The difficulty had been caused by the conduct of the sultan and of the khedive, and the manner in which they had delayed proclaiming him to be a rebel until they were compelled to recognize the danger of his pretensions and had to face the occupation of the country by a European force. This led to the surmise that at his trial more important people would be implicated than those who had been his agents or had been recognized as active confederates in the atrocities which had been committed.

As early as June, 1882, Lord Dufferin, who was at Therapia, had heard that the sultan had conferred decorations on Arabi, and on asking the Turkish minister of foreign affairs whether this report was true received the mysterious answer, "The time will come when you will entirely applaud the act."

This was at a time when Europeans were escaping from Alexandria, from Cairo, and from the provincial towns. News of a massacre at Benha, and of the establishment of the military tyranny of Arabi and his companions, had led the French and other foreign representatives at the conference to say that unless a prompt remedy were applied to the increasing anarchy in Egypt all the African provinces would eventually become uninhabitable by Europeans. After the bombardment of Alexandria the ex-governor, Omar Pasha Loutfi, on his way to Cairo, saw the dead bodies of many Europeans who had been killed by the soldiers and plunderers. The towns of Tantah, Damanhour, and

Mihalla had been looted and all Europeans who were found there had been killed. On his arrival at Cairo he found the greatest excitement and panic prevailing. A general council was hastily summoned to meet the minister of the interior, and was attended by about 100 pashas, ulemas, and merchants, and Hussein Pasha Dramali, who was elected president of the meeting, opened the proceedings by reading a letter addressed by Arabi to Yacoub Pasha, directing the latter to call a meeting and to read his letter publicly to them. The drift of this letter was: "The khedive has sold the country to the English; every evening he takes his family on board an English ship of war; he has given orders to the director of the military bakeries that 15,000 loaves be supplied daily to the English and nothing to the natives. The ministers have been imprisoned by the khedive's orders. The telegrams which I (Arabi) receive, purporting to be sent by my colleagues, are all forgeries. Under such circumstances I ask whether it would be advisable to cease military preparations or not."

A telegram from the khedive to Arabi, which was inclosed in his letter, was then read. In this telegram his highness had pointed out that England did not wish to take Egypt; and then followed an explanatory summary of events from the beginning of the crisis to the bombardment, ending by an invitation to Arabi to cease his military preparation and to come at once to the palace at Alexandria to receive his orders.

A sheikh named Hassan Edwi then said that by the order of God and the Prophet the khedive's commands could no longer be obeyed, and that the time had come to declare the holy war, a declaration which was seconded by another sheikh (el-Eish). On Akoosh Pasha, who spoke in opposition to it, refuting the statements made by Arabi, and denying their truth, many of the officers present rushed on him, seized him, and threatened to kill him. Order having been eventually restored, a proposition of the Coptic Patriarch was adopted by the majority of the meeting, and a deputation was appointed to go to Alexandria to hear what was the khedive's version of the story, and to inquire whether the ministers had really been imprisoned.

At this time two prefects and a mudir had been, by Arabi's orders, shut up in the citadel of Cairo, and others had been appointed to supersede them in their offices; Arabi had asked that the sixth part of the male population of every province should be sent to him to join the army at Kafr-Dowar, horses and provisions were everywhere being requisitioned, and the provinces were in a state of anarchy.

The delegates, after visiting Alexandria, went to the outposts of Arabi's forces at Kafr-Dowar, with the intention of discovering what were the terms which he would accept on condition of his yielding and putting an end to the rebellion; but various circumstances made any such arrangement exceedingly improbable. Arabi had read to Raouf Pasha, who visited his camp, a telegram from M. de Lesseps assuring him that if the Suez Canal was allowed to remain untouched, neither France nor any other power would co-operate with England in Egypt, and M. de Lesseps was expected to follow his telegram by special train from Port Said. He used every effort, also, to assure our representatives and generals that if we did not intervene to suppress the rebellion, Arabi would faithfully respect the neutrality of the canal, and he vehemently deprecated any occupation of it by vessels of war for any purpose whatever. It is scarcely likely that Arabi had much confidence in our abstaining from calling him to account for the condition of affairs at Alexandria and the massacres in the provinces, though for the trials of the murderers and incendiaries we had established native tribunals under European inspection.¹ He probably knew by that time that sufficient evidence could be brought against him if he should be proclaimed a rebel and a traitor. The governors of Port Said had been compelled to seek refuge on board an English vessel. However desirous some of his officers and followers may have been to submit to conditions and surrender, Arabi himself had reasons on both sides for holding out. His guilt would be established if he were brought to trial, his own false statements,

¹ The native tribunal established at Alexandria in July consisted of a president, Osman Pasha Nedjeb, a Circassian officer, assisted by six officers of the Egyptian army, two of whom were aides-de-camp to the khedive. Lord Charles Beresford, assisted by Mr. Beaman, watching the proceedings as chief of the police.

his accusations of the khedive, and his mutinous proclamations being sufficient to convict him; but he may have had some strong confidence that the sultan, who had decorated him and with whom he was in secret communication, desired to make use of him for a political revolution, and would support him in maintaining the attitude of patriotism which he had assumed.

In a previous page mention has been made of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt and two or three other gentlemen who professed a deep interest in the welfare of Egypt, and supported the claims of the national party. To this there could be no valid objection, and the representatives of our government were in unison with them, so far as this sympathy was concerned; but as we have seen, Mr. Blunt, and those who held his views, persisted until very late in the day, even if they did not continue to maintain, that Arabi and the mutineers represented the national feeling and ought not to be opposed. It may have been as a concession to this opinion that in an early stage of the rebellion a statement or proclamation of a patriotic character, by Arabi, was published in the *Times* newspaper; but of course that document was very different in character to those which were issued and disseminated in Egypt, and was doubtless designed to enlist sympathy for a cause which Arabi's conduct conclusively showed was not the object of the rebellion.

In December, 1881, Mr. Blunt, who had previously been in the English diplomatic service, and had recently travelled much among the Arab tribes, and devoted himself to acquiring a knowledge of their history and their political organization, had formed the acquaintance of Colonel Arabi Bey at Cairo and of the chiefs of the University of El Azhar. The consequence of this was, that he warmly espoused the cause of the national party, in which he thought he saw the germs of the regeneration of the Mohammedan religion,—on the possibility of which he had already written a good deal. Unfortunately Mr. Blunt in his desire to support the "National" movement sought to publish in the *Times* what he considered to be the programme of the party, and included in it statements which were so likely to arouse the

interference of the Porte, that the result would have been the restraint of the English government from giving powerful aid to a truly national movement towards reform and representative institutions in Egypt. Mr. Blunt eventually yielded to the remonstrances of Sir Edward Malet, withdrew his letters to the *Times*, and was said to have been of considerable service afterwards in removing misunderstandings; but his own misunderstanding of the character and aims of Arabi and his military colleagues, leading him to confound their actions with a desire to promote national liberty and the prosperity of the Egyptian people, still influenced him. In June (1882) he proposed to leave London and return to Egypt, because he had promised Arabi that in the event of a conflict arising between the Porte and Egypt he would fight with the Egyptians. On serious representations being made to him by the foreign office, Mr. Blunt did not go to Egypt at that time, but contented himself with writing a long letter to Mr. Gladstone reviewing all that had taken place up to the 21st of June, and founding his arguments against the diplomatic action of England on statements with regard to the identification of Arabi and the army with the national party, the fall of the Cherif ministry, the action of the controllers-general, the reports of press correspondents, the attitude of the Bedouins, and other matters which were afterwards answered, and the most important of them refuted by what appeared to be unassailable evidence. Whether or not the subsequent conduct of Arabi Pasha produced any change on the opinion of Mr. Blunt, Sir W. Gregory, Lord De la Warr, and others who had apparently regarded him and his military companions as the representatives of liberty and progress in Egypt, they were anxious that he should be defended by English counsel, and that the trial should not be left to an Egyptian court-martial, and they proposed to send proper legal assistance to the prisoner at their own charges, Mr. Blunt being prepared to go to Cairo to help to collect evidence for the defence. The government could not enter into a controversy with Mr. Blunt on the subject, though they did not deny that there was some danger of a purely Egyptian military court being untrustworthy. Mr. Blunt wrote again on

the 27th of September, referring to a report which had that day appeared in the *Times* from Cairo, that a military court to try all offenders would be named the next day, the khedive, Cherif, and Riaz all insisting strongly on the absolute necessity for the capital punishment of the prime offenders, an opinion from which there were few, if any, dissentients. Cherif was represented to have said, "It is not because I have a feeling of spite against any of them, but because it is absolutely necessary for the security of all who wish to live in the country. An English expedition is an excellent thing, but neither you nor we want it repeated every twelve months."

The English government had no objection to the prisoners being properly defended, and there were good reasons for preventing the trial from taking place in a court where evidence might be given under fear, and a sentence of capital punishment might be summarily carried out, without proper and legal forms being observed, for the purpose of satisfying private vengeance, and to stifle any defence which might include revelations likely to damage the prosecutors. People here were strongly in favour of an open trial.

By the 23d of October the plan decided on by the foreign office was settled. Our government had already proposed to hand over to the khedive all prisoners of war taken in Egypt, with the proviso that none of them would be put to death without the consent of the British authorities, and this was agreed to.

The terms of surrender granted to the mutineers included the entire disbanding of the army and the giving up of all arms and forts. The principal rebels were to be given up for trial in the districts where they had committed crimes, but were not to be put to death except with the concurrence of the British authorities; but our government would not take steps to prevent execution in the cases of persons guilty of taking part in the burning of Alexandria, of abusing the flag of truce on the 12th of July, or of being implicated in the murder of Europeans. The lives of those not proved to have committed crimes were to be spared. The English ministry desired to limit their action to an assurance that

the prisoners would have a fair trial, and they did not wish that English officers should sit among the judges. They reserved to themselves the right of appealing to the khedive's humanity of disposition to exercise his prerogative of mercy in any cases where the full execution of the sentence appeared to them to entail unnecessary severity. Lieutenant-colonel Sir C. Wilson, Her Majesty's consul-general for Anatolia, was selected to be present at the trials (but not as a member of the court), to watch the proceedings on behalf of the government.

The Egyptian government refused to allow the pleadings or the defence in any other language but Arabic. A solicitor and two counsel, Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier, had gone to Cairo to conduct the defence of Arabi, but the Egyptian government contended that by the code under which the court-martial was convened, prisoners were not allowed to have counsel, the trial would not be public, and no foreign officers would be permitted to assist. They considered that if they allowed Arabi to be defended by native counsel the condition on that point would be met. These claims, however, were not conceded by our government, who insisted that Arabi should be defended by counsel of his own choice, whether foreign or native, who would have free access to him, that interpreters should be provided, and that the trial should be public; and further, that all prisoners should be allowed to choose their counsel, but that the court should be able to control the conduct of the defence, and prevent the trial being unreasonably protracted. It was assumed that the prisoners would be tried on definite charges, and it was considered that if time should be requested to procure the attendance of absent witnesses, counsel should state what facts they are expected to prove, and that the request should be refused if the object were not to prove any fact material to the charges, but to prove any political reasons or motives. The following rules for the conduct of the trials were subsequently proposed by our government:—

“ 1. Prisoners should be allowed foreign counsel if any are on the spot, and available within the time reasonably fixed for the trial.

“2. The names of such counsel should be submitted to, and accepted by, the Egyptian government.

“3. Native counsel only should be allowed to address the court; foreign counsel should only advise.

“4. No arguments or evidence as to political motives or reasons in justification of the offences charged should be admitted, but only such as go to establish or disprove the truth of the charges made.

“5. No counsel should appear who does not subscribe to the above conditions, which should be rigidly enforced by the court.”

It will be seen that these rules were designed to remove the difficulties alleged by the Egyptian government, which accepted them as safeguards against the undue protraction of the trials and the introduction of political questions, which they had anticipated if the prisoners were defended by foreigners. There was a later agreement between the Egyptian government advocate, and the counsel for Arabi's defence, that each accused person would have the right to choose two counsel, one of whom, whether a native or a foreigner, would be allowed to address the court.

It will be seen that there was some apprehension on the part of the Egyptian government that certain evidence in defence of Arabi, Toulba, and the other chief prisoners might implicate their accusers, and that it was thought desirable to confine the evidence to the direct charges brought against the culprits, of having abused the flag of truce by withdrawing the troops and pillaging and burning Alexandria whilst it was flying; of having incited the Egyptians to arm against the government of the khedive; and of having continued the war after hearing that peace had been concluded (the fact that Arabi had been dismissed from his post as minister of war being an aggravation of the offence) and of having incited the people to civil war, and committed acts of destruction, massacre, and pillage on Egyptian territory.

It is now known from a memorandum sent to our foreign office, dated October 20th, that Sir C. Wilson, having examined the charges, recorded his belief that on the then existing evidence no English court-martial would convict the prisoners, except, perhaps,

Toulba and Said Khandeel, of any greater crime than that of taking part in a successful military revolt against the khedive. That was technically saying that the other crimes, for which they might in one sense be morally responsible, could not be personally brought home to them.

The mode of procedure of the trial had been settled, but it was evident that there would be considerable delay in procuring witnesses for the defence, and the necessity for preventing unnecessary postponement was already evident. On October 17th Sir E. Malet wrote to Earl Granville:

"The suppression of the rebellion through the victory of Tel-el-Kebir was followed by complete tranquillity throughout the country, and it is only by degrees that the population is beginning to recover from the blow which made it senseless for a time. According to all tradition, the victors would have made use of the opportunity to ride rough-shod in every direction, and to stifle every voice that did not raise itself in their praise. The reports now coming in from the country seem to show that the people either do not believe in the capture of Arabi or are convinced that he and the British forces have come to an agreement to his advantage. They cannot understand that though conquered he is treated with consideration, while awaiting sentence by a court-martial, because such treatment is unlike anything they have ever seen or heard of. Arabi contrived to inspire the people with the belief that he possessed divine power to restore the supremacy of Islam, and the common saying among the people is that he cannot be put to death, and that he will yet prove himself the 'Mahdi' or Saviour. The more ignorant have a story that he is at present making a forty days' journey through the heavens, and in general his hold on the sympathy of the lower classes has made rapid and dangerous strides since the time when he became the acknowledged leader of the people against armed Christian invasion.

"It is natural that the events of the past three months should have brought home to all parts of the country the fact that a great struggle was engaged, and the bare fact of Mussulmans being on

the one side and Christians on the other, is sufficient to account for the drift of public feeling with regard to it.

“ Now that the end has come and that the mass of the population find no evil effects accruing to them, they account for it by the divine powers of Arabi, on the ground that divine power alone could save them under such circumstances. They are beginning to lift up their heads, and an uneasy feeling is again pervading the country. Requests are made to me from many places to send English troops, in order that the fact of the occupation may be brought home to the people; but the military authorities are averse to distributing detachments, on account of the sickness which has attacked those which have already been stationed in the outlying districts. I am not apprehensive of danger, but there is no doubt that the hostility of the lower class of native to the Christian which has been aroused by recent events has not been allayed by our success, and that until the trial of the state prisoners is over, the evil spirit will continue to ferment and increase.”

It was a remarkable addition to the strange complications in Egypt that the notion that Ahmed Arabi was the Mahdi or the expected restorer of Islam should have been held by numbers of the people at the very time that another rebellion was being fomented in the Soudan by a pretender to the same mission.

A month before (on the 17th of September) Sir E. Malet had sent to Earl Granville a memorandum from Sir Charles Wilson stating that owing to telegrams sent by Arabi Pasha to the Soudan ordering people not to recognize the authority of the khedive, revolt had broken out in the country and the pretender Mahdi had gained more adherents. The Mahdi had then attacked Don on the White Nile, but had been defeated. The governor of the Soudan asked for 10,000 Remington rifles to be sent in order to arm a force under Said Pasha in order to crush the Mahdi. The memorandum went on to say, “that there had been killed of the rebels by the Egyptian troops, 1000 at Ziara, 1000 at Kordofan, and 300 at another place, and that the Mahdi was then two hours' march from Kordofan (Obeid) and had a large force. The Madhi,” added Sir Charles, “has only two roads by which he can

approach Lower Egypt, viz., by the Nubian desert and Nile valley and by the Darfour slave route. Both are difficult for the passage of large bodies of troops, and could be easily blocked by a small disciplined force. At present, however, should the Mahdi attempt a forward movement, there is no Egyptian force to meet him."

But it was necessary to provide for the protection of Europeans in Egypt itself, and this, of course, delayed the withdrawal of the British troops. It was considered necessary also to send visitors to the prisons in Cairo, Alexandria, Tantah, Zagazig, Damietta, and other places where a large number of criminals were confined, and the many persons who had been arrested for political offences only, or for having taken part in the atrocities accompanying the rebellion, were either suffering captivity as a punishment or were awaiting trial. Serious complaints had reached our foreign office that the condition of the Egyptian prisons was abominable, and that the unfortunate people confined in them were treated with gross cruelty and brutality. Our representatives at various places were communicated with, and it was deemed advisable that British officers should from time to time visit the prisons to guard against the practice of any cruelties. There were about 150 political prisoners at Cairo, 450 at Alexandria, 360 at Tantah, besides numbers at Zagazig, Mansourah, Siout, and other places, and as some of the charges were not of a very serious character, and political and criminal prisoners occupied the same buildings and were often treated in a similar manner, an inquiry was necessary. At Tantah and other places the condition of the captive Egyptians was very deplorable. Some had been half starved, others had been deprived of everything belonging to them, several had been seriously wounded or severely beaten and bastinadoed so that they were in great suffering, many were in irons, and the crowded buildings in which they were confined were unspeakably foul and filthy. This was the case with one of the prisons at Cairo itself, where Sir Charles Wilson made personal visitations, assisted by Lieut.-Col. Stewart, who was afterwards commissioned to make a journey of inspection to all the prisons where a number of persons were confined.

It was stated, however, that the filthy conditions were attributable to the incorrigibly dirty habits of the lower class of Egyptians, and particularly the fellaheen, and that both in Turkey and in Egypt, barracks and all buildings where any numbers of such people dwelt, could not be kept even moderately clean without constant trouble. In the principal Cairo prison, however, and at Alexandria there was a better state of things, and on the matter being emphatically brought to the notice of the Egyptian government great improvements were made. At the same time the increasing number of prisoners and the hardships to which they were exposed was an additional reason for hastening the trial of Arabi and his companions, and it was suggested that as probably only the charge of mutiny and rebellion could be sustained against him, it might be possible to deal with his case by returning a verdict on that accusation, the evidence of which need not be very protracted, and that he might be sentenced—not to exile—for it was suspected that in that case he might come to London and there be fêted by his friends, in which case nothing could have convinced the people of Egypt that his claims had not been supported by England—but to transportation, so that the place of his exile might be determined by the Egyptian government. It was most desirable that the trials should proceed, especially as there were numbers of the accused whose cases would have been met by the punishment of imprisonment that they had undergone—while the arrest at Canea of Suleiman Bey Sami, who was mainly responsible for the burning of Alexandria after the bombardment of the forts, and Moussa el Akbad, who was accused of being the principal instigator of the riots and massacres of the 11th of June, may be said to have completed the captures of the more guilty of the culprits.

Lieutenant-colonel Stewart having been commissioned to proceed to Khartûm to report on the condition of affairs there and in the Soudan, the inspection of the Egyptian prisons was continued by Major Chermside and M. Ardern Beaman, consular-assistant at Cairo. The investigation was very complete, and the reports of the overcrowding of the prisons where political and criminal offenders were huddled together, and the neglect and

cruelty with which many unfortunate creatures, including women and children, were treated, showed that the inquiry and the reforms that were demanded in consequence were highly necessary.

Among other things it was discovered that threats of accusation for complicity in the recent disturbances were being made against individuals for the purpose of extracting money from them, and among the many hundreds of prisoners awaiting trial there were numbers who had committed comparatively small offences, and might well have been left to the general amnesty which was granted after the sentence of the ringleaders, and those whose crimes or whose active participation in the mutiny demanded either sentence of death or punishment by transportation, exile, imprisonment, deprivation of property, degradation from rank, or fine. In the early trials by the courts-martial at Alexandria and some other places the sentence of death was carried out upon a few of the instigators and participators in the burning of the city, the massacres and the brutalities inflicted on Europeans.

The proceedings of the courts were fairly conducted, and British officers watched the proceedings at Tantah and Alexandria, where the commission sat for the trial of prisoners accused of being implicated in crimes such as murder, pillage, arson, theft, &c., and were therefore not released at the same time as the other political prisoners.

The inquiries which had to be made in many cases in order to sift evidence, which in Egypt, as in India, is likely to be given from corrupt or revengeful motives, or to be suppressed or distorted for the sake of a bribe, caused the trials to last a considerable time and the arrests and imprisonments to continue; but it may be believed that for the most part justice was done, and there was a leaning to the side of mercy in most of the sentences where the crimes had not been accompanied by special atrocity; indeed the instructions from our foreign office, no less than the desire of the officers appointed to advise and assist the native tribunals, had considerable influence in mitigating the punishments which would otherwise have been inflicted.

The discovery of the murderers of Professor Palmer and his

companions, and the trial and execution of the culprits, was an early instance of retribution, and it is not easy to say what definite connection that crime had with the rebellion. In a debate in the House of Commons in March, 1883, certain insinuations had been made that Professor Palmer had gone out as a spy, and the reply given by Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, on behalf of the government, seemed to show that Palmer, like Gordon, had been permitted to undertake a mission of an uncertain character, in which he had the imperfect support of the government, or rather that the government stopped short of its support at the very point where they ought either to have accorded it or to have forbidden him to join to his direct commission some independent action for which they as his employers would not hold themselves at all responsible. In explaining what the object of the expedition was, and how it came to pass that Mr. Palmer was sent into the deserts of Sinai, Mr. Bannerman said that at the end of June, 1882, before the attack on the forts of Alexandria, and when there was only a strong possibility, and not even a probability of warlike operations, it became obvious that steps must be taken to secure the tranquillity of the Suez Canal. The necessity for taking some measures apart from any military operation in Egypt itself to secure the friendliness of the Arabs, and also to obtain from them any help they could give in the control of the canal, was very urgent. For that purpose the first lord consulted two persons, Colonel Bradford and Captain Gill. It was suggested that the proper man to be consulted in regard to the whole matter would be Professor Palmer, who had spent a great deal of time in the peninsula of Sinai in connection with the survey, and who was an extraordinary adept at languages. It had been his custom to go about among the people dressed as a native, and he went on his late mission in the same name and dress as on other occasions. He was asked who would be the most likely man to go out to assist Sir B. Seymour as interpreter, and he then volunteered his own services. His own proposal was to go to Gaza and cross the desert to Suez, as he believed he would be able to acquire on that journey a certain amount of

knowledge as to the feeling of the Arabs, and be less likely to attract notice than if he went through the Suez Canal. In that sense it was a semi-secret journey. If it had been known where he was going, steps would, no doubt, have been taken to prevent his attaining the object he had in view. He received no money whatever on that journey. Professor Palmer formed a very sanguine idea of what he could do in the matter. He appeared to have represented that he could secure the allegiance of 50,000 Bedouins. But he received no encouragement from the government in carrying out any such purpose. A telegram was sent from the admiralty which was intended rather to dissuade him. It was, of course, not desirable to snub him, or to imply any rebuke for over-zeal, nor did he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) intend to imply that he was a victim to over-zeal. But the telegram directed that Professor Palmer should be instructed to keep the Bedouins available for patrol and transport on the canal. He was not supplied with any money either at home or by the authorities at the canal for the purpose of bribing the Bedouins. He only had £3000, and that was given to him at Suez to provide for his going into the desert for the purpose of securing camels for the use of the Indian contingent. It was certainly part of his mission to use his influence among the Bedouins to get them into a favourable frame of mind towards the British, but there was nothing in the way of bribery to secure their good-will.

Referring to the accusation that Professor Palmer was going as a spy in disguise among the Bedouins, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman stated that he went in his ordinary dress and under the ordinary name he had always assumed among the Bedouins. He wrote to the admiralty saying he thought it most desirable that a naval officer should accompany him as a guarantee that he was acting on the part of Her Majesty's government. Lieutenant Charrington accordingly accompanied Professor Palmer, and took with him part of his uniform.

It is almost impossible to convey an adequate notion of the difficulties which had to be encountered in sifting evidence in a country like Egypt, where tyranny, bribery, and extortion had for

ages attended proceedings in the so-called courts of justice, and false witness could be either compelled by persecution or obtained by presents. In the course of the inquiry numbers of men were found to have been imprisoned on false and vague evidence of their having belonged to the military party. Witnesses were procured by the use of the thumb-screw and the bastinado. One old man of over sixty declared that he had been stolen from his village and severely bastinadoed because he refused to give the evidence required against four men, till at last he was forced by suffering to name four men, who were thereupon shut up in prison by the wakil and bastinadoed. This was at Shibil-el-Koum, where fourteen other men accused of being "associates of the military party" affirmed that while in prison the sheikh had stolen their money, horses, cattle, and other property. It was in some of the provincial prisons that these monstrous perversions of justice were so numerous, and the one mentioned was perhaps the worst, for there the thumb-screw and the bastinado were in active operation. The instances given by Mr. Ardern Beaman were not to be considered to represent the number of prisoners who declared themselves to be the victims of oppression. As soon as he attempted to write a man's name and grievance others would seize his hand and strive to kiss it in order to ensure their cases also being noted; while two or three were clinging to his feet, a fourth would catch his beard and implore his attention. The scene beggared description, and the very desperation of the prisoners hindered their own cause by rendering it impossible to stay in the prison; but that they were convinced of the authority of the British commissioners, and of their power to demand justice, appears to be shown by the fact that they openly accused the mudiriate officials to their face of having received bribes, applied the thumb-screw, beaten them, and detained them unjustly in prison. In other prisons some of the accused were kept in chains without having been brought up for examination; in all, numbers of persons were detained for weeks and months without being brought to trial; in many the prisoners who could not bribe were starving—only a small loaf for a day's food, and water to drink—the regular rations being

three small loaves weighing together less than three pounds. Little or no clothing, scarcely any bedding, and in some cases none of either, was provided. Except in three or four instances the various rooms or wards, crowded with miserable wretches, were indescribably filthy and dilapidated; the courtyards and passages draughty, cold, and damp. Disease was prevalent, wounds and sores from repeatedly inflicted punishments had to be endured without amelioration.

In several jails the prisoners accused of political offences were undistinguished from the criminals, and had suffered similar punishments without having been brought to trial. The evidence against them when the examination was made by the commission was so slight, or so open to the suspicion of being prompted either by fear, or bribery, or private animosity, that numbers were released, numbers let out on bail, and the preparations for bringing others to trial were pushed on as fast as it is possible to push on anything in Egypt. The work to be done was difficult, almost appalling, but it seems to be indisputable that the British officials, to whom it was confided, spared no effort to accomplish it thoroughly, and to secure for the prisoners an impartial investigation by the sub-commission of inquiry which sat at Cairo under a native president to hear cases referred to it from the mudiriates.

It was absolutely necessary to release a large number of persons (about 140 in all) upon bail, and 100 were set free altogether because the charges brought against them could not be substantiated at the time that they were brought to trial. At Alexandria, exclusive of twelve men executed and 180 sentenced by the original court-martial, there were 118 cases, comprising about 200 prisoners accused of pillage and massacre, in the hands of the commission. The ordinary judicial machinery was quite inadequate, and the action of the few special commissions was so dilatory that there were at the date mentioned 190 prisoners classed as political offenders in the provinces which had been visited, including Alexandria, and above 900 accused of riot and massacre, including about 100 soldiers, besides the numerous cases marked as "ordinary," but more or less connected with the recent events. There were

universal complaints by all these classes of prisoners of the long time that they had been kept in misery without either examination or trial. Without exception the governors were of Turkish or Circassian extraction, and a number of them were, not unnaturally, actuated by vindictive feelings, so that at a serious crisis the prisoners and a large part of the population were living under a reign of terror, attributable, not alone to the cruelties exercised upon those who were arrested on trustworthy evidence, but to the opportunity afforded to accusers for procuring the imprisonment of personal enemies, or for threatening to denounce their neighbours unless their silence should be purchased by heavy bribes. Governors, local notables, employés of all sorts, and some Europeans joined in this detestable method of spoliation, for it was certain that the accused, once in prison, must undergo a lingering confinement. Prosecutions could be dropped for a consideration; and there was a fine harvest for all these scoundrels down to the officers of the local courts, and even the jailers.

In the dead-lock that followed the confusion and anarchy in which the country had been plunged ordinary charges went long without examination; prisoners declared over and over again that old charges had been brought up against them, or a vindictive governor was ready to imprison upon some petty accusation anyone who was accused of having helped the rebels.

The native Christians, Syrians, Maltese, Europeans, and, above all, the Greeks, were very vindictive, and the fine commercial instinct of the latter enabled them at once to grasp the value of the British occupation and of the present reaction to *exploiter* the situation. "Inciting against Christians," "pillage and massacre," were easy charges to bring, and there is no doubt that the fear of being proscribed was made a marketable commodity.

At Tantah, where there were some 400 people in prison for massacre and pillage—239 for the former alone—the commission was deluged with petitions, and fresh arrests were continually made. The official number of murdered was 38: 8 or 10 persons or more were accused of the murder of one individual. A Greek actually brought back his list of 10, amended, a rich notable being

substituted for one of the others; and it was said, on good authority, that meanwhile the said notable had been invited to compound. At Mohallet Kebir, where 6 (or 7) people were killed, 120 at least of the 180 prisoners were accused of riot and massacre, and 32 persons were accused of one murder.

At Zifteh, where a church was plundered, 80 men were imprisoned on this charge, and there was corroboration of the assertion of two well-to-do men, presumably above a senseless riot, that they were confined on evidence extorted from a boy by the bastinado. The boy and another man confirmed this.

It is impossible to dwell upon the horrible condition of some of the prisons; the want, exposure, and torment suffered by prisoners who had not been brought to trial. Fifty days in irons, with the addition of 500 strokes of the kourbash, crushed thumbs, feet lamed and swollen from the bastinado, were among the worst cases.

These evils were not surprising in a country where prisoners accused of ordinary non-political offences were kept for weeks and months without trial or examination, even though they might declare that they could prove their innocence: where servants of a man of distinction had been imprisoned, and after being released by the general pardon of the khedive had been again arrested without being charged with any offence: where a sarráf, who had embezzled government money, but whose sureties had paid the full amount, had been kept in prison because he had sued the Ma'mon of a district for £375 which he had lent him, and the ma'mon had forcibly entered his house in his absence and stolen his books and the acknowledgment for the money. This prisoner had given £145 in bribes to two of the clerks of the mudirieh in the endeavour to get back his £375. One man, who had been charged with stealing £3, 10s., had been twelve months in prison without trial; another, sentenced to one month, had been four years in prison; another, with his family of three women and children and twelve men from his village, had been seventy days without examination; another, charged with abusive language to a woman, fifty days without examination. Two were released from chains

after being kept in that condition for fifty and sixty days respectively. The less cruel punishments of distinguished or notable persons accused of political offences consisted in being starved on bread and water, refused permission to see or to communicate with their families, and the almost certainty that their property was being appropriated or destroyed. One singular case was that of an old sheikh, Ali Fakhri, who had taken to the Mudir of Mansoorah an egg said to have been laid bearing upon it the word "mansoor" (victorious), and had proposed that it should be presented to Arabi. The suggestion being complied with, another sheikh, Salli, now also in prison, had been summoned by the mudir (Khalil Pasha) to make corrections in the address, written by the mudir himself, to accompany the egg. The corrections having been made the mudir signed the address and sent that and the egg together to Arabi.

While numbers of men were starving in jail without trial, their families had been reduced to poverty and were begging outside. Mere boys and old men were cruelly beaten. It is not to be believed that the majority of the accused who declared that they were falsely imprisoned or were the innocent victims of spite were to be believed, whether they were charged with criminal or political offences; but the fact remained that they were barbarously used, and bore the revolting marks of the treatment they had received; that constant attempts were made to extort money from them; that hundreds of people went in fear, and were compelled to buy off the informers and false witnesses who threatened them; and that all had been kept in durance, many for long periods, without examination or trial. "It may safely be stated," wrote Mr. Ardern Beaman in concluding one of his reports, "that no report can convey the feeblest impression of the hopeless misery of the mass of the prisoners, who live for months like wild beasts, without change of clothing, half starved, ignorant of the fate of their families, and bewailing their own. They look forward to the day of their trial as synonymous with the day of their release, but the prospect of its advent is too uncertain to lend much hope to their wretchedness. From the moment of entering the prison,

even on the most trifling charge, they consider themselves lost. The one power than can release them is money, and they do not command it. It is impossible for them to guess at the time when a new official may begin to clear off the cases in his district, or when the slow march of administration may reach them. It may be weeks, it may be months, and it may be years: many of them have long since ceased to care which."

It will, of course, be seen that the events which had recently taken place in the country, the suppression of the rebellion by British interposition and the occupation by British troops, had not caused this condition of affairs. It already existed in all its revolting cruelty and injustice—and arose from the bad state of the government and the venality and irresponsibility of the officials. The visits of the British officials, commissioned to examine the prisons and hasten the trials, were expected with eager anticipation that abuses would be rectified and complaints listened to with a view to a demand for inquiry. But it is also easy to understand that the very considerable portion of the population who had been on the side of Arabi and believed that he was fighting for national freedom, began to show fresh symptoms of revolt. The first strong impression made upon them by the rapid suppression of the rebellion and the almost immediate defeat of an army that had seemed to melt away before the attack of the British troops, began to wear off. The conquering force was gradually diminishing, only a portion of it remaining to assist the khedive in keeping order. Arabi and his companions had for several weeks been prisoners—hundreds of those who were accused of abetting them were in durance and undergoing the torments of Egyptian jails, from which, according to ordinary experience, no man knew when they might be brought to trial. Where were the effects of the amnesty and of the declarations of English officials that justice would be done, and that no man would be put to death, or secretly sentenced, or left to rot in prison? Arabi was still in the country, and the presence of him and his former supporters at Cairo was in itself a danger. There were some among the ignorant people in distant places who believed that Arabi was still in power, or who

began to imagine, or perhaps were persuaded to believe, that the English were after all only temporizing, and would ultimately set him up in place of the khedive. Many of the Egyptians possess the strange credulity exhibited by most people who live in an atmosphere of lying, and the seeds of sedition grow a crop not easily uprooted or destroyed. One difficulty was that our government had distinctly declared that it would not take upon itself the government of Egypt or the administration of its courts of civil or military law. British officials were employed to make inquiries into alleged abuses and were to be present at the trials, but not with any official authority. They were, so to speak, expected "to see fair," but they had no part in the executive nor any judicial function. The responsibility of hastening the trials and of bringing the evil and injustice of the prevailing abuses before the native authorities, who began to bestir themselves under the vigilant eyes of our representatives, was one of the sharpest and most difficult of our experiences after the occupation of Cairo. There can be no doubt, however, that the relation we held towards the khedive and his government gave a very decided quality of authority to our advice and remonstrances, and we had the advantage of employing earnest, able, and indefatigable men, whose personal character and judicious mode of procedure compelled respect apart from the official position which they occupied. Lord Dufferin was truly as much master of the situation as though he had been commissioned sternly to demand instead of seriously advising, and our acting consuls and assistants as well as the military officers who, like Sir C. Wilson, Lieutenant-Col. Stewart, and Major Chermiside, were appointed to special and onerous duties, acted with great circumspection. The result was that the local commissions and the courts by which the prisoners were tried proceeded in the main with fairness, and probably, on the whole, justice was never before so promptly and so evenly administered by any native court in Egypt.

But the danger was serious, especially while the leaders of the late mutiny remained without trial. The lower order of Egyptians were constantly using insulting remarks to Europeans, not only in the provincial towns and villages, but in Cairo, and especially to

the Greeks, whom they detested. It soon became so evident that the leaders of the recent mutiny must be brought to trial that though Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier, who were their counsel, desired to extend the time during which they were to collect evidence for the defence, Lord Dufferin and Sir Edward Malet, who received careful reports from Sir C. Wilson as to the probable result of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the charges of participation in the firing of Alexandria and the massacres could not be sustained against Arabi, who vehemently denied that he was answerable for them; though Suleiman Sami, who had savagely instigated both, declared that he acted under his instructions. Some pressure was brought to bear upon the khedive to put an end to the trial and exile Arabi by decree, but this was precluded by the action taken by the British government.

It was for some time expected that Arabi would refuse to plead guilty even to the charge of rebellion. He had expressed confidence in the justice that would ensue from his having been permitted a public trial and the assistance of English counsel, and he had handed over to Mr. A. M. Broadley all his private papers, which had been hidden, and some of which his wife had kept concealed within her dress. These papers, which were supposed to implicate high Egyptian and Turkish officials, were given into the charge of the British vice-consul and deposited in the safe at the consulate, and were to be translated after having been initialed by Sir Charles Wilson.

After Lord Dufferin reached Cairo the trials were pushed on with greater despatch. It had transpired that Arabi, who was desirous of being tried before a properly constituted court under British observation, would be willing to plead guilty to the charge of rebellion, and more unexpectedly still it was made known, that he was willing, and even anxious, to get out of Egypt. It may be surmised that he foresaw that his life would not be safe should he be committed to prison after a sentence of capital punishment had been pronounced, even though it should be commuted to incarceration for a period preceding his being exiled, if that period extended beyond the British occupation. At anyrate, the British

government never meant that he should be put to death. To him and several of his companions it was intended that the khedive should be advised to extend his prerogative of mercy, and it was eventually not difficult to induce him to accept the suggestion that a sentence of exile to a region under the dominion or direct influence of the British government, and with a monthly allowance sufficient for comfortable maintenance, would be no bad exchange for a trial ending in a doubtful sentence and the risk of being assassinated, or privately executed, even if the punishment of death was supposed to be commuted.

On the 30th of November Lord Dufferin telegraphed to Lord Granville that an arrangement had been come to between the Egyptian government and Mr. A. M. Broadley on behalf of Arabi and his principal associates. They were to be charged simply with rebellion before the court-martial. To this charge they would plead guilty. In the event of the court pronouncing a capital sentence it was to be submitted to the khedive, who would commute it into perpetual exile. The prisoners would give their parole that they would proceed to any locality which might be indicated to them, and would there remain unless invited to remove. Should they return surreptitiously to Egypt the capital sentence might be enforced against them without a new trial. By a subsequent decree of the khedive their property would be confiscated, but the property of their wives would not be touched, and the Egyptian government undertook to provide each prisoner with an allowance sufficient for his maintenance. By another edict the military prisoners were to be degraded from their respective ranks. The maximum penalty to be inflicted on any of the other prisoners was not, except in one or two cases, to exceed two years' imprisonment or five years' exile. Those who were ready to plead guilty would thereby entitle themselves to a lighter sentence. It was understood that wherever possible, penalties less than the maximum would be imposed. Many of the prisoners were to be released with or without bail.

It is evident that there were very strong reasons for proposing such a compromise by which Arabi and his co-mutineers were let

down so easily, that many an unfortunate insolvent debtor in Europe would have accepted such a sentence as a boon to himself and to the family which was to go with him to ease and comfort in another and not altogether disagreeable country.

The complicated proceedings in which the representatives of England had to act with great caution were now becoming easier, although Riaz Pasha, the Egyptian minister of the interior, resigned office on the plea of ill health, but in reality because of his objection to the compromise made in the sentence of Arabi and his companions: Cherif Pasha, however, retained the premiership, and the ministry was reconstructed on what was regarded as a more liberal basis than that which had existed since the return from Alexandria.

On the 3d of December, 1882, the court-martial was held, at which the sentence was pronounced. Reouf Pasha, who presided, said to the prisoner: "Arabi Pasha, you are accused before this court, in accordance with the instructions of the commission of inquiry, of rebellion against His Highness the Khedive under articles 96 of the Ottoman Military Code, and 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code; are you guilty, or not guilty?" Mr. A. M. Broadley on behalf of his client replied: "Of my own free will, and in accordance with the advice given me by my advocate, I acknowledge myself guilty of the crime alleged against me." A paper signed by Arabi to the same effect was handed to the court and read out. The court then adjourned to deliberate, and in the afternoon pronounced the sentence, which was that of death, but it was to be submitted to the khedive. After the sentence had been pronounced, a khedival decree was read by the court commuting the capital sentence to perpetual exile. The confiscation of the prisoner's property and his degradation from military rank were to follow.

Arabi's companions, Mahmoud Sami, Ali Fehmi, Abdullah, Toulba, Yacoub Pasha Samy, and Mahmoud Pasha Fehmy, were brought up before the court on a like charge, acknowledged their guilt, and were sentenced to death, the sentence being commuted to perpetual exile; so that the seven chiefs of the rebellion were com-

comfortably disposed of, and it was the opinion of our government that Arabi should be sent to Ceylon at all events for the present. The arch rebel could have very little objection to take up a life of ease with a modest competency of £30 (which was afterwards increased to £40) a month in an island which is famous for its beauty and luxuriance. The Moslem tradition had made Ceylon the cradle of the human race, the place to which Adam had departed when he was exiled from Paradise, and Arabi neatly remarked that he considered himself to be "greatly honoured by being sent to the last resting-place of the common father of all men."

He may well have been satisfied at such a result of his rebellion, and people who had held the opinion that Egypt was, to say the least, divided in the belief of Arabi's patriotism and of his being the representative of the national feeling, were now able to point to the result of the influence of our government as a proof that the public belief in England was divided on the same subject, and that the compromise of punishment almost took the form of reward.

Arabi himself wrote to Sir Edward Malet a letter which, being translated, read:—"I feel bound to present to you my heartfelt thanks for the noble efforts you have made in order to ensure my treatment with fairness and justice, and for all that you have done to rescue me from the dangers which surrounded me. I hope, therefore, that you will accept the expression of my gratitude and of my highest respects, and of the friendly and sincere feelings I shall always entertain towards you." This was signed "Ahmed Arabi, *the Egyptian*."

Arabi's fellow-prisoners having been similarly tried and sentenced, and their sentences also commuted in the same way that Arabi's had been, it was afterwards decided to send them to the same destination, where they would be under the eye of British observation, though our government would not, of course, be responsible for their detention.

In this way seven of the principals concerned in the rebellion were comfortably disposed of, and all of them declared on oath, and engaged their personal word of honour to accept to go to the place

which the government should designate for them, and to stay there. It has been already mentioned that the sentence of confiscation did not touch the actual property of wives and children of the prisoners, and as their families accompanied them to Ceylon, the property remaining, with their allowances, must have enabled them to get on pretty well. The property confiscated was to go to the payment of indemnities claimed by those who had been injured by the rebellion, but the prisoners were very generously treated, and their English counsel still watched their interests narrowly. They were allowed to sell their horses and carriages to the value of about £750, in addition probably to personal property of a similar description, and they were permitted to take with them a proportion of their household furniture, bedding, &c. On its being represented by Messrs. Broadley and Napier that the persons sent to take an inventory invaded the privacy of the ladies of the families and proposed to take away the watches and personal effects of the prisoners, Cherif Pasha at once issued an order precluding the police from entering their houses and securing to the exiles their personal property. When inquiry was made as to the number of persons for whom accommodation would be required in the ship that was to take them to Ceylon, the demands were such as to rather stagger even the amiable Lord Dufferin. A list was sent in of 130 persons, including a large number of the sisters, the cousins, and the aunts of the prisoners,—female dependents, butlers, valets, cooks, eunuchs, and retainers. Lord Dufferin mildly observed in his despatch, that considering the position of those concerned, such requirements seemed to him unreasonable. The hire of the ship alone would cost the Egyptian government £5000, to which about £3000 would be added for incidental expenses. All the exiles and their followers had to be well found, the owners being bound by their contract to provide for them and their families on the same scale as for first-class passengers. The ship chartered, the *Mareotis* of 1392 tons, had accommodation for 20 first-class and about 30 second-class; it was provided with a stewardess and an English naval officer in the Egyptian service. Major Morice Rey, an officer of marines, was

to accompany the party to their destination. If all the female relatives and their belongings had been provided for also, a second ship would have been necessary, and it was blandly suggested that as this was out of the question, it would be desirable for the Egyptian government to restrict the number to the wives, sisters, or children of the prisoners, and servants enough to represent a servant for each man, a maid for each of the respective wives, and a nurse for each family of children. It was also gently hinted that these proposed arrangements did not preclude the unfortunate gentlemen from providing themselves or their families with additional servants, or from being joined by any number of affectionate relatives—who chose to meet them at Ceylon after having made the voyage in an ordinary passenger vessel.

Though Arabi, his truculent lieutenant Toulba, Fehmi, his former chief engineer and military adviser, and the other principal leaders were got rid of, neither we nor the Egyptian government had by any means heard the last of them. They joined in writing a letter of very hearty thanks to the commander, officers, and attendants of the ship which conveyed them agreeably to Ceylon, and for some time after their arrival and reception by the governor, they appeared to live in comfort, Arabi having applied to have his children sent to a proper school. His family was so large (fourteen in number) that his allowance was said to be insufficient, and the others made a similar complaint, though with less reason, upon which the Egyptian government consented that an additional £500 a year should be paid for their subsistence, of which Arabi eventually received £20 a month, and the remainder was divided among the rest. When the account was taken of the property belonging to these exiles, which had been confiscated by the government, it was found to amount only to about £3000, after all the claims of creditors had been satisfied; but it must be remembered, that the land and other property of the wives and families had not been interfered with, so that some of the exiles were not very badly off. The wife of Arabi, however, either had no property of her own, or she chose to keep it for herself. She had not accompanied the others to Ceylon, as she was in ill health,

and when Arabi applied that the expenses of her passage to Ceylon might be paid in accordance with the promised arrangement, the Egyptian government was quite willing to fulfil the agreement, but had to report that Madame Arabi, who lived with her mother in Cairo, showed no disposition to leave Egypt.

With the various complaints or requests of the exiles Mr. Wilfrid Blunt seemed still to be concerned, especially with the representations of Toulba, who was suffering from asthma, and found that the climate of Ceylon did not agree with him. There was medical testimony that he required a drier and more equable temperature, and he had the offer of being removed either to Cape Town or to Jaffna, a place further in the interior of Ceylon and having a more equal climate. Neither of these suited his notions, however, as he was anxious to be sent nearer to Egypt, and begged that he might go to Syria, Cyprus, or Beyrout.

Some surprise was caused by the exiles in Ceylon joining in a formal declaration that the promises they had made to remain in the place to which they might be sent were made, not to the Egyptian, but to the British government, to which they owed so much, and to which they intended to be loyal. They represented that they had consented to plead guilty, contrary to the actual truth, in consideration of the British government naming a place of exile, that that place should be under British control, and that thenceforward they would be answerable to the British government only. This view was afterwards supported by Mr. Mark Napier, one of the counsel who had been engaged on their behalf; but Lord Granville entirely denied that any such agreement was either understood or expressed.

In a similar manner there was a representation that our representatives, and therefore our government, had been instrumental in pushing on the trials for the express purpose of preventing accusations of participation in the alleged crimes being brought against various distinguished persons, including the khedive himself and Loufti Pasha, minister of war. This Lord Dufferin also entirely denied, referring to the expressed opinion of Sir C. Wilson, who, after examining the evidence, had distinctly

stated that the attempts to implicate the khedive in the atrocities at Alexandria, and the subsequent outrages, were quite groundless and unworthy of consideration. The counsel for Arabi and his companions had made some threatening intimations that the evidence they could produce would have the effect of bringing accusations against persons in high authority; but Lord Dufferin had immediately replied to the effect that the English government had nothing whatever to do with any such result, and that the trial and its consequences were the business of the Egyptian ministry. It seems to have been the case that though the official representatives were assiduous in endeavouring to prevent further delay, their object was to bring all the prisoners to trial on such evidence as would alone legally convict them, and so to put an end to the evils that were likely to ensue from retaining the chiefs of the mutiny at Cairo, and from crowding the prisons with political offenders whose examination might be indefinitely deferred. The alacrity with which the Egyptian court accepted the proposition that Arabi and his companions should plead guilty to the charge of rebellion, however, seemed to point to the fact that the high officials shrank from the production of Arabi's papers and from the criminating evidence that might have been forthcoming; but no such evidence, having any weight, had been produced at the examinations where English officials were present. The careful and complete report of the charges, trials, and sentences which were sent to our foreign office showed that our representatives had endeavoured to execute their difficult task thoroughly and impartially. Their object was to secure a fair trial for the prisoners, and they had nothing to do with the secret reasons which might have influenced the Egyptian government to adopt the recommendations given them that the offenders should be tried only on those charges which could be promptly substantiated.

After the deportation of Arabi and his companions the examinations went on more rapidly, and the sentences, many of which were mitigated by the advice of English officials, were on the whole far less severe than they would have been but for our intercession, and were mostly in just proportion to the degree of turpitude

which they were designed to punish. There were few persons put to death, although it had been distinctly stated that we would not interfere with the capital sentence being passed upon those who were proved to have taken part in the massacres and the burning of Alexandria. On these grounds it was beyond our province to interpose when some of the worst of the criminals were sentenced to execution. Among them was the chief culprit, Suleiman Sami, who had, without doubt, been the instigator of the destruction of the city and the murder of numbers of the inhabitants. In the former he had taken a personal part. He acted with the utmost ferocity, sometimes rushing about pistol in hand, and forcing the soldiers to set fire to the houses, and sometimes sitting in a high chair in the square urging them on to special acts of incendiarism, his rage being particularly directed against the family and possessions of the Sheikh Ibrahim Pasha, against whom he had a private quarrel. Suleiman admitted the part he took in the incendiarism, but declared that he had been ordered by Arabi to burn the town as a military measure, an assertion which was contradicted by Arabi and separately by each of his officers; while there was no direct evidence that Arabi had given such an order, and the buildings which were at first spared were precisely such as would have really been the first doomed to destruction under a military order. That Arabi marched his troops out of the city at a time when they should have remained to protect it, and that he cared nothing about what was likely to be done by such a man, did not prove that he had actually given orders for the destruction that followed. The impression made by the evidence was that Suleiman Sami, having been quartered in Alexandria, was acquainted with the town and its people, and took advantage of a time of great disorder to carry out a threat he had often made of burning the town, and to gratify a wish to be revenged on his personal enemies. His bearing at the trial was not in his favour. Others who had been convicted and sentenced to execution had maintained a firm bearing; but the ferocious ruffian, who had taken the most prominent part in the work of fire and slaughter, sunk into abject cowardice even while under examination. Endeavours were made in England to

induce our government to interpose on his behalf, but it was felt that to remonstrate against his sentence would be going beyond the extreme limit of our legitimate influence. His execution was ordered to take place on the 9th of June. He was hanged very near the spot on which he had ordered the destruction of the city—and his last muttered words are said to have been “Mazloun Arabi!” “victimized by Arabi!”

Having followed the current of events with such observations of the attendant or surrounding details as will show what were the difficulties which confronted us after the suppression of the rebellion and our partial occupation of the country; we may continue the narrative of the arduous task that had yet to be accomplished in the endeavour to restore order by introducing reforms in the government, which still relied upon our advice and support.

CHAPTER V.

Government Reform. Suez Canal Finance. Sickness of Troops. Condition of Cairo. Formation of Army and Police Forces. Alarming Rumours from the Soudan. The Mahdi. The Rebellion. Reports from Khartüm. Hicks Pasha. Destruction of Egyptian army. Sinkat and Tokar. Osman Digna. Defeat of Baker Pasha's Force. Preparations in England. Arrival of Forces at Suakim. General Graham's Expedition. Defeat of Rebels at El Teb and Tamai.

In the early months of 1883, while the trials of rebels were still going on, it became necessary that the Earl of Dufferin, as British plenipotentiary, should formulate his scheme for the reconstruction of government in Egypt. He and his coadjutors had devoted earnest attention to the subject, and had collected a vast amount of information of a practical character, founded on long observation and experience, which seemed calculated to assist them in their deliberations.

The first question that had to be asked was, Who are the Egyptians? and a writer on the subject had answered that it was sufficient for our inquiry into a proposed reconstruction of the government to reply, broadly speaking, that they comprise about 700,000 Copts, who are commonly regarded as the sole survivors of the Egyptian people; 400,000 Bedouins, made up of fifty tribes divided from each other by petty jealousies and long-existing feuds; about 4,000,000 fellaheen, the descendants of the hewers of wood and drawers of water to conquerors who date from thirty centuries; and about 30,000 men and women of Osmanli origin.

The Bedouins, of whom about 40,000 are capable of bearing arms, include: 1. The Eastern or Arabian tribes of the country bounded by the Red Sea and the Nile valley on the east and west, by the Mediterranean on the north, and on the south by the Keneh Kosseir route, where the Nile approaches nearest to the Red Sea coast; while to these are to be added the people of the Tih plateau and the Sinaitic peninsula. 2. The Western (or Mongredin) tribes in the western border of the Nile valley and the oasis of the Libyan Desert. 3. The Southern (or Ethiopian)

tribes on the eastern edge of the Nile valley south of the Keneh Kosseir route, and a great part of Nubia. Lord Dufferin, in the scheme of reconstruction which he prepared, did not contemplate the withdrawal of Egypt from the government of the Soudan, although the struggle that was being maintained there was a constant source of trouble and expense. He only thought that it would be wise to abandon Darfûr and, perhaps, part of Kordofan, and to be content with maintaining jurisdiction in the provinces of Khartûm and Sennâr; while he considered that the first step towards tranquillity would be the construction of a railway from Suakim to Berber or, perhaps, preferably to Shendy on the Nile.

The starting-point of the scheme for reform and reconstruction was, that it would be futile to attempt to go back to any race distinctions in apportioning the authority of future rulers of Egypt. It ought not to be a difficult task to endow the Egyptian people with good government. The institution of international tribunals had already aroused first surprise and then admiration, and the desire to extend courts where, whatever may have been their shortcomings, justice was administered with greater purity than was ever previously known in the country. Nor did the fact that a great number of the persons in high authority were the Osmanli, affect the position of the governing class. The valley of the Nile had always been ruled by foreigners, its inhabitants domineered over by alien races; its annals indicate no epoch when the justice of the country was not corrupt, its administration other than oppressive, and the indigenious population emotional, obsequious, and submissive; but the rulers themselves are under some of the influences which make the people desirous of reform and the adoption of a regular and equal administration of just laws. "Osmanli does not politically mean Turks only, but includes Roumelians, Albanians, Circassians, Armenians, and other subjects of the sultan; and of these the rulers of Egypt largely consist, for they are practically the dominant races, small as their proportionate numbers are, in Egypt. But the characteristics which in the earlier history of Egypt appeared to be so hateful, have lost something of their malignant influence. Her actual

rulers are still supplied from a foreign stock, but the progenitor of the race was one of the most illustrious men of the present century, who proved his right to found a dynasty by emancipating those whom he ruled from the arbitrary thralldom of an imperious suzerain. His successors have carried the liberation of their adopted country still further, and the prince now sitting on the khedival throne represents, at all events, the principle of autonomous government, of hereditary succession, and commercial independence. . . . His disposition is eminently benevolent and sympathetic. Well versed in history, and alive to the progress of events, he is indisposed either to claim or exercise the arbitrary powers of an Oriental autocrat. Having conscientiously at heart the welfare of his people, he is willing to accord them such a measure of constitutional privileges as their backward condition entitles them to demand."

Though the "foreign element" still holds sway in Egypt, and enjoys a social and political ascendancy not in harmony with a democratic ideal, it no longer occupies the same odious position as the foreign oligarchies which formerly crushed the fellaheen. The fellaheen themselves, though they constitute five-sixths of the population, have scarcely any intelligent interest in politics, and care very little who governs them, so long as they are allowed to cultivate their plots of land, are not compelled to pay exorbitant taxes, are free from the dominion of local tyrants wielding the kourbash for the purpose of extortion, and are not dragged off by irregular conscription to serve in the army.¹ It would matter little to them who ruled at Cairo, if they were made happier and more prosperous by the laws arising from a settled and righteous constitution. The invidious distinctions, too, which follow the conquest of one race by another have been greatly obliterated.

"The individuals of Turkish extraction left in the country form a very small minority; they do not stand in the relation of landlords to the peasantry, a few hundred thousand feddāns

¹ This seems to have been proved from the fact that when the fellaheen, under a new *régime*, had a vote for the village constituency or the provincial councils, many of them offered to pay something rather than take the trouble to leave their work for the purpose of voting; but this reluctance may have had an element of suspicion or fear in it.

out of five millions approximately representing the extent of their possessions; and they are closely incorporated with those amongst whom they have been domiciled by the bonds of a religion, the very essence of whose doctrine is brotherhood, equality, and social unity. The Ottoman Egyptian appreciates thoroughly the advantages secured to him by the firmans, and, proud of the political privileges of his country, he is as violently 'Chauvinist' as any Arab. The policy of some of the late rulers of Egypt has also contributed to amalgamate the races, Abbas, Said, and Ismail having found it their interest to promote to posts of honour and authority personages of 'fellah' origin. At the present moment two important state departments are administered by Pharaonic Egyptians. Sultan Pasha, a distinguished personage of fellah descent, is president of the Chamber of Notables, and holds a position of great influence in the country. Most of the judges and all the religious dignitaries are pure Egyptian, as are also the majority of the large landed proprietors and a host of the public servants. If, on the other hand, the prestige of the notabilities of Turkish extraction is still more considerable than a political philosopher might desire, we must accept it as the unavoidable outcome of the irrevocable past, and as in some measure justified by the superior education, ability, and energy of a vigorous race. Nor would it be just or advisable to resort to forcible means to redress the inequality. A similar process of epuration would have to be applied to the descendants of other nationalities—Armenians, Greeks, Syrians, and Jews—which would result in excluding such men as Nubar, Riaz, and Tigrane, equally with Cherif Pasha and his colleagues, from all contact with public affairs, until at last it would become the turn of the Copts to demand the disqualification of their Arab invaders. It will be safer to regard every native-born Egyptian, no matter what the stock from which he springs, as entitled to whatever position his talents or aptitudes may enable him to attain, and to rely upon the influence of equal laws and the development of constitutional principles to invalidate caste pretensions and obliterate obnoxious distinctions of race. Nor need the fact of the sparse descendants

of Mehemet Ali and his companions having become rooted in Egypt be considered as any longer incompatible with the introduction of a popular government, though their presence and the moral ascendancy they exercise may render still more urgent the establishment of an omnipotent justice and a perfection of equality before the law."

These were the opinions expressed by the Earl of Dufferin in the reconstruction scheme which was designed to reform and reorganize without revolutionizing the government of Egypt. Such declarations removed the supposed obstacles to the restoration of order under a system which would have in it elements of permanence and of future prosperity to the country, and at the same time the plan proposed was in accordance with the emphatic assertion of our government that their design was to leave the administration of the khedive to stand alone, directly it became capable of supporting its own authority by the influence of more just and regular laws which would enlist the confidence of the people.

The other European powers had been watching with expectant eyes the course that we appeared likely to take, and at the very beginning of the year Lord Granville had relieved their anxiety by issuing a circular note which had previously been approved by the Turkish government, who had abstained from taking any step that would have made our undertaking in Egypt more difficult.

The circular note sent out by Earl Granville to our representatives abroad treated of various matters relating to our interposition in Egypt as they concerned other countries, and required the concurrence of the European powers, and then went on to questions of the internal administration of Egypt itself. The chief of those of the former class were those relating to the Suez Canal, of which it was said:—

"One result of recent occurrences has been to call special attention to the Suez Canal, firstly, on account of the danger with which it was threatened during the first brief success of the insurrection; secondly, in consequence of its occupation by the

British forces in the name of the khedive, and their use of it as a base of the operations carried on in his highness' behalf and in support of his authority; and, thirdly, because of the attitude assumed by the direction and officers of the Canal Company at a critical period of the campaign.

“As regards the first two of these points, Her Majesty's government believe that the free and unimpeded navigation of the canal at all times, and its freedom from obstruction or damage by acts of war, are matters of importance to all nations. It has been generally admitted that the measures taken by them for protecting the navigation, and the use of the canal on behalf of the territorial ruler for the purpose of restoring his authority, were in no way infringements of this general principle.

“But to put upon a clearer footing the position of the canal for the future, and to provide against possible dangers, they are of opinion that an agreement to the following effect might with advantage be come to between the great powers, to which other nations would subsequently be invited to accede:—

“1. That the canal should be free for the passage of all ships, in any circumstances.

“2. That in time of war a limitation of time as to ships of war of a belligerent remaining in the canal should be fixed, and no troops or munitions of war should be disembarked in the canal.

“3. That no hostilities should take place in the canal or its approaches, or elsewhere in the territorial waters of Egypt, even in the event of Turkey being one of the belligerents.

“4. That neither of the two immediately foregoing conditions shall apply to measures which may be necessary for the defence of Egypt.

“5. That any power whose vessels of war happen to do any damage to the canal should be bound to bear the cost of its immediate repair.

“6. That Egypt should take all measures within its power to enforce the conditions imposed on the transit of belligerent vessels through the canal in time of war.

“7. That no fortifications should be erected on the canal or in its vicinity.

“8. That nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to abridge or affect the territorial rights of the government of Egypt further than is therein expressly provided.”

Another question in which the great powers were concerned was the financial arrangements in connection with the law of liquidation, and in relation to these our government recommended greater economy and simplicity in the management of the Daira estates and some other administrations by changes of detail which would not diminish the security of creditors. It was also proposed to provide an equitable plan for the equal taxation of foreigners and natives, and the last, but not the least, important proposition was that the international agreement for the establishment of mixed tribunals for deciding civil suits between natives and foreigners, instead of being permitted to expire at the end of the term agreed on, which would be in February, 1883, should be prolonged by the Egyptian ministry for a year, in order to give time for the discussion of amendments in the codes and procedure which had been interrupted by the events of 1882.

In subjects relating to the internal affairs of Egypt, the responsibility of advising, and assisting to reorganize, which lay upon our government, included the formation of a small Egyptian army commanded by British officers, lent for a time by request of the khedive, to fill the higher ranks, and of a separate force of gendarmerie and police. The latter, it was afterwards intimated to General Valentine Baker Pasha, who was commissioned to form it, was not to be a military but essentially a police force for the maintenance of order. Three thousand gendarmerie had already been reorganized and officered, and Sir Evelyn Wood was already well advanced in forming the new army, which it had then been decided should consist of 6000 men; the list of both forces falling much below the amount allotted for those services by the committee of liquidation.

The practical extinction of the dual control by the substitution of a single European financial adviser without authority to interfere

in the direct administration of the country was the next item referred to, and reasons were given for concurring in the proposal of the Egyptian government that the control should be abolished. After mentioning that the khedive had been strongly advised of the necessity of immediately introducing an improved system of administering justice to natives throughout the country, and alluding to the desire of our government to urge upon his highness to take such steps as might be judicious for the abolition of slavery, the circular said:—

“There remains the question of the development of political institutions in Egypt. It is one of great importance and complexity, and requires for its treatment careful study of the circumstances of the country and people. Her Majesty’s government are of opinion that the prudent introduction of some form of representative institutions may contribute greatly to the good government of the country and to the safety and regularity of the khedive’s rule. But they await further reports from their representatives in Egypt before coming to a conclusion as to the shape which would be best suited to the present occasion, while affording opportunities for future growth.”

The scheme of administrative and social reform was being elaborated by the Earl of Dufferin assisted by a number of gentlemen, among whom was Mr. Villiers Stuart, M.P., whose acquaintance with both Upper and Lower Egypt made his services of great value in a visit of inquiry and observation in the villages.

The scheme of reconstruction was founded, as we have noted, upon the conviction that English control was not to be authoritative, and was not to be permanent. That the Egyptians were not to have forced upon them institutions which they could not beneficially adopt until they had, so to speak, grown up to them, and could understand and appreciate them. Our object was to give to the country such institutions as would gradually develop and naturally lead to further reforms. Lord Dufferin in one part of his report points to the difficulties that present themselves in India, where we have direct and permanent authority,

when it is sought to make changes in the internal administration, and argues that much more allowance should be made for the working of newly introduced modes of procedure and striking reforms in the administration in Egypt. That, as it is impossible immediately to abolish all those practices and existing abuses which we desire for the sake of the country to put an end to, we must trust to the natural extension of the sentiments of liberty and justice which is promoted even by the imperfect or retarded operation of laws and principles which are good and just in themselves. As, for instance, Lord Dufferin had plainly declared, "The native courts were never more imbecile and corrupt than they are at present," it was a good plan to induce the khedive to issue a commission, presided over by Fakhry Pasha, minister of justice, and with Nubar Pasha, the founder of the mixed tribunals as a member, to examine how the proceedings of provincial governors and their lieutenants in criminal cases, and the strange notions of cadis and muftis in civil matters could be best remedied. The result was the proposal to establish eight new centres of justice, with a suitable number of native judges and one European judge in each,—a staff which was thought sufficient for administering the law around the district in which the court was the centre, as, at least, one court of appeal would have authority to review sentences, even in criminal cases, from the lower courts. We have seen in relation to this subject that the international tribunals of first instance and appeal were not to be touched by the measure, nor would they interfere with the new courts, which were only for trials between natives. Reverting to the difficulty of advising a too sudden and thorough change in matters which must be left to the gradual working of events, Lord Dufferin said:

"Had I been commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian subject state, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a resident would have quickly bent everything to his will, and in the space of five years we should have greatly added to the material wealth and well-being of the country, by the extension of its cultivated area, and the consequent expansion of its revenue; by the partial, if not the

total, abolition of the corvée and slavery; the establishment of justice; and other beneficent reforms. But the Egyptians would have justly considered these advantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence. Moreover, Her Majesty's government and the public opinion of England have pronounced against such an alternative."

In setting forth his plan he dealt successively with the necessity for seeking the material, moral, and political security of the country, the first maintained by the military and naval forces, the second guaranteed by its courts of justice, and the third defending its representative institutions. Isolated on three sides by the desert, the military forces of Egypt proper need not be numerous. The number was therefore fixed at 6000 men, the composition of the ranks being solely Egyptian, with the foreign janissary, but not the Turco-Egyptian element excluded. The khedive to be supreme commander-in-chief, the army to be divided into two brigades, in only one of which the first and second officer in command would be Englishmen, with three other English officers unattached to help them when required; the same principle of division of command and therefore the opportunity for promotion to Egyptian officers being observed in the artillery. The reorganized Egyptian army would consist of 6147 officers and men, including 1 regiment of cavalry, 4 batteries of artillery, 20 guns, 8 battalions of infantry, a camel corps, an engineer company, and coast artillery.

A body of provincial constabulary was also to be formed of a semi-military character, and capable of coping with any ordinary attempted incursions of Bedouin marauders, a considerable proportion of them being organized and equipped as mounted infantry; but within the valley of the Nile itself acting very much like ordinary policemen, and avoiding the display of military characteristics. The constabulary force was to be placed under the control of the minister of the interior, a school of instruction was to be provided, and two reserve battalions of 500 men each were to consist of volunteers, who would receive a rather higher rate of pay than the recruits obtained by conscription. The total number of men in this force was to be 5650.

In the large towns of the Delta order was to be maintained by an urban police force of 1600 constables with an element of Europeans among them, and under the same inspector-general and inspecting staff as the constabulary: the Cairo and Alexandria police being commanded by two European officers with two deputies, while thirty-five subaltern European officers were to be attached to the European sections of the corps, the rest of the force being purely native, a decision arrived at because of a disturbance having been caused by the numbers of Albanians who, hearing of the formation of the force at Alexandria, swarmed thither and demanded to be enrolled. They continued to be troublesome till their violent demonstrations were suppressed and they were all packed off again to their native villages. The total force for maintaining domestic order would be 7390 men, 3800 of whom were already enrolled and distributed, including 596 Europeans. The total expense of the army, police, and constabulary would be £E.519,741.

The system of representative institutions was to a great extent founded on the reform or reconstruction of existing elective principles. Speaking of the want even of the forms of constitutional freedom in the East, as despotism not only destroys the seeds of liberty but renders the soil on which it has trampled incapable of growing the plant—Lord Dufferin said:

“A long-enslaved nation instinctively craves for the strong hand of a master rather than for a lax constitutional régime. A mild ruler is more likely to provoke contempt and insubordination than to inspire gratitude. Nowhere is this truth more strikingly exhibited than in this country, and those whose only prescription for government in Egypt is the lash, diagnose correctly enough the symptoms of the disease, however wrong they may be in the choice of the remedy. The problem before us is not, however, so disheartening as it might seem. Though hitherto Eastern society has only been held together by the coercive forces of absolutism, it must be remembered that, on the one hand, the Mohammedan religion is essentially democratic; and, on the other, that the primitive idea of the elders of the land assembling in council round their chief has never altogether faded out of the traditions of the people.

Even the elective principle has been to some degree preserved amongst their village communities. If, therefore, we found ourselves upon what already exists, and endeavour to expand it to such proportions as may seem commensurate with the needs and aptitudes of the country, we may succeed in creating a vitalized and self-existent organism, instinct with evolutionary force. . . . Most people have fondly imagined that a chamber of notables implied constitutional freedom. . . . The component parts of the chamber of notables were large landed proprietors, rich townspeople, and village sheikhs, that is to say, the three classes most indifferent or opposed to the interests of the fellaheen. . . . Hitherto the village sheikhs have always been regarded as the spokesmen and delegates of the commune, but they are seldom really entitled to exercise such functions or assume such a character. In the first place, there are half a dozen sheikhs, or sometimes many more, in every village, each of them connected with varying sized sections of the community; and, in the next, they are either hereditary dignitaries or the direct or indirect nominees of the authorities, or have been chosen by the headmen of the adjoining districts. They may for the most part be looked upon as the most inveterate oppressors of those placed under their authority. It is they who best know what individuals in the village can be most profitably squeezed, and whose itching palms are greased by the wealthier peasant anxious to avoid the 'corvée' or greedy for a disproportionate share of the fertilizing stream. Although, therefore, it might be too revolutionary a step to interfere with the administrative position of these questionable authorities, the community should be at least given a free choice of the person with whom the suffrage of the hamlet is to be deposited."

Briefly stated the proposed Egyptian electoral institutions were:—

1. *The Village Constituency*.—Composed of representatives of each circumscription, chosen by manhood suffrage, who are the depositaries of the village vote.

2. *The Provincial Councils*.—(Varying in number from 4 to 8 members.)—Chosen by the spokesmen of the villages.

3. *The Legislative Council*.—Consisting of 26 members, of whom 12 are nominated by the khedive on the advice of his ministers, and 16 are elected by the provincial councils.

4. *The General Assembly*.—Of 80 members: 8 ministers; 26 members of the legislative council; 46 delegates elected by the spokesmen of the villages.

5. *Eight Ministers*.—Responsible to the khedive.

6. His highness the khedive.

In addition to these there was to be the establishment of a privy council of a purely administrative and not of a political character, but with a judicial side in relation to its functions in dealing with indigenous courts of justice. Justice was the chief requirement in Egypt. Justice administered on a pure, cheap, and simple system would prove more beneficial to the country than the largest constitutional privileges. The structure of society in the East is so simple that, provided the taxes are righteously assessed, it does not require much law-making to make the people happy. For several weeks the commission was engaged in the arduous task of elaborating an entirely new system of indigenous justice, by the entire revision of the codes and the organization of new tribunals presided over at first by European judges, principally taken from the judiciaries of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, except in special instances where a knowledge of the native language or other particular qualification would be requisite, and the election would turn upon such points. The minister of justice had secured the co-operation of an eminent English lawyer to act as procureur-general in organizing the new tribunals and making the necessary arrangements with the European judges. There was to be a court of first instance in every mudirieh: three judges to form a quorum, and one of the three to be a European. There would be an appeal court for Upper and one for Lower Egypt, where five judges would form a quorum—two being European and three native; and it had been advised by the commission that the salaries should be such as to remunerate men of high ability. A knowledge of Arabic was to be held indispensable. All public functionaries were to be amenable to the ordinary tribunals for any

act committed in violation of any law, decree, or regulation; but for trying cases where litigation might arise between the state in its corporate capacity as a government and its subjects, involving public interests of great importance, the privy council, already referred to, by having a proportion of its members independent of the government, and associating three of these with the two European members of the court of appeal, could secure a bench of judges of such exceptional ability as would entitle them to exercise so important a jurisdiction.

This then is a full outline of the scheme proposed so far as its political mechanism is concerned; but it also included provision for the material needs of the country by controlling and improving the works of the canals and irrigation, as the most necessary works had been neglected. The *corvée* or enforced labour was carried out in a manner which inflicted the greatest hardship on the peasantry; the poor suffered from the unequal distribution of water by corrupt officials; the crops of sugar and coffee were lighter every season, and the area of cultivated land was diminishing notwithstanding an expenditure of £187,434 per annum on the canals.

“Wishing to witness with my own eyes the forced-labour system,” said Mr. Villiers Stuart, “I went to a place where a new canal was being excavated. A cut about 18 feet deep had been made through a conglomerate of sand and gravel. This cut was flanked on either side by a high embankment of excavated *débris*. The distance from the summits of these ridges to the floor of the canal was about 40 feet. Along the bottom, and on the slopes right and left, men swarmed like bees for the length of a mile. The overseer told me that the entire forced labour of the province, amounting to 40,000 men, was concentrated beneath my eyes, and that they worked from sunrise to sunset, with a brief intermission at midday for a meal, consisting of bread, supplied by their relations, soaked in Nile water. They had a similar meal before commencing their work and when they left off. They were engaged in filling a quantity of small baskets with the soil, which they dug out with their fingers. A limited number had short picks

a foot long, but the majority had no implements but their hands. Both their tools and the baskets are provided by themselves. The day was excessively hot—82 degrees in the shade, probably 95 degrees at the bottom of the trench. They wore felt skull-caps on their heads, exactly like those represented on the workmen in the bas-reliefs of the fourth dynasty. At night they slept on the bare ground in the calico rags they wore during the day. The nights were often very cold. Amongst them were many overseers armed with sticks, with which they often struck the men without any apparent reasons. Many had sore fingers and sore feet, for there were sharp flints among the *débris*. Ophthalmia was very prevalent.”

When it is remembered that the men thus seen by Mr. Villiers Stuart were forcibly taken from their village plots, which they had been obliged to leave barren and uncultivated; that hundreds of them were probably conscious that they had been impressed, and their luckier neighbours left, through the spite, favouritism, or corruption of some official; and that the work upon which they were engaged was so distant from their homes as never to bring them any advantage, it will be understood what bitterness and ill-feeling must be generated by such a system.

The cost of the “*corvée*” to the country must have been prodigious, as, according to the best authorities, it implied the annual withdrawal from agricultural labour of from 100,000 to 130,000 men for a period which varied from 60 to 120 days.

The remaining portions of the scheme of reconstruction had relation to the proposals for the more economical and profitable working or the disposal of the “*Daira Sanieh*” and “*Domain*” territories, formerly, as was noted in an earlier page, in the exclusive possession of the ex-khedive and his family, and amounting to 1,000,000 *feddāns* of land, or an area equivalent to one-fifth of the whole cultivated land of Egypt, and ceded to the state, the *Domains* having in 1878 formed the guarantee for the Rothschild loan of £8,500,000.

Arrangements for a thorough and effective cadastral survey; the consideration of plans for relieving the widely spread mortgages

and debt encumbrances upon the land of the fellaheen—who had borrowed beyond their power of paying, with the imminent danger of considerable tracts of territory passing out of the hand of the peasant cultivators, whose mortgage debts had risen in six years from the total of £500,000 to something like £5,000,000,—occupied a considerable portion of the scheme. To save the fellaheen it was preferably proposed to make use of the “credit foncier,” which was already existing in the country, and if supported by the guarantee of the government could obtain the necessary fund at a low rate for the purchase of the debts, while to repay the loans the land would be charged with an annuity or “taxis” extending over a long period. Land revenue assessment, agricultural taxes, and other such questions were entered into, and provision made for simple but effectual reforms; and then came a careful review of the question of the necessity for educating the masses of the people, who at present derive little benefit from the elaborate system of instruction in the numerous schools and colleges in Egypt, the fellaheen children not being taught to speak the ordinary Arabic, but the Koranic Arabic, the fellah Arabic being quite a distinct language with a grammar of its own. The reduction of enforced labour by organization, and the use of hydraulic machinery, the reduction of the area of conscription, and the increased advantages of service by the establishment of the new army, also formed subjects with which the plan of reform was concerned. Other matters, however, such as slavery, the Soudan, and the Suez Canal, will be touched upon in another page. The scheme as set forth was wide in its scope, elaborate in detail, and so full and clear as to be indisputable evidence of the great ability, no less than the untiring energy and industry of those who had taken part in furnishing the particulars and examples by which the proposals made in its numerous sections were illustrated and supported.

The effect of the plan for liquidating the State Domain loan would be to complete that object in eight years and so to get rid of a troublesome administration, and to distribute among private cultivators those enormous accumulations of landed property in the

hands of one family, which took place during the rule of Ismail Pasha.

It was time that a thorough reform took place in the financial arrangements of the government, and our own government was inclined to render all possible assistance. On the 29th of December, 1882, Earl Granville wrote to the Earl of Dufferin that as the Egyptian government were doubtless preparing their budget for the ensuing year, it was desirable that they should know without delay the demand which her majesty's government would have to make for the maintenance of the British troops to be kept in Egypt pending the organization of a native defensive force.

Her majesty's government undertook to defray all expenditure incurred in the suppression of the rebellion, the date of the conclusion of which they had fixed with liberal intention at the 30th September. From that date, accordingly, they asked the Egyptian government to repay all extraordinary expenses which the retention for police purposes of the queen's troops in Egypt would entail on the exchequer of the United Kingdom. This force had been fixed for the present at 12,000 men, to be reduced from time to time and in the degree that was considered judicious, in view of the formation of a native force, whether military or police, ready and able to take its place.

Provision had been made in our normal army estimates of the year for the ordinary pay and charges of the army, and no demand was to be made upon Egyptian finances in respect of this expenditure; but additional expenditure incurred by the war office and admiralty for maintaining the troops in Egypt, and the cost of any reserves kept under the colours to replace men retained in that country, constituted the extraordinary charge which the Egyptian government were asked to repay. The war office and admiralty estimated this extraordinary charge in round figures at £4 per calendar month per man.

It may be mentioned here that when the estimates were brought forward in the House of Commons in the spring of 1883 the additional military expenditure consequent upon the opera-

tions in Egypt was about £3,400,000. Of that amount £1,142,000 related to the Indian contingent, and £500,000 was to be borne by this country, and the residue by India. The Egyptian government had agreed to pay at the rate of £4 per head per month for the military force left for the protection of the country; and from the first of October, 1882, to the 31st of March, 1883, that would amount to £279,000 (£209,000 for the army and £70,000 for the navy), which was shortly to be paid into the exchequer.

The Egyptian budget for 1883 was rather of a speculative character. The computed normal expenditure of the year amounted to £E.200,000 less than the receipts. But as there was no extraordinary budget the surplus of receipts over expenditure gave no effective surplus. Certain expenditures were all debited to the extraordinary budget; such as £E.100,000 for the Soudan, and £E.100,000 extra grant to public works having to be met from the ordinary budget.

The reserve fund for unforeseen expenses had been reduced to £E.90,000. Hitherto it had been £E.150,000, borne partly by the ordinary, partly by the extraordinary budget.

For the marine grant a large economy (£E.25,000) had been made, arrangements being in progress for selling off old ships and material. "War" showed a saving of £E.222,961; gendarmerie and police, an increase of £E.160,788; £E.17,000 were economized on the slavery suppression corps, whose duties were to be performed by the gendarmerie, the net saving shown on the army and gendarmerie being thus £E.79,173. But the real net saving was expected to be much in excess of this, certain items having been charged, for purposes of comparison, in the budget for 1882, to the interior, which should have been debited to the police.

A reduction of £E.15,000 would also be made on the cadastre (ministry of finance), which in future would stand at £E.55,000.

The cost of the army of occupation, and the interest on the new issues for indemnities, did not figure in the budget, because they had to be met by special means, which was also the

case with a probable deficit of the Domains, to be met during the year. If these items were separately arranged for, it was probable that at the close of 1883 there would be a saving on expenditure, and excess of receipts, of about £300,000 for the extraordinary budget of 1884.

There would also probably be a sum, the amount of which was quite uncertain, to be credited to the government during the year for the sale of war material.

“Quite uncertain!” As events turned out many calculations were upset; but apart from the unforeseen or the unprepared there were clear evidences, in the arrangements of this financial statement, that the proposed plan of reconstruction had already begun to work by anticipation.

The Egyptian budget, assuming its calculations to be correct, was regarded by our government as matter for congratulation, seeing that there was so slight a deficit in presence of the disorders and disorganization which had prevailed. It was recognized, however, that no contribution could be made during the current year to the extraordinary expenses of the British troops which had been lent to the Egyptian government. It was therefore agreed that as our financial year did not end till the 31st of March the six months' contribution (from the 1st of October) should be held over until March, and be paid before the end of that month. Our government had paid the Suez Canal Company for the dues and charges for British vessels of war, transports, &c., employed in the canal during the recent military operations, but an intimation was given to the directors of the company that these payments had been made as a recognition of the great assistance to the military operations afforded by the use of the canal, but without admitting that under the circumstances there was any legal obligation, as in any equitable claim that might be made on behalf of the company consideration must be given to the fact that the presence of the British forces on the canal alone prevented the suspension of the traffic and the consequent cessation of the earnings of the company, a view which was supported by the Egyptian government.

Some references have been made in earlier pages of this work to the employment of foreigners in Egypt and to the dissatisfaction which was said to have been caused by their appointment to the more important offices, and consequently by their appropriation of the largest salaries and rewards.¹

Without again dwelling on the fact that Egypt had for ages been governed by others than native Egyptians, and that recent Turco-Egyptian rulers had, so to speak, been so completely nationalized that they were identified with the progress and independence of the country, it is desirable at this point of the narrative briefly to consider what was the proportion of Europeans as compared with native officials and government employés, and what were their relative emoluments, at the time of the English intervention in the autumn of 1882, at the time, that is to say, that one of the complaints made by the so-called "leaders of the national party" was the preponderance of Europeans in the service of the state. This question has so often been raised in discussions on Egyptian affairs that it is necessary for us to have the facts before us in order to arrive at an intelligent understanding of the actual condition of affairs, especially as it became absolutely necessary for the Egyptian government to appoint European, and particularly English, officials to several important and responsible positions for the purpose of carrying out the scheme of reformed administration.

The returns from which we may glean a few particulars were contained in a second careful report and analysis prepared by Mr. Gerald Fitzgerald, director-general of public accounts, the result of which showed that in September, 1882, the foreigners employed in the Egyptian service formed but two per cent of the whole number of public servants, and that the aggregate of their salaries amounted to not more than $15\frac{5}{8}$ per cent of the amount paid in salaries by the Egyptian government.

This, of course, shows that foreigners occupied many of the positions which carried the highest salaries, but it is to be noted that the larger proportion of highly paid employés were not

¹ Vol i. pp. 81 and 82, &c.

English but French, and that under the term "English" there were classed Maltese, and all "English-protected" persons, so that of the 240 employés named as English there were 140 English-born subjects, 56 Maltese, and 44 English protégés. These protected persons were inhabitants of Egypt or Syria whose parents had sought the protection of the British government in order to avoid local laws or in some cases local taxation, and they were amenable only to the consular court. In presenting the report Sir Edward Malet was able to say that since November, 1879, when he had taken up his duties as her majesty's agent and consul-general, he had not obtained from the Egyptian government a single place for a British subject. Those who had come into the service after that date had done so through the acknowledged requirements of the service, and in consequence of the wishes of the different heads of departments. He had never heard a complaint from members of the successive governments that there were too many foreigners in the service, though he had often heard complaints that many of those employed did not do the amount of work to be expected of them. The conclusion that he had come to was that a weeding process applied to the service would be an advantage, but it should extend equally to the foreigner and the Egyptian.

Several among the English-born employés had been specially asked for by the government of Egypt for the purpose of introducing reforms in the administrations, others because European mechanical skill was required in the land survey, railways, telegraphs, and public works, and a knowledge of European languages in the departments of public instruction and justice, and for carrying on in the finance, customs, and post-office the ordinary business of government.

It should be noted also that it was owing to the presence and exertions of European officials that numerous and salutary reforms had been accomplished in the public departments, especially in the customs, the railways, and the octroi, where not only was the current work done with greater efficiency and simplicity, but the receipts had largely increased as compared with those of the

time when these departments were administered by natives. By the publication of accurate estimates and financial statements European officials had also succeeded in making known the real position and progress of the country, and this had tended to raise the national credit and to bring Egypt into fairer comparison with well-governed countries in Europe.

Of 1067 Europeans in the service of the Egyptian government in September, 1882, only 504 had been engaged before 1877 and 563 had been engaged after that date, the increased proportion being caused by the largely extended relations of Egypt with Europe, the development of external commerce and public works, the increased duties and improved methods of work necessitating the employment of a larger number of Europeans in the ministries of finance and public works, railways, telegraphs, ports, customs, and post-office. Of the 563 persons representing the increased number of European employés, the mixed tribunals and the land survey accounted for 208, leaving 355 for the remaining government departments.

In the previous return on the same subject it had been stated that the total number of 1263 Europeans employed in the Egyptian service included: French 328, at a total annual salary of £E.117,650; English 272, salary £E.95,686; Italians 345, salary £E.71,902; Austrians 96, salary £E.27,771; Greeks 114, salary £E.17,544; Germans 40, salary £E.14,673; other nations 68, salary £E.28,265. By the later return of 1882, however, it was shown that the number of European employés had diminished to 240 English, 244 French, 35 Germans, 80 Austrians, 300 Italians, 5 Russians, 9 Americans, 12 Belgians, 9 Spaniards, 104 Greeks, 9 Dutch, 1 Dane, 12 Swiss, 1 Swede, 3 Norwegians, and 3 Roumanians, or a total of 1067; the number of native employés being 52,974. It must again be remembered also, that the "English" element included Maltese and English-protected persons.

The number of departments of the government among which the European employés were distributed comprises the khedive's household, the service of his highness' yachts, council of ministers, ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of finance, employés in the

offices of the under-secretary of state, director-general of accounts, director of legal affairs, and director of revenues, office of the controllers-general, land survey, octroi department, administration of lighthouses, the mint, miscellaneous services, palaces of Ghizeh and Gezireh, ministry of war, marine department, public instruction, ministry of the interior, civil administration of the provinces, police, administration for the suppression of slavery, board of health, ministry of justice, mixed tribunals, public works, railways, telegraphs, port of Alexandria, customs and coast-guard, post-office, packet service, and salt department.

Natives only were employed in the financial service of the provinces, in the fire brigade, in the native tribunals, the government storehouses, and as messengers, porters, &c., in the ministry of finance, where the whole number of employés was small, and other departments. The aggregate salaries of Europeans, it is needless to say, bore a very large proportion as compared with those of natives, the numbers being 52,974 natives, with total salaries of £E.1,648,503; and 1067 Europeans, with £E.305,096. But the latter occupied positions of trust and responsibility, to which they were appointed for the purpose of effectually carrying out the direction of the departments. The number of Europeans employed in the purely administrative services was 893, with a total of annual salaries amounting to £E.234,964.

The English nationality predominated in the railways, post khedival steamers, customs, and lighthouses. The French and Italians were about equally represented in the cadastre and finance departments, both being of greater weight than the English, while the French alone was greatest in the department of public works, and the Italian in that of the post-office. The French also predominated in the services existing in virtue of international arrangements, viz.: the Control, Caisse de la Dette, Domains, Daira Sanieh, and the tribunals. The numbers and aggregate salaries of these being, French 124, £E.49,787; English 39, £E.25,225, the larger salaries falling to the English. Italian 102, £E.21,354; Austrian 36, £E.11,875; Greek 35, £E.6951; German 10, £E.5715; and other nations 24, £E.17,618.

Another important point for consideration was, that employés in Egypt were divided into two classes, those who were paid by the Egyptian tax-payer, and those who were paid by revenue derived wholly, or in part, from Europeans. The state employés would come under the first of these divisions, but there were notable exceptions even there. The customs, the port, the telegraph, the railways, the post-office, the octrois derived their revenues in very large measure from Europeans, the native tax-payer contributing a quota, which, in some cases, was little more than that of the European. The international tribunals employed a very large number of Europeans, and were mainly supported by fees paid by European litigants. The above administrations employed in all 465 Europeans, or more than a third of the whole number employed in Egypt.

In the second division come the numerous employés of the Daira and the Domains. These were paid from lands which were formerly the private property of the khedive or his family. Their salaries came out of the pockets of the bondholders, on whose behalf the Daira and Domain lands were administered. More than half the European employés in Egypt fell in these two classes. Thus European employés were very largely paid either by European capital, or from funds hypothecated to Europeans.

The following showed precisely the state of European salaries in Egypt. The statement includes all employés, whether of the state or the creditors:—

				Per Annum.		
				£	to	£
707	From 60		180
383	180		360
130	360		720
53	720		1500
15	1500		2000
13	2000		3000
2	3000		4000

The average salary being in round figures, 283*l.* per annum. Of the 13 receiving more than £2000 4 were the members of the "Caisse de la Dette Publique;" 4 were the members of the Daira

Sanieh and Domains Commissions; 2 were the members of the Railway Commission; 3 only were Egyptian employés, unconnected with the service of the debt. The 2 who received £4000 per annum were the controllers.

To the reader who may feel inclined to "skip" these figures because like most of such statements they appear only dry and uninviting, it may be hinted that the employment of foreigners in the principal offices in Egypt had been one of the "burning" questions for a long time previous to the series of events which led to our intervention and the subsequent occupation of the country. No accurate survey of the condition of affairs in relation to this complaint can be made without some knowledge of the facts which are here taken from the very elaborate report sent to our government; and though by the abolition of the control, the reconstruction of the government, and reform of the administration, considerable changes were made, those changes necessarily involved some additions to the number of European employés in the various departments of the government. The Earl of Dufferin, writing to the Earl of Granville, anticipated any objection that might arise on that score by saying:—

"In the first place, every new appointment has been made, not merely with the consent, but at the solicitation, of the Egyptian ministers. In no case have I attempted to force upon them a European administrator when they themselves did not think his services required. The fact is, that the objections raised to the number of posts occupied by foreigners in Egypt belong to a totally different order of ideas from those connected with the nomination to high and responsible office of distinguished individuals, with whose qualifications no native talent can pretend to compete. What vexes the Egyptian is to see well-paid offices filled by persons who discharge duties for which they know themselves to be equally competent, or dual offices created not out of regard to the nature of the work to be done, but to suit the political convenience of European nations. The Egyptians are perfectly intelligent enough to understand what an insignificant relation the salaries of a dozen first-rate experts bear to the

benefits their ability and talents enable them to confer upon the country. It is when we descend into the inferior ranks and return to the protected administrations that the multiplication of European clerks and commissioners begins to breed bad blood and discontent."

Early in May, 1883, Lord Dufferin was about to quit Egypt; the work which he had undertaken was accomplished, and the new organization was slowly, but it was hoped surely, working to beneficent ends.

Sultan Pasha, an Egyptian "*pur sang*" and one of the most influential representatives of Egyptian interests and aspirations, as distinguished from those of the Circassian and official world, had become assured of the good intentions of the English proposals, and went to Lord Dufferin for the purpose, as he said, of expressing the undying gratitude of the Egyptian people to England for all the benefits she had designed for their country. The proposals surpassed anything that he had expected, and he had not words to express his satisfaction. He confessed that he had been under a complete misapprehension as to our intentions, but now that he had had an opportunity of reading the Arabic version of the scheme as communicated to Lord Granville he and his were more than content: a universal feeling of gratitude towards England would possess the country from one end to the other.

The benefits which the new régime would confer on the country would mainly rest on the provision for the gradual but decisive liberation of the fellaheen, by means of a representative system and laws which would deliver them from tyranny and corruption and the arbitrary caprices of the local pashas directly they perceived that they had a voice in the administration of their own affairs and that they could breathe freely, at the same time that they would sustain a more intelligible situation in relation to foreign capitalists, and the whole agricultural system would be placed on a better footing.

"Various circumstances," said Lord Dufferin in concluding his report, "have combined to render the actual condition of the Egyptian fellah extremely precarious. His relations with his

European creditors are becoming dangerously strained. The agriculture of the country is rapidly deteriorating, the soil having become exhausted by overcropping and other causes. The labour of the 'corvée' is no longer equal to the cleansing of the canals. As a consequence the desert is encroaching on the cultivated land, and, unless some remedy be quickly found, the finances of the country will be compromised. With such an accumulation of difficulties native statesmanship, even though supplemented by the new-born institutions, will hardly be able to cope, unless assisted for a time by our sympathy and guidance. Under these circumstances I would venture to submit that we can hardly consider the work of reorganization complete, or the responsibilities imposed upon us by circumstances adequately discharged, until we have seen Egypt shake herself free from the initial embarrassments which I have enumerated. This point of departure once attained, we can bid her God-speed with a clear conscience, and may fairly claim the approbation of Europe for having completed a labour which every one desired to see accomplished, though no one was willing to undertake it but ourselves. Even then the stability of our handiwork will not be assured unless it is clearly understood by all concerned that no subversive influence will intervene between England and the Egypt she has re-created."

The accomplishment of these expectations had begun even before Lord Dufferin's departure for Constantinople. In writing a farewell letter to Cherif Pasha, who firmly upheld the new organization, Lord Dufferin, who had sent to him the able general report on Egyptian reorganization, was able to say that though they were but standing on the threshold of the new era, and the expectation of what was in preparation only accentuated more forcibly the unsatisfactory nature of the system which for the moment they must submit to tolerate,—already they were to be congratulated on the progress which had been made. The moral agitation excited by recent events had disappeared. The material tranquillity of the country was absolute from one end to the other. The progress made in the reconstruction of the army had excited the surprise and admiration of all who had witnessed its evolutions.

The defects which for some time prevailed in the organization of the police had been remedied, and that force began to command the confidence of the public, while the provincial constabulary had completely cleared the country of the marauders who infested some of the rural districts. The harvest of Upper Egypt was good, as were also the cereal crops in the Delta; the land revenue and the taxes were being satisfactorily paid; and the population at large was busily intent on the prosecution of the national industries. The indemnity commission had been for some time at work, and, so far, the claimants had no reason to be dissatisfied with its awards.¹ With a humane consideration which was beyond all praise, his excellency had made preparation for the immediate payment of all the smaller claims, and already their owners had begun to rebuild the shops in Alexandria. The application of the "kourbash" had been declared illegal by the minister of the interior, and the summary dismissal of two high officials for authorizing its use had proved that the government was determined to enforce its abolition.

The worst abuses attendant upon the conscription had been removed, and reforms in the application of the *corvée* were under consideration. It is true that the misuse of arbitrary power, corruption in official circles, and a thousand injustices, still prevailed. What else could be expected in a land as yet without law or any semblance of constitutional freedom? But the elaboration of the civil and criminal codes and their procedures was completed; they were being translated; and in a few weeks would be issued, thus securing, once and for ever, to every Egyptian, however poor, definite and indestructible rights of person and property, which he would be able to vindicate before trustworthy tribunals, emancipated from the control of executive authority. As soon as it was seen

¹ By the 8th of May 9000 applications had been received, representing claims to the extent of 230,500,000*f.* Austria-Hungary was on the list for 550 applications, amounting together to 12,000,000*f.* The number of claims recognized as valid by the commission, down to May 15th, was 2261, representing a total value of 23,500,000*f.* In these figures Austria-Hungary was included for 272 applications, amounting together to 2,200,000*f.* The total sum for indemnity which would devolve upon Egypt would not exceed 100,000,000*f.*, and it was considered that no heavy sacrifice would be necessary for its payment. The Egyptian government had already begun to pay small accounts not exceeding £E.200 each.

that the taking of a bribe, the illegal striking of a fellow-citizen, the abuse of the *corvée* or the conscription, would lead the author of the wrong, no matter how highly placed, straight to the felon's cell, corruption and tyranny would gradually become as rare in Egypt as in any other country. Long before the end of the year the representative institutions with which his highness the khedive had so generously endowed his people would have been called into activity. It seemed to be generally admitted that they were well calculated to promote the cause of good government, but doubts had been expressed as to the possibility of finding men to work them. Upon this point Lord Dufferin had no misgivings. Their function was to acquaint the government with the wants and wishes of the people; and as no one knows where the shoe pinches so accurately as he who wears it, there need be no misapprehension that the popular representatives would fail to articulate the needs of the nation. Nor was it probable that constructive statesmanship would be wanting. Within the circle of his own Egyptian acquaintance he could point to many a personage of unblemished integrity and of proved ability who would be anxious to assist in the regeneration of their country. In any event, it was plain that fortune had afforded Egypt an unexpected opportunity of working out her own salvation, and she would only have her own children to blame if she failed in the endeavour. Though the problems before her were arduous, they were not disheartening. With one of the most difficult of them, namely, the liquidation of the Domains, Cherif Pasha had already dealt. The next which was to engage his attention, was that of the indebtedness of the fellaheen. Such indications of uneasiness and dissatisfaction as still prevailed in Egypt, however differently expressed, might all be traced to this root of bitterness. The mere fact of the government seriously endeavouring to discover some mode whereby the fellaheen might be relieved from the instant pressure of their present embarrassments, without detriment to the legal interests of their creditors, would at once relax the strain of the actual situation. For the solution of the other problems, time, patience, and administrative ability would suffice.

In July, 1883, Lord Dufferin was in London and a guest at a banquet of the Grocers' Company, where, in acknowledging the toast of her majesty's representatives abroad, he said:

“For thousands of years the Egyptian people have been the victims of tyranny and malversation. Corruption and oppression in every form was so ingrained in the administration of the country as to have become, in the eyes of the unhappy peasantry, incorporated with the order of nature. Law and justice have never existed in Egypt. The conscription and the most capricious system of taxation that has been known to mankind ground the fellah to the dust. But ere the smoke of battle had cleared off the field of Tel-el-Kebir a new Egypt had come into existence—an Egypt soon, I trust, to be the home of equal laws, righteous legislation, domestic freedom, and constitutional government—above all, an Egypt which is destined to prove to the world that all that is best, most wholesome, and most useful to mankind in the wisdom of the West can be associated and combined, harmonized and amalgamated, with Eastern habits of thought and feeling, and with the precepts and customs of an Oriental religion. If the East is ever to be resuscitated it is in Egypt that the vital spark is most likely to spring into flame. Months and years may elapse before satisfactory results occur and unchallenged accomplishments can ripen into full and perfect consummation; but believe me, under the auspices of able men the good work is fairly in progress, and can never again be checked or interrupted. I have no hesitation in saying, that ere a year is past, England will have the satisfaction of knowing that it has been acknowledged on every hand that she has been the happy instrument of increasing a hundredfold the prosperity and the happiness of an ancient, innocent, industrious, and sober population, the good government and tranquillity of whose country is absolutely necessary to the commercial interests of Great Britain and the people of Europe.”

Much allowance is to be made for the “effusion” of a speech made at such a time, and it cannot be denied that the prospects in Egypt were in accordance with Lord Dufferin's declarations, and seemed to warrant his unhesitating assertion that the Egyptian

campaign would triumphantly stand the test of being justified by the peace it was undertaken to ensure, and the excess of the benefits over the risks, sacrifices, and losses which it caused.

At the time that these declarations were being made, however, a very serious outbreak of cholera had taken place at Damietta, and the rapid and terrible spread of the disease, and the necessity for taking measures to meet the calamity, retarded the immediate progress of the work of reconstruction. The disease first appeared towards the end of June, and it was thought that the immediate seclusion or isolation of the district of Damietta would be necessary.

Sir Samuel Baker said that Damietta was a disgusting example of Oriental neglect and filth accumulation. A long narrow street ran parallel with the river at the back of the dilapidated houses, which for a distance of a mile rose from the level of the stream. This street was without drainage, and was a miserable channel of communication, deep with poisonous mud after a heavy shower, and full of dust holes emitting germs of pestilence during hot and sultry weather. If cholera could be manufactured, there could not be a more elaborate factory.

The first necessary step being isolation upon the appearance of an epidemic, Lake Menzaleh, upon the east, would effectually protect the approach from that quarter. The railway terminus being upon the west bank of the river, while the town of Damietta was upon the east, that could be easily guarded. The embankments of the Nile which confined the stream, and which formed the highways upon either side, could be barred by sentries in half an hour. A bridge of boats should be at once constructed across the river to prevent all shipping from passing to and fro between Damietta and Mansourah.


But it was too late to take such measures, even if there had been much chance of being able to move so quickly in Egypt. The disorder had already spread. On the 25th of June cholera was at Mansourah and Port Said, and so rapidly did the infection extend that in three months the disease was fatal in 30,000 cases.

There is no need to recount the horrors that attended the

widely spread disease. It had doubtless originated at Damietta, where at the great fair about 15,000 people had assembled and had for several days been living on foul water and putrid food. The stench of the place tainted the air and was noticeable at several miles distance. Doubtless the conditions of the country were also such as to develop infection, for pestilence frequently follows war as famine often follows pestilence. There were no doctors, medicines, or disinfectants at Damietta, and there was no authority prompt enough or powerful enough to place a rigid cordon round the town before 10,000 people, who had attended the fair, dispersed to the various towns and villages of the interior. The death-rate at Damietta rose to 200 a-day, and the disease rapidly began to appear at other places where the sanitary conditions were little better.

No precautions had been taken, no sanitary organization existed, and all was delay, uncertainty, and confusion. In Egypt nothing is ever ready on an emergency, and it can scarcely be said that we always set the people there a good example in this respect. After the suppression of the military rebellion and the final engagement at Tel-el-Kebir, the condition of the hospitals to which our sick or wounded soldiers were consigned was abominable, and though it was understood that surgical appliances, medical comforts, and the furniture, beds, and bedding suitable for military hospital use had been ordered and sent, there was considerable delay before the bare, ruinous, and filthy buildings appropriated for the purpose of hospitals for the troops were either properly cleansed or even decently provided with the ordinary and necessary appointments of the commonest hospital ward. This was quickly remedied after the attention of Lord Wolseley and the superior officers had been emphatically called to the condition of the patients, and they had themselves visited the hospitals, but it lasted long enough to provoke in England strong remonstrances against the "departments" which had failed either to profit by or to remember the disastrous delays and confusion of the commissariat and supply during the earlier periods of the Crimean war.

With the cholera outbreak there was no one having sufficient



DARB-EL-AHMAR, CAIRO.

power to use the initial means of checking the spread of the disease; nor did the means themselves exist at the places first attacked. At Mansourah the filthy condition of the hospital to which the sufferers were sent prevented all but a few patients from recovering. On the 15th of July, 1883, one or two fatal cases were reported at Ghizeh and Boulak, the suburbs of Cairo. There were then grounds for serious apprehension that the capital itself would suffer from the epidemic, for beautiful and picturesque as "Grand Cairo" may be, and numerous as the modern improvements are, it is, like all other towns in Egypt, and in Europe also for that matter, defiled by noisome slums and foul buildings, while the science of drainage, cleansing, and ventilation has received little practical attention. We have already seen what was the condition of the prisons there and elsewhere, the hospitals were but little better. The narrow streets of Cairo and their picturesque irregularity are, of course, part of the Oriental character of the place, but there are pestilential festering nooks and corners there as elsewhere, and they are not easy to get at even if anybody thought of cleaning them up, or drenching them with dilute carbolic acid or Condy's fluid. The whole Oriental part of the city is divided into quarters consisting mainly of dwelling-houses, but named either from some public building, from somebody to whom the property may once have belonged, or from the social peculiarity in the callings followed by the greater part of the inhabitants, so that there is the "Hart-es-Suggaen"—the Quarter of the Water-carriers; the "Hart-el-Kobt"—the Copt Quarter; the "Hart-el-Yahood"—or Jews' Quarter; the "Hart-el-Frang"—or Frank Quarter, and so on; the Esbekeeyeh being now considered a separate quarter with its more modern additions of the Abdeen and the Ismaileeyeh. For administrative purposes Cairo is, or was then, divided into ten quarters or Toomns:—Esbekeeyeh, Bab-esh-Shareeyeh, Abdeen, Darb-el-Gammameez, Darb-el-Ahmar, Gemeleeyeh, Keysoon, Khaleefeh, Boulak, and Old Cairo. Some of these quarters have good and picturesque streets and fine mosques, one of the best being the mosque of Merdânee in the Darb-el-Ahmar, leading from the Bab Zuweleh to the citadel; but the

mosque itself, five centuries and a half old, was lately falling into ruin. This condition of ruin and comparative neglect, however picturesque and imposing it may be in an ancient building, is by no means an element to be desired in byways and narrow tortuous streets and dirty lanes, where the houses on the opposite sides touch each other at the upper stories: and in Cairo, as in less important towns, the habits of the lower classes of Egyptians are such as to defy any merely temporary efforts to effect sanitary reforms.

When the cholera broke out in the suburbs it quickly spread to the city itself, where the death-rate rose to 500 a-day, and though the extreme measure of isolating and setting fire to one of the most infected districts was adopted, the result was of little apparent advantage, since nothing was done to prevent hundreds of the evicted tenants from swarming in crowds through the streets of the city; and in the general want of any organization cholera patients were taken to the hospitals in vehicles which afterwards were seen plying for hire, mourners rode home from funerals seated on the coffins or shells which had conveyed the bodies of their deceased relatives to the grave, and the clothes of those who died in hospital were sent to surviving friends by the hospital authorities. The British troops were sent out of the city to more healthy quarters, and not only at Cairo, but at other places where the men were quartered, precautions were taken similar to those which had been found successful in India to preserve them from the ravages of the epidemic. They were frequently moved from one station to another, a hospital camp was established, and medical and sanitary knowledge were employed to overcome the danger to which our soldiers were exposed in Alexandria and other towns, as well as outside the walls of Cairo.

As soon as arrangements could be made in England, Surgeon-general W. Guyer Hunter started for Egypt with a staff of twelve surgeons, for the purpose of rendering assistance, but for some time they could not prevail on the Egyptian hospital authorities to adopt common precautions against the spread of the disease. Against the obstinate fatalism, and the indifference and indecision of

the Egyptians, they would have been powerless had they not, by their active self-denial and determined devotion to duty, succeeded in arousing the admiration of the people themselves. For a short time they were thwarted in every attempt to establish ordinary sanitary regulations, and it was not till they had threatened to resign their appointments and return to England that they were permitted to take active measures. Of the British soldiers outside Cairo, in various districts and in camp on the heights, 140 died, and the mortality among the natives was appalling, the ravages of the disease being far greater there and at Damietta than at Alexandria, where better precautions had been observed, and the city itself did not present so many conditions for the spread or the virulence of the disease.

During the whole period of the calamity the unflinching devotion of the English officers of the Egyptian army in their care of the men under their command aroused the warm admiration and grateful surprise of the natives, and the untiring activity, skill, and courage of the surgeon-general and his staff were regarded with equal satisfaction and astonishment. The efforts of all these officers were, however, heartily supported by the khedive, who himself set an excellent example by personally visiting some of the worst and foulest wards of the hospitals at Mansourah, Cairo, and other places, where he encouraged, admonished, and stimulated the authorities intelligently to perform their duties. The unselfish interest and sympathy which he showed was quite a new experience for the people, who everywhere met him with enthusiastic expressions of loyalty, and proved by their manifestations of gratitude that, for a time at least, he was thoroughly and deservedly popular. By the beginning of August the disease began to abate. It had already greatly diminished in other parts of the country where it had first appeared, and the cases in Cairo assumed a less virulent type and diminished in number. In September there was a full Nile, and the authority of the extraordinary council which had been appointed during the emergency was sufficient to enforce regulations to prevent corpses and the putrid carcasses of animals being thrown into the canals, which were then filling with

water. By the middle of the month the epidemic had almost entirely disappeared, and local restrictions and quarantine were soon afterwards removed.

For some time previously the news from the Soudan had excited attention, and, now that the health of the capital was restored and the recall of the British troops which had been interrupted was continued, the khedive and the Egyptian government urgently requested that a sufficient body of our men should be permitted to remain, to aid in maintaining public order, while the new constitution was being developed and the protection afforded by British arms, and the presence of British officers might be needed in order to carry out the proposed reformation.

After a time the surgeon-general¹ and the medical staff were able to return, leaving Egypt free from the further ravages of the epidemic, but the retirement of the troops went on more slowly than had been intended, and eventually was still further delayed. The great changes which were being effected in the administration, including even a scheme for improved education in the Egyptian colleges and schools where several necessary reforms were to be promptly inaugurated, made it necessary to retain some proof that the moral support of Europe was not withdrawn from the khedive's government, while the rebellious temper which had been aroused by the revolt and maintained by the adherents of Arabi, who still professed to believe in his patriotic professions, might make the presence of a British force necessary for the maintenance of order, until the organization of the Egyptian gendarmerie and police had been completed.

As early as October, 1882, General Valentine Baker Pasha, an English officer who had been in the Turkish service, arrived at Cairo in order to tender his military aid to the khedive should the British government permit English officers to offer such temporary service without quitting that of her majesty. The reorganization

¹ Sir W. Guyer Hunter, K.C.M.G., who now (1886) represents Central Hackney in parliament, entered the Indian Medical Service in 1850, and served through the Burmese War and the Indian Mutiny. In 1876 he was appointed Principal of the Grant Medical College, and in 1879 Vice-chancellor of the University of Bombay. He retired in 1880, but was despatched to Egypt on a special mission when the cholera broke out there in 1883.

of the Egyptian army was then under consideration, and General Baker proposed a scheme which, after some modifications by the council of ministers, was approved by the khedive. The proposed force was to consist of 11,500 men, of whom 5400 were to consist of 6 battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, 3 batteries of field artillery of 100 each, 1 battalion of 500 heavy artillery, 2 battalions of mounted infantry, and a company of 100 engineers. All these to be under the command of English officers, while Egyptian officers would command 6 battalions of infantry, 3 batteries of field artillery, 1 battalion of heavy artillery, 2 battalions of gendarmerie amounting to 2000 men, and 300 men for hospital and transport duty,—in all 6100 men. This scheme was subjected to some alterations, for though it included the number of men sufficient to allow drafts to be made to supplement the Soudan garrison and to occupy the Mediterranean forts, it did not appear to make a sufficient distinction between those services and that of Egypt proper. Lord Dufferin thought that though a military force was necessary for Egypt, it should not exceed by a single man the actual requirements of the country. Though an efficient gendarmerie might be able in ordinary times to prevent the Bedouins causing trouble along the desert border and the banks of the canal, it was essential that those unruly Arab communities should know that there was a military force sufficient to suppress any attempt they might make to disturb the country or to break through the frontier guards and plunder Cairo. There were also other dangers to be provided against. Egypt had at all times been liable to small local insurrections, usually of a so-called religious character, set on foot by half-mad impostors representing themselves to be divinely inspired leaders, and as such movements spread with extraordinary rapidity among the credulous population, the means of suppressing them should not be wanting. This was one of the reasons given for maintaining an Egyptian army in Egypt, and without reference to any such pseudo-religious insurrection in the Soudan itself, although, even at that time, rumours from the neighbourhood of Khartûm seemed to indicate troubles in that district. It was, however, thought most desirable that the affairs of Egypt and the

Soudan should be kept distinct, and that the armed forces belonging to each should be regarded separately. Only a small army would be required for Egypt, the Delta being a triangular area of only a few thousand square miles, traversed in every direction by railways and branches of the Nile, and the rest of Egypt consisting of a narrow strip of alluvial soil from six to fifteen miles broad, divided through its entire length by a navigable river, and consequently accessible to troops in every part and on the shortest notice. It was thought, therefore, and General Baker concurred in the proposition, that a force of 6000 men would be sufficient, mainly consisting of infantry, with a regiment of cavalry, a camel corps, artillery, rocket companies, engineers, and transport, including 100 garrison artillery and 100 palace guard; and it was proposed not to include Turkish or Albanian mercenaries, but to enlist native Egyptians, while General Baker's plan of dividing the command between English and Egyptian officers was regarded as highly desirable. It became evident, however, that a British general officer should be appointed to assist the khedive's government in organizing the army and to take command as chief of the staff, the khedive himself having desired to be ranked as commander-in-chief. As we have already seen, Major-general Sir Evelyn Wood, K.C.B., V.C., was selected for that duty, and left England for Cairo on the 15th of December, 1882.

We have already noticed the Bedouins—the factions of tribes which crossed into Egypt in remote times from Arabia and the Sinaitic peninsula, some of whom Lord Dufferin tells us still preserve a tradition of the district whence their ancestors came. The most powerful tribe is the Maazeh, whose ascendancy extends from the Keneh-Kosseir route to Suez. The Tarrazin dwell around Suez and its coasts, the Amran or Hamran between Suez and Cairo, the Allawin on the Isthmus, and the Ayaideh near Heliopolis, a few miles to the north-east of Cairo. Above Cairo are the Beni Wasel opposite Beni Souef, the Metahrat opposite Siout, and the Hawarah near Thebes. The Western Bedouins of the Libyan Desert though of Arab origin have come more immediately from Tripoli or Tunis, and are regarded by the

Eastern Bedouins as inferiors both in birth and breeding. The Southern or Nubian Bedouins, between the Nile valley and the Red Sea from the Kenh-Kosseir route to the table-lands of Abyssinia are known as the Beza tribes, and are believed to be descendants of the Blemmyer expelled from the Upper Nile valley in the fourth century. Though physiologically of a high type, they are not Arabs, and speak a language said to be a dialect of Abyssinia. The Ababdeh, occupying the district between the Kenh-Kosseir route and the second cataract, are the most civilized and docile, and have adopted the Arabic language. Further south are the Bishari and the Hadendon, who are fiercer and much less civilized.

The astute old Mohammed Ali employed the Bedouins as irregular cavalry, but as they were always a disturbing element he with equal sagacity transformed a considerable number of them into agriculturists, thinking that they might form a defence against the less amenable tribes who continued to be marauders. The result was that numbers of them settled on the irrigated land in districts near the desert. They despise the fellaheen, but they have to some extent mingled with them by intermarriage, and the government has a considerable hold over them through their sheikhs, many of whom have become owners of estates. An instance of this was found when one of the chiefs of the tribe near the scene of the murder of Professor Palmer was ordered by the government to assist in capturing the criminals, and found it to be to his interest to obey the command with considerable promptitude. The tribes are still independent enough to claim exemption from the "corvée" and from conscription, and in the rebellion a band of 2000 of them under a single leader crossed over from the Fayoum to the camp of Arabi: while the confusion which reigned at Alexandria after the bombardment was worse confounded by the irruption of several hundred Bedouins into the blazing streets. But these predatory or half-settled tribes were badly armed, and though they had picked up a few Remington rifles, had no ammunition. A good many of the chief men were not very likely to run the risk of having their property con-

fiscated, and it was believed that the gendarmerie pickets would be sufficient to deter even the most disorderly bands from serious outbreaks or organized raids.

The administration of the gendarmerie was, as we have seen, placed under the minister of the interior, but its organization was intrusted to General Baker Pasha, who was made inspector-general, with a deputy inspector-general to take his place in the event of sickness or absence. His headquarters staff was to consist of one European orderly officer and four Egyptian staff officers, and he was to have the supervision of the urban police of Alexandria, Cairo, Ismailia, Port Said, and Suez, so that his duties and responsibilities were arduous, and unremitting activity was required to form such a force out of the materials with which he had to deal. The commandant of the urban police, who was also amenable to the inspector-general of gendarmerie, was Count della Sala, an Italian officer who had previously had command of the anti-slavery police, and who had done good service in organizing the constabulary force at Alexandria, and suppressing the tumults made there by the Albanians who had demanded to be enrolled in the force.

These, then, were the provisions made for enrolling semi-military and constabulary bodies who would discharge duties that would render the maintenance of a large army unnecessary, and who would maintain order in the large towns where unruly foreign elements frequently created disturbances. It was not intended, however, to interfere with the ancient rural police system—probably as old as the time of the Pharaohs—by which each village sheikh is responsible for the maintenance of order in his hamlet: appoints the watchmen: and is made answerable to the higher authorities in case of any disturbance of the peace of the village.

By the 1st of January, 1883, a force of 1800 mounted and 1400 foot gendarmerie had been fully organized and equipped, and were being distributed throughout the provinces and the Delta. The force was composed almost entirely of noncommissioned officers taken from the reserve of the regular army, the

commissioned officers having been selected from those who had not been specially implicated in the recent troubles. In their military capacity the gendarmerie partook of the character of mounted infantry; a portion of them were to be organized into camel corps and rocket companies, an arrangement which was not difficult, as all the people in Egypt are accustomed to manage camels, and the rockets, as well as the camels, were likely to be useful in any conflict with the Arab tribes.

When all the arrangements were made for the protection of Egypt proper, however, there still remained the question of the military forces to be provided for the Soudan and Darfûr. Lord Dufferin was of opinion that the sooner Egypt relinquished the profitless incumbrance of Darfûr the better it would be for her, and there were a good many people who believed that it would be just as desirable that she should get rid of the Soudan also. The Egyptian government, however, were not likely to take this view. They desired that their jurisdiction should extend along the whole valley of the Nile, and were convinced that if it could be opened up by a railway the entire district would become a rich and profitable possession. A country with a length from Assouan to the equator of about 1650 miles, and a width from Massowa to the western limit of the Darfûr province of from 1200 to 1400 miles, is an immense territory to hold, and under present conditions it seems impossible to hold it securely; but the great plain has a population far less than it would support, and, though it is not fertilized and its surface is so high above the river that three tiers of chaloufs or water-wheels are needed to irrigate it, it would grow cotton and sugar in profusion if the means existed for importing the necessary machinery and exporting the produce; while other sources of natural wealth are abundant. But the chief difficulty was that it was abandoned to the slave-hunters, and that the so-called religious war, fomented by the Mahdi and his followers, was supported by the slave-dealers, who were always ready to take advantage of any such fanatic outbreak to restore their traffic and defy the authority of the Egyptian government. To include this vast tract of country under one name is in itself misleading. It is

inhabited by two totally distinct races. In the northern half of the territory—that is to say, north of the 11th parallel of north latitude—the inhabitants are almost wholly pure Arabs, most of them nomad tribes, professing a more or less adulterated form of Mohammedanism. South of the 11th parallel the country is peopled by negro tribes, who, though officially described as Mohammedans, are really Pagans. But besides these two main divisions of race, there are localities the inhabitants of which cannot be classed under either. The negroes, it may be said roughly, are all sedentary and cultivators; the Arabs are almost all nomads, and do little or no tillage. Up to a little more than sixty years ago, when the Egyptians seem first to have directed their attention steadily to the Soudan, the district was divided into a number of kingdoms and chieftaincies, and the petty monarchs seem to have lived in a state of chronic war.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. H. Stewart, in one of the able reports which he made of his investigations in the Soudan, said:—

“The Arabs and Dongolawis, negroes and others, settled within the Arab zone are all Mohammedans of the Maliki school. This religion, however, owing to the prevailing ignorance of the people, partakes mostly of an emotional and superstitious nature. Hence the enormous influences of the Fakis, or spiritual leaders, who are credited with a supernatural power, and are almost more venerated than the Prophet.” “The negro tribes,” he adds, “notwithstanding their being officially described as Mohammedans, are all Pagans, or have no system of religious belief.”

This will explain how it was that a pretended prophet raising a “religious war” so readily formed a host of followers, and the nature of the country prevented an immediate and decisive blow being struck. The physical difficulties were too many for the Egyptian forces to make rapid movements against the flying forces of the rebels, so that in 1883 the Soudan was unsubdued, and a source of boundless trouble after all that had been undergone to suppress slavery and bring the country under regular authority. “Of the country west of the White Nile,” reported Colonel Stewart, “between the parallels of Khartûm and that of Kaka (or Caka),

about eleven degrees latitude, the general appearance is that of a vast steppe, covered with low thorny trees (mimosa, gum-trees, &c.), and prickly grass. Occasionally low groups of bare hills are met with. The villages and the patches of cultivated ground are few and far between. Water is scarce, and stored in wells and trunks of baobab trees."

This was the very district in which the defeat of Hicks Pasha and his Egyptian army took place, an event to which with the occurrences preceding it we must now turn.

We have already referred to the reports sent by Colonel Stewart from Khartûm. In these he made known to the British consul at Cairo the position of affairs in the Soudan, and the anxiety of Abd-el-Kader, the governor-general, for large reinforcements of troops in order to prevent the rebels from taking El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in order that they might advance on Khartûm itself. This was in the latter part of 1882, while Lord Dufferin and the British representatives in Egypt were earnestly engaged in the trials of the associates of Arabi and the reconstruction of the government of the khedive, and though the organization of the small regular Egyptian army under Sir Evelyn Wood was being effected, the men had all been enlisted under a promise of exemption from service in the Soudan.

The insurrection had then been going on for above a year and a quarter, and had no doubt been joined by a number of the disaffected officers and soldiers who had taken part with Arabi. The success of the Mahdi in raising the tribes and extending his influence over great tracts of country, proved the inability of the Egyptian government either to reconcile the inhabitants to its rule or to maintain order. Within a year and a half about 9000 men had fallen in various engagements with the followers of the Mahdi, of whom it was computed that 40,000 had perished, and yet the fierce and fanatic tribesmen, and the retainers of the truculent slave-owning chiefs, swarmed to the standard of the false Prophet, and the slaughter seemed to be no nearer to an end. There is no doubt that Abd-el-Kader, the governor-general,

was active and not wanting in courage, and, though he had but poor material out of which to form an army, he was able for some time to inflict severe defeats upon the enemy. Colonel Stewart did not attribute the rise of the rebellion so much to the want of troops as to the want of military knowledge on the part of the Egyptian officers. The primary causes of the success of the pretensions of the Mahdi were, in fact: (1) the venality of the officials, and the oppressive and unjust method of collecting the taxes; and (2) the suppression of the slave-trade, most of the supporters of the Mahdi, especially the Baggar tribe, owing their wealth to the traffic in slaves which the Egyptian government was endeavouring to suppress.

It will be remembered that on the departure of General Gordon, Raouf Pasha had been made governor-general of the Soudan, and in July, 1881, his attention was drawn to the declarations of one Mohammed Achmet or Ahmed, then living at Marobieh, near the island of Abba, and claiming to be the Mahdi, the deliverer, whose coming had been foretold by the Prophet, as that of him who would restore the power and establish the faith of Islam. There have been at different periods several ambitious fanatics or pretended religious leaders who have claimed to be the Mahdi, and for a time they have raised riots and gained followers, but none of them attained such rapid and widely extended influence as this man, who had very artfully prepared the part he had to play. He claimed the degree of relationship to the Prophet which was said would belong to the true Mahdi, and, singularly enough, certain warts or moles upon his cheek, and a difference in the colour of his eyes, were tokens said to have been named as marks of the genuine leader and prophet. Of course among a deeply superstitious people, encouraged by a number of influential chiefs interested in creating an insurrection, such tokens are easily accepted; but there was nothing particularly remarkable about the professed Mahdi except that he possessed tact and cunning in dealing with the tribes. He had not even personal courage to recommend him, for he seldom led his troops or exposed himself to danger, and though his proclamations were couched in language of a semi-religious

kind, and declaring that he was the chosen leader in a holy war, he was in other respects, as well as in this, an unscrupulous liar, representing that he had achieved great things, and sending false intelligence to distant tribes in order to encourage them to continue the revolt after he had suffered defeats.

Colonel Stewart gave a succinct account of him in which he said Mahomet Achmet, the Mahdi, is a Dongolawi, or native of the province of Dongola. His grandfather was called Fahil, and lived on the island of Naft Arti (Arti—Dongolawi for "Island"). This island lies east of and opposite to Ordi, the native name for the capital of Dongola. His father was Abdullahi, by trade a carpenter. In 1852 this man left and went to Shindi, a town on the Nile south of Berber. At that time his family consisted of three sons and one daughter, called respectively Mahomed, Hamid, Mahomet Achmet (the Mahdi), and Nur-el-Sham (Light of Syria). At Shindi another son was born called Abdullah. As a boy, Mahomet Achmet was apprenticed to Sherif-ed-deen, his uncle, a boatman, residing at Shakabeh, an island opposite Sennâr. Having one day received a beating from his uncle, he ran away to Khartûm, and joined the free school or "Medressu" of a faki (learned man, head of a sect of dervishes) who resided at Hoghali, a village east of and close to Khartûm. This school is attached to the tomb of Sheikh Hoghali, the patron saint of Khartûm, and who is greatly revered by the inhabitants of that town and district. The sheikh of this tomb or shrine, although he keeps a free school and feeds the poor, derives a very handsome revenue from the gifts of the pious. He claims to be a descendant of the original Hoghali, and through him of Mahomet. Here he remained for some time studying religion, the tenets of his sheikh, &c., but did not make much progress in the more worldly accomplishments of reading and writing. After a time he left and went to Berber, where he joined another free school kept by a sheikh Ghubush, at a village of that name nearly opposite to Mekherref (Berber). The school is also attached to a shrine greatly venerated by the natives. Here Mahomet Achmet remained six months completing his religious education. Thence he went to

Aradup (Tamarind Tree) village, south of Kana. Here in 1870 he became a disciple of another faki—Sheikh Nur-el-Daim (Continuous Light). Nur-el-Daim subsequently ordained him a sheikh or faki,¹ and he then left to take up his home in the island of Abba, near Kana, on the White Nile. Here he began by making a subterranean excavation (*khaliva*—retreat) into which he made a practice of retiring to repeat for hours one of the names of the Deity, and this accompanied by fasting, incense-burning, and prayers. His fame and sanctity by degrees spread far and wide, and Mahomet Achmet became wealthy, collected disciples, and married several wives, all of whom he was careful to select from among the daughters of the most influential Baggara sheikhs (*Baggara*—tribes owning cattle and horses) and other notables. To keep within the legalized number (four), he was in the habit of divorcing the surplus and taking them on again according to his fancy. About the end of May, 1881, he began to write to his brother fakis (religious chiefs), and to teach that he was the Mahdi foretold by Mahomet, and that he had a divine mission to reform Islam, to establish a universal equality, a universal law, a universal religion, and a community of goods (“beyt-ul-mal”); also that all who did not believe in him should be destroyed, be they Christian, Mohammedan, or Pagan. Among others, he wrote to Mahomet Saleh, a very learned and influential faki of Dongola, directing him to collect his dervishes (followers) and friends and to join him at Abba. This sheikh, instead of complying with his request, informed the government, declaring the man must be mad. In person the Mahdi is tall, slim, with a black beard and light brown complexion. Like most Dongolawis, he reads and writes with difficulty. He is local head of the Gheelan or Kadrigé order of dervishes, a school originated by Abdul Kader-el-Ghulami, whose tomb is, I believe, at Bagdad. Judging from his conduct of affairs and policy, I should say he had considerable natural ability. The manner in which he has managed to merge the usually discordant tribes together denotes great tact.

¹ The Fokarah (Fakirs) are taught by their instructors how to write amulets or charms, which are doubtless a profitable source of income, and establish an influence over the superstitious Nubians. These amulets may be love charms, or protections against spears or bullets.

He had probably been preparing the movement for some time back.

An Austrian missionary, Father Dichtl, who was at Khartûm, gave an account of the Mahdi containing some further particulars; he says:—

“Mohamed Ahmed, who was born at Dongolah, is about forty years of age, tall, and of coppery red complexion. For a long time he worked with his two brothers in the neighbourhood of Khartûm at building boats for the Nile, but got tired of his trade and aspired to become a fakir, which is about the same thing as a priest. He applied to the sheikh of the island of Tuti, situated close to Khartûm, a little to the north of the junction of the White and Blue Niles. After a few years' study with the sheikh, he succeeded in taking the order of fakir. He then sought to become a sheikh, and was again successful. Thenceforth he had but one object in view, namely—to assume the character of a prophet. He retired to the island of Abba, near Kana on the White River, about twenty-one hours by steamer from Khartûm, and, taking up his abode in a dry cistern, he led the life of a sheikh in the strictest sense of the word. He remained there for six years, only leaving his retreat on Fridays to go to the mosque. His reputation for piety spread in course of time throughout the country, and when, subsequently, he came to be regarded as a saint, he expounded his mission to a numerous assembly of Moslems at Kana. He told them that the archangel Gabriel had twice commanded him to unsheath the sword of faith, in order to reform the bad Moslem and to found a Mussulman empire, which would be followed by universal peace. He held his mission from the Prophet, and would achieve what Mohammed had been unable to do. He therefore urged them to follow him; he was the Mahdi, and would lead them to the kingdom founded by Allah for true believers. Abd-el-Kader, the ex-governor-general of the Soudan, a man of high probity and ability, endeavoured by theological argument to convince the people that Mohamed Ahmed was an impostor, but to little purpose. Not only the lower classes but also the government officials and many officers secretly believed in the Mahdi's mission.

Raouf Pasha, at the time he was governor-general, sent an emissary to the false prophet."

Father Dichtl happened to be present when that emissary on his return rendered the following account of his interview with the Mahdi: "On arriving at Abba I found Mohamed Ahmed surrounded by 500 or 600 followers, all of them naked, with iron chain belts round their waists and broad drawn swords. The Mahdi occupied a raised seat in their midst, and in his right hand he held the Prophet's staff. When I asked him what his object was he described his pretended mission. I answered that the government and myself were as good Mussulmans as he. But this he denied, on the grounds that we allowed the Christians to have churches of their own, that we afforded them protection, and that the government levied taxes. I advised him to abandon his plans and to surrender, adding that he could not resist a government which disposed of soldiers, Remington rifles, guns, and steamers. To this he rejoined, 'If the soldiers fire upon me and my followers their bullets will not hurt us, and if you advance against us with steamers they will sink with everything on board.'"

It seems pretty evident that, at all events, a large number of the Arabs who joined the rebellion followed their chiefs, who desired to take advantage of any attempt that would serve to break the power of the Egyptian government in the Soudan.

According to M. Rassam of Abyssinian fame—and no mean authority—the Mahdi expected by the Moslems must be, "firstly, according to the Sunnite belief, a genuine Arab of the Koraish tribe, and of the family of Mohammed, and not of the so-called 'Arabs' of the Soudan, or half-caste Africans; secondly, his advent must be preceded by signs and wonders, such as the sun rising in the west, the coming of Antichrist, the descent of Christ from heaven, the appearance of Gog and Magog, the returning of the Arabs to idol worship; and last, but not least, the demolition of the temple of Mecca by the Ethiopians—that is to say, the Abyssinians."

The Sheeis, the other great sect of the Moslems, believe the

Mahdi to be living and concealed in some secret place till the time of his manifestation, and both sects expect him to do wonders and act as a superhuman being. "There has," he adds, "been no lack, from time to time, of false prophets among the Mahomedans, whether Arabs, Persians, or Turks; but their fanaticism only lasted as long as they could find lawless and discontented people to follow them."

The emissary who visited the Mahdi on behalf of Raouf Pasha was the notorious Abu Saoud, whose former doings have been noted on a previous page, and when the governor-general afterwards sent out a small expedition of 300 men, who embarked on a steamer with one cannon to invade the Mahdi's village, Abu Saoud was one of the three commanders of the force who quarrelled together on the journey and so mismanaged that another of their number, Ali Effendi, shot the wrong man in mistake for the Mahdi and was cut down by the Arabs along with 130 of his soldiers, the rest of the expedition running away, and the gunner on board the steamer being so overcome at sight of the Mahdi on horseback close to the bank that he lost all courage, and after some delay in finding his ammunition only succeeded in firing his cannon into the air. Thus the expedition ended in increasing the reputation of the Mahdi, who left his island village and settled at Gebel Gedir, where he was allowed to remain for some months undisturbed, to extend his influence, and make plans, not only for defeating the Egyptian government in the Soudan with the aid of the slave-dealers, but for advancing on Egypt itself. For there were already symptoms of an extension of the revolt among the tribes in the Eastern Soudan and Suakim with the garrisons at Sinkat and Tokar, the former 35 miles or two and a half days' journey from Suakim on the route to Berber, the latter south of Suakim and not far from Trinkatat on the Red Sea coast.

It will be seen that the insurrection threatened the main points of Egyptian occupation both in the Eastern and the Western Soudan. Khartûm was threatened by the danger which approached Obeid or El Obeiyad, the capital of Kordofan. Obeid, which stands in a vast plain, is composed of six different villages, repre-

sented by a straggling series of groups of mud-huts, each group forming a separate quarter and inhabited by a distinct class of people. These dwellings are mere huts of straw and mud, a few only being constructed of clay; and the Government House, one of the mosques, three barracks, and a hospital built of some dried bricks. But Obeid is a great trading centre for gum, ostrich-feathers, &c.; 100,000 cwts. of gum being sent annually from the market there, which is a lively place enough during the day. A Roman Catholic mission, a branch of that at Khartûm, has been established at Obeid. Though the wells are deep, some of them more than a hundred feet, water is sometimes very scarce, and for this reason it is expected that the government will be removed to Bara, an exceedingly pleasant place, with water supplied from wells twenty or thirty feet deep, luxuriant gardens, and plenty of vegetables and fruit of all kinds.

Khartûm, which, as we have before noted, lies at the confluence of the Blue and the White Niles at a height of 1450 feet above the sea, is chiefly upon the left bank of the Blue Nile and separated from it only by gardens, but it is also near enough to the White River for the inundations frequently to reach the earthen wall that surrounds the town. As approached from the White Nile it is a rather dreary mass of dirty gray houses, with a single minaret overlooking them, and in front a bare sandy plain without trees or shrubs. The one long narrow street by which to enter Khartûm runs from west to east, and the market is at the end of it. It is a filthy thoroughfare of windowless mud-houses—or, at all events, there are no windows, or any apertures but the doors, visible from the street itself. The other parts of the town are not streets at all, but mere congeries of huts and houses of all sizes and shapes, which seem to be stuck up at random, with labyrinthine approaches, but at irregular intervals one comes upon open spaces large enough for good-sized gardens or even for cornfields. The place is, of course, unhealthy. It contains hollow spaces where water collects and is allowed to stand. The larger number of the houses are wretched hovels of sun-dried clay, cemented with cow-dung and slime. Only in the main street are to be seen superior buildings,

the governor's house and offices, and several spacious dwellings belonging to Turks, Copts, and Arabs. There is a brick-built mosque in the market-place, and also a bazaar, coffee-houses, and shops for the sale of brandy and other commodities. The other buildings are a Coptic church, a Roman Catholic chapel and school, an infirmary, barracks, and a jail. The pleasantest features of Khartûm are the gardens on the bank of the Blue Nile, where fruit and vegetables grow in considerable variety, and the date-palms present a stately and handsome appearance, though they here are at their southern limit and consequently the fruit does not fully ripen. There is plenty of land capable of cultivation, but it is left barren from the old cause—over-taxation—the water-wheels are taxed, produce is taxed, and consequently the Arabs cultivate only enough for their immediate needs.

Suakim is better known to travellers, for it is within ordinary observation, is the principal port on the Red Sea for merchandise from the Nile provinces, and is the starting-point for the main caravan routes into the interior, namely to Berber across the desert on camels by two or three different routes, to Kassala across the desert and along the telegraph line, and to Tokar by the coast, thence up the Baraka river to Zoga, near which is a junction with the Keren and Kassala road.

Suakim consists of a town built on an island, and a suburb on the mainland which has grown to be larger and more important than the town. It contains a number of mosques and public buildings, of which the principal are the governor's house, the custom-house, and the bazaar. The inner harbour is formed by a channel 500 yards wide penetrating between the mainland and the two islands on one of which the town is built. It is sheltered from all winds, but is too shallow for vessels of the largest size; but the lagoon or bay in which the islands are situated is joined to the sea by a neck of water three-quarters of a mile long and just wide enough to admit of two ships passing, while in the bay outside the islands it is said, in a report by Captain Gascoigne in 1882, that the water is deep enough for ocean-going steamers. The entrance to the harbour is difficult, and as there are, or were, no lights it can

only be approached by daylight because of the coral reefs lying off the coast for twenty miles both north and south, these reefs being unmarked by buoys and lying only a few feet beneath the surface. The harbour once reached, however, is very secure, but there is not anchorage for more than four or five steamers at a time.

The town, which is built of coral, is rather picturesque-looking, though of a glaring white, and it boasts of one or two minarets. It is built on an island which is united to the mainland by a causeway which Col. Gordon had made when he was Governor-general of the Soudan. Its population is about eight thousand. In 1881 the Egyptian government separated the Red Sea ports Suakim and Massowah, together with the country between them and Kassala, Sanheit, the town of Kassala itself, Gedariff, the Hamran country, Galabat, and neighbouring provinces, from the rest of the Soudan. Ali-ed-Deen Pasha, who had been for a long time Governor of different parts of this territory, was made supreme governor, superseding Ali Reza Pasha, formerly governor of the Red Sea ports, who was deposed. A number of the shops in Suakim are kept by Greeks, who seem to make a living almost everywhere in Egypt as small traders, merchants, and money-lenders, but the town can scarcely be called a flourishing place. The surroundings are dreary. The largest building in Suakim is a storehouse and caravanserai, built on the mainland, erected for merchants to deposit their goods in while waiting for transport. It cost 80,000 dollars, and was, of course, built by slave labour. The builder and proprietor was formerly a government employé at 150 piastres (about thirty-one shillings) a month wages. No vegetables are grown, and the country is desert, the nearest village being Tokar, which is two days' journey, and there the cultivation is principally confined to a little dhurra (millet) which springs up after the rains.

The great caravan route from Suakim is that which, crossing the desert, strikes the Nile at Berber, a distance of 240 miles. Its trade, however, is not increasing, owing to the present low price of gum, its chief export to Europe, and to the restrictions on the slave-trade. Formerly slaves could be purchased with cotton cloth imported from Manchester, and were made to carry



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF SUAKIM.

BLACKIE & SON: LONDON, GLASGOW, AND EDINBURGH

ivory, ostrich-feathers, &c., to the coast; now this "branch of industry" is done away with, although more merchandise finds its way to Europe by Suakim than by the other great outlet, that *viâ* Berber and Korosko on the Nile.

The desert journey from Korosko to Abou Hamed is a most severe one; the distance is 250 miles of the worst desert imaginable, with nothing for the camels to eat, and only one well the whole way. The heat, too, during the greater part of the year is terrific, and the consequent mortality among the camels that make the transit very great. It is across this desert that the route of the regular slave caravans lies.

Besides the Berber and Korosko route, and that from Berber to Suakim, there is a third road much used by Soudanese travellers. This road follows the banks of the Nile to Wady Halfah; it is chiefly made use of by caravans coming from Darfûr and Kordofan, provinces to the west of the White Nile that produce great quantities of gum. The Nile is struck at a small village called Debbe, about latitude eighteen degrees north, whence goods are conveyed by boats as far as Dongola, where the cataracts render further navigation impossible; and then camels carry them to Wady Halfah at the second cataract. The journey is then resumed in boats to the first cataract, where a railway five miles in length carries the goods below the cataract to other boats waiting for Cairo or Alexandria.

Of course the camel service is the principal as it is the cheapest means of transport in the Soudan. The camel-drivers, who mostly belong to the Hadendowa tribe, live on the mainland. Most of them wear long hair standing up straight on the crown of the head, and of a fine but woolly texture, while that at the back of the head generally reaches to the shoulders, and is sometimes worn in plaits: when properly dressed the whole is covered with fat, and a wooden skewer, by way of comb, stuck into it. There are distinctive ways of dressing the hair in various tribes, but the distinctions are not very wide, and the general mode, and especially the free use of unguents, has already been referred to in a previous page. These Hadendowa Arabs were among the fiercest and

most hardy of the rebel hordes when the insurrection reached the Eastern Soudan.

When the author of *The Wild Tribes of the Soudan* was at Suakim in 1881 he saw huddled together in the courtyard of the "palace" or divan some forty Bedouins from the neighbourhood of Jeddah, mostly men, with a few women and children. They were government prisoners with chains on their legs, and were kept there in almost hopeless captivity. These people were some of a number of Bedouins who had crossed to Suakim for the purpose of settling in the adjoining country as camel-breeders, having obtained permission from the government. Of course they had no sooner occupied the place allotted to them than serious quarrels arose between them and the Arabs of the district, and Colonel Gordon, who was then Governor-general of the Soudan, found it expedient to give them 9000 dollars compensation and send them back to their own country. On Colonel Gordon's retirement it was only to be expected that a number of these people would break their implied agreement and go back again to the neighbourhood of Suakim to recommence camel-breeding—perhaps with the hope that they would again be compensated in case they were interfered with by the local occupants; but they no longer had the just and humane governor to deal with. Ali Reza Pasha was then governor of Suakim and the district, and he took this promising opportunity of putting the screw on to the Bedouins, who, having no more than 2000 dollars to pay, were put in irons and kept prisoners at their own expense, that is to say, no shelter was provided for them, and they had to find their own food or to subsist on the charity of people who saw and pitied their forlorn condition. Many of them died. Some of them, guarded by soldiers, were allowed to live with their diminishing herd of camels, which could only find food a few miles out of Suakim. The wretched Arabs were distressed enough, but it remained for the government agent, Achmed Effendi, to complete what the pasha had seemingly effected. The wretched prisoners had been shorn of their dollars, but there was still a possibility of obtaining more by adroit promises, and the agent gave them to understand that

a present of forty dollars to himself would help them to liberty. How the money was obtained it is difficult to say, but it eventually was forthcoming, and the condition of the prisoners was unaltered, or rather became worse, for they were suffering from disease as well as severe privations, when Ali-ed-Deen Pasha began to govern in place of Ali Reza, and had scarcely been an hour in Suakim before he set them free, at the same time giving permission to any of them who chose to settle in the country on the north of the town.

Having thus briefly glanced at the principal places to which the first operations of the conflict in the Soudan were directed, we may return to the narrative. Some descriptions of the various parts of the country have already occupied our attention in earlier pages, and these with a reference to the maps will enable us to understand the relative positions of the places which were most prominently identified with the series of hostilities which ensued.

It must be remembered that we are now considering the events which took place before British intervention in Egypt—the events following the demonstrations made by the false prophet in August, 1881, and we need only review them rapidly.

The Mudir of Kordofan, who was ordered to arm several companies of regular troops and march with them to the White Nile, to crush the revolt, did nothing. The Mahdi having left his own village and retired to the Tekelé Mountains with hundreds of followers, made his headquarters at Gebel Gedir (north-west of Fadosha), and the mudir, instead of following him, waited at Kawa for a month or so till the Nile had risen, and then returned to Kordofan.

The more active and resolute Mudir of Fashoda, Rashid Bey, a Kurd, however, assembled 400 regular troops, and with these and 1000 Shillûk negroes commanded by their own melik marched to Gebel Gedir to fight the Mahdi on his own authority. He was accompanied by Karl Berghoff, the slave inspector, who was stationed at Fashoda. The want of organization and military knowledge was fatal to this expedition. After fourteen days' march Rashid Bey arrived at Gebel Gedir on the 8th of Decem-

ber, 1881, and attacked the insurgents at once. There was a brief hot battle, in which nearly all the troops as well as the Shillûks were speared by the Baggara. Rashid, Berghoff, the Shillûk melik, and all the officers, were killed, and Remington guns, ammunition, and provisions fell into the hands of the enemy.

The catastrophe itself was less serious than the impression which it caused. After every such victory vast numbers of natives flocked to the standard of the Mahdi, who had, it was believed, proved himself to be invincible. There was a rising in Darfûr which occupied Slatin Bey the governor; and tribes in Sennâr, on the Blue and the White Niles, the Kabobish in the north of Kordofan, and the Bishari at Berber, were all in a ferment, and ready to join in a general rebellion. Raouf Pasha was at his wits' end, but before he had time to make either plans or excuses he was recalled, and Abd-el-Kader was appointed to the uncovetable post of Governor-general of the Soudan, with strict orders that he was to reside in Khartûm. Until he could reach Khartûm he chose as his deputy the Bavarian Giegler Pasha, who had, in fact, been vice-governor since General Gordon's departure, and who, having received a frank report of the state of affairs, began to organize another and stronger expedition.

In April, 1882, therefore, a body of 3000 men was ordered to concentrate operations against the Madhi at Kaka. The irregulars of this force were recruited from the Choterieh and Dongolawies and the warlike Shaiqies, who had remained loyal to the government, their commander was Mahomet Bey Suliman, and the commander of the whole force was our old acquaintance Yussuf Pasha, the Dongolawie slave-dealer, who had been lieutenant to Gessi when he suppressed the rebellion of Zebehr's son and caused the leaders of it to be shot. This army was well provisioned and accoutred. The troops left Kordofan for Gebel Gedir in the middle of March, and Yussuf started up the river with steamers conveying the forces from Khartûm. Over 1000 baggage camels from Kordofan were provided to accompany the force, and Giegler had impressed all his officers with the necessity for caution, for by this time the Mahdi, either from instruction or experience,

had acquired some military knowledge, and his followers, as the Egyptians had found to their cost, were not to be underrated. The more fanatic of them were quite reckless of their lives, and fought with a determined courage and desperate ferocity which few even of the regular troops could withstand, even though their weapons were only swords and spears, for the firearms which they acquired were of little use to them because of the want of ammunition. In fact, the dervishes and fakirs regarded the use of firearms as heretical. Scarcely had Yussuf Pasha left Khartûm, however, than 500 of his Dongolawies deserted to the Mahdi with arms, ammunition, and the wages which, contrary to Egyptian practice, had been paid to them beforehand.

No sooner had these troops concentrated at Kaka, and thus reduced the garrisons in other parts of the country, than Giegler received a despatch from the Mudir of Sennâr that that town was threatened by above 1000 of the Baggara commanded by Sheikh Amr-el-Makashef, a relative of the Mahdi, and brother of Achmed-el-Makashef, one of the false prophet's most influential supporters, who was with him at Gebel Gedir. The news caused a panic at Khartûm, for the spread of the insurrection to the most prosperous district of the Soudan provinces—the place that was the storehouse, the granary of Khartûm itself—had not been anticipated. The Mudir of Sennâr, however, thought he was strong enough to drive off the assailants, but he was mistaken. His troops made a sally, but were driven back by the Baggara, who followed them into the town and began to massacre not only the soldiers and the officers, but foreign merchants and natives, and to plunder and destroy the houses. But at the government buildings and the barracks they were brought to a stand, for the troops had occupied the roofs, from which they kept up a heavy fire upon them. The Arabs destroyed the telegraph offices and cut the wire, so that no more messages could be sent to Khartûm except by letter, and the reports were gloomy enough, while there were rumours that the Arabs were approaching Mesalamia.

Giegler Pasha took active measures to raise a force to go to the relief of Sennâr. Six companies of regular troops were sent

from Galabat to Abu Kharaz. In Khartûm a corps of Bashi-Bazouks was formed under the Sanjak Yussuf-el-Melek, and a company of irregulars from Kawa with 270 Shaiqies under Sanjak Salah Aga went direct to Sennâr. On the 15th of April Giegler himself went thither with 200 soldiers of the Khartûm garrison, who were conveyed in two steamers.

But Karkodj, sixty miles above Sennâr, had capitulated, and the inhabitants were allowed to leave only on payment of heavy fines to the Mahdi, who, wherever he went, had the sharpest possible eyes for finding where the money was kept. Many of the Greek and Jewish merchants disguised themselves as dervishes in order to avoid being killed by the savage fanatics, and walked through the town in procession, crying "La Illah illa Allah, wa Mohamed Achmed Mahdi Allah"—There is no God but God alone, and Mohamed Achmed is his Mahdi. The whole country of Kordofan was in terror and disorder. Robbers infested the roads, the telegraph line between Khartûm and El Obeid was broken; the wire to Fodjah being destroyed no messages could pass thence to Darfûr, and by that time (June, 1882) all intercourse with Darfûr had ceased, the post having several times been robbed before that date. In Obeid the panic was so prolonged that no business was done, the houses were barricaded, and the shops were closed.

A village, a little distance north of Abu Kharaz, was occupied by the chief who had threatened Mesalamia, a shereef named Mohammed Taha, who declared that he was the vizier of the Mahdi, who had presented him with a sword as a token of authority. When Giegler arrived at this village, which was near the river, he sent to the shereef to appear before him and answer for his rebellion. But the answer was, "If the pasha is a Christian he is an unbeliever, and therefore an enemy; if he is a Turk he is a heretic, and certainly an enemy." The soldiers who had been sent with the messenger were killed. Giegler then sent the Sanjak Yussuf with a hundred soldiers and fifty Shaiqies to bring the shereef by force to the steamers, but they were attacked with such ferocity that the square in which they had formed was broken, the soldiers were slain in a desperate hand-to-hand fight, in which

the women and girls of the village were said to have joined, biting and tearing like panthers, and Yussuf Aga was stoned to death. Giegler was obliged to go on to Abu Kharaz to wait for the troops expected there, but it was necessary that the shereef should be vanquished before Sennâr could be relieved. Again an attack was made upon the village, but his followers once more defeated several hundred of the mounted Shaiqies and killed their officers. The result of defeats like these was that the irregular troops began to fancy that the Mahdi was invincible, as he pretended to be, and they became demoralized and threw down their arms, while numbers of the Arabs went over to the enemy. The arrival of the regulars from Galabat under the command of the Mudir of Sennâr considerably strengthened Giegler's position, but, according to an account afterwards published, the Shukuri prince, Sheikh Auad-el-Kerim, with 2500 warriors of his tribe, arrived upon the scene, and offered his aid with many expressions of loyalty. He, his six sons, and the chiefs of his tribe wore some such armour as that discovered by Colonel Gordon—coats of mail, armllets, greaves, and steel helmets, and were all mounted on thorough-bred horses, the fleet and enduring steeds of the Arabian desert. They presented a spectacle which might have reminded one of an illustration to Sir Walter Scott's *Talisman*, especially when the prince approached and kissed the pasha, assuring him of their loyalty. The prince and Giegler Pasha were not strangers, for the former had received some benefits from the vice-governor, and had been treated with great consideration at the time that Gordon held the governorship.

At sunrise the next day the whole of the forces were drawn up, and the white-haired prince and the pasha addressed the men. The Shukuries were ready enough for fighting; the Shaiqies for revenge and plunder. The village of the shereef, who claimed to be the Mahdi's vizier, lay not far from a wood which separated it from the river, on the opposite bank of which was a seriba occupied by Sanjak Osman Aga with the recruits from the neighbourhood of Mesalamia for the purpose of watching the adjacent ford of the river. The regulars from Galabat took up a

position before the village with their front to the river, and behind them came Auad-el-Kerim with his Saracenic cavalry and his Shukuri, who stimulated the courage of the Egyptians by threatening them that if they turned their backs to the foe they would be speared.

The shereef presently appeared advancing towards the assailants on horseback amidst a vast crowd, consisting of hundreds of dervishes, whose screams, howls, prayers, and frantic gestures were doubtless intended to strike terror into the Egyptians; but the soldiers fired and a ring of dead fell around the shereef. Three times the bullets flew, and each time the gaps made in the ring where the corpses lay piled on each other, were filled by the dervishes, while the shereef remained untouched in the centre of the ring. This was too much for the Egyptians, who cried, "He has a bullet charm—none can kill him!" and would have turned and fled but for the Shukuri spears behind them. As the fanatic fury of the shereef's followers increased, the crowd surrounding him grew greater. Old and young, men, women, and children, pressing forward were shot down till he was surrounded by a wall of dead. He turned his horse to endeavour to get free from the bodies of the slain, and it stumbled and was falling, causing him to stoop forward, when a bullet entered the top of his head. A dreadful panic ensued, and well it might, for the fierce Shaiqies, wild for slaughter and vengeance, rushed upon the wretched fugitives and the carnage soon became horrible. Even those who sought refuge in the tomb of a saint were shot down through the doors and small windows; the straw huts, where the dead and wounded lay together, were fired, and those who fled to the river were shot down by Osman Aga's men. Giegler did all he could to prevent the slaying of women and children, but the fierce tribesmen were beyond control, and he could only contrive to save the wife and son of the shereef by himself conveying them to the steamer. The body of the shereef, the Mahdi's "vizier," was brought to the pasha on a camel, a company of mailed horsemen curvetting and galloping round it uttering wild cries and excited to a kind of frenzy. The head, already half severed from the body, was taken

through the villages of the Blue Nile and set up in the market-place at Khartûm.

Giegler Pasha then went on with a portion of his force to relieve Sennâr, but Salah Aga had already done that work. The governor, the officials, and merchants, with their wives and families, were in the buildings of the mudirieh and in the barracks, from the roof of which the soldiers by continued firing were keeping the rebels from approaching near enough to enter. For a week they continued in this state of siege, and the news that Sennâr was taken had brought several thousands more of the rebels, who encamped in or around the town where the fakirs and dervishes were using every means to stimulate the fanatics to fury. Salah Aga with his small body of Shaiqies arrived quietly before the town, and the Arabs, who could not tell what had brought him there, as they supposed that the telegraph was destroyed, sent to ask him whether he was on their side. He contrived to deceive them as to his intentions, while he marched his men in close file straight through the crowds till he was close to the river bank, and being thus protected from attack in the rear gave a rapid order to his followers to form in square, and instantly opening the ammunition boxes, shouted to them to fire. The rebels were confounded, but they did not retreat. For several hours they endeavoured to break and destroy the square, but the fire of the Shaiqies was close and deadly and their assailants were mown down by hundreds; at last, when the devoted band were beginning to fear the failure of their ammunition, the Arabs fled and Sennâr was saved, to the great rejoicing of the beleaguered people, who welcomed Salah Aga with effusive gratitude, crowding round him to kiss his garments and shout his praises. Shortly afterwards the Shukuris and the troops from Galabat combined to drive the rebels out of the province of Sennâr, and this was effected after a victory over Achmed-el-Makashef, who had held the village of Teko with about 10,000 Arabs; but there were still unquiet elements in the province.

It was early in May, 1882, that Abd-el-Kader, the new governor-general, arrived in Khartûm. The country was in a state of revolution, and news of sudden attacks on various villages were

constantly arriving. Amr-el-Makashef, who had recovered from his wounds, had just been sent by the Mahdi to join his brother Achmed-el-Makashef, who was collecting the scattered rebels in the south of Sennâr, but on his way he was attacked and killed by Salah Aga, his followers retreating across the White Nile; they afterwards received such reinforcements as to become formidable, but the death of their leader was a gain to the government as he had had great influence over the Baggara.

There is no need to enter into descriptions of the succeeding skirmishes and battles which occupied the constant activity of the governor-general, who met with varying success or defeat. It began to be more and more obvious that the cause of the Mahdi was strengthened by every victory that he obtained, and when he was defeated he contrived to explain it by pretending that he had misinterpreted the divine directions. He was an adept at lying proclamations, and he and his emissaries managed to send false intelligence even to Khartûm for the purpose of misleading the government. The rebellion was constantly being extended by resentment against official tyranny, the mode of collecting taxes, and the brutality of the Bashi-Bazouks, while wild fanaticism and tribe hatreds were added to hatred of the government to increase the hordes, who swarmed hither and thither and held the country in constant alarm and almost hopeless disorder, their numbers enabling them to attack, harass, and overcome small bodies of troops moving from place to place and to fill up the wells between the different stations.

Near the end of May Yussuf Pasha, governor of Fashoda, was placed in command of a great disorganized force of several thousand men and swarms of camp-followers, and was ordered to march against the Mahdi, who was in the mountains at Gedir; but the rains had set in and the march was slow, so that it was only on the 7th of June that the army came front to front with the rebels in a densely wooded part of the country, where they commenced to make a stockade or seriba, but the Arabs came down upon them, and though they formed into a hollow square, the fierce rush of the rebels sufficed to break through, and the whole force

was destroyed: a disaster the news of which was received with consternation at Khartûm, and gave an immense impetus to the insurrection.

The Mahdi now declared that he intended to take possession of Kordofan, and sent a portion of his army to the White Nile to the ford of Abu Zeir, to threaten Sennâr.

At this time the massacre and riots in Alexandria had but just taken place, and therefore the whole country, both Egypt and the Soudan, was in a state of revolt, but at the end of the month attacks on Om Shanga in Darfûr, and on Bara, by the rebels, were repulsed with heavy loss, though another defeat had been inflicted on 1000 Egyptians near Shakka.

Several minor engagements on the lines of communication between Kordofan and Duaim resulted in the success of the Mahdi, who, at the beginning of August, was with the bulk of his forces at Gebel Gedir, while a second army was wasting Kordofan, and a third stretched along the White Nile from Duaim to Geziret Abba on the north-west, and from Kaka to Marabieh on the east bank. On the 19th of August the rebels were again defeated at Bara and the garrison at El Obeid had been revictualled, and on the 23d an attack made on Duaim was so completely repulsed that 4500 of the insurgents were killed, while Makashef, who was advancing on Khartûm with the first army sent by the Mahdi, was also defeated with heavy loss.

The Mahdi now took the field in person, and advanced on El Obeid, where he arrived with about 60,000 men—for thousands of Baggara, Hassanis, and other tribes of Kordofan had joined him on the way—and at daybreak he commenced to storm the well-fortified town, where 6000 men were concentrated, and the walls of which were defended by twelve cannons. The attack was so violent that in spite of the continuous fire of the besieged, and the enormous losses of the rebels, the latter almost succeeded in taking the town on the first day; they pressed forward in hand-to-hand fight with the receding soldiers. At the critical moment, however, Iskender Bey, the commander of the town, ordered grape-shot to be fired into the fighting crowd, which, unfortunately, resulted in

the death of 300 soldiers, but Obeid was saved. On two following days, the 11th and 14th September, it was again stormed by the Mahdi, but in vain; he lost 15,000 men, the remainder were demoralized, and many who had joined him in the preceding days forsook him.

But his persuasions and the pretended confession that he had misread the prophetic message and should have waited a short time before attacking, enabled him to reassure his credulous followers, while others who had committed themselves to his cause were not unwilling to keep the flame of insurrection burning, as any restoration of the power of the government would, they knew, be accompanied by strong and regular measures against the slave-hunters.

On the 24th of September, twelve days after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, a relief column sent from Duaim under Ali Bey Satfi was directed on Bara, but was defeated in a second engagement with the enemy, and lost 1130 men, the survivors making good their retreat to Bara.

On the 9th and 10th of October, after some skirmishes in which the Egyptian troops were defeated, the rebels attacked Bara with great determination, but were again driven off with considerable loss. It appeared that the Mahdi could do nothing against regularly fortified places, so he blockaded both Bara and El Obeid. Nothing of importance took place in November except the defeat of a sheikh who led an expedition against Duaim and was taken prisoner and hanged at Khartûm; but early in the month the fortification of Khartûm had commenced.

At the end of the year El Obeid had a garrison of 3000 men and Bara 2000, and both were reported to be well provisioned. Troops of Arabi's regiments were being sent for service in the Soudan, but fresh disturbances were taking place in Sennâr, Mesalamia, and Qetena. About the middle of December, Lieutenant-colonel Stewart arrived in Khartûm to report on the condition of the Soudan to the English government through our officials at Cairo. He remained at Khartûm till the early part of March, 1883, when he left for Massowa. By that time, however, the

aspect of affairs had somewhat changed, and though an English officer was in command at Khartûm, they had not changed for the better as regarded the ultimate condition of the country and the suppression of the rebellion.


On the 17th of January Obeid, which had again been hemmed in by the Madhi, was obliged by famine to surrender. It is said that dogs, donkeys, and everything that could be consumed had been eaten, the price of the last fowl was 500 dollars, and a bushel of corn cost 100 dollars; the soldiers had even eaten their leathern straps and belts; the scurvy had broken out, and at last their commander, Iskender Bey, surrendered, and with his followers joined the ranks of the false prophet, and afterwards became one of his most active supporters—even sending a letter in conjunction with another skeikh to the people of Khartûm, where the gunboats kept the insurgents at a distance, inciting them for politic and religious reasons to join the rebellion.

At the beginning of 1883 Abd-el-Kader went himself to the province of Sennâr with a force of about 2400 regulars, 600 Bashi-Bazouks, and some irregular cavalry, commanded by the sons of the prince of the Shukuri—those warriors, as well as other native contingents, having been granted remission of taxes and certain rewards for their services. On the 24th of February they came upon about 10,000 or 12,000 rebels near Dai, under the command of the Mekshefeh, who had written to Abd-el-Kader entreating him to join the forces of the Mahdi if he valued his life and his happiness thereafter. After a severe engagement, in which about 2000 of the rebels with several of their leaders were killed, this force was completely dispersed, many being cut down in attempting to ford the river. So close was the fighting that Abd-el-Kader had his watch-chain broken by a bullet. This for a time quieted the district; but Kordofan was under the power of the Mahdi, and in the spring great efforts were made for retaking it, and considerable bodies of troops were sent from Lower Egypt to Khartûm for the purpose of effectually suppressing the rebellion. No movement could be attempted until after the close of the wet season in September, and as it was desirable to test the quality and disposition

of the new Egyptian force, many of whom had been Arabi's soldiers, a camp was formed at Um-Durman, a place on the west side of the Nile opposite Khartûm.

The Egyptian government had determined to place the new forces under the command of an English officer, and the khedive decided to intrust it to General Hicks (Pasha). Before this officer had arrived at Khartûm, however, Abd-el-Kader, who was apparently doing his best, was recalled by an order from the Egyptian government brought to him by Hassein Pasha, who succeeded him in the command of the Sennâr army, while Allah-ed-din Pasha, the Mohofa of Massowa, was to be installed, and on the 26th of March *was* installed as governor-general in Khartûm.

Colonel William Hicks, who entered the Bombay army in 1849, had served in Bengal in 1857-59, and as staff-officer in the Punjab movable column he was in the Rohilcund campaign with Major-general Penny, and was in the principal actions; afterwards he had served in the campaign for the subjugation of Oude, and again with Lord Clyde's force, and played a distinguished part in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny. He had served as brigade major, 2d brigade, 1st division, during the Abyssinian campaign in 1867-68, and was present at the capture of Magdala. Honourable mention in despatches and medals marked his career. Colonel Hicks obtained his lieutenancy in November 1856, became captain in December 1861, major in August 1868, lieutenant-colonel in December 1875, and honorary colonel in July 1880. He was appointed to the Reserve in October 1880, and went to Egypt in 1882, where he became chief of the staff of the Egyptian commander. The khedive conferred on him the rank of pasha, and afterwards made him commander-in-chief of the army of the Soudan; but the British government was careful to inform both him, their officials at Cairo, and the Egyptian government that they held themselves irresponsible for the appointment, and neither recommended it nor objected to it. They repeated that they desired to refrain from any participation in the measures which the Egyptian government might take in the Soudan. There can be no doubt, however, that Hicks Pasha was an officer



HICKS PASHA.

(MAJOR GENERAL HICKS.)

COMMANDER OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY DEFEATED IN THE BATTLE OF EL KHARIDIYA.

of experience, courage, and undoubted ability, a man of firmness, and even, when occasion required it, of severity, and accustomed to deal with Orientals. The one great drawback was that he was not well acquainted with the nature of the country in which he had to control operations, and from all that can be inferred he had some of the usual difficulties in dealing with Egyptian officials, who were ready to differ from him or to place obstacles in his way, and yet would themselves take no decided action and would accept no responsibility.

On the 7th of February, 1883, General Hicks Pasha and his staff of officers left Cairo for Suakim. Those officers were: Colonel Farquhar, chief of the staff, and previously captain in the Grenadier Guards; Lieutenant-colonel the Hon. John Colborne, formerly of the 60th King's Royal Rifles, and with the 77th Regiment in the Crimea, for which he received the medal with clasp, and the Turkish medal; Lieutenant-colonel Henry Watts Russell Coetlogon, late major of the 70th Foot; Major Martin, previously captain of Baker's Horse in South Africa, and now to command the cavalry; Major Warner, Captain Massey, Captain W. Page Phillips, Surgeon-major Rosenberg, and Mr. Edwin Baldwin Evans, intelligence department, who had acted as interpreter during the state trials in Cairo, and was to fulfil a similar office in the present expedition. Mr. Evans had served with the Indian contingent, and was at Tel-el-Kebir. During a long residence in the Hedjaz he had acquired a thorough knowledge of Arabic, and he had the additional qualification of being a cheerful, indefatigable campaigner, and an excellent comrade. The commissions were, of course, from the Egyptian government, these officers, as well as General Hicks, having entered the service of the khedive. Captain Forrestier Walker, who had been lieutenant of the Buff or East Kent Regiment, was in command of the artillery, and he remained behind to follow with the guns.

The general and his officers started in a hurry, and not without some apprehensions on the part of their friends, the general leaving his wife, two daughters, and a son at Cairo; but he and his staff were all officers who had seen hard service,

and knew what toil and danger meant; and though the expedition which they had undertaken was arduous and full of peril, they were not a gloomy party as they went on by rail to Suez, and thence by steamer to Suakim, whence having sent on their company of Bashi-Bazouks, they started on the camel route through the desert to Berber with a caravan of 145 camels, each officer having his "hygeen" to ride and two baggage camels, while the rest of the animals were laden with stores and water.

After twelve miles' march across a very gently rising plain strewn with huge black boulders, they reached Bir Handuk, their first halting-place, where the wells are situated at the foot of a low rocky spur jutting out from the main range of mountains which bounds the horizon. The next day they ascended the mountain route amidst the fragrance of camphor, mint, and thyme from the plants that grow there, and crossed the Wady Otan amidst an amphitheatre of rugged mountains, the ground thickly strewn with black hornblende rocks. After leaving this they ascended more rapidly, and entered a narrow valley or defile, into which debouched numerous ravines, the dry beds of torrents bearing witness to the violence and volume of the periodical floods on these mountains, which extend nearly 200 miles into the interior, and rise at the highest point to 6000 feet; their vegetation on the seaward side of the watershed, where alone plants grow amidst the glowing waste of bleak stone, being weird, uncouth euphorbiæ, dragon-trees, and the caraïb with jagged prickly branches. Among the scrub at the water stations game was met with, turkey-bustards, sand-grouse, pigeons, and gazelles; but eagles, vultures, and kites were predominant, for the carcasses of the dead camels which perish on the route supply them, and the jackals and hyenas, with food. The detachment of troops that followed with Captain Walker and the Nordenfeldts had a kid carried off at the second water station out of Suakim, probably by a leopard. Leaving the mountains, the expedition crossed the great arid plains of sand and stone, where in the long intervals between the wells not a living thing was to be seen. Silence and oppressive desolation reigned supreme, and every step

westward seemed to be towards a desert still more forbidding. After crossing the second pass, no herbage of any kind was to be found. There was nothing but bare grim rocks, without even a tuft of moss or lichen;—greenstone, serpentine, and vast masses of porphyry, but with none of the glowing colour visible, as the surface is as black as ink.

Leaving Sinkat on the left, and little thinking of the events that were soon to be enacted there, they crossed the Wady Otan and encamped at the wells of Djibisil; another stopping place being Oched, a small oasis between the Wady Otan and Haratree; the latter place, which they reached on the fourth day, is approached through a labyrinth of ravines. It is the highest point between Suakim and Berber, and there are two wells there, El Bir Tamai and El Bir Tuahwah. The road from this point to Ariab is nothing but a mountain pass, alternating with basin-like valleys surrounded by bold jagged mountains, split with deep gorges and ravines and full of dark shadows. The camels toiled through a succession of basins and along stony paths. From clefts and crannies tufts of dried desert herbage seemed to struggle for life, and the thorny mimosa, through which the camels strove to drag their riders, held out its barbs to tear clothes and skin. Rocks of all shapes and sizes seemed to start out in the hot glaring atmosphere—like fortresses or giant idols, or huddled together in conical shapes appeared in the distant vapour like villages. From Haratree across a hollow plain or basin of alternate herbage and stone towards the well Salaluat, where they halted, the travellers proceeded above twenty miles to Bir Hayaba, where the next water is to be obtained (the first in the Wady Kokreb), at a group of three wells: Bir Hayaba; Bir el Matre, about six furlongs ahead; and Bir Abd-el-Hab, a mile and a half farther still. The first two, like many so-called wells in the Soudan, are mere holes in the sand, from which the water is scooped out as it is wanted, or rather in much less quantity than is wanted: but Bir-el-Hab is a real well, revetted with stone, and having a good supply of water. Thence across Wady Kokreb, two miles to Wady Yumga, and the third mountain range is reached. On the south is Roweh, a much-

frequented oasis, but this they did not visit, but pushed on to Ariab, the line of demarcation between the territory of the Hadendowa and the Bishareen Arabs. Ariab is the prettiest oasis between Suakim and Berber, with two deep wells sunk in the solid rock, and giving a good supply of water, and luxuriant acacia-trees giving shelter from the sun. The party had descended more than a thousand feet since leaving Wady Haratree, and the most serious part of their journey was before them, as they were seven days from Suakim. It was two days' march to O'Bak, seventy miles off, where a limited supply of brackish water is taken from small shafts sunk in the sand. Thence to Bir Mohabé is a two days' journey across another waterless track. After leaving Ariab they rested by day and marched by night in the grand silent impressive solitude of the desert, beneath the starlight of the southern sky. At O'Bak commences a plain of shifting sand which for about six miles is blown up into dunes of a hundred feet high, and mostly looking like a long line of intrenchments, over and amidst which they had to pass, seeing the waterless and treeless plain beyond—where the mirage mocks the traveller with enchanting scenery. Twenty-four miles beyond this region of quicksand they encamped in a gloomy waterless waste full of black boulders, that looked as though they were the débris of some vast volcanic conflagration. They passed a huge solitary block of granite called "Eremit," and further on saw Aboo Odfa, the rock shaped like an obelisk, its base worn with wind-driven sand till it more resembled a rotten pear. The road across the boulder-strewn plain consisted of tracks running side by side. The pack-camels were again sent on as before, with the 300 Bashi-Bazouks whom they had overtaken at Ariab, and 100 Egyptians were retained as an escort. Twenty-five miles off lay Bir Mohabé, the last halting-place before Berber, which with the broad waters of the Nile was but seven miles' ride, so that they abandoned their camels and mounted their horses with deep sighs of relief that this part of the journey was accomplished.¹

There is no need to describe the journey to Khartûm. Hicks

¹ Col. the Hon. J. Colborne, *With Hicks Pasha in the Soudan.*

Pasha and his officers began at once to drill the troops there, and especially in ball practice and the manner of firing. In three weeks Captain Forrestier Walker arrived with the Nordenfeldts and the men who had been left with him at Cairo to be drilled into handling them. They had failed to learn their lesson, however, and Captain Walker, who knew no Arabic, found it difficult to drill them, but General Hicks kept him at it for three days without intermission. He was soon afterwards invalided from sunstroke and was obliged to leave for England, but he returned to the Soudan at a later date, and was killed while gallantly fighting his guns at El-Teb.

The troops at Khartûm were of various races, and the Bashi-Bazouks, who accompanied the expedition from Cairo, were probably the most gorgeously attired, the most arrogant, and, except the Egyptian levies, the least courageous. White turbans, embroidered Albanian or Roumelian jackets, Anatolian rainbow-hued scarfs, belts of stamped leather full of cartridges, silver-mounted pistols, and conspicuous knives, silk caftans, richly embroidered gaiters worn above sandals, distinguished the sort of gentlemen who fought under the green standard, and with the motley crowd already at Khartûm they made a bright and picturesque variety; but these Bashi-Bazouks were such thieves and lawless ruffians and braggarts that they were soon marched over to the other bank of the Nile, and encamped there. The mailed warriors, relics of the Saracens, were then at Khartûm, and were afterwards mounted and engaged in the first battle which Hicks fought at Marabia. One of these, Sheikh Mohammed Sebekh, of a loyal tribe of Baggara, resembled an ancient crusader, was over six feet high, rode seventeen stone, and wore a hauberk of mail fastened round the body by the baltan, a two-handed double-edged sword hanging between the leg and the saddle. His horse's head was encased in steel, and its body covered with a quilt. He said the armour had been in his family three hundred and ten years.

Intelligence which reached General Hicks of the movements of the enemy determined him to attack them before the rainy season set in, and on the 31st of March Lieutenant-colonel Colborne,

Major Martin, and Captain Massey had orders to take 180 Egyptian troops in a steamer to Kawa, 150 miles up the White Nile, towing a flat boat with the horses on board. A merkeb or large open 25-ton boat with a latteen-sail carried Egyptian officers, and eight others were crammed with troops for the same destination.

The vanguard of Hicks' Sennâr army arrived at the place, which was the last point held by Egyptian troops on that side the Bahr Gazelle, and between it and them both banks of the Nile were in the hands of the fierce fanatic Baggara. Major Martin was taken ill, and was sent back. General Hicks took up the rest of the troops on the 6th of April. News had arrived from Duaim that 20,000 rebels had assembled there from Darfûr and Sennâr, and that the enemy had a battery of artillery and rifles.

The Egyptian army, leaving 1000 men to garrison a fort left at Kawa though the village was in ruins, marched under the command of Suleiman Pasha to attack the enemy, and on the 23d another force with four Nordenfeldt guns and accompanied by three staff officers advanced; the whole expedition was under Hicks' command, but he went on by river to secure the ford between Kordofan and Sennâr, and to land and intrench himself some miles above it. He took with him 200 Bashi-Bazouks and two guns. On the 25th he rejoined the camp, which had reached about eighteen miles south of the fort at Kawa, on hearing that the rebels were approaching. The enemy appeared more than once afterwards, but it was not till the 29th that they suddenly approached in full force, thousands of their spearmen emerging from a wood. The forces of General Hicks had formed a vast square, and at once opened a tremendous fusillade; but the chiefs of the Arabs led their men on regardless of the withering volleys. They sought to penetrate the square, but the guns added to the firing of the rifles prevented them from approaching, and with the fall of their chiefs the advancing hordes gave way and retreated. About 500 were killed, including their commander and several leaders, and large numbers were wounded. It was hoped that this victory would tend to a general pacification of the country; but no more could be

done except to clear the country of skirmishers till the later months of the year, and therefore Hicks Pasha continued his exertions to complete a force for the reconquest of Kordofan. By the end of August he had collected an army of 7000 infantry, 120 cuirassiers, 300 Bashi-Bazouk cavalry, and about 30 guns, rockets, and howitzers. He then prepared for an expedition in force, and though he was evidently harassed by having to apply to Cairo for the pay of his soldiers, which was much overdue, and by other circumstances, he determined to commence the campaign. Lieutenant-colonel Colborne had left for Cairo invalided by sunstroke, but other officers remained, and the work went on, but with great difficulty so far as obtaining proper equipments and the proper accessories for conveying a large force for a long distance in a desert country was concerned. The task of collecting provisions and the necessary number of camels seemed to be insuperable, but the personal exertions of Allah-ed-Deen, the governor-general, helped to overcome them, and after some delay because of the endeavour to secure the co-operation of Adam, the so-called King of Takale, a district south-east of El Obeid, who would only promise aid if the expedition passed his way, but agreed not to let the Mahdi go through his territory, the force of about 10,000 men, 500 horses, and 5500 camels was ready to start on the 9th of September. First went two Habirs on camels followed by the armour-clad cavalry, then the general staff, preceding one battalion, and behind them the artillery, flanked by eight battalions of infantry on each side, and followed by another battalion of infantry and one of cavalry. Then came the great body of transport camels and the Bashi-Bazouks, and a body of irregular cavalry brought up the rear. In this order they left the camp, and it was expected that they would be joined by about 1000 men at Duaim.

There are three routes to Obeid: the ordinary caravan route to Bara, one passing to the north of a village on the left of the White Nile opposite to Khartûm, and the southern route along the river to Duaim and then through the desert. The latter was the way chosen, and the commander took a route as near to the western side of the White branch of that river as the inundations would

allow. The spirits of the men were pronounced excellent, and their officers expressed themselves highly satisfied with their *morale*. No one doubted the result of the expedition, or that the days of the Mahdi's power were already numbered.

On the 20th of September the force reached Duaim, 110 miles south of Khartûm, and situated on the west bank of the Nile. The march had been hindered by the flooded state of the country, but the men had done their ten miles a day under an unusually fierce tropical sun. El Obeid is distant from Duaim by the direct way less than 150 miles, but other considerations led to the selection of a southern route, which increased the distance to fully 240 miles, involving at the same rate of progress a march of more than three weeks.

It was a tremendous undertaking, and that it should have been attempted was afterwards accounted for by the supposition that orders from the Egyptian government may have precipitated it. At all events there was much to contend with, and Hicks Pasha had constant hindrances and annoyances to bear. In July he had tendered his resignation, but had been induced to remain by the promise that Suleiman Pasha, the sub-commander, should be removed from office.

Whether the long route to Kordofan was taken because assistance was expected from the tribes under the so-called King Adam cannot be decided.

Major Evans, who was on the staff of Hicks Pasha, writing to a friend from Zerezza, twenty-seven miles from Duaim, on the 30th of September, said: "We left Khartûm on Sept. 9, proceeding along the west bank of the White Nile, and with the exception of four days' rest at Duaim, have been marching ever since. The heat is terrible. About thirty men have died of exhaustion, and camels are falling down by the score. Yesterday we were twelve hours in the saddle, and for sixteen days we have averaged eight hours daily. We have halted at this wretched village of twenty huts to give rest to the men and animals. The water is horrible. The enemy is reported to be in great force thirty miles from this, so we will meet in four days. The road behind us is closed, and

after this note nothing can be sent to Khartûm till we crush the principal rebel."

Major Baron Von Seckendorf, formerly of the German army, who for two years had been in the Egyptian service, and a relation of Count Von Seckendorf, master of the household to the crown finances, writing from the camp of Duaim on the 25th, said: "Thank goodness, on Sept. 9 we at last started from Khartûm, and after a twelve days' march arrived yesterday at Duaim, a fortified place on the Nile, which will form the basis of our operations in Kordofan. Our march hither has given us a foretaste of what we have to expect, although, as we have still plenty of water, our experience was but on a small scale. I can, at any rate, assure you that it is not a pleasure-trip we have before us. The false prophet will give us plenty to do. He disposes of 15,000 serviceable breech-loading rifles and fourteen guns. He further holds two well-fortified towns—Bara and Obeid. The latter is the chief city of Kordofan. Above all, the fellow has a numerous and well-mounted cavalry, and each of his followers is rendered a hero by fanaticism, a thing that cannot be said of our own troops. I have seen the Egyptians in three different battles. If you want to find a hero amongst them you will have to look a long time. There is a terrible scarcity of water, all the wells on the road having been destroyed; while on leaving here we no longer follow the Nile, and there is no other river. We cannot take water with us for more than twenty-four hours. That is already a large quantity, as we are 11,000 men and 6000 camels, besides horses, mules, &c. Our march to Duaim was a most trying one. Every day, from half-past five in the morning till twelve or one o'clock, we were on the move. It was pleasant till nine o'clock, and bearable till ten; but after that the heat was overpowering. Our road lay through the desert, where there is nothing to be seen but thorn-bushes and sand. One day only we crossed an oasis, with green trees and grass. It was a beautiful bit of landscape, with clusters of small mountains. You cannot think how refreshing this was, not only to the eye, but to the whole system. You may believe me when I tell you I shall be glad to have done with this kind of life."


Poor fellow—he was soon to have done with it for ever. The whole force disappeared in that devouring desert, and perished by treachery at the hands of the savage foe. Of all that band of English officers who had accompanied Hicks to Khartûm there remained only Lieutenant-colonel Colborne and Major Martin, who had both been invalided, and Lieutenant-colonel Coetlogon (Pasha), who had been left in command at Khartûm.

At the last halting-place whence a message could be sent, what seemed to be a fatal decision was come to by the advice of the governor-general. Hicks in that last despatch wrote on October 3rd:—

“On leaving Duaim, on the White Nile, to march by the Khor-el-Nil to Melbeis and Obeid, I decided that my line of communications should be secured by posts of 200 men each, left in strongly fortified positions at the following places:—Shat, 16 miles distant; Zeraiga, 16 miles distant; Sarakhna, 32 miles distant; Naurabi, 16 miles distant; Agaila, 24 miles distant; Johan, 32 miles distant; Abli, 28 miles distant; Beliab, 22 miles distant; Um Sheikh, 12 miles distant; Rahad, 14 miles distant; Khashil (? Kasghul), 14 miles distant; Melbeis, 25 miles distant. At all these places I was informed water would be found. Large quantities of biscuits were to arrive at Duaim, and as we were unable to leave a single camel at the base, 1000 were ordered to be purchased and forwarded to Duaim. His excellency Ali-ed-Din Pasha had already at Khartûm 300, and gave orders for the remaining 700 to be purchased and forwarded to Duaim without delay. The biscuits would then, with ammunition and other stores, be pushed on to the front from post to post.

Depôts would be formed at each post, and in case of a reverse a line of retreat secured, the troops falling back upon these depôts, where we should be certain of finding supplies of food, ammunition, and water.

We marched to Shat, and formed the first post and depôt there; but before reaching Zeraiga I was informed by the Governor-general of the Soudan that it was useless for me to expect any supplies to be pushed up from Duaim, that the soldiers left at the



HICKS PASHA AND HIS ARMY ON THE MARCH AGAINST THE MAHDI,
OCTOBER, 1883.

posts would not guard the convoys; in fact, that they would be afraid to do so; that to ensure supplies being forwarded an army would be required with each convoy. The Arabs, although now absent from our line of route, would return after we have passed, and that they would be numerous, and the garrisons of the posts would not consider themselves strong enough to forward the supplies; that it would be dangerous; and I would find that they would not run the risk.

The governor-general requested me to abandon the idea of having this line of posts; to give up my line of communications and line of retreat, and to advance with the army *en l'air* with fifty days' supply of food only, the Arabs closing in on our rear.

I am naturally very averse to this; but if, as his excellency assures me, it is a fact that the posts will not be supplied from the base at Duaim, and supplies will not be forwarded through them, I should, in garrisoning these posts, be only weakening my fighting force without gaining any advantage. I have therefore called a council, have had the matter explained, and requested the members to record their opinion."

The majority of the council decided against the commander-in-chief. The posts were abandoned, and with the enemy left to close round them in the rear, the army marched into the desert after leaving the Nile, the whole force forming a square, with the baggage, horses, camels, and mules in the centre. It was impossible to carry a large supply of water, the wells were far apart, and would probably be filled or dug up, and not more than ten miles a day could be accomplished. Thus the army went out of sight and hearing, and though terrible rumours, and later something which looked like trustworthy evidence of a terrible disaster reached Cairo from Khartûm and other places, it was hoped that the worst accounts were exaggerated. Still the news that the whole force had been misled by a pretended guide into a defile where it had been totally annihilated by the Mahdi's savage followers, gained ground.

In the autumn of 1883 the Arabs on the Red Sea coast, in

the vicinity of Suakim, assumed a threatening aspect, and in August they broke into rebellion, and cut off communication between Suakim and the interior. There can be no doubt that at this time, or soon afterwards, the desperate position of the force of Hicks Pasha was known among the coast tribes, although no rumours of it had reached Cairo by the valley of the Nile. The greater portion of the tribes of the sea-coast, from the Abyssinian frontier to Suakim, declared for the Mahdi, and the Egyptian garrisons in Sinkat, a level sandy valley, five miles by three in extent, and 2500 feet above the sea-level, and of Tokar, some twelve miles from the coast, were, like the rest of the Egyptian garrisons of the Soudan, virtually besieged and surrounded by the rebels under Osman Digma, a principal lieutenant of the Mahdi, and a great slave-owner.

The Egyptian officer commanding the garrison at Suakim, Mahmoud Pasha, determined to effect the relief of Tokar. Placing 500 men on board a ship, he went down to Trinkatat, forty-five miles south of Suakim, the anchorage for Tokar, and landed there. He was accompanied by Captain Moncrieff, the English consul at Suakim. The force had marched but a few miles when the Arabs were seen in great force. The Egyptian troops were formed in a square; but the Arabs rushed straight down upon them, and at once burst through their ranks. A wild panic seized them, and throwing away their arms they fled at once. Eleven officers and 142 men were killed in the rout, and Captain Moncrieff, being surrounded by the Arabs, fell fighting to the last. The field-gun which accompanied them was taken, and 300 muskets fell into the hands of the Arabs. Mahmoud Pasha returned with the remnants of his force to Suakim, and despatched an urgent request for reinforcements, saying that it was necessary that black troops should be sent, as the event of the fight showed that Egyptian troops would not face the Arabs, even when, as in this case, the assailants were greatly inferior in numbers.

The news did not reach Cairo until ten days after the engagement, which took place on the 6th of November; but as soon

as it was known the urgency of the position was recognized. A council of the ministers assembled at the Ismailia Palace. It was determined to send down 150 Bashi-Bazouk troops to Suakim, and to order up six companies of black troops from Massowa. Immediately after the defeat of the Egyptian force the Arabs assumed a very threatening attitude around Suakim, and so great was the alarm that most of the European traders there left at once. The panic was, however, stayed by the arrival in the port of the British gun-boat *Ranger*, Rear-admiral Sir William Hewett having been ordered to take a small naval force for the protection of Suakim.

On the very day after the sitting of the council, confirmation was received of the annihilation of the army of Hicks Pasha. Native rumours of the event had for some days been in circulation, but no credence was attached to them; but on the 21st a Copt, disguised as a dervish, brought the news into Khartûm, whence it was at once telegraphed to Cairo.

Perhaps the most detailed narrative, professing to give an account of the event, was procured by Lieutenant-colonel Colborne, from a slave boy who was in the service of Sir Redvers Buller, and gave some evidence that he had actually been in the engagement, where all the officers were killed, and Mr. O'Donovan, the war correspondent of the *Daily News*, and Mr. Frank Vize-telly, an artist, had also perished. Lieutenant-colonel Colborne had taken great trouble to obtain trustworthy intelligence, and he declared that he had reason to believe the story told by the lad, who certainly could not have invented it.

"I was slave of Mohamed Bey, an officer in General Hicks' army. The army marched from Omderman and Khartûm along the banks of the Blue Nile. We experienced no opposition whatever on the road to Duaim, though we occasionally took spies, and saw parties of the Baggaras watching us at a distance. At night we heard their tom-toms all around, and saw their watch-fires, but we were never attacked. We had an enormous number of camels with us and plenty of provisions. There were

the same regiments that marched under you from Kawa Fort. I was with them, too, when Hicks Pasha joined you with the Nordenfeldt which he brought from the steamer. I remember you and the other English officers when we were attacked in square near Abas Island, when we beat the Baggaras away from us. You, Hicks Pasha, and the other English officers were on horseback outside the square when the Arabs first showed. Then you came in. You were all scattered about, looking out for the Arabs. [This was in answer to questions put to test the accuracy of the boy's information. This was correct, as, having no cavalry, all Hicks Pasha's English officers had to patrol outside the square, in which formation Hicks' army always marched.] Besides the old army you were with, there were a great many more who had come from Cairo, and two black battalions which before had been left behind at Khartûm and Kawa. We also had 500 cavalry on our march to Duaim. It was a grand army. All were confident of success, and felt certain of reaching El Obeid and defeating Mahomed Achmet. We had plenty of music, too; the bands played in the evening. We stayed at Duaim for some time waiting for stores; then two English officers came up in a steamer from Berber with them. This had delayed us for a long time, and it was unfortunate, most unfortunate, for the rainy season had already finished, and wells and pools soon dry up as in Kordofan. . . . Captain Massey and Major Werner were the two officers who brought up the remaining stores from Berber. At length we marched out of Duaim as far as Shat. We halted one whole day here—our first march inland. The world was to be shut out from us—a last opportunity was given to officers to write to their friends, and from here my master said Hicks Pasha wrote for the last time till Obeid should be reached, or perhaps till we returned to the Nile. My master told the officers around him that it had been decided that no communication should be kept up with the Nile.

It was early dawn when we marched from Shat. We plunged into the desert, having turned our backs on the Nile that the greater part of our soldiers were to see no more. They had

commenced their last march—the march from which there was to be no returning. No more would they greet the rising sun. With backs turned to the east, every step they traced on the sand led to the sunset—the sunset of their lives. We now occasionally saw the enemy in the distance—in scattered groups in front, on our flanks, and we perceived, too, they were gathering in our rear; but when the cavalry were sent out against them they vanished like mists in the morning sun; but they were dogging our footsteps like wild beasts do their prey—slowly, but surely. We used to shell them and fire the Krupps at them.

From Shat we went to the wells of Ragshah. . . . We always kept two squares a day's march apart. When Hicks Pasha's square, consisting of 5000 men, left that place Ali-ed-deen Pasha's force, consisting of 6500, occupied the position. We now marched to El Juama; from this to El Agana.

The enemy always prowled round us at a distance. When the cavalry pursued them they retired. A "door" was always left in the square for the horsemen to gallop back into the square in case of the enemy attacking in force. From El Agana the next march was to Dara-el-Gemmel (House of the Camel), and then to Arahkieh. After a halt here for a day we marched to Helet el Mama (Lodge of the Mama); thence to Naghier, and from Naghier to Helet-el-Dobat. At every one of these places we found water. Every day the enemy increased in numbers, and we used to wonder they did not attack us. We had now got into a thick brushwood country, though all along there were mimosa bushes.

At length we reached Lake Rahad. This is a large swamp with pools of water; there is always water here. It is on elevated ground, and rocks and hills around. We had hoped the Takala tribes would join us here—that is the reason we had come this way—but they were afraid of the Arabs.

I don't think Lake Rahad is more than two and a half days' journey from El Obeid. Hicks Pasha built a fort here, and placed in it four Krupp guns and nineteen smaller ones. We got here plenty of beans and melons, and as much water as we wanted. We rested here three days. This was our last rest. The enemy

were gradually hemming us in even here, and Hicks Pasha determined to push on at once to El Obeid. The order was given to advance, and all tents were struck at daybreak. We had not marched an hour when the enemy for the first time commenced to fire at us, but from a long distance. No one was hit, or scarcely any one; but some camels were wounded. We halted for the night and intrenched ourselves with earthworks, putting a seriba outside again. The fires of the enemy at nightfall played all around. We remained here two days. We found some water, but had to search for it.

We left at sunrise, and marched to Shekan, where we again halted for two days. The reason we did this was because we were now encircled by our enemies, and the camels began to fall from the fire, and soldiers to be wounded and killed. We marched from Shekan till the sun was in the middle of the sky. We halted, as Arabs were all around firing from the bush. On the third day, on our way to Birkee [Birket, Turkish, pronounced *birkee*, means a pool], the cavalry went out of the square and encountered the enemy's horsemen, putting them to flight. Our cavalry then returned, bringing with them several captured horses. This was when the sun was young. Our square continued to move on. Shortly afterwards, the sun being yet young, we heard a sound, "w-o-o-o-h" [here the boy tried to give the idea of the galloping of horses], and then presently all around we saw Arabs innumerable—the whole world surrounded us (verbatim), and bayareh (flags) were waving, and spears gleaming in the sunshine above the bush. Our square was halted, and we opened fire, killing a great many, but we too lost many. There were too many bushes for the Krupps to do execution, but the machine-guns were at work day and night. Next morning when we marched I saw Arabs lying in six heaps, slain by these guns. Before we got to Shaheen we had nine Englishmen with us besides Hicks Pasha. At first the Egyptians lay down to hide, but General Hicks ordered his English officers to go round and make them stand up. Some of the English were killed when doing this, and Hicks took out his pocket-book and wrote down their names and the time of day

that they were killed, and the manner. At noon Hicks Pasha called an assembly of them to see who were alive. We waited for Ali-ed-deen, who now joined us. The next morning we all marched off together. We came to many large trees. An immense number of the enemy could be seen by field-glasses. The men declared they would rather march on their way fighting and reach the water than stand still in square. So Hicks, yielding to these remonstrances, continued to march on in square. It was not yet *dhuka* (noon), and we were not far from Elquis. We could see it. We should have been there by noon, and there there was abundance of water. [I believe this is the same as is written in our maps "Melbeis."] The rear face of our square was formed by the two black battalions, one raised in Sennâr and the other from the mudirieh of Sankeet. The guide led us out of the way to a place called Kieb-el-Khaber (I mean before this), instead of taking us straight to Elquis. It was near noon, just about this time—*zyessa*—a rush, terrible and sudden, sweeping down like the torrent from the mountain, was made. The Arabs burst upon our front face in overwhelming numbers. It was swept away like chaff before the wind. Seeing this, the other sides of the square turned inwards, and commenced a death-dealing fusillade both on the Arabs pressing into the square and on each other crossways. A terrible slaughter commenced. Hicks Pasha and the very few English officers left with him, seeing all hope of restoring order gone, spurred their horses, and sprang out of the confused mass of wounded, dead, and dying. These officers fired away their revolvers, clearing a space for themselves, till all their ammunition was expended. They killed many. They had got clear outside. They then took to their swords, and fought till they fell. Hicks Pasha now alone remained. He was a terror to the Arabs. They said he never struck a man with his sword without killing him. They named him Abou Deraa Dougal, the heavy armed (or thick or brawny). He kept them all at bay, but he was struck on the wrist with a sword, and he dropped his own. He then fell. I was covered with blood, and I got under a dead body and pretended to be dead while

the struggling and yelling, uproar, fighting, and slaughtering was going on, as it did for three hours. They felt me and found I was alive; they pricked me with a spear. I was made prisoner. Now what I tell you further is from hearsay. The rear face alone remained in good order when all else was confusion, composed as it was of black troops. These marched away, forming a square of their own, and the Arabs could not break it, so they went to plunder and slaughter the rest. The blacks marched on till sunset, and there was a lull for them. [He represented that they were afterwards overtaken and killed.]

Mahomet Achmet remained far distant at the time of the battle. He had said to the ameers and dervishes: "Forward! Attack the enemy. Meanwhile I will remain here, and pray to Allah for your success." He came after all was over, and was shown the body of Hicks Pasha. I heard that Mahomet Achmet put all the spoil into a great hole. He ordered it all to be given to him."

The news from Suakim had the effect of postponing the evacuation of Egypt by the British forces, and to secure the safety of Lower Egypt, it was determined to send down a portion of the gendarmerie force to Suakim, and orders were given for Colonel Sartorius, the chief of the force at Suez, to leave at once with 2500 men. He was to be accompanied by Majors Harrington and Giles; Baker Pasha was to go down and take the command a few days later.

The gendarmerie received with great disgust the order to proceed to Suakim, and the Turkish officers belonging to the force at once threw up their appointments. They had been enlisted for civil service in Egypt only, and had worked very hard in restoring order and in performing the heavy duties entailed by the outbreak of cholera, when they had to keep a cordon round infected districts. Now they were ordered to go beyond the limits for which they were enlisted and to perform purely military duties, while the regular army of Egypt under Sir Evelyn Wood were to remain quietly in Lower Egypt, taking upon themselves the civil duties of the gendarmerie.

The only reason that can be assigned for ordering the gendarmes to Suakim is that the Egyptian government thought it might be necessary to send their regular army up the valley of the Nile to check the northward advance of the Mahdi. Whatever the cause was, the result was most unfortunate. The men and officers, considering justly that they were being ill treated, went down without any heart in the business, and a spirit of insubordination frequently showed itself. Thus the efforts of the English officers to discipline them were thwarted, and the way was prepared for the catastrophe which followed.

For the time the influence of Baker Pasha allayed the spirit of mutiny, the Egyptian officers consented to go to Suakim, and a majority of the men followed their example; some, however, persisted in their determination to abide by the letter of their contract, and left the ranks, and in consequence of the terms of their agreement no measures could be taken against them.

On the 28th of November the first contingent of the gendarmerie started, 200 horse and 300 foot, the former under Major Giles, who had now received the brevet rank of colonel, the infantry under Colonel Holroyd. A good many of the infantry, however, did not turn up at the rendezvous at the station, and others deserted when the train stopped at the various stations on its way to Suez—a bad beginning for a force about to be employed on dangerous service.

On the 3d of December 600 more men left Cairo. In the meantime the Arabs were showing increased confidence outside Suakim and came down from the hills every night and opened fire on the town. On the 2d 600 black troops went out from Suakim to attack them, but the Arabs fell back on their approach.

These black troops were the flower of the Egyptian army, and confident in their fighting power they had become impatient at their inaction. It was therefore in accordance with their wishes that the governor authorized the movement against the enemy. With the blacks a half battalion of Bashi-Bazouks also went out. When they had marched some distance small bodies of the enemy were seen in the plain. The force drove them before them towards

the foot of the hills, when suddenly an immense number of Arabs sprang from the bushes and dashed against them.

The onset fell first upon the Bashi-Bazouks, who, after firing one or two wild volleys, broke and fled in the greatest disorder. The Arabs then rushed upon the black battalion; these for a time stood their ground well, but they were unable long to resist the impetuous charges of the rebels; the square was broken, and a hand-to-hand fight took place. The black soldiers fought to the last, and for the most part died as they stood.

The battalion was almost exterminated, only a few men making their escape back to Suakim. Many of the Bashi-Bazouks were killed in their flight, but the greater portion regained the town—the Arabs being too intent upon attacking their braver foes to pay much attention to these flying cowards. This was a most serious blow to the hopes that had been entertained that Baker Pasha would speedily be enabled to effect the relief of the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar. The black troops had been relied upon as the nucleus of his fighting force, and their destruction by the Arabs not only weakened him materially, but had a crushing moral effect upon the Egyptian troops.

After the manner in which these had on two occasions given way at once before the Arab onslaughts it seemed a well-nigh hopeless undertaking to lead them out against the victorious hordes of the enemy. Colonel Sartorius on his arrival at Suakim at once set to to fortify the town, which was situated in an easily defensible position—an island connected with the mainland only by a causeway, and the plain by which the enemy must approach to the attack was commanded by the guns of the *Woodlark*, *Coquette*, *Euryalus*, and *Ranger*, which ships had now arrived in the harbour.

Admiral Hewett was on board the *Euryalus*, and his presence and aid were of great utility in supporting Colonel Sartorius against the Egyptian officers of the fort, who were constantly throwing obstacles in the way of the English commander.

Baker Pasha left Cairo for Suakim on the 18th of December. The position of the garrison at Sinkat was now becoming critical.

They were commanded by Tewfik Bey, a most gallant and determined officer, and had hitherto repulsed all the efforts of the Arabs to take the place; but their provisions and ammunition were running short, and they were, moreover, hampered by the presence of a large number of women and children—upwards of a thousand.

Mahmoud Ali, a friendly chief, endeavoured to pass some provisions into Sinkat, but he failed in doing so. The Bishareen Arabs had now joined the enemy, and Osman Digma, the Mahdi's lieutenant, was now ascertained to have over twenty thousand men under his command; of these some twelve hundred were armed with Remington rifles, the rest were a mere horde carrying sword and spear, but their fanaticism and contempt of death rendered them very formidable opponents, especially to such timid and untrustworthy troops as those under Baker Pasha's command, who were so ignorant of drill that they had difficulty in performing the most simple manœuvres even on the parade-ground.

On the 16th a scare took place at Suakim, news being brought in by the natives that an attack would be made that night upon the town. The ships of war pitched shells during the night on to the plain beside the town, and this probably deterred the Arabs from their expected attacks. On the 18th Colonel Sartorius, who had now received the brevet rank of general, and Colonel Giles with a party of 200 Turks and Bashi-Bazouks, made a successful foray against the enemy, and captured and drove in 200 camels.

On the 23d of December Baker Pasha arrived at Suakim, and a review took place on Christmas-day of all the troops in the station. The force consisted of 1300 infantry of the gendarmerie, 400 Egyptian infantry of the line, 400 Turks and Bashi-Bazouks, 47 European police, 200 mounted gendarmes, 100 Turkish cavalry, 90 mounted Bashi-Bazouks, and 200 Egyptian artillery.

Colonel Giles, who commanded the cavalry, executed a reconnaissance thirteen miles into the interior to the spot where the black regiment was annihilated. While the parties were examining the bodies the enemy were seen approaching in force. They

came on with loud shouts, keeping up a scattered fire, and when nearing the cavalry they disappeared in the nullahs or deep ravines which intersected the country, thus threatening the line of retreat.

As Colonel Giles had been ordered not to risk his command in an action he retired and fell back to Suakim. He reported that the country at the foot of the hills was extremely unfavourable for the action of regular troops, being greatly broken and intersected with nullahs, which would afford an enemy abundant opportunities for approaching unseen close to an advancing force and then rushing upon them.

The whole country from the shores of the Red Sea was indeed unfavourable for the action of regulars. The sandy plain which extends to the foot of the mountains is covered with scrub, with here and there clumps of thorny mimosa bushes, rendering it extremely difficult for troops to advance in regular formation, while enabling any number of the active and scantily clothed Arabs to creep up close at hand without their presence being suspected.

On the 2d of January a messenger from Sinkat, who had made his way through the enemy's lines, arrived with a message from Tewfik saying that his provisions were now all but exhausted, and that he could not hold out beyond the 10th, on which day, unless relief arrived, he should march out and try to fight his way down to the coast.

On the same day one of the three principal Sheikhs of Islam arrived at Suakim, sent by the khedive to try and reconcile the rebels.

Messengers were sent up to Tewfik, urging him to hold out, if possible, till the end of the month. Some of them succeeded in getting through, and in bringing a reply from him, saying that he would endeavour to do so. Although, until negotiations with the Abyssinians were concluded, it was impossible to withdraw the garrisons from Massowa and its neighbourhood, General Baker succeeded in recruiting some 800 or 900 blacks in that neighbourhood.

The number of the rebels was now estimated at 27,000. In spite of the smallness and unreliable nature of his force, Baker

Pasha would have attempted the rescue of the garrison of Sinkat; but he was absolutely without transport, beyond a few hundred camels, and was therefore unable to move in that direction.

The announcement of the British government of the proposed evacuation of the Soudan applied to Khartûm, Darfûr, and Kordofan, but on the receipt of the news that the Soudan was to be abandoned, the Cadi of Suakim secretly assembled the leading Arab inhabitants, and informed them that the English were going to give the Soudan up to the Mahdi, and that he should therefore at once go over and make friends with Osman Digma, and strongly advised them to do the same.

The same night he passed through our lines and joined the enemy. This defection naturally produced a very bad effect both in the town and among the wavering tribes. On the 18th of January General Baker went down to Trinkatat and, having examined the coast, found a suitable place for the disembarkation of troops.

From the ship a portion of the encampment of the enemy besieging Tokar was visible five miles distant from the shore. Three thousand of the enemy were encamped there, the remainder of the besieging force being in the vicinity of the town itself, fifteen miles inland. The ground appeared fairly level, and the general decided that he would first attempt the relief of Tokar.

The place was not so hard pressed as was Sinkat, and could hold out for some time longer; but he thought that were the operations successfully performed and a heavy blow inflicted upon the Arabs in the plains, it would dishearten the enemy and give his troops confidence in themselves before being called upon to advance into the hills upon the far more difficult and dangerous operation of the relief of Sinkat. He hoped, too, to draw Osman and the greater part of his force down towards Tokar, when the Sinkat garrison might possibly manage to make their way down to the coast.

In order to detain Osman Digma and a large portion of his force near Suakim, Baker Pasha on the 22d marched out with a body of cavalry 400 strong, and advanced towards the enemy's

camp at Tamai, fourteen miles distant, at the foot of the hills. On the way the cavalry came upon some eighty cattle, herded by a few of the Arabs, who at once took to flight; the cattle were captured. The force had proceeded but a short distance further when the bush in front was seen to be swarming with the enemy; these at once advanced yelling and shouting, and firing their rifles.

As the force of the enemy was considerably over a thousand, and there was no saying how many more might be advancing under shelter of the bushes, the general gave the order for the cavalry to retire. This they did, keeping up a fire with their carbines upon the enemy. Their retreat was conducted in extended order, the Egyptian cavalry forming a skirmishing line in the rear. The enemy pressed on very vigorously, and the squadron of Turks were sent out to support the Egyptians.

For upwards of an hour the fight went on, the cavalry falling back steadily, and opposing a firm resistance to the Arabs. But their ammunition began to run short, and a sudden panic seized the Turks, who fled in a body, hotly pursued by the Arabs.

Colonel Gildea in vain endeavoured to arrest the flight, and in order to set them the example charged back among the Arabs and killed three of them with his own hand. The Egyptian squadron lost heart upon the flight of the Bashi-Bazouks, and also fled. Several fell from their horses, and four were overtaken and killed by the enemy, who pursued them for four miles. The result was not altogether discouraging. The cavalry had for a long time resisted the attack of a greatly superior enemy, and it was only on the failure of their ammunition that they had been seized with panic. The native spies reported that the enemy's loss in the skirmish was upwards of a hundred, and that their failure to annihilate a force so inferior to themselves in number had caused them much disappointment, as it was the first time that they had failed in obtaining a decisive victory. On the 24th General Baker again moved out with 2200 men, and threw up some slight intrenchments in the plain. They passed the night there, and were not attacked by the enemy. On the evening of the 26th 800 more newly raised

black troops came down from Suez, and the same night General Baker embarked with 1000 men for Trinkatat; the rest of the force was to follow the next day.

The troops were transported rapidly down to Trinkatat, and soon the desert beach was busy with the crowd of men, horses, and camels, an intrenchment being thrown up to defend the camp from an attack of the enemy. Of this there was, however, but little probability, for between the line of beach and the sand-hills beyond was a salt-water lagoon some two miles wide and a foot deep. General Baker's force consisted of some 1200 gendarmerie, 300 Massowa blacks, 800 of the newly raised blacks, 300 Bashi-Bazouk Turks, 400 cavalry, 4 guns, and 2 Gatlings. The cavalry crossed the lagoon and scouted a short distance out. The enemy were not found anywhere near the water, but could be seen in numbers in the distance.

On the 2d of February a portion of the infantry crossed the lagoon and intrenched themselves on the other side. News arrived from Tokar that the sight of our ships in the distance had encouraged the besieged, who had made a successful sortie and had driven the enemy back. They sent word to say that they would make a sortie with 250 men to aid our advance.

On the 3d the rest of the force crossed the lagoon and prepared to advance upon Tokar on the following morning. The troops were in good spirits. The general had informed them that if they succeeded in relieving Tokar they might in a fortnight be on their way back to Cairo. Confident in their force and in their officers, the Egyptians chatted merrily round their fires, and even the British officers—who, knowing the utterly untrustworthy nature of their troops, had hitherto regarded the expedition as a well-nigh desperate one—began to hope that the men would really fight when it came to the point.

They had, at least, elements in their favour against which the Arabs of the sea-coast had not hitherto contended. There were guns and cavalry; the latter would give timely warning of the approach of the enemy, the former would check their charges and drive them out from the thick bushes in which they might be

lurking. It was probable that the fight would take place at a spot about half-way between Trinkatat and Tokar. Here were the wells of El-Teb, around which the principal portion of the enemy's force was known to be encamped.

It was at this spot that the column with which Captain Moncrieff had gone out was attacked and almost annihilated, and doubtless the Arabs would endeavour to repeat their victory on the same ground. A few shots were fired into the camp during the night. In the morning before dawn the bugle sounded and the camp became a scene of bustle and activity. Soon after daybreak the force were all under arms, and at half-past seven the advance began. The Egyptian cavalry were extended in front in skirmishing order, and the general and his staff rode a short distance behind. Colonel Giles with his Turkish cavalry followed; then came the artillery, four guns and two Gatlings; and close behind them the infantry, marching in massive columns, so arranged as to throw themselves into a great square if necessary.

It was intended that in case of attack the Turkish infantry and the black battalions should form in separate squares on the right and left flank of the main body, which they would cover with their fire from attack; while the Egyptian gendarmerie would form the main square, inclosing the baggage animals of the column. In front of the Egyptian cavalry the general sent out half a dozen European scouts, whom he had enrolled at Cairo. All were old cavalry soldiers: English, French, Italian, and Austrian.

The force had not been marching more than half an hour when the two Englishmen who were out in front galloped back to report that the enemy were to be seen in front, and their report was soon confirmed upon the best evidence, for dark figures could be seen moving rapidly among the bushes on the crests of the sand-hills in front. A sharp shower now fell and for a few minutes obscured all view of the surrounding country.

Dropping shots were now heard, and the Egyptian skirmishers had commenced the action. At half-past eight the column halted and one of the Krupp guns was brought up to the side of the

general, and thence opened fire upon a body of men mounted on camels some 3000 yards away. After two or three shells had been fired the Arabs fell back and the force again advanced. At nine o'clock it was raining heavily, but the force had now approached near enough to see something of the enemy's position.

In front was some rising ground covered with low scrub, and above this waved some flags. On the left front clumps of spearheads of from fifty to a hundred each could be seen among the bushes. A few rounds of shell were fired at the point where the flags were waving. As the force slowly advanced the firing between the front line of skirmishers and the enemy's parties became hotter and more continuous; the cavalry out on the flanks of the column, instead of keeping half a mile away as ordered, closed in to half that distance. A party of Arabs on wiry little horses dashed in between the cavalry on the right flank and the infantry and rode right along the line apparently in sheer bravado. Colonel Giles chased them for a short distance with his Turkish cavalry, but then halted and let them go on, and fell back to the position assigned to him. The general and his staff were still close behind the front line of cavalry skirmishers, who were making their way forward steadily and well, but already the great column of infantry were showing signs of disorganization. Instead of marching in regular order and in silence, as they had been taught to do, all were talking and marching in confused order. Instead of the one large central square and the two flanking ones in which they had been ordered to move, they were marching in one confused mass.

Unfortunately General Baker and his staff, being in front, were in ignorance of the disorder which was already spreading. General Sartorius, too, was with Baker, and there was no English officer present with the infantry. Had the English officers been present at this time with the square, halted it, and formed it into fighting order, the result of the day might have been different. Suddenly the fire of the cavalry skirmishers on the left flank ceased, and almost instantly the troopers came galloping back at full speed. In their rear could be seen a long line of Arabs,

spear in hand, coming on yelling as they ran. The column now attempted to close up into a regular square.

The black regiments, and the Turkish infantry, who were on the left face of the square, took up their position with some regularity; but on the right, and in front, were the Alexandrian and Cairo regiments of Egyptian gendarmerie. These fell at once into disorder, and the efforts of their officers were insufficient to induce them to keep steady, the Alexandrian regiment in front being especially unsteady, while the crowded mass of baggage animals in the centre, frightened by the din and shouting around them, the yells of the approaching Arabs, and the fire which the outer line of the square now began to open, were with difficulty restrained, and their struggles added to the confusion.

The Arabs were 700 yards away when first seen, and had the troops been steady and fallen quietly into their positions, their fire should have swept away the Arabs; for they were considerably superior in force to their assailants. Those coming, or on the left, did not number more than 1000, while on the right they were coming up in little parties of threes and fours.

When they were within about 400 yards the square had, to some extent, got into order, and a tremendous fire was opened, not only in the direction in which the Arabs were approaching, but from all four sides of the square, killing many of Colonel Giles's cavalry, who so far had stood fairly, but who now began to waver, in spite of the efforts of their colonel; but the fire of the Egyptians took but little effect upon the Arabs. The storm of lead passing high over their heads, they continued their course unchecked, and as they approached both the Egyptian regiments gave way, and the men rushed back among the animals in the centre.

In a minute the Arabs were among them, the square broke up altogether, and became a dense crowd of men, camels, and horsemen. The firing ceased almost altogether, the few Europeans in the square, the Massowa blacks and the Turks strove to defend themselves, but the Egyptians offered not the slightest resistance to the Arab spearmen. Many threw away their arms,

and casting themselves down on the sand allowed themselves to be speared like sheep. The three Englishmen in the square, Dr. Leslie, Morice Bey, and Captain Walker were with the guns in the front face. Of these Captain Walker was in command; but his men, themselves unsteady at the approach of the Arabs, and hampered by the cowardly Alexandrians, did not fire a single shot with the guns or Gatlings.

When the Arabs burst in, the three Englishmen defended themselves with their revolvers to the last. Round them the fighting was thickest, the European police, Turks, Egyptians, and Arabs all struggling in a confused mass; at last all resistance ceased, the Englishmen had fallen, and the work of slaughter continued with scarce an effort on the part of the victims to avoid their fate; then numbers of the Egyptians succeeded in extricating themselves from the mass of animals, and throwing away arms, accoutrements, and uniforms, fled for their lives hotly pursued by the exulting Arabs.

General Baker and his staff, as soon as they saw the enemy approaching, had ridden back from the front, but by the time they reached the square the enemy had already broken its ranks. Several of the English officers were killed, as they rode up, by the wild fire of the Egyptian infantry. The general rode along the square and tried in vain to rally the men, but their panic was so complete that no one heeded his shouts; for a minute or two the general, and the little group of officers, sat on their horses at the edge of the surging mass of men and animals, then seeing that nothing could be done, and that the Egyptians were no more capable of being rallied than would be a flock of sheep with a pack of wolves among them, they turned to ride off, having to cut their way through the swarming Arabs.

The general and his staff now joined the Turkish cavalry, whom Colonel Giles had succeeded in keeping in hand, and trotted off the ground, endeavouring as well as they could to cover the rear of the flying fugitives, and so the retreat went on for five miles to the edge of the lagoon, the fleet-footed Arabs continually overtaking the wretched Egyptians, who, when they found themselves cut off,

would kneel down and with bowed head accept unresistingly the thrust of spear or slash of sword; except a few of the blacks, the Turks, and the Europeans, not one of the 2000 men who were massacred lifted their hands in self-defence. On the approach of the first fugitives the garrison left in charge of the intrenchments commanding the ford across the lagoon had decamped; but here the general managed to rally some of the troopers, and on these opening fire with their carbines upon the Arabs the latter desisted from the pursuit, and the fugitives who arrived crossed the water to the beach at Trinkatat followed by the cavalry.

The scene of confusion on the beach was tremendous, and had the Arabs continued their pursuit across the lagoon the greater part of the fugitives would have been massacred, as the boats on the shore were not sufficient to take them away. The panic-stricken Egyptians rushed into the water and struggled and fought for a place in the boats. When General Baker and the English officers arrived they rode down into the water, and with their revolvers forced the crowds from the boats, and restored something like order.

During the afternoon and all night long Generals Baker and Sartorius, Colonel Hey, Colonel Burnaby, Major Harvey, and Colonel Giles remained on the beach, shipping off the men, horses, and stores; and thus 600 horses besides ammunition and numerous stores, which at one time seemed destined to fall into the enemy's hands, were saved.

Only about 700 of the Egyptians escaped, while from 1600 to 1800 were massacred. The loss of the Arabs was very small in comparison. A good many fell before the revolvers and swords of the European officers, while the Turkish battalion and the battalions of the mounted police made a stout fight before they were overpowered.

Many very gallant actions were done by the European officers, who were all engaged in hand-to-hand fights with the enemy's spearmen. Major Harvey saved his European servant when exhausted in the fight, by placing him on his horse and running himself on foot beside it. Of the English officers Maurice

Bey, Dr. Leslie, and Captains Forrestier Walker, Carrol, Smith, and Watkins were killed, with some ten foreign officers of the force.

The enemy showed the most profound contempt for the troops, and clearly regarded themselves as invincible. One Arab would attack a score of Egyptian infantry, and a mounted Arab rode single-handed at a troop of our cavalry. He slashed the Egyptian commander, who was too frightened even to attempt to defend himself, across the back and severely wounded him, and was then shot by an English officer.

Of the blacks from Suez who marched from Trinkatat 678 strong, 410 were killed; of the 560 men of the Alexandria brigade, 15 officers and 380 men were killed; of the Cairo battalion, 500 strong, 16 officers and 280 men were killed.

Of Zebehr's recently raised blacks, 17 officers and 414 men fell, out of 678; of 421 Sinkat blacks, 10 officers and 268 men; of 450 Massowa blacks, 13 officers and 234 men.

Of 40 European police, 2 officers and 35 men; of 429 Turkish infantry, 16 officers and 352 men; of 128 artillerymen, 8 officers and 101 men; of the headquarter staff, 12 officers and 30 men were killed; and 3 officers and 124 men of the baggage guard and drivers. The Turkish cavalry lost only 6 men; the Egyptian cavalry, 24 men. Total killed, 96 officers and 2250 men.

It was only the fear of the guns of the fleet which arrested the Arabs on the edge of the lagoon, and prevented the massacre being even more complete than it was.

General Baker returned at once with the survivors of his force to Suakim, where 1500 men had remained in garrison, and set to work to organize the whole into three battalions—one of Turks, one of blacks, and one of Egyptians.

Utterly useless as the troops had shown themselves in the field, it was hoped that they might defend the intrenchments, especially as they would have the aid of the marines from the fleet, and of the guns of the men-of-war. The task, however, was found to be well-nigh impossible. The Egyptian officers refused to do anything. The men on landing dispersed about the town,

and altogether disregarded the bugle-calls for the assembly, or the orders of the English officers for them to return to their camp.

Several of the Egyptian officers of the highest rank absolutely refused to take the men into the trenches, under the plea that they could not depend upon them. A hundred and fifty men of the fleet were landed and manned the intrenchments, but for the next three days the town was thronged with a mutinous and disorganized rabble of soldiers; and, had Osman Digma attacked, it was probable that the great portion of these would have joined the populace of the town in a rising against the foreigners.

The effects of the three defeats which the Egyptians had suffered at the hands of the rebels, had been to place in the possession of the latter 4000 Remington rifles, 5 Krupp guns, 2 Gatlings, 2 rocket tubes, and an abundance of all kinds of ammunition.

It was an immense relief to the British officers at Suakim when on the 10th news was received that the disorganized troops were to be sent back to Egypt at once. So far they felt that they were sitting on a mine, for at any moment an open mutiny might have broken out, the Europeans in the town might have been massacred before any assistance could be rendered from the ships, and the troops marched off with their arms to join the Mahdi. A parade was held at once of the remnant of the army; the battalion of mixed blacks and Egyptians, who had been the last arrival from Cairo, refused to obey orders, General Baker at once surrounded them by the Soudan battalion, which was the best of those remaining, and threatened to open fire unless the mutineers at once laid down their arms. This they did, and were then marched straight down to the port, and sent on board the troopship *Orontes* to be taken up to Suez.

The whole of the other troops were to follow immediately, with the exception of 400 of the most reliable blacks. On the following day a most important step was taken, a step which, had the British government seen fit to accomplish earlier, would have

entirely changed the position of affairs. The following proclamation was issued:—

“In accordance with a telegram received from Nubar Pasha, president of the council, it is notified that Admiral Hewett is appointed military and civil governor of Suakim by the Egyptian government, by the permission of the English government. Consequently he hereby declares the town to be in a state of siege and under martial law. The inhabitants need not have any further fear, as the British government have promised to protect the town, which is now perfectly safe.”

It was declared that had this proclamation been issued earlier there would have been no difficulty whatever in obtaining the adhesion of a great many of the tribes of the neighbourhood, and that even if the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar could not have been brought off, the tribesmen could without difficulty have thrown large quantities of provisions into those towns; but hitherto they had seen the Egyptian officials still all-powerful in Suakim; they had seen them thwarting the English general at every turn, and knew that they were in active communication with Osman Digma. Consequently they placed no reliance whatever upon the promises of protection and reward if they would assist against Osman, especially as we had officially proclaimed our intention of evacuating the Soudan.

In the town of Suakim itself the appointment effected an instant change in the situation. A strong body of marines were landed, order was restored. The appearance of the place changed as if by magic; the hubbub and confusion in the native bazaars at once subsided. The trading portion of the population, who had, since the return of the army, been living in the greatest trepidation, dreading by day an insurrection and sack of the town by the mutinous troops, and by night an attack by the Arabs, now showed themselves outside their houses with demonstrations of extreme satisfaction.

The disorderly soldiers were at once confined to their camps, and Suakim regained its ordinary appearance. On the following morning the whole force was paraded for the inspection of the

admiral. There were 3000 men upon the ground, and no stranger who had seen them would have imagined that three days before they were a mutinous rabble. The Egyptians are very quick in learning their drill, clean and tidy in appearance, quiet, attentive, and painstaking on parade. They have, indeed, many of the qualities required for making excellent soldiers, but these qualities are rendered useless by the fact that they will not fight.

The blacks especially made a good appearance. General Baker had removed all the worthless Egyptian officers and had replaced them by men promoted from the ranks. The English officers coming down from Suez were to be placed in command, and there is no doubt that these black troops, well drilled and disciplined, and officered by Englishmen, would make excellent soldiers—superior, indeed, to those of the West Indian regiments, which have often rendered good service, but which are recruited from a class of negroes inferior in fighting qualities to the warlike blacks of the Soudan.

One of the first actions of Admiral Hewett was to issue a notice that he should hold a court on shore every morning to inquire into any complaint or grievances brought before his notice, and that he would allow no acts of looting or violence whatever on the part of the troops. The next day came the long-dreaded news of the fall of Sinkat and the massacre of its brave garrison, and the streets of Suakim presented a heart-rending appearance, crowds of weeping women wandered in the streets, throwing dust upon their heads, and filling the air with their wailings for the loss of husbands and relations in the garrison of Sinkat.

For three months that heroic little garrison had repulsed every attack; for weeks they had been living on half rations, for the last fortnight had been existing on roots and leaves, hoping against hope that the long-expected aid from England would arrive. At last human nature could hold out no longer, the news of the defeat of Baker Pasha destroyed their last hope of rescue, and they determined to march out and try and cut their way down to Suakim. Their gallant commander, Tewfik Bey, pointed out to them that by fighting stoutly they might possibly

save themselves, while by remaining all must in a few days die of hunger, while flight was impossible.

Having animated his men with his own heroic spirit, he burned all the stores, spiked the guns, and blew up the magazine. Then the men, having filled their pouches with as much ammunition as they could carry, the 600 issued out in the form of a square, inclosed in which were over 1000 women and children. They had proceeded but a short distance when Osman's hordes rushed down to the attack. Enfeebled by hunger and privation Tewfik's soldiers yet fought gallantly, but in vain, the square was broken by the rush of the Arabs, and Tewfik and everyone of his men slaughtered—the only males who escaped with their lives were six soldiers, who, being too ill to march, had been left behind at Sinkat. These the Arabs, mad with carnage, spared on entering the place.

The women and children, including the wives of Tewfik and his officers, were divided as slaves among their captors.

Admiral Hewett at once sent off a letter to the commandant at Tokar telling him that if he could hold out a little longer an English column would march to his relief. Tokar lay in the heart of a fertile country, and there was still a sufficient amount of grain in store to last the troops for some time longer; they had been, however, for some time suffering from bad water, as the Arabs held possession of the wells outside the town, and those upon which the garrison had to depend were brackish and unwholesome.

On the 14th the *Carysfort* arrived at Suakim with a strong body of marines; 212 men were landed at once, and marched into the town, their appearance producing a great effect upon the populace, who had never before seen English soldiers; 120 blue-jackets were also landed. Henceforth the town was safe from any attack which Osman Digma might make against it.

On the 16th a large body of the enemy came down at night and fired into our camp for some hours. In the morning numerous bodies of men could be seen from the mast-heads of the men-of-war moving about the plain. Mahmoud Ali, the chief of one of the

tribes who called themselves friendly, but who might more properly be termed neutral, for they were standing aloof to see which was the winning side, reported that Osman was waiting for the arrival of the guns taken from Baker Pasha and for the fall of Tokar, when he had promised to lead his men to the capture of Suakim, and to drive the English into the sea.

In view of the number of men seen moving on the plain every precaution was taken, the sentries were doubled, and when in the evening native spies came in with the news that the enemy intended to attack at night, a boat-load of sailors with a Gatling gun was sent ashore to hold the causeway should the enemy carry the two outlying forts held by the marines, or manage, which was more probable, to pass between them. The intrenchments connected with the forts were held by the Egyptian troops, and it was considered probable that these would bolt at once if the enemy attacked.

In the course of the day one of the spies returned from Tokar with an answer from the commandant, who was a man of very different calibre from Tewfik Bey. He wrote in the most desponding tone, saying that his provisions were all used up—a statement known to be false. He stated that large numbers of the enemy were massed round the town, and that they were continually firing upon it with the Krupp guns captured from Baker, killing some of the garrison every day.

He asked that two vessels of war should at once be sent to Trinkatat to make a demonstration and keep up the spirits of his men till the troops arrived. The spy reported that the enemy had several times summoned the garrison to surrender, promising in that case their lives should be spared, and pointing out the futility of resistance, and the fate which had befallen the garrison of Sinkat, who ventured to resist the power of Osman.

The night passed off without the expected attack. The next day the *Jumna* arrived with 300 men of the 10th Hussars and 400 men of the Irish Fusiliers. The hussars had not brought their horses with them, but they at once took over the horses of the Egyptian cavalry. The ships now began to arrive fast. The

Bokhara landed the 3d battalion of Rifles at Suakim; the other ships as they arrived were sent down to Trinkatat, where the *Carysfort* and *Sphinx* had already gone in answer to the request of the commandant of Tokar.

The troops were not intended to land at present, but were sent on to Trinkatat because there was no accommodation for them in the harbour of Suakim.

On the 21st the transport *Neva*, with the 19th Hussars, ran ashore on a reef 19 miles from Suakim, and other steamers were sent to take the troops off. By dint of the greatest exertions all the animals on board, with the exception of some fifty mules, were saved, but the vessel herself became a complete wreck. The next morning the news was received that Tokar had surrendered to the enemy; it was brought by five soldiers who had made their way along the coast. They said that the civil governor of the town had entered into negotiations with the enemy, and had agreed to surrender, on a promise that the lives of the garrison should be spared.

This news was confirmed in the afternoon by the return of two spies, who had been sent to Tokar by Mr. Brewster, the assistant governor of Suakim. Their account tallied exactly with that of the soldiers. The garrison were so worried and annoyed by the constant fire of the five Krupp guns taken from Baker Pasha, which were worked by some black artillerymen captured at the same time, that they lost heart altogether, and allowed the inhabitants, who had long been in favour of surrender, to take the matter into their hands; accordingly a hundred and fifty of them, with the civil governor at their head, went out to the rebels, and made terms with them on the basis that all lives should be spared if the town surrendered.

This governor was known to have been a great adherent of Arabi's, and he had all along been the leader of the party for submission to the Mahdi. The spies and soldiers both agreed that Tokar was in no danger whatever of assault, as there were not more than a thousand of the enemy round the town, the rest of the besiegers, together with large bodies of men who had arrived from



Osman, having taken up their position at the wells of El-Teb, the scene of the defeat of the columns of Moncrieff and Baker, and where they were awaiting the advance of the force from Trinkatat.

The garrison at the time they surrendered possessed forty or fifty rounds of ammunition per man in their pouches, and there were forty thousand rounds in reserve. As the governor was well aware that the English troops would advance in a few days to his relief, the surrender of Tokar was an act of gross treachery. It was important, inasmuch as for a moment it arrested our action, as General Graham was obliged to telegraph the news to England and wait for orders, and the task of marching to Tokar would be rendered all the more difficult by the certainty that in addition to Osman's Arabs we should have to fight the well-armed garrison of Tokar, who would be in their ranks.

While waiting orders from home, General Graham and Admiral Hewett went down to Trinkatat, where the greater part of the force intending to operate was now gathered, and the troops had already been landed on the beach. The Black Watch, the Gordon Highlanders, the Irish Fusiliers, the mounted infantry, and half the 19th Hussars were already on shore. Across the lagoon large numbers of the enemy could be seen. The marines were to have formed part of the advancing body, but as soon as the troops had left Suakim the soldiers of the black regiment mutinied and refused to obey orders, and dispersed into the bazaar, openly saying that they intended to join the rebels.

The marines were consequently detained at Suakim for the defence of that place; and only a detachment of blue-jackets with six Gatling guns were sent down from the gun-boat there to form part of the expedition.

On the 24th the 19th Hussars and mounted infantry crossed the lagoon and made a reconnaissance, the enemy retiring as they advanced. On the following day the Gordon Highlanders and Irish Fusiliers moved across the lagoon and took possession of the intrenchments erected by General Baker on the further side. They were accompanied by a squadron of the 19th Hussars, the mounted infantry, and two cavalry guns. The enemy, who had



in the early morning been seen in large numbers about the intrenchments, retired as our troops advanced; but when we occupied the intrenchments they took up a position in large numbers on rising ground some 3000 yards away on the plain, where they could be seen through the field-glasses brandishing their spears, and going through exultant dances, deeming, no doubt, that they were about to enjoy a repetition of their two previous victories.

Our cavalry moved out towards them, but they held their ground and opened fire at a long range. As some 500 of them could be seen on the brow, and it was probable that a much larger force might be behind it, it was not deemed prudent for the cavalry to advance. Now, and throughout the campaign, the want of a battery of horse-artillery was greatly felt. Lord Wolseley had forbidden horse-artillery to be taken, and the want of this arm greatly crippled the force, and exposed them to dangers which would have been avoided had they possessed an efficient artillery. The camel-guns were unprovided with shrapnel, and their small calibre rendered them but of slight efficiency. After watching each other for a considerable time, the cavalry retired and recrossed the lagoon, while the infantry remained for the night in the fort.

The naval brigade landed on the morning of the 27th. They were a splendid body of seamen, picked from the crews of the gun-boats, and were 115 strong, with 10 officers. Parties of the enemy could be seen moving about the plain, but they did not attempt to advance, or even to keep up a distant fire. It was clear that they were acting under a regular plan, and intended to wait for us at some point along the road, and not to waste their strength by attempting an attack upon the intrenchments. On the 28th they showed more boldness in maintaining a heavy fire from a distance upon our mounted infantry. Our artillery fired a few shots in return.

Seeing the uselessness of the camel-guns, Admiral Hewett supplied eight 7-pounders from the fleet to take their place, together with a supply of shrapnel. In the afternoon, to the great

satisfaction of everyone, the 65th Regiment (York and Lancaster) arrived in the *Serapis*, whose engines had gone wrong, and it had been feared that she would not arrive in time. No one had any doubt of the ability of the British force assembled to defeat the rebels, however strong they might be. At the same time the addition of five or six hundred men was not to be despised, for the Arabs had already shown themselves really formidable antagonists. The 65th were landed at once.

The force of General Graham now consisted of the cavalry brigade—the 10th Hussars, 328 men; the 19th Hussars, 410; the mounted infantry, 126; artillery, 126; six 7-pounders, ten brass mounted guns, four Krupps. The naval brigade, with two 9-pounders, three Gatlings, and three Gardners, under Commander Rolfe of the *Euryalus* and Flag-lieutenant Graham. 1st brigade: the Rifles, 610; Gordon Highlanders, 751; the Royal Irish Rifles, 334. 2d brigade: Black Watch, 761; Royal Marine Infantry and Artillery, 361; Engineers, 100. To these were now to be added the York and Lancaster with some 500 men, making our force up to about 4500 men and 206 officers.

There were 600 camels for the transport, and 350 mules and 100 camels for the ambulance service, while the camel-battery was composed of eighty camels and about 100 men. The 65th crossed the lagoon as soon as they were landed, and were received with hearty cheers by the troops in the intrenchments there. In the afternoon Major Harvey accompanied by Lieutenant-colonel Burnaby, rode two miles out, and planted a white flag with a letter attached to the flag-staff, enjoining the rebels to retire and to allow us to pass without opposition. The Arabs kept up a distant fire on the officers while placing the flag.

A short time after their return the flag was taken down, and there was no doubt that the letter reached its destination. The troops bivouacked for the night in the order in which they were to march. 150 men had been left at Trinkatat under Colonel Ogilvie. 300 were to remain in the intrenchment, when the force marched, to defend the transport and stores there against any attacks the enemy might make during the absence of the column.

The troops were to advance in the form of a hollow square, of which the Gordon Highlanders were to form the front face, advancing in company columns at deploying distances. The Irish Fusiliers formed the right face, with the Rifles inside them; the 65th were on the left face, with the Marines inside; the Black Watch were to march in line in the rear. The square was about 250 yards broad by 150 deep.

In the centre, between the Marines and Rifles, were the transport animals, with reserve guns and rifles, ammunition, hospital necessaries, and stretchers. The six machine-guns with the sailors were to be stationed at the left of the Gordon Highlanders, and the camel-battery with the eight 7-pounder guns was to remain in the centre of the square in reserve.

The main body of the cavalry was to march well in rear of the square, and to abstain from action in order to pursue the enemy. Two squadrons of cavalry were to move in extended order as scouts a mile in front, and on both flanks, their orders were that they were not to engage the enemy, but if attacked were to open right and left, and to sweep round to the flanks to the rear of the square, so as not to intervene between the infantry fire and the enemy. The infantry were directed to fire only in volleys, on word of command, and were not to open fire until within 300 yards of the enemy.

The bivouac fires were kept up all night, lighting up the whole intrenchments, and presenting a wild and picturesque scene; lines of sleeping men wrapt in their cloaks lay in their places in the ranks ready to fall in at the first call of the bugle. Groups of men sat around the fires smoking and talking over the probable events of the next day's fighting, while somewhat in the rear stood the mules and camels of the transports.

A few shots were fired by the enemy during the night, and two rockets were let off by them; but these signs of the whereabouts of the distant foe in no way disturbed the camp. Towards morning the rain, for a time, fell heavily, completely soaking the troops as they lay, and all were glad when the bugle sounded the *reveillé*. The fires were piled high again, and the men

tried as best they could to dry themselves. Breakfast was eaten, and while the men were so engaged, the cavalry recrossed the lagoon to the beach in order that the horses might be watered at the tanks there the last thing in the morning before marching: they then rejoined the infantry.

At eight o'clock the troops were all in their allotted places, and moved out from their camp. When once beyond the intrenchments, and on ground free from the litter and stores of the camp, a halt was called, and a brief inspection made to see that all was in order, and each corps in the place assigned to it, then the advance began in earnest. Immediately the force moved forward the enemy could be seen falling back, just as they had done when Baker Pasha's force marched out from the same halting-place a month before.

With a good glass the enemy's position could be seen on a slight ridge of ground far away in the neighbourhood of the wells: there they could be seen swarming along a front a mile in length. Many flags floated lightly in the air, which was but just sufficient to lift them. Here and there guns could be seen in position. As the column advanced the enemy disappeared from their rising ground, and it was uncertain whether they had retired behind it, and were waiting there in anticipation of an assault, or whether they were moving round to make an attack in flank.

The position of the enemy was a strong one. A breastwork had been thrown up, the guns were well placed, and had the force advanced directly to the attack it would have been exposed to a sweeping fire of musketry and artillery, and to a charge by the whole body of the enemy.

In the enemy's lines all was quiet, the line of flags alone marking their position. Presently the gun-boat *Sphinx*, in the harbour, opened fire with one of her long 6-inch guns, but her shot fell far short and she was signalled to cease firing. Admiral Hewett himself accompanied the column in the character of a spectator.

It was now ten o'clock and the square was nearing the enemy's line; the pipers of the Black Watch struck up a cheerful air and

the column advanced more briskly. The enemy could be seen now, though partially concealed by the bushes in which they were crowded, still they made no movement.

The cavalry scouts moved away from the front, and at eleven o'clock the square was moving past the position at a distance of less than 400 yards. The moment was an intensely exciting one, as the troops expected momentarily to see the Arabs rise to their feet and dash down upon them in a dark mass. Suddenly the silence was broken by a hot fire of musketry which spurted out from bush and earthwork, while the Krupp guns, manned by the artillerymen of the Tokar garrison, also opened fire.

Several men in the square at once dropped out of their places wounded, but the greater number of the bullets flew harmlessly overhead. No reply was made to the fire, but the column inclined its course rather more to the right, thus taking it somewhat further from the face of the enemy's position, but still passing on to a point which would place them in its rear.

As they moved along they were pelted with a shower of bullets, while the shrapnel-shells from the Krupp burst overhead with great accuracy, showing that the Egyptian artillerymen were accustomed to their work. General Baker, who had accompanied the expedition as head of the intelligence department, was wounded in the cheek, and the ball, embedded in the jaw, could not be removed until the end of the day's fighting; nevertheless, having had his face bandaged, the general remounted his horse and continued to carry on his duties to the end of the day. At a quarter to twelve our guns had obtained a mastery over the guns of the enemy, and their artillery fire ceased. The men, who had been for some time lying impatient under the heavy fire, sprang to their feet with a cheer as the order was given for the force to advance. The pipes struck up, and the square moved on until well in rear of the enemy's position; then having attained the point aimed at the force moved directly towards the enemy.

Owing to the change of direction of the march, the flank of the square was now its front; and it was the Black Watch, the 65th, and the Naval Brigade who would be first exposed to the


charge of the enemy. The musketry fire from the bushes ceased as the square approached them; then with uplifted spears and swords the enemy burst out in parties of from ten to thirty, who leaped to their feet and dashed at the square.

For a moment the English fire was withheld. It seemed incredible that these handfuls of men could be intending to hurl themselves on the solid line of British bayonets, but as fresh parties sprang up from every bush, and with wild yells rushed down upon them, a flash of fire broke from the face of the great square, and a loud continued roar told that the breech-loading rifles were at last at work.

It appeared impossible that men should stand for a moment against the terrible hail of bullets; but the Arabs came on with a desperate courage, which seemed to defy danger and death. The Gardners and Gatlings at the corners of the square added their deeper rattle to the roar of the musketry. The Arabs fell beneath the leaden shower as if struck by lightning, as they approached a charmed circle, but they fell every man with his face to the foe. Not one of those wild warriors reached the square; not one of them turned to fly. They fell, mowed down like corn before the scythe of the reaper, in groups as they had approached. Then the square moved forward, but the instant the column reached the bushes the enemy were upon them again.

So fierce and sudden was the attack that they nearly succeeded in breaking in among the sailors, and for a minute there was a hand-to-hand fight, and the troops, bayonet in hand, crossed steel with the Arab spearmen, several single-handed combats taking place, but no efforts of individual courage or desperation availed to check the progress of the British troops. The ground over which they were now passing was broken and difficult; cut up with bushes, rifle-pits, and rough intrenchments, rendering it impossible to preserve the exact formation of the line, and every bush, every rifle-pit contained its party of Arabs, who, lying close until the troops were almost upon them, then leaped to their feet and hurled themselves upon the bayonets.

The hardest fighting was at their main intrenchment. There



THE NAVAL BRIGADE AT EL-TEB.

BLACKIE & SON: LONDON, GLASGOW, AND EDINBURGH

they made a desperate stand, and the Black Watch and sailors had to fight hard to win their way. Colonel Burnaby was wounded, and Captain Wilson of the *Hecla* rushing forward to the assistance of a soldier who was hard pressed by two or three of the Arab spearmen, received a severe slash across the face from an Arab sword; but he defended himself with his sword hilt until some of his men rushed to his assistance. The square now formed up again; two Krupp guns had been taken in the intrenchments, and these were turned against the second position of the enemy.

Their central post was around a brick building, formerly erected for the purpose of irrigation, but long since abandoned, a great steam boiler lying in front of it. All around this the Arabs had dug their rifle-pits, and in these they lay close as rabbits in a warren. Here the defence was obstinate; the Arabs fired through loopholes in the walls until the doors were burst open, and the defenders bayoneted. Many of our men were wounded by Arabs who lay feigning to be dead in the rifle-pits, leaping to their feet when the line of troops had passed them, and then rushing among the troops, cutting and slashing until bayoneted or shot down.

There were many examples of determined courage, some of which received special notice from the commander. Among the first of these was the action of Major R. W. Dalgety of the 65th Regiment (now Lieutenant-colonel Dalgety of the 1st Battalion York and Lancashire Regiment). This officer had called for volunteers to storm a mud house which appeared to be a post of some importance, and on eight men following him, he contrived to force the door of the house and was the first to enter. His life was saved by Sergeant Franklyn, who dragged him to the ground to save him from a spear thrust at his head, and at the same moment pushed back the weapon, which pierced through his own hand. For this gallant act the sergeant received a medal from the queen.

A great struggle took place as the Gordon Highlanders carried the village, while the Black Watch captured the last redoubt in the position which the enemy had at first held. This concluded

the fighting. Entering at the rear of the enemy's lines of defence, point after point had been carried until the troops issued out in a long line, now through the intrenchments, along the face of which they had marched in the morning.

During the early part of the battle the cavalry had been kept well in rear of the infantry, but when the square was seen to be forcing its way into the enemy's lines, and the Arabs were seen to be withdrawing from their position, General Stewart, who was in command of the cavalry division, swung round far to the right of the infantry, and led his men against a large body of Arabs visible in the plain beyond the ridge.

They had halted after pursuing the flying foe for some little distance, when the news reached them that Colonel Webster, who with a hundred men had formed the third line, had been attacked by a great number of the enemy on the right; the order "left about" was sounded immediately.

The enemy soon showed in great force, some mounted, some on foot. As the cavalry neared them the footmen threw themselves among the tufted hillocks and little mounds of which the whole plain was made up. As the cavalry swept over them, the horses leaping the little hillocks and swerving at the sight of the dark figures lying among them, the Arabs sprang to their feet in the intervals of the horsemen, and discharged their spears, or as they lay thrust them into the horses, and then as the animals fell sprang upon the riders, and cut them down before they could gain their feet.

At the same time some thirty Arab horsemen rode boldly at the squadron. There was a short, sharp hand-to-hand fight, and but three of the enemy made their way through the line, and these, turning the instant they had passed through, pursued the charging squadron before whose swords the rest of their comrades had just fallen. Colonel Barrow was pierced by a spear which passed through his arm and entered his body, but having lost their commander the squadron still charged on although the opposition they encountered was becoming momentarily hotter and hotter.

General Stewart, who was riding somewhat in advance of the

left flank of the second line, seeing a large body of Arabs rushing down on the right flank of the first squadron, galloped forward with his staff to arrest the further advance, followed closely by the 10th Hussars, but before they could reach the first line they had to cut their way through the foes.

Of the general's four orderlies, one was killed and two were wounded. Here Major Slade of the 10th Hussars fell; his horse was hamstrung by an Arab footman, and before the major could gain his feet he was pierced with seven spear wounds. Lieutenant Probyn of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, attached to the 10th Hussars, was killed, as was Lieutenant Freeman of the 19th Hussars; and twenty men were killed and as many wounded of the 10th and 19th.

The enemy were now in full retreat, and although Colonel Webster, who with his squadron had made several brilliant charges at the enemy, now joined the rest of the cavalry, it was not deemed prudent to press the pursuit further, as many thousands of the defenders of the intrenchments were now moving across the plain.

Our loss had been very small, with the exception of that suffered by the cavalry; the total being 30 killed and 142 wounded. Quartermaster Wilkins of the 3d battalion of the Rifles was the only officer killed, in addition to those already named. Lieutenant Royds, R.N., was dangerously wounded, and died two days later; and Captain Littledale, of the York and Lancaster Regiment, was severely wounded; many other officers receiving slight wounds.

The loss of the Arabs exceeded 2000. The enemy's force exceeded 10,000, but by far the greater portion of these retired when they saw that their position was turned, and all their disposition for attack completely frustrated.

The troops slept that night at the wells, and at nine next morning moved out towards Tokar, leaving half the Gordon Highlanders at El-Teb with orders to find and bury the Europeans.

Over 2000 bodies of the Arabs were found at El-Teb and buried by our troops, and numbers of their wounded must have died in the retreat. Some thirty wounded were found on the

field of battle. The bodies of all the English officers who fell with Baker Pasha's force were found and identified by the burying parties.

All through the day parties of the Egyptian garrison of Tokar continued to come into the camp from the surrounding villages.

The force which advanced to Tokar met with no resistance whatever; several parties of the enemy were seen, but these withdrew hastily as we advanced. In Tokar seventy of the Egyptian garrison were found in a half-starved condition, they having absolutely refused to join the Arabs against us. By them and by the population of the town the troops were received with the greatest joy.

The cavalry rode to Debbah, where the camp of the force besieging Tokar had been situated, and where a number of the enemy were still lingering. Before going out the cavalry armed themselves with Arab spears picked up on the battle-field, the uselessness of their swords against an enemy lying upon the ground having been fully proved. The Arabs evacuated the camp of Debbah before their arrival. Here the greater portion of the booty taken from General Baker's army was found, and an immense quantity of rifles regularly stacked. Large quantities of ammunition were also captured, together with a Gatling and a mountain gun, these with the pieces taken in the intrenchments making up the whole of the artillery captured from Baker Pasha and from Moncrieff's force.

No long stay was made by the troops at Tokar, and the column returned to the sea-shore, bringing with them such of the inhabitants as wished to leave the place. The work of the expedition was not yet done. Osman Digma had not himself been present at the fight of El-Teb, having contented himself with sending 1000 men to reinforce the body engaged in the siege of Tokar, and it was certain that he would explain away the result of that fight by alleging that in some way the tribesmen engaged there had acted in disobedience to his instructions.

One of the prisoners taken by Osman at the destruction of the garrison at Sinkat came in two or three days later to Suakim,

having made his escape from Osman's camp. He bore signs of ill usage, having many marks of blows on his body, and his wrists being chafed with ropes. He said that at the time he made his escape the news of the battle of El-Teb was known there, but that the Arab impression was that seven thousand of the English had been killed, and that it was only the approach of night which compelled the Arabs to withdraw, and so save the invaders from total annihilation.

Until the arrival of some three hundred of the garrison of Tokar, and four hundred women and children from that town, the people of Suakim were altogether incredulous as to our victory at El-Teb; but the arrival of these people from Tokar convinced them that the British troops had really defeated the hitherto invincible followers of Osman.

Among those brought down were the prefect and commandant of Tokar. It was a matter of surprise that these men were not tried by court-martial, and shot for their treachery; for the soldiers of the garrison completely confirmed the reports brought in by the spies, saying that they had plenty of ammunition and food, and that, so far from being forced to surrender because so many men were killed and wounded by the enemy's fire, only one man was killed and one wounded, and that they could have held out for a long time had not the commandant and prefect told them that it was better to fight with Moslems against Christians than with Christians against Moslems.

On arriving at Suakim Admiral Hewett and General Graham issued a joint proclamation to the tribes; they asked all the sheikhs to come in and meet them at Suakim. "You have already," said the proclamation, "been warned that the English force have come here not only to relieve the garrison of Tokar, but to redress the wrongs under which you have so long suffered; nevertheless, you have gone on trusting that notorious scoundrel Osman Digma, well known to you all as a bad man, his former life in Suakim having proved that to be the case. He has led you away with the foolish idea that the Madhi has come on earth. The great God who rules the universe does not send such scoundrels as Osman

Digma as his messengers. Your people are brave, and England always respects such men. Arise, then, and chase Osman Digma from your country. We promise you that protection and pardon shall be granted to all who come in at once. Otherwise the fate of those who fell at El-Teb will surely overtake you."

This proclamation was preceded by letters from the Sheikh Morghani telling the tribesmen that because they thought the old religion was not good enough for them they had made a new religion, and God had therefore sent to destroy them and the new religion together. He entreated them to come in and consult with him in order that further bloodshed might be avoided.

It was then determined to open communications with King John of Abyssinia, and eventually in April, Admiral Hewett went on a mission to that arrogant and intractable ruler, and succeeded, after a good deal of difficulty, in negotiating a treaty, by the terms of which the king bound himself, in return for the cession of the Boghos country and the free transit of goods through Massowa, to remain on friendly terms with the Egyptians, and to undertake the relief of the garrisons of Kassala, Gelahat, Gedari, and Gireh. The former portion of the contract was carried out, and Abyssinia gave no trouble for the remainder of the year, but nothing was done for the relief of the beleaguered garrisons.

But this treaty was not made till after we had completed the work immediately in hand, General Graham having learned in the month of March that a strong force of Arabs remained assembled at Tamai, a place about sixteen miles to the south-west of Suakim. At the latter port the work of disembarkation went on vigorously, so that in a short time the whole force was on shore. All the news which was brought in by spies tended to show that Osman would fight another battle. The most fanatical of the tribes were still with him, and their belief in his invincibility was unshaken. On the 9th of March twenty-one of the hostile sheikhs sent in a reply to the proclamation defiantly refusing our offers of peace, and as these represented tribes capable of putting 10,000 men into the field, it was evident that another desperate battle would have to be fought.

On the 10th the Black Watch marched out six miles and formed an encampment surrounded by a stockade or defence of bushes, &c., known by the natives as a seriba. On the evening of the 11th the rest of the force, with the exception of the cavalry, moved out to the seriba.

Many halts were made, and the force took four hours in getting over the seven miles of ground between the seriba and the spot where it was determined to encamp, within two miles of the enemy's position. The cavalry had a slight skirmish with the enemy before the point was reached, but the Arabs fell back without serious fighting. The spot chosen for the encampment was a space of open ground sufficiently large to allow the entire force to encamp in the form of a square, with some fifty yards of open space between them and the bushes, which covered the country thickly around. The position was an exciting one. It was known that some 10,000 daring and fanatical savages were lying within two miles, and that at any time during the night these might burst out from the bushes.

Fortunately there was a brilliant full moon, and though the enemy might have crept up unseen in the shelter of bushes, they would have been perceived the instant they emerged into the open space. The day's work, although the distance traversed had not been long, had been a trying one, the heat had been great, and the dust suffocating. The men of the Naval Brigade had had very heavy work in dragging the guns through the deep sand and across the rough ground, but it was felt that there would be little sleep in the camp that night, in such close and dangerous vicinity to an enemy whose valour had been already so thoroughly proved.

The early part of the night passed off quietly, and so bright was the moonlight that messages were flashed by the heliographic mirror to the force eight miles away. Soon after it fell dark Commander Rolfe, R.N., made a most daring reconnoissance of the enemy. Starting by himself he made his way to the bushes in the direction of their camp. For aught he knew the enemy might be lurking in great numbers in the scrub preparing for

an attack upon our camp; but he made his way fearlessly forward until he reached a point within 200 or 300 yards of their camp. He could see them sitting in great numbers round their fires or stretched on the ground, and he brought back the news to camp that for the present, at least, they were not meditating any attack upon our camp.

After the receipt of this report the troops were ordered to lie down and get what sleep they could. At one o'clock a musketry fire suddenly opened on the camp, and continued until daylight, the enemy swarming all round. The troops lay, rifle in hand, in readiness to leap to their feet to repel an assault should the Arabs come on, but not a shot was fired in return to the Arabs' fusillade.

As usual, the enemy fired high, and the leaden hail swept thickly overhead. Several of the camels, mules, and horses, which were huddled together in the centre of the square, were hit, but of the troops only one man was killed, and an officer and two men wounded. There was a general feeling of relief when the day began to dawn, and the long anxious hours of watching and expectation came to an end.

The Arabs, however, showed no signs of any intention of retiring, so a 9-pounder and Gatling gun were brought into play, and the Arabs soon fell back to their camp. The men then took their breakfast, and while they were so doing the cavalry arrived from the seriba where they had passed the night.

At eight o'clock the mounted infantry pushed on in front with some thirty Abyssinian scouts under Mr. Wild. They had not, however, gone far when they became warmly engaged, and Captain Humphreys, who was in command, sent back word that the broad ravine which was a few hundred yards in front, but was altogether hidden from the force by the thick bush, was strongly occupied. At half-past eight the infantry began to move forward, the two brigades being formed, as before, in squares.

The brigade under General Davis consisted of the 42d, 65th, and marines, General Buller's brigade consisting of the 89th, 75th, and 60th Rifles. General Graham with his staff were in the first brigade square, which first moved out, the second advancing in

echelon about 400 yards to the right rear of the first. The camels and baggage animals were left behind in the seriba.

General Davis's brigade had moved but a short distance when a heavy fire was opened by the enemy, and the mounted infantry and Abyssinians fell back. As soon as these had retreated sufficiently to clear the front of the square the machine-guns, which were placed at its corners, opened fire. These guns soon subdued the enemy's fire, and the square again advanced. As it did so the enemy's fire again broke out. General Graham then gave the order, "The 42d will charge."

The Highlanders responded by a cheer, and went forward at the double until they reached the edge of the ravine, but only a portion of the 65th went forward with them, the remainder not hearing the word of command. The result was that a huge gap was formed in the right front corner of the square, and great confusion took place. The enemy were seen coming on at the top of their speed. The three machine-guns under Lieutenant Graham, R.N., pushed forward into the gap.

The right companies of the 65th tried to form up to meet the enemy, but the confusion was too great and the enemy too close to permit the operation being completed in time. A heavy fire was opened on the advancing Arabs, and they fell in hundreds, but the survivors charged on undaunted with spears poised ready for action. The 65th fell back, and thus exposed the rear of the 42d, and the sergeants of that regiment were attacked in rear by the Arabs, and were the first victims. Major Dalgety, who at El-Teb had continued to lead his men after he had been injured by the fragments of an exploding shell, was again conspicuous in this engagement; and, as General Graham reported, displayed the utmost gallantry in rallying his men until he was severely wounded. He was in the front urging his men on when he became engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand fight. He had lost his helmet, and trying to guard his head received upon his left arm a serious thrust, at the same moment shooting his assailant.

The sailors manning the guns on the right stuck to their

pieces as long as possible, Lieutenant Montreson being first speared in the shoulder as he, with Midshipman Briscoe, was turning the handle of the Gatling, and was then shot by our own men as he endeavoured to reach the mass of soldiery, who were now falling back in full retreat.

With exulting shouts the Arabs poured down upon the retreating mass, and had not help been at hand a catastrophe similar to that which befell Baker's force would have taken place; but now the cavalry upon the left dismounted and poured volley after volley into the flank of the advancing Arabs. But a still more efficient support was at hand. General Buller's square had been attacked with equal fury by the Arabs, but these, being well handled and facing outwards in readiness to repel the enemy, poured in such a tremendous fire that not one of the Arabs ever reached the square, which advanced steadily, and their fire and that of the guns accompanying them speedily cleared off the Arabs from the right of Davis's retreating brigade, the men in which, as soon as the pressure upon them ceased, formed up again in line with Buller's brigade. Both brigades were now formed in line, and steadily advanced towards the ravine, retaking the abandoned guns, which the enemy in vain endeavoured to carry off.

When the troops reached the edge of the ravine the battle of Tamai was virtually over. Crowds of the enemy were flying along it or ascending its opposite side, and the fire of the infantry and guns swept them down by scores as they did so. But though the fighting was over the enemy all day maintained a distant fire, and it was dangerous for the troops to move about singly or in small parties, for the Arabs lying hidden in the bushes would leap up and fling themselves desperately upon any who approached them. The ground was strewed thickly with Arab bodies; they were of all ages, from boys of ten or twelve to gray-haired patriarchs. The slaughter of the Arabs was terrible, over four thousand having fallen before the fire of our men.

Passing across the ravine the force moved on against the three villages in the rear where Osman Digma's camp lay. The enemy made a short stand here, but were soon driven out. The huts

were found to be full of grain and property of all kinds—Korans, bags of money, bundles of clothing, and various plunder. Nothing had been removed by the rebels, who had not for a moment believed that our troops would be able to resist their attack. Osman Digma himself had taken no part in the fight, which he had viewed from a distant hill. When he saw that his followers were defeated he fled at once.

Our loss amounted to about 120 killed, of whom sixty-five belonged to the 42d, including ten sergeants.

The little naval brigade suffered heavily. Lieutenant Almack of the *Briton*, Lieutenant Montresor of the *Euryalus*, Lieutenant Houston Stewart, and ten seamen were killed, and several were severely wounded. Captain Ford of the York and Lancaster (65th), and Major Aitken of the 42d were killed. Captain Brophy, Lieutenant-colonel Green, and Lieutenant Macloud of the Black Watch, and Major Macdonald of the 2d Highland Light Infantry, Major Dalgety, 65th, Surgeon Cross, Royal Navy, Surgeon Prendergast, and Mr. St. Leger Herbert were wounded.

The next day the cavalry went out to a village two miles further, where they found great quantities of Krupp cannon and ammunition and other loot, some of which had been taken from Baker's column. The villages were burnt and the whole of the contents destroyed. Our force then began to retire to the coast.

It would have been hopeless to attempt to follow Osman Digma among the mountains, and it was hoped that after the tremendous defeat which had been inflicted upon him, his prestige and power would be altogether destroyed, and that he would never thenceforth be in a condition to cause us further trouble.

The greater part of our troops were then embarked and returned to Egypt, only a small force being left in garrison in Suakim to act in concert with the naval commander in the Red Sea; and with the exception of occasional skirmishes and outpost engagements, Suakim remained undisturbed during the remainder of the year.

Subsequent events show that the anticipations as to the effects which would be produced by the battle of Tamai were erroneous,

and from one point of view it appears to have been unfortunate that a force of some strength was not left at Suakim to complete the work; for, after we had retired, Osman Digma gradually recovered his influence, and before another year the whole work had to be recommenced, and the vast expense and the enormous effusion of blood in this campaign appeared to have been wasted.

It was shown, indeed, how terrible is the effect of breech-loading weapons at short distances, but it was also shown how far reckless bravery can make up for inferior arms, and that savages endowed with such valour as that possessed by the Arabs of the Soudan are, even when armed only with sword and spear, truly formidable opponents even for the best-armed and most disciplined troops.

END OF VOL. II.

SOME WORKS PUBLISHED BY

BLACKIE & SON,

LONDON, GLASGOW, EDINBURGH, AND DUBLIN.

To be completed in 14 parts, super-royal 8vo, 2s. each; or 4 vols., cloth elegant, burnished edges, at 9s. 6d. each.

The War in Egypt and the Soudan

An Episode in the History of the British Empire; Being a descriptive account of the scenes and events of that great drama, and sketches of the principal actors in it. By THOMAS ARCHER, F.R.H.S., Author of "Fifty Years of Social and Political Progress," &c.

There could scarcely be a more exciting story than that which recounts the events and incidents of this important episode in British History—a story which tells of heroic endurance and of brave achievements by the men of the army and the navy of Britain.

The book will be illustrated by a series of beautifully executed portraits, a series of pictures from drawings by eminent artists, and by plans and sketch maps which will serve to explain the localities of battles and the movements of the troops. In addition a LARGE MAP OF EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN, measuring 26 × 17½ inches, printed in colours and mounted in a case, will be presented to subscribers to the Work.

In 14 parts, super-royal 8vo, at 2s. each; or 7 divisions, at 4s. each.

The World as it Is:

A Popular Account of the Countries and Peoples of the Earth. By GEO. G. CHISHOLM, M.A., Editor and Translator of "Switzerland: Its Scenery and Its People." Profusely illustrated by over 300 Engravings, and a series of Maps and Plates printed in colours.

This work naturally divides itself into three sections. The *first* contains all that belongs to the description of the world as a whole, and not specially to any of its divisions. The *second* deals with the descriptive and political geography of the world. These two sections are illustrated by numerous diagrams, views of interesting localities, and groups of the inhabitants, interspersed through the text so plentifully that one is to be met with at almost every other opening of the book. The *third* section will be composed of a list of about 10,000 geographical names, whose pronunciation is shown by being re-written according to an easily understood plan. A copious Index will be added, whereby all the information contained in the book will be made readily accessible.

To be completed in 15 parts, super-royal 8vo size, price 2s. each; or 4 vols., cloth elegant, burnished edges, 9s. 6d. each.

William Ewart Gladstone

AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES: Fifty Years of Social and Political Progress. By THOMAS ARCHER, F.R.H.S., Author of "Pictures and Royal Portraits," &c. Illustrated by a series of 34 authentic and beautifully executed Portraits.

"This work is not so much a biography of Mr. Gladstone as a political History of England during his lifetime. It is a book which has evidently been compiled with no ordinary pains and care, and with a praiseworthy desire to be impartial."—Daily News.

"It is probably true that the biographical form of history is the best in dealing with times within the memory of men yet living. The life of a man, prominent in affairs during a particular period, may be taken as a central point round which matters of more general history group themselves."—Standard.

To be completed in 18 divisions, stiff paper covers, at 5s. each; or in 4 volumes, imperial 8vo, cloth, at 25s. each.

Ogilvie's Imperial Dictionary Of the English Language.

A complete Encyclopedic Lexicon, Literary, Etymological, Scientific, Technological, and Pronouncing. By JOHN OGILVIE, LL.D. NEW EDITION. Carefully revised and greatly augmented. Edited by CHARLES ANNANDALE, M.A., LL.D. Illustrated by above three thousand engravings on wood, and a series of engravings on steel specially prepared for this edition.

"So far as vocabulary and treatment are concerned, we should not wish for anything better than the new 'Imperial.' Few, except specialists, are likely to come across terms not to be found here. . . . The etymology is clear and concise, and the illustrations are copious, appropriate and well executed."—The Times.

"A monument of patience, industry, good work. It is copious, it is trustworthy, it is beautifully illustrated, and it is admirably printed on good paper. . . . It will be for many years the most serviceable and most highly valued of English Dictionaries."—The Saturday Review.

To be completed in 5 divisions, royal 4to, 8s. each; or 20 parts, 2s. each.

Suggestions in Design;

A comprehensive series of Original Sketches in various Styles of Ornament, arranged for application in the Decorative and Constructive Arts, comprising 102 plates, containing more than 1100 distinct and separate "suggestions," by JOHN LEIGHTON, F.S.A. To which is added descriptive and historical letterpress, with above 200 explanatory engravings, by JAMES KELLAWAY COLLING, F.R.I.B.A.

These suggestions have not been taken from other examples, or collected from already published works apart from those by their author; they are throughout *original*, designed in the spirit, and with the proper art feeling of the various styles to which they severally belong, and are the accumulated result of long and arduous studies, extending over many years of investigation and thought.

This work will be found to be eminently suited to the wants of nearly every one who has occasion for decoration in whatever form;—to the worker in stone, wood, metal, ivory, glass, and leather,—to the house-painter, decorator, manufacturer of wall-papers, carpets, curtains, and floor-cloths,—to the potter, weaver, calico-printer, engraver and lithographer,—as well as to others too numerous to mention.

To be completed in 4 vols., super-royal 8vo, cloth elegant,*8s. 6d. each; or 14 parts, 2s. each.

The Cabinet of Irish Literature.

A Selection from the Works of the chief Poets, Orators, and Prose Writers of Ireland. Edited, with biographical sketches and literary notices, by CHARLES A. READ, F.R.H.S., author of "Tales and Stories of Irish Life," "Stories from the Ancient Classics," &c. Illustrated by a series of 32 admirable Portraits in mesochrome, specially prepared for this work.

The Publishers aim in this Work to supply a standard work where the genius, the fire, the pathos, the humour, and the eloquence of Irish Literature are adequately represented. The specimens selected, which will be arranged chronologically from the earliest to the present time, will both present a historical view of Irish Literature, and enable the reader to judge of the individual style and particular merit of each author, while to those not critically disposed the infinite variety presented in this convenient collective form will afford both instruction and amusement.

In two handsome vols., super-royal 8vo, 36s.; or 15 parts, 2s. each.

The Works of the Ettrick Shepherd,

IN POETRY AND PROSE. Centenary Edition. With a Biographical Memoir by the Rev. THOMAS THOMSON. Illustrated by Forty-four fine Engravings on steel, from Original Drawings by D. O. Hill, R.S.A., K. Halsewelle, A.R.S.A., W. Small, and J. Lawson.

Hogg's Works comprise *Tales in Prose*, illustrative of Border history and superstitions. They comprise likewise Poems of great imaginative power and descriptive beauty; Ballads full of humour and touches of tender pathos; and Songs which, besides being universally popular when first made public, are still cherished as among the finest productions of our native lyric muse.

"Certainly we may now recognize him as the only one of Burns' followers who deserves to be named in the same breath."—Press.

To be completed in 14 parts, medium 8vo, price 2s. each; or 4 divisions in stiff covers, cloth back, at 6s. each, and one at 4s.

Modern Steam Practice and Engineering:

A Guide to Approved Methods of Construction, and the Principles relating thereto, with Examples, Practical Rules, and Formulæ. By JOHN G. WINTON, Engineer, Author of "Modern Workshop Practice." Assisted by W. J. MILLAR, C.E., Secretary of the Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland; Author of "Principles of Mechanics," &c. Illustrated by numerous Engravings.

The object of the present publication is to supply the practical Engineer, Shipbuilder, and Mechanic with a trustworthy guide to the varied operations of the Workshop and the Building-yard in a convenient form and at a moderate price. It is written by practical men, well acquainted with the operations which they describe, and seeks to convey to the workman detailed directions regarding his work in language such as he is daily familiar with; and, at the same time, to state clearly the higher principles upon which these operations are based and on which they depend for success.

In 20 parts, super-royal 4to, 2s. each.

The Carpenter and Joiner's Assistant.

By JAMES NEWLANDS, Borough Engineer of Liverpool, *New and Improved Edition*. Being a Comprehensive Treatise on the selection, preparation, and strength of Materials, and the mechanical principles of Framing, with their applications in Carpentry, Joinery, and Hand Railing; also, a complete treatise on Lines; and an Illustrated Glossary of Terms used in Architecture and Building. Illustrated by above One Hundred Engraved Plates, containing above Nine Hundred Figures; and above Seven Hundred Geometric, Constructive, and Descriptive Figures interspersed throughout the text.

"We know of no treatise on Carpentry and Joinery which at all approaches this in merit. . . . We strongly urge our practical mechanics to obtain and study it."—Mechanic's Magazine.

Third Edition. Large 8vo (1000 pp.), cloth 16s., or half morocco, 20s.

A Manual of Rules, Tables, and Data

FOR MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, based on the most recent investigations. By DANIEL KINNEAR CLARK, author of "Railway Machinery," &c. &c. Illustrated with numerous Diagrams.

This book comprises the leading rules and data, with numerous tables, of constant use in calculations and estimates relating to Practical Mechanics:—presented in a reliable, clear, and handy form, with an extent of range and completeness of detail that has not been attempted hitherto. This (the third) edition has been carefully revised, and in its preparation advantage has been taken of many suggestions made by those using the former editions.

"Mr. Clark writes with great clearness, and he has a great power of condensing and summarizing facts, and he has thus been enabled to embody in his volume a collection of data relating to mechanical engineering, such as has certainly never before been brought together. We regard the book as one which no mechanical engineer in regular practice can afford to be without."—Engineering.

Foolscap 8vo, bound, 7s. 6d.

Peddie's Practical Measurer.

A Series of Tables for the use of Wood Merchants, Builders, Carpenters, Joiners, Sawyers, Plasterers, Painters, Glaziers, Masons, Bricklayers, &c. New edition, greatly enlarged.

To this edition have been added Tables for facilitating calculations of timber in Deals and Battens; and also for estimating the price of Boards of various thickness, and for other purposes. The Work now presents the most extensive and complete set of Tables of the kind that is in the market, and contains information only to be elsewhere obtained from several books.

Foolscap 8vo, bound, 9s.

The Agriculturist's Calculator.

A Series of Forty-five Tables for Land Measuring, Draining, Manuring, Planting, Weight of Hay and Cattle by Measurement, Building, &c. &c.

It is believed that scarcely anything can occur in Farm calculations for which these Tables do not provide valuable assistance; and that the care and labour bestowed on their compilation entitle them to the confidence of the agricultural community.

"I have looked over the tables in your Agriculturist's Calculator, and, without hesitation, give it as my opinion that the Work will be of the greatest advantage to all connected with land. Every Proprietor, Factor and Farmer should have it."—THOMAS BALMER, Commissioner for His Grace the Duke of Richmond.

New Issue, with Questions. Eleven vols., post 8vo, cloth, red edges, 3s. 6d. each.

Notes on the New Testament,

Explanatory and Practical. With *Questions* for Bible Classes and Sunday-schools. By ALBERT BARNES. Edited by the Rev. ROBERT FREW, D.D. With numerous additional Notes, and an extensive series of beautiful Engravings and Maps, not in any other edition.

Shortly before his decease the Author completed a revision of his Notes on the New Testament, to the end of the Acts of the Apostles, the only section of the New Testament respecting the exposition and illustration of which modern research had accumulated new and important materials.

In making this new issue the first three volumes have been re-set so as to embody the author's latest corrections and additions, and they are now presented for the first time to readers in this country. This issue will consequently be the most complete and perfect of any published in Great Britain.

Additional Notes have been supplied by the Editor, chiefly in the Epistles, giving an epitome of the general doctrinal opinions held in this country.

This issue of *Barnes' Notes* will be enriched and rendered more useful by the addition of the valuable series of *Questions* "designed for Bible-classes and Sunday-schools" prepared by the Author.

The Illustrative Engravings, which enable the reader to realize New Testament scenes in a vivid and attractive manner, consist of views of the chief places of interest referred to in the New Testament, derived from the most authentic sources.

In nine volumes, post 8vo, cloth, red edges, 4s. each.

Notes on the Old Testament.

By ALBERT BARNES. Comprising the Books of Job, Psalms, Isaiah, and Daniel. Edited by the Rev. ROBERT FREW, D.D. With numerous additional Notes, and many illustrative Engravings not in any other Edition.

The editorial introduction to the Book of Job—the additions to the Notes on the Book of Psalms, from the most distinguished expositors at home and abroad, selected on the principle of more fully exhibiting the scope of the Psalms, or because of some special excellence in the extract—and the annotations on the books of Isaiah and Daniel, give a peculiar value to this Edition.

The Illustrations consist of 32 page Engravings and 3 folding Maps, besides 170 subjects printed in the text; and include some unusual but striking illustrations of passages of Holy Writ not usually deemed susceptible of pictorial illustration.

Royal 4to, cloth, 27s. 6d.; or in 25 parts at 1s. each.

Family Worship:

A Series of Devotional Services for every Morning and Evening throughout the Year, adapted to the purposes of Domestic Worship; Prayers for Particular Occasions, and Prayers suitable for Children, &c. By above TWO HUNDRED EVANGELICAL MINISTERS. Illustrated by Twenty-six fine Engravings on steel. New and Improved Edition.

The work comprises 732 Services, adapted to be used in the family, being a service for every MORNING and EVENING throughout the year, with Special Services for the Morning and Evening of New Year's-Day. Each Service is composed of Praise, Prayer, and Scriptural Exposition. Thus it points out a suitable psalm or hymn to be sung; next it refers to a portion of Scripture to be read from the Bible itself, and adds some brief explanatory and practical remarks; and the whole closes with a plain and earnest Prayer.

Complete in 16 parts, royal 4to, price 2s. each; forming a handsome volume.

The Life of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,

And the Lives of the Apostles and Evangelists. By Rev. JOHN FLEETWOOD, D.D. With Copious Illustrative and Explanatory Notes selected from the Works of the most eminent modern writers on New Testament History. Profusely illustrated by Engravings.

The numerous editions of this work which have been published testify sufficiently to its acceptance with the Christian public. It evidently supplies a felt want by presenting in one consecutive history the several narratives of our Lord's life and sayings while on earth recorded by the four Evangelists.

