# ELEMENTS

James Montgomery

OF

# CRITICISM.

Robert Reddick 1777.

VOLUME II.

The FIFTH EDITION.

With ADDITIONS and IMPROVEMENTS.

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DUBLIN:

Printed by CHARLES INGHAM, in Skinner-Row. M,DCC,LXXII,

# INTRODUCTION.

THAT nothing external is perceived till firſt it make an impreſſion upon the organ of ſenſe, is an obſervation that holds equally in every one of the external ſenſes. But there is a difference as to our knowledge of that impreſſion: in touching, taſting, and ſmelling, we are ſenſible of the impreſſion; that, for example, which is made upon the hand by a ſtone, upon the palate by an apricot, and upon the noſtrils by a roſe: it is otherwiſe in ſeeing and hearing; for I am not ſenſible of the impreſſion made upon my eye, when I behold a tree; nor of the impreſſion made upon my ear, when I liſten to a ſong*. This difference in the manner of perceiving external objects, diſtinguiſheth remarkably hearing and ſeeing from the other ſenſes; and I am ready to ſhew, that it diſtinguiſheth ſtill more remarkably the feelings of the former from thoſe of the latter: every feeling, pleaſant or painful, muſt be in the mind; and yet becauſe in taſting, touching, and ſmelling, we are ſenſible of the impreſſion made upon the organ, we unavoidably place there alſo the pleaſant or painful feeling cauſed by that impreſſion †: but with reſpect to ſeeing and hearing, being inſenſible of the organic

* See the Appendix, § 13.

† After the utmoſt efforts, we find it beyond our power to conceive the flavour of the roſe to exiſt in the mind: we are neceſſarily led to conceive that pleaſure as exiſting in the noſtrils along with the impreſſion made by the roſe upon that organ. And the ſame will be the reſult of experiments with reſpect to every feeling of taſte, touch, and ſmell. Touch affords the moſt ſatisfactory experiments. Were it not that the deluſion is detected by philoſophy, no perſon would heſitate to pronounce, that the pleaſure ariſing from touching a ſmooth, ſoft, and velvet ſurface, has its exiſtence at the ends of the fingers, without once dreaming of its exiſting any where elſe.

organic impreſſion, we are not miſled to aſſign a wrong place to the pleaſant or painful feelings cauſed by that impreſſion; and therefore we naturally place them in the mind, where they really are: upon that account, they are conceived to be more refined and ſpiritual, than what are derived from taſting, touching, and ſmelling; for the latter feelings ſeeming to exiſt externally at the organ of ſenſe, are conceived to be merely corporeal.

The pleaſures of the eye and the ear being thus elevated above thoſe of the other external ſenſes, acquire ſo much dignity as to become a laudable entertainment. They are not, however, ſet upon a level with the purely intellectual; being not leſs inferior in dignity to intellectual pleaſures, than ſuperior to the organic or corporeal: they indeed reſemble the latter, being, like them, produced by external objects; but they alſo reſemble the former, being, like them, produced without any ſenſible organic impreſſion. Their mixt nature and middle place between organic and intellectual pleaſures, qualify them to aſſociate with both: beauty heightens all the organic feelings, as well as the intellectual: harmony, though it aſpires to inflame devotion, diſdains not to improve the reliſh of a banquet.

The pleaſures of the eye and the ear have other valuable properties beſide thoſe of dignity and elevation: being ſweet and moderately exhilarating, they are in their tone equally diſtant from the turbulence of paſſion, and the languor of indolence; and by that tone are perfectly well qualified, not only to revive the ſpirits when ſunk by ſenſual gratification, but alſo to relax them when overſtrained in any violent purſuit. Here is a remedy provided for many diſtreſſes; and to be convinced of its ſalutary effects, it will be ſufficient to run over the following particulars. Organic pleaſures have naturally a ſhort duration; when prolonged, they loſe their reliſh; when indulged to exceſs, they beget ſatiety and diſguſt: and to relieve us from ſuch uneaſineſs, nothing can be more happily contrived than the exhilarating pleaſures of the eye and ear, which take place imperceptibly, without much varying the tone of mind. On the other hand, any intenſe exerciſe of intellectual powers, becomes painful by overſtraining the mind: ceſſation

ceſſation from ſuch exerciſe gives not inſtant relief; it is neceſſary that the void be filled with ſome amuſement, gently relaxing the ſpirits*: organic pleaſure, which hath no reliſh but while we are in vigour, is ill qualified for that office; but the finer pleaſures of ſenſe, which occupy without exhauſting the mind, are excellently well qualified to reſtore its uſual tone after ſevere application to ſtudy or buſineſs, as well as after ſatiety from ſenſual gratification.

Our firſt perceptions are of external objects, and our firſt attachments are to them. Organic pleaſures take the lead: but the mind, gradually ripening, reliſheth more and more the pleaſures of the eye and ear; which approach the purely mental, without exhauſting the ſpirits; and exceed the purely ſenſual, without danger of ſatiety. The pleaſures of the eye and ear have accordingly a natural aptitude to draw us from the immoderate gratification of ſenſual appetite; and the mind, once accuſtomed to enjoy a variety of external objects without being ſenſible of the organic impreſſion, is prepared for enjoying internal objects where there cannot be an organic impreſſion. Thus the author of nature, by qualifying the human mind for a ſucceſſion of enjoyments from low to high, leads it by gentle ſteps from the moſt groveling corporeal pleaſures, for which only it is fitted in the beginning of life, to thoſe refined and ſublime pleaſures which are ſuited to its maturity.

But we are not bound down to this ſucceſſion by any law of neceſſity: the God of nature offers it to us, in order to advance our happineſs; and it is ſufficient, that he hath enabled us to carry it on in a natural courſe. Nor has he made our taſk either diſagreeable or difficult: on the contrary, the tranſition is ſweet and eaſy, from corporeal pleaſures to the more refined pleaſures of ſenſe; and not leſs ſo, from theſe to the exalted pleaſures of morality and religion. We ſtand therefore engaged in honour, as well as intereſt, to ſecond the purpoſes of nature, by cultivating the pleaſures of the eye and

* Du Bos judiciouſly obſerves, that ſilence doth not tend to calm an agitated mind; but that ſoft and flow muſic hath a fine effect.

and ear, thoſe eſpecially that require extraordinary culture *, ſuch as ariſe from poetry, painting, ſculpture, muſic, gardening, and architecture. This eſpecially is the duty of the opulent, who have leiſure to improve their minds and their feelings. The fine arts are contrived to give pleaſure to the eye and the ear, diſregarding the inferior ſenſes. A taſte for theſe arts is a plant that grows naturally in many ſoils; but, without culture, ſcarce to perfection in any ſoil: it is ſuſceptible of much refinement; and is, by proper care, greatly improved. In this reſpect, a taſte in the fine arts goes hand in hand with the moral ſenſe, to which indeed it is nearly allied: both of them diſcover what is right and what is wrong: faſhion, temper, and education, have an influence to vitiate both, or to preſerve them pure and untainted: neither of them are arbitrary nor local; being rooted in human nature, and governed by principles common to all men. The deſign of the preſent undertaking, which aſpires not to morality, is, to examine the ſenſitive branch of human nature, to trace the objects that are naturally agreeable, as well as thoſe that are naturally diſagreeable; and by theſe means to diſcover, if we can, what are the genuine principles of the fine arts. The man who aſpires to be a critic in theſe arts, muſt pierce ſtill deeper: he muſt acquire a clear perception of what objects are lofty, what low, what proper or improper, what manly, and what mean or trivial. Hence a foundation for reaſoning upon the taſte of any individual, and for paſſing ſentence upon it: where it is conformable to principles, we can pronounce with certainty, that it is correct; otherwiſe, that

* A taſte for natural objects is born with us in perfection; for reliſhing a fine countenance, a rich landſcape, or a vivid colour, culture is unneceſſary. The obſervation holds equally in natural ſounds, ſuch as the ſinging of birds, or the murmuring of a brook. Nature here, the artificer of the object as well as of the percipient, hath accurately ſuited them to each other. But of a poem, a cantata, a picture, or other artificial production, a true reliſh is not commonly attained without ſome ſtudy and much practice.

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that it is incorrect, and perhaps whimsical. Thus the fine arts, like morals, become a rational science; and, like morals, may be cultivated to a high degree of refinement.

Manifold are the advantages of criticism, when thus studied as a rational science. In the first place, a thorough acquaintance with the principles of the fine arts, redoubles the pleasure we have in them. To the man who resigns himself entirely to sentiment or feeling, without interposing any sort of judgment, poetry, music, painting, are mere pastime: in the prime of life, indeed, they are delightful, being supported by the force of novelty, and the heat of imagination: but when no longer thus supported, they lose their relish; and are generally neglected in the maturity of life, which disposes to more serious and more important occupations. To those who deal in criticism as a regular science, governed by just principles, and giving scope to judgment as well as to fancy, the fine arts are a favourite entertainment; and in old age maintain that relish which they produce in the morning of life *.

In the next place, a philosophic inquiry into the principles of the fine arts, inures the reflecting mind to the most enticing sort of logic: the practice of reasoning upon subjects so agreeable tends to a habit; and a habit, strengthening the reasoning faculties, prepares the mind for entering into subjects more difficult and abstract. To have, in this respect, a just conception of the importance of criticism, we need but reflect upon the common method of education; which, after some years spent in acquiring languages, hurries us, without the least preparatory discipline, into the most profound philosophy. A more effectual method to alienate the tender mind from abstract science, is beyond the reach of invention: and accordingly, with respect to such speculations, the bulk of our youth contract a sort of hobgoblin terror, which is seldom, if ever, subdued. Those who

* "Though logic may subsist without rhetoric or "poetry, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and "correct logic, that without it they are no better than "warbling trifles." *Hermes*, p. 6.

who apply to the arts, are trained in a very different manner: they are led, ſtep by ſtep, from the eaſier parts of the operation, to what are more difficult; and are not permitted to make a new motion, till they be perfected in thoſe which go before. Thus the ſcience of criticiſm may be conſidered as a middle link, connecting the different parts of education into a regular chain. This ſcience furniſheth an inviting opportunity to exerciſe the judgment: we delight to reaſon upon ſubjects that are equally pleaſant and familiar: we proceed gradually from the ſimpler to the more involved caſes: and in a due courſe of diſcipline, cuſtom, which improves all our faculties, beſtows acuteneſs upon thoſe of reaſon, ſufficient to unravel all the intricacies of philoſophy.

Nor ought it to be overlooked, that the reaſonings employ'd upon the fine arts are of the ſame kind with thoſe which regulate our conduct. Mathematical and metaphyſical reaſonings have no tendency to improve ſocial intercourſe; nor are they applicable to the common affairs of life: but a juſt taſte of the fine arts, derived from rational principles, furniſhes elegant ſubjects for converſation, and prepares us for acting in the ſocial ſtate with dignity and propriety.

The ſcience of rational criticiſm tends to improve the heart not leſs than the underſtanding. It tends, in the firſt place, to moderate the ſelfiſh affections: by ſweetening and harmonizing the temper, it is a ſtrong antidote to the turbulence of paſſion and violence of purſuit: it procures to a man ſo much mental enjoyment, that in order to be occupied, he is not tempted to deliver up his youth to hunting, gaming, drinking*; nor his middle age to ambition; nor his old age to avarice. Pride and envy, two diſguſtful paſſions, find in the conſtitution no enemy more formidable than a delicate and diſcerning

* If any youth of a ſplendid fortune and Engliſh education ſtumble perchance upon this book and this paſſage, he will pronounce the latter to be empty declamation. But if he can be prevailed upon to make the experiment, he will find, much to his ſatisfaction, every article literally true.

diſcerning taſte: the man upon whom nature and culture have beſtowed this bleſſing, feels great delight in the virtuous diſpoſitions and actions of others: he loves to cheriſh them, and to publiſh them to the world: faults and failings, it is true, are to him not leſs obvious; but theſe he avoids, or removes out of ſight, becauſe they give him pain. On the other hand, a man void of taſte, upon whom even ſtriking beauties make but a faint impreſſion, indulges pride or envy without controul, and loves to brood over errors and blemiſhes. In a word, there are other paſſions, that, upon occaſions, may diſturb the peace of ſociety more than thoſe mentioned; but none of the other paſſions is ſo unwearied an antagoniſt to the ſweets of ſocial intercourſe: pride and envy put a man perpetually in oppoſition to others; and diſpoſe him to reliſh bad more than good qualities, even in a companion. How different that diſpoſition of mind, where every virtue in a companion or neighbour, is, by refinement of taſte, ſet in its ſtrongeſt light; and defects or blemiſhes, natural to all, are ſuppreſſed, or kept out of view!

In the next place, delicacy of taſte tends not leſs to invigorate the ſocial affections, than to moderate thoſe that are ſelfiſh. To be convinced of this tendency, we need only reflect, that delicacy of taſte neceſſarily heightens our feeling of pain and pleaſure, and of courſe our ſympathy, which is the capital branch of every ſocial paſſion. Sympathy in particular invites a communication of joys and ſorrows, hopes and fears: ſuch exerciſe, ſoothing and ſatisfactory in itſelf, is neceſſarily productive of mutual good-will and affection.

One other advantage of rational criticiſm is reſerved to the laſt place, being of all the moſt important; which is, that it is a great ſupport to morality. I inſiſt on it with entire ſatisfaction, that no occupation attaches a man more to his duty than that of cultivating a taſte in the fine arts: a juſt reliſh of what is beautiful, proper, elegant, and ornamental, in writing or painting, in architecture or gardening, is a fine preparation for the ſame juſt reliſh of theſe qualities in character and behaviour. To the man who has acquired a taſte ſo acute and accompliſhed, every action wrong or improper, muſt

be

be highly diſguſtful: if, in any inſtance, the overbearing power of paſſion ſway him from his duty, he returns to it upon the firſt reflection, with redoubled reſolution never to be ſway'd a ſecond time: he has now an additional motive to virtue, a conviction derived from experience, that happineſs depends on regularity and order, and that a diſregard to juſtice or propriety never fails to be puniſhed with ſhame and remorſe *.

Rude ages exhibit the triumph of authority over reaſon: Philoſophers antiently were divided into ſects, being Epicureans, Platoniſts, Stoics, Pythagoreans, or Sceptics: the ſpeculative relied no farther upon their own judgment than to chuſe a leader, whom they implicitly followed. In later times, happily, reaſon hath obtained the aſcendant: men now aſſert their native privilege of thinking for themſelves, and diſdain to be ranked in any ſect, whatever be the ſcience I muſt except criticiſm, which, by what fatality I know not, continues to be not leſs ſlaviſh in its principles, nor leſs ſubmiſſive to authority, than it was originally. Boſſu, a celebrated French critic, gives many rules; but can diſcover no better foundation for any of them, than the practice merely of Homer and Virgil, ſupported by the authority of Ariſtotle: Strange! that in ſo long a work, he ſhould never once have ſtumbled upon the queſtion, Whether, and how far, do theſe rules agree with human nature? It could not ſurely be his opinion, that theſe poets, however eminent for genius, were intitled to give laws to mankind; and that nothing now remains but blind obedience to their arbitrary will: if in writing they followed no rule, why ſhould they be imitated? if they ſtudied

* Genius is allied to a warm and inflammable conſtitution, delicacy of taſte to calmneſs and ſedateneſs. Hence it is common to find genius in one who is a prey to every paſſion; which can ſcarce happen with reſpect to delicacy of taſte. Upon a man poſſeſſed of that bleſſing, the moral duties, not leſs than the fine arts, making a deep impreſſion, counterbalance every irregular deſire: at the ſame time, a temper calm and ſedate is not eaſily moved, even by a ſtrong temptation.

ſtudied nature, and were obſequious to rational principles, why ſhould theſe be concealed from us?

With reſpect to the preſent undertaking, it is not the author's intention to compoſe a regular treatiſe upon each of the fine arts; but only, in general, to exhibit their fundamental principles, drawn from human nature, the true ſource of criticiſm. The fine arts are calculated for our entertainment, or for making pleaſant impreſſions; and, by that circumſtance, are diſtinguiſhed from the uſeful arts: but in order to make pleaſant impreſſions, we ought, as above hinted, to know what objects are naturally agreeable, and what naturally diſagreeable. This ſubject the author has attempted, as far as is neceſſary for unfolding the genuine principles of the fine arts; and he aſſumes no merit from his performance, but that of evincing, perhaps more diſtinctly than hitherto has been done, that theſe principles, as well as every juſt rule of criticiſm, are founded upon the ſenſitive part of our nature. What the author hath diſcovered or collected upon that intereſting ſubject, he chuſes to impart in the gay and agreeable form of criticiſm; imagining that this form will be more reliſhed, and perhaps be not leſs inſtructive, than a regular and laboured diſquiſition. His plan is, to aſcend gradually to principles, from facts and experiments; inſtead of beginning with the former, handled abſtractedly, and deſcending to the latter. But though criticiſm be thus his only declared aim, he will not diſown, that all along it has been his view, to explain the nature of man, conſidered as a ſenſitive being capable of pleaſure and pain: and though he flatters himſelf with having made ſome progreſs in that important ſcience; he is however too ſenſible of its extent and difficulty, to undertake it profeſſedly, or to avow it as the chief purpoſe of the preſent work.

To cenſure works, not men, is the juſt prerogative of criticiſm; and accordingly all perſonal cenſure is here avoided, unleſs where neceſſary to illuſtrate ſome general propoſition. No praiſe is claimed on that account; becauſe cenſuring with a view merely to find fault, cannot be entertaining to any perſon of humanity. Writers, one ſhould imagine, ought, above all others, to be

reſerved

reſerved upon that article, when they lie ſo open to retaliation. The author of this treatiſe, far from being confident of meriting no cenſure, entertains not even the ſlighteſt hope of ſuch perfection. Amuſement was at firſt the ſole aim of his inquiries: proceeding from one particular to another, the ſubject grew under his hand; and he was far advanced before the thought ſtruck him, that his private meditations might be publicly uſeful. In public, however, he would not appear in a ſlovenly dreſs; and therefore he pretends not otherwiſe to apologize for his errors, than by obſerving, that in a new ſubject, not leſs nice than extenſive, errors are in ſome meaſure unavoidable. Neither pretends he to juſtify his taſte in every particular: that point muſt be extremely clear, which admits not variety of opinion; and in ſome matters ſuſceptible of great refinement, time is perhaps the only infallible touchſtone of taſte: to this he appeals, and to this he chearfully ſubmits.

*N. B.* THE ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM, meaning the whole, is a title too aſſuming for this work. A number of theſe elements or principles are here unfolded: but as the author is far from imagining, that he has completed the liſt, a more humble title is proper, ſuch as may expreſs any undetermined number of parts leſs than the whole. This he thinks is ſignified by the title he has choſen, *viz.* ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM.

# ELEMENTS

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# CRITICISM.

## CHAP. XVIII. Beauty of Language.

OF all the fine arts, painting only and ſculpture are in their nature imitative. An ornamented field is not a copy or imitation of nature, but nature itſelf embelliſhed. Architecture deals in originals, and copies not from nature. Sound and motion may in ſome meaſure be imitated by muſic; but for the moſt part, muſic, like architecture, deals in originals. Language copies not from nature, more than muſic or architecture; unleſs where, like muſic, it is imitative of ſound or motion: in the deſcription, for example, of particular ſounds, language ſometimes furniſheth words, which, beſide their cuſtomary power of exciting ideas, reſemble by their ſoftneſs or harſhneſs the ſound deſcribed; and there are words, which, by the celerity or ſlowneſs of pronunciation, have ſome reſemblance to the motion they ſignify. This imitative power of words goes one ſtep farther: the loftineſs of ſome words, makes them proper ſymbols of lofty ideas; a rough ſubject is imitated by harſh-ſounding words; and words of many ſyllables pronounced ſlow or ſmooth, are naturally expreſſive of grief and melancholy. Words have a ſeparate effect on the mind, abſtracting from their ſignification and from their imitative power: they are more or leſs agreeable to the ear, by the fulneſs, ſweetneſs, faintneſs, or roughneſs of their tones.

Theſe are but faint beauties, being known to thoſe only who have more than ordinary acuteneſs of perception. Language poſſeſſeth a beauty ſuperior greatly in

degree, of which we are eminently ſenſible when a thought is communicated with perſpicuity and ſprightlineſs. This beauty of language, ariſing from its power of expreſſing thought, is apt to be confounded with the beauty of the thought itſelf; which beauty of thought is transferred to the expreſſion, and makes it appear more beautiful *. But theſe beauties, if we wiſh to think accurately, muſt be diſtinguiſhed from each other: they are in reality ſo diſtinct, that we ſometimes are conſcious of the higheſt pleaſure language can afford, when the ſubject expreſſed is diſagreeable; a thing that is loathſome, or a ſcene of horror to make one's hair ſtand on end, may be deſcribed in a manner ſo lively, as that the diſagreeableneſs of the ſubject ſhall not even obſcure the agreeableneſs of the deſcription. The cauſes of the original beauty of language conſidered as ſignificant, which is a branch of the preſent ſubject, will be explained in their order. I ſhall only at preſent obſerve, that this beauty is the beauty of means fitted to an end, that of communicating thought: and hence it evidently appears, that of ſeveral expreſſions all conveying the ſame thought, the moſt beautiful, in the ſenſe now mentioned, is that which in the moſt perfect manner anſwers its end.

The ſeveral beauties of language above mentioned, being of different kinds, ought to be handled ſeparately. I ſhall begin with thoſe beauties of language that ariſe from ſound; after which will follow the beauties of language conſidered as ſignificant: this order appears natural; for the ſound of a word is attended to, before we conſider its ſignification. In a third ſection come thoſe ſingular beauties of language that are derived from a reſem-

* Chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 5 Demetrius Phalereus (of Elocution, ſect. 75.) makes the ſame obſervation. We are apt, ſays that author, to confound the language with the ſubject; and if the latter be nervous, we judge the former to be ſo alſo. But they are clearly diſtinguiſhable; and it is not uncommon to find ſubjects of great dignity dreſſed in mean language. Theopompus is celebrated for the force of his diction; but erroneouſly: his ſubject indeed has great force, but his ſtyle very little.

a reſemblance between ſound and ſignification. The beauties of verſe are handled in the laſt ſection: for though the foregoing beauties are found in verſe as well as in proſe, yet verſe has many peculiar beauties, which for the ſake of connection muſt be brought under one view; and verſification, at any rate, is a ſubject of ſo great importance, as to deſerve a place by itſelf.

## SECT. I.

### *Beauty of language with reſpect to ſound.*

IN handling this ſubject, the following order appears the moſt natural. The ſounds of the different letters come firſt: next, theſe ſounds as united in ſyllables: third, ſyllables united in words: fourth, words united in a period: and in the laſt place, periods united in a diſcourſe.

With reſpect to the firſt article, every vowel is ſounded with a ſingle expiration of air from the wind-pipe, through the cavity of the mouth. By varying this cavity, the different vowels are ſounded: for the air in paſſing through cavities differing in ſize, produceth various ſounds, ſome high or ſharp, ſome low or flat; a ſmall cavity occaſions a high ſound, a large cavity a low ſound. The five vowels accordingly, pronounced with the ſame extenſion of the wind-pipe, but with different openings of the mouth, form a regular ſeries of ſounds, deſcending from high to low, in the following order, *i*, *e*, *a*, *o*, *u* * Each of theſe ſounds is agreeable to the ear: and if it be inquired which of them is the moſt agreeable, it is perhaps the ſafeſt ſide to hold, that there is no univerſal preference of any one before the reſt: probably thoſe vowels which are the fartheſt removed from the extremes, will be the moſt reliſhed. This is all I have to remark upon the firſt article: for conſonants being letters that of themſelves have no ſound, ſerve only in conjunction with vowels to form



* In this ſcale of ſounds, the letter *i* muſt be pronounced as in the word *intereſt*, and as in other words beginning with the ſyllable *in*; the letter *e* as in *perſuaſion*; the letter *a* as in *hat*; and the letter *u* as in *number*.

articulate ſounds; and as every articulate ſound of this kind makes a ſyllable, conſonants come naturally under the ſecond article; to which therefore we proceed.

All conſonants are pronounced with a leſs cavity than any of the vowels; and conſequently they contribute to form a ſound ſtill more ſharp than the ſharpeſt vowel pronounced ſingle. Hence it follows, that every articulate ſound into which a conſonant enters, muſt neceſſarily be double, though pronounced with one expiration of air, or with one breath, as commonly expreſſed: the reaſon is, that though two ſounds readily unite, yet where they differ in tone, both of them muſt be heard if neither of them be ſuppreſſed. For the ſame reaſon, every ſyllable muſt be compoſed of as many ſounds as there are letters, ſuppoſing every letter to be diſtinctly pronounced.

We next inquire, how far articulate ſounds into which conſonants enter, are agreeable to the ear. Few tongues are ſo poliſhed, as entirely to have rejected ſounds that are pronounced with difficulty; and it is a noted obſervation, That ſuch ſounds are to the ear harſh and diſagreeable. But with reſpect to agreeable ſounds, it appears, that a double ſound is always more agreeable than a ſingle ſound: every one who has an ear muſt be ſenſible, that the diphthong *oi* or *ai* is more agreeable than any of theſe vowels pronounced ſingly: the ſame holds where a conſonant enters into the double ſound; the ſyllable *le* has a more agreeable ſound than the vowel *e*, or than any vowel. And in ſupport of experience, a ſatisfactory argument may be drawn from the wiſdom of Providence: ſpeech is beſtowed upon man, to qualify him for ſociety; and the proviſion he hath of articulate ſounds, is proportioned to the uſe he hath for them: but if ſounds that are agreeable ſingly were not alſo agreeable in conjunction, the neceſſity of a painful ſelection would render language intricate and difficult to be attained in any perfection; and this ſelection, at the ſame time, would tend to abridge the number of uſeful ſounds, ſo as perhaps not to leave ſufficient for anſwering the different ends of language.

In this view, the harmony of pronunciation differs widely from that of muſic properly ſo called: in the latter

latter are discovered many sounds singly agreeable, that in conjunction are extremely disagreeable; none but what are called *concordant sounds* having a good effect in conjunction: in the former, all sounds singly agreeable, are in conjunction concordant; and ought to be, in order to fulfill the purposes of language.

Having discussed syllables, we proceed to words; which make a third article. Monosyllables belong to the former head: polysyllables open a different scene. In a cursory view, one will readily imagine, that the agreeableness or disagreeableness of a word with respect to its sound, should depend upon the agreeableness or disagreeableness of its component syllables: which is true in part, but not entirely; for we must also take under consideration, the effect of syllables in succession. In the first place, syllables in immediate succession, pronounced, each of them, with the same or nearly the some aperture of the mouth, produce a succession of weak and feeble sounds; witness the French words *dit-il, pathetique:* on the other hand, a syllable of the greatest aperture succeeding one of the smallest, or the opposite, makes a succession, which, because of its remarkable disagreeableness, is distinguished by a proper name, *viz hiatus.* The most agreeable succession, is, where the cavity is increased and diminished alternately within moderate limits. Examples, *alternative, longevity, pusillanimous.* Secondly, words consisting wholly of syllables pronounced slow, or of syllables pronounced quick, commonly called *long* and *short syllables*, have little melody in them; witness the words *petitioner, fruiterer, dizziness:* on the other hand, the intermixture of long and short syllables is remarkably agreeable; for example, *degree, repent, wonderful, altitude, rapidity, independent, impetuosity* *. The cause will be explained afterward, in treating of versification.



* Italian words, like those of Latin and Greek, have this property almost universally: English and French words are generally deficient; in the former, the long syllable being removed from the end as far as the sound will permit; and in the latter, the last syllable being generally long For example, Sēnator in English, Senātor in Latin, and Senatēur in French.

Diſtinguiſhable from the beauties above mentioned, there is a beauty of ſome words which ariſes from their ſignification: when the emotion raiſed by the length or ſhortneſs, the roughneſs or ſmoothneſs, of the ſound, reſembles in any degree what is raiſed by the ſenſe, we feel a very remarkable pleaſure. But this ſubject belongs to the third ſection.

The foregoing obſervations afford a ſtandard to every nation, for eſtimating, pretty accurately, the comparative merit of the words that enter into their own language: but they are not equally uſeful in comparing the words of different languages; which will thus appear. Different nations judge differently of the harſhneſs or ſmoothneſs of articulate ſounds; a ſound, for example, harſh and diſagreeable to an Italian, may be abundantly ſmooth to a northern ear: here every nation muſt judge for itſelf; nor can there be any ſolid ground for a preference, when there is no common ſtandard to which we can appeal. The caſe is preciſely the ſame as in behaviour and manners: plain-dealing and ſincerity, liberty in words and actions, form the character of one people; politeneſs, reſerve, and a total diſguiſe of every ſentiment that can give offence, form the character of another people; to each the manners of the other are diſagreeable. An effeminate mind cannot bear the leaſt of that roughneſs and ſeverity, which is generally eſteemed manly when exerted upon proper occaſions: neither can an effeminate ear bear the harſhneſs of certain words, that are deemed nervous and ſounding by thoſe accuſtomed to a rougher tone of ſpeech. Muſt we then relinquiſh all thoughts of comparing languages in the point of roughneſs and ſmoothneſs, as a fruitleſs inquiry? Not altogether ſo; for we may proceed a certain length, though without hope of an ultimate deciſion: a language pronouuced with difficulty even by natives, muſt yield to a ſmoother language: and ſuppoſing two languages pronounced with equal facility by natives, the rougher language, in my judgment, ought to be preferred, provided it be alſo ſtored with a competent ſhare of more mellow ſounds; which will be evident from attending to the different effects that articulate ſound hath upon the mind. A ſmooth gliding

ſound

ſound is agreeable, by calming the mind, and lulling it to reſt: a rough bold ſound, on the contrary, animates the mind; the effort perceived in pronouncing, is communicated to the hearers, who feel in their own minds a ſimilar effort, rouſing their attention, and diſpoſing them to action. I add another conſideration; that the agreeableneſs of contraſt in the rougher language, for which the great variety of ſounds gives ample opportunity, muſt, even in an effeminate ear, prevail over the more uniform ſounds of the ſmoother language*. This appears to me all that can be ſafely determined upon the preſent point. With reſpect to the other circumſtances that conſtitute the beauty of words, the ſtandard above mentioned is infallible when apply'd to foreign languages as well as to our own: for every man, whatever be his mother tongue, is equally capable to judge of the length or ſhortneſs of words, of the alternate opening and cloſing of the mouth in ſpeaking, and of the relation that the ſound bears to the ſenſe: in theſe particulars, the judgment is ſuſceptible of no prejudice from cuſtom, at leaſt of no invincible prejudice.

That the Engliſh tongue, originally harſh, is at preſent much ſoftened by dropping in the pronunciation many redundant conſonants, is undoubtedly true: that it is not capable of being further mellowed without ſuffering in its force and energy, will ſcarce be thought by any one who poſſeſſes an ear; and yet ſuch in Britain is the propenſity for diſpatch, that overlooking the majeſty of words compoſed of many ſyllables aptly connected, the prevailing taſte is to ſhorten words, even at the expence of making them diſagreeable to the ear, and harſh in the pronunciation. But I have no occaſion to inſiſt upon this article, being prevented by an excellent writer, who poſſeſſed, if any man ever did, the true genius of the Engliſh tongue†. I cannot however for-



* That the Italian tongue is rather too ſmooth, ſeems probable from conſidering, that in verſification words are frequently ſuppreſſed in order to produce a rougher and bolder tone.

† See Swift's propoſal for correcting the Engliſh tongue, in a letter to the Earl of Oxford.

bear urging one obſervation, borrowed from that author: ſeveral tenſes of our verbs are formed by adding the final ſyllable *ed*, which, being a weak ſound, has remarkably the worſe effect by poſſeſſing the moſt conſpicuous place in the word; upon which account, the vowel in common ſpeech is generally ſuppreſſed, and the conſonant added to the foregoing ſyllable; and hence the following rugged ſounds, *drudg'd*, *diſturb'd*, *rebuk'd*, *ſtedg'd*. It is ſtill leſs excuſable to follow this practice in writing; for the hurry of ſpeaking may excuſe what would be altogether improper in a compoſition of any value: the ſyllable *ed*, it is true, makes but a poor figure at the end of a word; but we ought to ſubmit to that defect, rather than multiply the number of harſh words, which, after all that has been done, bear an overproportion in our tongue. The author above-mentioned, by ſhowing a good example, did all in his power to reſtore that ſyllable; and he well deſerves to be imitated. Some exceptions however I would make: a word that ſignifies labour, or any thing harſh or rugged, ought not to be ſmooth; therefore *forc'd*, with an apoſtrophe, is better than *forced*, without it: another exception is, where the penult ſyllable ends with a vowel; in that caſe the final ſyllable *ed* may be apoſtrophized without making the word harſh: examples, *betray'd*, *carry'd*, *deſtroy'd*, *employ'd*.

The article next in order, is the muſic of words as united in a period. And as the arrangement of words in ſucceſſion ſo as to afford the greateſt pleaſure to the ear, depends on principles pretty remote from common view, it will be neceſſary to premiſe ſome general obſervations upon the appearance that a number of objects make when placed in an increaſing or decreaſing ſeries; which appearance will be very different, accordingly as reſemblance or contraſt prevails. Where the objects vary by ſmall differences ſo as to have a mutual reſemblance, we in aſcending conceive the ſecond object of no greater ſize than the firſt, the third of no greater ſize than the ſecond, and ſo of the reſt; which diminiſheth in appearance the ſize of the whole: but when, beginning at the largeſt object, we proceed gradually to the leaſt, reſemblance makes us imagine the ſecond as large

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as the firſt, and the third as large as the ſecond; which in appearance magnifies every object of the ſeries except the firſt. On the other hand, in a ſeries varying by great differences, where contraſt prevails, the effects are directly oppoſite: a large object ſucceeding a ſmall one of the ſame kind, appears by the oppoſition larger than uſual; and a ſmall object, for the ſame reaſon, ſucceeding one that is large, appears leſs than uſual *. Hence a remarkable pleaſure in viewing a ſeries aſcending by large differences; directly oppoſite to what we feel when the differences are ſmall. The ſmalleſt object of a ſeries aſcending by large differences has the ſame effect upon the mind as if it ſtood ſingle without making a part of the ſeries: but the ſecond object, by means of contraſt, makes a much greater figure than when viewed ſingly and apart; and the ſame effect is perceived in aſcending progreſſively, till we arrive at the laſt object. The oppoſite effect is produced in deſcending; for in this direction, every object, except the firſt, makes a leſs figure than when viewed ſeparately and independent of the ſeries. We may then lay down as a maxim, which will hold in the compoſition of language as well as of other ſubjects, That a ſtrong impulſe ſucceeding a weak, makes a double impreſſion on the mind; and that a weak impulſe ſucceeding a ſtrong, makes ſcarce any impreſſion.

After eſtabliſhing this maxim, we can be at no loſs about its application to the ſubject in hand. The following rule is laid down by Diomedes †. "In verbis "obſervandum eſt, ne a majoribus ad minora deſcendat "oratio; melius enim dicitur, *Vir eſt optimus*, quam, "*Vir optimus eſt*." This rule is alſo applicable to entire members of a period, which, according to our author's expreſſion, ought not, more than ſingle words, to proceed from the greater to the leſs, but from the leſs to the greater ‡. In arranging the members of a period, no writer equals Cicero: the beauty of the following

* See the reaſon, chap. 8.

† De ſtructura perfectæ orationis, l. 2.

‡ See Demetrius Phalereus of Elocution, ſect. 18.

ing examples out of many, will not ſuffer me to ſlur them over by a reference.

Quîcum quæſtor fueram,
Quîcum me ſors conſuetudoque majorum,
Quîcum me deorum hominumque judicium conjunxerat.

Again:

Habet honorem quem petimus,
Habet ſpem quam præpoſitam nobis habemus,
Habet exiſtimationem, multo ſudore, labore, vigiliiſque, collectam.

Again:

Eripite nos ex miſeriis,
Eripite nos ex faucibus eorum,
Quorum crudelitas noſtro ſanguine non poteſt expleri.
*De oratore, l.* 1. §. 52.

This order of words or members gradually increaſing in length, may, ſo far as concerns the pleaſure of ſound ſingly, be denominated *a climax in ſound*.

The laſt article is the muſic of periods as united in a diſcourſe; which ſhall be diſpatched in a very few words. By no other human means is it poſſible to preſent to the mind, ſuch a number of objects and in ſo ſwift a ſucceſſion, as by ſpeaking or writing: and for that reaſon, variety ought more to be ſtudied in theſe, than in any other ſort of compoſition. Hence a rule regarding the arrangement of the members of different periods with relation to each other, That to avoid a tedious uniformity of ſound and cadence, the arrangement, the cadence, and the length of theſe members, ought to be diverſified as much as poſſible: and if the members of different periods be ſufficiently diverſified, the periods themſelves will be equally ſo.

## SECT. II.

### *Beauty of language with reſpect to ſignification.*

IT is well ſaid by a noted writer *, "That by means "of ſpeech we can divert our ſorrows, mingle our "mirth,

* Scot's Chriſtian life.

" mirth, impart our secrets, communicate our counsels, " and make mutual compacts and agreements to supply " and assist each other." Considering speech as contributing to so many good purposes, words that convey clear and distinct ideas, must be one of its capital beauties. This cause of beauty, is too extensive to be handled as a branch of any other subject: for to ascertain with accuracy even the proper meaning of words, not to talk of their figurative power, would require a large volume; an useful work indeed, but not to be attempted without a large stock of time, study, and reflection. This branch therefore of the subject I humbly decline. Nor do I propose to exhaust all the other beauties of language with respect to signification: the reader, in a work like the present, cannot fairly expect more than a slight sketch of those that make the greatest figure. This task I attempt the more willingly, as being connected with certain principles in human nature; and the rules I shall have occasion to lay down, will, if I judge rightly, be agreeable illustrations of these principles. Every subject must be of importance that tends to unfold the human heart; for what other science is of greater use to human beings?

The present subject is too extensive to be discussed without dividing it into parts; and what follows suggests a division into two parts. In every period, two things are to be regarded: first, the words of which it is composed; next, the arrangement of these words; the former resembling the stones that compose a building, and the latter resembling the order in which they are placed. Hence the beauties of language with respect to its meaning, may not improperly be distinguished into two kinds: first, the beauties that arise from a right choice of words or materials for constructing the period; and next, the beauties that arise from a due arrangement of these words or materials. I begin with rules that direct us to a right choice of words, and then proceed to rules that concern their arrangement.

And with respect to the former, communication of thought being the principal end of language, it is a rule, That perspicuity ought not to be sacrificed to any other beauty whatever; if it should be doubted whether perspicuity

ſpicuity be a poſitive beauty, it cannot be doubted, that the want of it is the greateſt defect. Nothing therefore in language ought more to be ſtudied, than to prevent all obſcurity in the expreſſion; for to have no meaning, is but one degree worſe than to have a meaning that is not underſtood. Want of perſpicuity from a wrong arrangement, belongs to the next branch. I ſhall here give a few examples where the obſcurity ariſes from a wrong choice of words; and as this defect is too common in the ordinary herd of writers to make examples from them neceſſary, I confine myſelf to the moſt celebrated authors.

Livy, ſpeaking of a rout after a battle,

Multique in ruina majore quam fuga oppreſſi obtruncatique. *L* 4. § 46.

This author is frequently obſcure by expreſſing but part of his thought, leaving it to be completed by his reader. His deſcription of the ſea-fight, *l.* 28. *cap.* 30. is extremely perplexed.

Unde tibi reditum *certo ſubtemine* Parcæ
Rupere. [*Horace, epod.* xiii. 22.

Qui perſæpe cava teſtudine flevit amorem,
*Non elaboratum ad pedem.* [*Horace, epod.* xiv. 11.

Me fabuloſæ Vulture in Appulo,
Altricis extra limen Apuliæ,
Ludo, fatigatumque *ſomno*,
Fronde nova puerum palumbes
Texere. [*Horace, Carm. l.* 3. *ode* 4.

Puræ rivus aquæ, ſilvaque jugerum
Paucorum, et ſegetis certa fides meæ,
Fulgentem imperio fertilis Africæ
*Fallit ſorte beatior.* [*Horace, Carm. l.* 3. *ode* 16.

Cum fas atque nefas exiguo *fine* libidinum
Diſcernunt avidi. [*Horace, Carm. l.* 1. *ode* 18.

Ac ſpem fronte ſerenat. [*Æneid.* iv. 477.

I am in greater pain about the foregoing paſſages than about any I have ventured to criticiſe, being aware that a vague

a vague or obſcure expreſſion, is apt to gain favour with thoſe who neglect to examine it with a critical eye: to ſome it carries that ſenſe which they reliſh the moſt; and by ſuggeſting various meanings at once, it is admired by others as conciſe and comprehenſive: which by the way fairly accounts for the opinion generally entertained with reſpect to moſt languages in their infant ſtate, of their expreſſing much in few words. This obſervation cannot be better illuſtrated than by a paſſage from Quintilian, tranſcribed in the firſt volume for a different purpoſe, and which is in the following words.

At quæ Polycleto defuerunt, Phidiæ atque Alcameni dantur. Phidias tamen diis quam hominibus efficiendis melior artifex traditur: in ebore vero, longe citra æmulum, vel ſi nihil niſi Minervam Athenis, aut Olympium in Elide Jovem feciſſet, *cujus pulchritudo adjeciſſe aliquid etiam receptæ religioni videtur; adeo majeſtas operis Deum æquavit.*

The ſentence in the Italic characters appeared always to me extremely expreſſive, before I gave it peculiar attention. And yet if one examine it independent of the context, its proper meaning, is not what is intended: the words naturally import, that the beauty of the ſtatues mentioned, appears to add ſome new tenet or rite to the eſtabliſhed religion, or appears to add new dignity to it; and we muſt conſult the context before we can gather the true meaning; which is, that the Greeks were confirmed in the belief of their eſtabliſhed religion by theſe majeſtic ſtatues, ſo like real divinities.

There is want of neatneſs even in an ambiguity ſo ſlight as what ariſes from the conſtruction merely; as where the period commences with a member conceived to be in the nominative caſe, and which afterward is found to be in the accuſative. Example: "Some e-"motions more peculiarly connected with the fine arts, "I propoſe to handle in ſeparate chapters *." Better thus: "Some emotions more peculiarly connected with "the fine arts, are propoſed to be handled in ſeparate "chapters."

I add

* Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 1. p. 43. edit. 1.

I add another error againſt perſpicuity; which I mention the rather becauſe with ſome writers it paſſes for a beauty. It is the giving different names to the ſame object, mentioned oftener than once in the ſame period. Example: Speaking of the Engliſh adventurers who firſt attempted the conqueſt of Ireland, "and inſtead of reclaiming the natives from their uncultivated manners, they were gradually aſſimilated to the antient inhabitants, and degenerated from the cuſtoms of their own nation." From this mode of expreſſion, one would think the author meant to diſtinguiſh *the antient inhabitants* from *the natives*; and we cannot diſcover otherwiſe than from the ſenſe, that theſe are only different names given to the ſame object for the ſake of variety. But perſpicuity ought never to be ſacrificed to any other beauty, which leads me to think that the paſſage may be improved as follows: "and degenerating from the cuſtoms of their own nation, they were gradually aſſimilated to the natives, inſtead of reclaiming them from their uncultivated manners."

The rule next in order, becauſe next in importance, is, That the language ought to correſpond to the ſubject: heroic actions or ſentiments require elevated language; tender ſentiments ought to be expreſſed in words ſoft and flowing; and plain language devoid of ornament, is adapted to ſubjects grave and didactic. Language may be conſidered as the dreſs of thought; and where the one is not ſuited to the other, we are ſenſible of incongruity, in the ſame manner as where a judge is dreſſed like a fop, or a peaſant like a man of quality. Where the impreſſion made by the words reſembles the impreſſion made by the thought, the ſimilar emotions mix ſweetly in the mind, and double the pleaſure *; but where the impreſſions made by the thought and the words are diſſimilar, the unnatural union they are forc'd into is diſagreeable †.

This concordance between the thought and the words has been obſerved by every critic, and is ſo well underſtood as not to require any illuſtration. But there is a concordance

* Chap. 2. part 4. † Ibid.

concordance of a peculiar kind that has been ſcarcely touched in works of criticiſm, though it contributes greatly to neatneſs of compoſition. It is what follows.

In a thought of any extent, we ſeldom miſs to find ſome parts intimately united, ſome ſlightly, ſome diſjoined, and ſome directly oppoſed to each other. To find theſe conjunctions and diſjunctions imitated in the expreſſion, is a great beauty: becauſe ſuch imitation makes the words concordant with the ſenſe. This doctrine may be illuſtrated by a familiar example: when we have occaſion to mention the intimate connection that the ſoul hath with the body, the expreſſion ought to be, *the ſoul and body*; becauſe the particle *the*, relative to both, makes a connection in the expreſſion, reſembling in ſome degree the connection in the thought: but when the ſoul is diſtinguiſhed from the body, it is better to ſay *the ſoul and the body*; becauſe the diſjunction in the words reſembles the diſjunction in the thought. I proceed to other examples, beginning with conjunctions.

Conſtituit agmen; et expedire tela animoſque, equitibus juſſis, *&c.* [*Livy*, *l.* 38. § 25.

Here the words that expreſs the connected ideas are artificially connected by ſubjecting them both to the regimen of one verb. And the two following are of the ſame kind.

Quum ex paucis quotidie aliqui eorum caderent aut vulnerarentur, et qui ſuperarent, feſſi et corporibus et animis eſſent, *&c.* [*Livy*, *l.* 38. § 29.

Poſt acer Mneſtheus adducto conſtitit arcu,
Alta petens, pariterque oculos telumque tetendit.
*Æneid*, v. 507.

But to juſtify this artificial connection among the words, the ideas they expreſs ought to be intimately connected; for otherwiſe that concordance which is required between the ſenſe and the expreſſion will be impaired. In that view a paſſage from Tacitus is exceptionable; where words that ſignify ideas very little connected, are however forc'd into an artificial union. Here is the paſſage:

Germania omnis a Galliis, Rhætiiſque, et Pannoniis, Rheno

Rheno et Danubio fluminibus; a Sarmatis Daciſque, mutuo metu aut montibus ſeparatur. *De moribus Germanorum.*

Upon the ſame account, I eſteem the following paſſage equally exceptionable.

——————The fiend look'd up, and knew
His mounted ſcale aloft; nor more, but fled
Murm'ring, and with him fled the ſhades of night.
*Paradiſe loſt, b. 4. at the end.*

There is no natural connection between a perſon's flying or retiring, and the ſucceſſion of day-light to darkneſs; and therefore to connect artificially the terms that ſignify theſe things cannot have a ſweet effect.

Two members of a thought connected by their relation to the ſame action, will naturally be expreſſed by two members governed by the ſame verb; in which caſe theſe members, in order to improve their connection, ought to be conſtructed in the ſame manner. This beauty is ſo common among good writers as to have been little attended to; but the neglect of it is remarkably diſagreeable: For example, "He did not mention "Leonora, nor that her father was dead." Better thus: "He did not mention Leonora, nor her father's "death."

Where two ideas are ſo connected as to require but a copulative, it is pleaſant to find a connection in the words that expreſs theſe ideas, were it even ſo ſlight as where both begin with the ſame letter:

The peacock, in all his pride, does not diſplay half the colour that appears in the garments of a Britiſh lady, when ſhe is either dreſſed for a ball or a birth-day.
*Spectator*, N° 265.

Had not my dog of a ſteward run away as he did, without making up his accounts, I had ſtill been immerſed in ſin and ſea-coal. [*Ibid.* N° 530.

My life's companion, and my boſom friend,
One faith, one fame, one fate ſhall both attend.
*Dryden, Tranſlation of the Æneid.*

There

There is obviously a sensible defect in neatness when uniformity in this case is totally neglected *; witness the following example, where the construction of two members connected by a copulative is unnecessarily varied.

For it is confidently reported, that two young gentlemen of real hopes, bright wit, and profound judgment, who upon a thorough examination of causes and effects, and by the mere force of natural abilities, without the least tincture of learning, have made a discovery that there was no God, and *generously communicating* their thoughts for the good of the public, were some time ago, by an unparallelled severity, and upon I know not what obsolete law, broke for blasphemy †. [Better thus]:—having made a discovery that there was no God, and having generously communicated their thoughts for the good of the public, were some time ago, *&c.*

He had been guilty of a fault, for which his master would have put him to death, had he not found an opportunity to escape out of his hands, and *fled* into the deserts of Numidia. [*Guardian*, N° 139.

If all the ends of the revolution are already obtained, it is not only impertinent to argue for obtaining any of them, but *factious designs might be imputed*, and the name of incendiary be applied with some colour, perhaps, to any one who should persist in pressing this point. *Dissertation upon parties, Dedication.*

Next as to examples of disjunction and opposition in the parts of the thought, imitated in the expression; an imitation that is distinguished by the name of *antithesis*.

Speaking of Coriolanus soliciting the people to be made consul:

With a proud heart he wore his humble weeds.
*Coriolanus.*

Had you rather Cæsar were living, and die all slaves, than

* See Girard's French Grammar, discourse 12.

† An argument against abolishing Christianity. *Swift.*

than that Cæsar were dead, to live all free men?

*Julius Cæsar.*

He hath cool'd my friends and heated mine enemies.

*Shakespear.*

An artificial connection among the words, is undoubtedly a beauty when it represents any peculiar connection among the constituent parts of the thought; but where there is no such connection, it is a positive deformity, as above observed, because it makes a discordance between the thought and expression. For the same reason, we ought also to avoid every artificial opposition of words where there is none in the thought. This last, termed *verbal antithesis*, is studied by low writers, because of a certain degree of liveliness in it. They do not consider how incongruous it is, in a grave composition, to cheat the reader, and to make him expect a contrast in the thought, which upon examination is not found there.

A *light* wife doth make a *heavy* husband.

*Merchant of Venice.*

Here is a studied opposition in the words, not only without any opposition in the sense, but even where there is a very intimate connection, that of cause and effect; for it is the levity of the wife that torments the husband.

——————————Will maintain
Upon his *bad* life to make all this *good*.

*King Richard* II. *act* 1. *sc.* 2.

*Lucetta.* What, shall these papers lie like tell-tales here?
*Julia.* If thou respect them, best to take them up.
*Lucetta.* Nay, I was taken up for laying them down.

*Two Gentlemen of Verona, act* 1. *sc.* 3.

A fault directly opposite to that last mentioned, is to conjoin artificially words that express ideas opposed to each other in the thought. This is a fault too gross to be in common practice; and yet writers are guilty of it in some degree, when they conjoin by a copulative things transacted at different periods of time. Hence a want of neatness in the following expression.

The

The nobility too, whom the King had no means of retaining by ſuitable offices and preferments, had been ſeized with the general diſcontent, and unwarily threw themſelves into the ſcale which began already too much to preponderate. [*Hiſt. of G. Britain, vol.* 1. *p.* 250.

In periods of this kind, it appears more neat to expreſs the paſt time by the participle paſſive, thus:

The nobility having been ſeized with the general diſcontent, unwarily threw themſelves, *&c.* (or), The nobility, who had been ſeized, *&c.* unwarily threw themſelves, *&c.*

It is unpleaſant to find even a negative and affirmative propoſition connected by a copulative:

Nec excitatur claſſico miles truci,
Nec horret iratum mare;
Forumque vitat, et ſuperbo civium
Potentiorum limina. [*Horace, Epod* 2. *l.* 5.

If it appear not plain, and prove untrue,
Deadly divorce ſtep between me and you.
*Shakeſpear.*

In mirth and drollery it may have a good effect to connect verbally things that are oppoſite to each other in the thought. Example: Henry the Fourth of France introducing the Mareſchal Biron to ſome of his friends, "Here, Gentlemen, "ſays he, "is the Mareſchal Bi-"ron, whom I freely preſent both to my friends and "enemies."

This rule of ſtudying uniformity between the thought and expreſſion, may be extended to govern the conſtruction of ſentences or periods. A ſentence or period ought to expreſs one entire thought or mental propoſition; and different thoughts ought to be ſeparated in the expreſſion by placing them in different ſentences or periods. It is therefore offending againſt neatneſs, to crowd into one period entire thoughts requiring more than one; which is joining in language things that are ſeparated in reality. Of errors againſt this rule take the following examples.

Behold

Behold, thou art fair, my beloved, yea pleasant: also our bed is green.

Cæsar, describing the Suevi:

Atque in eam se consuetudinem adduxerunt, ut locis frigidissimis, neque vestitus, præter pelles, habeant quidquam, quarum propter exiguitatem magna est corporis pars aperta, et laventur in fluminibus.

*Commentaria, l. 4. prin.*

Burnet, in the history of his own times, giving Lord Sunderland's character, says,

His own notions were always good; but he was a man of great expence.

I have seen a woman's face break out in heats, as she has been talking against a great Lord, whom she had never seen in her life; and indeed never knew a party-woman that kept her beauty for a twelvemonth.

*Spectator*, N° 57.

Lord Bolingbroke, speaking of Strada:

I single him out among the moderns, because he had the foolish presumption to censure Tacitus, and to write history himself; and your Lordship will forgive this short excursion in honour of a favourite writer.

*Letters on history, vol. 1. let. 5.*

It seems to me, that in order to maintain the moral system of the world at a certain point, far below that of ideal perfection, (for we are made capable of conceiving what we are incapable of attaining), but however sufficient upon the whole to constitute a state easy and happy, or at the worst tolerable: I say, it seems to me, that the author of nature has thought fit to mingle from time to time, among the societies of men, a few, and but a few, of those on whom he is graciously pleased to bestow a larger proportion of the ethereal spirit than is given in the ordinary course of his providence to the sons of men.

*Bolingbroke, on the spirit of patriotism, let. 1.*

To crowd into a single member of a period different subjects, is still worse than to crowd them into one period. ——— Trojam,

——————Trojam, genitore Adamasto
Paupere (mansisserque utinam fortuna) profectus.
*Æneid.* iii. 614.

From conjunctions and disjunctions in general, we proceed to comparisons, which make one species of them, beginning with similies. And here also, the intimate connection that words have with their meaning requires, that in describing two resembling objects a resemblance in the two members of the period ought to be studied. To illustrate the rule in this case I shall give various examples of deviations from it; beginning with resemblances expressed in words that have no resemblance.

I have observed of late, the style of some great *ministers* very much to exceed that of any other *productions*.
*Letter to the Lord High Treasurer. Swift.*

This, instead of studying the resemblance of words in a period that expresses a comparison, is going out of one's road to avoid it. Instead of *productions*, which resemble not ministers great nor small, the proper word is *writers* or *authors*.

If men of eminence are exposed to censure on the one hand, they are as much liable to flattery on the other. If they receive reproaches which are not due to them, they likewise receive praises which they do not deserve.
*Spectator.*

Here the subject plainly demands uniformity in expression instead of variety; and therefore it is submitted, whether the period would not do better in the following manner:

If men of eminence be exposed to censure on the one hand, they are as much exposed to flattery on the other. If they receive reproaches that are not due, they likewise receive praises that are not due.

I cannot but fancy, however, that this imitation, which passes so currently with *other judgments*, must at some time or other have stuck a little with your *Lordship**.
[Better

* Letter concerning enthusiasm. Shaftesbury.

[Better thus]: I cannot but fancy, however, that this imitation, which paſſes ſo currently with *others*, muſt at ſome time or other have ſtuck a little with your *Lordſhip*.

A glutton or mere ſenſualiſt is as ridiculous as the other two characters. [*Shafteſbury, vol.* 1. *p.* 129.

They wiſely prefer *the generous efforts of good will and affection*, to the reluctant compliances *of ſuch as* obey by force. [*Remarks on the hiſtory of England, letter* 5. *Bolingbroke.*

Titus Livius, mentioning the people of Enna demanding the keys from the Roman garriſon, makes the governor ſay,

Quas ſimul tradiderimus, Carthaginienſium extemplo Enna erit, ſœdiuſque hic trucidabimur, quam Murgantiæ præſidium intertectum eſt. [*l.* 24. § 38.

Quintus Curtius, ſpeaking of Porus mounted on an elephant, and leading his army to battle:

Magnitudini Pori adjicere videbatur bellua qua vehebatur, tantum inter cæteras eminens, quanto aliis ipſe præſtabat. [*l.* 8. *cap.* 14.

It is a ſtill greater deviation from congruity, to affect not only variety in the words, but alſo in the conſtruction. Deſcribing Thermopylæ, Titus Livius ſays,

Id jugum, ſicut Apennini dorſo Italia dividitur, ita mediam Græciam diremit. [*l.* 36. § 15.

Speaking of Shakeſpear:

There may remain a ſuſpicion that we over-rate the greatneſs of his genius, in the ſame manner as bodies appear more gigantic on account of their being diſproportioned and miſhapen.

*Hiſtory of G. Britain, vol.* 1. *p.* 138.

This is ſtudying variety in a period where the beauty lies in uniformity. Better thus:

There may remain a ſuſpicion that we over-rate the greatneſs of his genius, in the ſame manner as we over-

rate

rate the greatneſs of bodies that are diſproportioned and miſhapen.

Next as to the length of the members that ſignify the reſembling objects To produce a reſemblance between ſuch members, they ought not only to be conſtructed in the ſame manner, but as nearly as poſſible be equal in length. By neglecting this circumſtance, the following example is defective in neatneſs.

As the performance of all other religious duties will not avail in the ſight of God, *without charity*; ſo neither will the diſcharge of all other miniſterial duties avail in the ſight of men, *without a faithful diſcharge of this principal duty.*

*Diſſertation upon parties, dedication.*

In the following paſſage, all the errors are accumulated that a period expreſſing a reſemblance can well admit.

Miniſters are anſwerable for every thing done to the prejudice of the conſtitution, in the ſame proportion as the preſervation of the conſtitution in its purity and vigour, or the perverting and weakening it, are of greater conſequence to the nation, than any other inſtances of good or bad government.

*Diſſertation upon parties, dedication.*

Next of a compariſon where things are oppoſed to each other. And here it muſt be obvious, that if reſemblance ought to be ſtudied in the words which expreſs two reſembling objects, there is equal reaſon for ſtudying oppoſition in the words which expreſs contraſted objects. This rule will be beſt illuſtrated by examples of deviation from it:

A friend exaggerates a man's virtues, an enemy inflames his crimes. [*Spectator*, N° 399.

Here the oppoſition in the thought is neglected in the words, which at firſt view ſeem to import, that the friend and the enemy are employ'd in different matters, without any relation to each other, whether of reſemblance or of oppoſition. And therefore the contraſt or oppoſition will be better marked by expreſſing the thought as follows.

A friend

A friend exaggerates a man's virtues, an enemy his crimes.

The following are examples of the ſame kind.

The wiſe man is happy when he gains his own approbation; the fool when he recommends himſelf to the applauſe of thoſe about him. [*Spectator*, N° 73.

Better:

The wiſe man is happy when he gains his own approbation; the fool when he gains that of others.

Sicut in frugibus pecudibuſque, non tantum ſemina ad ſervandum indolem valent, quantum terræ proprietas cœlique, ſub quo aluntur, mutat. [*Livy*, *l.* 38. § 17.

We proceed to a rule of a different kind. During the courſe of a period, the ſcene ought to be continued without variation: the changing from perſon to perſon, from ſubject to ſubject, or from perſon to ſubject, within the bounds of a ſingle period, diſtracts the mind, and affords no time for a ſolid impreſſion. I illuſtrate this rule by giving examples of deviations from it.

*Honos* alit artes, *omneſque* incenduntur ad ſtudia gloriâ; jacentque *ea* ſemper quæ apud quoſque improbantur. *Cicero*, *Tuſcul. queſt. l.* 1.

Speaking of the diſtemper contracted by Alexander bathing in the river Cydnus, and of the cure offered by Philip the phyſician:

Inter hæc à Parmenione fidiſſimo purpuratorum, literas *accipit*, quibus ei *denunciabat*, ne ſalutem ſuam Philippo committeret. [*Quintus Curtius*, *l.* 3. *cap.* 6

Hook, in his Roman hiſtory, ſpeaking of Eumenes, who had been beat down to the ground with a ſtone, ſays,

After a ſhort time *he* came to himſelf; and the next day, *they* put him on board his ſhip, *which* convey'd him firſt to Corinth, and thence to the iſland of Ægina.

I give another example of a period which is unpleaſant, even by a very ſlight deviation from the rule:

That ſort of inſtruction which is acquired by inculcating an important moral truth, &c. This

This expreſſion includes two perſons, one acquiring, and one inculcating; and the ſcene is changed without neceſſity. To avoid this blemiſh, the thought may be expreſſed thus:

That ſort of inſtruction which is afforded by inculcating, *&c.*

The bad effect of this change of perſon is remarkable in the following paſſage.

The *Britons*, daily haraſſed by cruel inroads from the Picts, were forced to call in the Saxons for their defence, *who* conſequently reduced the greateſt part of the iſland to their own power, drove the Britons into the moſt remote and mountainous parts, and *the reſt of the country*, in cuſtoms, religion, and language, became wholly Saxons. [*Letter to the Lord High Treaſurer. Swift.*

The following example is a change from ſubject to perſon.

*This proſtitution of praiſe* is not only a deceit upon the groſs of mankind, who take their notion of characters from the learned; but alſo *the better ſort* muſt by this means loſe ſome part at leaſt of that deſire of fame which is the incentive to generous actions, when they find it promiſcuouſly beſtowed on the meritorious and undeſerving. [*Guardian*, N° 4.

Even ſo ſlight a change as to vary the conſtruction in the ſame period, is unpleaſant:

Annibal luce prima, Balearibus levique alia armatura præmiſſa, tranſgreſſus flumen, ut quoſque traduxerat, ita in acie locabat; Gallos Hiſpanoſque equites prope ripam lævo in cornu adverſus Romanum equitatum; dextrum cornu Numidis equitibus datum. [*Tit. Liv. l.* 22. § 46.

Speaking of Hannibal's elephants drove back by the enemy upon his own army:

Eo magis ruere in ſuos belluæ, tantoque majorem ſtragem edere quam inter hoſtes ediderant, quanto acrius pavor conſternatam agit, quam inſidentis magiſtri imperio regitur. [*Liv. l.* 27. § 14.

This paſſage is alſo faulty in a different reſpect, that there is no reſemblance between the members of the expreſſion, though they import a ſimile.

The preſent head, which relates to the choice of materials, ſhall be cloſed with a rule concerning the uſe of copulatives. Longinus obſerves, that it animates a period to drop the copulatives; and he gives the following example from Xenophon.

Cloſing their ſhields together, they were puſh'd, they fought, they ſlew, they were ſlain.

*Treatiſe of the Sublime, cap.* 16.

The reaſon I take to be what follows. A continued ſound, if not loud, tends to lay us aſleep: an interrupted ſound rouſes and animates by its repeated impulſes: thus feet compoſed of ſyllables, being pronounced with a ſenſible interval between each, make more lively impreſſions than can be made by a continued ſound. A period of which the members are connected by copulatives, produceth an effect upon the mind approaching to that of a continued ſound; and therefore the ſuppreſſing of copulatives muſt animate a deſcription. It hath another good effect: the members of a period connected by proper copulatives, glide ſmoothly and gently along; and are a proof of ſedateneſs and leiſure in the ſpeaker: on the other hand, one in the hurry of paſſion, neglecting copulatives and other particles, expreſſes the principal images only; and for that reaſon, hurry or quick action is beſt expreſſed without copulatives:

Veni, vidi, vici.

——————————————Ite:
Ferte citi flammas, date vela, impellite remos.
*Æneid.* iv. 593.

Quis globus, O cives, caligine volvitur atra?
Ferte citi ferrum, date tela, ſcandite muros.
Hoſtis adeſt, eja. [*Æneid.* ix. 37.

In this view Longinus * juſtly compares copulatives in a period to ſtrait tying, which in a race obſtructs the freedom of motion.

It follows, that to multiply copulatives in the ſame period ought to be avoided: for if the laying aſide copulatives give force and livelineſs, a redundancy of them

* Treatiſe of the Sublime, cap. 16.

them muſt render the period languid. I appeal to the following inſtance, though there are not more than two copulatives.

Upon looking over the letters of my female correſpondents, I find ſeveral from women complaining of jealous huſbands; and at the ſame time proteſting their own innocence, and deſiring my advice upon this occaſion. [*Spectator*, N° 170.

I except the caſe where the words are intended to expreſs the coldneſs of the ſpeaker; for there the redundancy of copulatives is a beauty:

Dining one day at an alderman's in the city, Peter obſerved him expatiating after the manner of his brethren, in the praiſes of his ſirloin of beef. "Beef," ſaid the ſage magiſtrate, "is the king of meat: Beef "comprehends in it the quinteſſence of partridge, and "quail, and veniſon, and pheaſant, and plum-pudding, "and cuſtard." [*Tale of a Tub*, § 4.

And the author ſhews great delicacy of taſte in varying the expreſſion in the mouth of Peter, who is repreſented more animated:

"Bread," ſays he, "dear brothers, is the ſtaff of "life, in which bread is contained, *incluſive*, the quin-"teſſence of beef, mutton, veal, veniſon, partridge, "plum-pudding, and cuſtard."

Another caſe muſt alſo be excepted: copulatives have a good effect where the intention is to give an impreſſion of a great multitude conſiſting of many diviſions; for example: "The army was compoſed of Gre-"cians, and Carians, and Lycians, and Pamphylians, "and Phrygians." The reaſon is, that a leiſurely ſur-"vey, which is expreſſed by the copulatives, makes the parts appear more numerous than they would do by a haſty ſurvey: in the latter caſe the army appears in one groupe: in the former, we take as it were an accurate ſurvey of each nation, and of each diviſion *.

We proceed to the ſecond kind of beauty; which conſiſts in a due arrangement of the words or materials.



* See Demetrius Phalereus of Elocution, ſect. 63.

This branch of the ſubject is not leſs nice than extenſive; and I deſpair to put it in a clear light, except to thoſe who are well acquainted with the general principles that govern the ſtructure or compoſition of language.

In a thought, generally ſpeaking, there is at leaſt one capital object conſidered as acting or as ſuffering. This object is expreſſed by a ſubſtantive noun: its action is expreſſed by an active verb; and the thing affected by the action is expreſſed by another ſubſtantive noun: its ſuffering or paſſive ſtate is expreſſed by a paſſive verb; and the thing that acts upon it, by a ſubſtantive noun. Beſides theſe, which are the capital parts of a ſentence or period, there are generally under parts: each of the ſubſtantives as well as the verb, may be qualified: time, place, purpoſe, motive, means, inſtrument, and a thouſand other circumſtances, may be neceſſary to complete the thought. And in what manner theſe ſeveral parts are connected in the expreſſion, will appear from what follows.

In a complete thought or mental propoſition, all the members and parts are mutually related, ſome ſlightly, ſome more intimately. To put ſuch a thought in words, it is not ſufficient that the component ideas be clearly expreſſed: it is alſo neceſſary, that all the relations contained in the thought be expreſſed according to their different degrees of intimacy. To annex a certain meaning to a certain ſound or word, requires no art: the great nicety in all languages is, to expreſs the various relations that connect together the parts of the thought. Could we ſuppoſe this branch of language to be ſtill a ſecret, it would puzzle, I am apt to think, the acuteſt grammarian, to invent an expeditious method: and yet, by the guidance merely of nature, the rude and illiterate have been led to a method ſo perfect, as to appear not ſuſceptible of any improvement; and the next ſtep in our progreſs ſhall be to explain that method.

Words that import a relation, muſt be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe that do not. Subſtantives commonly imply no relation, ſuch as *animal*, *man*, *tree*, *river*. Adjectives, verbs, and adverbs, imply a relation: the adjective *good* muſt relate to ſome being poſſeſſed of that quality: the verb *write* muſt be applied to ſome perſon who writes;

writes; and the adverbs *moderately*, *diligently*, have plainly a reference to some action which they modify. When a relative word is introduced, it must be signified by the expression to what word it relates, without which the sense cannot be complete. For answering that purpose, I observe in Greek and Latin two different methods: adjectives are declined as well as substantives; and declension serves to ascertain the connection that is between them: if the word that expresses the subject be, for example, in the nominative case, so also must the word be that expresses its quality; example, *vir bonus*: again, verbs are related, on the one hand, to the agent, and, on the other, to the subject upon which the action is exerted; and a contrivance similar to that now mentioned, serves to express that double relation; the nominative case is appropriated to the agent, the accusative to the passive subject; and the verb is put in the first, second, or third person, to intimate its connection with the word that signifies the agent: examples, *Ego amo Tullium*; *tu amas Sempronium*; *Brutus amat Portiam*. The other method is by juxtaposition, which is necessary with respect to such words only as are not declined, adverbs, for example, articles, prepositions, and conjunctions. In the English language there are few declensions; and therefore juxtaposition is our chief resource: adjectives accompany their substantives*; an adverb accompanies the word it qualifies; and the verb occupies the middle place between the active and passive subjects to which it relates.

It must be obvious, that those terms which have nothing relative in their signification, cannot be connected in so easy a manner. When two substantives happen to



* Taking advantage of a declension to separate an adjective from its substantive, as is commonly practised in Latin, though it detract not from perspicuity, is certainly less neat than the English method of juxtaposition. Contiguity is more expressive of an intimate relation, than resemblance merely of the final syllables. Latin indeed has evidently the advantage when the adjective and substantive happen to be connected by contiguity, as well as by resemblance of the final syllables.

be connected, as cauſe and effect, as principal and acceſſory, or in any other manner, ſuch connection cannot be expreſſed by contiguity ſolely; for words muſt often in a period be placed together which are not thus related: the relation between ſubſtantives, therefore, cannot otherwiſe be expreſſed but by particles denoting the relation. Latin indeed and Greek, by their declenſions, go a certain length to expreſs ſuch relations, without the aid of particles: the relation of property, for example, between Cæſar and his horſe, is expreſſed by putting the latter in the nominative caſe, the former in the genitive; *equus Cæſaris:* the ſame is alſo expreſſed in Engliſh without the aid of a particle, *Cæſar's horſe.* But in other inſtances, declenſions not being uſed in the Engliſh language, relations of this kind are commonly expreſſed by prepoſitions. Examples: That wine came *from* Cyprus. He is going *to* Paris. The ſun is *below* the horizon.

This form of connecting by prepoſitions, is not confined to ſubſtantives. Qualities, attributes, manner of exiſting or acting, and all other circumſtances, may in the ſame manner be connected with the ſubſtantives to which they relate. This is done artificially by converting the circumſtance into a ſubſtantive, in which condition it is qualified to be connected with the principal ſubject by a prepoſition, in the manner above deſcrib'd: for example, the adjective *wiſe* being converted into the ſubſtantive *wiſdom*, gives opportunity for the expreſſion "a man *of* wiſdom," inſtead of the more ſimple expreſſion, *a wiſe man:* this variety in the expreſſion, enriches language. I obſerve, beſide, that the uſing a prepoſition in this caſe, is not always a matter of choice: it is indiſpenſable with reſpect to every circumſtance that cannot be expreſſed by a ſingle adjective or adverb.

To pave the way for the rules of arrangement, one other preliminary is neceſſary; which is, to explain the difference between a natural ſtyle, and that where tranſpoſition or inverſion prevails. There are, it is true, no preciſe boundaries between them, for they run into each other like the ſhades of different colours: no perſon however is at a loſs to diſtinguiſh them in their extremes:

and

and it is neceſſary to make the diſtinction; becauſe though ſome of the rules I ſhall have occaſion to mention are common to both, yet each hath rules peculiar to itſelf. In a natural ſtyle, relative words are by juxtapoſition connected with thoſe to which they relate, going before or after, according to the peculiar genius of the language. Again, a circumſtance connected by a prepoſition, follows naturally the word with which it is connected. But this arrangement may be varied, when a different order is more beautiful: a circumſtance may be placed before the word with which it is connected by a prepoſition; and may be interjected even between a relative word and that to which it relates. When ſuch liberties are frequently taken, the ſtyle becomes inverted or tranſpoſed.

But as the liberty of inverſion is a capital point in handling the preſent ſubject, it will be neceſſary to examine it more narrowly, and in particular to trace the ſeveral degrees in which an inverted ſtyle recedes more and more from that which is natural. And firſt, as to the placing a circumſtance before the word with which it is connected, I obſerve, that it is the eaſieſt of all inverſion, even ſo eaſy as to be conſiſtent with a ſtyle that is properly termed natural: witneſs the following examples.

In the ſincerity of my heart, I profeſs, *&c.*

By our own ill management, we are brought to ſo low an ebb of wealth and credit, that, *&c.*

On Thurſday morning there was little or nothing tranſacted in Change-alley.

At St Bride's church in Fleet-ſtreet, Mr Woolſton, (who writ againſt the miracles of our Saviour), in the utmoſt terrors of conſcience, made a public recantation.

The interjecting a circumſtance between a relative word and that to which it relates, is more properly termed inverſion; becauſe, by a disjunction of words intimately connected, it recedes farther from a natural ſtyle. But this licence has alſo degrees; for the diſjunction is more violent in ſome caſes than in others. And to give a juſt notion of the difference, there is a

neceſſity to enter a little more into an abſtract ſubject, than would otherwiſe be my inclination.

In nature, though a ſubject cannot exiſt without its qualities, nor a quality without a ſubject; yet in our conception of theſe, a material difference may be remarked. I cannot conceive a quality but as belonging to ſome ſubject: it makes indeed a part of the idea which is formed of the ſubject. But the oppoſite holds not; for though I cannot form a conception of a ſubject devoid of all qualities, a partial conception may however be formed of it, laying aſide or abſtracting from any particular quality: I can, for example, form the idea of a fine Arabian horſe without regard to his colour, or of a white horſe without regard to his ſize. Such partial conception of a ſubject, is ſtill more eaſy with reſpect to action or motion; which is an occaſional attribute only, and has not the ſame permanency with colour or figure: I cannot form an idea of motion independent of a body; but there is nothing more eaſy than to form an idea of a body at reſt. Hence it appears, that the degree of inverſion depends greatly on the order in which the related words are placed: when a ſubſtantive occupies the firſt place, the idea it ſuggeſts muſt ſubſiſt in the mind at leaſt for a moment, independent of the relative words afterward introduced; and that moment may without difficulty be prolonged by interjecting a circumſtance between the ſubſtantive and its connections. This liberty therefore, however frequent, will ſcarce alone be ſufficient to denominate a ſtyle inverted. The caſe is very different, where the word that occupies the firſt place denotes a quality or an action; for as theſe cannot be conceived without a ſubject, they cannot without greater violence be ſeparated from the ſubject that follows; and for that reaſon, every ſuch ſeparation by means of an interjected circumſtance belongs to an inverted ſtyle.

To illuſtrate this doctrine examples are neceſſary, and I ſhall begin with thoſe where the word firſt introduced does not imply a relation:

——————Nor Eve to iterate
Her former treſpaſs fear'd.

——————Hunger and thirſt at once,

Powerful

Powerful perſuaders, quicken'd at the ſcent
Of that alluring fruit, urg'd me ſo keen.

Moon that now meet'ſt the orient ſun, now fli'ſt
With the fix'd ſtars, fix'd in their orb that flies,
And ye five other wand'ring fires that move
In myſtic dance not without ſong, reſound
His praiſe.

In the following examples, where the word firſt introduced imports a relation, the disjunction will be found more violent.

Of man's firſt diſobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whoſe mortal taſte
Brought death into the world, and all our woe,
With loſs of Eden, till one greater man
Reſtore us, and regain the bliſsful ſeat,
Sing heav'nly muſe.

——— ——— Upon the firm opacous globe
Of this round world, whoſe firſt convex divides
The luminous inferior orbs, inclos'd
From chaos and th' inroad of darkneſs old,
Satan alighted walks.

——————— On a ſudden open fly,
With impetuous recoil and jarring ſound,
Th' infernal doors.

——————————— Wherein remain'd,
For what could elſe? to our almighty foe
Clear victory, to our part loſs and rout.

——————— Forth ruſh'd, with whirlwind ſound,
The chariot of paternal Deity.

Language would have no great power, were it confined to the natural order of ideas: I ſhall ſoon have opportunity to make it evident, that by inverſion, a thouſand beauties may be compaſſed, which muſt be relinquiſhed in a natural arrangement. In the mean time, it ought not to eſcape obſervation, that the mind of man is happily ſo conſtituted as to reliſh inverſion, though in one reſpect unnatural; and to reliſh it ſo much, as in many caſes to admit even ſuch words to be ſeparated as are the moſt intimately connected. It can ſcarce be ſaid that inverſion has any limits; though I may venture

to pronounce, that the disjunction of articles, conjunctions, or prepositions, from the words to which they belong, has very seldom a good effect: the following example with relation to a preposition, is perhaps as tolerable as any of the kind.

He would neither separate *from*, nor act against *them*.

I give notice to the reader, that I am now ready to enter upon the rules of arrangement; beginning with a natural style, and proceeding gradually to what is the most inverted. And in the arrangement of a period, as well as in a right choice of words, the first and great object being perspicuity, the rule above laid down, that perspicuity ought not to be sacrificed to any other beauty, holds equally in both. Ambiguities occasioned by a wrong arrangement are of two sorts; one where the arrangement leads to a wrong sense, and one where the sense is left doubtful. The first, being the more culpable, shall take the lead, beginning with examples of words put in a wrong place.

How much the imagination of such a presence must exalt a genius, we may observe *merely* from the influence which an ordinary presence has over men.

*Characteristics, vol.* 1. *p.* 7.

This arrangement leads to a wrong sense: the adverb *merely* seems by its position to affect the preceding word; whereas it is intended to affect the following words, *an ordinary presence*; and therefore the arrangement ought to be thus:

How much the imagination of such a presence must exalt a genius, we may observe from the influence which an ordinary presence merely has over men. [Or better],

——which even an ordinary presence has over men.

The time of the election of a poet-laureat being now at hand, it may be proper to give some account of the rites and ceremonies antiently used at that solemnity, and *only* discontinued through the neglect and degeneracy of later times. [*Guardian.*

The term *only* is intended to qualify the noun *degeneracy*, and not the participle *discontinued*; and therefore the arrangement ought to be as follows:

—— —— and

——————— and diſcontinued through the neglect and degeneracy only, of later times.

Sixtus the Fourth was, if I miſtake not, a great collector of books at leaſt.

*Letters on hiſtory, vol.* 1. *let.* 6. *Bolingbroke.*

The expreſſion here leads evidently to a wrong ſenſe: the adverb *at leaſt*, ought not to be connected with the ſubſtantive *books*, but with *collector*, thus:

Sixtus the Fourth was a great collector at leaſt, of books.

Speaking of Lewis XIV.

If he was not the greateſt king, he was the beſt actor of majeſty at leaſt, that ever filled a throne.

*Ibid. letter* 7.

Better thus:

If he was not the greateſt king, he was at leaſt the beſt actor of majeſty, *&c.*

This arrangement removes the wrong ſenſe occaſioned by the juxtapoſition of *majeſty* and *at leaſt.*

The following examples are of a wrong arrangement of members.

I have confined myſelf to thoſe methods for the advancement of piety, which are in the power of a prince limited like ours by a ſtrict execution of the laws.

*A project for the advancement of religion. Swift.*

The ſtructure of this period leads to a meaning which is not the author's, *viz.* power limited by a ſtrict execution of the laws. That wrong ſenſe is removed by the following arrangement:

I have confined myſelf to thoſe methods for the advancement of piety, which, by a ſtrict execution of the laws, are in the power of a prince limited like ours.

This morning, when one of Lady Lizard's daughters was looking over ſome hoods and ribands brought by her tirewoman, with great care and diligence, I employ'd no leſs in examining the box which contained them.

*Guardian*, N° 4.

The

The wrong ſenſe occaſioned by this arrangement, may be eaſily prevented by varying it thus:

This morning when, with great care and diligence, one of Lady Lizard's daughters was looking over ſome hoods and ribands, *&c.*

A great ſtone that I happened to find after a long ſearch by the ſea-ſhore, ſerved me for an anchor.
*Gulliver's Travels, part* 1. *chap.* 8.

One would think that the ſearch was confined to the ſea-ſhore; but as the meaning is, that the great ſtone was found by the ſea ſhore, the period ought to be arranged thus:

A great ſtone, that, after a long ſearch, I happened to find by the ſea-ſhore, ſerved me for an anchor.

Next of a wrong arrangement where the ſenſe is left doubtful; beginning, as in the former ſort, with examples of wrong arrangement of words in a member:

Theſe forms of converſation *by degrees* multiplied and grew troubleſome. [*Spectator*, N° 119.

Here it is left doubtful whether the modification *by degrees* relate to the preceding member or to what follows: it ſhould be,

Theſe forms of converſation multiplied by degrees.

Nor does this falſe modeſty expoſe us *only* to ſuch actions as are indiſcreet, but very often to ſuch as are highly criminal. [*Spectator*, N° 458.

The ambiguity is removed by the following arrangement:

Nor does this falſe modeſty expoſe us to ſuch actions only as are indiſcreet, *&c.*

The empire of Blefuſcu is an iſland ſituated to the north eaſt ſide of Lilliput, from whence it is parted *only* by a channel of 800 yards wide.
*Gulliver's Travels, part* 1. *chap.* 5.

The ambiguity may be removed thus:

——— from whence it is parted by a channel of 800 yards wide only.

In

In the following examples the ſenſe is left doubtful by wrong arrangement of members.

The miniſter who grows leſs by his elevation, *like a little ſtatue placed on a mighty pedeſtal*, will always have his jealouſy ſtrong about him.

*Diſſertation upon parties, dedication. Bolingbroke.*

Here, ſo far as can be gathered from the arrangement, it is doubtful, whether the object introduced by way of ſimile, relate to what goes before or to what follows: the ambiguity is removed by the following arrangement:

The miniſter who, like a little ſtatue placed on a mighty pedeſtal, grows leſs by his elevation, will always, *&c.*

Since this is too much to aſk of freemen, nay of ſlaves, *if his expectation be not anſwered*, ſhall he form a laſting diviſion upon ſuch tranſient motives? *Ibid.*

Better thus:

Since this is too much to aſk of freemen, nay of ſlaves, ſhall he, if his expectations be not anſwered, form, *&c.*

Speaking of the ſuperſtitious practice of locking up the room where a perſon of diſtinction dies:

The knight, ſeeing his habitation reduced to ſo ſmall a compaſs, and himſelf in a manner ſhut out of his own houſe, *upon the death of his mother*, ordered all the apartments to be flung open, and exorciſed by his chaplain. [*Spectator*, N° 110.

Better thus:

The knight ſeeing his habitation reduced to ſo ſmall a compaſs, and himſelf in a manner ſhut out of his own houſe, ordered, upon the death of his mother, all the apartments to be flung open.

Speaking of ſome indecencies in converſation:

As it is impoſſible for ſuch an irrational way of converſation to laſt long among a people that make any profeſſion of religion, or ſhow of modeſty, *if the country-gentlemen get into it*, they will certainly be left in the lurch. [*Spectator*, N° 119.

The ambiguity vaniſhes in the following arrangement:

the

——— the country gentlemen, if they get into it, will certainly be left in the lurch.

Speaking of a discovery in natural philosophy, that colour is not a quality of matter:

As this is a truth which has been proved inconteſtably by many modern philoſophers, and is indeed one of the fineſt ſpeculations in that ſcience, *if the Engliſh reader would ſee the notion explained at large*, he may find it in the eighth chapter of the ſecond book of Mr Lock's eſſay on human underſtanding. [*Spectator*, N° 413.

Better thus:

As this is a truth, &c. the Engliſh reader, if he would ſee the notion explained at large, may find it, &c.

A woman ſeldom aſks advice before ſhe has bought her wedding-cloaths. When ſhe has made her own choice, *for form's ſake* ſhe ſends a *conge d'elire* to her friends.

*Ibid.* N° 475.

Better thus:

——— ſhe ſends, for form's ſake, a *conge d'elire* to her friends.

And ſince it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a perpetual intercourſe of buying and ſelling, and dealing upon credit, *where fraud is permitted or connived at, or hath no law to puniſh it*, the honeſt dealer is always undone, and the knave gets the advantage.

*Gulliver's Travels, part* 1. *chap.* 6.

Better thus:

And ſince it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a perpetual intercourſe of buying and ſelling, and dealing upon credit, the honeſt dealer, where fraud is permitted or connived at, or hath no law to puniſh it, is always undone, and the knave gets the advantage.

From theſe examples, the following obſervation will occur, that a circumſtance ought never to be placed between two capital members of a period; for by ſuch ſituation it muſt always be doubtful, ſo far as we gather from the arrangement, to which of the two members it belongs: where it is interjected, as it ought to be, between parts of the member to which it belongs, the ambiguity

ambiguity is removed, and the capital members are kept diſtinct, which is a great beauty in compoſition. In general, to preſerve members diſtinct that ſignify things diſtinguiſhed in the thought, the beſt method is, to place firſt in the conſequent member, ſome word that cannot connect with what precedes it.

If by any one it ſhall be thought, that the objections here are too ſcrupulous, and that the defect of perſpicuity is eaſily ſupplied by accurate punctuation; the anſwer is, That punctuation may remove an ambiguity, but will never produce that peculiar beauty which is perceived when the ſenſe comes out clearly and diſtinctly by means of a happy arrangement. Such influence has this beauty, that by a natural tranſition of perception, it is communicated to the very ſound of the words, ſo as in appearance to improve the muſic of the period. But as this curious ſubject comes in more properly afterward, it is ſufficient at preſent to appeal to experience, that a period ſo arranged as to bring out the ſenſe clear, ſeems always more muſical than where the ſenſe is left in any degree doubtful.

A rule deſervedly occupying the ſecond place, is, That words expreſſing things connected in the thought, ought to be placed as near together as poſſible. This rule is derived immediately from human nature, in which there is diſcovered a remarkable propenſity to place together things that are in any manner connected*: where things are arranged according to their connections, we have a ſenſe of order; otherwiſe we have a ſenſe of diſorder, as of things placed by chance: and we naturally place words in the ſame order in which we would place the things they ſignify. The bad effect of a violent ſeparation of words or members thus intimately connected, will appear from the following examples.

For the Engliſh are naturally fanciful, and very often diſpoſed, by that gloominess and melancholy of temper which is ſo frequent in our nation, to many wild notions and viſions, to which others are not ſo liable.

*Spectator*, N° 419.

Here the verb or aſſertion is, by a pretty long circumſtance,

* See chap. 1.

ſtance, violently ſeparated from the ſubject to which it refers: this makes a harſh arrangement; the leſs excuſable that the fault is eaſily prevented by placing the circumſtance before the verb or aſſertion, after the following manner:

For the Engliſh are naturally fanciful, and, by that gloominess and melancholy of temper which is ſo frequent in our nation, are often diſpoſed to many wild notions, &c.

For as no mortal author, in the ordinary fate and viciſſitude of things, knows to what uſe his works may, ſome time or other, be apply'd, &c. [*Spectator*, N° 85.

Better thus:

For as, in the ordinary fate and viciſſitude of things, no mortal author knows to what uſe, ſome time or other, his works may be apply'd, &c.

From whence we may date likewiſe the rivalſhip of the houſe of France, for we may reckon that of the Valois and that of Bourbon as one upon this occaſion, and the houſe of Auſtria, that continues at this day, and has oft coſt ſo much blood and ſo much treaſure in the courſe of it.

*Letters on hiſtory, vol. 1. let. 6. Bolingbroke.*

It cannot be impertinent or ridiculous therefore in ſuch a country, whatever it might be in the Abbot of St Real's, which was Savoy I think; or in Peru, under the Incas, where Garcilaſſo de la Vega ſays it was lawful for none but the nobility to ſtudy — for men of all degrees to inſtruct themſelves, in thoſe affairs wherein they may be actors, or judges of thoſe that act, or controllers of thoſe that judge.

*Letters on hiſtory, vol. 1. let. 5. Bolingbroke.*

If Scipio, who was naturally given to women, for which anecdote we have, if I miſtake not, the authority of Polybius, as well as ſome verſes of Nevius preſerved by Aulus Gellius, had been educated by Olympias at the court of Philip, it is improbable that he would have reſtored the beautiful Spaniard. [*Ibid. let 3.*

If any one have a curioſity for more ſpecimens of this kind, they will be found without number in the works of the ſame author. A pro-

A pronoun, which saves the naming a person or thing a second time, ought to be placed as near as possible to the name of that person or thing. This is a branch of the foregoing rule; and with the reason there given, another concurs, *viz.* That if other ideas intervene, it is difficult to recal the person or thing by reference:

If I had leave to print the Latin letters transmitted to me from foreign parts, they would fill a volume, and be a full defence against all that Mr Partridge, or his accomplices of the Portugal inquisition, will be ever able to object; *who*, by the way, are the only enemies my predictions have ever met with at home or abroad.

Better thus:

——— and be a full defence against all that can be objected by Mr Partridge, or his accomplices of the Portugal inquisition; who, by the way, are, *&c.*

There being a round million of creatures in human figure, throughout this kingdom, *whose* whole subsistence, *&c.* [*A modest proposal*, &c. *Swift.*

Better,

There being, throughout this kingdom, a round million of creatures in human figure, whose whole subsistence, *&c.*

Tom is a lively impudent clown, and has wit enough to have made him a pleasant companion, had *it* been polished and rectified by good manners.

*Guardian*, N° 162.

It is the custom of the Mahometans, if they see any printed or written paper upon the ground, to take it up, and lay it aside carefully, as not knowing but it may contain some piece of their Alcoran. [*Spectator*, N° 85.

The arrangement here leads to a wrong sense, as if the ground were taken up, not the paper.

——— Better thus:

It is the custom of the Mahometans, if they see upon the ground any printed or written paper, to take it up, *&c.*

The following rule depends on the communication of

of emotions to related objects; a principle in human nature that hath an extenſive operation: and we find this operation, even where the objects are not otherwiſe related than by juxtapoſition of the words that expreſs them. Hence, to elevate or depreſs an object, one method is, to join it in the expreſſion with another that is naturally high or low: witneſs the following ſpeech of Eumenes to the Roman ſenate.

Cauſam veniendi ſibi Romam fuiſſe, præter cupiditatem viſendi *deos homineſque*, quorum beneficio in ea fortuna eſſet, ſupra quam ne optare quidem auderet, etiam ut coram moneret ſenatum ut Perſei conatus obviam iret.

*Livy, l. 42. cap. 11.*

To join the Romans with the gods in the ſame enunciation, is an artful ſtroke of flattery, becauſe it tacitly puts them on a level. On the other hand, when the purpoſe is to degrade or vilify an object, this is done ſucceſsfully by ranking it with one that is really low:

I hope to have this entertainment in a readineſs for the next winter; and doubt not but it will pleaſe more than the opera or puppet ſhow. [*Spectator*, N° 28.

Manifold have been the judgements which Heaven from time to time, for the chaſtiſement of a ſinful people, has inflicted upon whole nations. For when the degeneracy becomes common, 'tis but juſt the puniſhment ſhould be general. Of this kind, in our own unfortunate country, was that deſtructive peſtilence, whoſe mortality was ſo fatal as to ſweep away, if Sir William Petty may be believed, five millions of Chriſtian ſouls, beſides women and Jews.

*God's revenge againſt punning. Arbuthnot.*

Such alſo was that dreadful conflagration enſuing in this famous metropolis of London, which conſumed, according to the computation of Sir Samuel Moreland, 100,000 houſes, not to mention churches and ſtables.

*Ibid.*

But on condition it might paſs into a law. I would gladly exempt both lawyers of all ages, ſubaltern and field officers, young heirs, dancing-maſters, pickpockets, and players

*An infallible Octave to pay the public debts. Swift.*

Sooner

Sooner let earth, air, sea, to chaos fall,
Men, monkeys, lap-dogs, parrots, perish all.
*Rape of the Lock.*

Circumstances in a period resemble small stones in a building, employ'd to fill up vacuities among those of a larger size. In the arrangement of a period, such under-parts crowded together make a poor figure; and never are graceful but when interspersed among the capital parts. I illustrate this rule by the following examples.

It is likewise urged, that there are, by computation, in this kingdom, above 10,000 parsons, whose revenues, added to those of my Lords the bishops, would suffice to maintain, *&c.*

*Argument against abolishing Christianity. Swift.*

Here two circumstances, *viz. by computation* and *in this kingdom*, are crowded together unnecessarily: they make a better appearance separated in the following manner:

It is likewise urged, that in this kingdom there are, by computation, above 10,000 parsons. *&c.*

If there be room for a choice, the sooner a circumstance is introduced, the better; because circumstances are proper for that coolness of mind, with which we begin a period as well as a volume: in the progress, the mind warms, and has a greater relish for matters of importance. When a circumstance is placed at the beginning of the period, or near the beginning, the transition from it to the principal subject is agreeable: it is like ascending, or mounting upward. On the other hand, to place it late in the period has a bad effect; for after being engaged in the principal subject, one is with reluctance brought down to give attention to a circumstance. Hence evidently the preference of the following arrangement,

Whether in any country a choice altogether unexceptionable has been made, seems doubtful.

before this other,

Whether a choice altogether unexceptionable has in any country been made, *&c.*

For

For this reason the following period is exceptionable in point of arrangement.

I have considered formerly, with a good deal of attention, the subject upon which you command me to communicate my thoughts to you.

*Bolingbroke of the study of history, letter* 1.

which, with a slight alteration, may be improved thus:

I have formerly, with a good deal of attention, considered the subject, &c.

Swift, speaking of a virtuous and learned education:

And although they may be, and too often are drawn, by the temptations of youth, and the opportunities of a large fortune, into some irregularities, *when they come forward into the great world*; it is ever with reluctance and compunction of mind, because their bias to virtue still continues. [*The Intelligencer*, N° 9.

Better,

And although, *when they come forward into the great world*, they may be, and too often, &c.

The bad effect of placing a circumstance last or late in a period, will appear from the following examples.

Let us endeavour to establish to ourselves an interest in him who holds the reins of the whole creation in his hand. [*Spectator*, N° 12.

Better thus:

Let us endeavour to establish to ourselves an interest in him, who, in his hand, holds the reins of the whole creation.

Virgil, who has cast the whole system of Platonic philosophy, so far as it relates to the soul of man, into beautiful allegories, *in the sixth book of his Æneid*, gives us the punishment, &c. [*Spectator*, N° 90.

Better thus:

Virgil, who, in the sixth book of his Æneid, has cast, &c.

And Philip the Fourth was obliged at last to conclude a peace, on terms repugnant to his inclination, to that of

of his people, to the intereſt of Spain, and to that of all Europe, in the Pyrenean treaty.

*Letters on hiſtory, vol. 1. letter 6. Bolingbroke.*

Better thus:

And at laſt, in the Pyrenean treaty, Philip the Fourth was obliged to conclude a peace, *&c.*

In arranging a period, it is of importance to determine in what part of it a word makes the greateſt figure, whether at the beginning, during the courſe, or at the cloſe. The breaking ſilence rouſes the attention, and prepares for a deep impreſſion at the beginning: the beginning, however, muſt yield to the cloſe; which being ſucceeded by a pauſe, affords time for a word to make its deepeſt impreſſion *. Hence the following rule, That to give the utmoſt force to a period, it ought if poſſible to be cloſed with that word which makes the greateſt figure. The opportunity of a pauſe ſhould not be thrown away upon acceſſories, but reſerved for the principal object, in order that it may make a full impreſſion: which is an additional reaſon againſt cloſing a period with a circumſtance. There are however periods that admit not this ſtructure; and in that caſe, the capital word ought, if poſſible, to be placed in the front, which next to the cloſe is the moſt advantageous for making an impreſſion. Hence, in directing our diſcourſe to a man of figure, we ought to begin with his name; and one will be ſenſible of a degradation, when this rule is neglected, as it frequently is for the ſake of verſe. I give the following examples.

Integer vitæ, ſceleriſque purus,
Non eget Mauri jaculis, neque arcu,
Nec venenatis gravidâ ſagittis,
Fuſce, pharetrâ. [*Horat. Carm. l. 1. ode 22.*

Je crains Dieu, cher Abner, et n'ai point d'autre crainte.

In

* To give force or elevation to a period, it ought to begin and end with a long ſyllable. For a long ſyllable makes naturally the ſtrongeſt impreſſion; and of all the ſyllables in a period, we are chiefly moved with the firſt and laſt. [*Demetrius Phalereus of Elocution, ſect. 39*

In theſe examples, the name of the perſon addreſſed to, makes a mean figure, being like a circumſtance ſlipt into a corner. That this criticiſm is well founded, we need no other proof than Addiſon's tranſlation of the laſt example:

O Abner! I fear my God, and I fear none but him.
*Guardian*, N° 117.

O father, what intends thy hand, ſhe cry'd,
Againſt thy only ſon? What fury, O ſon,
Poſſeſſes thee to bend that mortal dart
Againſt thy father's head?
*Paradiſe loſt*, *book* 2. *l* 727.

Every one muſt be ſenſible of a dignity in the invocation at the beginning, which is not attained by that in the middle. I mean not however to cenſure this paſſage: on the contrary, it appears beautiful, by diſtinguiſhing the reſpect that is due to a father from that which is due to a ſon.

The ſubſtance of what is ſaid in this and the foregoing ſection, upon the method of arranging words in a period, ſo as to make the deepeſt impreſſion with reſpect to ſound as well as ſignification, is comprehended in the following obſervation. That order of words in a period will always be the moſt agreeable, where, without obſcuring the ſenſe, the moſt important images, the moſt ſonorous words, and the longeſt members, bring up the rear.

Hitherto of arranging ſingle words, ſingle members, and ſingle circumſtances. But the enumeration of many particulars in the ſame period is often neceſſary; and the queſtion is, In what order they ſhould be placed. It does not ſeem eaſy, at firſt view, to bring a ſubject apparently too looſe under any general rule: but luckily, reflecting upon what is ſaid in the firſt chapter about order, we find rules laid down to our hand, which leave us no taſk but that of applying them to the preſent queſtion. And, firſt, with reſpect to the enumerating a number of particulars of equal rank, it is laid down in the place quoted, that as there is no cauſe for preferring any one before the reſt, it is indifferent to the mind in what order they be viewed. And it is only neceſſa-

ry

ry to be added here, that for the ſame reaſon, it is indifferent in what order they be named. 2dly, If a number of objects of the ſame kind, differing only in ſize, are to be ranged along a ſtraight line, the moſt agreeable order to the eye is that of an increaſing ſeries: in ſurveying a number of ſuch objects, beginning at the leaſt, and proceeding to greater and greater, the mind ſwells gradually with the ſucceſſive objects, and in its progreſs has a very ſenſible pleaſure. Preciſely to the ſame reaſon, the words expreſſive of ſuch objects ought to be placed in the ſame order. The beauty of this figure, which may be termed *a climax in ſenſe*, has eſcaped Lord Bolingbroke in the firſt member of the following period:

Let but one great, brave, diſintereſted, active man ariſe, and he will be received, followed, and almoſt adored.

The following arrangement has ſenſibly a better effect:

Let but one brave, great, active, diſintereſted man ariſe, *&c.*

Whether the ſame rule ought to be followed in enumerating men of different ranks, ſeems doubtful: on the one hand, a number of perſons preſented to the eye in form of an increaſing ſeries, is undoubtedly the moſt agreeable order: on the other hand, in every liſt of names, we ſet the perſon of the greateſt dignity at the top, and deſcend gradually through his inferiors. Where the purpoſe is to honour the perſons named according to their rank, the latter order ought to be followed; but every one who regards himſelf only, or his reader, will chuſe the former order. 3dly, As the ſenſe of order directs the eye to deſcend from the principal to its greateſt acceſſory, and from the whole to its greateſt part, and in the ſame order through all the parts and acceſſories till we arrive at the minuteſt; the ſame order ought to be followed in the enumeration of ſuch particulars. I ſhall give one familiar example. Talking of the parts of a column, *viz.* the baſe, the ſhaft, the capital, theſe are capable of ſix different arrangements, and the queſtion is, Which is the beſt? When we have in view the erection of a column, we are naturally

turally led to expreſs the parts in the order above mentioned; which at the ſame time is agreeable by mounting upward. But conſidering the column as it ſtands, without reference to its erection, the ſenſe of order, as obſerved above, requires the chief part to be named firſt: for that reaſon we begin with the ſhaft; and the baſe comes next in order, that we may aſcend from it to the capital. Laſtly, In tracing the particulars of any natural operation, order requires that we follow the courſe of nature: hiſtorical facts are related in the order of time: we begin at the founder of a family, and proceed from him to his deſcendents: but in deſcribing a lofty oak, we begin with the trunk, and aſcend to the branches.

When force and liveline ſs of expreſſion are demanded, the rule is, to ſuſpend the thought as long as poſſible, and to bring it out full and entire at the cloſe: which cannot be done but by inverting the natural arrangement. By introducing a word or member before its time, our curioſity is raiſed about what is to follow; and it is agreeable to have our curioſity gratified at the cloſe of the period: ſuch arrangement produceth on the mind an effect ſimilar to a ſtroke exerted upon the body by the whole collected force of the agent. On the other hand, where a period is ſo conſtructed as to admit more than one complete cloſe in the ſenſe, the curioſity of the reader is exhauſted at the firſt cloſe, and what follows appears languid or ſuperfluous: his diſappointment contributes alſo to that appearance, when he finds, contrary to expectation, that the period is not yet finiſhed. Cicero, and after him Quintilian, recommend the verb to the laſt place. This method evidently tends to ſuſpend the ſenſe till the cloſe of the period; for without the verb the ſenſe cannot be complete: and when the verb happens to be the capital word, which is frequently the caſe, it ought at any rate to be put laſt, according to another rule, above laid down. I proceed as uſual to illuſtrate this rule by examples. The following period is placed in its natural order.

We e inſtruction an eſſential circumſtance in epic poetry, I doubt whether a ſingle inſtance could be given of this ſpecies of compoſition, in any language.

The

The period thus arranged admits a full close upon the word *composition*; after which it goes on languidly, and closes without force. This blemish will be avoided by the following arrangement:

Were instructions an essential circumstance in epic poetry, I doubt whether, in any language, a single instance could be given of this species of composition.

Some of our most eminent divines have made use of this Platonic notion, as far as it regards the subsistence of our passions after death, with great beauty and strength of reason. [*Spectator*, N° 90.

Better thus:

Some of our most eminent divines have, with great beauty and strength of reason, made use of this Platonic notion, &c.

Men of the best sense have been touched, more or less, with these groundless horrors and presages of futurity, upon surveying the most indifferent works of nature. [*Spectator*, N° 505.

Better,

Upon surveying the most indifferent works of nature, men of the best sense, &c.

She soon informed him of the place he was in, which, notwithstanding all its horrors, appeared to him more sweet than the bower of Mahomet, in the company of his Balsora. [*Guardian*, N° 167.

Better,

She soon, &c. appeared to him, in the company of his Balsora, more sweet, &c.

The Emperor was so intent on the establishment of his absolute power in Hungary, that he exposed the Empire doubly to desolation and ruin for the sake of it.

*Letters on history, vol.* 1. *let.* 7. *Bolingbroke.*

Better,

——————— that for the sake of it he exposed the Empire doubly to desolation and ruin.

None of the rules for the composition of periods are

more liable to be abuſed, than thoſe laſt mentioned; witneſs many Latin writers, among the moderns eſpecially, whoſe ſtyle, by inverſions too violent, is rendered harſh and obſcure. Suſpenſion of the thought till the cloſe of the period, ought never to be preferred before perſpicuity. Neither ought ſuch ſuſpenſion to be attempted in a long period; becauſe in that caſe the mind is bewildered among a profuſion of words: a traveller, while he is puzzled about the road, reliſhes not the fineſt proſpect:

All the rich preſents which Aſtyages had given him at parting, keeping only ſome Median horſes, in order to propagate the breed of them in Perſia, he diſtributed among his friends whom he left at the court of Ecbatana. *Travels of Cyrus, book* 1.

The foregoing rules concern the arrangement of a ſingle period: I add one rule more concerning the diſtribution of a diſcourſe into different periods. A ſhort period is lively and familiar: a long period, requiring more attention, makes an impreſſion grave and ſolemn *. In general, a writer ought to ſtudy a mixture of long and ſhort periods, which prevent an irkſome uniformity, and entertain the mind with variety of impreſſions. In particular, long periods ought to be avoided till the reader's attention be thoroughly engaged; and therefore a diſcourſe, eſpecially of the familiar kind, ought never to be introduced with a long period: for that reaſon, the commencement of a letter to a very young lady on her marriage is faulty:

Madam, The hurry and impertinence of receiving and paying viſits on account of your marriage, being now over, you are beginning to enter into a courſe of life, where you will want much advice to divert you from falling into many errors, fopperies, and follies, to which your ſex is ſubject. *Swift.*

See another example, ſtill more faulty, in the commencement of Cicero's oration, *Pro Archia poeta.*

Before

* Demetrius Phalereus (of Elocution, ſect. 44) obſerves, that long members in a period make an impreſſion of gravity and importance. And the ſame obſervation is applicable to periods.

Before we proceed farther, it may be proper to take a review of the rules laid down in this and the preceding ſection, in order to make ſome general obſervations. That order of the words and members of a period is juſtly termed natural, which correſponds to the natural order of the ideas that compoſe the thought. The tendency of many of the foregoing rules is to ſubſtitute an artificial arrangement, in order to catch ſome beauty either of ſound or meaning for which there is no place in the natural order. But ſeldom it happens, that in the ſame period there is place for a plurality of theſe rules: if one beauty can be retained, another muſt be relinquiſhed; and the only queſtion is, Which ought to be preferred. This is a queſtion that cannot be reſolved by any general rule: if the natural order be not reliſhed, a few trials will diſcover that artificial order which has the beſt effect; and this exerciſe, ſupported by a good taſte, will in time make the choice eaſy. All that can be ſaid in general is, that in making a choice, ſound ought to yield to ſignification.

The tranſpoſing words and members out of their natural order, ſo remarkable in the learned languages, has been the ſubject of much ſpeculation. It is agreed on all hands, that ſuch tranſpoſition or inverſion beſtows upon a period a very ſenſible degree of force and elevation; and yet writers ſeem to be at a loſs in what manner to account for that effect. Cerceau * aſcribes ſo much power to inverſion, as to make it the characteriſtic of French verſe, and the ſingle circumſtance which in that language diſtinguiſhes verſe from proſe: and yet he pretends not to ſay, that it hath any other power but to raiſe ſurpriſe; he muſt mean curioſity, which is done by ſuſpending the thought during the period, and bringing it out entire at the cloſe. This indeed is one power of inverſion; but neither its ſole power, nor even that which is the moſt remarkable, as is made evident above. But waving cenſure, which is not an agreeable taſk, I enter into the matter; and begin with obſerving, that if conformity between words and their meaning be agreeable, it muſt of courſe be



* Reflections ſur la poeſie Francoiſe.

agreeable to find the ſame order or arrangement in both. Hence the beauty of a plain or natural ſtyle, where the order of the words correſponds preciſely to the order of the ideas. Nor is this the ſingle beauty of a natural ſtyle: it is alſo agreeable by its ſimplicity and perſpicuity. This obſervation throws light upon the ſubject: for if a natural ſtyle be in itſelf agreeable, a tranſpoſed ſtyle cannot be ſo; and therefore its agreeableneſs muſt ariſe from contributing to ſome poſitive beauty that is excluded in a natural ſtyle. To be confirmed in this opinion, we need but reflect upon ſome of the foregoing rules, which make it evident, that language, by means of inverſion, is ſuſceptible of many beauties that are totally excluded in a natural arrangement. From theſe premiſſes it clearly follows, that inverſion ought not to be indulged, unleſs in order to reach ſome beauty ſuperior to thoſe of a natural ſtyle. It may with great certainty be pronounced, that every inverſion, which is not governed by this rule, will appear harſh and ſtrained, and be diſreliſhed by every one of taſte. Hence the beauty of inverſion when happily conducted; the beauty, not of an end, but of means, as furniſhing opportunity for numberleſs ornaments that find no place in a natural ſtyle: hence the force, the elevation, the harmony, the cadence, of ſome compoſitions: hence the manifold beauties of the Greek and Roman tongues, of which living languages afford but faint imitations.

## SECT. III.

### *Beauty of language from a reſemblance between ſound and ſignification.*

A Reſemblance between the ſound of certain words and their ſignification, is a beauty that has eſcaped no critical writer, and yet is not handled with accuracy by any of them. They have probably been of opinion, that a beauty ſo obvious to the feeling, requires no explanation. This is an error; and to avoid it, I ſhall give examples of the various reſemblances between ſound and ſignification, accompanied with an endeavour to explain why ſuch reſemblances are beautiful. Firſt of examples where the reſemblance between the

ſound

ſound and ſignification is the moſt entire, and next where the reſemblance is leſs and leſs ſo.

There being frequently a ſtrong reſemblance of one ſound to another, it will not be ſurpriſing to find an articulate ſound reſembling one that is not articulate: thus the ſound of a bow-ſtring is imitated by the words that expreſs it:

——————— The ſtring let fly,
*Twang'd ſhort and ſharp*, like the ſhrill ſwallow's cry.
*Odyſſey* xxi. 449.

The ſound of felling trees in a wood:

Loud ſounds the ax, redoubling ſtrokes on ſtrokes,
On all ſides round the foreſt hurls her oaks
Headlong. Deep echoing groan the thickets brown,
Then *ruſtling*, *crackling*, *craſhing*, thunder down.
*Iliad*, xxiii. 144.

But when loud ſurges laſh the ſounding ſhore
The hoarſe rough verſe ſhould like the torrent roar.
*Pope's Eſſay on Criticiſm*, 369.

No perſon can be at a loſs about the cauſe of this beauty: it is obviouſly that of imitation.

That there is any other natural reſemblance of ſound to ſignification, muſt not be taken for granted. There is evidently no reſemblance of ſound to motion, nor of ſound to ſentiment. In this matter we are apt to be deceived by artful pronunciation: the ſame paſſage may be pronounced in many different tones, elevated or humble, ſweet or harſh, briſk or melancholy, ſo as to accord with the thought or ſentiment: ſuch concord muſt be diſtinguiſhed from that concord between ſound and ſenſe, which is perceived in ſome expreſſions independent of artful pronunciation: the latter is the poet's work; the former muſt be attributed to the reader. Another thing contributes ſtill more to the deceit: in language, ſound and ſenſe being intimately connected, the properties of the one are readily communicated to the other; for example, the quality of grandeur, of ſweetneſs, or of melancholy, though belonging to the thought ſolely, is transferred to the words, which by that means reſemble in appearance the thought that is expreſſed by

them *. I have great reaſon to recommend theſe obſervations to the reader, conſidering how inaccurately the preſent ſubject is handled by critics: not one of them diſtinguiſhes the natural reſemblance of ſound and ſignification, from the artificial reſemblances now deſcribed; witneſs Vida in particular, who in a very long paſſage has given very few examples but what are of the latter kind †.

That there may be a reſemblance of articulate ſounds to ſome that are not articulate, is ſelf-evident; and that in fact there exiſt ſuch reſemblances ſucceſsfully employ'd by writers of genius, is clear from the foregoing examples, and from many others that might be given. But we may ſafely pronounce, that this natural reſemblance can be carried no farther: the objects of the different ſenſes, differ ſo widely from each other, as to exclude any reſemblance; ſound in particular, whether articulate or inarticulate, reſembles not in any degree taſte, ſmell, nor motion; and as little can it reſemble any internal ſentiment, feeling, or emotion. But muſt we then admit, that nothing but ſound can be imitated by ſound? Taking imitation in its proper ſenſe, as importing a reſemblance between two objects, the propoſition muſt be admitted: and yet in many paſſages that are not deſcriptive of ſound, every one muſt be ſenſible of a peculiar concord between the ſound of the words and their meaning. As there can be no doubt of the fact, what remains is to inquire into its cauſe.

Reſembling cauſes may produce effects that have no reſemblance; and cauſes that have no reſemblance may produce reſembling effects. A magnificent building, for example, reſembles not in any degree an heroic action; and yet the emotions they produce, are concordant, and bear a reſemblance to each other. We are ſtill more ſenſible of this reſemblance in a ſong, when the muſic is properly adapted to the ſentiment: there is no reſemblance between thought and ſound; but there is the ſtrongeſt reſemblance between the emotion raiſed by muſic tender and pathetic, and that raiſed by the complaint

* See chap. 2 part 1. ſect. 5.
† Poet. L. 3. l. 365 ——454.

plaint of an unsuccessful lover. When we apply this observation to the present subject, it will appear, that in some instances, the sound even of a single word makes an impression resembling that which is made by the thing it signifies; witness the word *running*, composed of two short syllables; and more remarkably the words *rapidity*, *impetuosity*, *precipitation*. Brutal manners produce in the spectator an emotion not unlike what is produced by a harsh and rough sound; and hence the beauty of the figurative expression, *rugged* manners. Again, the word *little*, being pronounced with a very small aperture of the mouth, has a weak and faint sound, which makes an impression resembling that made by a diminutive object. This resemblance of effects is still more remarkable where a number of words are connected together in a period: words pronounced in succession make often a strong impression; and when this impression happens to accord with that made by the sense, we are sensible of a complex emotion, peculiarly pleasant; one proceeding from the sentiment, and one from the melody or sound of the words. But the chief pleasure proceeds from having these two concordant emotions combined in perfect harmony, and carried on in the mind to a full close *. Except in the single case where sound is described, all the examples given by critics of sense being imitated in sound, resolve into a resemblance of effects: emotions raised by sound and signification may have a resemblance; but sound itself cannot have a resemblance to any thing but sound.

Proceeding now to particulars, and beginning with those cases where the emotions have the strongest resemblance, I observe, first, That by a number of syllables in succession, an emotion is sometimes raised, extremely similar to that raised by successive motion; which may be evident even to those who are defective in taste, from the following fact, that the term *movement* in all languages is equally apply'd to both. In this manner, successive motion, such as walking, running, galloping, can be imitated by a succession of long or short syllables, or by a due mixture of both: for example, slow



* See chap. 2. part 4.

motion may be juſtly imitated in a verſe where long ſyllables prevail; eſpecially when aided by a ſlow pronunciation:

Illi inter ſeſe magná vi brachia tollunt.

*Georg.* iv. 174.

On the other hand, ſwift motion is imitated by a ſucceſſion of ſhort ſyllables:

Quadrupedante putrem ſonitu quatit ungula campum.

Again:

Radit iter liquidum, celeres neque commovet alas.

Thirdly, A line compoſed of monoſyllables, makes an impreſſion, by the frequency of its pauſes, ſimilar to what is made by laborious interrupted motion:

With many a weary ſtep, and many a groan,
Up the high hill he heaves a huge round ſtone.

*Odyſſey*, xi. 736.

Firſt march the heavy mules ſecurely ſlow;
O'er hills, o'er dales, o'er craggs, o'er rocks they go.

*Iliad*, xxiii. 138.

Fourthly, The impreſſion made by rough ſounds in ſucceſſion, reſembles that made by rough or tumultuous motion: on the other hand, the impreſſion of ſmooth ſounds reſembles that of gentle motion. The following is an example of both.

Two craggy rocks projecting to the main,
The roaring wind's tempeſtuous rage reſtrain;
Within, the waves in ſofter murmurs glide,
And ſhips ſecure without their haulſers ride.

*Odyſſey*, iii. 118.

Another example of the latter:

Soft is the ſtrain when Zephyr gently blows,
And the ſmooth ſtream in ſmoother numbers flows.

*Eſſay on Crit.* 366.

Fifthly, Prolonged motion is expreſſed in an Alexandrine line. The firſt example ſhall be of ſlow motion prolonged:

A needleſs Alexandrine ends the ſong;

That,

That, like a wounded ſnake, drags its ſlow length along.
*Eſſay on Crit.* 356.

The next example is of forcible motion prolonged:

The waves behind impel the waves before,
Wide-rolling, foaming high, and tumbling to the ſhore.
*Iliad*, xiii. 1004.

The laſt ſhall be of rapid motion prolonged:

Not ſo when Swift Camilla ſcours the plain,
Flies o'er th' unbending corn, and ſkims along the main.
*Eſſay on Crit.* 373.

Again, ſpeaking of a rock torn from the brow of a mountain:

Still gath'ring force, it ſmokes, and urg'd amain,
Whirls, leaps, and thunders down, impetuous to the plain. *Iliad*, xiii. 197.

Sixthly, A period conſiſting moſtly of long ſyllables, that is, of ſyllables pronounced ſlow, produceth an emotion reſembling faintly that which is produced by gravity and ſolemnity. Hence the beauty of the following verſe:

Olli ſedato reſpondit corde Latinus.

Seventhly, A ſlow ſucceſſion of ideas is a circumſtance that belongs equally to ſettled melancholy, and to a period compoſed of polyſyllables pronounced ſlow; and hence, by ſimilarity of emotions, the latter is imitative of the former:

In thoſe deep ſolitudes, and awful cells,
Where heav'nly-penſive Contemplation dwells,
And ever-muſing Melancholy reigns.
*Pope, Eloiſa to Abelard.*

Eightly, A long ſyllable made ſhort, or a ſhort ſyllable made long, raiſes, by the difficulty of pronouncing contrary to cuſtom, a feeling ſimilar to that of hard labour:

When Ajax ſtrives ſome rock's *vaſt* weight to throw,
The line too labours, and the words move ſlow.
*Eſſay on Crit.* 370.

Ninthly, Harſh or rough words pronounced with difficulty,

ficulty, excite a feeling reſembling that which proceeds from the labour of thought to a dull writer:

Juſt writes to make his barrenneſs appear,
And ſtrains from hard bound brains eight lines a year.
*Pope's epiſtle to Dr Arbuthnot, l.* 181.

I ſhall cloſe with one example more, which of all makes the fineſt figure. In the firſt ſection mention is made of a climax in ſound; and in the ſecond of a climax in ſenſe. It belongs to the preſent ſubject to obſerve, that when theſe coincide in the ſame paſſage, the concordance of ſound and ſenſe is delightful: the reader is conſcious not only of pleaſure from the two climaxes ſeparately, but of an additional pleaſure from their concordance, and from finding the ſenſe ſo juſtly imitated by the ſound. In this reſpect, no periods are more perfect than thoſe borrowed from Cicero in the firſt ſection.

The concord between ſenſe and ſound is not leſs agreeable in what may be termed an *anticlimax*, where the progreſs is from great to little; for this has the effect to make diminutive objects appear ſtill more diminutive. Horace affords a ſtriking example:

Parturiunt montes, naſcetur ridiculus mus.

The arrangement here is ſingularly artful: the firſt place is occupied by the verb, which is the capital word by its ſenſe as well as ſound: the cloſe is reſerved for the word that is the meaneſt in ſenſe as well as in ſound: and it muſt not be overlooked, that the reſembling ſounds of the two laſt ſyllables give a ludicrous air to the whole.

Reviewing the foregoing examples, it appears to me, contrary to expectation, that in paſſing from the ſtrongeſt reſemblances to thoſe that are fainter, every ſtep affords additional pleaſure. Renewing the experiment again and again, I feel no wavering, but the greateſt pleaſure conſtantly from the fainteſt reſemblances. And yet how can this be? for if the pleaſure lie in imitation, muſt not the ſtrongeſt reſemblance afford the greateſt pleaſure? From this vexing dilemma I am happily relieved, by reflecting on a doctrine eſtabliſhed in the chapter of reſemblance and contraſt, that the pleaſure of reſemblance is the greateſt, where it is leaſt expected, and

and where the objects compared are in their capital circumſtances widely different. Nor will this appear ſurpriſing, when we deſcend to familiar examples: it raiſeth no degree of wonder to find the moſt perfect reſemblance between two eggs of the ſame bird: it is more rare to find ſuch reſemblance between two human faces; and upon that account ſuch an appearance raiſes ſome degree of wonder: but this emotion riſes to a ſtill greater height, when we find in a pebble, an agate, or other natural production, any reſemblance to a tree or to any organiſed body. We cannot heſitate a moment, in applying theſe obſervations to the preſent ſubject: what occaſion of wonder can it be to find one ſound reſembling another, where both are of the ſame kind? it is not ſo common to find a reſemblance between an articulate ſound and one not articulate; which accordingly affords ſome ſlight pleaſure: but the pleaſure ſwells greatly, when we employ ſound to imitate things it reſembles not otherwiſe than by the effects produced in the mind.

I have had occaſion to obſerve, that to complete the reſemblance between ſound and ſenſe, artful pronunciation contributes not a little. Pronunciation therefore may be conſidered as a branch of the preſent ſubject; and with ſome obſervations upon it the ſection ſhall be concluded.

In order to give a juſt idea of pronunciation, it muſt be diſtinguiſhed from ſinging: the latter is carried on by notes, requiring each of them a different aperture of the windpipe: the notes properly belonging to the former, are expreſſed by different apertures of the mouth, without varying the aperture of the windpipe. This however doth not hinder pronunciation to borrow from ſinging, as one ſometimes is naturally led to do, in expreſſing a vehement paſſion.

In reading, as in ſinging, there is a key-note: above this note the voice is frequently elevated, to make the ſound correſpond to the elevation of the ſubject, but the mind in an elevated ſtate, is diſpoſed to action; therefore, in order to a reſt, it muſt be brought down to the key note. Hence the term *cadence*.

The only general rule that can be given for directing the

the pronunciation, is, To ſound the words in ſuch a manner as to imitate the things they ſignify. In pronouncing words ſignifying what is elevated, the voice ought to be raiſed above its ordinary tone; and words ſignifying dejection of mind, ought to be pronounced in a low note: to imitate a ſtern and impetuous paſſion, the words ought to be pronounced rough and loud: a ſweet and kindly paſſion, on the contrary, ought to be imitated by a ſoft and melodious tone of voice: in Dryden's ode of *Alexander's feaſt*, the line, *Faln, faln, faln, faln*, repreſents a gradual ſinking of the mind, and therefore is pronounced with a falling voice by every one of taſte, without inſtruction. In general, words that make the greateſt figure ought to be marked with a peculiar emphaſis. Another circumſtance contributes to the reſemblance between ſenſe and ſound, which is ſlow or quick pronunciation: for though the length or ſhortneſs of the ſyllables with relation to each other, be in proſe aſcertained in ſome meaſure, and in verſe always; yet taking a whole line or period together, it may be pronounced ſlow or faſt. A period accordingly ought to be pronounced ſlow, when it expreſſes what is ſolemn or deliberate; and ought to be pronounced quick, when it expreſſes what is briſk, lively, or impetuous.

The art of pronouncing with propriety and grace, being calculated to make the ſound an echo to the ſenſe, ſcarce admits of any other general rule than that above mentioned. It may indeed be branched out into many particular rules and obſervations: but theſe belong not properly to the preſent undertaking, becauſe no language furniſheth words to ſignify the different degrees of high and low, loud and ſoft, faſt and ſlow. Before theſe differences can be made the ſubject of regular inſtruction, notes muſt be invented reſembling thoſe employ'd in muſic: we have reaſon to believe, that in Greece every tragedy was accompanied with ſuch notes, in order to aſcertain the pronunciation; but the moderns hitherto have not thought of this refinement. Cicero indeed *, without the help of notes, pretends to give rules for aſcertaining the various tones of voice that are proper in expreſſing

* De oratore, l. 3. cap. 58.

expreſſing the different paſſions; and it muſt be acknowledged, that in this attempt he hath exhauſted the whole power of language At the ſame time, every perſon of diſcernment will perceive, that theſe rules avail little in point of inſtruction: the very words he employs, are not intelligible, except to thoſe who beforehand are acquainted with the ſubject

To vary the ſcene a little, I propoſe to cloſe with a ſlight compariſon between ſinging and pronouncing. In this compariſon, the five following circumſtances relative to articulate ſound, muſt be kept in view. 1ſt, A ſound or ſyllable is harſh or ſmooth 2d, It is long or ſhort. 3d, It is pronounced high or low. 4th, It is pronounced loud or ſoft And, laſtly, A number of words in ſucceſſion, conſtituting a period or member of a period, are pronounced ſlow or quick. Of theſe five the firſt depending on the component letters, and the ſecond being aſcertained by cuſtom, admit not any variety in pronouncing. The three laſt are arbitrary, depending on the will of the perſon who pronounces; and it is chiefly in the artful management of theſe that juſt pronunciation conſiſts. With reſpect to the firſt circumſtance, muſic has evidently the advantage; for all its notes are agreeable to the ear; which is not always the caſe of articulate ſound. With reſpect to the ſecond, long and ſhort ſyllables variouſly combined, produce a great variety of feet; yet far inferior to the variety that is found in the multiplied combinations of muſical notes. With reſpect to high and low notes, pronunciation is ſtill more inferior to ſinging; for it is obſerved by Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus *, that in pronouncing, *i. e.* without altering the aperture of the windpipe, the voice is confined within three notes and a half: ſinging has a much greater compaſs. With reſpect to the two laſt circumſtances, pronunciation equals ſinging.

In this chapter, I have mentioned none of the beauties of language but what ariſe from words taken in their proper ſenſe. Beauties that depend on the metaphorical and figurative power of words, are reſerved to be treated chap. 20.

* De ſtructura orationis, ſect. 2.

SECT.

## SECT. IV.

### *VERSIFICATION.*

THE muſic of verſe, though handled by every grammarian, merits more attention than it has been honoured with. It is a ſubject intimately connected with human nature; and to explain it thoroughly, ſeveral nice and delicate feelings muſt be employ'd. But before entering upon it, we muſt ſee what verſe is, or, in other words, by what mark it is diſtinguiſhed from proſe; a point not ſo eaſy as may at firſt be apprehended. It is true that the conſtruction of verſe is governed by preciſe rules; whereas proſe is more looſe, and ſcarce ſubjected to any rules. But are the many who know nothing of rules, left without means to make the diſtinction? and even with reſpect to the learned, muſt they apply the rule before they can with certainty pronounce whether the compoſition be proſe or verſe? This will hardly be maintained; and therefore, inſtead of rules, the ear muſt be appealed to as the proper judge. But what gain we by being thus referred to another ſtandard; for it ſtill recurs, By what mark does the ear diſtinguiſh verſe from proſe? The proper and ſatisfactory anſwer is, That theſe make different impreſſions upon every one who hath an ear. This advances us one ſtep in our inquiry.

Taking it then for granted, that verſe and proſe make upon the ear different impreſſions; nothing remains but to explain this difference, and to aſſign its cauſe. To this end, I call to my aid an obſervation made above upon the ſound of words, that they are more agreeable to the ear when compoſed of long or ſhort ſyllables, than when all the ſyllables are of the ſame ſort: a continued ſound in the ſame tone, makes not a muſical impreſſion: the ſame note ſucceſſively renewed by intervals, is more agreeable; but ſtill makes not a muſical impreſſion. To produce that impreſſion, variety is neceſſary as well as number: the ſucceſſive ſounds or ſyllables, muſt be ſome of them long, ſome of them ſhort; and it alſo high and low, the muſic is the more perfect. The muſical impreſſion made by a period conſiſting of long

long and ſhort ſyllables arranged in a certain order, is what the Greeks call *rhythmus*, the Latins *numerus*, and we *melody* or *meaſure*. Cicero juſtly obſerves, that in one continued ſound there is no melody: "Numerus "in continuatione nullus eſt." But in what follows he is wide of the truth, if by *numerus* he mean melody or muſical meaſure: "Diſtinctio, et æqualium et ſæpe va- "riorum intervallorum percuſſio, numerum conficit; "quem in cadentibus guttis, quod intervallis diſtingu- "untur, notare poſſumus." Falling drops, whether with equal or unequal intervals, are certainly not muſic: we are not ſenſible of a muſical expreſſion but in a ſucceſſion of long and ſhort notes. And this alſo was probably the opinion of the author cited, though his expreſſion be a little unguarded *.

It will probably occur, that melody, if it depend on long and ſhort ſyllables combined in a ſentence, may be found in proſe as well as in verſe; conſidering eſpecially, that in both, particular words are accented or pronounced in a higher tone than the reſt; and therefore that verſe cannot be diſtinguiſhed from proſe by melody merely. The obſervation is juſt; and it follows, that the diſtinction between them, ſince it depends not ſingly on melody, muſt ariſe from the difference of the melody: which is preciſely the caſe; though that difference cannot with any accuracy be explained in words; all that can be ſaid is, that verſe is more muſical than proſe, and its melody more perfect. The difference between verſe and proſe, reſembles the difference in muſic properly ſo called between the ſong and the recitative: and the reſemblance is not the leſs complete, that theſe differences, like the ſhades of colours, approximate ſometimes ſo nearly as ſcarce to be diſcernible: the melody

* From this paſſage, however, we diſcover the etymology of the Latin term for muſical expreſſion. Every one being ſenſible that there is no muſic in a continued ſound; the firſt inquiries were probably carried no farther than to diſcover, that to produce a muſical expreſſion a number of ſounds is neceſſary; and muſical expreſſion obtained the name of *numerus*, before it was clearly aſcertained, that variety is neceſſary as well as number.

lody of a recitative approaches ſometimes to that of a ſong; which, on the other hand, degenerates ſometimes toward a plain recitative. Nothing is more diſtinguiſhable from proſe, than the bulk of Virgil's Hexameters: many of thoſe compoſed by Horace, are very little removed from proſe: Sapphic verſe has a very ſenſible melody: that, on the other hand, of an Iambic, is extremely faint *.

This more perfect melody of articulate ſounds, is what diſtinguiſheth verſe from proſe. Verſe is ſubjected to certain inflexible laws; the number and variety of the component ſyllables being aſcertained, and in ſome meaſure the order of ſucceſſion. Such reſtraint makes it a matter of difficulty to compoſe in verſe; a difficulty that is not to be ſurmounted but by a peculiar genius. Uſeful leſſons convey'd to us in verſe, are agreeable by the union of muſic with inſtruction: but are we for that reaſon to reject knowledge offered in a plainer dreſs? That would be ridiculous; for knowledge is of intrinſic merit, independent of the means of acquiſition; and there are many, not leſs capable than willing to inſtruct us, who have no genius for verſe. Hence the uſe of proſe; which, for the reaſon now given, is not confined to preciſe rules. There belongs to it, a certain melody of an inferior kind, which, being extremely ornamental, ought to be the aim of every writer; but for ſucceeding in it, practice is neceſſary more than genius. Nor do we rigidly inſiſt for melodious proſe: provided the work convey inſtruction, its chief end, we are the leſs ſollicitous about its dreſs.

Having aſcertained the nature and limits of our ſubject, I proceed to the laws by which it is regulated. Theſe would be endleſs, were verſe of all different kinds to be taken under conſideration. I propoſe therefore to confine the inquiry, to Latin or Greek Hexameter, and to French and Engliſh Heroic verſe; which perhaps may

* Muſic, properly ſo called, is analyſed into melody and harmony. A ſucceſſion of ſounds ſo as to be agreeable to the ear, conſtitutes melody: harmony ariſes from coexiſting ſounds. Verſe therefore can only reach melody, and not harmony.

may carry me farther than the reader will chuſe to follow. The obſervations I ſhall have occaſion to make, will at any rate be ſufficient for a ſpecimen; and theſe, with proper variations, may eaſily be transferred to the compoſition of other ſorts of verſe.

Before I enter upon particulars, it muſt be premiſed in general, that to verſe of every kind, five things are of importance. 1ſt, The number of ſyllables that compoſe a verſe. 2d, The different lengths of ſyllables, *i. e.* the difference of time taken in pronouncing. 3d, The arrangement of theſe ſyllables combined in words. 4th, The pauſes or ſtops in pronouncing. 5th, Pronouncing ſyllables in a high or a low tone. The three firſt mentioned are obviouſly eſſential to verſe: if any of them be wanting, there cannot be that higher degree of melody which diſtinguiſheth verſe from proſe. To give a juſt notion of the fourth, it muſt be obſerved, that pauſes are neceſſary for three different purpoſes: one, to ſeparate periods, and members of the ſame period, according to the ſenſe: another, to improve the melody of verſe: and the laſt, to afford opportunity for drawing breath in reading. A pauſe of the firſt kind is variable, being long or ſhort, frequent or leſs frequent, as the ſenſe requires. A pauſe of the ſecond kind, being determined by the melody, is in no degree arbitrary. The laſt ſort is in a meaſure arbitrary, depending on the reader's command of breath. But as one cannot read with grace, unleſs, for drawing breath, opportunity be taken of a pauſe in the ſenſe or in the melody, this pauſe ought never to be diſtinguiſhed from the others; and for that reaſon may be laid aſide. With reſpect then to the pauſes of ſenſe and of melody, it may be affirmed without heſitation, that their coincidence in verſe is a capital beauty: but as it cannot be expected, in a long work eſpecially, that every line ſhould be ſo perfect; we ſhall afterward have occaſion to ſee, that the pauſe neceſſary for the ſenſe muſt often, in ſome degree, be ſacrificed to the verſe-pauſe, and the latter ſometimes to the former.

The pronouncing ſyllables in a high or low tone, contributes alſo to melody. In reading, whether verſe or proſe, a certain tone is aſſumed, which may be called

*the*

*the key note*; and in that tone the bulk of the words are ſounded. Sometimes to humour the ſenſe, and ſometimes the melody, a particular ſyllable is ſounded in a higher tone; and this is termed *accenting a ſyllable*, or gracing it with an accent. Oppoſed to the accent, is the cadence, which I have not mentioned as one of the requiſites of verſe, becauſe it is entirely regulated by the ſenſe, and hath no peculiar relation to verſe. The cadence is a falling of the voice below the key-note at the cloſe of every period; and ſo little is it eſſential to verſe, that in correct reading the final ſyllable of every line is accented, that ſyllable only excepted which cloſes the period, where the ſenſe requires a cadence. The reader may be ſatisfied of this by experiments; and for that purpoſe I recommend to him the *Rape of the Lock*, which, in point of verſification, is the moſt complete performance in the Engliſh language. Let him conſult in particular a period canto 2. beginning at line 47. and cloſed line 52. with the word *gay*, which only of the whole final ſyllables is pronounced with a cadence. He may alſo examine another period in the 5th canto, which runs from line 45. to line 52.

Though the five requiſites above mentioned, enter the compoſition of every ſpecies of verſe, they are however governed by different rules, peculiar to each ſpecies. Upon quantity only, one general obſervation may be premiſed, becauſe it is applicable to every ſpecies of verſe, That ſyllables, with reſpect to the time taken in pronouncing, are long or ſhort; two ſhort ſyllables, with reſpect to time, being preciſely equal to a long one. Theſe two lengths are eſſential to verſe of all kinds; and to no verſe, ſo far as I know, is a greater variety of time neceſſary in pronouncing ſyllables. The voice indeed is frequently made to reſt longer than uſual, upon a word that bears an important ſignification; but that is done to humour the ſenſe, and is not neceſſary for melody. A thing not more neceſſary for melody occurs with reſpect to accenting, ſimilar to that now mentioned: A word ſignifying any thing humble, low, or dejected, is naturally, in proſe as well as in verſe, pronounced in a tone below the key-note.

We are now ſufficiently prepared for entering upon particulars;

particulars; beginning with Latin or Greek Hexameter, which are the ſame. What I have to obſerve upon that ſpecies of verſe, will come under the four following heads, number, arrangement, pauſe, and accent; for as to quantity, what is obſerved above may ſuffice.

Hexameter lines, as to time, are all of the ſame length; being equivalent to the time taken in pronouncing twelve long ſyllables or twenty-four ſhort. An Hexameter line may conſiſt of ſeventeen ſyllables: and when regular and not Spondaic, it never has fewer than thirteen: whence it follows, that where the ſyllables are many, the plurality muſt be ſhort; where few, the plurality muſt be long.

This line is ſuſceptible of much variety as to the ſucceſſion of long and ſhort ſyllables. It is however ſubjected to laws that confine its variety within certain limits: and for aſcertaining theſe limits, grammarians have invented a rule by Dactyles and Spondees, which they denominate *feet*. One at firſt view is led to think, that theſe feet are alſo intended to regulate the pronunciation: which is far from being the caſe; for were one to pronounce according to theſe feet, the melody of a Hexameter line would be deſtroy'd, or at beſt be much inferior to what it is when properly pronounced*. Theſe feet

* After ſome attention given to this ſubject, and weighing deliberately every circumſtance, I have been forc'd to reſt upon the foregoing concluſion, That the Dactyle and Spondee are no other than artificial meaſures invented for trying the accuracy of compoſition. Repeated experiments convince me, that though the ſenſe ſhould be neglected, an Hexameter line read by Dactyles and Spondees will not be melodious. And the compoſition of an Hexameter line demonſtrates this to be true, without neceſſity of an experiment; for, as will appear afterward, there muſt always, in this line, be a capital pauſe at the end of the fifth long ſyllable, reckoning, as above, two ſhort for one long; and when we meaſure this line by Dactyles and Spondees, the pauſe now mentioned divides always a Dactyle or a Spondee, without ever coming after either of theſe feet. Hence it is evident,

feet muſt be confined to their ſole province of regulating the arrangement, for they ſerve no other purpoſe. They are withal ſo artificial and complex, that I am tempted to ſubſtitute in their ſtead, other rules more ſimple and of more eaſy application; for example, the following. 1ſt, The line muſt always commence with a long ſyllable, and cloſe with two long preceded by two ſhort. 2d, More than two ſhort can never be found in

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dent, that if a line be pronounced, as it is ſcanned, by Dactyles and Spondees, the pauſe muſt utterly be neglected; which conſequently deſtroys the melody, becauſe this pauſe is eſſential to the melody of an Hexameter verſe. If, on the other hand, the melody be preſerved by making that pauſe, the pronouncing by Dactyles or Spondees muſt be abandoned.

What has led grammarians into the uſe of Dactyles and Spondees, ſeems not beyond the reach of conjecture. To produce melody, the Dactyle and the Spondee, which cloſe every Hexameter line, muſt be diſtinctly expreſſed in the pronunciation. This diſcovery, joined with another, that the foregoing part of the verſe could be meaſured by the ſame feet, probably led grammarians to adopt theſe artificial meaſures, and perhaps raſhly to conclude, that the pronunciation is directed by theſe feet as the compoſition is: the Dactyle and the Spondee at the cloſe, ſerve indeed to regulate the pronunciation as well as the compoſition; but in the foregoing part of the line, they regulate the compoſition only, not the pronunciation.

If we muſt have feet in verſe to regulate the pronunciation, and conſequently the melody, theſe feet muſt be determined by the pauſes. The whole ſyllables interjected between two pauſes ought to be deemed one muſical foot; becauſe, to preſerve the melody, they muſt all be pronounced together, without any ſtop. And therefore, whatever number there are of pauſes in a Hexameter line, the parts into which it is divided by theſe pauſes, make juſt ſo many muſical feet.

Connection obliges me here to anticipate, by obſerving, that the ſame doctrine is applicable to Engliſh Heroic

in any part of the line, nor fewer than two if any. And, 3d, Two long ſyllables which have been preceded by two ſhort, cannot alſo be followed by two ſhort. Theſe few rules fulfil all the conditions of a Hexameter line, with relation to order or arrangement. To theſe again a ſingle rule may be ſubſtituted, for which I have a ſtill greater reliſh, as it regulates more affirmatively the conſtruction of every part. That I may put this rule into words with the greater facility, I take a hint from the twelve long ſyllables that compoſe an Hexameter line to divide it into twelve equal parts or portions, being each of them one long ſyllable or two ſhort. A portion being thus defined, I proceed to the rule. The 1ſt, 3d, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, and 12th portions, muſt each of them be one long ſyllable; the 10th muſt always be two ſhort ſyllables; the 2d, 4th, 6th, and 8th, may indifferently be one long or two ſhort. Or to expreſs the thing ſtill more curtly, The 2d, 4th, 6th, and 8th portions may be one long ſyllable or two ſhort; the 10th muſt be two ſhort ſyllables; all the reſt muſt conſiſt each of one long ſyllable. This fulfils all the conditions of an Hexameter line, and comprehends all the combinations of Dactyles and Spondees that this line admits.

Next in order comes the pauſe. At the end of every Hexameter line, no ear but muſt be ſenſible of a complete cloſe or full pauſe; the cauſe of which follows. The two long ſyllables preceded by two ſhort, which always cloſe an Hexameter line, are a fine preparation for a pauſe: the reaſon is, that long ſyllables, or ſyllables pronounced ſlow, reſembling a ſlow and languid motion tending to reſt, naturally incline the mind to reſt, or,

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roic verſe. Conſidering its compoſition merely, it is of two kinds; one compoſed of five Iambi; and one of a Trochæus followed by four Iambi: but theſe feet afford no rule for pronouncing; the muſical feet being obviouſly thoſe parts of the line that are interjected between two pauſes. To bring out the melody, theſe feet muſt be expreſſed in the pronunciation; or, which comes to the ſame, the pronunciation muſt be directed by the pauſes, without regard to the Iambus or Trochæus.

or, which is the ſame, to a pauſe; and to this inclination the two preceding ſhort ſyllables contribute, which, by contraſt, make the ſlow pronunciation of the final ſyllables the more conſpicuous. Beſide this complete cloſe or full pauſe at the end, others are alſo requiſite for the ſake of melody: of which I diſcover two clearly, and perhaps there may be more. The longeſt and moſt remarkable, ſucceeds the 5th portion: the other, which, being ſhorter and more faint, may be called *the ſemipauſe*, ſucceeds the 8th portion. So ſtriking is the pauſe firſt mentioned, as to be diſtinguiſhed even by the rudeſt ear: the monkiſh rhymes are evidently built upon it: in which, by an invariable rule, the final word always chimes with that which immediately precedes the pauſe:

De planctu cudo ‖ metrum cum carmine nudo
Mingere cum bumbis ‖ res eſt ſaluberrima lumbis.

The difference of time in the pauſe and ſemipauſe, occaſions another difference not leſs remarkable; that it is lawful to divide a word by a ſemipauſe, but never by a pauſe, the bad effect of which is ſenſibly felt in the following examples:

Effuſus labor, at‖que inmitis rupta Tyranni

Again:

Obſervans nido im‖plumes detraxit; at illa

Again,

Loricam quam De‖moleo detraxerat ipſe

The dividing a word by a ſemipauſe has not the ſame bad effect:

Jamque pedem referens ‖ caſus e|vaſerat omnes.

Again:

| Qualis populea ‖ mœrens Philo|mela ſub umbra

Again:

Ludere que vellem ‖ calamo per|miſit agreſti.

Lines, however, where words are left entire, without being divided even by a ſemipauſe, run by that means much the more ſweetly.

Nec gemere aerea ‖ ceſſabit|turtur ab ulmo.

Again:

Again:

Quadrupedante putrem || sonitu quatit | ungula campum.

Again:

Eurydicen toto || referebant | flumine ripæ.

The reason of these observations will be evident upon the slightest reflection. Between things so intimately connected in reading aloud, as are sense and sound, every degree of discord is unpleasant to the ear: and for that reason, it is a matter of importance, to make the musical pauses coincide as much as possible with those of the sense; which is requisite, more especially, with respect to the pause, a deviation from the rule being less remarkable in a semipause. Considering the matter as to melody solely, it is indifferent whether the pauses be at the end of words or in the middle; but when we carry the sense along, it is disagreeable to find a word split into two by a pause, as if there were really two words: and though the disagreeableness here be connected with the sense only, it is by an easy transition of perceptions transferred to the sound; by which means, we conceive a line to be harsh and grating to the ear, when in reality it is only so to the understanding *.

To the rule that fixes the pause after the 5th portion, there is one exception, and not more: if the syllable succeeding the 5th portion be short, the pause is sometimes postponed to it:

Pupillis quos dura || premit custodia matrum

Again:

In terras oppressa || gravi sub religione

Again:

Et quorum pars magna || fui; quis talia fando

This contributes to diversify the melody; and where the words are smooth and liquid, is not ungraceful; as in the following examples:

Formosam resonare || doces Amaryllida sylvas

Again:

Agricolas, quibus ipsa || procul discordibus armis

If

* See chap. 2. part 1. sect. 5.

If this pauſe, placed as aforeſaid after the ſhort ſyllable, happen alſo to divide a word, the melody by theſe circumſtances is totally annihilated: witneſs the following line of Ennius, which is plain proſe:

Romæ mœnia terruſſit impiger | Hannibal armis.

Hitherto the arrangement of the long and ſhort ſyllables of an Hexameter line and its different pauſes, have been conſidered with reſpect to melody: but to have a juſt notion of Hexameter verſe, theſe particulars muſt alſo be conſidered with reſpect to ſenſe. There is not perhaps in any other ſort of verſe, ſuch latitude in the long and ſhort ſyllables; a circumſtance that contributes greatly to that richneſs of melody which is remarkable in Hexameter verſe, and which made Ariſtotle pronounce, that an epic poem in any other verſe would not ſucceed*. One defect however muſt not be diſſembled, that the ſame means which contribute to the richneſs of the melody, render it leſs fit than ſeveral other ſorts for a narrative poem. With regard to the melody, as above obſerved, there cannot be a more artful contrivance than to cloſe an Hexameter line with two long ſyllables preceded by two ſhort: but unhappily this conſtruction proves a great embarraſſment to the ſenſe; which will thus be evident. As in general, there ought to be a ſtrict concordance between the thought and the words in which it is dreſſed; ſo in particular, every cloſe in the ſenſe ought to be accompanied with a ſimilar cloſe in the ſound. In proſe this law may be ſtrictly obſerved; but in verſe the ſame ſtrictneſs would occaſion inſuperable difficulties: willing to ſacrifice to the melody of verſe, ſome ſhare of the concordance between thought and expreſſion, we freely excuſe the ſeparation of the muſical pauſe from that of the ſenſe, during the courſe of a line; but the cloſe of an Hexameter line is too conſpicuous to admit this liberty: for that reaſon there ought always to be ſome pauſe in the ſenſe at the end of every Hexameter line, were it but ſuch a pauſe as is marked with a comma: and for the ſame reaſon, there ought never to be a full cloſe in the ſenſe but at the end of a line, becauſe there the melody is cloſed. An Hexameter

* Poet. cap. 25.

ameter line, to preſerve its melody, cannot well admit any greater relaxation; and yet in a narrative poem, it is extremely difficult to adhere ſtrictly to the rule even with theſe indulgences. Virgil, the chief of poets for verſification, is forc'd often to end a line without any cloſe in the ſenſe, and as often to cloſe the ſenſe during the running of a line: though a cloſe in the melody during the movement of the thought, or a cloſe in the thought during the movement of the melody, cannot be agreeable.

The accent, to which we proceed, is not leſs eſſential than the other circumſtances above handled. By a good ear it will be diſcerned, that in every line there is one ſyllable diſtinguiſhable from the reſt by a capital accent: that ſyllable making the 7th portion, is invariably long; and in point of time occupies a place nearly at an equal diſtance from the pauſe, which ſucceeds the 5th portion, and the ſemipauſe, which ſucceeds the 8th.

Nec bene promeritis ‖ capitûr nec|tangitur ira

Again:

Non ſibi ſed toto ‖ genitûm ſe|credere mundo

Again:

Qualis ſpelunca ‖ ſubitó com|mota columba

In theſe examples, the accent is laid upon the laſt ſyllable of a word; which is favourable to the melody in the following reſpect, that the pauſe, which for the ſake of reading diſtinctly muſt follow every word, gives opportunity to prolong the accent And for that reaſon, a line thus accented, has a more ſpirited air, than where the accent is placed on any other ſyllable. Compare the foregoing lines with the following.

Alba neque Aſſyrio ‖ fucâtur | lana veneno

Again:

Panditur interea ‖ domus omnipo|tentis Olympi

Again:

Olli ſedato ‖ reſpondit | corde Latinus

In lines where the pauſe comes after the ſhort ſyllable ſucceeding the 5th portion, the accent is diſplaced, and rendered leſs ſenſible: it ſeems to be ſplit into two,

and to be laid partly on the 5th portion, and partly on the 7th, its uſual place; as in

Nuda genu, nodoque || ſinûs col|lecta fluentes

Again:

Formoſam reſonâre || docês Amar|yllida ſylvas

Beſide this capital accent, ſlighter accents are laid upon other portions; particularly upon the 4th, unleſs where it conſiſts of two ſhort ſyllables; upon the 9th, which is always a long ſyllable; and upon the 11th, where the line concludes with a monoſyllable. Such concluſion, by the by, impairs the melody, and for that reaſon is not to be indulged unleſs where it is expreſſive of the ſenſe. The following lines are marked with all the accents.

Ludere quæ vêllem calamô permîſit agreſti

Again:

Et duræ quêrcus ſudâbunt rôſcida mella

Again:

Parturiunt môntes, naſcêtur rîdiculûs mus

Inquiring into the melody of Hexameter verſe, we ſoon diſcover, that order or arrangement doth not conſtitute the whole of it; for when we compare different lines, equally regular as to the ſucceſſion of long and ſhort ſyllables, the melody is found in very different degrees of perfection; which is not occaſioned by any particular combination of Dactyles and Spondees, or of long and ſhort ſyllables, becauſe we find lines where Dactyles prevail and lines where Spondees prevail, equally melodious. Of the former take the following inſtance:

Æneadum genitrix hominum divumqûe voluptas.

Of the latter:

Molli paulatim flaveſcet campus ariſta.

What can be more different as to melody than the two following lines, which, however, as to the ſucceſſion of long and ſhort ſyllables, are conſtructed preciſely in the ſame manner?

Spond. Dact. Spond. Spond. Dact. Spond.
Ad talos nola dimiſſa et circumdata palla. *Hor.*

Spond.

Spond. Dact. Spond. Spond. Dact. Spond.
Placatumque nitet diffuſo lumine cœlum. *Lucret.*

In the former, the pauſe falls in the middle of a word, which is a great blemiſh, and the accent is diſturbed by a harſh eliſion of the vowel *a* upon the particle *et*. In the latter the pauſes and the accent are all of them diſtinct and full: there is no eliſion: and the words are more liquid and ſounding. In theſe particulars conſiſts the beauty of an Hexameter line with reſpect to melody; and by neglecting theſe, many lines in the Satires and Epiſtles of Horace are leſs agreeable than plain proſe; for they are neither the one nor the other in perfection: to draw melody from theſe lines, they muſt be pronounced without relation to the ſenſe, it muſt not be regarded, that words are divided by pauſes, nor that harſh eliſions are multiplied. To add to the account, proſaic low-ſounding words are introduced; and which is ſtill worſe, accents are laid on them. Of ſuch faulty lines take the following inſtances.

Candida rectaque ſit, munda hactenus ſit neque longa.
Jupiter exclamat ſimul atque audivit; at in ſe.
Cuſtodes, lectica, cinifones, paraſitæ.
Optimus eſt modulator, ut Alfenus Vafer omni.
Nunc illud tantum quæram, meritone tibi ſit.

Next in order comes Engliſh Heroic verſe, which ſhall be examined under the whole five heads, of number, quantity, arrangement, pauſe, and accent. This verſe is of two kinds; one named *rhyme* or *metre*, and one *blank verſe*. In the former, the lines are connected two and two by ſimilarity of ſound in the final ſyllables; and two lines ſo connected are termed a *couplet*: ſimilarity of ſound being avoided in the latter, couplets are baniſhed. Theſe two ſorts muſt be handled ſeparately, becauſe there are many peculiarities in each. Beginning with rhyme or metre, the firſt article ſhall be diſcuſſed in a few words. Every line conſiſts of ten ſyllables, five ſhort and five long; from which there are but two exceptions, both of them rare. The firſt is, where each line of a couplet is made eleven ſyllables, by an additional ſhort ſyllable at the end:

There heroes' wits are kept in pond'rous vaſes,
And beaus' in ſnuff-boxes and tweezer-caſes.

The piece, you think, is incorrect? Why, take it;
I'm all ſubmiſſion; what you'd have it, make it.

This licence is ſufferable in a ſingle couplet; but if frequent would give diſguſt.

The other exception concerns the ſecond line of a couplet, which is ſometimes ſtretched out to twelve ſyllables, termed an *Alexandrine line*:

A needleſs Alexandrine ends the ſong,
That, like a wounded ſnake, drags its ſlow length along.

It doth extremely well when employ'd to cloſe a period with a certain pomp and ſolemnity, where the ſubject makes that tone proper.

With regard to quantity, it is unneceſſary to mention a ſecond time, that the quantities employ'd in verſe are but two, the one double of the other; that every ſyllable is reducible to one or other of theſe ſtandards; and that a ſyllable of the larger quantity is termed *long*, and of the leſſer quantity *ſhort*. It belongs more to the preſent article, to examine what peculiarities there may be in the Engliſh language as to long and ſhort ſyllables. Every language has ſyllables that may be pronounced long or ſhort at pleaſure; but the Engliſh above all abounds in ſyllables of that kind: in words of three or more ſyllables, the quantity for the moſt part is invariable: the exceptions are more frequent in diſſyllables: but as to monoſyllables, they may, without many exceptions, be pronounced either long or ſhort; nor is the ear hurt by a liberty that is rendered familiar by cuſtom. This ſhows, that the melody of Engliſh verſe muſt depend leſs upon quantity, than upon other circumſtances: in which it differs widely from Latin verſe, where every ſyllable, having but one ſound, ſtrikes the ear uniformly with its accuſtomed impreſſion; and a reader muſt be delighted to find a number of ſuch ſyllables, diſpoſed ſo artfully as to be highly melodious. Syllables variable in quantity cannot poſſeſs this power; for though cuſtom may render familiar, both a long and a ſhort pronunciation of the ſame word; yet the mind wavering between the two ſounds, cannot be ſo much affected as where every ſyllable has one fixt ſound. What I have further to ſay upon quantity, will come more properly

properly under the following head, of arrangement.

And with reſpect to arrangement, which may be brought within a narrow compaſs, the Engliſh Heroic line is commonly Iambic, the firſt ſyllable ſhort, the ſecond long, and ſo on alternately through the whole line. One exception there is, pretty frequent, of lines, commencing with a Trochæus, *i. e.* a long and a ſhort ſyllable: but this affects not the order of the following ſyllables, which go on alternately as uſual, one ſhort and one long. The following couplet affords an example of each kind.

Sŏme ĭn thĕ fĭelds ŏf pūrĕſt æthĕr plāy,
And bāſk ănd whītĕn ĭn thĕ blāze ŏf dāy.

It is a great imperfection in Engliſh verſe, that it excludes the bulk of polyſyllables, which are the moſt ſounding words in our language; for very few of them have ſuch alternation of long and ſhort ſyllables as to correſpond to either of the arrangements mentioned. Engliſh verſe accordingly is almoſt totally reduced to diſſyllables and monoſyllables: *magnanimity* is a ſounding word totally excluded: *impetuoſity* is ſtill a finer word, by the reſemblance of the ſound and ſenſe; and yet a negative is put upon it, as well as upon numberleſs words of the ſame kind. Polyſyllables compoſed of ſyllables long and ſhort alternately, make a good figure in verſe; for example: *obſervance, opponent, oſtenſive, pindaric, productive, prolific*, and ſuch others of three ſyllables. *Imitation, imperfection, miſdemeanor, mitigation, moderation, obſervator, ornamental, regulator*, and others ſimilar of four ſyllables, beginning with two ſhort ſyllables, the third long, and the fourth ſhort, may find a place in a line commencing with a Trochæus. I know not if there be any of five ſyllables. One I know of ſix, *viz. miſinterpretation:* but words ſo compoſed are not frequent in our language.

One would not imagine without trial, how uncouth falſe quantity appears in verſe; not leſs than a provincial tone or idiom. The article *the* is one of the few monoſyllables that is invariably ſhort: ſee how harſh it makes a line where it muſt be pronounced long:

Thĭs nymph, tŏ thē dĕſtrūctiŏn ōf mănkĭnd,

Again:

Th' ădvēnt'rŏus bārŏn thē brĭght lŏcks ădmīr'd.

Let it be pronounced ſhort, and it reduces the melody almoſt to nothing: better ſo however than falſe quantity. In the following examples we perceive the ſame defect.

And old impertinence || expel by new.
With varying vanities || from ev'ry part.
Love in theſe labyrinths || his ſlaves detains.
New ſtratagems || the radiant lock to gain.
Her eyes half-languiſhing || half drown'd in tears.
Roar'd for the handkerchief || that caus'd his pain.
Paſſions like elements || though born to fight.

The great variety of melody conſpicuous in Engliſh verſe, ariſes chiefly from the pauſes and accents; which are of greater importance than is commonly thought. There is a degree of intricacy in this branch of our ſubject, and it will be difficult to give a diſtinct view of it; but it is too late to think of difficulties after we are engaged. The pauſe, which paves the way to the accent, offers itſelf firſt to our examination; and from a very ſhort trial, the following facts will be verified. 1ſt, A line admits but one capital pauſe. 2d, In different lines, we find this pauſe after the fourth ſyllable, after the fifth, after the ſixth, and after the ſeventh. Theſe four places of the pauſe lay a ſolid foundation for dividing Engliſh Heroic lines into four kinds; and I warn the reader beforehand, that unleſs he attend to this diſtinction, he cannot have any juſt notion of the richneſs and variety of Engliſh verſification. Each kind or order hath a melody peculiar to itſelf, readily diſtinguiſhable by a good ear; and I am not without hopes to make the cauſe of this peculiarity ſufficiently evident. It muſt be obſerved, at the ſame time, that the pauſe cannot be made indifferently at any of the places mentioned: it is the ſenſe that regulates the pauſe, as will be ſeen more fully afterward; and conſequently, it is the ſenſe that determines of what order every line muſt be: there can be but one capital muſical pauſe in a line; and that pauſe ought to coincide, if poſſible, with a pauſe in the ſenſe,

ſenſe, in order that the ſound may accord with the ſenſe.

What is ſaid ſhall be illuſtrated by examples of each ſort or order. And firſt of the pauſe after the fourth ſyllable:

Back through the paths || of pleaſing ſenſe I ran

Again,

Profuſe of bliſs || and pregnant with delight

After the 5th:

So when an angel || by divine command,
With riſing tempeſts || ſhakes a guilty land.

After the 6th:

Speed the ſoft intercourſe || from ſoul to ſoul

Again,

Then from his cloſing eyes || thy form ſhall part

After the 7th:

And taught the doubtful battle || where to rage

Again,

And in the ſmooth deſcription || murmur ſtill

Beſide the capital pauſe now mentioned, inferior pauſes will be diſcovered by a nice ear. Of theſe there are commonly two in each line; one before the capital pauſe, and one after it. The former comes invariably after the firſt long ſyllable, whether the line begin with a long ſyllable or a ſhort. The other in its variety imitates the capital pauſe: in ſome lines it comes after the 6th ſyllable, in ſome after the 7th, and in ſome after the 8th. Of theſe ſemipauſes take the following examples.

1ſt and 8th:

Led | through a ſad || variety | of wo.

1ſt and 7th:

Still | on that breaſt || enamour'd | let me lie

2d and 8th:

From ſtorms | a ſhelter || and from heat | a ſhade

2d and 6th:

Let wealth | let honour || wait | the wedded dame

2d and 7th:

Above | all pain || all paſſion | and all pride

Even from theſe few examples it appears, that the place of the laſt ſemipauſe, like that of the full pauſe, is directed in a good meaſure by the ſenſe. Its proper place with reſpect to the melody is after the 8th ſyllable, ſo as to finiſh the line with an Iambus diſtinctly pronounced, which, by a long ſyllable after a ſhort, is a preparation for reſt: but ſometimes it comes after the 6th, and ſometimes after the 7th ſyllable, in order to avoid a pauſe in the middle of a word, or between two words intimately connected; and ſo far melody is juſtly ſacrificed to ſenſe.

In diſcourſing of Hexameter verſe, it was laid down as a rule, That a full pauſe ought never to divide a word: ſuch licence deviates too far from the coincidence that ought to be between the pauſes of ſenſe and of melody. The ſame rule muſt obtain in an Engliſh line; and we ſhall ſupport reaſon by experiments:

A noble ſuper‖fluity it craves.
Abhor, a perpe‖tuity ſhould ſtand.

Are theſe lines diſtinguiſhable from proſe? Scarcely, I think.

The ſame rule is not applicable to a ſemipauſe, which being ſhort and faint, is not ſenſibly diſagreeable when it divides a word.

Relent|leſs walls ‖ whoſe darkſome round | contains.
For her | white virgins ‖ hyme|neals ſing.
In theſe | deep ſolitudes ‖ and aw|ful cells.

It muſt however be acknowledged, that the melody here ſuffers in ſome degree: a word ought to be pronounced without any reſt between its component ſyllables: the ſemipauſe muſt bend to this rule, and thereby ſcarce remains ſenſible.

With regard to the capital pauſe, it is ſo eſſential to the melody, that a poet cannot be too nice in the choice of its place, in order to have it clear and diſtinct. It cannot be in better company than with a pauſe in the ſenſe; and if the ſenſe require but a comma after the fourth, fifth, ſixth, or ſeventh ſyllable, it is ſufficient for the muſical pauſe. But to make ſuch coincidence eſſential, would cramp verſification too much; and we have

have experience for our authority, that there may be a pauſe in the melody where the ſenſe requires none. We muſt not however imagine, that a muſical pauſe may come after any word indifferently: ſome words, like ſyllables of the ſame word, are ſo intimately connected, as not to bear a ſeparation even by a pauſe: the ſeparating, for example, a ſubſtantive from its article would be harſh and unpleaſant: witneſs the following line, which cannot be pronounced with a pauſe as marked,

If Delia ſmile, the || flow'rs begin to ſpring.

But ought to be pronounced in the following manner,

If Delia ſmile, || the flow'rs begin to ſpring.

If then it be not a matter of indifferency where to make the pauſe, there ought to be rules for determining what words may be ſeparated by a pauſe, and what are incapable of ſuch ſeparation. I ſhall endeavour to aſcertain theſe rules; not chiefly for their utility, but in order to unfold ſome latent principles, that tend to regulate our taſte even where we are ſcarce ſenſible of them: and to that end, the method that appears the moſt promiſing, is to run over the verbal relations, beginning with the moſt intimate. The firſt that preſents itſelf, is that of adjective and ſubſtantive, being the relation of ſubject and quality, the moſt intimate of all: and with reſpect to ſuch intimate companions, the queſtion is, Whether they can bear to be ſeparated by a pauſe. What occurs is, that a quality cannot exiſt independent of a ſubject; nor are they ſeparable even in imagination, becauſe they make parts of the ſame idea: and for that reaſon, with reſpect to melody as well as ſenſe, it muſt be diſagreeable, to beſtow upon the adjective a ſort of independent exiſtence, by interjecting a pauſe between it and its ſubſtantive. I cannot therefore approve the following lines, nor any of the ſort; for to my taſte they are harſh and unpleaſant:

Of thouſand bright || inhabitants of air.
The ſprites of fiery || termagants inflame.
The reſt, his many colour'd || robe conceal'd.
The ſame, his antient || perſonage to deck.
Ev'n here, where frozen || Chaſtity retires.

I ſit, with ſad || civility, I read.
Back to my native || moderation ſlide.
Or ſhall we ev'ry || decency confound.
Time was, a ſober || Engliſhman would knock.
And place, on good || ſecurity, his gold.
Taſte, that eternal || wanderer, which flies.
But ere the tenth || revolving day was run.
Firſt let the juſt || equivalent be paid.
Go, threat thy thy earth-born || Myrmidons; but here.
Haſte to the fierce || Achilles' tent (he cries).
All but the ever-wakeful || eyes of Jove.
Your own reſiſtleſs || eloquence employ.

I have upon this article multiplied examples, that in a caſe where I have the misfortune to diſlike what paſſes current in practice, every man upon the ſpot may judge by his own taſte. And to taſte I appeal; for though the foregoing reaſoning appears to me juſt, it is however too ſubtile to afford conviction in oppoſition to taſte.

Conſidering this matter ſuperficially, one might be apt to imagine, that it muſt be the ſame, whether the adjective go firſt, which is the natural order, or the ſubſtantive, which is indulged by the laws of inverſion. But we ſoon diſcover this to be a miſtake: colour, for example, cannot be conceived independent of the ſurface coloured; but a tree may be conceived, as growing in a certain ſpot, as of a certain kind, and as ſpreading its extended branches all around, without ever thinking of its colour. In a word, a ſubject may be conſidered with ſome of its qualities independent of others; though we cannot form an image of any ſingle quality independent of the ſubject. Thus then, though an adjective named firſt be inſeparable from the ſubſtantive, the propoſition does not reciprocate: an image can be formed of the ſubſtantive independent of the adjective; and for that reaſon, they may be ſeparated by a pauſe, when the ſubſtantive takes the lead.

For thee the fates || ſeverely kind ordain.
And curs'd with hearts || unknowing how to yield.

The verb and adverb are preciſely in the ſame condition

dition with the ſubſtantive and adjective. An adverb, which modifies the action expreſſed by the verb, is not ſeparable from the verb even in imagination; and therefore I muſt alſo give up the following lines.

And which it much || becomes you to forget.
'Tis one thing madly || to diſperſe my ſtore.

But an action may be conceived with ſome of its modifications, leaving out others, preciſely as a ſubject may be conceived with ſome of its qualities, leaving out others; and therefore, when by inverſion the verb is firſt introduced, it has no bad effect to interject a pauſe between it and the adverb which follows: this may be done at the cloſe of a line, where the pauſe is at leaſt as full as that is which divides the line:

While yet he ſpoke, the Prince advancing drew.
Nigh to the lodge, *&c.*

The agent and its action come next, expreſſed in grammar by the active ſubſtantive and its verb Between theſe, placed in their natural order, there is no difficulty of interjecting a pauſe: an active being is not always in motion, and therefore it is eaſily ſeparable in idea from its action: when in a ſentence the ſubſtantive takes the lead, we know not that action is to follow; and as reſt muſt precede the commencement of motion, this interval is a proper opportunity for a pauſe.

But when by inverſion the verb is placed firſt, is it lawful to ſeparate it by a pauſe from the active ſubſtantive? I anſwer, Not; becauſe an action is not in idea ſeparable from the agent, more than a quality from the ſubject to which it belongs. Two lines of the firſt rate for beauty, have always appeared to me exceptionable, upon account of the pauſe thus interjected between the verb and the conſequent ſubſtantive; and I have now diſcovered a reaſon to ſupport my taſte:

In theſe deep ſolitudes and awful cells,
Where heav'nly-penſive || Contemplation dwells,
And ever-muſing || Melancholy reigns.

The point of the greateſt delicacy regards the active verb and the paſſive ſubſtantive placed in their natural order. On the one hand, it will be obſerved, that theſe words

words ſignify things which are not ſeparable in idea: killing cannot be conceived without a being that is put to death, nor painting without a ſurface upon which the colours are ſpread. On the other hand, an action and the thing on which it is exerted, are not, like ſubject and quality, united in one individual object: the active ſubſtantive is perfectly diſtinct from that which is paſſive; and they are connected by one circumſtance only, that the action exerted by the former, is exerted upon the latter. This makes it poſſible to take the action to pieces, and to conſider it firſt with relation to the agent, and next with relation to the patient. But after all, ſo intimately connected are the parts of the thought, that it requires an effort to make a ſeparation even for a moment: the ſubtiliſing to ſuch a degree is not agreeable, eſpecially in works of imagination. The beſt poets however, taking advantage of this ſubtilty, ſcruple not to ſeparate by a pauſe an active verb from the thing upon which it is exerted. Such pauſes in a long work may be indulged; but taken ſingly, they certainly are not agreeable; and I appeal to the following examples.

The peer now ſpreads || the glitt'ring forfex wide.
As ever ſully'd || the fair face of light.
Repair'd to ſearch || the gloomy cave of Spleen.
Nothing, to make || philoſophy thy friend.
Shou'd chance to make || the well dreſs'd rabble ſtare.
Or croſs, to plunder || provinces, the main.
Theſe madmen ever hurt || the church or ſtate.
How ſhall we fill || a library with wit.
What better teach || a foreigner the tongue.
Sure, if I ſpare || the miniſter, no rules.
Of honour bind me, not to maul his tools.

On the other hand, when the paſſive ſubſtantive is by inverſion firſt named, there is no difficulty of interjecting a pauſe between it and the verb, more than when the active ſubſtantive is firſt named. The ſame reaſon holds in both, that tho' a verb cannot be ſeparated in idea from the ſubſtantive which governs it, and ſcarcely from the ſubſtantive it governs; yet a ſubſtantive may always be conceived independent of the verb: when the paſſive

paſſive ſubſtantive is introduced before the verb, we know not that an action is to be exerted upon it; therefore we may reſt till the action commences. For the ſake of illuſtration take the following examples.

Shrines! where their vigils ‖ pale-ey'd virgins keep.
Soon as thy letters ‖ trembling I unclose.
No happier taſk ‖ theſe faded eyes purſue.

What is ſaid about the pauſe, leads to a general obſervation: That the natural order of placing the active ſubſtantive and its verb, is more friendly to a pauſe than the inverted order; but that in all the other connections, inverſion affords by far a better opportunity for a pauſe. And hence one great advantage of blank verſe over rhyme; its privilege of inverſion giving it a much greater choice of pauſes, than can be had in the natural order of arrangement.

We now proceed to the ſlighter connections, which ſhall be diſcuſſed in one general article. Words connected by conjunctions and prepoſitions admit freely a pauſe between them, which will be clear from the following inſtances:

Aſſume what ſexes ‖ and what ſhape they pleaſe.
The light militia ‖ of the lower ſky.

Connecting particles were invented to unite in a period two ſubſtantives ſignifying things occaſionally united in the thought, but which have no natural union: and between two things not only ſeparable in idea, but really diſtinct, the mind, for the ſake of melody, chearfully admits by a pauſe a momentary disjunction of their occaſional union.

One capital branch of the ſubject is ſtill upon hand, to which I am directed by what is juſt now ſaid. It concerns thoſe parts of ſpeech which ſingly repreſent no idea, and which become not ſignificant till they be joined to other words: I mean conjunctions, prepoſitions, articles, and ſuch like acceſſories, paſſing under the name of *particles*. Upon theſe the queſtion occurs, Whether they can be ſeparated by a pauſe from the words that make them ſignificant? whether, for example, in the following lines, the ſeparation of the acceſſory

ceſſory prepoſition from the principal ſubſtantive, be according to rule?

The goddeſs with || a diſcontented air.
And heighten'd by || the diamond's circling rays.
When victim's at || yon altar's foot we lay.
So take it in || the very words of Creech.
An enſign of || the delegates of Jove.
Two ages o'er || his native realm he reign'd.
While angels, with || their ſilver wings o'erſhade.

Or the ſeparation of the conjunction from the word that is connected by it with the antecedent word:

Talthybius and || Eurybates the good.

It will be obvious at the firſt glance, that the foregoing reaſoning upon objects naturally connected, are not applicable to words which of themſelves are mere cyphers: we muſt therefore have recourſe to ſome other principle for ſolving the preſent queſtion. Theſe particles out of their place are totally inſignificant: to give them a meaning, they muſt be joined to certain words; and the neceſſity of this junction, together with cuſtom, forms an artificial connection that has a ſtrong influence upon the mind: it cannot bear even a momentary ſeparation, which deſtroys the ſenſe, and is at the ſame time contradictory to practice. Another circumſtance tends ſtill more to make this ſeparation diſagreeable in lines of the firſt and third order, that it bars the accent, which will be explained afterward, in treating of the accent.

Hitherto we have diſcourſed upon that pauſe only which divides the line. We proceed to the pauſe that concludes the line; and the queſtion is, Whether the ſame rules be applicable to both. This muſt be anſwered by making a diſtinction. In the firſt line of a couplet, the concluding pauſe differs little, if at all, from the pauſe which divides the line; and for that reaſon, the rules are applicable to both equally The concluding pauſe of the couplet, is in a different condition: it reſembles greatly the concluding pauſe in an Hexameter line: both of them indeed are ſo remarkable, that they never can be graceful, unleſs when they accompany

company a pauſe in the ſenſe. Hence it follows, that a couplet ought always to be finiſhed with ſome cloſe in the ſenſe; if not a point, at leaſt a comma. The truth is, that this rule is ſeldom tranſgreſſed: in Pope's works I find very few deviations from the rule: take the following inſtances.

Nothing is foreign: parts relate to whole;
One all extending, all-preſerving ſoul.
Connects each being——

Another:

To draw freſh colours from the vernal flow'rs,
To ſteal from rainbows ere they drop in ſhow'rs,
A brighter waſh——

I add with reſpect to pauſes in general, that ſuppoſing the connection to be ſo ſlender as to admit a pauſe, it follows not that a pauſe may in every ſuch caſe be admitted. There is one rule to which every other ought to bend. That the ſenſe muſt never be wounded or obſcured by the muſic; and upon that account I condemn the following lines:

Ulyſſes, firſt || in public cares, ſhe found,

And,

Who riſing, high || th' imperial ſceptre rais'd.

With reſpect to inverſion, it appears, both from reaſon and experiments, that many words which cannot bear a ſeparation in their natural order, admit a pauſe when inverted. And it may be added, that when two words, or two members of a ſentence, in their natural order, can be ſeparated by a pauſe, ſuch ſeparation can never be amiſs in an inverted order. An inverted period, which deviates from the natural train of ideas, requires to be marked in ſome meaſure even by pauſes in the ſenſe, that the parts may be diſtinctly known. Take the following examples.

As with cold lips || I kiſs'd the ſacred veil.
With other beauties || charm my partial eyes.
Full in my view || ſet all the bright abode.
With words like theſe || the troops Ulyſſes rul'd.
Back to th' aſſembly roll || the thronging train.

Not

Not for their grief || the Grecian hoft I blame.

The fame where the feparation is made at the clofe of the firft line of the coup'let:

For fpirits freed from mortal laws, with eafe,
Aſſume what texes and what fhapes they pleaſe.

The pauſe is tolerable even at the clofe of the coup'let, for the reaſon juſt now ſuggeſted, that inverted members require ſome ſlight pauſe in the ſenſe:

'Twas where the plane-tree ſpread its ſhades around:
The altars heav'd; and from the crumbling ground
A mighty dragon ſhot.

Thus a train of reaſoning hath inſenſibly led us to concluſions with regard to the muſical pauſe, very different from thoſe in the firſt ſection, concerning the ſeparating by an interjected circumſtance words intimately connected. One would conjecture, that where-ever words are ſeparable by interjecting a circumſtance, they ſhould be equally ſeparable by interjecting a pauſe: but, upon a more narrow inſpection, the appearance of analogy vaniſheth. This will be evident from conſidering, that a pauſe in the ſenſe diſtinguiſhes the different members of a period from each other; whereas when two words of the ſame member are ſeparated by a circumſtance, all the three make ſtill but one member; and therefore that words may be ſeparated by an interjected circumſtance, though theſe words are not ſeparated by a pauſe in the ſenſe. This ſets the matter in a clear light; for, as obſerved above, a muſical pauſe is intimately connected with a pauſe in the ſenſe, and ought, as far as poſſible, to be governed by it: particularly a muſical pauſe ought never to be placed where a pauſe is excluded by the ſenſe, as, for example, between the adjective and following ſubſtantive, which make parts of the ſame idea; and ſtill leſs between a particle and the word that makes it ſignificant.

Abſtracting at preſent from the peculiarity of melody ariſing from the different pauſes, it cannot fail to be obſerved in general, that they introduce into our verſe no ſlight degree of variety. A number of uniform lines having all the ſame pauſe, are extremely fatiguing, which is

is remarkable in the French verſification. This imperfection will be diſcerned by a fine ear even in the ſhorteſt ſucceſſion, and becomes intolerable in a long poem. Pope excels in the variety of his melody, which indeed is not leſs perfect of its kind than that of Virgil.

From what is laſt ſaid, there ought to be one exception: uniformity in the members of a thought, demands equal uniformity in the verbal members which expreſs that thought. When therefore reſembling objects or things are expreſſed in a plurality of verſe-lines, theſe lines in their ſtructure ought to be as uniform as poſſible, and the pauſes in particular ought all of them to have the ſame place. Take the following examples.

By foreign hands || thy dying eyes were clos'd,
By foreign hands || thy decent limbs compos'd,
By foreign hands || thy humble grave adorn'd.

Again:

Bright as the ſun || her eyes the gazers ſtrike,
And, like the ſun, || they ſhine on all alike.

Speaking of Nature, or the God of Nature:

Warms in the ſun || refreſhes in the breeze,
Glows in the ſtars || and bloſſoms in the trees,
Lives through all life || extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided || operates unſpent.

Pauſes are like to remain longer upon hand than was expected; for the ſubject is not yet exhauſted. It is laid down above, that Engliſh Heroic verſe admits no more but four capital pauſes; and that the capital pauſe of every line is determined by the ſenſe to be after the fourth, the fifth, the ſixth, or ſeventh ſyllable. That this doctrine holds true ſo far as melody alone is concerned, will be teſtify'd by every good ear. At the ſame time I admit, that this rule may be varied where the ſenſe or expreſſion requires a variation; and that ſo far the melody may juſtly be ſacrificed. Examples accordingly are not unfrequent, in Milton eſpecially, of the capital pauſe being after the firſt, the ſecond, or the third ſyllable. And that this licence may be taken, even gracefully, when it adds vigor to the expreſſion, will be clear from the following example. Pope, in his

tranſlation

tranſlation of Homer, deſcribes a rock broke off from a mountain, and hurling to the plain, in the following words.

From ſteep to ſteep the rolling ruin bounds;
At every ſhock the crackling wood reſounds;
Still gath'ring force, it ſmokes; and urg'd amain,
Whirls, leaps, and thunders down, impetuous to the plain:
There ſtops || So Hector. Their whole force he prov'd,
Reſiſtleſs when he rag'd; and when he ſtopt, unmov'd.

In the penult line the proper place of the muſical pauſe is at the end of the fifth ſyllable; but it enlivens the expreſſion by its coincidence with that of the ſenſe at the end of the ſecond ſyllable: the ſtopping ſhort before the uſual pauſe in the melody, aids the impreſſion that is made by the deſcription of the ſtone's ſtopping ſhort; and what is loſt to the melody by this artifice, is more than compenſated by the force that is added to the deſcription. Milton makes a happy uſe of this licence: witneſs the following examples from his *Paradiſe loſt.*

——————Thus with the year
Seaſons return, but not to me returns
Day || or the ſweet approach of even or morn.

Celeſtial voices to the midnight air
Sole || or reſponſive each to others note.

And over them triumphant Death his dart
Shook || but delay'd to ſtrike.

————————And wild uproar
Stood rul'd || ſtood vaſt infinitude confin'd.

——————And hard'ning in his ſtrength
Glories || for never ſince created man
Met ſuch embodied force.

From his ſlack hand the garland wreath'd for Eve
Down drop'd || and all the faded roſes ſhed.

Of uneſſential night, receives him next,
Wide gaping || and with utter loſs of being
Threatens him, &c.

————————————For now the thought
Both of loſt happineſs and laſting pain
Torments him || round he throws his baleful eyes, &c.

If

If we conſider the foregoing paſſages with reſpect to melody ſingly, the pauſes are undoubtedly out of their proper place; but being united with thoſe of the ſenſe, they inforce the expreſſion, and enliven it greatly; for, as has been more than once obſerved, the beauty of expreſſion is communicated to the ſound, which, by a natural deception, makes even the melody appear more perfect than if the muſical pauſes were regular.

To explain the rules of accenting, two general obſervations muſt be premiſed. The firſt is, that accents have a double effect: they contribute to the melody, by giving it air and ſpirit: they contribute not leſs to the ſenſe, by diſtinguiſhing important words from others *. Theſe two effects can never be ſeparated, without impairing the concord that ought to ſubſiſt between the thought and the melody: an accent, for example, placed on a low word, has the effect to burleſque it, by giving it an unnatural elevation; and the injury thus done to the ſenſe does dot reſt there, for it ſeems alſo to injure the melody. Let us only reflect what a ridiculous figure a particle muſt make with an accent or emphaſis put upon it, a particle that of itſelf has no meaning, and that ſerves only, like cement, to unite words ſignificant. The other general obſervation is, That a word of whatever number of ſyllables, is not accented upon more than one of them. The reaſon is, that the object is ſet in its beſt light by a ſingle accent, ſo as to make more than one unneceſſary for the ſenſe: and if another be added, it muſt be for the ſound merely; which would be a tranſgreſſion of the foregoing rule, by ſeparating a muſical accent from that which is requiſite for the ſenſe.

Keeping in view the foregoing obſervations, the doctrine of accenting Engliſh Heroic verſe is extremely ſimple. In the firſt place, accenting is confined to the long ſyllables; for a ſhort ſyllable is not capable of an accent. In the next place, as the melody is enriched in proportion to the number of accents, every word that has a long ſyllable may be accented; unleſs the ſenſe interpoſe,

* An accent conſidered with reſpect to ſenſe is termed *emphaſis*.

terpoſe, which rejects the accenting a word that makes no figure by its ſignification. According to this rule, a line may admit five accents; a caſe by no means rare.

But ſuppoſing every long ſyllable to be accented, there is, in every line, one accent that makes a greater figure than the reſt, being that which precedes the capital pauſe. It is diſtinguiſhed into two kinds; one that is immediately ſucceeded by the pauſe, and one that is divided from the pauſe by a ſhort ſyllable. The former belongs to lines of the firſt and third order: the latter to thoſe of the ſecond and fourth. Examples of the firſt kind:

Smooth flow the wâves ‖ the zephyrs gently play,
Belinda ſmil'd ‖ and all the world was gay.
He rais'd his azure wând ‖ and thus began.

Examples of the other kind:

There lay three gârters ‖ half a pair of gloves,
And all the trophies ‖ of his former loves.
Our humble province ‖ is to tend the fair,
Not a leſs plêaſing ‖ though leſs glorious care.
And hew triumphal ârches ‖ to the ground.

Theſe accents make different impreſſions on the mind, which will be the ſubject of a following ſpeculation. In the mean time, it may be ſafely pronounced a capital defect in the compoſition of verſe, to put a low word, incapable of an accent, in the place where this accent ſhould be: this bars the accent altogether; than which I know no fault more ſubverſive of the melody, if it be not the barring a pauſe altogether. I may add affirmatively, that no ſingle circumſtance contributes more to the energy of verſe, than to have the place where this accent ſhould be, occupied by a word of an important ſignification, ſuch as merits a peculiar emphaſis. To ſhow the bad effect of excluding the capital accent, I refer the reader to ſome inſtances given above *, where particles are ſeparated by a pauſe from the capital words that make them ſignificant; and which particles ought, for the ſake of the melody, to be accented, were they capable

* Page 136.

capable of an accent. Add to theſe the following inſtances from the eſſay on Criticiſm.

Of leaving what || is natural and fit. *line* 448.
Not yet purg'd off, || of ſpleen and ſour diſdain. *l.* 528.
No pardon vile || obſcenity ſhould find. *l.* 531.
When love was all || an eaſy monarch's care. *l.* 537.
For 'tis but half || a judge's taſk, to know. *l* 562.
'Tis not enough, || taſte, judgment, learning, join. *l.* 563.
That only makes || ſuperior ſenſe belov'd. *l.* 578.
Whoſe right it is, || uncenſur'd, to be dull. *l.* 590.
'Tis beſt ſometimes || your cenſure to reſtrain. *l.* 597.

When this fault is at the end of a line that cloſes a couplet, it leaves not the leaſt trace of melody:

But of this frame the bearings, and the ties,
The ſtrong connections, nice dependencies.

In a line expreſſive of what is humble or dejected, it improves the reſemblance between the ſound and ſenſe to exclude the capital accent. This, to my taſte, is a beauty in the following lines.

In thêſe deep ſôlitudes || and awful cells
The poor inhâbitant || behôlds in vain

To conclude this article, the accents are not, like the ſyllables, confined to a certain number: ſome lines have no fewer than five, and there are lines that admit not above one. This variety, as we have ſeen, depends entirely on the different powers of the component words: particles, even where they are long by poſition, cannot be accented; and polyſyllables, whatever ſpace they occupy, admit but one accent. Polyſyllables have another defect, that they generally exclude the full pauſe. It is ſhown above, that few polyſyllables can find place in the conſtruction of Engliſh verſe; and here are reaſons for excluding them, could they find place.

I am now ready to fulfil a promiſe concerning the four ſorts of lines that enter into Engliſh Heroic verſe. That theſe have, each of them, a peculiar melody diſtinguiſhable by a good ear, I ventured to ſuggeſt, and promiſed to account for: and though the ſubject is extremely

tremely delicate, I am not without hopes of making good my engagement. But firſt, by way of precaution, I warn the candid reader not to expect this peculiarity of modulation in every inſtance. The reaſon why it is not always perceptible has been mentioned more than once, *viz.* that the thought and expreſſion have a great influence upon the melody; ſo great, as in many inſtances to make the pooreſt melody paſs for rich and ſpirited. This conſideration makes me inſiſt upon a conceſſion or two that will not be thought unreaſonable: firſt, That the experiment be tried upon lines equal with reſpect to the thought and expreſſion; for otherwiſe one may eaſily be miſled in judging of the melody: and next, That theſe lines be regularly accented before the pauſe; for upon a matter abundantly refined in itſelf, I would not willingly be embarraſſed with faulty and irregular lines.

Theſe preliminaries being adjuſted, I begin with ſome general obſervations, that will ſave repeating the ſame thing over and over upon each particular caſe. And, firſt, an accent ſucceeded by a pauſe, as in lines of the firſt and third order, makes a much greater figure than where the voice goes on without a ſtop. The fact is ſo certain, that no perſon who has an ear can be at a loſs to diſtinguiſh that accent from others. Nor have we far to ſeek for the efficient cauſe: the elevation of an accenting tone produceth in the mind a ſimilar elevation, which continues during the pauſe*: but where the pauſe is ſeparated from the accent by a ſhort ſyllable, as in lines of the ſecond and fourth order, the impreſſion made by the accent is more ſlight when there is no ſtop, and

* Hence the livelineſs of the French language as to ſound, above the Engliſh; the laſt ſyllable in the former being generally long and accented, the long ſyllable in the latter being generally as far back in the word as poſſible, and often without an accent. For this difference I find no cauſe ſo probable as temperament and diſpoſition; the French being briſk and lively, the Engliſh ſedate and reſerved: and this, if it hold, is a pregnant inſtance of a reſemblance between the character of a people and that of their language.

and the elevation of the accent is gone in a moment by the falling of the voice in pronouncing the ſhort ſyllable that follows. The pauſe alſo is ſenſibly affected by the poſition of the accent: in lines of the firſt and third order, the cloſe conjunction of the accent and pauſe, occaſions a ſudden ſtop without preparation, which rouſes the mind, and beſtows on the melody a ſpirited air: when, on the other hand, the pauſe is ſeparated from the accent by a ſhort ſyllable, which always happens in lines of the ſecond and fourth order, the pauſe is ſoft and gentle; for this ſhort unaccented ſyllable ſucceeding one that is accented, muſt of courſe be pronounced with a falling voice, which naturally prepares for a pauſe; and the mind falls gently from the accented ſyllable, and ſlides into reſt as it were inſenſibly. Further, the lines themſelves derive different powers from the poſition of the pauſe, which will thus appear. A pauſe after the fourth ſyllable divides the line into two unequal portions, of which the largeſt comes laſt: this circumſtance reſolving the line into an aſcending ſeries, makes an impreſſion in pronouncing like that of mounting upward; and to this impreſſion contributes the redoubled effort in pronouncing the largeſt portion, which is laſt in order. The mind has a different feeling when the pauſe ſucceeds the fifth ſyllable, which divides the line into two equal parts: theſe parts, pronounced with equal effort, are agreeable by their uniformity. A line divided by a pauſe after the ſixth ſyllable, makes an impreſſion oppoſite to that firſt mentioned: being divided into two unequal portions, of which the ſhorteſt is laſt in order, it appears like a ſlow deſcending ſeries; and the ſecond portion being pronounced with leſs effort than the firſt, the diminiſhed effort prepares the mind for reſt. And this preparation for reſt is ſtill more ſenſibly felt where the pauſe is after the ſeventh ſyllable, as in lines of the fourth order

To apply theſe obſervations is an eaſy taſk. A line of the firſt order is of all the moſt ſpirited and lively: the accent, being followed inſtantly by a pauſe, makes an illuſtrious figure: the elevated tone of the accent elevates the mind: the mind is ſupported in its elevation by the ſudden unprepared pauſe which rouſes and animates:

mates: and the line itſelf, repreſenting by its unequal diviſion an aſcending ſeries, carries the mind ſtill higher, making an impreſſion ſimilar to that of mounting upward. The ſecond order has a modulation ſenſibly ſweet, ſoft, and flowing: the accent is not ſo ſprightly as in the former, becauſe a ſhort ſyllable intervenes between it and the pauſe: its elevation, by the ſame means, vaniſheth inſtantaneouſly: the mind, by a falling voice, is gently prepared for a ſtop: and the pleaſure of uniformity from the diviſion of the line into two equal parts, is calm and ſweet. The third order has a modulation not ſo eaſily expreſſed in words: it in part reſembles the firſt order, by the livelineſs of an accent ſucceeded inſtantly by a full pauſe: but then the elevation occaſioned by this circumſtance, is balanced in ſome degree by the remitted effort in pronouncing the ſecond portion, which remitted effort has a tendency to reſt. Another circumſtance diſtinguiſheth it remarkably: its capital accent comes late, being placed on the ſixth ſyllable; and this circumſtance beſtows on it an air of gravity and ſolemnity. The laſt order reſembles the ſecond in the mildneſs of its accent, and ſofineſs of its pauſe; it is ſtill more ſolemn than the third, by the lateneſs of its capital accent: it alſo poſſeſſes in a higher degree than the third, the tendency to reſt; and by that circumſtance is of all the beſt qualified for cloſing a period in the completeſt manner.

But theſe are not all the diſtinguiſhing characters of the different orders. Each order alſo, is diſtinguiſhed by its final accent and pauſe: the unequal diviſion in the firſt order, makes an impreſſion of aſcending; and the mind at the cloſe is in the higheſt elevation, which naturally prompts it to put a ſtrong emphaſis upon the concluding ſyllable, whether by raiſing the voice to a ſharper tone, or by expreſſing the word in a fuller tone. This order accordingly is of all the leaſt proper for concluding a period, where a cadence is proper, and not an accent. The ſecond order, being deſtitute of the impreſſion of aſcent, cannot rival the firſt order in the elevation of its concluding accent, nor conſequently in the dignity of its concluding pauſe; for theſe have a mutual influence. This order, however, with reſpect to

to its close, maintains a superiority over the third and fourth orders: in these the close is more humble, being brought down by the impression of descent, and by the remitted effort in pronouncing; considerably in the third order, and still more considerably in the last. According to this description, the concluding accents and pauses of the four orders being reduced to a scale, will form a descending series probably in an arithmetical progression.

After what is said, will it be thought refining too much to suggest, that the different orders are qualified for different purposes, and that a poet of genius will be naturally led to make a choice accordingly? I cannot think this altogether chimerical. As it appears to me, the first order is proper for a sentiment that is bold, lively, or impetuous; the third order is proper for subjects grave, solemn, or lofty; the second for what are tender, delicate, or melancholy, and in general for all the sympathetic emotions; and the last for subjects of the same kind, when tempered with any degree of solemnity. I do not contend, that any one order is fitted for no other task than that assigned it; for at that rate, no sort of melody would be left for accompanying thoughts that have nothing peculiar in them. I only venture to suggest, and I do it with diffidence, that each of the orders is peculiarly adapted to certain subjects, and better qualified than the others for expressing such subjects. The best way to judge is by experiment; and to avoid the imputation of a partial search, I shall confine my instances to a single poem, beginning with the first order.

On her white breast, a sparkling cross she wore,
Which Jews might kiss, and infidels adore.
Her lively looks a sprightly mind disclose,
Quick as her eyes, and as unfix'd as those:
Favours to none, to all she smiles extends;
Oft she rejects, but never once offends.
Bright as the sun, her eyes the gazers strike,
And, like the sun, they shine on all alike.
Yet graceful ease, and sweetness void of pride,
Might hide her faults, if belles had faults to hide:
If to her share some female errors fall,
Look on her face, and you'll forget 'em all.

*Rape of the Lock.*

In accounting for the remarkable liveliness of this passage, it will be acknowledged by every one who has an ear, that the melody must come in for a share. The lines, all of them, are of the first order; a very unusual circumstance in the author of this poem, so eminent for variety in his versification. Who can doubt, that, in this passage, he has been led by delicacy of taste to employ the first order preferably to the others?

Second order.

Our humble province is to tend the fair,
Not a less pleasing, though less glorious care;
To save the powder from too rude a gale,
Nor let th' imprison'd essences exhale;
To draw fresh colours from the vernal flow'rs;
To steal from rainbows, ere they drop their show'rs, &c.

Again:

Oh, thoughtless mortals! ever blind to fate,
Too soon dejected, and too soon elate.
Sudden, these honours shall be snatch'd away,
And curs'd for ever this victorious day.

Third order.

To fifty chosen sylphs, of special note,
We trust th' important charge, the petticoat.

Again:

Oh say what stranger cause, yet unexplor'd,
Could make a gentle belle reject a lord?

A plurality of lines of the fourth order, would not have a good effect in succession; because, by a remarkable tendency to rest, their proper office is to close a period. The reader, therefore, must be satisfied with instances where this order is mixed with others.

Not louder shrieks to pitying Heav'n are cast,
When husbands, or when lap dogs, breathe their last.

Again:

Steel could the works of mortal pride confound,
And hew triumphal arches to the ground.

Again:

She sees, and trembles at th' approaching ill,
Just in the jaws of ruin, and codille.

Again:

Again:

With earneſt eyes, and round unthinking face,
He firſt the ſnuff-box open'd, then the caſe.

And this ſuggeſts another experiment, which is, to ſet the different orders more directly in oppoſition, by giving examples where they are mixed in the ſame paſſage.

Firſt and ſecond orders.

Sol through white curtains ſhot a tim'rous ray,
And ope'd thoſe eyes that muſt eclipſe the day.

Again:

Not youthful kings in battle ſeiz'd alive,
Not ſcornful virgins who their charms ſurvive,
Not ardent lovers robb'd of all their bliſs,
Not antient ladies when refus'd a kiſs,
Not tyrants fierce that unrepenting die,
Not Cynthia when her mantua's pin'd awry,
E'er felt ſuch rage, reſentment, and deſpair,
As thou, ſad virgin! for thy raviſh'd hair.

Firſt and third.

Think what an equipage thou haſt in air,
And view with ſcorn two pages and a chair.

Again:

What guards the purity of melting maids,
In courtly balls, and midnight maſquerades,
Safe from the treach'rous friend, the daring ſpark,
The glance by day, the whiſper in the dark?

Again:

With tender billet-doux he lights the pyre,
And breathes three am'rous ſighs to raiſe the fire;
Then proſtrate falls, and begs, with ardent eyes,
Soon to obtain, and long poſſeſs the prize.

Again:

Jove's thunder roars, heav'n trembles all around,
Blue Neptune ſtorms, the bellowing deeps reſound,
Earth ſhakes her nodding tow'rs, the ground gives way,
And the pale ghoſts ſtart at the flaſh of day!

Second and third.

Sunk in Thaleſtris' arms, the nymph he found,
Her eyes dejected, and her hair unbound.

Again:

On her heav'd boſom hung her drooping head,
Which with a ſigh ſhe rais'd; and thus ſhe ſaid.

Muſing on the foregoing ſubject, I begin to doubt whether all this while I have not been in a reverie, and whether the ſcene before me, full of objects new and ſingular, be not mere fairy-land. Is there any truth in the appearance, or is it wholly a work of imagination? We cannot doubt of its reality; and we may with aſſurance pronounce, that great is the merit of Engliſh Heroic verſe: for though uniformity prevails in the arrangement, in the equality of the lines, and in the reſemblance of the final ſounds; variety is ſtill more conſpicuous in the pauſes and in the accents, which are diverſified in a ſurpriſing manner. Of the beauty that reſults from a due mixture of uniformity and variety *, many inſtances have already occurred, but none more illuſtrious than Engliſh verſification: however rude it may be in the ſimplicity of its arrangement, it is highly melodious by its pauſes and accents, ſo as already to rival the moſt perfect ſpecies known in Greece or Rome; and it is no diſagreeable proſpect to find it ſuſceptible of ſtill greater refinement.

We proceed to blank verſe, which hath ſo many circumſtances in common with rhyme, that what is peculiar to it may be brought within a narrow compaſs. With reſpect to form, it differs from rhyme in rejecting the jingle of ſimilar ſounds, which purifies it from a childiſh pleaſure. But this improvement is a trifle compared with what follows. Our verſe is extremely cramped by rhyme; and the great advantage of blank verſe is, that, being free from the fetters of rhyme, it is at liberty to attend the imagination in its boldeſt flights. Rhyme neceſſarily divides verſe into couplets; each couplet makes a complete muſical period, the parts of which are divided by pauſes, and the whole ſummed up by a full cloſe at the end; the melody begins anew with the next couplet: and in this manner a compoſition in rhyme proceeds couplet after couplet. I have often had occaſion to mention the correſpondence and concord that ought to ſubſiſt between ſound and ſenſe;

* See chap. 9.

ſenſe; from which it is a plain inference, that if a couplet be a complete period with regard to melody, it ought regularly to be the ſame with regard to ſenſe. As it is extremely difficult to ſupport ſuch ſtrictneſs of compoſition, licences are indulged, as explained above; which however muſt be uſed with diſcretion, ſo as to preſerve ſome degree of concord between the ſenſe and the muſic: there ought never to be a full cloſe in the ſenſe but at the end of a couplet; and there ought always to be ſome pauſe in the ſenſe at the end of every couplet: the ſame period as to ſenſe may be extended through ſeveral couplets; but in that caſe each couplet ought to contain a diſtinct member, diſtinguiſhed by a pauſe in the ſenſe as well as in the ſound; and the whole ought to be cloſed with a complete cadence *. Rules ſuch as theſe, muſt confine rhyme within very narrow bounds: a thought of any extent, cannot be reduced within its compaſs; the ſenſe muſt be curtailed and broken into parts, to make it ſquare with the curtneſs of the melody; and beſide, ſhort periods afford no latitude for inverſion.

I have examined this point with the greater accuracy, in order to give a juſt notion of blank verſe; and to ſhow that a ſlight difference in form may produce a very great difference in ſubſtance. Blank verſe has the ſame pauſes and accents with rhyme, and a pauſe at the end of every line, like what concludes the firſt line of a couplet. In a word, the rules of melody in blank verſe, are the ſame that obtain with reſpect to the firſt line of a couplet; but being diſengaged from rhyme, or from couplets, there is acceſs to make every line run into another, preciſely as to make the firſt line of a couplet run into the ſecond. There muſt be a muſical pauſe at the end of every line; but this pauſe is ſo ſlight as not to require a pauſe in the ſenſe: and accordingly the ſenſe



* This rule is quite neglected in French verſification. Even Boileau makes no difficulty, to cloſe one ſubject with the firſt line of a couplet, and to begin a new ſubject with the ſecond. Such licence, however ſanctified by practice, is unpleaſant by the diſcordance between the pauſes of the ſenſe and of the melody.

may be carried on with or without pauſes, till a period of the utmoſt extent be completed by a full cloſe both in the ſenſe and the ſound: there is no reſtraint, other than that this full cloſe be at the end of a line; and this reſtraint is neceſſary in order to preſerve a coincidence between ſenſe and ſound, which ought to be aimed at in general, and is indiſpenſable in the caſe of a full cloſe, becauſe it has a ſtriking effect. Hence the aptitude of blank verſe for inverſion: and conſequently the luſtre of its pauſes and accents; for which, as obſerved above, there is greater ſcope in inverſion, than when words run in their natural order.

In the ſecond ſection of this chapter it is ſhown, that nothing contributes more than inverſion to the force and elevation of language: the couplets of rhyme confine inverſion within narrow limits; nor would the elevation of inverſion, were there acceſs for it in rhyme, readily accord with the humbler tone of that ſort of verſe. It is univerſally agreed, that the loftineſs of Milton's ſtyle ſupports admirably the ſublimity of his ſubject; and it is not leſs certain, that the loftineſs of his ſtyle ariſes chiefly from inverſion. Shakeſpear deals little in inverſion: but his blank verſe, being a ſort of meaſured proſe, is perfectly well adapted to the ſtage, where laboured inverſion is extremely improper, becauſe in dialogue it never can be natural.

Hitherto I have conſidered that ſuperior power of expreſſion which verſe acquires by laying aſide rhyme. But this is not the only ground for preferring blank verſe: it has another preferable quality not leſs ſignal; and that is, a more extenſive and more complete melody. Its muſic is not, like that of rhyme, confined to a ſingle couplet, but takes in a great compaſs, ſo as in ſome meaſure to rival muſic properly ſo called. The interval between its cadences may be long or ſhort at pleaſure; and, by that means, its melody, with reſpect both to richneſs and variety, is ſuperior far to that of rhyme; and ſuperior even to that of the Greek and Latin Hexameter. Of this obſervation no perſon can doubt who is acquainted with the *Paradiſe loſt*: in which work there are indeed many careleſs lines; but at every turn it ſhines out in the richeſt melody as well as in the ſublimeſt ſentiments. Take the following ſpecimen.

Now

Now Morn her roſy ſteps in th' eaſtern clime
Advancing, ſow'd the earth with orient pearl;
When Adam wak'd, ſo cuſtom'd, for his ſleep
Was aery light from pure digeſtion bred,
And temp'rate vapours bland, which th' only ſound
Of leaves and fuming rills, Aurora's fan,
Lightly diſpers'd, and the ſhrill matin ſong
Of birds on every bough; ſo much the more
His wonder was to find unwaken'd Eve
With treſſes diſcompos'd, and glowing cheek,
As through unquiet reſt: he on his ſide
Leaning half-rais'd, with looks of cordial love
Hung over her enamour'd, and beheld
Beauty, which, whether waking or aſleep,
Shot forth peculiar graces; then with voice
Mild, as when Zephyrus on Flora breathes,
Her hand ſoft touching, whiſper'd thus. Awake,
My faireſt, my eſpous'd, my lateſt found,
Heaven's laſt beſt gift, my ever-new delight,
Awake; the morning ſhines, and the freſh field
Calls us; we loſe the prime, to mark how ſpring
Our tender plants, how blows the citron grove,
What drops the myrrh, and what the balmy reed,
How nature paints her colours, how the bee
Sits on the bloom extracting liquid ſweet.

*Book 5. l. 1.*

Comparing Latin Hexameter with Engliſh Heroic rhyme, the former has obviouſly the advantage in the following particulars. It is greatly preferable as to arrangement, by the latitude it admits in placing the long and ſhort ſyllables. Secondly, the length of an Hexameter line hath a majeſtic air: ours, by its ſhortneſs is indeed more briſk and lively, but much leſs fitted for the ſublime. And, thirdly, the long high-ſounding words that Hexameter admits, add greatly to its majeſty. To compenſate theſe advantages, Engliſh rhyme poſſeſſes a greater number and greater variety both of pauſes and of accents. Theſe two ſorts of verſe ſtand indeed pretty much in oppoſition: in Hexameter, great variety of arrangement, none in the pauſes nor accents: in Engliſh rhyme, great variety in the pauſes and accents, very little in the arrangement.

In blank verſe are united, in a good meaſure, the ſeveral properties of Latin Hexameter and Engliſh rhyme; and it poſſeſſes beſide many ſignal properties of its own. It is not confined, like Hexameter, by a full cloſe at the end of every line; nor, like rhyme, by a full cloſe at the end of every couplet. Its conſtruction, which admits the lines to run into each other, gives it a ſtill greater majeſty than ariſes from the length of a Hexameter line. By the ſame means, it admits inverſion even beyond the Latin or Greek Hexameter; for theſe ſuffer ſome confinement by the regular cloſes at the end of every line. In its muſic it is illuſtrious above all: the melody of Hexameter verſe, is circumſcribed to a line; and of Engliſh rhyme, to a couplet: the melody of blank verſe is under no confinement, but enjoys the utmoſt privilege that the melody of verſe is ſuſceptible of; which is, to run hand in hand with the ſenſe. In a word, blank verſe is ſuperior to Hexameter in many articles; and inferior to it in none, ſave in the latitude of arrangement, and in the uſe of long words.

In French Heroic verſe, there are found, on the contrary, all the defects of Latin Hexameter and Engliſh rhyme, without the beauties of either: ſubjected to the bondage of rhyme, and to the full cloſe at the end of every couplet, it is alſo extremely fatiguing by uniformity in its pauſes and accents: the line invariably is divided by the pauſe into two equal parts, and the accent is invariably placed before the pauſe:

Jeune et vaillant heros || dont la haute ſageſſe
N'eſt point la fruit tardif || d'une lente vieilleſſe.

Here every circumſtance contributes to a tireſome uniformity: a conſtant return of the ſame pauſe and of the ſame accent, as well as an equal diviſion of every line; which fatigue the ear without intermiſſion or change. I cannot ſet this matter in a better light, than by preſenting to the reader a French tranſlation of the following paſſage of Milton:

Two of far nobler ſhape, erect and tall,
Godlike erect, with native honour clad,
In naked majeſty, ſeem'd lords of all;
And worthy ſeem'd, for in their looks divine

The

The image of their glorious Maker ſhone,
Truth, wiſdom, ſanctitude ſevere and pure,
Severe, but in true filial freedom plac'd;
Whence true authority in men: though both
Not equal, as their ſex not equal ſeem'd;
For contemplation he and valour form'd,
For ſoftneſs ſhe and ſweet attractive grace,
He for God only, ſhe for God in him.

Were the pauſes of the ſenſe and ſound in this paſſage but a little better aſſorted, nothing in verſe could be more melodious. In general, the great defect of Milton's verſification, in other reſpects admirable, is the want of coincidence between the pauſes of the ſenſe and ſound.

The tranſlation is in the following words:

Ce lieux délicieux, ce paradis charmant,
Recoit deux objets ſon plus bel ornement;
Leur port majeſtueux, et leur démarche altiere,
Semble leur meriter ſur la nature entiere
Ce droit de commander que Dieu leur a donné.
Sur leur auguſte front de gloire couronné,
Du ſouverain du ciel drille la reſemblance;
Dans leur ſimples regards éclatte l'innocence,
L'adorable candeur, l'aimable vérité,
La raiſon, la ſageſſe, et la sévérité,
Qu'adoucit la prudence, et cet air de droiture
Du viſage des rois reſpectable parure.
Ces deux objets divins n'ont pas les mêmes traits,
Ils paroiſſent formés, quoique tous deux parfaits;
L'un pour la majeſté, la force, et la nobleſſe;
L'autre pour la douceur, la grace, et la tendreſſe;
Celui ci pour Dieu ſeul, l'autre pour l'homme encor.

Here the ſenſe is fairly tranſlated, the words are of equal power, and yet how inferior the melody!

Many attempts have been made to introduce Hexameter verſe into the living languages, but without ſucceſs. The Engliſh language, I am inclined to think, is not ſuſceptible of this melody: and my reaſons are theſe. Firſt, the polyſyllables in Latin and Greek are finely diverſified by long and ſhort ſyllables, a circumſtance that qualifies them for the melody of Hexameter verſe: ours

are extremely ill qualified for that ſervice, becauſe they ſuperabound in ſhort ſyllables. Secondly, the bulk of our monoſyllables are arbitrary with regard to length, which is an unlucky circumſtance in Hexameter: for though cuſtom, as obſerved above, may render familiar a long or a ſhort pronunciation of the ſame word, yet the mind wavering between the two ſounds, cannot be ſo much affected with either, as with a word that hath always the ſame ſound; and for that reaſon, arbitrary ſounds are ill fitted for a melody which is chiefly ſupported by quantity: in Latin and Greek Hexameter, invariable ſounds direct and aſcertain the melody: Engliſh Hexameter would be deſtitute of melody, unleſs by artful pronunciation; becauſe of neceſſity the bulk of its ſounds muſt be arbitrary. The pronunciation is eaſy in a ſimple movement of alternate long and ſhort ſyllables; but would be perplexing and unpleaſant in the diverſified movement of Hexameter verſe.

Rhyme makes ſo great a figure in modern poetry, as to deſerve a ſolemn trial. I have for that reaſon reſerved it to be examined with deliberation; in order to diſcover, if I can, its peculiar beauties, and the degree of merit it is intitled to. The firſt view of this ſubject leads naturally to the following reflection: "That "rhyme having no relation to ſentiment, nor any effect "upon the ear other than a mere jingle, ought to be "baniſhed all compoſitions of any dignity, as affording "but a trifling and childiſh pleaſure." It will alſo be obſerved, "That a jingle of words hath in ſome meaſure a ludicrous effect, witneſs the double rhymes of "*Hudibras*, which contribute no ſmall ſhare to its drollery; that in a ſerious work this ludicrous effect would "be equally remarkable, were it not obſcured by the "prevailing gravity of the ſubject; that having however a conſtant tendency to give a ludicrous air to "the compoſition, more than ordinary fire is requiſite "to ſupport the dignity of the ſentiments againſt ſuch "an undermining antagoniſt *.

Theſe

* Voſſius, *de poematum cantu*, p. 26. ſays, "Nihil "æque gravitati orationis officit, quam in ſono ludere "ſyllabarum."

Theſe arguments are ſpecious, and have undoubtedly ſome weight. Yet, on the other hand, it ought to be conſidered, that in modern tongues rhyme has become univerſal among men as well as children; and that it cannot have ſuch a currency without ſome foundation in human nature. In fact, it has been ſucceſsfully employ'd by poets of genius, in their ſerious and grave compoſitions, as well as in thoſe which are more light and airy. Here, in weighing authority againſt argument, the ſcales ſeem to be upon a level; and therefore, to come at any thing deciſive, we muſt pierce a little deeper.

Muſic has great power over the ſoul; and may ſucceſsfully be employ'd to inflame or ſooth paſſions, if not actually to raiſe them. A ſingle ſound, however ſweet, is not muſic; but a ſingle ſound repeated after intervals, may have the effect to rouſe attention, and to keep the hearer awake: and a variety of ſimilar ſounds, ſucceeding each other after regular intervals, muſt have a ſtill ſtronger effect. This conſideration is applicable to rhyme, which connects two verſe-lines by making them cloſe with two words ſimilar in ſound. And conſidering attentively the muſical effect of a couplet, we find, that it rouſes the mind, and produceth an emotion moderately gay without dignity or elevation: like the murmuring of a brook gliding through pebbles, it calms the mind when perturbed, and gently raiſes it when ſunk. Theſe effects are ſcarce perceived when the whole poem is in rhyme; but are extremely remarkable by contraſt, in the couplets that cloſe the ſeveral acts of our later tragedies: the tone of the mind is ſenſibly varied by them, from anguiſh, diſtreſs, or melancholy, to ſome degree of eaſe and alacrity. For the truth of this obſervation, I appeal to the ſpeech of Jane Shore in the fourth act, when her doom was pronounced by Glo'ſter; to the ſpeech of Lady Jane Gray at the end of the firſt act; and to that of Caliſta, in the *Fair Penitent*, when ſhe leaves the ſtage, about the middle of the third act. The ſpeech of Alicia, at the cloſe of the fourth act of *Jane Shore*, puts the matter beyond doubt: in a ſcene of deep diſtreſs, the rhymes which finiſh the act, produce a certain gaiety and chearfulneſs, far from according with the tone of the paſſion:

*Alicia.*

*Alicia.* For ever? Oh! For ever!
Oh! who can bear to be a wretch for ever!
My rival too! his laſt thoughts hung on her:
And, as he parted, left a bleſſing for her.
Shall ſhe be bleſs'd, and I be curs'd, for ever!
No; ſince her fatal beauty was the cauſe
Of all my ſuff'rings, let her ſhare my pains;
Let her, like me, of ev'ry joy forlorn,
Devote the hour when ſuch a wretch was born:
Like me to deſerts and to darkneſs run,
Abhor the day, and curſe the golden ſun;
Caſt ev'ry good and ev'ry hope behind;
Deteſt the works of nature, loathe mankind:
Like me with cries diſtracted fill the air,
Tear her poor boſom, rend her frantic hair,
And prove the torments of the laſt deſpair.

Having deſcribed, the beſt way I can, the impreſſion that rhyme makes on the mind; I proceed to examine whether there be any ſubjects to which rhyme is peculiarly adapted, and for what ſubjects it is improper. Grand and lofty ſubjects, which have a powerful influence, claim precedence in this inquiry. In the chapter of grandeur and ſublimity it is eſtabliſhed, that a grand or ſublime object, inſpires a warm enthuſiaſtic emotion diſdaining ſtrict regularity and order; which emotion is very different in its tone from that inſpired by the moderately enlivening muſic of rhyme. Suppoſing then an elevated ſubject to be expreſſed in rhyme, what muſt be the effect? The intimate union of the muſic with the ſubject, produces an intimate union of their emotions; one inſpired by the ſubject, which tends to elevate and expand the mind; and one inſpired by the muſic, which, confining the mind within the narrow limits of regular cadency, and ſimilar ſound, tends to prevent all elevation above its own pitch. Emotions ſo little concordant, cannot in union have a happy effect

But it is ſcarce neceſſary to reaſon upon a caſe that never did, and probably never will happen, *viz.* an important ſubject clothed in rhyme, and yet ſupported in its utmoſt elevation. A happy thought or warm expreſſion, may at times give a ſudden bound upward; but it requires a genius greater than has hitherto exiſted,

ed, to support a poem of any length in a tone elevated much above that of the melody: Taſſo and Arioſto ought not to be made exceptions, and ſtill leſs Voltaire. And after all, where the poet has the dead weight of rhyme conſtantly to ſtruggle with, how can we expect an uniform elevation in a high pitch; when ſuch elevation, with all the ſupport it can receive from language, requires the utmoſt effort of the human genius?

But now, admitting rhyme to be an unfit dreſs for grand and lofty images; it has one advantage however, which is, to raiſe a low ſubject to its own degree of elevation. Addiſon * obſerves, "That rhyme, without "any other aſſiſtance, throws the language off from "proſe, and very often makes an indifferent phraſe paſs "unregarded; but where the verſe is not built upon "rhymes, there, pomp of ſound and energy of expreſ-"ſion are indiſpenſably neceſſary, to ſupport the ſtyle, "and keep it from falling into the flatneſs of proſe." This effect of rhyme is remarkable in the French verſe, which, being ſimple, and in a good meaſure unqualified for inverſion, readily ſinks down to proſe where not artificially ſupported: rhyme is therefore indiſpenſable in the French tragedy, and may be proper even in their comedy. Voltaire † aſſigns that very reaſon for adhering to rhyme in theſe compoſitions. He indeed candidly owns, that, even with the ſupport of rhyme, the tragedies of his country are little better than converſation pieces; which ſhows, that the French language is weak, and an improper dreſs for any grand ſubject. Voltaire was ſenſible of this imperfection; and yet Voltaire attempted an epic poem in that language.

The chearing and enlivening power of rhyme, is ſtill more remarkable in poems of ſhort lines, where the rhymes return upon the ear in a quick ſucceſſion; and for that reaſon, rhyme is perfectly well adapted to gay, light, and airy ſubjects: witneſs the following.

O the pleaſing, pleaſing anguiſh.
When we love, and when we languiſh!

Wiſhes

* Spectator, N° 285.

† Preface to his *OEdipus*, and in his diſcourſe upon tragedy, prefixed to the tragedy of *Brutus*.

Wiſhes riſing,
Thoughts ſurpriſing,
Pleaſure courting,
Charms tranſporting.
Fancy viewing,
Joys enſuing,
O the pleaſing, pleaſing anguiſh!

*Roſamond, act. 1. ſc. 2.*

For that reaſon, ſuch frequent rhymes are very improper for any ſevere or ſerious paſſion: the diſſonance between the ſubject and the melody, is very ſenſibly felt: witneſs the following.

Ardito ti renda,
T'accenda
Di ſdegno
D'un figlio
Il periglio
D'un regno
L'amor.
E'dolce ad un'alma
Che aſpetta
Vendetta
Il perder la calma
Fra l'ire del cor.

*Metaſtaſio. Artaſerſe, act 3. ſc. 3.*

Again:

Now under hanging mountains,
Beſide the fall of fountains,
Or where Hebrus wanders,
Rolling in mæanders,
All alone,
Unheard, unknown,
He makes his moan,
And calls her ghoſt,
For ever, ever, ever loſt;
Now with furies ſurrounded,
Deſpairing, confounded,
He trembles, he glows,
Amidſt Rhodope's ſnows.

*Pope, Ode for Muſic, l. 97.*

Rhyme is not leſs unfit for anguiſh or deep diſtreſs, than

than for subjects elevated and lofty; and for that reason has been long disused in the English and Italian tragedy. In a work where the subject is serious though not elevated, rhyme has not a good effect; because the airiness of the melody agrees not with the gravity of the subject: the *Essay on Man*, which treats a subject great and important, would show much better in blank verse. Sportive love, mirth, gaiety, humour, and ridicule, are the province of rhyme. The boundaries assigned it by nature, were extended in barbarous and illiterate ages, and in its usurpations it has long been protected by custom: but taste in the fine arts, as well as in morals, improves daily; and makes a progress toward perfection, slow indeed but uniform; and there is no reason to doubt, that rhyme, in Britain, will in time be forc'd to abandon its unjust conquests, and to confine itself within its natural limits.

Having thrown out what occurred upon rhyme, I close the section with a general observation, That the melody of verse so powerfully inchants the mind, as to draw a veil over very gross faults and imperfections. Of this power a stronger example cannot be given than the episode of Aristæus, which closes the fourth book of the *Georgics*. To renew a stock of bees when the former is lost, Virgil asserts, that they will be produced in the intrails of a bullock, slain and managed in a certain manner. This leads him to say, how this strange receipt was invented; which is as follows. Aristæus having lost his bees by disease and famine, never dreams of employing the ordinary means for obtaining a new stock; but, like a froward child, complains heavily to his mother Cyrene, a water-nymph. She advises him to consult Proteus, a sea-god, not how he was to obtain a new stock, but only by what fatality he had lost his former stock; adding, that violence was necessary, because Proteus would say nothing voluntarily. Aristæus, satisfied with this advice, though it gave him no prospect of repairing his loss, proceeds to execution. Proteus is catched sleeping, bound with cords, and compelled to speak. He declares, that Aristæus was punished with the loss of his bees, for attempting the chastity of Eurídice, the wife of Orpheus; she having been stung to death

death by a ſerpent in flying his embraces. Proteus, whoſe ſullenneſs ought to have been converted into wrath by the rough treatment he met with, becomes on a ſudden courteous and communicative. He gives the whole hiſtory of the expedition to hell which Orpheus undertook in order to recover his ſpouſe; a very entertaining ſtory, but without the leaſt relation to the the affair on hand. Ariſtæus, returning to his mother, is adviſed to deprecate by ſacrifices the wrath of Orpheus, who was now dead. A bullock is ſacrificed, and out of the intrails ſpring miraculouſly a ſwarm of bees. Does it follow, that the ſame may be obtained without a miracle, as is ſuppoſed in the receipt?

*A liſt of the different FEET, and of their NAMES.*

1. PYRRHICHIUS, conſiſts of two ſhort ſyllables. Examples: *Deus, given, cannot, hillock, running.*
2. SPONDEUS, conſiſts of two long ſyllables: *omnes, poſſeſs, forewarn, mankind, ſometime.*
3. IAMBUS, compoſed of a ſhort and a long: *pios, intent, degree, appear, conſent, repent, demand, report, ſuſpect, affront, event.*
4. TROCHÆUS, or CHOREUS, a long and a ſhort: *ſervat, whereby, after, legal, meaſure, burden, holy, lofty.*
5. TRIBRACHYS, three ſhort: *melius, property.*
6. MOLOSSUS, three long: *delectant.*
7. ANAPÆSTUS, two ſhort and a long: *animos, condeſcend, apprehend, overheard, acquieſce, immature, overcharge, ſerenade, opportune.*
8. DACTYLUS, a long and two ſhort: *carmina, evident, excellence, eſtimate, wonderful, altitude, burdened, miniſter, tenement.*
9. BACCHIUS, a ſhort and two long: *dolores.*
10. HYPOBACCHIUS, or ANTIBACCHIUS, two long and a ſhort: *pelluntur.*
11. CRETICUS, or AMPHIMACER, a ſhort ſyllable between two long: *inſito, afternoon.*
12. AMPHIBRACHYS, a long ſyllable between two ſhort: *honore, conſider, imprudent, procedure, attended,*

*tended, propoſed, reſpondent, concurrence, apprentice, reſpective, revenue*

13. Proceleusmaticus, four ſhort ſyllables: *hominibus, neceſſary.*
14. Dispondeus, four long ſyllables: *infinitus.*
15. Diiambus, compoſed of two Iambi: *ſeveritas.*
16. Ditrochæus, of two Trochæi: *permanere, procurator.*
17. Ionicus, two ſhort ſyllables and two long: *properabant.*
18. Another foot paſſes under the ſame name, compoſed of two long ſyllables and two ſhort: *calcaribus, poſſeſſory.*
19. Choriambus, two ſhort ſyllables between two long: *nobilitas.*
20. Antispastus, two long ſyllables between two ſhort: *Alexander.*
21. Pæon 1ſt, one long ſyllable and three ſhort: *temporibus, ordinary, inventory, temperament.*
22. Pæon 2d, the ſecond ſyllable long, and the other three ſhort: *rapidity, ſolemnity, minority, conſidered, imprudently, extravagant, reſpectfully, accordingly.*
23. Pæon 3d, the third ſyllable long and the other three ſhort: *animatus, independent, condeſcendence, ſacerdotal, reimburſement, manufacture.*
24. Pæon 4th, the laſt ſyllable long and the other three ſhort: *celeritas.*
25. Epitritus 1ſt, the firſt ſyllable ſhort and the other three long: *voluptates.*
26. Epitritus 2d, the ſecond ſyllable ſhort and the other three long: *pœnitentes.*
27. Epitritus 3d, the third ſyllable ſhort and the other three long: *diſcordias.*
28. Epitritus 4th, the laſt ſyllable ſhort and the other three long: *fortunatus.*
29. A word of five ſyllables compoſed of a Pyrrhichius and Dactylus: *miniſterial.*
30. A word of five ſyllables compoſed of a Trochæus and Dactylus: *ſingularity.*

31. A word

31. A word of five ſyllables compoſed of a Dactylus and Trochæus: *precipitation, examination.*

32. A word of five ſyllables, the ſecond only long: *ſignificancy.*

33. A word of ſix ſyllables compoſed of two Dactyles: *impetuoſity.*

34. A word of ſix ſyllables compoſed of a Tribrachys and Dactyle: *puſillanimity.*

*N. B.* Every word may be conſidered as a proſe foot, becauſe every word is diſtinguiſhed by a pauſe; and every foot in verſe may be conſidered as a verſe word, compoſed of ſyllables pronounced at once without a pauſe.

## CHAP. XIX.

### COMPARISONS.

COMPARISONS, as obſerved above *, ſerve two purpoſes: when addreſſed to the underſtanding, their purpoſe is to inſtruct; when to the heart, their purpoſe is to pleaſe. Various means contribute to the latter: firſt, the ſuggeſting ſome unuſual reſemblance or contraſt; ſecond, the ſetting an object in the ſtrongeſt light; third, the aſſociating an object with others that are agreeable; fourth, the elevating an object; and, fifth, the depreſſing it. And that compariſons may give pleaſure by theſe various means, appears from what is ſaid in the chapter above cited; and will be made ſtill more evident by examples, which ſhall be given after premiſing ſome general obſervations.

Objects of different ſenſes cannot be compared together; for ſuch objects are totally ſeparated from each other, and have no circumſtance in common to admit either reſemblance or contraſt. Objects of hearing may be compared together, as alſo of taſte, of ſmell, and of touch: but the chief fund of compariſon are objects of ſight; becauſe, in writing or ſpeaking, things can only be compared in idea, and the ideas of ſight are more diſtinct and lively than thoſe of any other ſenſe.

When

* Chap. 8.

When a nation emerging out of barbarity begins to think of the fine arts, the beauties of language cannot long lie concealed; and when discovered, they are generally, by the force of novelty, carried beyond all bounds of moderation. Thus, in the early poems of every nation, we find metaphors and similes founded on slight and distant resemblances, which, losing their grace with their novelty, wear gradually out of repute; and now, by the improvement of taste, no metaphor nor simile is admitted into any polite composition but of the most striking kind. To illustrate this observation, a specimen shall be given afterward of such metaphors as I have been describing: with respect to similes take the following specimen.

Behold, thou art fair, my love: thy hair is as a flock of goats that appear from Mount Gilead: thy teeth are like a flock of sheep from the washing, every one bearing twins: thy lips are like a thread of scarlet: thy neck like the tower of David built for an armoury, whereon hang a thousand shields of mighty men: thy two breasts like two young roes that are twins, which feed among the lilies: thy eyes like the fish-pools in Heshbon, by the gate of Bath-rabbim: thy nose like the tower of Lebanon, looking toward Damascus. *Song of Solomon.*

Thou art like snow on the heath; thy hair like the mist of Cromla, when it curls on the rocks and shines to the beam of the west: thy breasts are like two smooth rocks seen from Branno of the streams: thy arms like two white pillars in the hall of the mighty Fingal.

*Fingal.*

It has no good effect to compare things by way of simile that are of the same kind; nor to compare by contrast things of different kinds. The reason is given in the chapter cited above; and the reason shall be illustrated by examples. The first is a comparison built upon a resemblance so obvious as to make little or no impression.

This just rebuke inflam'd the Lycian crew,
They join, they thicken, and th'assault renew;
Unmov'd th'embody'd Greeks their fury dare,
And fix'd support the weight of all the war;

Nor

Nor could the Greeks repel the Lycian pow'rs,
Nor the bold Lycians force the Grecian tow'rs.
As on the confines of adjoining grounds,
Two ſtubborn ſwains with blows diſpute their bounds;
They tugg, they ſweat; but neither gain, nor yield,
One foot, one inch, of the contended field:
Thus obſtinate to death, they fight, they fall;
Nor theſe can keep, nor thoſe can win the wall.

*Iliad* xii. 505.

Another, from Milton, lies open to the ſame objection. Speaking of the fallen angels ſearching for mines of gold:

A numerous brigade haſten'd: as when bands
Of ploneers with ſpade and pick-ax arm'd,
Forerun the royal camp to trench a field
Or caſt a rampart.

The next ſhall be of things contraſted that are of different kinds.

*Queen.* What, is my Richard both in ſhape and mind
Transform'd and weak? Hath Bolingbroke depos'd
Thine intellect? Hath he been in thy heart!
The lion, dying, thruſteth forth his paw,
And wounds the earth, if nothing elſe, with rage
To be o'erpower'd: and wilt thou, pupil-like,
Take thy correction mildly, kiſs the rod,
And fawn on rage with baſe humility?

*Richard* II. *act* 5. *ſc.* 1.

This compariſon has ſcarce any force: a man and a lion are of different ſpecies, and therefore are proper ſubjects for a ſimile; but there is no ſuch reſemblance between them in general, as to produce any ſtrong effect by contraſting particular attributes or circumſtances.

A third general obſervation is, That abſtract terms can never be the ſubject of compariſon, otherwiſe than by being perſonified. Shakeſpear compares adverſity to a toad, and ſlander to the bite of a crocodile; but in ſuch compariſons theſe abſtract terms muſt be imagined ſenſible beings.

To have a juſt notion of compariſons, they muſt be diſtinguiſhed into two kinds; one common and familiar, as where a man is compared to a lion in courage, or to a horſe in ſpeed; the other more diſtant and refined, where

where two things that have in themſelves no reſemblance or oppoſition, are compared with reſpect to their effects. This ſort of compariſon is occaſionally explained above*; and for further explanation take what follows. There is no reſemblance between a flower-plot and a chearful ſong; and yet they may be compared with reſpect to their effects, the emotions they produce in the mind being extremely ſimilar. There is as little reſemblance between fraternal concord and precious ointment; and yet obſerve how ſucceſsfully they are compared with reſpect to the impreſſions they make.

Behold, how good and how pleaſant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity. It is like the precious ointment upon the head, that ran down upon Aaron's beard, and deſcended to the ſkirts of his garment. *Pſalm* 133.

For illuſtrating this ſort of compariſon, I add ſome more examples:

Delightful is thy preſence, O Fingal! it is like the ſun on Cromla, when the hunter mourns his abſence for a ſeaſon, and ſees him between the clouds.

Did not Oſſian hear a voice? or is it the ſound of days that are no more? Often, like the evening-ſun, comes the memory of former times on my ſoul.

His countenance is ſettled from war; and is calm as the evening beam, that from the cloud of the weſt looks on Cona's ſilent vale.

Sorrow, like a cloud on the ſun, ſhades the ſoul of Cleſſammor.

The muſic was like the memory of joys that are paſt, pleaſant and mournful to the ſoul.

Pleaſant are the words of the ſong, ſaid Cuchullin, and lovely are the tales of other times. They are like the calm dew of the morning on the hill of roes, when the ſun is faint on its ſide, and the lake is ſettled and blue in the vale.

Theſe quotations are from the poems of Oſſian, who abounds with compariſons of this delicate kind, and appears ſingularly happy in them†. I

* P. 85.

† The nature and merit of Oſſian's compariſons is fully illuſtrated, in a diſſertation on the poems of that author, by Dr Blair, profeſſor of rhetoric in the college of Edinburgh; a delicious morſel of criticiſm.

I proceed to illuſtrate by particular inſtances the different means by which compariſons, whether of the one ſort or the other, can afford pleaſure; and, in the order above eſtabliſhed, I begin with ſuch inſtances as are agreeable, by ſuggeſting ſome unuſual reſemblance or contraſt:

Sweet are the uſes of Adverſity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venemous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in her head.
*As you like it*, act 2. ſc. 1.

*Gardiner*. Bolingbroke hath ſeiz'd the waſteful King.
What pity is't that he had not ſo trimm'd
And dreſs'd his land, as we this garden dreſs,
And wound the bark, the ſkin of our fruit-trees;
Leſt, being over proud with ſap and blood,
With too much riches it confound itſelf.
Had he done ſo to great and growing men,
They might have liv'd to bear, and he to taſte
Their fruits of duty All ſuperfluous branches
We lop away, that bearing boughs may live:
Had he done ſo, himſelf had borne the crown,
Which waſte and idle hours have quite thrown down.
*Richard* II. act 3. ſc. 7.

See, how the Morning opes her golden gates,
And takes her farewell of the glorious Sun;
How well reſembles it the prime of youth,
Trimm'd like a yonker prancing to his love.
*Second part, Henry* VI. act 2. ſc. 1.

*Brutus*. O Caſſius, you are yoked with a lamb,
That carries anger as the flint bears fire:
Who, much inforced, ſhows a haſty ſpark,
And ſtraight is cold again. [*Julius Cæſar*, act 4. ſc. 3.

Thus they their doubtful conſultations dark
Ended, rejoicing in their matchleſs chief:
As when from mountain tops, the duſky clouds
Aſcending, while the North wind ſleeps, o'erſpread
Heav'n's chearful face, the low'ring element
Scowls o'er the darken'd landſcape, ſnow, and ſhower;
If chance the radiant ſun with farewell ſweet
Extends his ev'ning-beam, the fields revive,
The birds their notes renew, and bleating herds

Attest

Atteſt their joy, that hill and valley rings.
*Paradiſe loſt, book* 2.

As the bright ſtars, and milky way,
Shew'd by the night, are hid by day:
So we in that accompliſh'd mind,
Help'd by the night, new graces find,
Which, by the ſplendor of her view,
Dazzled before, we never knew. *Waller.*

The laſt exertion of courage compared to the blaze of a lamp before extinguiſhing, *Taſſo Gieruſalemme, canto* 19. *ſt* 22.

None of the foregoing ſimiles, as they appear to me, tend to illuſtrate the principal ſubject: and therefore the pleaſure they afford muſt ariſe from ſuggeſting reſemblances that are not obvious: I mean the chief pleaſure; for undoubtedly a beautiful ſubject introduced to form the ſimile affords a ſeparate pleaſure, which is felt in the ſimiles mentioned, particularly in that cited from Milton.

The next effect of a compariſon in the order mentioned, is to place an object in a ſtrong point of view; which effect is remarkable in the following ſimiles.

As when two ſcales are charg'd with doubtful loads,
From ſide to ſide the trembling balance nods,
(While ſome laborious matron, juſt and poor,
With nice exactneſs weighs her woolly ſtore,)
Till pois'd aloft, the reſting beam ſuſpends
Each equal weight; nor this nor that deſcends:
So ſtood the war, till Hector's matchleſs might,
With fates prevailing, turn'd the ſcale of fight.
Fierce as a whirlwind up the wall he flies,
And fires his hoſt with loud repeated cries.
*Iliad, b.* xii. 521.

Ut flos in ſeptis ſecretis naſcitur hortis,
Ignotus pecori, nullo contuſus aratro,
Quem mulcent auræ, firmat ſol, educat imber,
Multi illum pueri, multæ cupiere puellæ;
Idem, cum tenui carptus defloruit ungui,
Nulli illum pueri, nullæ cupiere puellæ:
Sic virgo, dum intacta manet, dum cara ſuis; ſed
Cum caſtum amiſit, polluto corpore, florem,

Nec

Nec pueris jucunda manet, nec cara puellis. [*Catullus.*

The imitation of this beautiful ſimile by *Arioſto*, *canto* 1. *ſt.* 42 falls ſhort of the original. It is alſo in part imitated by Pope *.

*Lucetta.* I do not ſeek to quench your love's hot fire,
But qualify the fire's extreme rage,
Leſt it ſhould burn above the bounds of reaſon.

*Julia.* The more thou damm'ſt it up, the more it burns:
The current, that with gentle murmur glides,
Thou know'ſt, being ſtopp'd, impatiently doth rage;
But when his fair courſe is not hindered,
He makes ſweet muſic with th'enamel'd ſtones,
Giving a gentle kiſs to every ſedge
He overtaketh in his pilgrimage.
And ſo by many winding nooks he ſtrays
With willing ſport, to the wild ocean.
Then let me go, and hinder not my courſe;
I'll be as patient as a gentle ſtream,
And make a paſtime of each weary ſtep
Till the laſt ſtep have brought me to my love;
And there I'll reſt, as, after much turmoil,
A bleſſed ſoul doth in Elyſium.

*Two Gentlemen of Verona, act* 2 *ſc.* 10.

——————She never told her love,
But let concealment, like a worm i' th' bud,
Feed on her damaſk cheek: ſhe pin'd in thought;
And with a green and yellow melancholy,
She ſat like Patience on a monument,
Smiling at Grief. [*Twelfth Night, act* 2. *ſc.* 6.

*York.* Then, as I ſaid, the Duke, great Bolingbroke,
Mounted upon a hot and fiery ſteed,
Which his aſpiring rider ſeem'd to know,
With ſlow but ſtately pace, kept on his courſe:
While all tongues cry'd, God ſave thee, Bolingbroke.

*Ducheſs.* Alas! poor Richard, where rides he the while!

*York.* As in a theatre, the eyes of men,
After a well-grac'd actor leaves the ſtage,

Are

* Dunciad, b. 4. l. 405.

Are idly bent on him that enters next,
Thinking his prattle to be tedious:
Even ſo, or with much more contempt, men's eyes
Did ſcowl on Richard; no man cry'd, God ſave him!
No joyful tongue gave him his welcome home;
But duſt was thrown upon his ſacred head;
Which with ſuch gentle ſorrow he ſhook off,
His face ſtill combating with tears and ſmiles,
The badges of his grief and patience;
That had not God, for ſome ſtrong purpoſe, ſteel'd
The hearts of men, they muſt perforce have melted;
And barbariſm itſelf have pitied him.

*Richard* II. *act* 5. *ſc.* 3.

*Northumberland.* How doth my ſon and brother?
Thou trembleſt, and the whiteneſs in thy cheek
Is apter than thy tongue to tell thy errand.
Even ſuch a man, ſo faint, ſo ſpiritleſs,
So dull, ſo dead in look, ſo wo-be-gone,
Drew Priam's curtain in the dead of night,
And would have told him, half his Troy was burn'd;
But Priam found the fire, ere he his tongue:
And I my Percy's death, ere thou report'ſt it.

*Second part, Henry* IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

Why, then I do but dream on ſov'reignty,
Like one that ſtands upon a promontory,
And ſpies a far-off ſhore where he would tread,
Wiſhing his foot were equal with his eye,
And chides the ſea that ſunders him from thence,
Saying, he'll lave it dry to have his way:
So do I wiſh, the crown being ſo far off,
And ſo I chide the means that keep me from it,
And ſo (I ſay) I'll cut the cauſes off,
Flatt'ring my mind with things impoſſible.

*Third part, Henry* VI. *act* 3. *ſc.* 3.

——— Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking ſhadow, a poor player,
That ſtruts and frets his hour upon the ſtage,
And then is heard no more. [*Macbeth, act* 5. *ſc.* 5.

O thou Goddeſs,
Thou divine Nature! how thyſelf thou blazon'ſt
In theſe two princely boys! they are as gentle
As zephyrs blowing below the violet,

Not wagging his ſweet head; and yet as rough,
(Their royal blood inchaf'd) as the rud'ſt wind,
That by the top doth take the mountain-pine,
And make him ſtoop to th' vale.
*Cymbeline, act 4. ſc. 4.*

Why did not I paſs away in ſecret, like the flower of the rock that lifts its fair head unſeen, and ſtrows its withered leaves on the blaſt? *Fingal.*

There is a joy in grief when peace dwells with the ſorrowful. But they are waſted with mourning, O daughter of Toſcar, and their days are few. They fall away like the flower on which the ſun looks in his ſtrength, after the mildew has paſſed over it, and its head is heavy with the drops of night. *Fingal.*

The ſight obtained of the city of Jeruſalem by the Chriſtian army, compared to that of land diſcovered after a long voyage, Taſſo's *Gieruſalem, canto* 3. *ſt.* 4. The fury of Rinaldo ſubſiding when not oppoſed, to that of wind or water when it has a free paſſage, *canto* 20. *ſt.* 58.

As words convey but a faint and obſcure notion of great numbers, a poet, to give a lively notion of the object he deſcribes with regard to number, does well to compare it to what is familiar and commonly known. Thus Homer * compares the Grecian army in point of number to a ſwarm of bees: in another paſſage † he compares it to that profuſion of leaves and flowers which appear in the ſpring, or of inſects in a ſummer's evening: and Milton,

——————— As when the potent rod
Of Amram's ſon in Egypt's evil day
Wav'd round the coaſt, up call'd a pitchy cloud
Of locuſts, warping on the eaſtern wind,
That o'er the realm of impious Pharaoh hung
Like night, and darken'd all the land of Nile:
So numberleſs were thoſe bad angels ſeen,
Hovering on wing under the cope of hell,
'Twixt upper, nether, and ſurrounding fires.
*Paradiſe loſt, book* 1.

Such

* Book 2. l. 111. † Book 2. l. 551.

Such comparisons have, by some writers ‡, been condemned for the lowness of the images introduced: but surely without reason; for, with regard to numbers, they put the principal subject in a strong light.

The foregoing comparisons operate by resemblance; others have the same effect by contrast.

*York.* I am the last of Noble Edward's sons,
Of whom, thy father, Prince of Wales, was first:
In war, was never lion rag'd more fierce;
In peace, was never gentle lamb more mild
Than was that young and princely gentleman?
His face thou hast, for even so look'd he,
Accomplish'd with the number of thy hours.
But when he frown'd, it was against the French,
And not against his friends. His noble hand
Did win what he did spend; and spent not that
Which his triumphant father's hand had won.
His hands were guilty of no kindred's blood,
But bloody with the enemies of his kin.
Oh, Richard! York is too far gone with grief,
Or else he never would compare between.

*Richard* II. *act* 2. *sc.* 3.

Milton has a peculiar talent in embellishing the principal subject by associating it with others that are agreeable; which is the third end of a comparison. Similes of this kind have, beside, a separate effect: they diversify the narration by new images that are not strictly necessary to the comparison: they are short episodes, which, without drawing us from the principal subject, afford great delight by their beauty and variety:

He scarce had ceas'd, when the superior fiend
Was moving toward the shore; his pond'rous shield,
Ethereal temper, massy, large, and round,
Behind him cast; the broad circumference
Hung on his shoulders like the moon, whose orb
Through optic glass the Tuscan artist views
At ev'ning from the top of Fesole,
Or in Valdarno, to descry new lands,
Rivers, or mountains, in her spotty globe.

*Milton, b.* 1.

 Thus

‡ See Vidæ Poetic. lib. 2. l. 282.

——— Thus far these, beyond
Compare of mortal prowess, yet observ'd
Their dread commander. He, above the rest
In shape and gesture proudly eminent,
Stood like a tow'r; his form had yet not lost
All her original brightness, nor appear'd
Less than archangel ruin'd, and th' excess
Of glory obscur'd: as when the sun new-risen
Looks through the horizontal misty air
Shorn of his beams; or from behind the moon
In dim eclipse, disastrous twilight sheds
On half the nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes monarchs. *Milton, b.* 1.

As when a vulture on Imaus bred,
Whose snowy ridge the roving Tartar bounds,
Dislodging from a region scarce of prey
To gorge the flesh of lambs, or yeanling kids,
On hills where flocks are fed, flies toward the springs
Of Ganges or Hydaspes, Indian streams,
But in his way lights on the barren plains
Of Sericana, where Chineses drive
With sails and wind their cany waggons light:
So on this windy sea of land, the fiend
Walk'd up and down alone, bent on his prey.
*Milton, b.* 1.

———Yet higher than their tops
The verdurous wall of Paradise up sprung:
Which to our general sire gave prospect large
Into this nether empire neighbouring round.
And higher than that wall, a circling row
Of goodliest trees loaden with fairest fruit,
Blossoms and fruits at once of golden hue,
Appear'd, with gay enamel'd colours mix'd,
On which the sun more glad impress'd his beams
Than in fair evening cloud, or humid bow,
When God hath show'r'd the earth; so lovely seem'd
That landscape: and of pure now purer air
Meets his approach, and to the heart inspires
Vernal delight and joy, able to drive
All sadness but despair: now gentle gales
Fanning their odoriferous wings dispense
Native perfumes, and whisper whence they stole

These

Thoſe balmy ſpoils. As when to them who ſail
Beyond the Cape of Hope, and now are paſt
Mozambic, off at ſea north-eaſt winds blow
Sabean odour from the ſpicy ſhore
Of Arabie the bleſt; with ſuch delay
Well-pleas'd they ſlack their courſe, and many a league,
Chear'd with the grateful ſmell, old Ocean ſmiles.

*Milton, b.* 4.

With regard to ſimiles of this kind, it will readily occur to the reader, that when a reſembling ſubject is once properly introduced in a ſimile, the mind is tranſitorily amuſed with the new object, and is not diſſatisfied with the ſlight interruption. Thus, in fine weather, the momentary excurſions of a traveller for agreeable proſpects or elegant buildings, chear his mind, relieve him from the languor of uniformity, and without much lengthening his journey in reality, ſhorten it greatly in appearance.

Next, of compariſons that aggrandize or elevate. Theſe affect us more than any other ſort: the reaſon of which may be gathered from the chapter of grandeur and ſublimity; and, without reaſoning, will be evident from the following inſtances.

As when a flame the winding valley fills,
And runs on crackling ſhrubs between the hills,
Then o'er the ſtubble up the mountain flies,
Fires the high woods, and blazes to the ſkies,
This way and that, the ſpreading torrent roars;
So ſweeps the hero through the waſted ſhores.
Around him wide, immenſe deſtruction pours,
And earth is delug'd with the ſanguine ſhow'rs.

*Iliad* xx. 569.

Through blood, through death, Achilles ſtill proceeds,
O'er ſlaughter'd heroes, and o'er rolling ſteeds.
As when avenging flames with fury driv'n
On guilty towns exert the wrath of Heav'n,
The pale inhabitants, ſome fall, ſome fly,
And the red vapours purple all the ſky:
So rag'd Achilles; Death, and dire diſmay,
And toils, and terrors, fill'd the dreadful day.

*Iliad* xxi. 605.

Methinks, King Richard and myſelf ſhould meet
With no leſs terror than the elements
Of fire and water, when their thund'ring ſhock,
At meeting tears the cloudy cheeks of heav'n.
*Richard* II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 5.

As ruſheth a foamy ſtream from the dark ſhady ſteep of Cromla, when thunder is rolling above, and dark brown night reſts on the hill: ſo fierce, ſo vaſt, ſo terrible, ruſh forward the ſons of Erin. The chief, like a whale of Ocean followed by all its billows, pours valour forth as a ſtream, rolling its might along the ſhore.
*Fingal*, *b.* 1.

As roll a thouſand waves to a rock, ſo Swaran's hoſt came on; as meets a rock a thouſand waves, ſo Inisfail met Swaran. *Ibid.*

I beg peculiar attention to the following ſimile, for a reaſon that ſhall be mentioned:

Thus breathing death, in terrible array,
The cloſe-compacted legions urg'd their way:
Fierce they drove on, impatient to deſtroy;
Troy charg'd they firſt, and Hector firſt of Troy.
As from ſome mountain's craggy forehead torn,
A rock's round fragment flies with fury borne,
(Which from the ſtubborn ſtone a torrent tends)
Precipitate the pond'rous maſs deſcends:
From ſteep to ſteep the rolling ruin bounds:
At every ſhock the crackling wood reſounds;
Still gath'ring force, it ſmoaks; and, urg'd amain,
Whirls, leaps, and thunders down, impetuous to the plain:
There ſtops—So Hector. Their whole force he prov'd,
Reſiſtleſs when he rag'd; and when he ſtopt, unmov'd.
*Iliad* xiii. 187.

The image of a falling rock is certainly not elevating *; and yet undoubtedly the foregoing ſimile fires and ſwells the mind: it is grand therefore, if not ſublime. And the following ſimile will afford additional evidence, that there is a real, though nice, diſtinction between theſe two feelings:

So

* See chap. 4.

So saying, a noble stroke he lifted high,
Which hung not, but so swift with tempest fell
On the proud crest of Satan, that no sight,
Nor motion of swift thought, less could his shield
Such ruin intercept. Ten paces huge
He back recoil'd; the tenth on bended knee
His massy spear upstaid; as if on earth
Winds under ground or waters forcing way,
Sidelong had push'd a mountain from his seat
Half-sunk with all his pines. *Milton, b. 6.*

A comparison by contrast may contribute to grandeur or elevation, not less than by resemblance; of which the following comparison of Lucan is a remarkable instance:

Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.

Considering that the Heathen deities possessed a rank but one degree above that of mankind, I think it would not be easy to exalt more, by a single expression, one of the human species, than is done by this comparison. I am sensible, at the same time, that such a comparison among Christians, who entertain more exalted notions of the Deity, would justly be reckoned extravagant and absurd.

The last article mentioned, is that of lessening or depressing a hated or disagreeable object; which is effectually done by resembling it to any thing low or despicable. Thus Milton, in his description of the rout of the rebel-angels, happily expresses their terror and dismay in the following simile:

——————————— As a herd
Of goats or timorous flock together throng'd,
Drove them before him thunder-struck, pursu'd
With terrors and with furies to the bounds
And crystal wall of heav'n, which op'ning wide,
Rowl'd inward, and a spacious gap disclos'd
Into the wasteful deep; the monstrous sight
Strook them with horror backward, but far worse
Urg'd them behind; headlong themselves they threw
Down from the verge of heav'n. *Milton, b. 6.*

In the same view, Homer, I think, may be justified in comparing the shouts of the Trojans in battle, to the

noise of cranes *, and to the bleating of a flock of sheep †: it is no objection, that these are low images; for it was his intention to lessen the Trojans by opposing their noisy march to the silent and manly march of the Greeks. Addison ‡, describing the figure that men make in the sight of a superior being, takes opportunity to mortify their pride by comparing them to a swarm of pismires.

A comparison that has none of the good effects mentioned in this discourse, but is built upon common and trifling circumstances, makes a mighty silly figure:

Non sum nescius, grandia consilia a multis plerumque causis, ceu magna navigia a plurimis remis, impelli.

*Strada de bello Belgico.*

By this time, I imagine, the different purposes of comparison, and the various impressions it makes on the mind, are sufficiently illustrated by proper examples. This was an easy work. It is more difficult to lay down rules about the propriety or impropriety of comparisons; in what circumstances they may be introduced, and in what circumstances they are out of place. It is evident, that a comparison is not proper upon every occasion: a man when cool and sedate, is not disposed to poetical flights, nor to sacrifice truth and reality to the delusive operations of the imagination: far less is he so disposed, when oppressed with care, or interested in some important transaction that occupies him totally. On the other hand, it is observable, that a man, when elevated or animated by any passion, is disposed to elevate or animate all his objects: he avoids familiar names, exalts objects by circumlocution and metaphor, and gives even life and voluntary action to inanimate beings. In this warmth of mind, the highest poetical flights are indulged, and the boldest similes and metaphors relished §. But without soaring so high, the mind is frequently

* Beginning of book 3. † Book 4. l. 498.

‡ Guardian, N° 153.

§ It is accordingly observed by Longinus, in his treatise of the Sublime, that the proper time for metaphor, is when the passions are so swelled as to hurry on like a torrent.

quently in a tone to reliſh chaſte and moderate ornament; ſuch as compariſons that ſet the principal object in a ſtrong point of view, or that embelliſh and diverſify the narration. In general, when by any animating paſſion, whether pleaſant or painful, an impulſe is given to the imagination; we are in that condition diſpoſed to every ſort of figurative expreſſion, and in particular to compariſons. This in a great meaſure is evident from the compariſons already mentioned; and ſhall be further illuſtrated by other inſtances. Love, for example, in its infancy, rouſing the imagination, prompts the heart to diſplay itſelf in figurative language, and in ſimiles:

*Troilus.* Tell me, Apollo, for thy Daphne's love,
What Creſſid is, what Pandar, and what we?
Her bed is India, there ſhe lies, a pearl:
Between our Ilium, and where ſhe reſides,
Let it be call'd the wild and wandering flood;
Ourſelf the merchant, and this ſailing Pandar
Our doubtful hope, our convoy, and our bark.
*Troilus and Creſſida, act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

Again:

Come, gentle Night; come, loving black-brow'd Night!
Give me my Romeo; and, when he ſhall die,
Take him, and cut him out in little ſtars,
And he will make the face of Heav'n ſo fine,
That all the world ſhall be in love with Night,
And pay no worſhip to the gariſh Sun.
*Romeo and Juliet, act* 3. *ſc.* 4.

The dread of a misfortune, however imminent, involving always ſome doubt and uncertainty, agitates the mind, and excites the imagination:

*Wolſey.* ——————Nay, then, farewell;
I've touch'd the higheſt point of all my greatneſs,
And from that full meridian of my glory
I haſte now to my ſetting. I ſhall fall,
Like a bright exhalation in the evening,
And no man ſee me more. [*Henry* VIII. *act* 3. *ſc.* 4.

But it will be a better illuſtration of the preſent head, to give examples where compariſons are improperly introduced. I have had already occaſion to obſerve, that ſimiles are not the language of a man in his ordinary

ſtate of mind, diſpatching his daily and uſual work: for that reaſon, the following ſpeech of a gardener to his ſervants, is extremely improper:

Go, bind thou up yon dangling apricoks,
Which, like unruly children, make their ſire
Stoop with oppreſſion of their prodigal weight:
Give ſome ſupportance to the bending twigs.
Go thou, and, like an executioner,
Cut off the heads of too-faſt-growing ſprays,
That look too lofty in our commonwealth:
All muſt be even in our government.

*Richard* II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 7.

The fertility of Shakeſpear's vein betrays him frequently into this error. There is the ſame impropriety in another ſimile of his:

*Hero.* Good Margaret, run thee into the parlour;
There ſhalt thou find my couſin Beatrice;
Whiſper her ear, and tell her, I and Urſula
Walk in the orchard, and our whole diſcourſe
Is all of her; ſay, that thou overheardſt us:
And bid her ſteal into the pleached bower,
Where honeyſuckles, ripen'd by the ſun,
Forbid the ſun to enter; like to favourites,
Made proud by princes, that advance their pride
Againſt that power that bred it.

*Much ado about nothing*, *act* 3. *ſc.* 1.

Rooted grief, deep anguiſh, terror, remorſe, deſpair, and all the ſevere diſpiriting paſſions, are declared enemies, perhaps not to figurative language in general, but undoubtedly to the pomp and ſolemnity of compariſon. Upon that account, the ſimile pronounced by young Rutland, under terror of death from an inveterate enemy, and praying mercy, is unnatural:

So looks the pent up lion o'er the wretch
That trembles under his devouring paws;
And ſo he walks inſulting o'er his prey,
And ſo he comes to rend his limbs aſunder.
Ah, gentle Clifford, kill me with thy ſword,
And not with ſuch a cruel threat'ning look.

*Third part, Henry* VI *act* 1. *ſc.* 5.

Nothing

Nothing appears more out of place, nor more awkwardly introduced, than the following ſimile:

*Lucia.* ——————— Farewel, my Portius,
Farewel, though death is in the word, *for ever.*
*Portius.* Stay, Lucia, ſtay; what doſt thou ſay? *for ever?*
*Lucia.* Have I not ſworn? If, Portius, thy ſucceſs
Muſt throw thy brother on his fate, farewell,
Oh, how ſhall I repeat the word, *for ever!*
*Portius* Thus, o'er the dying lamp th' unſteady flame
Hangs quivering on a point, leaps off by fits,
And falls again, as loath to quit its hold.
——Thou muſt not go, my ſoul ſtill hovers o'er thee,
And can't get looſe. *Cato, act 3. ſc. 2.*

Nor doth the ſimile which cloſes the firſt act of the ſame tragedy, make a better appearance; the ſituation there repreſented being to diſpiriting for a ſimile. A ſimile is improper for one who dreads the diſcovery of a ſecret machination:

*Zara.* The mute not yet return'd! Ha! 'twas the King.
The King that parted hence! frowning he went;
His eyes like meteors roll'd, then darted down
Their red and angry beams; as if his ſight
Would, like the raging Dog ſtar, ſcorch the earth,
And kindle ruin in its courſe.
*Mourning Bride, act 5. ſc. 3.*

A man ſpent and diſpirited after loſing a battle, is not diſpoſed to heighten or illuſtrate his diſcourſe by ſimiles:

*York.* With this we charg'd again; but out, alas!
We bodg'd again; as I have ſeen a ſwan
With bootleſs labour ſwim againſt the tide,
And ſpend her ſtrength with over-matching waves.
Ah! hark, the fatal followers do purſue;
And I am faint and cannot fly their fury.
The ſands are number'd that make up my life;
Here muſt I ſtay, and here my life muſt end.
*Third part, Henry VI. act 1. ſc. 6.*

Far leſs is a man diſpoſed to ſimiles who is not only defeated in a pitch'd battle, but lies at the point of death mortally wounded:

*Warwick,*

*Warwick.* — ——— My mangled body ſhews,
My blood, my want of ſtrength, my ſick heart ſhews,
That I muſt yield my body to the earth,
And, by my fall, the conqueſt to my foe.
Thus yields the cedar to the ax's edge,
Whoſe arms gave ſhelter to the princely eagle;
Under whoſe ſhade the ramping lion ſlept,
Whoſe top-branch overpeer'd Jove's ſpreading tree,
And kept low ſhrubs from winter's pow'rful wind.

*Third part, Henry* VI. *act* 5. *ſc.* 6.

Queen Katharine, deſerted by the King, and in the deepeſt affliction upon her divorce, could not be diſpoſed to any ſallies of imagination: and for that reaſon, the following ſimile, however beautiful in the mouth of a ſpectator, is ſcarce proper in her own:

I am the moſt unhappy woman living,
Shipwreck'd upon a kingdom, where no pity,
No friends, no hope! no kindred weep for me!
Almoſt no grave allow'd me! like the lily,
That once was miſtreſs of the field, and flouriſh'd,
I'll hang my head, and periſh.

*King Henry* VIII. *act* 3. *ſc.* 1.

Similes thus unſeaſonably introduced, are finely ridiculed in the *Rehearſal*.

*Bayes.* Now here ſhe muſt make a ſimile.

*Smith.* Where's the neceſſity of that, Mr Bayes?

*Bayes.* Becauſe ſhe's ſurpriſed; that's a general rule; you muſt ever make a ſimile when you are ſurpriſed; 'tis a new way of writing.

A compariſon is not always faultleſs even where it is properly introduced. I have endeavoured above to give a general view of the different ends to which a compariſon may contribute: a compariſon, like other human productions, may fall ſhort of its end; of which defect inſtances are not rare even among good writers; and to complete the preſent ſubject, it will be neceſſary to make ſome obſervations upon ſuch faulty compariſons. I begin with obſerving, that nothing can be more erroneous than to inſtitute a compariſon too faint: a diſtant reſemblance or contraſt fatigues the mind with its obſcurity, inſtead of amuſing it; and tends not to fulfil any one

end

erd of a compariſon. The following ſimiles ſeem to labour under this defect.

Albus ut obſcuro deterget nubila cœlo
Sæpe Notus, neque parturit imbres
Perpetuos: ſic tu ſapiens finire memento
Triſtitiam, vitæque labores,
Molli, Plance, mero. *Horat. Carm. l.* 1. *ode* 7.

——— Medio dux agmine Turnus
Vertitur arma tenens, et toto vertice ſupra eſt
Ceu ſeptem ſurgens ſedatis amnibus altus
Per tacitum Ganges: aut pingui flumine Nilus
Cum refluit campis, et jam ſe condidit alveo.
*Æneid.* ix. 28.

Talibus orabat, taleſque miſerrima fletus
Fertque refertque ſoror: ſed nullus ille movetur
Fletibus, aut voces ullas tractabilis audit.
Fata obſtant: placidaſque viri Deus obſtruit aures.
Ac veluti annoſo validam cum robore quercum
Alpini Boreæ, nunc hinc, nunc flatibus illinc
Eruere inter ſe certant; it ſtridor, et alte
Conſternunt terram concuſſo ſtipite frondes:
Ipſa hæret ſcopulis: et quantum vertice ad auras
Ætherias, tantum radice in Tartara tendit.
Haud ſecus aſſiduis hinc atque hinc vocibus heros
Tunditur, et magno perſentit pectore curas:
Mens immota manet, lacrymæ volvuntur inanes.
*Æneid*, iv. 437.

*K. Rich.* Give me the crown.—Here, Couſin, ſeize the crown,
Here, on this ſide, my hand; on that ſide, thine.
Now is this golden crown like a deep well,
That owes two buckets, filling one another;
The emptier ever dancing in the air,
The other down, unſeen and full of water;
That bucket down, and full of tears, am I,
Drinking my griefs, whilſt you mount up on high.
*Richard* II. *act* 4. *ſc.* 3.

*King John* Oh! Couſin, thou art come to ſet mine eye;
The tackle of my heart is crack'd and burnt:
And all the ſhrowds wherewith my life ſhould ſail,

Are

Are turned to one thread, one little hair:
My heart hath one poor ſtring to ſtay it by,
Which holds but till thy news be uttered.
*King John, act* 5. *ſc.* 10.

*York.* My uncles both are ſlain in reſcuing me:
And all my followers, to the eager foe
Turn back, and fly like ſhips before the wind,
Or lambs purſu'd by hunger-ſtarved wolves.
*Third part, Henry* VI. *act* 1. *ſc.* 6.

The latter of the two ſimiles is good: the former, becauſe of the faintneſs of the reſemblance, produces no good effect, and crowds the narration with an uſeleſs image.

The next error I ſhall mention is a capital one. In an epic poem, or in any elevated ſubject, a writer ought to avoid raiſing a ſimile upon a low image, which never fails to bring down the principal ſubject. In general, it is a rule, That a grand object ought never to be reſembled to one that is diminutive, however delicate the reſemblance may be: for it is the peculiar character of a grand object to fix the attention, and ſwell the mind; in which ſtate, it is diſagreeable to contract the mind to a minute object, however elegant. The reſembling an object to one that is greater, has, on the contrary, a good effect, by raiſing or ſwelling the mind: for one paſſes with ſatisfaction from a ſmall to a great object; but cannot be drawn down, without reluctance, from great to ſmall. Hence the following ſimiles are faulty.

Meanwhile the troops beneath Patroclus' care,
Invade the Trojans, and commence the war.
As waſps, provok'd by children in their play,
Pour from their manſions by the broad highway,
In ſwarms the guiltleſs traveller engage,
Whet all their ſtings, and call forth all their rage;
All riſe in arms, and with a general cry
Aſſert their waxen domes, and buzzing progeny:
Thus from the tents the fervent legion ſwarms,
So loud their clamours, and ſo keen their arms.
*Iliad* xvi. 312.

So burns the vengeful hornet (foul all o'er)
Repuls'd in vain, and thirſty ſtill of gore;

(Bold

(Bold ſon of air and heat) on angry wings
Untam'd, untir'd, he turns, attacks and flings.
Fir'd with like ardour fierce Atrides flew,
And ſent his ſoul with ev'ry lance he threw.
*Iliad* xvii. 642.

Inſtant ardentes Tyrii: pars ducere muros,
Molirique arcem, et manibus ſubvolvere ſaxa;
Pars aptare locum tecto, et concludere ſulco
Jura magiſtratuſque legunt, ſanctumque ſenatum.
Hic portus alii effodiunt: hic alta theatris
Fundamenta locant alii, immaneſque columnas
Rupibus excidunt, ſcenis decora alta futuris.
Qualis apes æſtate nova per florea rura
Exercet ſub ſole labor, cum gentis adultos
Educunt fœtus, aut cum liquentia mella
Stipant, et dulci diſtendunt nectare cellas,
Aut onera accipiunt venientum, aut agmine facto
Ignavum fucos pecus a præſepibus arcent.
Fervet opus, redolentque thymo fragrantia mella.
*Æneid.* i. 427.

To deſcribe bees gathering honey as reſembling the builders of Carthage, would have a much better effect *.

Tum vero Teucri incumbunt, et littore celſas
Deducunt toto naves: natat uncta carina;
Frondenteſque ferunt remos, et robora ſylvis
Infabricata, fugæ ſtudio.
Migrantes cernas, totaque ex urbe ruentes.
Ac veluti ingentem formicæ farris acervum
Cum populant, hyemis memores, tectoque reponunt:
It nigrum campis agmen, prædamque per herbas
Convectant calle anguſto: pars grandia trudunt
Obnixæ frumenta humeris: pars agmina cogunt,
Caſtigantque moras: opere omnis ſemita fervet.
*Æneid.* iv. 397.

The following ſimile has not any one beauty to recommend it. The ſubject is Amata, the wife of King Latinus.

Tum

* And accordingly Demetrius Phalereus (of Elocution, ſect. 85.) obſerves, that it has a better effect to compare ſmall things to great than great things to ſmall.

Tum vero infelix, ingentibus excita monſtris,
Immenſam ſine more furit, lymphata per urbem:
Ceu quondam torto volitans ſub verbere turbo,
Quem pueri magno in gyro vacua atria circum
Intenti ludo exercent. Ille actus habena
Curvatis fertur ſpatiis: ſtupet inſcia turba,
Impubeſque manus, mirata volubile buxum;
Dant animos plagæ. Non curſu ſegnior illo
Per medias urbes agitur, populoſque feroces.

*Æneid* vii. 376.

This ſimile ſeems to border upon the burleſque.

An error oppoſite to the former, is the introducing a reſembling image, ſo elevated or great as to bear no proportion to the principal ſubject. Their remarkable diſparity, being the moſt ſtriking circumſtance, ſeizes the mind, and never fails to depreſs the principal ſubject by contraſt, inſtead of raiſing it by reſemblance: and if the diſparity be very great, the ſimile takes on an air of burleſque; nothing being more ridiculous than to force an object out of its proper rank in nature, by equalling it with one greatly ſuperior or greatly inferior. This will be evident from the following compariſons.

Fervet opus, redolentque thymo fragrantia mella.
Ac veluti lentis Cyclopes fulmina maſſis
Cum properant: alii taurinis follibus auras
Accipiunt, reddunteque: alii ſtridentia tingunt
Æra lacu: gemit impoſitis incudibus Ætna:
Illi inter ſeſe magna vi brachia tollunt
In numerum; verſantque tenaci forcipe ferrum.
Non aliter (ſi parva licet componere magnis)
Cecropias innatus apes amor urget habendi,
Munere quamque ſuo. Grandævis oppida curæ,
Et munire favos, et Dædala fingere tecta.
At feſſæ multâ referunt ſe nocte minores,
Crura thymo plenæ: paſcuntur et arbuta paſſim,
Et glaucas ſalices, caſiamque crocumque rubentem,
Et pinguem tiliam, et ferrugineos hyacinthos.
Omnibus una quies operum, labor omnibus unus*:

*Georgic.* iv. 169.

* The Cyclops make a better figure in the following ſimile:

——— The-

Tum Bitian ardentem oculis animisque frementem;
Non jaculo, neque enim jaculo vitam ille dedisset;
Sed magnum stridens contorta falarica venit
Fulminis acta modo, quam nec duo taurea terga,
Nec duplici squama lorica fidelis et auro
Sustinuit: collapsa ruunt immania membra:
Dat tellus gemitum, et clypeum super intonat ingens.
Qualis in Euboico Baiarum littore quondam
Saxea pila cadit, magnis quam molibus ante
Constructam jaciunt ponto: sic illa ruinam
Prona trahit, penitusque vadis illisa recumbit:
Miscent se maria, et nigræ attolluntur arenæ:
Tum sonitu Prochyta alta tremit, durumque cubile
Inarime Jovis imperiis imposta Typhoeo.

*Æneid.* ix. 703.

Loud as a bull makes hill and valley ring,
So roar'd the lock when it releas'd the spring.

*Odyssey*, xxi. 51.

Such a simile upon the simplest of all actions, that of opening a door, is pure burlesque.

A writer of delicacy will avoid drawing his comparisons from any image that is nauseous, ugly, or remarkably disagreeable; for however strong the resemblance may be, more will be lost than gained by such comparison. Therefore I cannot help condemning, though with some reluctance, the following simile, or rather metaphor.

O thou

---

——— The Thracian leader prest,
With eager courage, far before the rest;
Him Ajax met, inflam'd with equal rage;
Between the wond'ring hosts the chiefs engage;
Their weighty weapons round their heads they throw,
And swift, and heavy, falls each thund'ring blow.
As when in Ætna's caves the giant brood,
The one-ey'd servants of the Lemnian god,
In order round the burning anvil stand,
And forge, with weighty strokes, the forked brand;
The shaking hills their fervid toils confess,
And echoes rattling through each dark recess:
So rag'd the fight. *Epigoniad, b.* 8.

O thou fond many! with what loud applauſe
Did'ſt thou beat heav'n with bleſſing Bolingbroke
Before he was what thou wou'dſt have him be?
And now being trimm'd up in thine own deſires,
Thou, beaſtly feeder, art ſo full of him,
That thou provok'ſt thyſelf to caſt him up.
And ſo, thou common dog, didſt thou diſgorge
Thy glutton boſom of the royal Richard,
And now thou wou'dſt eat thy dead vomit up,
And howl'ſt to find it.

*Second part, Henry* IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 6.

The ſtrongeſt objection that can lie againſt a compariſon, is, that it conſiſts in words only, not in ſenſe. Such falſe coin, or baſtard wit, does extremely well in burleſque; but is far below the dignity of the epic, or of any ſerious compoſition:

The noble ſiſter of Poplicola,
The moon of Rome; chaſte as the iſicle
That's curdled by the froſt from pureſt ſnow,
And hangs on Dian's temple. *Coriolanus, act* 5. *ſc.* 3.

There is evidently no reſemblance between an iſicle, and a woman, chaſte or unchaſte: but chaſtity is cold in a metaphorical ſenſe, and an iſicle is cold in a proper ſenſe; and this verbal reſemblance, in the hurry and glow of compoſing, has been thought a ſufficient foundation for the ſimile. Such phantom ſimiles are mere witticiſms, which ought to have no quarter, except where purpoſely introduced to provoke laughter. Lucian, in his diſſertation upon hiſtory, talking of a certain author, makes the following compariſon, which is verbal merely.

This author's deſcriptions are ſo cold, that they ſurpaſs the Caſpian ſnow, and all the ice of the north.

Virgil has not eſcaped this puerility:

——— Galathæa thymo mihi dulcior Hyblæ.
*Bucol.* vii. 37.

——— Ego Sardois videar tibi amarior herbis.
*Ibid.* 41.

Gallo cujus amor tantum mihi creſcit in horas,
Quantum vere novo viridis ſe ſubjicit alnus.
*Bucol.* x. 73.

Nor-

Nor Taſſo, in his Aminta:

Picciola e' l' ape, e fa col picciol morſo
Pur gravi, e pur moleſte le ferite;
Ma, qual coſa é più picciola d' amore,
Se in ogni breve ſpatio entra, e s' aſconde
In ogni breve ſpatio? hor, ſotto a l' ombra
De le palpebre, hor trà minuti rivi
D'un biondo crine, hor dentro le pozzette
Che forma un dolce riſo in bella guancia;
E pur ſá tanto grandi, e ſi mortali,
E coſi immedicabili le piaghe. *Act* 2. *ſc.* 1.

Nor Boileau, the chaſteſt of all writers; and that even in his art of poetry:

Ainſi tel autrefois, qu'on vit avec Faret
Charbonner de ſes vers les murs d'un cabaret,
S'en va mal à propos, d'une voix inſolente,
Chanter du peuple Hébreu la fuite triomphante,
Et pourſuivant Moiſe au travers des déſerts,
Court avec Pharaon ſe noyer dans les mers.
*Chant.* 1. *l.* 21.

Mais allons voir le Vrai juſqu'n ſa ſource même,
Un dévot aux yeux creux, et d'abſtinence blême,
S'il n'a point le cœur juſte, eſt affreux devant Dieu.
L'Evangile au Chrêtien ne dit, en aucun lieu,
Sois devot: elle dit, Sois doux, ſimple, equitable:
Car d'un dévot ſouvent au Chrêtien veritable
La diſtance eſt deux fois plus longue, à mon avis,
Que du Pôle Antarctique au Détroit de Davis.
*Boileau, Satire* 11.

——— But for their ſpirits and ſouls
This word *rebellion* had froze them up
As fiſh are in a pond.
*Second part, Henry* IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

*Queen.* The pretty vaulting ſea refus'd to drown me;
Knowing, that thou wou'dſt have me drown'd on ſhore
With tears as ſalt as ſea, through thy unkindneſs.
*Second part, Henry* VI. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

Here there is no manner of reſemblance but in the word *drown*; for there is no real reſemblance between being drown'd at ſea, and dying of grief at land. But perhaps this ſort of tinſel wit may have a propriety in it, when

when uſed to expreſs an affected, not a real paſſion, which was the Queen's caſe.

Pope has ſeveral ſimiles of the ſame ſtamp. I ſhall tranſcribe one or two from the *Eſſay on Man*, the graveſt and moſt inſtructive of all his performances:

And hence one maſter paſſion in the breaſt,
Like Aaron's ſerpent, ſwallows up the reſt,
*Epiſt.* 2. *l.* 131.

And again, talking of this ſame ruling or maſter paſſion:

Nature its mother, Habit is its nurſe;
Wit, ſpirit, faculties, but make it worſe;
Reaſon itſelf but gives it edge and pow'r;
As heav'n's bleſs'd beam turns vinegar more ſour.
*Ibid. l* 145.

Lord Bolingbroke, ſpeaking of hiſtorians:

Where their ſincerity as to fact is doubtful, we ſtrike out truth by the confrontation of different accounts; as we ſtrike out ſparks of fire by the collision of flints and ſteel.

Let us vary the phraſe a very little, and there will not remain a ſhadow of reſemblance. Thus,

We diſcover truth by the confrontation of different accounts; as we ſtrike out ſparks of fire by the colliſion of flints and ſteel.

Racine makes Pyrrhus ſay to Andromaque,

Vaincu, chargé de fers, de regrets conſumé,
Brulé de plus de feux que je n'en allumai,
Helas! fus-je jamais ſi cruel que vous l'etes?

And Oreſtes in the ſame ſtrain:

Que les Scythes ſont moins cruels qu' Hermione.

Similes of this kind put one in mind of a ludicrous French ſong:

Je croyois Janneton
Auſſi douce que belle:
Je croyois Janneton
Plus douce qu'un mouton;
Hela! helas!
Elle eſt cent fois, mille fois, plus cruelle
Que n'eſt le tigre aux bois.

Again:

Again:

Helas! l'amour m'a pris,
Comme le chat fait la ſouris.

A vulgar Iriſh ballad begins thus:

I have as much love in ſtore
As there's apples in Portmore.

Where the ſubject is burleſque or ludicrous, ſuch ſimiles are far from being improper. Horace ſays pleaſantly,

Quanquam tu levior cortice. *L.* 3 *ode* 9.

And Shakeſpear,

In breaking oaths he's ſtronger than Hercules.

And this leads me to obſerve, that beſide the foregoing compariſons, which are all ſerious, there is a ſpecies, the end and purpoſe of which is to excite gaiety or mirth. Take the following examples.

Falſtaff, ſpeaking to his page:

I do here walk before thee, like a ſow that hath overwhelmed all her litter but one.

*Second part, Henry* IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 4.

I think he is not a pick purſe, nor a horſe ſtealer; but for his verity in love, I do think him as concave as a cover'd goblet, or a worm-eaten nut.

*As you like it, act* 3. *ſc.* 10.

This ſword a dagger had his page,
That was but little for his age;
And therefore waited on him ſo,
As dwarfs upon knights-errant do.

*Hudibras canto* 1.

Deſcription of Hudibras's horſe:

He was well ſtay'd, and in his gait
Preſerv'd a grave, majeſtic ſtate.
At ſpur or ſwitch no more he ſkipt,
Or mended pace, than Spaniard whipt:
And yet ſo fiery, he would bound
As if he griev'd to touch the ground:
That Cæſar's horſe, who, as fame goes,
Had corns upon his feet and toes,
Was not by half ſo tender hooft,

Nor

Nor trod upon the ground so soft.
And as that beast would kneel and stoop,
(Some write, to take his rider up);
So Hudibras his ('tis well known)
Would often do to set him down. *Canto* 1.

Honour is, like a widow, won
With brisk attempt and putting on,
With entering manfully, and urging;
Not slow approaches, like a virgin. *Canto* 1.

The sun had long since in the lap
Of Thetis taken out his nap;
And, like a lobster boil'd, the morn
From black to red began to turn. *Part* 2. *canto* 2.

Books, like men, their authors, have but one way of coming into the world; but there are ten thousand to go out of it, and return no more. *Tale of a Tub.*

And in this the world may perceive the difference between the integrity of a generous author, and that of a common friend. The latter is observed to adhere close in prosperity, but on the decline of fortune, to drop suddenly off: whereas the generous author, just on the contrary, finds his hero on the dunghill, from thence by gradual steps raises him to a throne, and then immediately withdraws, expecting not so much as thanks for his pains. *Tale of a Tub.*

The most accomplish'd way of using books at present is, to serve them as some do lords, learn their *titles*, and then brag of their acquaintance. *Tale of a Tub.*

Box'd in a chair, the beau impatient sits,
While spouts run clatt'ring o'er the roof by fits;
And ever and anon with frightful din
The leather sounds; he trembles from within.
So when Troy chairmen bore the wooden steed,
Pregnant with Greeks, impatient to be freed,
(Those bully Greeks, who, as the moderns do,
Instead of paying chairmen run them through),
Laocoon struck the outside with his spear,
And each impriton'd hero quak'd for fear,

*Description of a city-shower.* *Swift.*

Clubs,

Clubs, diamonds, hearts, in wild diſorder ſeen,
With throngs promiſcuous ſtrow the level green.
Thus when diſpers'd a routed army runs,
Of Aſia's troops, and Afric's ſable ſons,
With like confuſion, different nations fly,
Of various habit, and of various dye,
The pierc'd battalions diſunited, fall
In heaps on heaps; one fate o'erwhelms them all.
*Rape of the Lock, canto 3.*

He does not conſider, that ſincerity in love is as much out of faſhion as ſweet ſnuff; no body takes it now.
*Careleſs huſband.*

*Lady Eaſy.* My dear, I am afraid you have provoked her a little too far.

*Sir Charles* O! Not at all You ſhall ſee, I'll ſweeten her, and ſhe'll cool like a diſh of tea. *Ibid.*

## CHAP. XX. FIGURES.

THE reader will not find here a complete liſt of the different tropes and figures that have been careſully noted by antient critics and grammarians; a liſt ſwelled to ſuch a ſize by containing every unuſual expreſſion, as to make it difficult to diſtinguiſh many of their tropes and figures from plain language. I little imagined that much could be made of tropes and figures in the way of rational criticiſm; till diſcovering by a ſort of accident, that many of them depend on principles formerly explained, I gladly embraced an opportunity to ſhow the influence of theſe principles where it would be the leaſt expected. Confining myſelf therefore to ſuch figures, I am luckily freed from much traſh; without dropping, ſo far as I remember, any trope or figure that merits a proper name. And I begin with Proſopopœia or perſonification, which is juſtly intitled to the firſt place.

### SECT. I. *PERSONIFICATION.*

THE beſtowing ſenſibility and voluntary motion upon things inanimate, is ſo bold a figure, as to require, one ſhould imagine, very peculiar circumſtances for operating the deluſion: and yet, in the language of

of poetry, we find variety of expreſſions, which, though commonly reduced to that figure, are uſed without ceremony, or any ſort of preparation; as for example, *thirſty* ground, *hungry* church-yard, *furious* dart, *angry* ocean. Theſe epithets, in their proper meaning, are attributes of ſenſible beings: what is their meaning, when apply'd to things inanimate? do they make us conceive the ground, the church-yard, the dart, the ocean, to be endued with animal functions? This is a curious inquiry; and whether ſo or not, it cannot be declined in handling the preſent ſubject.

The mind agitated by certain paſſion, is prone to beſtow ſenſibility upon things inanimate *. This is an additional inſtance of the influence of paſſion upon our opinions and belief †. I give ſome examples. Antony, mourning over the body of Cæſar, murdered in the ſenate-houſe, vents his paſſion in the following words.

*Antony.* O pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth,
That I am meek and gentle with theſe butchers.
Thou art the ruins of the nobleſt man
That ever lived in the tide of times.

*Julius Cæſar, act 3. ſc. 4.*

Here Antony muſt have been impreſſed with ſome ſort of notion, that the body of Cæſar was liſtening to him, without which the ſpeech would be fooliſh and abſurd. Nor will it appear ſtrange, after what is ſaid in the chapter above cited, that paſſion ſhould have ſuch power over the mind of man. In another example of the ſame kind, the earth, as a common mother, is animated to give refuge againſt a father's unkindneſs:

*Almeria* O Earth, behold, I kneel upon thy boſom,
And bend my flowing eyes to ſtream upon
Thy face, imploring thee that thou wilt yield;
Open thy bowels of compaſſion, take
Into thy womb the laſt and moſt forlorn
Of all thy race. Hear me, thou common parent;
—— I have no parent elſe.—— Be thou a mother,
And ſtep between me and the curſe of him,
Who was — who was, but is no more a father;

But

* Page 204. † Chap. 2. part 5.

But brands my innocence with horrid crimes;
And for the tender names of *child* and *daughter*,
Now calls me *murderer* and *parricide*.

*Mourning Bride, act* 4. *sc.* 7.

Plaintive passions are extremely sollicitous for vent; and a soliloquy commonly answers the purpose: but when such a passion becomes excessive, it cannot be gratified but by sympathy from others; and if denied that consolation in a natural way, it will convert even things inanimate into sympathising beings. Thus Philoctetes complains to the rocks and promontories of the isle of Lemnos*; and Alcestes dying, invokes the sun, the light of day, the clouds, the earth, her husband's palace, &c. †. Moschus, lamenting the death of Bion, conceives, that the birds, the fountains, the trees, lament with him: the shepherd, who in Virgil bewails the death of Daphnis, expresseth himself thus:

Daphni, tuum Pœnos etiam ingemuisse leones
Interitum, montesque feri sylvæque loquuntur.

*Eclogue* v. 27.

Again:

Illum etiam lauri, illum etiam flevere myricæ.
Pinifer illum etiam sola sub rupe jacentem
Mœnalus, et gelidi fleverunt saxa Lycæi.

*Eclogue* x. 13.

Again:

Ho visto al pianto mio
Responder per pietate i sassi e l'onde;
E sospirar le fronde
Ho visto al pianto mio.
Ma non ho visto mai,
Ne spero di videre
Compassion ne la crudele, e bella.

*Aminta di Tasso, act* 1. *sc.* 2.

That such personification is derived from nature, will not admit the least remaining doubt, after finding it in poems of the darkest ages and remotest countries. No



* Philoctetes of Sophocles, act 4. sc. 2.

† Alcestes of Euripides, act 2. sc. 1.

figure is more frequent in Offian's works; for example,

The battle is over, ſaid the King, and I behold the blood of my friends. Sad is the heath of Lena, and mournful the oaks of Cromla.

Again:

The ſword of Gaul trembles at his ſide, and longs to glitter in his hand.

King Richard having got intelligence of Bolingbroke's invaſion, ſays, upon landing in England from his Iriſh expedition, in a mixture of joy and reſentment,

——————————— I weep for joy
To ſtand upon my kingdom once again.
Dear earth, I do ſalute thee with my hand,
Though rebels wound thee with their horſes hoofs.
As a long parted mother with her child
Plays fondly with her tears, and ſmiles in meeting;
So weeping, ſmiling, greet I thee, my earth,
And do thee favour with my royal hands.
Fret not thy ſovereign's foe, my gentle earth,
Nor with thy ſweets comfort his rav'nous ſenſe:
But let thy ſpiders that ſuck up thy venom,
And heavy-gaited toads, lie in their way;
Doing annoyance to the treach'rous feet,
Which with uſurping ſteps do trample thee.
Yield ſtinging nettles to mine enemies!
And, when they from thy boſom pluck a flower,
Guard it, I pr'ythee, with a lurking adder;
Whoſe double tongue may with a mortal touch
Throw death upon thy ſovereign's enemies.
Mock not my ſenſeleſs conjuration, Lords!
This earth ſhall have a feeling; and theſe ſtones
Prove armed ſoldiers, ere her native king
Shall faulter under foul rebellious arms.

*Richard* II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 2.

After a long voyage, it was cuſtomary among the antients to ſalute the natal ſoil. A long voyage being of old a greater enterprize than at preſent, the ſafe return to one's country after much fatigue and danger, was a circumſtance extremely delightful; and it was natural to give the natal ſoil a temporary life, in order to ſympathiſe with the traveller. See an example, *Agamemnon*

*gamemnon* of Æschilus, act 3. in the beginning. Regret for leaving a place one has been accustomed to, has the same effect *.

Terror produceth the same effect: it is communicated in thought to every thing around, even to things inanimate:

Speaking of Polyphemus,

Clamorem immensum tollit, quo pontus et omnes
Intremuere undæ, penitusque exterrita tellus
Italiæ. *Æneid.* iii. 672.

——————— As when old Ocean roars,
And heaves huge surges to the *trembling* shores.
*Iliad* ii. 249.

And thund'ring footsteps *shake* the sounding shore.
*Iliad* ii. 549.

Then with a voice that *shook* the vaulted skies.
*Iliad* v. 431.

Go, view the settling sea. The stormy wind is laid; but the billows still tremble on the deep, and seem to fear the blast. *Fingal.*

Racine, in the tragedy of *Phædra*, describing the sea-monster that destroy'd Hippolytus, conceives the sea itself to be struck with terror as well as the spectators:

Le flot qui l'apporta recule epouvanté.

A man also naturally communicates his joy to all objects around, animate or inanimate:

——————— As when to them who sail
Beyond the Cape of Hope, and now are past
Mozambic, off at sea north-east winds blow
Sabean odour from the spicy shore
Of Araby the Blest; with such delay
Well pleas'd, they slack their course, and many a league
Chear'd with the grateful smell old Ocean smiles.
*Paradise lost*, *b.* 4.

I have been profuse of examples, to show what power many passions have to animate their objects. In all the foregoing examples, the personification, if I mistake



* Philoctetes of Sophocles, at the close.

not, is so complete as to afford an actual conviction, momentary indeed, of life and intelligence. But it is evident from numberless instances, that personification is not always so complete: it is a common figure in descriptive poetry, understood to be the language of the writer, and not of the persons he describes: in this case, it seldom or never comes up to conviction, even momentary, of life and intelligence. I give the following examples.

First in *his* east the glorious lamp was seen,
Regent of day, and all th'horizon round
Invested with bright rays; jocund to run
*His* longitude through heav'n's high road: the gray
Dawn, and the Pleiades before *him* danc'd,
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the moon
But opposite, in levell'd west was set
*His* mirror, with full face borrowing *her* light
From *him*; for other light *she* needed none.
*Paradise lost, b. 7. l. 370* *.

Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund day
Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain-tops.
*Romeo and Juliet, act 3. sc. 7.*

But look, the morn, in russet mantle clad,
Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastward hill.
*Hamlet, act 1. sc. 1.*

It may, I presume, be taken for granted, that, in the foregoing instances, the personification, either with the poet or his reader, amounts not to a conviction of intelligence; nor that the sun, the moon, the day, the morn, are here understood to be sensible beings. What then is the nature of this personification? I think it must be referred to the imagination: the inanimate object is imagined to be a sensible being, but without any conviction, even for a moment, that it really is so. Ideas or fictions

* The chastity of the English language, which in common usage distinguishes by genders no words but what signify beings male and female, gives thus a fine opportunity for the prosopopœia; a beauty unknown in other languages, where every word is masculine or feminine.

fictions of imagination have power to raiſe emotions in the mind †; and when any thing inanimate is, in imagination, ſuppoſed to be a ſenſible being, it makes by that means a greater figure than when an idea is formed of it according to truth. The elevation, however, in this caſe, is far from being equal to what it is when the perſonification amounts to actual conviction. Thus perſonification is of two kinds. The firſt, or nobler, may be termed *paſſionate perſonification:* the other, or more humble, *deſcriptive perſonification*; becauſe ſeldom or never is perſonification in a deſcription carried to the length of conviction.

The imagination is ſo lively and active, that its images are raiſed with very little effort; and this juſtifies the frequent uſe of deſcriptive perſonification. This figure abounds in Milton's *Allegro* and *Penſeroſo*.

Abſtract and general terms, as well as particular objects, are often neceſſary in poetry. Such terms however are not well adapted to poetry, becauſe they ſuggeſt not any image: I can readily form an image of Alexander or Achilles in wrath; but I cannot form an image of wrath in the abſtract, or of wrath independent of a perſon. Upon that account, in works addreſſed to the imagination, abſtract terms are frequently perſonified: but ſuch perſonification reſts upon imagination merely, not upon conviction:

Sed mihi vel Tellus optem prius ima dehiſcat;
Vel Pater omnipotens adigat me fulmine ad umbras,
Pallentes umbras Erebi, noctemque profundam,
Ante *pudor* quam te violo, aut tua jura reſolvo.
*Æneid.* iv. *l.* 24.

Thus, to explain the effects of ſlander, it is imagined to be a voluntary agent:

——————— No, 'tis Slander;
Whoſe edge is ſharper than the ſword; whoſe tongue
Out-venoms all the worms of Nile; whoſe breath
Rides on the poſting winds, and doth belie
All corners of the world, kings, queens, and ſtates,
Maids, matrons: nay, the ſecrets of the grave



† See appendix, containing definitions and explanation terms, § 28.

This viperous Slander enters.

*Shakeſpear, Cymbeline, act 3. ſc. 4.*

As alſo human paſſions: take the following example:

——————— For *Pleaſure* and *Revenge*
Have ears more deaf than adders, to the voice
Of any true deciſion.

*Troilus and Creſſida, act 2. ſc 4.*

Virgil explains fame and its effects by a ſtill greater variety of action *. And Shakeſpear perſonifies death and its operations in a manner extremely fanciful:

——————— Within the hollow crown
That rounds the mortal temples of a king,
Keeps Death his court; and there the antic ſits,
Scoffing his ſtate, and grinning at his pomp;
Allowing him a breath, a little ſcene
To monarchize, be fear'd, and kill with looks;
Infuſing him with ſelf and vain conceit
As if his fleſh, which walls about our life,
Were braſs impregnable; and humour'd thus,
Comes at the laſt, and with a little pin
Bores through his caſtle-walls, and farewell king.

*Richard II. act 3. ſc. 4.*

Not leſs ſucceſsfully is life and action given even to ſleep:

*King Henry.* How many thouſands of my pooreſt ſubjects
Are at this hour aſleep! O gentle *Sleep*,
Nature's ſoft nurſe, how have I frighted thee,
That thou no more wilt weigh my eye-lids down,
And ſteep my ſenſes in forgetfulneſs?
Why rather, Sleep, ly'ſt thou in ſmoky cribs,
Upon uneaſy pallets ſtretching thee,
And huſh'd with buzzing night-flies to thy ſlumber,
Than in the perfum'd chambers of the great,
Under the canopies of coſtly ſtate,
And lull'd with ſounds of ſweeteſt melody?
O thou dull god, why ly'ſt thou with the vile
In loathſome beds, and leav'ſt the kingly couch,
A watch-caſe to a common larum bell?
Wilt thou, upon the high and giddy maſt,

Seal

* Æneid. iv. 173.

Seal up the ſhip-boy's eyes, and rock his brains
In cradle of the rude imperious ſurge,
And in the viſitation of the winds,
Who take the ruffian billows by the top,
Curling their monſtrous heads, and hanging them
With deaf'ning clamours in the ſlipp'ry ſhrouds,
That, with the hurly, Death itſelf awakes?
Can'ſt thou, O partial Sleep, give thy repoſe
To the wet ſea-boy in an hour ſo rude;
And, in the calmeſt and the ſtilleſt night,
With all appliances and means to boot,
Deny it to a king? Then, happy low! lie down;
Uneaſy lies the head that wears a crown.
*Second part, Henry* IV. *act* 3. *ſc.* 1.

I ſhall add one example more, to ſhow that deſcriptive perſonification may be uſed with propriety, even where the purpoſe of the diſcourſe is inſtruction merely:

Oh! let the ſteps of youth be cautious,
How they advance into a dangerous world;
Our duty only can conduct us ſafe:
Our paſſions are ſeducers: but of all,
The ſtrongeſt *Love:* he firſt approaches us
In childiſh play, wantoning in our walks:
If heedleſsly we wander after him,
As he will pick out all the dancing-way,
We're loſt, and hardly to return again.
We ſhould take warning: he is painted blind,
To ſhew us, if we fondly follow him,
The precipices we may fall into.
Therefore let *Virtue* take him by the hand:
Directed ſo, he leads to certain joy. *Southern.*

Hitherto ſucceſs has attended our ſteps; but whether we ſhall complete our progreſs with equal ſucceſs, ſeems doubtful; for though it was to be expected that by this time every difficulty ſhould be over, yet when we look back to the expreſſions mentioned in the beginning, *thirſty* ground, *furious* dart, and ſuch like, it ſeems not leſs difficult than at firſt to ſay whether there be here any ſort of perſonification. Such expreſſions evidently raiſe not the ſlighteſt conviction of ſenſibility: nor do I think they amount to deſcriptive perſonification; be-

cauſe, in them, we do not even figure the ground or the dart to be animated. If ſo, they cannot at all come under the preſent ſubject. And to ſhew more clearly that they cannot, I ſhall endeavour to explain what effect ſuch expreſſions have naturally upon the mind. In the expreſſion *angry ocean*, for example, do we not tacitly compare the ocean in a ſtorm to a man in wrath? It is by this tacit compariſon that the expreſſion acquires a force or elevation, above what is found in an epithet proper to the object: which compariſon, though tacit only, excludes perſonification; becauſe, by the very nature of compariſon, the things compared are kept diſtinct, and the native appearance of each is preſerved. It will be ſhown afterward, that expreſſions of this kind belong to another figure, which I term *a figure of ſpeech*, and which employs the ſeventh ſection of the preſent chapter.

Though thus in general we can diſtinguiſh deſcriptive perſonification from what is merely a figure of ſpeech, it is however often difficult to ſay, with reſpect to ſome expreſſions, whether they be of the one kind or of the other. Take the following inſtances.

The moon ſhines bright: in ſuch a night as this,
When the ſweet wind did gently *kiſs* the trees,
And they did make no noiſe; in ſuch a night,
Troilus methinks mounted the Trojan wall,
And ſigh'd his ſoul towards the Grecian tents
Where Creſſid lay that night.

*Merchant of Venice, act 5. ſc. 1.*

——————————— I have ſeen
Th' *ambitious* ocean ſwell, and rage, and foam,
To be exalted with the threat'ning clouds.

*Julius Cæſar, act 1. ſc. 6.*

With reſpect to theſe and numberleſs other inſtances of the ſame kind, it muſt depend upon the reader, whether they be examples of perſonification, or of a figure of ſpeech merely: a ſprightly imagination will advance them to the former claſs; with a plain reader they will remain to the latter.

Having thus at large explained the preſent figure, its different kinds, and the principles from whence derived; what

what comes next in order is, to shew in what cases it may be introduced with propriety, when it is suitable, when unsuitable. I begin with observing, that passionate personification is not promoted by every passion indifferently. All dispiriting passions are averse to it; and remorse, in particular, is too serious and severe to be gratified with a phantom of the mind. I cannot therefore approve the following speech of Enobarbus, who had deserted his master Antony:

Be witness to me, O thou blessed moon,
When men revolted shall upon record
Bear hateful memory, poor Enobarbus did
Before thy face repent ——————
Oh sovereign mistress of true melancholy,
The poisonous damp of night dispunge upon me,
That life, a very rebel to my will,
May hang no longer on me.

*Antony and Cleopatra, act 4. sc. 7.*

If this can be justified, it must be upon the Heathen system of theology, which converted into deities the sun, moon, and stars.

Secondly, After a passionate personification is properly introduced, it ought to be confined to its proper province, that of gratifying the passion, without giving place to any sentiment or action but what answers that purpose; for personification is at any rate a bold figure, and ought to be employ'd with great reserve. The passion of love, for example, in a plaintive tone, may give a momentary life to woods and rocks, in order to make them sensible of the lover's distress: but no passion will support a conviction so far stretched, as that these woods and rocks should be living witnesses to report the distress to others;

Ch'i' t'ami piu de la mia vita,
Se tu nol sai, crudele,
Chie dilo à queste selve
Che t'el diranno, et t'el diran con esse
Le fere loro e i duri sterpi, e i sassi
Di questi alpestri monti,
Ch'i' ho si spesse volte
Inteneriti al suon de' miei lamenti.

*Pastor Fido, act 3. sc. 3.*

No lover who is not crazed will utter ſuch a ſentiment: it is plainly the operation of the writer, indulging his inventive faculty without regard to nature. The ſame obſervation is applicable to the following paſſage:

In winter's tedious nights ſit by the fire
With good old folks, and let them tell thee tales
Of woful ages, long ago betid:
And ere thou bid good night, to quit their grief,
Tell them the lamentable fall of me,
And ſend the hearers weeping to their beds.
For why! the ſenſeleſs brands will ſympathiſe
The heavy accent of thy moving tongue,
And in compaſſion weep the fire out.

*Richard* II. *act* 5. *ſc.* 1.

One muſt read this paſſage very ſeriouſly to avoid laughing. The following paſſage is quite extravagant: the different parts of the human body are too intimately connected with ſelf, to be perſonified by the power of any paſſion; and after converting ſuch a part into a ſenſible being, it is ſtill worſe to make it be conceived as riſing in rebellion againſt ſelf:

*Cleopatra.* Haſte, bear my arm, and rouſe the ſerpent's fury.
Coward fleſh ——————
Wouldſt thou conſpire with Cæſar, to betray me,
As thou wert none of mine? I'll force thee to't.

*Dryden, All for Love, act* 5.

Next comes deſcriptive perſonification; upon which I muſt obſerve, in general, that it ought to be cautiouſly uſed. A perſonage in a tragedy, agitated by a ſtrong paſſion, deals in warm ſentiments; and the reader, catching fire by ſympathy, reliſheth the boldeſt perſonifications: but a writer, even in the moſt lively deſcription, taking a lower flight, ought to content himſelf with ſuch eaſy perſonifications as agree with the tone of mind inſpired by the deſcription. Nor is even ſuch eaſy perſonification always admitted; for in plain narrative, the mind, ſerious and ſedate, rejects perſonification altogether: Strada, in his hiſtory of the Belgic wars, has the following paſſage, which, by a ſtrained elevation above the tone of the ſubject, deviates into burleſque.

Vix

Vix descenderat a prætoria navi Cæsar; cum fœda ilico exorta in portu tempestas, classem impetu disjecit, prætoriam hausit; quasi non vecturam amplius Cæsarem, Cæsarisque fortunam. *Dec. 1. l. 1.*

Neither do I approve, in Shakespear, the speech of King John, gravely exhorting the citizens of Angiers to a surrender; though a tragic writer has much greater latitude than a historian. Take the following specimen of this speech.

The cannons have their bowels full of wrath;
And ready mounted are they to spit forth
Their iron-indignation 'gainst your walls.
*Act 2. sc. 3.*

Secondly, If extraordinary marks of respect to a person of low rank be ridiculous, not less so is the personification of a low subject. This rule chiefly regards descriptive personification; for a subject can hardly be low that is the cause of a violent passion; in that circumstance, at least, it must be of importance. But to assign any rule other than taste merely, for avoiding things below even descriptive personification, will, I am afraid, be a hard task. A poet of superior genius, possessing the power of inflaming the mind, may take liberties that would be dangerous for others. Homer appears not extravagant in animating his darts and arrows: nor Thomson in animating the seasons, the winds, the rains, the dews; he even ventures to animate the diamond, and doth it with propriety:

——————— That polish'd bright
And all its native lustre let abroad,
Dares, as it sparkles on the fair-one's breast,
With vain ambition emulate her eyes.

But there are things familiar and base, to which personification cannot descend: in a composed state of mind, to animate a lump of matter even in the most rapid flight of fancy, degenerates into burlesque:

How now! what noise! that spirit's possessed with haste,
That wounds th' unresisting postern with these strokes,
*Shakespear, Measure for Measure, act 4. sc. 6.*

——————— Or from the shore
The plovers when to scatter o'er the heath,

And

And sing their wild notes to the list'ning *waste*.
*Thomson, Spring, l.* 23.

Speaking of a man's hand cut off in battle:

Te decisa suum, Laride, dextera quærit:
Semianimesque micant digiti; ferrumque retractant.
*Æneid.* x. 395.

The personification here of a hand is insufferable, especially in a plain narration: not to mention that such a trivial incident is too minutely described.

The same observation is applicable to abstract terms, which ought not to be animated unless they have some natural dignity. Thomson, in this article, is extremely licentious; witness the following instances out of many.

O vale of bliss! O softly swelling hills!
On which *the power of cultivation* lies,
And joys to see the wonders of his toil.
*Summer, l.* 1425.

Then fated *Hunger* bids his brother *Thirst*
Produce the mighty bowl:
Nor wanting is the brown October, drawn
Mature and perfect, from *his* dark retreat
Of thirty years; and now *his honest front*
Flames in the light refulgent. *Autumn, l.* 516.

Thirdly, It is not sufficient to avoid improper subjects: some preparation is necessary, in order to rouse the mind; for the imagination refuses its aid, till it be warmed at least, if not enflamed. Yet Thomson, without the least ceremony or preparation, introduceth each season as a sensible being:

From brightening fields of æther fair disclos'd,
Child of the sun, refulgent *Summer* comes,
In pride of youth, and felt through Nature's depth.
He comes attended by the sultry hours,
And ever-fanning breezes, on his way;
While from his ardent look, the turning Spring
Averts her blushful face, and earth and skies
All smiling, to his hot dominion leaves.
*Summer, l.* 1.

See *Winter* comes, to rule the vary'd year,
Sullen and sad with all his rising train,

*Vapours*,

*Vapours*, and *clouds*, and *ſtorms*. *Winter*, *l.* 1.

This has violently the air of writing mechanically without taſte. It is not natural, that the imagination of a writer ſhould be ſo much heated at the very commencement; and, at any rate, he cannot expect ſuch ductility in his readers. But if this practice can be juſtified by authority, Thomſon has one of no mean note: Vida begins his firſt eclogue in the following words:

Dicite, vos Muſæ, et juvenum memorate querelas;
Dicite; nam motas ipſas ad carmina cautes
Et requieſſe ſuos perhibent vaga flumina curſus.

Even Shakeſpear is not always careful to prepare the mind for this bold figure. Take the following inſtance.

——————— Upon theſe taxations,
The clothiers all, not able to maintain
The many to them 'longing, have put off
The ſpinſters, carders, fullers, weavers; who,
Unfit for other life, compell'd by hunger,
And lack of other means, in deſp'rate manner
Daring th'event to th' teeth, are all in uproar,
And *Danger* ſerves among them.

*Henry* VIII. *act* 1. *ſc.* 4.

Fourthly, Deſcriptive perſonification, ſtill more than what is paſſionate, ought to be kept within the bounds of moderation. A reader warmed with a beautiful ſubject, can imagine, even without paſſion, the winds, for example, to be animated: but ſtill the winds are the ſubject; and any action aſcribed to them beyond or contrary to their uſual operation, appearing unnatural, ſeldom fails to baniſh the illuſion altogether: the reader's imagination too far ſtrained, refuſes its aid; and the deſcription becomes obſcure, inſtead of being more lively and ſtriking. In this view, the following paſſage, deſcribing Cleopatra on ſhipboard, appears to me exceptionable.

The barge ſhe ſat in, like a burniſh'd throne,
Burnt on the water; the poop was beaten gold,
Purple the ſails, and ſo perfumed, that
The winds were love-ſick with 'em.

*Antony and Cleopatra*, *act* 2. *ſc.* 3.

The

The winds in their impetuous courſe have ſo much the appearance of fury, that it is eaſy to figure them wreaking their reſentment againſt their enemies, by deſtroying houſes, ſhips, &c.; but to figure them love-ſick, has no reſemblance to them in any circumſtance. In another paſſage, where Cleopatra is alſo the ſubject, the perſonification of the air is carried beyond all bounds:

——————————— The city caſt
Its people out upon her; and Antony
Inthron'd i'th'market-place, did ſit alone,
Whiſtling to th'air, which but for vacancy,
Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too,
And made a gap in nature.

*Antony and Cleopatra, act 2. ſc. 3.*

The following perſonification of the earth or ſoil is not leſs wild:

She ſhall be dignify'd with this high honour
To bear my Lady's train; leſt the baſe earth
Should from her veſture chance to ſteal a kiſs;
And of ſo great a favour growing proud,
Diſdain to root the ſummer-ſwelling flower,
And make rough winter everlaſtingly.

*Two Gentlemen of Verona, act 2. ſc. 7.*

Shakeſpear, far from approving ſuch intemperance of imagination, puts this ſpeech in the mouth of a ranting lover. Neither can I reliſh what follows:

Omnia quæ, Phœbo quondam meditante, beatus
Audiit Eurotas, juſſitque ediſcere lauros,
Ille canit. *Virgil. Buc.* vi. 82.

The chearfulneſs ſingly of a paſtoral ſong, will ſcarce ſupport perſonification in the loweſt degree. But admitting, that a river gently flowing may be imagined a ſenſible being liſtening to a ſong, I cannot enter into the conceit of the river's ordering his laurels to learn the ſong: here all reſemblance to any thing real is quite loſt. This however is copied literally by one of our greateſt poets; early indeed, before maturity of taſte or judgment:

Thames heard the numbers as he flow'd along,
And bade his willows learn the moving ſong.

*Pope's Paſtorals, paſt. 14. l. 3.*

This

This author, in riper years, is guilty of a much greater deviation from the rule. Dullneſs may be in agined a deity or idol, to be worſhipped by bad writers; but then ſome ſort of diſguiſe is requiſite, ſome baſtard virtue muſt be beſtow'd, to give this idol a plauſible appearance. Yet in the *Dunciad*, Dullneſs, without the leaſt diſguiſe, is made the object of worſhip: the mind rejects ſuch a fiction as unnatural; for dullneſs is a defect, of which even the dulleſt mortal is aſhamed:

Then he: great tamer of all human art!
Firſt in my care, and ever at my heart;
Dullneſs! whoſe good old cauſe I yet defend,
With whom my muſe began, with whom ſhall end,
E'er ſince Sir Fopling's periwig was praiſe,
To the laſt honours of the Bull and Bays!
O thou! of bus'neſs the directing ſoul!
To this our head, like bias to the bowl,
Which, as more pond'rous, makes its aim more true,
Obliquely wadling to the mark in view:
O! ever gracious to perplex'd mankind,
Still ſpread a healing miſt before the mind:
And, leſt we err by Wit's wild dancing light,
Secure us kindly in our native night.
Or, if to wit a coxcomb make pretence,
Guard the ſure barrier between that and ſenſe;
Or quite unravel all the reas'ning thread,
And hang ſome curious cobweb in its ſtead!
As, forc'd from wind-guns, lead itſelf can fly,
And pond'rous ſlugs cut ſwiftly through the ſky;
As clocks to weight their nimble motion owe,
The wheels above urg'd by the load below:
Me Emptineſs, and Dullneſs could inſpire,
And were my elaſticity, and fire. *B.* i. 163.

The following inſtance is ſtretched beyond all reſemblance: it is bold to take a part or member of a living creature, and to beſtow upon it life, volition, and action: after animating two ſuch members, it is ſtill bolder to make one envy the other; for this is wide of any reſemblance to reality:

——— De noſtri baci
Meritamenti

Meritamenti ſia giudice quella,
Che la bocco ha più bella.
Tutte concordemente
Eleſſer la beliſſima Amarilli;
Ed' ella i ſuoi begli occhi
Dolcemente chinando,
Di modeſto roſſo tutta ſi tinſe,
E monſtrò ben, che non men bella è dentro
Di quel che ſia di ſuori;
O foſſe, ch'el bel volto
Aveſſe invidia all'onorata bocca,
E s'adornaſſe anch' egli
Della purpurea ſua pompoſa veſta,
Quaſi voleſſe dir, ſon bello anch'io.

*Paſtor Fido, act 2. ſc. 1.*

Fifthly, The enthuſiaſm of paſſion may have the effect to prolong paſſionate perſonification: but deſcriptive perſonification cannot be diſpatched in too few words; a circumſtantiate deſcription diſſolves the charm, and makes the attempt to perſonify appear ridiculous. Homer ſucceeds in animating his darts and arrows: but ſuch perſonification ſpun out in a French tranſlation, is mere burleſque:

Et la fléche en furie, avide de ſon ſang,
Part, vole à lui, l'atteint, et lui perce le flanc.

Horace ſays happily,

Poſt equitem ſedet atra Cura.

See how this thought degenerates by being divided, like the former, into a number of minute parts:

Un fou rempli d'erreurs, que le trouble accompagne
Et malade à la ville ainſi qu' à la compagne,
En vain monte à cheval pour tromper ſon ennui,
Le Chagrin monte en croupe, et galope avec lui.

A poet, in a ſhort and lively expreſſion, may animate his muſe, his genius, and even his verſe: but to animate his verſe, and to addreſs a whole epiſtle to it, as Boileau doth *, is inſupportable.

The following paſſage is not leſs faulty.

Her-

* Epiſtle 10.

Her fate is whiſper'd by the gentle breeze,
And told in ſighs to all the trembling trees:
The trembling trees, in ev'ry plain and wood,
Her fate remurmur to the ſilver flood;
The ſilver flood, ſo lately calm, appears
Swell'd with new paſſion, and o'erflows with tears;
The winds, and trees, and floods, her death deplore,
Daphne, our grief! our glory! now no more.

*Pope's Paſtorals*, iv. 61.

Let grief or love have the power to animate the winds, the trees, the floods, provided the figure be diſpatched in a ſingle expreſſion: even in that caſe, the figure ſeldom has a good effect; becauſe grief or love of the paſtoral kind, are cauſes rather too faint for ſo violent an effect as imagining the winds, trees, or floods, to be ſenſible beings. But when this figure is deliberately ſpread out with great regularity and accuracy, through many lines, the reader, inſtead of reliſhing it, is ſtruck with its ridiculous appearance.

## SECT. II. *APOSTROPHE.*

THIS figure and the former are derived from the ſame principle. If, to humour a plaintive paſſion, we can beſtow a momentary ſenſibility upon an inanimate object, it is not more difficult to beſtow a momentary preſence upon a ſenſible being who is abſent:

Hinc Drepani me portus et illætabilis ora
Accipit. Hic, pelagi tot tempeſtatibus actus,
Heu! genitorem, omnis curæ caſuſque levamen,
Amitto Anchiſen: *hic me pater optime feſſum*
*Deſeris*, heu! tantis nequicquam erepte periclis.
Nec vates Helenus, cum multa horrenda moneret,
Hos mihi prædixit luctus; non dira Celæno.

*Æneid.* iii. 707.

Strike the harp in praiſe of Bragela, whom I left in the iſle of miſt, the ſpouſe of my love. Doſt thou raiſe thy fair face from the rock to find the ſails of Cuchullin? The ſea is rolling far diſtant, and its white foam ſhall deceive thee for my ſails. Retire, for it is night, my love, and the dark winds ſigh in thy hair. Retire to the hall of my feaſts, and think of the times that are paſt; for

for I will not return till the ſtorm of war is gone. O Connal, ſpeak of wars and arms, and ſend her from my mind; for lovely with her raven-hair is the white boſom'd daughter of Sorglan. *Fingal, b.* 1.

Speaking of Fingal abſent,

Happy are thy people, O Fingal, thine arm ſhall fight their battles. Thou art the firſt in their dangers; and wiſeſt in the days of their peace: thou ſpeakeſt, and thy thouſands obey; and armies tremble at the ſound of thy ſteel. Happy are thy people, O Fingal.

This figure is ſometimes joined with the former: things inanimate, to qualify them for liſtening to a paſſionate expoſtulation, are not only perſonified, but alſo conceived to be preſent:

Et, ſi fata Deûm, ſi mens non læva fuiſſet,
Impulerat ferro Argolicas fœdare latebras:
*Trojaque nunc ſtares, Priamique arx alta maneres.*
*Æneid.* ii. 54.

*Helena.* ——————— Poor Lord, is't I
That chaſe thee from thy country, and expoſe
Thoſe tender limbs of thine to the event
Of none ſparing-war? And is it I
That drive thee from the ſportive court, where thou
Waſt ſhot at with fair eyes, to be the mark
Of ſmoky muſkets? *O you leaden meſſengers,*
That ride upon the violent ſpeed of fire,
Fly with falſe aim; pierce the ſtill moving air
That ſings with piercing; do not touch my Lord!
*All's well that ends well, act* 3 *ſc.* 4.

And let them lift ten thouſand ſwords, ſaid Nathos with a ſmile: the ſons of car-borne Uſnoth will never tremble in danger. Why doſt thou roll with all thy foam, thou roaring ſea of Ullin? why do ye ruſtle on your dark wings, ye whiſtling tempeſts of the ſky? Do ye think, ye ſtorms, that ye keep Nathos on the coaſt? No; his ſoul detains him; children of the night! Althos, bring my father's arms, *&c.* *Fingal.*

Whither haſt thou fled, O wind, ſaid the King of Morven! Doſt thou ruſtle in the chambers of the ſouth, and purſue the ſhower in other lands? Why comeſt not thou

thou to my ſails, to the blue face of my ſeas? The foe is in the land of Morven, and the King is abſent.

*Fingal.*

Haſt thou left thy blue courſe in heaven, golden-hair'd ſon of the ſky! The weſt hath open'd its gates; the bed of thy repoſe is there. The waves gather to behold thy beauty: they liſt their trembling heads; they ſee thee lovely in thy ſleep; but they ſhrink away with fear. Reſt in thy ſhadowy cave, O Sun! and let thy return be in joy. *Fingal.*

Daughter of Heaven, fair art thou! the ſilence of thy face is pleaſant. Thou comeſt forth in lovelineſs: the ſtars attend thy blue ſteps in the eaſt. The clouds rejoice in thy preſence, O Moon! and brighten their dark-brown ſides. Who is like thee in heaven, daughter of the night? The ſtars are aſhamed in thy preſence, and turn aſide their ſparkling eyes. Whither doſt thou retire from thy courſe, when the darkneſs of thy countenance grows? Haſt thou thy hall like Oſſian? Dwelleſt thou in the ſhadow of grief? Have thy ſiſters fallen from heaven? and are they who rejoiced with thee at night, no more? —— Yes, they have fallen, fair light; and often doſt thou retire to mourn. —— But thou thyſelf ſhalt, one night, fail; and leave thy blue path in heaven. The ſtars will then liſt their heads: they, who in thy preſence were aſhamed, will rejoice. *Fingal.*

This figure, like all others, requires an agitation of mind. In plain narrative, as, for example, in giving the genaology of a family, it has no good effect:

—————— Fauno Picus pater; iſque parentem
Te, Saturne, refert; tu ſanguinis ultimus auctor.

*Æneid.* vii. 48.

## SECT. III. *HYPERBOLE.*

IN this figure, by which an object is magnified or diminiſhed beyond the truth, we have another effect of the foregoing principle. An object uncommon with reſpect to ſize, either very great of its kind or very little, ſtrikes us with ſurpriſe; and this emotion forces upon the mind a momentary conviction that the object is greater

er or leſs than it is in reality*: the ſame effect, preciſely, attends figurative grandeur or littleneſs; and hence the hyperbole, which expreſſes that momentary conviction. A writer, taking advantage of this natural deluſion, enriches his deſcription greatly by the hyperbole: and the reader, even in his cooleſt moments, reliſhes that figure, being ſenſible that it is the operation of nature upon a warm fancy.

It cannot have eſcaped obſervation, that a writer is generally more ſucceſsful in magnifying by a hyperbole than in diminiſhing. The reaſon is, that a minute object contracts the mind, and fetters its power of imagination; but that the mind, dilated and inflamed with a grand object, moulds objects for its gratification with great facility. Longinus, with reſpect to a diminiſhing hyperbole, quotes the following ludicrous thought from a comic poet: "He was owner of a bit of ground not "larger than a Lacedemonian letter †." But, for the reaſon now given, the hyperbole has by far the greater force in magnifying objects; of which take the following examples:

For all the land which thou ſeeſt, to thee will I give it, and to thy ſeed for ever. And I will make thy ſeed as the duſt of the earth: ſo that if a man can number the duſt of the earth, then ſhall thy ſeed alſo be numbered. *Geneſis* xiii. 15. 16.

Illa vel intactæ ſegetis per ſumma volaret
Gramina: nec teneras curſu læſiſſet ariſtas.
*Æneid.* vii. 808.

——— Atque imo barathri ter gurgite vaſtos
Sorbet in abruptum fluctus, rurſuſque ſub auras
Erigit alternos, et ſidera verberat undâ.
*Æneid.* iii. 421.

——— Horrificis juxta tonat Ætna ruinis,
Interdumque atram prorumpit ad æthera nubem,
Turbine ſumantem piceo et candente favilla:
Attollitque globos flammarum, et ſidera lambit.
*Æneid.* iii. 571.

Speaking

* See chap. 8.

† Chap. 31. of his treatiſe on the ſublime.

Speaking of Polyphemus,

——————— Ipſe arduus, altaque pulſat
Sidera. *Æneid.* iii. 619.

——————— When he ſpeaks,
The air, a charter'd libertine is ſtill.
*Henry* V. *act* 1. *ſc.* 1.

Now ſhield with ſhield, with helmet helmet cloſ'd,
To armour armour, lance to lance oppos'd,
Hoſt againſt hoſt with ſhadowy ſquadrons drew,
The ſounding darts in iron tempeſts flew,
Victors and vanquiſh'd join promiſcuous cries,
And ſhrilling ſhouts and dying groans ariſe;
With ſtreaming blood the ſlipp'ry fields are dy'd,
And ſlaughter'd heroes ſwell the dreadful tide.
*Iliad.* iv. 508.

The following may alſo paſs, though ſtretched pretty far.

E conjungendo à temerario ardire
Eſtrema forza, e infaticabili lena
Vien che ſi' impetuoſo il ferro gire,
Che ne trema la terra, e'l ciel balena.
*Gieruſalemme, cant.* 6. *ſt.* 46.

Quintilian * is ſenſible that this figure is natural: "For," ſays he, "not contented with truth, we naturally incline to augment or diminiſh beyond it; and for that reaſon the hyperbole is familiar even among the vulgar and illiterate:" and he adds, very juſtly, "That the hyperbole is then proper, when the ſubject of itſelf exceeds the common meaſure." From theſe premiſſes, one would not expect the following inference, the only reaſon he can find for juſtifying this figure of ſpeech, "Conceditur enim amplius dicere, quia dici quantum eſt non poteſt: meliuſque ultra quam citra ſtat oratio." (We are indulged to ſay more than enough, becauſe we cannot ſay enough; and it is better to be above than under). In the name of wonder, why this ſlight and childiſh reaſoning, after obſerving, that the hyperbole is founded on human nature? I could not reſiſt this perſonal ſtroke of criticiſm; intended not againſt our author, for no human creature is exempt from error,

* L. 8. cap. 6. in fin.

error, but againſt the blind veneration that is paid to the antient claſſic writers, without diſtinguiſhing their blemiſhes from their beauties.

Having examined the nature of this figure, and the principle on which it is erected, I proceed, as in the firſt ſection, to the rules by which it ought to be governed. And, in the firſt place, it is a capital fault, to introduce an hyperbole in the deſcription of any thing ordinary or familiar; for in ſuch a caſe, it is altogether unnatural, being deſtitute of ſurpriſe, its only foundation. Take the following inſtance, where the ſubject is extremely familiar, *viz.* ſwimming to gain the ſhore after a ſhipwreck.

I ſaw him beat the ſurges under him,
And ride upon their backs; he trode the water;
Whoſe enmity he flung aſide, and breaſted
The ſurge moſt ſwoln that met him: his bold head
'Bove the contentious waves he kept, and oar'd
Himſelf with his good arms, in luſty ſtrokes
To th'*ſhore*, that o'er his wave borne baſis bow'd,
As ſtooping to relieve him. *Tempeſt, act* 2. *ſc.* 1.

In the next place, it may be gathered from what is ſaid, that an hyperbole can never ſuit the tone of any diſpiriting paſſion: ſorrow in particular will never prompt ſuch a figure; and for that reaſon the following hyperboles muſt be condemned as unnatural.

*K. Rich.* Aumerle, thou weep'ſt, my tender-hearted couſin!
We'll make foul weather with deſpiſed tears;
Our ſighs, and they, ſhall lodge the ſummer-corn,
And make a dearth in this revolting land.
*Richard* II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

Draw them to Tyber's bank, and weep your tears
Into the channel, till the loweſt ſtream
Do kiſs the moſt exalted ſhores of all.
*Julius Cæſar, act* 1. *ſc.* 1.

Thirdly, A writer, if he wiſh to ſucceed, ought always to have the reader in his eye: he ought in particular never to venture a bold thought or expreſſion, till the reader be warmed and prepared For that reaſon, an hyperbole in the beginning of a work can never be in its place. Example: Jam

Jam pauca aratro jugera regiæ
Moles relinquent. *Horat. Carm. lib. 2. ode 15.*

The nicest point of all, is to ascertain the natural limits of an hyperbole, beyond which being overstrained it hath a bad effect. Longinus, in the above-cited chapter, with great propriety of thought, enters a caveat against an hyperbole of that kind: he compares it to a bow-string, which relaxes by overstraining, and produceth an effect directly opposite to what is intended. To ascertain any precise boundary, would be difficult, if not impracticable. Mine shall be an humbler task, which is, to give a specimen of what I reckon overstrained hyperboles; and I shall be extremely curt upon them, because examples are to be found every where: no fault is more common among writers of inferior rank; and instances are found even among classical writers; witness the following hyperbole, too bold even for an Hotspur.

Hotspur, talking of Mortimer:

In single opposition hand to hand,
He did confound the best part of an hour
In changing hardiment with great Glendower.
Three times they breath'd, and three times did they drink,
Upon agreement, of swift Severn's flood;
Who then affrighted with their bloody looks,
Ran fearfully among the trembling reeds,
And hid his crisp'd head in the hollow bank,
Blood-stained with these valiant combatants.

*First part, Henry* IV. *act* 1. *sc.* 4.

Speaking of Henry V.

England ne'er had a king until his time:
Virtue he had, deserving to command:
His brandish'd sword did blind men with its beams:
His arms spread wider than a dragon's wings:
His sparkling eyes, replete with awful fire,
More dazzled, and drove back his enemies,
Than mid-day sun fierce bent against their faces.
What should I say? his deeds exceed all speech:
He never lifted up his hand, but conquer'd.

*First part, Henry* VI. *act* 1. *sc.* 1.

Se

Se tutti gli alberi del mondo foſſero penne,
Il cielo foſſe carta, il mare inchoſtro,
Non baſterian a deſcrivere la minima
Parte delle voſtre perfettioni.

Se tante lingue haveſſi, e tante voci,
Quant' occhi il cielo, e quante arene il mare,
Perderian tutto il ſuono, e la favella
Nel dire a pieno le voſtri lodi immenſi. *Guarini.*

It is obſervable that a hyperbole, even the moſt extravagant, generally produces ſome emotion: the preſent hyperbole is an exception; and the reaſon is, that numbers, in which the extravagance entirely conſiſts, make no impreſſion upon the imagination when they exceed what can eaſily be conceived.

Laſtly, An hyperbole, after it is introduced with all advantages, ought to be comprehended within the feweſt words poſſible: as it cannot be reliſhed but in the hurry and ſwelling of the mind, a leiſurely view diſſolves the charm, and diſcovers the deſcription to be extravagant at leaſt, and perhaps alſo ridiculous. This fault is palpable in a ſonnet which paſſeth for one of the moſt complete in the French language: Phillis, in a long and florid deſcription, is made as far to outſhine the ſun as he outſhines the ſtars:

Le ſilence regnoit ſur la terre et ſur l'onde,
L'air devenoit ſerain et l'Olimpe vermeil,
Et l'amoureux Zephir affranchi du ſomeil,
Reſſuſcitoit les fleurs d'une haleine féconde.

L'Aurore déployoit l'or de ſa treſſe blonde,
Et ſemoit de rubis le chemin du ſoleil;
Enfin ce Dieu venoit au plus grand appareil
Qu'il ſoit jamais venu pour éclairer le monde:

Quand la jeune Phillis au viſage riant,
Sortant de ſon palais plus clair que l'orient,
Fit voir une lumiere et plus vive et plus belle.

Sacré flambeau du jour, n'en ſoiez point jaloux,
Vous parûtes alors auſſi peu devant elle,
Que les feux de la nuit avoient fait devant vous.
*Malleville.*

There is in Chaucer a thought expreſſed in a ſingle line, which

which ſets a young beauty in a more advantageous light, than the whole of this much laboured poem:

Up roſe the ſun, and up roſe Emelie.

## SECT. IV.

*The means or inſtrument conceived to be the agent.*

WHen we ſurvey a number of objects connected together, that which makes the greateſt figure employs chiefly our attention; and the emotion it raiſes, if lively, prompts us even to exceed nature in the conception we form of it. Take the following examples.

For Neleus' ſon Alcides' *rage* had ſlain.

A broken rock the *force* of Pirus threw.

In theſe inſtances, the rage of Hercules and the force of Pirus, being the capital circumſtances, are ſo far exalted as to be conceived the agents that produce the effects.

In the following inſtances, hunger being the chief circumſtance in the deſcription, is itſelf imagined to be the patient.

Whoſe hunger has not taſted food theſe three days.
*Jane Shore.*

——————— As when the *force*
Of ſubterranean wind tranſports a hill. *Paradiſe loſt.*

——————— As when the *potent rod*
Of Amram's ſon, in Egypt's evil day
Wav'd round the coaſt, upcall'd a pitchy cloud
Of locuſts. *Paradiſe loſt.*

## SECT. V.

*A figure, which, among related objects, extends the properties of one to another.*

THis figure is not dignified with a proper name, becauſe it has been overlooked by writers. It merits, however, a place in this work; and muſt be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe formerly handled, as depending on a different principle. *Giddy brink, jovial wine, daring wound*, are examples of this figure. Here are adjectives that cannot be made to ſignify any quality of the

ſubſtantives to which they are joined: a *brink*, for example, cannot be termed *giddy* in a ſenſe, either proper or figurative, that can ſignify any of its qualities or attributes. When we examine attentively the expreſſion, we diſcover, that a *brink* is termed *giddy* from producing that effect in thoſe who ſtand on it: in the ſame manner a wound is ſaid to be *daring*, not with reſpect to itſelf, but with reſpect to the boldneſs of the perſon who inflicts it: and wine is ſaid to be *jovial*, as inſpiring mirth and jollity. Thus the attributes of one ſubject are extended to another with which it is connected; and the expreſſion of ſuch a thought muſt be conſidered as a figure, becauſe the attribute is not applicable to the ſubject in any proper ſenſe.

How are we to account for this figure, which we ſee lies in the thought, and to what principle ſhall we refer it? Have poets a privilege to alter the nature of things, and at pleaſure to beſtow attributes upon a ſubject to which they do not belong? We have had often occaſion to inculcate, that the mind paſſeth eaſily and ſweetly along a train of connected objects; and where the objects are intimately connected, that it is diſpoſed to carry along the good or bad properties of one to another; eſpecially when it is in any degree inflamed with theſe properties *. From this principle is derived the figure under conſideration. Language, invented for the communication of thought, would be imperfect, if it were not expreſſive even of the ſlighter propenſities and more delicate feelings: but language cannot remain ſo imperfect among a people who have received any poliſh; becauſe language is regulated by internal feeling, and is gradually ſo improved as to expreſs whatever paſſes in the mind. Thus, for example, when a ſword in the hand of a coward, is termed *a coward ſword*, the expreſſion is ſignificative of an internal operation; for the mind, in paſſing from the agent to its inſtrument, is diſpoſed to extend to the latter the properties of the former. Governed by the ſame principle, we ſay *liſtening* fear, by extending the attribute *liſtening* of the man who liſtens, to the paſſion with which he is moved. In the expreſſion, *bold deed*,

* See chap 2. part 1. ſect. 5.

*deed*, or *audax facinus*, we extend the effect to what properly belongs to the cauſe. But not to waſte time by making a commentary upon every expreſſion of this kind, the beſt way to give a complete view of the ſubject, is to exhibit a table of the different relations that may give occaſion to this figure. And in viewing that table, it will be obſerved, that the figure can never have any grace but where the relations are of the moſt intimate kind.

1. An attribute of the cauſe expreſſed as an attribute of the effect.

Audax facinus.

Of yonder fleet a *bold* diſcovery make.
An impious mortal gave the *daring* wound.
——————— To my *adventrous* ſong,
That with no middle flight intends to ſoar.
*Paradiſe loſt.*

2. An attribute of the effect expreſſed as an attribute of the cauſe.

Quos periiſſe ambos *miſera* cenſebam in mari.
*Plautus.*

No wonder, fallen ſuch a *pernicious* height.
*Paradiſe loſt.*

3. An effect expreſſed as an attribute of the cauſe.

Jovial wine, Giddy brink, Drowſy night, Muſing midnight, Panting height, Aſtoniſh'd thought, Mournful gloom.

Caſting a dim *religious* light. *Milton Comus.*
And the *merry* bells ring round,
And the *jocund* rebecks ſound. *Milton, Allegro.*

4. An attribute of a ſubject beſtowed upon one of its parts or members.

*Longing* arms.

It was the nightingale, and not the lark,
That pierc'd the *fearful* hollow of thine ear.
*Romeo and Juliet, act 3. ſc. 7.*

——————— Oh, lay by
Thoſe moſt ungentle looks and angry weapons;
Unleſs you mean my griefs and killing fears

Should ſtretch me out at your *relentleſs* feet.
*Fair Penitent, act* 3.

——————— And ready now
To ſtoop with *wearied* wing, and *willing* feet,
On the bare outſide of this world.
*Paradiſe loſt, b.* 3.

5. A quality of the agent given to the inſtrument with which it operates.

Why peep your *coward* ſwords half out their ſhells?

6. An attribute of the agent given to the ſubject upon which it operates.

*High-climbing* hill. *Milton.*

7. A quality of one ſubject given to another.

Icci, *beatis* nunc Arabum invides
Gazis. *Horat. Carm. l.* 1. *ode* 29.

When ſapleſs age, and weak unable limbs,
Should bring thy father to his *drooping* chair.
*Shakeſpear.*

By art, the pilot through the boiling deep
And howling tempeſt, ſteers the *fearleſs* ſhip.
*Iliad* xxiii. 385.

Then, nothing loath, th' enamour'd fair he led,
And ſunk tranſported on the *conſcious* bed.
*Odyſſey* viii. 337.

A *ſtupid* moment motionleſs ſhe ſtood.
*Summer, l.* 1336.

8. A circumſtance connected with a ſubject, expreſſed as a quality of the ſubject.

*Breezy* ſummit.

'Tis ours the chance of *fighting* fields to try.
*Iliad* i. 301.

Oh! had I dy'd before that *well fought* wall.
*Odyſſey* v. 395.

From this table it appears, that the expreſſing an effect as an attribute of the cauſe, is not ſo agreeable as the oppoſite expreſſion. The progreſs from cauſe to effect is natural and eaſy: the oppoſite progreſs reſembles retrogade motion*; and therefore *panting height, aſtoniſh'd*

* See chap. 1.

*aſtoniſh'd thought*, are ſtrained and uncouth expreſſions, which a writer of taſte will avoid.

It is not leſs ſtrained, to apply to a ſubject in its preſent ſtate, an epithet that may belong to it in ſome future ſtate:

*Submerſaſque* obrue puppes. *Æneid.* i. 73.
And mighty *ruins* fall. *Iliad* v. 411.
Impious ſons their *mangled* fathers wound.

Another rule regards this figure, That the property of one ſubject ought not to be beſtow'd upon another with which that property is incongruous:

*K. Rich* ——— How dare thy joints forget
To pay their *awful* duty to our preſence?
*Richard* II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

The connection between an awful ſuperior and his ſubmiſſive dependent is ſo intimate, that an attribute may readily be transferred from the one to the other: but awfulneſs cannot be ſo transferred, becauſe it is inconſiſtent with ſubmiſſion.

## SECT. VI. *Metaphor and Allegory.*

A Metaphor differs from a ſimile, in form only, not in ſubſtance: in a ſimile, the two ſubjects are kept diſtinct in the expreſſion, as well as in the thought; in a metaphor, the two ſubjects are kept diſtinct in thought only, not in the expreſſion. A hero reſembles a lion, and upon that reſemblance many ſimiles have been made by Homer and other poets. But inſtead of reſembling a lion, let us take the aid of the imagination, and feign or figure the hero to be a lion: by that variation the ſimile is converted into a metaphor; which is carried on by deſcribing all the qualities of a lion that reſemble thoſe of the hero. The fundamental pleaſure here, that of reſemblance, belongs to the thought as diſtinguiſhed from the expreſſion. An additional pleaſure ariſes from the expreſſion: the poet, by figuring his hero to be a lion, goes on to deſcribe the lion in appearance, but in reality the hero; and his deſcription is peculiarly beautiful, by expreſſing the virtues and qualities of the hero in new terms, which, properly ſpeaking, belong not

to him, but to the lion. This will better be underſtood by examples. A family connected with a common parent, reſembles a tree, the trunk and branches of which are connected with a common root: but let us ſuppoſe, that a family is figured, not barely to be like a tree, but to be a tree; and then the ſimile will be converted into a metaphor, in the following manner.

Edward's ſev'n ſons, whereof thyſelf art one,
Were ſev'n fair branches, ſpringing from one root:
Some of theſe branches by the deſt'nies cut:
But Thomas, my dear Lord, my life, my Glo'ſter,
One flouriſhing branch of his moſt royal root,
Is hack'd down, and his ſummer-leaves all faded,
By Envy's hand and Murder's bloody axe.
*Richard* II *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

Figuring human life to be a voyage at ſea:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to Fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in ſhallows and in miſeries.
On ſuch a full ſea are we now afloat;
And we muſt take the current when it ſerves,
Or loſe our ventures. *Julius Cæſar*, *act* 4. *ſc.* 5.

Figuring glory and honour to be a garland of flowers:

*Hotſpur.* ——————— Would to heav'n,
Thy name in arms were now as great as mine!
*Pr. Henry.* I'll make it greater, ere I part from thee;
And all the budding honours on thy creſt
I'll crop, to make a garland for my head.
*Firſt part*, *Henry* IV. *act* 4. *ſc.* 9.

Figuring a man who hath acquired great reputation and honour to be a tree full of fruit:

——————— Oh, boys, this ſtory
The world may read in me: my body's mark'd
With Roman ſwords; and my report was once
Firſt with the beſt of note. Cymbeline lov'd me;
And when a ſoldier was the theme, my name
Was not far off: then was I as a tree,
Whoſe boughs did bend with fruit. But in one night,
A ſtorm or robbery, call it what you will,
Shook down my mellow hangings, nay my leaves;

And

And left me bare to weather.

*Cymbeline, act 3. sc. 3.*

Bleſt be thy ſoul, thou king of ſhells, ſaid Swaran of the dark-brown ſhield. In peace thou art the gale of ſpring; in war the mountain-ſtorm. Take now my hand in friendſhip, thou noble king of Morven. *Fingal.*

Thou dwelleſt in the ſoul of Malvina, ſon of mighty Oſſian. My ſighs ariſe with the beam of the eaſt: my tears deſcend with the drops of night. I was a lovely tree in thy preſence, Oſcar, with all my branches round me; but thy death came like a blaſt from the deſert, and laid my green head low; the ſpring returned with its ſhowers, but no leaf of mine aroſe. *Fingal.*

I am aware that the term *metaphor* has been uſed in a more extenſive ſenſe than I give it; but I thought it of conſequence, in a diſquiſition of ſome intricacy, to confine this term to its proper ſenſe, and to ſeparate from it things that are diſtinguiſhed by different names. An allegory differs from a metaphor; and what I would chuſe to call *a figure of ſpeech*, differs from both. I proceed to explain theſe differences A metaphor is defined above to be an operation of the imagination, figuring one thing to be another. An allegory requires no operation of the imagination, nor is one thing figured to be another: it conſiſts in chuſing a ſubject having properties or circumſtances reſembling thoſe of the principal ſubject; and the former is deſcribed in ſuch a manner as to repreſent the latter: the ſubject thus repreſented is kept out of view; we are left to diſcover it by reflection; and we are pleaſed with the diſcovery, becauſe it is our own work. Quintilian * gives the following inſtance of an allegory,

O navis, referent in mare te novi
Fluctus. O quid agis? fortiter occupa portum.

*Horat. lib. 1. ode 14.*

and explains it elegantly in the following words; "Totuſque ille Horatii locus, quo navim pro republica, fluctuum tempeſtates pro bellis civilibus, portum pro pace atque concordia, dicit."



* L. 8. cap. 6. ſect. 2.

There cannot be a finer or more correct allegory than the following, in which a vineyard is made to represent God's own people the Jews.

Thou haſt brought a vine out of Egypt: thou haſt caſt out the heathen, and planted it. Thou didſt cauſe it to take deep root, and it filled the land. The hills were covered with its ſhadow, and the boughs thereof were like the goodly cedar. Why haſt thou then broken down her hedges, ſo that all which paſs do pluck her? The boar out of the wood doth waſte it, and the wild beaſt doth devour it. Return, we beſeech thee, O God of hoſts: look down from heaven, and behold, and viſit this vine, and the vineyard thy right hand hath planted, and the branch thou madeſt ſtrong for thyſelf. *Pſalm* 80.

In a word, an allegory is in every reſpect ſimilar to an hieroglyphical painting, excepting only, that words are uſed inſtead of colours. Their effects are preciſely the ſame: a hieroglyphic raiſes two images in the mind; one ſeen, which repreſents one not ſeen: an allegory does the ſame; the repreſentative ſubject is deſcribed; and reſemblance leads us to apply the deſcription to the ſubject repreſented. In a figure of ſpeech, there is no fiction of the imagination employ'd, as in a metaphor, nor a repreſentative ſubject introduced, as in an allegory. This figure, as its name implies, regards the expreſſion only, not the thought; and it may be defined, the uſing a word in a ſenſe different from what is proper to it. Thus youth, or the beginning of life, is expreſſed figuratively by *morning of life*: morning is the beginning of the day; and in that view it is employ'd to ſignify the beginning of any other ſeries, life eſpecially, the progreſs of which it reckoned by days.

Figures of ſpeech are reſerved for a ſeparate ſection; but metaphor and allegory are ſo much connected, that they muſt be handled together: the rules particularly for diſtinguiſhing the good from the bad, are common to both. We ſhall therefore proceed to theſe rules, after adding ſome examples to illuſtrate the nature of an allegory. Horace, ſpeaking of his love to Pyrrha, which was now extinguiſhed, expreſſeth himſelf thus:

——— Me

——————Me tabulâ sacer
Votivâ paries indicat uvida
Suspendisse potenti
Vestimenta maris Deo. *Carm. l.* 1. *ode* 5.

Again:

Phœbus volentem prælia me loqui,
Victas et urbes, increpuit lyrâ:
Ne parva Tyrrhenum per æquor
Vela darem. *Carm. l.* 5. *ode* 15.

*Queen.* Great Lords, wise men ne'er sit and wail their loss,
But chearly seek how to redress their harms.
What though the mast be now blown overboard,
The cable broke, the holding-anchor lost,
And half our sailors swallow'd in the flood?
Yet lives our pilot still. Is't meet, that he
Should leave the helm, and, like a fearful lad,
With tearful eyes add water to the sea,
And give more strength to that which hath too much;
While in his moan the ship splits on the rock,
Which industry and courage might have sav'd?
Ah, what a shame! ah, what a fault were this!
*Third part, Henry* VI. *act* 5. *sc.* 5.

*Oroonoko.* Ha! thou hast rous'd
The lion in his den, he stalks abroad,
And the wide forest trembles at his roar.
I find the danger now. *Oroonoko, act* 3. *sc.* 2.

My well beloved hath a vineyard in a very fruitful hill. He fenced it, gathered out the stones thereof, planted it with the choicest vine, built a tower in the midst of it, and also made a wine-press therein: he looked that it should bring forth grapes, and it brought forth wild grapes. And now, O inhabitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, jugde, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard. What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes? And now go to; I will tell you what I will do to my vineyard: I will take away the hedge thereof, and it shall be eaten up; and break down the wall thereof, and it shall be trodden down. And I will lay it waste: it

ſhall not be pruned, nor digged, but there ſhall come up briers and thorns: I will alſo command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it. For the vineyard of the Lord of hoſts is the houſe of Iſrael, and the men of Judah his pleaſant plant. *Iſaiah*, v. 1.

The rules that govern metaphors and allegories, are of two kinds: thoſe of the firſt kind concern the conſtruction of theſe figures, and aſcertain what are regular and what irregular; thoſe of the other kind concern the propriety or impropriety of introduction, in what circumſtances theſe figures may be admitted, and in what circumſtances they are out of place. I begin with rules of the firſt kind; ſome of which coincide with thoſe already given with reſpect to ſimiles; ſome are peculiar to metaphors and allegories.

And, in the firſt place, it has been obſerved, that a ſimile cannot be agreeable where the reſemblance is either too ſtrong or too faint. This holds equally in a metaphor and allegory; and the reaſon is the ſame in all. In the following inſtances, the reſemblance is too faint to be agreeable.

*Malcolm.* ——— But there's no bottom, none,
In my voluptuouſneſs: your wives, your daughters,
Your matrons, and your maids, could not fill up
The ciſtern of my luſt. *Macbeth, act* 4 *ſc.* 4.

The beſt way to judge of this metaphor, is to convert it into a ſimile; which would be bad, becauſe there is ſcarce any reſemblance between luſt and a ciſtern, or betwixt enormous luſt and a large ciſtern.

Again:

He cannot buckle his diſtemper'd cauſe
Within the belt of rule. *Macbeth, act* 5. *ſc.* 2.

There is no reſemblance between a diſtempered cauſe and any body that can be confined within a belt.

Again:

Steep me in poverty to the very lips.
*Othello, act* 4. *ſc.* 9.

Poverty here muſt be conceived a fluid, which it reſembles not in any manner.

Speaking to Bolingbroke baniſh'd for ſix years:

Th

The ſullen paſſage of thy weary ſteps
Eſteem a foil, wherein thou art to ſet
The precious jewel of thy home return.
*Richard* II. *act* 1. *ſc.* 6.

Again:

Here is a letter, lady,
And every word in it a gaping wound
Iſſuing life-blood. *Merchant of Venice*, *act* 3. *ſc.* 3.

Tantæ *molis* erat Romanam condere gentem.
*Æneid.* i. 37.

The following metaphor is ſtrained beyond all endurance: Timur-bec, known to us by the name of Tamerlane the Great, writes to Bajazet Emperor of the Ottomans in the following terms:

Where is the monarch who dares reſiſt us? where is the potentate who doth not glory in being numbered among our attendants? As for thee, deſcended from a Turcoman ſailor, ſince the veſſel of thy unbounded ambition hath been wreck'd in the gulf of thy ſelf love, it would be proper, that thou ſhouldſt take in the ſails of thy temerity, and caſt the anchor of repentance in the port of ſincerity and juſtice, which is the port of ſafety; leſt the tempeſt of our vengeance make thee periſh in the ſea of the puniſhment thou deſerveſt.

Such ſtrained figures, as obſerved above *, are not unfrequent in the firſt dawn of refinement: the mind in a new enjoyment knows no bounds, and is generally carried to exceſs, till taſte and experience diſcover the proper limits.

Secondly, Whatever reſemblance ſubjects may have, it is wrong to put one for another, where they bear no mutual proportion: upon comparing a very high to a very low ſubject, the ſimile takes on an air of burleſque; and the ſame will be the effect, where the one is imagined to be the other, as in a metaphor; or made to repreſent the other, as in an allegory.

Thirdly, Theſe figures, a metaphor eſpecially, ought not to be crowded with many minute circumſtances; for in that caſe it is ſcarcely poſſible to avoid obſcurity.

A

* Chap. 19. Compariſons.

A metaphor above all ought to be ſhort: it is difficult during any courſe of time, to ſupport a lively image of one thing being another; and for that reaſon, a metaphor drawn out to any length, inſtead of illuſtrating or enlivening the principal ſubject, becomes diſagreeable by overſtraining the mind. Here Cowley is extremely licentious: take the following inſtance.

> Great and wiſe conqu'ror, who where-e'er
> Thou com'ſt, doth fortify, and ſettle there!
> Who canſt defend as well as get;
> And never hadſt one quarter beat up yet;
> Now thou art in, thou ne'er will part
> With one inch of my vanquiſh'd heart;
> For ſince thou took'ſt it by aſſault from me,
> 'Tis garriſon'd ſo ſtrong with thoughts of thee
> It fears no beauteous enemy.

For the ſame reaſon, however agreeable long allegories may at firſt be by their novelty, they never afford any laſting pleaſure: witneſs the *Fairy Queen*, which with great power of expreſſion, variety of images, and melody of verſification, is ſcarce ever read a ſecond time.

In the fourth place, The compariſon carried on in a ſimile, being in a metaphor ſunk by imagining the principal ſubject to be that very thing which it only reſembles; an opportunity is furniſhed to deſcribe it in terms taken ſtrictly or literally with reſpect to its imagined nature. This ſuggeſts another rule, That in conſtructing a metaphor, the writer ought to confine himſelf to the ſimpleſt expreſſions, and make uſe of ſuch words only as are applicable literally to the imagined nature of his ſubject: figurative words ought carefully to be avoided; for ſuch complicated figures, inſtead of ſetting the principal ſubject in a ſtrong light, involve it in a cloud; and it is well if the reader, without rejecting by the lump, endeavour patiently to gather the plain meaning, regardleſs of the figures:

> A ſtubborn and unconquerable flame
> Creeps in his veins, and drinks the ſtreams of life.
>
> *Lady Jane Gray, act* 1. *ſc.* 1.

Copied from Ovid,

Sorbent

Sorbent avidæ præcordia flammæ.

*Metamorphoſes, lib.* ix. 172.

Let us analyſe this expreſſion. That a fever may be imagined a flame, I admit; though more than one ſtep is neceſſary to come at the reſemblance: a fever, by heating the body, reſembles fire; and it is no ſtretch to imagine a fever to be a fire: again, by a figure of ſpeech, flame may be put for fire, becauſe they are commonly conjoined; and therefore a fever may be termed a flame. But now admitting a fever to be a flame, its effects ought to be explained in words that agree literally to a flame. This rule is not obſerved here; for a flame *drinks* figuratively only, not properly.

King Henry to his ſon Prince Henry:

Thou hid'ſt a thouſand daggers in thy thoughts,
Which thou haſt whetted on thy ſtony heart
To ſtab at half an hour of my frail life.

*Second part, Henry* IV. *act* 4. *ſc.* 11.

Such faulty metaphors are pleaſantly ridiculed in the *Rehearſal*.

*Phyſician.* Sir, to conclude, the place you fill has more than amply exacted the talents of a wary pilot; and all theſe threatening ſtorms, which, like impregnate clouds, hover o'er our heads, will, when they once are graſp'd but by the eye of reaſon, melt into fruitful ſhowers of bleſſings on the people.

*Bayes.* Pray mark that allegory. Is not that good?

*Johnſon.* Yes, that graſping of a ſtorm with the eye is admirable.

*Act* 2. *ſc.* 1.

Fifthly, The jumbling different metaphors in the ſame ſentence, or the beginning with one metaphor and ending with another, commonly called a mixt metaphor, ought never to be indulged. Quintilian bears teſtimony againſt it in the bittereſt terms: "Nam id quoque in "primis eſt cuſtodiendum, ut quo ex genere cœperis "tranſlationis, hoc deſinas. Multi enim, cum initium "a tempeſtate ſumpſerunt, incendio aut ruina finiunt: "quæ eſt inconſequentia rerum fœdiſſima." *L.* 8. *cap.* 6. § 2.

*K. Henry.* ——— Will you again unknit

This

This churliſh knot of all-abhorred war,
And move in that obedient orb again,
Where you did give a fair and natural light?
*Firſt part, Henry* VI. *act* 5. *ſc.* 1.

Whether 'tis nobler in the mind, to ſuffer
The ſtings and arrows of outrag'ous fortune;
Or to take arms againſt a ſea of troubles,
And by oppoſing end them. *Hamlet, act* 3. *ſc.* 2.

In the ſixth place, It is unpleaſant to join different metaphors in the ſame period, even where they are preſerved diſtinct: for when the ſubject is imagined to be firſt one thing and then another in the ſame period without interval, the mind is diſtracted by the rapid tranſition; and when the imagination is put on ſuch hard duty, its images are too faint to produce any good effect:

At regina gravi jamdudum ſaucia cura,
Vulnus alit venis, et cæco carpitur igni.
*Æneid.* iv. 1.

——————— Eſt mollis flamma medullas
Interea, et tacitum vivit ſub pectore vulnus.
*Æneid.* iv. 66.

Motum ex Metello conſule civicum,
Bellique cauſas, et vitia, et modos,
Ludumque fortunæ, graveſque
Principum amicitias, et arma
Nondum expiatis uncta cruoribus,
Periculoſæ plenum opus aleæ,
Tractas, et incedis per ignes
Subpoſitos cineri doloſo. *Horat. Carm. l.* 2. *ode* 1.

In the laſt place, It is ſtill worſe to jumble together metaphorical and natural expreſſion, ſo as that the period muſt be underſtood partly metaphorically, partly literally; for the imagination cannot follow with ſufficient eaſe changes ſo ſudden and unprepared: a metaphor begun and not carried on, hath no beauty; and inſtead of light there is nothing but obſcurity and confuſion. Inſtances of ſuch incorrect compoſition are without number: I ſhall, for a ſpecimen, ſelect a few from different authors.

Speaking of Britain,

This

This precious ſtone ſet in the ſea,
Which ſerves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defenſive to a houſe
Againſt the envy of leſs happier lands.

*Richard* II. *act* 2. *ſc.* 1.

In the firſt line Britain is figured to be a precious ſtone: in the following lines, Britain, diveſted of her metaphorical dreſs, is preſented to the reader in her natural appearance.

Theſe growing feathers pluck'd from Cæſar's wing,
Will make him fly an ordinary pitch,
Who elſe would ſoar above the view of men,
And keep us all in ſervile fearfulneſs.

*Julius Cæſar*, *act* 1. *ſc.* 1.

Rebus anguſtis animoſus atque
Fortis adpare: ſapienter idem
Contrahes vento nimium ſecundo
Turgida vela. *Hor.*

The following is a miſerable jumble of expreſſions, ariſing from an unſteady view of the ſubject, between its figurative and natural appearance:

But now from gath'ring clouds deſtruction pours,
Which ruins with mad rage our halcyon hours:
Miſts from black jealouſies the tempeſt form,
Whilſt late diviſions reinforce the ſtorm.

*Diſpenſary*, *canto* 3.

To thee, the world its preſent homage pays,
The harveſt early, but mature the praiſe.

*Pope's imitation of Horace*, *b.* 2.

Oui, ſa pudeur n'eſt que franche grimace,
Qu'une ombre de vertu qui garde mal la place,
Et qui s'evanouit, comme l'on peut ſavoir,
Aux rayons du ſoleil qu'une bouſe fait voir.

*Moliere*, *L'Etourdi*, *act* 3. *ſc.* 2.

Et ſon feu, depourvû de ſenſe et de lecture,
S'éteint à chaque pas, faute de nourriture,

*Boileau*, *L'art poetique*, *chant.* 3. *l.* 319.

Dryden, in his dedication of the tranſlation of *Juvenal*, ſays,

When thus, as I may ſay, before the uſe of the load-ſtone,

ſtone, or knowledge of the compaſs, I was ſailing in a vaſt ocean, without other help than the pole-ſtar of the antients, and the rules of the French ſtage among the moderns, *&c.*

There is a time when factions, by the vehemence of their own fermentation, ſtun and diſable one another.

*Bolingbroke.*

This fault of jumbling the figure and plain expreſſion into one confuſed maſs, is not leſs common in allegory than in metaphor. Take the following examples.

——————— Heu! quoties fidem,
Mutatoſque Deos flebit, et aſpera
Nigris æquora ventis
Emirabitur inſolens,
Qui nunc te fruitur credulus aureâ;
Qui ſemper vacuam, ſemper amabilem
Sperat, neſcius auræ
Fallacis. *Horat. Carm. l. 1. ode 5.*

Pour moi ſur cette mer, qu'ici bas nous courons,
Je ſonge à me pourvoir d'eſquif et d'avirons,
A regler mes deſirs, à prevénir l'orage,
Et ſauver, s'il ſe peut, ma Raiſon du naufrage.

*Boileau, epitre 5.*

Lord Halifax, ſpeaking of the antient fabuliſts: "They "(ſays he) wrote in ſigns and ſpoke in parables: all "their fables carry a double meaning: the ſtory is "one and entire; the characters the ſame throughout; "not broken or changed, and always conformable to "the nature of the creature they introduce. They ne"ver tell you, that the dog which ſnapp'd at a ſhadow, "loſt his troop of horſe, that would be unintelligible. "This is his (Dryden's) new way of telling a ſtory, and "confounding the moral and the fable together." After inſtancing from the hind and panther, he goes on thus: "What relation has the hind to our Saviour? or "what notion have we of a panther's Bible? If you "ſay he means the church, how does the church feed "on lawns, or range in the foreſt? Let it be always a "church or always a cloven-footed beaſt, for we can"not bear his ſhifting the ſcene every line."

A few words more upon allegory. Nothing gives greater

greater pleaſure than this figure, when the repreſentative ſubject bears a ſtrong analogy, in all its circumſtances, to that which is repreſented: but the choice is ſeldom ſo lucky: the analogy being generally ſo faint and obſcure, as to puzzle and not pleaſe. An allegory is ſtill more difficult in painting than in poetry: the former can ſhow no reſemblance but what appears to the eye; the latter hath many other reſources for ſhowing the reſemblance. And therefore, with reſpect to what the Abbé du Bos * terms mixt allegorical compoſitions, theſe may do in poetry, becauſe, in writing, the allegory can eaſily be diſtinguiſhed from the hiſtorical part; no perſon, for example, miſtakes Virgil's Fame for a real being: but ſuch a mixture in a picture is intolerable; becauſe in a picture the objects muſt appear all of the ſame kind, wholly real or wholly emblematical. For that reaſon, the hiſtory of Mary de Medicis, in the palace of Luxembourg, painted by Rubens, is unpleaſant by a perpetual jumble of real and allegorical perſonages, which produce a diſcordance of parts, and an obſcurity upon the whole: witneſs, in particular, the tablature repreſenting the arrival of Mary de Medicis at Marſeilles; where, together with the real perſonages, the Nereids and Tritons appear ſounding their ſhells: ſuch a mixture of fiction and reality in the ſame groupe, is ſtrangely abſurd. The picture of Alexander and Roxana, deſcribed by Lucian, is gay and fanciful; but it ſuffers by the allegorical figures. It is not in the wit of man to invent an allegorical repreſentation deviating farther from any appearance of reſemblance, than one exhibited by Lewis XIV. *anno* 1664; in which an overgrown chariot, intended to repreſent that of the ſun, is dragg'd along, ſurrounded with men and women, repreſenting the four ages of the world, the celeſtial ſigns, the ſeaſons, the hours, *&c*; a monſtrous compoſition, and yet ſcarce more abſurd than Guido's tablature of Aurora.

In an allegory, as well as in a metaphor, terms ought to be choſen that properly and literally are applicable to the repreſentative ſubject: nor ought any circumſtance to be added that is not proper to the repreſentative

* Reflections ſur la Poeſie, *&c*. vol. 1. ſect. 24.

tive ſubject, however juſtly it may be applicable properly or figuratively to the principal. Upon that account the following allegory is faulty.

Ferus et Cupido,
Semper ardentes acuens ſagittas
Cote *cruentâ*. *Horat. l. 2. ode 8.*

For though blood may ſuggeſt the cruelty of love, it is an improper or immaterial circumſtance in the repreſentative ſubject: water, not blood, is proper for a whetſtone.

We proceed to the next head, which is, to examine in what circumſtances theſe figures are proper, in what improper. This inquiry is not altogether ſuperſeded by what is ſaid upon the ſame ſubject in the chapter of compariſons; becauſe, upon trial it will be found, that a ſhort metaphor or allegory may be proper, where a ſimile, drawn out to a greater length and in its nature more ſolemn, would ſcarce be reliſhed.

And, in the firſt place, a metaphor, like a ſimile, is excluded from common converſation, and from the deſcription of ordinary incidents.

In the next place, in expreſſing any ſevere paſſion that totally occupies the mind, metaphor is unnatural. For which reaſon, we muſt condemn the following ſpeech of Macbeth:

Methought I heard a voice cry, Sleep no more!
Macbeth doth murther ſleep; the innocent ſleep;
Sleep that knits up the ravell'd ſleeve of Care,
The birth of each day's life, ſore Labour's bath,
Balm of hurt minds, great Nature's ſecond courſe,
Chief nouriſher in Life's feaſt —— *Act 2. ſc. 3.*

The next example, of deep deſpair, beſide the highly figurative ſtyle, hath more the air of raving than of ſenſe:

*Califta* Is it the voice of thunder, or my father?
Madneſs! Confuſion! let the ſtorm come on,
Let the tumultuous roar drive all upon me,
Daſh my devoted bark: ye ſurges, break it;
'Tis for my ruin that the tempeſt riſes,
When I am loſt, ſunk to the bottom low,
Peace ſhall return, and all be calm again.
*Fair Penitent, act 4.*

The

The metaphor I next introduce, is ſweet and lively, but it ſuits not the fiery temper of Chamont, inflamed with paſſion: parables are not the language of wrath venting itſelf without reſtraint:

*Chamont.* You took her up a little tender flower,
Juſt ſprouted on a bank, which the next froſt
Had nip'd; and with a careful loving hand,
Tranſplanted her into your own fair garden,
Where the ſun always ſhines: there long ſhe flouriſh'd,
Grew ſweet to ſenſe and lovely to the eye,
Till at the laſt a cruel ſpoiler came,
Cropt this fair roſe, and rifled all its ſweetneſs,
Then caſt it like a loathſome weed away.

*Orphan, act 4.*

The following ſpeech, full of imagery, is not natural in grief and dejection of mind.

*Gonſalez.* O my ſon! from the blind dotage
Of a father's fondneſs theſe ills aroſe.
For thee I've been ambitious, baſe and bloody:
For thee I've plung'd into this ſea of ſin;
Stemming the tide with only one weak hand,
While t'other bore the crown, (to wreathe thy brow),
Whoſe weight has ſunk me ere I reach'd the ſhore.

*Mourning Bride, act 5. ſc 6.*

There is an inchanting picture of deep diſtreſs in Macbeth *, where Macduff is repreſented lamenting his wife and children, inhumanly murdered by the tyrant. Stung to the heart with the news, he queſtions the meſſenger over and over: not that he doubted the fact, but that his heart revolted againſt ſo cruel a misfortune. After ſtruggling ſome time with his grief, he turns from his wife and children to their ſavage butcher; and then gives vent to his reſentment, but ſtill with manlineſs and dignity:

O, I could play the woman with mine eyes,
And braggart with my tongue. But, gentle Heav'n!
Cut ſhort all intermiſſion; front to front
Bring thou this fiend of Scotland and myſelf;
Within my ſword's length ſet him —— If he 'ſcape,
Then Heav'n forgive him too.

The

* Act 4. ſc. 6.

The whole ſcene is a delicious picture of human nature. One expreſſion only ſeems doubtful: in examining the meſſenger, Macduff expreſſes himſelf thus:

He hath no children —— all my pretty ones!
Did you ſay, all? what, all? Oh, hell-kite! all?
What! all my pretty little chickens and their dam,
At one fell ſwoop!

Metaphorical expreſſion, I am ſenſible, may ſometimes be uſed with grace where a regular ſimile would be intolerable: but there are ſituations ſo ſevere and diſpiriting, as not to admit even the ſlighteſt metaphor. It requires great delicacy of taſte to determine with firmneſs, whether the preſent caſe be of that nature: I incline to think it is; and yet I would not willingly alter a ſingle word of this admirable ſcene.

But metaphorical language is proper when a man ſtruggles to bear with dignity or decency a misfortune however great: the ſtruggle agitates and animates the mind:

*Wolſey.* Farewell, a long farewell, to all my greatneſs!
This is the ſtate of man; to-day he puts forth
The tender leaves of hope; to-morrow bloſſoms,
And bears his bluſhing honours thick upon him;
The third day comes a froſt, a killing froſt,
And when he thinks, good eaſy man, full ſurely
His greatneſs is a ripening, nips his root,
And then he falls as I do. *Henry* VIII. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

## SECT. VII. *Figure of Speech.*

IN the ſection immediately foregoing, a figure of ſpeech is defined, "The uſing a word in a ſenſe different from what is proper to it;" and the new or uncommon ſenſe of the word is termed *the figurative ſenſe*. The figurative ſenſe muſt have a relation to that which is proper; and the more intimate the relation is, the figure is the more happy. How ornamental this figure is to language, will not be readily imagined by any one who hath not given peculiar attention; and therefore I ſhall endeavour to unfold its capital beauties and advantages. In the firſt place, a word uſed figuratively, or in a new ſenſe, ſuggeſts at the ſame time the ſenſe it

it commonly bears: and thus it has the effect to present two objects; one signified by the figurative sense, which may be termed *the principal object*; and one signified by the proper sense, which may be termed *accessory*: the principal makes a part of the thought; the accessory is merely ornamental. In this respect, a figure of speech is precisely similar to concordant sounds in music, which, without contributing to the melody, make it harmonious. I explain myself by examples. *Youth*, by a figure of speech, is termed *the morning of life*: this expression signifies *youth*, the principal object, which enters into the thought; it suggests, at the same time, the proper sense of *morning*; and this accessory object, being in itself beautiful, and connected by resemblance to the principal object, is not a little ornamental. *Imperious ocean* is an example of a different kind, where an attribute is expressed figuratively: together with *stormy*, the figurative meaning of the epithet *imperious*, there is suggested its proper meaning, *viz.* the stern authority of a despotic prince; and these two are strongly connected by resemblance. Upon this figurative power of words, Vida descants with great elegance:

Nonne vides, verbis ut veris sæpe relictis
Accersant simulata, aliundeque nomina porro
Transportent, aptentque aliis ea rebus; ut ipsæ,
Exuviasque novas, res, insolitosque colores
Indutæ, sæpe externi mirentur amictus
Unde illi, lætæque aliena luce fruantur,
Mutatoque habitu, nec jam sua nomina mallent?
Sæpe ideo, cum bella canunt, incendia credas
Cernere, diluviumque ingens surgentibus undis.
Contra etiam Martis pugnas imitabitur ignis,
Cum furit accensis acies Vulcania campis.
Nec turbato oritur quondam minor æquore pugna:
Confligunt animosi Euri certamine vasto
Inter se, pugnantque adversis molibus undæ.
Usque adeo passim sua res insignia læ æ
Permutantque, juvantque vicissim; et mutua sese
Altera in alterius transformat protinus ora.
Tum specie capti gaudent spectare legentes:
Nam diversa simul datur è re cernere eadem

Multarum

Multarum ſimulacra animo ſubeuntia rerum.
*Poet. lib. 3. l. 44.*

In the next place, this figure poſſeſſes a ſignal power of aggrandiſing an object, by the following means. Words, which have no original beauty but what ariſes from their ſound, acquire an adventitious beauty from their meaning: a word ſignifying any thing that is agreeable, becomes by that means agreeable; for the agreeableneſs of the object is communicated to its name *. This acquired beauty, by the force of cuſtom, adheres to the word even when uſed figuratively; and the beauty received from the thing it properly ſignifies, is communicated to the thing which it is made to ſignify figuratively. Conſider the foregoing expreſſion *Imperious ocean*, how much more elevated it is than *Stormy ocean*.

Thirdly, This figure hath a happy effect by preventing the familiarity of proper names. The familiarity of a proper name, is communicated to the thing it ſignifies by means of their intimate connection; and the thing is thereby brought down in our feeling †. This bad effect is prevented by uſing a figurative word inſtead of one that is proper; as, for example, when we expreſs the ſky by terming it *the blue vault of heaven*; for though no work of art can compare with the ſky in magnificence, the expreſſion however muſt be reliſhed, becauſe it prevents the object from being brought down by the familiarity of its proper name. With reſpect to the degrading familiarity of proper names, Vida has the following paſſage.

Hinc ſi dura mihi paſſus dicendus Ulyſſes,
Non illum vero memorabo nomine, ſed qui
Et mores hominum multorum vidit, et urbes,
Naufragus

---

* See chap. 2. part 1. ſect 5.

† I have often regretted, that a factious ſpirit of oppoſition to the reigning family makes it neceſſary in public worſhip to diſtinguiſh the King by his proper name. One will ſcarce imagine, who has not made the trial, how much better it ſounds to pray for our Sovereign Lord the King, without any addition.

Naufragus everſæ poſt ſæva incendia Trojæ.
*Poet. lib 2. l. 46.*

Laſtly, By this figure language is enriched, and rendered more copious; in which reſpect, were there no other, a figure of ſpeech is a happy invention. This property is finely touched by Vida:

Quinetiam agricolas ea fandi nota voluptas
Exercet, dum læta ſeges, dum trudere gemmas
Incipiunt vites, ſitientiaque æ'heris imbrem
Prata bibunt, ridentque ſatis ſurgentibus agri.
Hanc vulgo ſpeciem propriæ penuria vocis
Intulit, indictiſque urgens in rebus egeſtas
Quippe ubi ſe vera oſtendebant nomina nuſquam,
Fas erat hinc atque hinc transferre ſimillima veris.
*Poet. lib 3. l. 90.*

The beauties I have mentioned belong to every figure of ſpeech. Several other beauties peculiar to one or other ſort, I ſhall have occaſion to remark afterward.

Not only ſubjects, but qualities, actions, effects may be expreſſed figuratively. Thus, as to ſubjects, *the gates of breath* for the lips, *the watery kingdom* for the ocean. As to qualities, *fierce* for ſtormy, in the expreſſion *Fierce winter*; *altus* for profundus, *Altus puteus*, *Altum mare*; *breathing* for perſpiring, *Breathing plants*. Again, as to actions, The ſea *rages*, Time will *melt* her frozen thoughts, Time *kills* grief. An effect is put for the cauſe, as *lux* for the ſun; and a cauſe for the effect, as *boum labores* for corn. The relation of reſemblance is one plentiful ſource of figures of ſpeech; and nothing is more common than to apply to one object the name of another that reſembles it in any reſpect: height, ſize, and wordly greatneſs, though in themſelves they have no reſemblance, produce emotions in the mind that have a reſemblance; and, led by that reſemblance, we naturally expreſs wordly greatneſs by height or ſize: one feels a certain uneaſineſs in looking down to a great depth; and hence depth is made to expreſs any thing diſagreeable by exceſs, as *depth* of grief, *depth* of deſpair: again, height of place, and time long paſt, produce ſimilar feelings; and hence the expreſſion, *Ut altius repetam:* diſtance in paſt time, producing a ſtrong feeling,

feeling, is put for any ſtrong feeling, *Nihil mihi antiquius noſtra amicitia:* ſhortneſs with relation to ſpace, for ſhortneſs with relation to time, *Brevis eſſe laboro, obſcurus fio:* ſuffering a puniſhment reſembles paying a debt; hence *pendere pœnas.* Upon the ſame account, light may be put for glory, ſun-ſhine for proſperity, and weight for importance.

Many words, originally figurative, having, by long and conſtant uſe, loſt their figurative power, are degraded to the inferior rank of proper terms. Thus the words that expreſs the operations of the mind, have in all languages been originally figurative: the reaſon holds in all, that when theſe operations came firſt under conſideration, there was no other way of deſcribing them but by what they reſembled: it was not practicable to give them proper names, as may be done to objects that can be aſcertained by ſight and touch. A *ſoft* nature, *jarring* tempers, *weight* of wo, *pompous* phraſe, *beget* compaſſion, *aſſuage* grief, *break* a vow, *bend* the eye downward, *ſhower* down curſes, *drown'd* in tears, *wrapt* in joy, *warm'd* with eloquence, *loaded* with ſpoils, and a thouſand other expreſſions of the like nature, have loſt their figurative ſenſe. Some terms there are, that cannot be ſaid to be either altogether figurative or altogether proper: originally figurative, they are tending to ſimplicity, without having loſt altogether their figurative power. Virgil's *Regina ſaucia cura*, is perhaps one of theſe expreſſions: with ordinary readers, *ſaucia* will be conſidered as expreſſing ſimply the effect of grief; but one of a lively imagination will exalt the phraſe into a figure.

For epitomiſing this ſubject, and at the ſame time for giving a clear view of it, I cannot think of a better method, than to preſent to the reader a liſt of the ſeveral relations upon which figures of ſpeech are commonly founded. This liſt I divide into two tables; one of ſubjects expreſſed figuratively, and one of attributes.

## FIRST TABLE.

### *Subjects expreſſed figuratively.*

1. A word proper to one ſubject employ'd figuratively to expreſs a reſembling ſubject.

There

There is no figure of ſpeech ſo frequent, as what is derived from the relation of reſemblance. Youth, for example, is ſignified figuratively by the *morning* of life. The life of a man reſembles a natural day in ſeveral particulars: the morning is the beginning of day, youth the beginning of life; the morning is chearful, ſo is youth, *&c.* By another reſemblance, a bold warrior is termed the *thunderbolt* of war; a multitude of troubles, a *ſea* of troubles.

At the ſame time, this figure, above all others, affords pleaſure to the mind by variety of beauties. Beſide the beauties above mentioned common to all ſorts, it poſſeſſes in particular the beauty of a metaphor or of a ſimile: a figure of ſpeech built upon reſemblance, ſuggeſts always a compariſon between the principal ſubject and the acceſſory; whereby every good effect of a metaphor or ſimile, may in a ſhort and lively manner, be produced by this figure of ſpeech.

2. A word proper to the effect employ'd figuratively to expreſs the cauſe.

*Lux* for the ſun. *Shadow* for cloud. A helmet is ſignified by the expreſſion *glittering terror*. A tree by *ſhadow* or *umbrage*. Hence the expreſſion:

Nec habet Pelion umbras. *Ovid.*

Where the dun umbrage hangs. *Spring, l.* 1023.

A wound is made to ſignify an arrow:

Vulnere non pedibus te conſequar. *Ovid.*

There is a peculiar force and beauty in this figure: the word which ſignifies figuratively the principal ſubject, denotes it to be a cauſe by ſuggeſting the effect.

3. A word proper to the cauſe, employ'd figuratively to expreſs the effect.

*Boumque labores* for corn. *Sorrow* or *grief* for tears.

Again Ulyſſes veil'd his penſive head,
Again unmann'd, a ſhow'r of *ſorrow* ſhed.
Streaming *Grief* his faded cheek bedew'd.

*Blindneſs* for darkneſs:

Cæcis erramus in undis. *Æneid.* iii. 200.

There is a peculiar energy in this figure, ſimilar to

that in the former: the figurative name denotes the subject to be an effect, by ſuggeſting its cauſe.

4. Two things being intimately connected, the proper name of the one employ'd figuratively to ſignify the other.

*Day* for light. *Night* for darkneſs; and hence, A ſudden night. *Winter* for a ſtorm at ſea:

Interea magno miſceri murmure pontum,
Emiſſamque Hyemem ſenſit Neptunus.
*Æneid.* i. 128.

This laſt figure would be too bold for a Britiſh writer, as a ſtorm at ſea is not inſeparably connected with winter in this climate.

5. A word proper to an attribute, employ'd figuratively to denote the ſubject.

*Youth* and *beauty* for thoſe who are young and beautiful:

Youth and beauty ſhall be laid in duſt.

*Majeſty* for the King:

What art thou, that uſurp'ſt this time of night,
Together with that fair and warlike form,
In which the *Majeſty* of buried Denmark
Did ſometime march? *Hamlet*, *act* 1. *ſc.* 1.

——— Or have ye choſen this place
After the toils of battle, to repoſe
Your weary'd *virtue?* *Paradiſe loſt.*

*Verdure* for a green field. *Summer*, *l.* 301.

Speaking of cranes,

To pigmy nations wounds and death they bring,
And all the *war* deſcends upon the wing.
*Iliad* iii. 10.

Cool *age* advances venerably wiſe. *Iliad* iii. 149.

The peculiar beauty of this figure ariſes from ſuggeſting an attribute that embelliſhes the ſubject, or puts it in a ſtronger light.

6 A complex term employ'd figuratively to denote one of the component parts.

*Funus* for a dead body. *Burial* for a grave.

7. The

7. The name of one of the component parts instead of the complex term.

*Tæda* for a marriage. The *East* for a country situated east from us. *Jovis vestigia servat*, for imitating Jupiter in general.

8. A word signifying time or place, employ'd figuratively to denote what is connected with it.

*Clime* for a nation, or for a constitution of government: hence the expression, *Merciful clime, Fleecy winter* for snow, *Seculum felix*.

9. A part for the whole.

The *pole* for the earth. The *head* for the person:

Triginta minas pro capite tuo dedi. *Plautus.*

*Tergum* for the man:

Fugiens tergum. *Ovid.*

*Vultus* for the man:

Jam fulgor armorum fugaces
Terret equos, equitumque vultus. *Horat.*

Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus
Tam chari *capitis?* *Horat.*
Dumque vigent *genua?* *Horat.*

Thy growing virtues justify'd my cares,
And promis'd comfort to my *silver hairs*.
*Iliad* ix. 616.

——— Forthwith from the pool he rears
His mighty *stature*. *Paradise lost.*
The silent *heart* which grief assails. *Parnell.*

The peculiar beauty of this figure consists in marking that part which makes the greatest figure.

10. The name of the container, employ'd figuratively to signify what is contained.

*Grove* for the birds in it, Vocal *grove*. *Ships* for the seamen, Agonizing *ships*. *Mountains* for the sheep pasturing upon them, Bleating *mountains*. *Zacynthus, Ithaca, &c.* for the inhabitants. *Ex mœstis domibus*. Livy.

11. The name of the sustainer, employ'd figuratively to signify what is sustained.

*Altar* for the ſacrifice. *Field* for the battle fought upon it, Well-fought *field*.

12. The name of the materials, employ'd figuratively to ſignify the things made of them.

*Ferrum* for *gladius*.

13. The names of the Heathen deities, employ'd figuratively to ſignify what they patroniſe.

*Jove* for the air, *Mars* for war, *Venus* for beauty, *Cupid* for love, *Ceres* for corn, *Neptune* for the ſea, *Vulcan* for fire.

This figure beſtows great elevation upon the ſubject; and therefore ought to be confined to the higher ſtrains of poetry.

## SECOND TABLE.

### *Attributes expreſſed figuratively.*

When two attributes are connected, the name of the one may be employ'd figuratively to expreſs the other.

Purity and virginity are attributes of the ſame perſon: hence the expreſſion, *Virgin* ſnow, for pure ſnow.

2. A word ſignifying properly an attribute of one ſubject, employ'd figuratively to expreſs a reſembling attribute of another ſubject.

*Tottering* ſtate. *Imperious* ocean. *Angry* flood. *Raging* tempeſt. *Shallow* fears.

My ſure divinity ſhall bear the ſhield,
And edge thy ſword to *reap* the glorious field.
*Odyſſey* xx. 61.

*Black omen*, for an omen that portends bad fortune.

*Ater* odor. *Virgil.*

The peculiar beauty of this figure ariſes from ſuggeſting a compariſon.

3. A word proper to the ſubject, employ'd to expreſs one of its attributes.

*Mens* for *intellectus*. *Mens* for a reſolution:

Iſtam, oro, exue mentem.

4. When two ſubjects have a reſemblance by a com-

mon

mon quality, the name of the one ſubject may be employ'd figuratively to denote that quality in the other.

*Summer* life, for agreeable life.

5. The name of the inſtrument made to ſignify the power of employing it.

——— Melpomene, cui liquidam pater
Vocem cum *cithara* dedit.

The ample field of figurative expreſſion diſplay'd in theſe tables, affords great ſcope for reaſoning. Several of the obſervations relating to metaphor, are applicable to figures of ſpeech; theſe I ſhall ſlightly retouch, with ſome additions peculiarly adapted to the preſent ſubject.

In the firſt place, as the figure under conſideration is built upon relation, we find from experience, and it muſt be obvious from reaſon, that the beauty of the figure depends on the intimacy of the relation between the figurative and proper ſenſe of the word. A ſlight remembrance, in particular, will never make this figure agreeable: the expreſſion, for example, *Drink down a ſecret*, for liſtening to a ſecret with attention, is harſh and uncouth, becauſe there is ſcarce any reſemblance between *liſtening* and *drinking*. The expreſſion *weighty crack*, uſed by Ben Johnſon for *loud crack*, is worſe if poſſible: a loud ſound has not the ſlighteſt reſemblance to a piece of matter that is weighty. The following expreſſion of Lucretius is not leſs faulty, "Et "lepido quæ ſunt *fucata* ſonore." i. 645.

——————— Sed magis
Pugnas et exactos tyrannos
Denſum humeris *bibit* aure vulgus.
*Horat. Carm. l. 2. ode 13.*

Phemius! let acts of gods, and heroes old,
What antient bards in hall and bow'r have told,
Attemper'd to the lyre, your voice employ,
Such the pleas'd *ear will drink* with ſilent joy.
*Odyſſey*, i. 433.

Strepitumque exterritus *hauſit*. *Æneid* vi. 559.

——————Write, my Queen,
And with mine eyes I'll *drink* the words you ſend.
*Cymbeline, act 1. ſc. 2.*

As thus th'effulgence tremulous I *drink*.
*Summer*, *l.* 1684.

Neque *audit* currus habenas. *Georg.* i. 514.

O Prince! (Lycaon's valiant ſon reply'd),
As thine the ſteeds, be thine the taſk to guide.
The horſes practis'd to their lord's command,
Shall *hear* the rein, and anſwer to thy hand.
*Iliad* v. 288.

The following figures of ſpeech ſeem altogether wild and extravagant, the figurative and proper meanings having no connection whatever. *Moving* ſoftneſs, Freſhneſs *breathes*, *Breathing* proſpect, *Flowing* ſpring, *Dewy* light, *Lucid* coolneſs, and many others of this falſe coin may be found in Thomſon's *Seaſons*.

Secondly, The proper ſenſe of the word ought to bear ſome proportion to the figurative ſenſe, and not ſoar much above it, nor ſink much below it. This rule, as well as the foregoing, is finely illuſtrated by Vida:

Hæc adeo cum ſint, cum fas audere poetis
Multa modis multis; tamen obſervare memento,
Si quando haud propriis rem mavis dicere verbis,
Tranſlatiſque aliunde notis, longeque petitis,
Ne nimiam oſtendas, quærendo talia, curam.
Namque aliqui exercent vim duram, et rebus iniquè
Nativam eripiunt formam, indignantibus ipſis,
Invitaſque jubent alienos ſumere vultus.
Haud magis imprudens mihi erit, et luminis expers,
Qui puero ingentes habitus det ferre gigantis,
Quam ſiquis ſtabula alta lares appellet equinos,
Aut crines magnæ genetricis gramina dicat.
*Poet.* iii. 148.

Thirdly, In a figure of ſpeech, every circumſtance ought to be avoided that agrees with the proper ſenſe only, not the figurative ſenſe; for it is the latter that expreſſes the thought, and the former ſerves for no other purpoſe but to make harmony:

Zacynthus green with ever ſhady groves,
And Ithaca, preſumptuous boaſt their loves;
Obtruding on my choice a ſecond lord,
They preſs the Hymenean rite abhorr'd.
*Odyſſey*, xix. 152.

Zacynthus

Zacynthus here ſtanding figuratively for the inhabitants, the deſcription of the iſland is quite out of place: it puzzles the reader, by making him doubt whether the word ought to be taken in its proper or figurative ſenſe.

——————————Write, my Queen,
And with mine eyes I'll drink the words you ſend,
Though ink be made of gall. *Cymbeline, act* 1. *ſc.* 2.

The diſguſt one has to drink ink in reality, is not to the purpoſe where the ſubject is drinking ink figuratively.

In the fourth place, To draw conſequences from a figure of ſpeech, as if the word were to be underſtood literally, is a groſs abſurdity, for it is confounding truth with fiction:

Be Moubray's ſins ſo heavy in his boſom,
That they may break his foaming courſer's back,
And throw the rider headlong in the liſts,
A caitiff recreant to my couſin Hereford.
*Richard* II. *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

Sin may be imagined heavy in a figurative ſenſe: but weight in a proper ſenſe belongs to the acceſſory only; and therefore to deſcribe the effects of weight, is to deſert the principal ſubject, and to convert the acceſſory into a principal:

*Cromwell.* How does your Grace?
*Wolſey.* Why, well;
Never ſo truly happy, my good Cromwell.
I know myſelf now, and I feel within me
A peace above all earthly dignities,
A ſtill and quiet conſcience. The King has cur'd me,
I humbly thank his Grace; and, from theſe ſhoulders,
Theſe ruin'd pillars, out of pity, taken
A load would ſink a navy, too much honour.
*Henry* VIII. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

Ulyſſes ſpeaking of Hector:

I wonder now how yonder city ſtands,
When we have here the baſe and pillar by us.
*Troilus and Creſſida, act* 4. *ſc.* 9.

*Othello.* No; my heart is turn'd to ſtone: I ſtrike it, and it hurts my hand. *Othello, act* 4. *ſc.* 5.

Not leſs, even in this deſpicable now,
Than when my name fill'd Afric with affrights,
And froze your hearts beneath your torrid zone.
*Don Sebaſtian King of Portugal, act* 1.

How long a ſpace, ſince firſt I lov'd, it is!
To look into a glaſs I fear,
And am ſurpris'd with wonder, when I miſs,
Grey hairs and wrinkles there.
*Cowley, vol.* 1. *p.* 86.

I choſe the flouriſhing'ſt tree in all the park,
With freſheſt boughs, and faireſt head;
I cut my love into its gentle bark,
And in three days behold 'tis dead;
My very written flames ſo violent be,
They've burnt and wither'd up the tree.
*Cowley, vol.* 1. *p.* 136.

Ah, mighty Love, that it were inward heat
Which made this precious limbeck ſweat!
But what, alas! ah what does it avail
That ſhe weeps tears ſo wond'rous cold,
As ſcarce the aſs's hoof can hold,
So cold, that I admire they fall not hail.
*Cowley, vol.* 1. *p.* 132.

Such a play of words is pleaſant in a ludicrous poem.

*Almeria.* Alphonſo, O Alphonſo!
Devouring ſeas have waſh'd thee from my ſight,
No time ſhall raſe thee from my memory;
No, I will live to be thy monument:
The cruel ocean is no more thy tomb;
But in my heart thou art interr'd.
*Mourning Bride, act* 1. *ſc.* 1.

This would be very right, if there were any inconſiſtence, in being interred in one place really, and in another place figuratively.

Je crains que cette ſaiſon
Ne nous amene la peſte;
La gueule du chien celeſte
Vomit feu ſur l'horiſon.
Afin que je m'en délivre,
Je veux lire ton gros livre
Juſques au dernier feüillet:

Tout

Tout ce que ta plume trace,
Robinet, a de la glace
A fair trembler Juillet. *Maynard.*

In me tota ruens Venus
Cyprum deseruit. *Horat. Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 19.

From considering that a word used in a figurative sense suggests at the same time its proper meaning, we discover a fifth rule, That we ought not to employ a word in a figurative sense, the proper sense of which is inconsistent or incongruous with the subject: for every inconsistency, and even incongruity, though in the expression only and not real, is unpleasant:

Interea genitor Tyberini ad fluminis undam
Vulnera *ficcabat* lymphis——— *Æneid.* x. 833.

Tres adeo incertos cæca caligine *soles*
Erramus pelago, totidem sine sidere noctes.
*Æneid.* iii. 203.

The foregoing rule may be extended to form a sixth, That no epithet ought to be given to the figurative sense of a word that agrees not also with its proper sense:

——— Dicat Opuntiæ
Frater Megillæ, quo *beatus*
Vulnere. *Horat. Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 27.

Parcus deorum cultor, et infrequens,
*Insanientis* dum sapientiæ
Consultus erro. *Horat. Carm. l.* 1. *ode* 34.

Seventhly, The crowding into one period or thought different figures of speech, is not less faulty than crowding metaphors in that manner: the mind is distracted in the quick transition from one image to another, and is puzzled instead of being pleased:

I am of ladies most deject and wretched,
That suck'd the honey of his music-vows. *Hamlet.*
My bleeding bosom sickens at the sound.
*Odyssey*, i. 439.

——— Ah miser,
Quantâ laboras in *Charybdi!*
Digne puer meliore *flammâ.*
Quæ saga, quis te solvere Thessalis
Magus *venenis*, quis poterit deus?

Vix illigatum te triformi
Pegasus expediet *Chimærâ*.
*Horat. Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 27.

Eighthly, If crowding figures be bad, it is still worse to graft one figure upon another: For instance,

While his keen falchion drinks the warriors lives.
*Iliad* xi. 211.

A falchion drinking the warriors blood is a figure built upon resemblance, which is passable. But then in the expression, *lives* is again put for *blood*; and by thus grafting one figure upon another, the expression is rendered obscure and unpleasant.

Ninthly, Intricate and involved figures, that can scarce be analysed, or reduced to plain language, are least of all tolerable:

Votis incendimus aras. *Æneid.* iii. 279.

——— Onerantque canistris
Dona laboratæ Cereris. *Æneid.* viii. 180.

Vulcan to the Cyclopes:

Arma acri facienda viro: nunc viribus usus,
Nunc manibus rapidis, omni nunc arte magistra:
*Præcipitate* moras. *Æneid.* viii. 441.

——— Huic gladio, perque ærea suta
Per tunicam squalentem auro, latus *haurit* apertum.
*Æneid.* x. 313.

Semotique prius tarda necessitas
Lethi, corripuit gradum.
*Horat. Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 3.

Scribêris Vario fortis, et hostium
Victor, Mæonii carminis *alite*.
*Horat. Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 6.

Else shall our fates be number'd with the dead.
*Iliad.* v. 294.

Commutual death the fate of war confounds.
*Iliad* viii. 85. *and* xi. 117.

Speaking of Proteus,

Instant he wears, elusive of the rape,
The mimic force of every savage shape.
*Odyssey* iv. 563.

Rolling

Rolling convulsive on the floor, is seen
The piteous object of a prostrate Queen.
*Ibid.* iv. 952.

The mingling tempest weaves its gloom.
*Autumn*, 337.

A various sweetness swells the gentle race.
*Ibid.* 640.

A sober calm fleeces unbounded æther. *Ibid.* 967.

The distant water-fall swells in the breeze.
*Winter*, 738.

In the tenth place, When a subject is introduced by its proper name, it is absurd to attribute to it the properties of a different subject to which the word is sometimes apply'd in a figurative sense:

Hear me, oh Neptune! thou whose arms are hurl'd
From shore to shore, and gird the solid world.
*Odyssey*, ix. 617.

Neptune is here introduced personally, and not figuratively for the ocean: the description therefore, which is only applicable to the latter, is altogether improper.

It is not sufficient, that a figure of speech be regularly constructed, and be free from blemish: it requires taste to discern when it is proper when improper; and taste, I suspect, is our only guide. One however may gather from reflection and experience, that ornaments and graces suit not any of the dispiriting passions, nor are proper for expressing any thing grave and important. In familiar conversation, they are in some measure ridiculous: Prospero, in the *Tempest*, speaking to his daughter Miranda, says,

The fringed curtains of thine eyes advance,
And say what thou seest yond.

No exception can be taken to the justness of the figure; and circumstances may be imagined to make it proper: but it is certainly not proper in familiar conversation.

In the last place, Though figures of speech have a charming effect when accurately constructed and properly introduced, they ought however to be scattered with a sparing hand: nothing is more luscious, and nothing

thing conſequently more ſatiating, than redundant ornaments of any kind.

## CHAP. XXI.

### NARRATION AND DESCRIPTION.

HORACE, and many critics after him, exhort writers to chuſe a ſubject adapted to their genius. Such peculiarities would multiply rules of criticiſm without end; and at any rate belong not to the preſent work, the object of which is human nature in general, and what is common to the ſpecies. But though the choice of a ſubject comes not under ſuch a plan, the manner of execution comes under it; becauſe the manner of execution is ſubjected to general rules, derived from principles common to the ſpecies. Theſe rules, as they concern the things expreſſed as well as the language or expreſſion, require a diviſion of this chapter into two parts; firſt of thoughts, and next of words. I pretend not to juſtify this diviſion as entirely accurate: for in diſcourſing of thoughts, it is difficult to abſtract altogether from words; and ſtill more difficult, in diſcourſing of words, to abſtract altogether from thought.

The firſt rule is, That in hiſtory, the reflections ought to be chaſte and ſolid; for while the mind is intent upon truth, it is little diſpoſed to the operations of the imagination. Strada's Belgic hiſtory is full of poetical images, which, being diſcordant with the ſubject, are unpleaſant; and they have a ſtill worſe effect, by giving an air of fiction to a genuine hiſtory. Such flowers ought to be ſcattered with a ſparing hand, even in epic poetry; and at no rate are they proper, till the reader be warmed, and by an enlivened imagination be prepared to reliſh them: in that ſtate of mind, they are extremely agreeable; but while we are ſedate and attentive to an hiſtorical chain of facts, we reject with diſdain every fiction. This Belgic hiſtory is indeed woefully vicious both in matter and in form: it is ſtuffed with frigid and unmeaning reflections; and its poetical flaſhes, even laying aſide their impropriety, are mere tinſel.

Secondly,

Secondly, Vida *, following Horace, recommends a modeſt commencement of an epic poem; giving for a reaſon, That the writer ought to huſband his fire. This reaſon has weight; but what is ſaid above ſuggeſts a reaſon ſtill more weighty: bold thoughts and figures are never reliſhed till the mind be heated and thoroughly engaged, which is not the reader's caſe at the commencement. Homer introduces not a ſingle ſimile in the firſt book of the Iliad, nor in the firſt book of the Odyſſey. On the other hand, Shakeſpear begins one of his plays with a ſentiment too bold for the moſt heated imagination:

*Bedford.* Hung be the heav'ns with black, yield day to night!
Comets, importing change of times and ſtates,
Brandiſh your cryſtal treſſes in the ſky,
And with them ſcourge the bad revolting ſtars,
That have conſented unto Henry's death!
Henry the Fifth, too famous to live long!
England ne'er loſt a king of ſo much worth.

*Firſt part, Henry* VI.

The paſſage with which Strada begins his hiſtory, is too poetical for a ſubject of that kind; and at any rate too high for the beginning of a grave performance. A third reaſon ought to have not leſs influence than either of the former, That a man who, upon his firſt appearance, ſtrains to make a figure, is too oſtentatious to be reliſhed. Hence the firſt ſentences of a work ought to be ſhort, natural, and ſimple. Cicero, in his oration *pro Archia poeta*, errs againſt that rule: his reader is out of breath at the very firſt period; which ſeems never to end. Burnet begins the hiſtory of his own times with a period long and intricate.

A third rule or obſervation is, That where the ſubject is intended for entertainment ſolely, not for inſtruction, a thing ought to be deſcribed as it appears, not as it is in reality. In running, for example, the impulſe upon the ground is proportioned in ſome degree to the celerity of motion; though in appearance it is otherwiſe,

* Poet. lib. 2. l. 30.

otherwiſe, for a perſon in ſwift motion ſeems to ſkim the ground, and ſcarcely to touch it. Virgil, with great taſte, deſcribes quick running according to its appearance; and thereby raiſes an image far more lively, than it could have been by adhering ſcrupulouſly to truth:

Hos ſuper advenit Volſca de gente Camilla,
Agmen agens equitum et florentes ære catervas,
Bellatrix: non illa colo calathiſve Minervæ
Fœmineas aſſueta manus; ſed prælia virgo
Dura pati, curſuque pedum prævertere ventos.
Illa vel intactæ ſegetis per ſumma volaret
Gramina: nec teneras curſu læſſiſſet ariſtas:
Vel mare per medium, fluctu ſuſpenſa tumenti,
Ferret iter; celeres nec tingeret æquore plantas.
*Æneid.* vii. 803.

This example is copied by the author of *Telemachus:*

Les Brutiens ſont legeres à la courſe comme les cerfs, et comme les daims. On croiroit que l'herbe même la plus tendre n'eſt point foulée ſous leurs pieds; à peine laiſſent ils dans le ſable quelques traces de leurs pas. *Liv.* 10.

Again:

Déjà il avoit abattu Euſilas ſi léger à la courſe, qu'à peine il imprimoit la trace des ſes pas dans le ſable, et qui devancoit dans ſon pays les plus rapides flots de l'Eurotas et de l'Alphée. *Liv.* 20.

Fourthly, In narration as well as in deſcription, objects ought to be painted ſo accurately as to form in the mind of the reader diſtinct and lively images. Every uſeleſs circumſtance ought indeed to be ſuppreſſed, becauſe every ſuch circumſtance loads the narration; but if a circumſtance be neceſſary, however ſlight, it cannot be deſcribed too minutely. The force of language conſiſts in raiſing complete images *; which have the effect to tranſport the reader as by magic into the very place of the important action, and to convert him as it were into a ſpectator, beholding every thing that paſſes. The narrative in an epic poem ought to rival a picture in the livelineſs and accuracy of its repreſentations: no circumſtance

* Chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 7.

circumſtance muſt be omitted that tends to make a complete image; becauſe an imperfect image, as well as any other imperfect conception, is cold and unintereſting. I ſhall illuſtrate this rule by ſeveral examples, giving the firſt place to a beautiful paſſage from Virgil:

Qualis *populeâ* mœrens Philomela ſub umbrâ
Amiſſos queritur fœtus, quos durus *arator*
Obſervans nido *implumes* detraxit.
*Georg. lib.* 4. *l.* 511.

The poplar, plowman, and unfledged ſwallows, though not eſſential in the deſcription, are circumſtances that tend to make a complete image, and upon that account are an embelliſhment.

Again:

Hic viridem Æneas *frondenti ex ilice* metam
Conſtituit, ſignum nautis. *Æneid.* v. 129.

Horace, addreſſing to Fortune:

Te pauper ambit ſollicita prece
Ruris colonus: te dominam æquoris,
Quicumque Bithynâ laceſſit
Carpathium pelagus carinâ.
*Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 35.

—— Illum ex mœnibus hoſticis
Matrona bellantis tyranni
Proſpiciens, et adulta virgo,
Suſpiret: Eheu, ne rudis agminum
Sponſus laceſſat regius aſperum
Tactu leonem, quem cruenta
Per medias rapit ira cedes. *Carm. lib.* 3. *ode* 2.

Shakeſpear ſays *, "You may as well go about to "turn the ſun to ice by fanning in his face with a *pea-* "*cock*'s feather." The peacock's feather, not to mention the beauty of the object, completes the image: an accurate image cannot be formed of that fanciful operation, without conceiving a particular feather; and one is at a loſs when this is neglected in the deſcription. Again, "The rogues ſlighted me into the river with as "little remorſe, as they would have drown'd a bitch's "blind puppies, fifteen i' th' litter †."

*Old Lady.*

* Henry V. act 4. ſc. 4.
† Merry Wives of Windſor, act 3. ſc. 15.

*Old Lady.* You would not be a queen?

*Anne.* No, not for all the riches under heaven.

*Old Lady.* 'Tis ſtrange: a three-pence bow'd would hire me, old as I am, to queen it.

*Henry* VIII. *act* 2. *ſc.* 5.

In the following paſſage, the action, with all its material circumſtances, is repreſented ſo much to the life, that it would ſcarce appear more diſtinct to a real ſpectator; and it is the manner of deſcription that contributes greatly to the ſublimity of the paſſage.

He ſpake; and to confirm his words, out flew
Millions of flaming ſwords, drawn from the thighs
Of mighty cherubim; the ſudden blaze
Far round illumin'd hell: highly they rag'd
Againſt the Higheſt, and fierce with graſped arms,
Claſh'd on their ſounding ſhields the din of war,
Hurling defiance toward the vault of heav'n.

*Milton, b.* 1.

A paſſage I am to cite from Shakeſpear, falls not much ſhort of that now mentioned in particularity of deſcription:

O you hard hearts! you cruel men of Rome!
Knew you not Pompey? Many a time and oft
Have you climb'd up to walls and battlements,
To towers and windows, yea, to chimney tops,
Your infants in your arms; and there have ſat
The live-long day with patient expectation
To ſee great Pompey paſs the ſtreets of Rome.
And when you ſaw his chariot but appear,
Have you not made an univerſal ſhout,
That Tyber trembled underneath his banks,
To hear the replication of your ſounds,
Made in his concave ſhores?

*Julius Cæſar, act* 1. *ſc.* 1.

The following paſſage is ſcarce inferior to either of thoſe mentioned:

Far before the reſt, the ſon of Oſſian comes; bright in the ſmiles of youth, fair as the firſt beams of the ſun. His long hair waves on his back: his dark brow is half beneath his helmet. The ſword hangs looſe on the he-

ro's

ro's ſide; and his ſpear glitters as he moves. I fled from his terrible eye, King of high Temora. *Fingal.*

The *Henriade* of Voltaire errs greatly againſt the foregoing rule: every incident is touched in a ſummary way, without ever deſcending to circumſtances. This manner is good in a general hiſtory, the purpoſe of which is to record important tranſactions: but in a fable it is cold and unintereſting: becauſe it is impracticable to form diſtinct images of perſons or things repreſented in a manner ſo ſuperficial.

It is obſerved above, that every uſeleſs circumſtance ought to be ſuppreſſed. The crowding ſuch circumſtances, is, on the one hand, not leſs to be avoided, than the conciſeneſs for which Voltaire is blamed, on the other. In the *Æneid* *, Barce, the nurſe of Sichæus, whom we never hear of before nor after, is introduced for a purpoſe not more important than to call Anna to her ſiſter Dido: and that it might not be thought unjuſt in Dido, even in this trivial incident, to prefer her huſband's nurſe before her own, the poet takes care to inform his reader, that Dido's nurſe was dead. To this I muſt oppoſe a beautiful paſſage in the ſame book, where, after Dido's laſt ſpeech, the poet, without detaining his readers by deſcribing the manner of her death, haſtens to the lamentation of her attendants:

Dixerat: atque illam media inter talia ferro
Collapſam ſuſcipiunt comites, enſemque cruore
Spumantem, ſparſaſque manus. It clamor ad alta
Atria, concuſſam bacchatur fama per urbem;
Lamentis gemituque et fœmineo ululatu
Tecta fremunt, reſonat magnis plangoribus æther.
*Lib.* 4. *l.* 663.

As an appendix to the foregoing rule, I add the following obſervation, That to make a ſudden and ſtrong impreſſion, ſome ſingle circumſtance happily ſelected, has more power than the moſt laboured deſcription. Macbeth, mentioning to his lady ſome voices he heard while he was murdering the King, ſays,

There's one did laugh in's ſleep, and one cry'd Murder!
They

* Lib. 4. l. 632.

They wak'd each other; and I ſtood and heard them;
But they did ſay their prayers, and addreſs them
Again to ſleep.
*Lady.* There are two lodg'd together.
*Macbeth.* One cry'd, God bleſs us! and, Amen! the other;
As they had ſeen me with theſe hangman's hands.
Liſtening their fear, I could not ſay, Amen,
When they did ſay, God bleſs us.
*Lady.* Conſider it not ſo deeply.
*Macbeth.* But wherefore could not I pronounce Amen?
I had moſt need of bleſſing, and Amen
Stuck in my throat.
*Lady.* Theſe deeds muſt not be thought
After theſe ways; ſo, it will make us mad.
*Macbeth.* Methought, I heard a voice cry,
Sleep no more!
Macbeth doth murder ſleep, *&c.* *Act 2. ſc. 3.*

Alphonſo, in the *Mourning Bride*, ſhut up in the ſame priſon where his father had been confined:

In a dark corner of my cell I found
This paper, what it is this light will ſhew.
" If my Alphonſo" ——— Ha! [*Reading.*
" If my Alphonſo live, reſtore him, Heav'n;
" Give me more weight, cruſh my declining years
" With bolts, with chains, impriſonment, and want;
" But bleſs my ſon, viſit not him for me."
It is his hand; this was his pray'r—yet more:
" Let ev'ry hair, which ſorrow by the roots [*Reading.*
" Tears from my hoary and devoted head,
" Be doubled in thy mercies to my ſon:
" Not for myſelf, but him, hear me, all-gracious"——
'Tis wanting what ſhould follow—Heav'n ſhould follow,
But 'tis torn off—Why ſhould that word alone
Be torn from his petition? 'Twas to Heav'n,
But Heav'n was deaf, Heav'n heard him not; but thus,
Thus as the name of Heav'n from this is torn,
So did it tear the ears of mercy from
His voice, ſhutting the gates of pray'r againſt him.
If piety be thus debarr'd acceſs
On high, and of good men the very beſt

Is

Is ſingled out to bleed, and bear the ſcourge,
What is reward? or what is puniſhment?
But who ſhall dare to tax eternal juſtice?

*Mourning Bride, act* 3. *ſc.* 1.

This incident is a happy invention, and a mark of uncommon genius.

Deſcribing Prince Henry:

I ſaw young Harry with his beaver on,
His cuiſſes on his thighs, gallantly arm'd,
Riſe from the ground like feather'd Mercury;
And vaulted with ſuch eaſe into his ſeat,
As if an angel dropt down from the clouds,
To turn and wind a fiery Pegaſus,
And witch the world with noble horſemanſhip.

*Firſt part, Henry* IV. *act* 4 *ſc.* 2.

*King Henry.* Lord Cardinal, if thou think'ſt on Heaven's bliſs,
Hold up thy hand, make ſignal of thy hope.
He dies, and makes no ſign!

*Second Part, Henry* VI. *act* 3. *ſc.* 10.

The ſame author, ſpeaking ludicrouſly of an army debilitated with diſeaſes, ſays,

Half of them dare not ſhake the ſnow from off their caſſocks, leſt they ſhake themſelves to pieces.

I have ſeen the walls of Balclutha, but they were deſolate. The flames had reſounded in the halls: and the voice of the people is heard no more. The ſtream of Clutha was removed from its place by the fall of the walls. The thiſtle ſhook there its lonely head: the moſs whiſtled to the wind. The fox looked out from the windows: and the rank graſs of the wall waved round his head. Deſolate is the dwelling of Morna: ſilence is in the houſe of her fathers. *Fingal.*

To draw a character is the maſter-ſtroke of deſcription. In this Tacitus excels: his portraits are natural and lively, not a feature wanting nor miſplaced. Shakeſpear, however, exceeds Tacitus in livelineſs, ſome characteriſtical circumſtance being generally invented or laid hold of, which paints more to the life than many words.

The

The following inſtances will explain my meaning, and at the ſame time prove my obſervation to be juſt.

Why ſhould a man, whoſe blood is warm within,
Sit like his grandſire cut in alabaſter?
Sleep when he wakes, and creep into the jaundice,
By being peeviſh? I tell thee what, Anthonio,
(I love thee, and it is my love that ſpeaks):
There are a ſort of men, whoſe viſages
Do cream and mantle like a ſtanding pond;
And do a wilful ſtillneſs entertain,
With purpoſe to be dreſs'd in an opinion
Of wiſdom, gravity, profound conceit;
As who ſhould ſay, I am Sir Oracle,
And when I ope my lips, let no dog bark!
O my Anthonio, I do know of thoſe,
That therefore only are reputed wiſe,
For ſaying nothing. *Merchant of Venice, act* 1. *ſc.* 2.

Again:

Gratiano ſpeaks an infinite deal of nothing, more than any man in all Venice: his reaſons are two grains of wheat hid in two buſhels of chaff; you ſhall ſeek all day ere you find them, and when you have them, they are not worth the ſearch. *Ibid.*

In the following paſſage a character is completed by a ſingle ſtroke.

*Shallow.* O the mad days that I have ſpent; and to ſee how many of mine old acquaintance are dead.

*Silence.* We ſhall all follow, Couſin.

*Shallow.* Certain, 'tis certain, very ſure, very ſure; Death (as the Pſalmiſt ſaith) is certain to all: all ſhall die. How a good yoke of bullocks at Stamford fair?

*Slender.* Truly, Couſin, I was not there.

*Shallow.* Death is certain. Is old *Double* of your town living yet?

*Silence.* Dead, Sir.

*Shadow.* Dead! ſee, ſee; he drew a good bow: and dead. He ſhot a fine ſhoot. How a ſcore of ewes now?

*Silence.* Thereafter as they be. A ſcore of good ewes may be worth ten pounds.

*Shallow.* And is old *Double* dead?

*Second Part, Henry* IV. *act* 3. *ſc.* 3.

Deſcribing

Deſcribing a jealous huſband:

Neither preſs, coffer, cheſt, trunk, well, vault, but he hath an abſtract for the remembrance of ſuch places, and goes to them by his note. There is no hiding you in the houſe. *Merry Wives of Windſor, act* 4. *ſc.* 3.

Congreve has an inimitable ſtroke of this kind in his comedy of *Love for Love:*

*Ben Legend.* Well, father, and how do all at home? how does brother Dick, and brother Val?

*Sir Sampſon.* Dick, body o' me, Dick has been dead theſe two years. I writ you word when you were at Leghorn.

*Ben.* Meſs, that's true; marry, I had forgot. Dick's dead, as you ſay. *Act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

Falſtaff ſpeaking of Antient Piſtol:

He's no ſwaggerer, hoſteſs; a tame cheater i'faith; you may ſtroak him as gently as a puppey-greyhound; he will not ſwagger with a Barbary hen, if her feathers turn back in any ſhew of reſiſtance.

*Second Part, Henry* IV. *act* 2. *ſc.* 9.

Oſſian among his other excellencies is eminently ſucceſsful in drawing characters; and he never fails to delight his reader with the beautiful attitudes of his heroes. Take the following inſtances.

O Oſcar! bend the ſtrong in arm; but ſpare the feeble hand. Be thou a ſtream of many tides againſt the foes of thy people; but like the gale that moves the graſs to thoſe who aſk thine aid.—So Tremor lived; ſuch Trathal was; and ſuch has Fingal been. My arm was the ſupport of the injured; and the weak reſted behind the lightning of my ſteel.

We heard the voice of joy on the coaſt, and we thought that the mighty Cathmor came. Cathmor the friend of ſtrangers! the brother of red-haired Cairbar. But their ſouls were not the ſame; for the light of heaven was in the boſom of Cathmor. His towers roſe on the banks of Atha: ſeven paths led to his halls: ſeven chiefs ſtood on theſe paths, and called the ſtranger to the feaſt. But Cathmor dwelt in the wood to avoid the voice of praiſe.

Dermid

Dermid and Oſcar were one: they reaped the battle together. Their friendſhip was ſtrong as their ſteel; and death walked between them to the field. They ruſh on the foe like two rocks falling from the brow of Ardven. Their ſwords are ſtained with the blood of the valiant: warriors faint at their name. Who is equal to Oſcar but Dermid? who to Dermid but Oſcar?

Son of Comhal, replied the chief, the ſtrength of Morni's arm has failed: I attempt to draw the ſword of my youth, but it remains in its place: I throw the ſpear, but it falls ſhort of the mark: and I feel the weight of my ſhield. We decay like the graſs of the mountain, and our ſtrength returns no more. I have a ſon, O Fingal, his ſoul has delighted in the actions of Morni's youth; but his ſword has not been fitted againſt the foe, neither has his fame begun. I come with him to battle, to direct his arm. His renown will be a ſun to my ſoul, in the dark hour of my departure. O that the name of Morni were forgot among the people! that the heroes would only ſay, "Behold the father of Gaul."

Some writers, through heat of imagination, fall into contradiction; ſome are guilty of downright abſurdities; and ſome even rave like madmen. Againſt ſuch capital errors one cannot be more effectually warned than by collecting inſtances; and the firſt ſhall be of a contradiction, the moſt venial of all. Virgil ſpeaking of Neptune,

Interea magno miſceri murmure pontum,
Emiſſamque hyemem ſenſit Neptunus, et imis
Stagna refuſa vadis: *graviter commotus*, et alto
Proſpiciens, ſummâ *placidum* caput extulit undâ.
*Æneid.* i. 128.

Again:

When firſt young Maro, in his boundleſs mind,
A work t'outlaſt *immortal* Rome deſign'd.
*Eſſay on Criticiſm, l.* 130.

The following examples are of abſurdities.

Alii pulſis e tormento catenis diſcerpti ſectique, dimidiato corpore pugnabant ſibi ſuperſtites, ac peremptæ partis ultores. *Strada, Dec. 2. l. 2.*

Il

Il povér huomo, che non ſen' era accorto,
Andava combattendo, ed era morto. *Berni.*

He fled, but flying, left his life behind.
*Iliad* xi. 443.

Full through his neck the weighty falchion ſped:
Along the pavement roll'd the mutt'ring head.
*Odyſſey* xxii. 365.

The laſt article is of raving like one mad. Cleopatra ſpeaking to the aſpic,

——————Welcome, thou kind deceiver,
Thou beſt of thieves; who, with an eaſy key,
Doſt open life, and unperceiv'd by us
Ev'n ſteal us from ourſelves; diſcharging ſo
Death's dreadful office, better than himſelf,
Touching our limbs ſo gently into ſlumber,
That Death ſtands by, deceiv'd by his own image,
And thinks himſelf but ſleep.
*Dryden, All for Love, act* 5.

Reaſons that are common and known to every one, ought to be taken for granted: to expreſs them is childiſh, and interrupts the narration. Quintus Curtius, relating the battle of Iſſus,

Jam in conſpectu, ſed extra teli jactum, utraque acies erat; quum priores Perſæ inconditum et trucem ſuſtulere clamorem. Redditur et a Macedonibus major, exercitus impar numero, ſed jugis montium vaſtiſque ſaltibus repercuſſus: *quippe ſemper circumjecta nemora petræque, quantumcumque accepere vocem, multiplicato ſono referunt.*

Having diſcuſſed what obſervations occurred upon the thoughts or things expreſſed, I proceed to what more peculiarly concerns the language or verbal dreſs. The language proper for expreſſing paſſion being handled in a former chapter, ſeveral obſervations there made are applicable to the preſent ſubject; particularly, That words being intimately connected with the ideas they repreſent, the emotions raiſed by the ſound and by the ſenſe ought to be concordant. An elevated ſubject requires an elevated ſtyle; what is familiar, ought to be familiarly expreſſed: a ſubject that is ſerious and im-

portan-

portant, ought to be cloathed in plain nervous language; a deſcription, on the other hand, addreſſed to the imagination, is ſuſceptible of the higheſt ornaments that ſounding words and figurative expreſſion can beſtow upon it.

I ſhall give a few examples of the foregoing doctrine. A poet of any genius will not readily dreſs a high ſubject in low words; and yet blemiſhes of that kind are found even in claſſical works. Horace, for example, obſerving that men, perfectly ſatisfied with themſelves, are ſeldom ſo with their condition, introduces Jupiter indulging to each his own choice:

Jam faciam quod vultis: eris tu, qui modo miles,
Mercator: tu, conſultus modo, ruſticus: hinc vos,
Vos hinc mutatis diſcedite partibus: eia,
Quid? ſtatis? nolint: atqui licet eſſe beatis.
Quid cauſæ eſt, merito quin illis *Jupiter ambas*
*Iratus buccas inflet?* neque ſe fore poſthac
Tam facilem dicat, votis ut præbeat aurem?
*Serm. lib.* 1. *ſat.* 1. *l.* 16.

Jupiter in wrath puffing up both cheeks, is a low and even ludicrous expreſſion, far from ſuitable to the gravity and importance of the ſubject: every one muſt feel the diſcordance. The following couplet, ſinking far below the ſubject, is not leſs ludicrous.

Not one looks backward, onward ſtill he goes,
Yet ne'er looks forward farther than his noſe.
*Eſſay on Man, ep.* iv. 223.

Le Rhin tremble et fremit à ces triſtes nouvelles;
Le feu ſort à travers ſes humides prunelles.
C'eſt donc trop peu, dit-il, que l'Eſcaut en deux mois
Ait appris à couler ſous de nouvelles loix;
Et de mille ramparts mon onde environnée
De ces fleuves ſans nom ſuivra la deſtinée?
Ah! periſſent mes eaux, ou par d'illuſtres coups
Montrons qui doit céder, des mortels ou de nous.
A ces mots *eſſuiant ſa barbe limonneuſe*,
Il prend d'un vieux guerrier la figure poudreuſe.
Son front cicatrice rend ſon air fatieux,
Et l'ardeur du combat étincelle en ſes yeux.
*Boileau, epitre* 4. *l.* 61.

A god

A god wiping his dirty beard is proper for burleſque poetry only; and altogether unſuitable to the ſtrained elevation of this poem.

On the other hand, to raiſe the expreſſion above the tone of the ſubject, is a fault than which none is more common. Take the following inſtances.

Orcan le plus fidéle à ſerver ſes deſſeins,
Né ſous le ciel brûlant des plus noirs Africains.
*Bajazet, act 3. ſc. 8.*

Les ombres par trois fois ont obſcurè les cieux
Depuis que le ſommeil n'eſt entré dans vos yeux;
Et le jour a trois fois chaſſé la nuit obſcure
Depuis que votre corps languit ſans nourriture.
*Phedra, act 1. ſc. 3.*

*Aſſuerus.* Ce mortel, qui montra tant de zéle pour moi, Vit-il encore?
*Aſaph.* ——— Il voit l'aſtre qui vous éclaire.
*Eſther, act 2. ſc. 3.*

Oui, c'eſt Agamemnon, c'eſt ton roi qui t'eveille;
Viens, reconnois la voix qui frappe ton oreille.
*Iphigenie.*

No jocund health that Denmark drinks to day,
But the great cannon to the clouds ſhall tell;
And the King's rowſe the heav'n ſhall bruit again,
Reſpeaking earthly thunder. *Hamlet, act 1. ſc. 2.*

——————— In the inner room
I ſpy a winking lamp, that weakly ſtrikes
The ambient air, ſcarce kindling into light.
*Southerne, Fate of Capua, act 3.*

In the funeral orations of the Biſhop of Meaux, the following paſſages are raiſed far above the tone of the ſubject:

L'Ocean etonné de ſe voir traverſé tant de fois, en les appareils ſi divers, et pour des cauſes ſi differentes, *&c.* *p. 6.*

Grande Reine, je ſatisfais à vos plus tendres deſirs, quand je célébre ce monarque; et ſon cœur qui n'a jamais vêcu que pour lui, ſe eveille, tout poudre qu'il eſt, t devient ſenſible, même ſous ce drap mortuaire, au om d'un epoux ſi cher. *p. 32.*

Monteſquieu, in a didactic work, *L'eſprit des Loix*, gives too great indulgence to imagination: the tone of his language ſwells frequently above his ſubject. I give an example:

Mr le Comte de Boulainvilliers et Mr l'Abbé Dubos ont fait chacun un ſyſteme, dont l'un ſemble être une conjuration contre le tiers-etat, et l'autre une conjuration contre la nobleſſe. Lorſque le Soleil donna à Phaéton ſon char à conduire, il lui dit, Si vous montez trop haut, vous brulerez la demeure céleſte; ſi vous deſcendez trop bas, vous réduirez en cendres la terre: n'allez point trop à droite, vous tomberiez dans la conſtellation du ſerpent; n'allez point trop à gauche, vous iriez dans celle de l'autel: tenez-vous entre les deux.

*L.* 30. *ch.* 10.

The following paſſage, intended, one would imagine, as a receipt to boil water, is altogether burleſque by the laboured elevation of the diction:

A maſſy caldron of ſtupendous frame
They brought, and plac'd it o'er the riſing flame:
Then heap the lighted wood; the flame divides
Beneath the vaſe, and climbs around the ſides:
In its wide womb they pour the ruſhing ſtream:
The boiling water bubbles to the brim.

*Iliad* xviii. 405.

In a paſſage at the beginning of the 4th book of Telemachus, one feels a ſudden bound upward without preparation, which accords not with the ſubject:

Calypſo, qui avoit été juſqu'à ce moment immobile et tranſportée de plaiſir en écoutant les avantures de Télémaque, l'interrompit pour lui faire prendre quelque repôs. Il eſt tems, lui dit-elle, que vous alliez goûter la douceur du ſommeil aprés tant de travaux. Vous n'avez rien à craindre ici; tout vous eſt favorable. Abandonnez vous donc à la joye. Goutez la paix, et tous les autres dons des dieux dont vous allez être comblé. Demain, *quand l'Aurore avec ſes doigts de rôſes entr'ouvrira les portes dorées de l'Orient, et que les chevaux du ſoleil ſortant de l'onde amére répandront les flames du jour, pour chaſſer devant eux toutes les etoiles du ciel* nou

nous reprendrons, mon cher Télémaque, l'hiſtoire de vos malheurs.

This obviouſly is copied from a ſimilar paſſage in the Æneid, which ought not to have been copied, becauſe it lies open to the ſame cenſure; but the force of authority is great:

At regina gravi jamdudum ſaucia cura,
Vulnus alit venis, et cæco carpitur igni.
Multa viri virtus animo, multuſque recurſat
Gentis honos: hærent infixi pectore vultus,
Verbaque: nec placidam membris dat cura quietem.
*Poſtera Phœbeâ luſtrabat lampade terras,*
*Humentemque Aurora polo dimoverat umbram;*
Cum ſic unanimem alloquitur maleſana ſororem.

*Lib.* iv. 1.

Take another example where the words riſe above the ſubject:

Ainſi les peuples y accoururent bientôt en foule de toutes parts; le commerce de cette ville étoit ſemblable au flux et au reflux de la mer. Les tréſors y entroient comme les flots viennent l'un ſur l'autre. Tout y étoit apporté et en ſortoit librement; tout ce qui y entroit étoit utile; tout ce qui en ſortoit, laiſſoit en ſortant d'autres richeſſes en ſa place. La juſtice ſevére preſidoit dans le port au milieu de tant de nations. La franchiſe, la bonne foi, la candeur, ſembloient du haut de ces ſuperbs tours appeller les marchands des terres les plus éloignées: chacun de ces marchands, *ſoit qu'il vînt des rives orientales où le ſoleil ſort chaque jour du ſein des ondes, ſoit qu'il fût parti de cette grande mer où le ſoleil laſſé de ſon cours va eteindre ſes feux*, vivoit paiſible et en ſureté dans Salente comme dans ſa patrie!

*Telemaque, l.* 12.

The language of Homer is ſuited to his ſubject, not leſs accurately than the actions and ſentiments of his heroes are to their characters. Virgil, in that particular, falls ſhort of perfection: his language is ſtately throughout; and though he deſcends at times to the ſimpleſt branches of cookery, roaſting and boiling for example, yet he never relaxes a moment from the high

tone *. In adjuſting his language to his ſubject, no writer equals Swift. I can recollect but one exception, which at the ſame time is far from being groſs: *The journal of a modern lady* is compoſed in a ſtyle blending ſprightlineſs with familiarity, perfectly ſuited to the ſubject: in one paſſage, however, the poet deviating from that ſtyle, takes a tone far above his ſubject. The paſſage I have in view begins, *l.* 116. *But let me now a while ſurvey, &c.* and ends at *l.* 135.

It is proper to be obſerved upon this head, that writers of inferior rank are continually upon the ſtretch to enliven and enforce their ſubject by exaggeration and ſuperlatives. This unluckily has an effect contrary to what is intended: the reader, diſguſted with language that ſwells above the ſubject, is led by contraſt to think more meanly of the ſubject than it may poſſibly deſerve. A man of prudence, beſide, will be not leſs careful to huſband his ſtrength in writing than in walking: a writer too liberal of ſuperlatives, exhauſts his whole ſtock upon ordinary incidents, and reſerves no ſhare to expreſs, with greater energy, matters of importance †.

The power of language to imitate thought, is not confined to the capital circumſtances above mentioned: it reacheth even the ſlighter modifications. Slow action, for example, is imitated by words pronounced ſlow; labour or toil, by words harſh or rough in their ſound. But this ſubject has been already handled ‡.

In dialogue-writing, the condition of the ſpeaker is chiefly to be regarded in framing the expreſſion. The centinel

* See Æneid. lib. 1. 188.—219.

† Montaigne, reflecting upon the then preſent modes, obſerves, that there never was at any other time ſo abject and ſervile proſtitution of words in the addreſſes made by people of faſhion to one another; the humbleſt tenders of life and ſoul, no profeſſions under that of devotion and adoration; the writer conſtantly declaring himſelf a vaſſal, nay a ſlave: ſo that when any more ſerious occaſion of friendſhip or gratitude requires more genuine profeſſions, words are wanting to expreſs them.

‡ Ch. 18. ſect. 3.

centinel in *Hamlet*, interrogated with relation to the ghoſt whether his watch had been quiet, anſwers with great propriety for a man in his ſtation, "Not a mouſe "ſtirring *."

I proceed to a ſecond remark, not leſs important than the former. No perſon of reflection but muſt be ſenſible, that an incident makes a ſtronger impreſſion on an eye-witneſs, than when heard at ſecond hand. Writers of genius, ſenſible that the eye is the beſt avenue to the heart, repreſent every thing as paſſing in our ſight; and from readers or hearers, transform us, as it were, into ſpectators: a ſkilful writer conceals himſelf, and preſents his perſonages: in a word, every thing becomes dramatic as much as poſſible. Plutarch, *de gloria Athenienſium*, obſerves, that Thucydides makes his reader a ſpectator, and inſpires him with the ſame paſſions as if he were an eye-witneſs; and the ſame obſervation is applicable to our countryman Swift. From this happy talent ariſes that energy of ſtyle which is peculiar to the latter: he cannot always avoid narration; but the pencil is his choice, by which he beſtows life and colouring upon his objects. Pope is richer in ornament, but poſſeſſeth not in the ſame degree the talent of drawing from the life. A tranſlation of the ſixth ſatire of Horace, begun by the former, and finiſhed by the latter, affords the faireſt opportunity for a compariſon. Pope obviouſly imitates the picturesque manner of his friend: yet every one of taſte muſt be ſenſible, that the imitation, though fine, falls ſhort of the original. In other inſtances, where Pope writes in his own ſtyle, the difference of manner is ſtill more conſpicuous

Abſtract or general terms have no good effect in any compoſition for amuſement; becauſe it is only of par-



* One can ſcarce avoid ſmiling at the blindneſs of a certain critic, who, with an air of ſelf-ſufficiency, condemns this expreſſion as low and vulgar. A French poet, ſays he, would expreſs the ſame thought in a more ſublime manner: "Mais tout dort, et l'armée, et les "vents, et Neptune." And he adds, "The Engliſh "poet may pleaſe at London, but the French every "where elſe."

ticular objects that images can be formed *. Shakespear's style in that respect is excellent: every article in his descriptions is particular, as in nature; and if accidentally a vague expression slip in, the blemish is extremely discernible by the bluntness of its impression. Take the following example: Falstaff, excusing himself for running away at a robbery, says,

By the Lord, I knew ye, as well as he that made ye. Why, hear ye, my masters; was it for me to kill the heir-apparent? should I turn upon the true prince? Why, thou knowest, I am as valiant as Hercules; but beware instinct, the lion will not touch the true prince: instinct is a great matter. I was a coward on instinct: I shall think the better of myself, and thee, during my life; I, for a valiant lion, and thou for a true prince. But, by the Lord, lads, I am glad you have the money. Hostess, clap to the doors, watch to-night, pray to-morrow. Gallants, lads, boys, hearts of gold, all the titles of good fellowship come to you! What, shall we be merry? shall we have a play *extempore?*

*First part, Henry* IV. *act* 2. *sc.* 9.

The sentence I object to is, *instinct is a great matter*, which makes but a poor figure, compared with the liveliness of the rest of the speech. It was one of Homer's advantages, that he wrote before general terms were multiplied: the superior genius of Shakespear displays itself in avoiding them after they were multiplied. Addison describes the family of Sir Roger de Coverley in the following words:

You would take his valet de chambre for his brother, his butler is gray-headed, his groom is one of the gravest men that I have ever seen, and his coachman has the looks of a privy counsellor. *Spectator*, N° 106.

The description of the groom is less lively than of the others; plainly because the expression, being vague and general, tends not to form any image. "Dives opum "variarum *," is an expression still more vague; and so are the following:

——— Mæcenas,

* See chap. 4.

* Georg. ii. 468.

——————— Mæcenas, *mearum*
Grande decus, columenque *rerum.*
*Horat. Carm. lib.* 2. *ode* 17.

——————— et fide Teîa
Dices *laborantes in uno*
Penelopen, vitreamque Circen.
*Horat. Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 17.

——————— Ridiculum acri
Fortius et melius magnas plerumque *fecat res.*
*Horat. Satir. lib.* 1. *fat.* 10.

In the fine arts, it is a rule, to put the capital objects in the ſtrongeſt point of view; and even to preſent them oftener than once, where it can be done. In hiſtory-painting, the principal figure is placed in the front, and in the beſt light: an equeſtrian ſtatue is placed in a centre of ſtreets, that it may be ſeen from many places at once. In no compoſition is there greater opportunity for this rule than in writing:

——————— Sequitur pulcherrimus Aſtur,
Aſtur equo fidens et verſicoloribus armis.
*Æneid.* x. 180.

——————— Full many a lady
I've ey'd with beſt regard, and many a time
Th' harmony of their tongues hath into bondage
Brought my too diligent ear; for ſeveral virtues
Have I lik'd ſeveral women, never any
With ſo full ſoul, but ſome defect in her
Did quarrel with the nobleſt grace ſhe ow'd,
And put it to the foil. But you, O you,
So perfect, and ſo peerleſs, are created
Of every creature's beſt. *Tempeſt, act* 3. *ſc.* 1.

*Orlando.* ——— Whate'er you are
That in this deſert inacceſſible,
Under the ſhade of melancholy boughs,
Loſe and neglect the creeping hours of time;
If ever you have look'd on better days;
If ever been where bells have knoll'd to church;
If ever ſat at any good man's feaſt;
If ever from your eye-lids wip'd a tear,
And know what 'tis to pity, and be pity'd;

Let gentleneſs my ſtrong inforcement be,
In the which hope I bluſh, and hide my ſword.

*Duke ſen.* True is it that we have ſeen better days;
And have with holy bell been knoll'd to church;
And ſat at good mens feaſts; and wip'd our eyes
Of drops that ſacred pity had engender'd:
And therefore ſit you down in gentleneſs,
And take upon command what help we have,
That to your wanting may be miniſtred.

*As you like it.*

With thee converſing I forget all time;
All ſeaſons and their change, all pleaſe alike.
Sweet is the breath of morn, her riſing ſweet,
With charm of earlieſt birds; pleaſant the ſun
When firſt on this delightful land he ſpreads
His orient beams, on herb, tree, fruit, and flow'r,
Gliſtering with dew; fragrant the fertile earth
After ſoft ſhowers; and ſweet the coming on
Of grateful evening mild, the ſilent night
With this her ſolemn bird, and this fair moon,
And theſe the gems of heav'n, her ſtarry train:
But neither breath of morn, when ſhe aſcends
With charm of earlieſt birds, nor riſing ſun
On this delightful land, nor herb, fruit, flower,
Gliſtering with dew, nor fragrance after ſhowers,
Nor grateful evening mild, nor ſilent night,
With this her ſolemn bird, nor walk by moon,
Or glittering ſtar-light, without thee is ſweet.

*Paradiſe loſt, book* 4. *l.* 634.

What mean ye, that ye uſe this proverb, The fathers have eaten ſour grapes, and the childrens teeth are ſet on edge? As I live, ſaith the Lord God, ye ſhall not have occaſion to uſe this proverb in Iſrael. If a man keep my judgments to deal truly, he is juſt, he ſhall ſurely live. But if he be a robber, a ſhedder of blood; if he have eaten upon the mountains, and defiled his neighbour's wife; if he have oppreſſed the poor and needy, have ſpoiled by violence, have not reſtored the pledge, have lift up his eyes to idols, have given forth upon uſury, and have taken increaſe: ſhall he live? he ſhall not live: he ſhall ſurely die; and his blood ſhall be upon him. Now, lo, if he beget a ſon, that ſeeth all his father's ſins, and

and conſidereth, and doth not ſuch like; that hath not eaten upon the mountains, hath not lift up his eyes to idols, nor defiled his neighbour's wife, hath not oppreſſed any, nor with-held the pledge, neither hath ſpoiled by violence, but hath given his bread to the hungry, and covered the naked with a garment; that hath not received uſury nor increaſe, that hath executed my judgments, and walked in my ſtatutes; he ſhall not die for the iniquity of his father; he ſhall ſurely live. The ſoul that ſinneth, it ſhall die; the ſon ſhall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither ſhall the father bear the iniquity of the ſon; the righteouſneſs of the righteous ſhall be upon him, and the wickedneſs of the wicked ſhall be upon him. Have I any pleaſure that the wicked ſhould die, ſaith the Lord God; and not that he ſhould return from his ways and live? *Ezekiel* xviii.

The repetitions in Homer, which are frequent, have been the occaſion of much criticiſm. Suppoſe we were at a loſs about the reaſon, might not taſte be ſufficient to juſtify them? At the ſame time, we are at no loſs about the reaſon: they evidently make the narration dramatic, and have an air of truth, by making things appear as paſſing in our ſight.

A conciſe comprehenſive ſtyle is a great ornament in narration; and a ſuperfluity of unneceſſary words, not leſs than of circumſtances, a great nuiſance. A judicious ſelection of the ſtriking circumſtances clothed in a nervous ſtyle, is delightful. In this ſtyle, Tacitus excells all writers, antient and modern. Inſtances are numberleſs: take the following ſpecimen.

Crebra hinc prælia, et ſæpius in modum latrocinii: per ſaltus, per paludes; ut cuique fors aut virtus: temere, proviſo, ob iram, ob prædam, juſſu, et aliquando ignaris ducibus. *Annal. lib.* 12. § 39.

After Tacitus, Oſſian in that reſpect juſtly merits the place of diſtinction. One cannot go wrong for examples in any part of his book; and at the firſt opening the following inſtance meets my eye:

Nathos clothed his limbs in ſhining ſteel. The ſtride of the chief is lovely: the joy of his eye terrible. The wind ruſtles in his hair. Darthula is ſilent at his ſide:

her look is fixed on the chief. Striving to hide the rising ſigh, two tears ſwell in her eyes.

I add one other inſtance, which, beſide the property under conſideration, raiſes delicately our moſt tender ſympathy:

Son of Fingal! doſt thou not behold the darkneſs of Crothar's hall of ſhells? My ſoul was not dark at the feaſt, when my people lived. I rejoiced in the preſence of ſtrangers, when my ſon ſhone in the hall. But, Oſſian, he is a beam that is departed, and left no ſtreak of light behind. He is fallen, ſon of Fingal, in the battles of his father.—Rothmar, the chief of graſſy Tromlo, heard that my eyes had failed; he heard that my arms were fixed in the hall, and the pride of his ſoul aroſe. He came towards Croma; my people fell before him. I took my arms in the hall, but what could ſightleſs Crothar do? My ſteps were unequal; my grief was great. I wiſhed for the days that were paſt; days! wherein I fought, and won in the field of blood. My ſon returned from the chace; the fair-haired Fovar-gormo. He had not lifted his ſword in battle, for his arm was young. But the ſoul of the youth was great; the fire of valour burnt in his eye. He ſaw the diſordered ſteps of his father, and his ſigh aroſe. King of Croma, he ſaid, is it becauſe thou haſt no ſon? Is it for the weakneſs of Fovar-gormo's arm that thy ſighs ariſe? I begin, my father, to feel the ſtrength of my arm? I have drawn the ſword of my youth, and I have bent the bow. Let me meet this Rothmar, with the youths of Croma: let me meet him, O my father, for I feel my burning ſoul.

And thou ſhalt meet him, I ſaid, ſon of the ſightleſs Crothar! But let others advance before thee, that I may hear the tread of thy feet at thy return; for my eyes behold thee not, fair-haired Fovar-gormo!—He went, he met the foe; he fell. The foe advances towards Croma. He who ſlew my ſon is near, with all his pointed ſpears.

If a conciſe or nervous ſtyle be a beauty, tautology muſt be a blemiſh; and yet writers, fettered by verſe, are not ſufficiently careful to avoid this ſlovenly practice: they may be pitied, but they cannot be juſtified. Take for

for a ſpecimen the following inſtances, from the beſt poet, for verſification at leaſt, that England has to boaſt of.

High on his helm celeſtial lightnings play,
His beamy ſhield emits a living ray,
Th' unweary'd blaze inceſſant ſtreams ſupplies,
Like the red ſtar that fires th' autumnal ſkies.
*Iliad* v. 5.

Strength and omnipotence inveſt thy throne.
*Iliad* viii. 576.

So ſilent fountains, from a rock's tall head,
In ſable ſtreams ſoft-trickling waters ſhed.
*Iliad* ix. 19.

His clanging armour rung. *Iliad* xii. 94.

Fear on their cheek, and horror in their eye.
*Iliad* xv. 4.

The blaze of armour flaſh'd againſt the day.
*Iliad* xvii. 736.

As when the piercing blaſts of Boreas blow.
*Iliad* xix. 380.

And like the moon, the broad refulgent ſhield
Blaz'd with long rays, and gleam'd athwart the field.
*Iliad* xix. 402.

No — could our ſwiftneſs o'er the wind prevail,
Or beat the pinions of the weſtern gale,
All were in vain ——— *Iliad* xix. 460.

The humid ſweat from ev'ry pore deſcends.
*Iliad* xxiii. 829.

Redundant epithets, ſuch as *humid* in the laſt citation, are by Quintilian diſallow'd to orators; but indulged to poets *, becauſe his favourite poets, in a few inſtances, are reduced to ſuch epithets for the ſake of verſification; for inſtance, *Prata canis albicant pruinis*, of Horace, and *liquidos fontes*, of Virgil.

As an apology for ſuch careleſs expreſſions, it may well ſuffice, that Pope, in ſubmitting to be a tranſlator, acts below his genius. In a tranſlation, it is hard to require the ſame ſpirit or accuracy, that is chearfully beſtow'd

* L. 8. cap. 6. ſect. 2.

ſtow'd on an original work. And to ſupport the reputation of that author, I ſhall give ſome inſtances from Virgil and Horace, more faulty by redundancy than any of thoſe above mentioned:

Sæpe etiam immenſum cœlo venit agmen aquarum,
Et fœdam glomerant tempeſtatem imbribus atris
Collectæ ex alto nubes: ruit arduus æther,
Et pluviâ ingenti ſata læta, boumque labores
Diluit. *Georg. lib.* i. 322.

Poſtquam altum tenuere rates, nec jam amplius ullæ
Apparent terræ; cœlum undique et undique pontus:
Tum mihi cæruleus ſupra caput aſtitit imber,
Noctem hyememque ferens: et inhorruit unda tenebris.
*Æneid. lib.* iii. 197.

——— Hinc tibi copia
Manabit ad plenum benigno
Ruris honorum opulenta cornu.
*Horat. Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 17.

Videre feſſos vomerem inverſum boves
Collo trahentes languido. *Horat. epod.* ii. 63.

Here I can luckily apply Horace's rule againſt himſelf.

Eſt brevitate opus, ut currat ſententia, neu ſe
Impediat verbis laſſas onerantibus aures.
*Serm. lib.* 1. *ſat.* x. 9.

I cloſe this chapter with a curious inquiry. An object, however ugly to the ſight, is far from being ſo when repreſented by colours or by words. What is the cauſe of this difference? With reſpect to painting the cauſe is obvious: a good picture, whatever the ſubject be, is agreeable by the pleaſure we take in imitation; and this pleaſure overbalancing the diſagreeableneſs of the ſubject, makes the picture upon the whole agreeable. With reſpect to the deſcription of an ugly object, the cauſe is what follows. To connect individuals in the ſocial ſtate, no particular contributes more than language, by the power it poſſeſſes of an expeditious communication of thought, and a lively repreſentation of tranſactions. But nature hath not been ſatisfied to recommend language by its utility merely: independent of utility, it is made ſuſceptible of many beauties, which are

are directly felt, without the intervention of any reflection *. And this unfolds the myſtery; for the pleaſure of language is ſo great, as in a lively deſcription to overbalance the diſagreeableneſs of the image raiſed by it †. This however is no encouragement to deal in diſagreeable ſubjects; for the pleaſure is incomparably greater where the ſubject and the deſcription are both of them agreeable.

The following deſcription is upon the whole agreeable, though the ſubject deſcribed is in itſelf diſmal:

Nine times the ſpace that meaſures day and night
To mortal men, he with his horrid crew
Lay vanquiſh'd, rowling in the fiery gulf,
Confounded though immortal! but his doom
Reſerv'd him to more wrath; for now the thought
Both of loſt happineſs and laſting pain
Torments him; round he throws his baleful eyes
That witneſs'd huge affliction and diſmay,
Mix'd with obdurate pride and ſtedfaſt hate:
At once as far as angels ken he views
The diſmal ſituation waſte and wild:
A dungeon horrible, on all ſides round
As one great furnace flam'd; yet from thoſe flames
No light, but rather darkneſs viſible
Serv'd only to diſcover ſights of wo,
Regions of ſorrow, doleful ſhades, where peace
And reſt can never dwell, hope never comes
That comes to all; but torture without end
Still urges, and a fiery deluge, fed
With ever-burning ſulphur unconſum'd!
Such place eternal juſtice had prepar'd
For thoſe rebellious. *Paradiſe loſt, book* 1. *l.* 50.

An unmanly depreſſion of ſpirits in time of danger is not an agreeable ſight; and yet a fine deſcription or repreſentation of it will be reliſhed:

*K. Richard.* What muſt the King do now? muſt he ſubmit?
The King ſhall do it: muſt he be depos'd?

The

* See chap. 18.
† See chap. 2. part 4.

The King ſhall be contented: muſt he loſe
The name of King? o' God's name, let it go;
I'll give my jewels for a ſet of beads;
My gorgeous palace, for a hermitage;
My gay apparel, for an almſman's gown;
My figur'd goblets, for a diſh of wood;
My ſceptre, for a palmer's walking ſtaff;
My ſubjects, for a pair of carved ſaints;
And my large kingdom, for a little grave;
A little, little grave;——an obſcure grave.
Or I'll be bury'd in the King's highway;
Some way of common tread, where ſubjects feet
May hourly trample on their ſovereign's head;
For on my heart they tread now, whilſt I live;
And, bury'd once, why not upon my head?

*Richard* II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

Objects that ſtrike terror in a ſpectator, have in poetry and painting a fine effect. The picture, by raiſing a ſlight emotion of terror, agitates the mind; and in that condition every beauty makes a deep impreſſion. May not contraſt heighten the pleaſure, by oppoſing our preſent ſecurity to the danger we would be in by encountering the object repreſented?

——————————The other ſhape,
If ſhape it might be call'd, that ſhape had none
Diſtinguiſhable in member, joint, or limb;
Or ſubſtance might be call'd that ſhadow ſeem'd,
For each ſeem'd either; black it ſtood as night,
Fierce as ten furies, terrible as hell,
And ſhook a dreadful dart.

*Paradiſe loſt, book* 2. *l.* 666.

—————————— Now ſtorming fury roſe,
And clamour ſuch as heard in heaven till now
Was never: arms on armour claſhing bray'd
Horrible diſcord, and the madding wheels
Of brazen chariots rag'd; dire was the noiſe
Of conflict; overhead the diſmal hiſs
Of fiery darts in flaming vollies flew,
And flying vaulted either hoſt with fire.
So under fiery cope together ruſh'd
Both battles main, with ruinous aſſault

And

And inextinguiſhable rage; all heav'n
Reſounded, and had earth been then, all earth
Had to her centre ſhook.

*Paradiſe loſt, book* 6. *l.* 207.

*Ghoſt.* ——————— But that I am forbid
To tell the ſecrets of my priſon-houſe,
I could tell a tale unfold, whoſe lighteſt word
Would harrow up thy ſoul, freeze thy young blood,
Make thy two eyes, like ſtars, ſtart from their ſpheres,
Thy knotty and combined locks to part,
And each particular hair to ſtand on end,
Like quills upon the fretful porcupine:
But this eternal blazon muſt not be
To ears of fleſh and blood. *Hamlet, act* 1. *ſc.* 8.

*Gratiano.* Poor Deſdemona! I'm glad thy father's dead:
Thy match was mortal to him; and pure grief
Shore his old thread in twain. Did he live now,
This ſight would make him do a deſp'rate turn:
Yea, curſe his better angel from his ſide,
And fall to reprobation. *Othello, act* 5. *ſc.* 8.

Objects of horror muſt be excepted from the foregoing theory; for no deſcription, however lively, is ſufficient to overbalance the diſguſt raiſed even by the idea of ſuch an object. Every thing horrible ought therefore to be avoided in a deſcription. Nor is this a ſevere law: the poet will avoid ſuch ſcenes for his own ſake, as well as for that of his reader; and to vary his deſcriptions, nature affords plenty of objects that diſguſt us in ſome degree without raiſing horror. I am obliged therefore to condemn the picture of Sin in the ſecond book of *Paradiſe loſt*, though drawn with a maſterly hand: the original would be a horrid ſpectacle; and the horror is not much ſoftened in the copy:

——————— Penſive here I ſat
Alone, but long I ſat not, till my womb
Pregnant by thee, and now exceſſive grown
Prodigious motion felt and rueful throes.
At laſt this odious offſpring whom thou ſeeſt,
Thine own begotten, breaking violent way,
Tore through my intrails, that with fear and pain
Diſtorted,

Distorted, all my nether shape thus grew
Transform'd; but he my imbred enemy
Forth issu'd, brandishing his fatal dart,
Made to destroy: I fled, and cry'd out Death;
Hell trembl'd at the hideous name, and sigh'd
From all her caves, and back resounded Death.
I fled, but he pursu'd, (though more, it seems,
Inflam'd with lust than rage), and swifter far,
Me overtook, his mother all dismay'd,
And in embraces forcible and foul
Ingendring with me, of that rape begot
These yelling monsters that with ceaseless cry
Surround me, as thou saw'st, hourly conceiv'd
And hourly born, with sorrow infinite
To me; for when they list, into the womb
That bred them they return, and howl and gnaw
My bowels, their repast; then bursting forth,
Afresh with conscious terrors vex me round,
That rest or intermission none I find.
Before mine eyes in opposition sits
Grim Death, my son and foe, who sets them on,
And me his parent would full soon devour
For want of other prey, but that he knows
His end with mine involv'd; and knows that I
Should prove a bitter morsel, and his bane,
Whenever that shall be. *Book 2. l. 777.*

Iago's character in the tragedy of *Othello*, is insufferably monstrous and Satanical: not even Shakespear's masterly hand can make the picture agreeable.

Though the objects introduced in the following scenes are not altogether so horrible as Sin is in Milton's picture; yet with every person of delicacy, disgust will be the prevailing emotion:

—— Strophades Graio stant nomine dictæ
Insulæ Ionio in magno: quas dira Celæno,
Harpyiæque colunt aliæ: Phineia postquam
Clausa domus, mensasque metu liquere priores.
Tristius haud illis monstrum, nec sævior ulla
Pestis et ira Deûm Stygiis sese extulit undis.
Virginei volucrum vultus, fœdissima ventris
Proluvies, uncæque manus, et pallida semper
Ora fame. Huc

Huc ubi delati portus intravimus: ecce
Læta boum paſſim campis armenta videmus,
Caprigenumque pecus, nullo cuſtode, per herbas.
Irruimus ferro, et Divos ipſumque vocamus
In prædam partemque Jovem: tunc littore curvo
Extruimuſque toros, dapibuſque epulamur opimis.
At ſubitæ horrifico lapſu de montibus adſunt
Harpyiæ: et magnis quatiunt clangoribus alas:
Diripiuntque dapes, contactuque omnia fœdant
Immundo: tum vox tetrum dira inter odorem.

*Æneid. lib.* iii. 210.

Sum patria ex Ithaca, comes infelicis Ulyſſei,
Nomen Achemenides: Trojam, genitore Adamaſto
Paupere (manſiſſetque utinam fortuna!) profectus.
Hic me, dum trepidi crudelia limina linquunt,
Immemores ſocii vaſto Cyclopis in antro
Deſeruere. Domus ſanie dapibuſque cruentis,
Intus opaca, ingens: ipſe arduus, altaque pulſat
Sidera: (Dii, talem terris avertite peſtem)
Nec viſu facilis, nec dictu affabilis ulli,
Viſceribus miſerorum, et ſanguine veſcitur atro.
Vidi egomet, duo de numero cum corpora noſtro,
Prenſa manu magna, medio reſupinus in antro,
Frangeret ad ſaxum, ſanieque aſperſa natarent
Limina: vidi, atro cum membra fluentia tabo
Manderet, et tepidi tremerent ſub dentibus artus.
Haud impune quidem: nec talia paſſus Ulyſſes,
Oblituſve ſui eſt Ithacus diſcrimine tanto.
Nam ſimul expletus dapibus, vinoque ſepultus
Cervicem inflexam poſuit, jacuitque per antrum
Immenſus, ſaniem eructans, ac fruſta cruento
Per ſomnum commixta mero; nos, magna precati
Numina, ſortitique vices, unà undique circum
Fundimur, et telo lumen terebramus acuto
Ingens, quod torva ſolum ſub fronte latebat.

*Æneid. lib.* iii. 613.

## CHAP. XXII.

### Epic and Dramatic Compositions.

TRAGEDY differs not from the epic in ſubſtantials: in both the ſame ends are propoſed, *viz.* inſtruction.

tion and amuſement; and in both the ſame mean is employ'd, *viz.* imitation of human actions. They differ only in the manner of imitating: epic poetry deals in narration: tragedy repreſents its facts as paſſing in our ſight: in the former, the poet introduces himſelf as an hiſtorian; in the latter, he preſents his actors, and never himſelf *.

This difference, regarding form only, may be thought ſlight: but the effects it occaſions, are by no means ſo; for what we ſee makes a deeper impreſſion than what we learn from others. A narrative poem is a ſtory told by another: facts and incidents paſſing upon the ſtage, come under our own obſervation; and are beſide much enlivened by action and geſture, expreſſive of many ſentiments beyond the reach of language.

A dramatic

* The dialogue in a dramatic compoſition diſtinguiſhes it ſo clearly from other compoſitions, that no writer has thought it neceſſary to ſearch for any other ſeparating mark. But much uſeleſs labour has been beſtow'd, to diſtinguiſh an epic poem by ſome peculiar mark. Boſſu defines this poem to be, "A compoſition in verſe, intended to form the manners by inſtructions diſguiſed under the allegories of an important action;" which will exclude every epic poem founded upon real facts, and perhaps include ſeveral of Æſop's fables. Voltaire reckons verſe ſo eſſential, as for that ſingle reaſon to exclude the adventures of Telemachus. See his *Eſſay upon epic Poetry*. Others, affected with ſubſtance more than with ornament, heſitate not to pronounce that poem to be epic. It is not a little diverting to ſee ſo many profound critics hunting for what is not to be found: they take for granted, without the leaſt foundation, that there muſt be ſome preciſe criterion to diſtinguiſh epic poetry from every other ſpecies of writing. Literary compoſitions run into each other, preciſely like colours: in their ſtrong tints they are eaſily diſtinguiſhed; but are ſuſceptible of ſo much variety, and of ſo many different forms, that we never can ſay where one ſpecies ends and another begins. As to the general taſte, there is little reaſon to doubt, that a work where heroic actions are related in an elevated ſtyle, will, without further requiſite, be deemed an epic poem.

A dramatic compoſition has another property, independent altogether of action; which is, that it makes a deeper impreſſion than narration: in the former, perſons expreſs their own ſentiments; in the latter, ſentiments are related at ſecond hand. For that reaſon, Ariſtotle, the father of critics, lays it down as a rule, That in an epic poem the author ought to take every opportunity of introducing his actors, and of confining the narrative part within the narroweſt bounds*. Homer underſtood perfectly the advantage of that method; and his poems are both of them in a great meaſure dramatic. Lucan runs to the oppoſite extreme: and is guilty of a ſtill greater fault, in ſtuffing his *Pharſalia* with cold and languid reflections, the merit of which he aſſumes to himſelf, and deigns not to ſhare with his actors. Nothing can be more injudiciouſly timed, than a chain of ſuch reflections, which ſuſpend the battle of Pharſalia after the leaders had made their ſpeeches, and the two armies are ready to engage†.

Ariſtotle, from the nature of the fable, divides tragedy into ſimple and complex: but it is of greater moment, with reſpect to dramatic as well as epic poetry, to found a diſtinction upon the different ends attained by ſuch compoſitions. A poem, whether dramatic or epic, that has nothing in view but to move the paſſions, and to exhibit pictures of virtue and vice, may be diſtinguiſhed by the name of *pathetic*: but where a ſtory is purpoſely contrived to illuſtrate ſome moral truth, by ſhewing that diſorderly paſſions naturally lead to external misfortunes, ſuch compoſition may be denominated *moral*‡. Beſide making a deeper impreſſion than can be done

* Poet. chap. 25. ſect. 6.

† Lib. 7. from line 385. to line 460.

‡ The ſame diſtinction is applicable to that ſort of fable which is ſaid to be the invention of Æſop. A moral, it is true, is by all critics conſidered as eſſential to ſuch fable. But nothing is more common than to be led blindly by authority; for of the numerous collections I have ſeen, the fables that clearly inculcate a moral, make a very ſmall part. In many fables, indeed, proper

done by cool reaſoning, a moral poem does not fall ſhort of reaſoning in affording conviction: the natural connection of vice with miſery, and of virtue with happineſs, may be illuſtrated by ſtating a fact as well as by urging an argument. Let us aſſume, for example, the following moral truths; that diſcord among the chiefs renders ineffectual all common meaſures; and that the conſequences of a ſlightly-founded quarrel, foſtered by pride and arrogance, are not leſs fatal than thoſe of the groſſeſt injury: theſe truths may be inculcated, by the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles at the ſiege of Troy. If facts or circumſtances be wanting, ſuch as tend to rouſe the turbulent paſſions, they muſt be invented; but no accidental nor unaccountable event ought to be invented or admitted; for the neceſſary or probable connection between vice and miſery, is not learned from any events but what are naturally occaſioned by the characters and paſſions of the perſons repreſented, acting in ſuch and ſuch circumſtances. A real event of which we ſee not the cauſe, may afford a leſſon, upon the preſumption that what hath happened may again happen: but this cannot be inferred from a ſtory that is known to be a fiction.

Many are the good effects of ſuch compoſitions. A pathetic compoſition, whether epic or dramatic, tends to a habit of virtue, by exciting us to do what is right, and reſtraining us from what is wrong *. Its frequent pictures of human woes, produce, beſide, two effects extremely ſalutary: they improve our ſympathy, and at the ſame time fortify us in bearing our own misfortunes. A moral compoſition muſt obviouſly produce the ſame good effects, becauſe by being moral it ceaſeth not to be pathetic: it enjoys beſide an excellence peculiar to itſelf; for it not only improves the heart, as above mentioned, but inſtructs the head by the moral it contains. For my part, I cannot imagine any entertainment more ſuited

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proper pictures of virtue and vice are exhibited: but the bulk of theſe collections convey no inſtruction, nor afford any amuſement beyond what a child receives in reading an ordinary ſtory.

*See chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 4.

ſuited to a rational being, than a work thus happily illuſtrating ſome moral truth; where a number of perſons of different characters are engaged in an important action, ſome retarding, others promoting, the great cataſtrophe: and where there is dignity of ſtyle as well as of matter. A work of that kind, has our ſympathy at command, and can put in motion the whole train of the ſocial affections: our curioſity in ſome ſcenes is excited, in others gratified: and our delight conſummated at the cloſe, upon finding, from the characters and ſituations exhibited at the commencement, that every incident down to the final cataſtrophe is natural, and that the whole in conjunction make a regular chain of cauſes and effects.

Conſidering that an epic and a dramatic poem are the ſame in ſubſtance and have the ſame aim or end, one would readily imagine, that ſubjects proper for the one muſt be equally proper for the other. But conſidering their difference as to form, there will be found reaſon to correct that conjecture, at leaſt in ſome degree. Many ſubjects may indeed be treated with equal advantage in either form; but the ſubjects are ſtill more numerous for which they are not equally qualified; and there are ſubjects proper for the one and not at all for the other. To give ſome ſlight notion of the difference, as there is no room here for enlarging upon every article, I obſerve, that dialogue is the beſt qualified for expreſſing ſentiments, and narrative for diſplaying facts. Heroiſm, magnanimity, undaunted courage, and the whole tribe of the elevated virtues, figure beſt in action: tender paſſions, and the whole tribe of ſympathetic affections, figure beſt in ſentiment: what we feel is the moſt remarkable in the latter; what we perform is the moſt remarkable in the former. It clearly follows, that tender paſſions are more peculiarly the province of tragedy, grand and heroic actions of epic poetry *.

I have no occaſion to ſay more upon the epic, conſidered

* In Racine, tender ſentiments prevail; in Corneille, grand and heroic manners. Hence clearly the preference of the former before the latter, as dramatic poets. Corneille would have figured better in an heroic poem.

dered as peculiarly adapted to certain ſubjects. But as dramatic ſubjects are more complex, I muſt take a narrower view of them; which I do the more willingly, in order to clear a point thrown into great obſcurity by critics.

In the chapter of emotions and paſſions *, it is occaſionally ſhewn, that the ſubject beſt fitted for tragedy is where a man has himſelf been the cauſe of his misfortune; not ſo as to be deeply guilty, nor altogether innocent: the misfortune muſt be occaſioned by a fault incident to human nature, and therefore in ſome degree venial. Such misfortunes call forth the ſocial affections, and warmly intereſt the ſpectator. An accidental misfortune, if not extremely ſingular, doth not greatly move our pity: the perſon who ſuffers, being innocent, is freed from the greateſt of all torments, that anguiſh of mind which is occaſioned by remorſe:

Poco é funeſta
Laltrui fortuna
Quando non reſta
Ragione alcuna
Ne di pentirſi, né darroſſir. *Metaſtaſio.*

An atrocious criminal, on the other hand, who brings misfortunes upon himſelf, excites little pity, for a different reaſon: his remorſe, it is true, aggravates his diſtreſs, and ſwells the firſt emotions of pity; but then our hatred of him, as a criminal, blending with pity, blunts its edge conſiderably. Misfortunes that are not innocent, nor highly criminal, partake the advantages of each extreme: they are attended with remorſe to embitter the diſtreſs, which raiſes our pity to a great height; and the ſlight indignation we have at a venial fault, detracts not ſenſibly from our pity. For that reaſon, the happieſt of all ſubjects for raiſing pity, is where a man of integrity falls into a great misfortune by doing an action that is innocent, but which, by ſome ſingular means, is conceived by him to be criminal: his remorſe aggravates his diſtreſs; and our compaſſion, unreſtrained by indignation, knows no bounds. Pity comes thus

* Part 4.

thus to be the ruling paſſion of a pathetic tragedy; and, by proper repreſentation, may be raiſed to a height ſcarce exceeded by any thing felt in real life. A moral tragedy takes in a larger field; as it not only exerciſes our pity, but raiſes another paſſion, which, though ſelfiſh, deſerves to be cheriſhed equally with the ſocial affection. The paſſion I have in view is fear or terror; for when a misfortune is the natural conſequence of ſome wrong bias in the temper, every ſpectator who is conſcious of ſuch a wrong bias in himſelf, takes the alarm, and dreads his falling into the ſame misfortune: and by that emotion of fear or terror, frequently reiterated in a variety of moral tragedies, the ſpectators are put upon their guard againſt the diſorders of paſſion.

The commentators upon Ariſtotle, and other critics, have been much graveled about the account given of tragedy by that author: "That by means of pity and "terror, it refines or purifies in us all ſorts of paſſion." But no one who has a clear conception of the end and effects of a good tragedy, can have any difficulty about Ariſtotle's meaning: our pity is engaged for the perſons repreſented; and our terror is upon our own account. Pity indeed is here made to ſtand for all the ſympathetic emotions, becauſe of theſe it is the capital. There can be no doubt, that our ſympathetic emotions are refined or improved by daily exerciſe; and in what manner our other paſſions are refined by terror, I have juſt now ſaid. One thing is certain, that no other meaning can juſtly be given to the foregoing doctrine than that now mentioned; and that it was really Ariſtotle's meaning, appears from his 13th chapter, where he delivers ſeveral propoſitions conformable to the doctrine as here explained. Theſe, at the ſame time, I take liberty to mention; becauſe, ſo far as authority can go, they confirm the foregoing reaſoning about ſubjects proper for tragedy. The firſt propoſition is, That it being the province of tragedy to excite pity and terror, an innocent perſon falling into adverſity ought never to be the ſubject. This propoſition is a neceſſary conſequence of his doctrine as explained: a ſubject of that nature may indeed excite pity and terror; but the former in an inferior degree, and the latter in no degree for moral inſtruction.

ſtruction. The ſecond propoſition is, That the hiſtory of a wicked perſon in a change from miſery to happineſs, ought not to be repreſented; which excites neither terror nor compaſſion, nor is agreeable in any reſpect. The third is, That the misfortunes of a wicked perſon ought not to be repreſented: ſuch repreſentation may be agreeable in ſome meaſure upon a principle of juſtice; but it will not move our pity; nor any degree of terror, except in thoſe of the ſame vicious diſpoſition with the perſon repreſented. The laſt propoſition is, That the only character fit for repreſentation lies in the middle, neither eminently good nor eminently bad; where the misfortune is not the effect of deliberate vice, but of ſome involuntary fault, as our author expreſſes it *. The only objection I find to Ariſtotle's account of tragedy, is, that he confines it within too narrow bounds, by refuſing admittance to the pathetic kind: for if terror be eſſential to tragedy, no repreſentation deſerves that name but the moral kind, where the misfortunes exhibited are cauſed by a wrong balance of mind, or ſome diſorder in the internal conſtitution: ſuch misfortunes always ſuggeſt moral inſtruction; and by ſuch misfortunes only, can terror be excited for our improvement.

Thus Ariſtotle's four propoſitions above mentioned, relate ſolely to tragedies of the moral kind. Thoſe of the pathetic kind, are not confined within ſo narrow limits: ſubjects fitted for the theatre, are not in ſuch plenty as to make us reject innocent misfortunes which rouſe our ſympathy, though they inculcate no moral. With reſpect indeed to ſubjects of that kind, it may be doubted, whether the concluſion ought not always to be fortunate. Where a perſon of integrity is repreſented as ſuffering to the end under misfortunes purely accidental, we depart diſcontented, and with ſome obſcure ſenſe of injuſtice: for ſeldom is man ſo ſubmiſſive to Providence, as not to revolt againſt the tyranny and vexations

* If one can be amuſed with a grave diſcourſe which promiſeth much and performs nothing, he may ſee this ſubject treated by Brumoy in his *Theatre Grec.* Preliminary diſcourſe on the origin of tragedy.

ations of blind chance; he will be inclined to ſay, This ought not to be. I give for an example the *Romeo and Juliet* of Shakeſpear, where the fatal cataſtrophe is occaſioned by Friar Laurence's coming to the monument a minute too late: we are vexed at the unlucky chance, and go away diſſatisfied. Such impreſſions, which ought not to be cheriſhed, are a ſufficient reaſon for excluding ſtories of that kind from the theatre. The misfortunes of a virtuous perſon, ariſing from neceſſary cauſes or from a chain of unavoidable circumſtances, will be conſidered in a different light: chance making an impreſſion of anarchy and miſrule, produces always a gloomy proſpect: on the contrary, a regular chain of cauſes and effects directed by the general laws of nature, never fails to ſuggeſt the hand of Providence; to which we ſubmit without reſentment, being conſcious that ſubmiſſion is our duty * For that reaſon, we are not diſguſted with the diſtreſſes of Voltaire's *Mariamne*, though redoubled on her till her death, without the leaſt fault or failing on her part: her misfortunes are owing to a cauſe extremely natural, and not unfrequent, the jealouſy of a barbarous huſband. The fate of Deſdemona in the *Moor of Venice*, affects us in the ſame manner. We are not ſo eaſily reconciled to the fate of Cordelia in *King Lear:* the cauſes of her misfortune are by no means ſo evident, as to exclude the gloomy notion of chance. In ſhort, a perfect character ſuffering under misfortunes, is qualified for being the ſubject of a pathetic tragedy, provided chance be excluded. Nor is a perfect character altogether inconſiſtent with a moral tragedy: it may ſucceſsfully be introduced as an underpart, ſuppoſing the chief place to be filled with an imperfect character from which a moral can be drawn. This is the caſe of Deſdemona and Mariamne juſt now mentioned; and it is the caſe of Monimia and Belvidera, in Otway's two tragedies, *The Orphan*, and *Venice preſerv'd*.

I had an early opportunity to unfold a curious doctrine, That fable operates on our paſſions, by repre-



* See eſſays on the principles of morality, edit. 2. p. 291.

ſenting its events as paſſing in our ſight, and by deluding us into a conviction of reality *. Hence, in epic and dramatic compoſitions, every circumſtance ought to be employ'd that may promote the deluſion; ſuch as the borrowing from hiſtory ſome noted event, with the addition of circumſtances that may anſwer the author's purpoſe: the principal facts are known to be true; and we are diſpoſed to extend our belief to every circumſtance. But in chuſing a ſubject that makes a figure in hiſtory, greater precaution is neceſſary than where the whole is a fiction. In the latter caſe there is full ſcope for invention: the author is under no reſtraint other than that the characters and incidents be juſt copies of nature. But where the ſtory is founded on truth, no circumſtances muſt be added, but ſuch as connect naturally with what are known to be true; hiſtory may be ſupplied, but muſt not be contradicted: further, the ſubject choſen muſt be diſtant in time, or at leaſt in place; for the familiarity of recent perſons and events ought to be avoided. Familiarity ought more eſpecially to be avoided in an epic poem, the peculiar character of which is dignity and elevation: modern manners make but a poor figure in ſuch a poem †.

After Voltaire, no writer, it is probable, will think of rearing an epic poem upon a recent event in the hiſtory of his own country. But an event of that kind is perhaps not altogether unqualified for tragedy: it was admitted in Greece; and Shakeſpear has employ'd it ſucceſsfully in ſeveral of his pieces. One advantage it poſſeſſes above fiction, that of more readily engaging our belief, which tends above any other particular to raiſe

* Chap 2. part 1. ſect. 7.

† I would not from this obſervation be thought to undervalue modern manners. The roughneſs, plainneſs, and impetuoſity of antient manners, may ſhew better in an epic poem, without being better fitted for ſociety. But without regard to this circumſtance, it is the familiarity of modern manners that unqualifies them for a lofty ſubject. The dignity of our preſent manners, will be better underſtood in future ages, when they are no longer familiar.

raiſe our ſympathy. The ſcene of comedy is generally laid at home; familiarity is no objection; and we are peculiarly ſenſible of the ridicule of our own manners.

After a proper ſubject is choſen, the dividing it into parts requires ſome art. The concluſion of a book in an epic poem, or of an act in a play, cannot be altogether arbitrary; nor be intended for ſo ſlight a purpoſe as to make the parts of equal length. The ſuppoſed pauſe at the end of every book, and the real pauſe at the end of every act, ought always to coincide with ſome pauſe in the action. In this reſpect, a dramatic or epic poem ought to reſemble a ſentence or period in language, divided into members that are diſtinguiſhed from each other by proper pauſes; or it ought to reſemble a piece of muſic, having a full cloſe at the end, preceded by imperfect cloſes that contribute to the melody. Every act in a dramatic poem ought therefore to cloſe with ſome incident that makes a pauſe in the action; for otherwiſe there can be no pretext for interrupting the repreſentation: it would be abſurd to break off in the very heat of action; againſt which every one would exclaim: the abſurdity ſtill remains, though the action relents, if it be not actually ſuſpended for ſome time. This rule is alſo applicable to an epic poem: though there, a deviation from the rule is leſs remarkable; becauſe it is in the reader's power to hide the abſurdity, by proceeding inſtantly to another book. The firſt book of *Paradiſe loſt* ends without any cloſe, perfect or imperfect: it breaks off abruptly, where Satan, ſeated on his throne, is prepared to harangue the convocated hoſt of the fall'n angels; and the ſecond book begins with the ſpeech. Milton ſeems to have copied the *Æneid*, of which the two firſt books are divided much in the ſame manner. Neither is there any proper pauſe at the end of the fifth book of the *Æneid*. There is no proper pauſe at the end of the ſeventh book of *Paradiſe loſt*, nor at the end of the eleventh.

This branch of the ſubject ſhall be cloſed with a general rule, That action being the fundamental part of every compoſition whether epic or dramatic, the ſentiments and tone of language ought to be ſubſervient to

the action, so as to appear natural, and proper for the occasion. The application of this rule to our modern plays, would reduce the bulk of them to a skeleton *.

After carrying on together epic and dramatic compositions, I proceed to handle them separately, and to mention circumstances peculiar to each; beginning with the epic kind. In a theatrical entertainment, which employs both the eye and the ear, it would be a gross absurdity to introduce upon the stage superior beings in a visible

* En général il y a beaucoup de discours et peu d'action sur la scene Francoise. Quelqu'un disoit en sortant d'une piece de Denis le Tiran, Je n'ai rien vu, mais j'ai entendu force paroles. Voila ce qu'on peut dire en sortant des pieces Francoises. Racine et Corneille avec tout leur génie ne sont eux-mêmes que des parleurs, et leur successeur est le premier qui, à l'imitation des Anglois, ait osé mettre quelquefois la scene en representation. Communément tout se passe en beaux dialogues bien agencés, bien ronflans, où l'on voit d'abord que le premier soin de chaque interlocuteur est toujours celui de briller. Presque tout s'enonce en maximes générales. Quelque agités qu'ils puissent être, ils songent toujours plus au public qu'à eux-mêmes; une sentence leur coute moins qu'un sentiment; les pieces de Racine et de Moliere exceptées, le *je* est presque aussi scrupuleusement banni de la scene Francoise que des écrits de Port-Royal; et les passions humaines, aussi modestes que l'humilité Chrétienne, n'y parlent jamais que par *on*. Il y a encore une certaine dignité manierée dans le geste et dans le propos, qui ne permet jamais à la passion de parler exactement son language, ni à l'auteur de revetir son personage, et de se transporter au lieu de la scene, mais le tient toujours enchainé sur le théatre, et sous les yeux des spectateurs. Aussi les situations les plus vives ne lui fontelles jamais oublier un bel arrangement de phrases, ni des attitudes élégantes; et si le desespoir lui plonge un poignard dans le cœur, non content d'observer la décence en tombant comme Polixene, il ne tombe point; la décence le maintient debout après sa mort, et tous ceux qui viennent d'expirer s'en retournent l'instant d'après sur leurs jambes. *Rousseau.*

a viſible ſhape. There is not place for ſuch objection in an epic poem; and Boileau *, with many other critics, declares ſtrongly for that ſort of machinery in an epic poem But waving authority, which is apt to impoſe upon the judgment, let us draw what light we can from reaſon. I begin with a preliminary remark, That this matter is but indiſtinctly handled by critics: the poetical privilege of animating inſenſible objects for enlivening a deſcription, is very different from what is termed *machinery*, where deities, angels, devils, or other ſupernatural powers, are introduced as real perſonages, mixing in the action, and contributing to the cataſtrophe; and yet theſe two things are conſtantly jumbled together in the reaſoning. The former is founded on a natural principle †: but can the latter claim the ſame authority? ſo far from it, that nothing is more unnatural. Its effects, at the ſame time, are deplorable. Firſt, it gives an air of fiction to the whole; and prevents that impreſſion of reality which is requiſite to intereſt our affections, and to move our paſſions §: which of itſelf is ſufficient to explode machinery, whatever entertainment it may afford to readers of a fantaſtic taſte or irregular imagination. And, next, were it poſſible, by diſguiſing the fiction, to delude us into a notion of reality, which I think can hardly be; an inſuperable objection would ſtill remain, which is, that the aim or end of an epic poem can never be attained in any perfection where machinery is introduced; for an evident reaſon, that virtuous emotions cannot be raiſed ſucceſsfully but by the actions of thoſe who are endued with paſſions and affections like our own, that is, by human actions: and as for moral inſtruction, it is clear, that none can be drawn from beings who act not upon the ſame principles with us. A fable in Æſop's manner is no objection to this reaſoning: his lions, bulls, and goats, are truly men under diſguiſe: they act and feel in every reſpect as human beings; and the moral we draw is founded on that ſuppoſition. Homer, it is

 true,

* Third part of his art of poetry.

† Chap. 20. ſect. 1

§ See chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 7.

true, introduces the gods into his fable: but the religion of his country authorised that liberty; it being an article in the Grecian creed, that the gods often interpose visibly and bodily in human affairs. I must however observe, that Homer's deities do no honour to his poems: fictions that transgress the bounds of nature, seldom have a good effect; they may inflame the imagination for a moment, but will not be relished by any person of a correct taste. They may be of some use to the lower rank of writers; but an author of genius has much finer materials of Nature's production, for elevating his subject, and making it interesting.

One would be apt to think, that Boileau, declaring for the Heathen deities as above, intended them only for embellishing the diction: but unluckily he banishes angels and devils, who undoubtedly make a figure in poetic language, equal to the Heathen deities. Boileau therefore by pleading for the latter in opposition to the former, certainly meant, if he had any distinct meaning, that the Heathen deities may be introduced as actors. And, in fact, he himself is guilty of that glaring absurdity, where it is not so pardonable as in an epic poem: in his ode upon the taking of Namur, he demands with a most serious countenance, whether the walls were built by Apollo or Neptune: and in relating the passage of the Rhine, *anno* 1672, he describes the god of that river as fighting with all his might to oppose the French monarch; which is confounding fiction with reality at a strange rate. The French writers in general run into this error: wonderful the effect of custom, entirely to hide from them how ridiculous such fictions are!

That this is a capital error in the *Gierusalemme liberata*, Tasso's greatest admirers must acknowledge: a situation can never be intricate, nor the reader ever in pain about the catastrophe, so long as there is an angel, devil, or magician, to lend a helping hand. Voltaire, in his essay upon epic poetry, talking of the *Pharsalia*, observes judiciously, "That the proximity of time, "the notoriety of events, the character of the age, "enlightened and political, joined with the solidity of "Lucan's subject, deprived him of all liberty of poe-

"tical

" tical fiction." Is it not amazing, that a critic who reasons so justly with respect to others, can be so blind with respect to himself? Voltaire, not satisfied to enrich his language with images drawn from invisible and superior beings, introduces them into the action: in the sixth canto of the *Henriade*, St Louis appears in person, and terrifies the soldiers; in the seventh canto, St Louis sends the god of Sleep to Henry; and, in the tenth, the demons of Discord, Fanaticism, War, &c. assist Aumale in a single combat with Turenne, and are driven away by a good angel brandishing the sword of God. To blend such fictitious personages in the same action with mortals, makes a bad figure at any rate; and is intolerable in a history so recent as that of Henry IV. This singly is sufficient to make the *Henriade* a short-liv'd poem, were it otherwise possessed of every beauty.

I have tried serious reasoning upon this subject; but ridicule, I suppose, will be found a more successful weapon, which Addison has applied in an elegant manner: " Whereas the time of a general peace is, in all " appearance, drawing near; being informed that there " are several ingenious persons who intend to shew their " talents on so happy an occasion, and being willing, " as much as in me lies, to prevent that effusion of " nonsense which we have good cause to apprehend; " I do hereby strictly require every person who shall " write on this subject, to remember that he is a " Christian, and not to sacrifice his catechism to his " poetry. In order to it, I do expect of him, in the " first place, to make his own poem, without depend- " ing upon Phœbus for any part of it, or calling out " for aid upon any of the muses by name. I do like- " wise positively forbid the sending of Mercury with " any particular message or dispatch relating to the " peace; and shall by no means suffer Minerva to take " upon her the shape of any plenipotentiary concerned " in this great work. I do further declare, that I shall " not allow the destinies to have had an hand in the " deaths of the several thousands who have been slain " in the late war; being of opinion that all such deaths " may be well accounted for by the Christian system of

" powder and ball. I do therefore ſtrictly forbid the " fates to cut the thread of man's life upon any pre- " tence whatſoever, unleſs it be for the ſake of the " rhyme. And whereas I have good reaſon to fear, " that Neptune will have a great deal of buſineſs on " his hands in ſeveral poems which we may now ſup- " poſe are upon the anvil, I do alſo prohibit his ap- " pearance, unleſs it be done in metaphor, ſimile, or " any very ſhort alluſion; and that even here he may " not be permitted to enter, but with great caution and " circumſpection. I deſire that the ſame rule may be " extended to his whole fraternity of Heathen gods; " it being my deſign to condemn every poem to the " flames in which Jupiter thunders, or exerciſes any " other act of authority which does not belong to him. " In ſhort, I expect that no Pagan agent ſhall be intro- " duced, or any fact related which a man cannot give " credit to with a good conſcience. Provided always, " that nothing herein contained ſhall extend, or be con- " ſtrued to extend, to ſeveral of the female poets in " this nation, who ſhall ſtill be left in full poſſeſſion of " their gods and goddeſſes, in the ſame manner as if " this paper had never been written." *

The marvellous is indeed ſo much promoted by machinery, that it is not wonderful to find it embraced by the bulk of writers, and perhaps of readers. If indulged at all, it is generally indulged to exceſs. Homer introduceth his deities with no greater ceremony than his mortals; and Virgil has ſtill leſs moderation; a pilot ſpent with watching cannot fall aſleep and drop into the ſea by natural means: one bed cannot receive the two lovers, Æneas and Dido, without the immediate interpoſition of ſuperior powers. The ridiculous in ſuch fictions, muſt appear even through the thickeſt veil of gravity and ſolemnity.

Angels and devils ſerve equally with the Heathen deities as materials for figurative language; perhaps better among Chriſtians, becauſe we believe in them, and not in the Heathen deities. But every one is ſenſible, as well as Boileau, that the inviſible powers in our creed make

* Spectator, N° 523.

make a much worſe figure as actors in a modern poem, than the inviſible powers in the Heathen creed did in antient poems; the cauſe of which I take to be what follows. The Heathen deities, in the opinion of their votaries, were beings elevated one ſtep only above mankind, ſubject to the ſame paſſions, and directed by the ſame motives; therefore not altogether improper to mix with men in an important action. In our creed, ſuperior beings are placed at ſuch a mighty diſtance from us, and are of a nature ſo different, that with no propriety can we appear with them upon the ſame ſtage: man, a creature much inferior, loſes all dignity in the compariſon.

There can be no doubt, that an hiſtorical poem admits the embelliſhment of allegory, as well as of metaphor, ſimile, or other figure. Moral truth, in particular, is finely illuſtrated in the allegorical manner: it amuſes the fancy to find abſtract terms, by a ſort of magic, converted into active beings; and it is delightful to trace a general propoſition in a pictured event. But allegorical beings ſhould be confined within their own ſphere, and never be admitted to mix in the principal action, nor to co operate in retarding or advancing the cataſtrophe; which would have a ſtill worſe effect than inviſible powers; and I am ready to aſſign the reaſon. The impreſſion of real exiſtence, eſſential to an epic poem, is inconſiſtent with that figurative exiſtence which is eſſential to an allegory*; and therefore no method can more effectually prevent the impreſſion of reality, than the introduction of allegorical beings co-operating with thoſe whom we conceive to be really exiſting. The love-epiſode in the *Henriade*†, inſufferable by the diſcordant mixture of allegory with real life, is copied from that of Rinaldo and Armida, in the *Gieruſalemme liberata*, which hath no merit to intitle it to be copied. An allegorical object, ſuch as Fame in the *Æneid*, and the Temple of Love in the *Henriade*, may find place in a deſcription: but to introduce Diſcord as a real perſonage, imploring the aſſiſtance of Love as another real perſonage, to enervate the courage of the hero, is mak-



* See chap. 20. ſect. 6. † Canto 9.

ing theſe figurative beings act beyond their ſphere, and creating a ſtrange jumble of truth and fiction. The allegory of Sin and Death in the *Paradiſe loſt*, is, I preſume, not generally reliſhed, though it is not entirely of the ſame nature with what I have been condemning: in a work comprehending the atchievements of ſuperior beings, there is more room for fancy than where it is confined to human actions.

What is the true notion of an epiſode? or how is it to be diſtinguiſhed from the principal action? Every incident that promotes or retards the cataſtrophe, muſt be part of the principal action. This clears the nature of an epiſode; which may be defined, "An incident connected with the principal action, but contributing "neither to advance nor retard it." The deſcent of Æneas into hell doth not advance nor retard the cataſtrophe, and therefore is an epiſode. The ſtory of Niſus and Euryalus, producing an alteration in the affairs of the contending parties, is a part of the principal action. The family-ſcene in the ſixth book of the *Iliad* is of the ſame nature; for by Hector's retiring from the field of battle to viſit his wife, the Grecians had opportunity to breathe, and even to turn upon the Trojans. Such being the nature of an epiſode, the unavoidable effect of it muſt be, to break in upon the unity of action; and therefore it ought never to be indulged unleſs to unbend the mind after the fatigue of a long narration. This purpoſe of an epiſode demands the following conditions: it ought to be well connected with the principal action: it ought to be lively and intereſting: it ought to be ſhort: and a time ought to be choſen when the principal action relents *.

In the following beautiful epiſode, which cloſes the ſecond book of Fingal, all theſe conditions are united.

Comal was a ſon of Albion; the chief of an hundred hills.

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* Homer's deſcription of the ſhield of Achilles is properly introduced at a time when the action relents, and the reader can bear an interruption. But the author in Telemachus deſcribes the ſhield of that young hero of the midſt of battle; a very improper time for an interruption.

hills. His deer drunk of a thousand streams; and a thousand rocks replied to the voice of his dogs. His face was the mildness of youth; but his hand the death of heroes. One was his love, and fair was she! the daughter of mighty Conloch. She appeared like a sunbeam among women, and her hair was like the wing of the raven. Her soul was fixed on Comal, and she was his companion in the chace. Often met their eyes of love, and happy were their words in secret. But Gormal loved the maid, the chief of gloomy Ardven. He watched her lone steps on the heath, the foe of unhappy Comal.

One day tired of the chace, when the mist had concealed their friends, Comal and the daughter of Conloch met in the cave of Ronan. It was the wonted haunt of Comal. Its sides were hung with his arms; a hundred shields of thongs were there, a hundred helms of sounding steel. Rest here, said he, my love Galvina, thou light of the cave of Ronan: a deer appears on Mora's brow; I go, but soon will return. I fear, said she, dark Gormal my foe: I will rest here; but soon return, my love.

He went to the deer of Mora. The daughter of Conloch, to try his love, cloathed her white side with his armour, and strode from the cave of Ronan. Thinking her his foe, his heart beat high, and his colour changed. He drew the bow: the arrow flew! Galvina fell in blood. He ran to the cave with hasty steps, and called the daughter of Conloch. Where art thou, my love? but no answer? —— He marked, at length, her heaving heart beating against the mortal arrow. O Conloch's daughter, is it thou! He sunk upon her breast.

The hunters found the hapless pair Many and silent were his steps round the dark dwelling of his love. The fleet of the ocean came: he fought, and the strangers fell: he searched for death over the field; but who could kill the mighty Comal? Throwing away his shield, an arrow found his manly breast. He sleeps with his Galvina: their green tombs are seen by the mariner, when he bounds on the waves of the north.

Next, upon the peculiarities of a dramatic poem. And the first I shall mention is a double plot; one of which

which muſt be of the nature of an epiſode in an epic poem; for it would diſtract the ſpectator, inſtead of entertaining him, if he were forc'd to attend, at the ſame time, to two capital plots equally intereſting. And even ſuppoſing it an under-plot, of the nature of an epiſode, it ſeldom hath a good effect in tragedy, of which ſimplicity is a chief property; for an intereſting ſubject that engages our affections, occupies our whole attention, and leaves no room for any ſeparate concern *. Variety is more tolerable in comedy, which pretends only to amuſe, without totally occupying the mind.

But

* Racine, in his preface to the tragedy of *Benrice*, is ſenſible, that ſimplicity is a great beauty in tragedy, but miſtakes the cauſe. "Nothing (ſays he) but veri-"ſimilitude pleaſes in tragedy: but where is the veriſi-"militude, that within the compaſs of a day, events "ſhould be crowded which commonly are extended "through months?" This is miſtaking the accuracy of imitation for the probability or improbability of future events. I explain myſelf. The veriſimilitude required in tragedy is, that the actions correſpond to the manners, and the manners to nature. When this reſemblance is preſerved, the imitation is juſt, becauſe it is a true copy of nature. But I deny that the veriſimilitude of future events, meaning the probability of future events, is any rule in tragedy. A number of extraordinary events, are, it is true, ſeldom crowded within the compaſs of a day: but what ſeldom happens may happen; and when ſuch events fall out, they appear not leſs natural than the moſt ordinary accidents. To make veriſimilitude in the ſenſe of probability a governing rule in tragedy, would annihilate that ſort of writing altogether; for it would exclude all extraordinary events, in which the life of tragedy conſiſts. It is very improbable or unlikely, pitching upon any man at random, that he will ſacrifice his life and fortune for his miſtreſs or for his country: yet when that event happens, ſuppoſing it conformable to the character, we recogniſe the veriſimilitude as to nature, whatever want of veriſimilitude or of probability there was *a priori* that ſuch would be the event.

But even there, to make a double plot agreeable, is no slight effort of art: the under plot ought not to vary greatly in its tone from the principal; for discordant passions are unpleasant when jumbled together; which, by the way, is an insuperable objection to tragi comedy. Upon that account, I blame the *Provok'd Husband:* all the scenes that bring the family of the Wrongheads into action, being ludicrous and farcical, are in a very different tone from the principal scenes, displaying severe and bitter expostulations between Lord Townley and his lady. The same objection touches not the double plot of the *Careless Husband*; the different subjects being sweetly connected, and having only so much variety as to resemble shades of colours harmoniously mixed. But this is not all. The under-plot ought to be connected with that which is principal, so much at least as to employ the same persons: the under-plot ought to occupy the intervals or pauses of the principal action; and both ought to be concluded together. This is the case of the *Merry Wives of Windsor.*

Violent action ought never to be represented on the stage. When the dialogue goes on, a thousand particulars concur to delude us into an impression of reality; genuine sentiments, passionate language, and persuasive gesture: the spectator once engaged, is willing to be deceived, loses sight of himself, and without scruple enjoys the spectacle as a reality. From this absent state, he is roused by a violent action: he wakes as from a pleasing dream, and gathering his senses about him, finds all to be a fiction. Horace delivers the same rule; and founds it upon the same reason:

Ne pueros coram populo Medea trucidet;
Aut humana palam coquat exta nefarius Atreus;
Aut in avem Progne vertatur, Cadmus in anguem:
Quodcumque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi.

The French critics join with Horace in excluding blood from the stage; but overlooking the most substantial objection, they urge only that it is barbarous, and shocking to a polite audience. The Greeks had no notion of such delicacy, or rather effeminacy; witness the murder of Clytemnestra by her son Orestes, passing behind

hind the ſcene, as repreſented by Sophocles: her voice is heard calling out for mercy, bitter expoſtulations on his part, loud ſhrieks upon her being ſtabb'd, and then a deep ſilence. I appeal to every perſon of feeling, whether this ſcene be not more horrible, than if the deed had been committed in ſight of the ſpectators upon a ſudden guſt of paſſion. If Corneille, in repreſenting the affair between Horatius and his ſiſter, upon which murder enſues behind the ſcene, had no other view but to remove from the ſpectators a ſhocking action, he certainly was in a capital miſtake: for murder in cold blood, which in ſome meaſure was the caſe as repreſented, is more ſhocking to a polite audience, even where the concluſive ſtab is not ſeen, than the ſame act performed in their preſence, when it is occaſioned by violent and unpremeditated paſſion, as ſuddenly repented of as committed. I heartily agree with Addiſon *, that no part of this incident ought to have been repreſented, but reſerved for a narrative, with every alleviating circumſtance in favour of the hero. This is the only method to avoid the difficulties that unqualify this incident for repreſentation, a deliberate murder on the one hand, and on the other a violent action performed on the ſtage, which muſt rouſe the ſpectator from his dream of reality.

A few words upon the dialogue, which ought to be ſo conducted as to be a true repreſentation of nature. I talk not here of the ſentiments, nor of the language; for theſe come under different heads: I talk of what properly belongs to dialogue-writing; where every ſingle ſpeech, ſhort or long, ought to ariſe from what is ſaid by the former ſpeaker, and furniſh matter for what comes after, till the end of the ſcene. In that view, the whole ſpeeches, from firſt to laſt, repreſent ſo many links, all connected together in one regular chain. No author, antient or modern, poſſeſſes the art of dialogue equal to Shakeſpear. Dryden, in that particular, may juſtly be placed as his oppoſite: he frequently introduces three or four perſons ſpeaking upon the ſame ſubject,

* Spectator, N° 44.

ſubject, each throwing out his own notions ſeparately, without regarding what is ſaid by the reſt; take for an example the firſt ſcene of *Aurenzebe*: ſometimes he makes a number club in relating an event, not to a ſtranger, ſuppoſed ignorant of it, but to one another, for the ſake merely of ſpeaking: of which notable ſort of dialogue, we have a ſpecimen in the firſt ſcene of the firſt part of the *Conqueſt of Granada*. In the ſecond part of the ſame tragedy, ſcene ſecond, the King, Abenamar, and Zulema, make their ſeparate obſervations, like ſo many ſoliloquies, upon the fluctuating temper of the mob: a dialogue ſo uncouth, puts one in mind of two ſhepherds in a paſtoral, excited by a prize to pronounce verſes alternately, each in praiſe of his own miſtreſs

This manner of dialogue-writing, beſide an unnatural air, has another bad effect: it ſtays the courſe of the action, becauſe it is not productive of any conſequence. In Congreve's comedies, the action is often ſuſpended to make way for a play of wit. But of this more particularly in the chapter immediately following.

No fault is more common among writers, than to prolong a ſpeech after the impatience of the perſon to whom it is addreſſed ought to prompt him or her to to break in. Conſider only how the impatient actor is to behave in the mean time. To expreſs his impatience in violent action without interrupting, would be unnatural; and yet to diſſemble his impatience by appearing cool where he ought to be highly inflamed, would be not leſs ſo.

Rhyme being unnatural and diſguſtful in dialogue, is happily baniſhed from our theatre: the only wonder is that it ever found admittance, eſpecially among a people accuſtomed to the more manly freedom of Shakeſpear's dialogue. By baniſhing rhyme, we have gained ſo much as never once to dream that there can be any further improvement And yet, however ſuitable blank verſe may be to elevated characters and warm paſſions, it muſt appear improper and affected in the mouths of the lower ſort Why then ſhould it be a rule, That every ſcene in tragedy muſt be in blank verſe? Shakeſpear,

pear, with great judgment, has followed a different rule; which is, to intermix profe with verfe, and only to employ the latter where it is required by the importance or dignity of the fubject. Familiar thoughts and ordinary facts ought to be expreffed in plain language: to hear for example a footman deliver a fimple meffage in blank verfe, muft appear ridiculous to every one who is not biaffed by cuftom. In fhort, that variety of characters and of fituations, which is the life of a play, requires not only a fuitable variety in the fentiments, but alfo in the diction.

## CHAP. XXIII. THE THREE UNITIES.

THE firft chapter accounts for the pleafure we have in a chain of connected facts. In hiftories of the world, of a country, of a people, this pleafure is but faint; becaufe the connections are flight or obfcure. We find more entertainment in biography, where the incidents are connected by their relation to one perfon, who makes a figure, and commands our attention. But the greateft entertainment of the kind, is in the hiftory of a fingle event, fuppofing it intereffting; and the reafon is, that the facts and circumftances are connected by the ftrongeft of all relations, that of caufe and effect: a number of facts that give birth to each other form a delightful train; and we have great mental enjoyment in our progrefs from the beginning to the end.

But this fubject merits a more particular difcuffion. When we confider the chain of caufes and effects in the material world, independent of purpofe, defign, or thought, we find a number of incidents in fucceffion, without beginning, middle, or end. every thing that happens is, in different refpects, both a caufe and an effect; being the effect of what goes before, and the caufe of what follows: one incident may affect us more, another lefs; but all of them, important and trivial, are fo many links in the univerfal chain: the mind, in viewing thefe incidents, cannot reft or fettle ultimately upon any one; but is carried along in the train without any clofe.

But when the intellectual world is taken under view, in

in conjunction with the material, the scene is varied. Man acts with deliberation, will, and choice: he aims at some end, glory, for example, or riches, or conquest, the procuring happiness to individuals, or to his country in general: he proposes means, and lays plans to attain the end proposed. Here are a number of facts or incidents leading to the end in view, the whole connected into one chain by the relation of causation. In running over a series of such facts or incidents, we cannot rest upon any one; because they are presented to us as means only, leading to some end: but we rest with satisfaction upon the ultimate event; because there the purpose or aim of the chief person or persons, is completed, and brought to a final conclusion. This indicates the beginning, the middle, and the end, of what Aristotle calls *an entire action* *. The story naturally begins with describing those circumstances which move the distinguished person to form a plan, in order to compass some desired event: the prosecution of that plan and the obstructions, carry the reader into the heat of action: the middle is properly where the action is the most involved; and the end is where the event is brought about, and the plan accomplished.

A plan thus happily perfected after many obstructions, affords wonderful delight to the reader; to produce which, a principle mentioned above † mainly contributes, the same that disposes the mind to complete every work commenced and in general to carry every thing to its ultimate conclusion.

I have given the foregoing example of a plan crowned with success, because it affords the clearest conception of a beginning, a middle, and an end, in which consists unity of action; and indeed stricter unity cannot be imagined than in that case. But an action may have unity, or a beginning, middle, and end, without so intimate a relation of parts; as where the catastrophe is different from what is intended or desired; which frequently happens in our best tragedies. In the *Æneid*, the hero, after many obstructions, brings his plan to perfection. The *Iliad* is formed upon a different model: it

* Poet. cap. 6. See also cap. 7. † Chap. 8.

it begins with the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon; goes on to deſcribe the ſeveral effects produced by that cauſe; and ends in a reconciliation. Here is unity of action, no doubt, a beginning, a middle, and an end; but inferior to that of the *Æneid:* which will thus appear. The mind hath a propenſity to go forward in the chain of hiſtory: it keeps always in view the expected event; and when the incidents or underparts are connected together by their relation to the event, the mind runs ſweetly and eaſily along them. This pleaſure we have in the *Æneid.* It is not altogether ſo pleaſant, as in the *Iliad*, to connect effects by their common cauſe; for ſuch connection forces the mind to a continual retroſpect: looking backward is like walking backward.

Homer's plan is ſtill more defective, for another reaſon, That the events deſcribed are but imperfectly connected with the wrath of Achilles, their cauſe: his wrath did not exert itſelf in action; and the misfortunes of his countrymen were but negatively the effects of his wrath, by depriving them of his aſſiſtance.

If unity of action be a capital beauty in a fable imitative of human affairs, a plurality of unconnected fables muſt be a capital defect. For the ſake of variety, we indulge an under-plot that is connected with the principal defect: but two unconnected events are a great deformity; and it leſſens the deformity but a very little, to engage the ſame actors in both. Arioſto is quite licentious in that particular: he carries on at the ſame time a plurality of unconnected ſtories. His only excuſe is, that his plan is perfectly well adjuſted to his ſubject; for every thing in the *Orlando Furioſo* is wild and extravagant.

Though to relate facts according to the order of time is natural, yet that order may be varied for the ſake of conſpicuous beauties *. If, for example, a noted ſtory, cold and ſimple in its firſt movements, be made the ſubject of an epic poem, the reader may be hurried into the heat of action; reſerving the preliminaries for a converſation-piece, if it ſhall be thought neceſſary; and that

* See chap. 1.

that method, at the ſame time, being dramatic, hath a peculiar beauty, which narration cannot reach *. But a privilege that deviates from nature ought to be ſparingly indulged; and yet with reſpect to that privilege, romance-writers have no moderation: they make no difficulty of preſenting to the reader, without the leaſt preparation, unknown perſons engaged in ſome arduous adventure equally unknown In *Caſſandra*, two perſonages, who afterward are diſcovered to be the heroes of the ſtory, ſtart up completely armed upon the banks of the Euphrates, and engage in a ſingle combat †.

A play analyſed, is a chain of connected facts, of which each ſcene makes a link. Each ſcene, accordingly, ought to produce ſome incident relative to the cataſtrophe or ultimate event, by advancing or retarding it. A ſcene that produceth no incident, and for that reaſon may be termed *barren*, ought not to be indulged, becauſe it breaks the unity of action: a barren ſcene can never be intitled to a place, becauſe the chain is complete without it. In the *Old Batchelor*, the 3d ſcene of act 2. and all that follow to the end of that act, are mere converſation-pieces, without any conſequence. The 10th and 11th ſcenes, act 3. *Double Dealer*, the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th ſcenes, act 1. *Love for Love*, are of the ſame kind. Neither is *The way of the World* entirely guiltleſs of ſuch ſcenes. It will be no juſtification, that they help to diſplay characters: it were better, like Dryden in his *dramatis perſonæ*, to deſcribe characters beforehand, which would not break the chain of action. But a writer of genius has no occaſion for ſuch artifice: he can diſplay the characters of his perſonages much more to the life in ſentiments

* See chap. 21.

† I am ſenſible that a commencement of this ſort is much reliſhed by certain readers diſpoſed to wonder. Their curioſity is raiſed, and they are much tickled in its gratification But curioſity is at an end with the firſt reading, becauſe the perſonages are no longer unknown; and therefore at the ſecond reading a commencement ſo artificial, loſes all its power even over the vulgar. A writer of genius loves to deal in laſting beauties.

ſentiment and action. How ſucceſsfully is this done by Shakeſpear! in whoſe works there is not to be found a ſingle barren ſcene.

Upon the whole, it appears, that all the facts in an hiſtorical fable, ought to have a mutual connection, by their common relation to the grand event or cataſtrophe. And this relation, in which the *unity* of action conſiſts, is equally eſſential to epic and dramatic compoſitions.

In handling unity of action, it ought not to eſcape obſervation, that the mind is ſatisfied with ſlighter unity in a picture than in a poem; becauſe of the perceptions of the former are more lively than the ideas of the latter. In *Hogarth's Enraged Muſician*, we have a collection of every grating ſound in nature, without any mutual connection except that of place. But the horror they give to the delicate ear of an Italian fidler, who is repreſented almoſt in convulſions, beſtows unity upon the piece, with which the mind is ſatisfied.

How far the unities of time and of place are eſſential, is a queſtion of greater intricacy. Theſe unities were ſtrictly obſerved in the Grecian and Roman theatres; and they are inculcated by the French and Engliſh critics, as eſſential to every dramatic compoſition. In theory, theſe unities are alſo acknowledged by our beſt poets, though their practice ſeldom correſponds: they are often forc'd to take liberties, which they pretend not to juſtify, againſt the practice of the Greeks and Romans, and againſt the ſolemn deciſion of their own countrymen. But in the courſe of this inquiry it will be made evident, that in this article we are under no neceſſity to copy the antients, and that our critics are guilty of a miſtake, in admitting no greater latitude of place and time than was admitted in Greece and Rome.

Suffer me only to premiſe, that the unities of place and time, are not, by the moſt rigid critics, required in a narrative poem. In ſuch compoſition, if it pretend to copy nature, theſe unities would be abſurd; becauſe real events are ſeldom confined within narrow limits either of place or of time: and yet we can follow hiſtory, or an hiſtorical fable, through all its changes, with the greateſt facility: we never once think of meaſuring the real time by what is taken in reading; nor of forming

ing any connection between the place of action and that which we occupy.

I am ſenſible, that the drama differs ſo far from the epic, as to admit different rules. It will be obſerved, "That an hiſtorical fable, which affords entertainment "by reading ſolely, is under no limitation of time nor "of place, more than a genuine hiſtory; but that a "dramatic compoſition cannot be accurately repreſent-"ed, unleſs it be limited, as its repreſentation is, to "one place and to a few hours; and therefore that no "fable can be admitted but what has theſe properties, "becauſe it would be abſurd to compoſe a piece for "repreſentation that cannot be juſtly repreſented." This argument, I acknowledge, has at leaſt a plauſible appearance; and yet one is apt to ſuſpect ſome fallacy, conſidering that no critic, however ſtrict, has ventured to confine the unities of place and of time within ſo narrow bounds*.

A view of the Grecian drama, compared with our own, may perhaps relieve us from this dilemma: if they be differently conſtructed, as ſhall be made evident, it is poſſible that the foregoing reaſoning may not be applicable with equal force to both. This is an article, that, with relation to the preſent ſubject, has not been examined by any writer.

All authors agree, that tragedy in Greece was derived from the hymns in praiſe of Bacchus, which were ſung in parts by a chorus. Theſpis, to relieve the ſingers and for the ſake of variety, introduced one actor; whoſe province it was to explain hiſtorically the ſubject of the ſong, and who occaſionally repreſented one or other

* Boſſu, after obſerving, with wonderful critical ſagacity, that winter is an improper ſeaſon for an epic poem, and night not leſs improper for tragedy; admits however, that an epic poem may be ſpread through the whole ſummer months, and a tragedy through the whole ſun-ſhine hours of the longeſt ſummer-day. *Du poeme epique, l. 3. chap. 12.* At that rate an Engliſh tragedy may be longer than a French tragedy; and in Nova Zembla the time of a tragedy and of an epic poem may be the ſame.

other perſonage. Eſchylus, introducing a ſecond actor, formed the dialogue; by which the performance became dramatic; and the actors were multiplied when the ſubject repreſented made it neceſſary. But ſtill, the chorus, which gave a beginning to tragedy, was conſidered as an eſſential part of its conſtitution. The firſt ſcene, generally, unfolds the preliminary circumſtances that lead to the grand event; and this ſcene is by Ariſtotle termed the *prologue*. In the ſecond ſcene, where the action properly begins, the chorus is introduced, which, as originally, continues upon the ſtage during the whole performance: the chorus frequently mix in the dialogue; and when the dialogue happens to be ſuſpended, the chorus, during the interval, are employ'd in ſinging. Sophocles adheres to that plan religiouſly. Euripides is not altogether ſo correct. In ſome of his pieces it becomes neceſſary to remove the chorus: but when that unuſual ſtep is riſked, matters are ſo ordered as to make their abſence but momentary. Nor does the removal of the chorus interrupt the repreſentation: they never leave the ſtage of their own accord, but at the command of ſome principal perſonage, who conſtantly wait their return.

Thus the Grecian drama is a continued repreſentation without any interruption; a circumſtance that merits attention. A continued repreſentation without a pauſe, affords not opportunity to vary the place of action, nor to prolong the time of the action beyond that of the repreſentation. To a repreſentation ſo confined in place and time, the foregoing reaſoning is ſtrictly applicable: a real or feigned action that is brought to a concluſion after conſiderable intervals of time and frequent changes of place, cannot accurately be copied in a repreſentation that admits no latitude in either. Hence it is, that the unities of place and of time, were, or ought to have been, ſtrictly obſerved in the Grecian tragedies; which is made neceſſary by the very conſtitution of their drama, for it is abſurd to compoſe a tragedy that cannot be juſtly repreſented.

Modern critics, who for our drama pretend to eſtabliſh rules founded on the practice of the Greeks, are guilty of an egregious blunder. The unities of place and

and of time, ſo much vaunted, were in Greece, as we ſee, a matter of neceſſity, not of choice; and I am now ready to ſhew, that if we ſubmit to ſuch fetters, it muſt be from choice, not neceſſity. This will be evident upon taking a view of the conſtitution of our drama, which differs widely from that of Greece; whether more or leſs perfect, is a different point, which ſhall be handled afterward. By dropping the chorus, opportunity is afforded to divide the repreſentation by intervals of time, during which the ſtage is totally evacuated and the ſpectacle ſuſpended. This conſtitution qualifies our drama for ſubjects ſpread through a wide ſpace both of time and of place: the time ſuppoſed to paſs during the ſuſpenſion of the repreſentation, is not meaſured by the time of the ſuſpenſion: nor is any connection formed, between the box we ſit in, and the place where things are ſuppoſed to be tranſacted in our abſence: by which means, many ſubjects can be juſtly repreſented in our theatres, that were excluded from thoſe of antient Greece. This doctrine may be illuſtrated, by comparing a modern play to a ſet of hiſtorical pictures; let us ſuppoſe them five in number, and the reſemblance will be complete: each of the pictures reſembles an act in one of our plays: there muſt neceſſarily be the ſtrictest unity of place and of time in each picture; and the ſame neceſſity requires theſe two unities during each act of a play, becauſe during an act there is no interruption in the ſpectacle. Now, when we view in ſucceſſion a number of ſuch hiſtorical pictures, let it be, for example, the hiſtory of Alexander by Le Brun, we have no difficulty to conceive, that months or years have paſſed between the events exhibited in two different pictures, though the interruption is imperceptible in paſſing our eye from the one to the other; and we have as little difficulty to conceive a change of place, however great: in which view, there is truly no difference between five acts of a modern play, and five ſuch pictures. Where the repreſentation is ſuſpended, we can with the greateſt facility ſuppoſe any length of time or any change of place: the ſpectator, it is true, may be conſcious, that the real time and place are not the ſame with what are employ'd in the repreſentation; but this is a work

of

of reflection; and by the ſame reflection he may alſo be conſcious, that Garrick is not King Lear, that the playhouſe is not Dover cliffs, nor the noiſe he hears thunder and lightning. In a word, after an interruption of the repreſentation, it is not more difficult for a ſpectator to imagine a new place, or a different time, than at the commencement of the play, to imagine himſelf at Rome, or in a period of time two thouſand years back. And indeed, it muſt appear ridiculous, that a critic, who is willing to hold candle-light for ſun-ſhine, and ſome painted canvaſſes for a palace or a priſon, ſhould affect ſo much difficulty in imagining a latitude of place or of time in the ſtory, beyond what is neceſſary in the repreſentation.

There are, I acknowledge, ſome effects of great latitude in time that ought never to be indulged in a compoſition for the theatre: nothing can be more abſurd, than at the cloſe to exhibit a full-grown perſon who appears a child at the beginning: the mind rejects, as contrary to all probability, ſuch latitude of time as is requiſite for a change ſo remarkable. The greateſt change from place to place hath not altogether the ſame bad effect: in the bulk of human affairs place is not material; and the mind, when occupied with an intereſting event, is little regardful of minute circumſtances: theſe may be varied at will, becauſe they ſcarce make any impreſſion.

But though I have thus taken arms to reſcue modern poets from the deſpotiſm of modern critics, I would not be underſtood to juſtify liberty without any reſerve. An unbounded licence with relation to place and time, is faulty for a reaſon that ſeems to have been overlooked, that it ſeldom fails to break in upon the unity of action: in the ordinary courſe of human affairs, ſingle events, ſuch as are fit to be repreſented on the ſtage, are confined to a narrow ſpot, and generally employ no great extent of time: we accordingly ſeldom find ſtrict unity of action in a dramatic compoſition, where any remarkable latitude is indulged in theſe particulars. I muſt ſay further, that a compoſition which employs but one place, and requires not a greater length of time than is neceſſary for the repreſentation, is ſo much the more perfect:

perfect: because the confining an event within so narrow bounds, contributes to the unity of action; and also prevents that labour, however slight, which the mind must undergo in imagining frequent changes of place and many intervals of time But still I must insist, that such limitation of place and time as was necessary in the Grecian drama, is no rule to us; and therefore, that though such limitation adds one beauty more to the composition, it is at best but a refinement, which may justly give place to a thousand beauties more substantial. And I may add, that it is extremely difficult, I was about to say impracticable, to contract within the Grecian limits, any fable so fruitful of incidents in number and variety, as to give full scope to the fluctuation of passion.

It may now appear, that critics who put the unities of place and of time upon the same footing with the unity of action, making them all equally essential, have not attended to the nature and constitution of the modern drama. If they admit an interrupted representation, with which no writer finds fault, it is plainly absurd to condemn its greatest advantage, that of representing many interesting subjects excluded from the Grecian stage. If there needs must be a reformation, why not restore the antient chorus and the antient continuity of action? There is certainly no medium: for to admit an interruption without relaxing from the strict unities of place and of time, is in effect to load us with all the inconveniencies of the antient drama, and at the same time to with-hold from us its advantages.

And therefore the only proper question is, Whether our model be or be not a real improvement? This indeed may fairly be called in question; and in order to a comparative trial, some particulars must be premised. When a play begins, we have no difficulty to adjust our imagination to the scene of action, however distant it be in time or in place; because we know that the play is a representation only. Our situation is very different after we are engaged: it is the perfection of representation to hide itself, to impose upon the spectator, and to produce in him an impression of reality, as if he were

ſpectator of a real event*; but any interruption annihilates that impreſſion, by rouſing him out of his waking dream, and unhappily reſtoring him to his ſenſes. So difficult it is to ſupport the impreſſion of reality, that much ſlighter interruptions than the interval between two acts are ſufficient to diſſolve the charm: in the 5th act of the *Mourning Bride*, the three firſt ſcenes are in a room of ſtate, the fourth in a priſon; and the change is operated by ſhifting the ſcene, which is done in a trice: but however quick the tranſition may be, it is impracticable to impoſe upon the ſpectators ſo as to make them conceive that they are actually carried from the palace to the priſon: they immediately reflect, that the palace and priſon are imaginary, and that the whole is a fiction.

From theſe premiſſes one will naturally be led, at firſt view, to pronounce the frequent interruptions in the modern drama to be an imperfection. It will occur, "That every interruption muſt have the effect to baniſh "the dream of reality, and with it to baniſh our con- "cern, which cannot ſubſiſt while we are conſcious "that all is a fiction; and therefore, that in the modern "drama ſufficient time is not afforded for fluctuation "and ſwelling of paſſion, like what is afforded in that "of Greece, where there is no interruption." This reaſoning, it muſt be owned, has a ſpecious appearance: but we muſt not become faint-hearted upon the firſt repulſe; let us rally our troops for a ſecond engagement

Conſidering attentively the antient drama, we find, that though the repreſentation is never interrupted, the principal action is ſuſpended not leſs frequently than in the modern drama: there are five acts in each; and the only difference is, that in the former, when the action is ſuſpended as it is at the end of every act, opportunity is taken of the interval to employ the chorus in ſinging. Hence it appears, that the Grecian continuity of repreſentation cannot have the effect to prolong the impreſſion of reality: to baniſh that impreſſion, a ſuſpenſion of the action while the chorus is employ'd in ſinging,

* Chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 7.

ſinging, is not leſs operative than a total ſuſpenſion of the repreſentation.

But to open a larger view, I am ready to ſhow, that a continued repreſentation, without a ſingle pauſe even in the principal action, ſo far from an advantage, would be an imperfection; and that a repreſentation with proper pauſes, is better qualified for moving the audience, and for making deep impreſſions. This will be evident from the following conſiderations. Repreſentations cannot very long ſupport an impreſſion of reality; for when the ſpirits are exhauſted by cloſe attention and by the agitation of paſſion, an uneaſineſs enſues, which never fails to baniſh the waking dream. Now ſuppoſing that an act requires as much time as can be employ'd with ſtrict attention upon any incident, a ſuppoſition that cannot be far from truth; it follows, that the impreſſion of reality would not be prolonged beyond the time of an act, even ſuppoſing a continued repreſentation. If ſo, a continued repreſentation of longer endurance than an act, inſtead of giving ſcope to fluctuation and ſwelling of paſſion, would overſtrain the attention, and produce a total abſence of mind. In this reſpect, the four pauſes have a fine effect: for by affording to the audience a ſeaſonable reſpite when the impreſſion of reality is gone, and while nothing material is in agitation, they relieve the mind from its fatigue; and conſequently prevent a wandering of thought at the very time poſſibly of the moſt intereſting ſcenes

In one article, indeed, the Grecian model has greatly the advantage: its chorus, during an interval, not only preſerves alive the impreſſions made upon the audience, but alſo prepares their hearts finely for new impreſſions. In our theatres, on the contrary, the audience, at the end of every act, being left to trifle time away, loſe every warm impreſſion; and they begin the next act cool and unconcerned, as at the commencement of the repreſentation. This is a groſs malady in our theatrical repreſentations; but a malady that luckily is not incurable: to revive the Grecian chorus, would be to revive the Grecian ſlavery of place and time; but I can figure a detached chorus coinciding with a pauſe in the repreſentation, as the antient chorus did with a

pauſe in the principal action. What objection, for example, can there lie againſt muſic between the acts, vocal and inſtrumental, adapted to the ſubject? Such detached chorus, without putting us under any limitation of time or place, would recruit the ſpirits, and would preſerve entire, the tone, if not the tide, of paſſion: the muſic, after an act, ſhould commence, in the tone of the preceding paſſion, and be gradually varied till it accord with the tone of the paſſion that is to ſucceed in the next act. The muſic and the repreſentation would both of them be gainers by their conjunction; which will thus appear. Muſic that accords with the preſent tone of mind, is, upon that account, doubly agreeable; and accordingly, though muſic ſingly hath not power to raiſe a paſſion, it tends greatly to ſupport a paſſion already raiſed. Further, muſic prepares us for the paſſion that follows, by making chearful, tender, melancholy, or animated impreſſions, as the ſubject requires Take for an example the firſt ſcene of the *Mourning Bride*, where ſoft muſic in a melancholy ſtrain, prepares us finely for Almeria's deep diſtreſs. In this manner, muſic and repreſentation ſupport each other delightfully: the impreſſion made upon the audience by repreſentation, is a fine preparation for the muſic that ſucceeds; and the impreſſion made by the muſic, is a fine preparation for the repreſentation that ſucceeds. It appears to me evident, that, by ſome ſuch contrivance, the modern drama may be improved, ſo as to enjoy the advantage of the antient chorus without its ſlaviſh limitation of place and time. And as to muſic in particular, I cannot figure any thing that would tend more to its improvement: compoſers, thoſe for the ſtage at leaſt, would be reduced to the happy neceſſity of ſtudying and imitating nature; inſtead of deviating, according to the preſent mode, into wild, fantaſtic, and unnatural conceits. But we muſt return to our ſubject, and finiſh the compariſon between the antient and the modern drama.

The numberleſs impropprieties forc'd upon the Grecian dramatic poets by the conſtitution of their drama, are of themſelves, one ſhould think, a ſufficient reaſon for preferring that of the moderns, even abſtracting from the improvement propoſed. To prepare the reader for this article,

article, it must be premised, that as in the antient drama the place of action never varies, a place necessarily must be chosen, to which every person may have access without any improbability. This confines the scene to some open place, generally the court or area before a palace; which excludes from the Grecian theatre transactions within doors, though these commonly are the most important. Such cruel restraint is of itself sufficient to cramp the most pregnant invention; and accordingly the Grecian writers, in order to preserve unity of place, are reduced to woful improprieties. In the *Hippolytus* of Euripides *, Phedra, distressed in mind and body, is carried without any pretext from her palace to the place of action; is there laid upon a couch, unable to support herself upon her limbs, and made to utter many things improper to be heard by a number of women who form the chorus: and what is still worse, her female attendant uses the strongest intreaties to make her reveal the secret cause of her anguish; which at last Phedra, contrary to decency and probability, is prevailed upon to do in presence of that very chorus †. *Alcestes*, in Euripides, at the point of death, is brought from the palace to the place of action, groaning, and lamenting her untimely fate ‡. In the *Trachiniens* of Sophocles ‖, a secret is imparted to Dejanira, the wife of Hercules, in presence of the chorus. In the tragedy of *Iphigenia*, the messenger employ'd to inform Clitemnestra that Iphigenia was sacrificed, stops short at the place of action, and with a loud voice calls the Queen from her palace to hear the news. Again, in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the necessary presence of the chorus forces Euripides in o a gross absurdity, which is to form a secret in their hearing §; and to disguise the absurdity, much courtship is bestow'd on the chorus, not one woman but a number, to engage them to secrecy. In the *Medea* of Euripides, that princess makes no difficulty, in presence of the chorus, to plot the death of her husband, of his mistress, and of her father the King of Corinth, all by poison: it was necessary to bring Medea upon the stage,



* Act 1. sc. 6. † Act 2. sc. 2.
‡ Act 2. sc. 1. ‖ Act 2. § Act 4. at the close.

and there is but one place of action, which is always occupied by the chorus. This scene closes the second act; and in the end of the third, she frankly makes the chorus her confidents in plotting the murder of her own children. Terence, by identity of place, is often forc'd to make a conversation within doors be heard on the open street: the cries of a woman in labour are there heard distinctly.

The Grecian poets are not more happy with respect to time than with respect to place. In the *Hippolytus* of Euripides, that prince is banished at the end of the fourth act; and in the first scene of the following act, a messenger relates to Theseus the whole particulars of the death of Hippolytus by the sea monster: that remarkable event must have employ'd many hours; and yet in the representation it is confined to the time employ'd by the chorus upon the song at the end of the 4th act. The inconsistency is still greater in the *Iphigenia in Tauris* *: the song could not exhaust half an hour; and yet the incidents supposed to have happened during that time, could not naturally be transacted in less than half a day.

The Grecian artists are forc'd, not less frequently, to transgress another rule, derived also from a continued representation: the rule is, that as a vacuity, however momentary, interrupts the representation, it is necessary that the place of action be constantly occupied. Sophocles, with regard to that rule as well as to others, is generally correct But Euripides cannot bear such restraint: he often evacuates the stage, and leaves it empty for others in succession. *Iphigenia in Tauris*, after pronouncing a soliloquy in the first scene, leaves the place of action, and is succeeded by Orestes and Pylades: they, after some conversation, walk off; and Iphigenia re-enters, accompanied with the chorus. In the *Alceste*, which is of the same author, the place of action is void at the end of the third act. It is true, that to cover the irregularity and to preserve the representation in motion, Euripides is extremely careful to fill the stage without loss of time: but this is still an interruption,

* Act 5. sc. 4.

interruption, and a link of the chain broken; for during the change of the actors, there must be a space of time, during which the stage is occupied by neither set. It makes indeed a more remarkable interruption, to change the place of action as well as the actors; but that was not practicable upon the Grecian stage.

It is hard to say upon what model Terence has formed his plays. Having no chorus, there is a cessation of the representation at the end of every act: but advantage is not taken of the cessation, even to vary the place of action; for the street is always chosen, where every thing passing may be seen by every person; and by that choice, the most sprightly and interesting parts of the action, which commonly pass within doors, are excluded; witness the last act of the *Eunuch*. He hath submitted to the like slavery with respect to time. In a word, a play with a regular chorus, is not more confined in place and time than his plays are. Thus a zealous sectary follows implicitly antient forms and ceremonies, without once considering whether their introductive cause be still subsisting. Plautus, of a bolder genius than Terence, makes good use of the liberty afforded by an interrupted representation: he varies the place of action upon all occasions, when the variation suits his purpose.

The intelligent reader will by this time understand, that I plead for no change of place in our plays but after an interval, nor for any latitude in point of time but what falls in with an interval. The unities of place and time ought to be strictly observed during each act; for during the representation, there is no opportunity for the smallest deviation from either. Hence it is an essential requisite, that during an act the stage be always occupied; for even a momentary vacuity makes an interval or interruption. Another rule is not less essential: it would be a gross breach of the unity of action, to exhibit upon the stage two separate actions at the same time; and therefore, to preserve that unity, it is necessary that each personage introduced during an act, be linked to those in possession of the stage, so as to join all in one action. These things follow from the very conception of an act, which admits not the slightest

interruption: the moment the repreſentation is intermitted, there is an end of that act; and we have no other notion of a new act, but where, after a pauſe or interval, the repreſentation is again put in motion. French writers, generally ſpeaking, are extremely correct in this particular: the Engliſh, on the contrary, are ſo irregular as ſcarce to deſerve a criticiſm; actors not only ſucceed each other in the ſame place without connection, but what is ſtill worſe, they frequently ſucceed each other in different places. This change of place in the ſame act, ought never to be indulged; for, beſide breaking the unity of the act, it has a diſagreeable effect: after an interval, the imagination readily adapts itſelf to any place that is neceſſary, juſt as readily as at the commencement of the play; but during the repreſentation, we reject change of place From the foregoing cenſure muſt be excepted the *Mourning Bride* of Congreve, where regularity concurs with the beauty of ſentiment and of language, to make it one of the moſt complete pieces England has to boaſt of. I muſt acknowledge, however, that in point of regularity, this elegant performance is not altogether unexceptionable. In the four firſt acts, the unities of place and time are ſtrictly obſerved: but in the laſt act, there is a capital error with reſpect to unity of place; for in the three firſt ſcenes of that act, the place of action is a room of ſtate, which is changed to a priſon in the fourth ſcene: the chain alſo of the actors is broken; as the perſons introduced in the priſon, are different from thoſe who made their appearance in the room of ſtate. This remarkable interruption of the repreſentation, makes in effect two acts inſtead of one: and therefore, if it be a rule that a play ought not to conſiſt of more acts than five, this performance is ſo far defective in point of regularity. I may add, that even admitting ſix acts, the irregularity would not be altogether removed, without a longer pauſe in the repreſentation than is allowed in the acting; for more than a momentary interruption is requiſite for enabling the imagination readily to fall in with a new place, or with a wide ſpace of time In *The Way of the World*, of the ſame author, unity of place is preſerved during every act, and a ſtricter unity of time during the whole play than is neceſſary.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXIV.

### GARDENING AND ARCHITECTURE.

THE books we have upon architecture and upon embelliſhing ground, abound in practical inſtruction, neceſſary for a mechanic: but in vain would we rummage them for rational principles to improve our taſte. In a general ſyſtem, it might be thought ſufficient to have unfolded the principles that govern theſe and other fine arts, leaving the application to the reader: but as I would neglect no opportunity of ſhowing the extenſive influence of theſe principles, the purpoſe of the preſent chapter is to apply them to gardening and architecture; but without intending any regular plan of theſe favourite arts, which would be unſuitable to the nature of this work, and not leſs ſo to the inexperience of its author.

Gardening was at firſt an uſeful art: in the garden of Alcinoous, deſcribed by Homer, we find nothing done for pleaſure merely. But gardening is now improved into a fine art; and when we talk of a garden without any epithet, a pleaſure-garden, by way of eminence, is underſtood: the garden of Alcinoous, in modern language, was but a kitchen-garden. Architecture has run the ſame courſe: it continued many ages an uſeful art merely, before it aſpired to be claſſed with the fine arts. Architecture therefore and gardening muſt be handled in a twofold view, being uſeful arts as well as fine arts. The reader however will not here expect rules for improving any work of art in point of utility; it being no part of my plan to treat of any uſeful art as ſuch: but there is a beauty in utility; and in diſcourſing of beauty, that of utility muſt not be neglected. This leads us to conſider gardens and buildings in different views: they may be deſtined for uſe ſolely, for beauty ſolely, or for both. Such variety of deſtination, beſtows upon theſe arts a great command of beauties, complex not leſs than various. Hence the difficulty of forming an accurate taſte in gardening and architecture; and hence that difference and wavering

of taſte in theſe arts, greater than in any art that has but a ſingle deſtination.

Architecture and gardening cannot otherwiſe entertain the mind, but by raiſing certain agreeable emotions or feelings; and with theſe we muſt begin, as the true foundation of all the rules of criticiſm that govern thoſe arts. Poetry, as to its power of raiſing emotions, poſſeſſes juſtly the firſt place among the fine arts; for ſcarce any one emotion of human nature is beyond its reach. Painting and ſculpture are more circumſcribed, having the command of no emotions but of what are produced by ſight: they are peculiarly ſucceſsful in expreſſing painful paſſions, which are diſplay'd by external ſigns extremely legible *. Gardening, beſide the emotions of beauty by means of regularity, order, proportion, colour, and utility, can raiſe emotions of grandeur, of ſweetneſs, of gaiety, melancholy, wildneſs, and even of ſurpriſe or wonder. In architecture, regularity, order, and proportion, and the beauties that reſult from them, are ſtill more conſpicuous than in gardening: but as to the beauty of colour, architecture is far inferior. Grandeur can be expreſſed in a building, perhaps more ſucceſsfully than in a garden; but as to the other emotions above mentioned, architecture hitherto has not been brought to the perfection of expreſſing them diſtinctly. To balance that defect, architecture can diſplay the beauty of utility in the higheſt perfection.

Gardening indeed poſſeſſes one advantage, never to be equalled in the other art; which is, that it is capable, in various ſcenes, to raiſe ſucceſſively all the different emotions above mentioned. But to operate that delicious effect, the garden muſt be extenſive, ſo as to admit a ſlow ſucceſſion: for a ſmall garden, comprehended at one view, ought to be confined to one expreſſion †; it may be gay, it may be ſweet, it may be gloomy; but an attempt to mix theſe, would create a jumble of emotions not a little unpleaſant. For the ſame reaſon, a building, even the moſt magnificent, is neceſſarily confined to one expreſſion.

Architecture, conſidered as a fine art, inſtead of rivaling

* See chap. 15. † See chap. 8.

valing gardening in its progreſs toward perfection, ſeems not far advanced beyond its infant ſtate. To bring it to maturity, two things mainly are wanted. Firſt, a greater variety of parts and ornaments than at preſent it ſeems provided with. Gardening here has greatly the advantage: it is provided with ſuch plenty of materials, as to raiſe ſcenes without end, affecting the ſpectator with variety of emotions. In architecture, on the contrary, materials are ſo ſcanty, that artiſts hitherto have not been ſucceſsful in raiſing any emotions but of beauty and grandeur: with reſpect to the former, there are indeed plenty of means, regularity, order, ſymmetry, ſimplicity, utility; and with reſpect to the latter, the addition of ſize is ſufficient. But though it be evident, that every building ought to have a certain character or expreſſion ſuitable to its deſtination; yet this refinement has ſcarce been attempted by any artiſt. A death's head and bones employ'd in monumental buildings, will indeed produce an emotion of gloom and melancholy; but every ornament of that kind, if theſe can be termed ſo, ought to be rejected, becauſe they are in themſelves diſagreeable. The other thing wanted to bring the art to perfection, is, to aſcertain the preciſe impreſſion made by every ſingle part and ornament, cupolas, ſpires, columns, carvings, ſtatues, vaſes, &c.: for in vain will an artiſt attempt rules for employing theſe, either ſingly or in combination, until the different emotions they produce be diſtinctly explained. Gardening in that particular alſo, hath the advantage: the ſeveral emotions raiſed by trees, rivers, caſcades, plains, eminencies, and other materials it employs, are underſtood; and each emotion can be deſcribed with ſome degree of preciſion, which is done occaſionally in the foregoing parts of this work.

In gardening as well as in architecture, ſimplicity ought to be the ruling principle. Profuſe ornament hath no better effect than to confound the eye, and to prevent the object from making an impreſſion as one entire whole. An artiſt deſtitute of genius for capital beauties, is naturally prompted to ſupply the defect by crowding his plan with ſlight embelliſhments: hence in a garden, triumphal arches, Chineſe houſes, temples, obeliſks,

obelisks, cascades, fountains without end; and in a building, pillars, vases, statues, and a profusion of carved wood. Thus some women devoid of taste, are apt to overcharge every part of their dress with ornament. Superfluity of decoration hath another bad effect, by giving the object a diminutive look: an island in a wide extended lake makes it appear larger; but an artificial lake, which is always little, appears still less by making an island in it *.

In forming plans for embellishing a field, an artist without taste deals in straight lines, circles, squares; because these show best upon paper. He perceives not, that to humour and adorn nature is the perfection of his art; and that nature, neglecting regularity, reacheth superior beauties by distributing her objects in great variety with a bold hand. A large field laid out with strict regularity, is stiff and artificial. Nature indeed, in organized bodies comprehended under one view, studies regularity; which, for the same reason, ought to be studied in architecture: but in large objects, which cannot otherwise be surveyed but in parts and by succession, regularity and uniformity would be useless properties, because they cannot be discovered by the eye †. Nature therefore, in her large works, neglects these properties; and in copying nature, the artist ought to neglect them.

Having thus far carried on a comparison between gardening and architecture; rules peculiar to each come next in order, beginning with gardening. The simplest idea of a garden, is that of a spot embellished with a number of natural objects, trees, walks, polish'd parterres, flowers, streams, &c. One more complex comprehends statues and buildings, that nature and art may be mutually ornamental. A third, approaching nearer perfection, is of objects assembled together in order to produce, not only an emotion of beauty, essential to every

* See appendix to part 5. chap. 2.

† A square field appears not such to the eye when viewed from any part of it; and the centre is the only place where a circular field preserves in appearance its regular figure.

every garden, but alſo ſome other particular emotion, grandeur, for example, gaiety, or any other of thoſe above mentioned. The moſt perfect idea of a garden is an improvement upon the third, requiring the ſeveral parts to be ſo arranged, as to inſpire all the different emotions that can be raiſed by gardening. In this idea of a garden, the arrangement is an important circumſtance; for it has been ſhown, that ſome emotions figure beſt in conjunction, and that others ought always to appear in ſucceſſion, and never in conjunction. It is mentioned above*, that when the moſt oppoſite emotions, ſuch as gloomineſs and gaiety, ſtillneſs and activity, follow each other in ſucceſſion, the pleaſure on the whole will be the greateſt; but that ſuch emotions ought not to be united, becauſe they produce an unpleaſant mixture†. For that reaſon, a ruin, affording a ſort of melancholy pleaſure, ought not to be ſeen from a flower parterre, which is gay and chearful. But to paſs from an exhilarating object to a ruin, has a fine effect; for each of the emotions is the more ſenſibly felt by being contraſted with the other. Similar emotions, on the other hand, ſuch as gaiety and ſweetneſs, ſtillneſs and gloomineſs, motion and grandeur, ought to be raiſed together; for their effects upon the mind are greatly heightened by their conjunction‡.

Kent's method of embelliſhing a field, is admirable; which is, to repleniſh it with beautiful objects, natural and artificial, diſpoſed as upon a canvas by help of colours. It requires indeed more genius to paint in the gardening way: in forming a landſcape upon a canvas, no more is required but to adjuſt the figures to each other: an artiſt who would form a garden in Kent's manner, has an additional taſk; which is, to adjuſt his figures to the ſeveral varieties of the field.

A ſingle garden muſt be diſtinguiſhed from a plurality; and yet it is not obvious wherein the unity of a garden conſiſts. We have indeed ſome notion of unity in a garden ſurrounding a palace, with views from each window, and walks leading to every corner: but there may

* Chap. 8. † Chap. 2. part 4.
‡ See the place immediately above cited.

may be a garden without a houſe; in which caſe, it is the unity of deſign that makes it one garden; as where a ſpot of ground is ſo artfully dreſſed as to make the ſeveral portions appear to be parts of one whole. The gardens of Verſailles, properly expreſſed in the plural number, being no fewer than ſixteen, are indeed all of them connected with the palace, but have ſcarce any mutual connection: they appear not like parts of one whole, but rather like ſmall gardens in contiguity. A greater diſtance between theſe gardens would produce a better effect: their junction breeds confuſion of ideas, and upon the whole gives leſs pleaſure than would be felt in a flower ſucceſſion.

Regularity is required in that part of a garden which joins the dwelling-houſe; for being conſidered as a more immediate acceſſory, it ought to partake the regularity of the principal object *: but in proportion to the diſtance from the houſe conſidered as the centre, regularity ought leſs and leſs to be ſtudied; for in an extenſive plan, it hath a fine effect to lead the mind inſenſibly from regularity

* The influence of that connection ſurpaſſing all bounds, is viſible in many gardens, remaining to this day, formed of horizontal plains forc'd with great labour and expence, perpendicular faces of earth ſupported by maſſy ſtone walls, terrace-walks in ſtages one above another, regular ponds and canals without the leaſt motion, and the whole ſurrounded, like a priſon, with high walls excluding every external object. At firſt view it may puzzle one to account for a taſte ſo oppoſite to nature in every particular. But nothing happens without a cauſe. Perfect regularity and uniformity are required in a houſe; and that idea is extended to its acceſſory the garden, eſpecially if it be a ſmall ſpot incapable of grandeur or much variety: the houſe is regular, ſo muſt the garden be; the floors of the houſe are horizontal, and the garden muſt have the ſame poſition: in the houſe we are protected from every intruding eye; ſo muſt we be in the garden. This, it muſt be confeſſed, is carrying the notion of reſemblance very far: but where reaſon and taſte are laid aſleep, nothing is more common than to carry reſemblance beyond proper bounds.

regularity to a bold variety. Such arrangement tends to make an impreſſion of grandeur: and grandeur ought to be ſtudied as much as poſſible, even in a more confined plan, by avoiding a multiplicity of ſmall parts *. A ſmall garden, on the other hand, which admits not grandeur, ought to be ſtrictly regular.

Milton, deſcribing the garden of Eden, prefers juſtly grandeur before regularity:

Flowers worthy of paradiſe, which not nice art
In beds and curious knots, but Nature boon
Pour'd forth profuſe on hill, and dale, and plain;
Both where the morning ſun firſt warmly ſmote
The open field, and where the unpierc'd ſhade
Imbrown'd the noontide bow'rs.

*Paradiſe loſt, b. 4.*

A hill covered with trees, appears both more beautiful and more lofty than when naked. To diſtribute trees in a plain requires more art: near the dwelling-houſe they ought to be ſcattered ſo diſtant from each other, as not to break the unity of the field; and even at the greateſt diſtance of diſtinct viſion, they ought never to be ſo crowded as to hide any beautiful object.

In the manner of planting a wood or thicket, much art may be diſplay'd. A common centre of walks, termed *a ſtar*, from whence are ſeen a number of remarkable objects, appears too artificial, and conſequently too ſtiff and formal, to be agreeable: the crowding withal ſo many objects together, leſſens the pleaſure that would be felt in a flower ſucceſſion. Abandoning therefore the ſtar, let us try to ſubſtitute ſome form more natural, that will diſplay all the remarkable objects in the neighbourhood. This may be done by various apertures in the wood, purpoſely contrived to lay open ſucceſſively every ſuch object; ſometimes a ſingle object, ſometimes a plurality in a line, and ſometimes a rapid ſucceſſion of them: the mind at intervals is roufed and cheared by agreeable objects; and the ſcene is greatly heightened by the ſurpriſe occaſioned by ſtumbling, as it were, upon objects of which we had no expectation.

Attending

* See chap. 4.

Attending to the influence of contraſt, explained in the eighth chapter, we diſcover why the lowneſs of the ceiling increaſes in appearance the ſize of a large room, and why a long room appears ſtill longer by being very narrow, as is remarkable in a gallery: by the ſame means, an object terminating a narrow opening in a wood, appears at a double diſtance. This ſuggeſts another rule for diſtributing trees in ſome quarter near the dwelling-houſe; which is, to place a number of thickets in a line, with an opening in each directing the eye from one to another; which will make them appear more diſtant from each other than they are in reality, and in appearance enlarge the ſize of the whole field. To give this plan its utmoſt effect, the ſpace between the thickets ought to be conſiderable: and in order that each may be ſeen diſtinctly, the opening neareſt the eye ought to be wider than the ſecond, the ſecond wider than the third, and ſo on to the end *.

By a judicious diſtribution of trees, various beauties may be produced, far exceeding what have been mentioned; which will appear as follows. A landſcape ſo rich as to ingroſs the whole attention, and ſo limited as ſweetly to be comprehended under a ſingle view, has a much finer effect than the moſt extenſive landſcape that requires a wandering of the eye through ſucceſſive ſcenes. This conſideration ſuggeſts a capital rule in laying out a field; which is, never at any one ſtation to admit a larger proſpect than can eaſily be taken in at once. A field ſo happily ſituated as to command a great extent of proſpect, is a delightful ſubject for applying this rule: let the proſpect be ſplit into proper parts by means of trees; ſtudying at the ſame time to introduce all the variety poſſible. A plan of this kind executed with taſte will

* An object will appear more diſtant than it really is, if we ſeparate it from the eye by lines of different coloured evergreens. Suppoſe the lines to be of holly and laurel, and the holly, which is of the deepeſt colour, next the eye: the degradation of colour in the laurel, makes it appear at a great diſtance from the holly, and conſequently removes the object, in appearance, to a greater diſtance than it really is.

will produce charming effects: the beautiful proſpects are multiplied: each of them is much more agreeable than the entire proſpect was originally: and, to crown the whole, the ſcenery is greatly diverſified.

As gardening is not an inventive art, but an imitation of nature, or rather nature itſelf ornamented; it follows neceſſarily, that every thing unnatural ought to be rejected with diſdain. Statues of wild beaſts vomiting water, a common ornament in gardens, prevails in thoſe of Verſailles Is that ornament in a good taſte? A *jet d'eau*, being purely artificial, may, without diſguſt, be tortured into a thouſand ſhapes: but a repreſentation of what really exiſts in nature, admits not any unnatural circumſtance. Theſe ſtatues therefore of Verſailles muſt be condemned; and ſo inſenſible has the artiſt been to juſt imitation, as to have diſplay'd his vicious taſte without the leaſt colour or diſguiſe: a lifeleſs ſtatue of an animal pouring out water, may be endured without much diſguſt; but here the lions and wolves are put in violent action, each has ſeized its prey, a deer or a lamb, in act to devour; and yet we know not by what hocus-pocus trick, the whole is converted into a different ſcene; the lion, forgetting his prey, pours out water plentifully; and the deer, forgetting its danger, performs the ſame work; a repreſentation not leſs abſurd than that in the opera, where Alexander the Great, after mounting the wall of a town beſieged, turns his back to the enemy, and entertains his army with a ſong *.

In gardening, every lively exhibition of what is beautiful in nature has a fine effect: on the other hand, diſtant and faint imitations are diſpleaſing to every one of taſte. The cutting evergreens in the ſhape of animals, is

* Ulloa, a Spaniſh writer, deſcribing the city of Lima, ſays, that the great ſquare is finely ornamented. "In "the centre is a fountain, equally remarkable for its "grandeur and capacity. Raiſed above the fountain is "a bronze ſtatue of Fame, and four ſmall baſons on "the angles. The water iſſues from the trumpet of "the ſtatue, and from the mouths of eight lions ſur-"rounding it, which (in his opinion) greatly heighten "the beauty of the whole."

is very antient; as appears from the epiſtles of Pliny, who ſeems to be a great admirer of the conceit The propenſity to imitation gave birth to that practice; and has ſupported it wonderfully long, conſidering how faint and inſipid the imitation is. But the vulgar, great and ſmall, devoid of taſte, are entertained with the oddneſs and ſingularity of a reſemblance, however diſtant, between a tree and an animal. An attempt in the gardens of Verſailles to imitate a grove of trees by a group of *jets d'eau*, appears, for the ſame reaſon, not leſs childiſh.

In deſigning a garden, every thing trivial or whimſical ought to be avoided. Is a labyrinth then to be juſtified? It is a mere conceit, like that of compoſing verſes in the ſhape of an axe or an egg: the walks and hedges may be agreeable; but in the form of a labyrinth, they ſerve to no end but to puzzle: a riddle is a conceit not ſo mean; becauſe the ſolution is proof of ſagacity, which affords no aid in tracing a labyrinth.

The gardens of Verſailles, executed with infinite expence by the beſt artiſts that could be found, are a laſting monument of a taſte the moſt depraved: the faults above mentioned, inſtead of being avoided, are choſen as beauties, and multiplied without end Nature, it would ſeem, was deemed too vulgar to be imitated in the works of a magnificent monarch; and for that reaſon preference was given to things unnatural, which probably were miſtaken for ſupernatural. I have often amuſed myſelf with a fanciful reſemblance between theſe gardens and the Arabian tales: each of them is a performance intended for the amuſement of a great king: in the ſixteen gardens of Verſailles there is no unity of deſign, more than in the thouſand and one Arabian tales: and, laſtly, they are equally unnatural; groves of *jets d'eau*, ſtatues of animals converſing in the manner of Æſop, water iſſuing out of the mouths of wild beaſts, give an impreſſion of fairy-land and witchcraft, not leſs than diamond-palaces, inviſible rings, ſpells and incantations.

A ſtraight road is the moſt agreeable, becauſe it ſhortens the journey. But in an embelliſhed field, a ſtraight walk has an air of formality and confinement: and at any rate is leſs agreeable than a winding or waving walk; for

for in furveying the beauties of an ornamented field, we love to roam from place to place at freedom. Winding walks have another advantage: at every ſtep they open new views. In ſhort, the walks in pleaſure ground ought not to have any appearance of a road: my intention is not to make a journey, but to feaſt my eye upon the beauties of art and nature. This rule excludes not openings directing the eye to diſtant objects. Such openings, beſide variety, are agreeable in various reſpects: firſt, as obſerved above, they extend in appearance the ſize of the field: next, an object, at whatever diſtance, continues the opening, and deludes the ſpectator into a conviction, that the trees which confine the view are continued till they join the object. Straight walks alſo in receſſes do extremely well: they vary the ſcenery, and are favourable to meditation.

Avoid a ſtraight avenue directed upon a dwelling-houſe: better far an oblique approach in a waving line, with ſingle trees and other ſcattered objects interpoſed. In a direct approach, the firſt appearance continues the ſame to the end: we ſee a houſe at a diſtance, and we ſee it all along in the ſame ſpot without any variety. In an oblique approach, the interpoſed objects put the houſe ſeemingly in motion: it moves with the paſſenger, and appears to direct its courſe ſo as hoſpitably to intercept him. An oblique approach contributes alſo to variety: the houſe, being ſeen ſucceſſively in different directions, takes on at each ſtep a new figure.

A garden on a flat ought to be highly and variouſly ornamented, in order to occupy the mind, and prevent our regretting the inſipidity of an uniform plain. Artificial mounts in that view are common: but no perſon has thought of an artificial walk elevated high above the plain. Such a walk is airy, and tends to elevate the mind: it extends and varies the proſpect: and it makes the plain, ſeen from a height, appear more agreeable.

Whether ſhould a ruin be in the Gothic or Grecian form? In the former, I think; becauſe it exhibits the triumph of time over ſtrength; a melancholy, but not unpleaſant thought: a Grecian ruin ſuggeſts rather the triumph of barbarity over taſte; a gloomy and diſcouraging thought.

There

There are not many fountains in a good taſte. Statues of animals vomiting water, which prevail every where, ſtand condemned as unnatural. A ſtatue of a whale ſpouting water upward from its head, is in one ſenſe natural, as whales of a certain ſpecies have that power; but it is a ſufficient objection, that its ſingularity would make it appear unnatural: there is another reaſon againſt it, that the figure of a whale is in itſelf not agreeable. In many Roman fountains, ſtatues of fiſhes are employ'd to ſupport a large baſon of water. This unnatural conceit is not accountable, unleſs from the connection that water hath with the fiſh that ſwim in it; which by the way ſhows the influence of even the ſlighter relations. The beſt deſign for a fountain I have met with, is what follows. In an artificial rock, rugged and abrupt, there is a cavity out of ſight at the top: the water, convey'd to it by a pipe, pours or trickles down the broken parts of the rock, and is collected into a baſon at the foot: it is ſo contrived, as to make the water fall in ſheets or in rills at pleaſure.

Hitherto a garden has been treated as a work intended ſolely for pleaſure, or, in other words, for giving impreſſions of intrinſic beauty. What comes next in order is the beauty of a garden deſtined for uſe, termed *relative beauty* *; and this branch ſhall be diſpatched in a few words. In gardening, luckily, relative beauty need never ſtand in oppoſition to intrinſic beauty: all the ground that can be requiſite for uſe, makes but a ſmall proportion of an ornamented field; and may be put in any corner without obſtructing the diſpoſition of the capital parts. At the ſame time, a kitchen-garden or an orchard is ſuſceptible of intrinſic beauty; and may be ſo artfully diſpoſed among the other parts, as by variety and contraſt to contribute to the beauty of the whole. In this reſpect, architecture is far more intricate, as will be ſeen immediately; for as intrinſic and relative beauty muſt often be blended in the ſame building, it becomes a difficult taſk to attain both in any perfection.

In a hot country, it is a capital object to have what may be term'd a *ſummer-garden*, that is, a ſpace of ground

* See theſe terms defined, chap. 3.

ground disposed by art and by nature to exclude the sun, but to give free access to the air. In a cold country, the capital object should be a *winter garden*, open to the sun, sheltered from wind, dry under foot, and having the appearance of summer by variety of evergreens. The relish of a country life is totally extinguished in France, and is decaying fast in Britain But as still many people of fashion, and some of taste, pass the winter, or part of it, in the country, it is amazing that winter-gardens should be almost totally overlooked. During summer every field is a garden; but for six months of the year the weather is seldom so good in Britain as to afford comfort in the open air without shelter, and yet seldom so bad as not to afford comfort with shelter. I say more, that beside providing for exercise and health, a winter garden may be made subservient to education, by introducing a habit of thinking. In youth, lively spirits give too great a propensity to pleasure and amusement, making us averse to serious occupation. That untoward bias may be corrected in some degree by a winter garden, which produces in the mind a calm satisfaction, free from agitation of passion, whether gay or gloomy; a fine tone of mind for meditation and reasoning *.

Gardening

* A correspondent, whose name I conceal that I may not be thought vain, writes to me as follows. "In life "we generally lay our account with prosperity, and seldom, very seldom, prepare for adversity We carry "that propensity even into the structure of our gardens: "we cultivate the gay ornaments of summer, relishing "no plants but what flourish by mild dews and gracious "sunshine: we banish from our thoughts ghastly winter, "when the benign influences of the sun cheering us no "more, are doubly regretted by yielding to the piercing northwind and nipping frost. Sage is the gardener, in the metaphorical as well as literal sense, "who procures a friendly shelter to protect us from December storms, and cultivates the plants that adorn "and enliven that dreary season. He is no philosopher "who cannot retire into the Stoic's walk, when the "gardens

Gardening being in China brought to greater perfection than in any other known country, we ſhall cloſe our preſent ſubject with a ſlight view of Chineſe gardens, which are found entirely obſequious to the principles that govern every one of the fine arts. In general, it is an indiſpenſable law there, never to deviate from nature: but in order to produce that degree of variety which is pleaſing, every method conſiſtent with nature is put in practice. Nature is ſtrictly imitated in the banks of their artificial lakes and rivers; which ſometimes are bare and gravelly, ſometimes covered with wood quite to the brink of the water. To flat ſpots adorned with flowers and ſhrubs, are oppoſed others ſteep and rocky. We ſee meadows covered with cattle; rice-grounds that run into lakes; groves into which enter navigable creeks and rivulets: theſe generally conduct to ſome intereſting object, a magnificent building, terraces cut in a mountain, a caſcade, a grotto, an artificial rock, or ſuch like. Their artificial rivers are generally ſerpentine; ſometimes narrow, noiſy, and rapid; ſometimes deep, broad, and ſlow: and to make the ſcene ſtill more active, mills and other moving machines are often erected. In the lakes are interſperſed iſlands; ſome barren, ſurrounded with rocks and ſhoals; others enriched with every thing that art and nature can furniſh. Even in their caſcades they avoid regularity, as forcing nature out of its courſe: the waters are ſeen buſting from the caverns and windings of the artificial rocks, here an impetuous cataract, there many leſſer falls; and the ſtream often impeded by trees and ſtones, that ſeem brought down by the violence of the current. Straight lines are ſometimes indulged, in order to take the advantage of ſome intereſting object at a diſtance, by directing openings upon it.

Senſible of the influence of contraſt, the Chineſe artiſts deal in ſudden tranſitions, and in oppoſing to each other, forms, colours, and ſhades. The eye is conducted,

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" gardens of Epicurus are out of bloom: he is too " much a philoſopher who will rigidly proſcribe the " flowers and aromatics of ſummer, to ſit conſtantly " under the cypreſs ſhade."

ed, from limited to extenſive views, and from lakes and rivers to plains, hills, and woods: to dark and gloomy colours, are oppoſed the more brilliant: the different maſſes of light and ſhade are diſpoſed in ſuch a manner, as to render the compoſition diſtinct in its parts, and ſtriking on the whole. In plantations, the trees are artfully mixed according to their ſhape and colour; thoſe of ſpreading branches with the pyramidal, and the light green with the deep green. They even introduce decay'd trees, ſome erect, and ſome half out of the ground *. In order to heighten contraſt, much bolder ſtrokes are riſked: they ſometimes introduce rough rock, dark caverns, trees ill formed, and ſeemingly rent by tempeſts, or blaſted by lightening; a building in ruins, or half conſumed by fire. But to relieve the mind from the harſhneſs of ſuch objects, the ſweeteſt and moſt beautiful ſcenes are always made to ſucceed.

The Chineſe ſtudy to give play to the imagination: they hide the termination of their lakes; and commonly interrupt the view of a caſcade by trees, through which are ſeen obſcurely the waters as they fall. The imagination once rouſed, is diſpoſed to magnify every object.

Nothing is more ſtudied in Chineſe gardens than to raiſe wonder or ſurpriſe In ſcenes calculated for that end, every thing appears like fairy-land; a torrent, for example, convey'd under ground, puzzling a ſtranger by its uncommon ſound to gueſs what it may be; and, to multiply ſuch uncommon ſounds, the rocks and buildings are contrived with cavities and interſtices. Sometimes one is led inſenſibly into a dark cavern, terminating unexpectedly in a landſcape enriched with all that nature affords the moſt delicious. At other times, beautiful walks inſenſibly conduct us to a rough uncultivated field, where buſhes, briers and ſtones interrupt the paſſage: looking about for an outlet, ſome rich proſpect

* Taſte has ſuggeſted to Kent the ſame artifice The placing a decay'd tree properly, contributes to contraſt; and alſo in a penſive or ſedate ſtate of mind produces a ſort of pity, grounded on an imaginary perſonification.

pect unexpectedly open to view. Another artifice is, to obſcure ſome capital part by trees or other interpoſed objects: our curioſity is raiſed to know what lies beyond; and after a few ſteps, we are greatly ſurpriſed with ſome ſcene totally different from what was expected.

Theſe curſory obſervations upon gardening, ſhall be cloſed with ſome reflections that muſt touch every reader. Rough uncultivated ground, diſmal to the eye, inſpires peeviſhneſs and diſcontent: may not this be one cauſe of the harſh manners of ſavages? A field richly ornamented, containing beautiful objects of various kinds, diſplays in full luſtre the goodneſs of the Deity, and the ample proviſion he has made for our happineſs; which muſt fill every ſpectator with gratitude to his Maker, and with benevolence to his fellow-creatures. Other fine arts may be perverted to excite irregular, and even vicious, emotions: but gardening, which inſpires the pureſt and moſt refined pleaſures, cannot fail to promote every good affection. The gaiety and harmony of mind it produceth, inclining the ſpectator to communicate his ſatisfaction to others, and to make them happy as he is himſelf, tend naturally to eſtabliſh in him a habit of humanity and benevolence *.

It is not eaſy to ſuppreſs a certain degree of enthuſiaſm when we reflect upon the advantages of gardening with reſpect to virtuous education. In early youth the deepeſt impreſſions are made; and it is a ſad truth, that the young ſtudent familiarized to the dirtineſs and diſorder of many colleges pent within narrow bounds in populous cities, is rendered in a meaſure inſenſible to the elegant beauties of art and nature. Would not every great man who loves his country, and wiſhes his countrymen to make a figure, be zealous to reform this evil?

* The manufactures of ſilk, flax, and cotton, in their preſent advance toward perfection, may be held as inferior branches of the fine arts; becauſe their productions in dreſs and in furniture are beautiful like thoſe of the fine arts, and inſpire gay and kindly emotions favourable to morality, ſimilar to what are inſpired by a garden or other production of the fine arts.

evil? It seems to me far from an exaggeration, that good professors are not more essential to a college, than a spacious garden sweetly ornamented, but without any thing glaring or bizarre, so as upon the whole to inspire our youth with a taste not less for simplicity than for elegance. In that respect, the university of Oxford may justly be deemed a model.

Having finished what occurred on gardening, I proceed to rules and observations that more peculiarly concern architecture. Architecture, being an useful as well as a fine art, leads us to distinguish buildings and parts of buildings into three kinds, *viz.* what are intended for utility solely, what for ornament solely, and what for both. Buildings intended for utility solely, such as detached offices, ought in every part to correspond precisely to that intention: the slightest deviation from the end in view, will by every person of taste be thought a defect or blemish. In general, it is the perfection of every work of art, that it fulfills the purpose for which it is intended; and every other beauty, in opposition, is neglected as improper. In things again intended for ornament, such as pillars, obelisks, triumphal arches, beauty solely ought to be regarded: a Heathen temple must be considered as merely ornamental; for being dedicated to some deity, and not intended for habitation, it is susceptible of any figure and any embellishment that fancy can suggest and beauty require. The great difficulty of contrivance, respects buildings that are intended to be useful as well as ornamental. These ends, employing different and often opposite means, are seldom united in perfection; and the only practicable method in such buildings is, to favour or neglect ornament according to the character of the building: in palaces, and other edifices sufficiently extensive to admit a variety of useful contrivance, regularity justly takes the lead; but in dwelling-houses that are too small for variety of contrivance, utility ought to prevail, neglecting regularity so far as it stands in opposition to convenience*.



* A building must be large to produce any sensible emotion of regularity, proportion, or beauty; which is an additional reason for minding convenience only in a dwelling-house of small size.

Intrinſic and relative beauty being founded on different principles, muſt be handled ſeparately; and I begin with relative beauty, as of the greater importance.

The proportions of a door, are determined by the uſe to which it is deſtin'd. The door of a dwelling-houſe, which ought to correſpond to the human ſize, is confined to ſeven or eight feet in height, and three or four in breadth. The proportions proper for the door of a barn or coach-houſe, are widely different. Another conſideration enters: to ſtudy intrinſic beauty in a coach-houſe or barn, intended merely for uſe, is obviouſly improper. But a dwelling-houſe may admit ornaments; and the principal doors of a palace demands all the grandeur that is conſiſtent with the foregoing proportions dictated by utility: it ought to be elevated, and approached by ſteps; and it may be adorned with pillars ſupporting an architrave, or in any other beautiful manner. The door of a church ought to be wide, in order to afford an eaſy paſſage for a multitude: the wideneſs, at the ſame time, regulates the height, as will appear by and by. The ſize of windows ought to be proportioned to that of the room they illuminate; for if the apertures be not ſufficiently large to convey light to every corner, the room is unequally lighted, which is a great deformity. Steps of ſtairs ought to be accommodated to the human figure, without regarding any other proportion: theſe ſteps accordingly are the ſame in large and in ſmall buildings, becauſe both are inhabited by men of the ſame ſize.

I proceed to conſider intrinſic beauty blended with that which is relative. Though a cube in itſelf be more agreeable than a parallelopipedon, yet a large building in the form of a cube, appears lumpiſh and heavy; whereas the other figure, ſet on its ſmaller baſe, is by its elevation more agreeable, and hence the beauty of a Gothic tower. But ſuppoſing that a parallelopipedon is deſtin'd for a dwelling-houſe, to make way for relative beauty, we immediately perceive that utility ought chiefly to be regarded, and that this figure, inconvenient by its height, ought to be ſet upon its larger height; the loftineſs is gone; but that loſs is more than compenſated by additional convenience; and for that reaſon the form

form of a building ſpread more upon the ground than raiſed in height, is always preferred for a dwelling-houſe, without excepting even the moſt ſuperb palace.

With reſpect to the diviſions within, utility requires that the rooms be rectangular; for otherwiſe void ſpaces will be left, which are of no uſe. A hexagonal figure leaves no void ſpaces; but it determines the rooms to be all of one ſize, which is extremely inconvenient. A room of a moderate ſize may be a ſquare; but in very large rooms that figure muſt, for the moſt part, give place to a parallelogram, which can more eaſily be adjuſted than a ſquare, to the ſmaller rooms contrived merely for convenience. A parallelogram, at the ſame time, is the beſt calculated for receiving light; becauſe, to avoid croſs lights, all the windows ought to be in one wall; and if the oppoſite wall be at ſuch diſtance as not to be fully lighted, the room muſt be obſcure. The height of a room exceeding nine or ten feet, has little or no relation to utility; and therefore proportion is the only rule for determining the height when above that number of feet.

As all artiſts who deal in the beautiful are naturally prone to entertain the eye, they have opportunity to exert their taſte upon palaces and ſumptuous buildings, where, as above obſerved, intrinſic beauty ought to have the aſcendant over that which is relative. But ſuch propenſity is unhappy with reſpect to dwelling-houſes of moderate ſize; becauſe in theſe, intrinſic beauty cannot be diſplay'd in any perfection, without wounding relative beauty: a ſmall houſe admits not great variety of form; and in ſuch houſes there is no inſtance of internal convenience being accurately adjuſted to external regularity: I am apt to believe that it is beyond the reach of art. And yet architects always ſplit upon that rock; for they never will give over attempting to reconcile theſe two incompatibles: how otherwiſe ſhould it happen, that of the endleſs variety of private dwelling-houſes, there is not one to be found generally agreed upon as a good pattern? The unwearied propenſity to make a houſe regular as well as convenient, forces the architect, in ſome articles, to ſacrifice convenience to regularity, and in others, regularity to convenience;

and accordingly the houſe, which turns out neither regular nor convenient, never fails to diſpleaſe: the faults are obvious, and the difficulty of doing better is known to the artiſt only *.

Nothing can be more evident, than that the form of a dwelling-houſe ought to be ſuited to the climate; and yet no error is more common, than to copy in Britain the form of Italian houſes; not forgetting even thoſe parts that are purpoſely contrived for air, and for excluding the ſun. I ſhall give one or two inſtances. A colonnade along the front of a building, hath a fine effect in Greece and Italy, by producing coolneſs and obſcurity, agreeable properties in warm and luminous climates: but the cold climate of Britain is altogether averſe to that ornament; and therefore, a colonnade can never be proper in this country, unleſs for a portico, or to communicate with a detached building. Again, a logio laying the houſe open to the north, contrived in Italy for gathering cool air, is, if poſſible, ſtill more improper for this climate: ſcarce endurable in ſummer, it, in winter, expoſes the houſe to the bitter blaſts of the north, and to every ſhower of ſnow and rain.

Having ſaid what appeared neceſſary upon relative beauty, the next ſtep is, to view architecture as one of the fine arts; which will lead us to the examination of ſuch buildings, and parts of buildings, as are calculated ſolely to pleaſe the eye. In the works of Nature, rich and magnificent, variety prevails; and in works of Art that are contrived to imitate Nature, the great art is to hide every appearance of art; which is done by avoiding regularity, and indulging variety. But in works of art that are original, and not imitative, the timid hand is guided by rule and compaſs; and accordingly in architecture ſtrict regularity and uniformity is ſtudied, as far as conſiſtent with utility.

Proportion is not leſs agreeable than regularity and uniformity; and therefore in buildings intended to pleaſe the eye, they are all equally eſſential. By many writers it

* "Houſes are built to live in, and not to look on "therefore let uſe be preferred before uniformity, ex- "cept where both may be had." *Lo. Verulam, eſſay* 45.

it is taken for granted, that in all the parts of a building there are certain ſtrict proportions that pleaſe the eye; preciſely as in ſound there are certain ſtrict proportions that pleaſe the ear; and that in both the ſlighteſt deviation is equally diſagreeable. Others again ſeem to reliſh more a compariſon between proportion in numbers and proportion in quantity; and hold that the ſame proportions are agreeable in both. The proportions, for example, of the numbers 16, 24, and 36, are agreeable; and ſo, ſay they, are the proportions of a room, the height of which is 16 feet, the breadth 24, and the length 36. May I rely upon the reader, that he will patiently go along with me in examining this point, which is uſeful as well as curious? Taking it for granted, I proceed. To refute the notion of a reſemblance between muſical proportions and thoſe of architecture, it might be ſufficient to obſerve in general, that the one is addreſſed to the ear, the other to the eye; and that objects of different ſenſes have no reſemblance, nor indeed any relation to each other. But more particularly, what pleaſes the ear in harmony, is not the proportion of the ſtrings of the inſtrument, but of the ſounds that theſe ſtrings produce: in architecture, on the contrary, it is the proportion of different quantities that pleaſes the eye, without the leaſt relation to ſound. Beſide, were quantity here to be the ſole ground of compariſon, we have no reaſon to preſume, that there is any natural analogy between the proportions that pleaſe in a building, and the proportions of ſtrings that produce concordant ſounds. Let us take for example an octave, produced by two ſimilar ſtrings, the one double of the other in length: this is the moſt perfect of all concords; and yet I know not that the proportion of one to two is agreeable in any two parts of a building. I add, that concordant notes are produced by wind-inſtruments, which, as to proportion, appear not to have even the ſlighteſt reſemblance to a building.

With reſpect to the other notion, inſtituting a compariſon between proportion in numbers and proportion in quantity; I urge, that number and quantity are ſo diſtinct from each other, as to afford no probability of any natural relation between them. Quantity is a real

quality of every body; number is not a real quality, but merely an idea that ariſes upon viewing a plurality of things, whether conjunctly or in ſucceſſion. An arithmetical proportion is agreeable in numbers; but have we any reaſon to infer that it muſt alſo be agreeable in quantity? At that rate, a geometrical proportion, and many others which are agreeable in numbers, ought alſo to be agreeable in quantity. A certain proportion may coincide in both; and among an endleſs variety of proportions, it would be wonderful, if there never ſhould be a coincidence: one example is given of coincidence in the numbers 16, 24, and 36; but to be convinced that it is merely accidental, we need but reflect, that the ſame proportions are not applicable to the external figure of a houſe, and far leſs to a column.

That we are framed by nature to reliſh proportion as well as regularity, is indiſputable; but that agreeable proportion, like concord in ſounds, ſhould be confined to certain preciſe meaſures, is not warranted by experience: on the contrary, we learn from experience, that proportion admits more and leſs, that ſeveral proportions are each of them agreeable, and that we are not ſenſible of diſproportion till the difference between the quantities compared become the moſt ſtriking circumſtance. Columns evidently admit different proportions, equally agreeable; and ſo do houſes, rooms, and other parts of a building. This leads to an intereſting reflection: the foregoing difference between concord and proportion, is an additional inſtance of that admirable harmony which ſubſiſts among the ſeveral branches of the human frame: the ear is an accurate judge of ſounds, and of their ſmalleſt differences; and that concord in ſounds ſhould be regulated by accurate meaſures, is perfectly well ſuited to this accuracy of perception: the eye is more uncertain about the ſize of a large object, than of one that is ſmall; and at a diſtance an object appears leſs than at hand. Delicacy of feeling, therefore, with reſpect to proportion in quantities, would be an uſeleſs quality; and it is much better ordered, that there ſhould be ſuch a latitude with reſpect to agreeable proportions, as to correſpond to the uncertainty of the eye with reſpect to quantity.

But

But all the beauties of this ſcene are not yet diſplay'd; and it is too intereſting to be paſſed over in a curſory view. I proceed to obſerve, that to make the eye as delicate with reſpect to proportion as the ear is with reſpect to concord, would not only be an uſeleſs quality, but be the ſource of continual pain and uneaſineſs. I need go no farther for a proof than the very room I occupy at preſent; for every ſtep I take varies to me, in appearance, the proportion of the length and breadth: at that rate, I ſhould not be happy but in one preciſe ſpot, where the proportion appears agreeable. Let me further obſerve, that it would be ſingular indeed, to find in the nature of man, any two principles in perpetual oppoſition to each other: which would preciſely be the caſe, if proportion were circumſcribed like concord; for it would exclude all but one of thoſe proportions that utility requires in different buildings, and in different parts of the ſame building.

It is ludicrous to obſerve writers acknowledging the neceſſity of accurate proportions, and yet differing widely about them. Laying aſide reaſoning and philoſophy, one fact univerſally agreed on ought to have undeceived them, that the ſame proportions which are agreeable in a model are not agreeable in a large building: a room 48 feet in length and 24 in breadth and height, is well proportioned; but a room 12 feet wide and high and 24 long, approaches to a gallery.

Perrault, in his compariſon of the antients and moderns*, is the only author who runs to the oppoſite extreme; maintaining, that the different proportions aſſigned to each order of columns are arbitrary, and that the beauty of theſe proportions is entirely the effect of cuſtom. This bewrays ignorance of human nature, which evidently delights in proportion, as well as in regularity, order, and propriety. But without any acquaintance with human nature, a ſingle reflection might have convinced him of his error, That if theſe proportions had not originally been agreeable, they could not have been eſtabliſhed by cuſtom.

To illuſtrate the preſent point, I ſhall add a few examples



* Page 94.

amples of the agreeableneſs of different proportions. In a ſumptuous edifice, the capital rooms ought to be large, for otherwiſe they will not be proportioned to the ſize of the building: and for the ſame reaſon, a very large room is improper in a ſmall houſe. But in things thus related, the mind requires not a preciſe or ſingle proportion, rejecting all others; on the contrary, many different proportions are made equally welcome. It is only when a proportion becomes looſe and diſtant, that the agreeableneſs abates, and at laſt vaniſheth. In all buildings accordingly, we find rooms of different proportions equally agreeable, even where the proportion is not influenced by utility. With reſpect to the height of a room, the proportion it ought to bear to the length and breadth, is extremely arbitrary; and it cannot be otherwiſe, conſidering the uncertainty of the eye as to the height of a room, when it exceeds 17 or 18 feet. In columns again, even architects muſt confeſs, that the proportion of height and thickneſs varies betwixt 8 diameters and 10, and that every proportion between theſe two extremes is agreeable. But this is not all. There muſt certainly be a further variation of proportion, depending on the ſize of the column: a row of columns 10 feet high, and a row twice that height, require different proportions: the intercolumniations muſt alſo differ in proportion according to the height of the row.

Proportion of parts is not only itſelf a beauty, but is inſeparably connected with a beauty of the higheſt reliſh, that of concord or harmony; which will be plain from what follows. A room of which the parts are all finely adjuſted to each other, ſtrikes us with the beauty of proportion. It ſtrikes us at the ſame time with a pleaſure far ſuperior: the length, the breadth, the height, the windows, raiſe each of them ſeparately an emotion: theſe emotions are ſimilar; and though faint when felt ſeparately, they produce in conjunction the emotion of concord or harmony, which is extremely pleaſant *. On the other hand, where the length of a room far exceeds the breadth, the mind comparing together parts ſo intimately

* Chap. 2. part 4.

mately connected, immediately perceives a disagreement or disproportion which disgusts. But this is not all: viewing them separately, different emotions are produced, that of grandeur from the great length, and that of meanness or littleness from the small breadth, which in union are disagreeable by their discordance. Hence it is, that a long gallery, however convenient for exercise, is not an agreeable figure of a room: we consider it, like a stable, as destined for use, and expect not that in any other respect it should be agreeable *.

Regularity and proportion are essential in buildings destined chiefly or solely to please the eye, because they are the means to produce intrinsic beauty. But a skilful artist will not confine his view to regularity and proportion: he will also study congruity, which is perceived when the form and ornaments of a structure are suited to the purpose for which it is intended. The sense of congruity dictates the following rule, That every building have an expression corresponding to its destination: A palace ought to be sumptuous and grand; a private dwelling, neat and modest; a play-house, gay and splendid; and a monument, gloomy and melancholy †. A Heathen temple has a double destination: it is considered chiefly as a house dedicated to some divinity; and in



* A covered passage connecting a winter-garden with the dwelling-house, would answer the purpose of walking in bad weather much better than a gallery. A slight roof supported by slender pillars, whether of wood or stone, would be sufficient; filling up the spaces between the pillars with evergreens, so as to give verdure and exclude wind.

† A house for the poor ought to have an appearance suited to its destination. The new hospital in Paris for foundlings, errs against this rule; for it has more the air of a palace than of a hospital. Propriety and convenience ought to be studied in lodging the indigent; but in such houses splendor and magnificence are out of all rule. For the same reason, a naked statue or picture, scarce decent any where, is in a church intolerable. A sumptuous charity-school, beside its impropriety, gives the children an unhappy taste for high living.

that reſpect it ought to be grand, elevated, and magnificent: it is conſidered alſo as a place of worſhip; and in that reſpect it ought to be ſomewhat dark or gloomy, becauſe dimneſs produces that tone of mind which is ſuited to humility and devotion. A Chriſtian church is not conſidered to be a houſe for the Deity, but merely a place of worſhip: it ought therefore to be decent and plain, without much ornament: a ſituation ought to be choſen, humble and retired; becauſe the congregation, during worſhip, ought to be humble, and diſengaged from the world. Columns, beſide their chief ſervice of being ſupports, contribute to that peculiar expreſſion which the deſtination of a building requires: columns of different proportions, ſerve to expreſs loftineſs, lightneſs, *&c.* as well as ſtrength. Situation alſo may contribute to expreſſion: conveniency regulates the ſituation of a private dwelling-houſe; but, as I have had occaſion to obſerve *; the ſituation of a palace ought to be lofty.

And this leads to a queſtion, Whether the ſituation, where there happens to be no choice, ought, in any meaſure, to regulate the form of the edifice? The connection between a great houſe and the neighbouring fields, though not extremely intimate, demands however ſome congruity. It would, for example, diſpleaſe us to find an elegant building thrown away upon a wild uncultivated country: congruity requires a poliſhed field for ſuch a building; and beſide the pleaſure of congruity, the ſpectator is ſenſible of the pleaſure of concordance from the ſimilarity of the emotions produced by the two objects. The old Gothic form of building ſeems well ſuited to the rough uncultivated regions where it was invented: the only miſtake was, the transferring this form to the fine plains of France and Italy, better fitted for buildings in the Grecian taſte; but by refining upon the Gothic form, every thing poſſible has been done to reconcile it to its new ſituation. The profuſe variety of wild and grand objects about Inverary, demanded a houſe in the Gothic form; and every one muſt approve the taſte of the proprietor, in adjuſting ſo finely,

* Chap. 10.

ly, as he has done, the appearance of his houſe to that of the country where it is placed.

The external ſtructure of a great houſe, leads naturally to its internal ſtructure. A large and ſpacious room, which is the firſt that commonly receives us, ſeems a bad contrivance in ſeveral reſpects. In the firſt place, when immediately from the open air we ſtep into ſuch a room, its ſize in appearance is diminiſhed by contraſt: it looks little compared with that great canopy the ſky. In the next place, when it recovers its grandeur, as it ſoon doth, it gives a diminutive appearance to the reſt of the houſe: paſſing from it, every apartment looks little. This room therefore may be aptly compared to the ſwoln commencement of an epic poem,

Bella per Emathios pluſquam civilia campos.

In the third place, by its ſituation it ſerves only for a waiting room, and a paſſage to the principal apartments; inſtead of being reſerved, as it ought to be, for entertaining company: a great room, which enlarges the mind and gives a certain elevation to the ſpirits, is deſtined by nature for converſation. Rejecting therefore this form, I take a hint from the climax in writing for another form that appears more ſuitable: a handſome portico, proportioned to the ſize and faſhion of the front, leads into a waiting-room of a larger ſize; and that to the great room, all by a progreſſion from ſmall to great. If the houſe be very large, there may be ſpace for the following ſuit of rooms; firſt, a portico; ſecond, a paſſage within the houſe, bounded by a double row of columns connected by arcades; third, an octagon room, or of any other figure, about the centre of the building; and, laſtly, the great room.

A double row of windows muſt be diſagreeable by diſtributing the light unequally: the ſpace in particular between the rows is always gloomy. For that reaſon, a room of great height, which cannot be conveniently ſerved by a ſingle row, ought regularly to be lighted from the roof. Artiſts have generally an inclination to form the great room into a double cube, even with the inconvenience of a double row of windows: they are pleaſed with the regularity, overlooking that it is mental

tal only, and not visible to the eye, which seldom can distinguish between the height of 24 feet and that of 30 *.

Of all the emotions that can be raised by architecture, grandeur is that which has the greatest influence on the mind; and it ought therefore to be the chief study of the artist, to raise this emotion in great buildings destin'd to please the eye. But as grandeur depends partly on size, it seems so far unlucky for architecture, that it is governed by regularity and proportion, which never deceive the eye by making objects appear larger than they are in reality: such deception, as above observed in the present chapter, is never found but with some remarkable disproportion of parts. But though regularity and proportion contribute nothing to grandeur as far as that emotion depends on size, they in a different respect contribute greatly to it, as has been explained above †.

Next of ornaments, which contribute to give buildings a peculiar expression. It has been doubted whether a building can regularly admit any ornament but what is useful, or at least has that appearance. But considering the different purposes of architecture, a fine as well as an useful art, there is no good reason why ornaments may not be added to please the eye without any relation to use. This liberty is allowed in poetry, painting, and gardening, and why not in architecture considered as a fine art? A private dwelling-house, it is true, and other edifices where use is the chief aim, admit not regularly any ornament but what has the appearance, at least, of use: but temples, triumphal arches, and other buildings intended chiefly or solely for show, admit every sort of ornament.

A thing

* One who has not given peculiar attention will scarce imagine how imperfect our judgment is about distances, without experience. Our looks being generally directed to objects upon the ground around us, we judge tolerably well of horizontal distances: but seldom having occasion to look upward in a perpendicular line, we scarce can form any judgment of distances in that direction.

† Vol. 1. p. 225.

A thing intended merely as an ornament without relation to uſe, may be of any figure and of any kind that fancy can ſuggeſt: if it pleaſe the ſpectator, the artiſt gains his end. Statues, vaſes, ſculpture upon ſtone, whether baſſo or alto relievo, are beautiful ornaments reliſh'd in all civilized countries. The placing ſuch ornaments ſo as to produce the beſt effect, is the only nicety. A ſtatue done to perfection is an inchanting work; and we naturally require that it ſhould be ſeen in every direction and at different diſtances; for which reaſon, ſtatues employ'd as ornaments are proper to adorn the great ſtair that leads to the principal door of a palace, or to occupy the void between pillars. But a niche in the external front is not a proper place for a ſtatue: and ſtatues upon the roof, or upon the top of a wall, would give pain by ſeeming to be in danger of tumbling down. To adorn the top of a wall with a row of vaſes is an unhappy conceit, by placing things apparently of uſe where they cannot be of any uſe. As to baſſo and alto relievo, I obſerve, that in architecture as well as in gardening, contradictory expreſſions ought to be avoided: for which reaſon, the lightneſs and delicacy of carved work ſuits ill with the firmneſs and ſolidity of a pedeſtal: upon the pedeſtal, whether of a ſtatue or a column, the antients never ventured any bolder ornament than the baſſo relievo.

One at firſt view will naturally take it for granted, that in the ornaments under conſideration beauty is indiſpenſable. It goes a great way undoubtedly; but upon trial we find many things eſteemed as highly ornamental that have little or no beauty. There are various circumſtances, beſide beauty, that tend to make agreeable impreſſions. For inſtance, the reverence we have for the antients is a fruitful ſource of ornaments. Amalthea's horn has always been a favourite ornament, becauſe of its connection with a lady who was honoured with the care of Jupiter in his infancy. A fat old fellow and a goat are ſurely not graceful forms; and yet Silenus and his companion are every where faſhionable ornaments. What elſe but our fondneſs for antiquity can make the horrid form of a Sphinx ſo much as endurable. Original deſtination is another circumſtance

that

that has influence to add dignity to things in themſelves abundantly trivial. In the ſculpture of a marble chimney-piece, inſtruments of a Grecian or Roman ſacrifice are beheld with pleaſure; original deſtination rendering them venerable as well as their antiquity. Let ſome modern cutlery ware be ſubſtituted, though not leſs beautiful, the artiſt will be thought whimſical, if not abſurd. Triumphal arches, pyramids, obeliſks, are beautiful forms; but the nobleneſs of their original deſtination has greatly inhanced the pleaſure we take in them. A ſtatue ſuppoſed to be an Apollo, will with an antiquary loſe much of its grace when diſcovered to have been done for a barber's apprentice. Long robes appear noble, not ſingly for their flowing lines, but for their being the habit of magiſtrates; and a ſcarf acquires an air of dignity by being the badge of a ſuperior order of churchmen. Theſe examples may be thought ſufficient for a ſpecimen: a diligent inquiry into human nature will diſcover other influencing principles; and hence it is, that of all ſubjects ornaments occaſion the greateſt variety of taſte.

Things merely ornamental appear more gay and ſhowy than things that take on the appearance of uſe. A knot of diamonds in the hair is ſplendid; but diamonds have a more modeſt appearance when uſed as claſps or buttons. The former are more proper for a young beauty, the latter after marriage.

And this leads to ornaments having relation to uſe. Ornaments of that kind are governed by a different principle, which is, That they ought to be of a form ſuited to their real or apparent deſtination. This rule is applicable as well to ornaments that make a component part of the ſubject, as to ornaments that are only acceſſory. With relation to the former, it never can proceed from a good taſte to make a tea-ſpoon reſemble the leaf of a tree; for ſuch a form is inconſiſtent with the deſtination of a tea ſpoon. An eagle's paw is an ornament not leſs improper for the foot of a chair or table; becauſe it gives it the appearance of weakneſs, inconſiſtent with its deſtination of bearing weight. Blind windows are ſometimes introduced to preſerve the appearance of regularity: in which caſe the deceit ought carefully

carefully to be concealed; for to make it viſible would be to mark the irregularity in the cleareſt manner, by ſignifying that real windows ought to have been there could they have been made conſiſtent with the internal ſtructure. A pilaſter is another example of the ſame ſort of ornament; and the greateſt error againſt its ſeeming deſtination of a ſupport, is to ſink it ſo far into the wall as to make it loſe that ſeeming. A compoſition repreſenting leaves and branches, with birds perching upon them, has been long in faſhion for a candleſtick: but none of theſe particulars is in any degree ſuited to the deſtination of a candleſtick.

A large marble baſon ſupported by fiſhes is a conceit much reliſhed in fountains. This is an example of acceſſory ornaments which are in a bad taſte; for fiſhes here are abſolutely unſuitable to their apparent deſtination. Not leſs ſo are the ſupports of a coach when they are carved in the figure of Dolphins or Tritons: for what have theſe marine beings to do on dry land? and what ſupport can they be to a coach?

In a column we have an example of both kinds of ornament. Where columns are employ'd in the front of a building to ſupport an entablature, they belong to the firſt kind: where employ'd to connect with detach'd offices, they are rather of the other kind. As a column is a capital ornament in Grecian architecture, it well deſerves to be handled at large.

With reſpect to the form of this ornament, I obſerve, that a circle is a more agreeable figure than a ſquare, a globe than a cube, and a cylinder than a parallelopipedon. This laſt, in the language of architecture, is ſaying that a column is a more agreeable figure than a pilaſter; and for that reaſon, it ought to be preferred, all other circumſtances being equal: another reaſon concurs, that a column annexed to a wall, which is a plain ſurface, makes a greater variety than a pilaſter. There is an additional reaſon for rejecting pilaſters in the external front of a building, ariſing from a principle unfolded above *, *viz.* a tendency in man, to advance every thing to its perfection as well as to its concluſion. If,

* Chap. 8.

If, for example, I ſee a thing obſcurely in a dim light and by disjointed parts, that tendency prompts me, out of the disjointed parts to compoſe an entire whole: I ſuppoſe it to be, for example, a horſe; and my eye-ſight being obedient to the conjecture, I immediately perceive a horſe, almoſt as diſtinctly as in day-light. This principle is applicable to the caſe in hand. The moſt ſuperb front, at a great diſtance, appears a plain ſurface: approaching gradually, we begin to perceive inequalities: theſe inequalities, when we advance a few ſteps more, take on the appearance of pillars: but whether round or ſquare, we are uncertain: our curioſity anticipating our progreſs, cannot reſt in ſuſpenſe: being prompted by the foreſaid tendency to ſuppoſe the moſt complete pillar, or that which is the moſt agreeable to the eye, we immediately perceive, or ſeem to perceive, a number of columns: if upon a near approach we find pilaſters only, the diſappointment makes theſe pilaſters appear diſagreeable; when abſtracted from that circumſtance, they would only have appeared ſomewhat leſs agreeable. But as this deception cannot happen in the inner front incloſing a court, I ſee no reaſon for excluding pilaſters there, when there is any cauſe for preferring them before columns.

With reſpect now to the parts of a column, a bare uniform cylinder without a capital, appears naked; and without a baſe, appears too ticklifhly placed to ſtand firm *: it ought therefore to have ſome finiſhing at the top and at the bottom. Hence the three chief parts of a column, the ſhaft, the baſe, and the capital. Nature undoubtedly requires proportion among theſe parts, but it admits variety of proportion. I ſuſpect that the proportions in uſe have been influenced in ſome degree by the human figure; the capital being conceived as the head, the baſe as the feet. With reſpect to the baſe, indeed, the principle of utility interpoſes to vary it from the

* A column without a baſe is diſagreeable, becauſe it ſeems in a tottering condition; yet a tree without a baſe is agreeable; and the reaſon is, that we know it to be firmly rooted. This obſervation ſhows how much taſte is influenced by reflection.

the human figure: the base must be so proportioned to the whole, as to give the column the appearance of stability.

We find three orders of columns among the Greeks, the Doric, the Ionic, and the Corinthian, distinguished from each other by their destination as well as by their ornaments. It has been warmly disputed, whether any new order can be added to these: some hold the affirmative, and give for instances the Tuscan and Composite: others deny, and maintain that these properly are not distinct orders, but only the original orders with some slight variations. Among writers who do not agree upon any standard for distinguishing the different orders from each other, the dispute can never have an end. All I can find with respect to it of any importance, is what follows.

The only circumstances that can serve to distinguish one order from another, are the form of the column, and its destination. To make the first a distinguishing mark, without regard to the other, would multiply these orders without end; for a colour is not more susceptible of different shades, than a column is of different forms. Destination is more limited, as it leads us to distinguish columns into three kinds or orders; one plain and strong, for the purpose of supporting plain and massy buildings; one delicate and graceful, for supporting buildings of that character; and between these, one for supporting buildings of a middle character. This distinction, which regards the different purposes of a column, is not naturally liable to any objection, considering that it tends also to regulate the form, and in some measure the ornaments, of a column. To enlarge the division by taking in a greater variety of purposes, would be of little use, and, if admitted, would have no end; for from the very nature of the foregoing division, there can be no good reason for adding a fourth order, more than a fifth, a sixth, &c. without any possible circumscription.

To illustrate this doctrine, I make the following observation. If we regard destination only, the Tuscan is of the same order with the Doric, and the Composite with

with the Corinthian; but if we regard form merely, they are of different orders.

The ornaments of theſe three orders ought to be ſo contrived as to make them look like what they are intended for. Plain and ruſtic ornaments would be not a little diſcordant with the elegance of the Corinthian order, and ornaments ſweet and delicate not leſs ſo with the ſtrength of the Doric. For that reaſon, I cannot be altogether ſatisfied with the ornaments of the laſt-mentioned order: if they be not too delicate, they are at leaſt too much multiplied for a pillar in which the character of utility prevails over that of beauty. The crowding of ornaments would be more ſufferable in a column of an oppoſite character. But this is a ſlight objection, and I wiſh I could think the ſame of what follows. The Corinthian order has been the favourite of two thouſand years, and yet I cannot force myſelf to reliſh its capital. The invention of this florid capital is aſcribed to the ſculptor Callimachus, who borrowed the hint from the plant *Acanthus*, growing round a baſket placed accidentally upon it; and in fact the capital under conſideration repreſents pretty accurately a baſket ſo ornamented. This object, or its imitation in ſtone, placed upon a pillar, may look well; but to make it the capital of a pillar intended to ſupport a building, muſt give this pillar an appearance inconſiſtent with its deſtination: an Acanthus, or any tender plant, may require ſupport, but is altogether inſufficient to ſupport any thing heavier than a bee or a butterfly. This capital muſt alſo bear the weight of another objection: to repreſent a vine wreathing round a column with its root ſeemingly in the ground, is natural; but to repreſent an Acanthus, or any plant, as growing on the top of a column, is unnatural. The elegance of this capital did probably at firſt draw a vail over its impropriety; and now by long uſe it has gained an eſtabliſhment, reſpected by every artiſt. Such is the force of cuſtom, even in contradiction to nature!

It will not be gaining much ground to urge, that the baſket, or vaſe if it be inſiſted on, is underſtood to be the capital, and that the ſtems and leaves of the plant are to be conſidered as ornaments merely; for, excepting

ing a plant, nothing can be a more improper ſupport for a great building than a baſket or vaſe even of the firmeſt contexture.

With reſpect to buildings of every ſort, one rule, dictated by utility, is, that they be firm and ſtable. Another rule, dictated by beauty, is, that they alſo appear ſo to the eye: for every thing that appears tottering and in hazard of tumbling down, produceth in the ſpectator the painful emotion of fear, inſtead of the pleaſant emotion of beauty; and, accordingly, it is the great care of the artiſt, that every part of his edifice appear to be well ſupported. Procopius, deſcribing the church of St Sophia in Conſtantinople, one of the wonders of the world, mentions with applauſe a part of the fabric placed above the eaſt front in form of a half-moon, ſo contrived as to inſpire both fear and admiration: for though, ſays he, it be perfectly well ſupported, yet it is ſuſpended in ſuch a manner as if it were to tumble down the next moment. This conceit is a ſort of falſe wit in architecture, which men would naturally be fond of in the infancy of the fine arts. A turret jutting out from an angle in the uppermoſt ſtory of a Gothic tower, is a witticiſm of the ſame kind.

To ſucceed in allegorical or emblematic ornaments, is no ſlight effort of genius; for it is extremely difficult to diſpoſe them ſo in a building as to produce any good effect. The mixing them with realities, makes a miſerable jumble of truth and fiction*. In a baſſo-relievo on Antonin's pillar, rain obtained by the prayers of a Chriſtian legion, is expreſſed by joining to the group of ſoldiers a rainy Jupiter, with water in abundance falling from his head and beard. De Piles, fond of the conceit, carefully informs his reader, that he muſt not take this for a real Jupiter, but for a ſymbol which among the Pagans ſignified rain: he never once conſiders, that a ſymbol or emblem ought not to make part of a group repreſenting real objects or real events, but be ſo detached, as even at firſt view to appear an emblem. But this is not all, nor the chief point: every emblem ought to be rejected that is not clearly expreſſive

* See chap. 20. ſect. 5.

preſſive of its meaning; for if it be in any degree obſcure, it puzzles, and doth not pleaſe. The temples of Antient and Modern Virtue in the gardens of Stow, appear not at firſt view emblematical; and when we are informed that they are ſo, it is not eaſy to gather their meaning: the ſpectator ſees one temple entire, another in ruins; but without an explanatory inſcription, he may gueſs, but cannot be certain, that the former being dedicated to Antient Virtue, the latter to Modern Virtue, are intended a ſatire upon the preſent times. On the other hand, a trite emblem, like a trite ſimile, is diſguſtful *. Nor ought an emblem more than a ſimile to be founded on low or familiar objects; for if theſe be not agreeable as well as their meaning, the emblem upon the whole will not be reliſhed. A room in a dwelling-houſe containing a monument to a deceaſed friend, is dedicated to Melancholy: it has a clock that ſtrikes every minute, to ſignify how ſwiftly time paſſes—upon the monument, weeping figures and other hackney'd ornaments commonly found upon tomb-ſtones, with a ſtuff'd raven in a corner—verſes on death, and other ſerious ſubjects, inſcribed all around. The objects are too familiar, and the artifice too apparent, to produce the intended effect †.

The ſtatue of Moſes ſtriking a rock from which water actually iſſues, is alſo in a falſe taſte; for it is mixing reality with repreſentation. Moſes himſelf may bring water out of the rock, but this miracle is too much for his ſtatue. The ſame objection lies againſt a caſcade where we ſee the ſtatue of a water-god pouring out of his urn real water.

I am more doubtful whether the ſame objection lies againſt the employing ſtatues of animals as ſupports, that

* See chap. 8.

† In the city of Mexico, there was a palace termed *the houſe of Affliction*, where Montezuma retired upon loſing any of his friends, or upon any public calamity. This houſe was better adjuſted to its deſtination: it inſpired a ſort of horror: all was black and diſmal: ſmall windows ſhut up with grates, ſcarce allowing paſſage to the light.

that of a Negro, for example, ſupporting a dial, ſtatues of fiſh ſupporting a baſon of water, *Termes* ſupporting a chimney-piece; for when a ſtone is uſed as a ſupport, where is the incongruity, it will be ſaid, to cut it into the form of an animal? But leaving this doubtful, another objection concurs, That ſuch deſigns muſt in ſome meaſure be diſagreeable, by the appearance of giving pain to a ſenſitive being.

It is obſerved above of gardening, that it contributes to rectitude of manners, by inſpiring gaiety and benevolence. I add another obſervation, That both gardening and architecture contribute to the ſame end, by inſpiring a taſte for neatneſs and elegance. In Scotland, the regularity and poliſh even of a turnpike-road has ſome influence of this kind upon the low people in the neighbourhood. They become fond of regularity and neatneſs; which is diſplay'd, firſt upon their yards and little incloſures, and next within doors. A taſte for regularity and neatneſs thus acquired, is extended by degrees to dreſs, and even to behaviour and manners. The author of a hiſtory of Switzerland, deſcribing the fierce manners of the plebeians of Bern three or four centuries ago, continually inured to ſucceſs in war, which made them inſolently aim at a change of government, in order to eſtabliſh a pure democracy, obſerves, that no circumſtance tended more to ſweeten their manners, and to make them fond of peace, than the public buildings carried on by the ſenate for ornamenting their capital; particularly a fine town-houſe, and a magnificent church, which to this day, ſays our author, ſtands its ground as one of the fineſt in Europe.

## CHAP. XXV. STANDARD OF TASTE.

"THAT there is no diſputing about taſte," meaning taſte in its figurative as well as proper ſenſe, is a ſaying ſo generally received as to have become a proverb. One thing even at firſt view is evident, that if the proverb hold true with reſpect to taſte in its proper meaning, it muſt hold equally true with reſpect to our other external ſenſes: if the pleaſures of the palate diſdain a comparative trial, and reject all criticiſm, the pleaſures

pleaſures of touch, of ſmell, of ſound, and even of ſight, muſt be equally privileged. At that rate, a man is not within the reach of cenſure, even where he prefers the Saracen's head upon a ſign-poſt before the beſt tablature of Raphael, or a rude Gothic tower before the fineſt Grecian building; or where he prefers the ſmell of a rotten carcaſs before that of the moſt odoriferous flower, or jarring diſcords before the moſt exquiſite harmony.

But we cannot ſtop here. If the pleaſures of external ſenſe be exempted from criticiſm, why not every one of our pleaſures, from whatever ſource derived? if taſte in its proper ſenſe cannot be diſputed, there is as little room for diſputing it in its figurative ſenſe. The proverb accordingly comprehends both; and in that large ſenſe may be reſolved into the following general propoſition, That with reſpect to the perceptions of ſenſe, by which ſome objects appear agreeable ſome diſagreeable, there is not ſuch a thing as a *good* or a *bad*, a *right* or a *wrong*; that every man's taſte is to himſelf an ultimate ſtandard without appeal; and conſequently that there is no ground of cenſure againſt any one, if ſuch a one there be, who prefers Blackmore before Homer, ſelfiſhneſs before benevolence, or cowardice before magnanimity.

The proverb in the foregoing examples is indeed carried very far: it ſeems difficult, however, to ſap its foundation, or with ſucceſs to attack it from any quarter: for is not every man equally a judge of what ought to be agreeable or diſagreeable to himſelf? doth it not ſeem whimſical, and perhaps abſurd, to aſſert, that a man *ought not* to be pleaſed when he is, or that he *ought* to be pleaſed when he is not?

This reaſoning may perplex, but will never afford conviction: every one of taſte will reject it as falſe, however unqualified to detect the fallacy. At the ſame time, though no man of taſte will aſſent to the proverb as holding true in every caſe, no man will affirm that it holds true in no caſe: objects there are, undoubtedly, that we may like or diſlike indifferently, without any imputation upon our taſte. Were a philoſopher to make a ſcale for human pleaſures, he would not think of making

ing diviſions without end; but would rank together many pleaſures ariſing perhaps from different objects, either as equally conducing to happineſs, or differing ſo imperceptibly as to make a ſeparation unneceſſary. Nature hath taken this courſe, at leaſt it appears ſo to the generality of mankind. There may be ſubdiviſions without end; but we are only ſenſible of the groſſer diviſions, comprehending each of them various pleaſures equally affecting: to theſe the proverb is applicable in the ſtricteſt ſenſe; for with reſpect to pleaſures of the ſame rank, what ground can there be for preferring one before another? if a preference in fact be given by any individual, it cannot proceed from taſte, but from cuſtom, mitation, or ſome peculiarity of mind.

Nature, in her ſcale of pleaſures, has been ſparing of diviſions: ſhe hath wiſely and benevolently filled every diviſion with many pleaſures; in order that individuals may be contented with their own lot, without envying that of others. Many hands muſt be employ'd to procure us the conveniencies of life; and it is neceſſary that the different branches of buſineſs, whether more or leſs agreeable, be filled with hands: a taſte too refined, would obſtruct that plan; for it would crowd ſome employments, leaving others, not leſs uſeful, totally neglected. In our preſent condition, lucky it is, that the plurality are not delicate in their choice, but fall in readily with the occupations, pleaſures, food, and company, that fortune throws in their way; and if at firſt there be any diſpleaſing circumſtance, cuſtom ſoon makes it eaſy.

The proverb will hold true as to the particulars now explained; but when apply'd in general to every ſubject of taſte, the difficulties to be encountered are inſuperable. We need mention no other but the difficulty that ariſes from human nature itſelf? do we not talk of a good and a bad taſte? of a right and a wrong taſte? and upon that ſuppoſition, do we not, with great confidence, cenſure writers, painters, architects, and every one who deals in the fine arts? Are ſuch criticiſms abſurd, and void of common ſenſe? have the foregoing expreſſions, familiar in all languages and among all people, no ſort of meaning? This can hardly be; for what

what is univerſal, muſt have a foundation in nature. If we can reach that foundation, the ſtandard of taſte will no longer be a ſecret.

We have a ſenſe or conviction of a common nature, not only in our own ſpecies, but in every ſpecies of animals: and our conviction is verified by experience; for there appears a remarkable uniformity among creatures of the ſame kind, and a deformity not leſs remarkable among creatures of different kinds. This common nature is conceived to be a model or ſtandard for each individual that belongs to the kind. Hence it is a matter of wonder, to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the ſpecies, whether in its internal or external conſtruction: a child born with averſion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, not leſs than if born without a mouth, or with more than one *. This conviction of a common nature in every ſpecies, paves the way finely for diſtributing things into *genera* and *ſpecies*; to which we are extremely prone, not only with regard to animals, and perhaps vegetables, where nature has led the way, but alſo with regard to many other things where there is no ground for ſuch diſtribution, but fancy merely.

With reſpect to the common nature of man, in particular, we have a conviction that it is invariable not leſs than univerſal; that it will be the ſame hereafter as at preſent, and as it was in time paſt; the ſame among all nations and in all corners of the earth. Nor are we deceived; becauſe, giving allowance for the difference of culture and gradual refinement of manners, the fact correſponds to our conviction.

We are ſo conſtituted as to conceive that this common nature, is not only invariable, but alſo *perfect* or *right*; and conſequently that individuals *ought* to be made conformable to it. Every remarkable deviation from the ſtandard, makes accordingly an impreſſion upon us of imperfection, irregularity, or diſorder: it is diſagreeable, and raiſes in us a painful emotion: monſtrous births, exciting the curioſity of a philoſopher, fail

* See eſſays on morality and natural religion, part 1. eſſay 2. ch. 1.

fail not at the ſame time to excite averſion in a high degree.

This conviction of a common nature or ſtandard, and of its perfection, accounts clearly for that remarkable conception we have, of a right and a wrong ſenſe or taſte in morals. It accounts not leſs clearly for the conception we have of a right and a wrong ſenſe or taſte in the fine arts. A man who rejects objects generally agreeable, and delights in objects generally diſagreeable, is condemned as a monſter: we diſapprove his taſte as bad or wrong, becauſe we have a clear conception that he deviates from the common ſtandard. If man were ſo framed as not to have any notion of a common ſtandard, the proverb mentioned in the beginning would hold univerſally, not only in the fine arts, but in morals: upon that ſuppoſition, the taſte of every man, with reſpect to both, would to himſelf be an ultimate ſtandard. But as the conviction of a common ſtandard is univerſal, and a branch of our nature, we intuitively conceive a taſte to be right or good if conformable to the common ſtandard, and wrong or bad if diſconformable.

No particular in human nature is more univerſal, than the uneaſineſs a man feels when in matters of importance his opinions are rejected by others: why ſhould difference in opinion create uneaſineſs, more than difference in ſtature, in countenance, or in dreſs? The conviction of a common ſtandard explains the myſtery: every man, generally ſpeaking, taking it for granted that his opinions agree with the common ſenſe of mankind, is therefore diſguſted with thoſe who think differently, not as differing from him, but as differing from the common ſtandard: hence in all diſputes, we find the parties, each of them equally, appealing conſtantly to the common ſenſe of mankind as the ultimate rule or ſtandard. With reſpect to points arbitrary or indifferent, which are not ſuppoſed to be regulated by any ſtandard, individuals are permitted to think for themſelves with impunity: the ſame liberty is not indulged with reſpect to points that are reckoned of moment; for what reaſon, other than that the ſtandard by which theſe are regulated, ought, as we judge, to produce an uniformity of opinion in all men? In a word, to this

conviction of a common ſtandard muſt be wholly attributed the pleaſure we take in thoſe who eſpouſe the ſame principles and opinions with ourſelves, as well as the averſion we have at thoſe who differ from us. In matters left indifferent by the ſtandard, we find nothing of the ſame pleaſure or pain: a bookiſh man, unleſs ſway'd by convenience, reliſheth not the contemplative man more than the active; his friends and companions are choſen indifferently out of either claſs: a painter conſorts with a poet or muſician, as readily as with thoſe of his own art; and one is not the more agreeable to me for loving beef, as I do, nor the leſs agreeable for preferring mutton.

I have ventured to ſay, that my diſguſt is raiſed, not by differing from me, but by differing from what I judge to be the common ſtandard. This point, being of importance, ought to be firmly eſtabliſhed Men, it is true, are prone to flatter themſelves, by taking it for granted that their opinions and their taſte are in all reſpects conformable to the common ſtandard; but there may be exceptions, and experience ſhows there are ſome: there are inſtances without number, of perſons who cling to the groſſer amuſements of gaming, eating, drinking, without having any reliſh for the more elegant pleaſures, ſuch, for example, as are afforded by the fine arts; yet theſe very perſons, talking the ſame language with the reſt of mankind, pronounce in favour of the more elegant pleaſures; and they invariably approve thoſe who have a more refined taſte, being aſhamed of their own as low and ſenſual. It is in vain to think of giving a reaſon for this ſingular impartiality, other than the authority of the common ſtandard with reſpect to the dignity of human nature*: and from the inſtances now given we diſcover, that the authority of that ſtandard, even upon the moſt groveling ſouls, is ſo vigorous, as to prevail over ſelf-partiality, and to make them deſpiſe their own taſte compared with the more elevated taſte of others.

Uniformity of taſte and ſentiment reſulting from our conviction of a common ſtandard, leads to two important

* See chap. 11.

tant final cauſes; the one reſpecting our duty, the other our paſtime. Barely to mention the firſt ſhall be ſufficient, becauſe it does not properly belong to the preſent undertaking. Unhappy it would be for us did not this uniformity prevail in morals: that our actions ſhould uniformly be directed to what is good and againſt what is ill, is the greateſt bleſſing in ſociety; and in order to uniformity of action, uniformity of opinion and ſentiment is indiſpenſable.

With reſpect to paſtime in general, and the fine arts in particular, the final cauſe of uniformity is illuſtrious. Uniformity of taſte gives opportunity for ſumptuous and elegant buildings, for fine gardens, and extenſive embelliſhments, which pleaſe univerſally: and the reaſon is, that without uniformity of taſte, there could not be any ſuitable reward, either of profit or honour, to encourage men of genius to labour in ſuch works, and to advance them toward perfection. The ſame uniformity of taſte is equally neceſſary to perfect the arts of muſic, ſculpture, and painting; and to ſupport the expence they require after they are brought to perfection. Nature is in every particular conſiſtent with herſelf: we are framed by Nature to have a high reliſh for the fine arts, which are a great ſource of happineſs, and extremely friendly to virtue: we are, at the ſame time, framed with uniformity of taſte, to furniſh proper objects for that high reliſh; and if uniformity did not prevail, the fine arts could never have made any figure.

And this ſuggeſts another final cauſe, not leſs illuſtrious. The ſeparation of men into different claſſes, by birth, office, or occupation, however neceſſary, tends to relax the connection that ought to be among members of the ſame ſtate; which bad effect is in ſome meaſure prevented by the acceſs all ranks of people have to public ſpectacles, and to amuſements that are beſt enjoy'd in company. Such meetings, where every one partakes of the ſame pleaſures in common, are no ſlight ſupport to the ſocial affections.

Thus, upon a conviction common to the ſpecies, is erected a ſtandard of taſte, which without heſitation is apply'd to the taſte of every individual. That ſtand-

ard, ascertaining what actions are right what wrong, what proper what improper, hath enabled moralists to establish rules for our conduct from which no person is allow'd to swerve. We have the same standard for ascertaining in all the fine arts, what is beautiful or ugly, high or low, proper or improper, proportioned or disproportioned: and here, as in morals, we justly condemn every taste that deviates from what is thus ascertained by the common standard.

That there exists a rule or standard in nature for trying the taste of individuals, in the fine arts as well as in morals, is a discovery; but is not sufficient to complete the task undertaken. A branch still more important remains upon hand; which is, to ascertain what is truly the standard of nature, that we may not lie open to have a false standard imposed on us But what means shall be employ'd for bringing to light this natural standard? This is not obvious: for when we have recourse to general opinions and general practice, we are betray'd into endless perplexities. History informs us, that nothing is more variable than taste in the fine arts: judging by numbers, the Gothic taste of architecture must be preferred before that of Greece, and the Chinese taste probably before either: it would be endless to recount the various tastes that have prevailed in different ages with respect to gardening, and still prevail in different countries: despising the modest colouring of nature, women of fashion in France daub their cheeks with a red powder: nay, an unnatural swelling in the neck, peculiar to the inhabitants of the Alps, is relished by that people. But we ought not to be discouraged with such untoward instances, when we find not greater uniformity in moral opinions: was it not among some nations held lawful for a man to sell his children for slaves, to expose them in their infancy to wild beasts, and to punish them for the crime of their parents? was any thing more common than to murder an enemy in cold blood? nay more, did not law once authorise the abominable practice of human sacrifices, not less impious than immoral? Such aberrations from the rules of morality prove only, that men, originally savage and brutal, acquire not rationality nor any delicacy

licacy of taſte till they be long diſciplined in ſociety. To aſcertain the rules of morality, we appeal not to the common ſenſe of ſavages, but of men in their more perfect ſtate: and we make the ſame appeal in forming the rules that ought to govern the fine arts: in neither can we ſafely rely on a local or tranſitory taſte; but on what is the moſt univerſal and the moſt laſting among polite nations.

In this very manner, a ſtandard for morals has been aſcertained with a good deal of accuracy, and is daily apply'd by able judges with general ſatisfaction. The ſtandard of taſte in the fine arts, is not yet brought to ſuch perfection; and we can account for its ſlower progreſs. The ſenſe of right and wrong in actions is vivid and diſtinct, becauſe its objects are clearly diſtinguiſhable from each other; whereas the ſenſe of right and wrong in the fine arts is faint and wavering, becauſe its objects are commonly not ſo clearly diſtinguiſhable from each other. And there appears to me a ſtriking final cauſe in thus diſtinguiſhing the moral ſenſe from the ſenſe of right and wrong in the fine arts. The former, as a rule of conduct, and as a law we ought to obey, muſt be clear and authoritative. The latter is not intitled to the ſame privilege, becauſe it contributes to our pleaſure and amuſement only: were it ſtrong and lively, it would uſurp upon our duty, and call off the attention from matters of greater moment: were it clear and authoritative, it would baniſh all difference of taſte, leaving no diſtinction between a refined taſte and one that is not ſo; which would put an end to rivalſhip, and conſequently to all improvement.

But to return to our ſubject: However languid and cloudy the common ſenſe of mankind may be as to the fine arts, it is notwithſtanding the only ſtandard in theſe as well as in morals. True it is indeed, that in gathering the common ſenſe of mankind, more circumſpection is requiſite with reſpect to the fine arts than with reſpect to morals: upon the latter, any perſon may be conſulted; but as to the former, a wary choice is neceſſary, for to collect votes indifferently would certainly miſlead us. Thoſe who depend for food on bodily labour, are totally void of taſte; of ſuch a taſte at leaſt as can be

of uſe in the fine arts. This conſideration bars the greater part of mankind; and of the remaining part, many by a corrupted taſte are unqualified for voting. The common ſenſe of mankind muſt then be confined to the few that fall not under theſe exceptions. But as ſuch ſelection ſeems to throw matters again into uncertainty, we muſt be more explicit upon this branch of our ſubject.

Nothing tends more than voluptuouſneſs to corrupt the whole internal frame, and to vitiate our taſte, not only in the fine arts, but even in morals: voluptuouſneſs never fails, in courſe of time, to extinguiſh all the ſympathetic affections, and to bring on a beaſtly ſelfiſhneſs, which leaves nothing of man but the ſhape: about excluding ſuch perſons there will be no diſpute. Let us next bring under trial, the opulent who delight in expence: riches rouſe the appetite for ſuperiority and reſpect; which in that caſe is vented upon coſtly furniture, numerous attendants, a princely dwelling, ſumptuous feaſts, every thing ſuperb and gorgeous, to amaze and humble all beholders: ſimplicity, elegance, propriety, and things natural, ſweet, or amiable, are deſpiſed or neglected; for theſe are not appropriated to the rich, nor make a figure in the public eye; in a word, nothing is reliſhed, but what ſerves to gratify pride, by an imaginary exaltation of the poſſeſſor above thoſe who ſurround him. Such ſentiments contract the heart, and make every principle give way to ſelf-love: benevolence and public ſpirit, with all their refined emotions, are little felt, and leſs regarded; and if theſe be excluded, there can be no place for the faint and delicate emotions of the fine arts.

The excluſion of claſſes ſo many and numerous, reduces within a narrow compaſs thoſe who are qualified to be judges in the fine arts. Many circumſtances are neceſſary to form ſuch a judge: there muſt be a good natural taſte; that is, a taſte approaching, at leaſt in ſome degree, to the delicacy of taſte above deſcribed*: that taſte muſt be improved by education, reflection, and

* Chap. 2. part 2.

and experience *: it muſt be preſerved alive in a regular courſe of life, by uſing the goods of fortune with moderation, and by following the dictates of improved nature, which give welcome to every rational pleaſure without deviating into exceſs. This is the tenor of life which of all contributes the moſt to refinement of taſte; and the ſame tenor of life contributes the moſt to happineſs in general.

If there appear much uncertainty in a ſtandard that requires ſo painful and intricate a ſelection, we may poſſibly be reconciled to it by the following conſidera-



* That theſe particulars are uſeful, it may be ſaid neceſſary, for acquiring a diſcerning taſte in the fine arts, will appear from the following facts, which ſhow the influence of experience ſingly. Thoſe who live in the world and in good company, are quick ſighted with reſpect to every defect or irregularity in behaviour: the very ſlighteſt ſingularity in motion, in ſpeech, or in dreſs, which to a peaſant would be inviſible, eſcapes not their obſervation. The moſt minute differences in the human countenance, ſo minute as to be far beyond the reach of words, are diſtinctly perceived by the plaineſt perſon; while, at the ſame time, the generality have very little diſcernment in the faces of other animals to which they are leſs accuſtomed: ſheep, for example, appear to have all the ſame face, except to the ſhepherd, who knows every individual in his flock, as he does his relations and neighbours. The very populace in Athens were critics in language, in pronunciation, and even in eloquence, harangues being their daily entertainment. In Rome, at preſent, the moſt illiterate ſhopkeeper is a better judge of ſtatues and of pictures, than perſons of the higheſt education in London. Theſe facts afford convincing evidence, that a diſcerning taſte depends ſtill more on experience than on nature. But theſe facts merit peculiar regard for another reaſon, that they open to us a ſure method for improving our taſte in the fine arts; which, with reſpect to thoſe who have leiſure for improvements, ought to be a powerful incitement to cultivate a taſte in theſe arts: an occupation that cannot fail to embelliſh their manners, and to ſweeten ſociety.

tion, That, with reſpect to the fine arts, there is leſs difference of taſte than is commonly imagined. Nature hath marked all her works with indelible characters of high or low, plain or elegant, ſtrong or weak: theſe, if at all perceived, are ſeldom miſapprehended; and the ſame marks are equally perceptible in works of art. A defective taſte is incurable; and it hurts none but the poſſeſſor, becauſe it carries no authority to impoſe upon others. I know not if there be ſuch a thing as a taſte naturally bad or wrong; a taſte, for example, that prefers a groveling pleaſure before one that is high and elegant: groveling pleaſures are never preferred; they are only made welcome by thoſe who know no better. Differences about objects of taſte, it is true, are endleſs: but they generally concern trifles, or poſſibly matters of equal rank, where preference may be given either way with impunity: if, on any occaſion, perſons differ where they ought not, a depraved taſte will readily be diſcovered on one or other ſide, occaſioned by imitation, cuſtom, or corrupted manners, ſuch as are deſcribed above. And conſidering that every individual partakes of a common nature, what is there that ſhould occaſion any wide difference in taſte or ſentiment? By the principles that conſtitute the ſenſitive part of our nature, a wonderful uniformity is preſerved in the emotions and feelings of the different races of men; the ſame object making upon every perſon the ſame impreſſion, the ſame in kind, if not in degree. There have been, as above obſerved, aberrations from theſe principles; but ſoon or late they prevail, and reſtore the wanderer to the right road.

And this leads to the only remaining mean that occurs to me for aſcertaining the common ſenſe of mankind; and let it be obſerved, that I throw it out, not in deſpair, but in great confidence of ſucceſs. As the taſte of every individual ought to be governed by the principles above mentioned, an appeal to theſe principles muſt neceſſarily be deciſive of every controverſy that can ariſe upon matters of taſte. In general, every doubt with relation to the common ſenſe of man, or ſtandard of taſte, may be cleared by the ſame appeal; and to unfold theſe principles is the declared purpoſe of the preſent undertaking.

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# APPENDIX.

## TERMS DEFINED OR EXPLAINED.

1. EVERY thing we perceive or are conſcious of, whether a being or a quality, a paſſion or an action, is with reſpect to the percipient termed an *object*. Some objects appear to be internal, or within the mind; paſſion, for example, thinking, volition: ſome external; ſuch as every object of ſight, of hearing, of ſmell, of touch, of taſte.

2. That act of the mind which makes known to me an external object, is termed *perception*. That act of the mind which makes known to me an internal object, is termed *conſciouſneſs*. The power or faculty from which conſciouſneſs proceeds, is termed an *internal ſenſe*. The power or faculty from which perception proceeds, is termed an *external ſenſe*. This diſtinction refers to the objects of our knowledge; for the ſenſes, whether external or internal, are all of them powers or faculties of the mind.

3. But as ſelf is an object that cannot be termed either external or internal, the faculty by which I have knowledge of myſelf, is a ſenſe that cannot properly be termed either internal or external.

4. By the eye we perceive figure, colour, motion, *&c.*: by the ear we perceive the different qualities of ſound, high, low, loud, ſoft: by touch we perceive rough, ſmooth, hot, cold, *&c.*: by taſte we perceive ſweet, ſour, bitter, *&c.*: by ſmell we perceive fragrant, fetid, *&c.* Theſe qualities partake the common nature of all qualities, that they are not capable of an independent exiſtence, but muſt belong to ſome being of which they are properties. A being with reſpect to its qualities is termed a *ſubject*, or *ſubſtratum*; becauſe it ſupports its qualities, which are ſpread, as it were, upon it. Every ſubſtratum of viſible qualities, is termed *ſubſtance*, and of tangible qualities, *body*.

5. Subſtance and ſound are perceived exiſting at a diſtance from the organ; often at a conſiderable diſtance. But ſmell, touch, and taſte, are perceived as exiſting at the organ of ſenſe.

6. All the objects of internal ſenſe are attributed: witneſs deliberation, reaſoning, reſolution, willing, conſenting, which are internal actions; as alſo paſſions and emotions, which are internal agitations. With regard to the former, I am conſcious of being active; with regard to the latter, I am conſcious of being paſſive.

7. Again, we are conſcious of internal action as in the head; of paſſions and emotions as in the heart.

8. Many actions may be exerted internally, and many effects produced, of which we are not conſcious: when we inveſtigate the ultimate cauſe of the motion of the blood, and of other internal motions upon which life depends, it is the moſt probable opinion that ſome internal power is the cauſe; and if ſo, we are ſo far unconſcious of the operations of that power. But conſciouſneſs being imply'd in the very meaning of deliberating, reaſoning, reſolving, willing, conſenting, ſuch operations cannot eſcape our knowledge. The ſame is the caſe of paſſions and emotions; for no internal agitation is denominated a paſſion or emotion, but what we are conſcious of.

9. The mind is not always the ſame: by turns it is chearful, melancholy, calm, peeviſh, &c. Theſe differences may not improperly be denominated *tones*. An object, by making an impreſſion, produceth an emotion or paſſion, which again gives the mind a certain tone ſuited to it.

10. Perception and ſenſation are commonly reckoned ſynonymous terms, ſignifying that internal act by which external objects are made known to us. *Perceiving* is a general term for hearing, ſeeing, taſting, touching, ſmelling; and therefore *perception* ſignifies every internal act by which we are made acquainted with external objects: thus we are ſaid to perceive a certain animal, a certain colour, ſound, taſte, ſmell, &c. *Senſation* properly ſignifies that internal act by which we are made conſcious of pleaſure or pain felt at the organ of ſenſe: thus we have a ſenſation of the pleaſure ariſing from warmth, from a fragrant ſmell, from a ſweet taſte; and of the pain ariſing from a wound, from a fetid ſmell, from a diſagreeable taſte. In perception, my attention is fixed upon the external object: in ſenſation, it is fixed upon the pleaſure or pain I feel.

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The terms *perception* and *ſenſation* are ſometimes employ'd to ſignify the objects of perception and ſenſation. Perception in that ſenſe is a general term for every external thing we perceive; and ſenſation a general term for every pleaſure and pain felt at the organ of ſenſe.

11. Conception is different from perception. The latter includes a conviction of the reality of its object: the former does not; for I can conceive the moſt extravagant ſtories told in a romance, without having any conviction of their reality Conception differs alſo from imagination. By the power of fancy I can imagine a golden mountain, or an ebony ſhip with ſails and ropes of ſilk. When I deſcribe a picture of that kind to another, the idea he forms of it is termed a *conception*. Imagination is active, conception is paſſive.

12. Feeling, beſide denoting one of the external ſenſes, is a general term, ſignifying that internal act by which we are made conſcious of our pleaſures and our pains; for it is not limited, as ſenſation is, to any one ſort. Thus, feeling being the genus of which ſenſation is a ſpecies, their meaning is the ſame when apply'd to pleaſure and pain felt at the organ of ſenſe; and accordingly we ſay indifferently, "I feel pleaſure from "heat, and pain from cold," or, "I have a ſenſation "of pleaſure from heat, and of pain from cold." But the meaning of feeling, as is ſaid, is much more extenſive: it is proper to ſay, I feel pleaſure in a ſumptuous building, in love, in friendſhip; and pain in loſing a child, in revenge, in envy: ſenſation is not properly apply'd to any of theſe.

The term *feeling* is frequently uſed in a leſs proper ſenſe to ſignify what we feel or are conſcious of; and in that ſenſe it is a general term for all our paſſions and emotions, and for all our other pleaſures and pains.

13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impreſſion be made upon our body, is probable from reaſon, and is aſcertained by experience. But it is not neceſſary that we be made ſenſible of the impreſſion: in touching, it is true, in taſting, and in ſmelling, we are ſenſible of the impreſſion; but not in ſeeing and hearing. We know indeed from experiments, that before

fore we perceive a viſible object, its image is ſpread upon the *retina tunica*; and that before we perceive a ſound, an impreſſion is made upon the drum of the ear: but we are not conſcious either of the organic image or of the organic impreſſion; nor are we conſcious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception: all we can ſay, is, that we ſee that river, or hear that trumpet *.

14. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I recall an object of ſight in that manner, it appears to me preciſely the ſame as in the original ſurvey, only more faint and obſcure. For example, having ſeen yeſterday a ſpreading oak growing on the brink of a river, I endeavour to recall theſe objects to my mind. How is this operation performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of them or repreſentative image? Not ſo. I tranſport myſelf ideally to the place where I ſaw the tree and river yeſterday; upon which I have a perception of theſe objects, ſimilar in all reſpects to the perception I had when I viewed them with my eyes, only more obſcure. And in this recollection, I am not conſcious of a picture or repreſentative image, more than in the original ſurvey: the perception is of the tree and river themſelves, as at firſt. I confirm this by another experiment. After attentively ſurveying a fine ſtatue, I cloſe my eyes. What follows? The ſame object continues, without

* Yet a ſingular opinion, that impreſſions are the only objects of perception, has been eſpouſed by ſome philoſophers of no mean rank; not attending to the foregoing peculiarity in the ſenſes of ſeeing and hearing, that we perceive objects without being conſcious of an organic impreſſion, or of any impreſſion. See the Treatiſe upon human nature: where we find the following paſſage, book 1. p. 4. ſect. 2. "Properly "ſpeaking, it is not our body we perceive when we "regard our limbs and members; ſo that the aſcri"bing a real and corporeal exiſtence to theſe impreſſi"ons, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as "difficult to explain," &c.

without any difference but that it is less distinct than formerly *. This indistinct secondary perception of an object,

* This experiment, which every one may make and reiterate till entire satisfaction be obtained, is of greater importance than at first view may appear; for it strikes at the root of a celebrated doctrine that for more than two thousand years has misled many philosophers. This doctrine as delivered by Aristotle is in substance, "That "of every object of thought there must be in the mind "some form, phantasm, or species; that things sensi- "ble are perceived and remembered by means of sen- "sible phantasms, and things intelligible by intelligible "phantasms; and that these species or phantasms have "the form of the object without the matter, as the "impression of a seal upon wax has the form of the seal "without its matter" The followers of Aristotle add, "That the sensible and intelligible forms of things, are "sent forth from the things themselves, and make im- "pressions upon the passive intellect, which impressions "are perceived by the active intellect." This notion differs very little from that of Epicurus, which is, "That "all things send forth, constantly and in every direction, "slender ghosts or films of themselves, (*tenuia simulacra*, "as expressed by his commentator Lucretius); which "striking upon the mind, are the means of perception, "dreaming," *&c.* Des Cartes, bent to oppose Aristo- tle, rejects the doctrine of sensible and intelligible phan- tasms; maintaining however the same doctrine in effect, *viz.* That we perceive nothing external but by means of some image either in the brain or in the mind: and these images he terms *ideas*. According to these philo- sophers, we perceive nothing immediately but phantasms or ideas; and from these we infer, by reasoning, the existence of external objects. Locke, adopting this doc- trine, employs almost the whole of his book about ideas. He holds, that we cannot perceive, remember, nor ima- gine, any thing, but by having an idea or image of it in the mind. He agrees with Des Cartes, that we can have no knowledge of things external but what we ac- quire by reasoning upon their ideas or images in the mind;

object, is termed an *idea*. And therefore the precise and accurate definition of an idea, in contradistinction to an original perception, is, " That perception of a " real

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mind; taking it for granted, that we are conscious of these ideas or images, and of nothing else. Those who talk the most intelligibly explain the doctrine thus: When I see in a mirror a man standing behind me, the immediate object of my sight is his image, without which I could not see him: in like manner, when I see a tree or a house, there must be an image of these objects in my brain or in my mind; which image is the immediate object of my perception; and by means of that image I perceive the external object.

One would not readily suspect any harm in this ideal system, other than the leading us into a labyrinth of metaphysical errors in order to account for our knowledge of external objects, which is more truly and more simply accounted for by direct plain perception. And yet some late writers have been able to extract from it death and destruction to the whole world, levelling all down to a mere chaos of ideas. Dr Berkeley, upon authority of the philosophers named, taking for granted that we cannot perceive any object but what is in the mind, discovered, that the reasoning employ'd by Des Cartes and Locke to infer the existence of external objects, is inconclusive; and upon that discovery ventured, against common sense, to annihilate totally the material world. And a later writer discovering that Berkeley's arguments might with equal success be applied against immaterial beings, ventures still more boldly to reject by the lump the immaterial world as well as the material; leaving nothing in nature but images or ideas floating *in vacuo*, without affording them a single mind for shelter or support.

When such wild and extravagant consequences can be drawn from the ideal system, it might have been expected, that no man who is not crazy would have ventured to erect such a superstructure, till he should first be certain beyond all doubt of a solid foundation. And yet upon examination, we find the foundation of this terrible doctrine

"real object which is raised in the mind by the power "of memory." Every thing we have any knowledge of, whether internal or external, passions, emotions, thinking,

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doctrine to be no better than a shallow metaphysical argument, *viz.* "That no being can act but where it is; "and, consequently, that it cannot act upon any sub- "ject at a distance." This argument possesses indeed one eminent advantage, that its obscurity, like that of an oracle, is apt to impose upon the reader, who is willing to consider it as a demonstration, because he does not clearly see the fallacy. The best way to give it a fair trial, is to draw it out of its obscurity, and to state it in a clear light, as follows. "No subject can be perceived "unless it act upon the mind; but no distant subject can "act upon the mind, because no being can act but "where it is; and, therefore, the immediate object of "perception must be something united to the mind, so "as to be able to act upon it." Here the argument completed in all its parts seems to be justly stated; and from it is derived the supposed necessity of phantasms or ideas united to the mind, as the only objects of perception. It is singularly unlucky for this argument, that it concludes directly against the very system of which it is the only foundation; for how can phantasms or ideas be raised in the mind by things at a distance, if things at a distance cannot act upon the mind? I say more, that it assumes a proposition as true, without evidence, *viz.* That no distant subject can act upon the mind. This proposition undoubtedly requires evidence, for it is not intuitively certain. And, therefore, till the proposition be demonstrated, every man without scruple may rely upon the conviction of his senses, that he hears and sees things at a distance.

But I venture a bolder stroke, which is, to shew that the proposition is false. Admitting that no being can act but where it is, is there any thing more simple or more common, than the acting upon subjects at a distance by intermediate means? This holds in fact with respect both to seeing and hearing. When I see a tree, for example, rays of light are reflected from the tree to my eye,

thinking, reſolving, willing, heat, cold, *&c.* as well as external objects, may be recalled as above, by the power of memory *.

15. The original perceptions of external objects, are either ſimple or complex. Some ſounds are ſo ſimple as not to be reſolvable into parts, and the perception of ſuch

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eye, forming a picture upon the *retina tunica:* but the object perceived is the tree itſelf, not the rays of light, nor the picture. In this manner diſtant objects are perceived, without any action of the object upon the mind, or of the mind upon the object. Hearing is in a ſimilar caſe: the air put in motion by thunder, makes an impreſſion upon the drum of the ear; but this impreſſion is not what I hear, it is the thunder itſelf by means of that impreſſion.

With reſpect to viſion in particular, we are profoundly ignorant by what means and in what manner the picture on the *retina tunica* contributes to produce a ſight of the object. One thing only is clear, that as we have no knowledge of that picture, it is as natural to conceive that it ſhould be made the inſtrument of diſcovering the external object, and not itſelf, as of diſcovering itſelf only, and not the external object.

Upon the chimerical conſequences drawn from the ideal ſyſtem, I ſhall make but a ſingle reflection. Nature determines us neceſſarily to rely on the veracity of our ſenſes; and upon their evidence the exiſtence of external objects is to us a matter of intuitive knowledge and abſolute certainty. Vain therefore is the attempt of Dr Berkeley and of his followers, to deceive us, by a metaphyſical ſubtilty, into a diſbelief of what we cannot entertain even the ſlighteſt doubt.

* From this definition of an idea, the following propoſition muſt be evident, That there can be no ſuch thing as an innate idea. If the original perception of an object be not innate, which is obvious, it is not leſs obvious, that the idea or ſecondary perception of that object cannot be innate. And yet, to prove this ſelf-evident propoſition, Locke has beſtow'd a whole book of his treatiſe upon human underſtanding. So neceſſary it is to give

ſuch ſounds muſt be equally ſo: the like with reſpect to the perception of certain taſtes and ſmells. A perception of touch, is generally compounded of the more ſimple perceptions of hardneſs or ſoftneſs, joined with ſmoothneſs or roughneſs, heat or cold, &c. But of all the perceptions of external ſenſe, that of a viſible object is the moſt complex; becauſe the eye takes in more particulars than any other organ. A tree is compoſed of a trunk, branches, leaves; it has colour, figure, ſize. Every one of theſe ſeparately produceth a perception in the mind of the ſpectator, which are all combined into the complex perception of the tree.

16. The original perception of an object of ſight, is more complete, lively, and diſtinct, than that of any other object. And for that reaſon, an idea or ſecondary perception of a viſible object, is alſo more complete, lively, and diſtinct, than that of any other object. A fine paſſage in muſic, may, for a moment, be recalled to the mind with tolerable accuracy; but, after the ſhorteſt interval, it becomes not leſs obſcure than the ideas of the other objects mentioned.

17. As the range of an individual is commonly within narrow bounds of ſpace, it rarely happens, that every thing neceſſary to be known comes under our own perceptions; which therefore are a proviſion too ſcanty for the purpoſes of life. Language is an admirable contrivance for ſupplying that deficiency; for by language every man may communicate his perceptions to all: and the ſame may be done by painting and other imitative arts. The facility of communication is in proportion to the livelineſs of the ideas; eſpecially in language, which hitherto has not arrived at greater perfection than to expreſs clear and lively ideas: and hence it is, that poets and orators, who are extremely ſucceſsful in deſcribing objects of ſight, find objects of the other

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give accurate definitions, and ſo preventive of diſpute are definitions when accurate. Dr Berkeley has taken great pains to prove another propoſition equally evident, That there can be no ſuch thing as a general idea: all our original perceptions are of particular objects, and our ſecondary perceptions or ideas muſt be equally ſo.

other ſenſes too faint and obſcure for language. An idea thus acquired of an object at ſecond hand, ought to be diſtinguiſhed from an idea of memory, though their reſemblance has occaſioned the ſame term *idea* to be apply'd to both; which is to be regretted, becauſe ambiguity in the ſignification of words is a great obſtruction to accuracy of conception. Thus Nature hath furniſhed the means of multiplying ideas without end, and of providing every individual with a ſufficient ſtock to anſwer, not only the neceſſities, but even the elegancies of life.

18. Further, man is endued with a ſort of creative power: he can fabricate images of things that have no exiſtence. The materials employ'd in this operation, are ideas of ſight, which he can take to pieces and combine into new forms at pleaſure: their complexity and vivacity make them fit materials. But a man hath no ſuch power over any of his other ideas, whether of the external or internal ſenſes: he cannot, after the utmoſt effort, combine theſe into new forms, being too obſcure for that operation. An image thus fabricated cannot be called a ſecondary perception, not being derived from an original perception: the poverty of language however, as in the caſe immediately above mentioned, has occaſioned the ſame term *idea* to be apply'd to all. This ſingular power of fabricating images without any foundation in reality, is diſtinguiſhed by the name *imagination*.

19. As ideas are the chief materials employ'd in reaſoning and reflecting, it is of conſequence that their nature and differences be underſtood. It appears now, that ideas may be diſtinguiſhed into three kinds; firſt, Ideas derived from original perceptions, properly termed *ideas of memory*; ſecond, Ideas communicated by language or other ſigns; and, third, Ideas of imagination. Theſe ideas differ from each other in many reſpects; but chiefly in reſpect that they proceed from different cauſes: the firſt kind is derived from real exiſtences that have been objects of our ſenſes: language is the cauſe of the ſecond, or any other ſign that has the ſame power with language: and a man's imagination is to himſelf the cauſe of the third. It is ſcarce neceſſary to

to add, that an idea, originally of imagination, being convey'd to others by language, or any other vehicle, becomes in their mind an idea of the ſecond kind; and again, that an idea of this kind, being afterwards recalled to the mind, becomes in that circumſtance an idea of memory.

20. We are not ſo conſtituted as to perceive objects with indifference: theſe, with very few exceptions, appear agreeable or diſagreeable; and at the ſame time raiſe in us pleaſant or painful emotions. With reſpect to external objects in particular, we diſtinguiſh thoſe which produce organic impreſſions, from thoſe which affect us from a diſtance. When we touch a ſoft and ſmooth body, we have a pleaſant feeling as at the place of contact; which feeling we diſtinguiſh not, at leaſt not accurately, from the agreeableneſs of the body itſelf; and the ſame holds in general with regard to all organic impreſſions. It is otherwiſe in hearing and ſeeing: a ſound is perceived as in itſelf agreeable, and raiſes in the hearer a pleaſant emotion: an object of ſight appears in itſelf agreeable, and raiſes in the ſpectator a pleaſant emotion. Theſe are accurately diſtinguiſhed: the pleaſant emotion is felt as within the mind; the agreeableneſs of the object is placed upon the object, and is perceived as one of its qualities or properties. The agreeable appearance of an object of ſight, is termed *beauty*; and the diſagreeable appearance of ſuch an object is termed *uglineſs*.

21. But though beauty and uglineſs, in their proper and genuine ſignification, are confined to objects of ſight; yet in a more lax and figurative ſignification, they are apply'd to objects of the other ſenſes: they are ſometimes apply'd even to abſtract terms; for it is not unuſual to ſay, *a beautiful theorem*, *a beautiful conſtitution of government*.

22. A line compoſed by a ſingle rule, is perceived and ſaid to be regular: a ſtraight line, a parabola, a hyperbola, the circumference of a circle, and of an ellipſe, are all of them regular lines. A figure compoſed by a ſingle rule, is perceived and ſaid to be regular: a circle, a ſquare, a hexagon, an equilateral triangle, are regular figures, being compoſed by a ſingle rule that determines

determines the form of each. When the form of a line or of a figure is aſcertained by a ſingle rule that leaves nothing arbitrary, the line and the figure are ſaid to be perfectly regular; which is the caſe of the figures now mentioned, and the caſe of a ſtraight line and of the circumference of a circle. A figure and a line that require more than one rule for their conſtruction, or that have any of their parts left arbitrary, are not perfectly regular: a parallelogram and a rhomb are leſs regular than a ſquare; the parallelogram being ſubjected to no rule as to the length of ſides, other than that the oppoſite ſides be equal; the rhomb being ſubjected to no rule as to its angles, other than that the oppoſite angles be equal: for the ſame reaſon, the circumference of an ellipſe, the form of which is ſuſceptible of much variety, is leſs regular than that of a circle.

23. Regularity, properly ſpeaking, belongs, like beauty, to objects of ſight: and, like beauty, it is alſo apply'd figuratively to other objects: thus we ſay, *a regular government*, *a regular compoſition of muſic*, and, *regular diſcipline*.

24. When two figures are compoſed of ſimilar parts, they are ſaid to be uniform. Perfect uniformity is where the conſtituent parts of two figures are equal: thus two cubes of the ſame dimenſions are perfectly uniform in all their parts. Uniformity leſs perfect is, where the parts mutually correſpond, but without being equal: the uniformity is imperfect between two ſquares or cubes of unequal dimenſions; and ſtill more ſo between a ſquare and a parallelogram.

25 Uniformity is alſo applicable to the conſtituent parts of the ſame figure. The conſtituent parts of a ſquare are perfectly uniform: its ſides are equal and its angles are equal. Wherein then differs regularity from uniformity? for a figure compoſed of uniform parts muſt undoubtedly be regular. Regularity is predicated of a figure conſidered as a whole compoſed of uniform parts: uniformity is predicated of theſe parts as related to each other by reſemblance: we ſay, a ſquare is a regular, not an uniform, figure; but with reſpect to the conſtituent parts of a ſquare, we ſay not, that they are regular, but that they are uniform.

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26 In things deſtined for the ſame uſe, as legs, arms, eyes, windows, ſpoons, we expect uniformity. Proportion ought to govern parts intended for different uſes: we require a certain proportion between a leg and an arm; in the baſe, the ſhaft, the capital of a pillar; and in the length, the breadth, the height of a room: ſome proportion is alſo required in different things intimately connected, as between a dwelling houſe, the garden, and the ſtables: but we require no proportion among things lightly connected, as between the table a man writes on and the dog that follows him. Proportion and uniformity never coincide: things equal are uniform; but proportion is never applied to them: thy four ſides and angles of a ſquare are equal and perfectly uniform; but we ſay not that they are proportionae Thus, proportion always implies inequality or difference; but then it implies it to a certain degree only: the moſt agreeable proportion reſembles a *maximum* in mathematics; a greater or leſs inequality or difference is leſs agreeable.

27. Order regards various particulars. Firſt, in tracing or ſurveying objects, we are directed by a ſenſe of order: we perceive it to be more orderly, that we ſhould paſs from a principal to its acceſſories, and from a whole to its parts, than in the contrary direction. Next, with reſpect to the poſition of things, a ſenſe of order directs us to place together things intimately connected. Thirdly, in placing things that have no natural connection, that order appears the moſt perfect where the particulars are made to bear the ſtrongeſt relation to each other that poſition can give them. This parallelism is the ſtrongeſt relation that poſition can beſtow upon ſtraight lines. if they be ſo placed as by production to interſect, the relation is leſs perfect. A large body in the middle, and two equal bodies of leſs ſize, one on each ſide, is an order that produces the ſtrongeſt relation the bodies are ſuſceptible of by poſition: the relation between the two equal bodies would be ſtronger by juxtapoſition; but they would not both have the ſame relation to the third.

28 The beauty or agreeableneſs of a viſible object, is perceived as one of its qualities; which holds, not only

only in the original perception, but alſo in the ſecondary perception or idea: and hence the pleaſure that ariſes from the idea of a beautiful object. An idea of imagination is alſo pleaſant, though in a lower degree than an idea of memory, where the objects are of the ſame kind; for an evident reaſon, that the former is more diſtinct and lively than the latter. But this inferiority in ideas of imagination, is more than compenſated by their greatneſs and variety, which are boundleſs; for the imagination acting without controul, can fabricate ideas of finer viſible objects, of more noble and heroic actions, of greater wickedneſs, of more ſurpriſing events, than ever in fact exiſted: and in communicating ſuch ideas by words, painting, ſculpture, *&c.* the influence of the imagination is not leſs extenſive than great.

29. In the nature of every man, there is ſomewhat original, that ſerves to diſtinguiſh him from others, that tends to form a character, and to make him meek or fiery, candid or deceitful, reſolute or timorous, chearful or moroſe. This original bent, termed *diſpoſition*, muſt be diſtinguiſhed from a *principle*: the latter, ſignifying a law of human nature, makes part of the common nature of man; the former makes part of the nature of this or that man. *Propenſity* is a name common to both; for it ſignifies a principle as well as a diſpoſition

30. *Affection*, ſignifying a ſettled bent of mind toward a particular being or thing, occupies a middle place between diſpoſition on the one hand, and paſſion on the other. It is clearly diſtinguiſhable from diſpoſition, which being a branch of one's nature originally, muſt exiſt before there can be an opportunity to exert it upon any particular object; whereas affection can never be original, becauſe having a ſpecial relation to a particular object, it cannot exiſt till the object have once at leaſt been preſented. It is not leſs clearly diſtinguiſhable from paſſion, which depending on the real or ideal preſence of its object, vaniſhes with its object; whereas affection, once ſettled on a perſon, is a laſting connection; and, like other connections, ſubſiſts even when we do not think of the perſon. A familiar example will clear the whole. There may be in my mind a diſ-

a diſpoſition to gratitude, which, through want of an object, happens never to be exerted; and which therefore is never diſcovered even by myſelf. Another who has the ſame diſpoſition, meets with a kindly office that makes him grateful to his benefactor: an intimate connection is formed between them, termed *affection*; which, like other connections, has a permanent exiſtence, though not always in view. The affection, for the moſt part, lies dormant, till an opportunity offer of exerting it: in that circumſtance, it is converted into the paſſion of gratitude; and the opportunity is greedily ſeized for teſtifying gratitude in the warmeſt manner.

31. *Averſion*, I think, is oppoſed to affection, and not to deſire, as it commonly is. We have an affection to one perſon; we have an averſion to another: the former diſpoſes us to do good to its object, the latter to do ill.

32. What is a ſentiment? It is not a perception; for a perception ſignifies the act by which we become conſcious of external objects. It is not conſciouſneſs of an internal action, ſuch as thinking, ſuſpending thought, inclining, reſolving, willing, &c. Neither is it the conception of a relation amongſt objects; a conception of that kind being termed *opinion*. The term *ſentiment* is appropriated to ſuch thoughts as are prompted by paſſion.

33. *Attention* is that ſtate of mind which prepares one to receive impreſſions. According to the degree of attention, objects make a ſtronger or weaker impreſſion*. Attention is requiſite even to the ſimple act of ſeeing: the eye can take in a conſiderable field at one look; but no

* Bacon, in his natural hiſtory, makes the following obſervations. Sounds are meliorated by the intenſion of the ſenſe, where the common ſenſe is collected moſt to the particular ſenſe of hearing, and the ſight ſuſpended. Therefore ſounds are ſweeter, as well as greater, in the night than in the day; and I ſuppoſe they are ſweeter to blind men than to others: and it is manifeſt, that between ſleeping and waking, when all the ſenſes are bound and ſuſpended, muſic is far ſweeter than when one is fully waking.

no object in the field is ſeen diſtinctly, but that ſingly which fixes the attention: in a profound reverie that totally occupies the attention, we ſcarce ſee what is directly before us. In a train of perceptions, no particular object makes ſuch a figure as it would do ſingle and apart: for when the attention is divided among many objects, no particular object is intitled to a large ſhare. Hence, the ſtillneſs of night contributes to terror, there being nothing to divert the attention:

Horror ubique animos, ſimul ipſa ſilentia terrent.
*Æneid.* ii.

*Zara.* Silence and ſolitude are ev'ry where!
Through all the gloomy ways and iron doors
That hither lead, nor human face nor voice
Is ſeen or heard. A dreadful din was wont
To grate the ſenſe, when enter'd here, from groans
And howls of ſlaves condemn'd, from clink of chains,
And craſh of ruſty bars and creaking hinges:
And ever and anon the ſight was daſh'd
With frightful faces and the meagre looks
Of grim and ghaſtly executioners.
Yet more this ſtillneſs terrifies my ſoul
Than did that ſcene of complicated horrors.
*Mourning Bride, act* 5. *ſc.* 8.

And hence it is, that an object ſeen at the termination of a confined view, is more agreeable than when ſeen in a group with the ſurrounding objects:

The crow doth ſing as ſweetly as the lark
When neither is attended; and, I think,
The nightingale, if ſhe ſhould ſing by day,
When ev'ry gooſe is cackling, would be thought
No better a muſician than the wren.
*Merchant of Venice.*

34. In matters of ſlight importance, attention is moſtly directed by will; and for that reaſon, it is our own fault if trifling objects make any deep impreſſion. Had we power equally to with-hold our attention from matters of importance, we might be proof againſt any deep impreſſion. But our power fails us here: an intereſting object

object ſeizes and fixes the attention beyond the poſſibility of controul; and while our attention is thus forcibly attached to one object, others may ſolicit for admittance; but in vain, for they will not be regarded. Thus a ſmall misfortune is ſcarce felt in preſence of a greater:

*Lear.* Thou think'ſt 'tis much, that this contentious ſtorm
Invades us to the ſkin; ſo 'tis to thee;
But where the greater malady is fix'd,
The leſſer is ſcarce felt. Thou'dſt ſhun a bear;
But if thy flight lay tow'rd the roaring ſea,
Thou'dſt meet the bear i' th' mouth. When the mind's free,
The body's delicate: the tempeſt in my mind
Doth from my ſenſes take all feeling elſe,
Save what beats there.

*King Lear, act 3. ſc. 5.*

35. *Genus*, *ſpecies*, *modification*, are terms invented to diſtinguiſh beings from each other. Individuals are diſtinguiſhed by their qualities: a number of individuals conſidered with reſpect to qualities that diſtinguiſh them from others, is termed a *ſpecies*: a plurality of *ſpecies* conſidered with reſpect to their diſtinguiſhing qualities, is termed a *genus*. That quality which diſtinguiſheth one genus, one ſpecies, or even one individual, from another, is termed a *modification*: thus the ſame particular that is termed a *property* or *quality* when conſidered as belonging to an individual, or a claſs of individuals, is termed a *modification* when conſidered as diſtinguiſhing the individual or the claſs from another: a black ſkin and ſoft curled hair, are properties of a negro: the ſame circumſtances conſidered as marks that diſtinguiſh a negro from a man of a different ſpecies, are denominated *modifications*.

36. Objects of ſight, being complex, are diſtinguiſhable into the ſeveral particulars that enter into the compoſition: theſe objects are all of them coloured; and they all have length, breadth, and thickneſs. When I behold a ſpreading oak, I diſtinguiſh in that object, ſize, figure, colour, and ſometimes motion: viewing a flow-

ing river, I diſtinguiſh colour, figure, and conſtant motion: a dye has colour, black ſpots, ſix plain ſurfaces, all equal and uniform. Objects of touch have all of them extenſion: ſome of them are felt rough, ſome ſmooth: ſome of them are hard, ſome ſoft. With reſpect to the other ſenſes, ſome of their objects are ſimple, ſome complex: a ſound, a taſte, a ſmell, may be ſo ſimple as not to be diſtinguiſhable into parts: others are perceived to be compounded of different ſounds, different taſtes, and different ſmells.

37. The eye at one look can graſp a number of objects, as of trees in a field, or men in a crowd: as theſe objects are diſtinct from each other, each having a ſeparate and independent exiſtence, they are diſtinguiſhable in the mind as well as in reality; and there is nothing more eaſy than to abſtract from ſome and to confine our contemplation to others. A large oak with its ſpreading branches, fixes our attention upon itſelf, and abſtracts us from the ſhrubs that ſurround it. In the ſame manner, with reſpect to compound ſounds, taſtes, or ſmells, we can fix our thoughts upon any one of the component parts, abſtracting our attention from the reſt. But the power of abſtraction is not confined to objects that are ſeparable in reality as well as mentally: it alſo takes place where there can be no real ſeparation; the ſize, the figure, the colour, of a tree, are inſeparably connected, and have no independent exiſtence; the ſame of length, breadth, and thickneſs; and yet we can mentally confine our obſervations to one of theſe, neglecting or abſtracting from the reſt. Here abſtraction takes place where there cannot be a real ſeparation.

38. This power of abſtraction is of great utility. A carpenter conſiders a log of wood with regard to hardneſs, firmneſs, colour, and texture: a philoſopher, neglecting theſe properties, makes the log undergo a chymical analyſis; and examines its taſte, its ſmell, and its component principles: the geometrician confines his reaſoning to the figure, the length, breadth, and thickneſs. In general, every artiſt, abſtracting from all other properties, confines his obſervations to thoſe which have a more immediate connection with his profeſſion.

39. Hence

39. Hence clearly appears the meaning of an *abſtract term*, and *abſtract idea*. If in viewing an object we can abſtract from ſome of its parts or properties and attach ourſelves to others, there muſt be the ſame facility when we recall this object to the mind in idea. This leads directly to the definition of an abſtract idea, *viz.* "A partial idea of a complex object, limited to "one or more of the component parts or properties, "laying aſide or abſtracting from the reſt." A word that denotes an abſtract idea, is called an *abſtract term*.

40. The power of abſtraction is beſtowed upon man, for the purpoſe ſolely of reaſoning. It tends greatly to the facility as well as clearneſs of any proceſs of reaſoning, that, withdrawing from every other circumſtance, we can confine our attention to the ſingle property we deſire to inveſtigate.

41. Abſtract ideas, may, I think, be diſtinguiſhed into three different kinds, all equally ſubſervient to the reaſoning faculty. Individuals appear to have no end; and did we not poſſeſs the faculty of diſtributing them into claſſes, the mind would be loſt in an endleſs variety, and no progreſs be made in knowledge. It is by the faculty of abſtraction that we diſtribute beings into *genera* and *ſpecies*: finding a number of individuals connected by certain qualities common to all, we give a name to theſe individuals conſidered as thus connected, which name, by gathering them together into one claſs, ſerves in a curt manner to expreſs the whole of theſe individuals as diſtinct from others. Thus the word *animal* ſerves to denote every being which hath ſelf-motion; and the words *man*, *horſe*, *lion*, &c. anſwer ſimilar purpoſes. This is the firſt and moſt common ſort of abſtraction; and it is of the moſt extenſive uſe, by enabling us to comprehend in our reaſoning whole kinds and ſorts, inſtead of individuals without end. The next ſort of abſtract ideas and terms comprehends a number of individual objects conſidered as connected by ſome occaſional relation. A great number of perſons collected together in one place, without any other relation but merely that of contiguity, are denominated *a crowd*: in forming this term, we abſtract from ſex, from age, from condition, from dreſs, &c. A number of perſons

connected by being ſubjected to the ſame laws and to the ſame government, are termed *a nation:* and a number of men ſubjected to the ſame military command, are termed *an army*. A third ſort of abſtraction is, where a ſingle property or part, which may be common to many individuals, is ſelected to be the ſubject of our contemplation; for example, whiteneſs, heat, beauty, length, roundneſs, head, arm.

42. Abſtract terms are a happy invention: it is by their means chiefly, that the particulars which we make the ſubject of our reaſoning are brought into cloſe union, and ſeparated from all others however naturally connected. Without the aid of ſuch terms, the mind could never be kept ſteady to its proper ſubject, but be perpetually in hazard of aſſuming foreign circumſtances, or neglecting what are eſſential. We can, without the aid of language, compare real objects by intuition, when theſe objects are preſent; and, when abſent, we can compare them in idea. But when we advance farther, and attempt to make inferences, and draw concluſions, we always employ abſtract terms, even in thinking: it would be as difficult to reaſon without them, as to perform operations in algebra without ſigns; for there is ſcarce any reaſoning without ſome degree of abſtraction, and we cannot abſtract to purpoſe without making uſe of abſtract terms. Hence it follows, that without language man would ſcarce be a rational being.

43. The ſame thing, in different reſpects, has different names. With reſpect to certain qualities, it is termed a *ſubſtance*; with reſpect to other qualities, a *body*; and with reſpect to qualities of all ſorts, a *ſubject*. It is termed a *paſſive ſubject* with reſpect to an action exerted upon it; an *object* with reſpect to a percipient; a *cauſe* with reſpect to the effect it produces; and an *effect* with reſpect to its cauſe.

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