




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Cicero, Marcus Tullius
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CICERO
DE AMICITIA

A TRANSLATION

BY

J. F. STOUT, M.A. CAMB.

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The Text is in all cases accompanied by Introduction and Notes: books marked (*) contain also an alphabetical Lexicon.

The Vocabularies are in order of the Text and are preceded by Test Papers.

	Text.	Voc.		Text.	Voc.
AESCHYLUS—			DEMOSTHENES—		
Eumenides.	4/6	1/3	Androtion.	6/0	...
Persae.	3/0	...	EURIPIDES—		
Prometheus Vinc-tus.	3/6	...	Alceatis.	...	1/3
Septem contra Tho-bas.	4/6	1/3	Andromache.	4/6	...
CAESAR—			Bacchae.	4/6	...
Civil War, Book 1.	2/0	...	Hecuba.	2/0	...
Civil War, Book 3.	3/0	1/3	Hippolytus.	4/6	1/3
Gallic War, Books 1-7.			Iphigenia in Tauris.	4/6	...
(each)	*2/0	1/0	Medea.	3/0	...
Gallic War, Book 1,			HERODOTUS—		
Ch. 1-29.	1/6	...	Book 3.	4/6	...
Gallic War, Books 4, 5.	*3/6	...	Book 4, Ch. 1-144.	4/6	1/3
The Invasion of Britain,			Book 6.	...	1/3
Gallic War, Book 4,			Book 8.	4/6	...
Ch. 20-5, Ch. 23.	*2/0	1/0	HOMER—		
CICERO—			Iliad, Book 14.	3/0	...
De Amicitia.	*2/0	1/0	Odyssey, Books 13, 14.	3/6	...
De Finibus, Book 1.	3/6	...	Odyssey, Book 17.	2/0	1/3
De Finibus, Book 2.	4/6	...	HORACE—		
De Officiis, Book 3.	3/0	1/3	Epistles (including <i>Ars Poetica</i>).	4/6	...
De Senectute.	*2/0	1/0	Epistles (excluding <i>Ars Poetica</i>).	...	1/3
In Catilinam I.-IV.	3/0	...	Epistles, Book 1.	2/0	...
In Catilinam *I., III.			Epodes.	2/0	...
(each)	2/0	1/0	Odes, Books 1-4.	*4/6	...
Philippic II.	3/6	1/3	Separately, each Book	*2/0	1/0
Pro Archia.	2/0	1/0	Satires.	4/6	1/3
Pro Cluentio.	4/6	1/3	ISOCRATES—		
Pro Lege Manilia.	2/6	1/3	De Bigia.	3/6	...
Pro Marcello.	...	1/0			
Pro Milone.	3/0	1/3			
Pro Plancio.	4/6	1/3			
Pro Rege Deiotaro.	2/6	...			
Pro Roscio Amerino.	3/6	1/3			
Somnium Scipionis.	2/6	...			
CURTIUS—					
Book 9, Ch. 6-end.	1/0	...			

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CICERO DE AMICITIA

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CICERO DE AMICITIA.

A TRANSLATION.

I.—1. QUINTUS Mucius Scaevola, the Augur, used to relate many a tale about Gaius Laelius, his father-in-law, with perfect memory and in a pleasant style, nor did he hesitate whenever he spoke to call him Wise. Now I, on assuming the dress of manhood, had been introduced to Scaevola by my father with the idea that, so far as I could and it was permitted me, I should never quit the old man's side. And so I used to commit to memory many able arguments, and many terse and pointed sayings of his, and I was all on fire to become, by his skill, more learned in the law. And when he died, I betook myself to Scaevola the Pontifex, who I venture to say was beyond doubt the man in our state most distinguished for ability and justice. But I will speak of him another time ; I now resume my remarks about the Augur.

2. I remember much that he said on many occasions, but especially that once, when he was at home sitting according to his wont upon a *fautewil*, myself and a very few intimate friends being with him, he fell into a discourse on a subject which happened at that time to be on many people's lips. For of a surety, Atticus, you remember, and remember all the more vividly because you were a close friend of Publius Sulpicius, how deep was men's surprise and disgust when he, as tribune of the people, was estranged by a deadly feud from the then consul, Quintus Pompeius, a man with whom he had lived in the strongest bonds of affection.

3. And so at that time, since Scaevola had chanced to mention that very occurrence, he set forth to us that discourse concerning friendship which Laelius had held with him and his other son-in-law, Gaius Fannius, the son of Marcus Fannius, a few days after the death of the younger Africanus. I committed to memory the chief opinions maintained in that conversation, and I have set them forth in this book in my own way ; for I have brought upon the boards the very men themselves, so to speak, in order that the words 'say I' and 'says he' might not be scattered too thickly, and that the discussion might seem to be held as it were by men present face to face.

4. For since you often pleaded with me to write something about Friendship, the subject seemed to me worthy alike of the consideration of all and our own friendship in particular. Therefore I have taken pains—no unwilling task—to benefit many at your request. But, just as in the "Cato Major," which I dedicated to you, on the subject of Old Age, I introduced Cato discussing it in his old age, because no personage appeared to me more fit to speak of that time of life than he, who had not only been an old man for a very long time, but had also even in his old age outstripped other men in prosperity ; so, since we had learned from our fathers that the friendship of Gaius Laelius and Publius Scipio was especially proverbial, the personage of Laelius seemed to me a proper one to set forth those very points about friendship which Scaevola had called to mind as having been discussed by him. Now this kind of discourse seems in some strange way to have more weight, if it rests on the authority of men of old, particularly such as are famous ; and so, when I myself am reading my own writings, a feeling at times comes over me, that I imagine Cato, and not myself, to be speaking.

5. And just as in the *De Senectute* I as an old man wrote to an old man on the subject of old age, so in this volume I, the sincerest of friends, have written to a friend about friendship. In my former book the spokesman was Cato, than whom there was hardly anybody of greater age in those days and none wiser ; while in this treatise Laelius, who was both wise (for so he was esteemed) and dis-

tinguished for the celebrity of his friendship, shall speak about friendship. I should like you for a little while to turn your attention from me, and fancy Laelius himself to be speaking. Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus; the conversation is opened by them and Laelius replies. To him belongs the whole of this discourse about friendship, and while reading it you will recognize your own portrait.

II.—6. FANNIUS. Quite true, Laelius; a better man or a greater than Africanus never lived. But you ought to consider that the eyes of all are turned upon you, and men both style and think you wise. This title was a little while since bestowed upon Marcus Cato, and we know that Lucius Acilius was in the time of our fathers called “the Wise.” Each however was so styled in a somewhat different manner: Acilius was “the Wise” because he was reputed to be skilled in civil law; Cato, because he had experience in many things. Many stories used to be related of his wise foresight, his resolute action, and his shrewd answers, alike in the senate and in the forum; and therefore by the time he reached old age he had already acquired the surname, so to speak, of “the Wise.”

7. You however we know to be wise after another fashion; you are wise, not only by nature and character, but also by your industry and learning; “wise,” not in the sense in which the common crowd but the learned are wont to call a man “wise.” Such an one, we have heard, there was not in the rest of Greece; for those who enquire into these matters with more than usual exactness do not include those who are termed the Seven in the class of “wise” men; while at Athens there was one only, and he indeed adjudged by the oracle of Apollo to be wisest of all. Men think such wisdom to be in you, that you hold all your happiness to rest upon yourself, and regard the chances of man’s life as of less might than virtue. Therefore they enquire of me, and I believe of Scaevola here as well, in what manner you bear the death of Africanus; and the more so, because on these last Nones when we had come, as is our custom, into the pleasure grounds of Decimus Brutus the Augur for the purpose of practising our art, you were not present, though

you had always been accustomed to pay the most careful attention to that day and that duty.

8. SCAEVOLA. Many people do indeed enquire, Gaius Laelius, as Fannius has said; but I reply to them just what I have observed—that you bear with resignation the grief you have suffered by reason of the death of a man who was not only very great, but your dearest friend; that you could not fail to be affected, nor was such insensibility possible to your gentle disposition; and as to the fact that you were not present on these last Nones at the meeting of our college, your weak health and not your sorrow was the cause.

LAELIUS. You answer indeed aright, Scaevola, and truly: for I had no right to withdraw through any trouble of my own from that duty, which I have always performed regularly when I was well, nor do I think it can happen by any chance to a man of principle, that he should neglect a duty.

9. Now you, Fannius, speak as a friend when you say that so much is ascribed to me by people—such a tribute I neither acknowledge nor demand; but, in my opinion, you do not judge rightly concerning Cato. For either he was a wise man, or else no one was ever wise—the alternative to which I rather incline. To omit other circumstances, with what firmness did he endure his son's death! Now I remembered Paulus, and I had seen Galus; but the sons they lamented were mere children, whereas Cato's grief was aroused by the death of a full grown and distinguished man.

10. Wherefore be not hasty to prefer to Cato even that man himself whom Apollo, as you say, judged to be wisest of all; for men praise Socrates' words, but Cato's deeds. Of myself however, to speak now with both of you, form your opinion thus.

III. Were I to deny that I feel the loss of Scipio, how far I should do so aright I must leave the wise to judge; it would certainly be a lie. For I am sore grieved at being bereft of a friend, the like of whom, as I think, there never will be again—the like of whom, as I can confidently assert, there never was before. But I have no

need of a remedy; I console myself, and especially with the comforting thought, that I am free from the delusion wherewith on the decease of friends most men are wont to be tormented. No misfortune, I think, has happened to Scipio; misfortune, if it has happened at all, has fallen upon me; but to be grievously tormented by one's own discomforts is characteristic of one who loves not his friend but himself.

11. Who however would deny that Scipio's career was most glorious? For unless he chose to covet immortality,—a desire which never entered his mind—what of all it is lawful for a man to desire did he fail of obtaining? As a youth, he forthwith by his marvellous merit surpassed the lofty hopes which his fellow-countrymen had already conceived of him when he was but a boy. He was never a candidate for the consulship, yet was made consul twice; on the first occasion before the legal age, on the second, as regards himself at a fitting age, but as regards the commonwealth almost too late. Two cities most hostile to this empire did he overthrow, and thus extinguished not only present but also future wars. What can I say of his courtesy, his affection towards his mother, his generosity to his sisters, his kindness towards his relatives, his justice towards all? They are well known to you. Moreover how beloved he was by the state, men showed by their grief at his funeral. How then could a few years more have benefited him? For although old age is not a burden, as I remember Cato explained to Scipio and myself the year before he died, nevertheless it takes away that vigour which was still Scipio's.

12. Wherefore his life indeed was such in respect of both fortune and fame, that nothing could be added to it, while the suddenness of his death took away the consciousness of dying. Concerning a death of this nature it is difficult to make any positive assertion, but you are aware what men suspect. We may however make this one statement with truth, that out of the many days, full of the greatest festivity and joy, which he saw in his lifetime, that day was the most glorious, when, after the senate had broken up, he was escorted home at eventide by the

conscript fathers, the Roman people, the allies and Latins. That was the day before he died. From so high a position of dignity, he seems rather to have reached a place among those above, that is the gods, than those below.

IV.—13. I do not agree with those who have of late begun to argue, that the soul perishes with the body, and that everything is blotted out by death. I am more influenced by the authority of the ancients, whether they be our own forefathers, who paid to the dead the most ceremonious rites, which assuredly they would not have done if they had thought that nothing affected them; or whether they be those who once dwelt in this land, and by their principles and maxims instructed Magna Graecia, which now indeed is destroyed, but was then flourishing; or whether it be the man who was judged by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of all. On this subject, he was not wont to teach first this doctrine and then that, as he did on most points, but was always true to one opinion; the souls of men, he believed, came from God, and when they had departed from the body, a return to heaven lay open to them, all the speedier in proportion as a man was more virtuous and just.

14. Scipio too believed this, and, just as though he had a presentiment, a few days before his death, when Philus and Manilius were present and several others, and you also, Scaevola, had come with me, he discoursed for three days concerning the Commonwealth; and the end of this discussion chiefly dealt with the immortality of souls, things which he said he had learnt in his sleep from the elder Africanus through a vision. If it is the case that the souls of all the best men most easily escape in death from the prison-house, so to speak, and bonds of the body, to whom can we think that the passage to the gods was easier than to Scipio? Wherefore to sorrow for the fate that has befallen him would, I fear, be more like one who envied him than a friend. But if that other opinion is more true, that the same destruction involves soul and body, and no consciousness remains, though there is nothing good in death, yet is there nothing evil. For when consciousness has been lost, it is with a man as

though he had not been born at all; still, for the fact that he was born both we rejoice, and this State, so long as it shall last, will be glad.

15. Therefore, as I said above, the fates have been most propitious to him, to me less kind; for it had been more fitting that I who entered life first should quit it first. Still I enjoy the recollection of our friendship so keenly that my life seems to have been a happy one, because it was passed with Scipio. He shared my cares about public and private matters alike; with him I spent my life at home and in the army, and—a circumstance wherein lies the whole strength of friendship—we had the most profound agreement in wishes, pursuits, and opinions. Therefore it is not so much my reputation for wisdom, which Fannius mentioned just now, that delights me, especially as it is unfounded, as that I hope the recollection of our friendship will last for ever; and I have this the more at heart, since from time immemorial hardly three or four pairs of friends are mentioned, and in this class I think I may hope that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity.

16. FANNIUS. Your hope, Laelius, will certainly come to pass. But since you have made mention of friendship, and we are at leisure, you will confer a great favour on me, and I hope on Scaevola as well, if, in the same way as you are wont to reply about other matters when questions are asked of you, you will discourse about friendship, and tell us what you think of it, of what nature you conceive it to be, and what maxims you would lay down with regard to it.

SCAEVOLA. It will indeed be agreeable to me, and I was essaying to make that very request of you, when Fannius anticipated me. Therefore you will confer a great favour on both of us.

V.—17. LAELIUS. I should raise no objection to doing so, if I felt equal to the task: for the subject is a splendid one, and, as Fannius has said, we are at leisure. But who am I, and what special aptitude have I for the task? It is the custom of philosophers, and that too of Greek philosophers, to have a subject set before them about which to argue extempore. But the task is a great one,

and requires no little practice. Wherefore I think you should enquire concerning the points that can be discussed about friendship from those who make these things their profession: I can only exhort you to place friendship before everything else on earth; for there is nothing in such harmony with nature, or so well adapted alike to prosperity and adversity.

18. Well, in the first place I feel that friendship can exist only among the good; but I do not press this statement too far, as those do who go with more subtlety into these matters, perhaps correctly, but with little result for the general good for they say that no one is good, except the wise man. Let us grant by all means the truth of that assertion; but they explain wisdom to be something which no mortal has as yet attained. We however ought to have an eye to those things which occur in practice and everyday life, not to those things which are imagined or desired. Never will I say that Gaius Fabricius, or Manius Curius, or Titus Coruncanius, whom our ancestors adjudged wise, were wise according to the standard of those philosophers. Let them, therefore, keep to themselves a definition of wisdom which is both offensive and unmeaning; let them only grant that these were good men. But they will not even do this, for they will declare that this cannot be granted except to a wise man. 19. Let us do the best we can, then, with our own homespun wit, as the proverb runs. Those who so conduct themselves and live in such a fashion that their honour, their uprightness, their sense of justice, and their generosity are approved; that they are unstained by avarice, or caprice, or effrontery; that they are men of strong principle, as those were whom I have just mentioned—let us hold that these, even as they have been thought good, also ought to be called good, on the ground that, so far as men can, they follow Nature, the best guide to living well.

I can see clearly, that we were born under the condition that there should exist among us all a certain social tie, and that the nearer each approached us, the stronger it should be. Therefore fellow-citizens are of more account than foreigners, and relations than strangers; for with these Nature herself has created friendship,—but this has not

sufficient stability. For in this respect friendship surpasses relationship, because kindly feeling can be removed from relationship, whereas it cannot from friendship; for when kindly feeling has vanished, the name of friendship disappears as well, while that of relationship remains. 20. How great moreover the power of friendship is can be most fully understood from the fact that, starting from the undefined social bond among the human race which Nature herself has knit together, the whole idea has been so contracted and drawn within narrow limits, that every union of affection takes place between two or among a few persons.

VI. Now friendship is nothing else than perfect agreement on all divine and human things, joined to kindness and affection; and than this, wisdom alone being excepted, I am inclined to think that no better gift has been given to man by the immortal gods. Some prefer riches, some good health, some power, some office, many prefer even sensual pleasures. The last of these is the attribute of beasts, and even the first-named are fleeting and unstable, for they depend not so much on our own plans, as on the blind hazard of fortune. Those however who place the greatest good in virtue make an admirable decision; but this very virtue both creates and maintains friendship, nor can friendship by any means exist without virtue. 21. Let us now explain virtue according to the usage of our life and common talk, and not, as certain philosophers do, measure it with high-flown grandiloquence; but let us hold as good those who are so accounted, men like Paulus, Cato, Galus, Scipio, Philus. With these our everyday life is satisfied, and let us pass by those ideal men who are not found anywhere at all.

22. Among men of this kind therefore friendship has advantages so great, that I can hardly describe them. In the first place, how can there be a "life worth living," as Ennius says, which does not find repose in the mutual kindness of a friend? What can be more pleasant than to have one with whom you can venture to talk about all things in the same way as with yourself? Where would there be such great advantage in prosperity, unless you had

one who should rejoice in it equally with yourself? Adversity again would indeed be hard to endure without some one who would bear it with even greater concern than yourself. Finally, all the other objects of desire are each as a rule adapted to a single purpose only: riches, that you may enjoy them; influence, that you may be honoured; public offices, that you may be extolled; pleasures, that you may rejoice; health, that you may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body. But friendship comprises a very great number of things; wherever you turn, she is at hand, from no place is she shut out, never is she out of season, never troublesome; and so we do not use water and fire, as the proverb goes, on more occasions than we do friendship. Nor am I now speaking of common or ordinary friendship, which nevertheless is both delightful and beneficial, but of true and flawless friendship, such as was that of those few men whose names are proverbial. For friendship makes prosperity more bright, and adversity, by dividing and sharing it, more supportable.

VII.—23. Now while friendship comprises very many and very great advantages, in one point she certainly surpasses everything else, inasmuch as she sends forth the light of a good hope for the future, and does not suffer the spirits to be weakened or to sink. For he who looks upon a true friend looks upon a kind of reflexion of himself. Wherefore the absent are present, the poor have plenty, the feeble are strong, and, what is still more difficult to assert, the dead live; so great is the respect, the recollection, the regret on the part of their friends that attends them. From which circumstance the death of those seems to be happy, the life of these worthy of praise. Take away from our world the bond of kindly feeling, and neither house nor city will be able to stand; the very land will cease to be tilled. If it is not sufficiently understood how great is the power of friendship and concord, it can be grasped from disagreements and quarrels. For what house is so firmly established, what state so stable, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by animosities and dissensions? From this consideration we can judge how much good there is in friendship.

24. They say indeed that a certain learned Agrigentine sang in Greek verses like one inspired, that friendship unites and discord scatters those objects in the constitution of things and the entire universe which are at rest, and those as well which are in motion. And this statement all mortals not only understand but prove by experience. Consequently if at any time any duty of a friend has been displayed in facing dangers or sharing them, who does not extol the deed with the highest praise? What acclamations lately rang throughout the whole theatre at the performance of the new play of my guest and friend Marcus Pacuvius, when, the king not knowing which of the two was Orestes, Pylades said that he was Orestes, so that he might be put to death in his stead, while Orestes maintained, as indeed was the case, that he was Orestes. The audience rose and applauded at an imaginary incident; what do we think they would have done in real life? Nature herself easily showed her power, inasmuch as men pronounced that what they themselves could not do was rightly done in the case of another. Thus far I think I have been able to say what are my opinions about friendship. If there are any further points to be discussed—and I am sure that there are many—enquire, if it seems good to you, of those who handle such matters.

25. FANNIUS. But we would rather hear from you; and yet I have also often made enquiries for them, and listened to them willingly enough; but the texture of your discourse is something quite different.

SCAEVOLA. You would say so still more, Fannius, if you had been present not so long ago in Scipio's gardens, when there was a discussion about the State. What an advocate of justice was he then against the skilful speech of Philus!

FANNIUS. Nay, it was easy for the justest of men to defend justice.

SCAEVOLA. What! and is it not an easy thing for him to make a defence of friendship, who has won the greatest glory for having preserved it with the utmost loyalty, firmness, and integrity?

ÆLIUS VIII.—26. This is indeed to use violence against me. What does it matter by what means you compel me? you

certainly use compulsion. For it is difficult, and not even fair, to resist the earnest wishes of one's sons-in-law, especially in a good cause. Very often, therefore, when I am thinking about friendship, the following point seems to me deserving of especial consideration—whether the want of friendship was felt on account of weakness and poverty, so that in giving and receiving benefits each man might receive from another, and pay back in return that which he was unequal to accomplish by himself; or whether, while this was indeed an attribute of friendship, its origin was more venerable and honourable, and proceeded more directly from nature itself. For love, from which friendship received its name, is the chief means to the formation of the bond of kindly feeling. For advantages indeed are often received from those who under the pretence of friendship are courted and have attention paid them as occasion demands; but in friendship there is neither feigning nor pretence, and whatever feeling exists is real and sincere.

27. Wherefore it seems to me that friendship has sprung rather from nature than from poverty, more through a certain bent of the mind together with a certain feeling of affection than through calculation about the amount of advantage that the connection was likely to bring. Its nature indeed can be observed even in certain beasts, which so love their offspring up to a certain time, and are so loved by them, that their feelings are easily discerned. And this in the case of man is much more evident, first of all from that affection which exists between children and parents, and which cannot be destroyed without horrible wickedness; and next it is evident on occasions when a sense of love similar to that between parent and child has arisen, if we have met with some one, with whose character and disposition we are in harmony, because in him we seem to see clearly a certain bright light, as it were, of goodness and virtue.

28. For nothing is more loveable than virtue, nothing which more strongly induces love, seeing that we love in a fashion, because of their virtue and goodness, even those whom we have never seen. Who is there that does not recall with some affection and kindly feeling the memory

of Gaius Fabricius and Manius Curius, though he has never seen them? On the other hand, who is there that does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius? There was a protracted struggle for empire in Italy against two generals, Pyrrhus and Hannibal: for the one, on account of his uprightness, we have no great aversion; the other, because of his cruelty, this state will always detest.

IX.—29. Now if the power of uprightness is so great that we love it even in those whom we have never seen, or what is still more astonishing, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if the minds of men are stirred when they seem to see the virtue and the goodness of those with whom they can be united in friendship? And yet love is strengthened by the receiving of a service, by the perception of a liking in others for us, and by the addition of close intercourse, and when these things have been added to that first impulse of the mind and of the affection, there blazes up a wonderful amount of kindly feeling. And if any think that this has its origin in weakness, in order that there may be some person through whom each man may gain what he lacks, they leave us an origin of friendship truly mean and (so to speak) far from high-born, in wishing it to be the child of want and poverty. Now if this were so, the fewer resources each person thought he possessed in himself, the better adapted he would be for friendship; but this is far from being the case.

30. For the more confidence a man has in himself, and the more he is so fortified by virtue and wisdom that he stands in need of no one, and judges that all his elements of happiness depend on himself, the more does he excel in seeking out and cultivating friendships. Just think. Was Africanus in need of me? No, indeed! and assuredly I was not in need of him; but I loved him through a certain admiration of his virtue, and he in return loved me, perhaps for some good opinion which he had of my character, and social intercourse increased the kindly feeling. But though advantages many and great followed this friendship, yet it was not in the hope of these that our attachment originated. 31. For just as we do a kindness and show generosity, not that we may exact gratitude (for we are not

usurers in the matter of benefits, but are by nature inclined to liberality), so we think that friendship ought to be sought, not because we are attracted by the hope of reward, but because the whole of its profit lies in the love itself.

32. But those who, like brute beasts, refer everything to the standard of sensual pleasure, dissent strongly from this opinion, and no wonder; for those who have cast away all their thoughts on a thing so mean and contemptible, are capable of looking up to nothing lofty, great, and divine. Wherefore let us exclude these teachers from our discourse, and let us for our part feel convinced that it is from nature that the sentiment of loving and the affection that springs from kindly feeling are born, when intimation has been given of goodness. And those who have sought for this goodness, devote themselves to it, and draw still nigher, in order that they may enjoy both the society of the man whom they have begun to love, and also his moral character, and may be commensurate and equal in love, and more inclined to confer favours than to ask them back. And let there be between them a noble rivalry on this point. Thus both the greatest advantages will be received from friendship, and its origin from nature will be alike more dignified and more real than if it had been the child of weakness. For if it were expediency that cemented friendships, a change in expediency would in its turn break them up; but since nature cannot be changed, true friendships are everlasting. The origin indeed of friendship you now perceive, unless you wish, perchance, to make some reply to my views.

✓FANNIUS. Pray continue, Laelius; for by virtue of my right of seniority I reply for my friend here, who is younger than I.

33. SCAEVOLA. Quite right. And so let us listen.

X. LAELIUS. Hear then, my excellent friends, the discussions which very often used to take place between Scipio and myself about friendship. Now he used to say that nothing was more difficult than that a friendship should last right up to the last day of a man's life. It often happened, he said, either that the same thing was not advantageous to two friends, or that the same opinion in politics was not

held by both of them. Again, the characters of men also change, sometimes through adversity, anon by the growing burden of old age. He used to find instances of these changes by referring to the early days of life, inasmuch as the warmest affections of boys were often laid aside at the same time as the child's garb, (34) and even supposing they had continued their friendship to manhood, yet it was nevertheless sometimes broken off by rivalry for a marriage alliance, or some other advantage which they could not both secure. But if some had lived on still longer in friendship, it was nevertheless often shaken should they have become competitors for office; for nothing was a greater bane to friendship than the desire for money felt by the average man, and the strife for office and glory waged by all the nobler citizens. From this cause the most bitter enmity had often arisen between the dearest friends.

35. In the next place, he would say, great dissensions, and those for the most part justifiable ones, arose, when something that was not right was demanded from friends, so that they should be either the ministers of lust, or abettors in injustice. And those who refused, though they did so from an honourable motive, were none the less charged with neglecting the claims of friendship by those whom they are unwilling to oblige; but those who dared to make any and every demand from a friend, by that very demand professed that they would do everything for the sake of a friend. Through perpetual complaints of these men, not only were friendships broken up, but eternal hatreds produced as well. These numerous causes, fatalities, so to speak, were ever threatening friendships, so that he used to say, that it seemed to him to require not only wisdom, but good fortune as well, to escape them all.

XI.—36. Wherefore let us first, if you please, investigate the point, how far affection ought to proceed in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, was it their duty to carry arms against their country with Coriolanus? Was it the duty of the friends of Spurius Cassius Vecellinus and of Maelius to assist them, when aiming at kingly power? 37. We saw Tiberius Gracchus indeed, when he was causing confusion in the state, deserted by Quintus Tubero and such

of his contemporaries as were his friends. / But Gaius Blossius of Cumae, the friend of your family, Scaevola, came to me to pray for pardon when I was present as one of the committee of advice to the consuls Laenas and Rupilius, and the plea that he brought forward to induce me to pardon him, was to the effect that he had esteemed Tiberius Gracchus so highly, that he thought it his duty to do whatever his friend wished. Then said I: "What, even if he wished you to set fire to the Capitol?" "That," he replied, "he would never have wished; but had he done so, I should have obeyed him." You see, what an impious utterance! And, by Hercules, he did so or even more than he said he would: for he was not a follower of the infatuation of Tiberius Gracchus, but its director, and he did not show himself the companion of Gracchus' mad folly, but its leader. And so, being in this state of frenzy and terrified by the newly-appointed court of enquiry, he fled into Asia, went over to the enemy, and paid a penalty to the state which was both severe and well deserved. It is therefore no excuse for a sin, if one commits it for the sake of a friend. For since it was the belief in your virtue that won his friendship, it is difficult for the friendship to remain if you have abandoned virtue.

38. But supposing we lay it down as a right principle, either to grant to friends whatever they may wish, or to get from them whatever we may wish, the principle would be sound if we were to prove to be men of perfect wisdom; but we are speaking of those friends who are before our eyes, whom we have seen or about whom we have heard by tradition, with whom everyday life is acquainted. From their number we must take our examples, and especially indeed from those who approach nearest to wisdom. 39. We see that Papus Aemilius was the intimate friend of Luscinius,—so we have learned from our fathers,—that they were twice consuls together, and colleagues in the censorship; and it is related, that in those days Manius Curius and Titus Coruncanus were most intimate both with them and with each another. Therefore we cannot even suspect that any one of these made the slightest demand from his friend that violated a promise

or an oath, or was detrimental to his country. . For as to a request of this kind, what need to say that if any of these men had made it, he would not have obtained his wish? Certainly not, since they were the purest of men, and it is just as wrong to grant a request of this kind as to ask it. But truly Gaius Carbo and Gaius Cato used to take the part of Tiberius Gracchus, as did his brother Gaius, who then was by no means active, but is now exceedingly so.

XII.—40. Let this law therefore be enacted in friendship, that we neither ask any one to pursue a dishonourable course, nor follow it ourselves when asked to do so. For such an excuse is disgraceful, and one by no means to be accepted in the case of any wrongful act; but it is especially so if one avows that he has injured the state for the sake of a friend. For we are now placed, Fannius and Scaevola, in such a position, that it is our duty to look out beforehand for the disasters that are fated to come upon the state. Our traditional policy has already swerved far aside from its wonted course and career. 41. Tiberius Gracchus endeavoured to seize kingly power, or rather for a few months was actually king. Had the Roman people either heard or seen anything like it? And what his friends and relations, following in the steps of the dead leader, have done in the case of Publius Scipio, I cannot relate without tears. We bore with Carbo as patiently as we could, owing to the recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus; but what I forbode with regard to the tribuneship of Gaius Gracchus, I hardly dare predict. The evil soon waxes, and when once it has taken a start, it glides with increasing speed down the road to ruin. You see, in the case of the ballot box what great corruption has already been caused, first by the Gabinian law, and two years afterwards by the Cassian. I think I already see the populace at loggerheads with the senate, and the most important measures carried by the caprice of the multitude. More men will learn how these things come to pass than how they can be resisted.

42. But what is my object in making these remarks? This, that without comrades no one attempts anything so outrageous. We must therefore instruct all good men, that if by some chance they should unawares fall into a friend-

ship of this nature, they are not to consider themselves so rigidly bound by their friendship as not to quit their friends when they are sinning in some important public matter; against the wicked however we must enact a penalty, equally severe to followers and to leaders in impiety. In Greece who was more distinguished or more powerful than Themistocles? This man, when commander-in-chief in the Persian war, freed Greece from slavery, but was afterwards driven into exile through his unpopularity. But instead of patiently enduring the wrong inflicted on him by his ungrateful country, as was his duty, he acted in the same wise as Coriolanus twenty years before had done among us. These men found no one to support them against their country, and each fell by his own hand.

43. Wherefore such an agreement among wicked men, instead of being sheltered beneath the cloak of friendship, must rather be visited with every punishment, so that no one may think it permissible to follow a friend even when he is waging war upon his native land. Yet this extremity, considering the way matters have begun to tend, will, I am convinced, some day come about; and to me it is a matter of not less anxiety, what the state will be like after my death, than what it is like to-day.

XIII.—44. So let this be enacted as the first law of friendship—to seek what is honourable from our friends, to do what is honourable for them, and not even to wait until we are asked. Let zeal ever be present, and hesitation absent; and let us dare to give advice with all freedom. Let the authority of friends who give good counsel have the most weight in friendship, and let it be employed in warning not merely with frankness, but even with sternness, if the occasion shall demand; and when it is so employed, let obedience follow. 45. Now I believe that certain men, who I hear have been considered wise in Greece, have held some strange doctrines—there is really nothing which those men do not worry to death with their hair-splitting. Some of them say that too warm friendships must be avoided, so that it may not be necessary for one man to be anxious for a multitude. Every man has enough and more than enough to do with his own troubles:

it is a nuisance to be too much involved in the affairs of others. It is most convenient to hold the reins of friendship as loosely as possible, so that you can tighten them or slacken them at your pleasure: for the chief consideration towards a happy life is, so they assert, freedom from care, and the mind cannot enjoy this if one man is, as it were, in labour for many.

46. And it is said that others of these wise thinkers affirm in a much more brutal strain—I touched briefly upon this topic a little time ago—that friendships are to be sought after for the sake of protection and assistance, not of kindly feeling or affection; and therefore the less steadfastness and strength a man has, the more he desires friendships, whence it happens that weak women seek the protection of friendships more than men, the poor more than the rich, and people in distress more than those who are considered prosperous.

47. What surpassing wisdom! Why, they seem to take away the sun from the universe when they take away friendship from life, than which we have received no nobler or more blessed gift from the immortal gods. What is that freedom from care? In appearance it is indeed seductive, but in reality to be rejected on many grounds. It is unbecoming to refuse to undertake any honourable business or course of action, or to lay it aside when it has been undertaken, simply from the fear of being troubled by it. Now if we flee from anxiety, we must flee from virtue as well, and virtue must needs with some anxiety despise and abominate her opposite, even as kindness of heart loathes ill-will, and self-control hates lust, and bravery hates cowardice. And therefore you will find that it is the just who are most indignant at injustice, the brave who most resent cowardice, the law-abiding who most resent an outrage. Thus it is characteristic of a well-ordered mind to rejoice at good things and feel pain at the opposite.

48. Hence, if grief of mind befalls the wise man—and assuredly it does befall him, unless we are to suppose that all human feeling is rooted from his breast—what reason is there for us to utterly banish friendship from life, merely to avoid undergoing some troubles because of it? For take

away the emotions of the mind, and what difference is there, I do not say between a beast and a man, but between a man and a log or a stone, or anything of the same kind? We must not listen to those men, who want to make out that virtue is a certain hard and, as it were, iron quality: on the contrary, it is in many things, and in friendship especially, gentle and pliant, so that it is, so to speak, expanded by a friend's prosperity and contracted by his misfortunes. Consequently that pain, which must often be felt on a friend's account, is not so potent as to banish friendship from life, any more than that the virtues should be rejected because they bring with them some anxieties and troubles.

XIV.—Since however a man contracts a friendship, as I have said above, if any sign of virtue shines forth in another to which a like disposition may incline and attach itself; when this happens, love must needs arise. 49. For what is so unreasonable as to be delighted with many empty things, such as office, glory, a house, or the clothing and adornment of the body, and not to be delighted beyond measure with a living creature endowed with virtue, and which can either love, or, as I may say, love back? For there is nothing more delightful than the repayment of kindly feeling, nothing more delightful than the interchange of affection and of good offices.

50. And suppose we also add this remark, which can be added with perfect truth, that nothing so allures and attracts anything to itself as likeness of disposition attracts men to friendship. It will assuredly be acknowledged as a truth that the good love the good, and attach them to themselves just as though they were bound to them by a kind of relationship and natural affinity. For nothing is more eager and greedy for things like itself than Nature. Wherefore let this point, Fannius and Scaevola, be established, that, as I think, there is between good men and good men a necessary feeling of kindness, and this has been appointed by Nature as the fountain-head of friendship. But the kindness also extends to the multitude. For virtue is not unfeeling or unserviceable or haughty, since she is wont to protect even whole nations, and consult their interests in

the best manner, which she assuredly would not do if she shrank from kindness towards the common people.

51. And again, those who conceive friendships to exist for the sake of expediency, seem to me to take away the tenderest bond of friendship. For it is not so much the advantage obtained through a friend as a friend's love that delights us, and that which has proceeded from a friend becomes delightful only if it has proceeded from affection; and so far is it from being the case, that friendships are cultivated on account of poverty, that those who, by reason of their wealth and their resources, and their virtue in particular, in which there is the greatest protection, are least in need of another, are the most generous and the most ready to confer a favour. And yet I should rather fancy that it is not indispensable for friends never to lack anything at all. For how could our zealous affection have displayed its activity, if Scipio had never needed my advice or help, either at home or in the army? Therefore friendship is not the result of advantage, but advantage of friendship.

XV.—52. Accordingly, men who are enervated by luxury must not be listened to if they ever hold discussions on friendship, of which they have no experience either in practice or theory. Who, by the faith of gods and men, would wish to overflow with wealth and to live amid an abundance of all things on condition that he should neither love any one nor be himself loved by any one? This, of course, is the life of tyrants, in which there can be neither confidence, nor affection, nor firm reliance on the kindly feeling of others: their whole life is full of mistrust and anxiety, and for friendship there is no room.

53. For who could love either a man whom he fears, or a man by whom he thinks that he is feared? Yet tyrants are courted through hypocrisy, at least for a season. But if, as usually happens, they chance to fall, then men see how poor they were in friends. And so Tarquinius is related to have said when in exile, that he knew at last which of his friends were faithful and which unfaithful, since then he could show gratitude to neither.

54. And yet I am surprised that a man of his haughtiness and perversity could have any friend. | Again, just as the

character of this man, whom I have mentioned, could not procure true friends, so the riches of many who are very powerful makes a faithful friendship impossible. For not only is fortune herself blind, but she also generally blinds those whom she has embraced. So they are as a rule carried away by disdain and obstinacy, nor can anything more unbearable be found than a fool favoured by fortune. And we can see, that those who before were of obliging character, are changed by military power, and office, and prosperity; old friendships are despised by them, and new ones indulged in.

55. Yet what is more foolish than for men who have unlimited power through their riches, resources, and influence, to procure everything else which money can buy—horses, slaves, fine raiment, costly vases—and not to procure friends, the best and most beautiful furniture of life, so to speak? When they procure the other things, they know not for whom they are procuring them, nor for whose sake they toil,—for each of these things belongs to him who has prevailed by his strength,—whereas the possession of friendships remains sure and certain to all; so that, even should there remain to them those things which are as it were the gifts of fortune, still a life that is barren and destitute in respect of friends cannot be pleasant. But enough on this point.

XVI.—56. We must now determine, what are in friendship the limits and, as it were, the bounds of loving. I see that three opinions are expressed about these limits, none of which I approve. The first is, that we should feel towards a friend just as we do towards ourselves; the second, that our kindly feeling towards our friends should answer to the same extent and degree to their kindly feeling towards us; the third, that a man should be estimated by his friends at the same value he sets upon himself.

57. With no one at all of these three opinions do I agree. The first is not true, namely, that a man should feel towards his friend as he feels towards himself. For how many things there are which we should never do for our own sake, that we do for the sake of our friends! Begging and praying of one that is unworthy, attacking a man with

great bitterness and railing at him vehemently—things which would be altogether improper in our own affairs—can be done with the utmost honour in the affairs of our friends. And there are many circumstances in which good men subtract much from their own advantages, or suffer much to be subtracted, that their friends rather than themselves may enjoy it.

58. The second opinion is that which limits friendship by an equal interchange of benefits and kindly feeling. This indeed is to call friendship to a reckoning with overmuch meanness and illiberality, so that the account of what is received and what is disbursed may balance. True friendship appears to me to be richer and more bountiful, and not to watch narrowly, lest it should pay more than it has received. A friend must not be afraid lest something should be lost, or should fall to the ground, or lest more than what is fair be heaped upon the measure of friendship.

59. But that third limit is the worst, that a man should be estimated by his friends at the value at which he estimates himself. For often, in some men, either their spirit is too crushed, or the hope of mending their fortune is too broken. It is not therefore the part of a friend to be towards him such as he is towards himself, but rather to strive and bring it about, that he may raise his friend's dejected spirits, and lead him on to more cheerful hopes and thoughts. I shall therefore have to set up another limit of true friendship, as soon as I have stated what Scipio reserved for his severest censure. He used to say that no utterance could have been found more hostile to friendship than that of him who had said, that one ought to love in such a way as if some time or other he was likely to hate; and that he refused to believe that this sentiment was, as currently supposed, uttered by Bias, who was considered a wise man, and one of the Seven. It was rather, he considered, the opinion of some degraded or selfish wretch, or of one who regarded all things as they affected his own influence. For how can any one possibly be a friend to a man to whom he thinks he may perhaps become an enemy? Why, it will be necessary to desire

and pray that a friend may sin as often as possible, in order that he may offer the more handles, if I may so speak, for catching hold of him; and on the other hand, it will be necessary to be vexed, grieved, and envious at the good actions and advantages of friends.

60. Wherefore this precept, to whomsoever it may belong, tends to destroy friendship; it should rather have taken this form, that we ought to exercise such vigilance in forming friendships, that we never begin to love a man whom we could possibly come to hate. Nay further, if we should have been unfortunate in loving, Scipio thought that we should exercise patience rather than cast about for an opportunity for a quarrel.

XVII.—61. I think therefore we must adopt these limits: when the character of friends is free from faults, let there be complete community of all things, of plans and wishes, without any exception: so that, even if it should happen by some chance that it is necessary to forward a friend's unjust wishes, in which either his status as a citizen or his reputation is at stake, we must deviate from the straight path, provided only that no very deep disgrace follows; for there is a point up to which indulgence can be granted to friendship. We must not, however, neglect our own reputation, nor ought we to consider the goodwill of our fellow-citizens an unimportant weapon in public life, though it is disgraceful to try to win it by wheedling and flattery. Least of all must we abandon virtue, which brings affection with it as a matter of course.

62. Scipio was wont to complain—I often return to him from whom came the whole of this discourse concerning friendship—that men used to take greater pains in everything than in friendship. Every man, he declared, could tell how many goats and sheep he had, yet knew not the number of his friends. In procuring the former men exercised care, while in choosing friends they were negligent, and had not, as it were, signs and marks by which they might discover those who were suited for friendship. The firm, the steadfast, and the constant ought therefore to be chosen; but of this kind there is a great scarcity, and it is indeed difficult to form a judgment, except for

one that is experienced; and experience must be gained in friendship itself. So friendship outstrips the judgment, and takes away our opportunity of gaining experience.

63. It is therefore a prudent man's way to check the impulse to kindly feeling, just as he would a horse's speed, in order that we may indulge in friendship only when our friends' characters have been in some degree tested, just as we do with tried steeds. The fickleness of certain men is often discovered in the case of a small sum of money, while others, whom a small sum could not have affected, are found out when a large sum is in question. But suppose there shall be some found who think it mean to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not place public office, magistracies, military commands, civil authority, influence, above friendship, so that when these things are put before them on the one side, and on the other the claims of friendship, they do not much rather prefer the former? For our nature is weak when it is a question of despising power; and even if men have obtained power by neglecting friendship, they think that this neglect will be concealed, because it is not without good cause that friendship has been disregarded.

64. Therefore true friendships are very rarely found among those who are busied in public office and affairs of state; for where would you find the man who would prefer the political advancement of his friend to his own? Why, to pass over this point, how burdensome and hard does an association in misfortune appear to most men, and it is not easy to find people who would care to face it! And yet Ennius rightly says, "A friend in need is a friend indeed." Still these two things convict most men of fickleness and weakness—if in their own prosperity they despise a friend, or in his adversity desert him.

XVIII. Accordingly, the man who shows himself under both these conditions, true, consistent, and steady in the matter of friendship, we ought to consider to belong to an especially rare and almost divine class of men.

65. Now the foundation of firmness and constancy is the loyalty of him whom we seek in friendship: for nothing is firm which is without loyalty. Besides, it is right that for

a friend one should be chosen who is frank, sociable, and sympathetic—and by sympathetic I mean one who is affected by the same circumstances as ourselves; all these qualities have to do with loyalty. A nature that is deceitful and tortuous cannot be loyal; nor indeed can a man who is not affected by the same circumstances as ourselves, and is not naturally sympathetic, be either loyal or firm. To these characteristics we must add, that he shall not take delight in bringing forward charges against another, or believe them when they are made—qualities which all have to do with that constancy of which I have now for some time been treating. So that is shown to be true which I said at the beginning: friendship cannot exist except among the good. For it is the part of a good man, whom we may also call a wise man, to hold fast these two things in friendship: first to see that there be nothing feigned or pretended in him, for it is more characteristic of one who is frank to show his hatred openly than to conceal his real feeling behind a mask; next, not only to repel the charges brought by some one against a friend, but himself to abstain from suspicion, and from always imagining that some infidelity has been committed by his friend. 66. There ought to be added to this a certain pleasantness of conversation and manners, which is a seasoning of no mean importance to friendship. Now sternness and hardness on all occasions bring with them dignity indeed, but friendship ought to be less strict, more free, more pleasant, and more inclined to all forms of courtesy and friendly intercourse.

XIX.—67. There arises, however, at this point a certain problem which is attended by some difficulty, whether at any time new friends, who are worthy of friendship, should be preferred to old ones, just as we are accustomed to prefer young horses to old hacks. Doubt unworthy of man! For there ought not to be satiety of friendships as there is of other things; all the oldest friendships ought to be the sweetest, just as with those wines which bear age well; and the proverbial saying is true, “many bushels of salt must be eaten together, that the function of friendship may be fully carried out.”

68. Now new friendships, provided they bring with them the hope that fruit will appear, even as it does in blades of corn which do not disappoint their promise, should not indeed be rejected, yet the old friendship should be preserved in its own place; for the power of age and long custom is very great. Nay, even in the case of the horse, of which I just now made mention, if no circumstance hinder, there is no one who would not with greater pleasure use that which he has grown accustomed to use than one that is unbroken and strange to him. And not only in this case, where an animal is concerned, but in those things also which are inanimate, habit is strong, since we take delight in those very places, though they be mountainous and woody, in which we have dwelt for a considerable time.

69. But it is of the highest importance in friendship that the better man should put himself on an equality with his inferior. For there are often certain instances of superiority, such as was that of Scipio in our own flock, if I may so call it. He never set himself before Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or his friends of humbler rank; while Quintus Maximus his brother, an admirable man it is true, but by no means equal to himself, he used to honour as though he were his superior, because he surpassed him in years; and he used to wish that all his friends could receive more dignity by his efforts.

70. And this ought to be done and imitated by all—that is, if they have attained any pre-eminence in merit, genius, or fortune, they must communicate these things with their friends and share them with their relations, so that if they are born from humble parents, or have relations possessed of less genius or a humbler position than their own, they may increase their influence, and be a credit and dignity to them. Just as in legends, those who, owing to ignorance of their origin and family, have for some time formed part of another's household, retain their affection for the shepherds, whom they have looked upon as their fathers for many years, even after they have been recognized and found to be sons of either gods or kings. And this ought much more to be done in the case of real and undoubted

fathers. For the fruit of talent and virtue and of every excellence is then only gathered in greatest abundance, when it is conferred on all those nearest to us.

XX.—71. As therefore those who are superior among a group of friends and relations ought to place themselves on a level with their inferiors, so the inferiors ought not to feel chafed that they are surpassed by their own friends either in ability or fortune or dignity. The majority of these are either always complaining of some grievance or even upbraiding their friends; and this they do all the more if they think they have something which they can point to as done by themselves in a kind and friendly manner, and at the cost of some exertion. **Hateful**, assuredly, is that class of persons who fling their good services in one's teeth; the man upon whom these benefits have been conferred ought to be mindful of them, but he who conferred them should not recall the fact.

72. Wherefore, just as those who are superior ought to humble themselves in friendship, so in a certain sense ought they to raise up their inferiors. For there are some persons who make friendship a nuisance, when they fancy that they themselves are slighted. As a rule, this only happens to those who have a suspicion that they deserve to be slighted; and they must be relieved from this idea by deeds as well as by words. 73. You must confer upon each of your friends, first, as much as you yourself can effect, secondly, as much also as he whom you love and aid is able to bear. For no matter how high your position, you could not carry through all your friends to the highest honours; just as Scipio was strong enough to make Publius Rupilius consul, but could not do the same for the latter's brother Lucius. But even if you were able to confer any benefit on another, you must nevertheless see what he can bear.

74. On the whole we must form our judgment about friendships when both our intellect and years have arrived at their full strength and maturity; nor if in early life people have been fond of hunting or ball-playing, need they retain as intimate friends those whom they loved at that time because they were endowed with the same tastes as

themselves. For on that principle our nurses and slave-attendants would demand the largest share of kindly feeling by right of long-standing friendship: certainly they ought not to be slighted; still they must be regarded in some other manner than our other friends. If you do not wait until mature age, friendships cannot remain without alteration. For with diversity of character there comes diversity of tastes, and dissimilarity in this respect severs friendships; nor is there any other cause why the good cannot be friends with the wicked, or the wicked with the good, except that there is between them the greatest possible divergence of habits and tastes.

75. It may also be laid down as a principle in friendships, that a kind of ill-regulated goodwill must not, as very often happens, be a hindrance to the important interests of friends. To revert to the myths, Neoptolemus could never have taken Troy if he had been willing to listen to Lycomedes, with whom he had been brought up, when he tried with many tears to prevent his journey. And indeed weighty circumstances often befall which make it necessary to part with friends; and the man who wishes to over-ride these, because, as he says, he cannot easily bear the loss of his friends, is naturally weak and effeminate, and for that very cause far from upright in his friendship. 76. And so on every occasion you must consider, both what you ought to demand from a friend, and what you should allow to be obtained from yourself.

XXI. There is also a kind of calamity, sometimes inevitable, consisting in breaking off a friendship; for now our discourse siuks from the intimacies of the wise down to common friendships. The faults of friends often break out; sometimes they affect their friends, at other times they affect strangers; yet even in the latter case the disgrace flows back upon their friends. Such friendships therefore must be dissolved by the abatement of familiarity, and, as I have heard Cato say, should be unravelled rather than rent, unless some utterly intolerable wrong has blazed out, which renders it neither right, nor honourable, nor possible, that estrangement and disunion should not take place forthwith. 77. But if in either habits or tastes

any change, as is wont to happen, has taken place, or disagreement has occurred between political parties—for I speak now, as I said a little while ago, not of the friendships of the wise, but of ordinary friendships—we must be on our guard, lest it seem that not only are friendships laid aside, but animosities also are incurred. For nothing is more disgraceful than to wage war with a man with whom you have lived on familiar terms. Scipio, as you know, had broken off, on my account, his friendship with Quintus Pompeius, and by reason of the disagreement there was in the state, he was estranged from my colleague Metellus; yet on both occasions he acted with dignity, and moderation, and displeasure which showed no bitterness.

78. Wherefore we must, in the first place, take care that no ruptures between friends occur; but if anything of the kind should take place, that the friendship may seem rather to have died out than to have been forcibly extinguished. And we must indeed be on our guard that friendships do not turn even into bitter hatreds: from them quarrels, foul words, and insults are bred. These however must be put up with if they are endurable, and this honour should be paid to a long-standing friendship, that he shall be in fault who inflicts, not he who suffers, the injury.

To sum up: against all these faults and disadvantages there is one safeguard and precaution; it is that men should not begin to love too quickly, and that they should not love the unworthy. 79. Now those are worthy of friendship who possess in themselves some reason why they should be loved. A rare class! And in truth all things that are excellent are rare; nor is there anything more difficult than to find that which is altogether perfect of its kind. But most men do not recognize anything good in human affairs, except what is profitable; and with friends, just as they do with cattle, they love those most of all from whom they hope that they will derive the largest profit.

80. Thus they are destitute of that very lovely and exquisitely natural friendship, which is an object of desire in itself and for itself, nor can they learn from themselves how valuable and powerful such a friendship is. For each

man loves himself, not that he may get from himself some reward for his own affection, but because each one is of himself dear to himself. And unless this same feeling be transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found; for a true friend is one who is, as it were, a second self.

81. And if it is a manifest truth in beasts, whether they fly or swim or live in the fields; whether they are tame or wild, that in the first place they love themselves—for self-love is a feeling equally born with every creature—next that they seek out and long for some creature of the same race to which they may attach themselves, and do this with longing and with a certain likeness to human love, how much more in accordance with nature does this process take place with man, who both loves himself, and seeks another whose spirit he may so blend with his own as almost to make one out of two!

XXII.—82. But most men wrongly, not to say shamelessly, wish to have as a friend such an one as they themselves cannot be, and expect from their friends what they do not bestow upon them; whereas it is fair that a man should first of all be good himself, and then seek another like himself. In the case of such persons, that steadfastness of friendship about which we have now been for some time discoursing can be strengthened, since men who are united by kindly feeling will in the first place be masters of those passions to which others are slaves, and secondly will take delight in fairness and justice, and the one will do anything for the other, nor will the one ever demand from the other anything but what is honourable and right, and not only will they cherish and love each other, but will also respect each other. For he who takes away respect from friendship takes away its greatest ornament.

83. Therefore those who think that there lies open in friendship a free indulgence to all passion and sin make a ruinous mistake; friendship has been given by Nature as a handmaid of the virtues, not as a companion of the vices, in order that, since virtue could not unaided arrive at the highest perfection, it might arrive thither when united and associated with another. And if this association either exists, or has existed, or shall exist between any persons,

their companionship must be considered the best and the happiest for the highest good of our nature. 84. This is, I say, an association which contains everything that men consider to be objects of desire—honour and glory, peace of mind and enjoyment—so that when these are present life is happy, and without them must be miserable. And since this is the best and the greatest blessing, we must, if we wish to attain it, pay attention to virtue, without which we are able to attain neither friendship nor anything that is worthy of desire. But when virtue has been neglected, those who think that they have friends, then, and then only, feel their mistake, when some severe misfortune constrains them to make trial of them.

85. Wherefore—for I must say it again and again—you must love when you have exercised your judgment, not use your judgment after you have loved. We are punished for our lack of prudence in many matters, but especially in loving and cherishing friends; for we put the cart before the horse in our plans, and lock the stable door when the steed is gone, which we are forbidden to do by the old proverb. For being entangled mutually either by daily intercourse or even by kind offices, suddenly in mid-career we break up a friendship as soon as some cause for offence has arisen.

XXIII.—86. Wherefore such great carelessness in a matter of the highest consequence is all the more to be blamed. For friendship is the one thing in human affairs concerning the advantage of which all with one voice agree. Virtue itself is despised by many, and said to be a fraud and a pretence. Many despise riches, who are contented with little, and delighted by simple fare and living; while as to public office, with the desire for which some men are all aflame, how many despise it so utterly, that they think there is nothing emptier or more trifling! And so with regard to all other things, while some men think them admirable, very many more consider them as of no account. But concerning friendship, all to a man have the same feeling—both those who have devoted themselves to public life, and those who take pleasure in the investigation of nature and in learning, and those who attend to

their own business without caring for public duties, and lastly those who have given themselves up wholly to sensuality—they all feel that life is nothing without friendship, if they wish, that is, to live at all as a free man ought.

87. For friendship creeps, I know not how, through the lives of all, nor does it suffer any method of passing life to be free from itself. Nay more, if any one is so harsh and fierce of nature, that he flees and loathes the society of men, being a man such as we have heard a certain Timon of Athens was, nevertheless he would not be able to refrain from searching after some one to whom he might pour out the venom of his bitterness. This question would best be determined, if it could so happen that some god should remove us from this throng of men, and place us somewhere in a desert, and there, supplying us with abundance and plenty of all things that nature craves for, should take away from us altogether the opportunity of beholding a human being. Who is made of such stern material that he could endure that life, and from whom would not solitude take away the enjoyment of all pleasures?

88. So the following remark is true which I have heard our old men say was wont to be made by Archytas of Tarentum, I believe, they having heard it from other old men: "If any one had ascended to heaven, and beheld the nature of the universe and the magnificence of the stars, all his wonder thereat would be without pleasure to him; whereas it would have been most agreeable if he had had some one to whom he might describe it." Thus Nature loves nothing that is solitary, and ever leans towards some prop, so to speak; and this is the sweeter, the dearer that the friend is.

XXIV. But although Nature declares by so many signs what she wishes, requires, and longs for, we nevertheless somehow or other shut our ears against her, and do not listen to her admonitions. For intercourse in friendship is varied and manifold, and many grounds for suspicion and offence are given, which it is the duty of a wise man at one time to avoid, at another to make light of, at another to bear quietly. But there is one cause of offence which must be encountered, in order that advantage and

loyalty may be retained in friendship: our friends must be often admonished and reprovèd, and these reproofs must be received in a friendly spirit when they are offered in kindness.

89. But somehow or other, what my friend Terence says in his *Andria* is true—"Deference begets friends, while truth begets hatred." Truth is troublesome, inasmuch as from it springs hatred, which is the bane of friendship, but flattery is much more troublesome, because by granting indulgence to faults, it allows a friend to be borne headlong to his ruin: but the greatest fault rests with the man who despises truth, and is driven on by flattery to destruction. In all this matter, therefore, carefulness and diligence must be employed, first that warning may be free from bitterness, and next that reproof may be free from insult. In paying deference, however (for I gladly adopt the word used by Terence), let courtesy be present, but let flattery, the hand-maid of the vices, be removed far away; for flattery is unworthy not only of a friend, but even of a free man; for we live in one way with a tyrant, in another with a friend.

90. But as for the man whose ears are closed against the truth, so that he cannot bring himself to hear the truth from a friend, his welfare must be despairèd of. For that saying of Cato, like many of his, is a shrewd one—"Bitter enemies deserve better from some men than those friends who seem agreeable; for the former often speak the truth, the latter never." It is also absurd, that those who are admonished do not feel that annoyance which they ought to feel, but feel that from which they ought to be free; for they are not distressed because they have done wrong, but are offended because they are reprovèd; whereas, on the other hand, they ought to grieve at the fault and rejoice at its correction.

XXV.—91. Since therefore it is essential to true friendship that a man should both give and take advice, and that he who gives advice should speak frankly yet not harshly, and that the other should receive what is said with forbearance and not with repugnance, so we must conclude, that there is no plague in friendship greater than

flattery, fawning, and adulation. For no matter how many names it may have, we must set a brand on this defect as the fault of fickle and deceitful men, who speak everything with a view to please, and nothing with a view to truth. 92. But while hypocrisy in all things is blameworthy—for it does away with our power of judging truth, and adulterates it—so it is especially opposed to friendship; for it destroys truth, without which the name of friendship has no meaning. For while the strength of friendship lies in the fact that one soul is, as it were, made by it out of many, how can this be effected, if not even in each individual is there a soul one and always the same, but a soul fickle, changeable, manifold?

93. For what can be so pliable, so unreasonable, as the soul of him who shifts about, not only in accordance with the feelings and wishes, but even with the look and nod of another? “If one says no, I say no too; if he says yes, I say yes; in fact, I have charged myself to agree with him in all things,” as the same Terence says, but in the character of Gnatho, a kind of friend which it is a mark of worthlessness to attach to oneself at all. 94. But since there are many like Gnatho, who are higher in position, fortune, and reputation, the flattery of these is a curse when to their worthlessness is added influence. 95. But a fawning friend can be distinguished from a true one, and discerned just as easily, if only we are careful, as everything that is dyed and counterfeit can be distinguished from the genuine and the true. A public meeting, which consists of the most inexperienced men, is nevertheless capable of judging what difference there is between the popular demagogue, that is, the flatterer and worthless citizen, and the consistent, the serious, and dignified one.

96. What smooth flattery did Gaius Papirius lately pour into the ears of a public meeting, when he proposed the law concerning the re-election of the tribunes of the people! I spoke against it; but I will say nothing of myself, it is about Scipio that I will speak more willingly. How great, ye immortal gods, was that dignity of his, how great the majesty that appeared in his speech! so that you would say without hesitation that he was the leader, not the boon-

companion, of the Roman people. But you were present, and the speech is in everybody's hands. Therefore the bill, though drawn up to please the people, was rejected by the votes of the people. And to return to myself: you remember when Quintus Maximus, Scipio's brother, and Lucius Mancinus were consuls, how popular the bill of Gaius Licinius Crassus concerning the priesthoods appeared to be. For he wanted to transfer to the patronage of the people the right of the colleges to fill up their vacancies; and he was the first who began to address the people with his face turned towards the forum. Nevertheless reverence for the immortal gods, with myself as advocate, easily defeated his specious oration; and this happened when I was only praetor, five years before I was made consul; so that the cause owed its successful defence more to its own merits than because I possessed any special authority.

XXVI.—97. But if on the stage,—the public assembly, I mean,—where there is the widest scope for falsehood and misrepresentation, the truth nevertheless prevails, if only it has been set forth openly and brought into full light, what ought to take place in friendship, which depends entirely upon truth? In friendship, unless, as men say, you see your friend's heart and bare your own, you can have no faithfulness or certainty, not even as to whether you love and are loved, since you know not how much truth there is in the love. And yet that flattery, however baneful it may be, can nevertheless injure no one, except him who accepts it and is pleased with it. And so it happens that the man who flatters himself and is most highly pleased with himself, listens with the greatest eagerness to flatterers.

98. No doubt virtue is a lover of herself, for she knows herself best, and understands how loveable she is. But it is not about virtue that I am now speaking, but about the belief a man has in his own virtue. For the people who wish to be actually endowed with virtue are not so numerous as those who wish to appear so. To such people flattery is delightful, and when language is addressed to them which is framed to suit their own wishes, they regard these empty words as a testimony to their own merits. It is therefore

no friendship when one party will not listen to the truth, and the other is prepared to lie. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies seem to us humorous unless there were braggart soldiers as well. "Does Thais then return me many thanks?" It would have been enough to reply—"many thanks"; but the parasite says, "a million." The flatterer always exaggerates that which the man for whose gratification he is speaking wishes to be great.

99. Wherefore, although it is with those who court and encourage it, that this soothing falsehood has weight, still even the more serious and firm among men must be warned to take care that they are not ensnared by clever flattery. For unless he is utterly devoid of sense, no one fails to perceive the barefaced flatterer; but we must take great care that the skilful and secret flatterer does not ingratiate himself with us; for he is not easily recognized, inasmuch as he is one who often flatters even by opposing, and, while pretending to take the other side of the question, acts the flatterer, and in the end gives in and permits himself to be beaten, so that he who has been the dupe appears to have been the keener-sighted of the two. But what is more disgraceful than to be duped? We must all the more carefully take care that this may not happen. "How you have to-day twisted me round your finger and splendidly duped me, beyond all the silly old men of comedy."

100. For even in plays this character of a blind and credulous old man is the most foolish. But, somehow or other, our discourse has descended from the friendships of perfect men, that is, of wise men (I speak of wisdom such as befalls the average man), to common friendships. Wherefore let us return to the principle I first laid down, and let us at length bring our remarks to a close.

XXVII. It is virtue, Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius, virtue, I say, that both produces and preserves friendships. For upon virtue depends harmony in all things, and stability, and firmness; and when it has lifted itself up and shown forth its light, and has seen and recognized the same thing in another, it draws near to it, and in return receives that which is in the other; and hence there is kindled either love or friendship. Both these qualities have

been named from "loving"; but "to love" is nothing else than to have an affection for him whom you love, not from any need of him, or because you seek for any advantage from him; yet advantage blossoms forth from friendship, even though you were never to look for it.

101. It was with this kindly feeling that we as young men loved those old men, Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Gaius Galus, Publius Nasica, Tiberius Gracchus, the father-in-law of my friend Scipio; and this manifests itself even more between those of the same age, as between myself and Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, Spurius Mummius. And in return we old men feel pleasure in the affection of young men, as with yourself and Quintus Tubero; I for my part also take delight in my friendship with those very young men Publius Rutilius and Aulus Verginius. And since the manner of our life and of our constitution has been so ordained that one generation is ever springing from another, it is very greatly to be desired that you should be able to arrive at the goal, as the proverb has it, along with those of your own age, with whom you have been let loose, so to speak, from the starting-point.

102. But since human affairs are frail and perishable, some persons must always be sought, whom we may love and by whom we may be loved; for when affection and kindly feeling has been removed, all pleasure has been removed from life. To me indeed Scipio, although he was snatched away suddenly, nevertheless still lives and ever will live; for it was the virtue of that man which I loved, and that has not been extinguished; nor does it dwell before my eyes alone, who always had it at hand, but even to posterity it will be a bright and shining light. No one will ever either in thought or in hope undertake greater tasks than ordinary without thinking that he must keep before him a remembrance and impression of that man.

103. For my part, out of all the things which either fortune or nature has assigned to me, I have nothing which I can compare with the friendship of Scipio. In it I found agreement in politics, and advice about my private affairs, and repose full of delight. Never, so far as I could perceive,

even in the smallest matter, did I displease him ; never did I myself hear from him aught that I was unwilling to hear. We had one house, the same style of living, and that in common, and not only our campaigns, but even our travels and our sojourns in the country were in common.

104. For why should I speak about our devotion in constantly acquiring and learning something ? In this pursuit, far removed from the gaze of the people, we spent all our leisure time. And if the recollection and memory of these things had died along with him, I should not now be able to bear in any way my grief for the closest of friends and most loving of men. But they are not destroyed ; rather they are strengthened and increased through my reflexion and remembrance, and if I should be entirely deprived of them, nevertheless the mere lapse of time brings to me great consolation. For at my time of life I cannot remain longer in this state of regret. And all things that are of short duration ought to be bearable, even if they are great.

This is what I have had to say about friendship. But I exhort you to put virtue, without which friendship cannot exist, in such a position, that you may think that with the exception of virtue nothing is more excellent than friendship.

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