

Univ. Corr. Coll. Tutorial Series.

CICERO

DE AMICITIA.

TEXT, NOTES, VOCABULARIES,
AND TRANSLATION.



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


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WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, &c.

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CICERO

DE AMICITIA.

WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, &c.

[by G. Moses and G. F. H. Sykes]

(BY THE EDITORS OF "CICERO PRO BALBO.")



LONDON: W. B. CLIVE & CO.,
UNIV. CORR. COLL. PRESS WAREHOUSE,
BOOKSELLERS ROW, STRAND, W.C.


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HOW TO USE THIS BOOK.



Part I. consists of (*a*) Introduction, (*b*) Text, (*c*) Notes. Part II. contains (*a*) Vocabularies, and (*b*) Test Papers. Part III. contains a Translation.

Before commencing the TEXT read the INTRODUCTION, in order to obtain a general idea of the subject-matter, referring to it subsequently as occasion requires. In a final reading, immediately before the examination, all important points should be carefully committed to memory.

In reading the TEXT the chief object should be to *arrive at the meaning with as little help as possible*, while nevertheless ensuring perfect accuracy. There will probably occur, even in the first sentence, (*a*) some words which you do not know, and (*b*) some difficulty in seeing the exact construction. For the first, turn to the VOCABULARIES; for the second, to the NOTES. If there occur any words which you do not know and which do not appear in the Vocabulary, write them neatly down, with their meaning, in a double column upon the blank pages left for the purpose, adding genitive cases or principal parts, &c., exactly as has been done in the case of the printed words.

After doing your utmost to make out the passage in this way, turn to the TRANSLATION and see how far you were right. The Translation is not intended to save the reader the trouble of making out the meaning, but to serve as a test of his accuracy and to correct his errors. Beginners may find such a method as this somewhat slow

at first, but speed will soon be attained, while the memory will be strengthened in a degree otherwise unattainable.

Variant readings are not noticed in the NOTES, excepting when they differ from the University Correspondence College Text sufficiently to perplex the student if adopted by the examiners. When given, it is as well to write the variant reading in the margin of the text and to grasp the meaning and syntax of either reading in the same degree.

Make a point of looking up all references to the text which occur in the Notes, marking them, for the sake of future reference, with the number of the note in which they are mentioned.

The *subject-matter*, excepting in so far as it is explained in the Introduction, may as a rule be neglected on first reading the book; more thorough attention can thus be given to the *language*.

When reading the book for the first time, work through the *first* series of TEST PAPERS, leaving the *second* series for the second and subsequent perusals.

On reading the text through for the last time previous to the Examination, mark in Text, Notes, and Vocabularies such points as will require still a final revision.

PART 1.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. **Marcus Tullius Cicero**, the greatest of Roman orators, was born at Arpinum in 106 B.C. His family was of equestrian rank, but had never held any office in Rome. Cicero was accordingly a *novus homo*, and his struggle to obtain the praetorship and consulship was on that account made harder. He was sent while still a young lad to Rome and there studied under the best masters, such as Archias. In B.C. 91 he assumed the *toga virilis*, and then attended the lectures of orators and lawyers. He was entrusted by his father to the special care of Mucius Scaevola the Augur, from whose side he hardly ever departed. At that time one of the easiest methods of obtaining fame and success was by means of oratory, and as Cicero had a natural talent for this art, he cultivated it in preference to devoting himself to a military life. However, he served, as was usual with young Romans who aspired to public office, one campaign, and this happened to be in the Social War (89 B.C.) under Cn. Pompeius Strabo (the father of Pompey the Great). For the next six years he took no part in public affairs, but devoted his time to the study of rhetoric and the various schools of philosophy; from Phaedrus he learned the Epicurean system, from Philo that of the New Academy, and from Diodotus that of the Stoics.

The first of his extant speeches is that *Pro P. Quinctio*, which was delivered in 81 B.C. Two years later, in a criminal trial, he defended Sextus Roscius Amerinus, whose

accuser was Chrysogonus, the powerful freedman of Sulla. It was very bold in Cicero to undertake this defence, but his boldness was equalled by his eloquence, and his success on this occasion placed him at once amongst the best orators of the day. Ill-health obliged him to retire to Athens, where he continued his study of rhetoric and philosophy for two years, returned to Rome in 77 B.C., and was elected quaestor in 76 B.C. He served this office in Sicily, and acquired golden opinions from the natives through his integrity, impartiality, and self-denial. In 74 B.C. he returned to Rome and again devoted himself to his profession as an advocate. In 70 B.C. he undertook the impeachment of Verres, who was charged by the Sicilians with having been guilty of misgovernment, oppression, and extortion during his quaestorship in Sicily from 73-71 B.C. Hortensius, the consul-elect for the following year, was Verres's advocate, and on behalf of his client was anxious that the trial should be delayed until the next year, when the presiding praetor would be more favourably disposed to the defendant. Cicero frustrated this attempt by getting his evidence ready in half the time allowed, and by opening his case very briefly and proceeding at once to the examination of his witnesses. The *In Verrem* as we possess it was not the speech he actually delivered, but a speech which he published after the trial as representing what he would have said had the case run the usual course. The result of Cicero's onslaught was that Verres departed at once into exile without even attempting a defence.

In 69 B.C. Cicero was aedile, in 66 B.C. praetor, and in 63 B.C. consul. During his consulship he had to deal with the famous conspiracy of Catiline. In his efforts to crush it Cicero imprisoned some of the participators in the plot, and ordered them to be put to death without being tried before the people. For his services on this occasion he received the thanks of the whole people, and was dignified by the name of *pater patriae*. But his enemy Clodius, by calling public attention to the illegal execution of the conspirators, brought about the orator's banishment in 58 B.C. Cicero's friends actively exerted themselves to procure his return, and succeeded in their efforts in 57 B.C. In 53 B.C.

he was admitted into the College of Augurs, and in the following year acted as proconsul and commanded the province of Cilicia, where he conducted some successful military operations.

It has been stated above that Cicero was a *novus homo*, and as such would naturally belong to the democratic party. From the date of his consulship, however, he seems to have attached himself to the *optimates*, or aristocratic party, and accordingly at the outbreak of the civil war in 49 B.C., after some hesitation, he joined Pompey, but subsequently, after the battle of Pharsalia in 48 B.C., he was reconciled to Caesar. After the death of Caesar, 44 B.C., an open rupture ensued between him and Antony, and Cicero gave vent to his anger and indignation in the famous 'Philippic Orations,' fourteen speeches, the finest and most renowned of which is the second. From the beginning of 43 B.C. until the end of April Cicero was in the height of his glory, but before the end of that year, in the proscription that followed upon the formation of the triumvirate, Cicero's name was, on the suggestion of Antony which was not opposed by Octavianus, put in the list of those doomed to immediate destruction. Soldiers were immediately sent in pursuit, and although his attendants wished to offer opposition, Cicero forbade them, and surrendered to his pursuers, by whom he was immediately killed.

In the foregoing sketch no mention has been made of Cicero's philosophical works, which were both numerous and important. His activity in this direction begins from his exile in 57 B.C.; in 55 B.C. he produced the *De Oratore*, in 54 B.C. the *De Re Publica*, and in 52 B.C. the *De Legibus*. This period of activity was followed by five years (51 to 46 B.C.) of comparative rest, but in 46 B.C. he wrote the *Hortensius* or *De Philosophia*, a treatise now lost, in addition to the *Partitiones Oratoriae*, the *Brutus* or *De Claris Oratoribus*, and the *Orator*. During the years 45 and 44 B.C. he wrote the *De Consolatione*, on the occasion of the death of his daughter Tullia; the *Academica*, an account of the new Academic Philosophy, which maintained that there was no such thing as certainty—we must be content with probability; the *Disputationes Tusculanae*,

treating of happiness and morality; the *De Natura Deorum*, the *De Divinatione* (on the subject whether gods communicate with men by means of augury, &c.), the *De Senectute*, the **De Amicitia**, the *De Fato* (an account of Fate and Freewill), the *Paradoxa* (an account of certain paradoxical opinions of the Stoics), the *De Officiis*, a treatise on duty, and the *De Finibus*, on the Highest Good.

So far we have dealt with Cicero's speeches and philosophical works. In addition to these must be mentioned (1) his Letters, of which he wrote a vast number, and of which more than 800 are preserved; (2) his poetical works, which were very poor in quality though not small in quantity—his chief poem was written on the subject of his consulship; and (3) his historical and miscellaneous works, *e.g.* a prose account of his consulship, an account of his policy immediately previous to his consulship, &c.

§ 2. The **De Amicitia** is a discussion in the form of a conversation on the subject of Friendship. There are three persons who take part in this discussion—C. Laelius and his two sons-in-law, C. Fannius and Q. Mucius Scaevola. Cicero, as described above, was constantly in the society of Scaevola, and from him obtains an account of this conversation. The chief interlocutor, C. LAELIUS, is appropriately chosen on account of his long and celebrated intimacy with the younger Scipio, and the scene is artistically laid in the year 129 B.C., just after Scipio's sensational death. C. Laelius was born about 180 B.C. and greatly distinguished himself as a statesman, soldier, and orator, though he was more of a statesman than a soldier, and more of an orator than a statesman. He was a useful and successful officer of Scipio's in the Third Punic War, was praetor in 145 B.C., when he conducted the military operations in Spain against the powerful Viriathus with energy and success, and was consul in 140 B.C., after having been rejected in 141 B.C. in spite of the support of Scipio. He was a leader of a large literary circle which included the poet Terence; in fact, he is said to have written many parts of Terence's plays.

§ 3. The persons of the dialogue.—C. Fannius, born about 160 B.C., married the daughter of Laelius. He

served under Scipio in Africa and Spain; he and Tib. Gracchus were the first two men to mount the walls of Carthage when it was captured, 146 B.C. He was a person of great literary attainments, and among other things wrote a history of his own times. His character appears to have been somewhat stern.

(2) *Mucius Scaevola*, another son-in-law of Laelius, was born about 157 B.C., and was Praetor of Asia in 121 B.C. On his return to Rome he was prosecuted for extortion in his province, but was acquitted. He lived to a great age—was certainly alive after 88 B.C. His family had produced a series of great lawyers, among whom he himself was not the least renowned. When Cicero assumed the *toga virilis* his father took him to Scaevola, from whose side the future orator never willingly departed. This Scaevola is generally spoken of as the Augur, to distinguish him from his namesake, the Pontifex, as to whom see Appendix.

§ 4. **Sources of the Treatise.**—There is probably very little original thought in the *De Amicitia*. Cicero has for the most part merely put into the mouths of Roman speakers ideas which he has adapted from Greek writers. In the treatise *Peri Philias* (περὶ φιλίας) of Theophrastus, in the *Lysis* and also in the *Theaetetus* of Plato, in Bk. viii. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, in the *Memorabilia of Socrates* by Xenophon, and in some fragments of a philosopher named Chrysippus (fl. third century B.C.), many similarities of thought and expression can be found, and there can be but little doubt that Cicero was acquainted with all these books, and, with them as a foundation, built up the edifice of his arguments in the *De Amicitia*. In Cicero's time a Roman writer was ashamed to show too close an acquaintance with Greek literature, and this, perhaps, is the reason why he does not mention his authorities as much as we should otherwise expect.

§ 5. **Brief Analysis of the Argument.**—The treatise may well be divided into the portions marked out by Cicero through the interposition of remarks by Scaevola and Fannius, *i.e.* into portions (a) Chap. I., (b) Chaps. II.—

IV., (c) Chaps. V.-VII., (d) Chaps. VIII., IX., (e) Chaps. X.-XXVII., and these can be further subdivided.

(a) Chap. I.—Introductory. The recent estrangement between the two friends Sulpicius and Pompey brings to the recollection of Scaevola a famous conversation about friendship by Laelius at which he and C. Fannius had been present. Cicero heard this conversation from Scaevola, and now reproduces it in Laelius's own words, and dedicates the treatise to Atticus.

(b) Chaps. II.-IV.—Fannius and Scaevola ask Laelius, who has won the title of Wise, how he bears the loss of his friend Scipio. Laelius replies, "I am grieved personally, but am consoled by the knowledge that death was no misfortune to my friend. My friendship with him is still my greatest pride and happiness." Fannius and Scaevola thereupon ask him to tell them the meaning, nature, and rules of friendship.

(c) Chaps. V.-VII.—Laelius: For full information you had better apply to the professors of philosophy; all I can say is that friendship is the choicest gift attainable, can exist only among the good, is a combination of kindness, affection, and agreement, cannot exist without virtue, and has many advantages;—some of which he enumerates. Fannius and Scaevola urge him to continue and describe—

(d) Chaps. VIII., IX.—The origin of friendship. Friendship does not arise from a sense of weakness or deficiency, or from a hope of receiving favour, but from Nature herself, who has planted in us an innate love for our children and also for virtue. The object of friendship is love and not reward, but reward and profit are incidental to friendship as a result.

(e) 1. Chap. X.—The causes of the breach of friendship.

2. Chaps. XI.-XIII.—The limits of affection in friendship. Historical examples given.

3. Chaps. XIV., XV.—Further consideration of the origin of friendship (supplemental to Chaps. VIII.

and IX.). Good men naturally love good men. The most self-sufficient are the most eager for friendship. Power and wealth are often an obstacle to friendship.

4. Chaps. XVI., XVII.—The limits of friendship. Discussion of four well-known opinions. The true limits are (1) Use care in selecting a friend. (2) For a friend's life or liberty a very slight deviation from virtue is allowable.
5. Chaps. XVIII., XX.—Nine attributes of friendship enumerated. We may not decide on friendship until we are of mature mind and age. Chap. XIX. starts the question whether new friends are to be preferred to old.
6. Chaps. XXI., XXII.—Supplements to Chap. X. on the causes of the breach of friendship, viz. (1) the faults of our friends; (2) change of our own character, tastes, or political opinions; (3) beginning to love too early; (4) loving the unworthy; (5) excessive and unjustifiable requests by a friend. Chaps. XI.—XX. deal with the friendships of the wise, and Chaps. XXI.—XXVI. deal with ordinary friendships.
7. Chaps. XXIII.—XXVI.—Indifference in the making of friendship is culpable in the extreme; advice and reproof must be accepted with good humour. Truth must be cultivated and flattery avoided.
8. Chap. XXVII.—Summary and conclusion.

The text adopted in this edition is Teubner's. We beg to acknowledge our deep indebtedness to the careful edition of Mr. E. S. Shuckburgh, and our still deeper indebtedness to the excellent and scholarly work of Dr. Reid. If the student has plenty of time at his disposal we recommend him to read Dr. Reid's edition in addition to, or even in place of, ours.



M. TULLI CICERONIS
DE AMICITIA LIBER

AD T. POMPONIUM ATTICUM.



I. § 1. Q. Mucius augur multa narrare de C. Laelio socero suo memoriter et iucunde solebat nec dubitare illum in omni sermone appellare sapientem; ego autem a patre ita eram deductus ad Scaevolam sumpta virili toga, ut quoad possem et liceret, a senis latere numquam discederem; itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commode dicta memoriae mandabam ferique studebam eius prudentia doctior. Quo mortuo me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli, quem unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere. Sed de hoc alias; nunc redeo ad augurem.

2. Cum saepe multa, tum memini domi in hemicyclio sedentem, ut solebat, cum et ego essem una et pauci admodum familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere, qui tum forte multis erat in ore. Meministi enim profecto, Attice, et eo magis, quod P. Sulpicio utebare multum, cum is tribunus pl. capitali odio a Q. Pompeio, qui tum erat consul, dissideret, quocum coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat, quanta esset hominum vel admiratio vel querella. 3. Itaque tum Scaevola cum in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, exposuit nobis sermonem Laeli de amicitia habitum ab illo secum et cum altero genero, C. Fannio Marci filio, paucis diebus post mortem Africani. Eius disputationis sententias memoriae mandavi, quas hoc libro exposui arbitrato meo; quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne 'inquam' et 'inquit' saepius interponeretur, atque ut tanquam a praesentibus coram haberi videretur.

4. Cum enim saepe mecum ageres, ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi res cum omnium cognitione, tum nostra familiaritate visa est. Itaque feci non invitus, ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. Sed ut in Catone Maiore, qui est scriptus

ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur aptior persona, quae de illa aetate loqueretur, quam eius, qui et diutissime senex fuisset et in ipsa senectute praeter ceteros floruisset, sic, cum accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laeli et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Laeli persona visa est, quae de amicitia ea ipsa dissereret, quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaevola. Genus autem hoc sermonum positum in hominum veterum auctoritate, et eorum inlustrium, plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis; itaque ipse mea legens sic adficior interdum, ut Catonem non me loqui existimem. 5. Sed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimum scripsi de amicitia. Tum est Cato locutus, quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior; nunc Laelius et sapiens (sic enim est habitus) et amicitiae gloria excellens de amicitia loquitur. Tu velim a me animum parumper avertas, Laelium loqui ipsum putes. C. Fannius et Q. Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani; ab his sermo oritur, respondet Laelius, cuius tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens te ipse cognoscas.

II. 6. FANNIUS. Sunt ista, Laeli; nec enim melior vir fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior. Sed existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse coniectos unum; te sapientem et appellant et existimant. Tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni, scimus L. Acilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse sapientem, sed uterque alio quodam modo, Acilius, quia prudens esse in iure civili putabatur, Cato, quia multarum rerum usum habebat; multa eius et in senatu et in foro vel provisae prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur; propterea quasi cognomen iam habebat in senectute sapientis. Te autem alio quodam modo non solum natura et moribus, verum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem, nec sicut vulgus, sed ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem, qualem in reliqua Graecia neminem [7] (nam qui septem appellantur, eos, qui ista subtilius quaerunt, in numero sapientium non habent), Athenis unum accepimus, et eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum iudicatum; hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant, ut omnia tua in te posita esse dicas humanosque casus virtute inferiores putes. Itaque ex me quaerunt, credo ex hoc item Scaevola, quoniam pacto mortem Africani feras, eoque magis, quod proximis Nonis cum in hortos D. Bruti auguris commentandi causa, ut adsolet, venissemus, tu non adfuisti, qui diligentissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.

8. SCAEVOLA. Quaerunt quidem, C. Laeli, multi, ut est a Fannio dictum, sed ego id respondeo, quod animum adverti, te dolorem,

quem acceperis cum summi viri, tum amicissimi morte, ferre moderate nec potuisse non commoveri nec fuisse id humanitatis tuae; quod autem Nonis in conlegio nostro non adfuisses, validudinem respondeo causam, non maestitiam fuisse.

LAELIUS. Recte tu quidem, Scaevola, et vere; nec enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi, cum valerem, abduci incommodo meo debui, nec ullo casu arbitrator hoc constanti homini posse contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat officii. ✓ 9. Tu autem, Fanni, quod mihi tantum tribui dicis, quantum ego nec adgnosco nec postulo, facis amice; sed, ut mihi videris, non recte iudicas de Catone; aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut, si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. Quo modo, ut alia omittam, mortem filii tulit? memineram Paulum, videram Galum, sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro. 10. Quam ob rem cavae Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque loquar, sic habetote:—

III. Ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem, quam id recte faciam, viderint sapientes; sed certe mentiar. Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitrator, nemo unquam erit, ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit: sed non egeo medicina, me ipse consolor, et maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo, quo amicorum decessu plerique angii solent. Nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto, mihi accidit, si quid accidit; suis autem incommodis graviter angii non amicum, sed se ipsum amantis est. 11. Cum illo vero quis neget actum esse praeclare? Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, immortalitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est, quod homini fas esset optare? qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit, qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus consul est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero, qui duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia, verum etiam futura bella delevit. Quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, iustitia in omnes? nota sunt vobis. Quam autem civitati carus fuerit, maerore funeris indicatum est. Quid igitur hunc paucorum amorum accessio iuvare potuisset? Senectus enim quemvis non sit gravis, ut memini Catonem anno ante, quam est mortuus, mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen aufert eam viriditatem, in qua etiam nunc erat Scipio. 12. Quam ob rem vita quidem talis fuit vel fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere, moriendi autem sensum celeritas abstulit; quo de genere mortis difficile dictu est, quid homines suspicentur, videtis; hoc vere tamen licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex multis diebus, quos in vita celeberrim-

mos laetissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, quom senatu dimisso domum reductus ad vesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e vita, ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius quam ad inferos pervenisse.

IV. 13. Neque enim adsentior iis, qui haec nuper disserere coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire atque omnia morte deleri; plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum maiorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, vel eorum, qui in hac terra fuerunt magnamque Graeciam, quae nunc quidem deleta est, tum florebat, institutis et praeceptis suis erudierunt, vel eius, qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, †qui non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper, animos hominum esse divinos, iisque, cum ex corpore excessissent, reditum in caelum patere, optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum. 14. Quod idem Scipioni videbatur, qui quidem, quasi praesagiret, perpaucis ante mortem diebus, cum et Philus et Manilius adesset et alii plures, tuque etiam, Scaevola, mecum venisses, triduum disseruit de re publica; cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de immortalitate animorum, quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse dicebat. Id si ita est, ut optimi cuiusque animus in morte facillime evolet tamquam e custodia vinculisque corporis, cui censemur cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? Quocirca maerere hoc eius eventu vereor ne invidi magis quam amici sit. Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali: sensus enim amisso fit idem, quasi natus non esset omnino, quem tamen esse natum et nos gaudemus et haec civitas, dum erit, laetabitur. 15. Quam ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum optime est, mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius, ut prius introieram, sic prius exire de vita. Sed tamen recordatione nostrae amicitiae sic fruor, ut beate vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vixerim, quocum mihi coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata fuit, quocum et domus fuit et militia communis et, id in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum, studiorum, sententiarum summa consensio. Itaque non tam ista me sapientiae, quam modo Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam spero sempiternam fore, idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum; quo in genere sperare videor Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam posteritati fore.

16. FANNIUS. Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse est. Sed

quoniam amicitiae mentionem fecisti et sumus otiosi, pergratum mihi fore, spero item Scaevolae, si, quem ad modum soles de ceteris rebus, quom ex te quaeruntur, sic de amicitia disputari quid sentias, qualem existumes, quae praecepta des.

Scaevola. Mihi vero erit gratum; atque id ipsum cum tecum agere conarer, Famius antevortit. Quam ob rem utrique nostrum gratum admodum feceris.

V. 17. LAELIUS. Ego vero non gravarer, si mihi ipse confiderem; nam et praeclara res est et sumus, ut dixit Famius, otiosi. Sed quis ego sum? aut quae est in me facultas? doctorum est ista consuetudo, eaque Graecorum, ut iis ponatur, de quo disputent quamvis subito; magnum opus est egetque exercitatione non parva. Quam ob rem, quae disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis, qui ista profitentur; ego vos hortari tantum possum, ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas. 18. Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse; neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi, qui haec subtilius disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem parum; negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane; sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus, nos autem ea, quae sunt in usu vitaeque communi, non ea, quae finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus. Numquam ego dicam C. Fabricium, M. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium, quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes. Quare sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et invidiosum et obscurum, concedant, ut viri boni fuerint. Ne id quidem facient, negabunt id nisi sapienti posse concedi. 19. Agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva. Qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides, integritas, aequitas, liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas, libido, audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ii fuerint, modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur, quantum homines possunt, naturam optimam bene vivendi ducem. Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos, ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam, maior autem, ut quisque proxume accederet. Itaque cives potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit; sed ea non satis habet firmitatis. Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benivolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benivolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet. 20. Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et adducta in

angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.

VI. Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benivolentia et caritate consensus; qua quidem haut scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum. Divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii valitudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates. Beluarum hoc quidem extremum, illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam in fortunae temeritate. Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest. 21. Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur virosque bonos eos, qui habentur, numeremus, Paulos, Catones, Galos, Scipiones, Philos; his communis vita contenta est; eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur. 22. Talis igitur inter viros amicitia tantas oportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. Principio qui potest esse vita 'vitalis,' ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benivolentia conquiescit? Quid dulcius quam habere, quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? Qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes, qui illis aequae ac tu ipse gauderet? adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret. Denique ceterae res, quae expetuntur, oportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis, divitiae, ut utare, opes, ut colare, honores, ut laudare, voluptates, ut gaudeas, valitudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis; amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris, praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, nunquam intempestiva, nunquam molesta est; itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia. Neque ego nunc de vulgari aut de mediocri, quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit. Nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.

VII. 23. Quomque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bonam spem praelucet in posterum nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. Verum enim amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et inbecilli valent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt; tantus eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum. Ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. Quodsi exemeris ex rerum natura benivolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri

quidem cultus permanebit. Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque ex discordiis perspicui potest. Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit everti? Ex quo, quantum boni sit in amicitia, iudicari potest. 24. Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent, quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. Itaque, si quando aliquod officium exitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est, quid id non maximis eferat laudibus? Qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitibus et amici mei M. Pacuvi nova fabula! cum ignorante rege, uter Orestes *esset*, *Pylades* Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret. Stantes plaudebant in re ficta; quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse? Facile indicabat ipsa natura vim suam, cum homines, quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent.

Haec mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem potuisse dicere; si quae praeterea sunt (credo autem esse multa), ab iis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant, quaeritote.

25. FANNIUS. Nos autem a te potius; quamquam etiam ab istis saepe quaesivi et audivi non invitus quidem; sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae.

SCAEVOLA. Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortibus Scipionis, cum est de re publica disputatum, adfuisses. Qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!

FANNIUS. Facile id quidem fuit, iustitiam iustissimo viro defendere.

SCAEVOLA. Quid? amicitiam nonne facile ei, quid ob eam summa fide, constantia iustitiaque servatam maximam gloriam ceperit?

VIII. 26. LAELIUS. Vim hoc quidem est adferre. Quid enim refert, qua me ratione cogatis? cogitis certe. Studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est, tum ne aequum quidem obsistere.

Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter inbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa perfecta alia causa. Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benivolentiam coniungendam. Nam utilitates quidem etiam

ab iis percipiuntur saepe, qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa, in amicitia autem nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum et, quidquid est, id est verum et voluntarium. 27. Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, adplicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione, quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura. Quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest, quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur, ut facile earum sensus appareat. Quod in homine multo est evidentius, primum ex ea caritate, quae est inter natos et parentes, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest; deinde cum similis sensus exitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus, cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur. 28. Nihil est enim virtute amabilius, nihil, quod magis adliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. Quis est, qui C. Fabrici, M'. Curi non cum caritate aliqua benivola memoriam usurpet, quos numquam viderit? quis autem est, qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit? Cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit.

IX. 29. Quodsi tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis, quos numquam vidimus, vel, quod maius est, in hoste etiam diligamus, quid mirum est, si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur? Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit benivolentiae magnitudo. Quam si qui putant ab inbecillitate proficisci, ut sit, per quem adsequatur, quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt. Quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum esse in se arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus; quod longe secus est. 30. Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit, et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic munitus est, et nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita indicet, ita in amicitias expetendis colendisque maxime excellit. Quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? Minime hercule! ac ne ego quidem illius; sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse non nulla, quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit benivolentiam consuetudo. Sed

quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae. 31. Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam (neque enim beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus), sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus. 32. Ab his, qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt, longe dissentiunt, nec mirum; nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt, qui suas omnes cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. Quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et benivolentiae caritatem (facta significatione) probitatis. Quam qui adpetiverunt, adplicant se et propius admovent, ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et moribus sintque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposedum, atque haec inter eos sit honesta certatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximae capientur, et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab inbecillitate gravior et verior. Nam si utilitas amicitias conglutinaret, eadem commutata dissolveret; sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt. Ortum quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte vultis.

FANNIUS. Tu vero perge, Laeli; pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.

33. SCAEVOLA. Recte tu quidem. Quam ob rem audiamus.

X. LAELIUS. Audite vero, optimi viri, ea, quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur. Quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat, quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere. Nam, vel ut non idem expediret, incidere saepe, vel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur; mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias aetate ingravescente. Atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga ponerentur; [34] sin autem ad adulescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriae condicionis vel commodi alicuius, quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. Quodsi qui longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari, si in honoris contentione incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitias quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae; ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse. 35. Magna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis, quod rectum non esset, postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent

ad iniuriam; quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab iis, quibus obsequi nollent. Illos autem, qui quidvis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos. Eorum querela inveterata non modo familiaritates extinguere solere, sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna. Haec ita multa quasi fata inpendere amicitias, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae, sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri. /

XI. 36. Quam ob rem id primum videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. Numne, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? num Vecellinum amici regnum adpetentem, num Maelium debuerunt iuvare? 37. Tib. quidem Gracchum rem publicam vexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaevola, quom ad me, quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc, ut sibi ignoscerem, causam adferebat, quod tanti Tib. Gracchum fecisset, ut, quidquid ille vellet, sibi faciendum putaret. Tun ego: 'Etiamne, si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet?' 'Numquam,' inquit, 'voluisset id quidem; sed si voluisset, paruissem.' Videtis, quam nefaria vox! Et hercule ita fecit vel plus etiam, quam dixit; non enim paruit ille Ti. Graechi temeritati, sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem praebuit. Itaque haec amentia questione nova perterritus in Asiam profugit, ad hostes se contulit, poenas rei publicae graves iustasque persolvit. Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris. / 38. Quodsi rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis, quidquid velint, vel inpetrare ab iis, quidquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res vitii; sed loquimur de iis amicis, qui ante oculos sunt, quos vidimus aut de quibus memoria accepimus, quos novit vita communis. Ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime, qui ad sapientiam proxime accedunt. 39. Videmus Papum Aemilium Luscino familiarem fuisse (sic a patribus accepimus), bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum iis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M. Curium, Ti. Cornelianum memoriae proditum est. Igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quippiam contendisse, quod contra fidem, contra ius iurandum, contra rem publicam esset. Nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid adinet dicere, si contendisset, impetraturum non fuisse? cum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, aequae autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum

et rogare: At vero Tib. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem C. frater nunc idem acerrimus.

XII. 40. Haec igitur lex in amicitia sancitur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae. Deflexit iam aliquantum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum. 41. Tib. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est, vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses. Num quid simile populus Romanus audierat aut viderat? Hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P. Scipione effecerint, sine lacrimis non queo dicere. Nam Carbonem, quocumque modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Tib. Gracchi sustinimus; de C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid expectem, non lubet augurari. Serpit † deinde res, quae proclivis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. Videtis, in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia. Videre iam videor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis arbitrio res maximas agi. Plures enim discent, quem ad modum haec fiant, quam quem ad modum iis resistatur. 42. Quorsum haec? Quia sine sociis nemo quicquam tale conatur. Praecipendum est igitur bonis, ut, si in eius modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se alligatos, ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re publica peccantibus non discedant; improbis autem poena statuenda est, nec vero minor iis, qui secuti erunt alterum, quam iis, qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces. Quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle, quis potentior? qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam liberavisset propterque invidiam in exilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit, quam ferre debuit, fecit idem, quod xx annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. His adiutor contra patriam inventus est nemo; itaque mortem sibi uterque consevit. 43. Quare talis inproborum consensus non modo excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est, sed potius supplicio omni vindicanda est, ut ne quis concessum putet amicum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi; quod quidem, ut res ire coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit. Mihi autem non minori curae est, qualis res publica post mortem meam futura, quam qualis hodie sit. ✓

XIII. 44. Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sancitur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogemur; studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit; consilium vero dare audeamus libere. Plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et

adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur. 45. Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam (sed nihil est, quod illi non persequantur argutiis): partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum, alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas, cum velis, vel remittas; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus. 46. Alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanum (quem locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi) praesidii adiuventique causa, non benivolentiae neque caritatis amicitias esse expetendas; itaque, ut quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias adpetere maxime; ex eo fieri, ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri et inopes quam opulenti et calamitosi quam ii, qui putentur beati. 47. O praeclaram sapientiam! Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt, qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. Quae est enim ista securitas? Specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda. Neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. Quodsi curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit, ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia lubricitatem, ignaviam fortitudo; itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, inbellibus fortes, flagitiosis modestos. Ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis. 48. Quam ob rem, si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo extirpatam humanitatem arbitramur, quae causa est, cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? Quid enim interest motu animi sublato non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem? Neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt; quae quidem est cum multis in rebus, tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur. Quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet, ut tollat e vita amicitiam, non plus quam ut virtutes, quia non nullas curas et molestias adferunt, repudientur.

XIV. Cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se similis animus adplicet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse est. 49. Quid

enim tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanimis rebus, ut honore, ut gloria, ut aedificio, ut vestitu cultuque corporis, animante virtute praedito, eo qui vel amare vel, ut ita dicam, redamare possit, non admodum delectari? Nihil est enim remuneratione benivolentiae, nihil vicissitudine studiorum officiorumque iucundius. 50. Quid, si illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse, quod ad se rem ullam tam alliciat et attrahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo? concedetur profecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant adseiscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura. Nihil est enim appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura. Quam ob rem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scaevola, constet, ut opinor, bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam benivolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus. Sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet. Non enim est inhumana virtus neque inmundis neque superba, quae etiam populos universos tueri eisque optime consulere solet; quod non faceret profecto, si a caritate vulgi abhorreret. 51. Atque etiam mihi quidem videntur, qui utilitatum causa fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum amicitiae tollere. Non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat, tumque illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum, iucundum, si cum studio est profectum; tantumque abest, ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ii, qui opibus et copiis maximeque virtute, (in qua plurimum est praesidii,) minime alterius indigeant, liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi. Atque haut sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. Ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est.

XV. 52. Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffuentes audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. Nam quis est, pro deorum fidem atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? Haec enim est tyrannorum vita nimirum, in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benivolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae. 53. Quis enim aut eum diligat, quem metuat, aut eum, a quo se metui putet? Coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus. Quodsi forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderunt, tum intellegitur, quam fuerint inopes amicorum. Quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt exulantem, tum se intellexisse, quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset. 54. Quamquam miror, illa superbia et inopportunitate si

quemquam amicum habere potuit. Atque ut huius, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare non potuerunt, sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fideles. Non enim solum ipsa Fortuna caeca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos, quos complexa est; itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia, nec quicquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos, qui antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio, potestate, prosperis rebus inmutari[, sperni ab iis veteres amicitias, indulgeri novis]. 55. Quid autem stultius quam, cum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quae parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa, amicos non parare, optumam et pulcherrimam vitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent, nesciunt, nec cuius causa laborent (eius enim est istorum quidque, qui vicit viribus), amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio; ut, etiamsi illa maneant, quae sunt quasi dona Fortunae, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. Sed haec hactenus. †

XVI. 56. Constituendi autem sunt, qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi. De quibus tres video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo, unam, ut eodem modo erga amicum affecti simus, quo erga nosmet ipsos, alteram, ut nostra in amicos benivolentia illorum erga nos benivolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat, tertiam, ut, quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis. 57. Harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus adsentior. Nec enim illa prima vera est, ut, quem ad modum in se quisque sit, sic in amicum sit animatus. Quam multa enim, quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facinus causa amicorum! precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum acerbius in aliquem invehi insectarique vehementius, quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime; multaeque res sunt, in quibus de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt detrahi que patiuntur, ut iis amici potius quam ipsi fruantur. 58. Altera sententia est, quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. Hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. Divitior mihi et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare restricte, ne plus reddat quam acceperit; neque enim verendum est, ne quid excidat, aut ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne plus aequo quid in amicitiam congeratur. 59. Tertius vero ille finis deterrimus, ut, quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. Saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae fortunae fractior. Non est igitur amici talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere, ut amici iacentem animum excitet indu-

catque *in* spem cogitationemque meliorem. Alius igitur finis verae amicitiae constituendus est, si prius, quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit, dixerō. Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorum amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus; nec vero se adduci posse, ut hoc, quem ad modum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem; impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit ei, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare, ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo plures det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum; rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi, dolere, invidere. 60. Quare hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet; illud potius praecipendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse possemus. Quin etiam, si minus felices in diligendo fuisset, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.

XVII. 61. His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut, etiamsi qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudine sequatur; est enim, quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit. Nec vero neglegenda est fama, nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benivolentiam civium; quam blanditiis et adsentando colligere turpe est; virtus, quam sequitur caritas, minime repudianda est. 62. Sed (saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia) querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent; capras et oves quot quisque haberet, dicere posse, amicos quot haberet, non posse dicere, et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis neglegentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos, qui ad amicitias essent idonei, iudicarent. Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi; cuius generis est magna penuria. Et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum; experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia. Ita praecurrit amicitia iudicium tollitque experiendi potestatem. 63. Est igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benivolentiae, † quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia ex aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. Quidam saepe in parva pecunia perspicuntur quam sint leves, quidam autem, quos parva movere non potuit, cog-

noscuntur in magna. Sin erunt aliqui reperti, qui pecuniam praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment, ubi eos inveniemus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut, cum ex altera parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint? Inbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam; quam etiamsi neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. 64. Itaque verae amicitiae difficillime reperiuntur in iis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur; ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo? Quid? haec ut omittam, quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates! ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendant. Quamquam Ennius recte:

Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur,

tamen haec duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt. XVIII. Qui igitur utraque in re gravem, constantem, stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene divino.

(XVIII.) 65. Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est eius, quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides; nihil est enim stabile, quod infidum est. Simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est qui rebus isdem moveatur, eligi par est, quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem; neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum, neque vero, qui non isdem rebus movetur naturaque consentit, aut fidus aut stabilis potest esse. Addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblati, quae pertinent omnia ad eam, quam iam dudum tracto, constantiam. Ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse. Est enim boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam; deinde non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum. 66. Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.

XIX. 67. Existit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis, num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus. Indigna homine dubitatio! Non enim debent esse amicitiarum sicut

aliarum rerum satietates; veterrima quaeque, ut ea vina, quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debet suavissima; verumque illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit. 68. Novitates autem si spem adferunt, ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda; maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Quin ipso equo, cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res impediatur, nemo est, quin eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur quam intractato et novo. Nec vero in hoc, quod est animal, sed in iis etiam, quae sunt inanima, consuetudo valet, quom locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus.

69. Sed maximum est in amicitia parem esse inferiori. Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis, Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat aetate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnes per se posse esse ampliores volebat. 70. Quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut, si quam praestantiam virtutis, ingenii, fortunae consecuti sint, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis, ut, si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant inbecilliore vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati. Ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerunt, cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores, quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt. Quod est multo profecto magis in veris patribus certisque faciendum. Fructus enim ingenii et virtutis omnisque praestantiae tum maxumus capitur, cum in proximum quemque confertur.

XX. 71. Ut igitur ii, qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari. Quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant, eoque magis, si habere se putant, quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo factum queant dicere. Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobrantium; quae meminisse debet is, in quem conlata sunt, non commemorare, qui contulit. 72. Quam ob rem, ut ii, qui superiores sunt, summittere se debent in amicitia, sic quodam modo inferiores extollere. Sunt enim quidam, qui molestas amicitias faciunt, cum ipsi se contemni putant; quod non fere contingit nisi iis, qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur qui hac opinione non

modo verbis, sed etiam opere levandi sunt. 73. Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam quantum ille, quem diligas atque adiuves, sustinere. Non enim neque tu possis, quamvis excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere, ut Scipio P. Rupilius potuit consullem efficere, fratrem eius L. non potuit. Quodsi etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen, quid ille possit sustinere.

74. Omnino amicitiae corroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingenis et aetatibus iudicandae sunt, nec, si qui ineunte aetate venandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios, quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. Isto enim modo nutrices et paedagogi iure vetustatis plurimum benivolentiae postulabunt; qui neglegendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam modo *aestimandi*. Aliter amicitiae stabiles permanere non possunt. Disparis enim mores, disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias; nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse, morum studiorumque distantia. 75. Recte etiam praecipitur in amicitias, ne intemperata quaedam benivolentia, quod persaepe fit, impediatur magnas utilitates amicorum. Nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, si Lyncedem, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impediendum audire voluisset. Et saepe incidunt magnae res, ut discedendum sit ab amicis; quas qui impedire vult, quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus. 76. Atque in omni re considerandum est, et quid postules ab amico et quid patiari a te impetrari.

XXI. Est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitias dimittendis non nunquam necessaria; iam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad vulgares amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. Erumpunt saepe vitia amicorum tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. Tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae et, ut Catonem dicere audivi, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit, ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque faciunda sit. 77. Sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit (loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium, sed de communibus amicitias), cavendum erit, ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. Nihil est enim turpius quam cum eo bel-

lum gerere, quocum familiariter vixeris. Ab amicitia Q. Pompei meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem, quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello; utrumque egit graviter, auctoritate et offensione animi non acerba. 78. Quam ob rem primum danda opera est, ne qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut extinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae videantur. Cavendum vero, ne etiam in graves inimicitias convertant se amicitiae; ex quibus iurgia, maledicta, contumeliae gignuntur. Quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt, et hic honos veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit, qui faciat, non, qui patiat in iuram.

Omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis cito diligere incipiant neve non dignos. 79. Digni autem sunt amicitia, quibus in ipsis inest causa, cur diligantur. Rarum genus. Et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec quicquam difficilius quam reperire, quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum. Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quicquam bonum norunt, nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos. 80. Ita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. Ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigit caritatis suae, sed quod per se sibi quisque carus est. Quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus numquam reperietur; est enim is, qui est tamquam alter idem. 81. Quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volueribus, nantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur), deinde ut requirant atque adpetant, ad quas se adplicent eiusdem generis animantis, idque faciunt cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani, quanto id magis in homine fit natura! qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit, cuius animum ita cum suo miscet, ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus.

XXII. 82. Sed plerique perverse, ne dicam inprudenter, habere talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab iis desiderant. Par est autem primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. In talibus ea, quam iam dudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest, cum homines benivolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus iis, quibus ceteri serviunt, imperabunt, deinde aequitate iustitiaeque gaudebunt, omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet, neque quicquam unquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit, neque solum colent inter se ac diligunt, sed

etiam verebuntur. Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam. 83. Itaque in iis perniciosus est error, qui existunt lubidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam; virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea, quae summa sunt, pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret. Quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum optimum beatissimusque comitatus. 84. Haec est, inquam, societas, in qua omnia insunt, quae putant homines expetenda, honestas, gloria, tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas, ut et, cum haec adsint, beata vita sit et sine his esse non possit. Quod cum optimum maximumque sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus; ea vero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt, cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit. 85. Quocirca (dicendum est enim saepius), cum iudicaris, diligere oportet, non, cum dilexeris, iudicare. Sed cum multis in rebus negligentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis; praeposteris enim utimur consiliis et acta agimus, quod vetamur veteri proverbio. Nam implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officii repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione dirumpimus.

XXIII. 86. Quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime necessariae tanta incuria. Una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt. Quamquam a multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur; multi divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat; honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur, quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil esse levius existiment! itemque cetera, quae quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent; de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt, et ii, qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt, et ii, qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ii, qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi, postremo ii, qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere. 87. Serpit enim nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui. Quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et inmanitate naturae, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus, tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitalis suae. Atque hoc maxime iudicaretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut

aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet. Quis tam esset ferreus, qui eam vitam ferre posset, cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo? 88. Verum ergo illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audiavi ab aliis senibus auditum: 'si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore; quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset.' Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum admittitur; quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est. ♪

XXIV. Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret, quid velit, anquirat, desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ea, quae ab ea monemur, audimus. Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae, multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est; una illa sublevanda offensio est, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benivole fiunt. 89. Sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit:

Obssequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Molesta veritas, siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxima autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio impellitur. Omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat; in obsequio autem, quoniam Terentiano verbo libenter utimur, comitas adsit, adsentatio, vitiorum adiutrix, procul amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur. † 90. Cuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est. Scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: 'melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri quam eos amicos, qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos numquam.' Atque illud absurdum, quod ii, qui monentur, eam molestiam, quam debent capere, non capiunt, eam capiunt, qua debent vacare; peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt; quod contra oportebat, delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

XXV. 91. Ut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est verae

amicitiae et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est nullam in amicitiiis pestem esse maiorem quam adulationem, blanditiam, adsentationem; quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium ad voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem. 92. Cum autem omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est (tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat), tum amicitiae repugnat maxime; delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius, commutabilis, multiplex? 93. Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium quam animus eius, qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam vultum atque nutum convertitur?

*Négat quis, nego; ait, áio; postremo ímperavi
egomét mihi
Ómnia adsentári,*

ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona, quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est. 94. Multi autem Gnathonum similes cum sint loco, fortuna, fama superiores, horum est adsentatio molesta, cum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas. 95. Secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. Contio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen iudicare solet, quid intersit inter popularem, id est adsentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem, severum et gravem. 96. Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuxer influebat in auris contionis, cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis! Dissuasimus nos; sed nihil de me, de Scipione dicam lubentius. Quanta illa, di immortales, fuit gravitas, quanta in oratione maiestas! ut facile ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceres. Sed adfuitis, et est in manibus oratio. Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. Atque, ut ad me redeam, meministis, Q. Maxumo, fratre Scipionis, et L. Mancino consulibus quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C. Licini Crassi videbatur! cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur; atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo. Tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium nobis defendentibus facile vincebat. Atque id actum est praetore me quinquennio ante, quam consul sum factus; ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa est.

XXVI. 97. Quodsi in scaena, id est in contione, in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si

modo id patefactum et inlustratum est, quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur? in qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari, cum, id quam vere fiat, ignores. Quamquam ista adsentatio, quamvis pernicio-
 98. Omnino est amans sui virtus; optime enim se ipsa novit, quamque amabilis sit, intellegit. Ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor, sed de virtutis opinione. Virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt. Hos delectat adsentatio, his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant. Nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter verum audire non vult, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. Nec parasitorum in comoediis adsentatio faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi.

Magnas vero agere gratias Thaïs mihi?

Satis erat respondere: 'magnas'; 'ingentes,' inquit. Semper auget adsentator id, quod is, cuius ad voluntatem dicitur, vult esse magnum. 99. Quam ob rem, quamquam blanda ista vanitas apud eos valet, qui ipsi illam adlectant et invitant, tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animadvertant, ne callida adsentatione capiantur. Aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors; callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet, studiose cavendum est; nec enim facillime agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam adversando saepe adsentetur et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vineique se patitur, ut is, qui inclusus sit, plus vidisse videatur. Quid autem turpius quam inludi? Quod ut ne accidat, magis cavendum est.

Ut me hodie ante omnes cômicos stultôs senes

Versâris atque inlûsseris lautîssime.

100. Haec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est in-
 providorum et credulorum senum. Sed nescio quo pacto ab amicitiiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium (de hac dico sapientia, quae videtur in hominem cadere posse), ad leves amicitias defluxit oratio. Quam ob rem ad illa prima redeamus eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.

XXVII. Virtus, virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat. In ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia; quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumien et idem asperit adgnovitque in alio, ad id

se admovet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est; ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia; utrumque enim dictum est ab amando; amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum ipsum diligere, quem ames, nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita; quae tamen ipsa efflorescit ex amicitia, etiamsi tu eam minus secutus sis. 101. Hac nos adulescentes benivolentia senes illos, L. Paulum, M. Catonem, C. Galum, P. Nasicam, Ti. Gracchum, Scipionis nostri socerum, dileximus, haec etiam magis elucet inter aequales, ut inter me et Scipionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummius. Vicissim autem senes in adulescentium caritate adquiescimus, ut in vestra, ut in Q. Tuberonis; equidem etiam admodum adulescentis P. Rutili, A. Vergini familiaritate delector. Quoniamque ita ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut alia *ex alia* aetas oriatur, maxime quidem optandum est, ut cum aequalibus possis, quibuscumque tamquam e carceribus emissus sis, cum isdem ad calcem, ut dicitur, pervenire. 102. Sed quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt, semper aliqui acquirendi sunt, quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur; caritate enim benivolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata incunditas. Mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque vivet; virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae extincta non est; nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, qui illum semper in manibus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis. Nemo unquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet, qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet. 103. Equidem ex omnibus rebus, quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo, quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare. In hac mihi de re publica consensus, in hac rerum privatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectationis fuit. Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem senserim, nihil audivi ex eo ipse, quod nollem; una domus erat, idem victus, isque communis, neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes. 104. Nam quid ego de studiis dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi? in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus. Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem. Sed nec illa extincta sunt alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea, et, si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen adfert mihi aetas ipsa solacium. Diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum. Omnia autem breviter tolerabilia esse debent, etiamsi magna sunt.

Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem. Vos autem hortor, ut ita virtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut ea accepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.

NOTES.



CAP. I. *Scaevola the augur, from whose side Cicero when a boy hardly ever departed, is one day speaking about the sudden change in the relations between Sulpicius and the consul Pompeius from close friendship into deadly enmity. This reminds Scaevola of a discourse of his father-in-law, C. Laelius, concerning friendship which took place in the form of a dialogue between the latter and his two sons-in-law, Scaevola and Fannius, in 129 B.C., just after the death of the younger Scipio, the bosom friend of Laelius.—Dedication of Cicero's treatise to Atticus.*

§ 1. **augur**: the office of augur was one of the highest dignity at Rome. At first there were three augurs, then four, then nine, and from the time of Sulla fifteen. The augurs were a corporate body, and, in case of a vacancy in their number, they themselves elected the new member. Their duty, among other things, was to advise by judging from the phenomena of the heavens, by the flying of birds, by the manner in which the sacred birds ate their food, &c., whether an undertaking would be successful, or whether an election could rightfully take place.

The word *augur* is added to distinguish him from Q. Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex, mentioned below. See Biographical Index.

sapientem: Laelius is said to have received this name because he had the good sense to withdraw an agrarian law he had proposed as tribune in 151, when he saw that to persist in it would have produced serious riots. Probably, however, it was given to him in consequence of his great skill and knowledge in the law.

deductus: "introduced"—a word used especially of introducing a young man to a guardian or master. It was customary among the Romans for a young man destined for a public career to live at the house of a distinguished jurist or statesman, and there learn the course of public business.

virili toga: the *toga virilis* was first worn when a Roman youth entered his seventeenth year. Before this age he wore the *toga praetexta*, or purple bordered robe.

Multa ab eo, &c.: lit. "many (points) sensibly discussed by him, many (things) also said briefly and aptly."

commode: "conveniently"; hence = "aptly."

prudencia: this word is a contraction of *providentia* from *pro* and *video*, and literally means "foreseeingness"; hence (1) "knowledge" or "skill" in a special subject; (2) "good sense," "intelligence." The meaning here is probably "skill in jurisprudence."

Quo: notice this very common use of the relative pronoun in the place of a conjunction and demonstrative or personal pronoun. Thus *qui* can mean "and he," "but he," "when he," "since he," &c.

pontificem: the pontiffs, first four in number, but after 300 B.C. nine, decided all questions of religion and regulated the worship of the gods.

unum praestantissimum: this use of *unus* with the superlative to increase the force of the latter is idiomatic and not uncommon.

audeo: this is a semi-deponent verb; cp. *gaudeo, gavisus sum*, 2, "to rejoice"; *soleo, -itus sum*, 2, "to be accustomed."

alias: supply *dicam*, as in English, "but of this at another time."

§ 2. **Cum . . . tum:** these two correlative conjunctions often cannot be translated by "when . . . then"; the usual renderings are "not only . . . but also," or "both . . . and."

hemicyclio: probably a semicircular bench, placed outside in the grounds, on which several persons could sit and look at each other while they talked or received instruction.

admodum: goes with *pauci* which precedes it, and not with *familiares*. The adverb *admodum* = *ad* and *modum*, lit. "up to the measure," i.e., "to the full," "exceedingly."

meministi: *memini*, "I remember," and *odi*, "I hate," have no present-stems; they are perfect tenses used as present. *Cocpi* = "I have begun," is used as a perfect tense.

utebare: notice this use of *utor* = "to be familiar with," "to be in the society of." So the noun *usus* = "acquaintance," "intimacy."

tribunus pl.: the *tribuni plebis* were officers instituted after the first Secession of the Plebs in 494 B.C., in order to protect the interests of the plebeians, who at that time had no political representation. At first there were two tribunes, but in 457 B.C. the number was increased to ten. The chief power of the tribunes lay in their veto (*intercessio*), by means of which they could prevent the passing of any decree by the senate, or any action of a magistrate. They took the initiative in proposing laws at the Comitia Tributa, they had the right of being present in the senate without being members, and eventually, in 131 B.C., they became members of that body.

capitali odio: "deadly hatred"; *capitalis* = involving the life or *caput* (i.e., political standing) of a person; cp. "capital punishment" = punishment which takes away life.

quocum: the preposition *cum*, when used with *me*, *te*, *se*, *nobis*, *vobis*, *quo*, and *quibus*, is an enclitic, i.e., you must say *necum*, not *cum me*. A common form, instead of *quocum*, is *quicum* (as in § 22), the *qui* being the old ablative case, as seen in *quin* = *qui-ne* = "by which not," and in *quē* = "how."

quanta esset: depends on *meministi* at the beginning of the sentence.

admiratio: not "admiration," but "astonishment," "surprise." So *persona* = "character," not (as a rule) "person"; *officium* = "duty," not "office," &c.

§ 3. **Marci filio:** some editions abbreviate these two words and read M. F.

altero genero: "the other son-in-law." Q. Mucius Scaevola and C. Fannius were both sons-in-law of Laelius.

quasi: this word is constantly inserted by Cicero, whenever a word is used in a slightly metaphorical or strained sense.

saepius. comparative of adverb = "too often." See G. § 351.

coram: here adv. Sometimes it is a prep.

§ 4. **mecum ageres:** "pleaded with me," lit. = "dealt with me." Cp. § 96, *agere cum populo*.

cum . . . tum: see note, § 2.

feci . . . ut: see G. § 450 b.

Catone Majore: the alternative title of the "*De Senectute*." So *Laelius* is the alternative title of the "*De Amicitia*."

scriptus: "dedicated."

persona: (1) "a mask"; (2) "a character in a play"; (3) "a personage" in general.

fuisset: for mood see G. § 476.

senex: *senex* is *old in age*; *vetus* is (1) *old* as opp. to *young*; (2) *old* as opp. to *new (recent)*; (3) *old* as opp. to the *present time*. Cp. *Antiquus*. *Antiquus* is *old* as opp. to *novus* = what has not previously existed.

maxime memorabilem: we rarely find the superlative forms in *-issimus* of adjectives in *-bilis*, though the comparative in *-ior* is not uncommon. Where the superl. in *-issimus* is not used, *maxime* with the positive is employed instead. See G. § 64 (esp. Subs. IV.).

nescio quo pacto: lit. = "I don't know by what means"; hence = "some how or other." So *nescio quis* = *aliquis* = "some one." Strictly, *quis*, &c., after *nescio*, introduce an object sentence, whose

verb should be in the subj., but the combination came to be looked upon as a pronominal phrase which does not affect the mood of the following verb. See G. § 623. *pacto*: abl. of *pactum*, from *paciscor*, "to agree," "bargain."

§ 5. *tum*: at the end of 45 B.C., or beginning of 44. The "*De Senectute*" was written immediately before the "*De Amicitia*."

Tu velim avertas: *avertas* is in the subjunctive, as if governed by an *ut* which may be understood after *velim*. In Cicero, when *volo* is followed by a subjunctive, the *ut* is seldom expressed, and the pronoun of the subjunctive is placed before the part of *volo*.

socerum: *i.e.*, C. Laelius.

te ipse cognosces: notice the idiomatic use of *ipse* agreeing with the subject of *cognosces*, where in English we should have expected the accusative *ipsum*. Cicero here compliments his old friend Atticus by looking upon him as Friendship personified.

CAP. II. FANNIUS. *Cato was called wise, and Acilius also, but you are called wise in a somewhat different sense: various persons ask me how you, a wise man, bear the loss of your friend Scipio; they are especially anxious to know, as they noticed your absence from practice in Brutus the augur's gardens.*

SCAEVOLA. *People put the same enquiries to me: I said the reason was your health, not your distress.*

§ 6. *Sunt ista*: "those statements of yours are so," *i.e.* "are true." So the imperative *esto* = "be it so," is the same as *verum esto* = "let it be," or "suppose it to be true."

hoc modo: *modo* here is an adverb = "recently."

alio quodam modo: *modo* is here a noun. The adverbial use is derived from the meaning "limit," "measure" = "by measure," hence = "only," "recently." *quodam*: Cicero uses *quidam* like *quasi* and *tanquam*, to show either that the word he employs does not strictly express his meaning, or else that he is employing it in a strained or metaphorical sense.

Acilius, Cato: the construction is here changed from an acc. with the infin. governed by *scimus* into an independent indic., *appellatus est* being understood.

multa ejus, &c.: lit. "many (acts) of him . . . either foreseen with forethought or done with firmness or replied with sharpness, were talked of."

cognomen: a Roman generally had three names—(1) the *praenomen*, or front name, as Marcus, corresponding to our Christian name—*e.g.*, Harry; (2) the *nomen*, or family name, as Porcius, corresponding to our surname—*e.g.*, Smith, Robinson; and (3) a *cognomen*,

or extra name, as Cato, Naso, Scipio. In addition to these, a few had a *cognomen secundum*, or *agnomen*, as Sapiens, Africanus, Macedonicus. The first *cognomen* was generally derived from some physical or bodily peculiarity. The *agnomen* was usually given in commemoration of some event or deed in the person's life.

Te autem: sc. *scimus esse*.

reliqua: "the rest," is proleptic, looks forward to *Athenis* = "all Greece with the exception of Athens."

§ 7. **septem:** the Seven Wise Men of Greece always included Solon of Athens, Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, and Bias of Priene. The other three are variously given; e.g., Cleobulus, Myson, Chilon, Periander.

Be careful of the construction of *nam qui*, &c. The order is, "nam ii, qui ista subtilius quaerunt, in numero sapientium non habent eos qui septem appellantur."

unum: Socrates.

omnia tua in te: this is the Stoic doctrine that external circumstances ought not to affect one's happiness: virtue, the entire cause of one's happiness, exists in one's own self.

ducas: notice this not uncommon use of *duco* = "to consider."

virtute: abl. of comparison.

proximis: lit. = "nearest," used both of the past and future; here it is used of the past = "last." In English "next" (= "nighest," "nearest") is only used of the future.

Nonis: G. § 922.

auguris: see supra § 1.

commentandi causa: *commentor* strictly denotes mental preparation, deliberation. The augurs had to practise their art, and for this purpose had periodical meetings in large open grounds where they could get a large, uninterrupted view of the sky, and where they could consider and report on any prodigies that might demand their attention.

qui solitus esses: *qui* here = "although," and governs the subjunctive.

obire: lit. "to go to meet," hence = "to attend to." The usual meaning of "to die" arises from the phrase, *obire mortem* = "to go to meet death."

animum adverti: "I have turned my mind to," i.e., "noticed"; printed sometimes *animadverti*.

cum . . . tum: see note § 2.

humanitatis tuae: the predicative genitive = "nor did that belong to," or "nor was that like your cultured nature."

conlegio: "college of augurs."

valitudinem: *valitudo* means "state of health," and can be used either for *good health* or *bad health*. It is a colourless word, the context deciding the meaning. Here it means "bad health."

abduci debui: *debui*, perfect followed by pres. infin., whereas in English "I ought" (pres.) is followed by the perfect infin. *Possum, debeo*, with the perfect infin. are not allowed in Latin.

contingere: *contingo* usually (not here) signifies good fortune, *accido* either good or bad fortune (cp. *accident* in English).

fili: in old Latin, nouns in *-ius* and *-ium* make their genitive in *i*. In adjectives the double *i* was used. The voc. of *filius, genius*, and proper names in *-ius* ends in *i*, as *fili, geni*. See G. § 19.

in pueris, in viro: this use of *in* = "in the case of," is very common.

§ 10. **istum quidem**: Socrates, see supra § 7.

CAP. III. LAELIUS. *You gave the true reason, Scaevola. I am indeed troubled at the loss of my friend; but I am consoled by the knowledge that his life was glorious throughout, and the last day of it the most glorious of all: death has been no misfortune to him.*

Scipionis desiderio: *Scipionis* is the objective genitive. *Injuriae Aediorum* can mean either (1) "the injuries caused by the Aedui," subjective, or (2) "the injuries done to the Aedui," objective. The way to tell whether a genitive depending on a noun is obj. or subj. is—turn the noun into an active verb, and if the meaning requires the genitive to be the subj. of the verb, it is a subj. genitive, and if the meaning requires the genitive to be the object of the verb, it is an object. genitive. Thus (1) = "the Aedui injure" = subjective, (2) = "they injure the Aedui" = objective genitive. Below, § 23, in *amicorum desiderio*, we have an objective genitive after *desiderio*.

viderint: used as an imperative = "let the wise men look out." Strictly it is a future perfect indic. = "the wise men shall have considered," or the wise men shall consider by and by."

amico: abl. governed by *orbatus*, see G. § 307; so *egco* and *carco* in the following sentence govern the ablative.

quo . . . decessu: *quo* does not go with *decessu*, but refers to *errore* and is governed by *angi*; *decessu* = "at the departure."

accidisse: used in its usual sense of ill-fortune. See supra § 9.

amantis: pred. genitive. See supra § 8.

§ 11. **cum illo actum esse praeclare**: lit. = "that it has been done famously with him," sc. "by the gods," *i.e.* "that his fate has been splendid."

optare: optare is generally used of a wish that cannot be fulfilled, sperare of a wish that can be fulfilled.

jam: goes with habuerant.

consulatum numquam petiverat: he was elected consul (1) in 147 B.C. when he was a candidate for the aedileship, and (2) in 134 B.C., during his absence from Italy, and when he was not a candidate. See Index, s.v. "Scipio."

ante tempus: by the Lex Annalis, 180 B.C., it was enacted that no one could hold certain offices if he was under a certain age; thus 27 years was the limit for the quaestorship, 36 for the aedileship, 39 for the praetorship, and 43 for the consulship. Scipio was consul in 147 B.C., when he was only 38. Cicero often boasts that he was elected to each of these high offices directly he attained the legal age.

suo tempore: this phrase generally means at the earliest age allowed by law. In this case as Scipio was 51 in 134, it must mean at his proper age, *i.e.* after he was 42 years old.

duabus urbibus: (1) Carthage, (2) Numantia in Spain.

paene sero: the Numantine war began in 143, and the nine years preceding Scipio's appointment to the command had been very disastrous for Rome.

futura: it seems strange to say "put an end to future wars," *i.e.* to wars which have no existence as yet, but the idea is easy to understand, *viz.*, to prevent future wars from arising by putting a final end to the existing wars.

facillimis: facilis = "easy of access," "easily spoken to"; hence = "affable."

liberalitate in sorores: *i.e.* generosity in giving them dowries.

§ 12. fortuna, gloria: ablatives, not nominatives.

dictu: for the supine dictu see G. § 88. 3. The supine in *u* is used after an adj., as, facile, mirabile, and the supine in *um* is used after verbs of motion, as venio visum = "I come to see."

suspicientur: from suspicio (dep.), "to mistrust," "suspect"; must be distinguished from suspicio, -exi, -ectum, 3, "to look up to," "admire," "esteem" (cp. § 32). The participle of this verb, however, suspectus, does mean "suspected" or "suspicious." The noun suspicio, or suspitio, means "suspicion." Most people suspected that Carbo had murdered Scipio.

ex multis diebus quos in vita celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit: Notice this idiom—in Latin the superlative adjective must be transferred into the relative clause. Thus, "he sent me the most beautiful flower he had" must be turned into Latin by "Misit ad me flores, quos habuit pulcherrimos." "Misit ad me pulcherrimos

flores quos habuit" might mean, "he sent me some very beautiful flowers that he had."

Deducere is to escort a public man from his home to the forum or senate-house; *reducere* to escort him home.

ad vesperum: "at evening." The phrase *ad vesperam* is also found in Cic., but *vesperum* is more common after *ad* and *sub*.

patribus conscriptis: "conscript fathers." After the expulsion of the kings from Rome, the consuls, in order to fill up the senate to its proper number of 300, enrolled certain new members, who were called *conscripti*. Hence the custom arose of addressing the senate as *Patres conscripti*, i.e., *patres et conscripti*, "old heads of families, and newly-enrolled members of the senate." In the course of time *conscripti* came to be regarded merely as an adj. agreeing with *patres*.

sociis et Latinis: the phrase *sociis et Latinis* must be taken as one idea, corresponding to the one idea *populo Romano*. It can be translated as "Latin allies," the *et* being an explanatory word equivalent to "that is." Any member of these "Latin allies" had the right of migrating to Rome and becoming a full Roman burgess on two conditions, (1) that he had held a magistracy in his native colony, (2) that he had left a representative of his family in his native town.

CAP. IV. *For my own part, I, like Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, do not believe that the soul is destroyed when the body dies. Scipio shared my belief; but, whether our belief is true or not, Scipio's fate must be regarded as both fortunate and happy. The State will always rejoice at having given birth to him. My reputation of being wise I value as nothing compared with having enjoyed his friendship.*

FANNIUS. *What do you mean by friendship: what is its nature, by what rules is it regulated?*

SCAEVOLA *repeats the same questions.*

§ 13. *iis*: the Epicureans. (The Peripatetics and New Academy held somewhat similar views on this subject.)

nuper coeperunt: *nuper* is not quite accurate, as the doctrines of Epicurus were known at Rome ever since 350 B.C., but they were especially prominent about 150 B.C.

eorum: the Pythagoreans.

magnamque Graeciam: see Index.

tum florebat: you would expect some adversative conj., e.g., "but," to be inserted before *tum*.

ejus: Socrates, see supra, § 7.

tum hoc tum illud: "at one time this, at another time that." See

§ 2. This refers to the later Academics, who always argued both sides of the question, and said that certainty could never be obtained.

excessissent: *quam*, temporal, followed by an imperf. or pluperf. tense, takes the subjunct. See G. § 484. In *Oratio Recta*, *excessissent* would have been the fut. perf. indic. *excesserint*.

optimoque et justissimo cuique: see G. § 356. This use of the superlative also contains the notion of proportion: "the better and juster a man is, the more open is his path to heaven."

§ 14. **disseruit de republica**: this refers to the treatise *De Republica*, which was written about 54 B.C.

quae: strictly should be *quod*, as it refers to *extremum*, but *quae* = (the last part, *i.e.*) "such things as."

per visum: "through," or "in a dream." *Visum* is the neut. participle used as a noun, not the acc. of *visus*, -us, m. (Reid).

Africano: the elder Africanus who conquered Hannibal; see Index.

maerere: the infin. used as a noun and subject to *sit*.

invidi, amici: predicative genitives.

illa veriora: *illa* refers to what follows immediately, "ut idem interitus," &c.

quem tamen = "and yet (that) he."

§ 15. **cum illo actum**: see § 11.

ut = "as," expressing *manner*, not *cause*, governs the indic.

vixerim: in a sub-oblique sentence, giving a reason for the statement in "ut...videar." The next verbs are indic., because the statements are quite independent, and their omission would not affect the sense.

quam quod...spero: *quod* is here the conj. "that" or "because." The construction is here changed; to correspond with *fama*, the subj. of *delectat*, we should have expected some word like *spes*, which would also be the subj. of *delectat* understood.

est cordi: *cordi* is a predicative dative, "is to the heart to me" = Eng. "to my mind."

vix tria aut quatuor paria: the three best-known pairs of friends are Theseus and Pirithous, Achilles and Patroclus, Pylades and Orestes, and the fourth is probably Damon and Phintias (or Pythias).

paria: *par*, an adj., = "equal"; *par* (m.), subst., = "a comrade," "companion"; and *par* (n.), subst., = "a pair."

§ 16. **feceris**: notice the fut. perf. ind. in both clauses, where in English we use the simple future.

quid sentias, &c.: = "your sentiments, &c." *sentias* is subj. because it is an object-sentence.

CAP. V. LAELIUS. You had better ask the professors of philosophy, who will answer you more readily than I can. All I will say is that friendship is preferable beyond everything. It can exist only among the good, and is in accordance with nature, which has made us social beings. I do not admit that only the "wise" are good. Those who possess the ordinary virtues, such as justice and generosity, and are free from vices, are to be called good. In order to constitute friendship good-will must exist; the fact of relationship remains whether good-will exists or not.

§ 17. *quamvis subiti*: *quamvis* in Cicero can be used either as an adv. = "however," "as much as you please," or as a conj. The conj. *quamvis* governs the subjunct., while *quanquam* governs the indic.

magnum opus est: *opus*, -*eris*, n., strictly means work, hence *opus est mihi gladio* = "I have work (to do) with a sword," i.e. "I have need of a sword." Hence *opus est* with the abl. came to be used idiomatically for "to be in need of."

censeo petatis: *petatis* is in the subjunctive depending on *censeo*, just as if the latter verb had been followed by *ut*. Similarly, *ut* is sometimes omitted after *curo*, *caveo*, *sino*, *hortor*, *necesse*, &c.

§ 18. *id*: this refers to "nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse."

subtilius: comp. of *subtiliter*, adv., used here without an object of comparison, = "more subtly than is needed," "with too much subtlety."

ad vivum reseco: "cut back to the quick," an obvious metaphor = "to penetrate deep into a thing." The English word "quick," "living" (e.g. "the quick and the dead") gives the same idea.

quemquam: *quisquam* or *ullus*, and not *quilibet* or *quivis*, must be used in negative and comparative sentences, and interrog. sentences expecting the answer "no."

sapientiae nomen: notice the genitive *sapientiae* where we might expect an acc. in apposition with *nomen*, = "the word wisdom." Cp. *amicitiae nomen*, infra, § 19. On the other hand, "the city of Rome" in Latin is *Urbs Roma*.

concedant ut: we should expect the acc. and inf. instead of *ut* and the subjunctive. The *ut* construction brings into prominence the result rather than the fact of the admission. "Make an admission such that the result would be," &c. We may compare also *verum esse ut*, § 50, and *spem afferunt ut*, § 68.

§ 19. *pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva*: "with our own dull wits, as the proverb says." *Minerva* is looked upon as Wit or Intelligence personified. *Pinguis* = "fat," "slow," "dull." Besides *pingui Minerva*, we find *crassa Minerva*, and *invita Minerva*. *Aiunt, ut aiunt, quod dicitur, ut dicitur* are all used to introduce a proverb.

his: refers to *propinqui*, as being the more prominent and nearer in thought, and not to *alieni*, which is nearer in actual position.

hoc praestat: *hoc* is the abl. = "in this," "in this respect."

amicitiae nomen: see note on *sapientiae nomen*, supra, § 18.

§ 20. **hoc**: refers to the following sentence, "quod ex infinita . . . jungeretur."

res: "the thing," *i.e.* the subject we are discussing, *i.e.* friendship.

jungeretur: literally "was joined,"—the past tense of the subj. is used, because the consequence is general, and not a particular instance.

CAP. VI. *Friendship defined as the combination of kindness and affection, together with agreement in all things human and divine. Virtue produces and upholds friendship, and friendship cannot exist without virtue. The advantages of friendship enumerated.*

haud scio an: in Cicero generally means "probably," in post-classical writers it generally means "probably not." See G. § 438.

homini: "mankind."

bonam valitudinem: cp. supra, § 8; *valitudo* alone may mean either good or bad health.

honores: this word generally has special reference to dignified official positions, such as the consulship, praetorship, censorship, &c.

extremum: "the furthest point;" "the end or object of existence," "the highest good."

temeritate: *temeritas* has here its primary meaning of "chance," "hap," "fortune," but the secondary and more usual meaning is "rashness."

praeclare illi quidem: understand *faciunt*.

§ 21. **quidam docti**: the Stoics; cp. § 17.

§ 22. **vix queo**: Cicero does not use *nequeo* (1st pers. pres. ind.), but always *vix queo* or *non queo*, but he uses the other parts of *nequire* (Reid). See G., § 110.

qui: the old abl. form = "how," "in what way," "by what means," so in next sentence, *quicum* is the abl.

vita vitalis: "a true life," "a life worth living," a phrase modelled on *βίος βιωτός* (*bios biōtos*).

aeque ac tu: the lit. translation of this idiom is "he would rejoice equally and you would rejoice equally," *i.e.* "he would rejoice equally with you," "as much as you."

utare, laudere, fungare are all 2nd pers. sing. subj.

opes: a defective noun; see G. § 52. 2.

nullo loco: either the abl. after *excluditur* = "from no place," or else = "in no place," "nowhere."

non aqua, non igni: this phrase has some reference to the common expression for banishment, "aqua et igni interdicere."

qui pauci nominantur: refers to the three or four pairs of friends mentioned in § 15. *Nos multi* = "many of us;" hence *qui pauci*, "few of whom."

CAP. VII. *Further advantages. Friendship prevents us from losing hope. Without friendship neither the home nor the State could exist. According to Empedocles, friendship is the uniting force in the Universe. LAELIUS ceases after he has thus arrived at a definition of friendship. FANNIUS and SCAEVOLA urge him to continue. Chapters VIII. and IX. accordingly deal with the origin of friendship.*

illa: sc. *commoditate* = "by (or in) the following advantage," and is explained by *quod . . . patitur*.

omnibus: is the dative after *praestat* = "excels all things."

spem praelucet: *praeluceo* is generally intransitive = "to give light beforehand." Here translate "kindles in front the torch of good hopes."

et absentes adsunt, &c.: this is a well-known instance of "oxymoron," or a collocation of words which is pointedly contradictory; see § 59; cp. 2 Cor. vi. 9.

Amicorum: subjective genitive; see § 10.

ex rerum natura: lit. = "out of the nature of things," i.e. "out of things as they exist in nature," i.e. "out of the universe."

minus: lit. "less," is often almost equivalent to *non* = "not."

§ 24. **boni**: partitive genitive depending on *quantum*, which is regarded as a neuter noun.

↳ **vaticinatum**: *vaticinor* primarily means "to prophesy," "foretell": most of the prophecies, especially those of the oracles, were in verse.

constarent: is contrasted with *moverentur*, "things fixed" as opposed to "things moveable."

ea: *ea* is the acc. governed by *contrahere* and *dissipare*; *amicitiam* and *discordiam* are the respective subjects of the infinitives. The relative sentence being put first, the antecedent *ea* is placed first in its own sentence to draw attention to it.

si quando aliquod: after *ne, nisi, num, and si, quis* is used instead of *aliquis*; so *quando* is used instead of *aliquando*. Here, however, *aliquod* is used instead of *quid*. The fact is that Cicero occasionally

disregards the rule, but when the *ali-* is preserved we can generally notice an intention to be more emphatic.

- ✓ *cavea*: lit., "a hollow place," hence the part of the theatre where the spectators sat, which in the Greek theatres was often hollowed out of the side of a hill.

hospitis: *hospes* has three chief meanings, (1) "host," (2) "guest," (3) "stranger" as opp. to "native." Here the second and third meanings are combined.

- ✓ *nova fabula*: probably the *Dulorestes*, by some thought to be an adaptation from the "*Iphigenia in Tauris*" of Euripides.

rege: Thoas, the king of Tauric Chersonese.

uter: "which of the two," Pylades and Orestes.

- ✓ *stantes plaudebant*—either (1) "as they stood they applauded," or (2) "they rose up and applauded." If the latter meaning is adopted, according to some annotators there is an anachronism, as in the time of Pacuvius all the spectators of a play had to stand. The first theatre at Rome in which the spectators could sit was built by Pompey many years after the death of Pacuvius.

facturos fuisse: lit., "would have been likely to do."

qui ista disputant: the professed philosophers and rhetoricians.

§ 25. *equidem*: "verily," "indeed."

quoddam: *quidam* is often used by Cicero to introduce a metaphor, "the thread, as we say."

- ✓ *de re publica*: for the treatise *De Republica*, cp. supra, § 14.

- ✓ *patronus* here has its usual meaning "advocate." It also means "patron," "protector."

accuratam: "prepared with care," from *accuro*, "to apply care to," "take pains about."

amicitiā: governed by *defendere* understood.

ob eam servatam: "on account of the preservation of it," "through having preserved it." In Latin a past participle and a noun or pronoun agreeing with it must often be translated by two nouns, or a noun and pronoun, joined by "of," thus: *post urbem conditam* = "after the foundation of the city."

CAP. VIII. LAELIUS. *The origin of friendship is not a sense of weakness and need of help, nor the hope of receiving favour for favours done. The origin is found in Nature herself, in the love which can be seen in man and beast alike as regards their affection for their offspring. Men have an innate love of virtue, and hatred of vice,*

and friendship arises from love in any form. Friendship is everlasting, and continues when there is no longer any expectation of reaping advantages.

§ 26. **generorum** — Fannius and Scaevola, the sons-in-law of Laelius.

utrum . . . an = "Whether . . . or," introducing an object or subject clause. **Sive (seu)**: *sive (seu)* expresses an alternative condition. "I ask you whether this is true or not." *Rogo vos utrum hoc verum sit an non.* "This does not affect me whether it is true or false"—*Hoc sive verum est seu falsum nullo modo me movet.*

proprium: *amicitiae* is the genitive and not the dative.

antiquior: "more ancient," hence perhaps, "more venerable." Supply *est* after *antiquior* from *esset* in the previous sentence.

percipiuntur: *percipio* = (1) "to seize," "obtain," "gather" (the meaning here), (2) "to perceive," "understand."

temporis causa: "for the sake of the time," *i.e.* "to suit the time or circumstances," "for self-interest."

voluntarium: expressive of a person's will, hence "sincere."

§ 27. **ab indigentia orta**: *natus, ortus, and satus* are generally followed by the simple abl.; as *natus Jove*, "son of Jupiter," but Cicero often adds the preposition *ab* with *ortus*.

potius: comparative adv. of *magnus* = "in a greater degree"; strictly *potius* = "preferably."

applicatione: instrumental ablative.

quantum: follows closely upon *cogitatione* in construction.

esset: the historic tense is used in accordance with Cicero's usual practice to indicate something habitual or a general sentiment, though the principal verb is present.

Quod: we must here translate the relative as a demonstr., and may omit or insert the conj. at our option; cp. § 1.

si aliquem: *aliquem* = "some one," more definite and emphatic than "any one." *Si* here nearly = *cum*, "in the case that"; the subj. supposes something which is *not* the case.

quasi lumen: *quasi* like *quidam* is inserted to prepare the way for a metaphorical expression.

§ 28. **vidimus**: states a fact, hence indic.: *viderit* and *oderit* concessive subjunct. "whom (we grant) he has never seen."

decertatum: lit., "it was struggled out" = "there was a long struggle."

ab altero: the *ab* here is joined closely with *alicnos* = "alienated" or "estranged from the one," lit., "We have feelings not too much estranged."

probitatem: refers to Pyrrhus, especially to his surrender of the Roman prisoners when Fabricius sent him the man who had offered to poison him.

crudelitatem owing to prejudice refers to Hannibal, whose name among the Romans was proverbially associated with cruelty.

oderit is here the fut. perf. indic. Just above it is the perfect subjunctive. *Odi* being a defective verb without any present stem, the fut. perf. takes the place of the simple future, and the perfect of the simple present.

CAP. IX. *Friendship does not arise from a sense of weakness and a consequent desire for help. It is the strong, powerful, and self-sufficing man who especially cultivates friendship, e.g. Africanus. The object of friendship is love, and not mere reward, though as a matter of fact the greatest advantages are obtained from friendship though they are not sought for directly.*

§ 29. **casu**: "by familiar intercourse."

quamquam: is often used as a particle of transition, in passing from one point to another, and also as a particle of concession = "and yet."

animi et amoris: in Latin we often find two words coupled by a conjunction to express what is to us a compound conception: "a loving heart."

quam must be translated by *it* with or without a conj.; see note on *quod*, § 27, also § 1.

humilem: from *humus*, "the ground" = "lowly," "humble," "mean," "base," "insignificant." In Latin *humilis* never has the laudatory meaning which "humble" and "humility" have acquired in English.

generosum: from *genus*, of "good birth, origin, position," the opposite of *humilis*: *generosus* does not mean "generous" in the sense of "liberal," "bountiful."

natam volunt: *esse* must be understood; this omission is very common after *volo*: similarly *ut* governing a subjunctive is commonly omitted after *volo*; lit., "as each thought there was least in himself, so . . . most fit."

§ 30. **nullo**: the abl. and genit. of *nemo* are not found; *nullo* and *nullius* are used instead.

egeat: verbs meaning "to be full, empty," &c., govern the abl., e.g. *egeo, careo, abundo, vaco*. *Indigeo* on the other hand generally takes the genitive, cp. *Africanus indigens mei*.

ac ne ego quidem: Cicero never says *nec quidem*, but uses *inste ac*, or *et* followed by *ne . . . quidem*.

dilexit: distinguish *diligo*, *-exi*, *-ectum*, 3, "to love," from *deligo*, *-egi*, *-ectum*, 3, "to choose out," "select," and from *deligo*, 1, "to bind together," "bind fast," and from *delēgo*, 1, "to send," "entrust," "charge."

multae et magnae: notice the insertion of *et*; in English we omit "and" and say "many great."

§ 31. **ut . . . ut**: *ut* with the indic. *sumus* = "as," with the subjunct. *exigamus* = "in order that."

§ 32. **ad voluptatem omnia referunt**: "refer everything to pleasure," "make pleasure their universal standard," This refers to the Epicureans.

susplicere: see note on § 12.

contemptam: lit. "despised," hence "worthy of contempt," "despicable."

hos quidem: the Epicureans, who refer everything to sensual pleasure.

Quam: refers to *probitatis* which immediately precedes.

usu: "familiarity," "acquaintance"; cp. § 29.

gravior: "more weighty," "important."

ad haec: sc. *dicere*.

minor natu: "less by birth," i.e. "younger." So *minimus natu*, "youngest"; *major*, *maximus natu*, "older," "eldest."

meo jure: "by my right of seniority, I am entitled to speak on his behalf."

§ 33. **Ea, quae disserebantur**: lit., "those (things) which used to be discussed."

CAP. X. *So much for the origin of friendship. Now he comes to the causes of the breach of friendship, which are (1) change of interest, (2) change of political opinion, (3) change of character through adversity or old age (under the first two headings are included rivalry in love or office), (4) asking too much of friends, especially asking for something that is not right or just.*

quamquam: cp. note on *quamquam*, § 29.

ut non idem expediret: the *ut* depends on *incidere* = "it often happened that."

non idem sentiretur: "the same (thing) was not thought."

alias . . . alias: explain and amplify *saepe*.

praetexta: see note on *virili toga*, § 1; the *toga praetexta* was laid aside when a lad was seventeen years old.

ponerentur: subjunct. to show that it is Scipio's opinion that is being stated, not an admitted fact.

§ 34. **interdum** = "sometimes," must be distinguished from *interdiu* = "in the day-time."

uxoriae condicionis = "matrimonial alliance," lit. = "terms of the nuptial contract," *condicio* meaning "conditions" or "terms."

labefactari: the subject of this infin. is either (1) *amicitiam*, understood from *in amicitia*, or (2) *amores*, which is also the subject of *dirimi*.

honoris: *i.e.* dignities and official positions in the state, see § 20.

pestem majorem: lit., "a greater plague."

optimis quibusque: the masc. and fem. pl. of *quisque* with a superlative is rarely used in classical Latin though the neut. pl. is found. The masc. here is probably due to the influence of the preceding *plerisque*.

§ 35. **arguerentur**: subj. because a condition is implied in *quod qui*.

diceret videri: this is a natural but illogical expression instead of *dixit ut . . . videretur*.

CAPS. XI., XII. *The limits of affection in friendship. Coriolanus, Gracchus, Blossius, Themistocles, and others taken as illustrations. A man ought not to ask of his friend a dishonourable act, nor do one himself. Friendship depends on merit and virtue: the doing of a dishonourable act destroys the virtue which was the cause of the friendship.*

§ 37. **familiae vestrae**: *familia* generally means strictly a "household of slaves," here "house."

Laenati et Rupilio consulibus: in 132 B.C.

deprecatum: the supine in *-um* after the verb of motion *venisset*.

sibi: *sibi* is used because it refers to the subject of the main verb *adferebat*.

tanti: G. § 281.

si voluisset, paruissem: this is the regular construction for a conditional sentence expressing a past condition impossible to be fulfilled.

vox: lit. "voice," hence = "expression," "words."

paruit: distinguish *pāreo*, 2, "to obey," *pāro*, 1, "to prepare," and *pario, peperit, partum*, 3, "to bear," "produce."

praefuit: aor. of *praesesse*, "to be before or over," hence "to head."
quaestione nova: "by a new or special court of inquiry."

conciliatrix: Cicero is very fond of fem. nouns in *-trix*; cp. § 89, *adsentatio, vitiorum adjutrix*. In English it is often necessary to turn the noun into a verb.

§ 38. **perfecta sapientia**: the abl. of quality. Notice that this construction cannot be used with a noun unless accompanied by an adj. Thus *homo summa virtute* = "a man of the highest excellence," but *homo virtute* for "a man of excellence" is not Latin.

vitii: partitive genitive depending on *nihil*.

quos novit vita communis: lit., "whom common life is acquainted with."

ex hoc numero = *ex horum numero*.

§ 39. **bis una consules**: 282 B.C. and 278 B.C.

censura: "censorship"; one of the highest offices in Rome. There were two Censors, and their duties were to fill up vacancies in the Senate, to hold a census of the citizens, and in some degree to superintend the morals of the state, and especially of the Equites. They held office for five years (a *lustrum*), but after 434 B.C. they were obliged to complete their special duties in the first eighteen months, but no new Censors were appointed until the expiration of the five years. Aemilius Papus and Fabricius Luscinus were Censors in 278 B.C.

Igitur: as a rule *igitur* in Cicero, like *autem, enim, -que, quidem, -ve*, and *vero*, cannot stand at the beginning of a sentence. In Sallust and later writers it is very often the first word of a sentence.

susplicari: see note § 12.

quemquam: not *aliquem* because the sentence is negative. The difference in meaning between *quisquam* and *quispiam* is scarcely appreciable.

quid adinet: lit., "in what respect does it reach" (to the question)?

rogatum: the acc., prob. masc., the subj. of *rogare*, rather than neut., agreeing with *aliquid* and object of *rogare*.

minime: this superlative is rather awkward, as it cannot govern another superl. *acerrimus*. From this word we must understand the positive *acer*.

§ 40. **cum . . . tum**: see § 2.

de spatio curriculoque: a metaphor from the race-course; *spatium* = "race-course," "track"; *curriculum* = (1) "a race," (2) "a race-course," "racing ground."

majorum: "of our ancestors"; depends on *spatio curriculoque*, not on *consuetudo*.

§ 41. **occupare**: *occupo*, which is derived from *ob* and *capio*, means "to seize," "take possession of," and not (except very rarely) "to occupy." The infin., and not *ut* with the subjunct., is the regular construction after *conor* and *jubeo*.

vel: is connected with *volo*; hence = "or if you like."

paucos menses: acc. of duration of time.

quid: *quid* must be used, and not *aliquid*, after the particles *ne*, *nisi*, *num*, and *si*.

in P. Scipione: it is more likely that this is Scipio the younger than Scipio Nasico the Pontifex; see Index.

tribunatu: as a matter of fact, C. Gracchus was not Tribune until 123 B.C., six years after the date of this dialogue, so there is possibly an anachronism here. More probably, however, the public action of C. Gracchus was such as to show his intention of being Tribune at the proper age, and also such as to make men speculate upon the results of his tribuneship.

serpit: lit. "creeps," *i.e.*, "makes imperceptible progress."

deinde: the exact meaning of this word ("in the second place") can be understood only by reference to the *semel* which comes after it in position, but before it in sense.

tabella: properly a diminutive of *tabula* = "a little table" or "tablet"; hence "a voting tablet"; hence "voting," "ballot."

Gabinia lege: the *lex Gabinia* brought forward by the tribune Aulus Gabinus, 139 B.C., first introduced secret voting, or voting by ballot, in the election of consuls, &c.

Cassia: the *lex Cassia* of the tribune L. Cassius Longinus, 137 B.C., introduced secret voting for juries in criminal cases.

iis resistatur: verbs that govern the dative in the active can only be used impersonally in the passive. See G. § 291. *Obs.* 1.: lit. "resistance is offered to them."

§ 42. **bonis praecipendum est**: see last note; lit. "instruction is to be given to the good."

ut . . . ne existimant: in *final* sentences, Cicero uses *ne* or *ut ne*, and in consecutive sentences, *ut non*: "ita alligatos . . . ut non discedant."

secuti erunt . . . fuerint: the Latin indicates that these actions are perfect (complete) in future time; the English, less accurately, only points out that they are perfect in themselves.

qui: goes with *tulit*.

patriae injuriam : subjective genitive.

xx annis : Themistocles fought at Salamis B.C. 480, was ostracised in 471. Coriolanus, threatened by the plebeians, took refuge with the Volscians B.C. 491.

conscivit : *conscisco* primarily means "to approve of," "decree something in common"; hence "to adjudge to," or "to inflict upon": *mortem sibi consciscere* = "to inflict death on one's self" = "to commit suicide." It is doubtful whether either Themistocles or Coriolanus committed suicide. Thucydides makes Themistocles die a natural death, and Livy does not assert that Coriolanus committed suicide.

§ 43. *supplicio* : *supplicium* is a stronger word than *poena*.

ut ne quis : see § 42, also § 24.

concessum : neut., = "a thing allowed"; hence "permissible," "allowable."

vel ; see *supra*, § 41.

haud scio an : see *supra*, § 20.

minori curae : predicative dat. ; see G. § 297.

CAP. XIII. *Ask honourable acts from friends, do honourable acts for friends, and give good advice without the slightest hesitation or reluctance. Give no heed to the paradoxes of certain philosophers (1) that excessive friendships are to be avoided; (2) the reins of friendship are to be kept loose, so that you can tighten or slacken them when you please; (3) the source of friendship is not affection, but a desire for protection. Friendship must not, any more than virtue, be avoided on account of the trouble to which it gives rise.*

§ 44. *adhibitae pareatur* : cp. § 41, *is resistatur*.

§ 45. *quibusdam* : the allusion here is not quite definite. Probably it is to the Epicureans.

quibusdam placuisse : "(that) it pleased certain persons," but the sense is stronger in Latin. Cp. *senatui placet*, "the senate resolves." Hence "certain persons have held as dogmas."

mirabilia : "extraordinary opinions," "paradoxes."

argutiis : v.l. *argutius*, the compar. adv.

partim : this refers to *quibusdam* = "some think." The correlative to *partim* should be another *partim*, but instead of it we have *alios*, in *alios dicere aiunt*.

adducas : *adducere* = "to pull towards one's self"; hence "to tighten."

caput : lit. "the head"; hence = "the chief or principal thing."

securitatem: *securitas* does not mean "security" in the sense of safety, but "freedom from care," according to the derivation, *se* = *sine*, "without," and *cura* = "care."

§ 46. **alios**: this corresponds with the preceding *partim*, and refers to the later school of the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics.

locum: *locus* = "place," "topic," "subject." It is curious to notice that "topic" is derived from *tōpos* (τόπος), "a place," the Greek equivalent for the Latin *locus*.

virium: see G. § 270. Distinguish *vīri*, "men," *vīri*, "of poison," *vīres*, "forces" (pl. of *vis*), and *vīres*, "thou art green" or "flourishing" (from *vīreo*).

mulierculae: *muliercula* is a diminutive of *mulier*, and means "a puny, weak woman."

§ 47. **praeclaram sapientiam**: this is the interjectional acc.; cp. *me miserum*. The accusative may be regarded as governed by some verb understood from the context, e.g., *monstrantes*.

specie blanda: the abl. of quality.

reapse: contracted from *re* and *eapse*, *eapse* being an old form of *ipsā*.

neesse est . . . aspernetur: for the omission of *ut* see supra § 17. In translating into English, *neesse est* may be regarded as an adverbial phrase = "necessarily."

§ 48. **ne aliquas**: cp. § 24.

quid interest: "what is there between," "what is the difference."

motu animi: "the movement of the mind," i.e., "sensation," "thought."

bonis, incommodis are adjectives agreeing with *rebus*.

diffundatur, contrahatur: probably a metaphor from water solidifying into ice under the action of cold, and flowing in a stream under the action of heat.

CAP. XIV. *Further considerations on the origin of friendship. Like attaches itself to like, good men have necessarily a feeling of goodwill towards good men. Friendship is not based on utility, but vice versā. Those who are in the least need of any other person are the most ready to do a kind service.*

contrahat: the subject of this verb is *quis* understood.

contigit: v.l. *contingit*. On the difference between *contingo* and *accido*, see supra, § 9.

exoriatur: *neesse* is again followed by the subjunct. without the insertion of *ut*; cp. the use of *volo*.

§ 49. *animante praedito*: *animans*, when referring to the lower animals, is neut.; when referring, as here, to man, it is masculine. *animante* is the abl. of the means after *delectari*, *eo* agrees with *animante*.

§ 50. *profecto*: *prōfecto* (derived from *pro* and *facto*) = "for a deed or fact" = "assuredly," "certainly," must be distinguished from *prōfecto*, the abl. of the perf. partic. of *proficiscor*, "to set out," and from *prōfecto*, the abl. of the perf. partic. pass. of *prōficio*, "I advance," "accomplish."

ut: the use of *ut* here after *verum esse* shows that a consequence is expressed. The acc. and infin. would have expressed a fact.

appetentius: present participles used as adjs., and some adjectives ending in *-ax*, take the genitive, e.g. *amans*, *capax*, *sagax*, *edax*, *tenax*, *cupiens*, *appetens*, *sapiens*, *patiens*, *prudens*, *potens*, *impotens*.

similium: see G. § 277.

bonis inter bonos esse: "good (men) have among good (men)."

necessariam: *esse* must be supplied here.

qui est fons: *qui* should strictly be *quae*, agreeing with its antecedent *benivolentia*, but it is attracted into the gender of the predicate *fons*. This attraction is found almost invariably; it is quite the exception to meet the strict logical gender.

immunis: from *in* = "not," and *munus*, "a service or duty" = "free from services, or burdens"; hence (1) "inactive," (2) "unserviceable," (3) "free from," "exempt from."

quae . . . soleat: subj. expressing the reason. Distinguish *consultere aliquem*, "to consult somebody," "ask his advice," from *consultere alicui*, "to take measures for some one's benefit."

§ 51. *tantumque abest ut . . . ut . . .* The verb *abest*, *abfuit*, &c., is always used impersonally by the best writers. The first *ut* clause is explanatory of the impersonal subject, and the second *ut* clause depends on *tantum*, and expresses the result. The predicate of *ii* is "liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi," and the pred. of *qui* is "indigeant."

Atque haut sciam an: *Atque* = "and yet." *Sciam* is occasionally found for the more common *scio*: it is to be explained as the apodosis of a conditional sentence of which the protasis is not expressed (e.g. "si quis ex me quaerat").

operā: pl. from *opus*, *-eris*, n., "a work"; *operā* is the abl. of *opera*, *-ac*, f., "service," "pains," "labour." The pl. *operae* = "labourers," "workmen."

nec domi nec militiae: both *domi* and *militiae* are locative (ep. *Romae*, &c. = "at Rome"). The locative case used to end in *i*, and the old genitives of the first decl. used to be written *ai*.

CAP. XV. *We may not follow the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Who would accept unlimited wealth on condition of loving and being loved by nobody? This would be to live the unenviable life of a tyrant. Power and wealth are often a hindrance to true friendships. The wealth we acquire may be for others to enjoy, but the possession of friendship is fixed and certain. A life without friends cannot be pleasant.*

§ 52. *homines*: i.e. the Epicureans and Cyrenaics.

diffuentes: *difflo* = "to flow away in different directions," hence "to waste," "melt away," "to be demoralized."

habent cognitam: lit., "have (being) known"; in such phrases as this, and also *compertum habere*, we see the beginning of the use of *habere* as an auxiliary verb like *have* in English. This is the beginning of the analytical process in Latin, which is a *synthetical* language.

pro: an interj.; can be followed by either (1) the nom., or (2) the accusative. The accus. is the interjectional accus. as in *me miserum*.

ut = "provided that," "on the terms that."

nimirum is derived from *ne* and *nirum*: *ne* may stand for *non*, so *nimirum* = *non mirum est* = "it is not wonderful," "doubtless," or else *ne* = "lest," and *nimirum* is a contraction for *ne mirum (sit, hoc dico)* = "I say this lest it should be wonderful," hence = "that is to say," "doubtless."

§ 53. *metuat . . . putet*: subjunct., because a class is considered.

dumtaxat: "only," "to this extent," "at any rate," "at least," from *dum* = "whilst," "so far as," and *taxat*, aorist of *tangere*, "to touch," "value," "judge," = "so far as one can judge."

gratiam referre: "to repay a favour," "to return thanks"; *gratiam habere*, "to feel thankful."

§ 54. *illa superbia et importunitate*: abl. of quality; see G. § 319.

nec quicquam intolerabilius: this use of the neut. with the comparative adj. is very common although reference is made to a person.

commodis moribus: abl. of quality; *imperio*, &c., are abl. of instrument; *mos* in sing. = manner, custom; in pl. = character.

indulgeri: as this verb governs a dative it must be used impersonally in the passive, so the full construction of this sentence is "veteres amicitias sperni ab iis, indulgeri novis amicitiiis."

§ 55. *cum*: conj., not preposition.

Vasa: distinguish *vās*, *vāsis*, pl. *vāsa*, -orum, n., "a vessel," "dish," from *vās*, *vādīs*, "bail," "security."

supellectilem: acc. of *supellea*, -ectilis, f., "furniture."

istorum: "of those things," e.g. horses, slaves, garments, &c., which such men possess.

hactenus (lit., *hac*, "this," *tenus*, "up to," a prep. governing abl. and placed after its case): "so far," hence "so far and no farther," "so much as regards this part of our subject."

CAP. XVI. *Limits of friendship. Three opinions are held: (1) to love our friends as we love ourselves, (2) to love our friends as they love us, (3) to have the same value set upon us by our friends as we set upon ourselves. Laelius agrees to none of these; for, as regards (1), a man may do for his friends many things which he may not honourably do for himself, and so seems to love his friends more than himself; as regards (2), it is too cold and calculating and unlike friendship; as regards (3), it is the worst opinion of all. Must the friends of a worthy man, who has too low an opinion of himself, also have a low opinion of him? Another opinion (4), "Love in such a way as to remember you will some day hate," is equally wrong; if it were right we should have to pray for our friend to sin. The true limit is (1) "Be so careful in selecting a friend as never to choose one whom you could afterwards hate."*

§ 56. **ferri**: "to be borne" (in speech), "spoken of."

Affecti: lit., "affected (with feeling)."

nosmet ipsos: these two words are sometimes written as one. The *met* strengthens the *nos*. G. § 76.

alteram: "the second," corresponding to *unam* and *tertiam*.

quanti . . . tanti: genitive of price, by some regarded as a locative; see G. § 281.

facit: indic. expressing a fact, and does not depend on the *ut*, which governs *fiat* alone.

§ 57. **prorsus**: from *pro* and *versus*, "straight on," "directly," "exactly"; here it goes with *nulli* = "to none at all," and not with *assentior* = "I agree entirely."

illa: rightly used (= "that yonder") of that which is farther off.

ab indigno: "from an unworthy person"; *aliquid* must be understood after *precari*.

non satis honeste: *non satis*: lit., "not enough," hence "not quite." *honestus* (f., *honos*, "honour") = "honourable."

iis: i.e. *iis rebus*, abl., governed by *fruantur*; *iis* is fem. not *neut*.

§ 58. **ad calculos vocare**: "to call to an account": *calculi* were pebbles used in counting by bankers and others.

acceptorum et datorum: *accepta* = "the things received" = "the credit side"; *data* = "the outgoings," "the things given to others"

= "the debit side." The usual word instead of *datorum* is *expensorum*.

divitior: from *dives*. Some editions read the contracted form *ditior*.

restrictē: "strictly," "narrowly"; the simple word *stricte* is not used except in late Latin.

verendum est ne: see G. § 460.

plus aequo: *aequo*, the abl. in comparison, "more than right."

§ 59. *abjectior*, *fractior*: these comparatives are to be rendered by *too* instead of *more*, "too downcast," "too much shattered."

amplificandae fortunae: the gerundive depending on *spes*.

amici: pred. gen.: "It is not the part of a friend."

in spem: many editions omit *in*, and make *spem* the acc. of *inducat*. If you read *in*, the obj. of *inducat* is *animum amici*, or *amicum*.

negabat: *i.e. dicebat non*.

vocem: "saying," "expression."

inimiciorem amicitiae: another instance of "oxymoron," see supra § 23.

quam ejus = *quam vocem ejus*.

unus e septem: this refers to the Seven Wise Men of Greece; see note on § 7.

impuri: "of impure motives," "sordid," "mean."

ambitiosi: the literal meaning of *ambitio* is "going around in order to canvass and gain votes," hence *ambitiosus* = "full of desire to get votes for one's self," "ambitious," "egoistic."

reprehendendum: this word may be used either in its literal sense of "catch hold of," or in its derived sense of "reproach."

§ 60. *ut ne quando*: see supra, § 42.

CAP. XVII. (1) *When a friend's liberty or life is at stake we may make a slight, but only a slight, deviation from the path of virtue.* (2) *Carefully test a man before making him your friend, see whether he is strong, steady, and consistent in character, and able to resist the temptations of money, office, power, and also of adversity.*

§ 61. *utendum*: gerund; see G. § 536 (B).

qua fortuna: *qua* for *aliqua*, see § 24.

minus justae = "unjust"; for the "litotes" cp. *minus felices*, supra, § 60; *minus justae* may, however, here mean "less just," "not quite just."

caput agatur: the *caput* is the status of a Roman citizen. The loss of his *caput* (*deminutio capitis*) might involve either death, or else merely the deprivation of his rights as a citizen. *agi* = "to be acted or done," "to be dealt with"; hence "to be a question of," "to be at stake."

modo ne: "provided only that . . . not."

est enim, quatenus: "for there is a limit up to which," cp. *est ubi*, "there is a place where," "there is a time when."

neglegenda est fama: the word *fama* refers back to *turpitude*, which is the result of the neglect of one's reputation.

blanditiis et adsentando: this use of the gerund as co-ordinate with the noun *blanditiis* shows how closely it approximated to a noun.

§ 62. **cujus omnis sermo erat de am.:** "whose was (*i.e.* from whom came) the whole of the discussion on friendship," not "whose whole conversation was about friendship."

in amicis eligendis: here = *in eligendo amicos*; three lines lower down *eligendi* is used as an adj. in the pred. = "to be chosen."

neglegentis: the nom. and acc. pl. of the third (I) decl. often ends in *is*; not to be confounded with gen. sing.

quibus: abl. of means.

expertum: acc. sing. masc. agreeing with subj. of *judicare*. Remember *experior* is a deponent, hence *nisi expertum* = "unless he has made a trial."

praecurrit: "anticipates," "outstrips."

§ 63. **prudentis:** predic. gen.

quo: conj. = "in order that."

amicitia: abl. of means after *periclitatis*.

periclitatis: *periclitator* is a deponent verb, but its perfect partic. is here used passively, cp. *meditatus* and *comitatus* = "meditated" and "accompanied," as well as "meditating" and "accompanying."

honores: is a general word meaning "offices of dignity in the state."

magistratus: "civil magistracies"; *e.g.* censorship, aedileship, &c.

imperia: "military commands," such as were held by the consul, praetor, and dictator.

potestates: corresponds to *magistratus*, as *imperia* to *honores*.

obscuratum iri: remember in this pass. future infin. the so-called participle does not agree with the subject, because the participle is in reality the supine in *-um* after the verb of motion *iri*, used impersonally, and the subject of the infin. is really the object of the

supine: "they think that it is being gone (men are going) to obscure the neglect of friendship," *i.e.* "they think that the neglect of friendship will be obscured."

quia . . . sit: the subjunctive is used here because a reason is stated as supposed to exist in another's mind, but not actually existent; if a reason were stated as existing in reality, we should have the indic. *est*.

§ 64. **reque publica**: the Latins looked upon *res publica* as two, separate words (not like our "republic"), and a *que* can consequently be inserted between them.

facile inventu: for the supine in *-u* after adjectives see G. § 544 and cp. *mirabile dictu*.

descendat: a metaphor borrowed from the language of athletes—"to go down into the arena."

Amicus certus, &c.: lit. "a reliable friend is seen when our affairs are unreliable."

levitatis, &c.: the genitive of the charge after *convincunt*; see G. § 280.

aut si . . . aut: after the second *aut* a *si* must be supplied; its omission is very strange.

CAP. XVIII. *The foundation of friendship is trustworthiness or loyalty. A friend must also be (1) single-minded, (2) sociable, (3) sympathetic, (4) unwilling to bring charges against a friend, and unwilling to believe them when brought, (5) affable and courteous.*

§ 65. **qui moveatur**: the subjunctive is used because *qui* limits the class = "such as to be affected"; *qui movetur*, a little lower down, merely states a fact.

naturaque: of course abl. = "by nature," "naturally."

eodem: strictly adv., "to the same place": cp. *Huc accedit*, "there is added to this."

criminibus: *crimen* (derived from *cerno*, "I judge") means a "charge" or "accusation, but in later Latin it means a "crime."

jam dudum tracto: *jam dudum* with the present in Latin is translated by the perfect with *have* in English. In § 56 he begins to define the limits of friendship, and shows how far a man must display *constantia* in it.

quem eundem: *idem* in this kind of phrases must often be translated by a pronoun, "also," *e.g.* "he also."

quid fictum . . . simulatum: lit. "anything feigned," "pretended."

fronte occultare sententiam: *occultare* is a stronger word than *celare*, implies a deliberate habit. *Fronte* = "by the appearance of

the brow or face." (Distinguish the two words: *frons, frontis*, f. = "the forehead," and *frons, frondis*, f. = "a leaf.")

§ 66. *accedat*: subjunct. after *oportet*. In later Latin an *ut* is inserted before the subjunct., but the inserted *ut* is rarely, if at all, met with in Cicero.

facilitatemque: *facilitas*, from *facilis*, "easy" (to approach or speak to), hence "affability."

CAP. XIX. *Are new friends to be preferred to old, like young horses to old hacks? Certainly not; why, even in the case of a horse, "caeteris paribus," we prefer an old tried horse to one that is fresh and unbroken. But new friendships are not to be rejected if they are likely to be fruitful, merely because we are well supplied with old friends.*

§ 67. *quaestio subdifficilis*: *quaestio* here = "an enquiry," "problem," in § 37 = a specially constituted court of law presided over by a praetor in order to investigate a particular charge. *Subdifficilis*: *sub* in composition with an adjective modifies and diminishes the force of the adjective; so *subdifficilis* = "somewhat hard," *subobscurus* = "somewhat obscure," *subfuscus* = "somewhat dark."

num quando: "whether at any time"; cp. *num quis*, see § 24.

homine: governed by *indigna*, "a human being," as opposed to *equis*.

quae vetustatem ferunt: "which bear old age," i.e. "which can bear keeping."

§ 68. *novitates*: *novitas* = "newness," "a novelty," hence "a new friendship."

vetustas: "old friendship," as opp. to *novitas*.

Quin ipso equo: *quin* = "moreover"; *ipso equo* is governed by *utatur*.

§ 69. *parem esse*: before *parem* some editions insert *superiorem*, but the insertion is unnecessary.

nostro, ut ita dicam, grege: Cicero is using *grex* in a rather unusual sense, so he qualifies it by *ut ita dicam*. The *flock* or *school* to which he refers is the Scipionic circle, which consisted of Scipio, Laelius, Scaevola the Augur, L. Furius Philus, P. Rupilius, M. Manilius, Spurius Mummius, the historian Polybius, the satirist Lucilius, and the dramatists Terence and Pacuvius.

omnino: "on the whole," hence "no doubt," "indeed."

ampliores: the word *amplus* has special reference to the holding high offices of state.

§ 70. *honor, dignitati*: predicative datives.

imbecilliore animo . . . fortuna : abl. of quality.

in fabulis : *e.g.*, the stories of Romulus and Remus, or the Persian king, Cyrus. Some editors take *fabula* to mean "a play," as in § 24.

in proximum quemque : "to all our nearest connexions"; remember this use of *quisque* with the superlative adjective.

CAP. XX. Continuing with Cap. XVIII.: *A friend must be (6) willing to put himself on a level with his inferiors, (7) unwilling to boast of his kind services, (8) eager to acknowledge and proclaim the kind services done to him, (9) liberal in conferring as much as he can give, or the recipient can take. The time for deciding on friendship is when we are of mature age and mind. Our greatest friends are not necessarily those of longest standing. At different times in life, and in consequence of our changing pursuits and character, we choose a different type of friend. Diversity of character and pursuits severs friendship. Two cautions to be observed: (1) not to let your unbounded affection injure your friend's interests, (2) not to ask more from your friend than you would be willing to grant to him.*

§ 71. **necessitudine :** *necessitudo* (connected with *nec-tere*, "bind"), "a close tie"; *necessarius*, "one bound by a close tie."

officiose : "kind service"; *officium* does not mean an "office" in the sense of a place of business, but means "duty," "good service," in the way in which we use "kind offices." Thus *officiose*, "in accordance with a sense of duty," or "in a manner full of kind services."

quae meminisse, &c. : construe—"et is, in quem conlata sunt, debet ea meminisse; is qui contulit ea, non debet ea commemorare." Notice *meminisse*, the perf., is exactly parallel with the present *commemorare*, since *memini* has no present tense.

§ 72. **inferiores :** is the object of *extollere*; grammatically, it could be taken as the subj. (*inferiores debent se extollere*), but the sense so obtained is not appropriate.

levandi : lit. "to be lightened."

opere : v. l. *operâ*, which word Cicero is perhaps more likely to have employed; see note on § 51.

§ 73. **possis :** indefinite subjunct., expressing uncertainty.

ille : after this word we must supply *possit* from *possis*.

perducere : *per* in composition often has the sense of carrying a thing through to a goal or end, after passing through the intermediate stages.

consulem efficere : "to make consul"; *consulem facere* = "to vote for as consul," does not imply that the candidate was elected consul.

fratrem ejus L.: the *ejus* of course refers to P. Rupilius and not to Scipio.

§ 74. **onnino:** "on the whole," "in short."

conroboratis jam, &c.: abl. absolute, not ablatives of the instr.

pilae: ball was a very common game among Romans of all ages, and was played in a variety of ways.

studiosi: governs genitive.

aliter: "otherwise," *i.e.* if the rule to decide on friendships only at a mature age is not followed.

nutrices et paedagogi: these were a favoured class of slaves; the *nutrix* had the superintendence of the child from its earliest years, and undoubtedly often exercised a great influence in forming its character. The *paedagogus* accompanied the child to and from school, and carried his satchel and books for him. He often became the child's chief friend and confidant.

vetustatis: *i.e. veteris amicitiae.*

aestimandi: the MSS. read *est*, and the remaining letters have been added by the conjecture of Mommsen.

mores: acc. after *sequuntur*: it would be a very harsh construction to make it nom. to *sequuntur* and takes *disparēs mores* as = *homines moribus disparibus.*

distantia: in Cicero never means "distance in space," but only "diversity in quality."

§ 75. **capere potuisset:** notice the pres. inf. *capere* and pluperf. *potuisset* where in English we say "could have taken," see supra § 9.

educatus: "brought up," "educated," from *edūco.*

quod: "because."

CAP. XXI. *The causes of the breach of friendship.* (1) *The faults of our friends,* (2) *change of character, taste, political views. Friendship should die a gradual easy death, not violently or suddenly. Care must be taken that friendship does not turn into hostility. The best safeguards are* (1) *not to begin to love too quickly,* (2) *not to love the unworthy. We should make a man our friend because of his innate worth, not from any hope of advantage. A friend is a second self.*

§ 76. **redundet:** subjunctive, the so-called generic subjunct.; see G. § 479, *cluendae, dissuendae, magis quam discindendae*: *cluo* = "to wash out," especially "to wash out a stain," whether physical or moral; *dissuo* = "to unsew" the seams of a garment in order to take it to pieces; *discindo* is to "tear the material to pieces."

Catonem dicere: if the meaning had been "as I have heard Cato say," we should have had *dicentem*, not *dicere*: reading *dicere* we must translate "as I have heard that Cato said."

exarserit: from *exardesco*, not *exardeo*, which is only found in late Latin.

faciunda: the old form of *facienda*; cp. *cundus* from *eo*. So *legundus* was the old form of *legendus*.

§ 77. **rei publicae partibus**: "political factions."

quocum: v. l. *quicum*, *quo* and *qui* being both ablatives and the *cum* being placed after the pronoun instead of before; see supra § 2.

meo nomine = "on my account." Pompey had promised Scipio to give way to Laelius and not to compete with him for the consulship. In spite of this Pompey carried on a secret canvass, and so lost the friendship of Scipio.

auctoritate: this reading neither makes good sense nor good grammar. We should expect an adjective to qualify it. A preferable reading is *ac moderate*, but if *auctoritate* is kept, we must translate "with his usual high character."

offensione animi: *offensio* = (1) "a tripping," "stumbling"; (2) an offence given to any one, hence "disgust," "aversion"; (3) an offence which one receives, hence "vexation," "annoyance"; hence *offensione animi non acerba*, lit. = "with a not-bitter vexation of heart," i.e. "with vexation but without bitterness."

§ 78. **danda opera est**: "pains must be taken"; see § 72 and § 51. It is followed by *ne fiant*, and also *ut videantur*.

extinctae potius quam oppressae: "to have died out rather than to have been crushed out." For the difference between *potius* and *magis*, see note on § 27.

ut is in culpa sit, &c.: "that the man who does the wrong, not the man who suffers it, shall be considered in fault"; i.e. when an injury has been done by a former friend, if a man retaliates he puts himself in the wrong, whereas if he submits to the injury he puts the former friend in the wrong. The claims of former friendship prevent a man from retaliating.

omnino: "on the whole," "in short."

ut ne . . . neve: see supra, § 42.

§ 79. **quibus in ipsis**: *quibus* can be either dat. ("to whom they are in themselves") or the abl.

omnia praeclara rara: this is a proverb, and we may notice (1) the jingle (*praeclara rara*), cp. § 64, "*amicus certus in re incerta cernitur*," and (2) the conciseness as shown by the omission of *sunt*.

§ 80. *exemplo*: predic. dative.

qualis et quanta: "the nature and greatness," lit., "of what kind and how great." Notice how these relative adjectives can be translated by nouns.

alter idem: "a second self"; lit., "another same." For the idea, cp. § 23.

§ 81. *bestiis volucris*: *bestiis* is a noun, and is followed by five adjectives agreeing with it; *volucris*, *nantibus*, *agrestibus* describe the abode of the beast (air, water, or land), and *cicuribus*, *feris* describe the nature (tame or wild).

ut se: this *ut* depends on *apparet*.

anquirit: "seeks all round for"; *an* is from the same root as *ambi*, "on both sides," "around" (e.g. *ambio*) and *ἀμφι* (*amphi*) = "around" in Greek.

CAP. XXII. *Many people have the impudence to desire for a friend a person with a disposition the opposite of their own, e.g. a bad man desires to have a good man for his friend. This is unfair, a man must be virtuous before he can hope for a virtuous friend. Friendship opens the path to virtue, not to vice and indulgence. You must exercise a careful judgment in choosing your friends.*

§ 82. *ne dicam*: "let me not say," "not to say."

par est: lit., "it is equal," hence = "it is fair."

jam dudum tractamus: cp. *jam dudum tracto*, § 65. The "long while" refers to §§ 65-82.

imperabunt governs the dat. Verbs of commanding when followed by an English inf. take the subjunct. in Latin; *jubeo*, however, takes the acc. and infin.

verebuntur: *vereor*, "I have a respect for," "feel fear."

§ 83. *adjutrix*: Cicero is fond of forming these fem. nouns expressing agent; cp. *conciliatrix*, § 37.

a natura: the preposition *a* shows that Nature is personified: the ablative of instrument would not have required a preposition.

virtuti opera danda est: see supra, § 78.

ea vero neglecta: abl. absol.

§ 85. *saepius*: "more often than once," "rather often"; cp. *diutius*, § 68.

cum judicaris: lit. = "when you shall have judged," i.e. "after you have formed your judgment."

plectimur: lit. "we are punished."

praeposteris consiliis: *praeposterus* = "with the hind part in front," "having the cart before the horse."

acta agimus: "we are doing what is already done," "labouring in vain," as in English "to kill a dead man."

ultra et citra: "on the farther and on the near side," "on this side and that," "in all directions."

CAP. XXIII. *Indifference with regard to friendship is extremely culpable. Many despise, or pretend to despise, virtue; but no one affects to despise friendship. Friendship is indispensable to life. The beauties of nature, no matter how lavishly displayed, cannot be appreciated unless a man has some one to talk to about them.*

§ 86. **quo:** "wherefore."

rei: obj. gen.

una: by attraction for *unum*; cp. § 50, *benivolentiam qui est amicitiae fons*.

uno ore: lit., "with one mouth": *os, oris*, "mouth"; *os, ossis*, "bone."

venditatio: lit., "an offering for sale," hence "puffing."

victus: *victus, -us, m.*, "food," "means of livelihood," derived from *vivo*, must be distinguished from *victus, -a, -um* = "conquered," the part. of *vinco*, and from *vinculus, -us, m.*, "bound," the part. of *vincio*.

quam multi: *quot* is never used by good writers as a substantive, and so could not be used here instead of *quam multi*. In addition to this Cicero often prefers *quam multi* when *quot* could be used. There is another reading here, *permulti*.

negotium . . . otiosi: these two words are contrasted: *negotium* from *nec* and *otium* = "not leisure," hence = "business"; *otiosi* = "full of leisure," *i.e.* engaged in no public occupation, but with all their time free for their own business.

liberaliter: "in a way worthy of a free man."

§ 87. **serpiter:** = "crawls," "makes its way imperceptibly."

expertem sui: *expertem* from *expers* (from *ex* and *pars*), "without a part in," "free from," governs the genitive. *Sui*, not *cjus*, is used because *amicitia* is the subj. of the sentence.

asperitate ea: abl. of qual., see G. § 319.

nescio quem: see *n.*, § 4.

ut non: expresses result; see G. § 449 (b).

virus: a neut. noun of the 2nd decl. ending in *-us*; cp. *pelagus* and see G. § 19. 2.

frequentia: *frequens* always contains the idea of "crowded."

ferreus: there is undoubtedly a play upon words intended here between *ferreus* and *ferre*; see § 79, *omnia praeclara rara*.

cuique: compounded of *cui* and *que*, not from *quisque*.

§ 88. **commemorare**: notice the infin., not the participle *commemorantes*; hence we must translate "I have heard that our old men relate," not "I have heard our old men relating or relate." The construction is "quod audiivi nostros senes commemorare, auditum ab aliis senibus, dici solitum a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor." *Auditum* is in apposition to *quod*. With *solitum* supply *esse*.

in amicissimo quoque: the superl. adj. with *quisque* often contains the notion of *in proportion to*: "to every one in proportion to his friendliness or friendship."

CAP. XXIV. *Advice and reproof must be accepted with good humour. But the advice should not be given with harshness, nor the reproof with insolence. A man should be courteous but not obsequious. Truth is necessary, though not always palatable. A man should be sorry for his faults and glad at their correction, and not vice versa.*

eadem: nom. fem. agreeing with *natura*, = "also."

quae ab ea monemur: lit., "what (things) we are admonished by her," "the admonitions we receive from her"; *quae*, acc. of the thing, being retained in the passive.

usus amicitiae: "intimacy," "intercourse in friendship."

tum . . . tum . . . tum: "at one time, . . . at another, . . . at another."

sapientis: pred. gen.

sublevanda: another reading, *subeunda* = "must be undergone," makes very good sense. *Sublevanda* is a variation on the preceding word *elevare* = "must be removed,"—"if the following cause of offence must be removed," *i.e.* for the future people must take advice and reproof without being offended.

haec: *i.e.* advice and reproof, understood from *monendi et objurgandi*.

§ 89. **in Andria**: "in the play of the Andrian girl."

familiaris meus: Terence was an intimate friend of Laelius, and belonged to the Scipionic circle; see *supra*, § 69.

ex ea nascitur odium: lit., "hatred is born of it."

obsequium: here used in a bad sense = "flattery"; later on it is used in a good sense = "respect," "deference," "obedience."

in fraudem: *fraus*, besides meaning "deceit," also has the signification of "injury," "ruin."

adsentatio vitiorum adjutrix: cp. *supra*, §§ 83 and 37.

libero : adjective used as noun. We cannot understand *amico*, but must supply *homine*.

non modo : "not only not"; *non modo* can mean "not only not" only when followed by a second negative clause, as *ne . . . quidem*, here.

vivitur : impers., "life is passed," "we live."

§ 90. **scitum** : *scitus*, adj. from *scisco*, "to seek to know," = (1) "shrewd," "wise," "skilled" (applied to persons), and (2) "shrewd," "suitable," "witty," "neat" (applied to things).

quod contra : *quod* is not the acc. neut. governed by the prep. *contra*, but a conj. like "whereas," and *contra* is an adv. = "on the other hand." For this use of *quod* cp. *quodsi*, = "but if," lit. = "as to which if."

CAP. XXV. *A friend must give and receive advice and avoid flattery. Flattery is opposed to truth, which is the essence of friendship. Flattery from people in powerful positions is especially dangerous. Flattery can, with the help of care, be readily distinguished from true friendship, even by unskilled persons; e.g. see how the common people judged between the proposals of C. Papirius and Scipio, or see how they regarded the proposals of Crassus about the priesthood.*

§ 91. **amicitiae** : gen. not dat., *proprium* being regarded as a quasi noun.

sic : corresponds to *ut* at the beginning of the sentence.

nominibus : "names," e.g. *adulatio*, *adsentatio*, *blanditia*. This is a different use of *nomen* from that in *meo nomine* of § 77.

levium hominum : predic. gen., understand *est*.

ad voluntatem = "to meet your wishes," "in order to please."

§ 92. **idque** : *i.e.*, *verumque*, not *judiciumque*.

nomen amicitiae : "the word friendship"; see supra, § 18.

valere : lit. "to be strong," here = "to have any meaning,"

qui = "how," the old abl.

quōque : from *quisque*, not *quōque* = "also."

§ 93. **devium** : "departing from the path," "erratic," "wandering."

negat quis : *quis* = "some one" or "any one," and is used instead of *aliquis* because the sentence is interrog.; *nego* is said to be for *ne-igo*, *i.e.*, *ne* and *ajo* or *aio*; *aio* = "I say yes," and *nego* = "I say no."

imperavi : *impero* takes an acc. of the thing, and dat. of the person; *omnia assentari* here takes the place of the acc. of the thing.

idem Terentius : "the same Terence whom I mentioned," above in § 89.

Gnathonis persona: see *n.*, § 4.

levitatis: pred. gen.

§ 94. **Gnathonum similes**: see *G.* § 277.

loco: "position," especially position in which one is born; hence = "birth."

accessit: lit. "approached"; hence = "was added to."

§ 95. **Contio**: this word is a contraction for *co-ventio*, from *con* and *venio*, and means "an assembly"—usually one summoned by a military commander.

§ 96. **nuper**: "lately," *i.e.* in 130 B.C.

influebat: "flowed into," *i.e.*, "dropped his pleasing words into."

ferret legem: "was trying to pass his law": *ferre legem*, "to propose a law"; *suadere legem*, "to recommend," *i.e.*, "to speak in favour of a law"; *dissuadere*, "to speak against it."

de tribunis plebis reficiendis: the existing law was that a man could not serve as tribune of the plebs for a second time until ten years after his previous tribunate. Papirius, in 130 B.C., proposed to abolish this law, and make a man eligible for the year following his tribunate. In this Papirius was unsuccessful, but before 123 B.C. a law was passed making an outgoing tribune eligible if the number of candidates proposed were not sufficient to fill all the vacancies.

Dissuasimus nos: means no more than *dissuasi*—the pl. is occasionally thus used for the sing.

ducem . . . comitem: Scipio was only a private citizen, and held no office then, yet he seemed a *dux*.

diceres: see *G.* § 449 (*b*).

in manibus: "is in your hands," *i.e.*, "is or has been read by all of you."

Q. Maxumo et L. Mancino consulibus: B.C. 145; the insertion of the *et* is unusual, but due here to the addition of the words *fratre Scipionis*.

lex de sacerdotiis: Crassus, the tribune 145, proposed B.C. that the people should elect when vacancies occurred in the College of Priests. Previous to this the rule was that the surviving members of the college selected or co-opted the new member (*cooptatio*).

beneficium: "benefit," "favour," "patronage."

transferebatur: the imperf. expresses an attempt, and here also the failure of the attempt.

in forum versus: these words are obscure and difficult. Previous to the time of Crassus, the tribune, when addressing the people, used to look towards the Senate-house, the people being assembled in the

comitium, between him and the Senate-house. The space where the people could collect was very confined, so Crassus introduced the custom for the tribune, when speaking from the Rostra, to have his back towards the Senate-house, and his face towards the people who were assembled in the forum.

agere cum populo: "to deal" or "speak with the people," a technical phrase for the tribune laying measures before the people.

vendibilem: (cp. *venditatio*, § 86) "saleable," "puffed up," "plausible."

religio deorum: Laelius urged that the people had no right to control the method of religious observance; that could only be controlled by the gods.

nobis defendentibus = *me defendente*.

praetore me: Laelius was praetor in 145 B.C.

consul: 140 B.C.: he was candidate 141, but was defeated.

summa auctoritate: the weight or authority of the consulship. If a consul spoke against a measure, his opposition would naturally have great influence and effect. In this case the opposition was successful *re*, "on account of its real substance."

CAP. XXVI. *The power of truth, which is great everywhere, is especially great in friendship. The man who flatters himself and shirks the truth is the easiest prey to flatterers. It is easy to see open flattery; we must be especially on our guard against flattery which is concealed and self-insinuating.*

§ 97. in *scaena*: Laelius compares speaking before the assembly to speaking a part on the stage.

adumbratis: *adumbro* = "to represent a thing only in outline," and, consequently, imperfectly; contrasted with *illustratum*, "brought into full light."

loci: partitive genitive, depending on the quasi-substantive *plurimum*.

perpenditur: *perpendo* = "to weigh carefully," "estimate," "consider," "which is estimated entirely by its truth"; *totū* is nom.

amare, &c.: the subj. of *amare* and *amari* is *te* understood, and they depend on *exploratum habeas*.

§ 98. *omnino*: "no doubt"; cp. § 69.

amans sui: the part. *amans* is used as an adj. with genitive of the object; cp. *patiens*, *impatiens*, also adjectives in *-ax*, as *capax*, *edax*, &c.

de virtutis opinione: "about the opinion or reputation of virtue," *i.e.* "about supposed virtue."

laudum: *laus* means (1) "praise," (2) "merit that deserves praise."

parasitorum: *parasitus* is lit. "one who eats with another," a Greek word corresponding to *conviva*; hence, in a bad sense, one who by flattery and buffoonery manages to live at another's expense, "a sponger," "parasite." The parasite was a stock character in almost every comedy.

nisi essent milites gloriosi: "unless there were braggart soldiers." A braggart soldier is a person every one comes across, and so all can appreciate the witty description and grotesqueness of the parasite's character. The *Miles Gloriosus* of Plautus, and Thraso in the *Eunuchus* of Terence, were well-known characters.

agere gratias: "to pay (lit., 'to do') thanks." This line is from Terence's *Eunuchus*, but it is in the form of an exclamation, and not a question.

§ 99. adlectant: a frequentative of *adlicio*, so *jacto* is a frequent. of *jacio*; see Gr. § 189.

quippe qui: "inasmuch as he."

litigare: from *litem agere* = (1) "to quarrel," and especially (2) "to sue at law." The first meaning is the one here.

det manus: "throws up his hands," as a sign of defeat. It was the ordinary gesture on the battlefield and in the arena in begging for mercy.

ut: this construction is said to be explained by an ellipse of *num credibile est*.

omnes comicos stultos: notice the three adjectives all together without any *et*; *comicos* = "belonging to comedy."

inlusseris: in early Latin, down to Cicero's time, it was customary to put two *s*'s instead of one after a long vowel.

lautissime: "most splendidly."

§ 100. nescio quo pacto: "I don't know by what means," "some how or other."

in hominem cadere: lit., "to fall on to a man," "to come within his powers of attainment"; cp. § 48, "si cadit in sapientem animi dolor."

aliquando: "at some time," hence = "at last."

CAP. XXVII. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY. *Friendship is won and preserved by virtue, which produces harmony, firmness, and constancy. Friendship is caused by an appreciation of like qualities in another. Hence arises love, from which is derived the word friendship. Utility is the result, not the basis or origin, of friendship. Friendship can*

exist among persons of all ages, but especially among those of the same age. Man's fortune is frail and perishable, but love and friendship are imperishable, and without them life contains no pleasure. Friendship survives the death of one party to the friendship; thus my friendship with Scipio survives though he is dead.

convenientia rerum: "agreement or fitness or harmony in all things."

quae: refers to *utilitate*, not to *indigentia*.

minus: a "litotes" for *non*.

§ 101. **aequales**: "people of the same age."

e carceribus: the *carceres* were the enclosures from which the chariots started in the chariot races,—“the barrier or starting-place.”

ad calcem: "to the goal"; the *calx* was the limit or goal in the racecourse, and was so called because its position was marked by a chalk line. In Latin metaphors from chariot races are extremely common.

§ 102. **solī**: dat. sing. of *solus*, "alone"; see G. § 57.

in manibus habui: "had in my hands," *i.e.* "at hand," "near." This phrase is different from *est in manibus oratio*, § 96.

§ 103. **senserim**: see G. § 430; the subjunctive of limitation.

victus: subst., = "food," "mode of living."

§ 104. **cognoscendi semper aliquid**: *aliquid* is the accus. after *cognoscendi*; this is not the gerundive construction, which would require the obj. to be in the same case as the participle; see G. § 537.

contrivimus: *contero* = "to rub together," hence "to waste."

desiderium: lit., "the missing," "wishing for something absent."

recordatio: *recordatio* is the "recalling to memory," *memoria* = "retaining a thing in memory," and *cogitatio*, "pondering over a thing in one's mind."

alunturque potius: the *que* is disjunctive = "nor" or "but"; *potiusque* constantly means "or rather."

augentur: *augeo* = "to increase" (trans.), *cresco* = "to increase," "grow" (intr.)

adfert: should according to rule be *adferret*, or *attulisset*; but Laelius breaks off the conditional sentence, and graphically ends with a statement or assertion.

diutius: "somewhat longer," "much longer."



APPENDIX.

- accīdo**: accīdo, -cīdi, *to happen*.
- ācer**, -eris, n., *the maple tree*.
- appāret**: 3rd sing. pres. subj of
apparo, 1, *I prepare*.
- cāro**, carnis, f., *flesh*.
- cecīdi**, *I fell*, from cādo, 3.
- cōmes**, -itis, c., *a companion*.
- dūces**: pl. of dux, ducis, m., *a leader*.
- edūco**: from educo, 1, *to educate*.
- fābula**, *a little bean*.
- fīdes**: fides, ei, *faith*.
- īdem**, *the same* (neut.).
- impēdēre**: impendo, -di, -sum, 3,
tr. *to weigh out, expend*.
- incīdere**: incīdo, -cīdi, -cāsūm, 3,
to fall upon, happen.
- indicat**: from indīco, 1, *to point out*.
- jacēre**: from jacio, jeci, jactum,
to throw.
- lābes**: 2nd sing. pres. subj. of lābo,
1, *to totter*.
- lābor**, *toil*.
- latēre**: abl. of lātus, -eris, n., *a side*.
- lātus**, *a side*.
- accīdo**: accīdo, -īdi, -īsum, *to cut into, fell*.
- ācer**, acris, acre, adj.; *bold*.
- appāret**: *it appears*.
- cāro**: dat. of cārus, -a, -um, *dear*.
- cecīdi**, *I killed*, from caedo, 3.
- cōmes**: pl. of cōmis, adj., *courteous*.
- dūces**: *you will lead*, from dūco.
- edūco**: from edūco, 3, *to lead out*.
- fābula**, *a play, fable*.
- fīdes**: from fīdo = *you will trust*.
- īdem**, *the same* (masc.).
- impēdēre**: impēdeo, -ēre, *to overhang, impend*.
- incīdere**: incīdo, -cīdi, -cīsūm, 3,
to cut into.
- indicat**: 3rd pres. subj. indīco, 1,
to declare.
- jacēre**: inf. of jaceo, *to lie*.
- lābes**: lābes, -is, f., *disgrace*.
- lābor**, *I glide*.
- latēre**: infin. of lateo, 2, *to lie hidden*.
- lātus**, *broad*; also *borne*, partic. of fero.

lēges: 2nd per. fut. indic. of *lego*,
I read or choose.

lēvis, *light.*

liber: liber, libri, *a book.*

libro: dat. of liber, *a book.*

māla: fem. sing. and n. pl. of
mālus, -a, -um, *bad.*

mālo: dat. or abl. sing. of malus,
bad.

mālo: dat. or abl. sing. of mālum,
an evil.

mānet, *remains*, pres. ind. of
maneo.

mānibus: dat. or abl. pl. of manus,
-us, f., *a hand.*

mīseris: dat. pl. of miser, -era,
-erum, *wretched.*

nīsi, *unless.*

nōtā: nota, -ae, f., *a mark.*

nōtā: abl. of nōta, f., *a mark.*

nōtā: pres. imper. of nōto, 1.

nōtus, *the South wind.*

occīdo: occīdo, -īdi, -āsum, *to fall.*

operā: nom. sing. of opera, -ae, f.,
diligence.

operā: pl. of opus, -eris, n., *a work.*

pāres: pl. of par, = *equal*; 2nd
sing. subj. of pārō, *I prepare.*

pārens, *a parent.*

patēre: imper. 2nd sing. of patior,
to suffer.

pīla: pīla, -ae, f., *a ball.*

pīlus: pīlus, -i, m., *a hair.*

lēges: pl. of lex, legis, f., *a law.*

lēvis, *smooth.*

liber: liber, -era, -erum, *free.*

liberi: liberi, -orum, *children.*

Liber: Liber, -eri, *the god of wine.*

libro: libro, 1, *to balance, swing,*
brandish.

māla: māla, ae, f., *a cheek*; also
n. pl. of mālum, *an apple.*

mālo: mālo, inf. malle, *to prefer*;
mālus, -i, f., *an apple tree*;
mālum, -i, n., *an apple.*

mānet, *may flow*, pres. subj. of
māno, 1.

mānibus: from manes, -ium, *ghosts,*
shades.

mīseris: fut. perf. ind. and perf.
subj. of mitto, *to send.*

nīsi, *leaning or striving*, from nītor,
nīxus, or nīsus sum, 3.

nōtā: fem. of nōtus, *well-known*

nōtā: abl. fem. sing. of notus,
well-known.

nōtus, *well-known.*

occīdo: occīdo, -īdi, -īsum, *to kill.*

operā: abl. of opera, -ae, f.

pāres: 2nd sing. of pārō, *I obey.*

pārens, *obeying.*

patēre: inf. of pāteo, *to lie open.*

pīla: pīla, -ae, f., (1) *a mortar*, (2)
a pillar.

pīla: pilum, -i, n., *a Roman javelin.*

pīlus: pilus, -i, m., *a division of*
the Roman army.

plācet, *it pleases*, fr. plāceo.

pōpulus: populus, -i, m., *people*.

pōtes, *you are able*, from possum.

prōfecto, *assuredly*; also partic. of prōfiscor, *to set out*.

profūgit: pres. of profugio, -fūgi, 3, *to flee from*.

quōque, *also*.

rēfert: from rēfero, *I bring back*.

salis: gen. sing. of sal, salis, m., = *salt*.

sēdes: 2nd sing. of sēdeo, *to sit*.

sēro: (1) serui, sertum, 3, *to twine*; (2) sēvi, sātum, 3, *to sow*.

sōles: 2nd sing. of soleo = *you are accustomed*.

sōlum: solum, -i, n., *soil, ground*.

suspīcio: vb., *I look up at*.

vēlis: subj. of volo, *to wish*.

Vēnēris, of *Venus*.

vēnit, *comes*, pres. of venio.

vidēris: fut. pf. indic. or perf. subj. of video, *to see*.

vincitur, *is conquered*, from vincio, vinci, victum, 3.

vīres: 2nd sing. of vīreo, *to be green*.

vōces: 2nd subj. of vōco, 1, *to call*.

plācet: pres. subj. of plāco, *to pacify*.

pōpulus, -i, f., *poplar tree*.

pōtes, *you may drink*, from poto, 1.

prōfecto: dat. or abl. of pass. partic. of prōficio, *to advance, make progress*.

profūgit: perf. of profugio.

quōque: (1) abl. of quisque = *each*; (2) = *quo* and *que*, *quo* being abl. of *qui* or *quis*.

rēfert, *it concerns*.

salis: 2nd sing. of salio, *to leap*.

sēdes: sēdes, -is, f., *a seat*; also 2nd sing. subj. of sēdo, *to settle, allay*.

sēro: adv. = *late*; also adj., from serus = *late*.

sōles: pl. of sol, sōlis, *the sun*.

sōlum: from sōlus, -a, -um, *alone*.

suspīcio, -ōnis, f., *suspicion*.

vēlis: fr. velum, -i, n., *a sail*.

vēnēris: fut. perf. ind. and perf. subj. of venio.

vēnēris: 2nd sing. subj. of vēnor, *to hunt*.

vēnit: perf. of venio = *came*; pres. of vēneo = *is sold*.

vidēris: 2nd sing. ind. pres. of videor.

vincitur, *is bound*, from vincio, vinci, victum, 4.

vīres: pl. of vis, *strength*.

vōces: pl. of vox, vocis, f., *a voice*.

HISTORICAL INDEX.



A.

A. = Aulus.

Acilius (§ 6): L. Acilius, a commentator on the Twelve Tables, probably a contemporary of Cato.

Aemilius (§ 39): Quintus Aemilius Papus, a constant friend of C. Fabricius Luscinus, with whom he was consul in 282 B.C. and also in 278, and censor in 275.

Africanus (§ 7, &c.): see under Scipio.

Agrigentinus (§ 24): the Agrigentine—*i.e.*, Empedocles, a philosopher, poet, and historian, born at Agrigentum, in Sicily, 444 B.C. According to him there were four elements—Earth, Water, Air, and Fire—which were regulated by two forces, Love and Hatred; Love (*amicitia* according to Cicero) being the attractive force, and Hatred (*discordia*) the repulsive force. Empedocles was said to have jumped down the crater of Mount Etna, so that people, not knowing where he had died, might think that he had been carried off to heaven by the Gods.

Andria (§ 89): the Andrian maid, so called from Andros, one of the Cyclades, S.E. of Euboea. "Andria" was the name of one of the best plays of Terence. See Terentius.

Archytas (§ 88), a follower of Pythagoras, and an able astronomer and geometrician, flourished 400 B.C., redeemed Plato, his instructor, from the hands of the tyrant Dionysius. He was seven times governor of Tarentum.

Athenae (§§ 7, 87), the capital of Attica and of Greece, in Cicero's time was used as a university, to which young Romans went in order to finish their education. Cicero attended lectures here from 79-77 B.C. Socrates the Wise, and Timon the Misanthrope, were celebrated characters in connexion with Athens.

Atticus (§ 2): Titus Pomponius Atticus, a Roman knight, a rich banker, and a bosom friend of Cicero. He obtained the name of

Atticus either from his constant residence at Athens, or from his thorough acquaintance with the Greek language. He was born 109 B.C., and died 32 B.C. He went to school with Cicero, kept up an intimate acquaintance with him throughout his life, and constantly gave him sound and useful advice. Cicero dedicated several of his treatises to Atticus.

B.

Bias (§ 59), a native of Priene, in Ionia, was one of the Seven Sages of Greece, and flourished about 550 B.C. His title to the name Sage rests upon certain maxims, moral and political, which were commonly attributed to him. His best known saying was, "Love in such a way as to remember you will one day hate the present object of your love."

Blosius or Blossius (§ 37): C. Blosius, of Cumae, a *hospes* of Scaevola's family, was an intimate friend of Ti. Gracchus, and was said to have urged the latter to bring forward his Agrarian Law. On the death of Ti. Gracchus in 132 B.C., Blosius was brought before the Consuls. He fled to Aristonicus, king of Pergamus, and eventually committed suicide, in order to avoid falling into the hands of the Romans, B.C. 130.

Brutus (§ 7): Decimus Junius Brutus, the Augur, was consul with Cornelius Scipio Nasica in B.C. 138. He was a firm supporter of the senatorial party, and a strong opponent of the tribunes. His talents as a general were very great, and he gained a complete victory over the Gallaei, for which he was honoured with a triumph, B.C. 136.

C.

C.: an abbreviation for Caius or Gaius.

Caecilius: Caecilius Statius, a Roman comic poet, B.C. 219-168, a native of Milan, was at one time a slave. The lines quoted in § 99 are supposed to have been written by him.

Capitolium: the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus and citadel of Rome on the southern summit of Mons Capitolinus. The building was completed by Tarquinius Superbus, B.C. 533. It was burnt B.C. 83, during the Marian war, and rebuilt by Sulla.

Carbo (§§ 39, 41, 96): Caius Papirius Carbo, born about B.C. 164, was an intimate friend of Ti. Gracchus. After the death of the latter, he was appointed one of the commissioners for carrying out the Agrarian Law. He was tribune B.C. 131, and introduced a bill for voting by ballot at the Comitia (the Lex Papiria, or Lex Tabellaria of Carbo). As consul in 120 B.C., he attempted to go over from the popular to the senatorial side, but his conversion was not welcomed, and in 119 he was prosecuted for his participation with the Gracchi, and escaped condemnation only by suicide.

Cassia lex (§ 41): the law passed by the tribune, L. Cassius Longinus, in 137 B.C., by which juries in criminal cases were allowed to vote by ballot. This Cassius was the author of the famous saying, "Cui bono?" = "For whose good?" For another *Cassia lex* of the consul Spurius Cassius, see s.v. *Cassius*.

Cassius (§ 28): Spurius Cassius Viscellinus was consul in 502, 493, and 486 B.C. During his third consulship, in 486 B.C., he proposed his famous Agrarian Law (*Cassia Lex*), to divide the country of the newly conquered Hernici equally among (1) the Hernici, (2) the Plebs, and (3) the Latins. All parties were offended by this, and Cassius was accused of aiming at the kingship, and was accordingly put to death.

Cato (§ 39): (1) Caius Porcius Cato, grandson of Cato the Censor, consul B.C. 114, was condemned for corruption in his dealings with Jugurtha. He was a friend and follower of Ti. Gracchus. (2) Marcus Porcius Cato, surnamed the Censor, born 234 B.C., was quaestor under Africanus in the war against Carthage; was consul B.C. 195. He was famous for his uprightness and temperance, exemplified among other things by the resignation with which he endured his son's untimely death. Until very late in life he was strongly opposed to the introduction of any kind of Greek refinement into Roman character and life, but before his death he withdrew this opposition. He was censor in 184, and used the powers of his office with rigour and severity. He died about 150 B.C., after having lived to a good old age. To him Cicero dedicated his treatise "De Senectute," otherwise known as "Cato Major." §§ 4, 5, 9, 76, 90.

Coriolanus (§§ 36, 42): Cn. Marcus, surnamed Coriolanus, from his victory over Corioli 493 B.C., was a persistent opponent of the Plebs. When there was a famine at Rome he resisted the proposal to give corn to the people. The tribunes inflamed the people against him, so that he was exiled in 491. He then joined Rome's bitterest enemies, and by their help brought his native city within an ace of destruction. His cruel purpose was averted by the entreaties of his mother and wife. See Shakespeare's play of "Coriolanus."

Coruncanianus (§§ 18, 39): Ti. Coruncanianus, a distinguished Roman jurist, was consul 280 B.C., and was the first plebeian Pontifex Maximus B.C. 254. He was a close and intimate friend of M'. Curius, and was dignified with the name of Sapiens.

Crassus: see note on § 96.

Cumanus (§ 37), of Cumae, an epithet of Blossius, who was a native of Cumae, an ancient Greek colony on the coast of Campania.

Curius (§§ 18, 28, and 39): Manius Curius Dentatus was three times consul, 290, 275, and 274, and celebrated two triumphs. He gained decisive victories over the Samnites, Lucanians, and Pyrrhus (near Tarentum, 275 B.C.). He is often mentioned as the friend of

Coruncanus and Fabricius, and the type of the frugal, hardy Roman. After his victory over Pyrrhus he retired into private life, but was censor in 272 B.C.

D.

D. = Decimus.

Dentatus: see Curius.

E.

Empedocles: see Agrigentinus.

Ennius (§ 22): Q. Ennius, the first epic poet of Rome, born at Rudiae in Calabria 239 B.C. When serving in the Roman army in Sardinia he was befriended by Cato and taken to Rome. He wrote eighteen books of "Annales" or History of Rome from the times of Aeneas, and dramatical and satirical compositions. He died about 169 B.C.

F.

F.: an abbreviation for *filius*.

Fabricius: C. Fabricius Luscinus was consul in 282 B.C., and also in 278. Like his friend M'. Curius Dentatus, he was the type of Roman simplicity, frugality, and hardness. During his first consulship he gained victories over the Samnites and Lucanians; and in his second consulship had to oppose Pyrrhus. On this occasion he informed Pyrrhus of his physician's treacherous offer to poison his own master.

Fannius: C. Fannius Strabo; see Introduction, § 3.

Furius: see *s. v.* Philus.

G.

Gabinia lex (§ 41): a law "de magistratibus mandandis," carried by the tribune Aulus Gabinus 139 B.C., introducing the system of voting by ballot at elections.

Gallus or **Galus**: C. Sulpicius Gallus, praetor 169 B.C., served under L. Aemilius Paullus in B.C. 168, during the Macedonian war, when, by foretelling the exact time of an eclipse, he prevented his soldiers from being panic-stricken. He was consul in 166. He was a distinguished orator, a great astronomer, and altogether a man of refinement and cultivation (§§ 9, 21, and 101).

Gnatho (§§ 93 and 94): the parasite in Terence's play of "Eunuchus." The braggart soldier (§ 98), "miles gloriosus," is *Thraso*.

Gracchus (§§ 36, 37, 101): (1) § 101. Tiberius Gracchus, father of Tiberius and Caius mentioned below, was consul 177, and conquered Sardinia. He was son-in-law of the elder Scipio, and father-in-law

of the younger Scipio. (2) Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, born 164 B.C., tribune of the plebs in 133, brought forward a famous agrarian law (*lex Sempronia*), by which certain portions of the publicus ager were to be divided among the poorer citizens and Italians. In order to carry this proposal, Tib. Gracchus had to move that his colleague, the tribune Octavius, who had vetoed the law, should be deposed. Octavius was deposed from office, and the law was passed. This deposition was probably illegal; and as soon as his tribunate was over Gracchus was open to attack. He accordingly became a candidate for the next year. During a debate in the Senate Tiberius raised his hand to his head, to show that his head was in danger. His enemies shouted that he wanted a crown, so as to be king over them. Scipio Nasica called upon the consul to save the State, and in the tumult that followed Gracchus was slain. (3) Caius Sempronius Gracchus, the younger brother of Tib., born about 155 B.C., quaestor in Sardinia 126 B.C., and tribune 123. While tribune he followed out the ideas of his brother, carried an agrarian law, and made immediate re-election to the tribunate legal. He was sent to Africa to found a new colony, Junonia, on the site of Carthage. In 121 his enemy Opimius was consul, and a law was proposed prohibiting the colony. Gracchus and his friends returned to oppose the law; a tumult ensued, in consequence of which Gracchus had to flee, and on being pursued ordered his slave to kill him.

Graccia Magna (§ 13): the South of Italy, including Lucania and Campania, so called from the Greek colonies there, comprising Tarentum, Crotona, Sybaris, Siris (Heraclea), Caulonia, Locri, Rhegium, Metapontum, Cumae, Neapolis.

H.

Hannibal (§ 28): Hannibal, the famous Carthaginian general, who defeated the Romans in several battles, especially at Lake Trasimene and at Cannae, 216 B.C., but was himself recalled to defend Carthage, and was defeated by Scipio at the battle of Zama in 202. After this defeat he retired to the court of King Antiochus III., and in 190 to the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia. The Romans demanded his surrender, to prevent which he killed himself by poison in 183 B.C. The Romans always regarded Hannibal as the type of cruelty and barbarity; but we do not know on what acts of his this reputation rests.

L.

Laelius: Caius Laelius Sapiens, the younger; see Introduction.

Laenas (§ 37): Publius Popilius Laenas, consul 132 B.C. with Rupilius, held an enquiry about the riot in which Tib. Gracchus was killed. He went into voluntary exile when C. Gracchus had a law

passed to prosecute magistrates who had put a citizen to death without trial. During his absence he was outlawed on the motion of Gracchus; but he was restored to Rome 120 B.C.

Latini (§ 12): originally the inhabitants of the old towns of Latium, but later the occupants of certain towns in Latium and elsewhere who possessed all or nearly all the civil rights of Roman citizens, but not the public rights, though they could acquire the public rights by fulfilling certain conditions.

Lex Cassia: see Cassia.

Lex Gabinia: see Gabinia.

Lex Papiria tabellaria: see Carbo.

Luscinius: see Fabricius.

Lycomedes (§ 75): king of Scyros, an island in the Aegean.

M.

M.: an abbreviation for Marcus.

M': an abbreviation for Manius.

Maelius (§§ 28, 36): Spurius Maelius, a plebeian of great wealth. About 440 B.C. there was a great famine at Rome, and Maelius bought up vast quantities of corn from Etruria, and distributed it for nothing or for a small price, among the poor. The patricians accused him of trying to become king; they appointed Cincinnatus dictator, who sent Ahala, his master of the horse, to summon Maelius to explain his conduct. Maelius refused, and Ahala struck him dead, an exploit which Cicero always regards with the greatest approbation.

Mancinus (§ 96): L. Hostilius Mancinus served in the third Punic War, and was one of the first to enter Carthage when it was stormed. He was consul B.C. 145 with Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, and is said to have owed his election to his having had war scenes painted and exhibited in the forum, he himself explaining what the pictures represented.

Manilius (§ 14): Marcus Manilius is one of the speakers in the "De Re Publica," and a contemporary of Laelius and Scipio. He was consul in 149, and held the command at the outbreak of the third Punic War.

Maximus (§§ 69, 96): Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, the eldest son of Aemilius Paulus, brother of Africanus Minor, was adopted into the family of the Fabii. He was consul B.C. 145, and conquered Viriathus in Spain, 144-3 B.C.

Metellus (§ 77): Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus was praetor in 148 B.C., commanded in Greece until 146, and was leader of the opposition against Scipio. The cause of the quarrel between him

and Scipio is not known, but the quarrel itself is famous, and probably began with the appointment of Mummius, one of Scipio's friends, to the command in Achaëa. Metellus was consul in 143, censor in 131, and lived till 115. Laelius speaks of him as *collega noster*, hence we know he was an augur.

Mucius: see under Q. Mucius Scaevola the Augur, in Introduction, and under Scaevola *infra*.

Mummius (§§ 69, 101): Spurius Mummius, a man of wit and literary attainments, a very intimate friend of Scipio, and one of the speakers in the "De Re Publica."

N.

Nasica (§ 41): Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio (in the text called P. Scipio), was consul b.c. 138, and Pontifex Maximus. When the shout arose that Tib. Gracchus (see s. v. Gracchus) was aiming at kingly power, Scipio led the attack upon him, which resulted eventually in his death. Nasica had to retire to Asia, where he died in exile. P. Nasica Corculum (§ 101) was the father of Nasica Serapio.

Neoptolemus (§ 75): Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, and grandson of Lycomedes. It being announced that Troy could only be taken if Neoptolemus and Philoctetes took part in the attack, Ulysses came to Scyros, and persuaded Neoptolemus, in spite of the opposition of Lycomedes, to accompany him. The two then went to Philoctetes and prevailed on him to come, and Troy was eventually captured.

Numantia: a large town in Spain (Hispania Tarraconensis), destroyed after a prolonged war (143-133 b.c.) by Scipio Africanus.

O.

Orestes (§ 24): Orestes, son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, slew his mother because she had murdered her husband, his father. In order to be purified from this murder he had to bring the statue of Diana to Greece from Tauric Chersonese. In this expedition he was accompanied by his friend Pylades.

P.

P.: an abbreviation for Publius.

Pacuvius (§ 24): M. Pacuvius, the son of Ennius's sister, was born at Brundisium, b.c. 220. He early distinguished himself through his talents both in poetry and painting. Most of his plays were translations or adaptations from the Greek. The play referred to here in § 24 is by some regarded as the "Dulorestes," which perhaps

followed the "Iphigenia in Tauris" of Euripides. Pacuvius probably never became a Roman citizen, and is accordingly called *hospes* by Cicero. Pacuvius died at Brundisium, B.C. 130.

Papiria lex : see Carbo.

Papirius (§ 96) : see Carbo.

Papus : see Aemilius.

Paullus or **Paulus** : L. Aemilius Paullus (or Paulus), consul 181 B.C., and again 168 B.C. During the latter year he gained the battle of Pydna, by which he ended the Third Macedonian War. One of his sons was adopted into the family of the Scipios, and was known as the younger Scipio Africanus (see s. v. Scipio). Another son was adopted into the family of the Fabii, and was called Quintus Fabius Maximus (see Maximus).

Persicum Bellum (§ 42) : the war between the Persian king Xerxes and the Greeks, in which were fought the battles of Thermopylae, Artemisium, and Salamis (480 B.C.), and Plataea and Mycale, 479. The result was that the Persian invasion was completely repulsed.

Philus, L. Furius Philus, consul B.C. 136, was commissioned by the senate to deliver up to the Numantines C. Hostilius Mancinus, the consul of the preceding year.

Pompeius (§ 2) : (1) Q. Pompeius Rufus, § 2, was consul B.C. 88, when his friend P. Sulpicius Rufus was tribune. The latter joined the Marians and drove out the consul, who subsequently returned with a large army and in their turn drove out the Marians. Sulla, the colleague of Pompeius in the consulship, went to take the command against Mithridates, but Pompeius remained to govern Italy and was murdered by Pompeius Strabo, the father of Pompey the Great. (2) Quintus Pompeius, a *novus homo*, became consul B.C. 141. He was grandfather of Q. Pompeius Rufus above mentioned. Scipio quarrelled with him on account of his behaviour in the consular election of 141 B.C. Pompey had told Scipio that he would retire in favour of Laelius, but in spite of this announcement he carried on a secret canvass, so that he himself was elected and Laelius defeated.

Pylades (§ 24), the son of Agamemnon's sister, was brought up with his cousin Orestes. The friendship between the two cousins was so strong and close that it has become proverbial. In appreciation of Pylades' kind services Orestes gave him his sister Electra in marriage.

Pyrrhus (§ 28) : Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, was born 318 B.C. In 280 he invaded Italy in order to assist the Tarentines against the Romans. He won the battle of Heraclea in 280 but himself suffered severe losses; he won another victory at Asculum in 279, but again suffered still severer losses. From 278-276 he employed himself in Sicily; he then returned to Italy and was defeated at Beneventum 275

b.c. by the consul Curius Dentatus. After this he returned to Greece, and was killed in 272 during an attack upon Argos. He is always looked upon as a type of bravery and chivalry, as contrasted with the cruelty of Hannibal. One of the grounds on which this reputation is based is his restoration of all the Roman prisoners without ransom and without conditions in return for the consuls' conduct when they refused the assistance of the king's physician who offered to poison his master.

Q.

Q. : an abbreviation for Quintus.

R.

Rupilius (§§ 37, 69, 73, 101) : (1) Publius Rupilius, consul b.c. 132, together with the other consul Laenas investigated the charges against the followers of Tib. Gracchus, and punished the offenders with great severity. He served with success in Sicily, and brought the Servile War to an end. He is said to have been elected to the consulship almost solely by the aid of Scipio. In 123, when C. Gracchus was tribune, Rupilius was condemned for the illegality of his acts as consul. (2) Lucius Rupilius, younger brother of Publius, failed to be elected to the consulship although Scipio supported his candidature.

S.

Scaevola : (1) Q. Mucius, the Augur, see Introduction. (2) Q. Mucius Scaevola, the Pontifex, who was consul in 95 b.c. and assassinated during the Marian riots b.c. 82. Like his namesake, he had the government of Asia entrusted to him, but his integrity and moderation were so marked that as a matter of necessity no prosecution for extortion was instituted against him. His murder caused especial horror among the people inasmuch as he held the sacred office of pontiff. He was not only a great orator but also a skilful jurist, and wrote an important work in eighteen books on the Jus Civile.

Scipio (§ 14) : (1) P. Cornelius Scipio defeated Hannibal at Zama in 202 and concluded the Second Punic War. From this achievement he was called Africanus. He was legate to his brother Lucius in the Syrian War, 190 b.c. ; they were both accused of corruption ; Lucius was convicted, but the prosecution against Africanus was not proceeded with. He died 180 b.c. (2) P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (§§ 3, 6, 7, &c.), was the son of Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Pydna (see Paullus), and was adopted by P. Cornelius Scipio, the conqueror of Hannibal (234-180). Scipio Aemilianus was born about 185 b.c., fought at Pydna 168 b.c., was consul 147 b.c. although under the legal age, and entrusted with the command against Carthage. He finished the Third Carthaginian War in 146 b.c.

whence he was called Africanus, or Africanus Minor, to distinguish him from his adopted father who was also called Africanus. He was censor 142, and accused of treason in 139 but acquitted. In 133 he finished the Numantian War (whence he is sometimes called Numantinus). On his return to Rome he opposed the democratic party and expressed approval of the death of Tib. Gracchus, his brother-in-law. In B.C. 129 he was found dead in bed on the morning after he had made a speech against Gracchus' Agrarian Law, and the tribune Carbo was suspected of his murder. Laelius was a bosom friend of this Scipio, and the dialogue contained in this treatise "De Amicitia," is supposed to take place a few months after Scipio's death.

Socrates, the famous Athenian philosopher, born 469 B.C., was the teacher of Plato, Xenophon, and others. The oracle of Apollo pronounced him to be the wisest man in Greece, although he was constantly saying that he knew nothing.

Sp.: an abbreviation for Spurius.

Sulpicius (§ 2): (1) P. Sulpicius Rufus, born B.C. 124, tribune of the plebs B.C. 88, was one of the most distinguished orators of his time. Up to the year of his tribunate he had been a supporter of the aristocrats; but while still tribune he suddenly joined the Marian party (probably in the hope of freeing himself from his heavy debts), and was put to death by command of Sulla. (2) P. Sulpicius Gallus: see Gallus.

T.

T.: an abbreviation for Titus.

Tarquinius (§ 28): L. Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome (534-510 B.C.), disregarded the interests of the people and failed to restrain the wild tempers of his sons. In consequence, among other things, of an outrage committed by his youngest son Sextus, the people revolted and expelled Tarquin, 510 B.C.

Terentius (§§ 89 and 93): P. Terentius Afer, the Roman comic poet, born 195 B.C., was originally a Carthaginian slave, but was manumitted by his master Terentius Lucanus, a Roman senator. Most of Terence's works were adaptations of the Greek of Menander; he is said to have been assisted in his works by his two friends and patrons Scipio and Laelius. After having written 108 comedies (of which only six survive, among the latter being the "Andria" and "Eunuchus)," he died in Greece, 159 B.C.

Themistocles (§ 42): the famous Athenian general and statesman, born 514 B.C. He fought at the battle of Salamis, 480 B.C., but was afterwards banished by the Athenians on a charge of treacherous correspondence with the Persians. He took refuge with the Persian king Artaxerxes, whom he promised to help in taking vengeance upon the Greeks. He died in 449 B.C.

Ti: an abbreviation for Tiberius.


Timon (§ 87): Timon, a celebrated misanthrope, or hater of mankind, flourished at Athens 420 B.C., and was a contemporary of Socrates.

Troia (§ 75): the famous city of Troy, the capital of the Troad, in the N.W. of Asia Minor, about four miles from the sea.

Tubero (§§ 37, 101): Aelius Tubero, a celebrated jurist.

V.

Verginius (§ 101): Aulus Verginius, a skilled lawyer, of whom very little is known.





TEST PAPERS.

TEST PAPER 1. (§§ 1-16.)

1. Translate:—§ 4, Cum enim saepe ... meminisset Scaevola.
2. What is the meaning of:—*qui diligentissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire; dolorem quem acceperis cum summi viri tum amicissimum morte; duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia verum etiam futura bella delevit; virilis toga; parumper; nuper; reductus; patres conscripti.*
3. (a) Give the principal parts of *natus, exire, vivere, fore, diseruit, evolet, sensit, aufert, coeperunt, mentiar, quaerunt.*
(b) Distinguish *idem* and *idem*, *sōles* and *sōles*, *quisque*, *quisquam*, and *quisquis*, *vereor* and *verior*, *maneat* and *manat*, *quidem* and *quidam*, *libri* and *liberi*.

TEST PAPER 2. (§§ 17-34.)

1. Translate:—(a) § 20, Beluarum hoc quidem ... pacto potest.
(b) § 30, Quid enim? ... diligendi profectae.
2. Parse *extremum*, *illi*, *gignit* in (a), and *mei*, *ne*, *auxit*, *consecutae sunt* in (b).
3. (a) Give three verbs that respectively govern (i.) the dative, (ii.) the ablative, and (iii.) the genitive.
(b) Distinguish—*lēvis*, *lēvis*, and *laevus*; *interdiu* and *interdum*; *profecto* (adv.) and *profecto* (partic.).
(c) Decline *nemo*, *opes*, and *quisque* in the singular number.

TEST PAPER 3. (§§ 35-58.)

1. Translate:—(a) § 39, Nam hoc quidem ... rogatum et rogare.
(b) § 50, Quid, si illud ... rapacius quam natura.
2. What is the meaning of:—(a) *Quid enim interest inter hominem et truncum?* (b) *Non est enim inhumana virtus neque immunis neque superba.* (c) *Sed haec haecenus.* (d) *Quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis.* (e) *Quae est enim ista securitas? Specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda.*
Give the cases of the words in italics, and state the reason for the case.
3. (a) Decline the following words in sing.:—*ego*, *unus* (m.), *virium*, *Fannius*, *quidquid*, *quippiam*, *hospes*, *faces*, *idem*.
(b) Give the comparative and superlative of *bene*, *multus*, *difficile*, *prope*, *parvus*, *potius*.

TEST PAPER 4. (§§ 59–81.)

1. Translate:—(a) § 66, *Accedat huc ... facilitatemque proclivior.*
(b) § 76, *Erumpunt ... faciunda sit.*
2. (a) Trace the various meanings of *gravis, lævis, constans, omnino, vetustas, desiderium, capere.*
(b) Give the Latin for:—“A friend in need is a friend indeed.”
“Where shall we find men who will not prefer office, civil and military commands, dignities, and wealth to friendship?”
3. (a) Give the principal parts of *diligere, deligere, delegare, reperire, norunt, capturos, curent, evigat, apparet, adpetant, jit, colent, errasse, experiri, vixeris, dissuendae.*
(b) Give the genitive and gender of *desiderio, discidia, genere, exemplo.*

TEST PAPER 5. (§§ 82–104.)

1. Translate:—(a) § 89, *Sed nescio quo ... impellitur.*
(b) § 99, *Quid autem turpius ... senum.*
2. (a) What is the meaning of:—*jam dudum tractamus; verebuntur; praeposteris utimur consiliis; implicati ultro et citro; qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur; uspiam; scitum est illud Catonis; vicissim; det manus vincique se patiatur.*
(b) Parse *nascitur, multo, molestius, praecipitem, sinit, aspernatur, impellitur* in 1 (a).
3. (a) Give the nominative and genitive singular, and gender, of *virus, obsequio, tyranno, pulchritudinem, frequentia, offensionum, adminiculum, religio, laudum, carceribus, calcem, consensus.*
(b) Give the comparative and superlative of *benevole, necessarius, libenter, facile.*

TEST PAPER 10. (§§ 1–16.)

1. Translate:—(a) § 10, *Ego si ... solent.*
(b) § 12, *Quam ob rem ... videtis.*
2. Translate the following passages, and write notes on the italicised words:—
 - (a) *Nam qui septem appellantur, eos, qui ista subtilius quaerunt, in numero sapientium non habent.*
 - (b) *Quo modo, ut alia omittam, mortem filii tulit! memineram Paulum, videram Gallum; sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro.*
 - (c) *Quam ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum optime est, mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius, ut prius introieram, sic prius exire de vita.*
3. (a) Who were Gaius Laelius, Q. Mucius Scaevola, Gaius Fannius, P. Sulpicius Rufus, Manilius?
(b) Write short notes on *maxime memorabilem; coram; contingere; optare* and *sperare; maeror*, giving any particulars you can as to their usage or construction.

TEST PAPER 11. (§§ 17-34.)

1. Translate:—(a) §§ 18, 19, Quare sibi habeant ... vivendi ducem.
(b) § 24, Itaque, si quando ... eferat laudibus.
2. Translate the following passages, and write short notes on the italicised words:—
 - (a) *Adplicatione* magis animi cum *quodam* sensu amandi quam *cogitatione* quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura.
 - (b) Quis est qui *C. Fabrici, M. Curi* non cum caritate aliqua benevola memoriam *usurpet*, quos numquam *viderit*?
 - (c) Atque *earum rerum* exemplum ex similitudine capiebat *ineuntis aetatis*, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum *praetexta toga* ponerentur.
3. (a) Who were Philus, Ennius, Pacuvius, Agrigentinus doctus?
(b) Give Laelius' definition of *amicitia*. What advantages according to him are derived from friendship?

TEST PAPER 12. (§§ 35-58.)


1. Translate:—(a) § 43, Quare talis improborum ... qualis hodie est.
(b) § 51, Tantumque abest ... deesse amicis.
2. Translate the following passages, and write short notes on the italicised words:—
 - (a) Videtis quam nefaria *vox*! Et *hercule* ita fecit *vel* plus etiam quam dixit; non enim paruit ille *Ti. Gracchi temeritati*, sed *praefuit*.
 - (b) Nam *quibusdam* quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia *placuisse* opinor *mirabilia* quaedam (sed nihil est, quod illi *non persequantur argutiis*): partim fugiendas esse nimias *amicitias*.
 - (c) Videre licet eos *imperio potestate* prosperis rebus immutari, *sperni* ab iis veteres *amicitias*, *indulgeri* novis.
3. (a) Give Laelius' argument as to (i.) the relation between friendship and expediency or interest, and (ii.) the limits of friendship.
(b) Give the principal parts of *auderent*, *proferri*, *inveterata*, *progredi*, *ignoscerem*, *paret*, *paret*, *sanciatur*, *inciderint*, *inciderint*.

TEST PAPER 13. (§§ 59–81.)

1. Translate:—(a) § 61, His igitur ... possit.
(b) § 71, Quorum plerique ... exprobrantium.
2. Translate the following passages, and write short notes on the italicised words:—
 - (a) Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam *ejus*, qui *dixisset* ita amare oportere ut si *aliquando* esset osurus.
 - (b) Est igitur *prudētis* sustinere ut *cursum*, sic impetum benevolentiae; quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia, ex aliqua parte *periclitatis* moribus amicorum.
 - (c) Quodsi hoc apparet in *bestiis*, *volucribus*, *nantibus*, *agrestibus*, *cicuribus*, *feris*, primum ut se ipsae diligant.
3. (a) Who were Bias, Mummius, Q. Maximus, Neoptolemus, Lycomedes, P. Rupilius?
(b) What, according to Laelius, are the two chief causes which lead to a breach of friendship?

TEST PAPER 14. (§§ 82–104.)

1. Translate:—(a) § 84, Quod cum ... cogit.
(b) § 96, Quibus blanditiis ... oratio.
2. Translate the following passages, and write short notes on the italicised words:—
 - (a) *Quamvis* enim multis *nominibus* est hoc vitium *notandum* levium hominum atque fallacium, *ad* voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem.
 - (b) Ut ait *idem* Terentius, sed ille in *Gnathonis* persona, quod amici genus adhibere *omnino* levitatis est.
 - (c) Nihil fidum, nihil exploratum *habeas*, *ne* amare quidem aut amari, cum, *id* quam vere fiat, ignores.
 - (d) Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, *quod* quidem *senserim*; nihil auctivi ex eo ipse, quod *nollem*.
3. (a) Who were Q. Tubero, P. Nasica, L. Paulus, C. Licinius Crassus?
(b) Give the principal parts of *illusus*, *senserim*, *oriatur*, *sinit*, *contrivimus*, *defluo*.






VOCABULARY.

- § 1 socero..... socer, -eri, m., a father-in-law.
 memoriter adv., with good memory.
 solebat soleo, -ere, solitus sum, to be used to.
 dubitare..... dubito, -are, to hesitate.
 appellare appello, -are, to call.
 deductus eram. deduco, -ĕre, -xi, -ctum, to introduce.
 sumpta sumo, -ere, -psi, -ptum, to assume.
 ◊ quoad..... adv., as far as.
 lătĕre latus, -eris, n., the side.
 discederem ... discedo, -ere, -cessi, -cessum, to depart.
 disputata disputo, -are, to discuss.
 commode adv., aptly.
 mandabam ... mando, -are, to commit.
mortuo morior, mori, mortuus sum, to die.
 pontificem pontifex, -icis, m., a pontiff.
 ◊ contuli confero, -ferre, -tuli, -latum, to betake.
 praestantissi- } praestans, g. -ntis, conspicuous.
 mum }
 ◊ alias adv., at another time.
 § 2 hemicyclio..... hemicyclium, -ii, n., a semicircular bench.
 sedentem sedeo, ĕre, sedi, sessum, to sit.
 una adv., together with.
 admodum adv., very.
 familiares familiaris, -is, m., a friend.
 incidĕre incido, -ĕre, -cidi, -casum, to fall into.
 meministi memini, -isse, to remember.
 profecto..... adv., surely.
 utebare utor, uti, usus sum, (to use), to be in the society of.
 ◊ capitali adj., capitalis, -e, deadly.
 ◊ dissideret dissideo, -ĕre, -sedi, -sessum, to be at variance with.
 ◊ querella querella, -ae, f., a complaint.
 § 3 -exposuit..... expono, -ĕre, -posui, -positum, to explain.
 ◊ arbitrato arbitratus, -ūs, m., judgment, discretion.
 quasi adv., as it were.
 ◊ saepius adv., comp. degree of saepe, too frequently.
 coram..... adv., face to face.
 § 4 -cognitione cognitio, -onis, -f., consideration.

- § 4 invitus adj., *invitus, -a, -um, unwillingly.*
 rogatu rogatus, -ūs, m., *a request.*
 diutissime adv., superl. degree of *diu, for the longest time.*
 idonea adj., *idoneus, -a, -um, fit.*
 dissereret dissero, -ĕre, -serui, -sertum, *to discuss.*
 nescio quo }
 pacto } adv. phrase, *somehow.*
 afficior afficio, -ĕre, -feci, -fectum, *to affect.*
 interdum adv., *at times.*
 existimem existimo, -are, *to think.*
- § 5 fere adv., *almost.*
 parumper adv., *for a little while.*
 avertas avertō, -ĕre, averti, aversum, *to turn away.*
 oritur orior, -iri, ortus, *to arise.*
 cognosces cognosco, -ĕre, -novi, -nitum, *to recognise.*
- § 6 coniectos conjicio, -ĕre, -jeci, -jectum, *to cast.*
 tribuebatur ... tribuo, -ĕre, -ui, -utum, *to give.*
 modo adv., *recently.*
 uterque uterque, utraque, utrumque, pron., *each of the two.*
 jure jus, juris, n., *law.*
- § 7 studio..... studium, -i, n., *zeal, devotion.*
 doctrinā..... doctrina, -ae, f., *culture.*
 reliquā reliquus, -a, -um, *the rest.*
 subtilius..... adv., *more accurately.*
 quaerunt quaero, -ere, quaesivi, quaesitum, *to enquire into.*
 iudicatum iudico, -are, *to adjudge.*
 casūs casus, -ūs, m., *chance, vicissitude.*
 item adv., *also, in like manner.*
 quonam pron., *quinam, quaenam, quodnam, who? who, pray?*
 commentandi .. commentor, -ari, *to (meditate) practise.*
 assolet assoleo, -ere, -itus sum, *to be usual.*
- § 8 valetudinem ... valetudo, -inis, f., *health.*
 usurpavi usurpo, -are, *to perform.*
 valerem valeo, -ĕre, -ui, -itum, *to be well.*
 contingere..... contingo, -ere, -tigi, -tactum, *to happen.*
- § 9 agnosco agnosco, -ere, -novi, -nitum, *to recognise.*
 videris video, -ere, vidi, visum, *to see.*





VOCABULARY.

- § 9 spectata specto, -are, *to observe, judge of, (here, well proved).*
- § 10 anteponas ... antepono, -ere, posui, positum, *to prefer.*
 ne quidem ... adv., *not even.*
 negem nego, -are, *to deny.*
 -orbatus orbo, -are, *to deprive of.*
 egeo egeo, -ēre, -ui, *to stand in need of.*
 careo careo, -ēre, -ui, -itum, *to be free from.*
 plerique plerique, pleraeque, pleraque, *the most part,*
 (here, most people).
 angi ango, -ēre, -xi, -ctum or -xum, *to torture.*
 -accidisse ... accido, -ēre, accidī, *to happen.*
- § 11 adeptus est ... adipiscor, -i, adeptus sum, *to obtain.*
 fas n. indecl., *divine law (fas est, it is allowable).*
 continuo adv., *forthwith, immediately.*
 suo suus, -a, -um, *his own, his proper.*
 sero... adv., *late.*
 -maerore maeror, -oris, m., *grief.*
 funeris funus, -eris, *a funeral.*
 igitur adv., *then, therefore.*
 accessio accessio, -onis, f., *addition.*
 -iuvare iuvo, -are, iuvi, iutum, *to help.*
 -quamvis conj., *although.*
 aufert aufero, ferre, abstuli, ablatum, *to take away.*
 viriditatem ... viriditas, -atis, f., *(greenness) freshness.*
- § 12 suspicentur ... suspicor, -ari, -atus sum, *to suspect.*
 -dimisso dimitto, -ēre, -misi, -missum, *to disperse.*
 pridie adv., *on the day before.*
 potius adv., *rather.*
- § 13 -adsentior ... adsentior, -iri, -sensus, *to agree.*
 nuper adv., *lately.*
 -interire intereo, -ire, -ivi, or -ii, -itum, *to die.*
 valet valeo, -ēre, -ui, -itum, *to have import, weight.*
 institutis institutum, -i, n., *a doctrine.*
 praeceptis ... praeceptum, -i, n., *a principle.*
 -erudierunt ... erudio, -ire, -ii, -itum, *to instruct.*
 excessissent... excedo, -ēre, -cessi, -cessum, *to depart.*
 reditum reditus, -ūs, m., *(the path of) return.*

- § 13 expeditissimi- } expeditus, -a, -um, *ready*.
 mum.....
- § 14 praesagiret ... praesagio, -ire, -ivi, *to have a presentiment*.
 perpaucis ... perpaucus, -a, -um, *very few*.
 triduum adv., *for three days*.
 -evolet evolo, -are, *to fly away*.
 -censemus..... censeo, -ēre, -ui, *censum, to think*.
 -maerere maereo, -ēre, *to mourn*.
 -eventu eventus, -ūs, m., *issue, end, fate*.
 invidi adj., invidus, -a, -um, *envious*.
 interitus interitus, -ūs, m., *destruction, death*.
 -maneat maneo, -ēre, mansi, mansum, *to remain*.
 amisso amitto, -ēre, -misi, -missum, *to lose*.
 -laetabitur ... laetor, -ari, laetatus, *to exult*.
- § 15 -incommodius. comp. adv., fr. *incommodus, unkindly*.
 aequius comp. adv., fr. *aequus, fair*.
 -introieram ... introeo, -ire, -ivi, -itum, *to enter*.
 fruor fruor, frui, fructus sum, *to enjoy*.
 voluntatum... voluntas, -atis, f., *inclination, taste*.
 praesertim ... adv., *especially*.
 fore fut. infin., sum, esse, fui, *to be*.
 cordi cor, cordis, n., *the heart*.
 saeculis saeculum, -i, n., *a century*.
- § 16 -istuc..... istic, istac, istuc, *that*.
 necesse indeclin. adj., *necessary*.
 des do, dare, dedi, datum, *to give*.
 -conarer conor, -ari, conatus sum, *to endeavour*.
 -antevertit ... antevertō, -ēre, -verti, -versum, *to anticipate*.
- § 17 gravarer gravor, -ari, gravatus sum, (*lit. to be burdened*)
to have reluctance.
 opus opus, -cris, n., *a work*.
 petatis peto, -ēre, petivi, petitum, *to seek*.
 -profitentur ... profiteor, -ēri, -fessus sum, *to make profession of*.
 -secundas secundus, -a, -um, *prosperous*.
- § 18 vivum vivus, -a, -um, *living, quick*.
 -reseo reseo, -are, -ui, -sectum, *to cut back*.
 fortasse *perhaps*.

VOCABULARY.

- § 18 parum adv., *too little*.
normam norma, -ae, f., *a rule, standard*.
concedi concedo, -ĕre, -cessi, -cessum, *to make admission*.
- § 19 integritas ... integritas, -atis, f., *uprightness*.
libido libido, -inis, f., *licentiousness*.
constantia ... constantia, -ae, f., *strength of character*.
perspicere ... perspicio, -ĕre, -spexi, -ectum, *to see*.
peregrini peregrinus, -a, -um, *foreign*.
peperit..... pario, -ĕre, peperit, partum, *to produce*.
tolli tollo, -ĕre, sustuli, sublatum, *to take away*.
- §]20 intellegi intellego, -ĕre, -lexi, -lectum, *to perceive*.
conciliavit ... concilio, -are, *to tie together*.
angustum ... angustus, -a, -um, *narrow*.
caritate caritas, -atis, f., *affection*.
beluarum ... belua, -ae, f., *a brute*.
caduca caducus, -a, -um, *(falling) fleeting*.
gignit gigno, -ĕre, genui, genitum, *to produce*.
continet contineo, -ĕre, -ui, -tentum, *to comprise*
- § 21 metiamur ... metior, -iri, mensus sum, *to measure*.
- §]22 queo..... queo (quire), quivi, quitam, *I can*.
quicum *with whom*.
colare colo, -ĕre, -ui, cultum, *to court*.
fungare fungor, -i, functus sum, *to perform*.
quoquo adv., *whithersoever*.
verteris verto, -ĕre, verti, versum, *to turn*.
praesto adv., *at hand*.
intempeſtiva.. intempeſtivus, -a, -um, *out of season*.
patitur patior, pati, passus sum, *to suffer, permit*.
- § 23 intuetur intueor, -ĕri, intuitus sum, *to look upon*.
exemplar ... exemplar, -aris, n., *copy*.
imbecilli imbecillus, -a, -um, *weak*.
desiderium ... desiderium, -ii, n., *a longing, regret*.
exemeris eximo, -ĕre, -emi, -emptum, *to take away*.
si minus *if not*.
percipi percipio, -ĕre, -cepi, -ceptum, *to see*.
discidiis discidium, -ii, n., *a faction*.
funditus adv., *completely*.

- ̄verti evertō, -ĕre, -rti, -rsum, *to overthrow.*
 § 24 ̄constantē ... constō, -are, -stiti, -statum, *to remain still, to be fixed.*
 dissipare dissipō, -are, *to scatter.*
 ̄cavea cavea, -ae, f., *the theatre.*
 fabula fabula, -ae, f., *a play.*
 perseveraret.. perseverō, -are, *to persist, maintain.*
 ̄hactenus adv., *so far.*
 § 25 ̄filum filum, -i, n., *thread.*
 § 26 quisque quisque, quaeque, quidque, *each.*
 ̄profecta proficiscor, profectus sum, *(to set out) to proceed.*
 ̄fictum fingo, -ĕre, finxi, fictum, *to feign.*
 voluntarium .. voluntarius, -a, -um, *willing, spontaneous.*
 § 27 indigentia ... indigentia, -ae, f., *want.*
 ̄applicatione .. applicatio, -onis, f., *a bending together.*
 dirimi dirimō, -ĕre, diremi, diremptum, *to destroy.*
 ̄nacti..... nanciscor, -i, nactus sum, *light on, discover.*
 congruamus .. congruo, -ĕre, -grui, *to sympathise.*
 alliciat allicio, -ĕre, allexi, -lectum, *to entice.*
 ̄diligendum ... diligo, -ĕre, -lexi, -lectum, *to love.*
 § 28 ̄quippe adv., *forsooth.*
 ̄decertatum ... decerto, -are, *to struggle.*
 § 29 maius nom. s. n., maior, maius, *greater.*
 ̄exardescit ... exardesco, -ĕre, -arsi, -arsum, *to glow forth.*
 ̄adsequatur ... adsequor, -i, adsecutus -sum, *to obtain.*
 ̄desideret..... desidero, -are, *to yearn for.*
 ̄secus adv., *otherwise.*
 § 30 ̄auxit augeo, -ĕre, auxi, auctum, *to increase.*
 § 31 ̄exigamus..... exigo, -ĕre, -egi, -actum, *to exact.*
 ̄faeneramur... faeneror, -ari, -atus sum, *to let out on interest.*
 mercedis merces, mercedis, f., *reward.*
 § 32 pecudum pecus, -udis, f., *beast.*
 ̄ritu ritus, -ūs, m., *observance, fashion.*
 pares par, paris, *equal.*
 ̄merendum ... mereo, -ĕre, -ui, -itum, *to deserve, do service.*
 ̄repscendum. reposco, -ĕre, *to ask back.*
 ̄concertatio ... concertatio, -onis, f., *a contest.*

VOCABULARY.

- § 32 *conglutinaret.* *conglutino, -are, to cement.*
voltis *volo, velle, volui, to wish.*
perge *pergo, -ĕre, perrexi, perrectum, to continue.*
- § 33 *expediret* *expedio, -ire, -ivi, -itum (to set free), imper-*
sonally = to be advantageous. ✓
ingravescente *ingravesco, -ĕre, to grow in weight.*
ineuntis *ineo, -ire, -ivi, -itum, to enter upon, commence.*
- § 34 *interdum* *adv., sometimes.*
provectiessent *proveho, -ĕre, -vexi, -vectum, to bear on (in*
pass., to live).
labefactari ... *labefacto, -are, to make to totter.*
certamen *certamen, -inis, n., a contest.*
- § 35 *deserere* *desero, -ĕre, -ui, -rtum, to desert, neglect.*
obsequi *obsequor, -i, obsecutus sum, to oblige, gratify.*
extingui *extinguo, -ere, -stinxi, -stinctum, to put out,*
destroy.
impendere ... *impēdeo, -ĕre, to hang over.*
- § 36 *quatenus* *conj., how far.*
progredi *progredior, -i, gressus sum, to advance.*
- § 37 *derelictum* ... *derelinquo, -ĕre, -liqui, -lictum, to abandon.*
deprecatum... *deprecor, -ari, -atus sum, to ask pardon.*
ignoscerem ... *ignosco, -ĕre, ignovi, -notum, to forgive.*
faces..... *fax, facis, f., a firebrand.*
praefuit *praesum, -esse, -fui, to be above, to guide.*
praebuit *praebeo, -ĕre, -ui, -itum, to offer, show, make.*
amentia *amentia, -ae, f., madness.*
defeceris *deficio, -ĕre, -feci, -fectum, to fail, fall away.*
- § 38 *impetrare* ... *impetro, -are, to obtain (by entreaty).*
viti *vitium, vitii, n., a fault.*
- § 39 *censura* *censura, -ae, f., censorship.*
proditum..... *prodo, -ĕre, prodidi, proditum, to hand down.*
- § 40 *sanciatu*r *sancio, -ire, sanxi, sanctum, to ratify.*
deflexit..... *deflecto, -ere, -flexi, -flexum, to turn aside.*
occupare *occupo, -are, -avi, -atum, to seize.*
- § 41 *augurari* *auguror, -ari, to prophesy.*
serpit *serpo, -ĕre, serpsi, -ptum, to crawl, move on.*
proclivis *proclivis, -e, down hill.*

- § 41 perniciem ... perniciēs, -ei, f., *destruction*.
 labitur lābor, labi, lapsus sum, *to glide*.
 labes..... labes, labis, f., *corruption*.
 biennio..... biennium, -ii, n., *a space of two years*.
 discent..... disco, -ĕre, didici, *to learn*.
- § 42 quorsum adv., *whither*.
 ignari ignarus, -a, -um, *unaware*.
 alligatos alligo, -are, *to bind*.
 peccantibus... pecco, -are, *to commit crime*.
 adiutor..... adiutor, -oris, m., *one who assists*.
 conscivit conscisco, -ĕre, -scivi, -scitum, *to adjudge, inflict*.
- § 43 supplicio supplicium, ii, n., *penalty*.
 aliquando ... adv., *sometime*.
 hodie adv., *to-day*.
- § 44 cunctatio..... cunctatio, -onis, f., *hesitation*.
 libere adv., *with freedom*.
 aperte adv., *openly*.
- § 45 argutiis argutiae, -arum, f., *subtleties*.
 nimias nimius, -a, -um, *excessive*.
 sollicitum ... sollicitus, -a, -um, *troubled*.
 parturiat parturio, -ire, -ivi, -itum, *to be in the pangs of labour*.
- § 46 perstrinxi ... perstringo, -ĕre, -strinxi, -strictum, *to touch lightly upon*.
 adiumenti ... adiumentum, -i, n., *assistance*.
 mulierculae... muliercula, -ae, f., *a weak woman*.
- § 47 reapse adv., *in reality*.
 consentaneum consentaneus, -a, -um, *consistent*.
 aspernetur ... aspernor, -ari, -atus sum, *to feel contempt for*.
 malitiam malitia, -ae, f., *evil-mindedness*.
 imbellibus ... imbellis, -e, *unwarlike*.
 flagitiosis..... flagitiosus, -a, -um, *licentious*.
- § 48 extirpatam... extirpo, -are, *to eradicate*.
 truncum truncus, -i, m., *a log*.
 ferream ferreus, -a, -um, *of iron quality*.
 diffundatur ... diffundo, -ĕre, -fudi, -fusum, *to spread out, expand*.

VOCABULARY.

- § 48 repudientur... repudio, -are, *to reject*.
 eluceat elucco, -ēre, eluxi, *to shine forth*.
- § 49 praedito praeditus, -a, -um, *endowed with*.
 redamare redamo, -are, *to love in return*.
 vicissitudine.. vicissitudo, -inis, f., *interchange*.
- § 50 illiciat illicio, -ēre, -lexi, -lectum, *to entice*.
 asciscant ascisco, -ēre, ascivi, ascitum, *to attach to*.
 appetentius... comp. degree of appetens, -ntis, *eager*.
 tueri tueor, -ēri, tuitus, *to protect*.
 abhorreret ... abhorreo, -ēre, -ui, *to shrink from*.
- § 51 parta pario, -ēre, peperī, partum, *to produce gain*.
 alterius g. s., alter, -era, -erum, *another*.
 viguissent ... vigesco, -ēre, vigui, *to thrive*.
- § 52 deliciis deliciae, -arum, f., *luxury*.
 diffluentes ... diffluo, -ēre, *to dissolve, to abandon oneself to*.
 nimirum adv., *doubtless*.
 fiducia fiducia, -ae, f., *reliance*.
- § 53 dumtaxat..... adv., *but only*.
 inopes adj. inops, -is, *poor*.
 exulantem ... exsulo, -are, *to be in exile*.
 importunitate importunitas, -atis, f., *perversity*.
 caeca caecus, -a, -um, *blind*.
 complexa..... complector, -i, -plexus, *to embrace*.
 insipiente..... insipiens, -tis, *unwise, a fool*.
 sperni sperno, -ēre, sprevi, spretum, *to despise*.
 veteres vetus, g., -eris, *old*.
 indulgeri indulgeo, -ēre, -dulsi, -dultum, *to indulge in*.
- § 55 facultatibus... facultas, -atis, f., *opportunity*.
 supellectilem. supellex, supellectilis, f., *furniture*.
 inculta incultus, -a, -um, *neglected, unadorned*.
- § 56 termini terminus, -i, m., *limit*.
- § 57 animatus *disposed, minded*.
 acerbius adv. (comp. of acerbe), *with extra bitterness*.
 invehi inveho, -ēre, -vexi, -vectum, *to carry into, in pass. to clamour against*.
 insectari insector, -ari, -atus sum, *to attack*.
- § 58 definit definio, -ire, -ivi, -itum, *to limit*.

- § 58 exigue adv., *minutely*.
 exiliter adv., *with exactness*.
 calculos calculus, -i, *a pebble*.
 restricte adv., *narrowly*.
 congeratur ... congero, -ĕre, -gessi, -gestum, *to heap up*.
- § 59 eniti enitor, -i, enisus or enixus, *to strive*.
 jacentem jaceo, ĕre, -ui, -itum, *to lie (here, depressed)*.
 osurus odi, odisse (osum), *to hate*.
 cupere cupio, -ere, cupivi, cupitum, *to desire*.
 ansas ansa, -ae, f., *a handle*.
 reprehenden- }
 dum } reprehendo, -ere, -ndi, -nsum, *to catch hold of*.
 rursum adv., *again, on the other hand*.
- § 60 adhiberemus . adhibeo, -ĕre, -ui, -itum, *to employ*.
- § 61 emendati emendo, -are, -avi, -atum, *to free from faults*.
 declinandum.. declino, -are, -avi, -atum, *to deviate*.
 turpitude turpitude, -inis, f., *disgrace*.
 venia venia, -ae, f., *indulgence*.
 mediocre mediocris, -e, *unimportant*.
 blanditiis blanditia, -ae, f., *flattery*.
 assentando ... assentor, -ari, *to be obsequious*.
 colligere colligo, -ĕre, -egi, -ectum, *to gather, obtain*.
- § 62 querebatur ... queror, -i, questus sum, *to complain*.
 capras capra, -ae, f., *a she-goat*.
 oves ovis, -is, f., *a sheep*.
 quot *how many*.
 notas nota, -ae, f., *sign*.
 eligendi eligo, -ĕre, -egi, -ectum, *to choose*.
 penuria penuria, -ae, f., *scarcity*.
 sane adv., *indeed*.
 expertum experior, -iri, expertum, *to make trial of*.
- § 63 impetum impetus, -ūs, m., *an attack*.
 temptatis ... tempto, -are, *to make proof of, try*.
 sin *but if*.
 sordidum sordidus, -a, -um, *mean*.
 malint malo, malle, malui, *to prefer*.
- § 64 societates societas, -atis, f., *a union, friendship*.

VOCABULARY.

- § 64 praestiterit ... praesto, -are, -stiti, -stitum, *to show*.
 paene adv., *almost*.
- § 65 simplicem ... simplex, -plicis, *simple-minded*.
 par adj., *par, paris, meet, suitable*.
 tortuosum .. tortuosus, -a, -um, *twisting*.
 jamdudum ... adv., *now for a long while*.
 fictum sit fingo, -ĕre, finxi, fictum, *to devise, use invention*.
 simulatum ... simulo, -are, -avi, -atum, *to make pretence*.
 occultare occulto, -are, -avi, -atum, *to hide*.
 allatas affero, afferre, attuli, allatum, *to bring against*.
 criminationes. criminatio, -onis, f., *a charge*.
 suspiciosum... suspiciosus, -a, -um, *suspicious*.
 violatum violo, -are, *to offend against*.
- § 66 condimentum condimentum, -i, n., *seasoning*.
 remissior (comp.adj. of remissus, -a, -um, *relaxed*) *less strict*.
 comitatem ... comitas, -atis, f., *courtesy*.
 proclivior..... comp. adj. of proclivis, -e, *inclined*.
- § 67 vetulis vetulus, -a, -um, *old*.
 satietates..... satietas, -atis, f., *surfeit*.
 modios modius, -ii, m., *a corn measure, bushel*.
 salis sal, -is, m., *salt*.
 edendos edo, edere, or esse, edi, esum, *to eat*.
- § 68 fallacibus..... adj., fallax, -acis, *deceptive, giving disappointment*.
 montuosis ... montuosus, -a, -um, *mountainous*.
 commorati ... commoror, -ari, -atus, *to stay*.
- § 69 grege grex, gregis, m., *a flock, set*.
 nequaquam ... adv., *by no means*.
 anteibat anteeo, -ire, -ivi, -itum, *to go before, surpass*.
 ampliores ... compar. adj. of amplus, -a, -um, *great, distinguished, of high dignity*.
- § 70 impertiant ... impertio, -ire, -ivi, -itum, *to share*.
 aliquamdiu ... adv., *for some while*.
 stirpis stirps, stirpis, f., *stock*.
 famulatu famulatus, ūs, m., *servitude*.
- § 71 exaequare ... exaequo, -are, *to put on the same level*.
 officiose adv., *dutifully*.
 exprobrantium exprobro, -are, *to put forward offensively*.

- § 73 excellas excello, -ĕre, -llui, -lsum, *to surpass.*
- § 74 corroboratis .. corrobore, -are, *to make strong.*
 venandi venor, -ari, *to hunt.*
 pilae pila, -ae, f., *a ball.*
 nutrices nutrix, -icis, f., *a nurse.*
 paedagogi ... paedagogus, -i, m., *a tutor.*
 disparis dispar, genit., -is, *unequal, different.*
 dissociat dissocio, -are, *to unbind.*
- § 76 redundet redundo, -are, *to flow back.*
 remissione ... remissio, -onis, f., *relaxing.*
 eluendae eluo, -ĕre, -ui, -utum, *to wipe out.*
 dissuendae ... dissuo, -ĕre, dissutum, *to unsew.*
- § 77 alienatio alienatio, -onis, f., *separation.*
 paulo ante ... *a little while ago.*
- § 78 jurgia jurgium, -ii, n., *a quarrel.*
 contumeliae... contumelia, -ae, f., *insult.*
 cito adv., *quickly.*
- § 79 norunt or noverunt, fr. nosco, -ĕre, novi, notum, *to know.*
- § 80 exigat exigo, -ĕre, -egi, -actum, *to extract.*
- § 81 volucris .. volucer, -cris, -cre, *flying, winged.*
 nantibus no, nare, navi, *to swim.*
 cicuribus adj., cicur, -is, *tame.*
 feris ferus, -a, -um, *wild.*
- § 83 patĕre pateo, -ĕre, -ui, *to stand open.*
 adiutrix adiutrix, -tricis, f., *one who assists.*
 comes comes, comitis, c., *a companion.*
 comitatus ... comitatus, -ūs, m., *companionship.*
- § 84 adipisci adipiscor, -i, adeptus sum, *to attain.*
 consequi consequor, -i, secutus sum, *to obtain.*
 cogit..... cogo, -ere, coegi, coactum, *to compel.*
- § 85 plectimur..... plecto, -ĕre, -xi, -xum, *to punish.*
 praeposteris... praeposterus, -a, -um, *inverted.*
 diuturno diuturnus, -a, -um, *of long standing.*
 repente adv., *suddenly.*
 vitupero vitupero, -are, *to blame.*
- § 86 incuria incuria, -ae, f., *want of care.*
 venditatio ... venditatio, -onis, f., *a vaunting, puffing.*

VOCABULARY.

- § 86 inanius..... comp. adv. fr. inanis, *empty*.
 otiosi otiosus, -a, -um, *at leisure*.
 tradiderunt... trado, -ĕre, tradidi, traditum, *to give, hand over*.
- § 87 serpit serpo, -ĕre, -psi, -ptum, *to insinuate*.
 degendae dego, -ĕre, degi, *to spend, pass*.
 expertem..... expers, expertis, *free from*.
 congressus ... congressus, -ŭs, m., *an assembly*.
 evomat evomo, -ĕre, -ui, -itum, *to give vent*.
 virus virus, -i, n., *poison*.
 frequentia ... frequentia, -ae, f., *concourse, crowd*.
 uspiam adv., *anywhere*.
 suppeditans... suppedito, -are, *to supply*.
- 88 perspexisset. . perspicio, -ĕre, -spexi, -spectum, *to see thoroughly*.
 adminiculum.. adminiculum, -i, n., *a prop, support*.
 adnititur adnitor, -niti, -nisus or -nixus, *to lean against*.
 obsurdescimus obsurdesco, -ĕre, surdus, *to become deaf*.
 retineatur ... retineo, -ĕre, -ui, -tentum, *to preserve*.
 obiurgandi .. obiurgo, -are, *to rebuke*.
 benevole adv., *with good will*.
- 89 obsequium ... obsequium, -ii, n., *flattery*.
 venenum venenum, -i, n., *poison*.
 molestius..... adv., *more troublesome*.
 praecipitem... praeceps, gen., cipitis, *headlong*.
 sinit sino, -ĕre, sivi, situm, *to allow*.
 monitio monitio, -onis, f., *admonition*.
 lubenter adv., *willingly, gladly*.
 procul adv., *far off*.
 amoveatur ... amoveo, -ĕre, -movi, -motum, *to remove*.
- § 90 scitum scitus, -a, -um, *shrewd*.
 vacare vaco, -are, *to be free from*.
 delicto delictum, -i, n., *a fault*.
- § 91 pestem pestis, -is, f., *a plague*.
- § 93 flexibile flexibilis, -e, *pliable*.
 devium devius, -a, -um, *erratic*.
 nutum nutus, -ŭs, m., *nod*.
 egomet..... I (*myself*).
 persona persona, -ae, *a character of a drama*.


- § 95 *secerni*..... *secerno*, -ĕre, -crevi, -cretum, *to separate*.
internosci ... *internosco*, -ĕre, -novi, -notum, *to distinguish*.
fucata *fuco*, -are, *to dye*.
sinceris *sincerus*, -a, -um, *genuine*.
contio *contio*, -onis, f., *popular assembly*.
- § 96 *suffragiis* *suffragium*, -ii, n., *vote*.
sacerdotiis ... *sacerdotium*, -ii, *the priesthood*.
vendibilem ... *vendibilis*, -e, *plausible*.
quinquennis... *quinquennium*, -ii, *a period of five years*.
- § 97 *scena* *scena*, -ae, f., *the stage*.
adumbratis ... *adumbro*, -are, *to overshadow*, in part. *counterfeited, shadowy*.
patefactum ... *patefacio*, -ere, -feci, -factum, *to lay open*.
perpenditur... *perpendo*, -ĕre, -pendi, -pensum, *to depend*.
exploratum ... *exploratus*, -a, -um, *certain*.
- § 98 *mentiendum*... *mentior*, -iri, *mentitus sum*, *to lie*.
parasitorum ... *parasitus*, -i, m., *parasite*.
comoediis ... *comoedia*, -ae, f., *comedy*.
faceta *facetus*, -a, -um, *witty*.
- § 99 *adlectant*..... *allecto*, -are, *to allure, fish for*.
excors *excors*, gen., -rdis, *without intelligence*.
callidus *callidus*, -a, -um, *cunning*.
occultus *occultus*, -a, -um, *secret*.
insinuet *insinuo*, -are, *to insinuate*.
litigare..... *litigo*, -are, *to quarrel*.
illusus *illudo*, -ĕre, -lusi, -lusum, *to laugh at*.
versaris *versor*, -ari, *to turn*, metaphorically, *turn round one's finger*.
lautissime ... adv., *most excellently*.
- § 100 *convenientia*.. *convenientia*, -ae, *agreement, harmony*.
ecflorescit ... *ecfloresco*, -ere, -florui, *to blossom forth*.
- § 101 *socerum* *socer*, *soceri*, *father-in-law*.
acquiescimus.. *acquiesco*, -ere, -quievi, *to rest on*.
carceribus ... *carcer*, -is, m., in plur. *starting places*.
calcem *calx*, *calcis*, f., *goal*.
- § 102 *fragiles* *fragilis*, -e, *frail*.
caducae *caducus*, -a, -um, *perishable*.

VOCABULARY.

- § 103 oblectationis. oblectatio, -onis, f., *joy*.
peregrina- }
tiones } peregrinatio, -onis, f., *travels*.
rusticationes rusticatio, -onis, *country tours*.
- § 104 contrivimus.. contero, -ĕre, -trivi, -tritum, *to pass, spend*.
aluntur alo, -ĕre, -ui, -itum, *to foster*.
plane adv, *wholly, altogether*.
locetis loco, -are, *to place*.
praestabilis praestabilis, -e, *excellent*.

CICERO DE AMICITIA.

A TRANSLATION.



I. 1. Q. Mucius the augur was wont to narrate many a tale about C. Lælius, his father-in-law, with good memory, and in a pleasant style, nor to hesitate in all his conversation to call him wise; but I had been introduced to Scævola by my father when I had assumed the dress of manhood, on the understanding that, as far as it was possible or permissible for me, I should never depart from the old man's side. Accordingly I committed to memory many sensible discussions of his, and many short and apt sayings; and was eager to become more learned, through his skill, in law. When he was dead I betook myself to Scævola the pontiff, who, I venture to say, was absolutely the most distinguished in our state for his talent and regard for the right. But I will speak of him at another time; now I return to the augur.

2. I remember much that he said on many occasions, and especially that, as he was sitting at home on the semicircular bench, in his customary manner, when a very few intimate friends and myself were present with him, he fell into a conversation on a subject which happened at that time to be in the mouths of many people. You assuredly remember, Atticus, and the more so because you were much in the society of P. Sulpicius, how great was the surprise, or shall I call it the complaint, of people when he, as tribune of the plebs, with (feelings of) deadly hatred, was at variance with Q. Pompeius, who was then consul, and with whom he had lived bound by the strongest ties of love.

3. So at that time, when Scævola had chanced to mention that very circumstance, he set forth to us a conversation of Lælius about friendship, which Lælius had held with him and with his other son-in-law, C. Fannius, the son of M. Fannius, a few days after the death of Africanus. The opinions delivered in that discussion I committed to memory, and have set them forth at my own discretion in this book. I have introduced them as speaking in person, as it were, so that 'said I' or 'says he' might not be inserted too frequently, and so that the discussion might appear to be held, as it were, face to face by speakers who are present.

4. Since you often pleaded with me to write something about friendship, the matter seemed to me worthy of the consideration of all, and especially worthy of our friendship, and so, not unwillingly, I took pains to confer a benefit on many at your request. But, as in the 'Cato Major,' which was dedicated to you on the subject of old age, I introduced Cato as carrying on the discussion when an old man, because no personage seemed more fit to speak about that age than he who both had been an old man for a very long time, and who, in old age itself, had been prosperous beyond all others; so, since we had heard from our fathers that the intimacy of C. Lælius and P. Scipio was most noteworthy, Lælius seemed to me a suitable personage to discuss those very points about friendship which Scævola remembered to have been discussed by him. This kind of discourse, resting on the authority of men of old, and they illustrious men, seems, somehow, to possess more weight. Accordingly, when reading my own writings I am affected in such a way at times as to think that Cato is speaking, and not myself.

5. But as at that time I, an old man, wrote to an old man on old age, so in this book I, a very attached friend, have written to a friend about friendship. The speaker then was Cato, than whom scarcely anyone at those times was older, or possessed of more good sense; now the speaker on friendship shall be Lælius, who was both wise (for so he was considered) and distinguished for the renown of his friendship. I would like you to turn your attention away from me for a little while, and to think that Lælius himself is talking. C. Fannius and Q. Mucius come to their father-

in-law after the death of Africanus; by them the conversation is started; Lælius replies, and his whole discourse is on friendship, in reading which you will recognise yourself.

II. 6. *Fannius*.—What you say is right, Lælius; no man was better or more famous than Africanus. But you ought to think that the eyes of all are cast on you alone; they both call and think you wise. This title was given recently to M. Cato, and we know that L. Acilius was called wise among our fathers; but each of them in a somewhat different way, Acilius because he was thought to be skilful in civil law, and Cato because he had experience in many things. Many instances used to be told of his wise foresight, firm behaviour, and shrewd replies, both in the senate and in the forum; wherefore he had already, in his old age, the surname, so to speak, of the Wise.

7. But they think you wise in some different way, not only by your nature and character, but also by your devotion and culture, and not just as the common people, but as the learned are accustomed to call a person wise. Such a one as we have heard there was none in the other countries of Greece (for those who inquire into these things with more than usual accuracy do not count those who are called the Seven among the number of the wise), and in Athens only one, and he, indeed, judged by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of all. This is the wisdom that they think is in you, that you look upon all your elements of happiness as being stored in yourself, and that you consider man's vicissitudes of less importance than virtue. So they ask of me, and I believe also of our friend here, Scævola, in what way you bear the death of Africanus; and they ask it the more because when on the Nones last past we had come into the gardens of D. Brutus the augur, in order to practise as usual, you were not present, although you always used to pay the most careful attention to that day and that duty.

8. *Scævola*.—Many people do indeed inquire, C. Lælius, as Fannius has said, but I answer that which I have noticed—that you bear with moderation the pain you have incurred through the death of a man who was not only very great, but also your closest friend; but that you could not fail to be moved, and to have so failed would have been unlike your

gentle disposition ; and I answer that the reason of your absence from our college-meeting on the Nones was not your sorrow, but your health.

Lalius.—You answer rightly, indeed, Scævola, and truly, for I ought not to have been drawn away through any trouble of my own from that duty which I have always performed regularly while I was well, nor do I think that it can happen by any chance to a man of firm character that any intermission of duty should take place.

9. But you, Fannius, are acting like a friend in saying that attention is paid to me by people to such an amount as I neither recognise nor claim. Yet, as you seem to me, you do not form a right judgment about Cato ; for either he, if anyone, was wise, or else no one was wise, and the latter alternative I rather believe. To omit other things, in what way did he bear the death of his son ? I remembered Paulus. I had seen Galus. But these showed their self-command in the case of boys, while Cato showed it in the case of a grown-up man of approved worth and well-proved merit.

10. Wherefore beware of preferring to Cato even that very man whom Apollo, as you say, adjudged to be most wise, for it is the deeds of Cato, and only the words of Socrates, that are praised. But about myself, to speak now with both of you, thus form your opinion.

III. If I were to say that I was not troubled by regret for the loss of Scipio, let the philosophers consider how far I should do so rightly ; but I should certainly tell a lie. I am troubled at being deprived of a friend, the like of whom, as I think, there never will be,—the like of whom, as I can confidently assert, there never was. But I do not stand in need of a remedy ; I myself console myself, and especially by the consolation that I am free from that delusion by which, on the death of their friends, most people are usually tortured. No misfortune, I think, has happened to Scipio ; but if any has happened at all, it has happened to me. For to be grievously tortured by one's own troubles is the sign of a man who loves himself, but not his friend.

11. But, in his case, who would say that his lot has not been a distinguished one ? For unless he chose to wish for

immortality, a thing that he by no means thought of, what did he not obtain that it was lawful to man to wish for? While still a youth he immediately, by his marvellous merit, surpassed the highest hopes which his fellow-citizens had already held about him when he was no more than a boy. Without ever being a candidate for the consulship he was twice made consul, first before the proper age, and again, as regards himself, at the proper age, but, as regards the state, almost too late; and by the overthrow of two cities most hostile to this empire he extinguished not only the then existing wars, but also future wars. What shall I say about his affable manners, his filial respect to his mother, his generosity to his sisters, his kindness to his relations, and his justice towards all? You know them full well. How beloved he was by the state is shown by the general grief at his funeral. Then in what way could the addition of a few years have helped him? Although old age is not burdensome, as I remember Cato, in the year before his death, maintained in argument with me and with Scipio, still, it takes away that freshness of youth which Scipio even then enjoyed.

12. Wherefore his life, whether in respect of his fortune or his fame, was such that it admitted of no addition, and the quickness of his death took away the sense of dying, and, you see, in this kind of death it is difficult to say what men suspect. Still, we can say this with truth: out of the many days that, in the course of his life, he saw most attended by joyful crowds, that day was the most glorious to Scipio when, after the rising of the senate, he was accompanied home in the evening by the conscript fathers, the Roman people, and Latin allies, on the day before he departed this life. So that from such a high step of dignity he seems to have reached a place among the Gods above rather than among those below.

IV. 13. I do not agree with those who have lately begun to argue that our souls die at the same time as our bodies, and that everything is blotted out by death. The authority of the ancients has more weight with me, whether it be that of our own ancestors, who paid to the dead such ceremonious rites as they assuredly would not have done if they had thought that these rites in no way belonged to the dead; or

whether it be that of those who used to be in this land, and who instructed Magna Græcia (which now, indeed, is destroyed, but which at that time was flourishing) in their principles and maxims; or whether it be that of him who was adjudged to be wisest of all men by the oracle of Apollo, who did not hold at one time one opinion and at another time another, as on most subjects, but always the same, viz., that the souls of men were immortal, and that when they departed from the body a return to heaven lay open to them, and that it was most easy and speedy to every good and just man.

14. This also was the opinion of Scipio, who indeed, as if he had a presentiment, a very few days before his death, when Philus and Manilius and many others were present, and you also, Scævola, had come with me, for three days argued about the commonwealth. Almost the last part of this discussion treated of the immortality of the soul, things which he said he had heard through a vision from Africanus in his sleep. If the truth really is that the souls of all good men most easily fly away in death, as it were, from the custody and bonds of the body, to whom do we think that the path to the Gods was easier than for Scipio? Wherefore I fear that to mourn over what has befallen him is more like an envious man than like a friend. But if the former opinion is more true, that there is a simultaneous death of soul and body, and that no sensation remains, then, as there is no good in death, so, at any rate, there is no harm. For when sensation is lost he becomes the same as if he had not been born at all, and yet (for the fact) that he was born both we rejoice, and this state, so long as it shall exist, will be glad.

15. Wherefore, as I said above, with him indeed fate has acted most kindly, but with me more unkindly, for it had been (to my mind) fairer that as I had entered upon life sooner so I should quit it sooner. Still, I enjoy the recollection of our friendship in such a way that I seem to have had a happy life because I passed it with Scipio, with whom I had a joint care about public and private matters, with whom I had both home (life) and military service in common, and—that wherein is the whole force of friendship—the most profound

agreement in tastes, pursuits, and sentiments. Accordingly, I am not so much delighted by my reputation for wisdom, which Fannius just mentioned (especially as it is false), as by the fact that I hope the memory of our friendship will be eternal; and this is the more to my mind because, out of all the ages, scarcely three or four pairs of friends are mentioned by name, and in this class I seem to hope that the friendship of Scipio and Lælius will be known to posterity.

16. *Fannius*.—What you say, Lælius, is necessarily so. But since you have made mention of friendship and we are at leisure, you will confer a great favour on me, and I hope also on Scævola, if, as you are wont (to do) about other matters when questions are put to you about them, you will state for discussion what your opinion is about friendship, of what kind you think it to be, what instructions you give (about it).

Scævola.—It will indeed be agreeable to me. Fannius anticipated me as I was endeavouring to touch upon this very thing with you. Wherefore you will do both of us a very great favour.

V. 17. *Lælius*.—I should, indeed, have no reluctance to do so if I had confidence in myself. For both the subject is splendid and, as Fannius has said, we are at leisure. But who am I? Or, what special aptitude have I? [The custom you mention is one peculiar to philosophers, and that, too, to Greeks, that a subject should be proposed to them to argue about, no matter how suddenly. It is a great task, and needs no little practice. Wherefore I think you should seek the points capable of discussion in friendship from those who make those things their profession. I can only exhort you to prefer friendship beyond all things human: there is nothing so adapted to nature, so suitable for either prosperity or adversity. But, first of all, I feel this, that friendship cannot subsist except among good people. Nor do I probe the question to the quick, like those who discuss these (points) with too much subtlety, perhaps with truth, but with little result to the general good; for they say that no one but a wise man can be a good man. Let that be so by all means; but they understand by wisdom a thing which no mortal as yet has obtained, whereas we ought to contemplate those things

which belong to common experience and to everyday life, and not those things which are the objects of imagination or aspiration. I shall never say that C. Fabricius, M. Curius, Ti. Coruncanius, whom our ancestors judged to be wise men, were wise according to the standard of those philosophers. Wherefore let them keep to themselves the invidious and unintelligible word 'wisdom,' but let them allow that these were good men. They will not even do this; they will say that this can be allowed only to a wise man.

19. Let us then proceed with our own dull brains, as the proverb says. Those who behave and live in such a way that their faithfulness and uprightness, their fair dealing and generosity, are approved of by all, and so that there is not in them any passion, licentiousness, or recklessness, and are men of great strength of character, like those were whom I have just named,—let us think that these are to be called good men even as they have been considered to be, because as far as men can they follow nature, the best guide to living well. For I seem to see very clearly something of this kind, that we were born under the condition that there should be a certain social union among all, a union which is greater the more nearly each approaches us. Accordingly, fellow-citizens are preferable to foreigners, relatives to strangers: with relatives Nature herself has produced a friendship, but this has not sufficient solidity. For friendship is superior to relationship in this respect, viz., kindly feeling can be separated from relationship, but not from friendship. When kindly feeling is taken away, the name friendship is taken away, while that of relationship remains. 20. How great, moreover, is the power of friendship can especially be perceived from the fact that, starting from the undefined social bond among mankind, which Nature herself has knit together, the (aspect of the) thing has been so shrunk and drawn into narrow limits, that every union of affection takes place either between two or among a few persons.

VI. For friendship is nothing else than an agreement on all things, human and divine, together with kindly feeling and affection; than which, indeed, with the exception of wisdom, the immortal Gods have given nothing better to man. Some prefer wealth, some good health, some power,

some dignities; many prefer even pleasures. Of these the latter (pleasures) are the supreme good in the eyes of brutes; but the former are fleeting and uncertain, dependent not so much on our own plans as on the chance of fortune. Those who put the highest good in virtue decide gloriously indeed. This very virtue both produces and upholds friendship; nor can friendship exist without virtue on any terms.

21. Now let us explain virtue according to the standard of our ordinary life and our ordinary conversation; and let us not measure it out, as certain learned men do, by big words. Let us count as good men those who are considered so to be, viz., men like Paulus, Cato, Galus, Scipio, and Philus; with such as these our ordinary life is satisfied, and let us neglect those who are not found anywhere at all. 22. Such friendship, then, among men possesses I can scarcely say how great advantages. In the first place, how can a life be liveable, as Ennius says, which does not find repose in the interchange of kind feeling with a friend? What is more pleasant than to have someone with whom you can dare to talk on all things as if talking with yourself? What sort of enjoyment of such importance would there be in prosperity unless you had someone to rejoice at it equally with yourself? and it would be hard to endure adversity without someone who would be more pained at it than yourself. In short, all the other things which are the objects of desire are each of them, for the most part fit for a particular purpose: wealth, that you may enjoy it; power, that you may be courted; dignities, that you may be praised; pleasures, that you may rejoice; health, that you may be free from pain and perform the duties of the body. Friendship lends support to very many things; wherever you turn, it is at hand; it is shut out from no place; it is never out of season, never troublesome: and so we do not use fire and water, as the proverb goes, in more places than friendship. I am not now speaking about the common or middling friendship, which itself nevertheless is both delightful and beneficial, but of the true and faultless friendship, as was the friendship of those of whom few are quoted. For friendship makes prosperity more brilliant, and adversity less burdensome, by dividing and sharing it.

VII. 23. And not only does friendship comprise very

many great advantages (as we have seen), but in the following advantage it doubtless surpasses all things, viz., it kindles in front the torch of good hope over the future, and does not permit our spirits to be weakened or cast down. For he who looks upon a true friend, looks upon, as it were, a copy of himself. Wherefore, the absent are present, the poor have plenty, the weak are strong, and,—what is harder to say,—the dead are alive; so great is the respect, recollection, and regret in their friends which accompanies them on their way. Hence the death of the one party seems happy, and the life of the other party praiseworthy. But if you take away from the constitution of things the bond of goodwill, no home or city will be able to stand; not even the cultivation of the land will remain. And if you cannot quite understand how great is the power of friendship and concord, it can be seen clearly from disagreements and discords. For what house is so well established, what state so strongly settled, as not to admit of being completely overthrown by animosities and factions? Hence we can judge what great good there is in friendship.

24. Indeed, they say that a certain learned Agrigentine sang, like an inspired bard, in Greek verses that friendship draws closer, and discord scatters those objects which are fixed in the constitution of things, and in the entire universe, and also those objects which are movable. And this statement, indeed, all men both perceive and approve in actual life. Accordingly, if at any time some kindness on the part of a friend has been displayed in meeting or sharing dangers with a friend, who is there who does not extol it with the loudest praises? What shouts were there lately in the whole of the theatre on (the occasion of) the new play of M. Pacuvius, my guest and friend—when, as the king did not know which was Orestes, Pylades said he was Orestes, so as to be slain in his stead; while Orestes, on the other hand, maintained, as was the fact, that he was Orestes! The people stood up and cheered on (the occasion of) an imaginary incident; what do we think they would have done in real life? Nature herself easily showed her power, inasmuch as men decided that what they themselves could not do was rightly done in the case of another.

So far, I think, I have been able to express my sentiments

concerning friendship. If there are any other points to be discussed besides (and I believe there are many), make inquiries, if it seems good to you, from those who argue on those topics.

25. *Fannius*.—But we would rather (make inquiries) of you, although I have often made inquiries of them also, and have listened to their discourses, for my own part, not unwillingly; but the thread of your speech is something different.

Scævola.—You would say so still more, Fannius, if you had been present lately in the gardens of Scipio, when the discussion on the state took place. What an advocate of justice he was then against the subtle speech of Philus!

Fannius.—It was indeed an easy thing for a most just man to defend justice.

Scævola.—What! is it not an easy thing for him (to defend friendship), who has obtained the greatest fame for preserving it with the most complete loyalty, steadiness, and justice?

VIII. 26. *Lælius*.—Why, this is bringing force against me! What does it matter by what means you compel me? You are compelling me, at any rate. For not only is it hard, but it is not even just to oppose the eager wishes of one's sons-in-law, especially in a good cause.

Well, then, very often, when thinking about friendship, it usually appears to me that the following must be chiefly considered—whether friendship is desired on account of weakness and neediness, so that, in giving and receiving services, each man may take from another, and in turn pay back, that which he is unable to do by himself; or whether this, indeed, is merely an attribute of friendship, while there is some other cause, more ancient and honourable, proceeding more from Nature herself. For love (from which friendship has received its name) leads the way to the union of kindness. Advantages, indeed, are obtained often even by those who, under the pretence of friendship, are courted and worshipped to suit the occasion; but in friendship there is no feigning or pretence, and whatever there is is true and sincere.

27. On which account friendship seems to me to have arisen from nature rather than from neediness, through a

leaning of the mind, together with a certain feeling of love rather than through the thought of how much advantage it was likely to obtain. Its nature, indeed, can be remarked even in certain beasts, who love their offspring up to a certain time, and are loved by them in such a way that their feeling is easily manifest. And this is much clearer in the case of man; first, from the affection which exists between children and parents, which cannot be destroyed, except by detestable wickedness; secondly, in that a like feeling of love has arisen, if we discovered some actual person with whose character and nature we sympathize, because in him we seem to see, as it were, a shining light of integrity and virtue.

28. For there is nothing more lovable than virtue, nothing which more entices to loving, since, forsooth, on account of their virtue and integrity, we love, in a certain way, even those whom we have never seen. Who is there who does not go over his recollections of C. Fabricius or M. Curius (although he has never seen them) with some feeling of goodwill and affection? And who is there who does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Sp. Cassius, and Sp. Mælius? There was a long struggle with two generals, Pyrrhus and Hannibal, for the sovereignty in Italy. From the one, on account of his integrity, our feelings are not excessively estranged; the other, on account of his cruelty, this state will always hate.

IX. 29. Now, if the force of integrity is so great that we love it either in those whom we have never seen, or—what is a greater marvel—even in an enemy, what wonder is it if the minds of men are stirred when they seem to see the virtue and goodness of those with whom they can be united by actual intercourse? And yet love is strengthened by the receiving of a service, by the perception of zealous affection, and by the addition of a close intimacy; and when these things are joined to that first movement of the loving heart, there begins to glow forth a certain marvellous intensity of kindliness. But if any people think that it proceeds from weakness, so that there may be someone through whom to obtain what each yearns for, they leave us an origin of friendship mean, forsooth, and far from noble, so to speak, in wishing it to be the offspring of want and neediness. Now,

if this were so, the less resource each person thought he possessed in himself, the more suited would he be for friendship—but the fact is far otherwise.

30. For the more confidence a man has in himself, and the more a man is so fortified with virtue and wisdom as to be in want of nobody, and to judge that all his elements of happiness depend on himself, the more does he excel in seeking and cultivating friendships. Why now! Was Africanus in want of me? Far from it, by Heaven! And, assuredly, neither was I in want of him. But I loved him through a certain admiration for his excellence, and he, in his turn, loved me, perchance through some opinion which he held about my personal character, and acquaintance increased our goodwill. But although many great advantages followed, the motives of our love did not proceed from the expectation of those advantages.

31. For as we are beneficent and generous, not in order to exact gratitude (we do not lend out benefits at interest, but we are inclined to generosity by nature), so we think that we must seek friendship induced, not by the hope of reward, but by the fact that all its advantages are in love, and love alone.

32. But those who, after the fashion of beasts, refer all things to (the standard of) pleasure, differ widely, and no wonder, from these (opinions); for they, who have degraded all their thoughts down to an object so mean and despicable, cannot look up to anything lofty, grand, or divine. Wherefore, let us remove those teachers, at any rate from our conversation, and let us ourselves understand that when an indication has been given of integrity, a sense of loving and an affectionate goodwill are naturally produced. And those who have sought after this integrity incline themselves, and draw nearer to it, so that they may enjoy both the intercourse of the man whom they have begun to love and also his moral character, and so that they may be equal and on a level in love, and more inclined to do a kind service than to ask one back, and so that there may be this honourable rivalry between them. Thus, both the greatest advantages will be obtained from friendship, and its origin from nature, rather than from weakness, is more dignified and real. For

if expediency were to cement friendships, a change in it (expediency) would also break them up; but since nature cannot be changed, on that account true friendships are eternal. As regards the origin of friendship, you see (what it is), unless, perchance, you wish to make some remark on these (topics).

Fannius.—Nay, do you continue, *Laelius*; for I answer, in my own right, on behalf of *Scævola* here, who is my junior.

33. *Scævola*.—You answer rightly, indeed. Accordingly, let us listen.

X. *Laelius*.—Hear then, worthy gentlemen, the discussions which used very frequently to take place between *Scipio* and me concerning friendship. And yet he indeed used to say that nothing was more difficult than for friendship to continue right up to the last day of life. For it often happened either that the same thing was not advantageous to both, or that the same opinion was not held concerning public affairs. He used often to say that man's moral principle changed also, sometimes through adversity, sometimes through the increasing burden of age. And he used to take an instance of these changes from a comparison with the first years of life, since the deepest attachments of boys were often laid aside at the same time as the purple-bordered robe; (34) nay, if they had continued them up to youth, they were still sometimes destroyed by the struggle for a marriage alliance or for some advantage, since both could not obtain the same thing. Now, if some had lived to a further period of life in friendship, still that friendship was often made to totter should they have entered into a contest for office; for there was no influence more baneful for friendships than, among most people, the lust for money, and, among all the best men, the strife for office and fame. For this cause the greatest enmity has often arisen amongst the closest friends.

35. Moreover, great, and, for the most part, just quarrels were bred when a request for something which was not right was made of friends; *e.g.*, that they should be the servants of their lust or their assistants in perverting justice. Since those who refused, although they did so from honourable motives, would still be charged, by those whom they were

those

unwilling to oblige, with neglecting the claims of friendship. But ~~they~~ who dared to make any and every request from a friend, by the very request proclaimed that they would do everything on behalf of a friend. Through their unceasing complaint, not only were intimacies commonly destroyed, but also everlasting hatreds produced. These destinies, as it were, hung over friendships in such numbers, that, he said, it seemed to him that it required not only wisdom, but also good luck, to escape all of them.

XI. 36.—Wherefore, let us first, if it pleases you, look into this point, how far affection ought to go in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, ought they with Coriolanus to have borne arms against their country? When Vecellinus and Mælius were seeking to establish royal power, ought their friends to have helped them? 37. As for Tib. Gracchus, when he was harassing the state, we saw him abandoned by Q. Tubero, and other friends of the same age as himself. But when C. Blossius, of Cumæ, a friend of your house, Scævola, came to me to ask pardon—for I was present with the consuls Lænas and Rupilius at their deliberations—he brought forward this (as a) reason that I should forgive him, viz., that he esteemed Tib. Gracchus so highly that he thought he must do whatever he (Tib.) wished. ‘Then,’ said I, ‘(would you obey him) even if he wished you to bring firebrands into the Capitol?’ ‘Never,’ said he, ‘could he have had that wish indeed; but if he had had that wish, I should have obeyed.’ You see how impious a speech it was. And, by heavens, he did exactly as, or even more than, he said; for he did not obey, but headed the rash infatuation of Tib. Gracchus, and made himself not the companion but the leader of his frenzy. So on account of this madness, frightened by the newly established court of inquiry, he fled to Asia, betook himself to the enemy, and paid a heavy and just penalty to the state. It is therefore no palliation for your sin if you commit it for the sake of a friend; for, as the belief about another’s virtue won the friendship, it is hard for friendship to remain if you fall away from virtue. 38. Now, should we lay it down as a right principle either to grant to friends whatever they wish or to obtain from them whatever we wish, this prin-

ciple would involve no fault if only we were (men) of perfect wisdom. But we are speaking about those friends who are before our eyes, whom we have seen, or about whom we have heard by tradition, or who are known to our everyday life. From this number we must take our instances, and especially from the number of those, indeed, who approach nearest to wisdom. 39. We see that Papus Æmilius was the close friend of Luscinius (so we have heard from our fathers), twice (they were) consuls together, twice colleagues in the censorship; then it is handed down to memory that M. Curius and Ti. Coruncanius were most attached to them and to one another. So we cannot even suspect that any one of these asked from his friend anything that might be a violation of a pledge or an oath, or an injury to the welfare of the state. In the case of such men as these, what is it to the point to say the following indeed—that he would not have obtained it if he had made a point of obtaining it? Since they were the purest of men, and it is equally impious for a person to do anything like this when asked, or to ask for it (to be done). But, in truth, Tib. Gracchus was followed by C. Carbo, C. Cato, and by his brother Caius, who at that time indeed was not very active, but who is now exceedingly so.

X XII. 40. Let this law then be ratified in friendship—that we should neither ask for base things nor do them when asked. For it is a discreditable way of excusing one's self, and one by no means to be accepted, as well in other sins, and especially when one confesses that he has acted against the welfare of the state for the sake of a friend. For we are placed in such a position, Fannius and Scaevola, that we ought to look far ahead for the coming misfortunes of the state. For already our custom has turned somewhat aside from the course and career of our ancestors. 41. Tib. Gracchus tried to seize kingly power, or, rather, he was indeed actually king for a few months. Had the Roman people heard or seen anything like it? What his friends and relations, following in his steps, did—even after his death—in the case of P. Scipio, I cannot describe without tears. We have put up with Carbo, in whatever way we have been able, on account of the recent punishment of Tib. Gracchus; but I do not like forecasting what I expect from the tribuneship of

C. Gracchus. Affairs which are creeping down the slope to destruction, when they have once begun, go gliding on. You see how great a corruption was caused in the ballot even before, first by the law of Gabinus, and two years afterwards by the law of Cassius. I already seem to see the people separated from the senate, and affairs of the greatest importance decided according to the will of the populace. For more will learn how such measures are brought about than how they are resisted. 42. But whither (are) these (remarks tending)? (I make them) because without comrades no one makes any such attempt. We must therefore instruct all good men that if, unaware, by some chance they become involved in friendships of this kind, they are not to think that they are so bound as not to depart from friends who are committing a crime in some important public matter; and a punishment must be appointed for the wicked, and, indeed, no less a one for those who have followed another than for those who have been themselves the leaders in impiety. Who was more renowned or more powerful in Greece than Themistocles? But when (in his office of) general in the Persian war he had freed Greece from slavery, and yet had been driven into exile on account of his unpopularity, instead of enduring, as he ought to have, the wrong inflicted upon him by his ungrateful country, he did the same as Coriolanus had done among us twenty years before. For these men no helper was found against their native country, and so each of them committed suicide. 43 Wherefore such an agreement among wicked people not only ought not to be covered by the plea of friendship, but ought rather to be punished by every penalty, so that no one should think it allowable to follow a friend who is even bringing war against his native country. Now this, considering the way matters have begun to go, will probably come about at some time or other. To me, moreover, it is a matter of no less anxiety what the state will be like after my death than what it is like to-day.

XIII. 44. So let this be established as the first law of friendship—to seek honourable things from friends, to do honourable actions for the sake of friends, and not even to wait until we are asked; let zeal be always at hand, hesitancy absent; but let us dare to give advice with

freedom. Let the authority of friends who give good counsel have the greatest weight in friendship, and let it be applied for the purpose of giving advice, not only openly, but even earnestly, if the matter so demand; and when it is applied let it be obeyed. 45. For I think that certain men, who I hear were regarded as wise in Greece, held as dogmas certain strange (paradoxes)—by the way, there is nothing which they do not follow up with their subtleties—some (of them saying) that excessive friendships are to be avoided, lest it should be necessary for one person to be anxious on behalf of several; each man has enough for himself, and more than enough, of his own affairs. It is a nuisance to be too much involved in the affairs of strangers. It is most convenient to keep the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so that you can either draw them up when you wish, or slacken them: for the chief thing towards a happy life is freedom from care, which the mind cannot enjoy if it is, as it were, in the pangs of labour, one on behalf of several. 46. Moreover, they say that others speak in a much more inhuman strain (a topic on which I have touched lightly a little before), that friendships are to be eagerly sought for the sake of protection and assistance, not for goodwill or affection. Accordingly, the less strength or power one has, the more one seeks for friendship; and hence it happens that weak women seek the protection of friendship more than men, the poor more than the wealthy, and those who are full of misfortunes more than those who are considered to be happy. 47. Glorious wisdom! Why, they seem to take away the sun from the world when they take away from life friendship, than which we have no better or more pleasing (gift) from the immortal Gods. For what is that freedom from care? Of enticing appearance, indeed, but in reality to be rejected on many grounds. For it is not consistent (with your other conduct) either to refuse to take up, or to lay aside after you have taken it up, any honourable object or course of action, for fear of being made anxious. Now, if we try to shun uneasiness, we must shun virtue, which necessarily with some uneasiness spurns and hates objects opposed to itself, as kind-heartedness hates ill-will; self-control, lust; and bravery, cowardice; and so you would see that it is the just men

who are chiefly grieved at instances of injustice, the brave at feebleness of spirit, the temperate at shocking crimes. Accordingly, this is the characteristic of a well-ordered mind, to feel both joy at good things and pain at the opposite. 48. Wherefore, if grief of the heart happens to a wise man—and it certainly does happen, unless we think that all feelings of a man are rooted out of his mind—what reason is there for us to remove friendship completely from life merely to avoid taking up with some trouble on account of it? For when you have taken away the emotions of the mind, what difference is there, I do not say between a beast and a man, but between a man and a log, or a stone, or anything of the same kind? For we must not listen to those people who want to make virtue a certain hard and, as it were, iron quality: nay, in many things, and especially in friendship, it is tender and pliable, so that it is, as it were, expanded by the good fortune of a friend and shrunk by his troubles. Wherefore that pinch of pain which must often be endured on behalf of a friend has not so much power that it removes friendship from life, any more than that virtues are rejected merely because they bring some anxieties and annoyances.

XIV. But since a man contracts a friendship, as I said above, if any sign of virtue shine forth to which a similar mind may incline and attach itself, when this happens, love necessarily arises. 49. For what is so absurd as to be delighted with many lifeless things, as with office, fame, house-building, the clothing and adornment of the body, and not to be delighted to the full with a living being endowed with excellence such that it can either love or, so to speak, love in return. For nothing is more pleasant than the rewarding of goodwill and the interchange of devotion and kind services. 50. What if we add also that which can be rightly added, that there is nothing which so entices and attracts anything unto itself so much as likeness attracts to friendship? For it will be assuredly granted that it is true that good men love and attach to themselves good men, as if united to them by relationship and nature. For there is nothing which is more eager and greedy for things like itself than nature. Wherefore, Fannius and Scævola, let this be established, that, as I think, between good men and good men there is as it were a

necessary feeling of goodwill, which is the source of friendship established by nature. But this same good feeling extends even to the people in general. For virtue is not unkindly nor unserviceable nor arrogant, since it is accustomed to protect even whole nations and to look after their interests in the best way; and this it would certainly not do if it shrink from affection for the common people. 51. And, moreover, those who imagine friendships based on advantage seem to me to take away the most lovable knot of friendship. For it is not so much the advantage gained through a friend as the love itself of the friend which delights us; and that which has originated from a friend becomes pleasant only if it has originated with zealous affection. And so far are friendships from being cultivated on account of neediness, that those who, from their wealth, resources, and especially by their virtue, in which is the greatest amount of protection, stand least in need of another, are the most generous and the most ready to do a kind service. Nay, I should rather think that it is no advantage that nothing at all should at any time be wanting to friends. For in what circumstances would our zealous affection have thriven if Scipio had never, either at home or abroad, been in want of my advice or my active help? Accordingly, friendship is not the result of expediency, but expediency of friendship.

XV. 52.—Accordingly, men who are abandoned to luxury will not be worthy of attention if ever they have discussions about friendship which they have an acquaintance with neither by experience nor by reason. Who is there, by the faith of men and Gods, who, on condition that he should neither love anybody nor be himself loved by anybody, would be willing to overflow with wealth and to live amid abundance of everything? This, doubtless, is the life of tyrants, in which there can be no faith, no affection, no firm reliance on goodwill, in which everything is always an object of suspicion and anxiety, in which there is no place for friendship. 53. For who would love either the men he fears or the men by whom he thinks himself feared. Yet they are courted with a pretence (of friendship), although only for a time; and if perchance, as it generally happens, they fall, men then perceive how poor in friends they were. As they say

Tarquinius said, when in exile, that he knew at length what faithful and what unfaithful friends he had had, when he could no longer make returns to either. And yet I wonder how a man of his well-known haughtiness and perversity could have had any friend. And as the character of the man I have mentioned was unable to procure true friends, so the wealth of many who are very powerful shuts out faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune herself blind, but she generally makes those also blind whom she has embraced: accordingly, they are hurried away generally by disdain and insolence, and there is nothing that is harder to endure than the fool who is lucky. And the following, indeed, we may see, that those who formerly were of an obliging character are changed by power, office, and by good fortune; old friendships are despised by them, and new ones cherished. 55. But what is more foolish, when men, through their prosperity, opportunities, and wealth have the greatest power, than to procure all the other objects which can be procured by money, viz., horses, slaves, splendid garments and costly vases, and to omit to procure friends, who are, so to speak, the best and most beautiful furniture of life. For when they procure other things they do not know for whom they may be procuring them, nor on whose account they are toiling (for each of those things belongs to him who has conquered by his strength), whereas the possession of friendship remains fixed and sure to each person; so that even if those things were to remain which are, as it were, gifts of Fortune, still a life unadorned and deserted by friends could not be pleasant. But so far on this point.

XVI. 56. But we must establish what are the limits and, as it were, the bounds of loving in friendship. About these limits I see three opinions are spoken of, none of which I approve. One, that we should feel towards our friends the same as we feel towards ourselves; a second, that our goodwill towards them should answer equally in amount and degree to their goodwill towards us; and a third, that a man should have the same value set on him by his friends as he sets upon himself. 57. To none at all of these three opinions do I assent. For the first is not true, that a person should have the same feelings towards his friend as he has

towards himself. How many things do we perform on behalf of our friends which we should never perform on behalf of ourselves!—begging and praying of an unworthy person; again clamouring against a person with extra bitterness, and attacking him with extra violence; things which in our own affairs cannot be done quite with honour, are done in the affairs of friends with the greatest honour. And there are many circumstances in which good men take away much from their own advantages and suffer much to be taken away, that their friends may enjoy them rather than they themselves.

58. The second opinion is (that) which limits friendship to an equality of services and kind feelings. This, indeed, is to call friendship to an account with too much minuteness and exactness, so that the amount of creditor and debtor may be equal. True friendship seems to me to be richer and more bountiful, and not to watch narrowly against paying more than it receives, nor must there be any fear lest anything should fall out or overflow to the ground, or lest anything more than what is fair should be heaped up on (the side of) friendship.

59. But that third limit is the worst, viz., that a man should have the same value set on him by his friends as he sets upon himself. For often, in certain persons, the spirit is too downcast, or the hope of increasing his fortune too much shattered. Accordingly, it is not the part of a friend to behave towards him as he behaves towards himself, but rather to strive and to bring (it) about that he may rouse his friend's prostrate spirit, and lead him on to better hopes and thoughts. Accordingly, another limit of true friendship must be set up, as soon as I have stated what Scipio used chiefly to blame. He used to say that no expression could have been found more hostile to friendship than that of him who had said that a man ought to love in such a way as if some day he was likely to hate. Nor, indeed, could he be induced to believe that this, as it was thought, was said by Bias, who was considered a wise man, one of the Seven; it was the opinion of some mean and selfish person, or of one who referred everything to (the increase of his) own influence. For how can anyone be a friend to a

man to whom he thinks he may possibly be hostile? Nay, more; it will be even necessary to desire and pray that his friend may sin as often as possible, so that he may give him the more handles, as it were, by which to catch hold of him, and, on the other hand, it will be necessary to be troubled, pained, and envious at the good deeds and advantages of our friends.

60. Wherefore this doctrine, indeed, whose soever it is, amounts to doing away with friendship; the following ought rather to have been the doctrine—to apply such carefulness in acquiring our friends as never, at any time, to begin to love a person whom we should be able to hate some time or other. Nay, more; if we had been unfortunate in loving, Scipio used to think, we ought rather to endure this than to think about an opportunity for enmities.

XVII. 61. So I think we must employ such limitations (of friendship) that, when the character of friends is faultless, there should be between them a complete community of property, plans, and wishes, so that, even if it should happen by some chance that the wishes of our friends, when not quite just, have to be aided, wishes in which their standing or reputation is at stake, we must deviate from the road, provided only if no very deep disgrace is the consequence; for there is a limit to which indulgence can be extended in friendship. Nor, indeed, must we neglect reputation, nor ought we to consider the goodwill of our fellow-citizens an unimportant weapon for the conduct of public affairs. Yet it is disgraceful to obtain their goodwill by flattery and obsequiousness: virtue which is followed by affection is least of all to be rejected.

62. But Scipio used to complain (I often go back to him, from whom came this whole discourse about friendship) that in all things men were more painstaking than in friendship. Each man could tell how many goats and sheep he had, but could not tell how many friends; and, indeed, they took pains in procuring the former, but in choosing friends they were careless, and had not, as it were, signs and marks by which to judge those who were fit for friendship. Those, then, who are strong, steady, and consistent in character, must be chosen; but of this class there is a great scarcity, and it is difficult for anyone to judge unless he has made a

trial, but he must make his trial in friendship itself. So friendship forestalls our judgment, and takes away our opportunity of making a trial.

63. Accordingly, it is the part of the wise man, as (he checks a horse's) speed, to check the rush of kindly feeling, that we may enjoy the characters of our friends, just as we do well-broken horses, only after they have been previously tried, in some degree, by friendship. Certain people are often seen through in a small (matter of) money, (and show) how fickle they are; some, again, whom a small question of money has not been able to affect, have their characters discovered in case of large ones. But if some persons should be found who think it mean to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find persons who would not prefer office, magistracies, military and civil commands, dignities and wealth, to friendship—so that when these were set before them on one side, and the claims of friendship on the other, they would not much prefer the former? For our nature is too weak to despise power; and even if they have obtained this power by disregarding friendship, they think that this disregard of friendship will be cast into the shade, because (it was) not without great reason (that) friendship was disregarded.

64. And so true friendships are with the greatest difficulty found among those who are in office, and are employed in state affairs. For where would you find that man who would prefer the advancement of his friend to his own? Again, to pass by these points, how burdensome and hard do partnerships in calamities appear to some! it is not easy to find persons who will come down to these. And yet Ennius rightly says 'a friend in need is a friend indeed.' Still, these two things convict most people of fickleness and weakness, if during their own prosperity they despise a friend, and forsake him in his adversity.

XVIII. Accordingly, the man who, in both these conditions, shows himself a man of weight, consistent and steady, him we ought to consider to belong to a class especially scarce and almost God-like.

65. Now, the foundation of that steadiness and consistency which we seek in friendship is trustworthiness; for nothing which is untrustworthy is steadfast. Besides, it is fair that

a friend should be chosen who is simple-minded, sociable, and sympathetic, so as to be affected by the same circumstances (in the same way as you are); all these qualities have to do with faithfulness. A nature that is shift and twisting cannot be trustworthy, nor, indeed, can a man be either trustworthy or steadfast who is not affected by the same things, and naturally sympathetic. We must also add that he should neither be pleased at bringing charges against another, nor should he believe them when brought—qualities which all have to do with that consistency with which I have now for a long while been dealing. Accordingly, what I said at the beginning turns out to be true, viz., friendship can only exist among good people. For it is the part of a good man, whom we may also call wise, to keep in view these two things in friendship: first (to see), that there be no shamming or pretence, for even to hate openly is more like a frank man than to hide one's opinion under one's looks; secondly, not only to repel the charges brought by anyone against a friend, but to abstain even from being himself suspicious, thinking that some offence has been committed by his friend. 66. There ought to be added to this a certain pleasantness of speech and behaviour, a by no means unimportant seasoning to friendship. Moroseness and sternness in everything brings with it indeed dignity, but friendship ought to be less strict and more fine and sweet, and more inclined to all kinds of courtesy and affability.

XIX. 67. Now there arises in this place a certain rather difficult question, whether at any time new friends, worthy of our friendship, are to be preferred to old, as we usually prefer young and tender horses to old hacks. The doubt is unworthy of a human being; for there ought not to be any surfeit of friendships as there is of other things. The older friendship ought to be the more pleasant, just as those wines which bear old age well. And the following saying is true, that many bushels of salt must be eaten together that the office of friendship may be fully carried out.

68. But new friendships, if they bring the hope that fruit may appear, as if in blades of corn, that do not disappoint—those new friendships are not to be rejected; yet an old friendship must be preserved in its own (proper)

place—for the force of age and custom is exceedingly great. Nay, in the case of the horse itself, which I have just mentioned, if nothing was to prevent it, there is no one who would not use one which has become accustomed to use more willingly than one which was unbroken and fresh. And, indeed, not only in the case of that which is a thing of life, but also in the case of things which are without life, custom has weight, since we are delighted by those very places, even though mountainous and wooded, in which we have stayed for rather a long while.

69. But it is of the highest importance in friendship to be on an equality with your inferior. For there are often certain points of superiority, as there were belonging to Scipio in our flock, so to speak. He never set himself before Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or his friends of humbler rank. But to his brother, Quintus Maximus—an excellent man, certainly, though by no means his equal—he always paid respect, as to his superior, because he surpassed him in years; and he always wished that all his friends might obtain more dignity through him. And this should be done and copied by all, viz., to share with their friends and divide with their connections any superiority in merit, mind, or position, they may have acquired; so that if they are born of lowly parents, or if they have connections of feebler talents or position, they may increase their wealth, and be an honour and pride to them. Just as in the legends those who for some while have been counted among the household, through ignorance of their family stock and descent, when they are recognised and discovered to be the sons of either Gods or kings, still keep their affection for the shepherds whom for many years they have thought their fathers. And this certainly should be done much more in the case of our real and undoubted parents. For the fruit of talent and virtue, and of every excellence, is obtained in the greatest amount only when it is bestowed upon all our nearest connections.

XX. 71. As, therefore, those who in the ties of friendship and association are superior, ought to put themselves on a level with their inferiors, so the inferiors ought not to grieve that they are surpassed by their friends, either in talents, position or honours. And most of these are always making either some

complaint or even some reproach; and they do this the more if they think they have something which they can say they have done, in accordance with their sense of duty or friendship, or at the expenditure of some trouble on their part. Forsooth, the class of men who cast their kind services in your teeth is hateful. The men on whom these services are conferred should remember them; the men who conferred them should not recall the fact. 72. Wherefore, as those who are superior ought to lower themselves in friendship, so ought they in some way to raise up those who are inferior. For there are certain men who make friendships troublesome, since they themselves think they are slighted. This generally only happens to those who think that they actually deserve to be slighted; these men must be relieved from that idea, not only by words, but also by deeds. 73. You must confer on each friend, first, as much as you can yourself accomplish; and secondly, as much as he whom you would love and help can endure. Why, not even you yourself, although you may surpass others in power, could carry through all your friends to the highest honours; as, for instance, Scipio was able to make P. Rupilius consul, but could not (make) his brother Lucius (consul). And even if you could pass on any honour you please to another, you must nevertheless consider what he is able to bear.

74. On the whole, friendships are to be decided on when our natural powers and time of life have become strengthened and settled; nor if any of us, at an early age, were fond of hunting or ball-playing, those whom we then loved (because they were) endowed with the same taste (must we still) regard as intimate friends. For at that rate nurses and tutors, by the right of old attachment, will demand the greatest share of our goodwill. They, of course, are not to be neglected, but they must be regarded in a certain different manner. Otherwise friendships cannot last unaltered; for difference of character is followed by difference of pursuits, the unlikeness of which disconnects friendships. Nor is it on account of any other reason that good men cannot be friendly with wicked or wicked with good, except that there is between them the greatest diversity that can be of character and pursuits. For it can be laid

down as a correct principle in friendships that a certain kind of immoderate goodwill, as it often happens, should not interfere with the great interests of friends. For to return to the myths, Neoptolemus could not have taken Troy if he had been willing to listen to Lycomedes, at whose court he was brought up, when with many tears he tried to stop his journey. And often important matters befall, so that we have to part from our friends: and the man who wishes to obstruct these important matters, because he cannot easily endure to miss his friends, is both weak and effeminate by nature, and, for that very reason, far from reasonable in friendship. 76. And so in everything you must consider both what you would ask from a friend, and what you would suffer to be obtained from yourself.

XXI. There is, also, a certain kind of disaster always involved in the breaking up of friendships—for our discourse now is gliding from the intimacies of the wise down to commonplace friendships. Often the faults of our friends break out not only upon the friends themselves but also upon strangers, and yet so that the disgrace often flows back upon their friends. Accordingly such friendships must be allowed to fade out by relaxing our familiarity, and, as I have heard Cato used to say, are to be unsewn rather than torn asunder, unless the flame of some quite insupportable injury has blazed forth so that it is neither right, honourable, nor possible that an estrangement and severance should not immediately take place. 77. But if there has been a certain change of either character or taste, as usually happens, or if a disagreement as to parties in public affairs has intervened—(I am speaking now, as I said a little while ago, not of the friendships of the wise, but of ordinary friendships)—we shall have to beware lest not only our friendships appear to be laid aside, but also lest enmities should appear to be taken up. For nothing is more disgraceful than to carry on war with a man with whom you have lived on intimate terms. Scipio, as you know, had removed himself from friendship with Q. Pompeius on my account; and on account of a disagreement in public affairs he was estranged from my fellow-augur Metellus. On both occasions he acted with

dignity and moderation, and with feelings hurt, but not embittered.

78. Wherefore we must take pains, first, that no severances of friends take place; but if anything of this kind does happen, secondly, that the friendship should appear rather to have died out than to have been crushed. But we must beware lest friendships change into serious enmities, from which quarrels, curses, and insults are bred. And yet they must be borne if they are endurable; and here consideration must be paid to a friendship of long standing, so that the man who does the wrong, not the one who suffers it, may be in the wrong. To sum up, there is one safeguard and one precaution against all these faults and inconveniences—not to begin to love too quickly, and not to love the unworthy.

79. Those people are worthy of friendship who have in themselves a reason why they should be loved. The class is scarce. And, indeed, all excellent things are scarce; nor is there any task harder than to find something which in its own class shall be perfect in every respect. But most people know nothing good in human affairs, except what is profitable; and they chose friends as if they were sheep, (taking) those in preference to all others from whom they hope they will obtain the greatest advantage. 80. And so they go without that most beautiful and most natural friendship which is sought in and for itself; nor are they themselves an example to themselves of the nature and greatness of this power of friendship. For everyone loves himself, not in order to exact some reward for his affection from himself, but because each man of himself is dear to himself. And unless this same feeling is transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found. For a true friend is, as it were, a second self. 81. And if it is clear in the case of all animals, whether they fly or swim, whether they live in the fields, are tame or wild, first, that they themselves love themselves (this feeling is born in an equal degree with everything that breathes); and secondly,, that they seek and desire some creature of the same class of animal to whom they may unite themselves (and this they do with a yearning and with a certain resemblance to human love): how much more naturally does this happen in the case of man, who both loves himself and seeks another whose

heart he so combines with his own that he almost makes the two hearts one.

XXII. 82. But most people perversely, not to say shamelessly, desire to have a friend of such a nature as they themselves cannot be, and wish to obtain from their friends what they themselves do not give to them. It is, however, fair for a man to be first good himself, and then to seek for another like himself. In such men that firmness of friendship with which we have for a long while been dealing can be strengthened, since men united by good feeling will in the first place have command over those passions to which the others are slaves, and, in the next place, they will rejoice in fairness and justice, and the one will undertake everything on behalf of the other, nor will the one ask from the other anything but what is honourable and right; nor will they only pay attention to and love each other, but they will also respect each other. For he who takes away respect from friendship takes away its greatest ornament. 83. Accordingly, those who think that in friendship there is an open path to indulgence in all passions and sins make a fatal mistake. Friendship was given by nature as a helper to virtue, not as a companion in vice, in order that since virtue, solitary and alone, could not arrive at the things which are highest, it might reach (that goal) when joined in fellowship with another. † And among whomsoever this kind of fellowship is, was, or shall be, theirs is to be considered the best and happiest companionship on the path to the highest good in nature. 84. This, I say, is the fellowship in which is contained everything that men think should be sought after: honour, fame, tranquillity and cheerfulness of heart; so that when these are present life is happy, and without them it cannot be. And since this is the best and greatest object, if we wish to attain it, we must devote our attention to virtue, without which we cannot obtain either friendship or any desirable blessing; but if virtue is disregarded, those who think they have friends then, and then only, perceive they have made a mistake when some heavy misfortune compels them to make the trial. 85. Wherefore, you ought to love after you have formed your judgment—I have to repeat this remark rather often—instead of judg-

ing after you have loved. But we suffer for our carelessness in many things, and especially in loving and paying court to our friends. For we put the cart before the horse in our plans and do what is already done, which we are forbidden from doing by the old proverb. For when we are already entangled on this side and that, either by long habit or even by duty, suddenly in the middle of the course some cause of offence arises, and we break off the friendship.

XXIII. 86. Wherefore such great want of care in a matter of the highest importance is still more to be blamed. For friendship is the one thing in human affairs about the expediency of which all unanimously agree. And yet, by many, Virtue herself is despised and said to be a kind of puffing and display; many look down upon riches who content themselves with little, and are delighted with meagre food and dress; as to offices, with eagerness for which some people, I know, are on fire, how many despise them in such a way as to think nothing emptier or more trifling! And so with the other things which seem wonderful to some people—there are very many who consider them of no account. About friendship all, to a man, have the same feeling, both those who have betaken themselves to public life, and those who are delighted by study and learning, and those who, having leisure, do their own business, and, lastly, those who have given themselves up entirely to pleasures. All feel that without friendship there can be no life, if only they wish to live, to some extent, like free men. 87. For, somehow or other, friendship insinuates itself through the lives of all, nor does it suffer any method of passing life to be without its (presence). Nay, more; if a man is of such a harsh and savage nature as to flee from and hate the assemblies of men, just as was, we hear, a certain Timon at Athens, still, he could not bear to abstain from seeking, in all directions, for someone to whom he may give vent to the venom of his harshness. And this question could best be decided, if any such thing as the following could happen, viz., that some God should take us from this throng of men and place us anywhere in a desert, and there, providing abundant supplies of everything which nature wants, were to take away the opportunity of seeing a man at all. Who would be so iron-hearted

as to be able to endure that life, or from whom would not solitude take away the enjoyment of all pleasures? 88. So the following is true—it used to be said, I think, by Archytas of Tarentum, (as) I have been told that our old men relate that they have heard from other old men: ‘If anyone had ascended to heaven, and had thoroughly seen the universe and the beauty of the stars, that admiration would have been without pleasure to him; but it would have been most enjoyable if he had had anyone to whom to tell it.’ Thus nature likes nothing lonely, and always leans to some prop, so to speak. This, too, gives the greatest delight (when found) in the most attached friends.

XXIV. But although Nature, also, by so many signs shows her wishes, requirements, and wants, still we grow deaf, in some way or other, and do not listen to her admonitions. For the intercourse of friendship is varied and manifold, and many causes of suspicion and offence are given, which it is the part of the philosopher at one time to avoid, at another to remove, and at others to endure. One especial occasion of offence must be taken away, so that both usefulness and loyalty may be preserved in friendship. For friends require often both admonition and rebuke, and these must be received in a friendly spirit, when they are made with goodwill. 89. But, somehow or other, what my friend (Terence) says in his ‘Andria’ is true: ‘Deference makes friends; truth causes hatred.’ Truth is troublesome if indeed it gives birth to hatred, which is the poison of friendship; but deference is much more troublesome, which, by giving indulgence to sins, allows a friend to be hurried headlong to destruction. But the greatest fault rests with the man who both scorns truth and is driven by deference to ruin. So, in the whole of this matter, precaution and care must be taken, first, that the admonition be free from harshness; secondly, that the rebuke should be free from insult. But, in the case of deference, since we gladly use Terence’s word, let courtesy be present, and let flattery, the helper of vice, be removed far off—flattery, which is not only not worthy of a friend, but not even of a free man. For we live in one way with a tyrant, and in another with a free man. †

90. But as to the man whose ears are shut to truth,

so that he cannot listen to what is true from a friend, all hope of his welfare must be given up. For the following remark of Cato, like many of his, is neat—‘that bitter enemies deserve better of certain men than those friends who seem pleasant. For the former often speak the truth, the latter never.’ And it is absurd that those who are admonished do not feel that annoyance which they ought to feel, but do feel that from which they ought to be free. For they are not pained at having sinned, but they are annoyed at being rebuked; whereas, on the contrary, they ought to be grieved at the fault, and rejoice in its correction.

XXV. 91. Since, therefore, to give and receive advice is the province of true friendship, and that the one should give it freely without harshness, the other receive it with patience and without combating it, so we must consider that there is no greater plague in friendship than fawning, wheedling, and flattery; for this vice is to be branded by as many names as you please, and is the characteristic of worthless and deceitful men, who make all their speeches with the view of securing your goodwill, none with a view to truth. 92. But while pretence in all things is depraved (for it takes away our power of judging the truth, and adulterates the latter), it is especially opposed to friendship. For it blots out truth, without which the name friendship can have no meaning. For since the force of friendship consists in the fact that one mind, as it were, is made out of many, how can this happen if not even in each individual a mind can be found which is always one, and always the same, instead of being fickle, changeable, and manifold?

93. For what can be so pliable or so erratic as the mind of him who changes himself to suit not only the feeling and wishes of another, but even to suit his look and nod? ‘Some one says no, I say no; he says yes, I say yes: in fine, I have ordered myself to agree in everything,’ as Terence (whom I have just quoted) also says, but he (says it) in the character of Gnatho. It is, however, a sign of light-mindedness to attach to one’s self at all a friend of that kind.

94. But since there are many like the Gnathos, who are higher in position, wealth, and reputation, their flattery is troublesome when to empty-headedness is added authority.

95 But a flattering friend can be separated and distinguished from a true friend by the application of carefulness, just as everything that is dyed and counterfeit can be distinguished from the genuine and true. An assembly which consists of people most deficient in skill, is nevertheless wont to judge what difference there is between the popular demagogue, *i.e.*, the flatterer and untrustworthy citizen, on the one hand, and the consistent, strict, and dignified man on the other hand. 96 With what fawning words did C. Papirius lately flow into the ears of the assembly, when he was trying to carry the law about re-electing the tribunes of the people. I spoke against the measure; but I will say nothing about myself; I will more willingly speak about Scipio. 96. Immortal Gods! how great was his well-known gravity! how great was the dignity of his speech! So great was it that you would readily say that he was the leader, and not the follower, of the Roman people. But you were present, and his speech is commonly read. And so this popular law was rejected by the votes of the populace. And, to return to myself, you remember when Q. Maximus, the brother of Scipio, and L. Mancinus were consuls, how democratic seemed the law of C. Licinius Crassus about the priestly offices; for an attempt was being made to change co-optation of the colleges into a matter of public patronage, and he was the first to introduce the fashion of turning towards the forum when doing business with the people. And yet reverence for the immortal Gods, when I took up their defence, easily overcame his plausible speech. And this was done when I was only praetor, five years before I was made consul. So the defence in that matter relied on its merits rather than on the high influence of its advocate.

XXVI. 97. But if on the stage, *i.e.*, in the public assembly, where there is the greatest room for shadowy pretence, truth nevertheless has weight, provided only it be laid bare and brought to full light, what ought to be done in friendship which depends entirely upon truth? In friendship, unless, as they say, you see an open breast and show your own, you would have no faith or certainty either that you love, or even that you are loved, since you would not know what degree of truth there is in the love. And yet

that fawning, however ruinous it may be, can injure no one except the man who takes it in and is delighted with it. So it happens that the man who flatters himself, and is, most of all, delighted with himself, is the man, most of all, to open his ears to flatterers. 98. Without doubt Virtue is a lover of herself; for she knows herself best, and perceives how lovable she is. But I am not speaking now about virtue, but about supposed virtue. For there are not so many people endowed with virtue itself as are anxious to appear so. These are delighted by flattery, and when language is addressed to them moulded to their taste, they consider that false speech a testimony to their merits. This, then, is no friendship, when one party is unwilling to hear the truth, and the other party is ready to lie. Nor would the flattery of the parasites in comedy appear witty to us unless there were braggart soldiers. 'Does Thais, indeed, give me many thanks?' It was sufficient to reply, 'Many;' but he says, 'A million thanks.' The flatterer always exaggerates that which the man, to whose taste he is speaking, wishes to be great. (99) Wherefore, although that fawning falsehood has weight with those who fish for it and court it, still the more sober-minded and consistent are also to be warned to look out that they are not caught by clever flattery. For no one, unless he is exceedingly stupid, fails to see open flattery, but we must sedulously take care that the cunning and secret flatterer does not wind himself in; for he is not very easily recognised, inasmuch as he often flatters even by opposing, and while pretending to have a dispute, is wheedling you, and at the last gives in and allows himself to be beaten, so that the man who has been made game of may seem to have been more far-sighted. But what is more disgraceful than to be made game of? We must all the more take care against this happening to us. 'How you have turned me round your finger to-day, and played the most splendid jokes on me above all the old fools of comedy!'

100. For even in plays this character of blind and credulous old men is the most foolish. But somehow my discourse has glided down from the friendships of perfect men, *i.e.*, of wise men—I am speaking of that wisdom which can evidently fall within the reach of men)—down to worthless friendships.

Wherefore let us return to those first principles I laid down, and let us at last form a conclusion about them.

XXVII. C. Fannius, and you, Q. Mucius, it is virtue—virtue, I say, that both wins and preserves friendship. On that depends harmony in all things, on that the firmness, on that the consistency of all things. And when it has raised itself and shown its light, and has seen and recognised the same thing in another, it moves itself to it, and in return receives that which is in the other; hence begins the flame of either love or friendship. Each of these two things is named from loving. Now, to love is nothing else than to feel a strong regard for that very person whom you may love, from no sense of deficiency, from no search after profit; yet this very profit blossoms forth from friendship, even if you have not pursued it. 101. It was with this goodwill that in my youth I loved those famous old men, L. Paulus, M. Cato, C. Galus, P. Nasica, Ti. Gracchus, the father-in-law of our Scipio. This goodwill shines forth still more among persons of the same age, as between Scipio, L. Furius, P. Rupilius, Sp. Mummius, and myself. And in turn, in my old age I rest on the affection of young men, as on yours and on Q. Tubero's. For my own part, I am delighted by the intimate acquaintance even of the very youthful P. Rutilius and A. Verginius. And since the method of our life and nature is so arranged that one age arises out of another, you must indeed, most of all, desire to be able to reach the goal, as they say, in the company of your contemporaries, with whom you set off, as it were, from the starting-post. 102. But since the fortunes of men are frail and perishable, we must always look round for some whom we may love and who may love us; for if you take away affection and goodwill, all pleasantness is taken away from life. Although Scipio was suddenly snatched away, yet to me, indeed, he lives, and always will live. For I loved that man's virtue, and that has not been destroyed; and not only is it present before the eyes of me alone, who always had it at hand, but to posterity also it will be bright and remarkable. No one will ever have an intention or hope to undertake tasks greater than ordinary without thinking that he must put before himself a remembrance and impression of that man. 103.

For my own part, out of all the things which either fortune or nature have granted me, I have nothing which I can compare with the friendship of Scipio. In it I found agreement on public affairs; in it I found advice about my private affairs; in it, also, I found repose full of delight. I never clashed with him, even on the slightest thing, as far as I could perceive; I never heard anything from him which I would rather have left unheard. We had one home, the same food, and that in common; not only our military service, but also our travels and country tours, were in common. 104. For what shall I say about our pursuits in always studying and learning something? In this pursuit, removed from the eyes of the people, we spent all our leisure time. But if the recollection and remembrance of these things had died with him, I could in no way bear now to miss a man so closely bound and so very dear to me. They are not destroyed, but are rather fostered and enlarged in my thoughts and memory; and if I were altogether deprived of them, still the mere lapse of time brings me a great consolation. For at my time of life I cannot be involved much longer now in this state of regret, and all troubles that are short, even though they are great, ought to be endurable.

This is what I had to say about friendship. But I exhort you to place virtue, without which friendship cannot exist, in such a place that, with the exception of virtue, you should think nothing more excellent than friendship.



February, 1890.



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