MEMCAL ^SC]HI©©L UIBmAmT rhomas W.Hiantington,3r Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/darwinafterdarwi02romarich DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN II POST-DARWINIAN QUESTIONS HEREDITY AND UTILITY BY THE SAME AUTHOR. DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN. An Exposition of the Darwinian Theory and a Discussion of Post-Darwinian Questions. 1. The Darwinian Theory. With Portrait of Darwin. 460 pages. 125 illustrations. Cloth, fa. 00. 2. Post-Darwinian Questions. Edited by Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan. With Portrait of G. J. Romanes. 338 pages. Cloth, $1.50. 3. Post-Darwinian Questions. Isolation and Phy- siological Selection. Edited by Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan. With Portrait of Mr. J. T. Gulick. 181 pages. Cloth, $1.00. All three volumes together, $4.00 net. AN EXAMINATION OF WEISMANNISM. With Portrait of Weismann. 236 pages. Cloth, $1.00. THOUGHTS ON RELIGION. Edited by Charles Gore, M.A., Canon of Westminster. Third Edition. 184 pages. Cloth, gilt top, $1.25. THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY, 324 Dearborn Street, Chicago. DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN AN EXPOSITION OF THE DARWINIAN THEORY AND A DISCUSSION OF POST-DARWINIAN QUESTIONS BY THE LATE GEORGE JOHN^OMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S. Honorary Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge II POST-DARWINIAN QUESITONS HEREDITY AND UTILITY THIRD EDITION. THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY 1 906 CHAPTER I. CCFYRIGHTED BY The Open pouRx Publishing Co. CHICAGO, ILL., 1895. Srf)e fLaftrsHit )9rr00 R. R. DONNELLEV & SONS CO. CHICAGO PREFACE As Its sub-title announces, the present volume is mainly devoted to a consideration of those Post- Darwinian Theories which involve fundamental questions of Heredity and Utility. As regards Heredity, I have restricted the discussion almost exclusively to Professor Weismann's views, partly because he is at present by far the most im- portant writer upon this subject, and partly because his views with regard to it raise with most distinctness the issue which lies at the base of all Post-Darwinian speculation touching this subject -the issue as to the inheritance or non-inheritance of acquired characters. My examination of the Utility question may well seem to the general reader needlessly elaborate ; for to such a reader it can scarcely fail to appear that the doctrine which I am assailing has been broken to fragments long before the criticism has drawn to a close. But from my previous experience of the hardness with which this fallacious doctrine dies, I do not deem it safe to allow even one fragment of it to remain, lest, hydra-like, it should re-develop into a 3 vi Preface. its formed proportions. And I can scarcely think that naturalists who know the growing prevalence of the doctrine, and who may have followed the issues of previous discussions with regard to it, will accuse me of being more over-zealous in my attempt to make a full end thereof. One more remark. It is a misfortune attending the aim and scope of Part II that they bring me into frequent discord with one or other of the most eminent of Post- Darwinian writers— especially with Mr. Wallace. But such is the case only because the subject-matter of this volume is avowedly re- stricted to debateable topics, and because I choose those naturalists who are deservedly held in most esteem to act spokesmen on behalf of such Post- Darwinian views as appear to me doubtful or erro- neous. Obviously, however, differences of opinion on particular points ought not to be taken as imply- ing any failure on my part to recognize the general scientific authority of these men, or any inability to appreciate their labours in the varied fields of Biology. G. J. R. Christ Church, Oxford. NOTE Some time before his death Mr. Romanes decided to publish those sections of his work which deal with Heredity and Utility, as a separate volume, leaving Isolation and Physiological Selection for the third and concluding part of Darwitiy and after Darwin* Most of the matter contained in this part was already in type, but was not finally corrected for the press. The alterations made therein are for the most part verbal. Chapter IV was type-written ; in it, too, no altera- tions of any moment have been made. For Chapters V and VI there were notes and iso- lated paragraphs not yet arranged. I had promised during his life to ^yrite for Mr. Romanes Chapter V on the basis of these notes, extending it in such ways as seemed to be desirable. In that case it would have been revised and amended by the author and received his final sanction. Death annulled this friendly compact ; and since, had I written the chapter myself, it could not receive that imprimatur which would have given its chief value, I have decided VIU Note. to arrange the material that passed into my hands without adding anything of importance thereto. The substance of Chapters V and VI is therefore entirely the author's : even the phraseology is his ; the arrange- ment only is by another hand. Such parts of the Preface as more particularly refer to Isolation and Physiological Selection are reserved for publication in Part III. A year or more must elapse before that part will be ready for publication. Mr. F. Howard Collins has, as a kindly tribute to the memory of the author, read through the proofs. Messrs. F. Darwin, F. Gal ton, H. Seebohm, and others, have rendered incidental assistance. After much search I am unable to give the references to one or two passages. I have allowed a too flattering reference to myself to stand, in accordance with a particular injunction of Mr. Romanes given shortly before that sad day on which he died, leaving many to mourn the loss of a personal friend most bright, lovable, and generous- hearted, and thousands to regret that the hand which had written so much for them would write for them no more. C. Ll. m. University College, Bristol, Aprils 1894. CONTENTS CHAPTER I. PAGB Introductory: The Darwinism of Darwin and of the Post-Darwinian Schools i CHAPTER II. Characters as Hereditary and Acquired {Preliminary) 39 CHAPTER III. Characters as Hereditary a^id Acquired {Continued). A. Indirect evidence in favour of the Inheritance of Ac- quired Characters 60 "&, Inherited effects of Use and of Disuse , • • • 95 CHAPTER IV. Characters as Hereditary and Acquired {Continued). C. Experimental evidence in favour of the Inheritance of Acquired Char outers . . • • • .103 CHAPTER V. Characters as Hereditary and Acquired {Continued). A. and B. Direct and Indirect Evidence in favour of the Non-inheritance of Acquired Characters . . -133 C. Experimental Evidence as to the Noninhetitanu 0f Acquired Characters 143 X Contents. CHAPTER VI. VAGB Characters as Hereditary and Acquired {Conclusion) 150 CHAPTER VII. Characters as Adaptive and Specific . • • .159 CHAPTER VIII. Characters as Adaptive and Specific (^Continued), 1. Climate aoo II. Food 317 III. Sexual Selection 219 IV. Isolation 223 V. Laws of Growth • 226 CHAPTER IX. Characters as Adaptive and Specific {Continued) . .328 CHAPTER X. Characters as Adaptive and Specific {Concluded) , . 251 Summary 274 Appendix I. On Panmixia 291 Appendix II. On Characters as Adaptive and Specific . 307 Note A to Page 57 333 Note B to Page 89 337 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Portrait of George John Romanes .... Froniispieu Diagram of Prof. Weismann's Theories 43 Fig. I. Guinea pigs, showing gangrene of ears due to injury of restiform bodies Il8 Fig. 2. Old Irish Pig (after Richardson) . . • • . l88 Fig. 3. Skulls of Niata Ox and of Wild White Ox . . • 193 Fig. 4. Lower teeth of Orang (after Tomes) .... 267 DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN. CHAPTER I. Introductory : The Darwinism of Darwin, AND OF THE POST-DARWINIAN SCHOOLS. It is desirable to open this volume of the treatise on Darwin and after Darwin by taking a brief survey of the general theory of descent, first, as this was held by Darwin himself, and next, as it is now held by the several divergent schools of thought which have arisen since Darwin's death. The most important of the questions in debate is one which I have already had occasion to mention, while dealing, in historical order, with the objections that were brought against the theory of natural selection during the life-time of Darwin ^. Here, how- ever, we must consider it somewhat more in detail, and justify by quotation what was previously said regarding the very definite nature of his utterances upon the matter. This question is whether natural selection has been the sole, or but the main, cause of organic evolution. * Part I, pp. 253-256. II. I! 2 DarwiUy and after Darwin, Must we regard survival of the fittest as the one and only principle which has been concerned in the progressive modification of living forms, or are we to suppose that this great and leading principle has been assisted by other and subordinate principles, without the co-operation of which the results, as presented in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, could not have been effected ? Now Darwin's answer to this question was distinct and unequivocal. He stoutly resisted the doctrine that natural selection was to be regarded as the only cause of organic evolution. On the other hand, this opinion was — and still continues to be — persistently maintained by Mr. Wallace; and it con- stitutes the source of all the differences between his views and those of Darwin. Moreover, up to the time of Darwin's death, Mr. Wallace was absolutely alone in maintaining this opinion : the whole body of scientific thought throughout the world being against him ; for it was deemed improbable that, in the enormously complex and endlessly varied processes of organic evolution, only a single principle should be everywhere and exclusively concerned ^ But since Darwin's death there has been a great revolution of biological thought in favour of Mr. Wallace's opinion. And the reason for this revolution has been, that his doctrine of natural selection as the sole cause of organic evolution has received the corroborative support of Professor Weismann's theory of heredity — which has been more or less cordially embraced by a certain section of evolutionists, and which appears to carry the doctrine in question as a logical corollary, so far, at all events, as adaptive structures are concerned. ' Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, p. 47. Introduction. 3 Now in this opening chapter we shall have to do merely with a setting forth of Darwin's opinion : we are not considering how far that opinion ought to be regarded as having been in any measure dis- placed by the results of more recent progress. Such, then, being the only matter which here concerns us, I will supply a few brief quotations, to show how unequivocally Darwin has stated his views. First, we may take what he says upon the " Lamarckian factors ^ ; " and next we may consider what he says with regard to other factors, or, in general, upon natural selection not being the sole cause of organic evolution. '* Changed habits produce an inherited effect, as in the period of the flowering of plants when transported from one climate to another. With animals the increased use or disuse of parts has had a more marked influence ^" " There can be no doubt, from the facts given in this chapter, that extremely slight changes in the conditions of life sometimes, probably often, act in a definite manner on our domesticated productions ; and, as the action of changed conditions in causing indefinite variability is accumulative, so it may be with their definite action. Hence considerable and definite modifi- cations of structure probably follow from altered conditions acting during long series of generations V " How, again, can we explain the inherited effects of the use and disuse of particular organs ? The domesticated duck flies ' So far as we shall be concerned with them throughout this trea- tise, the "Lamarckian factors" consist in the supposed transmission of acquired characters, whether the latter be due to the diiect influence of external conditions of life on the one hand, or to the inherited effects of use and disuse on the other. For the phrase " inherited effects of use and disuse," I shall frequently employ the term "use-inheritance," which has been coined by Mr. Piatt Ball as a more convenient expression. ^ Origin of Species, 6th ed. p. 8. * Variation &c. 2nd ed. ii. p. 280. B 2 4 Darwin, and after Darwin, less and walks more than the wild duck, and its limb bones have become diminished and increased in a corresponding manner in comparison with those of the wild duck. A horse is trained to certain paces, and the colt inherits similar consensual movements. The domesticated rabbit becomes tame from dose confinement; the dog, intelligent from associating with man; the retriever is taught to fetch and carry; and these mental endowments and bodily powers are all inherited Nothing in the whole circuit of physiology is more wonderfu.. How can the use or disuse of a particular limb or of the bram affect a small aggregate of reproductive cells, seated in a distant part of the body, in such a manner that the being developed from these cells inherits the characters of either one or both parents ? ... In the chapters devoted to inheritance, it was shown that a multitude of newly acquired characters, whether injurious or beneficial, whether of the lowest or highest vital importance, are often faithfully transmitted '.'' "When discussing special cases, Mr. Mivart passes over the effects of the increased use and disuse of parts, which I have always maintained to be highly important, and have treated in my * Variation under Domestication' at greater length than, as I believe, any other writer . ' So much for the matured opinion of Darwin touching the validity of the theory of use-inheritance. Turning now to his opinion on the question whether or not there are yet any further factors concerned in the process of organic evolution, I think it will be sufficient to quote a single passage from the Origin of Species. The first paragraph of the " Conclusion " is devoted to a rhumi of his views upon this matter, and con- sists of the following most emphatic words. " I have now recapitulated the facts and considerations which have thoroughly convinced me that species have been modified, during a long course of descent. This has been effected chiefly through the natural seleclion of numerous successive, slight, * Variation &c. ii. p. 367. " Origin of Specits, p. 176. Introduction. 5 fevourable variations; aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts ; and in an un- important manner, that is in relation to adaptive structures, whether past or present, by the direct action of external con- ditions, and by variations which seem to us in our ignorance to arise spontaneously. It appears that I formerly underrated the frequency and value of these latter forms of variation, as leading to permanent modifications of structure independently of natural selection. But as my conclusions have lately been much mis- represented, and it has been stated that I attribute the modifica- tion of species exclusively to natural selection, I may be permitted to remark that in the first edition of this work, and subsequently, I placed in a most conspicuous position — namely, at the close of the Introduction -the following words : * 1 am convinced that natural selection has been the main, but not the exclusive means of modification.' This has been of no avail. Great is the power of steady misrepresentation ; but the history of science shows that fortunately this power does not long endure." In the whole range of Darwin's writings there cannot be found a passage so strongly worded as this : it presents the only note of bitterness in all the thousands of pages which he has published. Therefore I do not think it is necessary to supply any further quotations for the purpose of proving the state of his opinion upon the point in question. But, be it carefully noted, from this great or radical difference of opinion between the joint originators of the theory of natural selection, all their other differ- ences of opinion arise ; and seeing that since the death of Darwin a large number of naturalists have gone over to the side of Wallace, it seems desirable here to state categorically what these other or sequent points of difference are. Without at present discuss- ing them, therefore. I will merely set them out in a tabular form, in order that a clear perception may be Darwiny and after Darwin, gained of their logical connexion with this primary point of difference. Thetheory of Natural Selection according to Darwin. Natural Selection has been the main means of modifica- tion, not excepting the case of Man. {a) Therefore it is a question of evidence whether the La- marckian factors have co- operated. {b) Neither all species, nor, a fortiori^ all specific char- acters, have been due to natural selection. (c) Thus the principle of Utility is not of universal ap- plication, even where species are concerned. {d) Thus, also, the sugges- tion as to Sexual Selection, or any other supplementary cause of modification, may be enter- tained ; and, as in the case of the Lamarckian factors, it is a question of evidence whether, or how far, they have co- operated. {e) No detriment arises to the theory of natural selection as a theory of the origin of species by entertaining the possibility, or the probability, of supplementary factors. (/) Cross-sterility in species cannot possibly be due to natural selection. Thetheory of Natural Selection according to Wallace. Natural Selection has been the sole means of modification, excepting in the case of Man. (at) Therefore it is ante- cedently impossible that the Lamarckian factors can have co-operated. [b) Not only all species, but all specific characters, must necessarily have been due to natural selection. {c) Thus the principle of Utility must necessarily be of universal application, where species are concerned. {d) Thus, also, the sugges- tion as to Sexual Selection, or of any other supplementary cause of modification, must be ruled out ; and, as in the case of the Lamarckian factors, their co-operation deemed im- possible. {e) The possibility — and, a fort tori \.h.t probability — of any supplementary factors cannot be entertained without serious detriment to the theory of natural selection, as a theory of the origin of species. (/) Cross-sterility in species is probably due to natural selection ^ ' This, to the best of my judgement, is the fairest extract that I can give of Mr. Wallace's most recently published opinions on the points in Introduction. 7 As it will be my endeavour in the ensuing chapters to consider the rights and the wrongs of these anti- thetical propositions, I may reserve further quotations from Darwin's works, which will show that the above is a correct epitome of his views as contrasted with those of Wallace and the Neo-Darwinian school of Weismann. But here, where the object is merely a statement of Darwin's theory touching the points in which it differs from those of Wallace and Weis- mann, it will be sufficient to set forth these points of difference in another and somewhat fuller form. So far then as we are at present concerned, the fol- lowing are the matters of doctrine which have been clearly, emphatically, repeatedly, and uniformly ex- pressed throughout the whole range of Darwin's writings. 1. That natural selection has been the main means of modification. 2. That, nevertheless, it has not been the only means ; but has been supplemented or assisted by the co-operation of other causes. 3. That the most " important '* of these other causes has been the inheritance of functionally-produced modifications (use-inheritance); but this only because the transmission of such modifications to progeny must always have had immediate reference to adaptive ends, as distinguished from merely useless change. 4. That there are sundry other causes which lead question. [In particular as regards (a) see Darwinism pp. 435-6.] But with regard to some of them, his expression of opinion is not always consistent, as we shall find in detail later on. Besides, I am here taking Mr. Wallace as representative of the Neo- Darwinian school, one or other prominent member of which has given emphatic expression to each of the above propositions. 8 Darwifiy and after Darwin. to merely useless change — in particular, "the direct action of external conditions and variations which seem to us in our ignorance to arise spontaneously." 5. Hence, that the " principle of utility," far from being of universal occurrence in the sphere of animate nature, is only of what may be termed highly general occurrence ; and, therefore, that certain other advocates of the theory of natural selection were mistaken in representing the universality of this principle as following by way of necessary consequence from that theory. 6. Cross-sterility in species cannot possibly be due to natural selection ; but everywhere arises as a result of some physiological change having exclusive refer- ence to the sexual system — a change which is probably everywhere due to the same cause, although what this cause could be Darwin was confessedly unable to suggest Such, then, was the theory of evolution as held by Darwin, so far as the points at present before us are concerned. And, it may now be added, that the longer he lived, and the more he pondered these points, the less exclusive was the role which he as- signed to natural selection, and the more importance did he attribute to the supplementary factors above named. This admits of being easily demonstrated by comparing successive editions of his works ; a method adopted by Mr. Herbert Spencer in his essay on the Factors of Organic Evolution. My object in thus clearly defining Darwin's attitude regarding these sundry points is twofold. In the first place, with regard to merely historical accuracy, it appears to me undesirable that naturalists Introduction. 9 should endeavour to hide certain parts of Darwin's teaching, and give undue prominence to others. In the second place, it appears to me still more un- desirable that this should be done — as it usually is done — for the purpose of making it appear that Darwin's teaching did not really differ very much from that of Wallace and Weismann on the important points in question. I myself believe that Darwin's judgement with regard to all these points will eventually prove more sound and accurate than that of any of the recent would-be improvers upon his system ; but even apart from this opinion of my own it is undesirable that Darwin's views should be misrepresented, whether the misrepre- sentation be due to any unfavourable bias against one side of his teaching, or to sheer carelessness in the reading of his books. Yet the new school of evo- lutionists, to which allusion has now so frequently been made, speak of their own modifications of Darwin's teaching as "pure Darwinism," in contradistinction to what they call " Lamarckism." In other words, they represent the principles of '• Darwinism " as standing in some kind of opposition to those of '• Lamarckism " : the Darwinian principle of natural selection, they think, is in itself enough to account for all the facts of adaptation in organic nature. There- fore they are eager to dispense with the Lamarckian principle of the inherited effects of use and disuse, together with the direct influence of external conditions of life, and all or any other causes of modification which either have been, or in the future may possibly be, suggested. Now, of course, there is no reason why any one should not hold these or any other opinions lo Darwin f and after Darwin, to which his own independent study of natural science may lead him ; but it appears to me that there is the very strongest reason why any one who deviates from the carefully formed opinions of such a man as Darwin, should above all things be careful to be absolutely fair in his representations of them; he should be scrupulously jealous, so to speak, of not letting it appear that he is unjustifiably throwing over his own opinions the authority of Darwin's name. But in the present case, as we have seen, not only do the Neo-Darwinians strain the teachings of Dar- win ; they positively reverse those teachings — repre- senting as anti-Darwinian the whole of one side of Darwin's system, and calling those who continue to accept that system in its entirety by the name " Lamarckians " I know it is sometimes said by members of this school, that in his utilization of Lamarckian principles as accessory to his own, Darwin was actuated by motives of "generosity." But a more preposterous suggestion could not well be made. We may fearlessly challenge any one who speaks or writes in such a way, to show any other instance where Darwin's great generosity of dis- position had the effect of influencing by one hair's breadth his still greater loyalty to truth. Moreover, and with special regard to this particular case, I would point out that in no one of his many allu- sions to, and often lengthy dicussions of, these so- called Lamarckian principles, does he ever once introduce the name of Lamarck; while, on the other hand, in the only places where he does so— whether in his books or in his now published letters— he Introduction. ii does so in order to express an almost contemptuous dissatisfaction, and a total absence of obligation. Hence, having regard to the "generosity" with which he always acknowledged obligations, there can be no reasonable doubt that Darwin was not in the smallest degree influenced by the speculative writings of Lamarck ; or that, even if Lamarck had never lived, the Origin of Species would have differed in any single particular from the form in which it now stands. Finally, it must not be forgotten that Darwin's acceptance of the theory of use- inherit- ance was vitally essential to his theory of Pangenesis — that 'beloved child" over which he had *' thought so much as to have lost all power of judging it^." What has just been said touching the relations between Darwin's theory and that of Lamarck, applies with equal force to the relations between Darwin's theory and any other theory appertain- ing to evolution which has already been, or may hereafter be, propounded. Yet so greatly have some of the Neo-Darwinians misunderstood the teach- ings of Darwin, that they represent as "Darwinian heresy" any suggestions in the way of factors "supple- mentary to," or '^co-operative with" natural selection. Of course, if these naturalists were to avow themselves followers of Wallace, instead of followers of Darwin, they would be perfectly justified in repudiating any such suggestions as, ipso facto heretical. But, as we have now seen, through all his life Darwin differed from Wallace with regard to this very point ; and therefore, unlike Wallace, he was always ready to en- tertain " additional suggestions " regarding the causes ' Life and Letters y vol. iii. pp. 72 and 75. la DarwiUy and after Darwin. of organic evolution — several of which, indeed, he himself supplied. Hence we arrive at this curious state of matters. Those biologists who of late years have been led by Weismann to adopt the opinions of Wallace, represent as anti-Darwinian the opinions of other biologists who still adhere to the unadulterated doctrines of Darwin. Weismann's Essays on Heredity (which argue that natural selection is the only pos- sible cause of adaptive modification) and Wallace's work on Darwmism (which in all the respects where any charge of " heresy " is concerned directly contradicts the doctrine of Darwin) — these are the writings which are now habitually represented by the Neo-Darwinians as setting forth the views of Darwin in their 'pure" form. The result is that, both in conversation and in the press, we habitually meet with complete inversions of the truth, which show the state of confusion into which a very simple matter has been wrought by the eagerness of certain naturalists to identify the views of Darwin with those of Wallace and Weismann. But we may easily escape this confusion, if we remember that wherever in the writings of these naturalists there occur such phrases as "pure Darwinism" we are to understand pure Wallaceism, or the pure theory of natural selection to the exclusion of any supplementary theory. Therefore it is that for the sake of clearness I coined, several years ago, the terms " Neo- Darwin- ian " and " Ultra- Darwinian " whereby to designate the school in question. So much, then, for the Darwinism of Darwin, as contrasted with the Darwinism of Wallace, or, what Introduction, 13 is the same thing, of the Neo-Darwinian school of Weismann. Next we may turn, by way of antithesis, to the so-called '* Neo-Lamarckian '* school of the United States. For, by a curious irony of fate, while the Neo-Darwinian school is in Europe seeking to out-Darwin Darwin by assigning an exclusive pre- rogative to natural selection in both kingdoms of animate nature, the Neo-Lamarckian school is in America endeavouring to reform Darwinism in precisely the opposite direction — viz. by transferring the sovereignty from natural selection to the principles of Lamarck. Without denying to natural selection a more or less important part in the process of organic evolution, members of this school believe that much greater importance ought to be assigned to the inherited effects of use and disuse than was assigned to these agencies by Darwin. Perhaps this noteworthy state of affairs, within a decade of Darwin's death, may lead us to anticipate that his judgement — standing, as it does, between these two extremes — will eventually provie the most accurate of all, with respect to the relative importance of these factors of evolution. But, be this as it may, I must now offer a few remarks upon the present position of the matter. In the first place, to any one who (with Darwin and against Weismann) admits not only the abstract pos- sibility, but an actual working, of the Lamarckian factors, it becomes difficult to determine, even approximately, the degrees of value which ought to be ascribed to them and to natural selection respec- tively. For, since the results are in both cases identical in kind (as. adaptive changes of organic types), where 14 Darwin^ and after Darwin, both sets of causes are supposed to be in operation together, we have no means of estimating the relative shares which they have had in bringing about these results. Of course there are large numbers of cases where it cannot possibly be supposed that the Lamarckian factors have taken any part at all in pro- ducing the observed effects ; and therefore in such cases there is almost full agreement among evolutionists in theoretically ascribing such effects to the exclusive agency of natural selection. Of such, for instance, are the facts of protective colouring, of mimicry, of the growth of parts which, although useful, are never active (e.g. shells of mollusks. hard coverings of seeds), and so on. But in the majority of cases where adaptive structures are concerned, there is no means of discriminating between the influences of the Lamarckian and the Darwinian factors. Conse- quently, if by the Neo-Lamarckian school we under- stand all those naturalists who assign any higher importance to the Lamarckian factors than was assigned to them by Darwin, we may observe that members of this school differ very greatly among themselves as to the degree of importance that ought to be assigned. On the one hand we have, in Europe, Giard, Perrier, and Eimer, who stand nearer to Dar- win than do a number of the American representatives — of whom the most prominent are Cope, Osborn, Packard, Hyatt, Brooks, Ryder, and Dall. The most extreme of these is Professor Cope, whose collection of essays entitled The Origin of the Fittest, as well as his more recent and elaborate monograph on The Development of the Hard Parts of the Mammalia, represent what appears even to some other members Introduction, 15 of his school an extravagant estimate of the impor- tance of Lamarckian principles. But the most novel, and in many respects the most remarkable school of what may be termed Anti-selectionists is one which is now (1894) rapidly increasing both in numbers and in weight, not only in the New World, but also in Germany, and to a lesser extent, in Great Britain. This school, without being either Lamarckian or Darwinian (for its individual members differ widely from one another in these respects) maintains a principle which it deems of more importance than either use-inheritance or natural selection. This prin- ciple it calls Self-adaptation. It is chiefly botanists who constitute this school, and its principal representa- tives, in regard to authority, are Sachs, Pfeffer and Henslow. Apart from topics which are to be dealt with in subsequent chapters, the only matters of much impor- tance which have been raised in the Post-Darwinian period are those presented by the theories of Geddes, Cope. Hyatt, and others, and certain more or less novel ideas set forth in Wallace's Darwinism. Mr. Geddes has propounded a new theory of the origin of species, which in his judgement supersedes to a large extent the theory of natural selection. He has also, in conjunction with Mr. Thomson, propounded a theory of the origin of sex. For my own part, I cannot see that these views embody any principles or suggestions of a sufficiently definite kind to constitute them theories at all. In this respect the views of Mr. Geddes resemble those of Professors Cope, Hyatt, and others, on what they term *the i6 Darwin, and after Darwin, law of acceleration and retardation." In all these cases, so far as I can see, the so-called explanations are not in fact any explanations ; but either a mere re-statement of the facts, or else an enunciation of more or less meaningless propositions. Thus, when it is said that the evolution of any given type has been due to the " acceleration of growth-force " with respect to some structures, and the "retardation of growth - force " with respect to others, it appears evident that we have not any real explanation in terms of causality; we have only the form of an explanation in the terms of a proposition. All that has been done is to express the fact of evolution in somewhat obscure phraseology, since the very thing we want to know about this fact is — What are the causes of it as a fact. or the reasons which have led to the increase of some of the parts of any given type, and the concomitant decrease of others ? It is merely the facts themselves that are again presented by saying that the develop- ment has been in the one case accelerated, while in the other it has been retarded ^. So much for what may be termed this New World theory of the origin of species: it is a mere re-statement of the facts. Mr. Geddes' theory, on the ^ Take, for example, the following, which is a fair epitome of the whole : — ** I believe that this is the simplest mode of stating and explaining the law of variation ; that some forms acquire something which their parents did not possess; and that those which acquire something additional have to pass through more numerous stai,'es than their ancestors; and those which lose something pass through fewer stages than their ancestors ; and these processes are expressed by the terms "acceleration " and "retardation " {Origin of the Fittest, pp 125, 226, and 297). Even if this be "the simplest mode of stating the law of variation," it obviously does nothing in the way of explaining the law. Introduction. 17 other hand, although more than a mere re-statement of the facts, appears to me too vague to be of any- explanatory service. His view is that organic evolu- tion has everywhere depended upon an antagonism, within the limits of the same organism, between the processes of nutrition and those of reproduction. But although he is thus able hypothetically to explain certain facts — such as the shortening of a flower-spike into a composite flower — the suggestion is obviously inadequate to meet, even hypothetically, most of the facts of organic evolution, and especially the develop- ment of adaptive structures. Therefore, it seems to me, we may dismiss it even as regards the comparatively few facts which it might conceivably explain— seeing that these same facts may be equally well explained by the causes which are already known to operate in other cases. For it is the business of natural selection to ensure that there shall nowhere be any needless expenditure of vital energy, and, conse- quently, that everywhere the balance between nutrition and reproduction shall be most profitably adjusted. Similarly with respect to the theory of the Origin of Sex, I am unable to perceive even this much of scientific relevancy. As stated by its authors the theory is that the female is everywhere *' anabolic," as compared with the male, which is " katabolic." By anabolic is meant comparative inactivity of proto- plasmic change due to a nutritive winding up of molecular constitution, while by katabolic is meant the opposite condition of comparative activity due to a dynamic running down of molecular constitution. How, then, can the origin of sex be explained, or the causes which led to the difl'erentiation of the sexes be II. c i8 Darwin^ and after Darwin, shown, by saying that the one sex is anabolic and the other katabolic ? In so far as these verbal statements serve to express what is said to be a general fact — namely, that the female sexual elements are less mobile than the male — they merely serve to re-state this general fact in terminology which, as the authors themselves observe, is "unquestionably ugly." But in so far as any question of origin or causality is con- cerned, it appears to me that there is absolutely no meaning in such statements. They belong to the order of merely formal explanations, as when it is said that the toxic qualities of morphia are due to this drug possessing a soporific character. Much the same, in my opinion, has to be said of the Rev. G. Henslow's theory of the origin of species by what he terms "self-adaptation." Stated briefly his view is that there is no sufficient evidence of natural selection as a vera causa, while there is very abundant evidence of adjustments occurring without it, first in individual organisms, and next, by inherit- ance of acquired characters, in species. Now, much that he says in criticism of the selection theory is of considerable interest as such ; but when we pass from the critical to the constructive portions of his books and papers, we again meet with the want of clearness in thought between a statement of facts in terms of a proposition, and an explanation of them in those of causality. Indeed, I understand from private correspondence, that Mr. Henslow him- self admits the validity of this criticism ; for in answer to my questions, — '* How does Self-adapta- tion work in each case, and why should protoplasm be able to adapt itself into the millions of diverse Introduction, 19 mechanisms in nature ? '* — he writes, " Self-adaptation does not profess to be a vera causa at all ; for the true causes of variation can only be found in the answer to your [above] questions, and I must say at once, these questions cannot be answered'^ That is, they cannot be answered on the hypothesis of self-adaptation, which is therefore a statement of the facts of adaptation as distinguished from an explanation of them. Nevertheless, two things have here to be noted. In the first place, the statement of facts which Mr. Henslow has collected is of con- siderable theoretical importance as tending to show that there are probably causes of an internal kind (i.e. other than natural selection) which have been largely concerned in the adaptive modification of plants. And, in the second place, it is not quite true that the theory of self-adaptation is, as its author says in the sentences above quoted, a mere statement of the facts of adaptation, without any attempt at explaining their causes. For in his published words he does attempt to do so^ And, although I think his attempt is a conspicuous failure, I ought in fair- ness to give examples of it. His books are almost exclusively concerned in an application of his theory to the mechanisms of flowers for securing their own fertilization. These mechanisms he ascribes, in the case of entomophylous flowers, to the "thrusts," " strains," and other '* irritations " supplied to the flowers by their insect visitors, and consequent "reac- tions " of the vegetable " protoplasm." But no attempt is made to show why these " reactions " * Floral Structures (Internat. Sc. Ser. Ixiv. 1888): The Making of Flowers (Romance of Science Ser. 189 1) ; and Linn. Soc. Papers 1893-4. C 2 20 Darwin, and after Darwin. should be of an adaptive kind, so as to build up the millions of diverse and often elaborate mechanisms in question — including not only forms and move- ments, but also colours, odours, and secretions. For my own part I confess that, even granting to an ultra- Lamarcki an extent the inheritance of acquired characters, I could conceive of "self-adaptation" alone producing all such innumerable and diversified adjust- ments only after seeing, with Cardinal Newman, an angel in every flower. Yet Mr. Henslow somewhat vehemently repudiates any association between his theory and that of teleology. On the whole, then, I regard all the works which are here classed together (those by Cope, Geddes, and Henslow), as resembling one another both in their merits and defects. Their common merits lie in their erudition and much of their criticism, while their common defects consist on the one hand in not sufficiently distinguishing between mere statements and real explanations of facts, and, on the other, in not perceiving that the theories severally suggested as substitutes for that of natural selection, even if they be granted true, could be accepted only as co-operative factors, and by no stretch of logic as substitutes. Turning now to Mr. Wallace's work on Darwinism^ we have to notice, in the first place, that its doctrine differs from " Darwinism " in regard to the important dogma which it is the leading purpose of that work to sustain — namely, that "the law of utility" is, to all intents and purposes, universal, with the result that natural selection is virtually the only cause of organic Introduction, 2i evolution. I say "to all intents and purposes," or "virtually," because Mr. Wallace does not expressly maintain the abstract impossibility of laws and causes other than those of utility and natural selec- tion ; indeed, at the end of his treatise, he quotes with approval Darwin's judgement, that "natural selection has been the most important, but not the exclusive means of modification." Nevertheless, as he nowhere recognizes any other law or cause of adaptive evolution^, he practically concludes that, on induc- tive or empirical grounds, there is no such other law or cause to be entertained — until we come to the par- ticular case of the human mind. But even in making this one particular exception — or in representing that some other law than that of utility, and some other cause than that of natural selection, must have been concerned in evolving the mind of man — he is not approximating his system to that of Darwin. On the contrary, he is but increasing the divergence, for, of course, it was Darwin's view that no such exception could be legitimately drawn with respect to this particular instance. And if, as I understand must be the case, his expressed agreement with Darwin touching natural selection not being the only cause of adaptive evolution has reference to this point, the quotation is singularly inapt. Looking, then, to these serious differences between his own doctrine of evolution — both organic and mental — and that of Darwin, I cannot think that * "The law of correlation," and the "laws of growth," he does recognize; and shows that they furnish an explanation of the origin of many characters, which cannot be brought under " the law of utility." 22 Darwin, and after Darwin, Mr. Wallace has chosen a suitable title for his book ; because, in view of the points just mentioned, it is unquestionable that Darwinism differs more widely from the Origin of Species than does the Origin of Species from the writings of the Neo-Lamarckians. But, passing over this merely nominal matter, a few words ought to be added on the very material question regarding the human mind. In subsequent chapters the more general question, or that which relates to the range of utility and natural selection elsewhere, will be fully considered. Mr. Wallace says, — " The immense interest that attaches to the origin of the human race, and the amount of misconception which prevails regarding the essential teachings of Darwin's theory on the question, as well as regarding my own special views upon it, induce me to devote a final chapter to its discussion.'* Now I am not aware that there is any miscon- ception in any quarter as to the essential teach- ings of Darwin's theory on this question. Surely it is rather the case that there is a very general and very complete understanding on this point, both by the friends and the foes of Darwin's theory — so much so, indeed, that it is about the only point of similar import in all Darwin's writings of which this can be said. Mr. Wallace's ** special views " on the other hand are, briefly stated, that certain features, both of the morphology and the psychology of man, are inexplicable by natural selection — or indeed by any other cause of the kind ordinarily understood by the term natural : they can be explained only by supposing * the intervention of some distinct individual intelligence," which, however, need not Introduction. 23 necessarily be " one Supreme Intelligence," but some other order of Personality standing anywhere in " an infinite chasm between man and the Great Mind of the universe ^" Let us consider separately the corporeal and the mental peculiarities which are given as justifying this important conclusion. The bodily peculiarities are the feet, the hands, the brain, the voice, and the naked skin. As regards the feet Mr. Wallace writes, " It is difficult to see why the prehensile power [of the great toe] should have been taken away," because, although *' it may not be compatible with perfectly easy erect locomotion," " how can we conceive that early man, as an animal, gained anything by purely erect locomotion ^ ? " But surely it is not difficult to con- ceive this. In the proportion that our simian progenitors ceased to be arboreal in their habits (and there may well have been very good utilitarian reasons for such a change of habitat, analogous to those which are known to have occurred in the phylogenesis of countless pther animals), it would clearly have been of advantage to them that their already semi-erect attitude should have been rendered more and more erect. To name one among several probabilities, the more erect the attitude, and the more habitually it was assumed, the more would the hands have been liberated for all the important purposes of mani- pulation. The principle of the physiological division of labour would thus have come more and more into play : natural selection would therefore have rendered the upper extremities more and more suited to the ^ Natural Selection and Tropical NcUuf% p. 205 ; 1 891. ' Ibid. pp. 197-8. 24 DarwiUy and after Darwin. execution of these purposes, while at the same time it would have more and more adapted the lower ones to discharging the sole function of locomotion. For my own part, I cannot perceive any difficulty about this : in fact, there is an admirable repetition of the process in the ontogeny of our own children ^. Next, with regard to the hand, Mr. Wallace says, that it " contains latent capacities which are unused by savages, and must have been even less used by palaeolithic man and his still ruder predecessors." Thus, " it has all the appearance of an organ prepared for the use of civilized man 2." Even if this be true, however, it would surely be a dangerous argument to rely upon, seeing that we cannot say of how much importance it may have been for early man — or even apes — to have had their power of manipulation pro- gressively improved. But is the statement true ? It appears to me that if Mr. Wallace had endeavoured to imitate the manufactures that were practised by " palaeolithic man," he would have found the very best of reasons for cancelling his statement. For it is an extremely difficult thing to chip a flint into the form of an arrow-head : when made, the suitable attachment of it to a previously prepared arrow is no easy matter : neither a bow nor a bow-string could have been constructed by hands of much less per- fection than our own i and the slaying of game with the whole apparatus, when it has been constructed, requires a manual dexterity which we may be per- * For an excellent discussion on the ontogeny of the child in this connexion, see Some Laws of Heredity, by Mr. S. S. Buckman, pp. 390, et seq. (Proc. Coiteswold Nat. Field Club, vol. x. p. 3, 1892). ' loc. cit, p. 198. Introduction. 25 fectly certain that Mr. Wallace — unless he has practised the art from boyhood— does not possess. So it is with his similar argument that the human voice is more "powerful,*' more "flexible/' and pre- sents a greater '' range " and " sweetness " than the needs of savage life can be held to require. The futility of this argument is self-evident as regards " power." And although its weakness is not so obvious with respect to the other three qualities which are named, need we go further than the closely analogous case of certain birds to show the precariousness of arguing from such facts of organic nature to the special operation of " a superior intelligence " ? I can hardly suppose that Mr. Wallace will invoke any such agency for the purpose of explaining the " latent capacities " of the voice of a parrot. Yet, in many re- spects, these are even more wonderful than those of the human voice, albeit in a wild state they are " never required or used V Once more, with regard to the naked skin, it seems sufficient to quote the following passage from the first edition of the Descent of Man. "The Rev. T. R. Stebbing, in commenting on this view, remarks, that had Mr. Wallace ' employed his usual ingenuity on the question of man's hairless skin, he might have seen the possibility of its selection through its superior beauty, or the health attaching to superior cleanliness. At any rate it is surprising that he should picture to himself a superior * For a discussion of this remarkable case, see Mental Evolution in Animals, pp. 222-3. It appears to me that if Mr. Wallace's argument from the "latent capacities of the voice of Man" is good for anything, a fortiori it must be taken to prove that, in the case of the Parrot, " the organ has been prepared in anticipation " of the amusement which the cultivation of its latent capacities arous«» in " civilized man." 26 Darwin^ and after Darwin, intelligence plucking the hair from the .backs of savage men (to whom, according to his own account, it would have been use- ful and beneficial), in order that the descendants of the poor shorn wretches might, after many deaths irom cold and damp in the course of many generations,' have been forced to raise themselves in the scale of civilization through the practice of various arts, in the manner indicated by Mr. \\ allace '." To this it may be added that the Chimpanzee "Sally" was largely denuded of hair, especially on the back, or the part of " man's organization " on which Mr. Wallace lays special stress, as being in this respect out of analogy with other mammalia ^. Lastly, touching his statement that the brain of savage man is both quantitatively and qualitatively in advance of his requirements, it is here also sufficient to refer to Darwin's answer, as given in the Descent of Man, Mr. Wallace, indeed, ignores this answer in his recent re-publication of the argument ; but it is im- possible to understand why he should have done so. To me, at all events, it seems that one out of several considerations which Darwin advances is alone sufficient to show the futility of this argument. I allude to the consideration that the power of forming abstract ideas with the complex machinery of language as the vehicle of their expression, is probably of itself enough to account for both the mass and the structure of a savage's brain. But this leads us to the second division of Mr. Wallace's argu- * Descent of Matty ist Ed. ch. xx. (Trans. Dev. Assoc, for Science, 1 890). * The late Prof. Moseley informed me that, during his voyage on the Challenger, he had seen many men whose backs were well covered with hair. — For an excellent discussion of the whole question, chiefly in the light of embryology, see the paper by Buckman already alluded to, pp. 380-289. Also, for an account of an extraordinary hairy race of men, see Alone with the Hairy Ainu, by A. H. Savage Landor, 1893. Introduction. 2rj ment, or that derived from the mental endowments of mankind. Here the peculiarities called into evidence are, " the Mathematical Faculty," " the Artistic Faculties/' and "the Moral Sense." With regard to the latter, he avows himself a member of the intuitional school of ethics ; but does not prove a very powerful advocate as against the utilitarian \ It comes, then, to this. According to Mr. Wallace's * E. g. " The special faculties we have been discussing clearly point to the existence in man of something which he has not derived from his animal progenitors — something which we may best refer to as being of a spiritual essence or nature, capable of progressive de- velopment under favourable conditions. On the hypothesis of this spiritual nature, superadded to the animal nature of man, we are able to understand much that is otherwise mysterious or unintelligible in regard tb him, especially the enormous influence of ideas, principles, and beliefs over his whole life and action. Thus alone can we understand the constancy of the martyr, the unselfishness of the philanthropist, the devotion of the patriot, the enthusiasm of the artist, and the resolute and persevering search of the scientific worker after nature's secrets. Thus we may perceive that the love of truth, the delight in beauty, the passion for justice, and the thrill of exultation with which we hear of any act of courageous self-sacrifice, are the workings within us of a higher nature which has not been developed by means of the struggle for material existence." {Darwinism^ p. 474.) I have quoted this whole paragraph, because it is so inconsistent with the rest of Mr, W allace's system that a mere epitome of it might well have been suspected of error. Given an intellectual being, howsoever produced, and what is there " mysterious or unintelligible " in ** the enormous influence of ideas, principles, and beliefs over his whole life and action"? Or again, if he be also a social being, what is the relevancy of adducing " the constancy of the martyr," " the unselfishness of the philanthropist," "the devotion of the patriot," "the love of truth," "the passion for justice,' "the thrill of exultation when we hear of any act of courageous self-sacrifice," in evidence against the law of utility, or in order to prove that a " nature " thus endowed has " not been developed by means of the struggle for existence," when once this struggle has been transferred from individuals to communities ? The whole passage reads like an ironical satire in favour of " Darwinism," rather than a serious argument against it. 28 Darwin^ and after Darwin. eventual conclusion, man is to be separated from the rest of organic nature, and the steady progress of evolution by natural causes is to be regarded as stopped at its final stage, because the human mind presents the faculties of mathematical calculation and aesthetic perception. Surely, on antecedent grounds alone, it must be apparent that there is here no kind of proportion between the conclusion and the data from which it is drawn. That we are not confined to any such grounds, I will now try to show. Let it be remembered, however, that in the following brief criticism I am not concerned with the issue as to whether, or how far, the " faculties" in question have owed their origin or their development to natural selectio7t. I am concerned only with the doctrine that in order to account for such and such particular " faculty " of the human mind, some order of causation must be supposed other than what we call natural. I am not a Neo-Darwinist, and so have no desire to make " natural selection " synonym- ous with '* natural causation" throughout the whole domain of life and of mind. And I quite agree with Mr. Wallace that, at any rate, the '• aesthetic faculty " cannot conceivably have been produced by natural selection — seeing that it is of no conceivable life-serving value in any of the stages of its growth. Moreover, it appears to me that the same thing has to be said of the play instincts, sense of the ludicrous, and sundry other " faculties " of mind among the lower animals. It being thus understood that I am not differing from Mr. Wallace where he imposes " hmits " on the powers of natural .selection, but only where he seems to take for granted that this is the same thing Introduction, 2.^ as imposing limits on the powers of natural causation, my criticism is as follows. In the first place, it is a psychological fallacy to regard the so-called " faculties " of mind as analogous to " organs " of the body. To classify the latter with reference to the functions which they severally perform is to follow a natural method of classification. But it is an artificial method which seeks to partition mental faculty into this, that, and the other mental faculties. Like all other purely artificial classifications, this one has its practical uses ; but, also like them, it is destitute of philosophical meaning. This statement is so well recognized by psychologists, that there is no occasion to justify it. But I must remark that any cogency which Mr. Wallace's argument may appear to present, arises from his not having recognized the fact which the statement conveys. For, had he considered the mind as a whole, instead of having contemplated it under the artificial categories of constituent " faculties," he would probably not have laid any such special stress upon some of the latter. In other words, he would have seen that the general development of the human mind as a whole has presumably involved the growth of those conven- tionally abstracted parts, which he regards as really separate endowments. Or, if he should find it easier to retain the terms of his metaphor, we may answer him by saying that the " faculties " of mind are " correlated," like " organs " of the body ; and, there- fore, that any general development of the various other "faculties" have presumably entailed a collateral development of the two in question. Again, in the second place, it would seem that 30 Darwin^ and after Darwin, Mr. Wallace has not sufficiently considered the co- operation of other well-known natural causes, which must have materially assisted the survival of the fittest where these two " faculties " are concerned. For, even if we disregard the inherited effects of use — which, however, if entertained as possible in any degree at all, must have here constituted an important factor, — there remain on the one hand, the un- questionable influences of individual education and, on the other hand, of the selection principle operating in the mind itself. Taking these two points separately, it is surely sufficiently well known that individual education — or special training, whether of mind or body — usually raises congenital powers of any kind to a more or less considerable level above those of the normal type. In other words, whatever doubt there may be touching the inherited effects of use, there can be no question touching the immense developmental effects thereof in the individual life-time. Now, the conditions of savage life are not such as lead to any deliberate cultivation of the "faculties" either of the mathematical or aesthetic order. Consequently, as might be ex- pected, we find both of them in what Mr. Wallace regards as but a " latent " stage of development. But in just the same way do we find that the marvellous powers of an acrobat when specially trained from child- hood— say to curve his spine backwards until his teeth can bite his heels — are " latent *' in all men. Or, more correctly, they are potential in every child. So it is with the prodigious muscular development of a trained athlete, and with any number of other cases where either the body or the mind is concerned. Why then Introduction. 31 should Mr. Wallace select the particular instances of the mathematical and aesthetic powers in savages as in any special sense "prophetic" of future development in trained members of civilized races ? Although it is true that these "latent capacities and powers are unused by savages," is it not equally true that savages fail to use their latent capacities and powers as tumblers and athletes? Moreover, is it not likewise true that as used by savages, or as occurring normally in man, such capacities and powers are no less poorly developed than are those of the " faculties " on which Mr. Wallace lays so much stress? In other words, are not "latent capacities and powers" of all kinds more or less equally in excess of anything that is ever required of them by man in a state of nature ? There- fore, if we say that where mathematics and the fine arts are concerned the potential capacities of savage man are in some mystical sense " prophetic " of a Newton or a Beethoven, so in consistency ought we to say that in these same capacities we discern a similar prophecy of those other uses of civilized life which we have in a rope-dancer or a clown. Again, and in addition to this, it should be remem- bered that, even if we do suppose any prophecy of this kind where the particular capacities in question are concerned, we must clearly extend the reference to the lower animals. Not a few birds display aesthetic feelings in a measure fairly comparable with those of savages; while we know that some animals present the germs of a " faculty " of computation ^ But. it is ^ See Proc. Zool. Soc, June 4, 1 889, for an account of the performances in this respect of the Chimpanzee "Sally." Also, for some remarks on the psychology of the subject, in Mental Evolution in Man, p. 315. I should like to take this opportunity of stating that, after the two 32 Darwin^ and after Darwin, needless to add, this fact is fatal to Mr. Wallace's argument as I understand it — viz. that the " faculties " in question have been in some special manner com- municated by some superior intelligence to man. Once more, it is obviously unfair to select such men as a ** Newton, a La Place, a Gauss, or a Cayley *' for the purpose of estimating the difference between savages and civilized man in regard to the latter "faculty." These men are the picked mathematicians of centuries. Therefore they are men who not only enjoyed all the highest possible benefits of individual culture, but likewise those who have been most endowed with mathematical power congenitally. So to speak, they are the best variations in this particular direction which our race is known to have produced. But had such variations arisen among savages it is sufficiently obvious that they could have come to nothing. Therefore, it is the normal average of " mathematical faculty " in civilized man that should be contrasted with that of savage man ; and, when due regard is paid to the all-important consideration which immediately follows, I cannot feel that the contrast presents any difficulty to the theory of human evolution by natural causation. Lastly, the consideration just alluded to is, that civilized man enjoys an advantage over savage man far in advance even of those which arise from a set- tled state of society, incentives to intellectual training. and so on. This inestimable advantage consists in the art of writing, and the consequent transmission publications above referred to, this animal's instruction was continued, and that, before her death, her "counting" extended as far as ten. That is to say, any number of straws asked for from one to ten would always be correctly given. Introduction. 33 of the effects of ailture from generation to generation* Quite apart from any question as to the hereditary transmission of acquired characters, we have in this intellectual transmission of acquired experience a means of accumulative cultivation quite beyond our powers to estimate. For, unlike all other cases where we recognize the great influence of individual use or practice in augmenting congenital "faculties** (such as in the athlete, pianist, &c.), in this case the effects of special cultivation do not end with the individual life, but are carried on and on through successive genera- tions ad infinitum. Hence, a civilized man inherits mentally, if not physically, the effects of culture for ages past, and this in whatever direction he may choose to profit therefrom. Moreover — and I deem this an immensely important addition — in this unique department of purely intellectual transmission, a kind of non-physical natural selection is perpetually engaged in producing the best results. For here a struggle for existence is constantly taking place among '■ ideas," " methods," and so forth, in what may be termed a psychological environment. The less fit are superseded by the more fit, and this not only in th^ mind of the individual, but, through lan- guage and literature, still more in the mind of the race. "A Newton, a La Place, a Gauss, or a Cayley," would all alike have been impossible, but for a pre- viously prolonged course of mental evolution due to the selection principle operating in the region of mathe- matics, by means of continuous survivals of the best products in successive generations. And, of course, the same remark applies to art in all its branches ^ * In Prof. Lloyd Morgan's Animal Life and Intelligence there is an II. D 34 Darwifiy and after Darwin. Quitting then the last, and in my opinion the weakest chapter of Darwinism, the most important points presented by other portions of this work are — to quote its author's own enumeration of them — an attempted *' proof that all specific characters are (or once have been) either useful in themselves or corre- lated with useful characters": an attempted "proof that natural selection can, in certain cases, increase the sterility of crosses": an attempted "proof that the effects of use and disuse, even if inherited, must be overpowered by natural selection " : an attempted proof that the facts of variation in nature are in them- selves sufficient to meet the difficulty which arises against the theory of natural selection, as held by him, from the swamping effects of free inter-crossing : and, lastly, " a fuller discussion on the colour relations of animals, with additional facts and arguments on the origin of sexual differences of colour." As I intend to deal with all these points hereafter, excepting the last, it will be sufficient in this opening chapter to remark, that in as far as I disagree with Mr. Wallace (and agree with Darwin), on the subject of "sexual differences of colour," my reasons for doing so have been already sufficiently stated in Part I. But there is much else in his treatment of this subject which appears to me highly valuable, and therefore present- ing an admirable contribution to the literature of Darwinism. In particular, it appears to me that the most important of his views in this connexion admirable discussion on this subject, which has been published since the above was written. The same has to be said of Weismann's Essay on Music, where much that 1 have here said is anticipated. With the views and arguments which Mr. Mivart has forcibly set forth I have already dealt to the best of my ability in a work on Mental Evolution in Man. Introduction. 35 probably represents the truth — namely, that, among the higher animals, more or less conspicuous pecu- liarities of colour have often been acquired for the purpose of enabling members of the same species quickly and certainly to recognize one another. This theory was first published by Mr. J. E. Todd, in 1888, and therefore but a short time before its re-publication by Mr. Wallace. As his part in the matter has not been sufficiently recognized, I should like to conclude this introductory chapter by drawing prominent attention to the merits of Mr. Todd's paper. For not only has it the merit of priority, but it deals with the whole subject of "recognition colours" — or, as he calls them, "directive colours" — in a more comprehensive manner than has been done by any of his successors. In particular, he shows that the principle of recognition-marking is not re- stricted to facilitating sexual intercourse, but extends also to several other matters of importance in the economy of animal life^. Having thus briefly sketched the doctrines of the sundry Post-Darwinian Schools from a general point of view, I shall endeavour throughout the rest of this treatise to discuss in appropriate detail the questions which have more specially come to the front in the post-Darwinian period. It can scarcely be said that any one of these questions has arisen altogether de novo during this period ; for glimmerings, more or less conspicuous, of all are to be met with in the writings of Darwin himself. Nevertheless it is no less true that only after his death have they been ' American Naturalist^ xxii. pp. 201-207. D 2 36 Darwin^ and after Darwin. lighted up to the full blaze of active discussion *. By far the most important of them are those to which the rest of this treatise will be confined. They are four in number, and it is noteworthy that they are all intimately connected with the great question which Darwin spent the best years of his life in contem- plating, and which has therefore, in one form or another, occupied the whole of the present chapter— the question as to whether natural selection has been the sole cause, or but the chief cause of modification. The four questions above alluded to appertain respectively to Heredity, Utility, Isolation, and Physio- logical Selection. Of these the first two will form the subject-matter of the present volume, while the last two will be dealt with in the final instalment of Darwin, and after Darwin * It is almost needless to say that besides the works mentioned in this chapter, many others have been added to the literature of Darwinism since Darwin's death. But as none of these profess to contain much that is original, I have not thought it necessary to consider any of them in this merely general review of the period in question. In subsequent chapters, however, allusions will be made to those among them which I deem of most importance. [Since this note wns written and printed the following works have been published to which it does not apply : Animal Life and Intelli- gence, by Professor Lloyd Morgan ; The Colours of Animals, by Professor Poulton ; and Materials for the Study of Variation, by Mr. Bateson. All these works are of high value and importance. Special reference should also be made to Professor Weismann's Essays.] SECTION I HEREDITY CHAPTER 11. Characters as Hereditary and Acquired (Preliminary). We will proceed to consider, throughout Section 1 of the present work, the most important among those sundry questions which have come to the front since the death of Darwin. For it was in the year after this event that Weismann published the first of his numerous essays on the subject of Heredity, and, unquestionably, it has been these essays which have given such prominence to this subject during the last decade. At the outset it is desirable to be clear upon certain points touching the history of the subject; the limits within which our discussion is to be con- fined ; the relation in which the present essay stands to the one that I published last year under the title An Examination of Weismannism ; and several other matters of a preliminary kind. The problems presented by the phenomena of heredity are manifold ; but chief among them is the hitherto unanswered question as to the trans- mission or non-transmission of acquired characters. This is the question to which the present Section will be confined. Although it is usually supposed that this question 40 Darwin^ and after Darwin, was first raised by Weismann, such was not the case. Any attentive reader of the successive editions of Darwin's works may perceive that at least from the year 1859 he had the question clearly before his mind ; and that during the rest of his life his opinion with regard to it underwent considerable modifications — becoming more and more Lamarckian the longer that he pondered it. But it was not till 1875 that the question was clearly presented to the general public by the independent thought of Mr. Galton, who was led to challenge the Lamarckian factors in toto by way of deduction from his theory of Stirp — the close resemblance of which to Professor Weismann's theory of Germ-plasm has been shown in my Examination of Weismannism, Lastly, I was myself led to doubt the Lamarck- ian factors still further back in the seventies, by having found a reason for questioning the main evidence which Mr. Darwin had adduced in their favour. This doubt was greatly strengthened on reading, in the following year, Mr. Galton's Theory of Heredity just alluded to ; and thereupon I com- menced a prolonged course of experiments upon the subject, the general nature of which will be stated in future chapters. Presumably many other persons must have entertained similar misgivings touching the inheritance of acquired characters long before the publication of Weismann's first essay upon the subject in 1883. The question as to the inheritance of acquired characters was therefore certainly not first raised by Weismann— although, of course, there is no doubt that it was conceived by him independently, and that he had the great merit of calling general Characters, Hereditary and Acquired, 41 attention to its existence and importance. On the other hand, it cannot be said that he has succeeded in doing very much towards its solution. It is for these reasons that any attempt at dealing with Welsmann's fundamental postulate — i.e. that of the non-inherit- ance of acquired charactcrs^-was excluded from my Examination of VVeismaniiism. As there stated he is justified in assuming, for the purposes of his discussion, a negative answer to the question of such inheritance ; but evidently the question itself ought not to be in- cluded within what we may properly understand by " Weismannism." Weismannism, properly so called, is an elaborate system of theories based on the funda- mental postulate just mentioned — theories having reference to the mechanism of heredity on the one hand, and to the course of organic evolution on the other. Now it was the object of the foregoing Examination to deal with this system of theories per se ; and therefore we have here to take a new point of departure and to consider separately the question of fact as to the inheritance or non-inheritance of acquired characters. At first sight, no doubt, it will appear that in adopting this method I am putting the cart before the horse. For it may well appear that I ought first to have dealt with the validity of Weismann's postulate, and not till then to have considered the system of theories which he has raised upon it. But this criticism is not likely to be urged by any one who is well ac- quainted with the questions at issue. For, in the first place, it is notorious that the question of fact is still open to question ; and therefore it ought to be considered separately, or apart from any theories which may have been formed with regard to it. In 42 Darwin, and after Darwin. the second place, our judgement upon this question of fact must be largely influenced by the validity of general reasonings, such as those put forward in the interests of rival theories of heredity ; and, as the theory of germ-plasm has been so thoughtfully elaborated by Professor Weismann, I have sought to give it the attention which it deserves as preliminary to our discussion of the question of fact which now lies before us. Thirdly and lastly, even if this question could be definitely answered by proving either that acquired characters are inherited or that they are not,, it would by no means follow that Weismann's theory of heredity would be proved wholly false in the one case, or wholly true in the other. That it need not be wholly true, even were its fundamental postulate to be proved so, is evident, because, although the fact might be taken to prove the theory of Continuity, the theory of Germ-plasm is, as above stated, very much more than this. That the theory of Germ-plasm need not be wholly false, even if acquired characters should ever be proved heritable, a little thought may easily show, because, in this event, the further question would immediately arise as to the degrees and the comparative frequency of such inheritance. For my own part, as stated in the Examination, I have always been disposed to accept Mr. Galton's theory of Stirp in preference to that of Germ-plasm on this very ground — i. e. that it does not dogmatically exclude the possibility of an occasional inheritance of acquired characters in faint though cumulative degrees. And whatever our individual opinions may be touching the admissibility of such a via media between the theories of Pangenesis and Germ-plasm, at least we may all Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired, 43 agree on the desirability of fully considering the matter as a preliminary to the discussion of the question of fact As it is not to be expected that even those who may have read my previous essay can now carry all these points in their memories, I will here re-state them in a somewhat fuller form. The following diagram will serve to give a clearer view of the sundry parts of Professor Weismann's system of theories, as well as of their relations to one another. \ /y */-■»" \\% f7/ V 1 1 1 6 s •s 8 >, § 1 '€ .9 1 § Postulate as to the absolute non-inheritance of acquired characters. Now, as just explained, the parts of this system which may be properly and distinctively called '• Weismannism " are those which go to form the Y-like structure of deductions from the fundamental postulate. Therefore, it was the Y-like system of 44 Darwin, and after Darwin, deductions which were dealt with in the Exammation of Weis7nannisrn^ while it is only his basal postulate which has to be dealt with in the following chapters. So much, then, for the relations of Weismann's system of theories to one another. It is, however, of even more importance that we should gain a clear view of the relations between his theory of heredity to those of Darwin and of Galton, as preliminary to considering the fundamental question of fact. As we have already seen, the theory of germ-plasm is not only a theory of heredity : it is also, and more distinctively, a theory of evolution, &c. As a theory of heredity it is grounded on its author's fundamental postulate — the continuity of germ -plasm. But as a theory of evolution, it requires for its support this additional postulate, that the continuity of germ- plasm has been absolute "since the first origin of life." It is clear that this additional postulate is not needed for his theory of heredity, but only for his additional theory of evolution, &c. There have been one or two other theories of heredity, prior to this one, which, like it, have been founded on the postulate of Continuity of the substance of heredity ; but it has not been needful for any of these theories to postulate further that this substance has been always thus isolated, or even that it is now invariably so. For even though the isolation be frequently invaded by influences of body-changes on the congenital characters of this substance, it does not follow that this principle of Continuity may not still be true in the main, even although it is supplemented in some degree by that of use-inheritance. Indeed, so far as the pheno mena of heredity are concerned, it is conceivable that Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired, 45 all congenital characters were originally acquired, and afterwards became congenital on account of their long inheritance. I do not myself advocate this view as biologically probable, but merely state it as logically possible, and in order to show that, so far as the phenomena of heredity are concerned, there appears to be no reason for Weismann's deduction that the principle of Continuity, if true at all, must be absolute. And it would further appear, the only reason why he makes this deduction (stem of the Y) is in order to provide a foundation for his further theories of evolu- tion, &c. (arms of the Y). It is indeed necessary for these further theories that body-changes should never exercise any hereditary influence on the heredi- tary endowments of germ-plasm, and therefore it is that he posits the substance of heredity as, not only continuous, but uninterruptably so "since the first origin of life." Now, this may be made more clear by briefly com- paring Weismann's theory with those of Darwin and of Galton. Weismann's theory of heredity, then, agrees with its predecessors which we are considering in all the following respects. The substance of heredity is particulate ; is mainly lodged in highly specialized cells ; is nevertheless also distributed thoughout the general cellular tissues, where it is concerned in all processes of regeneration, repair, and a-sexual repro- duction ; presents an enormously complex structure, in that every constituent part of a potentially future organism is represented in a fertilized ovum by cor- responding particles; is everywhere capable of virtually unlimited multiplication, without ever losing its here- ditary endowments ; is often capable of carrying 46 Darwin^ and after Darwin, these endowments in a dormant state through a long series of generations until at last they re-appear in what we recognize as recursions. Thus far all three theories are in agreement. In fact, the only matter of any great importance wherein they disagree has reference to the doctrine of Continuity ^ For while Darwin's theory supposes the substance of heredity to be mainly formed anew in each ontogeny, and therefore that the continuity of this substance is for the most part interrupted in every generation ^, Weismann's theory supposes this substance to be formed only during the phylogeny of each species, and therefore to have been absolutely uninterrupted since the first origin of life. But now, Galton's theory of heredity stands much nearer to Weismann's in this matter of Continuity ; for it is, as he says, a theory of " modified pangenesis," and the modification consists in allowing very much more for the principle of Continuity than is allowed by Darwin's theory ; in fact he expresses himself as quite willing to adopt (on adequate grounds being shown) the doctrine of Continuity as absolute, and therefore propounded, as logically possible, the iden- tical theory which was afterwards and independently announced by Weismann. Or, to quote his own words — " We might almost reserve our belief that the structural [i. e. somatic] cells can react on the sexual elements at all, and we * Originally, Weismann's further assumption as to the perpetual stability of germ-plasm, " since the first origin of sexual reproduction," was another very important point of difference, but this has now been withdrawn. * 1 say '' mainly formed anew," and "for the most part interrupted," because even Darwin's theory does not, as is generally supposed, exclude the doctrine of Continuity in toto. Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired. 47 may be confident that at most they do so in a very faint degree; in other words, that acquired modifications are barely, if at all, inherited^ in the correct sense of that word *." So far Mr. Galton ; but for Weismann's further theory of evolution, &c., it is necessary to postulate the additional doctrine in question ; and it makes a literally immeasurable difference to any theory of evolution whether or not we entertain this additional postulate. For no matter how faintly or how fitfully the substance of heredity may be modified by somatic tissues, the Lamarckian principles are hypothetically allowed some degree of play. And although this is a lower degree than Darwin supposed, their influence in determining the course of organic evolution may still have been enormous : seeing that their action in any degree must always have been directive of varia- tion on the one hand, and cumulative on the other. Thus, by merely laying this theory side by side with Weismann's we can perceive at a glance how a pure theory of heredity admits of being based on the postulate of Continuity alone, without cum- bering itself by any further postulate as to this Continuity being absolute. And this, in my opinion is the truly scientific attitude of mind for us to adopt as preliminary to the following investigation. For the whole investigation will be concerned —and con- cerned only — with this question of Continuity as ab- solute, or as admitting of degrees. There is, without any question, abundant evidence to prove that the substance of heredity is at least partly continuous (Gemmules). It may be that there is also abundant evidence to prove this substance much more largely * Theory of Heredity (Joum. Anthrop. Inst. 1875, p. 346). 48 Darwin^ and after Darwin, continuous than Darwin supposed (Stirp) ; but be this as it may, it is certain that any such question as to the degree of continuity differs, toto caelo, from that as to whether there can ever be any continuity at all. How, then, we may well ask, is it that so able a naturalist and so clear a thinker as Weismann can have so far departed from the inductive methods as to have not merely propounded the question touching Continuity and its degrees, or even of Con- tinuity as absolute ; but to have straightway assumed the latter possibility as a basis on which to run a system of branching and ever-changing speculations concerning evolution, variation, the ultimate struc- ture of living material, the intimate mechanism of heredity, or, in short, such a system of deductive conjectures as has never been approached in the history of science? The answer to this question is surely not far to seek. Must it not be the answer already given? Must it not have been for the sake of rearing this enormous structure of speculation that Weismann has adopted the assumption of Continuity as absolute? As we have just seen, Galton had well shown how a theory of heredity could be founded on the general doctrine of Con- tinuity, without anywhere departing from the in- ductive methods — even while fully recognizing the possibility of such continuity as absolute. But Galton's theory was a " Theory of Heredityl^ and nothing more. Therefore, while clearly perceiving that the Continuity in question may be absolute, he saw no reason, either in fact or in theory, for concluding that it must be. On the contrary, he saw that this question is, for the present, necessaril)' Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired. 49 unripe for profitable discussion — and, a fortioriy for the shedding of clouds of seed in all the directions of ** Weismannism." Hence, what I desire to be borne in mind through- out the following discussion is, that it will have exclusive reference to the question of fact already- stated, without regard to any superjacent theories ; and, still more, that there is a vast distinction between any question touching the degrees in which acquired characters are transmitted to progeny, and the question as to whether they are ever trans- mitted in any degree at all. Now, the latter question, being of much greater importance than the former, is the one which will mainly occupy our attention throughout the rest of this Section. We have already seen that before the subject was taken up by Weismann the difference between acquired and congenital characters in respect to transmissibility was generally taken to be one of degree ; not one of kind. It was usually supposed that acquired char- acters, although not so fully and not so certainly inherited as congenital characters, nevertheless were inherited in some lesser degree ; so that if the same acquired character continued to be successively ac- quired in a number of sequent generations, what was at first only a slight tendency to be inherited would become by summation a more and more pronounced tendency, till eventually the acquired character might become as strongly inherited as a congenital one. Or, more precisely, it was supposed that an acquired character, in virtue of such a summation of hereditary influence, would in time become congenital. Now, if this supposition be true, it is evident that more or II. E 50 Darwin, and after Darwin, less assistance must be lent to natural selection in its work of evolving adaptive modifications ^ And inasmuch as we know to what a wonderful extent adaptive modifications are secured during individual life-times — by the direct action of the environment on the one hand, and by increased or diminished use of special organs and mental faculties on the other — it becomes obvious of what importance even a small measure of transmissibility on their part would be in furnishing to natural selection ready-made varia- tions in required directions, as distinguished from promiscuous variations in all directions. Contrari- wise, if functionally-produced adaptations and adapta- tions produced by the direct action of the environ- ment are never transmitted in any degree, not only * Mr. Piatt Ball has, indeed, argued that " use- inheritance would often be an evil," since, for example, "the condyle of the human jaw would become larger than the body of the jaw, because as the fulcrum of the lever it receives more pressure"; and similarly as reg;^rds many other hypothetical cases which he mentions. ( The Effects of Use and Disuse, pp. 1 28-9 et seq.) But it is evident that this argument proves too much. For if the effects of use and disuse as transmitted to progeny would be an evil, it could only be because these effects as they occur in the parents are an evil— and this they most certainly are not, being, on the contrary and as a general rule, of a high order of adaptive value. Moreover, in the race, there is a superadded agency always at work, which must effect- ually prevent any undue accumulation of these effects — namely, natural selection, which every Darwinist accepts as a controlling principle of all or any other principles of change. Therefore, if, as first produced in the life-time of individuals, the effects of use and disuse are not injurious, much less can they become so if transmitted through the life-time of species. Again, Mr. Wallace argues that, even supposing use-inheritance to occur, its adapting work in the individual can never extend to the race, seeing that the natural selection of fortuitous variations in the directions required must always produce the adaptations more quickly than would be possible by use-inheritance. This argument, being one of more weight, will be dealt with in a future chapter. Characters, Hereditary and Acquired, 51 would there be an incalculable waste, so to speak, of adaptive modifications— these being all laboriously and often most delicately built up during life-times of individuals only to be thrown down again as regards the interest of species — but so large an additional burden would be thrown upon the shoulders of natural selection that it becomes difificult to conceive how even this gigantic principle could sustain it, as I shall endeavour to show more fully in future chapters. On the other hand, however, Weismann and his followers not only feel no difficulty in throwing overboard all this ready-made machinery for turning out adaptive modifications when and as required ; but they even represent that by so doing they are following the logical maxim, Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem — which means, in its relation to causality, that we must not needlessly multiply hypothetical principles to explain given results. But when appeal is here made to this logical principle — the so-called Law of Parsimony — two things are forgotten. In the first place, it is forgotten that the very question in debate is whether causes of the Lamarck- ian order are unnecessary to explain all the phe- nomena of organic nature. Of course if it could be proved that the theory of natural selection alone is competent to explain all these phenomena, appeal to the logical principle in question would be justi- fiable. But this is precisely the point which the followers of Darwin refuse to accept ; and so long as it remains the very point at issue, it is a mere begging the question to represent that a class of causes which have hitherto been regarded as necessary are, in fact, unnecessary. Or, in other words, when Darwin E 2 52 Darwin, and after Darwin. himself so decidedly held that these causes are neces- sary as supplements to natural selection, the burden of proof is quite as much on the side of Weismann and his followers to show that Darwin's opinion was wrong, as it is on the side of Darwin's followers to show that it was right. Yet, notwithstanding the elaborate structure of theory which Weismann has raised, there is nowhere one single fact or one single consideration of much importance to the question in debate which was not perfectly well known to Darwin. Therefore I say that all this challenging of Darwinists to justify their " Lamarckian assump- tions" really amounts to nothing more than a pitting of opinion against opinion, where there is at least as much call for justification on the one side as on the other. Again, when these challenges are thrown down by Weismann and his followers, it appears to be forgotten that the conditions of their own theory are such as to render acceptance of the gauge a matter of great difficulty. The case is very much like that of a doughty knight pitching his glove into the sea, and then defying any antagonist to take it up. That this is the case a very little explanation will suffice to show. The question to be settled is whether acquired characters are ever transmitted by heredity. Now suppose, for the sake of argument, that acquired characters are transmitted by heredity — though not so fully and not so certainly as congenital characters — how is this fact to be proved to the satisfaction of Weismann and his followers? First of all they answer, — Assuredly by adducing experimental proof Characters, Hereditary and Acquired, 53 of the inheritance of injuries, or mutilations. But in making this answer they appear to forget that Darwin has already shown its inefficiency. That the self-styled Neo-Lamarckians have been much more unguarded in this respect. I fully admit ; but it is obviously unfair to identify Darwin's views with those of a small section of evolutionists, who are really as much opposed to Darwin's teaching on one side as is the school of Weismann on the other. Yet, on read- ing the essays of Weismann himself — and still more those of his followers— one would almost be led to gather that it is claimed by him to have enunciated the distinction between congenital and acquired char- acters in respect of transmissibility ; and therefore also to have first raised the objection which lies against the theory of Pangenesis in respect of the non-transmissibility of mutilations. In point of fact, however, Darwin is as clear and decided on these points as Weismann. And his answer to the obvious difficulty touching the non-transmissibility of mutila- tions is, to quote his own words, '* the long-confinued inheritance of a part which has been removed during many generations is no real anomaly, for gem mules formerly derived from the part are multiplied and transmitted from generation to generation ^" There- fore, so far as Darwin's theory is concerned, the challenge to produce evidence of the transmission of injuries is irrelevant : it is no more a part of Darwin's theory than it is of Weismann's to maintain that injuries are transmitted. There is, however, one point in this connexion to which allusion must here be made. Although Darwin ' Variation under Domestication, ii. 392. 54 Darwifiy and after Darwin. did not believe in the transmissibility of mutilations when these consist merely in the amputation of parts of an organism, he did believe in a probable tendency to transmission when removal of the part is followed by gangrene. For, as he says, in that case all the gemmules of the mutilated or amputated part, as they are gradually attracted to that part (in accordance with the law of affinity which the theory assumes), will be successively destroyed by the morbid process. Now it is of importance to note that Darwin made this exception to the general rule of the non-trans- missibility of mutilations, not because his theory of pangenesis required it, but because there appeared to be certain very definite observations and experiments — which will be mentioned later on — proving that when mutilations are followed by gangrene they are apt to be inherited : his object, therefore, was to reconcile these alleged facts with his theory, quite as much as to sustain his theory by such facts. So much, then, for the challenge to produce direA evidence of the transmissibility of acquired characters, so far as mutilations are concerned : believers in Darwin's theory, as distinguished from Weismann's, are under no obligation to take up such a challenge. But the challenge does not end here. Show us, say the school of Weismann, a single in- stance where an acquired character of any kind (be it a mutilation or otherwise) has been inherited : this is all that we require : this is all that we wait for : and surely, unless it be acknowledged that the Lamarckian doctrine reposes on mere assumption, at least one such case ought to be forthcoming. Well, nothing can sound more reasonable than this in the first in- Characters, Hereditary and Acquired. 55 stance ; but as soon as we begin to cast about for cases which will satisfy the Neo-Darwinians, we find that the structure of their theory is such as to pre- clude, in almost every conceivable instance, the possi- bility of meeting their demand. For their theory begins by assuming that natural selection is the one and only cause of organic evolution. Consequently, what their demand amounts to is throwing upon the other side the burden of disproving this assumption — or, in other words, of proving the negative that in any given case of transmitted adaptation natural selection has not been the sole agent at work. Now, it must obviously be in almost all cases impossible to prove this negative among species in a state of nature. For, even sup- posing that among such species Lamarckian prin- ciples have had a large share in the formation of hereditary and adaptive characters, how would Weis- mann himself propose that we should set about the proof of such a fact, where the proof demanded by his assumption is, that the abstract possibility of natural selection having had anything to do with the matter must be excluded.? Obviously this is impossible in the case of inherited characters which are also adaptive characters. How then does it fare with the case of inherited characters which are not also adaptive ? Merely that this case is met by another and sequent assumption, which constitutes an integral part of the Neo-Darwinian creed — namely, that in nature there can be no such characters. Seeing that natural selection is taken to be the only possible cause of change in species, it follows that all changes occurring in species must necessarily be adaptive, whether or not we are able to perceive the adaptations. 56 Darwin, and after Darwin. In this way apparently useless characters, as well as obviously useful ones, are ruled out of the question : that is to say, all hereditary characters of species in a state of nature are assumed to be due to natural selection, and then it is demanded that the validity of this assumption should be disproved by anybody who doubts it. Yet Weismann himself would be unable to suggest any conceivable method by which it can be disproved among species in a state of nature — and this even supposing that the assumption is entirely false \ Consequently, the only way in which these speciously-sounding challenges can be adequately met is by removing some individuals of a species from a state of nature, and so from all known influences of natural selection ; then, while carefully avoiding artificial selection, causing these individuals and their progeny through many generations unduly to exer- cise some parts of their bodies, or unduly to fail in the exercise of others. But, clearly, such an experi- ment is one that must take years to perform, and therefore it is now too early in the day to reproach the followers of Darwin with not having met the challenges which are thrown down by the followers of Weismann ^, ^ In subsequent chapters, especially devoted to the question (i.e. Section II), the validity of this assumption will be considered on its own merits. * I say '* the followers of Weismann," because Weismann himself, with his clear perception of the requirementsof experimental research, expressly states the above considerations, with the conclusions to which they lead. Nevertheless, he is not consistent in his utterances upon this matter; for he frequently expresses himself to the effect, " that the onus probandi rests with my opponents, and therefore they ought to bring forward actual proofs " {Essays, i. p. 390). But, as above shown, the Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired. 57 Probably enough has now been said to show that the Neo- Darwinian assumption precludes the possi- bility of its own disproof from any of the facts of nature (as distinguished from domestication)— and this even supposing that the assumption be false. On the other hand, of course, it equally precludes the possibility of its own proof; and therefore it is as idle in Darwinists to challenge Weismann for proof of his negative (i.e. that acquired characters are not trans- mitted), as it is in Weismann to challenge Darwinists for proof of the opposite negative (i. e. that all seeming cases of such transmission are not due to natural selection). This dead-lock arises from the fadt that in nature it is beyond the power of the followers of Darwin to exclude the abstract possi- bility of natural selection in any given case, while it is equally beyond the power of the followers of Weismann to exclude the abstract possibility of Lamarckian principles. Therefore at present the question must remain for the most part a matter of opinion, based upon general reasoning as distinguished from special facts or crucial experiments. The evidence available on either side is presumptive, not demonstrative^. But it is to be hoped that in the future, when time shall have been allowed for the performance of definite experiments on a number of generations of domesti- cated plants or animals, intentionally shielded from the influences of natural selection while exposed to those of the Lamarckian principles, results will be onus rests as much with him as with his opponents ; while, even if his opponents are light, he elsewhere recognizes that they can bring "actual proofs" of the fact only as a result of experiments which must take many years to perform. 1 Note A. 58 DarwiUy and after Darwin. gained which will finally settle the question one way or the other. Meanwhile, however, we must be content with the evidence as it stands ; and this will lead us to the second division of our subject. That is to say, having now dealt with the antecedent, or merely logical, state of the question, we have next to consider what actual, or biological, evidence there is at present available on either side of it. Thus far, neither side in the debate has any advantage over the other. On grounds of general reasoning alone they both have to rely on more or less dogmatic assumptions. For it is equally an unreasoned statement of opinion whether we allege that all the phenomena of organic evolution can be, or can not be, explained by the theory of natural selection alone. We are at present much too ignorant touching the causes of organic evolution to indulge in dogmatism of this kind ; and if the question is to be referred for its answer to authority, it would appear that, both in respect of number and weight, opinions on the side of having provisionally to retain the Lamarckian factors are more authoritative than those per contra ^. Turning then to the question of fact, with which the following chapters are concerned, I will conclude this preliminary one with a few words on the method of discussion to be adopted. First I will give the evidence in favour of Lamarck- ianism ; this will occupy the next two chapters. * For a fair and careful statement of the present balance of authoritative opinion upon the question, see H. F. Osborn, Anurican NatureUist^ 189a, pp. 537-^7. Characters f Hereditary and Acquired. 59 Then, in Chapter V, I will similarly give the evidence per contra, or in favour of Continuity as absolute. Lastly, I will sum up the evidence on both sides, and give my own judgement on the whole case. But on whichever side I am thus acting as special pleader for the time being, I will adduce only such arguments as seem to me valid — excluding alike from both the many irrelevant or otherwise invalid reasonings which have been but too abundantly published. Moreover, I think it will be convenient to consider all that has been said — or may be said — in the way of criticism to each argument by the opposite side while such argument is under discussion — i. e. not to wait till all the special pleading on one side shall have been exhausted before considering the exceptions which have been (or admit of being) taken to the arguments adduced, but to deal with such exceptions at the time when each of these arguments shall have been severally stated. Again, and lastly, I will arrange the evidence in each case — i.e. on both sides — under three headings, viz. (A) Indirect, (B) Direct, and (C) Ex- perimental \ * [The above paragraph is allowed to remain exactly as Mr. Romanes left it. Chapters V and VI were however not completed. See note appended to Preface. C. LI. M.] CHAPTER III. Characters as Hereditary and Acquired (cotttmued). (A.) Indirect Evidence in favour of the Inheritance of Acquired Characters. Starting with the evidence in favour of the so- called Lamarckian factors, we have to begin with the Indirect — and this without any special reference to the theories, either of Weismann or of others. It has already been shown, while setting forth in the preceding chapter the antecedent standing of the issue, that in this respect the prima facie presump- tion is wholly on the side of the transmission, in greater degree or less, of acquired characters. Even Weismann allows that all " appearances " point in this direction, while there is no inductive evidence of the action of natural selection in any one case, either as regards germs or somas, and therefore, a fortiori, of the "all-sufficiency" of this caused It is true that in some of his earlier essays he has argued that there is no small weight of prima facie evidence in favour of his own views as to the non- ^ See, especially, his excellent remarks on this point, Contemp. Rev Sept. 1893. Characters y Hereditary and Acquired, 6i inheritance of acquired characters. This, however, will have to be considered in its proper place further on. Meanwhile I shall say merely in general terms that it arises almost entirely from a confusion of the doctrine of Continuity as absolute with that of Continuity as partial, and therefore as admitting of degrees in different cases — which, as already ex- plained, are doctrines wide as the poles asunder. But, leaving aside for the present such prima facie evidence as Weismann has adduced on his side of the issue, I may quote him as a hostile witness to the weight of this kind of evidence per contra^ in so far as it has already been presented in the foregoing chapter. Indeed, Weismann is much too logical a thinker not to perceive the cogency of the '^ appearances " which lie against his view of Continuity as absolute — although he has not been sufficiently careful in distinguishing between such Continuity and that which admits of degrees. We may take it, then, as agreed on all hands that whatever weight merely prima facie evidence may in this matter be entitled to, is on the side of what I have termed moderated Lamarckianism : first sight " appearances '' are against the Neo-Darwinian doc- trine of the absolute non- inheritance of acquired characters. Let us now turn to another and much more important line of mdirect evidence in favour of moderated Lamarckianism. The difficulty of excluding the possibility of na- tural selection having been at work in the case of wild plants and animals has already been noticed. 62 Darwin^ and after Darwin. Therefore we may now appreciate the importance of all facts or arguments which attenuate the prob- ability of natural selection having been at work. This may be done by searching for cases in nature where a congenital structure, although unquestionably adaptive, nevertheless presents so small an amoum of adaptation, that we can scarcely suppose it to have been arrived at by natural selection in the struggle for existence, as distinguished from the inheritance of functionally-produced modifications. For if functionally-produced modifications are ever transmitted at all, there is no limit to the minute- ness of adaptive values which may thus become congenital ; whereas, in order that any adaptive structure or instinct should be seized upon and ac- cumulated by natural selection, it must from the very first have had an adaptive value suflficiently great to have constituted its presence a matter of life and death in the struggle for existence. Such structures or instincts must not only have always presented some measure of adaptive value, but this must always have 'been sufficiently great to reach what I have elsewhere called a selection- value. Hence, if we meet with cases in nature where adaptive structures or instincts present so low a degree of adaptive value that it is difficult to con- ceive how they could ever have exercised any appreciable influence in the battle for life, such cases may fairly be adduced in favour of the Lamarckian theory. For example, the Neo- Lamarckian school of the United States is chiefly composed of palaeon- tologists ; and the reason of this seems to be that the study of fossil forms — or of species in process of Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired. 63 r „....,„ ^H which in their nascent condition present such ex- ceedingly minute degrees of adaptive value, that it seems unreasonable to attribute their development to a survival of the fittest in the complex struggle for existence. But as this argument is in my opinion of greatest force when it is applied to certain facts of physiology with which I am about to deal, I will not occupy space by considering any of the number- less cases to which the Neo-Lamarckians apply it within the region of palaeontology ^ Turning then to inherited actions, it is here that we might antecedently expect to find our best evi- dence of the Lamarckian principles, if these principles have really had any share in the process of adaptive evolution. For we know that in the life-time of individuals it is action, and the cessation of action, which produce nearly all the phenomena of acquired adaptation —use and disuse in animals being merely other names for action and the cessation of action. Again, we know that it is where neuro- muscular machinery is concerned that we meet with the most conclusive evidence of the remarkable extent to which action is capable of co-ordinating structures for the ready performance of particular functions ; so that even during the years of childhood *• practice makes perfect " to the extent of organizing neuro- muscular adjustments, so elaborate and complete as to be indistinguishable from those which in natural * There is now an extensive literature within this region. Theprincipal writers are Cope, Scott and Osborn. Unfortunately, however, the facts adduced are not crucial as test-cases between the rival theories — nearly all of them, in fact, being equally susceptible of explanation by either. 64 Darwin y and after Darwin, species we recognized as reflex actions on the one hand, and instinctive actions on the other. Hence, if there be any such thing as " use-inheritance ' at all, it is in the domain of reflex actions and instinc- tive actions that we may expect to find our best evidence of the fact. Therefore I will restrict the present line of evidence — (A) — to these two classes of phenomena, as together yielding the best evidence obtainable within this line of argument. The evidence in favour of the Lamarckian factors which may be derived from the phenomena of reflex action has never, I believe, been pointed out before ; but it appears to me of a more cogent nature than perhaps any other. In order to do it justice, I will begin by re-stating an argument in favour of these factors which has already been adduced by previous writers, and discussed by myself in published corre- spondence with several leaders of the ultra- Darwinian school. Long ago Professor Broca and Mr. Herbert Spencer pointed to the facts of co-adaptation, or co-ordination within the limits of the same organism, as presenting good evidence of Lamarckian principles, working in association with natural selection. Thus, taking one of Lamarck's own illustrations, Mr. Spencer argued that there must be numberless changes — extending to all the organs, and even to all the tissues, of the animal — which in the course of many generations have conspired to convert an antelope into a giraffe. Now the point is, that throughout the entire history of these changes their utility must always have been dependent on their association. It would be useless Character Sy Hereditary and Acquired, 65 that an incipient giraffe should present the peculiar form of the hind-quarters which we now perceive, unless at the same time it presented the correspond- ingly peculiar form of the fore-quarters ; and as each of these great modifications entails innumerable sub- ordinate modifications throughout both halves of the creature concerned, the chances must have been in- finitely great against the required association of so man) changes happening to have arisen congenitally in the same individuals by way of merely fortuitous variation. Yet, if we exclude the Lamarckian interpretation, which gives an intelligible cause of co-ordination we are required to suppose that such a happy con- currence of innumerable independent variations must have occurred by mere accident — and this on innu- merable different occasions in the bodies of as many successive ancestors of the existing species. For at each successive stage of the improvement natural selection (if working alone) must have needed all, or at any rale most, of the co-ordinated parts to occur in the same individual organisms ^ In alluding to what I have already published upon the difficulty which thus appears to be presented to his theory, Weismann says, "At no distant time I hope to be able to consider this objection, and to show that the apparent support given to the old idea [i. e. of the transmission of functionally-produced modifications] is really insecure, and breaks down as soon as it is critically examined ^.*' * For another and better illustration more recently published by Mr. Spencer, see The Inadequacy of Natural Selection, p. 32. * Essays on Heredity, vol. i, p. 389. [For further treatment of the subject under discussion see Weismann, The All-sufficiency of Natural Selection (Contemp. Rev. Sept. and II. F 66 Darwin^ and after Darwin. So much for what Weismann has said touching this matter. But the matter has also been dealt with both by Darwin and by Wallace. Darwin very properly distinguishes between the fallacy that '* with animals such as the girafi'e, of which the whole structure is admirably co-ordinated for certain purposes, it has been supposed that all the parts must have been simultaneously modified^," and the sound argument that the co-ordination itself cannot have been due to natural selection alone. This important distinction may be rendered more clear as follows. The facts of artificial selection prove that immense modifications of structure may be caused by a cumu- lative blending in the same individuals of characters which were originally distributed among different individuals. Now, in the parallel case of natural selection the characters thus blended will usually — if not invariably — be of an adaptive kind ; and their eventual blending together in the same individuals will be due to free intercrossing of the most fit. But this blending of adaptations is quite a different matter from the occurrence of co-ordination. For it belongs to the essence of co-ordination that each of the co-ordinated parts should be destitute of adap- tive value per se : the adaptation only begins to arise if all the parts in question occur associated together in the same individuals from the very first. In this case it is obvious that the analogy of artificial selec- tion can be of no avail in explaining the facts, since the difficulty presented has nothing to do with Oct. 1893), and The Effect of External Influences upon Development. •* Romanes Lecture " 1894, and Spencer, Weismannism once more i^Cont. Rev. Oct. 1894). C. LI. M.] ^ Variation^ &c., vol. ii. p. 206. Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired. 67 the blending in single individuals of adaptations previously distributed among different individuals . it has to do with the simultaneous appearance in single individuals of a co-adaptation of parts, none of which could ever have been of any adaptive value had it been previously distributed among different individuals. Consequently, where Darwin comes to consider this particular case (or the case of co-adaptation as distinguished from the blending of adaptations), he freely invokes the aid of the Lamarckian principles \ Wallace, on the other hand, refuses to do this, and says that " the best answer to the difficulty" of sup- posing natural selection to have been the only cause of co-adaptation may be "found in the fact that the very thing said to be impossible by variation and natural selection, has been again and again affected by variation and artificial selection V* This analogy (which Darwin had already and very properly adduced with regard to the blending of adaptations) he enforces by special illustrations ; but he does not appear to perceive that it misses the whole and only point of the "difficulty" against which it is brought. For the case which his analogy sustains is not that which Darwin, Spencer, Broca and others, mean by co-adaptation-, it is the case of a blending of adaptations. It is not the case where adaptation \s first initiated in spite of intercrossing, by a fortuitous concurrence of variations each in itself being with- out adaptive value : it is the case where adaptation is afterwards increased by means of intercrossing ^ * E. g. Origin of Species, p. 178. ■ Darwinism, p. 418. F 2 68 Darwin^ and after Danmn. through the blending of variations each of which has always been in itself of adaptive value. From this I hope it will be apparent that the only- way in which the " difficulty " from co-adaptation can be logically met by the ultra-Darwinian school, is by denying that the phenomenon of co-adaptation (as distinguished from the blending of adaptations) is ever to be really met with in organic nature. It may be argued that in all cases where co-adaptation appears to occur, closer examination will show that the facts are really due to a blending of adaptations. The characters A -I- B -f- C -f- D, which are now found united in the same organism, and. as thus united, all conspiring to a common end. may originally have been distri- buted among different organisms, where they severally subserved some other ends — or possibly the same end, though in a less efficient manner. Obviously, however, in this case their subsequent combination in the same organism would not be an instance of co-adaptation, but merely of an advantageous blend- ing together of already existing adaptations. This argument, or rejoinder, has in point of fact been adopted by Professor Meldola, he believes that all cases of seeming co-adaptation are thus due to a mere blending of adaptations ^ Of course, if this position can be maintained, the whole difficulty ' Nature, vol. xliii. pp. 410, 557 ; vol. xliv. pp. 7, 29. I say "adopted," because I had objected to his quoting the analogy of artificial selection, and stated, as above, that the only way to meet Mr. Spencer s "difficulty" was to deny the fact of co-adaptation as. ever occurring in any case. It then appeared that Professor Meldola agreed with me as to this. But I do not yet understand why, if such were his view, he began by endorsing Mr. Wallace's analogy from artificial selection — i. e. confusing the case of co-adaptation with that of the blending of adapta- tions. If any one denies the fact of co-adaptation, he cannot assist his Characters, Hereditary and Acquired. 69 from co-adaptation would lapse. But even then it would lapse on the ground of fact. It would not have been overturned, or in any way affected, by Wallace's argument from artificial selection. For, in that event, no such argument would be required, and, if adduced, would be irrelevant, since no one has ever alleged that there is any difficulty in under- standing the mere confluence of adaptations by free- intercrossing of the best adapted. Now, if we are agreed that the only question in debate is the question of fact whether or not co-adaptation ever occurs in nature, it appears to me that the best field for debating the question is furnished by the phenomena of reflex action. I can well perceive that the instances adduced by Broca and Spencer in support of their common argument — such as the giraffe, the elk, &c. — are equivocal. But I think that many instances which may be adduced of reflex action are much more to the point. For it belongs to the very nature of reflex action that it cannot work unless all parts of the machinery concerned are already pre- sent, and already co-ordinated in the same organism. It would be useless, in so far as such action is con- cerned if the afferent and efferent nerves, the nerve- centre, and the muscles organically grouped together, were not all present from the very first in the same individuals, and from the very first were not co- ordinated as a definite piece of organic machinery. , With respect to reflex actions, therefore, it is desirable to begin by pointing out how widely the denial by arguing the totally different fact that adaptations may be blended by free intercrossing ; for this latter fact has never been ques- tioned, and has nothing to do with the one which he engaged in disputing. TO Darwin^ and after Darwin, adaptations which they involve differ from those where no manufacture, so to speak, of special machinery is required. Thus, it is easy to understand how natural selection alone is capable of gradually accumulating congenital variations in the direction of protective colouring ; of mimicry ; of general size, form, mutual correlation of parts as connected with superior strength, fleetness, agility, &c. ; of greater or less development of particular parts, such as legs, wings, tails, &c. For in all such cases the adaptation which is in process of accumulation is, from its very commencement and throughout each of its subsequent stages, of use in the struggle for existence. And inasmuch as all the individuals of each successive generation vary round the specific mean which characterized the preceding generation, there will always be a sufficient number of individuals which present congenital variations of the kind required for natural selection to seize upon, without danger of their being swamped by free in- tercrossing— as Mr. Wallace has very ably shown in his Darwinism. But this law of averages can apply only to cases where single structures— or a single group of correlated structures — are already present, and already varying round a specific mean. The case is quite different where a co-ordination of structures is required for the performance oidi previously non-existejit reflex action. For some, at least, of these structures must be new, as must also be the function which all of them first conspire to perform. Therefore, neither the new elements of structure, nor the new combination of structures, can have been previously given as varying round a specific mean. On the contrary, a very definite piece of machinery, consisting of many co- Characters, Hereditary and Acquired. 71 ordinated parts, must somehow or other be or'ginated in a high degree of working efficiency, before it can be capable of answering its purpose in the prompt performance of a particular action under particular circumstances of stimulation. Lastly, such pieces of machinery are always of a highly delicate character, and usually involve so immensely complex a co- ordination of mutually dependent parts, that it is only a physiologist who can fully appreciate the magnitude of the distinction between " adaptations " of this kind, and " adaptations " of the kind which arise through natural selection seizing upon congenital variations as these oscillate round a specific mean. Or the whole argument may be presented in another form, under three different headings, thus : — In the first place, it will be evident from what has just been said, that such a piece of machinery as is con- cerned in even the simplest reflex action cannot have occurred in any considerable number of individuals of a species, when it first begati to be constructed. On the contrary, if its origin were dependent on con- genital variations alone, the needful co-adaptation of parts which it requires can scarcely have happened to occur in more than a very small percentage of cases — even if it be held conceivable that by such means alone it should ever have occurred at all. Hence, instead of preservation and subsequent improvement having taken place in consequence of free intercrossing among all individuals of the species (as in the cases of protective colouring, &c., where adaptation has no reference to any mechanical co-adaptation of parts), they must have taken place in spite of such inter- crossing. 72 Darwin, and after Darwin, In the second place, adaptations due to organic machineries of this kind differ in another all-important respect from those due to a summation of adaptive characters which are already present and already- varying round a specific mean. The latter depend for their summation upon the fact — not merely, as just stated, that they are already present, already varying round a specific mean, and therefore owe their pro- gressive evolution to free intercrossing, but also — that they admit of very different degrees of adaptation. It is only because the degree of adaptation in generation B is superior to that in generation A that gradual improvement in respect of adaptation is here possible. In the case of protective resemblance, for example, a very imperfect and merely accidental resemblance to a leaf, to another insect, &c., may at the first start have conferred a sufficient degree of adaptive imitation to count for something in the struggle for life ; and, if so, the basis would be given for a progressive building up by natural selection of structures and colours in ever-advancing degrees of adaptive resemblance. There is here no necessity to suppose — nor in point of feet is it ever supposed, since the supposition would involve nothing short of a miracle — that such extreme perfection in this respect as we now so fre- quently admire has originated suddenly in a single generation, as a collective variation of a congenital kind affecting simultaneously a large proportional number of individuals. But in the case of a reflex mechanism — which may involve even greater marvels of adaptive adjustment, and all the parts of which must occur in the same individuals to be of any use — it is necessary to suppose some such sudden Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired. 73 and collective origin in some very high degree of efficiency, if natural selection has been the only principle concerned in afterwards perfecting the mechanism. For it is self-evident that a reflex action, from its very nature, cannot admit of any great differences in its degrees of adaptation : if it is to work at all, so as to count for anything in the struggle for life, it must already be given in a state of working efficiency. So that, unless we invoke either the doctrine of " prophetic types " or the theory of sudden creations, I confess I do not see how we are to explain either the origin, or the development, of a reflex mechanism by means of natural selection alone. Lastly, in the third place, even when reflex mechanisms have been fully formed^ it is often beyond the power of sober credence to believe that they now are, or ever can have been, of selective value in the struggle for existence, as I will show further on. And such cases go to fortify the preceding argument. For if not conceivably of selective value even when com- pletely evolved, much less can they conceivably have been so through all the stages of their complex evolution back to their very origin. Therefore, sup- posing for the present that there are such cases of reflex action in nature, neither their origin nor their development can conceivably have been due to natural selection alone. The Lamarckian factors, however, have no reference to degrees of adaptation, any more than they have to degrees of complexity. No question of value, as selective or otherwise, can obtain in their case : neither in their case does any difficulty obtain as regards the co- adaptation of severally useless parts. 74 Darwin, and after Darwin, Now, if all these distinctions between the Dar- winian and Lamarckian principles are valid — and I cannot see any possibility of doubt upon this point — strong evidence in favour of the latter would be furnished by cases (if any occur) where structures, actions, instincts, &c., although of some adaptive value, are nevertheless plainly not of selective value. According to the ultra-Darwinian theory, no such cases ought ever to occur : according to the theory of Darwin himself, they ought frequently to occur. Therefore a good test, or criterion, as between these different theories of organic evolution is furnished by putting the simple question of fact — Can we, or can we not, show that there are cases of adaptation where the degree of adaptation is so small as to be incom- patible with the supposition of its presenting a selective value? And if we put the wider question — Are there any cases where the co-adaptation of severally useless parts has been brought about, when even the re- sulting whole does not present a selective value? — then, of course, we impose a still more rigid test. Well, notwithstanding the difficulty of proving such a negative as the absence of natural selection where adaptive development is concerned, I believe that there are cases which conform to both these tests simul- taneously ; and, moreover, that they are to be found in most abundance where the theory of use-inheritance would most expect them to occur — namely, in the province of reflex action. For the very essence of this theory is the doctrine, that constantly associated use of the same parts for the performance of the same action will progressively organize those parts into a reflex mechanism — no matter how high a degree of Character Sy Hereditary and Acquired, 75 co-adaptation may thus be reached on the one hand, or how low a degree of utilitarian value on the other. Having now stated the general or abstract prin- ciples which I regard as constituting a defence of the Lamarckian factors, so far as this admits of being raised on grounds of physiology, we will now consider a few concrete cases by way of illustra- tion. It is needless to multiply such cases for the mere purpose of illustration. For, on reading those here given, every physiologist will at once perceive that they might be added to indefinitely. The point to observe is, the relation in which these samples of reflex action stand to the general principles in question ; for there is nothing unusual in the samples themselves. On the contrary, they are chosen because they are fairly typical of the phenomena of reflex action in general. In our own organization there is a reflex mechanism which ensures the prompt withdrawal of the legs from any source of irritation supplied to the feet. For instance, even after a man has broken his spine in such a manner as totally to interrupt the func- tional continuity of his spinal cord and brain, the reflex mechanism in question will continue to retract his legs when his feet are stimulated by a touch, a burn, &c. This responsive action is clearly an adaptive action, and, as the man neither feels the stimulation nor the resulting movement, it is as clearly a reflex action. The question now is as to the mode of its origin and development. I will not here dwell upon the argument from co-adaptation, because this may be done more efTectually in the case of more complicated reflex 76 Darwin^ and after Darwin. actions, but will ask whether we can reasonably hold that this particular reflex action — comparatively simple though it is — has ever been of selective value to the human species, or to the ancestors thereof? Even in its present fully-formed con- dition it IS fairly questionable whether it is of any adaptive value at all. The movement performed is no doubt an adaptive movement ; but is there any occasion upon which the reflex mechanism con- cerned therein can ever have been of adaptive use} Until a man's legs have been paralyzed as to their voluntary motion, he will always promptly withdraw his feet from any injurious source of irritation by means of his conscious intelligence. True, the reflex mechanism secures an almost in- appreciable saving in the time of response to a stimulus, as compared with the time required for response by an act of will ; but the difference is so exceedingly small, that we can hardly suppose the saving of it in this particular case to be a matter of any adaptive — much less selective — importance. Nor is it more easy to suppose that the reflex mechanism has been developed by natural selection for the purpose of replacing volun- tary action when the latter has been destroyed or suspended by grave spinal injury, paralysis, coma, or even ordinary sleep. In short, even if for the sake of argument we allow it to be conceivable that any single human being, ape, or still more distant ancestor, has ever owed its life to the possession of this mechanism, we may still be certain that not one in a million can have done so. And, if this is the case with regard to the mechanism as now fully Characters y Hereditary and Acquired. 77 constructed, still more must it have been the case with regard to all the previous stages of construction. For here, without elaborating the point, it would appear that a process of construction by survival of the fittest alone is incomprehensible. On the other hand, of course, the theory of use- inheritance furnishes a fully intelligible — whether or not a true — explanation. For those nerve-centres in the spinal cord which co-ordinate the muscles required for retracting the feet are the centres used by the will for this purpose. And, by hypothesis, the frequent use of them for this purpose under circumstances of stimulation which render the muscular response appropriate, will eventually establish an organic connexion between such response and the kind of stimulation to which it is appropriate — even though there be no utilitarian reason for its establish- ment ^ To invert a phrase of Aristotle, we do not frequently use this mechanism because we have it (seeing that in our normal condition there is no necessity for such use) ; but, by hypothesis, we have it because we have frequently used its several elements in appropriate combination. I will adduce but one further example in illustra- tion of these general principles — passing at once from the foregoing case of comparative simplicity to one of extreme complexity. There is a well-known experirhent on a brainless frog, which reveals a beautiful reflex mechanism in * It may be said, with regard to this particular reflex, that it may perhaps be, so to speak, a mechanical accident, arising from the contiguity of the sensory and motor roots in the cord. But as this suggestion cannot apply to other reflexes presently to be adduced, it need not be considered. 78 Darwin, and after Darwin, the animal, whereby the whole body is enabled con- tinually to readjust its balance on a book (or any other plane surface), as this is slowly rotated on a horizontal axis. So long as the book is lying flat, the frog remains motionless ; but as soon as the book is tilted a little, so that the frog is in danger of slipping off, all the four feet begin to crawl up the hill ; and the steeper the hill becomes, the faster they crawl. When the book is vertical, the frog has reached the now horizontal back, and so on. Such being the facts, the question is — How can the complicated piece of machinery thus implied have been developed by natural selection? Obviously it cannot have been so by any of the parts concerned having been originally distributed among different individuals, and afterwards united in single individuals by survival (i.e. free intercrossing) of the fittest. In other words, the case is obviously one of co-adap- tation, and not one of the blending of adaptations. Again, and no less obviously, it is impossible that the co-adaptation can have been gradually developed by natural selection, because, in order to have been so, it must by hypothesis have been of some degree of use in every one of its stages ; yet it plainly cannot have been until it had been fully perfected in all its astonishing complexity*. * Of course it will be observed that the question is not with regard to the development of all the nerves and muscles concerned in this particular process. It is as to the development of the co-ordinating centres, which thus so delicately respond to the special stimuli furnished by variations of angle to the horizon. And it is as inconceivable in this case of reflex action, as it is in almost every other case of reflex action, that the highly specialized machinery required for performing the adaptive function can ever have had its origin in the performance of any other I Characters, Hereditary and Acquired, 79 Lastly, not only does it thus appear impossible that during all stages of its development — or while as yet incapable of performing its intricate function — this nascent mechanism can have had any adaptive value ; but even as now fully developed, who will venture to maintain that it presents any selective value? As long as the animal preserves its brain, it will likewise preserve its balance, by the exercise of its intelligent volition. And, if the brain were in some way destroyed, the animal would be unable to breed, or even to feed ; so that natural selection can never have had any opportunity, so to speak, of developing this reflex mechanism in brainless frogs. On the other hand, as we have just seen, we cannot perceive how there can ever have been any raison d'etre for its development in normal frogs — even if its development were conceivably possible by means of this agency. But if practice makes perfect in the race, as it does in the individual, we can immediately perceive that the constant habit of correctly adjusting its balance may have gradually developed, in the batrachian organization, this non- necessary reflex ^. function. Indeed, a noticeable peculiarity of reflex mechanisms as a class is the highly specialized character of the functions which their highly organized structures subserve. ' We meet with a closely analogous refltx mechanism in brainless vertebrata of other kinds ; but these do not furnish such good test cases, because the possibility of natural selection cannot be so efficiently attenuated. The perching of brainless birds, for instance, at once refers us to the roosting of sleeping birds, where the reflex mechanism concerned is clearly of high adaptive value. Therefore such a case is not available as a test, although the probability is that birds have inherited their balancing mechanisms from their sauropsidian ancestors, where it would have been of no such adaptive importance. 8o Darwin, and after Darwin, And, of course, this example — like that of with- arawing the feet from a source of stimulation, which a frog will do as well as a man — does not stand alone. Without going further a-field than this same animal, any one who reads, from our present point of view, Goltz s work on the reflex actions of the frog, will find that the great majority of them — complex and refined though most of them are — cannot conceivably have ever been of any use to any frog that was in undisturbed possession of its brain. Hence, not to occupy space with a reiteration of facts all more or less of the same general kind, and therefore all presenting identical difficulties to ultra-Darwinian theory, I shall proceed to give two others which appear to me of particular interest in the present connexion, because they furnish illus- trations of reflex actions in a state of only partial development, and are therefore at the present moment demonstrably useless to the animal which displays them. Many of our domesticated dogs, when we gently scratch their sides and certain other parts of the body, will themselves perform scratching movements with the hind leg of the same side as that upon which tht irritation is being supplied. According to Goltz \ this action is a true reflex ; for he found that it is performed equally well in a dog which has been deprived of its cerebral hemispheres, and therefore of its normal volition. Again, according to Haycraft^, * Pfliigers Archiv, Bd. xx. s. 23 (1879). " Brain, part xlviii, pp. 516-19 (1889). — There is still better proof of this in the case of certain rodents. For instance, observing that rats and mice are under the necessity of very frequently scratching themselves with their hind-feet, I tried the experiment of removing the latter from Characters, Hereditary and Acquired. 81 this reflex is congenital, or not acquired during the life-time of each individual dog. Now, although the action of scratching is doubtless adaptive, it appears to me incredible that it could ever have become organized into a congenital reflex by natural selec- tion. For, in order that it should, the scratching away fleas would require to have been a function of selective value. Yet, even if the irritation caused by fleas were supposed to be so far fatal in the struggle for existence, it is certain that they would always be scratched away by the conscious intelligence of each individual dog ; and, therefore, that no advantage could be gained by organizing the action into a reflex. On the other hand, if acquired characters are ever in any degree transmitted, it is easy to understand how so frequently repeated an action should have become, in numberless generations of dogs, congenitally automatic. So much for the general principle of selective value as applied to this particular case. And simi- larly, of course, we might here repeat the application newly-born individuals — i.e. before the animals were able to co-ordinate their movements, and therefore before they had ever even attempted to scratch themselves. Notwithstanding that they were thus destitute of individual experience with regard to the benefit of scratching, they began their scratching movements with their stumps as soon as they were capable of executing co-ordinated movements, and afterwards continued to do so till the end of their lives with as much vigour and frequency as nnmutilated animals. Although the stumps could not reach the scats of irritation which were bent towards them, they used to move rapidly in the air for a lime sufficient to have given the itching part a good scratch, had the feet been present — after which the animals would resume their sundry other avocations with apparent satisfaction. These facts showed the hereditary response to irritation by parasites to be so strong, that even a whole life-time's experience of its futility made no difference in the frequency or the vigour thereof. II. G 82 Darwin, and after Darwin, of all the other general principles, which have just been applied in the two preceding cases. But it is only one of these other general principles which I desire in the present case specially to consider, for the purpose of considering more closely than hitherto the difficulty which this principle presents to ultra-Darwinian theory. The difficulty to which I allude is that of under- standing how all the stages in the development of a reflex action can have been due to natural selection, seeing that, before the reflex mechanism has been sufficiently elaborated to perform its function, it can- not have presented any degree of utility. Now the particular force of the present example, the action of scratching — as also of the one to follow — consists in the fact that it is a case where a reflex action is not yet completely organized. It appears to be only in course of construction, so that it is neither in- variably present, nor, when it is present, is it ever fully adapted to the performance of its function. That it is not invariably present (when the brain is so) may be proved by trying the simple experi- ment on a number of puppies — and also of full- grown dogs. Again, that even when it is present it is far from being fully adapted to the perform- ance of its function, may be proved by observing that only in rare instances does the scratching leg succeed in scratching the place which is being irritated. The movements are made more or less at random, and as often as not the foot fails to touch the body at any place at all. Hence, althoui;h we have a "prophecy" of a reflex action well designed for the discharge of a particular function, at present Characters y Hereditary and Acquired. 83 the machinery is not sufficiently perfected for the adequate discharge of that function. In this impor- tant respect it differs from the otherwise closely analogous reflex action of the frog, whereby the foot of the hind leg is enabled to localize with precision a seat of irritation on the side of the body. But this beautiful mechanism in the frog can- not have sprung into existence ready formed at any historical moment in the past history of the phyla. It must have been the subject of a more or less prolonged evolution, in some stage of which it must presumably have resembled the now nascent scratch- ing reflex of the dog, in making merely abortive attempts at localizing the seat of irritation — supposing, of course, that some physiologist had been there to try the experiment by first removing the brain. Now, even if one could imagine it to be, either in the frog or in the dog, a matter of selective importance that so exceedingly refined a mechanism should have been developed for the sole purpose of inhibiting the bites of parasites — which in every normal animal would certainly be discharged by an intentional performance of the movements in question,— even if, in order to save an hypothesis at all costs, we make so violent a supposition as this, still we should do so in vain. For it would still remain undeniably certain that the reflex mechanism is not of any selective value. Even now the mechanism in the dog is not sufficiently precise to subserve the only function which occasionally and abortively it attempts to perform. Thus it has all the appearance of being but an imitating shadow of certain neuro-muscular adjustments, which have been habitually performed in the canine phyla by a G 2 84 Darwin^ and after Darwin. volitional response to cutaneous irritation. Were it necessary, this argument might be strengthened by observing that the reflex action is positively improved by removal of the brain. The second example of a nascent reflex in dogs which I have to mention is as follows. Goltz found that his brainless dogs, when wetted with water, would shake themselves as dry as possible, in just the same way as normal dogs will do under similar circumstances. This, of course, proves that the shaking movements may be performed by a reflex mechanism, which can have no other function to perform in the organization of a dog, and which, besides being of a highly elaborate character, will respond only to a very special kind of stimulation. Now, here also I find that the mechanism is con- genital, or not acquired by individual experience. For the puppies on which I experimented were kept indoors from the time of their birth — so as never to have had any experience of being wetted by rain, &c. — till they were old enough to run about with a full power of co-ordinating their general movements. If these young animals were suddenly plunged into water, the shock proved too great : they would merely lie and shiver. But if their feet alone were wetted, by being dipped in a basin of water, the puppies would soon afterwards shake their heads in the peculiar manner which is required for shaking water off the ears, and which in adult dogs consti- tutes the first phase of a general shaking of the whole body. Here, then, we seem to have good evidence of all the same facts which were presented in the case of the Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired, 85 scratching reflex. In the first place, co-adaptation is present in a very high degree, because this shaking reflex in the dog, unlike the skin-twitching reflex in the horse, does not involve only a single muscle, or even a single group of muscles : it involves more or less the co-ordinated activity of many voluntary muscles all over the body. Such, at any rate, is the case when the action is performed by the in- telligent volition of an adult dog ; and if a brainless dog, or a young puppy, does not perform it so extensively or so vigorously, this only goes to prove that the reflex has not yet been sufficiently developed to serve as a substitute for intelligent volition — i.e. that it is useless, or a mere organic shadow of the really adaptive substance. Again, even if this nascent reflex had been so far developed as to have been capable of superseding voluntary action, still we may fairly doubt whether it could have proved of selective value. For it is questionable whether the imme- diate riddance of water after a wetting is a matter of life and death to dogs in a state of nature. Moreover, even if it were, every individual dog would always have got rid of the irritation, and so of the dan^^er, by means of a voluntary shake — with the double result that natural selection has never had any opportunity of gradually building up a special reflex mechanism for the purpose of securing a shake, and that the canine race have not had to wait for any such unnecessary process. Lastly, such a process, besides being unnecessary, must surely have been, under any circumstances, impossible. For even if we ^yere to suppose — again for the sake of saving an hypothesis at any 86 DarwiUy and after Darwin. cost — that the presence of a fully-formed shaking reflex is of selective value in the struggle for exist- ence, it is perfectly certain that all the stages through which the construction of so elaborate a mechanism must have passed could not have been, under any circumstances, of any such value. But, it is needless to repeat, according to the hypothesis of use-inheritance, there is no necessity to suppose that these incipient reflex mechanisms are of any value. If function produces structure in the race as it does in the individual, the voluntary and frequently repeated actions of scratching and shaking may very well have led to an organic integration of the neuro-muscular mechanisms con- cerned. Their various parts having been always co-ordinated for the performance of these actions by the intelligence of innumerable dogs in the past, their co-adapted activity in their now automatic responses to appropriate stimuli presents no diflficulty. And the consideration that neither in their prospec- tively more fully developed condition, nor, a fortiori, in their present and all previous stages of evolution, can these reflex mechanisms be regarded as present- ing any selective — or even so much as any adaptive — value, is neither more nor less than the theory of use-inheritance would expect. Thus, with regard to the phenomena of reflex action in general, all the facts are such as this theory requires, while many of the facts are such as the theory of natural selection alone cannot conceivably explain. Indeed, it is scarcely too much to say, that most of the facts are such as directly contradict the latter theory in its application to them. But, be this Characters^ Hereditary and Acquired. 87 as it may, at present there are only two hypo- theses in the field whereby to account for the facts of adaptive evolution. One of these hypotheses is universally accepted, and the only question is whether we are to regard it as alone sufficient to ex- plain all the facts. The other hypothesis having been questioned, we can test its validity only by finding cases which it is fully capable of explaining, and which do not admit of being explained by its com- panion hypothesis. I have endeavoured to show that we have a large class of such cases in the domain of reflex action, and shall next endeavour to show that there is another large class in the domain of instinct. If instinct be, as Professor Hering, Mr. Samuel Butler, and others have argued, "hereditary habit*'— i. e. if it comprises an element of transmitted ex* perience — we at once find a complete explanation of many cases of the display of instinct which otherwise remain inexplicable. For although a large number — or even, as I believe, a large majority — of instincts are explicable by the theory of natural selection alone, or by supposing that they were gradually developed by the survival of fortuitous variations in the way of advantageous psychological peculiarities, this only apphes to comparatively simple instincts, such as that of a protectively coloured animal exhibiting a prefer- ence for the surroundings which it resembles, or even adopting attitudes in imitation of objects which occur in such surroundings. But in all cases where instincts become complex and refined, we seem almost com- pelled to accept Darwin's view that their origin is to 88 Darwin^ and after Darwin. be sought in consciously intelligent adjustments on the part of ancestors. Thus, to give only one example, a species of Sphex preys upon caterpillars, which it stings in their nerve-centres for the purpose of para' y zing, without killing them. The victims, when thus ren- dered motionless, are then buried with the eggs of the Sphex, in order to serve as food for her larvae which subsequently develop from these eggs. Now, in order thus to paralyze a caterpillar, the Sphex has to sting it successively in nine minute and particular points along the ventral surface of the animal — and this the Sphex unerringly does, to the exclusion of all other points of the caterpillar's anatomy. Well, such being the facts — according to M. Fabre, who appears to have observed them carefully — it is con- ceivable enough as Darwin supposed \ that the ancestors of the Sphex, being like many other hymen- opterous insects highly intelligent, should have observed that on stinging caterpillars in these particular spots a greater amount of effect was produced than could be produced by stinging them anywhere else ; and, therefore, that they habitually stung the cater- pillars in these places only, till, in course of time, this originally intelligent habit became by heredity instinc- tive. But now, on the other hand, if we exclude the possibility of this explanation, it appears to me in- credible that such an instinct should ever have been evolved at all ; for it appears to me incredible that natural selection, unaided by originally intelligent action, could ever have developed such an instinct * For details of his explanation of this particular case, for which 1 particularly inquired, see Mental Evolution in Animals^ pp. 301-2. Characters, Hereditary and Acquired, 89 out of merely fortuitous variations — there being, by hypothesis, nothing to determine variations of an insect's mind in the direction of stinging caterpillars only in these nine intensely localized spots ^. Again, there are not a few instincts which appear to be wholl\' useless to their possessors, and others again which appear to be even deleterious. The dusting over of their excrement by certain freely- roaming carnivora ; the choice by certain herbivora of particular places on which to void their urine, or in which to die ; the howling of wolves at the moon ; purring of cats, &c., under pleasurable emotion ; and sundry other hereditary actions of the same appar- ently unmeaning kind, all admit of being readily accounted for as useless habits originally acquired in various ways, and afterwards perpetuated by heredity, because not sufficiently deleterious to have been stamped out by natural selection -. But it does not seem possible to explain them by survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. Finally, in the case of our own species, it is self- evident that the aesthetic, moral, and religious instincts admit of a natural and easy explanation on the hypothesis of use-inheritance, while such is by no means the case if that hypothesis is rejected. Our emotions of the ludicrous, of the beautiful, and of the sublime, appear to be of the nature of hereditary instincts ; and be this as it may, it would further appear that, whatever else they may be, they are certainly not 01 a life-preserving character. And » Note B. ' For fuller treatment see Mental Evolution in Animals^ pp. 274-385, 378-379» 381-383. 90 Darwifiy and after Darwin. although this cannot be said of the moral sense when the theory of natural selection is extended from the individual to the tribe, still, when we remember the extraordinary complexity and refinement to which they have attained in civilized man, we may well doubt whether they can have been due to natural selection alone. But space forbids discussion of this large and important question on the present occasion. Suffice it therefore to say, that I doubt not Weismann himself would be the first to allow that his theory of heredity encounters greater difficulties in the domain of ethics than in any other — unless, indeed, it be that of religion ^. I have now given a brief sketch of the indirect evidence in favour of the so-called Lamarckian factors, in so far as this appears fairly deducible from the facts of reflex action and of instinct. It will now be my endeavour to present as briefly what has to be said against this evidence. As previously observed, the facts of reflex action have not been hitherto adduced in the present con- nexion. This has led me to occupy considerably more space in the treatment of them than those of instinct. On this account, also, there is here nothing to quote, or to consider, per contra. On the other hand, however, Weismann has himself dealt with the phenomena of instinct in animals, though not, I think, in man— if we except his brilliant essay on music. Therefore let us now begin this division of our * For an excellent essay on the deleterious character of early forms of religion from a biological point of view, see the Hon. Lidy Welby, An Apparent Paradox in Mentai Evolution {joynrn. AnXhxo^. Inst. May 1891). Characters, Hereditary and Acquired. 91 subject by briefly stating, and considering, what he has said upon the subject. The answer of Weismann to difficulties which arise against the ultra-Darwinian theory in the domain of instinct, is as follows : — " The necessity for extreme caution in appealing to the sup- posed hereditary effects of use, is well shown in the case of those numerous instincts which only come into play once in a life-time, and which do not therefore admit of improvement by practice. The queen-bee takes her nuptial flight only once, and yet how many and complex are the instincts and the reflex mechanisms which come into play on that occasion. Again, in many insects the deposition of eggs occurs but once in a life-time, and yet such insects always fulfil the necessary conditions with unfailing accuracy '." But in this rejoinder the possibility is forgotten, that although such actions are ftow performed only once in the individual life-time, originally — i. e. when the instincts were being developed in a remote ancestry — they may have been performed on many frequent and successive occasions during the individual life-time. In all the cases quoted by Weismann, instincts of the kind in question bear independent evidence of high antiquity, by occurring in whole genera (or even families), by being associated with peculiar and often highly evolved structures required for their performance, and so on. Consequently, in these cases ample time has been allowed for subse- quent changes of habit, and of seasonal alterations with respect to propagation — both these things being of frequent and facile occurrence among animals of all kinds, even within periods which fall under actual ' Essays, i. p. 93. 92 Darwin, and after Darwin. observation. Nevertheless, I do not question that there are instinctive activities v^^hich, as far as we are able to see, can never have been performed more than once in each individual life- time ^. The fact, however, only goes to show what is fully admitted — that some instincts (and even highly complex instincts) have apparently been developed b\' natural selection alone. Which, of course, is not equivalent to showing that all instincts must have been developed by natural selection alone. The issue is not to be debated on general grounds like this, but on those of particular cases. Even if it were satislactorily proved that the instincts of a queen-bee have been developed by natural selection, it would not thereby be proved that such has been the case with the instincts of a Sphex wasp. One can very well understand how the nuptial fliglit of the former, with all its associated actions, may have been brought about by natural selection alone ; but this does not help us to under- stand how the peculiar instincts of the latter can have been thus caused. Strong evidence in favour of Weismann's views does, however, at first sight seem to be furnished by social hymenoptera in other respects. For not only does the queen present highly specialized and alto- gether remarkable instincts ; but the neuters present totally different and even still more remarkable instincts — which, moreover, are often divided into two or more classes, corresponding with the different '' castes.*' Yet the neuters, being barren females, never have an opportunity of bequeathing their instincts to progeny. Thus it appears necessary to 1 See Mental Evolution in Animals y pp. 377-8. Characters, Hereditary and Acquired, 93 suppose that the instincts of all the different castes of neuters are latent in the queen and drones, together with the other instincts which are patent in both. Lastly, it seems necessary to suppose that all thi clearly * Nahtrty vol. xxxiii. p. loo. 224 Darwin^ and after Darwin, set forth by Mr. Gulick : — '* The fundamental cause of this seems to lie in the fact that no two portions of a species possess exactly the same average characters ; and, therefore, that the initial differences are for ever reacting on the environment and on each other in such a way as to ensure increasing divergence in each generation, as long as the individuals of the two groups are kept from intergenerating^." In other words, as soon as a portion of a species is separated from the rest of that species, so that breeding between the two portions is no longer possible, the general average of characters in the separated portion not being in all respects precisely the same as it is in the other portion, the result of in-breeding among all individuals of the separated portion will eventually be different from that which obtains in the other portion ; so that, after a number of generations, the separated portion may become a distinct species from the effect of isolation alone. Even without the aid of isolation, any original dif- ference of average characters may become, as it were, magnified in successive generations, provided that the divergence is not harmful to the individuals .presenting it, and that it occurs in a sufficient pro- portional number of individuals not to be immedi- ately swamped by intercrossing. For, as Mr. Murphy has pointed out, in accordance with Delboeufs law, "if, in any species, a number of individuals, bearing a ratio not infinitely small to the entire number of births, are in every generation born with a particular variation which is neither beneficial nor injurious, * Divergent Evoluion through Cumulative Segregation^ Linn. Jouin. Zoology, vol. XX. p. 215. Characters as Adaptive and Specific, 225 and if it be not counteracted by reversion, then the proportion of the new variety to the original form will increase till it approaches indefinitely near to equality ^." Now even Mr. Wallace himself allows that this must be the case ; and thinks that in these considerations we may find an explanation of the existence of certain definite varieties, such as the melanic form of the jaguar, the brindled or ring- eyed guillemot, &c. But, on the other hand, he thinks that such varieties must always be unstable, and continually produced in varying proportions from the parent forms. We need not, however, wait to dispute this arbitrary assumption, because we can see that it fails, even as an assumption, in all cases where tlie superadded influence of isolation is concerned. Here there is nothing to intercept the original tendency to divergent evolution, which arises directly out of the initially different average of qualities presented by the isolated section of the species, as compared with the rest of that species ^. * Habit and Intelligence, p. 241. * Allusion may here again be made to the case of the niata cattle. For here is a case where a very extreme variety is certainly not unstable, nor produced in varyin^^ proportions from the parent form. Moreover, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, this almost monstrous variety most probably originated as an individual sport— being after- wards maintained and multiplied for a time by artificial selection. Now, whether or not this was the case, we can very well see that it may have been. Hence it will serve to illustrate another possibility touching the origin and maintenance of useless specific characters. For what is to prevent an individual congenital variation of any kind (provided it be not harmful) from perpetuating itself as a " varietal," and eventually, should offspring become sufficiently numerous, a *' specific character " ? There is nothing to prevent this, save panmixia, or the presence of free intercrossing. But, as we shall see in the next division of this treatise, there are in nature many forms of isolation. Hence, as often as a small number of individuals may have experienced isolation in any of its forms, II. Q 226 Darwifij and after Darwin, As we shall have to consider the important principle of isolation more fully on a subsequent occasion, I need not deal with it in the present connexion, further than to remark that in this principle we have what appears to me a full and adequate condition to the rise and continuance of specific characters which need not necessarily be adaptive characters. And, when we come to consider the facts of isolation more closely, we shall find superabundant evidence of this having actually been the case. V. Laws of Growth. Under this general term Darwin included the opera- tion of all unknown causes internal to organisms leading to modifications of form or structure — such modifications, therefore, appearing to arise, as he says " spontaneously," or without reference to utility. That he attributed no small importance to the opera- opportunity for perpetuation will have been given to any congenital variations which may happen to arise. Should any of these be pronounced variations, it would afterwards be ranked as a specific character. I do not myself think that this is the way in which indifferent specific characters usually originate. On the contrary, I believe that their origin is most frequently due to the influence of isolation on the average characters of the whole population, as briefly stated in the text. But here it seems worth while to notice this possibility of their occa- sionally arising as merely individual variations, afterwards perpetuated by any of the numerous isolating conditions which occur in nature. For, if this can be the case with a varietal form so extreme as to border on the monstrous, much more can it be so with such minute differences as frequently go to constitute specific distinctions. It is the business of species-makers to search out such distinctions, no matter how trivial, and to record them as " specific characters." Consequently, wherever in nature a congenital variation happens to arise, and to be perpetuated by the force of heredity alone under any of the numerous forms of isola- tion which occur in nature, there will be a case analogous to that of the niata cattle. Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 227 tion of these principles is evident from the last edition of the Origin of Species. But as these " laws of growth " refer to causes confessedly unknown, I will not occupy space by discussing this division of our subject — further than to observe that, as we shall subsequently see, many of the facts which fall under it are so irreconcilably adverse to the Wallacean doctrine of specific characters as univer- sally adaptive, that in the face of them Mr. Wallace himself appears at times to abandon his doctrine in toto. Q « CHAPTER IX. Characters as Adaptive and Specific [continued). It must have appeared strange that hitherto I should have failed to distinguish between " true species" and merely "climatic varieties." But it will conduce to clearness of discussion if we con- sider our subject point by point. Therefore, having now given a fair statement of the facts of climatic variation, I propose to deal with their theoretical implications — especially as regards the distinction which naturalists are in the habit of drawing between them and so-called true species. First of all, then, what is this distinction ? Take, for example, the case of the Porto Santo rabbits. To almost every naturalist who reads what has been said touching these animals, it will have appeared that the connexion in which they are adduced is wholly irrelevant to the question in debate. For, it will be said that the very fact of the seemingly specific differentiation of these animals having proved to be illusory when some of them were restored to their ancestral conditions, is proof that their peculiar characters are not specific characters ; but only what Mr. Wallace would term " individual characters/' or Characters as Adaptive and Specific, 229 variations that are not inherited. And the same remark applies to all the other cases which have been adduced to show the generality and extent of climatic variation, both in other animals and also in plants. Why, then, it will be asked, commit the absurdity of adducing such cases in the present discussion ? Is it not self-evident that however general, or however considerable, such merely individual, or non-heritable, variations may be, they cannot possibly have ever had anything to do with the origin of species ? Therefore, is it not simply preposterous to so much as mention them in relation to the question touching the utility of specific characters? Well, whether or not it is absurd and preposterous to consider climatic variations in connexion with the origin of species, will depend, and depend exclusively, on what it is that we are to understand by a species. Hitherto I have assumed, for the sake of argument, that we all know what is meant by a species. But the time has now come for showing that such is far from being the case. And as it would be clearly absurd and preposterous to conclude anything with regard to specific characters before agreeing upon what we mean by a character as specific, I will begin by giving all the logically possible definitions of a species. I . A group of individuals descended by zvay of natural generation from an originally and specially created type. This definition may be taken as virtually obsolete. a. A group of individuals which^ while fully fertile inter se, are sterile with all other individuals — or^ at any rate, do not generate fully fertile hybrids. This purely physiological definition is not nowadays 230 Darwin, and after Darwin, entertained by any naturalist. Even though the physiological distinction be allowed to count for something in otherwise doubtful cases, no systematist would constitute a species on such grounds alone. Therefore we need not concern ourselves with this definition, further than to observe that it is often taken as more or less supplementary to each of the following definitions. 3. A group of individuals which, however many characters they share with other individuals^ agree in presenting one or more characters of a peculiar kind, with some certain degree of distinctness. In this we have the definition which is practically followed by all naturalists at the present time. But, as we shall presently see more fully, it is an extremely lax definition. For it is impossible to determine, by any fixed and general rule, what degree of distinctness on the part of peculiar characters is to be taken as a uniform standard of specific separation. So long as naturalists believed in special creation, they could feel that by following this definition (3) they were at any rate doing their best to tabulate very real distinctions in nature — viz. between types as originally produced by a supernatural cause, and as subsequently more or less modified (i. e. within the limits imposed by the test of cross-fertility) by natural causes. But evolutionists are unable to hold any belief in such real distinctions, being confessedly aware that all distinctions between species and varieties are purely artificial. So to speak, they well know that it is they themselves who create species, by determining round what degrees of differentiation their diagnostic boundaries shall be drawn. And, seeing that these Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 231 degrees of differentiation so frequently shade into one another by indistinguishable stages (or, rather, that they always do so, unless intermediate varieties have perished), modern naturalists are vi^ell avi^ake to the impossibility of securing any approach to a uniform standard of specific distinction. On this account many of them feel a pressing need for some firmer definition of a species than this one — which, in point of fact, scarcely deserves to be regarded as a definition at all, seeing that it does not formu- late any definite criterion of specific distinctness, but leaves every man to follow his own standards of discrimination. Now, as far as I can see, there are only two definitions of a species which will yield to evolutionists the steady and uniform criterion required. These two definitions are as follows. 4. A group of individuals which, however many characters they share with other individuals, agree in presenting one or more characters of a peculiar and hereditary kind, ivith some certain degree of dis- tinctness. It will be observed that this definition is exactly the same as the last one, save in the addition of the words "and hereditary." But, it is needless to say, the addition of these words is of the highest im- portance, inasmuch as it supplies exactly that objective and rigid criterion of specific distinctness which the preceding definition lacks. It immediately gets rid of the otherwise hopeless wrangling over species as *' good " and " bad." or " true " and " climatic," of which (as we have seen) Kerner's essay is such a remarkable outcome. Therefore evolutionists have 232 Darwifiy and after Darwin, more and more grown to lay stress on the hereditary character of such pecuh'arities as they select for diagnostic features of specific distinctness. Indeed it is not too much to say that, at the present time, evolutionists in general recognize this character as, theoretically, indispensable to the constitution of a species. But it is likewise not too much to say that, practically, no one of our systematic naturalists has hitherto concerned himself with this matter. At all events, I do not know of any who has ever taken the trouble to ascertain by experiment, with regard to any of the species which he has consti- tuted, whether the peculiar characters on which his diagnoses have been founded are, or are not, heredi- tary. Doubtless the labour of constituting (or, still more, of r^-constituting) species on such a basis of experimental inquiry would be insuperable; while, even if it could be accomplished, would prove unde- sirable, on account of the * chaos it would produce in our specific nomenclature. But, all the same, we must remember that this nomenclature as we now have it— and, therefore, the partitioning of species as we have now made them — has no reference to the criterion of heredity. Our system of distinguishing between species and varieties is not based upon the definition which we are now considering, but upon that which we last considered — frequently coupled, to some undefinable extent, with No. 2. 5. There is, however, yet another and closer defini- tion, which may be suggested by the ultra- Darwinian school, who maintain the doctrine of natural selection as the only possible cause of the origin of species, namely : — I Characters as Adaptive and Specific, 233 A group of individuals which y however many characters they share with other individuals, agree in presenting one or more characters of a peculiar, hereditary, and adaptive kind, with some certain degree of distinctness. Of course this definition rests upon the dogma of utility as a necessary attribute of characters qu& specific — i. e. the dogma against which the whole of the present discussion is directed. Therefore all I need say with reference to it is, that at any rate it cannot be adduced in any argument where the validity of its basal dogma is in question. For it would be a mere begging of this question to argue that every species must present at least one peculiar and adaptive character, because, according to definition, unless an organic type does present at least one such character, it is not a specific type. Moreover, and quite apart from this, it is to be hoped that naturalists as a body will never consent to base their diagnostic work on what at best must always be a highly speculative extension of the Darwinian theory. While, lastly, if they were to do so with any sort of consistency, the precise adaptation which each peculiar character subserves, and which because of this adaptation is constituted a character of specific distinction, would have to be determined by actual observation. For no criterion of specific distinction could be more vague and mischievous than this one, if it were to be applied on grounds of mere inference that such and such a character, because seemingly constant, must '* necessarily" be either useful, vestigial, or correlated. Such then, as far as T can see, are all the 234 Darwin^ and after Darwin. definitions of a species that are logically possible^. Which of them is chosen by those who maintain the necessary usefulness of all specific characters ? Observe, it is for those who maintain this doctrine to choose their definition : it is not for me to do so. My contention is, that the term does not admit of any definition sufficiently close and constant to serve as a basis for the doctrine in question — and this for the simple reason that species-makers have never agreed among themselves upon any criterion of specific distinction. My opponents, on the other hand, are clearly bound to take an opposite view, because, unless they suppose that there is some such definition of a species they would be self-convicted of the absurdity of maintaining a great generalization on a confessedly untenable basis. For example, a few years ago I was allowed to raise a debate in the Biological Section of the British Association on the question to which the present chapters are devoted. But the debate ended as I had anticipated that it must end. No one of the naturalists present could give even the vaguest definition of what was meant by * It is almost needless to say that by a definition as " logical *' is meant one which, while including all the differentiae of the thing defined, excludes any qualities which that thing may share in common with any other thing. But by definitions as " logically possible " I mean the number of separate definitions which admit of being correctly given of the same thing from different points of view. Thus, for instance, in the present case, since the above has been in type the late M. Quatre- fages' posthumous work on Darwin et ses Precurseurs Francois has been published, and gives a long list of definitions of the term " species" which from time to time have been enunciated by as many naturalists of the highest standing as such (pp 1S6-187). But while none of these twenty or more definitions is logical in the sense just defined, they all present one or other of the differentiae given by those in the text. Characters as Adaptive and Specific, 235 a species — or, consequently, of a character as specific. On this account the debate ended in as complete a destruction as was possible of the doctrine that all the distinctive characters of every species must necessarily be useful vestigial, or correlated. For it became unquestionable that the same generalization admitted of being made, with the same degree of effect, touching all the distinctive characters of every "snark." Probably, however, it will be thought unfair to have thus sprung a difficult question of definition in oral debate. Therefore I allude to this fiasco at the British Association, merely for the purpose of em- phasizing the necessity of agreeing upon some defini- tion of a species, before we can conclude anything with regard to the generalization of specific characters as necessarily due to natural selection. But when a naturalist has had full time to consider this funda- mental matter of definition, and to decide on what his own shall be, he cannot complain of unfairness on the part of any one else who holds him to what he thus says he means by a species. Now Mr. Wallace, in his last work, has given a matured statement of what it is that he means by a species. This, there- fore, I will take as the avowed basis of his doctrine touching the necessary origin and maintenance of all specific characters by natural selection. His definition is as follows : — " An assemblage of individuals which have become somewhat modified in structure, form, and constitution, so as to adapt them to slightly different conditions of life ; which can be differen- tiated from allied assemblages ; which reproduce their like ; which usually breed together ; and, perhaps, when crossed with their 236 Darwin, and after Darwin, near allies, always produce oflfspring which are more or less sterile inter se ^." From this definition the portion which I have italicized must be omitted in the present discussion, for the reasons already given while considering definition No. 5. What remains is a combination of Nos. 2 and 4. According to Mr. Wallace, therefore, our criterion of a species is to be the heredity of peculiar characters, combined, perhaps, with a more or less exclusive fertility of the component individuals inter se. This is the basis on which his generalization of the utility of specific characters as necessary and universal is reared. Here, then, we have something definite to go upon, at all events as far as Mr. Wallace is concerned. Let us see how far such a basis of definition is competent to sustain his generalization. First of all it must be remarked that, as species have actually been constituted by systematists, the test of exclusive fertility does not apply. For my own part I think this is to be regretted, because I believe that such is the only natural — and there- fore the only firm — basis on which specific dis- tinctions can be reared. But, as previously observed, this is not the view which has been taken by our species-makers. At most they regard the physio- logical criterion as but lending some additional weight to their judgement upon morphological features, in cases where it is doubtful whether the latter alone are of sufficient distinctness to justify a recognition of specific value. Or, conversely, if the morphological features are clearly sufficient to justify such a recog- nition, yet if it happens to be known that there is ^ Darwinism, p. 167. Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 237 full fertility between the form presenting them and other forms which do not, then the latter fact will usually prevent naturalists from constituting the well differentiated form a species on grounds of its morpho- logical features alone — as, for instance, in the case of our domesticated varieties. In short, the physiological criterion has not been employed with sufficient close- ness to admit of its being now comprised within any practical definition of the term " species " — if by this term we are to understand, not what any one may think species ought to be, but what species actually are, as they have been constituted for us by their makers. From all this it follows that the definition of the term " species " on which Mr. Wallace relies for his deduction with respect to specific characters, is the definition No. 4. In other words, omitting his petitio prmcipii and his allusion to the test of fertility, the great criterion in his view is the criterion of Heredity. And in this all other evolutionists, of whatever school, will doubtless agree with him. They will recognize that it is really the distinguishing test between " climatic varieties " and " true species," so that how- ever widely or however constantly the former may diverge from one another in regard to their peculiar characters, they are not to be classed among the latter unless their peculiar characters are likewise hereditary characters. Now, if we are all agreed so far, the only question that remains is whether or not this criterion of Heredity is capable of supplying a basis for the generalization, that all characters which have been ranked as of specific value must necessarily be 238 Darwin^ and after Darwin, regarded as presenting also an adaptive, or life- serving, value? I will now endeavour to show that there are certain very good reasons for answering this question in the negative. (A.) In the first place, even if the modifications induced by the direct action of a changed environment are not hereditary, who is to know that they are not? Assuredly not the botanist or zoologist who in a particular area finds what he is fully entitled to regard as a well-marked specific type. Only by experiments in transposition could it be proved that the modifications have been produced by local conditions; and although the researches of many experimentalists have shown how considerable and how constant such modifications may be, where is the systematic botanist who would ever think of trans- planting an apparently new species from one distant area to another before he concludes that it is a new species? Or where is the systematic zoologist who would take the trouble to transport what appears to be an obviously endemic species of animal from one country to another before venturing to give it a new specific name? No doubt, both in the case of plants and animals, it is tacitly assumed that constant differences, if sufficient in amount to be re- garded as specific differences are hereditary ; but there is not one case in a hundred where the validity of this assumption has ever been tested by experiments in transposition. Therefore naturalists are apt to regard it as remarkable when the few experiments which- have been made in this direction are found ( Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 239 to negative their assumption — for example, that a diagnostic character in species of the genus Hiera- tium is found by transplantation not to be hereditary, or that the several named species of British trout are similarly proved to be all " local varieties " of one another. But, in point of fact, there ought to be nothing to surprise us in such results — unless, indeed, it is the unwarrantable nature of the assumption that any given differences of size, form, colour, &c., which naturalists may have regarded as of specific value, are, on this account, hereditary. Indeed, so sur- prising is this assumption in the face of what we know touching both the extent and the constancy of climatic variation, that it seems to me such a naturalist as Kerner, who never considers the criterion of heredity at all, is less assailable than those who profess to constitute this their chief criterion of specific distinction. For it is certain that whatever their professions may have nowadays become, sys- tematic naturalists have never been in the habit of really following this criterion. In theory they have of late years attached more and more weight to definition No. 4 ; but in practice they have always adopted definition No. 3. The consequence is, that in literally numberless cases (particularly in the vegetable kingdom) "specific characters" are assumed to be hereditary characters merely because systematic naturalists have bestowed a specific name on the form which presents them. Nor is this all. For, conversely, even when it is known that constant mor- phological characters are unquestionably hereditary characters, if they happen to present but small degrees of divergence from those of allied formS, then 240 Darvoin^ and after Darwin, the form which presents them is not ranked as a species, but as a constant variety. In o.ther words, when definitions 3 and 4 are found to clash, it is not 4, but 3, that is followed. In short, even up to the present time, systematic naturalists play fast and loose with the criterion of Heredity to such an extent, that, as above observed, it has been rendered well nigh worthless in fact, whatever may be thought of it in theory. Now, unless all this can be denied, what is the use of representing that a species is distinguished from a variety — "climatic" or otherwise — by the fact that its constituent individuals ''reproduce their like"? We are not here engaged on any abstract question of what might have been the best principles of specific distinction for naturalists to have adopted. We are engaged on the practical question of the principles which they actually have adopted. And of these principles the reproduction of like by like, under all circumstances of environment, has been virtually ignored. (B.) In the second place, supposing that the criterion of Heredity had been as universally and as rigidly employed by our systematists in their work of con- structing species as it has been but occasionally and loosely employed, could it be said that even then a basis would have been furnished for the doctrine that all spe- cific characters must necessarily be useful characters? Obviously not, and for the following reasons. It is admitted that climatic characters are not necessarily — or even generally — useful characters. Charade s as Adaptive and Specific. 241 Consequently, if there be any reason for believing that climatic characters may become in time here- ditary characters, the doctrine in question would collapse, even supposing that all specific types were to be re-constituted on a basis of experimental inquiry, for the purpose of ascertaining which of them conform to the test of Heredity. Now there are very good reasons for believing that climatic characters not unfrequently do become hereditary characters ; and it was mainly in view of those reasons that I deemed it worth while to devote so much space in the preceding chapter to the facts of climatic variation. I will now state the reasons in question under two different lines of argument. We are not as yet entitled to conclude definitely against the possible inheritance of acquired char- acters. Consequently, we are not as yet entitled to assume that climatic characters — i. e. characters acquired by converse with a new environment, con- tinued, say, since the last glacial period — can never have become congenital characters. But, if they ever have become congenital characters, they will have become, at all events as a general rule, congenital characters that are usek'^ss ; for it is conceded that, qud climatic characters, they have not been due to natural selection. Doubtless the followers of Weismann will repudiate this line of argument, if not as entirely worthless, at all events as too questionable to be of much practical worth. But even to the followers of Weis- mann it may be pointed out, that the Wallacean doctrine of the origin of all specific characters by means of natural selection was propounded many years II. R 242 Darwin^ and after Darwin. before either Galton or Weismann had questioned the transmission of acquired characters. However. I allow that this line of argument has now become — for the time being at all events — a dubious line, and will therefore at once pass on to the second line, which is not open to doubt from any quarter. Whether or not we accept Weismann's views, it will here be convenient to employ his terminology, since this will serve to convey the somewhat im- portant distinctions which it is now my object to express. In the foregoing paragraphs, under heading (A), we have seen that there must be " literally numberless forms" which have been ranked as true species, whose diagnostic characters are nevertheless not congenital. In the case of plants especially, we know that there must be large numbers of named species which do not conform to the criterion of Heredity, although we do not know which species they are. For present purposes, however, it is enough for us to know that there are many such named species, where some change of environment has acted directly and similarly on all the individual " somas " exposed to it, without affecting their "germ-plasms," or the material bases of their hereditary qualities. For named species of this kind we may employ the term somato- genetic species. But now, if there are any cases where a change of environment does act on the germ-plasms exposed to it, the result would be what we may call bias to- genetic species — i.e. species which conform to the criterion of Heredity, and would therefore be ranked by all naturalists as "true species." It would not Characters as Adaptive and Specific, 243 signify in such a case whether the changed con- ditions of life first affected the soma, and then, through changed nutrition, the germ-plasm ; or whether from the first it directly affected the germ -plasm itself. For in either case the result would be a " species/' which would continue to reproduce its peculiar features by heredity. Now, the supposition that changed conditions of life may thus affect the congenital endowments of germ- plasm is not a gratuitous one. The sundry facts already given in previous chapters are enough to show that the origin of a blastogerietic species by the direct action on germ -plasm of changed conditions of life is, at all events, a possibility. And a little further thought is enough to show that this possibility becomes a probability — if not a virtual certainty. Even Weismann — notwithstanding his desire to main- tain, as far as he possibly can, the *' stability" of germ-plasm — is obliged to allow that external con- ditions acting on the organism may in some cases modify the hereditary qualities of its germ-plasm, and so, as he says, " determine the phyletic development of its descendants." Again, we have seen that he is compelled to interpret the results of his own experi- ments on the climatic varieties of certain butterflies by saying, " I cannot explain the facts otherwise than by supposing the passive acquisition of characters produced by direct influences of climate"; by which he means that in this case the influence of climate acts directly on the hereditary qualities of germ- plasm. Lastly, and more generally, he says : — " But although I hold it improbable that individual variability can depend on a direct action of external influences upon the R 2 244 Darwin J and after Darwin. germ-cells and their contained germ-plasm, because — as tollows from sundry facts— the molecular structure of the germ-plasm must be very difficult to change, yet it is by no means to be implied that this structure may not possibly be altered by influences of the same kind continuing for a very long time. Thus it seems to me the possibility is not to be rejected, that influences continued for a long time, that is, for generations, such as temperature, kind of nourishment, &c., which may affect the germ-cells as well as any other part of the organism, may produce a change in the constitu- tion of the germ-plasm. But such influences would not then produce individual variation, but would necessarily modify in the same way all the individuals of a species living in a certain district. It is possible, though it cannot be proved, that many climatic varieties have arisen in this manner." So far, then, we have testimony to this point, as it were, from a reluctant witness. But if we Have no theory involving the " stability of germ-plasm " to maintain, we can scarcely fail to see how susceptible the germ-plasm is likely to prove to changed con- ditions of life. For we know how eminently sus- ceptible it is in this respect when gauged by the practical test of fertility ; and as this is but an expres- sion of its extraordinarily complex character, it would indeed be surprising if it were to enjoy any immunity against modification by changed conditions of life. We have seen in the foregoing chapter how fre- quently and how considerably somatogenetic changes are thus caused, so as to produce '■ somatogenetic species" — or, where we happen to know that the changes are not hereditary, *' climatic varieties.'* But the constitution of germ-plasm is much more complex than that of any of the structures which are developed therefrom. Consequently, the only wonder is that hitherto experimentalists have not been more successful Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 245 in producing " blastogenetic species" by artificial changes of environment. Or, as Ray Lankester has well stated this consideration, '* It is not difficult to suggest possible ways in which the changed con- ditions, shown to be important by Darwin, could act through the parental body upon the nuclear matter of the egg-cell and sperm-cell, with its immensely complex and therefore unstable constitution. . . . The wonder is, not that [blastogenetic] variation occurs, but that it is not excessive and monstrous in every product of fertilization ^." If to this it should be objected that, as a matter of fact, experimentalists have not been nearly so successful in producing congenital modifications of type by changed conditions of life as they have been in thus producing merely somatic modifications ; or if it should be further objected that we have no evidence at all in nature of a "blastogenetic species" having been formed by means of climatic influences alone, — if these objections were to be raised, they would admit of the following answer. With regard to experiments, so few have thus far been made upon the subject, that objections founded on their negative results do not carry much weight — especially when we remember that these results have not been uniformly negative, but sometimes positive, as shown in Chapter VI. With regard to plants and animals in a state of nature, the objection is wholly futile, for the simple reason that in as many cases as changed conditions of life may have caused an here- ditary change of specific type, there is now no means ^ A'a/wr^, Dec. la, 1889, P- 129. 246 DarwiUy and aftei Darwin, of obtaining " evidence " ..pen the subject. But we are not on this account entitled to conclude against the probability of such changes of specific type having been more or less frequently thus produced. And still less can we be on this account entitled to conclude against the possibility of such a change having ever occurred in any single instance. Yet this is what must be concluded by any one who maintains that the origin of all species— and, a for- tiori, of all specific characters — must necessarily have been due to natural selection. Now, if all this be admitted — and I do not see how it can be reasonably questioned — consider how impor- tant its bearing becomes on the issue before us. If germ-plasm (using this term for whatever it is that constitutes the material basis of heredity) is ever capable of having its congenital endowments altered by the direct action of external conditions, the result- ing change of hereditary characters, whatever else it may be, need not be an adaptive change. Indeed, according to Weismann's theory of germ-plasm, the chances must be infinitely against the change being an adaptive one. On the theory of pangenesis — that is to say, on the so-called Lamarckian principles — there would be much more reason for entertaining the possibly adaptive character of hereditary change due to the direct action of the environment. Therefore we arrive at this curious result. The more that we are disposed to accept Weismann's theory of heredity, and with it the corollary that natural selection is the sole cause of adaptive modification in species the less are we entitled to assume that all specific characters must necessarily be adaptive. Seeing that in nature Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 2^^ there are presumably many cases like those of Hoff- mann's plants, Weismann's butterflies, &c., where the hereditary qualities of germ-plasm have (on his hypo- thesis) been modified by changed conditions of life, we are bound to believe that, in all cases where such changes do not happen to be actively deleterious, they will persist. And inasmuch as characters which are only of '• specific " value must be the characters most easily — and therefore most frequently — induced by any slight changes in the constitution of germ- plasm, while, for the same reason (namely, that of their trivial nature) they are least likely to prove injurious, it follows that the less we believe in the functionally-produced adaptations of Lamarck, the more ought we to resist the assumption that all specific characters must necessarily be adaptive characters. Upon the whole, then, and with regard to the direct action of external conditions, I conclude— not only from general considerations., but also from special facts or instances quite sufficient for the purpose — that these must certainly give rise to immense num- bers of somatogenetic species on the one hand, and probably to considerable numbers of blastogenetic species on the other ; that in neither case is there any reason for supposing the distinctively " specific char- acters " to be other than " neutral " or " indifferent"; while there are the best of reasons for concluding the contrary. So that, under this division of our subject alone (B), there appears to be ample justification for the statement that " a large proportional number of specific characters " are in reality, a« they are in 248 Darwin^ and after Darwin, appearance, destitute of significance from a utilitarian point of view. (C.) Thus far in the present chapter we have been dealing exclusively with the case of " climatic varia- tion," or change of specific type due to changes in the external conditions of life. But it will be remem- bered that, in the preceding chapter, allusion was likewise made to changes of specific type due to internal causes, or to what Darwin has called " the nature of the organism." Under this division of our subject I mentioned especially Sexual Selection, which is supposed to arise in the aesthetic taste of animals themselves ; Isolation, which is supposed to originate new types by allowing the average characters of an isolated section of an old type to develop a new history of varietal change, as we shall see more fully in the ensuing part of this treatise ; and the Laws of Growth, which is a general term for the operation of unknown causes of change incidental to the living processes of organisms which present the change. Now, under none of these divisions of our subject can there be any question touching the criterion of Heredity. For if new species — or even single specific characters of new species — are ever produced by any of these causes, they must certainly all " reproduce their like." Therefore the only question which can here obtain is as to whether or not such causes ever do originate new species, or even so much as new specific characters. Mr. Wallace, though not always consis- tently, answers this question in the negative ; but the Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 249 great majority of naturalists follow Darwin by answering it in the affirmative. And this is enough to show the only point which we need at present concern ourselves with showing — viz. that the question is, at the least, an open one. For as long as this question is an open one among believers in the theory of natural selection, it must clearly be an unwarrantable deduction from that theory, that all species, and a fortiori all specific characters, are necessarily due to natural selection. The deduction cannot be legitimately drawn until the possibility of any other cause of specific modifica- tion has been excluded. But the bare fact of the question as just stated being still and at the least an open question, is enough to prove that this possibility has not been excluded. Therefore the deduction must be, again on this ground alone (C), unwarrantable. Such are my several reasons — and it is to be observed that they are all independent reasons — foi concluding that it makes no practical difference to the present discussion whether or not we entertain Heredity as a criterion of specific distinction. Seeing that our species- makers have paid so little regard to this criterion, it is neither absurd nor preposterous to have adduced, in the preceding chapter, the facts of climatic variation. On the contrary, as the defini- tion of " species " which has been practically followed by our species-makers in No. 3, and not No. 4, these facts form part and parcel of our subject. It is per- fectly certain that, in the vegetable kingdom at all events, " a large proportional number " of specifically diagnostic characters would be proved by experiment to be '* somatogenetic " ; while there are numerous 250 Darwin, and after Darwin. constant characters classed as varietal, although it is well known that they are " blastogenetic.'* Moreover, we can scarcely doubt that many specific characters which are also hereditary characters owe their exist- ence, not to natural selection, but to the direct action of external causes on the hereditary structure of " germ-plasm " ; while, even apart from this con- sideration, there are at least three distinct and highly general principles of specific change, which are ac- cepted by the great majority of Darwinists, and the only common peculiarity of which is that they pro- duce hereditary changes of specific types without any reference to the principle of utility. CHAPTER X. Characters as Adaptive and Specific {concluded). Our subject is not yet exhausted. For it remains to observe the consequences which arise from the dogma of utility as the only raison d'itre of species, or of specific characters, when this dogma is applied in practice by its own promoters. Any definition of " species " — excepting Nos. I, %, and 5, which may here be disregarded — must needs contain some such phrase as the one with which Nos. 3 and 4 conclude. This is, that peculiar characters, in order to be recognized as of specific value, must present neither more nor less than "some certain degree of distinctness." If they present more than this degree of distinctness, the form, or forms, in question must be ranked as generic ; while if they present less than this degree of distinctness, they must be regarded as varietal — and this even if they are known to be mutually sterile. What, then, is this certain degree of distinctness.? What are its upper and lower limits? This question is one that cannot be answered. From the very nature of the case it is impossible to find a 252 Darwin^ and after Darwin. uniform standard of distinction whereby to draw our boundary lines between varieties and species on the one hand, or between species and genera on the other. One or two quotations will be sufficient to satisfy the general reader upon this point. Mr. Wallace himself alludes to "the great diffi- culty that is felt by botanists in determining the limits of species in many large genera," and gives as examples well-known instances where systematic botanists of the highest eminence differ hopelessly in their respective estimates of "specific characters." Thus : — " Mr. Baker includes under a single species, Rosa canina, no less than twenty-eight named varieties distinguished by more or less constant characters, and often confined to special localities, and to these are referred about seventy of the species of British and continental botanists. Of the genus Rubus or bramble, five British species are given in Bentham's Handbook of British Flora^ while in the fifth edition of Babington's Manual of British Botany, published about the same time, no less than forty-five species are described. Of willows (Salix) the same two works enumerate fifteen and thirty-one species respectively. The hawkweeds (Hieracium) are equally puzzling, for while Mr. Bentham admits only seven British species, Professor Babington describes no less than seventy-two, besides several named varieties ^" Mr. Wallace goes on to quote further instances, such as that of Draba verna, which Jordan has found to present, in the south of France alone, no less than fifty-two permanent varieties, which all "come true from seed, and thus present all the character- istics of a true species*'; so that, "as the plant is ' Darwinism, p. 77. characters as Adaptive and Specific. 253 very common almost all over Europe, and ranges from North America to the Himalayas, the number of similar forms over this wide area would probably have to be reckoned by hundreds, if not by thou- sands ^.'* One or two further quotations may be given to the same general effect, selected from the writings of specialists in their several departments. " There is nothing that divides systematists more than what constitutes a genus. Species that resemble each other more than other species, is perhaps the best definition that can be given. This is obviously an uncertain test, much depending on individual judgement and experience ; but that, in the evolu- tion of forms, such difficulties should arise in the limitation of genera and species was inevitable. What is a generic character in one may be only a specific character in another. As an illustration of the uncertain importance of characters, I may mention the weevil genus Centrinus, in which the leading characters in the classification of the family to w^aich it belongs are so mixed that systematists have been content to keep the species together in a group that cannot be defined. . . . No advantage or disadvantage is attached, apparently, to any of the characters. There are about 200 species, all American. ^ The venation of the wings of insects is another example of modifications without serving any special purpose. There is no vein in certain Thripidae, and only a rudiment or a single vein in Chalcididae. There are thousands of variations more or less marked, some of the same type with comparatively trivial variation, others presenting distinct types, even in the same family, such genera, for example, as Polyneura^ Tetii- getra, Huechys^ &c. in the Cicadidae. Individual differences have often been regarded as distinctive of species ; varieties also are very deceptive, and races come very near to species. A South-American beetle, Arescus histriOf has varieties of yellow, red, and black, or these colours ' Darwinism, p. 77. 254 DarwiUy and after Darzvin, variously intermixed, and, what is very unusual, longitudinal stripes in some and transverse bars in others, and all taken in the same locality. Mr. A. G. Butler, of the British Museum, is of opinion that 'what is generally understood by the term species (that is to say, a well-defined, distinct, and constant type, having no near allies) is non-existent in the Lepidoptera, and that the nearest approach to it in this order is a constant, though but slightly differing, rare or local form— that genera, in fact, con- sist wholly of a gradational series of such forms (Ann. Mag. Nat. Hist. 5, xix. io3)V " So much as regards entomology, and still living forms. In illustration of the same principles in connexion with palaeontological series, I may quote Wiirtenberger, who says : — "With respect to these fossil forms [i.e. multitudinous forms of fossil Ammonites], it is quite immaterial whether a very short or a somewhat longer part of any branch be dignified with a separate name, and regarded as a species. The prickly Ammonites, classed under the designation of Armata, are so intimately connected that it becomes impossible to separate the accepted species sharply from one another. The same remark applies to the group of which the manifold forms are distin- guished by their ribbed shells, and are called Planulata '^." I had here supplied a number of similar quotations from writers in various other departments of systematic work, but afterwards struck them out as superfluous. For it is not to be anticipated that any competent naturalist will nowadays dispute that the terms "variety," "species," and "genus" stand for merely conventional divisions, and that whether a given form shall be ranked under one or the other of them is * Pascoe, The Darwinian Theory of the Origin of Species, 1891, pp. 3i-33» and 46. " Neuer Beitrag zum geologischen Beweis der Darwin schen Theorie, 1873. Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 255 often no more than a matter of individual taste. From the nature of the case there can be no objective, and therefore no common, standards of delimitation. This is true even as regards any one given depart- ment of systematic work ; but when we compare the standards of delimitation which prevail in one depart- ment with those which prevail in another, it becomes evident that there is not so much as any attempt at agreeing upon a common measure of specific dis- tinction. But what, it may well be asked, is the use of thus insisting upon well-known facts, which nobody will dispute? Well, in the first place, we have already seen, in the last chapter, that it is incumbent on those who maintain that all species, or even all specific characters, must be due to natural selection, to tell us what they mean by a species, or by characters as specific. If I am told to believe that the definite quality A is a necessary attribute of B, and yet that B is " not a distinct entity," but an undefinable ab- straction, I can only marvel that any one should expect me to be so simple. But, without recurring to this point, the use of insisting on the facts above stated is, in the second place, that otherwise I cannot suppose any general reader could believe them in view of what is to follow. For he cannot but feel that the cost of believing them is to render inexplicable the mental processes of those naturalists who, in the face of such facts, have deduced the following conclusions. The school of naturalists against which I am contending maintains, as a generalization deduced from the theory of natural selection, that all species, or even all specific characters, must necessarily owe 256 Darwiriy and after Darwin. their origin to the principle of utility. Yet this same school does not maintain any such generalization, either with regard to varietal characters on the one hand, or to generic characters on the other. On the contrary, Professor Huxley, Mr. Wallace, and all other naturalists who agree with them in refusing to entertain so much as the abstract possibility of any cause other than natural selection having been pro- ductive of species, fully accept the fact of other causes having been largely concerned in the production of varieties, genera, families, and all higher groups, or of the characters severally distinctive of each. Indeed, Mr. Wallace does not question what appears to me the extravagant estimate of Professor Cope, that the non-adaptive characters distinctive of those higher groups are fully equal, in point of numbers, to the adaptive. But, surely, if the theory of evolution by natural selection is, as we all agree, a true theory of the origin of species, it must likewise be a true theory of the origin of genera ; and if it be supposed essential to the integrity of the theory in its former aspect that all specific characters should be held to be useful, I fail to see how, in regard to its latter aspect, we are so readily to surrender the necessary usefulness of all generic characters. And exactly the same remark applies to the case of constant "varieties," where again the doctrine of utility as universal is not maintained. Yet, according to the general theory of evolution, constant varieties are what Darwin termed "incipient species," while species are what may be termed " incipient genera." Therefore, if the doctrine of utility as universal be conceded to fail in the case of varieties on the one hand and of genera on the Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 257 other, where is the consistency in maintaining that it must "necessarily" hold as regards the intermediate division, species? Truly the shade of Darwin may exclaim, " Save me from my friends." And truly against logic of this description a follower of Darwin must fijid it difficult to argue. If one's opponents were believers in special creation, and therefore stood upon some definite ground while maintaining this difference between species and all other taxonomic divisions, there would at least be some issue to argue about. But when on the one hand it is conceded that species are merely arbitrary divisions, which differ in no respect as to the process of their evolution from either varieties or genera, while on the other hand it is affirmed that there is thus so great a difference in the result, all we can say is that our opponents are entangling themselves in the meshes of a sheer contradiction. Or, otherwise stated, specific characters differ from varietal characters in being, as a rule, more pronounced and more constant : on this account advocates of utility as universal apply the doctrine to species, while they do not feel the '* necessity " of applying it to varieties. But now, generic and all higher char- acters are even more constant and more pronounced than specific characters — not to say, in many cases, more generally diffused over a larger number of organisms usually occupying larger areas. There- fore, a fortiori^ if for the reasons above stated evolu- tionists regard it as a necessary deduction from th? theory of natural selection that all specific char- acters must be useful, much more ought it to be a necessary deduction from this theory that all generic, II. s 258 Darwin, and after Darwin. and still more all higher, characters must be useful. But, as we have seen, this is not maintained by our opponents. On the contrary, they draw the sharpest distinction between specific and all other characters in this respect, freely conceding that both those below and those above them need not — and very often do not — present any utilitarian significance. Although it appears to me that this doctrine is self- contradictory, and on this ground alone might be summarily dismissed, as it is now held, in one or other of its forms by many naturalists, I will give it a more detailed consideration in both its parts — namely, first with respect to the distinction between varieties and species, and next with respect to the distinction between species and genera. Until it can be shown that species are something more than merely arbitrary divisions, due to the disappearance of intermediate varietal links ; that in some way or another they are "definite entities," which admit of being delineated by the application of some uniform or general principles of definition ; that, in short, species have only then been classified as such when it has been shown that the origin of each has been due to the operation of causes which have not been concerned in the production of varieties ; — until these things are shown, it clearly remains a gratuitous dogma to maintain that forms which have been called species differ from forms which have been called varieties in the important respect, that they (let alone each of all their distinctive characters) must necessarily have been due to the principle of utility Yet, as we have seen, even Mr. Wallace Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 259 allows that a species is " not a distinct entity," but " an assemblage of individuals which have become somewhat modified in structure, form, and consti- tution"; while estimates of the kinds and degrees of modification which are to be taken as of specific value are conceded to be undefinable, fluctuating, and in not a few cases almost ludicrously divergent. Perhaps one cannot more forcibly present the rational value of this position than by noting the fol- lowing consequences of it. Mr. Gulick writes me that while studying the land-shellsof the Sandwich Islands, and finding there a rich profusion of unique varieties, in cases where the intermediate varieties were rare he could himself have created a number of species by simply throwing these intermediate varieties into his fire. Now it follows from the dogma which we are considering, that, by so doing, not only would he have created new species, but at the same time he would have proved them due to natural selection, and endowed the diagnostic characters of each with a " necessarily " adaptive meaning, which previously it was not necessary that they should present. Before his destruction of these intermediate varieties, he need have felt himself under no obligation to assume that any given character at either end of the series was of utilitarian significance : but, after his destruction of the intermediate forms, he could no longer entertain any question upon the matter, under pain of being denounced as a Darwinian heretic. Now the application is self-evident. It is a general fact, which admits of no denial, that the more our knowledge of any flora or fauna increases, the greater is the number of intermediate forms which are S 2 26o Darwifty and after Darwin, brought to light, either as still existing or as having once existed. Consequently, the more that such knowledge increases, the more does our catalogue of '• species " diminish. As Kerner says, '■ bad species " are always multiplying at the expense of "good species " ; or, as Oscar Schmidt (following Hackel) similarly remarks, if we could know as much about the latter as we do about the former, '• all species, without any exception, would become what species- makers understand by ' bad species ' ^." Hence we see that, just as Mr. Gulick could have created good species by secretly destroying his intermediate varieties, so has Nature produced her '' good species " for the delectation of systematists. And just as Mr. Gulick, by first hiding and afterwards revealing his intermediate forms, could have made the self-same characters in the first instance necessarily useful, but ever afterwards presumably useless, so has Nature caused the utility of diagnostic characters to vary with our knowledge of her intermediate forms. It belongs to the essence of our theory of descent, that in all cases these intermediate forms must either be now existing or have once existed ; and, therefore, that the work of species- makers consists in nothing more than marking out the lacunae in our knowledge of them. Yet we are bound to believe that wherever these lacunae in our knowledge occur, there occurs also the objective necessity of causation as utilitarian — a necessity, however, which vanishes so soon as our advancing information supplies the intermediate forms in question. It may indeed appear strange that * The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism, Eng. Trans, p. loa. Characters as Adaptive and Specific, 261 the utility or non-utility of organic structures should thus depend on the accidents of human knowledge; but this is the Darwinian faith, and he who doubts the dogma is to be anathema. Turning next to the similar distinction which it is sought to draw between species and genera, here it will probably be urged, as I understand it to be urged by Mr. Wallace, that generic characters (and still more characters of families, orders, &c.) refer back to so remote a state of things that utility may have been present at their birth which has disappeared in their maturity. In other words, it is held that all generic characters were originally specific characters ; that as such they were all origin- ally of use ; but that, after having been rendered stable by heredity, many of them may have ceased to be of service to the descendants of those species in which they originated, and whose extinction has now made it impossible to divine what that service may have been. Now, in the first place, this is not the interpretation adopted by Darwin. For instance, he expressly contrasts such cases with those of vestigial or " rudi- mentary" structures, pointing out that they differ from vestigial structures in respect of their perma- nence. One quotation will be sufficient to establish the present point. "A structure which has been developed through long-con- tinued selection, when it ceases to be of service to a species, generally becomes variable, as we see with rudimentary organs, for it will no longer be regulated by this same power of selection. But when, from the nature of the organism and of the conditions, modifications have been induced which are 262 DarwiUy and after Darwin, unimportant for the welfare of the species, they may be, and apparently often have been, transmitted in nearly the same state to numerous, otherwise modified, descendants^" Here, and in the context, we have a sufficiently- clear statement of Darwin's view — first, that unadap- tive characters may arise in species as "fluctuating variations, which sooner or later become constant through the nature of the organism and of surround- ing conditions, as well as through the intercrossing of distinct individuals, but not through natural selec- tion " ^ ; second, that such unadaptive characters may then be transmitted in this their stable condition to species-progeny, so as to become distinctive of genera, families, &c. ; third, that, on account of such characters not being afterwards liable to diverse adaptive modifications in different branches of the species- progeny, they are of more value as indicating lines of pedigree than are characters which from the first have been useful ; and, lastly, they are therefore now empirically recognized by systematists as of most value in guiding the work of classification. To me it appears that this view is not only perfectly rational in itself, but likewise fiilly compatible with the theory of natural selection — which, as I have previously shown, is primarily a theory of adaptive characters, and therefore not necessarily a theory of all specific characters. But to those who think otherwise, it must appear— and does appear — that there is some- thing wrong about such a view of the case — that it was not consistent in the author of the Origin of Species thus to refer non-adaptive generic characters to a parentage of non-adaptive specific characters. * Origin of Species ^ p. 175. " Ibid. p. 176 : italics mine Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 263 Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, Darwin was perfectly consistent in putting forth this view, because, unlike Wallace, he was not under the sway of any antecedent dogma erroneously deduced from the theory of natural selection. Next, without reference to Darwin's authority, let us see for ourselves where the inconsistency really lies. To allow that generic characters may be useless, while denying that specific characters can ever be so (unless correlated with others that are useful), involves an appeal to the argument from ignorance touching the ancestral habits, life-conditions, &c., of a parent species now extinct. Well, even upon this assumption of utility as obsolete, there remains to be explained the "stability" of useless characters now distinctive of genera, families, orders, and the rest. We know that specific characters which have owed their origin to utility and have afterwards ceased to present utility, degenerate, become variable, inconstant, "rudimen- tary," and finally disappear. Why, then, should these things not happen with regard to useless generic distinctions.? Still more, why should they not happen with regard to family, ordinal, and class distinctions? On the lines against which I am arguing it would appear impossible that any answer to this question can be suggested. For what explanation can be given of the contrast thus presented between the obsolescence of specific characters where previous utility is demonstrable, and the permanence of higher characters whose previous utility is assumed ? As we have already seen, Mr. Wallace himself employs this consideration of permanence and con- stancy against the view that any cause other than 264 Darwin^ and after Darwin. natural selection can have been concerned in the origin and maintenance of specific characters. But he does not seem to see that the consideration cuts two ways — and much more forcibly against his views than in favour of them. For while, as already shown in the chapter before last, it is sufficiently easy to dispose of the consideration as Wallace uses it (by simply pointing out with Darwin that any causes other than natural selection which may have been concerned in the genesis of specific characters, must, if equally uniform in their operation, equally give rise to permanence and constancy in their results) ; on the other hand, it becomes impossible to explain the stability of useless generic characters, if, as Wallace's use of the argument requires, natural selec- tion is the only possible cause of stability. The argument is one that cannot be played with fast and loose Either utility is the sole condition to the stability of any diagnostic character (in which case it is not open to Mr. Wallace to assume that all generic or higher characters which are now use- less have owed their origin to a past utility) ; or else utility is not the sole condition to stability (in which case his use of the present argument in relation to specific characters collapses). We have seen, indeed, in the chapter before last, that his use of the argument collapses anyhow, or quite irrespec- tive of his inconsistent attitude towards generic characters, with which we were not then concerned. But the point now is that, as a mere matter of logic, the argument from stability as Wallace applies it to the case of specific characters, is incompatible with his argument that useless generic characters Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 265 may originally have been useful specific characters. It can scarcely be questioned that the transmuta- tion of a species into a genus must, as a rule, have allowed time enough for a newly acquired — i.e. peculiar specific-character — to show some signs of undergoing degeneration, if, as supposed, the original cause of its development and maintenance was with- drawn when the parent species began to ramify into its species-progeny. Yet, as Darwin says, " it is notorious that specific characters are more variable than generic^." So that, upon the whole, I do not see how on grounds of general reasoning it is logically possible to maintain Mr. Wallace's distinction between specific and generic characters in respect of necessary utility. But now, and lastly, we shall reach the same conclusion if, discarding all consideration of general principles and formal reasoning, we fasten attention upon certain particular cases, or concrete facts. Thus, to select only two illustrations within the limits of genera, it is a diagnostic feature of the genus Equus that small warty callosities occur on the legs. It is impossible to suggest any useful function that is now discharged by these callo- sities in any of the existing species of the genus. If- it be assumed that they must have been of some use to the species from which the genus originally sprang, the assumption, it seems to me, can only be saved by further assuming that in existing species of the genus these callosities are in a vesti- gial condition — i. e. that in the original or parent species they performed some function which is now * Origin of Species^ p. 12a. 266 Darwin, and after Darwin, obsolete. But against these assumptions there lies the following fact. The callosities in question are not similarly distributed through all existing species of the genus. The horse has them " upon all his four legs, while other species have them only upon two. Therefore, if all specific characters are necessarily due to natural selection, it is manifest that these callosities are not now vestigial : on the contrary, they /«2/j/ still be— or, at best, have recently been — of so much importance to all existing species of the genus, that not only is it a matter of selection- ' value to all these species that they should possess these callosities ; but it is even a matter of selection- value to a horse that he should possess four of them, while it is equally a matter of selection-value to the ass that he should possess only two. Here, it seems to me, we have once more the doctrine of the necessary utility of specific characters reduced to an absurdity ; while at the same time we display the incoherency of the distinction between specific characters and generic characters in respect of this doctrine. For the distinction in such a case amounts to saying that a generic character, if evenly distributed among all the species, need not be an adaptive character ; whereas, if any one of the species presents it in a slightly different form, the character must be, on this account, necessarily adaptive. In other words, the uniformity with which a generic character occurs among the species of the genus is taken to remove that character from the necessarily useful class while the absence of such uniformity is taken as proof that the character must be placed within the necessarily useful class. Which is surely no less Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 267 a reductio ad absurdum with regard to the generic character than the one just presented with regard to its variants as specific characters. And, of course, this twofold absurdity is presented in all cases where a generic character is unequally distributed among the constituent species of a genus. Eut here is an illustration of another class of cases. Mr. Tomes has shown that the molar teeth of the Orang present an extraordinary and altogether super- fluous amount of attachment in their sockets — the fangs Fig. 4.— Lower Teeth of Orang (after Tomes). being not only exceedingly long, and therefore deeply buried in the jaw-bone, but also curving round one another, so as still further to strengthen the whole ^ In the allied genera of anthropoid apes there is no such abnormal amount of attachment. Now, the question is, of what conceivable use can it ever have been, either to the existing genus, or to its parent species, that such an abnormal amount of attachment should obtain? It certainly is not re- quired to prevent dislocation of the teeth, seeing that in all allied genera, and even in man himself, the * A Manual of Dental Anatomy, p. 455. 268 Darwin^ and after Darwin. amount of attachment is already so great that teeth will break before they can be drawn by anything short of a dentist's forceps. Therefore I conclude that this peculiarity in the dentition of the genus must have arisen in its parent species by way of what Darwin calls a " fluctuating variation," with- out utilitarian significance. And I adduce it in the present connexion because the peculiarity is one which is equally unamenable to a utilitarian ex- planation, whether it happens to occur as a generic or a specific character. Numberless similar cases might be quoted ; but probably enough has now been said to prove the inconsistency of the distinction which our opponents draw between specific and all higher characters in respect of utility. In point of fact, a very little thought is enough to show that no such distinction admits of being drawn ; an^, therefore, that any one who maintains the doctrine of utility as universal in the case of specific characters, must in consistency hold to the same doctrine in the case of generic and all higher characters. And the fact that our opponents are unable to do this becomes a virtual confession on their part of the futility of the generalization which they have propounded ^. * It may be observed that this distinction was not propounded by Mr. Wallace — nor, so far as I am aware, by anybody else — until he joined issue with me on the subject of specific characters. Whether he has always held this important distinction between specific and generic characters, I know not ; but, as originally enunciated, his doctrine of Utility as universal was subject to no such limitation : it was stated unconditionally, as applying to all taxonomic divisions indifferently. The words have already been quoted on page 180; and, if the reader will turn to them, he may further observe that, prior lo our discussion, Mr. Wallace made no allowance for the principle of correlation, which, Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 269 On what then do Mr. Wallace and his followers reiy for their great distinction between specific and all other characters in respect of utility? This is the final and fundamental question which I must leave these naturalists themselves to answer ; for my whole contention is, that it is unanswerable. But although I am satisfied that they have nothing on which to base their generalization, it seems worth while to conclude by showing yet one further point. And this is, that these naturalists themselves, as soon as they quit merely abstract assertions and come to deal with actual facts, contradict their own general- ization. It is worth while to show this by means of a few quotations, that we may perceive how impossible it is for them to sustain their generalization in the domain of fact. As it is desirable to be brief, I will confine myself to quoting from Mr. Wallace. " Colour may be looked upon as a necessary result of the highly complex chemical constitution of animal tissues and fluids. The blood, the bile, the bones, the fat, and other tissues have characteristic, and often brilliant colours, which we cannot suppose to have been determined for any special purpose as colours, since they are usually concealed. The external organs and integuments, would, by the same general laws, naturally give rise to a greater variety of colour^." Surely comment is needless. Have the colour of external organs and integuments nothing to do with as we have seen, furnishes so convenient a loop-hole of escape in cases where even the argument from our ignorance of possible utility appears absurd. In his latest work, liowever, he is much less sweeping in his statements. He limits his doctrine to the case of " sj)ecific charac- ters " alone, and even with regard to them makes unlimited drafts upon the principle of correlation. ' Parwinism, p. 297. 270 Darwin^ and after Darwin. the determining of specific distinctions by system- atists? Or, may we not rather ask, are there any other " characters " which have had more to do with their delineation of animal species ? Therefore, if " the external organs and integuments naturally give rise to a greater variety of colours," for non-utilitarian reasons, than is the case with internal organs and tissues ; while even the latter present, for similarly non-utilitarian reasons, such variety and intensity of colours as they do ; must it not follow that, on the ground of the " Laws of Growth " alone, Mr. Wallace has conceded the entire case as regards " a large proportional number of specific characters" being non-adaptive — " spontaneous " in their occurrence, and " meaningless " in their persistence ? Once more : — " The enormously lengthened plumes of the bird of paradise and of the peacock, can, however, have no such use [i.e. for pur- poses of defence], but must be rather injurious than beneficial in the birds' ordinary life. The fact that they have been de- veloped to so great an extent in a few species is an indication of such perfect adaptation to the conditions of existence, such complete success in the battle for life, that there is, in the adult male at all events, a surplus of strength, vitality, and growth-power, which is able to expend itself in this way without injury. That such is the case is shown by the great abun- dance of most of the species which possess these wonderful superfluities of plumage. . . . Why, in allied species, the development of accessory plumes has taken different forms, we are unable to say, except that it may be due to that individual variability which has served as a starting-point for so much of what seems to us strange in form, or fantastic in colour, both in the animal and vegetable world \" Here, again, one need only ask, How can such state- Darwinism, pp. 292-3. Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 271 ments be reconciled with the great dogma, " which is indeed a necessary deduction from the theory of Natural Selection, namely, that none of the definite facts of organic nature, no special organ, no character- istic form or marking can exist, but which must now be, or once have been, usefuV ? Can it be said that the plumes of a bird of paradise present '^ no charac- teristic form," or the tail of a peacock " no character- istic marking " ? Can it be held that all the '• fantastic colours/' which Darwin attributes to sexual selection, and all the " strange forms " in the vegetable world which present no conceivable reference to adaptation, are to be ascribed to 'individual variability" without reference to utility, while at the same time it is held, " as a necessary deduction from the theory of Natural Selection," that all specific characters must be ''• use- ful " ? Or must we not conclude that we have here a contradiction as direct as a contradiction can well be ^ ? Nor is it any more possible to reconcile these contradictory statements by an indefinite extension of the term " correlation," than we found it to be in the cases previously quoted. It might indeed be logically possible, howsoever biologically absurd, to attribute the tail of a peacock — with all its elabora- tion of structure and pattern of colour, with all the drain that its large size and weight makes upon the vital resources of the bird, with all the increased danger to which it exposes the bird by rendering it more conspicuous, more easy of capture, &c. — to correlation with some useful character peculiar to ' Since the above was written both Mr. Gulick and Professor Lloyd Morgan have independently noticed the contradiction. 272 Darwin^ and after Darwin. peacocks. But to say that it is due to correlation with general ''vitality/' is merely to discharge the doctrine of correlation of any assignable meaning. Vitality, or " perfect adaptation to the conditions of existence," is obviously a prime condition to the occurrence of a peacock's tail, as it is to the occur- rence of a peacock itself; but this is quite a different thing from saying that the specific characters which are presented by a peacock's tail, although useless in themselves, are correlated with some other and useful specific characters of the same bird — as we saw in a previous chapter with reference to secondary sexual characters in general. Therefore, when Mr. Wallace comes to the obvious question why it is that even in " allied species," which must be in equally " perfect adaptation to the conditions of existence," there are no such " wonderful superfluities of plumage," he falls back — as he previously fell back — on what- ever unknown causes it may have been which pro- duced the peacock's tail, when the primary condition to their operation has been furnished by " complete success in the battle for life." I have quoted the above passages, not so much for the sake of exposing fundamental inconsistencies on the part of an adversary, as for the sake of observing that they constitute a much truer exposition of " Darwinism " than do the contradictory views ex- pressed in some other parts of the work bearing that title. For even if characters of so much size and elabo- ration as the tail of a peacock, the plumes of a bird of paradise &c., are admitted to be due to non-utilitarian causes, much more must innumerable other characters of incomparably less size and elaboration be mere Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 273 "superfluities." Without being actually deleterious, " a large proportional number of specific characters," whose utility is not apparent, vcwxst a fortiori have been due to " individual variation," to ''' general laws which determine the production" of such characters— or, in short, to some causes other than natural selection. And this, I say, is a doctrine much more in harmony with " Darwinism " than is the contradictory doctrine which I am endeavouring to resist. But once again, and still more generally, after saying of " the delicate tints of spring foliage, and the intense hues of autumn," that "as colours they are unadaptive, and appear to have no more relation to the well-being of plants themselves than do the colours of gems and minerals," Mr. Wallace proceeds thus : — "We may also include in the same category those algae and fungi which have bright colours— the red snow of the Arctic regions, the red, green, or purple seaweeds, the brilliant scarlet, yellow, white or black agarics, and other fungi. All these colours are probably the direct results of chemical com- position or molecular structure, and being thus normal products of the vegetable organism, need no special explanation from our present point of view; and the same remark will apply to the varied tints of the bark of trunks, branches and twigs, which are often of various shades of brown and green, or even vivid reds and yellows'." Here, as Mr. Gulick has already observed, " Mr. Wallace seems to admit that instead of useless specific characters being unknown, they are so common and so easily explained by ' the chemical constitution of the organism ' that they claim no special attention ^." * Darwinism, p. 302. "^ American Journal of Science, Vol. XL. art. I. on The Inconsistencies of Utilitarianism as the Exclusive Theory of Organic Evolution. II. T 274 Darwin^ and after Darwin, And whatever answer Mr. Wallace may make to this criticism, I do not see how he is to meet the point at present before us— namely, that, upon his own show- ing, there are in nature numberless instances of " characters which are useless without being hurtful," and which nevertheless present absolute *' constancy." If, in order to explain the contradiction, he should fall back upon the principle of correlation, the case would not be in any way improved. For, here again, if the term correlation were extended so as to include "the chemical constitution or the molecular structure of the organism," it would thereby be extended so as to discharge all Darwinian significance from the term. Summary, I will conclude this discussion of the Utility question by recapitulating the main points in an order somewhat different from that in which they have been presented in the foregoing chapters. Such a variation may render their mutual connexions more apparent. But it is only to the main points that allusion will here be made, and, in order the better to show their independent character, I will separately number them. 1. The doctrine of utility as universal, whether with respect to species only or likewise with respect to specific characters, is confessedly an a priori doctrine, deduced by way of general reasoning from the theory of natural selection. 2. Being thus founded exclusively on grounds of deduction, the doctrine cannot be combated by any Characters as Adaptive and Specific, 275 appeal to facts. For this question is not one of fact : it is a question of reasoning. The treatment of our subject matter is logical : not biological. 3. The doctrine is both universal and absolute. According to one form of it all species, and according to another form of it all specific characters, must necessarily be due to the principle of utility. 4. The doctrine in both its forms is deduced from a definition of the theory of natural selection as a theory, and the sole theory, of the origin of species : but, as Professor Huxley has already shown, it does not really follow, even from this definition, that all specific characters must be "necessarily useful." Hence the two forms of the doctrine, although coin- cident with regard to species, are at variance with one another in respect of specific characters. Thus far, of course, I agree with Professor Huxley ; but if I have been successful in showing that the above definition of the theory of natural selection is logically fallacious, it follows that the doctrine in both its forms is radically erroneous. The theory of natural selection is not, accurately speaking, a theory of the origin of species: it is a theory of the origin and cumulative development of adaptations, to whatever order of taxonomic division these may happen to belong. Thus the premisses of the deduction which we are considering collapse : the principle of utility is shown not to have any other or further reference to species, or to specific characters, than it has to fixed varieties, genera, families, &c., or to the char- acters severally distinctive of each 5. But, quitting all such antecedent considera- tions, we next proceeded to examine the doctrine T 2 276 Darwin^ and after Darwin. a posteriori, taking the arguments which have been advanced in favour of the doctrine, other than those which rest upon the fallacious definition. These arguments, as presented by Mr. Wallace, are two in number. First, it is represented that natural selection must occupy the whole field, because no other principle of change can be allowed to operate in the presence of natural selection. Now I fully agree that this statement holds as regards any principle of change which is deleterious, but I cannot agree that it does so as regards any such principle which is merely neutral. No reason has ever been shown why natural selection should interfere with " indifferent " characters — to adopt Professor Huxley's term— supposing such to have been produced by any of the agencies which we shall presently have to name. Therefore this argument— or rather assertion— goes for nothing. Mr. Wallace's second argument is, that utility is the only principle which can endow specific characters with their characteristic stability. But this again is mere assertion. Moreover, it is assertion opposed alike to common sense and to observable fact. It is opposed to common sense, because it is obvious that any other principle would equally confer stability on characters due to it, provided that its action is constant, as Darwin expressly held. Again, this argument is opposed to fact, because we know of thousands of cases where peculiar characters are stable, which, nevertheless, cannot possibly be due to natural selection. Of such are the Porto Santo rabbits, the niata cattle, the ducks in St. James' Park, turkeys, dogs, horses, &c., and, in the case of Characters as Adaptive and Specific, 277 plants, wheat, cabbage, maize, &c., as well as all the hosts of climatic varieties, both of animals and plants, in a state of nature. Indeed, on taking a wide survey of the facts, we do not find that the principle of utility is any better able to confer stability of character than are many other principles, both known and unknown. Nay, it is positively less able to do so than are some of these other principles. Darwin gives two very probable reasons for this fact ; but I need not quote them a second time. It is enough to have seen that this argument from stability 01; constancy is no less worthless than the previous one. Yet these are the only two arguments of a corroborative kind which Mr. Wallace adduces whereby to sustain his " necessary deduction." 6. At this point, therefore, it may well seem that we need not have troubled ourselves any further with a generalization which does not appear to have anything to support it. And to this view of the case I should myself agree, were it not that many naturalists now entertain the doctrine as an essential article of their Darwinian creed. Hence, I proceeded to adduce considerations per contra. Seeing that the doctrine in question can only rest on the assumption that there is no cause other than natural selection which is capable of originating any single species — if not even so much as any single specific character — I began by examining this assump- tion. It was shown first that, on merely antecedent grounds, the assumption is '* infinitely precarious." There is absolutely no justification for the state- ment that in all the varied and complex processes of organic nature natural selection is the only possible 278 Darwin, and after Darwin, cause of specific change. But, apart altogether from this a priori refutation of the dogma, our analysis went on to show that, in point of actual fact, there are not a few well-known causes of high generality, which, while having no connexion with the principle of utility, are demonstrably capable of originating species and specific characters — if by '* species " and " specific characters " we are to under- stand organic types which are ranked as species, and characters which are described as diagnostic of species. Such causes I grouped under five dif- ferent headings, viz. Climate^ Food, Sexual Selection, Isolation, and Laws of Growth. Sexual Selection and Isolation are, indeed, repudiated by Mr. Wallace ; but, in common I believe with all biologists, he accepts the other three groups of causes as fully adequate to produce such kinds and degrees of modification as are taken to constitute specific dis- tinction. And this is amply sufficient for our present purposes. Besides, under the head of Sexual Selection, it does not signify in the present connexion whether or not we accept Darwin's theory on this subject. For, in any case, the facts of secondary sexual char- acters are indisputable : these characters are, for the most part, specific characters: and they cannot be explained by the principle of utility. Even Mr. Wallace does not attempt to do so ; and the ex- planation which he does give is clearly incompatible with his doctrine touching the necessarily life-serving value of all specific characters. Lastly, the same has to be said of the Laws of Growth. For we have just seen that on the grounds of this principle likewise Mr. Wallace abandons the doctrine in question. As Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 279 regards Isolation, much more remains to be said in the ensuing portion of this work, while, as regards Climatic Variation, there are literally innumerable cases where changes of specific type are known to have been caused by this means. 7. To the latter class of cases, however, it will be objected that these changes of specific type, although no doubt suflficiently '* stable '' so long as the changed conditions remain constant, are found by experiment not to be hereditary ; and this clearly makes all the difference between a true specific change and a merely fictitious appearance of it. Well, in the first place, this objection can have reference only to the first two of the five principles above stated. It can have no reference to the last three, because of these heredity constitutes the very foundation. This consideration ought to be borne in mind throughout. But now, in the second place, even as regards changes produced by climate and food, the reply is nugatory. And this for three reasons, as follows. {a) No one is thus far entitled to conclude against the possible transmission of acquired characters ; and, so long as there is even so much as a possibility of climatic (or any other admittedly non-utilitarian) variations becoming in this way hereditary, the reply before us merely begs the question. {b) Even supposing, for the sake of argument, that acquired characters can never in any case become congenital, there remains the strong probability — sanctioned as such even by Weismann — that changed conditions of life may not unfrequently act upon the material of heredity itself, thus giving rise to specific 28o Darwifiy and after Darwin, changes which are from the first congenital, though not utilitarian. Indeed, there are not a few facts (Hoffmann's plants, Weismann's butterflies, &c.), which can only be explained either in this way, or as above (a). And in the present connexion it is immaterial which of these alternative explanations we choose to adopt, seeing that they equally refute our opponents' objection. And not only do these considerations— (^) and {h) — refute this particular objection ; they overturn on new and independent grounds the whole of our opponents' generalization. For the generalization is, that the principle of utility, acting through natural selection, is " necessarily " the sole principle which can be concerned in hereditary changes of specific type. But here we perceive both a possibility [a] and a probability (3), if not indeed a certainty, that quite other principles have been largely concerned in the production of such changes. (c) Altogether apart from these considerations, there remains a much more important one. For the objection that fixed — or "stable" — climatic varieties differ from true species in not being sub- ject to heredity, raises the question — What are we to understand by a " species " ? This question, which was thus far purposely left in abeyance, had now to be dealt with seriously. For it would clearly be irrational in our opponents to make this highly important generalization with regard to species and specific characters, unless they are prepared to tell us what they mean by species, and therefore by characters as specific. In as far as there is any ambiguity on this point it makes entirely for our Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 281 side in the debate, because even any small degree of uncertainty with regard to it would render the generalization in question proportionally unsound. Yet it is notorious that no word in existence is more vague, or more impossible to define, than the word "species." The very same men who at one time pronounce their great generalization with regard to species, at another time asseverate that "a species is not a definite entity/' but a merely abstract term, serving to denote this that and the other organic type, which this that and the other systematist regards as deserving such a title. Moreover it is acknow- ledged that systematists differ among themselves to a wide extent as to the kinds and degrees of peculiarity which entitle a given form to a specific rank. Even in the same department of systematic work much depends on merely individual taste, while in different departments widely different standards of delimination are in vogue. Hence, our reductio ad absurdum consists in this — that whether a given form is to be regarded as necessarily due to natural selection, and whether all its distinctive characters are to be regarded as necessarily utilitarian characters, will often depend on whether it has been described by naturalist A or by naturalist B. There is no one criterion — there is not even any one set of criteria — agreed upon by naturalists for the construction of specific types. In particular, as regards the principle of heredity, it is not known of one named species in twenty — probably not in a hundred — whether its diagnostic characters are hereditary characters ; while, on the other hand, even in cases where experiment has proved " constant varieties " to be hereditary — 282 Darwifiy and after Darwin, and even also cross-sterile with allied varieties — it is only some three or four living botanists who for these reasons advocate the elevation of such varieties to the rank of species. In short, as we are not engaged on any abstract question touching the principles on which species ought to have been constituted by their makers, but upon the actual manner in which they have been, the criterion of heredity must needs be disregarded in the present discussion, as it has been in the work of systematists. And the result of this is, that any objection to our introducing the facts of climatic varia- tion in the present discussion is excluded. In par- ticular, so far as any question of heredity is concerned, all these facts are as assuredly as they are cogently relevant. It is perfectly certain that there is " a large proportional number " of named species — particularly of plants; — which further investigation would resolve into climatic varieties. With the advance of know- ledge, "bad species" are always increasing at the expense of "good species," so that we are now justified in concluding with Kerner, Hackel, and other naturalists best qualified to speak on this subject, that if we could know as much about the past history and present rela- tions of the remaining good species as we do about the bad, all the former, without exception, would become resolved into the latter. In point of fact, and apart altogether from the inductive experience on which this conclusion is based, the conclusion follows " as a neces- sary deduction " from the general theory of descent. For this theory essentially consists in supposing either the past or the present existence of interme- diate varietal forms in all cases, with the consequence that *' good species " serve merely to mark lacunae in Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 283 our knowledge of what is everywhere a finely gradu- ated process of transmutation. Hence, if we place this unquestionably " necessary deduction " from the general theory of descent side by side with the alleged "necessary deduction" from the theory of natural selection, we cannot avoid the following absurdity — Whether or not a given form is to be regarded as necessarily due to natural selection, and all its characters necessarily utilitarian, is to be determined, and determined solely, by the mere accident of our having found, or not having found, either in a living or in a fossil state, its varietal ancestry. 8. But this leads us to consider the final and crowning incongruities which have been dealt with in the present chapter. For here we have seen, not only that our opponents thus draw a hard and fast line between "varieties" and "species" in regard to " necessary origin " and '* necessary utility," but that they further draw a similar line between "species" and '* genera " in the same respects. Yet, in ac- cordance with the general theory of evolution, it is plainly as impossible to draw any such line in the one case as it is to do so in the other. Just as fixed varieties are what Darwin called " incipient species," so are species incipient genera, genera incipient families, and so on. Evolutionists must believe that the process of evolution is everywhere the same. Nevertheless, while admitting all this, the school of Huxley contradicts itself by alleging some unintelligible exception in the case of *' species," while the school of Wallace presses this exception so as to embrace " specific characters." Indeed Mr. Wallace, 284 DarwiUy and after Darwin. while maintaining that all specific characters must necessarily be useful, maintains at the same time that any number of varietal characters on the one hand, and a good half of generic characters on the other, are probably useless. Thus he contra- dicts his argument from the "constancy of specific characters" (seeing that generic characters are still more constant), as later on we saw that he contra- dicts his deductive generalization touching their necessary utility, by giving a non-utilitarian ex- planation of whole multitudes of specific characters. I need not, however, again go over the ground so recently traversed ; but will conclude by once more recurring to the only explanation which I have been able to devise of the otherwise inexplicable fact, that in regard to this subject so many natural- ists still continue to entangle themselves in the meshes of absurdity and contradiction. The only conceivable explanation is, that these naturalists have not yet wholly divested themselves of the special creation theory. Although professing to have discarded the belief that '* species" are " definite entities," differing in kind from " varieties " on the one Kand and from "genera" on the other, these writers are still imbued with a vague survival of that belief. They well know it to belong to the very essence of their new theory that "species" are but *' pronounced varieties," or, should we prefer it. "incipient genera"; but still they cannot alto- gether escape the pre-Darwinian conception of species as organic units, whose single mode of origin need not extend to other taxonomic groups, and whose Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 285 characters therefore present some exceptional signifi- cance to the scientific naturalist. So to speak, such divinity doth still hedge a species, that even in the very act of declaring it but an idol of their own creation, these naturalists bow before their fetish as something that is unique — differing alike in its origin and in its characters from the varieties beneath and the genera above. The consequence is that they have endeavoured to reconcile these incompatible ideas by substituting the principle of natural selec- tion for that of super-natural creation, where the particular case of "species" is concerned In this way, it vaguely seems to them, they are able to save the doctrine of some one mode of origin as appertaining to species, which need not " necessarily " appertain to any other taxonomic division. All other such divisions they regard, with their pre- Darwinian forefathers, as merely artificial construc- tions ; but, likewise with these forefathers, they look upon species as natural divisions, proved to be such by a single and necessary mode of origin. Hence, Mr. Wallace expressly defines a species with reference to this single and necessary mode of origin {see above, p. 235), although he must be well aware that there is no better, or more frequent, proof of it in the case of species, than there is in that of somewhat less pronounced types on the one hand (fixed varieties), or of more pronounced types on the other (genera, families, &c.). Hence, also, the theory of natural selection is defined as par excellence a theory of the origin of species ; it is taken as applying to the particular case of the origin of species in a peculiarly stringent manner, or in a manner which does not 286 Darwin^ and after Darwin. apply to the origin of any other groups. And I believe that an important accessory reason of the continuance of this view for more than thirty years after the publication of the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, is to be found in the title of that work. " Natural Selection " has thus become verbally associated with " Origin of Species," till it is thought- lessly felt that, in some way or another, natural selec- tion must have a peculiar reference to those artificially delineated forms which stand anywhere between a fixed variety and a so-called genus. This verbal association has no doubt had the effect of still further preserving the traditional halo of mystery which clings to the idea of a " species." Hence it comes that the title which Darwin chose — and, looking to the circum- stances of the time, wisely chose — for his great work, has subsequently had the effect of fostering the very idea which it was the object of that work to dissipate, namely, that species are, peculiar entities, which differ more or less in origin or kind from all other taxonomic groups. The full title of this work is — The Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection : or the Preserva- tion of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. Now, supposing that instead of this its author had chosen some such title as the following: — The Origin of Organic Types by means of Adaptive Evolution : or Survival of the Fittest Forms in the Struggle for Life. Of course this would have been a bad substitute from various points of view ; but could any objection have been urged against it from our present point of view ? I do not see that there could. Yet, if such had been the title, I have little doubt that we should never have heard of those great generalizations with regard to Characters as Adaptive and Specific. 287 species and specific characters, the futility of which it has been the object of these chapters to expose. In conclusion, it only remains to reiterate that in thus combating what appears to me plainly errone- ous deductions from the theory of natural selection, I am in no wise combating that theory itself. On the contrary, I hope that I am rendering it no unim- portant service by endeavouring to relieve it of a parasitic growth — an accretion of false logic. Regarding as I do the theory of natural selection as, primarily, a theory of the origin (or cumulative development) of adaptations, I see in merely non- adaptive characters-^ be they "specific" or other — a comparatively insignificant class of phenomena, which may be due to a great variety of incidental causes, without any further reference to the master- principle of natural selection than that in the presence of this principle none of these non-adaptive characters can be actively deleterious. But that there may be " any number of indifferent characters " it is no part of the theory of natural selection to deny ; and all attempts to foist upon it apriori " deductions " opposed alike to the facts of nature and to the logic of the case, can only act to the detriment of the great generalization which was expressly guarded from such fallacies by the ever-careful judgement of Darwin. APPENDICES AND NOTES n. APPENDIX I. On Panmixia. There are several points of considerable theoretical im- portance connected with Panmixia, which were omitted from the text, in order to avoid distracting attention from the main issue which is there under consideration. These side issues may now be appropriately presented in the form in which they were published in Nature, March 13, 1890 ^ After stating, in almost the same words, what has already been said in Chapter X, this paper proceeds, with the excep- tion of a few verbal alterations, as follows. "There is, however, one respect in which Professor Weismann's statement of the principle of panmixia differs from that which was considered by Mr. Darwin ; and it is this difference of statement — which amounts to an important difference of theory— that I now wish to discuss. " The difference in question is, that while Professor Weismann believes the cessation of selection to be capable of inducing de- generation down to the almost complete disappearance of a rudi- mentary organ, I have argued that, unless assisted by some other principle, it can at most only reduce the degenerating organ to considerably above one-half its original size— or probably not through so much as one-quarter. The ground of this argument (which is given in detail in the Nature articles of 1 873-1 874) is, that panmixia depends for its action upon fortuitous variations round an ever-diminishing average— the average thus diminish- ing because it is no longer sustained by natural selection. But although no longer sustained by natural selection^ it does con- * Vol. xli. p. 438. U 2 , 292 DarwiHy and after Darwin, tinue to be sustained by heredity ; and therefore, as long as the force of heredity persists unimpaired, fortuitous variations alone— or variation which is no longer controlled by natural selection — cannot reduce the dwindling organ to so much as one-half of its original size ; indeed, as above foreshadowed, the balance between the positive force of heredity and the negative effects of promiscuous variability will most likely be arrived at above the middle line thus indicated. Only if for any reason the force of heredity begins to fail can the average round which the cessation of selection works become a progressively diminishing average. In other words, so long as the original force of heredity as regards the useless organ remains unimpaired, the mere with- drawal of selection cannot reduce the organ much below the level of efficiency above which it was previously maintained by the f)resence of selection. If we take this level to be 80 or 90 per cent, of the original size, cessation of selection will reduce the organ through the 10 or 20 per cent., and there leave it fluc- tuating about this average, unless for any reason the force of heredity begins to fail — in which case, of course, the average will progressively fall in proportion to the progressive weakening of this force. " Now, according to my views, the force of heredity under such circumstances is always bound to fail, and this for two reasons. In the first place, it must usually happen that when an organ becomes useless, natural selection as regards that organ will not only cease ^ but become reversed. For the organ is now absorbing nutriment, causing weight, occupying space, and so on, uselessly. Hence, even if it be not also a source of actual danger, ' economy of growth ' will determine a reversal of selection against an organ which is now not merely useless, but deleterious. And this de- generating influence of the reversal of selection will throughout be assisted by the cessation of selection, which will now be always acting round a continuously sinking average. Nevertheless, a point of balance will eventually be reached in this case, just as it was in the previous case where the cessation of selection was supposed to be working alone. For, where the reversal of selec- tion has reduced the diminishing organ to so minute a size that its presence is no longer a source of detriment to the organism, the cessation of selection will carry the reduction a small degree Appendix L 293 further; and then the organ will remain as a 'rudiment.* And so it will remain permanently, unless there be some further reason why the still remaining force of heredity should be abolished. This further (or second) reason I found in the consideration that, however enduring we may suppose the force of heredity to be, we cannot suppose that it is actually everlasting; and, therefore, that we may reasonably attribute the eventual disappearance of rudimentary organs to the eventual failure of heredity itself. In support of this view there is the fact that rudimentary organs, although very persistent, are not everlasting. That they should be very persistent is what we should expect, if the hold which heredity has upon them is great in proportion to the time during which they were originally useful, and thus firmly stamped upon the organization by natural selection causing them to be strongly inherited in the first instance. For example, we might expect that it would be more difficult finally to eradicate the rudiment of a wing than the rudiment of a feather ; and accordingly we find it a general rule that long-enduring rudiments are rudiments of organs distinctive of the higher taxonomic divisions— i.e. of organs which were longest in building up, and therefore longest sustained in a state of working efficiency. " Thus, upon the whole, my view of the facts of degeneration remains the same as it was when first published in these columns seventeen years ago, and may be summarized as follows. " The cessation of selection when working alone (as it probably does during the first centuries of its action upon structures or colours which do not entail any danger to, or perceptible drain upon, the nutritive resources of the organism) cannot cause de- generation below, probably, some lo to 20 per cent. But if from the first the cessation of selection has been assisted by the reversal of selection (on account of the degenerating structure having originally been of a size sufficient to entail a perceptible drain on the nutritive resources of the organism, having now become a source of danger, and so forth), the two principles acting together will continue to reduce the ever-diminishing structure down to the point at which its presence is no longer a perceptible disadvantage to the species. When that point is reached, the reversal of selection will terminate, and the cessation of selection will not then be able of itself to reduce the organ 294 DarwiUy and after Darwin, through more than at most a very few further percentages of its original size. But, after this point has been reached, the now total absence of selection, either for or against the organ, will sooner or later entail this further and most important consequence, a failure of heredity as regards the organ. So long as the organ was of use, its efficiency was constantly maintained by the /r^j'2, 300 Darwiriy and after Darwin, to be useful, it will degenerate by the withdrawal of selection alone. Which, of course, is merely a re- statement of the doctrine of panmixia, or cessation of selection, in somewhat varied terminology — provided that the birth-mean be taken over a number of generations, or not only over a few follow- ing the selection-mean of the structure while still in its highest stale of efficiency. For the sake of brevity I will hereafter speak of these " few following " generations by the term of " first generations." It remains to consider the views of Professor Lloyd Morgan upon the subject. In my opinion he is the shrewdest, as well as the most logical critic that we have in the field of Darwinian speculation; therefore, if possible, I should like to arrive at a full agreement with him upon this matter. His latest utterance with regard to it is as follows : — "To account for the diminution of organs or structures no longer of use, apart from any inherited effects of disuse, Mr. Romanes has invoked the Cessation of Selection; and Mr. Francis Galton has, in another connexion, summarized the effects of this cessation of selection in the convenient phrase * Regression to Mediocrity.' This is the Panmixia of Professor Weismann and his followers; but the phrase regression to mediocrity through the cessation of selection appears to me preferable. It is clear that so long as any organ or structure is subject to natural selection through elimination, it is, if not actually undergoing improvement, kept at a high standard of efficiency through the elimination of all those individuals in which the organ in question falls below the required standard. But if, from change in the environment or any other cause, the character in question ceases to be subject to selection, elimina- tion no longer takes place, and the high standard will no longer be maintained. There will be reversion to mediocrity. The probable amount of this reversion is at present a matter under discussion '." ' Presidential Address to the Bristol Naturalist f Society, 1891. Appendix I, 301 So far, then, Professor Lloyd Morgan is in complete agreement with previous writers upon the subject. He does not doubt that the cessation of selection must always be a cause of degeneration : the only question is as to the potency of this cause, or the amount of degeneration which it is capable of effecting. Taking, first, the case of bulk or size of an organ, as distinguished from its organization or complexity, we have seen that Weismann represents the cessation of selection — even if working quite alone, or without any assistance from the reversal of selection — to be capable of reducing a fully developed organ to the state of a rudiment, or even, if we take his most recent view, of abolishing the organ in toto. Professor Lloyd Morgan, on the other hand, does not think that the cessation of selection alone can cause reduc- tion further than the level of "mediocrity" in the first generations — or, which is much the same thing, further than the difference between the " birth-mean " and the " selection- mean " of the first generations. This amount of reduction he puts at 5 per cent., as " a very liberal estimate." Here, then, we have three estimates of the amount of degeneration which can be produced by panmixia alone, where mere size or bulk of an organ is concerned — say, 3 to 5 per cent., lo to 20 per cent., and 95 per cent, to o. At first sight, these differences appear simply ludicrous; but on seeking for the reasons of them, we find that they are due to different views touching the manner in which panmixia operates. The oversights which have led to Weismann's extremely high estimate have already been stated. The reason of the difference between the extremely low estimate of Professor Lloyd Morgan, as compared with my own intermediate one, is, that he supposes the power of panmixia to become exhausted as soon as the level of mediociity of the first generations has become the general level in succeeding generations. In my view, however, the 302 Darwin^ and after Darwin, level of mediocrity is itself a sinking level in successive generations, with the result that there is no reason why the reducing power of panmixia should ever become exhausted, save that the more reduction it effects the greater is the force of heredity which remains to be overcome, as previously explained. Thus the only question between Professor Lloyd Morgan and myself is — Does the level of mediocrity fall in successive generations under the cessation of selection, or does it remain permanently where it used to be under the presence of selection ? Does the " birth-mean " remain constant throughout any number of generations, notwithstanding that the sustaining influence of selection has been withdrawn ; or does it progressively sink as a con sequence of such withdrawal ? In order to answer this question we had better begin by considering now the case of organization of structure, as distinguished from mere size of structure. Take any case where a complex organ — such as a compound eye — has been slowly elaborated by natural selection, and is it not self- evident that, when natural selection is withdrawn, the com- plex structure will deteriorate ? In other words, the level of mediocrity, say in the hundred thousandth generation after the sustaining influence of natural selection has been with- drawn, will not be so high as it was in the first generations. For, by hypothesis, there is now no longer any elimination of unfavourable variations, which may therefore perpetuate themselves as regards any of the parts of this highly complex mechanism ; so that it is only a matter of time when the mechanism must become disintegrated. I can scarcely suppose that any one who considers the subject will question this statement, and therefore I will not say anything that might be said in the way of substantiating it. But, if the statement be assented to, it follows that there is no need to look for any cause of deterioration, further than the with- (irawal of selection — or cessation of the principle which (as Appendix L 303 we are supposing) had hitherto been the sole means of maintaining efficient harmony among all the independently variable parts of the highly complex structure. Now, I hold that the same thing is true, though in a lesser degree, as regards degeneration of size. That there is no difference in kind between the two cases. Professor Lloyd Morgan implicitly allows ; for what he says is — "In any long-established character, such as wing-power in birds, brain-development, the eyes of Crustacea, &c., no short- comer in these respects would have been permitted by natural selection to transmit his shortcomings for hundreds of genera- tions. All tendency to such shortcomings would, one would suppose, have been bred out of the race. If after this long process of selection there still remains a strong tendency to deterioration, this tendency demands an explanation *." Here, then, deterioration as to size of structure (wings of birds), and deterioration as to complexity of structure (brain and eyes) are expressly put upon the same footing. There- fore, if in the latter case the "tendency to deterioration" does not " demand an explanation," beyond the fact that the hitherto maintaining influence has been withdrawn, neither is any such further explanation demanded in the former case. Which is exactly my own view of the matter. It is also Mr. Galton's view. For although, in the passage formerly quoted, Professor Lloyd Morgan appears to think that by the phrase " Regression to Mediocrity " Mr. Galton means to indicate that panmixia can cause degeneration only as far as the mediocrity level of the first generations, this, in point of fact, is not what Galton means, nor is it what he says. The phrase in question occurs "in another connexion/* and, indeed, in a different publication. But where he expressly alludes to the cessation of selection, this is what he says. The italics are mine. * Presidential Address to the Bristol Naturalists^ Society, 1891. 304 Darwin^ and after Daruutn, **A special cauce may be assigned for the effects of use in causing hereditary atrophy of disused parts. It has already been shown that all exceptionally developed organs tend to de- teriorate : consequently, those that are not protected by selec- tion will dwindle. The level of muscular efficiency in the wing of a strongly flying bird [curiously enough, the same case that is chosen by Professor Lloyd Morgan to illustrate his opposite view], is like the level of water in the leaky vessel of a Danaid, only secured to the race by constant effort^ so to speak. Let the effort be relaxed ever so little^ and the level immediately falls \" I take it, then, that the burden of proof lies with Professor Lloyd Morgan to show why the withdrawal of selection is not sufficient to account for degeneration any further than the mediocrity-level in the former presence of selection. Why does "the strong tendency* to deterioration demand an explanation," further than the fact that when all variations below the average in every generation are allowed to survive, they must gradually lower the average itself through a series of generations ? To answer that any such tendency "would have been bred out of the race " by the previous action of selection, is to suppose that the function of selection is at an end when once it has built up a structure to the highest point of working efficiency, — that the presence of selection is no longer required to maintain the structure at that point. But it is enough to ask in reply — Why, under the cessation of selection, does complexity of structure degenerate so much more rapidly than size of structure ? Why is it, for instance, that "the eyes of Crustacea" in dark caves have entirely disappeared, while their foot-stalks (when originally present) still remain? Can it be maintained that "for hundreds of generations " natural selection was more intent * A Theory of Heredity, Journal of Anthropological Institute, 1875. Vol. V. p. 345. ^ No one has supposed that the tendency need be "strong": it has only to be persistent. Appendix /. 305 on developing the foot-stalks than the eyes which were mounted upon them — so that while the latter were left by selection with " a strong tendency to deterioration," the former have had this tendency " bred out in the race " * ? To sum up. There is now no question in any quarter touching the fact that panmixia, or the cessation of selection, is a true cause of degeneration. The only question is as to the amount of degeneration which it is able to effect when not assisted by the reversal of selection, or any other cause of degeneration. Moreover, even with regard to this * Of course it must be observed that degeneration of complexity involves also degeneration of size, so that a more correct statement of the case would be — Why, under the cessation of selection, does an organ of extreme complexity degenerate much more rapidly than one of much less complexity? For example, under domestication the brains of rabbits and ducks appear to have been reduced in some cases by as much as 50 per cent. (Darwin, and Sir !• Crichton Browne.) But if it is possible to attribute this effect — or part of it — to an artificial selection of stupid animals, I give in the text an example occurring under nature. Many other cases, however, might be given to show the general rule, that under cessation of selection complexity of structure degenerates more rapidly — and also more thoroughly — than size of it. This, of course, is what Mr. Galton and I should expect, seeing that the more complex a structure the greater are the number of points for deterioration to invade when the structure is no longer "protected by selection." (On the other hand, of course, this fact is opposed to the view that degeneration of useless structures below the "birth-mean" of the first generations, is exclusively due to the reversal of selection ; for economy of growth, deleterious effect of weight, and so forth, ought to affect size of structure much more than complexity of it.) But I choose the above case, partly because Professor Lloyd Morgan has himself alluded to " the eyes of Crustacea," and partly because Professor Ray Lankester has maintained that the loss of these eyes in dark caves is due to the reversal of selection, as distinguished from the cessation of it. In view of the above parenthesis it will be seen that the point is not of much importance in the present connexion ; but it appears to me that cessation of selection must here have had at least the larger share in the process of atrophy. For while the economy of nutrition ought to have removed the relatively \2i\^tive characters;, but in the wider sense that any change in one part of an organism — whether or not it happens to be an adaptive change — is apt to induce changes in other pans. Appendix II. 321 other sex, though of no use to this sex. But structures thus indirectly gained, although at first of no advantage to a species^ may subsequently have been taken advantage of by its modified descendants, under new conditions of life and newly acquired habits V» It appeared — and still appears — tome, that where so many causes are expressly assigned as producing useless specific characters, and that some of them (such as climatic influences and independent variability) must be highly general in their action, I was justified in representing it as Darwin's opinion that "a large proportional number of specific characters" are useless to the species presenting them, although after- wards they may sometimes become of use to genera, families, &c. Moreover, this passage goes on to point out that specific characters which at first sight appear to be obviously useful, are sometimes found by fuller knowledge to be really useless — a consideration which is the exact inverse of the argument from ignorance as used by Mr. Wallace, and serves still further to show that in Darwin's opinion utility is by no means an invariable, still less a *' necessary," mark of specific character. The following are some of the instances which he gives. " The sutures in the skulls of young mammals have been ad- vanced as a beautiful adaptation for aiding parturition, and no doubt they may facilitate, or be indispensable for this act ; but as sutures occur in the skulls of young birds and reptiles, which have only to escape from a broken ^gg^ we may infer that this structure has arisen from the laws of growth^ and has been taken advantage of in the parturition of the higher animals ^" " The naked skin on the head of a vulture is generally con- sidered as a direct adaptation for wallowing in putridity; and so it may be, or it may possibly be due to the direct action of the putrid matter ; but we should be very cautious * Origin of Species, pp. 157-8. =* Ibid. II. Y 322 Darwin^ and after Darwin, in drawing any such inference [i.e. as to utility] when we see the skin on the head of the clean-feeding male Turkey is likewise naked V* Similarly, in the Descent of Man it is said : — " Variations of the same general nature have often been taken advantage of and accumulated through sexual selection in re- lation to the propagation of the species, and through natural selection in relation to the general purposes of life. Hence, secondary sexual characters^ when equally transmitted to both sexes, can be distinguished from ordinary specific characters,, only by the light of analogy. The modifications acquired through sexual selection are often so strongly pronounced that the two sexes have frequently been ranked as distinct species, or even as distinct genera ^" As Mr. Wallace does not recognize sexual selection, he incurs the burden of proving utility (in the life-preserving sense) in all these ** frequently " occurring cases where there are such '* strongly pronounced modifications," and we have already seen in the text his manner of dealing with this burden. But the point here is, that whether or not we accept the theory of sexual selection, we must accept it as Darwin's opinion — first, that in their beginnings, as specific characters, these sexual modifications were often of a merely '^general nature" (or without reference to utility even in the Hfe-embellishing sense), and only after- wards "have often been taken advantage of and accumu- lated through sexual selection**: and, secondly, that "we know they have been acquired in some instances at the cost not only of inconvenience, but of exposure to actual dangers '/' We may now pass on to some further, and even stronger, expressions of opinion with regard to the frequent inutihly of specific characters. * Origin of Species, pp. 157-8. • Descent of Man, p. 615. " Ibid, Appendix II. 323 ** I have made these remarks only to show that, if we are un- able to account for the characteristic differences of our several domestic breeds, which nevertheless are generally admitted to have arisen through ordinary generation from one or a few parent stocks, we ought not to lay too much stress on our ignorance of the precise cause [i.e. whether natural selection or some other cause] of the slight analogous differences between true species. ... I fully admit that many structures are now of no use to their possessors, and may never have been of any use to their progenitors ; but this does not prove that they were formed solely for beauty or variety. No doubt the definite action of changed conditions, and the various causes of modification, lately specified, have all produced an effect, probably a great effect^ independently of any advantage thus gained. It is scarcely possible to decide how much allowance ought to be made for such causes of change, as the definite action of external conditions, so-called spontaneous variations, and the complex laws of growth ; but, with these important exceptions^ we may conclude that the structure of every living creature either now is, or formerly was, of some direct or indirect use to its possessor V Here again, if we remember how "important" these " exceptions " are, I cannot understand any one doubting Darwin's opinion to have been that a large proportional number of specific characters are useless. For that it is " species " which he here has mainly in his mind is evident from what he says when again alluding to the subject in his " Summary of the Chapter " — namely, " In many other cases [i.e. in cases where natural selection has not been concerned] modifications are probably the direct result of the laws of variation or of growth, independently of any good having been thus gained." Now, not only do these "laws" apply as much to species as they do to genera; "but," the passage goes on to say, "even such structures have often, we may feel assured, been subsequently taken * Descent of Man, pp. i59-6o# Y a 324 Darwin y and after Darwin. advantage of, and still further modified, for the good of species under new conditions of life/' Obviously, there- fore, the inutility in such cases is taken to have been prior to any utility subsequently acquired; and genera are not historically prior to the species in which they originate. Here is another quotation : — " Thus, as I am inclined to believe, morphological differences, which we consider as important— such as the arrangement of the leaves, the divisions of the flower or of the ovarium, the position of the ovules, Sic.^/irst appeared in matiy cases as fluctuating va7iations^ which sooner or later became constant through the nature of the organism and of the surrounding conditions, as well as through the intercrossing of distinct in- dividuals, but not through natural selection ; for as these morphological characters do not affect the welfare of the species^ any slight deviations in them could not have been governed or accumulated through this latter agency. It is a strange result which we thus arrive at, namely, that characters of slight vital importance to the species^ are the most im- portant to the systematist ; but, as we shall hereafter see when we treat of the genetic principle of classification, this is by no means so paradoxical as it may at first appear V Clearly the view here expressed is that characters which are now distinctive of higher taxonomic divisions ** first appeared" in the parent species of such divisions; for not only would it be unreasonable to attribute the rise and preservation of useless characters to " fluctuating variations " affecting a number of species or genera similarly and simul- taneously ; but it would be impossible that, if such were the case, they could be rendered "constant through the nature of the organism and of the surrounding conditions, as well as through the intercrossing of distinct individuals V * Descent of Matty ^. 176. * The pa-^sage to which these remarks apply is likewise quoted, in the same Connexion as above, in my paper on Physiological Selection. Appendix IL 325 Here is another passage to the same geneial effect. In alluding to the objection from inutility as advanced by Bronn, Broca, and Nageli, Mr. Darwin says : — " There is much force in the above objection"; and, after again pointing out the important possibility in any particular cases of hidden or former use, and the action of the laws of growth, he goes on to say, — " In the third place, we have to allow for the direct and definite action of changed con- ditions of life, and for so-called spontaneous variations, in which the nature of the conditions plays quite a sub- ordinate part \" Elsewhere he says, — '* It appears that I formerly underrated the frequency and value of these latter forms of variation as leading to permanent modifications of structure independently of natural selection *." The *' forms of variation " to which he here alludes are " variations which seem to us in our ignorance to arise spontaneously"; and it is evident that such variations cannot well " arise " in two or more species of a genus similarly and simultane- ously, so as independently to lead " to permanent modifica- tions of structure" in two or more parallel lines. It is further evident that by " spontaneous variations " Darwin alludes to extreme cases of spontaneous departure from the general average of specific characters; and therefore that lesser or more ordinary departures must be of still greater '* frequency," Again, speaking of the principles of classification, Darwin writes: — " We care not how trifling a character may be — let it be the mere inflection of the angle of the jaw, the manner in which In criticising that paper in Nature (vol. xxxix. p. 127), Mr. Thiselton Dyer says of my interpretation of this passage, " the obvions drift of this does not relate to specific- differences, but to those which are charac- teristic of family." But in making this remark Mr. Dyer could not have read the passage with sufficient care to note the points which I have now explained. * Origin of Species, p. 171. • Ibid, p. 431. 326 Darwin y and after Darwin, an insect's wing is folded, whether the skin be covered by hair or feathers— if it prevail throughout many and different species, especially those having very different habits of life, it assumes high value [i.e. for purposes of classification]; for we can account for its presence in so many forms with such different habits^ only by inheritance from a common parent. We may err in this respect in regard to single points of structure, but when several characters, let them be ever so trifling, concur througliout a large group of beings having different habits, we may feel almost sure, on the theory of descent, that these characters have been inherited from a common ancestor; and we know that such aggregated characters have especial value in classification ^" Now it is evident that this argument for the general theory of evolution would be destroyed, if Wallace's as- sumption of utility of specific characters as universal were to be entertained. And the fact of apparently "trifling* characters occurring throughout a large group of beings " having different habits " is proof that they are really trifling, or without utilitarian significance. It is needless to multiply these quotations, for it appears to me that the above are amply sufl[icient to establish the only point with which we are here concerned, namely, that Darwin's opinion on the subject of utility in relation to specific characters was substantially identical with my own. And this is established, not merely by the literal meaning of the sundry passages here gathered together from different parts of his writings ; but likewise, and per- haps still more, from the tone of thought which pervades these writings as a whole. It requires no words of mine to show that the literal meaning of the above quotations is entirely opposed to Mr. Wallace's view touching the necessary utility of all specific characters ; but upon the other point — or the general tone of Mr. Darwin's thought regarding such topics — it may be well to add two remarks. » Origin of Species, pp. 373-373- Appendix IL 327 In the first place, it must be evident that so soon as we cease to be bound by any a priori deduction as to natural selection being " the exclusive means of modifica- tions," it ceases to be a matter of much concern to the theory of natural selection in what proportion other means of modifi- cation have been at work — especially when non-adaptive modifications are concerned, and where these have refer- ence to merely "specific characters,'* or modifications oi the most incipient kind, least generally diffused among organic types, and representing the incidence of causes of less importance than any others in the process of organic evolution considered as a whole. Consequently, in the second place, we find that Darwin nowhere displays any solicitude touching the proportional number of specific char- acters that may eventually prove to be due to causes other than natural selection. He takes a much wider and deeper view of organic evolution, and, having entirely emancipated himself from the former conception of species as the organic units, sees virtually no significance in specific characters, except in so far as they are also adaptive characters. Such, at all events, appears to me the obvious interpretation of his writings when these are carefully read with a view to ascertaining his ideas upon "Utilitarian doctrine: how far true." And I make these remarks because it has been laid to my charge, that in quoting such passages as the above I have been putting " a strained interpretation " upon Darwin's utterances : " such admissions," it is said, " Mr. Romanes appears to me to treat as if wrung from a hostile witness \" But, from what has gone before, it ought to be apparent that I take precisely the opposite view to that here imputed. Far from deeming these and similar passages as " admissions wrung from a hostile witness," and far from seeking * Mr. Thiselton Dyer in Nature^ loc. cit. 328 Darwiriy and after Darwin, to put any " strained interpretation '* upon them, I believe that they are but the plain and unequivocal expressions of an opinion which I have always understood that Darwin held. And if any one has been led to think other- wise, I throw back this charge of " strained interpretation,*' by challenging such a person to adduce a single quotation from any part of Darwin's works, which can possibly be held to indicate that he regarded passages like those above quoted as in any way out of conformity with his theory of natural selection — or as put forward merely to "admit the possibility of explanations, to which really, however, he did not attach much importance." To the best of my judgement it is only some bias in favour of Mr. Wallace's views that can lead a naturalist to view in this way the clear and consistent expression of Darwin's. That Mr. Wallace himself should be biassed in this matter might, perhaps, be expected. After rendering the following very unequivocal passage from the Origin of Species (p. 72) — " There can be little doubt that the tendency to vary in the same manner has often been so strong, that all individuals of the same species have been similarly modified without the aid of any form of selection" — Mr. Wallace says, "But no proof whatever is offered of this statement, and it is so entirely opposed to all we know of the facts of variation as given by Darwin himself, that the important word ' all ' is probably an oversight." But, if Mr. Wallace had read the very next sentence he would have seen that here the important word "all" could not possibly have been "an oversight." For the passage continues, — " Or only a third, fifth, or tenth part of the individuals may have been thus affected, of which fact several instances could be given. Thus Graba estimates I hat about one-fifth of the guillemots in the Faroe Islands consist of a variety so well marked, that it was formerly ranked as a distinct species under the name of Una lacrymans." And even if this passage had not been thus Appendix II, 329 specially concerned with the question of the proportion in which " individuals of the same species have been similarly modified without the aid of any form of selection^' the oversight with respect to " the important word ' all * " would still have remained an oversight of a recurrent character, as the fol- lowing additional quotations from other parts of Darwin's writings may perhaps render apparent. " There must be some efficient cause for each slight individual difference, as well as for more strongly marked variations which occasionally arise ; and if the unknown cause were to act persistently, it is almost certain that all the individuals of the species would be similarly modified \" " The acquisition of a useless part can hardly be said to raise an organism in the natural scale We are so igno- rant of the exciting cause of the above specified modifications ; but if the unknown cause were to act almost uniformly for a length of time, we may infer that the result would be almost uniform ; and in this case all the individuals of the species would be modified in the same manner V Moreover, when dealing even with such comparatively slight changes as occur between our domesticated varieties — and which, a fortiori, are less likely to become " stable " through the uniform operation of causes other than selec- tion, seeing that they are not only smaller in amount than occurs among natural species, but also have had but a comparatively short time in whicli to accumulate — Darwin is emphatic in his assertion of the same principles. For instance, in the twenty-third chapter of the Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication, he repeatedly uses the term " definite action of external conditions," and begins the chapter by explaining his use of the term thus : — "By the term definite action, as used in this chapter, I mean an action of such a nature that, when many individuals of * Origin of Species, p. 171. * Ibid. p. 175. 330 Darwin, and after Darwin, the same variety are exposed during: several generations to any change in their physical conditions of life, a//, or nearly ally the individuals are modified in the same manner. A new sub-variety would thus be produced without the aid of selec- Hon\* As an example of the special instances that he gives, I may quote the following from the same work : — " Each of the endless variations which we see in the plumage of our fowls must have had some efficient cause ; and if the same cause were to act uniformly during a long series of generations on many individuals, all probably would be modi- fied in the same manner." And, as instances of his more general statements in Chapter XXIII, these may suffice : — "The direct action of the conditions of life, whether leading to definite or indefinite results, is a totally distinct consider- ation from the effects of natural selection The direct and definite action of changed conditions, in contra- distinction to the accumulation of indefinite variations, seems to me so tmj)0?tant that I will give a large additional body of miscellaneous facts V Then, after giving these facts, and showing how in the case of species in a state of nature it is often impossible to decide how much we are to attribute to natural selection and how much to the definite action of changed conditions, he begins his general summary of the chapter thus: — " There can be no doubt, from the facts given in the early part of this chapter, that extremely slight changes in the conditions of life sometimes act in a definite manner on our already variable domesticated productions [productions, there- fore, with regard to which unilormity and "stability" of modification are least likely to arise] ; and, as the action of changed conditions in causing general or indefinite vari- * Variation, &c., vol. ii.p. 260. * Ibid, vol.ii. p. 261. Appendix II. 331 ability is accumulative, so it may be with their definite ac- tion. Hence it is possible that great and definite modifications of structure may result from altered conditions acting during a long series of generations. In some few instances a marked effect has been produced quickly on nll^ or nearly ally the individuals which have been exposed to some considerable change of climate, food, or other circumstance *." Once more, in order to show that he retained these views to the end of his life, I may quote a passage from the second edition of the Descent of Man, which is the latest expression of his opinion upon these points: — " Each of the endless diversities in plumage, which we see in our domesticated birds, is, of course, the result of some de- finite cause ; and under natural and more uniform conditions, some one tint, assuming that it was in no way injurious^ would almost certainly sooner or later prevail. The free-inter- crossing of the many individuals belonging to the same species would ultimately tend to make any change of colour thus in- duced uniform in character. .... Can we believe that the very slight differences in tints and markings between, for in- stance, the female black-grouse and red-grouse serve as a protection ? Are partridges as they are now coloured, better protected than if they had resembled quails? Do the slight differences between the females of the common pheasant, the Japan and golden pheasants, serve as a protection, or might not their plumage have been interchanged with impunity ? From what Mr. Wallace has observed of the habits of certain gallinaceous birds in the East, he thinks that such slight differences are beneficial. For myself, I will only say, I am not convinced V Yet *' convinced " he certainly must have been on merely a priori grounds, had he countenanced Mr. Wallace's reasoning from the general theory of natural selection ; and the fact that he here tails to be convinced even by "what Mr. Wallace has observed of the habits of certain gallinaceous * Variation^ &c., vol. ii. p. 280. * Descent of Man, pp. 473-4. 332 Darwin^ and after Darwin, birds," appears to indicate that he had considered the question of utility with special reference to Mr. Wallace's opinion. That opinion was then, as now, the avowed result of a theo- retical prepossession ; and this prepossession, as the above quotations sufficiently show, was expressly repudiated by Darwin. Lastly, this is not the only occasion on which Darwin expressly repudiates Mr. Wallace's opinion on the point in question. For it is notorious that these co-authors of the theory of natural selection have expressed divergent opinions concerning the origin by natural selection of the most general of all specific characters — cross-sterility. Although allowing that cross- sterility between allied species may be of adaptive value in " keeping incipient species from blending," Darwin persistently refused to be influenced by Wallace's belief that it is due to natural selection; i. e. the belief on which alone can be founded the " necessary de- duction " with which we have been throughout concerned. Note A to Page 57. I THINK it is desirable here to adduce one or two concrete illustrations of these abstract principles, in order to show how, as a matter of fact, the structure of Weismann's theory is such as to preclude the possibility of its assumptions being disproved— and this even supposing that the theory is false. At first sight nothing could seem more conclusive on the side of Darwinian or Lamarckian principles than are the facts of hereditary disease, in cases where the disease has unques- tionably been acquired by the parents. Take, for example, the case of gout. Here there is no suspicion of any microbe being concerned, nor is there any question about the fact of the disease being one which is frequently acquired by certain habits of life. Now, suppose the case of a man who in middle age acquires the gout by these habits of life — such as insufficient exercise, over-sufficient food, and free indulgence in wine. His son inherits the gouty diathesis, and even though the boy may have the fear of gout before his eyes, and con- sequently avoid over-eating and alcoholic drinking, &c., the disease may overtake him also. Well, the natural explanation of all this is, that the sins of the fathers descend upon the children ; that gout acquired may become in the next generation gout transmitted. But, on the other hand, the school of Weismann will maintain that the reason why the parent contracted the gout was because he had a congenital, or " blastogenetic," tendency towards that disease— a tendency which may, indeed, have been intensified by his habits of life, but which, in so far as thus intensified, was not trans- mitted to his offspring. All that was so transmitted was the 334 Darwin, and after Darwin, congenital tendency ; and all that is proved by such cases as those above supposed, where the offspring of gouty parents become gouty notwithstanding their abstemious habits, is that in such offspring the congenital tendency is even more pro- nounced than it was in their parents, and therefore did not require so much inducement in the way of unguarded living to bring it out. Now, here again, without waiting to consider the relative probabilities of these two opposing explanations, it is enough for the purposes of the illustration to remark that it is obviously impossible to disprove either by means of the other, or by any class of facts to which they may severally appeal. I will give only one further example to show the elusiveness of Weismann's theory, and the consequent impossibility of finding any cases in nature which will satisfy the conditions of proof which the theory imposes. In one of his papers Weismann says that if there be any truth in the Lamarckian doctrine of the transmission of acquired characters, it ought to follow that the human infant should speak by instinct. For, ever since man became human he has presumably been a talking animal: at any rate it is certain that he has been so for an innumerable number of generations. Therefore, by this time the faculty of language ought to have been so deeply impressed upon the psychology of the species, that there ought to be no need to teach the young child its use of language; and the fact that there is such need is taken by Weismann to constitute good evidence in proof of the non-transmissibility of individually acquired characters. Or, to quote his own words, "it has never yet been found that a child could read of itself, although its parents had throughout their whole lives practised this art. Not even are our children able to talk of their own accord ; yet not only have their parents, but, more than that, an infinitely long line of ancestors have never ceased to drill their brains and to perfect their organs of speech. . . . From this alone we may be disposed to doubt whether acquired capabilities in the true sense can ever be transmitted." Well, in answer to this particular case, we have first of all to remark that the construction of even the simplest language is, psychologically considered, a matter Note A. 335 of such enormous complexity, that there is no real analogy between it and the phenomena of instinct : therefore the fact that Lamarckian principles cannot be applied to the case of language is no evidence that they do not hold good as regards instinct. Secondly, not only the construction, but still more the use of language is quite out of analogy with all the phenomena of instinct ; for, in order to use, or speak, a language, the mind must already be that of a thinking agent; and therefore to expect that language should be in- stinctive is tantamount to expecting that the thought of which it is the vehicle should be instinctive — i.e. that human parents should transmit the whole organization of their own intellectual experiences to their unborn children. Thirdly, even neglecting these considerations, we have to remember that language has been itself the product of an immensely long course of evolution; so that even if it were reasonable to expect that a child should speak by instinct without instruction, it would be necessary further to expect that the child should begin by speaking in some score or two of unknown tongues before it arrived at the one which alone its parents could under- stand. Probably these considerations are enough to show how absurd is the suggestion that Darwinians ought to expect children to speak by instinct. But, now, although it is for these reasons preposterous under any theory of evolution to expect that children should be able to use a fully developed language without instruction, it is by no means so preposterous to expect that, if all languages present any one simple set of features in common, these features might by this time have grown to be instinctive ; for these simple features, being common to all languages, must have been constantly and forcibly impressed upon the structure of human psychology throughout an innumerable number of sequent generations. Now, there is only one set of features common to all languages ; and this comprises the combinations of vowel and consonantal sounds, which go to constitute what we know as articulate syllables. And, is it not the case that these particular features, thus common to all languages, as a matter of fact actually are instinctive ? Long before a young child is able to under- stand the meanings of any words, it begins to babble articulate 336 Darwin^ and after Darwin, syllables ; and I do not know that a more striking fact can be adduced at the present stage of the Weismann controversy than is this fact which he has thus himself unconsciously suggested, namely, that the young of the only talking animal should be alone in presenting— and in unmistakably pre- senting—the instinct of articulation. Well, such being the state of matters as regards this particular case, in the course of a debate which was held at the Newcastle meeting of the British Association upon the heredity question, 1 presented this case as I present it now. And subsequently I was met, as I expected to be met, by its being said that after all the faculty of making articulate sounds might have been of con- genital origin. Seeing of how much importance this faculty must always have been to the human species, it may very well have been a faculty which early fell under the sway of natural selection, and so it may have become congenital. Now, be it remembered, 1 am only adducing this case in illustration of the elusiveness of Weismann's theory. First of all he selects the faculty of articulate speech to argue that it is a faculty which ought to be instinctive if acquired char- acters ever do become instinctive ; and so good does he deem it as a test case between the two theories, that he says Jrom it alone we should be prepared to accept the doctrine that acquired characters can never become congenital. Then, when it is shown that the only element in articulate speech which possibly could have become congenital, actually has become congenital, the answer we receive is a direct contradiction of the previous argument : the faculty originally selected as representative of an acquired character is now taken as repre- sentative of a congenital one. By thus playing fast and loose Hfith whatever facts the followers of Darwin may adduce, the followers of Weismann bring their own position simply to this : — All characters which can be shown to be inherited we assume 10 be congenital, or as we term it, " blastogenetic," while all characters which can be shown not to be inherited, we assume to be acquired, or as we term it, " somatogenetic " — and this merely on the ground that they have been shown to be inherited or not inherited as the case may be. Now, there need be no objection to such assumptions, provided Note B, 337 they are recognized as assumptions ; but so long as the very question in debate has reference to their validity as assumptions, it is closely illogical to adduce them as arguments. And this is the only point with which we are at present concerned. Note B to Page 89. In answer to this illustration as previously adduced by me, Mr. Poulton has objected that the benefit arising from the peculiar mode of stinging in question is a benefit conferred, not on the insect which stings, but upon its progeny. The point of the illustration however has no reference to the maternal instinct (which here, as elsewhere, I doubt not is due to natural selection) ; it has reference only to the particular instinct of selective stinging, which here ministers to the pur- poses of the other and more general instinct of rearing progeny. Given then the maternal instinct of stinging prey for the use of progeny, the question is— What first determined the ancestors of the Sphex to sting their prey only in nine particular points ? Darwin's answer to this question is as follows : — " I have been thinking about Pompilius and its allies. Please take the trouble to read on perforation of the corolla by Bees, p. 425 of my * Cross-fertilization,' to end of chapter. Bees show so much intelligence in their acts, that it seems not improbable to me that the progenitors of Pompilius originally stung caterpillars and spiders, &c.* in any part of their bodies, and then observed by their intelligence that if they stung them in one particular place, as between certain segments on the lower side, their prey was at once paralyzed. It does not seem to me at all incredible that this action should then become instinctive, i. e. memory transmitted from one generation to another. It does not seem necessary to suppose that when Pompilius stung its prey in the ganglion it intended or knew that their prey would keep long alive. The development of the larvae may have been subsequently modified in relation to their half-dead, instead of wholly dead prey ; supposing that the prey was at first quite killed, which would have required much stinging. Turn this over in your mind," &c. 11. Z • 338 Darwin, and after Darwin, Weismann, on the other hand, can only suppose that this intensely specialized instinct had its origin in fortuitous varia- tions in the psychology of the species. But, neglecting the consideration that, in order to become fixed as an instinct by natural selection, the particular variation required must have occurred in many difterent individuals, not only in the first, but also in the sequent generations, the chances against its occurring only once, or in but one single individual case, are many thousands if not millions to one. INDEX Acceleration and retardation, i6. Acquired characters, heredity of, 39' '03,133. ^ ^ Adaptation, 7, 13, 55, 62, 67, 71, I59> 165; of species and of specific characters, 166. Allen, Mr., reterred to, 209. All-sufficiency of Natural Selection^ referred to, 65, 95. Alone with the Hairy Ainu, re- ferred to, 26. American and European trees compared, 201. American Journal of Science^ re- ferred to, 273. American Naturalist, referred to, 35. 58. . ^ Ammonites, species of, 254. Animal Intelligence, referred to, 93. Animal Life, referred to, loi. Animal Life and Intelligence, re- ferred to, 33, 36. Apparent Paradox in Mental Evolution^ referred to, 90. Appendages of Normandy and Irish pigs, 188. Articulation and inheritance, 335. Artistic faculties of man, 27. Babington, Prof., referred to, 252. Bachman, Dr., referred to, 186. Bailey, Prof, referred to, 127. Baker, Mr., referred lo, 252. Balancing of brainless frog, 78. Ball, Mr. Piatt, referred to, 3. 96 ; quoted, 50. Bateson, Mr. \V., referred to, 36. Beddard, Mr. F., referred to, 174. Bentham, Mr., referred to, 253. Uiids, diagnostic characters of, 176; of Australia, effect of cli- mate on, 310 ; influence of food on, 218. Blastogenetic, 123, 242, 245, 250. Blending of adaptations, 67. Brain, referred to, 80. Broca, Prof., referred to, 64, 67, 174, 318. Bronn, Prof., referred to, 174. Brooks, Prof., referred to, 14. BROWN-SiQUARD,relerredto, 104, 122, 142; quoted, 104. Buckley, Mr., referred to, 147. BUCKMAN, Prof. James, referred to, 125. BucKMAN, Prof. S. S., referred to, 24. Butler, Mr. A. G., referred to, 2 54- BiT'iLER, Mr. Samuel, referred to, >^7- Butt rfly, seasonal changes of, 210; influence of food on, 217. C. Carnivora, instincts of, 89. Carriere, M. L. a., referred to, 133. % 340 Index. Cave animals, colour-changes in, 211. Cave Fauna of North America, quoted, 211. Cessation of Selection, 99, 199, 212, 292. Characters, adaptive and specific, 1 59, 307 ; specific, due to Natural Selection, 171. Charadriidae, Geograph ical Distri- bution of the Family^ quoted, 173. Chimpanzee, counting of, 31. Climate, influence of, on plants, 300 ; on animals, 209. Co-adaptation, 64. Cjckerell, Prof., referred to, 218. Colour, 269. Colour-changes in butterflies, 210. in cave animals, 211. Colours of Animals, referred to. Congenital, as opposed to acquired characters, 134. Constancy of characters not neces- sarily due to Natural Selection, 186. Conteviporary Review, referred to, 60, 65, 95. Continuity of germ-plasm, 44, 61, 135; absolute and relative, 134, 155- Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, referred to, 2 ; quoted, 180. Cope, Prof, referred to, 14, 15, 20, 63, 256 ; quoted, 16. Correlation, 171, 184, 211, 222, 268. Costa, M., quoted, 217. Cunningham, Mr. J. T., quoted, 103; referred to, 95, 122. D. Dall, Prof, referred to, 14. Darwin, Charles, referred to, 1-13, 20-22, 25, 44, 45, 51-53, 56, 66, 67, 74, 87, 88, 93, 95, 96-100, 149, 159, 160, 167, 173, 174, 181-183, 187-191, 193. 195, 198, 200-203, ai3-ai6, 218, 219, 226, 256, 261-265, 268, 271, 277, 283, 287, 291, 305-307» 3 '3-33 2, 337; quoted, ii> 53> 66, 96, 181, 182, 186- 191, 193, 195, 201, 202, 213- 215, 261, 262, 265, 313-316, 319-322, 324-326, 328-331, 337- Darwin et ses Pricurseurs Fran- fuis, referred to, 234. Danvinian Theory of the Origin of Species, quoted, 254. Daiwinisni, quoted, 22, 27, 67, i8r, 182, 186, 189-191, 221, 222, 235, 236, 252, 253, 269, 270* 273, 313, 316; referred to, 7, 12, 15, 20, 70, De Candolle, Prof, referred to, 206. Deep-sea faunas, 212. Delbceuf, referred to, 224. Descent of Man, quoted, 25, 322- •324, 331. Development of the Hard Parts oj the Mammalia, referred to, 14. De Vries, Prof., referred to, 122, 174. Diai;nostic charactersof birds, 1 76 ; Marsupials, 178. Divergent Evolution through Cumulative Segregation, c^oXt^, 224. Dixon, Mr. Charles, referred to, 174; quoted, 177, 22.:;. Doctrijte of Descent and Darwin- ism, quoted, 2'^o. Dogs, scratching, reflex of, 80; shaking off water, 84 ; trans- plantation of ovaries, 143. DORFMEISTER, Dr., referred to, 211. Ducks, use-inheritance in, 96; losing true plumage, 187. DUPUY, Dr., referred to, 105. Dyer, Mr. Thistleton, quoted. 325,337. E. Effect of External Influences upon Development, referred to, 66,95. Index, 341 Effects of Use and Disuse, quoted, 50. EiMER, Prof., referred to, 14, 174, 217. Entomological Society, Trans, of, quoted, 211 ; referred to, 217. Epilepsy of guinea-pigs, 104, Essays on Heredity, quoted, 56, 91, 97, 107, 152; referred to, 12, 36,65, 105, no. Eudes-Deslongchamps, M., re- ferred to, 188. European and American trees, compared, 201. Everest, Rev. E., quoted, 213. Evolution without Natural Selec- tion, quoted, 127- Examination of Weismannism, referred to, 39-42, 44, 100, 122, 123, 134, 136, 138-140, 156. Experiments in Pangenesis, re- ferred to, 145. Fabre, M., referred to, 88. Factors of organic evolution : Natural Selection, 2, 5, 6 ; use- inheritance, 3, II. Factors of Organic Evolution, re- ferred to, 8. Faculties and organs, 39. Fertility, 229. Flat-fish, Mr. Cunningham on, 103. Floral Structures, referred to, 19. FOCKE, Dr., referred to, 174. Fonctions du Cerveau, referred to, 109, Food, influence of, 317. Foot, of man, 23. Frog, brainless, balancing of, 78. G. Galton, Mr. Francis, referred to, 40-48, 100, 103, 134-139, I45> 146,152,154,156,300,303-305; quoted, 46, 100. Gangrene, effects of, 54, 105. Gardener's Chronicle, quoted, 127. Gartner, Dr., referred to, 206. Geddes, Prof., referred to, 15, 30, 174- Gemmnles, 47,145, i55- Genera and species, 261. Germ-plasm and Stirp, 40; and pangenesis, 42 ; isolation of, 137; stability of, 243. Germ-plasm, referred to, 128. GlARD, Prof., referred to, 14, 174. Giraffe, co-adaptation in, 64. GoLTZ, Prot, referred to, 80, 84. Gould, Mr., referred to, 210. Graft-hybridization, 143. Growth, laws of, 333, 326, 248, 270, 321. Guinea-pigs, epilepsy of, 104. GULICK, Mr. , referred to, 1 74, 259, 260, 271 ; quoted, 224, 273. Gute und schlechte Arten, quoted, 203. H. Habit, henditary, 87. Habit and Intelligence, quoted, 335. Hand, of man, 24. Handbook of British Flora, referred to, 252. Haycraft, Prof., referred to, 80. Heapk, Mr. Walter, referred to,i47. Henslow, Prof George, referred to, 18-20, 127-132, 174, 208; quoted, 19, 130, 131. Heredity, problems of, 39. Hering, Prof., referred to, 87. Hewitt, Mr., referred to, 187. Hill, Prof. Leonard, quoted, 132. Haeckel, Prof., referred to, 174, 260, 282. Hoffmann, Dr., referred to, 123, 280. Horse, callosities of, 265. Huxley, Prof. T. H., referred to, 167-170, 185, 256, 275, 283, 307-312; quoted, 307-309. Huxleyan doctrine of species, 167. Hyatt, Prof., referred to, 14, 15. Hymenoptera, social, 93. Inadequacy of Natural Selection, refeired to, 65, 95. Inconsistencies of Utilitarianism as the Exclusive Theory of Organic Evolution, quoted, 373. 342 Index. Indifferent characters, 171, 185, 208, 247. Insects, instincts of, gr. Instability of useless characters, 186. Instinct and hereditary habit, 87; of Sphex, 88 ; of carnivora, 89 ; of man, 89; Prof. Weismann's views on, 90 ; of insects, 91. Intercrossing, 67-71. Isolation, 223 tf/jtf^. J. Jordan, Dr., referred to, 206,252. K. Karyokinesis, 140. Kerner, Prof., referred to, 174, 202-206, 231, 239, 260, 282; quoted, 203. Koch, Dr., referred to, 217. KoLLlKER, Prof., referred to, 174. Lamarck, referred to, 9-15. Lamarckism, g, 61, 113. Landor, a. H. Savage, referred to, 26. Language and Weismannism, 334. Lankester, Prof. Ray, quoted, 245, 299 ; referred to, 305. Lesage, M., referred to, 126. Life and Letters of Charles Darwin J quoted, 319, 320 ; referred to, 11. Luciani, referred to, 109. M. Making of Flowers, referred to, 19. Manual of British Botany, re- ferred to, 252. Manual of Dental Anatomy, figure from, 267. Marsupials, diagnostic characters of, ip. Materials for the Study of Varia- tion, referred to, 36. Meehan, Mr., referred to, 201. Meldola, Prof., referred to, 68. Mental Evolution in Animals, re- ferred to, 25, 88, 89, 9a. On Truth, referred to, 317. Orang-utan, teeth of, 267. Mental Evolution in Man, referred to, 31. Merrifield, Mr., referred to, 211. Mije, mutilation of tails of, '48. MlVART, Prof. St. George, referred to, 4, 174, 217. Monstrosity, in turkeys, 181 ; in cattle, 196. Morgan, Prof. Lloyd, referred to, 33, 36, I74» 271, 300 305; quoted, 300, 303. Moseley, Prof., referred to, 26. Murphy, Mr. J. J., referred to, 224. Mutilations, inheritance of, 53, 148. N. Nageli, Prof., referred to, 174, 206, 318. Naked skin of man, 25. Nathusius, referred to, 188. Natural Selection, range of, 3, 5, 51, 62, 92 ; a theory of species, 1 6 1 , 1 69 ; and cave animals, 211; and Porto Santo rabbits, 21 a Natural Selection and Tropical Nature, quoted, 23. Natural Science, quoted, 104. Wa/Mr^, quoted, 132, 223, 24=,, 99, 325 ; referred to, 68, 98, 218. Neci-Darwinian school, 10, 61. Neo-Lamarckian school,i3, 62, 63. Ntuer Beitrag zum geologischen Beweis der Darwin schen Theorie, quoted, 2.A4. Neuter Lnsects and Darwinism, referred to, 95. Neuter Insects a}td Lamarckism, referred to, 95. Neuters of hymenopterous insects, 92. Newman, Cardinal, referred to, 20. Niata cattle, 191. O. Obersteiner, Dr., referred to, 105, 106. Oesierreichischemedicinischejahr- biicher, referred to, 105. Index. 343 Organic Evolution^ referred to, 217. Origin of the Fittest, quoted, 16; referred to, 14. Origine des Plantes Domestiques, dimontrie par la culture du Kadis sauvagCy referred to,. 123. Origin of Sex, referred to, 17. Origin of Species, Q^oXxA, 3, 4, 181, 1S2, 186, 188,190,261,262, 265, 321,322,325,326,329; referred to, 67, 159, 227, 286. OsBOftN, Prof., referred to, 14, 58, 63. Owen, Sir Richard, referred to, 191. Oxen, skulls of, compared, 193. Oysters, change of, 317. P. Packard, Prof., referred to, 14, 213. Pangenesis, ii, 42. Panmixia, 97, 212, 391. Parsimony, law of, 51. Parsnips, variation of, 125. Pasco E, Mr., referred to, 174; quoted. 254. Perkier, Prof., referred to, 14, 93 9.'5- Peter, Dr., referred to, 206. Pfeffer, Herr, referred to, 15. Ffliigers Archiv, referred to, 80. Philosophical Transactions, re- ferred to, 103. Physiological Selection, referred to, 187, 307, 313, 324; quoted, 188, 308. PiCKARD Cambridge, Rev. O., quoted, 221. Pig, old Irish, 188. Plants, influence of climate on, 122-207. Porto Santo rabbits, 314. PouLTON, E. B., referred to, 36, 217- 337- Presidential Address to the Bristol Naturalists Society y\2>gi^<{\iiOteAf 300, 303- I Proceedings of the Royal Society, referred to, 145, 147; quoted, 307. Protective resemblance, 73. Protrusion of eyeball, in epileptic guinea-pigs, iii. QuATREFAGES, M., referred to, 234- R. Rabbits, and use-inheritance, 96; transplantation of ovaries, 143 ; Porto Santo, 214. Radish, variation of, 123. Rats, scratching, reflex of, 81. Maupen und Schmetterlinge der Wetterau, referred to, 217. Reflex action and use-inheritance, 64-87. Rejoinder to Prof Weismann^ re- ferred to, 95. Reversal of selection, loi, 292. Fevue Gdnirale de Botanie, referred to, 126. Richardson, referred to, 188. Roux, Prof, referred to, 298. Rudiments, 294. Ryder, Prof., referred to, 14. S. Sachs, Prof., referred to, 15, 174. "Sally," counting of, 31. Sauermann, Dr., referred to, 218. SCHAFER, Prof., referred to, 145. Schmetterlinge des Siidivestlichen Deutschlands, referred to, 217, Schmidt, Dr. Oscar, quoted, 260. Schools of Evolutionists, i3-Jo. Scott, Prof., referred to, 63. Scratching, reflex, in dogs, 80 ; in rats, 81. Seasonal changes of butterflies, 210. Seebohm, Mr. Henry, quoted, 173 ; referred to, 174. Selection, cessation of, 99, 393; reversal of, loi, 292. • sexual, 219 ^/ seq. Selective value, 73. Self-adaptation, 18. Semper, Prof. Karl, referred to» lOI. Sexual selection, %\^et seq. 344 Index, Sole, pigment of, 104, Somatogcnetic and somatoplasm, 133,137,155,343-249- Some Laws of Heredity y referred to, 34. Species, stress laid on origin of, 159; necessarily due to natural selection, 168. definitions of, 229. Si-RNCER, Herbert, referred to, 8, 64-68, 95. Sphex, instincts of, 88, 337. Stebbing, Rev. T. R., quoted, 35. Sterility, 8. Stirp'and germ-plasm, 40, 47, 138. Struggle for Existence between the parts of an Organism^ referred to, 299. T. 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