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
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



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
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THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS.



PART II.

THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

EDINBURGH :
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THE
ELEMENTS
OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE.

IN TWO BOOKS.

BOOK I.—ON METHOD. BOOK II.—ON DOCTRINE.

WITH
AN ACCOUNT OF ANDREW YARRANTON,
THE FOUNDER OF ENGLISH POLITICAL ECONOMY.

BY
PATRICK EDWARD DOVE,
AUTHOR OF "THE THEORY OF HUMAN PROGRESSION."

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"It is a very old wish, and one which, who knows how late, may perhaps some time be accomplished, that for once, instead of the endless variety of civil laws, we might investigate their principles; for therein alone consists the secret of simplifying legislation."—IMMANUEL KANT.

"For if there be no difference between good and evil antecedent to all laws, there can be no reason why any laws should be made at all, when all things are naturally indifferent."—SAMUEL CLARKE.

"Moral science is therefore possible."—VICTOR COUSIN.

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PREFACE.

It may perhaps be imagined that the principles contained in the present volume are of too abstract or too metaphysical a character to be capable of reduction to real practice.

Let us therefore, in the first place, endeavour to understand what is meant by metaphysics, and to inquire whether all rational hopes of human progression and human amelioration must not be based on the improved and amended condition of abstract moral science.

1st, The term metaphysics has two distinct significations; one subjective, the other objective. In a subjective sense (the popular vulgar and improper sense), it refers to the constitution of the human mind, to the mental faculties, to the *process* of thought, but does not involve the substantive element of thought itself; nor in this sense does it pronounce on the reality or non-reality of the objects of thought. In this sense, it is mere psychology, more or less imperfect; and however interesting or useful that science may be, it is plainly evident that the province of that science for ever

forbids that it should be made the foundation of political ethics, which, if possible at all, can only be possible by their assuming the form of an abstract science based on the primary and indisputable axioms of the human reason.

2*d*, In an objective sense, the term metaphysics applies to something incomparably more extensive, and incomparably more important. In this sense, it neglects the instrument that thinks, and lays hold on the concrete product, *thought*. The mind that thinks is no longer the object of contemplation, nor are the difficulties connected with the mere process of thought (except so far as *logic* is concerned) allowed for one moment to interfere with the legitimate development of truth. Here the objective* elements of knowledge are supreme, and when once the fundamental principles are announced and admitted, the only legitimate process is the application of a correct logic which shall lead us further and further to the development of the necessary consequences of our principles. In this sense, logic itself is a metaphysical science; and so is arithmetic, and so are all the mathematical sciences; and in this sense we have endeavoured to exhibit the elements of political science.

* The term *objective* is frequently used as applicable only to the external world. I consider, on the contrary, that all *knowledge* is objective,—that is, objective to the intellect that knows. The mathematical sciences are thus objective, although they contain no reference to the material world; and it is the quality of objectivity that renders them capable of demonstration by one man to another. Psychology is, in one sense, as objective as astronomy.

Every abstract science is based on some few primary propositions of the reason, which are brought to bear on one substantive element of thought. That element in arithmetic is number; in algebra, quantity; in geometry, space; in statics, force; and in politics, equity: and the greater or less perfection of these respective sciences depends on the relative completeness with which the suites of consequences flowing from the primary propositions happen at any period of time to be evolved and developed. In an objective sense, therefore, metaphysics is coincident with philosophy, the *scientia scientiarum*, the science of first principles, the science of the fundamentals of human credence. Without metaphysics in this sense, we could believe in nothing that was not visible, tangible, or appreciable by some one of the organs of sense; we could have no morals, no religion, no Deity, no principles of honour, no ideal of beauty, no longings after good, no shame and confusion for error. But let us consider that man is not only an intellectual creature who *knows*, but also, and as especially, an agent who *acts*, and who in all his courses has two directions ever before him,—a *right* and a *wrong*. Supposing him willing, at every period of his life, to choose the better path, and to avoid the way of error, what guide has he, what light to direct his steps? Nothing, we reply, but *true thought*. Wherever this true thought may be derived from, or whatever the process by which it may be obtained, it is the proximate guide by whose aid

alone correct action can be evolved. Without the true thought, the correct action is impossible; and though it may be true with regard to the individual that the true thought may be borne down and give way before the temptations to which humanity is subject, it may most assuredly be maintained that the true thought will ultimately evolve an amended order of action, and, in every department to which it refers, ameliorate the condition of man upon the globe.

True thought, in every department of man's voluntary activity, is the precursor and harbinger of improved action. Whether in mechanics, in agriculture, in navigation, in morals, or in religion, true thought, *correct credence*, is the foundation of all action that assumes itself to be correct. And with the perfection of the thought, there does follow, as one of the great phenomena of mankind, an amended order of human action, and consequently a product of continually improving character. Why, it may be asked, could no man, one hundred years since, construct a steam vessel or a steam cotton mill? The materials were all at hand; their properties were known; there was no lack of wealth to embark; and no lack of hands to labour. What was the wanting requisite, the element without which those prodigies of man's creation would not spring into active being. There wanted the *true thought*. No man had ever in thought laid together the elements of the mechanism. No man's *reason* had ever seen through the necessary combinations, and con-

sequently no man's hands had ever exhibited the concrete mechanism. Accident, it is true, may lay bare an important fact, and many of the most useful discoveries are owing to what is termed chance ; but accident could never construct a steam vessel, nor ever evolve any of those complex combinations which mark the progress of civilization, while, at the same time, they prepare the way for its further advancement. What is true in mechanics is true also in other departments of human design and human activity. Accident might lay bare the primary fact that two lenses placed in certain positions would aid the eye and vastly increase the range of observation. But accident teaches only an isolated fact, which the human reason requires to ponder on, and the human activity to work into perfection. The astronomical telescope of the present day is the embodiment of true thought, just as the steam-engine or the chronometer is the embodiment of true thought. Had not the true thought preceded the execution of the mechanism, the instrument would have worked incorrectly, or would not have worked at all. And so in navigation or in agriculture. What has driven the galley from the Mediterranean, or the antiquated implement from the field of labour ? An amended order of thought, expressing itself in an amended product of human activity. The true thought precedes and produces all the improvements that take place by human design in every department of life. The progress of civilization itself is nothing more than the improvement of the condition of mankind

under an amended order of thought. Let the thought remain fixed and immovable at any period of a nation's progress, and all other beneficial progress is instantly arrested.

To apply this principle to the question of political amelioration, let us only ask what is indeed the problem of politics.

“To construct a system of political society that shall involve no injustice in its theoretic constitution, and in its practical operation shall involve the minimum of political evil.” Such, we apprehend, is the problem; and we maintain, without the slightest hesitation, that this problem can only be solved by a new and amended order of thought, and by exhibiting clearly that certain political conditions are logically based on the primary and metaphysical axioms of the human reason. There is a TRUTH in politics as well as in astronomy, and so far as the abstraction *equity* is concerned, the principles of true thought, or, in other words, of *knowledge*, must be abstract principles, and therefore in one sense metaphysical, but not more metaphysical than the axioms of mathematics.

Political evils exist because political societies are not the embodiments of true principles. They are miscalculated machines, whose theory is erroneous, and whose practical working is consequently incorrect; and so long as this is the case, there is a perpetual danger that the mechanism of society will be disturbed by the elements of revolt. Europe is gasping for a true system of political dogma, and the

events of the last few years teach us that no difficulty and no danger will restrain the masses of the population from seeking to construct a new mechanism of political society, let the temporary evils of the change be what they may.

It is very questionable, however, *whether any man in the world* is at this present moment capable of constructing a system of society, that, were it established to-morrow, would not fail, and be recast, ere many years are over, merely through its own falsity and demerit. Institutions endure for a period, but the erroneous thought that prevailed in their construction is ultimately found to produce practical evils that require to be swept away. The institutions fall, and others arise in their stead; better, it is true, but still wanting in the elements of permanence. Credence is continually becoming more correct, and change succeeds change as the amended order of thought becomes embodied in the institutions of the nations.

But let us ask, Is there no absolute rule of right, no immutable principle of ultimate certitude, with which the most scrupulous reason may rest satisfied after the most calm and impartial investigation? Is the political progress of mankind only a perpetual experiment, and a perpetual attempt to correct evils which can never be finally obliterated? Or, on the contrary, is not that political progress a definite and continuous tending to an ultimate principle, and to an ultimate condition of society which shall require no further organic change? Is it not a progress

from the antagonism and diversity of error to the equilibrium and unity of truth? Is it not a progress from the reign of power,—that is, from despotism,—to the reign of reason,—that is, to absolute equality of rights and absolute freedom of condition. And if we only learn to read aright the past history of political progress, shall we not there discover its law and measure, and be able to satisfy ourselves that the changes yet to come are confined within definite limits, and that, amid all the diversity of circumstances and all the variety of changes, there is evolving an ultimate and perfectly definite form of society, whose theory presents no discrepancies, and whose practical operation shall be the best the earth permits of.

That society is advancing to an ultimate and definite form we believe both on the testimony of revelation and on the teaching of history. But before that ultimate form can be realised in practice, it is absolutely necessary that its theory should be so perfected as to stand before the most strict investigation of the impartial reason. Scripture informs us that there shall yet be a reign of righteousness (justice) on the earth; and as man is the agent employed in working out his own political regeneration, it becomes him to use his best endeavours to ascertain what the particular form of that justice is, and how it may best be carried into universal operation. The principles of that *justice* are necessarily philosophical (or metaphysical, for names are of no importance); that is, they are abstract *principles*, written

by the finger of God on the constitution of the human mind, and necessarily believed to be true, universally and unconditionally, whatever the *conduct* of the individual may be. So soon as the intellect of man clearly comprehends an axiom, the belief in its truth is in no sense a matter of option or a matter of opinion. It is, in fact, only the expression in language of a necessary form of human thought; and though in morals the primary and most indisputable axioms may be infringed in practice every day of a man's existence, his *intellect*, so long as it continues to comprehend, has no power to believe that an axiom is erroneous, or that an impossibility (a contradiction) is true.

So far, then, from attempting to repel metaphysical or philosophical axioms from the region of politics, it is our very first duty, if we desire the political regeneration of mankind, to ascertain what are indeed the axioms of justice, what are its primary and fundamental principles, what are its universal and necessary truths, which must indeed command the assent of the human intellect, wherever that intellect shall clearly comprehend them. On the evolution of these principles, and on their universal acceptance, the hopes of the human race are irrevocably hinged. Nothing can be more certain than that error produces evil as its necessary consequence, and that truth produces good. On the discovery of mechanical *truth* (correct thought) depends in every age the progress and improvement of mechanics; and on the discovery of political *truth* depends, as neces-

sarily and universally, the progress and improvement of the political well-being of mankind. The institutions of bygone ages are fast melting away before the progress of human thought; and the great problem of politics is to discover the final and fundamental principles or axioms on which societies should be constructed, so that no man shall be able to say with reason that he is deprived of any right to which as a *man* he is legitimately entitled.

If there be no truth and no falsehood in politics, every man may do what he has the power to do; but if there be a truth and a falsehood, that truth may be investigated on the same principles as any other science, and may be maintained before the world with as little hesitation as the truths of geometry, geology, or astronomy. Nor can we hesitate to believe that whatever interests may be involved, whatever privileges of class, whatever advantages of the few at the expense of the many, the progress of true thought will continue to roll on, and to entail with it the absolute and complete destruction of every privilege and every institution that will not stand the calm and resolute investigation of reason.

The masses of the population have now acquired a power that can no longer be governed by force, and that ought to be regulated by reason. A large portion of Europe has been recently insurged, and the continental governments have been taught that force is not the *only* element required to allow the mechanism of society to function with safety and regularity. The evils of Ireland are still uncured,

and the practical answer of statesmen is, that they are incurable. The labouring classes of England are gradually but resolutely preparing themselves to claim, and, if need be, to extort the rights which reason teaches them ought not to be withheld. From the Mediterranean to the Baltic, and from the Carpathians to the Atlantic, a universal necessity for political change and political amelioration is expressing itself in terms that can scarcely be misunderstood.

And yet, amid all the excitement and all the turmoil, amid the "wars and rumours of wars," it is plainly evident that the reactions against the governments and established institutions are only reactions under a pressure that can no longer be sustained. They are forcible attempts to correct unbearable evils; they are struggles of a class that suffers against another class that is supposed to cause that suffering; but in no case is there the clear and definite exhibition of the ultimate end that ought to be arrived at. The popular party is attempting to obtain as much as it can, and the ruling party to withhold as much as it can; but no rational judgment is pronounced upon what ought to be obtained. No definite standard is appealed to; no principle is laid before the reason of which it can be said, This is right, and always was right, and always will be right, under every possible condition of political association. Certain advances are, it is true, made in the right direction—that is, certain evils are cured; but the problem of politics does not consist in the mere

cure of those gross and flagrant evils which have become so apparent that, by the very laws of humanity, they must cure themselves. In the ardour of changing the form of administration, it seems to be forgotten or neglected that the true welfare of a country consists, not in the form of government, but in the essential laws which are administered. And though the form of government may ultimately react, in a most powerful manner, on the internal constitution of the state, it is of absolute and primary importance that we should bear in mind, that slavery and despotism, lynch law or licentiousness, may be as rife and detrimental under a republic as a monarchy.

So far from the definite principles of political science being generally known, the very boundaries of political interference or of government legislation are undetermined. The very nature of an act, which the government of a country (whatever its form, whether monarchical or republican) is *competent* to prohibit, or to shackle with impositions, is left undefined, and determined on no principle of reason that commands the assent of mankind. Notwithstanding all the political experience of the French, and all the intellect that has been directed in that country to the discussion of political theories, the broad line of demarcation that separates individual action from political action is overstepped with an apparent unconsciousness of its existence. The first and most essential questions of politics, "What are the ends of government?" and, "In what cases is government

interference (legislation) legitimate?" are left unanswered, and the chief attention is concentrated on the form of administration; while the higher laws by which every government should be restricted, and to which every ruler should be subject, are left for the most part in abeyance. To illustrate our meaning, let us consider for a moment the case of the blacks in the slave states of America. Let us suppose that these blacks were admitted members of the political association; that they were allowed universal suffrage, and that they were freely, so far as the state is concerned, allowed to vote for the ordinary members of Congress; *but that they were still held to be the property of their masters.* Let us suppose that they had free power to bring their case before Congress; that one of their representatives should move for their emancipation, and that he should be outvoted by the *majority.* Will it be contended that an improvement has taken place in the condition of the *slave* by his being allowed a political vote, or that any majority in the world is *competent* to take into consideration whether a negro shall or shall not be continued in slavery? It is plain that so long as he is continued in slavery, whether by individual violence *or by the most regular form of law,* he is a wronged man; and whenever he has the smallest chance of success, he has the undoubted right to stand on his defence, and obtain his liberty at all hazards and in all circumstances.

The truth we wish to inculcate is, that there are principles of immutable and never-changing jus-

tice, which by no government and no majority can ever be legitimately infringed. That these principles are capable of being ascertained and developed. That they are metaphysical or philosophical principles,—that is, axioms of the human reason, to which the human reason must give its intellectual assent wherever it clearly comprehends them. That the denial of the logical consequences of these principles by those whose pecuniary interests are involved, is no more a refutation of the principles themselves than the non-admission of the earth's motion by the Roman priests, or the non-admission of the circulation of the blood by the physicians of England.

That the political well-being, not only of Britain, but of every country on the globe—that is, of the whole race of mankind—depends on the definite ascertainment, universal acknowledgment, and universal reduction to practice, of these principles of equity. That however knowledge may increase, and, by its beneficial influence, gradually improve the condition of mankind, it is to the perfection of political *science* that we must direct our views if we wish to ascertain those laws of reason which, when carried into practice, would ensure a *stable*, because a *just* order of society.

Without justice (a mental abstraction) there can be no stability (a concrete and external reality); and whatever the ignorant and the unreflecting may be inclined to charge against “mere theories,” the whole world may be challenged to bring forth one single

product of human activity and human design whose real correctness in practice does not depend on the mental correctness of the thought that superintended its production. Correct *thought* is the only means given to man to enable him to evolve correct action. It is true, however, that in few cases (perhaps none) are the political institutions of a country the result of direct design; but this is no reason that they should not become so. The darker ages, in which power, and not reason, regulated the affairs of mankind, have transmitted to all countries a vast heritage of error and injustice, that requires to be corrected. Many evils have been swept away, many errors buried in oblivion; but the question still remains, Are the existing institutions of any country (and for us of Britain more especially) now based upon a clear principle of equity, which would dictate the establishment of exactly the same institutions, were we called upon to originate a new State, or had liberty to remodel the old? Every change that takes place is designed upon some theory or other, and every attempt to form new institutions is derived from the mental conviction that the new institutions will work in a given direction. But amid all the temporary and practical changes which appear to absorb so much of the attention, it should be fairly asked, "What is the clear and definite *end* at which we wish to arrive?" True, we cannot attain that end at once, and generation after generation may pass away before the process of change is completed; but still it is of the utmost importance to

set the end before us, as the ultimate though far off point of destination, towards which we are at present travelling, and towards which the generations that come after us will continue to travel, perhaps with a continually increasing rapidity. To know what that end really is, we allege that we may learn, partly from history, which gives us the abstract course of political change, seen through the concrete changes that have already taken place; partly from revelation, which assures us, on an authority the most stable of all, that there yet shall be a reign of righteousness and peace on the earth; and partly by drawing out from the depths of human belief those primary axioms or laws of justice which neither vary nor change, and which, when fairly stated and pursued by the correct rules of logic, will give us the particular form of the fundamental laws which ought to regulate the political relations of mankind. Scripture, indeed, informs us that justice *shall* prevail; and on the testimony of HIM who is TRUTH, we may assuredly rest satisfied that in His good time it shall prevail. But what is the particular form of that justice? what institutions are compatible with it? what laws of human enactment or enunciation will it admit, and what laws will it reject? Will justice tolerate *slavery*? If not, slavery is doomed to perish for ever. Will justice tolerate the taxation of those who are excluded from all voice in the legislature or its appointment? If not, this also must pass away. Will justice tolerate that the gift of a dead king should be title sufficient to as much land as would

support a thousand families in plenty, while, as it is, those families may be forcibly removed, not having an atom of that earth which God gave to the children of men? And if the theory of fair and even-handed justice to all mankind without respect of persons will not tolerate these things; if they are found to controvert the primary and fundamental axioms of the human belief, universal and homogeneous, then come what may, and be the concrete form of change what it will,—let monarchies stand or fall, or republics, or any form of administration whatever, most assuredly we may predict that these things shall pass away and be forgotten, and that truth shall yet be *realised* on earth.

Although it is true that in one sense our Saviour's kingdom is not of this world, and although we are bound to repel all priestly domination of men who presumptuously assume to be the special interpreters of the divine will, and thereby to attract *to themselves* a worldly power and dignity, yet the plain tenour of the prophecies contained in the sacred Scriptures would, we think, lead to the belief that ere the world's close there shall be a period of peace and rest, a sabbath of the world, a sacred finishing of man's labours upon earth, a blessed time when truth shall prevail, a holy day when error shall no longer deceive, and when the pure light of God's Word shall shine in greater effulgence, casting its benign rays into every region of the earth, and uniting the whole race of man into one common brotherhood, having one faith, one Lord, and one heavenly Father. And if such be

the case, it is no metaphor to say that the kingdom of our Lord shall yet come on earth, and that He who was crowned with thorns shall yet (whether in visible form or not we cannot tell) be installed the supreme Ruler and Governor of mankind, the King of that Israel into which all the families of men shall have received adoption, "the King over all the earth." *

* Zech. xiv. 9.

THE ELEMENTS, &c.

BOOK I.

ON METHOD.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TRUE POLITICS.

THERE happily exists in the present day a strong tendency to the study of political economy, and although it is naturally to be expected that in so complex a subject many erroneous inferences should be drawn, especially in the infancy of the investigations, yet the value of the facts elicited, and the increased attention of the public mind to such studies, must more than compensate for the illogical reasonings which time and more extensive experience cannot fail to correct.

It may therefore be advantageous to point out the relation of political economy to true politics,—to ex-

hibit each in its essential character, and to show the difference of their respective origin.

Scientific method presents itself under two forms or aspects. In the first, we commence with the axioms, general principles, and elementary definitions of a science, and from these descend to the more complex details, which are only particular cases or points of view of the elementary propositions. In the second, we commence with the observation of isolated facts, and these, being selected in a specific region or department of nature, are found (although presenting an endless variety of accidents or concrete circumstances) to involve a permanent element of similarity whose general expression is identical.

The first is *à priori* reasoning, or *deduction*; the second is *à posteriori* reasoning, or *induction*. The first mode is exhibited in the mathematical sciences, which are purely rational, independent of sensational observation, and indeed of the existence of matter. The second mode is exhibited in the physical sciences, which are composed of observation and reasoning,—their facts being derived from the observation of natural phenomena, their laws from logical reasoning on those facts.

Induction and deduction, however, are only processes or methods by which the intellect searches after truth, and as there is but *one* truth, the two methods must ever furnish us with the same final result, provided there be any object to which both may be legitimately applied.

Geometry, for instance, is purely rational, and may

be studied without any mechanical or external aid whatever, it may be studied in the mind alone, and the mind can by the bare contemplation of ideal space discover its truths.*

But even in Geometry the inductive method is capable of application, and probably was used to a certain extent at the commencement of the science. Thus a person measuring the square of the hypotenuse of a right angled triangle might accidentally find it to be equal to the sum of the squares of the base and perpendicular of the same triangle. Suppose his triangle to have been a field, surrounded by three square fields,—a case which might very easily occur. He measures the area of the squares, and he finds perhaps to his surprise that the two smaller squares are exactly equal to the greater. Struck with the coincidence he measures squares on the sides of many other right angled triangles, and he finds the equality to hold constant in every case. He would naturally infer the general fact that they were always and in every case equal to each other, but he has not proven it scientifically, he has only learnt it empirically. The same process might enable him to discover many other geometric truths, which, although not mathematically proven, would be considered true for practical purposes, and thus the inductive or *à posteriori* mode would lead to the same result as the deductive or *à priori* mode. Principles in the manufacturing arts which are unexplained by science, are

* See some admirable remarks on this subject in the preliminary treatise of the Library of Useful Knowledge, pp. 7-9.

of the *à posteriori* character, they have been learnt through observation, and are acted on as *general* principles; indeed, art is frequently the forerunner of science, many of its truths being known long before science advances to such a point as to be able to explain them rationally.

We are well aware that the pure geometrician may smile at the idea of *induction* being applied to the mathematical sciences. We reply, that there is not a truth which geometry shows to be *necessary* which may not, by the actual measurement of real spaces, be shown to be *general*. Deductive science gives us *necessary* truths, inductive science gives us *general* truths, and when the object is really the same the two coincide. As *sciences*, politics, and political economy are perfectly distinct, they are based upon primary propositions altogether different; the process of proof is essentially reversed, and yet as being *both* conversant about the correct mode of human action, they coincide in their results. Politics treats of equity, whence human *duty*; political economy treats of utility, whence human *benefit*; and we maintain that if human duty were universally carried into actual operation, we should thereby evolve the greatest amount of human benefit. Man and man's action is the subject of both sciences; but the one science is *sensational*, and generalises from facts obtained through the senses; the other is *rational*, and deduces from primary propositions of the human reason. To evolve the maximum of human benefit, *both* are absolutely necessary, because although they

coincide so far as they treat of the same subjects, each has a peculiar province in which the other can afford us no information.

The science of politics is *à priori* and rational, (that is, the produce of axiomatic reason); political economy is *à posteriori*, and founded on observation. The science of politics must commence with its indisputable axioms and exact definitions, and pursuing these into their details show how they would affect the relations of men and the order of society. Political economy commences with the observation of facts, and when these are sufficiently numerous they are gathered into clusters according to their agreement, and from them is inferred a general fact, or law, or principle, which, although not proven by pure reason, and indeed incapable of such proof, is a fair inference from the facts brought before the mind, and may justly be taken as the ground of argument or of action.

To use the language of logic, which applies with strict accuracy to this subject, we may state that political economy commences with the consequent (conclusion) and minor premiss of the argument, and from these infers the major. Politics, on the contrary, commences with the major and minor premisses, and from them deduces the consequent. This radical difference is the distinguishing characteristic between the abstract and the inductive sciences.

Political economy, so far from being the result of *mere* observation, can by no possibility be even a science until its various propositions are connected together by the law of *reason and consequent*, and

even then before it can become of practical application it must admit an *à priori* principle or axiom altogether extraneous to itself. This is exemplified in the doctrine of utilitarianism, for when political economy has collected a certain number of facts, and has traced them back to their cause, it pronounces judgment on the cause according to the character of the effects. If the effects have been *bad*, it pronounces the cause *bad*; if the effects have been *good*, it pronounces the cause *good*. But then to apply this to legislation, it is under the necessity of admitting the *à priori* principle, that “the public good ought to be the object of the legislator.”*

It is possible, however, for political economy, as an inductive science, to confine itself simply to the calculation of what is beneficial or prejudicial,—to arrange this in a systematic form, and present it to the world—to guide rulers in their legislative acts, and to instruct the ruled in their temporal interests. It would thus have no direct interference with legislation, which, indeed, is not its province, but would hold to legislation a relation similar to that which a science holds to its art, and thus legislation would become the practical application of the principles of political economy.

But we have said that the *à priori* or purely scientific mode leads to the same result as the empirical and *à posteriori* mode; in other words, that pure politics would lead to the same result,

* This admission of Bentham's has been noticed in the *Essais de Philosophie Morale* of A. Vinet. Ed. Paris, p. 96.

so far as it extends, as political economy perfectly understood. And if we believe the universe to be harmoniously constructed, this must hold good in every case whatever,—indeed it is only on the principle of harmonious construction that political economy could be taken as the basis of legislative *duty*. It is in the accordance of the *just* with the *beneficial*, and of *both* with the *logical*, that the moral, the physical, and the intellectual worlds are combined into one harmonious whole, or rather shown to be parts of a universe—of *one* intelligent creation. Each portion may be studied separately, each may be considered in its unity alone, and each may throw off its dependence upon the others, so long as it is considered *scientifically* by the mind; but while science severs a branch from the great tree of nature, and pursues it into all its ramifications, philosophy views the branches in their common connection, as springing from the same origin, as being mutually dependent upon each other, and as incapable of actual separation as they are of annihilation.

There is another difference between pure politics and political economy.

Pure politics, if there be such a science, must lay down its rules of perfect and abstract political right. These rules being investigated by the intellect alone, are capable, like mathematical propositions, of universal verification. Any one having the capacity, who shall choose to direct his mind to the study, may convince himself of their truth. Being purely

rational, they are capable of examination by the reason alone, and may thus be tried by the axiomatic judgment of mankind. Political economy, on the contrary, is dependent on the correct observation of an indefinite number of facts, and as these must be received on the evidence of many individuals, it is sometimes difficult to arrive at an unobjectionable conclusion. True, if the facts could be perfectly observed, perfectly recorded, and perfectly reasoned with, the result would be as certain in this case as the other ; but the difficulty of accurate appreciation renders the result always to a certain degree uncertain. While the intellect can *think* perfectly (witness algebra and geometry), it cannot appreciate external nature perfectly, so that every thing dependent on observation is an approximation, and no more. In some branches of knowledge the error may be so small as to be negligible, or may be corrected by analogy, but still strictly speaking there is an error, however small, and this error must ever make the mathematical sciences more certainly exact than the physical, independently of the circumstance that the mathematical and other abstract sciences are so inherent in our constitution that we cannot possibly conceive them to have been other than they are. The same must hold true of political science. If it exist at all, it must exist as an abstract science (that is, independent of observation), and taking its origin in the primary convictions of the reason, or the axioms of the mind, cannot be supposed different from what it is.

It will be found that politics and political economy have each its respective use, and influence, and application.

It must be admitted (although the doctrine is yet imperfectly understood, even in the most enlightened states of Europe) that legislation has its limits and its boundaries, that there is a province within whose circle legislation is competent, upon due deliberation, and that beyond the circle, legislation is not competent, not *lawful*, in the higher meaning of the word. There are actions which no human legislation can ever render *right*, and acts which are immutably and irrevocably *wrong*, whatever sanction they may derive from law, or enactment, or even from general consent. This general fact, however, is of little value, unless we can ascertain the rule by which it is to be definitely determined—the boundary that separates the province within which legislation is competent, and beyond which it necessarily degenerates into tyranny. A moment's reflection will suffice to convince those who are familiar with such investigations, that political economy can never be the science destined to declare the limits of the legislator's *duty*. No inductive science can ever produce an axiom, and no inductive science can ever establish, or go one step towards establishing, a *principle of right or wrong*. Right and wrong are abstract qualities superadded by the human mind to actions which otherwise would be viewed in their natural or physical character alone, and no inductive science can by any possibility determine the *abstract*

character of any of the substantives with which it has to do. It is this universal law which distinguishes the abstract from the inductive sciences, and which necessarily prevents mathematical science from admitting even the smallest portion of mechanical proof or mechanical assistance. Whatever may be the limits of legislation, those limits are *necessary*, and necessary exactly in the same sense as mathematical truth is necessary,—we cannot conceive it to be other than it is. Unless it be maintained that every act which a legislator has the physical power to execute be *à priori* lawful and competent, there is, and there must necessarily be, a limit, determined, not by induction, nor by any observation of any facts whatever, but by the necessary axioms of the human mind, which exist at all times, and in all places, and in all individuals. This, then, is the province of the science of politics; and the province of political economy is to point out to legislators those acts which are most useful or beneficial within the circle where legislation is legitimate.

The science of political economy can never determine whether men *ought* to be free to express their opinions, or to worship their Creator according to their conscience; neither, on the other hand, can the science of politics determine whether it be more *beneficial* to levy a direct or an indirect tax, or whether a free trade in gold and silver be as beneficial to a community as a free trade in corn. Politics determines the province of legislation; political economy determines what particular act may be

beneficially performed within that province for the welfare of the community. Politics should settle the constitution of society so far as the relations of men are concerned. Political economy should, then, point out those beneficial or prejudicial modes of action, whose operation is only to be ascertained by observation. In the eye of politics, the end of legislation is the perfect preservation to every man of all his *rights*. In the eye of political economy, the end of legislation is the greatest *good* (benefit) of the greatest number. The end of politics, therefore, is distinct from that of political economy. And just as pure mathematics seek to determine the universal and abstract qualities of spaces, numbers, and quantities, so does politics seek to determine the universal and abstract relations of men, and to found them on axioms which are capable of universal verification. Political economy, on the contrary, bearing the same relation to pure politics that actual land-measuring does to geometry, inquires into no abstract relations, seeks to determine no principles of universal and *necessary* truth, but limits itself to the inquiry of what actually *is* in the given circumstances of society, and points out, not the *character* of legislative acts, but their *fruits* and *consequences*.

But while politics and political economy differ essentially in their character as sciences, and are separated from each other by a broad line of demarcation, we are not to suppose that they have no common ground. So far from this, political truth must ever find its *verification* in political economy,

and political economy may find the first hint of its great principles in the dogmas of abstract politics. Politics treats of the *just*—political economy of the *beneficial*. But according to the constitution of nature and of man, the just and the beneficial walk hand in hand, inseparably connected by the fiat of the Almighty. The unjust and the prejudicial are no less inseparably connected; and thus, wherever we find systematic *injustice*, we must also and invariably find systematic *suffering* as its constant and invariable attendant. On the other hand, wherever we find systematic *suffering*—(that is, suffering produced by the order of society, and not merely by the ordinary operation of the laws of general nature)—we may infer, and rightly infer, that *injustice* is operating somewhere, and that some men are defrauding their fellows of their *rights*. If it be true, then, that wherever injustice is, there also is suffering, and wherever systematic suffering is, there also is injustice, the sciences which investigate the laws of these two substantives must (although perfectly distinct in themselves) afford perpetual illustration of each other's truth. It is not the suffering that *constitutes* the injustice; for we can determine *à priori* upon the character of an act, even although we had no means of appreciating the character of its consequences. On the contrary, the suffering is that invariable attendant which it has pleased God to attach to injustice, whenever and wheresoever it may be found. The *injustice* of an act does not reside in the act itself, in such a manner as to be appreciable by

the senses ; and therefore it can never by any possibility become a portion of an inductive science. It is not capable of observation ; it has no form nor colour, neither can it be represented, like benefit or suffering, by the increase or decrease of the objects of physical wealth. It is the result of a *mental* judgment. It exists in the *mind*, and in the mind alone. It is an abstract quality, which the mind, from its moral constitution, superadds to an action, over and above all those natural qualities which may be detected in the action by external observation. Such benefit and prejudice, on the contrary, as enter into the science of political economy, are qualities which may be *observed*, appreciated with accuracy, and *measured*. This, and this only, permits the possibility of political economy becoming an *inductive* science. To illustrate this, let us take a familiar example. On the table before me stands an ink-stand. I can *observe* its various qualities, its form, weight, size, colour, density, &c. I can measure its angles and sides, and survey it. I can analyse its parts, test the ingredients of the ink, examine its wood botanically to discover the species of tree of which it is made, and mechanically to discover its power of resistance to strains in different directions. I can call to my aid arithmetic, to number its parts ; algebra, to determine their relations in quantity ; geometry, their relations in space ; chemistry, their relations in affinity ; mechanics, their relations in weight ; mineralogy, the qualities and properties of its metals, &c. &c. ; and thus can pursue a long

course of investigation, all primarily based on the qualities apparent or discoverable in the object itself, the inkstand. But what I cannot possibly discover by any observation of the object is, *whose PROPERTY it is*. No attention that I can give, no investigation that I can ever make will advance me one single step in this inquiry. By observation I may determine in whose *possession* it is, but never by observation can I determine to whom it rightfully belongs. But still I can pursue my observations further. I can place the inkstand in various circumstances. I can give it first to a clerk who uses it beneficially, then to a child who injures or destroys it; or, pursuing the inquiry on a larger scale, I can successively give it for a day to twenty different persons, and observe and record the benefit or prejudice that arose in each particular case. When the observations are completed, I am in a condition to pronounce in whose *possession* the inkstand will be most *beneficially* placed. But I have not advanced a single step towards the solution of the question, *Whose property is it?* To whom does it *rightfully belong?* We have here the true distinction between politics and political economy. Political economy, which can never admit the concept *property*, inquires only into the question of *beneficial possession*,—a question which may be solved by a careful and accurate observation of external circumstances. But the concept *property* is invariably introduced by mankind, and there must remain some means of determining its laws. *Property*, like justice, is one of those abstract quali-

ties which the human mind superadds to all the qualities or conditions that can be observed in the external object, and as an abstract substantive its primary laws are *à priori*, and take their birth in the human mind, independently of all observation or of any appreciation of external matter whatsoever. It is then the province of politics (an abstract science) to determine the laws and the natural theory of *property*, and to settle by axiom the principles on which the objects existing in nature should be rightfully distributed. And it is the province of political economy (an inductive science) to determine in whose *possession* the objects of nature are most beneficially placed. Both sciences have their legitimate use. Both are branches of nature, and both, in so far as they are true, are the expression of the will of the Divine Intelligence, who hath done all things well.

CHAPTER II.

THE LORD AND THE SERF.

“In Russia the nation is divided into two great classes,—the aristocracy, who enjoy all the privileges, and the people, who bear all the burdens.”—*Hommage de Hell, Steppes de la Mer Caspienne.*

Not only does the society of Great Britain, but to a far greater extent do the societies of the Continent suffer from systematic evils, caused and perpetuated by unjust laws. Millions of Russian slaves are degraded from their manhood, by the barbarous institutions maintained by the privileged classes of the country; and even in France, which boasts a liberty that it does not possess, twenty citizens cannot assemble to discuss their social welfare, without incurring pains and penalties from the *law*. In Great Britain, the unprivileged classes have almost achieved their personal liberty; and the Briton, although still denuded of his rightful *property*, can stand erect as a freeman, enjoying in his person the freedom that has been purchased by a struggle of five centuries,

during the whole of which period the unprivileged classes have been emerging from the domination of those who made the laws. This fact, which the interested attempt to misrepresent or explain away, stands out before the reader of history in far too palpable a guise to be easily concealed, and at the same time affords the surest ground for anticipating that the progress of change will continue in the same beneficial direction, and that pure principles of equal justice will ultimately regulate the form and condition of society. If we cast our eye back on the condition of Britain after the Norman conquest, we find at the extremes of society the two great types of *lord* and *serf*, who form the two classes of an infant State, just beginning to arrange itself into some definite and systematic form. If we consider for a moment, we shall find that the lord and the serf present the furthest *possible* remove from nature, and the furthest possible remove from justice. Nature has made each man's body obedient in its physical motions to the dictates of the indwelling mind. As each mind wills, so does its attendant body move, and labour, and execute its actions. This is the law or constant order of nature, that each man's mind has power over that man's body, *and over no other*. Now, the condition of lord and serf changes this order, and instead of two individuals, each of whom thinks, wills, and acts for himself, we have one individual thinking and willing for the other, coercing him to labour, directing his actions by force, and reaping the reward of his toil. The serf is without

will, without property, without rights, without even those natural rights of family, which the animals enjoy in almost undisturbed possession. He is a thing, not a man,—a thing that can be bought and sold, bartered against goods, or slain with the utmost impunity. The lord, on the other hand, has the advantages of two men. His own body obeys him, and so does that of the serf. Every thing that the serf has is the lord's—his body, his hands, his family, his all. The distinction is as great as it can possibly be—the serf has nothing, the lord has every thing. Let us now consider the possibility of a change, by which the serf shall acquire something of his own. In his present condition he is as low as he can be, and the lord as high as he can be. It is now evident that every thing the serf acquires must be at the expense of the lord, and as he rises progressively step by step in the acquisition of his *rights*, the lord comes down exactly according to the same scale in the loss of his *privileges*. Perhaps the first thing that the serf acquires is a right to his family, the next perhaps a right to his life. When these are withdrawn from the will of the lord, he has made some progress upwards, and the lord has made a corresponding progress downwards. The struggle has at all events commenced, and year after year rolls on, giving the serf new possessions, and depriving the lord of his exclusive privileges. This question, and this struggle, it will be observed, is one of personal freedom. The *land* has not yet been taken into consideration. All that, with its fruits, and trees, and game, and animals

of all kinds, is necessarily in the possession of the lord, who doles it out as it may suit his own particular purposes. The struggle continues for centuries, and what is its *natural termination*? In any other science there could not be the slightest difficulty in determining what the result will be, provided sufficient time be allowed for the completion of the process. The serf is continually rising, the lord is continually falling, exactly in the same ratio of progression. Where can such a process of change terminate, except at that point where the serf, no longer a serf, shall be a freeman, on an *equality* with the lord, and the lord, no longer a lord, shall be merely a freeman, on an equality with the emancipated serf? Every country of Europe is at one stage or other of this double process, in which the unprivileged classes are acquiring a legal title to their natural rights, and the privileged classes are losing the legal title to their unnatural privileges. In Britain the struggle has been a long but a successful one. The serf has triumphed, and, so far as personal liberty is concerned, the serf is a serf no longer. But there still remains the question of the *land*. Shall the lord still continue to possess it, or shall the same process of change that has continued so long in operation, still continue to operate, and at last place the emancipated serf, *as regards the land*, on the same footing of equality that he has attained as regards personal liberty? This question each one will answer prophetically, in the mode most suited to his hopes or his fears; in the mean time, we shall state a few propositions on the

process of the change that has yet to take place, before men can be said to be in their best political state.

As a means of hastening or advancing the necessary changes, I am not sanguine in my estimate of the power of any treatise on the science of politics.

1. If men be not in their best political state, to produce a change for the better ought to be the object of every political treatise. If men be in their best political state, any treatise on the subject would be superfluous, except inasmuch as it was a scientific exhibition of formal truth for the instruction of the intellect.

2. Men will be in their best political state when each shall possess *legally* exactly what he has a right to *justly*.

3. It is quite certain that men are not in their best political state; and such being the case, some men must possess *more* and others *less* than they are justly entitled to.

4. Those who possess more, may be termed the *privileged* classes; those who possess less, the *unprivileged* classes. The actual government or political power must always be vested in the privileged classes; for it is absurd to suppose that men should have the power and not possess their own. On the contrary, it is very easy to suppose that the men who have the power should possess more than their own.*

5. Change for the better, then, consists in reduc-

* What is intended by *less*, *more*, *own*, will be explained definitely hereafter.

ing the privileged classes to the legal possession of what is their own, and of elevating the unprivileged classes to the legal possession of what is theirs.

6. Change may be produced by the rulers or government directly and legally, and by the unprivileged classes by force, directly and *illegally*, or through what is termed moral influence, or public opinion, indirectly and *legally*.

7. Men are not in their best political state, because long ago their predecessors were so ignorant and so brutalised that the strong did as they pleased, took all they could get, and enacted laws to secure its possession to them and to their descendants, and because many of those laws are still in force. With the progress and dissemination of knowledge, political changes for the better have continually taken place; but the amount of change has not yet been equal to the amount of evil formerly established by law, consequently men have not yet arrived at their best political state.

8. To arrive at the best political state it is necessary that change should take place.

9. Change takes place slowly, because the privileged classes *will* not make it, and because the unprivileged classes have not legally the power to make it otherwise than slowly, nor the will to make it otherwise than legally.

10. Change may be made quickly by force or revolution *illegally*, but there are objections to revolution.

11. The privileged classes will not produce change

for the better, because they are either ignorant or corrupt. Either they *do not know* what changes ought to be made, and are consequently ignorant, or they do know, and *will not* make them, consequently are corrupt.

12. The unprivileged classes cannot produce change speedily, because their moral influence is not sufficient.

13. The diffusion of knowledge amongst the unprivileged classes tends to increase their moral influence. All knowledge does not in the same degree tend to increase the moral influence of the unprivileged with the privileged classes,—it is particularly the knowledge of political truth and of political economy.

I have said that I do not believe a treatise on politics capable of producing much political change for the better,—because,

1. The privileged classes, including rulers who have the power of making change directly, are little likely to peruse those books whose object is to show that they hold in possession what is not theirs, and less likely are they to act on the principles of that book.

2. It is, therefore, only as a treatise on politics can affect the unprivileged classes that it can be a means of working change, and that only as it tends to increase their knowledge of political truth, and consequently their moral influence. But the circulation of a book is necessarily limited, and however true its principles might be, considerable time must

elapse before they can have any notable effect, especially when the pecuniary interests of the powerful are leagued against them. Thus the utmost we can expect from any treatise on politics is, that if its principles be true, they should silently work their way amongst the thinking portion of the unprivileged classes, and by increasing the moral influence of those classes enable them to labour effectually for their rights; or if its principles be not true, that they should go, like their author, to the grave and be forgotten.

There is in nature, however, a means of change much more efficient than books can be,—because,

3. Nature is harmoniously constructed; that which is just is beneficial.

4. When that which is unjust is done, that which is prejudicial will arise as a necessary consequence. When that which is prejudicial arises, inconvenience will be experienced by those who suffer the injustice. When this inconvenience becomes excessive, it will produce clamour for change, and this is the mode which nature provides for the correction of the abuses of her laws. Thus, *right* should lead to possession. Power instead of right has led to possession. But that power instead of right should lead to possession is contrary to the laws and harmony of nature, and as the laws of nature cannot be infringed with impunity, guilt and suffering have necessarily ensued. Suffering is inconvenience, and inconvenience has produced clamour for change.

But when men are so grossly ignorant as not to

trace the suffering to its true cause, or when so enslaved and degraded as not to dream of change, the clamour is faint, has no direct object, or perhaps a mistaken object, and is for the most part ineffectual.

In this there is discovered another truth, that knowledge must show the true cause of the suffering before the clamour can become effectual to produce or to extort the change.

Thus the diffusion of knowledge will gradually lead towards the best political state. It is therefore important that the unprivileged classes should be informed of, and correctly understand, the causes of their systematic suffering. Suffering makes them feel their wrongs, and knowledge teaches them how these wrongs may be corrected.

CHAPTER III.

THE QUESTION FOR SOLUTION.

ALL civilised communities agree in the general fact, that legislation of some kind or other is desirable and necessary. All agree in establishing rules of action for the body politic, and all agree in enforcing those enactments by the strong arm of physical power. It cannot be denied, however, that the utmost diversity of opinion prevails on the subject of politics. Principles of the most opposite nature and tendency are professed and defended by parties of different interests, and by the people of different nations. Creeds in politics are almost as diverse as creeds in religion; and numerous as these creeds are, their professors are still further subdivided by shades of opinion, which almost exclude the possibility of classification. Practically there is no rule in politics, no common groundwork or basis on which opinions are established; and if there be in reality a science capable of being expounded, of being taught as a branch of knowledge, and of being made the rule of legislation, either it remains to be discovered, or, if already discovered, it is utterly disregarded.

It is quite evident, that if anterior to any legislation things be not altogether indifferent, there must be some principles of good and evil, of right and wrong, in which legislation ought to originate, or otherwise it ought not to exist at all. If, then, anterior to legislation, there be rules or principles of political right and duty, what are they? where are they contained? and are they invariably adhered to? But, be it observed, that if a rule or principle exist and be capable of being known, it must of necessity be a certain one, or else could not justly be taken as the basis of legislative enactment. And also a rule in its own nature is certain, for only in so far as it is certain is it a rule.

But how can we reconcile with the existence of a rule the prevailing diversity of opinion? Whence does it arise that a rule should exist and be so little known, and that it should not at once, and in all cases, be referred to as the ultimate and only measure of social right and wrong? It does exist, or legislative acts are neither right nor wrong,—a proposition which few, I apprehend, will be inclined to maintain.

Historically, however, it cannot be concealed that, except in a few rare instances, men have never legislated according to a rule. A rule is objective, something that exists outside and independently of the legislator, something that can be weighed and studied and examined by all men, something that the *intellect* can appreciate and pronounce judgment on, before the will reduces it to the form of an enactment.

When there is a rule, there is an acknowledgment of something anterior and paramount to the will of the legislator, something by which the legislator himself is bound, something that rules even the ruler, and from which he cannot lawfully depart. But when there is no rule, the *will* of the legislator is paramount; he acts, not because his judgment is convinced, but because his passions or his desires require satisfaction; and his enactments, so far from being the expression of deliberative judgment, are neither more nor less than the expression of a will that may run in one direction to-day, and in another direction to-morrow, without a guide, without a bridle, and with no other object than its own immediate gratification.* In the relation of lord and serf we have legislation without a rule. The lord does as he pleases in the first instance, and his power is only restrained step by step after a long course of mutual

* "The hereditary kings of Denmark and Norway shall be in effect, and ought to be esteemed by their subjects, the only supreme head on earth; they shall be above all human laws, and shall acknowledge in all ecclesiastical and civil affairs no higher power than God alone. The king shall enjoy the right of making and interpreting the laws, of abrogating, adding to, and dispensing with them. He may also annul all the laws which either he or his predecessors shall have made, excepting this royal law, which must remain irrevocable, and be considered as the fundamental law of the state. He has the power of declaring war, making peace, imposing taxes, and levying contributions of all sorts."—*Royal Law of Denmark*.

England in Henry VIII.'s time, France in the time of Louis XIV., and Russia now under the autocrat, may be considered as representing this phase of society. The present autocracy of the French Emperor is purely exceptional. France is essentially non-autocratic, although the present government is so—for a short season.

struggle, in which the serf succeeds in withdrawing portion after portion of his personal liberty from the unlicensed will of the lord. Every man who reads history must acknowledge that such has been the course of actual legislation. The rulers found themselves in a position of power, and enacted such laws as occurred to them, on any or on no principle of objective propriety. They had no rule before them to determine the just limits of legislation, and no rule to determine what legislation ought to be, even within its own legitimate limits. On some occasions they enacted laws of sterling value, which could not fail to improve the condition of society, and to restrain the evil-doer in his malpractices. On other occasions they enacted laws of the most frantic iniquity, such, in fact, as we can scarcely imagine to have emanated from the human mind. But in both cases the ultimate and only appeal was, not to the objective rule of right, but to the subjective will of the legislator or ruler, who was to all intents and purposes the lord paramount, irresponsible and accountable to none for good or for evil.

In pursuing our inquiry into the primary rule of political right, we shall not attempt to determine what laws the legislator ought to enact or to refrain from enacting, but we shall commence at an earlier period of the investigation, and endeavour to ascertain the origin of the legislator's right to enact any law whatever. The lord and the serf (and these still represent, to a certain extent, the ruler and the ruled) are for us two *men*, into whose mutual relations we

institute a rational inquiry. We have first to ask whether there ought or ought not to be any ruler whatever, before we can possibly determine the duties of the ruler's office; and this question can only be determined by an inquiry into the natural relations of men. To assume the legislator's office, and then to inquire into the propriety of certain laws, must ever leave one of the most important parts of the subject without satisfactory explanation. Besides which, there is the invariable fallacy of assuming the actual or present legislators as those who are rightfully invested with legislative power,—a question that has still to undergo discussion in more than one country of Europe.

In endeavouring to ascertain the original principles from which a right to legislate must spring before it can be legitimate, we shall naturally be led to inquire into the original rights of mankind, and to determine how much or how little is naturally inherent in the individual, for no principle can be plainer than that "the whole can contain no more than the aggregate of all its parts." When this truth is applied to societies, it teaches us that no society, no aggregate body of men, no community, no majority, can by any possibility have rights that do not exist originally and essentially in the various individuals of which the society is composed. And it is only when the rights of individuals have been ascertained on a principle that admits of no arbitrary determination, that we can proceed to inquire into the relations of those individuals when associated

into communities, and acting in a public capacity as a state or nation. Scientific knowledge consists in the knowledge of *relations*, and viewed in this light the science of politics is the science that treats of the original and immutable relations of men. But when we come to define more clearly what the particular object of politics really is, we shall immediately recognise a difficulty that does not attach to the sciences of mathematics and mechanics, inasmuch as the inquiry present to politics is not "*what is,*" but "*what ought to be done;*" and when we speak of relations that are immutable, we speak not of that natural immutability that attaches to the principles of the natural sciences, but of that moral immutability which depends on the constitution of the human mind, and obliges it to pronounce a judgment of a particular character in all ages and in all circumstances the same. When the inquiry is limited to the investigation of *what is,* we find that it is impossible to discover any conditions of matter or of men that do not fully and perfectly accord with such laws as have been already ascertained to be true. But, on the other hand, no sooner do we endeavour to discover the laws of *what ought to be,* than we find the most infinite variety of circumstances presented to our consideration, all as contrary and as contradictory as can possibly be conceived. So soon as a truth is proven in the physical sciences, no circumstance whatever can be adduced in which that truth is infringed, and no conditions of matter can be made by man in which

the proposition is not actually and invariably true. Truth in the physical sciences receives its constant illustration from the actual conditions of matter, and we cannot so arrange its circumstances that it shall not present to our view the very phenomena that accord with the *intellectual proposition* already ascertained. The mental proposition—the thought—was obtained from realities that have passed away, from real occurrences which began and terminated, it may be a century before we were born, but that thought is as true to-day as it was then, and the real occurrences of to-day *illustrate* but do not belie it. What the reason discovered to be *true* yesterday, the senses may realise to-day in the actual conditions and actual modes of operation. All the items may be dissimilar, all the substantial realities unlike, but the permanent element of truth remains, and shows phenomena shadowing forth the immutable principles of reason. Every single actuality that sense can perceive may be *not the same*, every change in the phenomena may be on a larger or a smaller scale, but the truth, the permanent *thought*, remains, and be the changes as they may, the substratum of rational assertion is *identical*. Far otherwise, however, is it with the moral sciences. Let it be granted that a proposition is demonstrated in such a manner that no possible doubt can remain concerning its absolute and necessary truth. Shall we thence infer that we can walk into the fields of nature and of society, and find its confirmation in those circumstances which can be appreciated by

the natural intellect? On the contrary, let the proposition be as true as it may, we shall find it infringed in thousands of different circumstances, because *what ought to be done* has no necessary and invariable power to determine *what is done*. In our investigation, therefore, when we speak of principles that are immutable, and of rights that are immutable, we are well aware that thousands of circumstances can be adduced in which those principles have no actual illustration, and in which those rights have no other reality than that which attaches to their demonstration. Such, however, must always be the case so long as man continues to infringe the laws of his Creator, and to erect himself into the independent judge and author of his actions. Were it permitted to carry an illustration into that better land where there is no evil and no error, it might be said that *there* every moral proposition that is *true* finds its real illustration in the actual circumstances of the ministering spirits who do His pleasure, and that no discord whatever is to be found between the intellectual perception of *what ought to be*, and the observed appreciation of *what is*. Neither let us too hopelessly conclude that the discord even here is so utterly beyond redeem, that man can do nothing to lessen it, and that he must ever remain the slave of those despotic principles of evil which have made our fair mother earth a temple of the adversary, a reeking altar of Baal on which the race of man has been offered a perpetual sacrifice. Shroud it as we will, the history of man

has been but a dreary tale, and yet it is better to hope and to struggle than to let a craven fear overwhelm us, and paralyse our efforts which (if we faint not) we have the surest ground for expecting shall yet be crowned with success.

In examining into the original and necessary relations of men, two prominent objects naturally arrest our attention—man and the earth. On the one hand, we have the race of sentient and intelligent beings who are capable of acting *justly* or *unjustly* towards each other. With them lies the question of human *liberty*, its nature, its origin, its limits (if there be any), and the form of society best suited to preserve to every man those natural *rights* which he inherits from the mere fact of his being a *man*.

On the other hand, we have the *earth*—the land, the sea, the air. This earth must be possessed, and with it lies the question of human *property*. How and on what principles is this earth to be divided and portioned out amongst its inhabitants? What is property? Whence is the concept of *property* derived?—for property is not a quality residing in the object itself that can be appreciated through the senses like colour, temperature, weight, &c. What is the just and rightful division of the land, so that no man shall possess more than he is entitled to, no man less than he is entitled to? And this not determined on an arbitrary principle of opinion, but on a principle of axiomatic reason, which either decides the question positively, or if unable to do

so, leaves a negative result, which practically is as definite so far as *right* is concerned.

Such are the questions we propose to examine in the following pages. And now for the principles on which the examination is to be conducted. Politics is a moral science. Do we therefore intend to treat it as a branch of that higher morals known as religion, and to appeal to the books of revelation for the establishment of our propositions? No.

Revelation is given to make men wise unto salvation, but not to teach men science. There is in the human mind a principle of *equity* acknowledged in its abstract form by all the communities on earth. This principle of equity is capable of investigation, it has axioms attached to it, and it produces propositions which are true *à priori*, independently of the will of any man or of any body of men whatever.

Every question has a certain number of possibilities attached to it, and no more. We may exhaust them, and one of them must necessarily be true, even although we may have no sufficient means for determining which is the true one. Let us apply this to legislation. What are the possibilities of the case?

1st, Anterior to legislation there must exist natural principles on which legislation ought to be founded; or else,—

2d, Some particular and definite form of legislation must be of divine institution and establishment; or else,—

3d, Legislation ought not to exist.

One of these must be true. The latter we shall not inquire into at present. The second is *possible*, the only objection to it is the total absence of evidence that it is true. The first is supported by the common judgment of mankind. It is true, for the anterior principles can be adduced. And it must be admitted by every man who admits legislation at all, because it is the necessary position into which every such man will come, if he is consistent with himself, and refrains from holding two contradictory propositions. But if these anterior principles exist, they can be logically investigated like the principles of any other science, quite independently of those higher truths that are more peculiarly intended to guide man in his eternal welfare. And being so considered, they are placed on the broader basis of axiomatic universality, and are laid open to the general verification of the human intellect, wherever it may be found willing to examine them.

Now, therefore, although I have the most perfect belief and conviction, that whatever is thus naturally true, is also in strict harmony with that which is revealed, or of divine communication, I do not, in the first place, intend to examine revelation, because it is as a natural science that I propose to treat the theory of politics,—as something that may be studied by the unaided intellect, as something that may be known by all men, whether they have or have not the books of revelation. There is a natural theory of political equity, quite independent of the truths of revelation, and though it cannot fail to be interesting

to study the politics of Scripture, it is of primary necessity that the politics of nature should receive that due attention, without which the sanction of revelation would too easily degenerate into theocratic tyranny and priestly domination. We learn from history, that those who based their theories too exclusively on Scripture, fell into the error of confounding sins against the Almighty with crimes against society, and animated with the best possible intentions, they did establish laws essentially tyrannical, and endeavoured to exclude from *civil* rights those who were only obnoxious to *ecclesiastical* censure or discipline. The pilgrim fathers who fled from persecution at home, and who willingly expatriated themselves in the cause of civil and religious liberty, —when they settled on the western shores of the Atlantic, endeavoured to found a *scriptural* community. And what was the result? Those very men who had maintained the cause of human rights and human liberty, who had thrown their all into the contest with the noble recklessness of the truest heroism, founded a theocratic association, and made church membership the criterion of civil privileges. The temptations to such a course were no doubt most powerful under the circumstances of their exile, but the laws were nevertheless essentially tyrannical, and brought forth the natural fruits of dissension, coupled with the hypocrisy or heresy of those who purchased their civil status by assenting to religious forms and ceremonies in which they had no real interest. The Scriptures do, no doubt, contain the best and purest

principles of political rectitude, but where is the man of so perfect judgment, and so perfect impartiality, that he can from Scripture draw the line of true demarcation between the things that man may justly take cognisance of, and the things which the Creator and Divine Judge has reserved for his own supreme disposal? Besides, even grant that the Scriptures contain the principles of right and wrong as applied to societies, it will be found on more minute examination that something more definite is required before a community can justly assume the form of a state in which one man rules and another is ruled. The Scripture sanctions no particular man, but the ruler must be a particular man; the Scripture sanctions no particular form of constitution, but the form of constitution must be a particular one. Now, who is to determine which man shall fill the ruler's office, and who is to determine what particular form of constitution shall be established in the state, and upon what principles are these to be determined? These are questions which Scripture does not answer, and does not profess to enlighten us on. They are left to the judgment of mankind, to be determined on some other principle than that of divine revelation. Scripture sanctions all good and equitable constitutions, but by no means determines the peculiar form that is most in accordance with the will of the Creator. No license is afforded in Scripture for the domination of one man over another, backed with the awful authority of eternal power and wisdom. The ruler and the ruled equally receive approbation,

so long as they act rightly in their stations; but what the particular form of that rightly is, Scripture does not trace in such minute detail as to allow any man or any body of men to assume the proposition that they have the authority of Heaven to interfere in any way whatever with their fellows. Scripture arms no man against his fellow-man, but gives the sanction of authority to every act that is just, and righteous, and benevolent, and kind and charitable, leaving it to men themselves to arrange their own forms of government, or of law, within those general limits which justice legitimately admits. No act of *injustice* receives the sanction of the Scriptures, and every act of injustice is threatened with the visitation of divine displeasure. But in the formation of a State, which necessarily involves positive enactment on the part of the community, something more is required than the mere negative prohibition of injustice, namely, the determination of what injustice is; and this *something else* must be sought for, not in the Scriptures, in the first place, but in those natural principles of equity, whose existence Scripture takes for granted when it gives its sanction to the just, and promulgates its threatenings against the unjust. Many illustrations of justice, both as applied to individuals and to communities, may be found in the books of revelation, and many valuable precepts may be gathered for the conduct of societies; but we must clearly remember, that Scripture presupposes the existence of that *justice* which it so often inculcates and sanctions, but does not originate.

From these considerations, therefore, it is evident that Scripture must be appealed to, not for the purpose of teaching us a divine science of politics, but for sanctioning and approving all such human systems as are naturally just and equitable. Tyranny, whether the tyranny of the many or the few, is equally hateful and equally reprobated in the eye of revelation. Licentiousness, which is only tyranny under another name, meets with no more favour than unbridled despotism.

If any great principle of practical application can plainly be derived from Scripture, in so general a signification as to cast aside dispute, it is that which sanctions the *supremacy of law*, making the law paramount and supreme, and holding it with the most even-handed justice over both the ruler and the ruled. In the eye of Scripture, no man is independent to act according to the dictates of his will; no man is allowed, whatever be his station, to form a code of action for himself, or to do as he pleases, merely because no other man is powerful enough to call him to account. The ruler has his boundaries which he may not lawfully overstep, whatever be his power, or whatever be his designation. The law is the objective principle of right, by which the ruler must be bound exactly in the same sense as the ruled, and no authority is given for a ruler's licentiousness any more than for the licentiousness of the subject multitude. Every forcible departure from the law of even-handed justice is licentiousness, whether it be on the part of the ruler or the ruled;

and every such departure is tyranny in its essence. What, so far as the *liberties* of a state are concerned, can be more licentious than the assumption of a right to regulate the mode in which men shall worship their Creator, and to visit with pains and penalties those who do not conform to the church by law established? And what, so far as the *property* of a state is concerned, can be more licentious than the grant of thirty or forty thousand acres of the nation's land to an individual who may happen to have performed some trifling service to the person of the king? Yet, both of these have occurred in Britain, both have received the sanction of the law, both have been publicly enforced by the strong arm of physical power, and both have been defended as justifiable actions. Now, if any political truth stand out prominently on the face of Scripture, it is that there are limits to the ruler's sphere of action which he may not lawfully overstep. He himself, whether he be represented by the person of a king, or an aristocracy, or a popular parliament, can only act rightfully within those natural limits of justice in which every man's rights are preserved to him entire, without infringement and without diminution. The ruler must have the same objective law as the ruled, and his province is merely that of the public servant, who watches over the various members of the community, and takes care that none is allowed to interfere unjustly with his neighbour. Of himself he can originate nothing that is in anywise binding upon any other man whatever, so long as it is the

mere expression of the ruler's *will*; for neither reason, nor nature, nor Scripture, do in any way whatever recognise the subjection of one man to another. The *law*, the objective rule of right, must in every case be paramount and supreme; and the ruler is only the person to whose share it falls to carry that law into just and general operation. Neither do we here intend such law as may happen to have received a form of sanction by human enactment, but that general and anterior law which every man may judge of, and which every man must recognise, whether it have or have not been promulgated by the legislator. Every State should sit in judgment on those enactments that the ruler attempts to enforce, and try them by the primary principles of equity, written in the constitution of the human mind by the finger of the Creator. If the State do this, its course is a course of liberty, becoming more and more perfect with the lapse of years. If it do not, its course is a course of slavery and degradation, of vice, and crime, and licentiousness, whose only natural termination is the tempest of revolution and bloodshed, by which the disorder of the laws of equity is for a moment superseded by the destruction of society. The circumstances of any country permit only a certain amount of injustice; if this be exceeded, society becomes disorganised, and an appeal to arms must be made as between enemies who are openly at war. This natural termination to tyranny proves, beyond a doubt, that society tends to recover the equilibrium of equity according to

certain laws of nature, which allow of disturbance only within given limits, which limits are probably determined by the amount of true knowledge that happens to be disseminated throughout a population. If the population be ignorant and superstitious, the amount of injustice to which they will submit before revolt is so great that we can scarcely say how far it may not be carried with impunity. When the population, on the contrary, is instructed, when its judgment has been cultivated, and is, to a certain degree, matured, a much less amount of legislative injustice is sufficient to fan its energies into a flame of insurrection, and to produce an appeal to those anterior principles of justice which are always forthcoming when required, though so easily forgotten and neglected when the pressing occasion has gone by. Knowledge would be far less valuable than it is, if it did not possess this constant tendency to preserve the liberties of a people. The surest of all safeguards against insurrection and popular tumult is the absence of the cause that produces them,—namely, legislative injustice. No other security can possibly be permanent; for sooner or later the equilibrium of equity must be restored. And if true liberty be the surest ground of social peace and order, knowledge and virtue are at once the most certain bases of liberty and its most certain safeguards. A virtuous and well-instructed population can scarcely be oppressed; an ignorant and vicious population neither knows nor values, nor is able to appreciate, the inestimable blessing of equitable laws

carefully administered in the single intention of the nation's welfare.

Notes.—But while it is maintained that Scripture sanctions and authenticates, but *does not originate*, the principles of natural justice, it must not be forgotten that Scripture is the Word of God, a revelation from the Creator of the world and of man. And it is only because Scripture does not contain a complete system of worldly policy that we are obliged to have recourse to the axiomatic principles of equity implanted by the Creator in the constitution of the human mind. And here it is necessary to draw a distinction between the science of morals that furnishes an answer to the question, "What ought to be?" and those other abstract sciences that furnish an answer to the question, "What is?" When the human mind is engaged in the inquiry of *What is*, its convictions and its belief are determined by a law of imperious necessity, over which it has no control. It believes, and necessarily believes, according to the sufficiency of the evidence brought before it; and a *demonstrated truth* is a proposition that the human mind can by no possibility refrain from believing, so soon as it apprehends the process of the demonstration. No latitude is allowed it, no swerving to the right hand or the left; but so soon as the demonstration is understood, that moment does the mind acquire a conviction that it can neither eradicate nor alter. Revelation can produce no change here; for the demonstration, if, indeed, it be a demonstration, is complete, unalterable, and eternal; and so long as the constitution of man remains the same, the demonstrated truth must be believed, simply because no power of man can conceive its falsehood. Far otherwise, however, is it with the science of morals, that inquires, *What ought to be?* God is the moral Governor of the universe, and, as man's creator, he has the most undoubted RIGHT to establish such laws as seem to him good, and to promulgate those laws in such circumstances, and in such a manner, as seem most befitting to his wisdom and his will.

As the Scriptures, then, are a revelation from the Creator, and a declaration of his *will*, it becomes us most carefully to ascertain their contents, and to inquire, not how far do they coincide with the principles of natural equity, but how far do the principles of natural equity coincide with *them*. When it is a question of "What ought to be," the *revelation* must ever be paramount and supreme; and if actions the most contrary to every principle of *natural* justice be commanded, those actions must be performed as sacred duties, without any other inquiry,

on the part of *the created*, than a due and legitimate inquiry into the authenticity of the revelation. Neither are we to suppose this an imaginary case, or one that has not really occurred. It has occurred, and the whole history of a people was a continued assertion of God's moral supremacy to command, and of man's incumbent duty to *obey*. What could be more licentious, or more contrary to every principle of *natural justice*, than the invasion of the land of Canaan by the Hebrews, coupled, as it was, with principles of absolute extermination, to which mercy was unknown? And yet, where is the man, admitting the divine origin of Scripture, who can for a single moment call in question God's RIGHT to employ the Hebrews as the executors of his just displeasure, and thus to substitute a new law of divine command for that natural law of equity that depends on the mutual relations of mankind? And where is the man, denying the divine origin of Scripture, who does not at once assent to the abstract principle, that the obedience of the Hebrews would have been a duty, provided the revealed command was duly authenticated as coming from the Creator?

In attempting an inquiry, therefore, into the natural relations of men, it is with the fullest admission of the supremacy of Scripture. Whatever results may be arrived at, those results can only be *principles of right*, inasmuch as they contradict no portion of the written Word of God. Whatever is revealed is of primary obligation, and the results of reason hold but that secondary place that belongs to them, either from the absence of revelation or from its coincidence. Where revelation is silent, there reason may hold her legitimate domain; and where reason coincides with Scripture, there she acquires a heavenly confirmation, that sheds the halo of divine truth over the emanations of the human understanding.

Again, amid the moral precepts of the Bible, there are many that refer to the conduct of men as associated in society. Some of these are incumbent on men as *men*, and some of them are incumbent on men as *Christians*. The first contain the objective principles of human duty; the second, those peculiar principles that are given to the Christian to guide his conduct in circumstances where his judgment might be at a loss. The first would condemn tyranny and oppression, and denounce judgment against the unrighteous ruler for his iniquity. The second, on the other hand, may teach the Christian to obey even the most unrighteous ruler in all matters not forbidden by the Scriptures. The first may say, "Thou shalt not steal;" the second, "If any man take thy cloak, let him have thy coat also." We must, therefore, distinguish between the *rectitude of the action* and the *duty of the Christian*. What the Christian may be called upon to *suffer*, forms no criterion whatever of the rightfulness of

the law, or system, by which he *may* suffer. The law may be unjust, and the system bad, and yet it may be the Christian's duty to submit to both until he have the legal opportunity to procure their abrogation.

In studying the precepts of Scripture, therefore, two distinct questions are presented to our consideration. First, What is right? and, second, What is the Christian's duty? Were all men Christians, the two questions might blend more nearly into one; but since, unhappily, it is not so, they must be studied in their own separate distinctness, because an answer to the one does not necessarily furnish an answer to the other. Scripture draws the distinction, and man ought not carelessly to overlook it. Compare, on this subject, the 21st chapter of Exodus, where the *rule of right* is laid down by Almighty God, with the 5th chapter of Matthew, where the rule of the *Christian's duty* is laid down by the Saviour of mankind. The distinction between the two is essential, because the former determines the rightfulness of reciprocal action, and includes *both* parties; the latter determines only the duty of *one* party. Our Saviour never intended to teach that it was right or just, or allowable, for any man to injure a Christian, neither is it his intention to give the *law of justice*, which had already been given, but he teaches his followers that, even if they have been injured by another party, and even if that other party *have* departed from the law of justice, it is his will and pleasure that his followers should *forgive*. There is no discrepancy whatever between the two laws. The one is the law of justice, which deals *equally* with all men; the other is the law of divine benevolence, to which those who desire to be saved in and through the merits of the Redeemer are called by the Son of God. The *natural* relations of men are relations of justice, and ought to be regulated by the law of justice; but the spiritual relations of the follower of Christ are relations of benevolence, and in his personal character of a follower of Christ every man is called upon to forgive every injury freely and fully from the heart, inasmuch as this, we are explicitly informed, is one of the conditions of his own salvation. It is my firm belief that the reader of Scripture may profitably consider the three laws of benevolence (which admits into itself no injustice), of justice (which does not *include* benevolence, but *excludes* all *detriment*,—namely, the opposite of benefit), and of benefit, which does not include either justice or benevolence, but confines itself to the inquiry of what is beneficial. When these are duly considered, the *harmony* of revelation is more clearly perceived, and many passages which appear contradictory immediately range themselves into an order that exhibits them as the *different parts* of the *same system*. To make this more plain, let us take an example:—In the first place, let us

contrast the first and the third laws. Suppose I have a hundred pounds of surplus money, and many of my neighbours are poor. This money I have acquired by my own labour, and have equitably discharged all just claims that could be brought against me. Consequently it is *my own*. In *justice* I may keep it all to myself,—that is, no other person can advance a *just* claim to any portion of it whatever. But still there is another law, which no man has a right to enforce upon me, as he has a right to enforce the law of justice, but which God tells me to act on, and makes me responsible to him, and not to my fellow-creatures, for obeying or disobeying. This is the law of benevolence. I have money to spare, and my neighbours are in want. Benevolence tells me assist them, and, as I have received benefits from God, so does benevolence teach me to share my good things with the needy. Now, let us imagine that I take the most extreme view of the case, and resolve to give *the whole* of my hundred pounds away, reserving no part to myself, but trusting to my own labour for future supplies. The law of benevolence is completely satisfied. I can do no more than give the whole. But now there is another law, according to which I must still be regulated. I have satisfied *justice*, I have satisfied *benevolence*; but the question has still to be determined, *How am I to lay out my hundred pounds to the greatest advantage of my poor neighbours?* Benevolence will never teach me this; justice will never teach me this. I must therefore study the law of *benefit*. One of my poor neighbours has an indifferently shabby wardrobe, and his wife is not overstocked with blankets, petticoats, and bibs for the children. “Oh, by all means give the poor fellow a ten-pound note, and set him up decently.” Not so fast, Mr Philanthropist; perhaps I may do him more good with a ten-pound note. If I give him a new suit of clothes, and his wife a supply of blankety for the house, where is he to get another coat when this one is done? What *good* will the coat do him except keep him warm for a little while? Now, suppose I happen to know that if my poor neighbour had a pony he could earn, in the gross, six shillings a-day by carting coals, wood, and country articles into the neighbouring town, whereas, by his present work on the roads he only has seven shillings a-week, and six children to feed. The keep of the pony, and tear and wear of the cart, in a part of the country where things are cheap, will cost him 1s. 6d. a-day. Now, for £15 I can get him a pony and cart, and set him on his feet, so that he shall not only be kept warm for a while, but shall, by his own labour, earn enough to clothe, feed, and shelter himself and his family. Now, this is not a question of *benevolence*, for I have already resolved to give the whole of my money; nor of *justice*, for my poor neighbour has no *claim* to my £15, but of *benefit*. Shall I give him £10 to purchase

clothes, or shall I give him £10 to purchase a pony, and lend him £5 to procure a cart. Who cannot see the difference in the result; and who cannot see that the course of inquiry in the three laws of benefit, the lowest, justice, the middle, and benevolence, the highest, is quite distinct, and that the mind is in quite a different attitude when engaged with the different questions? If we take the three laws from the bottom upwards, we find that they give an answer to three different questions, and that the lower does not include the one above it; while the higher does include the one below it. The law of *benefit* answers the question, *What is the most efficient mode of doing good?* but it does *not* inculcate, or even suggest to a man, his duty to do good. It is purely an intellectual calculation of consequences as to how far they are or are not beneficial. The most selfish and the most unjust man may have the clearest conception of this law, and may attain to a knowledge of it that would be of great service to the benevolent.

The law of justice answers the question (not *how much* do I owe; this is a question of *fact*, not of *justice*, but), "Is there an incumbent duty on me to pay what I owe, and to abstain in all cases from injuring my neighbour?" but the law of *justice* does *not* inculcate the duty of giving money, or of giving service without a fair equivalent. The law of perfect *justice* may be carried out by a man of no benevolence. Such a man may discharge all just obligations, and may abstain from trespassing on the rights of his neighbour; but he may, at the same time, come short of the law of benevolence, and never do a charitable action from the love of God, or the love of his fellow-creatures.

The law of benevolence answers to the question, "Is there an incumbent obligation on me to share, with a willing heart, my property with my poorer neighbour, and to do him all the good in my power as occasion offers, without fee or reward?"

It will be observed, that men have a right to *enforce* the law of justice, but not to enforce the law of benevolence, because the law of justice is purely restrictive and negative, keeping every man to his own; whereas the law of benevolence is expansive and positive, and demands that a man should part with his own. The one is the law of mankind as a natural being, and ought to regulate all systems of society and associations of men. The other is the divine law given to each man for the regulation of his own personal conduct. For all actions measured by the law of justice, man is responsible to man; for all actions measured by the law of benevolence, man is responsible to God.

If any man abstain from the duties of justice, society may justly force him to attend to them; but if any man abstain entirely from the duties of benevolence, no other society than the church can justly take cognisance of his avarice. God has re-

served this case to himself, and He, in his own appointed time, will judge men according as they have done good or done evil.

Viewing these laws from the highest point and going downwards, we find that a different series of truths present themselves. Let us take the law of benevolence, and suppose it in *perfect* operation. "Love worketh no ill to his neighbour," and consequently, where benevolence is in perfect operation, there cannot be the slightest injustice; and therefore, as the absence of injustice is all that the law of justice requires, benevolence contains within itself the whole *duty* of justice. But benevolence in perfect operation is benevolence perfectly *inclined* to do good, and perfectly *enlightened* as to the most efficient means of doing it. Consequently the law of benevolence does, in its abstract form, contain the whole law of benefit, because, what is benevolence in its operation? It is the doing *good*. But how can good be done unless it be *known*? for the mere vague desire to do *something*, and the mere gratification of a propensity in the readiest way that presents itself, is totally unworthy of the name of benevolence,—the highest virtue of the Christian,—inasmuch as it may be the parting with money or service, to the absolute *detriment* of the recipient. What is *good* must be known and determined before benevolence can be *in operation*; and for this cause man requires an intellect to *know*, as well as an impulse to desire and execute. Strictly speaking, perfect benevolence is only to be found in the Deity, who, at the same moment, is infinitely good to desire, infinitely wise to know, and infinitely powerful to execute. And in the operations of the Deity there can be no doubt that the three laws of benevolence, justice, and benefit, do find a simultaneous execution in absolute perfection.

We have already said that justice does not *include* benevolence,—that is, justice may be perfect, and yet there may be the entire *absence* of benevolence. But yet justice contains within itself the law of benefit; not *necessarily*, but from the harmony which God has established between the axiomatic reason of mankind and the constitution of the external world,—a harmony that is similar to that which exists between the abstract principles of mathematics and the actually observed facts of mechanics. The pursuit of the inquiry into the law of justice is quite independent of any inquiry into the law of beneficial possession, and *vice versâ*; but it is found that the two terminate in a harmonious result, and that the abstract action called the just does invariably coincide with the concrete action called the beneficial. Had the intellect of man and the constitution of external nature not been constructed on a principle of reciprocal harmony, no science would have been possible, because the *rational calculation* would not, as now, have coincided with the observed phenomenon. Systematic truth depends not one iota more on the exist-

ence of the external phenomenon than it depends on the abstract preparation of the mind for the analysis of that phenomenon; and though this truth is sometimes thrust into the background, it forms by far the most wonderful illustration of God's wisdom that is to be found in the whole circle of created nature.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ABSTRACT AND THE INDUCTIVE SCIENCES, AND CLASSIFICATION OF THE ABSTRACT SCIENCES.

“A science is a complement of cognitions, having in point of form the character of logical perfection, and in point of matter the character of real truth.”*

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ABSTRACT AND THE INDUCTIVE SCIENCES.

[THE mathematical sciences are called *abstract*, the physical and psychological sciences are called *inductive*.]

1. Every science has an *object noun*, the relations of whose various forms are the subjects of investigation.

This object noun is the first necessary condition of the existence of science.

2. When the object noun is known or appreciated

* This beautiful definition was given by Sir William Hamilton in his course of lectures on Logic, delivered in the college of Edinburgh.

by the mind, the mind considers the various forms of which it is susceptible, and classifies them.

3. When the classification has made a certain degree of progress, the mind can investigate the relations of those various forms, and by the aid of the axioms that exist intuitively in all men, can connect the propositions by the law of reason and consequent.

A science is more or less perfect according to the number of propositions that are thus connected by the law of reason and consequent.

No number of isolated propositions can constitute a science. It is absolutely necessary that they be connected by the law of reason and consequent; that is, that one proposition (called technically the consequent) shall result from two other propositions, called the premises.

To illustrate these propositions let us turn our attention for a moment to geometry.

1st, The object noun of geometry is *space*.

2d, The mind first inquires into the various forms of which space is susceptible. These are determined and classed,—namely, into lines and figures; the lines into straight lines and curves; the figures into triangles, the square, the circle, &c.

3d, When the classification of these *forms of space* has made some progress, their relations may be investigated by the aid of the axioms that exist in the minds of all men. But propositions can be connected through axioms only by making one proposition a major premiss; another, a minor premiss; and the

third that results from them a consequent. Logic is therefore universally present in every *science*, but it is not present in the classification. The descriptive sciences (descriptive botany, descriptive anatomy, &c.) are not *sciences*, they are merely classifications. Their propositions are not connected by the law of reason and consequent, and thus every proposition is isolated from its fellow.

In every science, therefore, there is a major proposition, a minor proposition, and a consequent.

The essential difference between the abstract and the inductive sciences is this: In the abstract sciences we commence our reasonings with the major and minor premiss, and descend to the consequent; in the inductive sciences we commence our reasonings with the consequent and minor premiss, and ascend to the major premiss.

In every reasoning whatever, two propositions must be given to find the one that is required.

In the abstract sciences the propositions given are the major premiss (the *axiom*) and the minor premiss (the form of the object noun expressed in its description), and the proposition required is the necessary consequent that results from these two.

In the inductive sciences the propositions given are the consequent (namely, the observed phenomenon considered as *an effect*), the minor premiss (namely, the *conditions* of matter), and the required proposition is the major premiss,—namely, any such general proposition as will complete the syllogism,

and make the consequent follow necessarily from it and the minor premiss.

Viewed in this light, the necessity of *observation* in the inductive sciences, and its non-necessity in the abstract sciences, become immediately apparent.

Let it be remembered, that in every reasoning whatever, two propositions (two relations) must be given before we can discover the relation that is required.

Now, if any two propositions of a syllogism be given, the third follows necessarily and can be discovered.

In the abstract sciences, if we have *given* the forms of the object noun, the mind from its constitution supplies the major premiss, the axiom or general principle, and the consequent can be discovered without the aid of any external observation whatever.

But in the inductive sciences the general principle is the proposition required; and we can only arrive at it through the medium of the two other propositions of the syllogism, both of which must be obtained through observation, as one is the phenomenon, the other the actual condition of matter.

The difference, then, between the abstract and the inductive sciences is this: In the abstract sciences let the object noun be *given*, and the mind can investigate the relations of its various forms; in a word, can discover the *science* of that object noun. In the inductive sciences, on the contrary, it is not sufficient that the minor premiss (the conditions of matter) be given, the phenomena must also be *observed*, because

two propositions must always be given before the third can be discovered through reasoning, and the major or general principle of the inductive sciences does not exist in the human mind as does the major proposition of the abstract sciences.

OF THE ABSTRACT SCIENCES.

Each abstract science has an object noun, of the relations of whose forms that science exclusively treats.

The abstract sciences are Logic, Arithmetic, Algebra, Geometry, Statics, and Ethics.

The object noun of Logic is Identity.

The object noun of Arithmetic is Number.

The object noun of Algebra is Quantity.

The object noun of Geometry is Space.

The object noun of Statics is Force.

The object noun of Ethics is Equity.

The forms of Identity are terms singular, partial, or universal (considered as identical with or equal to each other in any particular syllogism).

The forms of Number are units, tens, hundreds, &c.

The forms of Quantity are x , $-x$, \sqrt{x} , x^2 , x^3 , &c.

The forms of Space are lines, angles, and figures.

The forms of Force are forces of particular quantity acting in particular directions; and the object of these various sciences is to discover the necessary and universal *relations* of these various forms.

It will be observed that we have given the sciences in a certain order. This order is not arbitrary, but the order in which they must necessarily be studied,

and the order in which they must necessarily be discovered.

Logic is the first and simplest of all the abstract sciences, and it is so simple that it need scarcely be studied objectively for the purpose of reasoning, although every advantage attends its study for the purpose of teaching us how we do reason.

Arithmetic is nothing more than logic applied to number.

Algebra is logic and arithmetic applied to quantity.

Geometry (in its larger sense) is logic, arithmetic, and algebra (the science of *quantity*) applied to space.

Statics is logic, arithmetic, algebra, and geometry applied to force.

The following table may be given of the abstract sciences:—

[ONTOLOGICAL, OR NATURAL.]				
Identity,				Logic.
”	Number,			Arithmetic.
”	”	Quantity,		Algebra.
”	”	”	Space,	Geometry.
”	”	”	” Force,	Statics.
[DEONTOLOGICAL, OR MORAL.]				
Equity,			Politics or Ethics.*	

* The dogma of ethics must be as carefully distinguished from the human facts to which it is applied, as the dogma of mathematics and dynamics is from the physical facts to which it is applied in astronomy. Without the mathematical dogma, astronomy is impossible as a science. It is and can be only a superstition, and always was so till the dogma was introduced. So also practical politics, law, legislation; and the whole device of government and rule is only a great superstition until the ethical dogma (which must be first perfected) is introduced. Unless we distinguish between the abstract dogma and the real facts we can make no progress.

The object of the first five sciences is to inquire *what is*; the object of the last, to inquire *what ought to be done*. Ethics is distinguished by the name of a moral science, and is nothing more than logic applied to equity.

It will be observed that although the abstract sciences may be studied in their abstract form, they are of no possible use (objectively) until they are applied to the real objects that exist in the world; and also, it will be observed that *abstract* number, quantity, space, &c., have no existence whatever except in the mind, and that every *real* number, quantity, &c., is number of something, quantity of something, &c.

But not only is the existence of the subject represented by the object noun necessary to an abstract science, there must also be the axiom that forms the fundamental canon of the science. This canon in logic is, "Things that are identical with the same are identical with each other," which sometimes assumes the technical form of "whatever is predicated of a term may be predicated of that term's equivalent."* In arithmetic we have "the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts," which is the essential foundation of addition, and consequently of subtraction, the reverse of addition. But multiplication is only the addition of similar sums, and division is only demultiplication, consequently this canon is the essential basis of the four primary rules of arithmetic.

* The first form is the real canon of the *science*, the second the canon of the *language*; but the empirical logicians generally prefer the latter, as they seem determined that logic shall not be a science.

In algebra the canon is, "Equals added to equals give equals," which, of course, extends to subtraction, multiplication, and division, as those operations are only forms of addition, or of de-addition (that is, of addition reversed).

The canon of arithmetic is only a particular form of the canon of logic; the canon of algebra is only a particular form of the canon of arithmetic; so that logic presents the abstract form, arithmetic the abstract form applied to *number*, and algebra the abstract form (modified by arithmetic) applied to *quantity*.

These canons or axioms may or may not be *announced*; if not, they are always taken for granted as portions of the mental constitution.* Practically,

* "If all men had logical heads, metaphysic dogmas might be regarded as matters of indifference. They work mischief only in confused brains, just as the flaring comet, while coolly gazed at by the astronomer, who knows what he is looking at," (?) "actually stirs revolutions and overthrows empires, among superstitious nations."—(*Isaac Taylor*.) When we say that it is a matter of indifference whether axioms are announced or not, we speak exclusively of *science*, and not of *philosophy*. Each science takes *one single portion* of the mass, and investigates that *alone*, without ever going beyond the boundary that separates it from all the other portions. Were all men to do nothing but investigate geometric truth, they never would go beyond *space and its relations*. *Every* noun substantive they made use of would have a relation to the identity, equality, number, or quantity of the various spaces whose relations they investigated. Beyond this they could never go, were they to think for ever. The instrument that thinks (the mind, brain, or whatever it may be) has no more right to be the subject of their speculations as geometers, than the anatomy of the hand by which they write their signs. Philosophy, however, endeavours to grasp the whole series of phenomena contained within the whole region of our consciousness, and to class man and man's mind, man's abstract thought, and man's *axiom*, and to furnish a reasonable scheme by which things shall appear to be *correlative* to each other.

it is perhaps a matter of indifference whether they are announced or not; but there seems to be an advantage in stating them, as a science involves a rational *operation* (namely, the operation of proof), and as the axiom is the ultimate form of a proposition—the *most* abstract form in which it can be presented—a science is formally complete when the axiom is stated, and not otherwise.

The conditions, then, that permit of the existence of an abstract science are:—

1st, The existence of an object noun, abstract, simple, and incapable of definition.

2d, The possibility of stating the forms of that noun in primary propositions, called definitions.

3d, The existence of axioms applicable to the forms of the object noun.

If these conditions are fulfilled, an abstract science is possible; if they are not fulfilled (tacitly or explicitly), an abstract science is impossible.

We maintain that the abstract science of *equity* fulfils all these conditions, and it is the purpose of the following pages to attempt a demonstration of one or two of the more general and more simple propositions of the science.

[To avoid a complication of language (by the repeated limitation of certain terms to the abstract sciences), it may be as well to premise that *proof* is of two kinds; and when we speak of proofs in the science of equity, we speak of deductive, and not of inductive proof. In deductive proof the definition and the axiom represent the whole science, and every

proposition, to be correct, must be a particular case of them. Demonstration is only the exhibition of the process by which a proposition, whose truth is not self-evident, is shown to be *equivalent* to, or involved in, another proposition, whose truth is self-evident. Inductive proof, on the contrary, rests on an appeal to facts which can be *observed*; and observation never gives us the major proposition of a syllogism, but the minor and conclusion, from which the major is inferred. The reader will therefore bear in mind that when we speak of proof, or of propositions, we mean *in the abstract sciences*.]

It has usually been maintained that moral science is *not capable* of being reduced to the same accurate form as the other sciences. This assumption (and it is nothing more) is not peculiar to morals, but has also been applied to the physical sciences. *Every* branch of knowledge not yet reduced to scientific form is obnoxious to a similar objection; and there are excellent men who doubt the propriety of attempting to fathom the unknown,—forgetting that our fathers have been guilty of the same offence, and that we are quietly reaping the fruits of their labours. If equity be incapable of reduction to scientific form, it must have some distinguishing characteristic that places it on a different footing from the abstract sciences already reduced to systematic ordination.

But if the *conditions* of a science are fulfilled, all that remains to be done is, to apply the intellect, and as a *simple* concept (one that is incapable of

definition) is just as simple whatever be its nature, it is perfectly absurd to object to the application of logic to that concept, because it happens to be the one that men have not yet specifically investigated.

The science of equity is less complex than geometry, and much less complex than mechanics; and although men have not been in the habit of viewing politics in this light, we must not forget that the generality of mankind are wedded to their accustomed course of thought, and believe nothing possible until it is actually realised. At the same time, equity is pretty generally admitted to *exist*; all *law* being supposed to be founded on equity, and to derive its authority, not from the fact of its *enactment*, but from its *justice*. Enactment is only the *publication* or the *application* of the rules of equity. Now, equity either has rules or it has no rules. If it have rules, let them be investigated, on the same principle as the rules of arithmetical or geometric calculation. If it have no rules, let us abandon the subject altogether, and let there be no right and no wrong, and let every one do as he pleases.

The possibility of reducing equity to a science admits of only one answer that is of any practical importance. Men will admit the science when it *is* a science, and not till then.

CHAPTER V.

ON DEFINITION.

ALTHOUGH the importance of definition be generally acknowledged, one important thing concerning it appears to be forgotten, namely, its own definition. The definitions given by some of the most celebrated men differ essentially in their *character*. Some are statements of the components of the thing defined; some are statements of the properties that the thing *has*; some are statements of *events* relating to the thing defined; some are *histories* of the thing, &c. It is evident, that until the *character* of a definition be determined, much of the utility arising from the practice of defining must be lost.

As every portion of recorded or expressed knowledge necessarily implies three things, it is of importance to determine which of these three is the subject of the definition. There is first the *thing in nature* (ens). (This is what metaphysicians and theologians attempt to define.) 2d, The *concept* of that thing. (This is what the man of science attempts to define.) 3d, The *expression* of the thing,

or of its concept, in a word or symbol. (This is what the lexicographer attempts to define).

As there exists no book of intellectual philosophy of sufficient authority to merit or to obtain general reception, every writer is unfortunately under the necessity of determining for himself, not only what should be contained in a definition, but what the character of a definition ought to be.

The discussions and controversies so prevalent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, seem to have arisen very much from men attempting to determine or to define the character of the things *in nature*. To take the most common entity as an example—*matter*: what matter is in itself, or in external nature, man knows not. No man can determine, nor even conceive, nor give an idea of what the essence of matter is—that is, what matter is in itself. But when we speak of our conception of matter, we are not altogether on such uncertain ground. When we say that matter is that which *possesses* properties appreciable by the senses, we no longer speculate on its essence, but state exactly *what* we know of it by means of those things by which we *do* know it.

When, on the contrary, we define an equilateral triangle as a *figure* bounded by three equal straight lines, we predicate not what the triangle *has*, but what it *is*. A figure is a *space* bounded. And what is *space*? Here we may stop, if space be considered the most simple form of the concept; or, if *distance* and *direction* be considered to constitute space, we

fall back on distance and direction. But we can go no farther; for distance and direction are absolutely incapable of any thing approaching to analysis. Consequently, the comprehension of what is meant by distance and direction (or space) must be taken for granted.

It is quite evident that the practice of defining cannot be of indefinite extent; for, if a definition be given, and it be required to define each term in that definition, and, again, each term in those new definitions, language, which is limited, would be exhausted.

There must, therefore, be a certain number of concepts taken for granted, a certain number of primaries from which to start; for no two beings can hold communication with each other unless they have the mutual conception of a certain number of terms (or things signified by terms) with which to commence their communication. These primaries, or simples, must themselves be incapable of true definition; but they will be found, or ought to be found, to consist of concepts common to all mankind.

The definition of a simple concept, then, is not a definition, but the announcement of some commonly known truth or fact, which shall call up in the mind of another person the concept to which we wish to refer. For instance, all men have the concept of *time*; but no man can define time otherwise than by stating some event belonging to it, which event being already known, the person addressed shall understand that the simple concept *time* is meant.

But there is another class of concepts which are capable of definition in a different manner. Simple concepts are found in certain combinations, or juxtapositions, and the same combination is of so frequent recurrence, that, instead of employing two or more names to express it, we employ only one,—as *duration*, a single word or symbol, which implies two distinct concepts, namely, *time* and *quantity*. The definition in this case, therefore, consists in expressing all the simple concepts of which the complex one is composed, with their relations. Again, *motion*, a single word; but it implies three concepts—the *subject*, *space*, and *change*.

Definition is, then, the decomposition of a complex into its substantive elements. It is the analysis of a concept; and as into it should not be introduced events or history, it might be termed, not the natural history nor the physics of an idea, but its chemistry. And in chemistry we have something very analogous, *e. g.*, *rust*, one word. But in the proper understanding of rust, there is the conception of *iron* and of *oxygen*; and to state these two with their relation, would be to define rust in a chemical sense.

We have made these preliminary observations for the purpose of pointing out the fact, that *the fundamental concept* of an abstract science is a simple concept incapable of definition. *Identity*, *unity*, *quantity*, *distance*, *direction*, *force*, and *equity*, are all incapable of definition. The metaphysicians may attempt to define them, as they may attempt to

demonstrate an axiom ; but the attempt is a mere fruitless effort to go beyond the limits of our nature. A simple concept is incapable of division ; and all the primary substantives treated of by the abstract sciences are simple. At the same time, it is worthy of remark that *all* men appear to have exactly the same simple concepts, and difference of opinion seldom or never arises concerning the abstract form of the concept, but only concerning some particular case of it. The *sentiments* appear to follow the same law,—all men have the same sentiments, but they differ entirely about the particular cases. For instance, all men appear to have the sentiment of right and wrong ; yet they differ entirely as to what *particular acts* are right or wrong ; and so with *worship* and *equity*, &c.

If definition be confined to the analysis of a concept, we see at once that the verbs *to have*, *to do*, and *to suffer*, should find no place in a definition, and that the only verb must be the substantive verb *to be*. But as the verb *to be* is an auxiliary as well as a substantive verb, a little care is requisite to distinguish the cases in which it is used in the one sense or the other. [This ambiguity of the substantive verb is productive of innumerable ambiguities, that are never detected, on account of the apparent simplicity of the language ; and we may elsewhere take occasion to advert to the theory of the verbs as employed in logic.]

Definition, then, according to our view, can only be applied legitimately to composite concepts ; and

a definition is the statement of the concepts that compose the complex one, with their relations.

Definitions may be real or spurious, true or false, adequate, inadequate, or redundant. A real definition is one that is really a definition with regard to form, whether correct or false in its matter.

A false definition is one that contains an erroneous proposition, whether the form be that of a real definition or not. A great proportion of the definitions usually given are *spurious*—that is, not definitions at all, although their proposition may be correct.

The definitions of the mathematical sciences, for the most part, follow the rule we have given; but the definitions of political economy are many of them spurious. Many political economists attempt to define *value* (a simple concept), and every attempt is only productive of a spurious definition. The other substantives of political economy are only *forms of value*,—*e. g.*, *wealth, capital, rent, wages, profits, price*, are only forms of value, in the same sense as figures are forms of *space*, or x , $-x$, \sqrt{x} , &c., are forms of *quantity*. No real definition of *value* is possible, any more than a definition of quantity is possible. *Wealth, capital, &c.*, ought to be defined *in value*. “What kind of value is meant by capital, wealth, rent?” The answer to this question gives the definition of the *form*; but the primary concept *value* is simple, and cannot be defined. It may be limited, however, to *exchangeable value*; but this is only a *form*, and the fundamental concept remains as far as ever from definition. What is it to which

the adjective *exchangeable* is annexed? No answer can be given except "*value*." Value, like so many other nouns, is only a *cause*, and a cause cannot be defined. Man desires an object; he then conceives a *cause* (residing in the object) that produces his desire; this cause he calls *value*. Force, heat, light, &c., are in the same category, and no definition of them is possible. Force = cause of motion, &c.; heat = cause of combustion, &c.; light = cause of visibility. None of these are definitions, but only determinations of *language*.

[For some remarks on the definitions of the terms used in political economy, see Whately's *Logic*, seventh edition, p. 402. "1. *Value*. As value is the only relation with which political economy is conversant, we might expect all economists to be agreed as to its meaning. There is no subject on which they are less agreed. The popular, and far the most convenient use of the word, is to signify the capacity of being given and received in exchange. So defined, it expresses a relation."—(P. 403.) This definition applies equally well to the thrust of a sword, which has "the capacity of being given and received in exchange. So defined, it expresses a relation." Yet we should scarcely call the thrust of a sword an article of *value*,—at all events, to the recipient. Again, a man may have a *valuable* wife; yet it can scarcely be said that the capacity of *exchanging* the lady is the measure of her valuable qualities, although even that view might not be altogether without its supporters, were the exchange lawful.

If value be fixed upon as the fundamental substantive of political economy, it might be *limited* to "such value as can be exchanged for desired objects;" but no *definition* of value can result in any thing else than confusion. The other terms, however, can be defined *in value*, and their definitions may be real, provided value be taken for granted. The definition of *labour* ought to follow the limitation of value, and labour might be limited to such labour as was employed to produce articles of exchange.

The fundamental concept of politics is EQUITY or JUSTICE, and the definitions of the science must be made in that concept. Of course, as in the other sciences, there is the abstract form, the particular case (concrete form), the noun, adjective, the verb, and the adverb; but these are only grammatical variations, and the concept remains the same. We must not suppose that a difference of the *word* makes a difference in the meaning. For instance, "a square *ought* to be constructed in such and such a manner;" "the *correct* method of constructing a square is so and so." Here the same idea is expressed by the verb *ought* in the former case, and by the adjective *correct* in the latter. The different parts of speech are required to facilitate communication; but the very same concept may be present, although the form of expression might not suggest even an analogy. The only *peculiar* term in the science of politics is the term *equity*, and its opposite, *injustice*, as in logic the only peculiar term is identity, and its opposite, non-identity. Our definitions, therefore, must be made

to contain no peculiar concept except equity (or its opposite); and as equity is a simple concept, it is one of those that are common to man as man. If any man should not happen to possess it, he is not a moral being, and no instruction whatever can give him the slightest conception of what it is. At the same time, indefinite diversity of opinion may (from ignorance) exist as to the *particular cases* in which equity should be predicated; but the concept, in its abstract form, is too generally understood to require substantiating, nor would any proof of its existence be *possible*. *Duty* and *conscience*, &c., have been called in question as to whether they had any existence or not. The whole discussion is perfectly unnecessary, inasmuch as no primary whatever, either in the physical, the mathematical, or the moral sciences, is *ever* proven to exist. Forms and relations, and not existence, are the exclusive objects of science; and it should also be remembered that, so far as the abstract sciences are concerned, the truths are just as necessary, whether there be any *real* objects to signify the abstract relations or not. It makes no difference to abstract logic whether there are, or are not, any *real equivalents*,—the relations are the same. And so with arithmetic; it makes no difference whether there are, or are not, any real objects to number,—the relations remain the same. Provided the mind can *conceive* the first primary substantive, the whole question is settled, so far as the science is abstract. And, in the matter of equity, the relations are dependent on the necessary form of

thought common to mankind; and if the mind can conceive equity, the abstract science must be just as necessary, whether man be, or be not, a moral being. At the same time, perhaps the very power of conceiving equity is the best argument that man is a moral being, and has duties to fulfil; and those who would obliterate *duty*, for the purpose of substituting *benefit*, might do well to examine their own minds more narrowly, and inquire at the elementary sentiments of our nature, whether there are not acts which ought *not* to be done, and which we know ought *not* to be done, even though we have no knowledge of the consequences that would follow.* The first man who committed *murder*, and the first man

* "If man be not a moral agent, and if his sphere in this respect do not immeasurably transcend that of the sentient orders around him, how comes he to talk as if he were? If, in regard to a moral system, he be only a brute of finer form, born of the earth, and returning to it, whence is it that, in respect of virtue and vice, of good and evil, the dialect of heaven rolls over his lips? When was it, and how, that he stole the vocabulary of the skies? Human responsibility, then, using the term in its highest sense, is not an opinion to be proved, but a principal and obvious fact in the natural history of man. The consciousness of responsibility attaches to all men; and the only seeming exceptions (for they are not really such) are of two kinds, namely,—that of individuals or races long brutalised by sensuality and ferocity; and that of a handful of sophists, who have talked themselves and one another out of common sense, until they no longer know where to find within their bosoms any genuine sentiments."—(*Isaac Taylor*.)—"La liberté n'est pas une simple croyance, comme le veut Kant, *c'est un fait*, un fait égal en certitude à tout ce qu'il y a de plus certain; on peut la nier en théorie, on la reconnaît nécessairement en pratique; tous les sentiments de l'homme la supposent, tous ses actes l'expliquent. Il croit à la liberté quand il approuve, blâme, estime, méprise, admire; il y croit encore quand il conseille, invite, menace, dirige."—(*Cousin*.)

who committed *suicide*, could have no *inductive* means of determining the character of the actions, yet it will scarcely be maintained, we should imagine, that those acts were *à priori* as indifferent as an experiment in physical science. And if not, then must the position be abandoned that *the whole* of politics is inductive. The *whole* of politics (taking the term generally) is *not* inductive. The most essential part of the science is *à priori*, and relates to the *constitution* of the State, and to the definite settlement of the *principles* on which a government must be formed to be a just government.

It is a pity that the two branches of political science should ever have been placed in opposition. They do not infringe each other's domain, neither can the one dispense with the other. Pure politics teaches what ought *not* to be done. Political economy teaches what may be done beneficially within the limits that remain. Pure politics draws a definite boundary, and says, "Beyond this boundary the ruler is not competent to act, without becoming an oppressor or a defrauder." Neither can the majority, nor the deliberative assembly, nor any other society whatever, be one single shade more competent than the ruler. *Man* is not competent to overstep the boundary without acting in opposition to those principles of axiomatic equity that the Creator has given to the race, to guide them in their actions towards each other. It is true that the boundary *has* been universally overstepped by rulers, but the physical sciences present the same kind of departure

from the correct rule. A few centuries since, men believed all kinds of propositions relating to matter, just as they now believe all kinds of propositions relating to men. Astrology and alchymy were the forerunners of astronomy and chemistry. But what, after all, were astrology and alchymy? Suites of superstitious propositions *assumed without evidence*, and turned to the profit of the designing. And what was the divine right of kings, or the right of a slaveholder to a negro, or the right to make men conform to a particular creed, or the right to gift the nation's land, or the right to conquer a country, and give the land to the followers of the conqueror? Nothing but suites of superstitious propositions assumed without evidence, and turned to the profit of the designing, who backed their superstitious credence by the licentious arm of power.

The superstitions of the physical sciences are fast dying away in Europe, but the political superstitions yet remain; and many a credence, with regard to politics, has yet to be abandoned, and many a privilege has yet to be overthrown, on the one simple principle, that the positive proposition is not to be credited until accompanied by evidence. And if not to be credited, how much less to be acted on?

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE AXIOM.

AN axiom is a self-evident truth ; that is, it is a proposition which, when clearly comprehended by the human mind, is at once admitted to be necessarily and universally true. It is, in fact, nothing more than the expression in language of the ultimate and abstract mode of human thought, out of which the concrete realities have been dropped, so as to leave only the form of cognition. If I say, for instance, that 25 francs are equal to 12 Rhenish florins, *because* each sum is equal to £1 sterling, and I then drop out the francs, florins, and pound, and reflect on the form of the proposition, I shall find that I have been affirming that things equal to the same are equal to each other, which is the *abstract* statement of the same proposition, generalised or universalised. No axiom ever relates to any concrete reality, except as that reality may be expressed in a *general* description. The axiom announces an abstract relation, which we cannot conceive to be other than it is. Of the two terms (or substantives connected by a copula), the one is usually subject to

direct or immediate appreciation ; the other is only arrived at through the axiom ; and thus the scheme of abstract thought, or rather the abstract form of knowledge, existing universally the same in all human minds, becomes capable of application to, or of union with, the infinite variety of concrete reality. For instance, in the axiom, "every change must have a cause," the substantives are change and cause. The former is subjected to immediate and direct appreciation ; that is, we can observe and measure a change. *Cause*, on the contrary, is utterly beyond all means of direct apprehension, and we are only conscious of causes through the intuitive axiom of the reason that every change must have a cause. Again, *force* is invisible, intangible, and incapable of direct appreciation ; and we arrive at it only through the axiom that "every *motion* has a force," where motion is capable of observation and measurement.

A very large portion of human language consists of abstract terms, to which there is no real correlative. Were it not for the existence of axioms there would be no possibility of linking these abstract terms (which represent abstract conceptions of the mind) with the realities and real events of the actual universe. The axiom is the bridge that connects the region of abstraction with the region of reality. The use or function of the axiom is, in the scheme of human knowledge, only equalled by the function of the abstraction. As in mechanics we have the body (the substantive) and the force (the operating agent), so in knowledge have we the abstraction (the

substantive) and the axiom (the operating agent). Were there no *force*, we necessarily conceive that every portion of matter would cease to move, and that all human knowledge would be confined to the knowledge of objects and of their quiescent conditions. There would be no motion, no function, of the created realities. And so in knowledge. Were there no *axiom*, knowledge would at once cease to be rational (that is, operational or dynamic), and would immediately become contemplational,—that is, merely static and substantial.

Although the axiom may be called a mere truism, and is a mere truism—(were it *not* so, it could not be an axiom)—it is the necessary condition, without which rational knowledge would be impossible. The necessity of its explicit statement is a very different matter from the necessity of its subjective existence. The statement, in the mathematical sciences, at all events, is perhaps of no vital importance; but if it did not exist in the human mind (subjectively) no effort of man could ever originate one item of mathematical science. The abstractions of mathematics are only made to function (that is, to produce propositions), by the existence and application of the axiom. Obliterate the axiom and the abstraction, and you leave knowledge only a nomenclature of the physical objects that are appreciable by sense, and of the psychological phenomena of which we are immediately conscious.

The same holds true with political science in its ethical form. If there were no axioms necessary and

universal, there could be no ethics. There might be a summation of pleasures and pains, of advantages and disadvantages; but there could not by any possibility be a doctrine of duties, or a doctrine of rights. Both rights and duties are intuitional abstractions, the conception of which, as applicable to humanity, constitutes man a moral agent. If man were merely involved in an empirical and inductive scheme of political economy, he would not be a moral agent,—he would only be an *instinctive* agent,—he would only be an animal of a higher grade, in some things more knowing and in some things more foolish, than the other animals that tenant the globe,—he would be first cousin to the ape and second cousin to the monkey. It is the conception of *duty*, as distinguished from mere instinctive desire, that makes the unfathomable gulf of separation between man and the other classes of sensitive creatures. Instinct can perform its office without intellect, and can produce, objectively, results of surpassing beauty without the reasons of the same being subjectively present to the intelligence of the operator. But *duty* can never be performed by instinct—the very conception of duty involving also the intelligent conception of reasons for acting in one mode rather than another. Duty is only possible for a being who is, so far, placed upon the verge of freedom, and allowed consciously to select a good action, not because he is irresistibly impelled to perform the same, but because, weighing and considering it, he beholds it to be right. All our conceptions of justice, and all our administrations

of justice, proceed on this principle of conscious deliberation, investigation, and selection,—a process which indicates in man a higher nature than has been given to the animals.

At this conclusion we must therefore arrive,—either that there are axioms of duty capable of being stated as indisputable truths, and capable of being put in systematic operation, or, if there be no such axioms, then is there no duty whatever (unless such could be derived from revelation), and all morals would be mere superstition, and all laws which restrained, controlled, or punished men, only superfluous infliction.

If, however, there are axioms of justice from which a political system can be derived, and if such a system is capable of actual realization, then *that* system is the great requirement of the world, for until it be carried into practice, confusion, disorder, pauperism, and social derangement must necessarily prevail. The social world can no more produce good without being constructed on the principles of truth, than the field of labour would produce its burthen of yellow grain were we to sow a heterogeneous mixture of seeds—thistles, briars, and weeds, mingled only with a few particles of the cereal we desired. In the axioms of justice may be hid a new arrangement of the social world, prolific of human benefit to an extent which would now appear only as a fabulous dream, as the fond imagining of fancy roving untrammelled by experience of the present, and building its future with the deceptive materials of delusive hope. It may be

so, yet even now the dawn of a better, freer, more peaceful, and more prosperous world may almost be seen faintly gilding the horizon, and heralding to the eye of expectation the daybreak of a golden age, in which the fruits of righteousness shall be peace, and the effects of righteousness quietness and assurance for ever.

BOOK II.

ON DOCTRINE.

CHAPTER I.

FACTS, PRINCIPLES, AND PROBABLE FACTS RELATING TO MAN, THE AGENT INVOLVED IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.

1. THAT man is a moral being responsible for his voluntary actions.

2. The definition of man for political purposes is, that he is an agent endowed with intellect, will, and passions, and capable of acting equitably or unequitably towards his fellow-creatures.

3. That in this world man is responsible to man for his political actions, but not for those actions which terminate with himself, and do not extend to his fellow-men.

4. That the sentiment of equity or justice is involved in the human constitution, but that through ignorance its law may be undiscovered, or through passion neglected.

5. That the law which should regulate the political actions of mankind requires to be investigated

on the same principles as any other law in any other department of science.

6. That man is a fallen, ignorant, and erring being, and that *truth* is the only known means by which his errors may be corrected, and he himself delivered from the empire of error and superstition.

7. That man's religious welfare depends on his knowledge and acceptance of *religious truth*, his political welfare on his knowledge and acceptance of *political truth*, and so with every department of human action. Although, however, truth in each department is the necessary condition of correct action, it is one of the phenomena of humanity that an amended order of thought in one province may most efficaciously *tend* to improve the condition of mankind in another province. Thus the religion of the Bible, under the blessing of Almighty God, entails with it many advantages of worldly prosperity which are not immediately connected with religion, but which flow from it as the collateral and comparatively minor blessings attached by the divine favour to the acceptance of revealed truth.

8. That the progress of mankind upon the earth is a progress from ignorance, superstition, and error towards the knowledge of *truth*.

9. That in no country in the world are the actual political relations of men co-ordinated or determined on a clear and defensible system of political *truth*.

10. That whatever present obstacles may stand in the way, there are good grounds for believing that the world will yet see all the most perfect theory of

politics, which the human reason is capable of elaborating, carried into practical and universal operation.

11. That history teaches us that the past progress of mankind has been from a diversity of privileges towards an equality of rights.

12. That if the course of actual progress continue in the same direction, we can have no hesitation in believing that all men must ultimately come to the most perfect and absolute *equality* in all natural rights, although by no means to an equality of *conditions*.

13. That as all men are the children of the same Divine Father, no good reason has ever been adduced to the world why one man should enjoy privileges which can only be enjoyed by another man being deprived of some property or power to which he has an equitable claim.

14. That no particular form of government, or of political administration, is of divine institution or commandment.

15. That men, being rational creatures, are left to discover and apply the principles of political science.

16. That the sacred Scriptures are a revelation from Almighty God, the Creator both of man and of the material universe.

17. That the sacred Scriptures teach the only true religion, and that every system opposed to their teaching is, so far, an error or a superstition.

18. That a *sin* in *religion* requires to be carefully distinguished from a *crime* in *politics*.

19. That in so far as any act whatever is a sin in

religion, Almighty God has reserved the cognisance, pardon, or punishment of that sin exclusively to himself; nor will He sanction any usurpation of His authority by any man, or body of men, or class of men.

20. That God has established an ecclesiastical society in this world, and has given to that society rules of discipline which that society is bound to carry into effect whatever opposition it may meet with on the part of the world.

21. That those rules of discipline are *ecclesiastical*, and not *political*.

22. That no passage in the sacred Scriptures allows force (physical compulsion) to be used for the purpose of carrying out ecclesiastical rules of discipline, nor for the purpose of punishing *ecclesiastical offences*.

23. That the cognisance of *sin* belongs exclusively to Almighty God; that the cognisance of ecclesiastical offences belongs exclusively to the Christian churches; and that the cognisance of political offences *alone* belongs to political society. That no act is a political offence which is not a forcible, fraudulent, or defamatory *interference* of one man with another. That the prevention of such interference is the primary and essential end of political association.

24. That if political society attempt to punish sin, or to interfere with ecclesiastical offences, it thereby presumptuously invades the authority of God, or sinfully interferes with that ecclesiastical

order and discipline which our Saviour, and the apostles appointed by Him, have committed exclusively into the hands of the Christian churches.

25. That no rule, or command, or precept, or injunction, contained in holy Scripture, and now obligatory on man, enjoins the commission of any act whatever that is really a political crime.

26. That political society (however constituted, or however governed, whether by emperor, king, or assembly) is not *competent* to take cognisance of any act whatever, save a political act.

27. That it is the duty of political society to prevent every political offence, by whomsoever committed, or under whatever pretext.

28. That, while the authority of revelation is paramount to all other authority, no pretext for the commission of political offences, founded on any particular views of revelation, can be admitted as valid.

29. That if any man, or any body of men, or any society of men calling themselves a church, or by any other name, commit *political* offences, it is the duty of political society to take cognisance of the same, and to pursue the same course that would be pursued were the offences committed under any other pretext.

30. That an act may be at once a sin, an ecclesiastical offence, and a political offence. That an act may be a sin *without* being either an ecclesiastical offence or a political offence. That an act may be a sin and an ecclesiastical offence *without* being a political offence.

31. That, if political society interfere with the ecclesiastical offence, or if ecclesiastical society interfere with the political offence, each society has overstepped the legitimate boundaries of its proper province, and ought at once to be resisted.

32. That it is a political *crime* for political society to interfere with any human being on the ground of his having committed an ecclesiastical offence, or on the ground of his having committed any act whatever that is not a political offence.

33. That no human legislature whatever is competent to treat an ecclesiastical offence as a political offence. The act may be *called* a political offence, and it may be punished to any extent whatever; but it never *is*, nor ever *can be*, a political offence, nor ever can be *justly* punished by political society.

34. That an immense amount of *evil* (pain, poverty, ignorance, vice, &c.) exists in the world.

35. That evils are of several characters, and must be classed in several distinct categories.

36. That whatever evils may afflict a country, political society—that is, *the State*—is responsible for those *alone* that are caused by an erroneous system of politics, or by maladministration.

37. That it is the duty of political society to confine itself exclusively to the correction of political evils, except upon consent of all concerned.

38. That where there is a perfectly *just* system of law fairly administered, there is the smallest possible amount of political evil.

39. That a perfectly just, fair, and impartial sys-

tem of law made for all individuals alike, without class privileges or class exemptions, would eminently tend to promote the prosperity of any country where such a system might happen to be adopted.

40. That in no country in the world is the *province* of legislation definitely understood and rigidly adhered to.

41. That, with the progress of civilization, the boundaries of legislation have been undergoing a gradual but sure course of circumscription.

42. That some regions of human action do not enter the sphere of *politics*, and consequently that no political legislature is competent (otherwise than by the right of the strongest) to encroach on those regions, or to enact any law whatever on the subject of the actions.

43. That every prohibitory or restrictive law enacted and enforced beyond the true province of politics, is unjust in its nature, and prejudicial in its effects.

44. That every such law ought to be abolished immediately and unconditionally, and that whoever has the *power* so to abolish it, or to procure its abolition, by consent or without consent, by force, or by any other means, has the undoubted *right* to do so. [Scripture injunctions to the contrary being always excepted. We speak only of *political* right.]

45. That there are universal laws of justice, which every man is bound for himself to carry into universal operation, inasmuch as they are negative, and may be concisely expressed in the maxim, "Refrain

from injustice," and which every man is entitled to compel (by force, if necessary) every other man to adhere to.

46. That this right of compulsion inheres in every human being, and is the logical origin of a State armed with the sword of justice.

47. That *power* can never by any possibility constitute *right*, but that there are laws of justice which may be justly enforced by whoever has power. The right is the same in all men equally, and the possession of power is only that necessary condition without which the actual enforcement could not take place.

48. That a correct or an incorrect view may be taken of the *progression* of humanity.

49. That as nations advance in civilization there is a real progression.

50. That the progression of the ancients in agriculture, commerce, wealth, luxury, and art, is *essentially* different from the progression of the moderns in physical, moral, and religious *truth*.

51. That the progression of the ancients was merely *practical* and *artistic*, and did not contain within itself any principles of permanence, inasmuch as the foundation truths of humanity were unknown, and the universe was an enigma which no man could solve, save the Hebrew, and he only under a shadow.

52. That the progression of the moderns is *intellectual* and *scientific*, and does contain within itself the principles of permanence, inasmuch as the foundation truths of humanity have been laid by Al-

mighty God in the Word of Revelation, and thereby man has been delivered from the empire of superstition.

53. That although few individuals of the human race have candidly accepted the truths of Revelation, yet, since the propagation of the gospel, there has ever been on earth the true light of Heaven, and the genuine Word of divine *truth*, which shall most assuredly perform the purpose for which it was sent.

54. That that truth shall yet fill the earth fully, abundantly, and without measure; and that all the tribes of man, abandoning stocks and idols, and superstitions, and rites of blood, and scepticism, and philosophic infidelity, and every other falsehood, shall bow the knee to the one true God, and see all hopes of salvation wrapped up in God manifest in the flesh.

55. That the theory of human progression can only be seen in its true light by the aid of Scripture.

56. That man is not in his nature a progressive being (as some would have us believe, meaning thereby that he contains within *himself* the elements of perfectibility), but that he was created good, upright, and holy, and that he fell from that high estate by disobedience to the command of Almighty God; and being come into a state of darkness, superstition, error, and degradation, his *progression* is only his gradual restitution to holiness and truth.

57. That it has pleased God to promise, as it will most surely please Him to perform, that men,—the

human race—the whole family of humanity,—shall yet on earth be brought to the knowledge of Himself, and that He shall reign over them in justice while they dwell in peace and safety, reconciled to Him by the sacrifice of the Saviour, and to each other by the principles of Christian fellowship and Christian brotherhood.

58. That this great evolution of Christianity is the keystone of human history. That the revolutions of empires, the external phases of humanity, and the mighty wave of events that rolls ceaselessly forward, are all co-ordinated upon the plan of God's eternal purpose with regard to his church. That without contingency, without possibility of accident or risk of failure, the preordained purposes of Almighty God, with regard to the triumph of his Son in this world, and the universal dissemination of Christian truth, under the divine teaching of the Holy Spirit, shall be carried out, as surely as the Hebrews of old were led from Egypt to the land of promise.

59. That whether the purposes of God and their absolute assurance may be reconcilable or irreconcilable with any theory of man's nature, the promise of a reign of righteousness is the very surest ground of certainty that man will continue to progress, and the most abundant source of hope that evil will be obliterated from the earth.

60. That although human freedom (of volition) appears at first sight (and *especially when stated in language*) to be incompatible or inconsistent with

God's absolute predestination, it is quite possible, for any thing we can know to the contrary, that a higher and more expanded view of truth would enable us to escape the trammels of mere *expression*, and to see the unity of harmony, where now we only conclude the diversity of discord.

61. That no man does, and that no man ever has, succeeded in persuading himself that he himself, and those with whom he comes in contact, are mere organised mechanisms, producing, without free will on their own part, certain actions, which follow as necessarily from the conditions in which those mechanisms are placed, as do the motions or combinations of unconscious matter.

62. That to view man as a mere mechanism, whose actions (functions) are produced necessarily in a mode analogous to the functions of matter, or of plants, or even of animals, however great their sagacity or instinct, is to contradict the universal consciousness of mankind, and the plain assertion of Scripture.

63. That however degraded or barbarous a man may be, there is still within him the element of a higher and freer nature than belongs to any other animated inhabitant of the globe.

64. That while we attribute to man a certain primary freedom, and a certain power of choice, it is by no means necessary that we endow him with such freedom as would result from his having a will, but no passions, no evil desires, no weaknesses, no frailties, and no temptations.

65. That philosophic difficulties with regard to the freedom of the will are much more difficulties as to how the facts may be consistently expressed in language, than difficulties that present obstacles in any department of practical life.

66. That in politics those difficulties are of little importance, and may be thrown aside with as little hesitation as they are in agriculture, navigation, or mechanics.

67. That while our individual consciousness, and, so far as can be learnt, the universal consciousness of mankind, would tend to reject every system approaching to absolute fatalism, yet, on the other hand, we may not shut our eyes to the influence exerted by circumstances on the character and actions of men.

68. That men placed in extreme circumstances of ignorance and poverty will manifest corruption of morals, and depravity of conduct, is *a fact* which may be ascertained on the same principles as any other fact.

69. That where any system of political rule, or of political distribution of natural property, entails extreme poverty (and its usual accompaniment, extreme ignorance) on a portion of the community, that system does invariably *cause* corruption of morals and depravity of conduct which we have no reason to suppose would have otherwise existed.

70. That wherever we find large masses of men in extreme poverty and ignorance (as in Ireland, in the Highlands of Scotland, and, to a less extent, in

some parts of England), we may refer that poverty to three distinct sources or origins:—

1st, Either that poverty is the work of God, who has placed man in circumstances where he cannot find sufficient support.

Or, 2d, That poverty is the work of the individuals themselves, who have the opportunity of cultivating the earth, and engaging in other remunerative labours, but neglect to do so.

Or, 3d, That poverty is the work of *the laws of the land*, which have made such a distribution of the sources of human support, that, although Almighty God made a plentiful provision for all, yet some are reduced to poverty, because others, without labour on their own part, are elevated to great comparative wealth.

Notwithstanding the utter falsity of the first hypothesis, and its extreme blasphemy if it be false, it seems to be adopted by many who charge the poverty of Ireland, for instance, on *Providence*, forgetting that, at this moment, Ireland, according to the lowest calculation of competent men, is able, at the very least, to support double the number of its inhabitants. That therefore we should bless God for the abundant provision He has been pleased to make, and look for the causes of poverty *in man, and in the mode in which man manages the earth*.

The second hypothesis is partially correct, and therefore affords to those whose interests are involved an opportunity of so exaggerating its extent, that *the whole* of Irish poverty comes to be

represented as resulting from the unwillingness of the population to take advantage of the opportunities of support which are fairly within their reach. When all the land (the great source of human support) and almost every other *direct* source of human support, with the exception of the sea fishery, has been *by the law* taken from the great body of the population, it is absurd, in the highest degree, to charge that consequent poverty on those who, let them labour as they will, can obtain but from 3s. 6d. to 7s. per week, with the risk of occasional want of employment.

The third hypothesis is, in the present day of political superstition, a heresy, which few will be found to advance calmly and seriously, as if they were really convinced of its truth. Believing, as we do, that it is one of the greatest causes of Ireland's poverty, and, at the same time, the bane of England and Scotland, we maintain it and advance it, in the hope that the masses of the population will soon see it in its true light, and use means to effect a revision of the laws relating to natural property.

71. That God did not send man into this world to subsist and to discharge all his lawful obligations *by his labour alone*.

72. That labour can only take place where there is *an object* to labour on.

73. That while God gave to man a capacity to labour, he also gave him a right to the object (the earth) on which that labour must be employed to produce the necessaries of life.

74. That this gift of God is to all men alike.

75. That no compact or consent or legislation, on the part of one portion of the community, can ever justly deprive another portion of the community of their right to their share of the earth, and of its natural productions.

76. That no arrangement or agreement or legislation of men now dead, can justly deprive the present inhabitants of the earth, or any portion of those inhabitants, of their right to labour, and to labour for their own profit, on some portion of the earth which God has given to man.

77. That no arrangement or agreement or legislation, on the part of the present inhabitants of the globe, whereby any portion, or class, or individual, of the future inhabitants would be deprived of their rights of equality, is valid, or binding in any respect whatever.

78. That no legislature whatever is *competent* to enact laws which disturb the equal rights of men.

79. That legislation is not for the purpose of granting rights, but for the purpose of securing to every man the peaceable and safe possession of those rights which he has by nature.

80. That if any legislature go beyond its province, and (instead of protecting men in the quiet possession of their natural rights) accord to one man a large portion of that natural property which is necessary to human subsistence, thereby depriving many others of the opportunity which God had given them of obtaining an abundant livelihood out of the

earth, such legislation is unjust, partial, and wicked, and may be righteously amended by the mass of the population.

81. That so far from it being a crime to resist unjust laws, which necessarily reduce large masses of the population to poverty, ignorance, and most probably to crime, such resistance, where there is a tolerable prospect of success, is one of the highest political *duties* of man.

82. That no government is legitimate, unless, *1st*, it be constituted and appointed on the principles of equity; and *2d*, that its acts be without *partiality* to classes or individuals.

83. That a self-constituted government, or a government appointed only by one portion of the community, has no claim to obedience, and may be lawfully resisted.

84. That such a government might, however, enact just, impartial, and beneficial laws; and as the laws of justice are universally *binding*, whether enacted by a human legislature or not, the masses of the population might so far, without detriment, acquiesce in the acts of that government.

85. That the mode in which a government happens to be appointed (although there is, theoretically, only *one* right mode) is of incomparably less real importance *than the laws which that government enacts, upholds, and enforces.*

86. That the genuine reformation of a country consists not so much in the mode of appointing the government, as in the revision of the fundamental

laws of the country relating to *life, liberty, property, and reputation*.

87. That the fundamental moral laws, with regard to life, liberty, property, and reputation, are absolutely the same at all times and in all circumstances; that they vary not, nor can vary; and that they ought to be enacted in every country that has attained to some degree of civilization.

88. That those fundamental moral laws depend not upon any legislature, or individual, or majority; and that it is not the duty of a legislature to make (originate) laws, but to discover, promulgate, and enforce those laws of equal-handed justice, which are binding at all times and in all places.

89. That it is as absurd for men to originate and enact laws in the region of *morals*, as it would be for them to enact laws in the region of mathematics or physics. There is a *truth* in morals as well as in mathematics or physics, and the duty of man is to discover that truth, and to carry it into practical operation. Where the truth has not been discovered there can be no just ground for legislation, and consequently no ground for the law.

90. That the vast changes which take place in human legislation, as a country progresses in civilization, are nothing more than the slow and gradual transference of laws from the subjective will of the legislator to the objective principles of truth. As time rolls on, the approximation to equity becomes nearer and nearer.

91. That religion (as such) is extra-political, and

that no legislature is competent to enact any laws whatever on the subject.

92. That although religion itself is extra political, every man in every engagement of life is bound by the precepts of the Christian religion, and may not *infringe* them.

93. That as no good reason has ever been adduced for supposing that the decalogue (the only law ever given to a large multitude of men directly by Almighty God himself, in the plenitude of divine majesty, with the exception of "This is my beloved Son, hear him,") has ever been abrogated or repealed, and as that decalogue prohibits worldly labour on the Sabbath, no Christian legislator or State official is justified in engaging in the unnecessary worldly labours of the State on the Sabbath; and therefore, where the majority of a people accepts the decalogue, it may be necessary to proclaim that the State is not at liberty to protect the person or the property of any individual labouring publicly on the day of rest.

94. That therefore as *political* offences would necessarily arise from such proclamation, it may be necessary in every country that accepts the decalogue to prohibit all outward and public desecration of the day of rest.

95. That the first worldly essential for the Christian church, or for any branch of the same, is absolute and unconditional freedom from all extra ecclesiastical control, so long as the members of the society conduct themselves peaceably, and neither commit offences nor offend public morals.

96. That the same God who commissioned the church to go into every part of the earth and proclaim the gospel, is abundantly able to find support for the ministrations he has commanded, and therefore it is not necessary for the Christian church to rely on the support of any association that bargains for that support at the expense of some of the ecclesiastical liberties of the church.

97. That amid all present change and present turmoil, amid diversity of sentiment and too often rancour of heart, it is pleasant to turn away from man, to close our eyes upon his frailties and his errors, to draw the veil of obscurity over his fleeting purposes and fond ambitions, and to rest in the assurance that the stream of time rolls on guided by the hand of Divine Providence, and that the light which now partially illumines the world will shine brighter and brighter unto the perfect day. And if we look forward into the vista of futurity, surely we may believe that all present changes are but preparations for a reign of peace, forerunnings of the kingdom of our Lord. Come what will, and come what may, His kingdom must extend from land to land, till the whole earth join in the song of the angel and the multitude of the heavenly host: "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward man."

CHAPTER II.

DEFINITIONS.

SECT. I.—DEFINITION OF MAN, AND JURAL EQUALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RACE.

“ God, that made the world and all things therein,
hath made of one blood all nations of men.”—*Acts of the Apostles,*
17th chap.

WHILE the *science* of politics, as a formal development of true and necessary *thought*, is confined to the statement of one or two axioms, with the application of those axioms to the subjects of a few definitions, and to the logical deduction of certain consequences which follow independently of all will on the part of man, it must not be forgotten that the reality of politics is not a matter of logical deduction, but a vast reality of *action*. The problem to be solved is not *merely* whether a certain proposition be logically valid. This is the question for the student, who bends his intellect on the bare form of the truth expressed in language. As a student his only question is, “Is this proposition true, or is it false?” The trueness or the falsity is the only end he has in view,—the ultimatum of his

labour, the final termination of his thought. On the other hand, when we turn to the *reality*, we are astounded with its vastness. The question then comes, clothed with realization—teeming with hot life—warm in the breath and blood of *men*. It is no longer the strict examination of a syllogism, but the investigation of a problem in which millions upon millions of sentient and rational beings are involved. It is no longer the mere study of a barren and fruitless truth, but of a truth that may spring into gigantic life and give birth to action which no calculation can compute. It is the question, “*What is the rule of life, with relation to each other, for these millions of rational beings associated upon earth?*”

Around us we behold the glorious universe of God, which to the ear of reason hymns its majestic praise, and overwhelms the soul with the beauty it unfolds. We gaze on stars that hold their perpetual habitation beyond the furthest reach of reason’s measurement, while within the measureable expanse we behold orbs that wing their way in a stable harmony of order. We look on earth, our moving home, that floats and circulates and returns according to her season. We look on matter, formless and dead as it may be from the abrasion of its parts, or shooting into forms that give us the first evidence of regularity. From the crystal we turn to the moss, and see matter creeping into life and beginning a system of function where part is necessary to part, and where the whole forms a *one*,—an individual that grows, and lives, and dies. From matter that merely lives and grows, and trans-

mits its species, we turn to matter that moves, and acts, and exhibits phenomena of conscious sensation. We run through the scale of animal organization, and last of all we find one that has no peer, that stands alone—incomparable—the crowning piece-work of earth's creation.

Such is the great field of nature. The space illimitable—the perpetual duration—the firmament with its orbs—the all-pervading air—the verdant earth—the unfettered ocean—the rock, the river, tree, shrub, and herb—the fish of the sea—the bird of the air—the beast of the field—and all the visible creation around us—the light and the darkness—the sunbeam and the shadow—the sound and the silence—the motion and the stillness—the eye that beholds, the ear that listens—the nerve that conveys to our spirit the reality of the world without:—these are nature; but are these all? If all that is mere matter were annihilated, would there remain—*nothing*? If it were so there could be no science of morals, nothing that could teach men their duty towards each other. With a godless Universe and a soulless Man, it is idle to speak of Duty. There might, indeed, be a summation of nervous emotions—a computation of pleasures and pains, but never could there possibly be any rule established why, if I chose, and have the power, I should not inflict pain, and do as I *will*, let the consequences to others be what they may. Nor need it be replied that those consequences will reflect upon myself in the shape of pain. This, in the first place, is not an invariable *fact*, and in the second, if it were

invariable, it is too minute to be comparable with the pain I inflict on others. I may say, as the man maddened with ambition and tempted with the possession of power virtually says, "I *accept* the pain, I take the consequences, be what they may, to myself." And so soon as I have triumphed over the shrinking frailties of my physical nature, and resolved to act my own will, though I should in the course of action be blown into ten thousand atoms, will it then be true that I have emancipated myself from every law of morals? And if it is *not* true, then is there something more than matter?

Is it indeed true that *will* is non-existent, and that we have lived to this age of the world only to learn that man is an aggregate of material atoms, ruled by the adamantine laws of fate; for such is the conclusion at which all systems must arrive which reason exclusively on the knowledge obtained through the senses? When Regulus returned to Carthage, or Cæsar crossed the Rubicon, was it a mere function of white and grey matter acted on by atmospheric and other material influences? And when the martyr Christians sung their songs of immortal aspiration, and departed, joyful that they were counted worthy to bear the reproach of their Lord, when they hymned their way to heaven amid the flames and agonies which their fellow-men had awarded as the due meed of their unworldly virtue, was it indeed a mere function of their carbonization, a mere effect produced on matter by the physical circumstances in which that matter was placed? To this conclusion a physical theory of

the universe *necessarily* brings us. Strange that it should be possible for man so to mistake his nature and his destiny !

So far from the *material* universe being the most important object with which man is acquainted, we maintain that, in this nether world, man himself is incomparably the highest object that comes within the limit of our knowledge. *Mind* is the true reality. Divest the world of human mind, and you have left it irrational, impelled by the laws of mechanics, electricity, chemistry, vegetable life, and animal instinct. You have robbed it of its fairest inheritance and blotted out its jewel. You have robbed it of its soul, and left a mere aggregation of atoms to function according to the laws of irrational determination. Within the sphere of thought and of natural appreciation there is nothing comparable to mind. Mind peoples the earth with spirit, and links it with that world after which the hopes of man are ever going forth. Mind is the substance of reason and volition ; matter is only the substance of resistance, form, and colour. Mind knows, wills, and originates its actions ; matter knows nothing, wills nothing, and obeys in blind unconsciousness. If we could only break through the crust of our physical sensations, and emancipate ourselves from the influence of sense ; if we could weigh the world, and have present to our appreciation, at one and the same instant, every atom of which it is composed, every phenomenon it is capable of manifesting, and every reality it contains, we should see that mind, human mind, was incomparably

the most glorious (all fallen as it is), incomparably the most important, and incomparably the most valuable of all the created substantives that come within the limits of our knowledge.

Politics, then, in its dogma is the definite statement of the relations of men in equity; and in its reality is the expression of the rule of life for all the millions of men who inhabit the globe, so far as their actions affect their social relations. In so far as the pure dogma is laid before the spiritual *mind*, the science is abstract; in its actual reduction to real action, it is concrete. Were the mind a *disembodied* spirit, the *duty* would still remain—the law of the volitions, affections, and desires. But as the spirit is embodied, and men are not only capable of desiring, but of executing acts of justice and injustice, and of inflicting pain upon their fellows, the duty becomes a *rule of life*, founded on a dogma deduced from the primary and underived axioms of the reason. The mere body is not the man, neither is the mere mind the man. The man is the mind embodied. But so far as the dogma is concerned, the intelligent mind is that which it addresses, while the mind that wills and determines its actions is that which receives its *rational law*.

Politics, then, is the development of the rational law which should determine human volition and human action, so far as mutual interference is concerned.* It gives the moral law primarily to human

* Politics in its definition is the science of equity; in its description, the knowledge of the rational law which ought to

volition, and consequently to human action. But volition requires an impulsion as well as a law of regulation, and the dogma is not the *cause* of action, but the *reason for acting in one mode rather than another*.

We have not, therefore, the elements of a definition of man so far as is requisite to a science of politics. Man is a conscious being capable of acting voluntarily, endowed with various emotional sentiments (among which is that of equity or justice), and endowed with a reason or intellect which enables him to comprehend not only relations of number, quantity, extent, direction, &c., but relations of *equity*. The will *acts*, the emotional desire furnishes the *cause* of action; but inasmuch as the intellect furnishes the moral law of the action, and the conscious being may choose between two different courses, the man is morally guilty or morally innocent according to whether he acts in accordance with the law of the reason, or acts merely according as he is impelled by passion.* The law of the reason is imposed on man, not in any such mode as

regulate the active will of men so far as mutual interference is concerned. It may otherwise be expressed the science of those mutual *duties* which are universally obligatory *and which may at all times be justly enforced*.

* The "freedom" of the will, or its "non-freedom," may depend very much on the point of view from which we survey the mental operations. Both are true in one sense, both false in another sense. But the sense in which one is true, is the sense in which the other is false, and *vice versa*. Let us take an illustration. A ship is on the open sea and a north wind is blowing. The ship is necessarily constrained to move. Do what the mariners will the ship will move. If we view the ship from the *point of view of the wind*, we affirm that it is subject to the law of necessity. Let us now turn to the mariners and the helm.

shall necessarily determine him to act in any particular direction, for in that case it would be a law of instinct and not a law of *reason*; but in such a mode as shall necessarily convince him that he *ought* to act in a particular direction, whether he does so act or not. All men exhibit the *sentiment* of equity; but the diversities of the law by which the sentiment should be regulated are as numerous as can well be conceived. Neither should we argue from this that there is not a stable and universal law which ought to regulate human action in the figure of society, but rather compare the various opinions which prevail to the various opinions which prevailed in the physical sciences not many centuries since, where, when truth was discovered, men abandoned diversity and adopted unity of credence.

So soon as the mere *will of the ruler* is no longer held to be the rule of political rectitude, it is evident that the *opinion* of the ruler requires an intellectual law, without which it is no more entitled to attention than his will. There is, and there must neces-

By trimming the sails and regulating the helm the mariners may make the ship sail in any direction between E.N.E. southward to W.N.W., and by tacking may bring the ship to a given point due N. from its former position. The mariners, therefore, may navigate their ship to almost any point they choose. If, then, we view the ship from the *point of view of the helm*, we affirm that it is *not* subject to the law of necessity, inasmuch as it is not necessarily constrained by the wind to move in *any one particular direction*. If we call the wind the *motives*, the man at the helm the *will*, and the chart and compass the *reason*, we have a tolerable analogy. But a theologian steps in and deduces the non-freedom of the will from its invariability to act with perfect morality. Thus we might say, the ship, although free, cannot sail up into the air.

sarily be, a *truth* and a *falsehood* in politics as much as in geometry or astronomy ; and, notwithstanding the almost endless diversity of political creeds and political enactments, we have no hesitation whatever in believing, that ere the great curtain of eternity shall have fallen on the drama of man's terrestrial existence, legislation will come to be as exclusively *the application of ascertained truth to the conditions of men upon the globe*, as is mechanics the application of ascertained truth to the conditions of matter.

As in the physical sciences a century or two since, men wished to make propositions true which were false, and propositions false which were true ; so has legislation, even down to the present day, endeavoured to make crimes of actions which were not criminal, and to punish those actions as if they had been infringements of the moral law of equity. Laws have endeavoured to regulate thought, and to make some religions true, others false ; to regulate speech and action, and to make these innocent or criminal, upon a principle of arbitrary determination, which did not, and would not, investigate the reality or non-reality of the crime. Men are beginning to emerge from political superstition, and to cast about for that objective law which, when the intellect discovers it, shall acknowledge to be the true basis of political association. There is a vast troubling of the waters which indicates the crying desire for political *truth*, and whatever interests may be implicated in the struggle, there can be little doubt that truth shall yet be evolved, and that the world shall

yet see it carried into practical and universal operation.

The only question, then, that remains, before proceeding to the investigation of the dogma of politics, is this, "Are all men *equal* in natural rights?"

This question is sometimes encumbered with such a mass of absurdity that it seems almost hopeless to disentangle it, or even to state it in such a manner that even the mere statement shall be unobjectionable. The objectors to the equality of men say, "men differ in intellect," "men differ in strength," "men differ in perseverance," "men differ in good fortune," &c. &c. All these are entirely beside the mark, and never affect the question in any possible way.

There are three regions to which we may address ourselves for an answer.

1st, Scripture; 2d, Reason; 3d, Observation. Scripture informs us that God made of one blood all nations of men. This makes all men of the same species, and whatever differences there may be between individuals, whatever variety of races, whatever peculiarity of form or colour, the whole tenor of Scripture teaches us that God, who is no respecter of individuals, has given the same moral law as obligatory on all, and consequently that the same duties are incumbent upon all.

2d, Reason. Reason teaches us that rights arise out of the universality of the moral law. As regards a lion or a tiger, I have no *rights*, he slays me if he can, and I destroy him if I can, in circumstances where he

appears likely to be *dangerous*. We never attribute to him the power of conceiving of a moral law, and, therefore, we never attach to his actions those judgments which we invariably pass upon the acts of men. With men it is otherwise; reason tells us that men *ought* not to murder, to steal, or to defraud. But if one man is bound by a moral law to refrain from murdering or defrauding, every other man thereby acquires a moral *right* to be unmurdered and undefrauded. Rights, therefore, arise from the universality of the moral law, and the only question is, Is the same moral law universally binding upon men? for if it is, all men are necessarily *equal* in natural rights.

If there be no moral law, then it is true men have no rights. This doctrine, as fatal to every high aspiration of the human mind as it is to the safety and welfare of society, has been advocated by some whose attention was exclusively directed to the investigation of the laws of utility. We have no doubt whatever that great good will ultimately arise out of the doctrine of utility; but many who are capable of understanding the doctrine itself appear incapable of understanding its *position*, and endeavour to advance it to the exclusion of every other law, divine or moral. So far as the doctrine of utility is positive, that is, assertory, it is true, and cannot be controverted. Things are, or are not, *beneficial* in a certain order or sequence. But so far as the doctrine is *exclusive*, that is, negative, it fails, like every other doctrine that assumes to be

the *only* rule. It has a province, and in its province it is supreme and cannot be disputed. But there is a province which it cannot reach, a region that lies beyond it, a sphere where the quantities are incommensurable with mere profit and loss, a vast region of thought (and of language) where the coins or counters of utility neither pass current, nor are capable of implementing transactions. If it be the only rule, there is nothing *right* and nothing *wrong*, only something *beneficial* and something *prejudicial* (that is, something pleasant and something painful); just as if induction be the only mode of investigation, there is nothing *necessary*, but only something *general*. To advance any doctrine whatever that contradicts the universal form of human thought, and the universal form of human language, we conceive to be a vain attempt. The most consistent materialists never could obliterate either the concept or the word *force*; the most consistent sensualists never could obliterate *thought* and *mind*, neither can the utilitarians (those of them who deny all moral law) obliterate both the concept and the word *duty*. When men of science have abandoned the word *force* (and all its equivalents) it will be time enough for moralists to take into consideration the abandonment of the word *duty*. We grant that there are innumerable opinions as to what *is* a duty, just as in theology there are (taking the earth at large) multitudes of opinions as to *who* is God; but that there is a duty and that there is a God it is vain to controvert. Scepticism on both points may endure

for a short period; but the two concepts are the necessary requirements of stable thought, and in spite of all reasonings and of all subtleties men invariably return to them, because they are the only thoughts that in a certain province can find a lasting home in their minds, and fill a requirement of their nature which ever and ever calls for satisfaction.

While reason teaches us that rights arise out of the universality of the moral law, her office does not stop here,—she also teaches us that the moral law is universally binding on *man*. In the first place, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that if one man is morally bound to refrain from a certain action, every other man is morally entitled to escape from the effects of that action—in short, that if one man is bound to refrain from *doing*, every other man is entitled to escape from *suffering*. This right to escape from suffering constitutes the basis of all political rights, but the word *suffering* must be understood, not in the sense of *pain*, but in the grammatical sense of being *acted upon*. If another man has no right to *act*, I have a right to be *unacted upon*. If another man is morally bound to refrain from slaying, robbing, defrauding, &c., I, as a necessary consequence, have a correlative *right* to be unslain, unrobbed, and undefrauded. This is the whole theory of political *rights*, namely, that where the moral law imposes a *restriction* upon one man, another man is thereby necessarily endowed with a correlative *exemption*. The final termination of political *progress* will be found at the point where the law of

the land ensures to every man this *right* that arises from the restriction which the moral law makes absolutely binding upon every *other* man. Never till then, can the EQUILIBRIUM OF EQUITY be restored; and never till then, can we be certain that the elements of change are finally obliterated. Until that period, at whatever great a distance it may be, we must necessarily anticipate a constant series of changes. But reason teaches us that the moral law is absolutely universal,—because every axiom that exists in the human mind is universal, and the moral law is based on the axioms of the reason. Every axiom that relates to numbers is universal with regard to numbers; every axiom that relates to spaces is universal with regard to spaces; and every axiom that relates to *men* is universal with regard to men. Axiomatic reason not only *does not* draw a distinction between the individuals of whom the human race is at any one period of time composed, but axiomatic reason does not even know the means of drawing such a distinction. Every axiom is abstract, and the moment we have abstracted, we have left behind all distinction of individuals, and assembled into one general category all the substantives to which the axiom refers.

From revelation, then, we learn the fact of primary creation—that God made all men of one blood. From reason, we learn the universal restriction which the moral law makes obligatory on all moral beings, so far as they can act upon each other.

But neither revelation nor reason, alone, can teach us another fact which is absolutely necessary to com-

plete the series of propositions, and to transform the abstract law of morals into a concrete rule of life. Reason lays upon us a restriction *so far as other moral beings are concerned*; but reason, alone, does not tell us who (what individuals) are moral beings. For this, *observation* is necessary. In a physical sense man is an animal; and we require to distinguish him from the other animals that inhabit the globe, before we pronounce that any given individual is a moral being, and entitled to the rights which flow from the moral law. But although observation furnishes us with the outward and visible appearance, observation *alone* can never make man other than an animal of a higher species. Observation appreciates form and colour, &c.; and although observation may class man at the very top of the scale of organization, it can never detect his moral and rational character, inasmuch as moral and rational characteristics are inappreciable by sense, and can only be apprehended by the reason. When, therefore, any given individual is presented to us, observation *classes* him; and if he be ranked in the class *man*, reason at once endows him with all the inward and invisible attributes of humanity. This process would still be the same even were there no other animals whatever. It is not because we distinguish man from *them* that we endow him with reason and volition, but because we have *classed him in the same category with ourselves, and viewed him only as another individual of the same species or kind.** The very moment we have done this,

* We are conscious that *we* are moral beings, and bound by a

we have endowed him of necessity with all the rights to which we ourselves lay claim, and deprived ourselves of all the rights which we are not willing to accord to him. *Reason* can know no difference between individuals in the same category, whatever the accidents that attach or do not attach to them. Below all the accidents and all the variable phenomena, reason lays holds of the permanent and stable characters that know no change, and are subject to no transformation. If they are there at all, they are there the same, identical in their definition, immutable as the reason that substantiates them. If I have rights, it is not because I am *I*, but because I am *a man*; and the moment we place another in the same category as ourselves, reason at once endows him with all the abstract qualities, and all the abstract relations to which we can have any possible claim.

To decide upon who are men and who are not men, forms no part of our inquiry. The question is, "Are all men *equal* in natural rights?"—not, Is

law of equity. We have the inward witness of our moral nature, which, it is true, we may neglect, but from which we can never entirely escape; and when we class another individual in the same category with ourselves, we judge instantaneously that *he* is a moral being and has a moral nature, and is also, as much as ourselves, bound by a law of equity. When *he* neglects the law of equity, we complain and feel justly entitled to remonstrate or to *resort to force*. When we reason of justice and righteousness, we do so with the full and perfect conviction that however *depraved* an individual may be, he is still endowed with a rational power of comprehension, and with a moral principle that bears witness in his heart that he *ought* to act in a particular direction, and to refrain from acting in another direction. Were moral teaching not felt to be *imperative*, it would be unintelligible.

this or that individual a man? The latter is settled *currently* by each one as the various individuals happen to be presented to him, and *generally* by the man of science, who classifies individuals according to their permanent physical characters, and assigns the name *man* to a certain class, all the individuals of which, although presenting extensive varieties and peculiarities of race, he reckons to belong to the same species. Some (perhaps in jest) have pretended to advance that negroes were not men.* Even though they were not, and it could be proven that they were not, this would not affect, in the slightest degree, the equal rights of those who were men. All the difference would be in the fact of throwing out certain individuals who had been improperly classed. The moral relations of all who remained,—that is, of the *men*,—would remain exactly as they were before, and those relations, we have endeavoured to prove, are relations of equality.

At the same time it should not be overlooked that those who have no rights have no *duties*. The two are correlative; and if we deny an individual his rights, we, by the same process, emancipate him from his duties towards *us*. Were the blacks of the

* The highest moral peculiarity of man is his capacity for the intelligent *adoration* of the Divine Being. The second is his capacity of experiencing the emotion, and intelligently performing the action, of *benevolence*. The third is his capacity of experiencing the emotion, and intelligently performing the action, of *justice*. What character can be given to slavery, when it denied religion to the slave, deprived him of all that was his own, and taught him that he had no rights of *justice*!

southern states of America to accept the theory that they had no rights, they would soon see the equivalent proposition that they had no duties. If they are men, they have rights; and if they are not men, we can have no means of laying a moral duty on them. This doctrine the slaveowners ought to propagate with caution—it might be dangerous.

We arrive, then, at the conclusion—

1st, That rights arise out of the restrictions of the moral law. If A is morally bound not to perform a certain action towards B, it follows necessarily that B has a moral right to be free from the effects of that action.

2d, That Scripture makes the same divine law obligatory on all mankind.

3d, That the moral law of reason is universal, and applies to all men.

4th, That the moral law of reason is one and the same at all times and in all circumstances, and that it knows no distinction whatever except abstract distinctions, nor can acknowledge any distinction except abstract distinctions between the different individuals of the same species.*

5th, That consequently the same duties are in-

* It may be necessary to explain what is meant by an *abstract* distinction. For instance, the man who by his labour produces a new value in raw material is the *creator* of that value, while another who does not produce such value is not the creator. Reason both establishes and acknowledges a distinction between these two individuals, *not as individuals*, but as *creator and non-creator*, that is, in their *abstract relations*. If the axiom relate to individuals, it is universal with regard to individuals,—*e. g.*, a whole is equal to the sum of all its parts; if it relate to *creators*, it is universal with regard to creators, and so forth.

cumbent on all men, and consequently, as a right is only the correlative of a duty, the same rights are morally possessed by all men.

6th, That therefore all men are equal in those natural rights that derive from the reason, and in all those rights that derive from the Divine Creator through the particular revelation of Scripture.

7th, That observation enables us to understand who are men, and thereby the abstract laws of reason are brought into a region of real operation. The theoretic dogma is translated into a practical rule of life.

The question as to the equality of human rights is susceptible of endless disputation when confounded and interchanged (as it so frequently is) with the question, "Have all men an equal right to the same material object?" The tendency in the human mind to abandon the abstraction and to fix it in some sensible object, is one of those phenomena against the results of which reason has ever to maintain a perpetual struggle. While in religion man abandons the spiritual idea and manufactures an idol, or a symbol, to which alone he ultimately comes to bend the knee, so in ethics do men endeavour to reduce the abstraction to some material and concrete reality, and to reason with that reality, as if they were reasoning with the immutable abstraction. Hence the origin of the peculiar sense of the word "*property*," as applied to a certain extent of land—"duty," as applied to the mere action, whether that action were really a duty or a crime—

“*goods*,” as applied even to bales of blasphemous books, &c.*

Of course, wherever this ambiguity of language prevails, men are speaking of things perfectly distinct, and nothing but diversity of assertion can be anticipated, although in reality there may be no diversity of opinion. Both are correct in their own sense, because one is speaking of the abstraction, the other of the concrete reality. While mere opinions, and not scientific truth, are allowed to prevail in politics, any assertion, however absurd, may be made the basis of action; but should the day ever come when there shall be a system of truth capable of being taught, and of being maintained against every *rational* objection (as distinguished from the objection of mere assertion, backed by power), diversities of opinion and diversities of assertion will fall to the ground, as they have already done in so many other branches of science. Men now speak in politics and pronounce definite opinions, although they have scarcely ever devoted an hour’s real thought to the investigation of the subject; and yet can there be a doubt that so absurd a system will eventually die away, and that they will first *learn* (either from the fountain, or from those who have been at the fountain), before they give utterance to

* For instance:—“This man has a fine *property* in Yorkshire, although, if each had his own, it would belong to his cousin.” “The men were ordered to sack and burn the town, and they performed the *duty* with great alacrity.” “A foreign house consigned some *goods* to me, but they were of so infamous a description that I returned them.”

propositions which after all are only, "I think so because I do?" The whole progress of society is teaching us, that propositions which will not bear the most strict and thorough investigation of the reason must be abandoned and overthrown. The tide of TRUTH has set in, and wherever that truth may lead us, *there* we can have little doubt will man be found to follow. Through many breakers, and through many disasters, it may be, but still it is the tide of truth, and no fortuitous event—no hand of man—no complication of circumstances—not all the adverse powers of all the universe, can prevent the destinies of our race from landing at last in that bright haven of peace and safety, of true knowledge and Christian virtue, which on the sure word of prophecy we confidently anticipate.

Although politics as a science is perfectly distinct from religion, the history of man, past, present, and future, is essentially connected and bound up with religion. No separation between the two is possible without at once landing us in the most inexplicable mysteries, which do not admit even of intelligible statement.

It is the duty of every Christian surely and certainly to expect a millennium. Whether there shall or shall not be a personal reign of the Son of God on the earth we know not, and can offer no opinion that is worthy of attention. At the same time, we have the sure word of promise that there shall be a reign of righteousness (justice) on the earth, and that God himself, the true and legitimate ruler of

the human race, shall take to himself his great power and *reign*. If God reign, we must necessarily have the total abolition of all systematic injustice ; and as the human race is evolving from the multitudes of diverse credences, so may it ultimately evolve from the multitudes of human rulers and be assembled under its one legitimate Lord. It is true, the world may say that "these all do contrary to Cæsar, saying that there is another king, *one Jesus*," but "let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, Lord and Christ."

That Jesus is the only personal ruler who has a right to reign over mankind. Until he assume his power, it is the duty of human rulers merely to fill the office of administrators of the rules of justice. They are the magistrates of equity, not the rulers of men. To all honour and to all proper obedience they are entitled, when they act justly and impartially ; but the only PERSON who can rule from his own right as a person, is the incarnate Son of God. The Christian can give allegiance to no other, except as that other is the administrator, and not the supreme sovereign ; if he act wrongfully, he may be deposed, tried, or even condemned to death, if he have been guilty of a crime that would entail that penalty on a subject ; he may be set up to-day, and put down to-morrow, and set up again the next day, without any more crime attaching to such actions than attaches to the hiring and discharge of a servant. For man, there is but one true ruler ; one

who hath purchased his kingdom, who hath redeemed his people, who is not only the true and good pastor, but the legitimate and rightful Lord; one who is not only man but God, blessed for ever. Whether in visible form, or in spiritual essence, that divine Lord must ultimately reign. The world may scoff as it will, but it can neither arrest the promise nor the arm of the Almighty. "Thy kingdom come," is all that the earth requires to make it happy.

SECT. II.—DEFINITIONS.

POLITICS is the science of EQUITY, and treats of the relations of men *in* equity, or of the equitable relations of men.

[As arithmetic is the science of number, and treats of the relation of things in number, or of the numerical relations of things.]

Equity or Justice is a simple concept, totally incapable of definition, but common to all mankind. It stands on the same footing as the concepts *identity, equality, number, quantity, space, force, value, utility, &c.*, neither of which is capable of definition, yet all of which are common to all mankind. Equity or justice, although incapable of definition, is capable of *division*, that is, we may specify its *forms*. These are distributive justice, corrective justice, and retributive justice.

Distributive justice has for its end the equitable allocation of all the elements of society, in rights, property, office, relation, succession, &c. It professes to distribute all things that enter into the region of politics, *justly*.

Corrective justice has for its end the restoration of the elements of society to their equitable condition, when that condition has been disturbed either by intention or accident. Hence all *suits* in civil law.

Retributive justice has for its end the prevention of intentional crime, by the infliction of such pains and penalties as are supposed to be capable of *detering* any from intentionally disturbing the equitable condition of society.

These three are equally included in a science of politics, although the first only is commonly treated of under this name.

A complete system of political science ought to discuss the principles of the three divisions.

The noun adjective of equity is *equitable* or *just*.

The adverb of equity is *justly* or *equitably*.

The verb of equity is the moral *ought*.

[The verb *ought* points out the relation of *correctness*. This it does *generally*. *E. g.* :—A circle *ought* to be drawn in such and such a manner ; the intellect *ought* to be convinced by sufficient evidence ; a man *ought* to act towards others as he would that others should act towards him. The meaning in each case is, “that it is *correct*,” &c. This correctness depends on the region of thought in which we are discours-

ing. *E.g.*:—If we wish the *nearest* distance between two towns, the length of a straight line drawn from one to the other is the *correct* distance required. If we consider this as a mere *fact*, it belongs to the region of *external nature*. A different kind of correctness is found in the region of *thought*. If $x + a = a$, we *conclude* that $x = 0$. The *conclusion* is correct.

In *rational action* again we have a different kind of correctness. *E.g.*:—“The weather was so dry that the grass failed, but the farmer brought a run of water to the head of the field and irrigated it. In a few days the grass revived.” His *action* was correct, that is, it *produced the desired end*.

In *moral action* again we have still a different kind of correctness. *E.g.*:—“While exposed to many temptations his *conduct* was correct.” That is, *the end produced was correct*.

It is evident that a straight line, a logical conclusion, a rational action, and a moral action, are very different things; yet the same language applies to them and gives rise to many ambiguities. The verb *ought* follows wherever *correct* is employed, and we may say, “A road to be the shortest ought to be straight.” “If $x + a = a$, x ought to be $= 0$.”

“If the farmer wants his grass to grow, he ought to irrigate his field.”

“He did what he ought although exposed to temptation.”

UGHT, therefore, has no specific meaning until the region in which we discourse is determined, and it then signifies the relation of correctness *in that*

region. When the relation of correctness is ascertained (or supposed) in either of the four regions of BEING, KNOWING, ACTING RATIONALLY, or ACTING MORALLY, the verb *ought* may be employed, as a verb is required to facilitate discourse. The current ambiguities of the verb *ought* may usually be traced to the difference between *rational action*, which has for its object *the production of an end merely*, and *moral action*, in which we pronounce on *the character of the end produced.*]

In political economy the verb *ought* is employed in a non-moral sense. *E.g.*:—"What means ought to be employed to produce a given end?" This is the exclusive inquiry of political economy. In politics the sense is perfectly distinct from the sense in political economy. "*What end ought to be produced?*" is the exclusive inquiry of politics. Both signify *correctness*; but the one is *rational correctness*, the other *moral correctness*.

In politics the verb *ought* signifies correctness in *equity*.

The most important words involving equity are the nouns substantive, DUTY, CRIME, RIGHT, WRONG, PROPERTY.

Duty and crime apply to *actions*; right and wrong apply to *actions, conditions, and possessions*; property applies to *possessions*. The terms *duty, crime, right, wrong, and property*, are *abstract*, that is, they signify mental concepts which have no correlatives in external nature; but which are superadded to actions, conditions, and possessions, by the human reason, which, from its constitution, is necessarily impelled

to regard actions, conditions, and possessions, not merely in their physical characteristics, which can be ascertained by sensational observation, but also in their moral characteristics, which are inappreciable to sense, and can only be apprehended by the reason.

[Neither of the above terms can ever be introduced *legitimately* into political economy.]

The terms *duty*, *crime*, *right*, *wrong*, and *property*, taken as substantive concepts of the intellect, are simple, incapable of analysis, and consequently incapable of definition. But they may be viewed in another light.

The general form or abstract concept is incapable of real definition; but the concrete form or particular case is capable of *determination*; otherwise a practical rule of action could not be evolved. We must consider, therefore, not what concepts *compose* duty and crime in the abstract (they being not compound, and consequently indecomposable), but what characteristics of an action *constitute* it a duty or a crime. We have, therefore, to unite the abstract concepts and principles, which belong exclusively to the reason, with the concrete characteristics of an action, which are derived exclusively from observation, and the question presents itself in this light—given, the concept equity, with its axioms, and the *physical* characteristics of an action, to determine whether the action be a duty or a crime, or neither.

Viewed in this light, therefore, a duty becomes an action that corresponds with the axioms of

equity ; and a crime, an action that controverts the axioms of equity. The concise definition of a crime, therefore, is "*a breach of equity.*" Whatever is a breach of equity is a political crime, and whatever is not a breach of equity is *not* a political crime (and can never be *justly* treated as such).

Finally, *duty* and *crime* are opposites to each other.

The above observations apply to the substantives *right*, *wrong*, and *property*.

Let us first consider the use of the word *right* as it appears in ordinary discourse. "The *rights* of man." "A man has a *right* to do what he wills with his own." "The slave has a *right* to his liberty." The substantive *right* here evidently signifies "just claim"—the just (or equitable) claims of man. The slave has an equitable claim to his liberty.

But as there is ever in man a tendency to forsake the abstract concept, and to adhere to the object to which the concept is attached, or in which it is supposed to reside as a quality, the *object* of the just claim is sometimes called the *right*,—*e.g.*, liberty is a natural right. Here the form of expression is abbreviated ; it is not meant that liberty is a just claim, but one of the things *to* which man has a just claim. This principle of abbreviation is applied so generally in common discourse that an attempt to avoid it there is mere pedantry. At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between the object and the character of the object ; and as one of the terms of politics (*property*) is so often used in an improper sense from the confusion of the object with its

character, we define RIGHT (the noun substantive) as "an equitable or just claim,"—*e.g.*, a man has a right to liberty, that is, a man has an equitable claim to liberty.

A WRONG, an unjust interference with the powers, property, or reputation of another.

PROPERTY, the object to which a man has a just claim. Property is usually restricted to *material* objects, but a man's life or reputation may be said to be his property. *Matter* does not enter into an abstract science, and the word *object* is used in its grammatical signification to signify either things material or immaterial. A copyright, for instance, may be property, and yet it can scarcely be called a material object.

Property is one of the important substantives of politics, and, like liberty, is used in two senses, one of which implies equity. It is sometimes used to signify the object of property, *e.g.*, the estate, land, houses, money, &c., *possessed*; sometimes to include the relation of the object to the person who has a just claim to it. The former sense is expressed by the terms, "*object possessed*," or "*possession*." (Possession has two meanings also, namely, the object possessed, and its relation to the possessor.) This abbreviation of language is quite legitimate, and every one is entitled to use it, provided it belong to the language in which he writes.* It is, of course

* In Archbishop Whately's Logic, some remarks are made on the use of terms in senses not consistent with the definitions.—(See definitions of terms used in Political Economy. Logic, p. 402, &c.)

desirable, that uniformity should be preserved, but it must not be forgotten that the language of ordinary discourse is ambiguous. The definition sense is only obligatory in matters of proof. In the ordinary current of the work, the English, and not the definition sense is quite legitimately employed. We should scarcely consider a mathematician inconsistent for calling Russell Square a *square*, because it did not happen to coincide exactly with his definition of that figure. The cases pointed out by Archbishop Whately may, however, be those in which the ambiguity is involved in the *argument*, and not in the *narration*, and in that case the criticism is valuable as calculated to improve so important a branch of knowledge. *Possession*, we shall use indifferently as the object, or the relation. It is so used in ordinary discourse, and the *peculiar* terms of politics are all that we profess to define,—*e.g.*, a slave is the possession of his master, or *in* his possession; a slave is not the *property* of his master.

The ambiguity of the word property, as signifying either "the thing actually possessed," or "the thing justly possessed," is at the bottom of all the arguments in favour of the rights of slaveholders or the rights of landowners. It is impossible that a slave should be the *property* of his master. One of the objects of this work is (ultimately) to exhibit the *impossibility* both as applied to *slaves* and to *land*.*

* In Mr Alison's History of Europe, the words *rights* and *property* present a long series of ambiguities, and these ambiguities really form the basis of his reasonings. The slave says, "I have a *right* to my liberty." The slaveowner says, "I have a *right*

PROPERTY is a correlative term, and always requires the existence of a *proprietor* or *owner*. Where there is no *owner*, there can be no *property*, and where there is no *property*, there can be no *owner*. An object may exist and may be *valuable*, but if it have not a proprietor, it is merely *an object*, and not *property*. The definition states, "*object to which a being has a just claim*,"—we do not mean *material* object. Every noun substantive is supposed to represent an *object*, whether material or immaterial. This distinction is necessary, because a man may have a just claim to the *value* (or part of the value) of an object, and yet not to the material object itself. Or the material object in which a value resided may be destroyed, and yet a man may have a just claim to the *value*. This principle is every day exhibited in legal matters. We have defined *property*, "*the object to which a being has a just claim*," but "*just claim*" constitutes "*a right*," consequently the concise definition of property is, "*object to which a being has a right*."

VALUE is a simple concept and cannot be defined. It is one of the numerous *causes* that are supposed to excite or produce emotions. "*We desire objects—to my slave*." It is impossible that these two propositions can be *true*, where the word *right* is used in the same sense; but they *are* true in fact, because the slave means *moral* right, the planter, *legal* right. The ambiguity of the word is really at the bottom of all that can be advanced by the slaveowner. No man can possibly have a moral right to a slave, that is, to another man subjected to servitude, without his consent. "*The assembly had long hesitated as to the course they should adopt, and were inclined to support the rights of the planters*."—*Alison, Hist. Eur.*, chap. vii.

let the quality (resident in the object) which causes that desire be called *value*." This is all that can be said about the abstract form of value, but value may be divided into its various concrete forms, and they can be definitely limited and determined. *Commercial* value is only one form of value, namely, that form which men are willing to receive in exchange. Value never exists *alone*, but resides in some object, whether material or immaterial.

LIBERTY is not necessarily defined by political science, inasmuch as it does not involve *equity*, when used in its most general signification. But as it forms an important term of politics, and as it frequently *does* involve equity from the abbreviation of language, we define it as the condition in which a man's powers and property are disposed of by his own consent—*e.g.*, This man is in a state of liberty, that is, this man is in a condition in which his powers and property are disposed of by his own consent.

In politics, however, the relation of man to man is the only subject of investigation, and liberty may be defined, "The condition in which a man's powers and property are disposed of without the interference of another man, unless such interference be by consent." The former definition states, "by his own consent." Now, the elements may destroy his property, or the snow may make him a prisoner in his house. In these cases he loses his liberty, but not his *political* liberty,—that is, he loses nothing by the agency of his fellow-men. The latter definition is, therefore, the one that applies to politics; the former,

the one that applies generally to the most extensive case of liberty.

POWERS OF PERFORMANCE consist of the powers of thinking, feeling, speaking, writing and publishing, and acting. *Power* is sometimes confounded with *right*, but power is a general term, and is non-moral in its general form.

PLEASURE and PAIN are two primaries, non-moral in their *general* signification.

INTERFERENCE is one of the most important terms in politics. Its general form is non-moral, but we shall find it in a postulate.

LAW has various significations.

1st, A generalised *fact*—*e.g.*, Matter gravitates towards matter in a certain ratio. This fact is ascertained by observation. This form is termed “a law of the physical universe.”

2d, A necessary form of thought—*e.g.*, Things equal to the same are equal to each other. This is a universal and underived conviction of the reason, altogether independent of sensational observation. This form is termed “a law of the reason.”

3d, A divine command—*e.g.*, Thou shalt not kill. This form is termed “a divine law, a revealed law, or a law of God.”

4th, A human enactment—*e.g.*, The man who shoots a grouse without a game certificate shall be fined or imprisoned. This form is termed “a human law, or law of the legislature.”

In the various sciences the principles of truth peculiar to each (or especially used in each) are

sometimes and perhaps not improperly termed laws, whether those principles are primary or consequential, general or particular.

In politics and in political economy, we have the laws of equity and the laws of utility; the former being general principles of the reason, the latter, generalised facts learnt through observation. But to these must be added human enactments, which are variable, without any principle of permanence, and certainly not *morally* obligatory except so far as they coincide with the principles of equity.

A law of the legislature, therefore, is "an expression of the will of one or more beings, which expression requires obedience."

SECT. III.—AXIOMS.

Action.

1. No man has a right to *originate* an interference with another man.

2. A just interference (of one man with another) must be based on a reason sufficient in equity (or in negation). An interference that has not a reason sufficient in equity, is not a just interference.

3. All just interference of one man with another man must be based on the fact, that this other man has originated an interference with ourselves or others.

Property.

1. An object is the property of its creator. [An object may be either material or non-material.]

2. Right should lead to possession.

3. A proprietor may give his right.

4. A proprietor may lend his right.

5. He who receives a gift from the proprietor, becomes the proprietor of the gift.

6. He who loans an object from the proprietor, becomes just lessee of the object.

7. A proprietor may justly defend his property.


8. A proprietor may justly recover his property.

[As a *right* may be considered as *property*, even when it applies to *action*, these axioms refer also to rights of action.]

General.

1. *Politically*, a man may do what he pleases with his own powers or property, provided he does not interfere with another man. [That is, what a man does without *interfering* with another (by force, fraud, or defamation), does not come within the limits of *politics*. His personal actions belong to personal, and not to political morals.]

2. A whole is equal to the sum of all its parts. If it be equal, it cannot be greater; consequently, a whole can contain nothing but the aggregate of those things that are contained in its constituent parts.

3. All men are bound by the laws of justice.
 4. Two rights cannot be contradictory. [Various other axioms might be added, but these are sufficient to develop the elements of a system.]
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Postulates.

1. It is possible for men to act towards each other equitably or unequitably.
2. It is possible for men to possess portions of the earth equitably or unequitably.
3. Labour may create new value in raw material.

CHAPTER III.

PROPOSITION 1.

THAT ALL MEN ARE *EQUAL* IN NATURAL RIGHTS.

BE it admitted that there is a moral law of justice deriving from the very constitution of the human reason, and that this law is capable of being expressed in axioms.

A moral law is that which renders *duties* morally obligatory on mankind.

But every axiom is *universal*, that is, it includes every individual in the general category to which it refers.

But the universality of the moral law fixes upon all men the same *duties*.

But a natural right is the *correlative* of a moral duty.

And a natural right is coextensive with its correlative duty.

It follows, therefore, by necessary consequence, as all men have the same duties, that all men are *equal* in natural rights.

Note to Prop. 1.—It must be observed that the terms "*duty*" and "*right*" are *abstract* terms, and we

do not mean that every man is bound to perform *identically the same acts*, but to fulfil identically the same duties. *E.g.*:—One man, A, owes a just debt of £1 to B; another man, C, owes a just debt of £10 to D. A pays £1, and C pays £10. So far the acts are different, that is, in their *concrete* form. But let us translate the acts into their abstract form, and we find their expression *identical*. A discharged his just debt, and C discharged his just debt—that is, each *fulfilled his duty*. The correlation of the *right* to the *duty* is also seen in the same example. If A owed justly to B £1, then B had a correlative right—that is, a just claim to the possession of that £1. It is universal *in Equity* (not in Benevolence or Christianity), that where a duty is obligatory on X towards Y, then Y has a correlative right which he may assert, and *enforce* if he can.

PROPOSITION 2.

THAT A MAN HAS NOT A RIGHT TO DO EVERY THING.

By definition, a right is a just claim to the possession of property or power of action; and by axiom, that right should lead to possession.

To *do* is to perform *an action*.

Let it be supposed, therefore, that a man *has* a right to do every action.

But if one has a right to do every action, then all have a right to do every action.

But to take away the just possessions of another is an action.

And to take away the just powers of another is an action.

But if the just powers of that other be taken away, he remains without his just powers. But that he remain without his just powers is contrary to the supposition that he has a right to do every action, inasmuch as by supposition (that each had a right to do every action), his powers have been *justly* taken away. That his powers have been justly taken away, and that he still has a just claim to those powers, is a contradiction, consequently it cannot be true that a man has a right to do every thing.

Note to Prop. 2.—This proposition may be concisely stated as follows:—“If every man have a right to do every thing, no man has a right to do any thing, because each has a right to take away the rights of others.”

Again, the proposition may be viewed in another light than that of the specific *reductio ad absurdum*. A moral law necessarily supposes limitations and boundaries to action. But if man has a right to do every thing, there is no limitation, and consequently the moral law is obliterated.

PROPOSITION 3.

THAT MEN HAVE A RIGHT TO DO SOMETHING.

By postulate it has been said that it is possible for men to act equitably towards each other, and by axiom that a man has a right to do an equitable action.

Consequently men have a right to do something.

PROPOSITION 4.—PROBLEM.

TO FIND THE EQUITABLE LIMIT OF ACTION.

Seeing that men have a moral right to do something, but not a moral right to do every thing, we require to find the general and abstract limitations which divide possible actions into the equitable and the unequitable.

Let X and Y represent two men, equal in rights. X has a right to use his powers to a certain extent still undetermined; and Y has a right to use his powers to a similar extent. Let the action of X upon Y (upon Y's person, powers, or property), be called *interference*. We state, then, that the limit of equitable action is at the point of interference; because if X has a right of interference with Y, Y has a corresponding right of interference with X, and if X attempted to carry the supposed right of interference into practice, Y may attempt to control him, and an appeal to force is the only alternative. But an appeal to force cannot be equitable *on both sides*, for two rights cannot be contradictory.

But as equity regards only the *relations* of men, no action can be unequitable by which one man does not interfere (by force, fraud, or defamation,) with another man, and consequently, in Equity, every man has a political right (or right in society), to use his powers or his property as he chooses, provided he does not interfere with another. But if it be not unequitable

for him to use his powers up to the point of interference, and if it be unequitable for him to use his powers *beyond* that point, and to *coerce* his fellow-man, the point of interference is the required equitable limit of action.

PROPOSITION 5.

NO MAJORITY OF MEN MAY EQUITABLY INTERFERE WITH A MINORITY, OR WITH A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL.

One man in his individual capacity having no right to interfere with another, two men cannot have that right, nor can any number of men, because no number of *no rights* can ever make a right.

PROPOSITION 6.

SOCIETY CAN CONTAIN ONLY THOSE RIGHTS WHICH BELONG TO THE INDIVIDUALS COMPOSING SOCIETY.

Let any society be as great as it may, it is merely an aggregate of individuals, and, as *a whole*, can contain only the aggregate of its constituent parts; no society can possibly possess rights which do not belong to the individuals composing it.

From this also it follows that, as no individual has a right of interference with another, no society can have a right of interference with an individual.

E.g.:—If A have no right to interfere with X, and B have no right to interfere with X, and C, &c., then A B C, *associated together*, can have no right to interfere with X.

Note to Prop. 4, 5, 6.—We posit, then, as a universal truth in politics, that no man, and no majority, and no society, has a *primary* right to interfere (by *force, fraud, or defamation*) with any human being. The primary, essential, and immutable end of political association and of human legislation, is *to prevent all primary interference of one man with another*. Such interference is a *crime*, a breach of equity, a political offence, whether performed by a single individual, contrary to law, or performed by a legislature under the formality of legislative enactment. The *criminal intention* may, it is true, be very different in the single individual who commits a crime, from the intention of the individuals who, under the appellation of a legislature or government, order the performance of similar acts. We speak not of *intentions*, however, but of the character of the acts themselves; and we maintain that a man may be slain, enslaved, or defrauded, *quite as unjustly* by a government as by a private individual, and that such crimes on the part of a government are usually incomparably more prejudicial to the great body of society than any amount of individual crime that could reasonably be expected to take place in a civilised country. No instance can be adduced of a country being brought to ruin and degradation by individual crime, whereas legislative crime has produced revolutions, persecutions, civil wars, anarchies, and decays innumerable. The Italian republics were ruined by legislative crime—Spain was ruined by legislative crime—the three French revolutions have been produced by legislative

crime—and one half of the Continent of Europe was recently in a state of semi-anarchy through legislative crime. And that crime we define to be any primary interference *whatever* that affects the powers (liberty of action), property, or reputation of any man whatever, who is not a criminal. To stop here, however, would give us only a portion of the truth, and not the whole. Society requires to be constructed, and society requires both laws and regulations; and society requires a public revenue, public defence, and public police, and it remains for us to construct political society in such a manner that all necessary conditions shall be fulfilled, without any man whatever being deprived of his rights, or being interfered with against his will, so long as he is not a criminal.

It is of the first necessity to distinguish between *primary* and *secondary* interference. Primary interference is the interference of one man with another, when that other shall not have committed a breach of equity. Secondary interference is the interference of one man with another, when that other has been guilty (certainly or probably) of a breach of equity.

We maintain that, *except upon previously-given consent*, the former is universally unjust, whether the interference be by an individual or by a government.

If a government enact any laws by which the liberty of action of the population is restricted (crime excepted), we maintain that those laws are essentially *unjust*, that they will ultimately prove themselves to be most *prejudicial*, and that they ought at once to be

abolished, as nothing whatever can justify their continuance. To take a case. We take the customs and excise laws of Britain, and we maintain that no legislature in the world *is competent* to enact and enforce such laws, without trespassing on the rights of the community. And those laws, we feel assured, will ere long produce so much *evil*, that their abolition will be a matter of absolute necessity.

The right of a legislature to perform acts which may not be justly performed by individuals, is only a portion of the political *superstition* from which Europe is gradually emerging, as it emerged from religious and physical superstition a few centuries since. *The same moral law is incumbent upon men associated in society, that ought to regulate their conduct as individuals.* And the acts from which an individual is morally bound to refrain, no legislature in the world is competent to command, and no government to carry into execution. If it be not so, men have the power to obliterate all moral law whatever, by merely enacting its universal abolition. But although the theoretic limit of just legislation may be clearly seen, we must not expect that legislation will be confined to its proper boundaries, until the evils growing one after another to a height, and pressing too severely on the population, shall be traced to their true cause, and be successively abolished, because they can no longer be borne.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE, AND THE RIGHT OF THE MAJORITY.

1. All men are equal in natural rights.

A right is a just claim to—

1st, Powers of performance, which include all human *liberty*.

2d, Possession, which includes all human *property*.

Powers of performance are—

1st, Power of thinking ; 2d, speaking ; 3d, writing and publishing ; 4th, acting.

Consequently all men are equal in their natural right to think, speak, write, and act. Consequently, no man and no body of men have a right to interfere with the thoughts, words, writings, or actions of others, *which right is not to the same extent possessed by those others, vice versa*.

2. All men have a right to defend their rights.

Consequently they may set apart certain persons armed with physical power for the purpose of that defence.

The government of a country is nothing more than the body of men so set apart to defend the rights of

each individual of the community, consequently the whole operations of government in its *primary* capacity are limited to the *prevention of unjust interference*.

No man has a right, in the first place, to interfere with his fellow in his thoughts, words, or actions.

And if no man did so interfere, there would be no use for government in its primary and most essential capacity. But when he does interfere with his fellow by force, fraud, or defamation, then he is amenable to society, *1st*, for the compensation of all the evil he may have done to another; and, *2d*, for all the expense society has been at in maintaining a criminal police and criminal judicature, for the purpose of preventing his malpractices.

But all legislation is interference, and as no man has a right of interference primarily, legislation must be limited to that secondary interference that takes place when the rights of an individual have been invaded.

Consequently legislation has for its primary end and object nothing more than the preservation to every man of all his natural rights.

Rulers, therefore, have no right whatever to legislate except such as they derive as public servants of the community; and if they legislate from their own *will*, such legislation is not competent and need not be obeyed, except in so far as men may be called upon by Scripture to obey even unjust laws.

3. The right of legislation resides primarily in every individual, and extends just so far as his own

rights are concerned, and no farther. Consequently no man has a right to legislate for another, unless that other shall have been guilty of an attack on the rights of his fellows.

Laws, therefore, to be just, can only affect the powers or property of those who make them, except in so far as these laws are mere enactments against *crime*. And if laws do affect the powers or property of those who do not make them, those laws are unjust, except as they affect criminals.

4. All men have a right to defend their rights against every kind of interference. Consequently, if their rights be interfered with by the legislature or government of a country, they have the same right to defend them against that government that they have to defend them against the interference of a private individual.

5. The object of property is **THE EARTH**, namely, the land, the ocean, and the air.

6. All living men are equal in their natural right to the earth, that is, the earth belongs equally to the living generation of men who inhabit the surface of the globe; consequently, no disposition of the earth made by men who are dead can by any possibility affect the right of the present inhabitants to their equitable share of the globe. Therefore, neither the land, the air, nor the ocean can by any possibility belong to any individual *allodialy*. Man is but the liferenter of the earth.

7. The land of a nation belongs equally to every living citizen of that nation, consequently all title-

deeds granted by dead kings are invalid and need not be respected.

8. If every man have a right to defend his rights, he has also a right to recover them when they have been taken away from him — consequently every man in a nation has a right to recover his portion of the national land.*

9. The man who is born with only a legal title to his *liberty* is deprived by the law of his natural *property*.

10. When a man is deprived of his *property*, he

* These propositions are, of course, contrary to the present credence and the present practice, and the reader will no doubt at first consider them as mere arbitrary assertions. It must be remembered, however, that no theory of property (except an empirical superstition based on mere fiction) is currently extant in the English language, and consequently the subject has not yet been determined on other grounds than those of *law*.

Let us suppose an indefinite number of men *commencing a new STATE* in a new country, and no other supposition is possible but that all are exactly equal in their right to the soil. Now, this equality, if departed from, must be departed from, not according to arbitrary superstitions and the arbitrary will of despotic power (as by the king's grant of lands which belonged to the STATE); but according to *principles of equity*, which are in no respect dependent on the will of any individual whatever. And if the principles of equity have *not* been adhered to (and they have not been adhered to in any country in Europe), it follows of necessity that a new generation has an undoubted right to make such new arrangements as *are* equitable, whatever the traditional arrangements may have been in times past.

It must be remembered that the allocation of the State lands (for instance, the abbey lands by Henry VIII.) to *private individuals* is now exactly equivalent to the imposition of a taxation on articles of consumption equal to the *present* rental of those lands, so that those who are labourers have actually the rental of the lands taken from them in the shape of *taxes*. Were there *no taxes*, the alienation of the lands would be a question of comparatively minor import.

has a right to recover it; and consequently every citizen of a country, where the law does not secure to him his natural property, may justly use means to recover that property, exactly in the same manner as he may justly defend his natural liberty, or use means to recover it when he has been deprived of it.

11. Legislation has two ends, consequently a government has two objects.

The first is necessary and immutable, and does not depend on the will or choice of any man or body of men, or majority of men, in any way whatever.

The second is mutable, and *does* depend on the will and choice of those who may be selected to deliberate for the community.

The first end of legislation is *justice*, namely, the preservation by society of the rights of every individual forming society. No will or choice of even a majority can ever make it just that the rights of any individual should be interfered with.

The second end of legislation is *expediency*, namely, the determination and execution of those public acts and public works that are, according to the deliberative judgment of the lawfully-elected legislators, the most calculated to benefit the community.

But no act of *injustice* can ever benefit a community, and an interference with the rights of men against their will is an act of injustice. Consequently, the secondary end of legislation must never be carried out at the expense of the primary end of legis-

lation ; and therefore no deliberative assembly is competent to deliberate on any act whatever that would interfere with the rights of any individual.

12. The primary end of legislation, inasmuch as it is based on the immutable laws of justice, may be carried out either with or without the consent of any person or persons whatever. The secondary end of legislation, inasmuch as it is based on the deliberative choice of the nation, can only affect the actions or property of those who have a free voice in the election of the deliberative legislators. If it affect those who have not such free voice of election, it is an unjust stretch of power.

13. The primary end of legislation is universal and universally binding ; no man, whether he consent or do not consent, can ever be freed from the law of universal justice, that has for its object the prevention of the interference of one man with another. The secondary end of legislation, on the contrary, is not universal, nor can it justly affect the rights of those who have not the opportunity of freely electing their representative, and procuring him a place in the national assembly of deliberative legislators.

14. The primary end of legislation is negative, and does not interfere with the liberty or property of any individual whatever, *neither does it command any man to do any thing*, but only to refrain from *interfering* with his neighbour.

If the primary end of legislation be not carried out by a government, every man may justly carry it out for himself, inasmuch as it is confined to the defence

or recovery of his own rights and of the rights of his fellows, who are attacked by force or fraud.

The secondary end of legislation is positive, and does interfere with the actions and property of those who freely elect the deliberative assembly, but the deliberative assembly is only competent to take into consideration such questions, or such acts or works, as may be considered for the general benefit of the community; neither, if the deliberative assembly determine on an act or measure of *partiality*, is that act or measure in any way binding on any individual whatsoever.

15. The primary end of legislation is the reduction to practice of the immutable principles of equity as developed in political science. The secondary end of legislation is the reduction to practice of the principles which are inferred from an observation of the fruits and consequences of human action.

The rule of the first is politics.

The rule of the second is political economy.

16. It is possible for the deliberative assembly to err in their judgment as to the benefit likely to accrue from a particular act, but that act is not to be viewed as an act of injustice, so long as it does not contain *partiality*—that is, so long as one man is not called upon to bear a burden that is not equally shared by every member of the community, including the members of the assembly and the legislators and executive persons of every description.

But if an act of the deliberative assembly be an act of partiality, and throw upon one class of the

community a burden that is not equally borne by every other class, then must that act be esteemed an act of injustice and an overstepping of the just sphere of the deliberative assembly, and as such it is not competent, neither need it be obeyed, inasmuch as it is an interference with the equal rights of men.

17. The secondary end of legislation is positive, and calls on men to *do something* (to expend their labour or money, for instance), and this is quite equitable and legitimate for the good of society, provided every man be called upon equally; but neither must men be called upon unequally, nor must any be called upon who have not a perfectly free voice, and opportunity of exercising that voice, in the election of a member of the deliberative assembly.

To carry out the two ends of legislation two classes of State servants are required.

1st, An executive government, who have no power whatever to will or to choose, but only to carry out the provisions of natural justice, reduced to *law*—that is, to prevent all internal interference of one member of the State with another member of the State, and to prevent all external interference of a foreign State with the nation or its members.

2d, A deliberative government or assembly, who have no power whatever to execute, but only to deliberate and determine, and then to order execution through the executive servants of the State.

18. But, inasmuch as the deliberative assembly

might overstep its legitimate boundary, and order the execution of an act of injustice, there ought to be a code of *written law*, containing the clear and full declaration of human rights, and the cases in which the executive power may be authorised to arrest and try an individual who has been accused of interference with his fellows by force or fraud,—that is, who has been accused of *crime*.

This body of written law should be unalterable, inasmuch as it is the expression of those immutable principles of justice which never vary from time or circumstance. But as it could not reasonably be expected that a code of law should be perfected at once, some means should be provided for its alteration, so as to render it more and more perfect; but these means should be quite distinct from the ordinary deliberations of the deliberative assembly. And the written law should in no wise be departed from (so long as it exists), even at the command of the deliberative assembly; and every servant of the State who should depart from its provisions should at once be arrested and tried, and if found guilty, dismissed or otherwise dealt with, according to circumstances.

19. This written law should be preserved perfectly distinct from all or any of the ordinary acts or statutes of the deliberative assembly, neither should the two be confounded on any pretext whatever; inasmuch as the one is the sacred depositary of the rights of the community, and the other only the determination of such things as are supposed to be expedient for the time being.

And this written law would be the best security for the rights of the nation, inasmuch as it could be known and published, and every man might make himself acquainted with its contents, learning from it those limits within which he might at all times freely walk, without fear of interference from any quarter whatever.

This written law, it is probable, need not be of great extent, inasmuch as its province would be to determine the cases of arrest and trial (taking the first generally to signify compulsory attendance in court, not merely imprisonment), leaving a large latitude to the court to determine, according to the circumstances of the case, the future disposal of the convicted criminal.

In every well-regulated State it should be the first object to preserve the *innocent*, and not to sacrifice him to an inordinate moderation towards any one who may have been convicted of wilfully infringing the laws of justice. So soon as any one has knowingly and wittingly committed an offence against society, that person has, by his own free act, thrown himself beyond the pale of its protection, and has no right whatever, except to be tried according to the fairest principles of evidence. If intentional guilt be really proved against him, he must be made to repay society for the damage, and must not wonder if he find the path of guilt beset with thorns.

20. The written law of which we have spoken would not be the only written law, but inasmuch as it would contain a detailed declaration of the immut-

able principles of justice, with the grounds upon which all other law of whatever kind must be based, it should hold the first place of pre-eminence, and should be styled the **BOOK OF THE LAW**.

21. To this law of justice, which neither varies from lapse of time or change of circumstance, all other law must necessarily be inferior, whether based on the will of one individual, or on the choice of a body of individuals, however numerous that body might happen to be.

22. It is right, and immutably right, that every man should have the full opportunity of enjoying the fruits of his own labour, without curtailment, without diminution, and without interference.

And it is wrong, immutably wrong, that any man should, by fraud or force, encroach upon the fruits of any other's toil, unless he have the consent of that other.

But it is not, and cannot be, immutably right, in the same sense, that a nation should be governed by one ruler, or ten rulers, or five hundred rulers.

The first is a matter of justice.

The second is a matter of expediency.

Yet both may require to be declared by law.

23. In addition to the book of the law, therefore, which is based on the unchanging principles of man's nature, as determined by the Divine Creator, there is also requisite for a nation the **BOOK OF THE CONSTITUTION**.

24. This book of the constitution ought to determine the *form of government* that the nation wills

to have, whether a monarchy, an aristocracy, a republic, or a mixed constitution composed of these various elements, like the actual government of Great Britain.

25. It should be the object of the book of the constitution to lay down in detail the form of government: the order of succession, supposing a monarchy—the form of election, supposing a republic—and the definite limits of power which each should possess as regards the people, and, in the event of a mixed government, as regards each other.

26. The book of the constitution, it is evident, is based proximately on the will and choice of the nation, but no principle that it contains, and no enactment that it may attempt to enforce, can be valid, if it infringe any of those anterior principles of universal law, which are supposed to have their origin in justice. Neither can any portion of the book of the constitution be valid, or binding on any man whatever, who has not anteriorly agreed to join society in its formation; but if he have agreed to join, and be outvoted, then has he no just cause of complaint whatever.

And much more especially can no portion of this book of the constitution be valid, or binding on any man who is afforded no opportunity of joining in the national deliberation, and who is *excluded* from that deliberation by any person or persons whatever.

27. But again. In the event of the nation willing a constitution that should not only have an executive power for the enforcement of the equitable laws of

universal justice, but also a deliberative assembly for the determination of those measures that are (apparently) for the benefit of society, it is evident that this deliberative assembly must express its resolutions in written declarations, which can be of no value unless they are enforced.

28. Therefore, besides the book of the law and the book of the constitution, there is also requisite for a nation a **BOOK OF THE STATUTES**, namely, a book of the enactments of the deliberative assembly.

29. But it is evident that these statutes must be restricted to certain limits, inasmuch as no deliberative assembly is competent to deliberate on an act of injustice, nor does it depend on them to say what is or what is not an act of injustice.

Consequently the deliberative assembly must be confined to the consideration of those public measures that interfere with the rights of no man; for if the representatives do interfere with rights, then are they to be regarded as having overstepped their boundary, and *de facto* to be no longer the representatives of the nation.

30. But as the deliberative assembly must have power to raise money and service for the works of the State, it now remains to show how this may justly be done without any man's *rights* being curtailed.

First, Every man is by nature entitled to his fractional share of the liferent of the earth, that is, of *property*.

And every man is by nature entitled to the fruits of his own labour.

Second, This property and this labour may be employed in any way whatever that does not encroach on the equal rights of another.

Third, Therefore every man has a right, if he so choose, to employ persons to protect his property or his liberty, inasmuch as protection is negative, and interferes with no man, except in case of attack, and even then it *repels* attack, but does not originate an interference.

Consequently any numerous body of men have a right to employ the *same individuals* for the protection of their separate property or liberty, and these individuals must be *paid*.

31. The individuals, who are so selected to protect the properties or liberties of the general body, form the *government*, which government must be *paid*.

[But if a government proceed to use its power for the purpose of *paying itself*, instead of receiving payment from the hands of the nation, then must it be held as having departed from its just sphere, and should be dealt with in the same manner as any other forcible oppressor, whether public or private. If it take more than the nation has hired it at, then is it a robber, and should be dealt with as such.

And if any body, not actually hired by the nation, profess to be a government, and do levy money or service, then should every man make it his duty to resist that body, as a confederated band of defrauders, except always Scripture injunctions to the contrary.]

32. But if a society have a right to employ its pro-

erty and its labour in paying those who are appointed to defend the rights of each individual forming that society, society does not thereby *forfeit any or the smallest portion of its RIGHTS*, but only *uses* its rights in the way most agreeable to itself,—that is, employs its property or its service according to its own free will and choice.

33. But if society have a right to employ and to pay persons for the protection of the rights of each individual, society has also a right to elect certain individuals to inquire into those public acts and works that may be for the general benefit.

The individuals so elected form the deliberative assembly of the nation, and the constitution of this deliberative assembly ought to be definitely laid down in the book of the constitution.

34. But every member of society who agrees to elect a deliberative assembly, must also, at the same time, endow that assembly with certain powers, or otherwise the deliberations could be of no use, because no means would be provided for carrying them into effect.

These powers, whatever may be their extent or their limitations, do not reside in the deliberative assembly, but in those who employed them to deliberate. Of itself, the assembly has no power whatever, except as each individual composing it has a right and power to dispose of his own property and service as he pleases, provided he does not interfere with the equal rights of another.

35. But if society has a right to elect a delibera-

tive assembly, society has also a right to endow that assembly with such powers as may be fitting in the will and judgment of society; and each individual elector who agrees to the appointment of the assembly, and to the extent of its powers, does thereby agree to abide by its resolutions, so long as they are made without partiality, and within their proper limits.

36. It is evident, that if a man have a right to employ his property and his labour for his own advantage, he has also a right to employ a servant (if he can find a willing one), and to allocate to that servant any such portion of his business as he may will and choose.

37. But any large number of individuals may agree to employ the same servants for the same portion of their own particular business; and as this business may involve a common expense in which all are interested, they may empower those servants to collect from every individual who employed them his share of the expense.

38. But here it is evident, that the servants have no right or power of their own to collect money, except just in so far as they are authorised by the society that hires them; and also, if they by force collect money from any that did not enter into the hiring association, then must they be regarded as forcible defrauders who ought to be resisted.

39. And also, it is evident that in empowering these servants to collect money for the common expense, society does not part with any, or the

smallest portion of its rights, but only exercises those rights in the mode that appears most befitting to its own judgment.

40. If we suppose the hiring association to be the nation, and the servants to be the deliberative assembly of the nation, we may at once perceive how a deliberative assembly may raise money, (impose taxes,) without the *rights* of any individual in the nation being interfered with. For the deliberative assembly has no public right whatever, except such as it derives from the individuals who agree to elect it. But each of the individuals who agree to elect it, does so elect it for certain known purposes that involve common expense. And in agreeing to elect it, he merely employs the deliberative assembly to judge of those things that are for his own benefit, which benefit, previous to electing the assembly, he agrees to pay for. And on this ground alone can a deliberative assembly raise money without interfering with the rights of society.

41. But it is evident that the deliberative assembly is only competent to deliberate for those who have agreed to elect it, and to endow it with certain powers.

42. The theory of a deliberative assembly, then, is as follows :—A large number of individuals, located proximately to each other, find that certain works would be for their general benefit and profit, although the execution of those works would not be for the benefit or profit of any single individual amongst them, inasmuch as the expense would exceed the

returns that he, as an individual, could expect to derive from them.

[Twenty thousand persons located on the sea-coast might find that a *harbour* would be for their general benefit, although the benefit that any one individual amongst them could derive from the *use* of the harbour would not be sufficient to cover the expense of its construction. The same principle applies to paving, lighting, draining, watching, &c.—all most beneficial to society, yet not sufficiently advantageous to any single individual as to be remunerative to that individual, unless he receive rent for the same. But in receiving rent, those who pay rent, pay for the benefit, and this is not a case of individual execution, but a case in which the rent-payers, namely, society, execute the work.]

This congregate body of individuals we term *society*.

43. Every member of this society is *à priori* supposed to have certain natural property, and (except in the case of sickness, or deformity,) a certain power of labouring, which power is *valuable*, inasmuch as it may be profitably employed.

44. The members of this society then agree among themselves that they will execute certain public works for their common benefit, and discharge the expense of the same. And it is evident that those who do not agree, can neither be called upon to bear any portion of the expense, neither can they claim to participate in the benefit.

45. But having so agreed, it is evident that un-

less *all* are to be employed in executing the desired works, it is necessary for society to select certain individuals to whom the care of carrying these works into execution is to be entrusted.

46. And these individuals who are so selected, whatever powers they may be endowed with, are merely the servants of society. Of themselves, they can have no right to carry the works into execution at the public expense, but only in so far as they have been chosen for that purpose by society.

47. But as it might not be convenient for a large society to inquire and determine what particular works would be for the general benefit, inasmuch as each member requires to attend to his own occupations and business, society might select their public servants, not merely to carry into execution certain works already pointed out and determined on, but to inquire what works would be for the general benefit.

48. And society might also empower their public servants to carry into execution, not merely the works that had previously received the approbation of society, but also those works which, after due deliberation, should appear to the servants themselves to be beneficial.

And in so doing, society does not sacrifice nor give away any or the smallest portion of its rights, but only employs servants to perform for it what it could not so conveniently perform for itself.

49. And in giving the public servants a power to deliberate and to determine on public works, it is

evident, that society must, at the same time, agree to defray the expense of those works, or otherwise there could be no use in giving the power of deliberation.

50. But as, unfortunately, every man is not honest in this world, there might be some, who, although agreeing to the election of the public servants, and to the extent of their deliberative and executive power, should, by fraud, endeavour to escape from paying their portion of the public expense; it would therefore be necessary that some persons should have the power of compelling them to pay their portion, inasmuch as they, by the fact of election, *had agreed* to pay it. It must be observed, however, that this compulsion is not *primary*, neither is it at all similar to that compulsion that is exercised towards one *who never did agree*, nor had the opportunity afforded him of agreeing.

In the one case the compulsion is *just*, in the other case it is *unjust*.

51. For suppose one hundred persons agree together to execute a work for their common advantage. The expense of the work is £100. Certain persons are employed to execute it, and it is completed. When it is completed, the hundred persons are called upon to pay for it in an equal proportion. Ninety persons produce each £1, but the other ten endeavour to evade the payment. Now, suppose these ten are allowed to escape, *who can be called upon in justice* to pay the £10 that should have fallen to their share? The persons who performed the work

did so on the faith of receiving £100, and not £90, for it; neither can it be maintained for a moment that the loss should fall upon them. It is not *just* that *they* should bear the loss. But if they did not bear it, are the ninety to bear it? They agreed to pay £1 each and not more, and it is possible that they would not have consented to order the execution of the work had they contemplated an excess over £1. It is evident that *they* cannot in *justice* be called upon, although *they* must bear the loss in preference to those who executed the work, inasmuch as they were parties to the order, and took the risk of copartnership, which the workmen did not take.

It is clear, then, that if the ten do not pay the £10, some person must be *injured*. But the ten have no right to injure, and the ninety have the right to protect themselves from injury. The ten are those who *originate* the injury, and every injury is an interference. But the first axiom of *justice* is, that no man has a right to interfere primarily with another, so that the ten have committed an injustice for which they must be called to account.

52. Now, in this possibility of some seeking to evade their share of the public expense lies the necessity of a further agreement previous to the execution of the work,—that certain persons shall be chosen and endowed with power to compel payment from *ALL*. But it is clear that this power of compulsion is not, and cannot be *unjust*, inasmuch as it should only be applied to those who did agree to the

execution of the work, or to the election of those who ordained the work.

53. If it apply to those who never did so agree, or who were deprived of the opportunity of agreeing, then it is without doubt *unjust*.

54. And here it must be remarked, that the laws of *justice* differ essentially from the laws of *benefit*. The laws of justice may be carried into execution by one or by all, over one or over all, at all times and in all circumstances. Every man has the right to defend himself, and to defend his neighbour, and to recover his own property for himself, or his neighbour's property for his neighbour, in all circumstances, and at all times. If he have the *power*, then may he *justly* use that power, but there may be circumstances in which it would not be *judicious* to use it. The defence and recovery of rights is all that the law of justice can take into consideration, and every man has the right to defend and recover his rights, or his neighbour's rights, consequently every man may carry the law of *justice* into effect.

55. But the law of benefit is of a different character. Ten thousand men may think that a certain work shall be for their benefit, and for the benefit of the one other man who is amongst them. And those ten thousand may agree to execute the work at their common expense, yet have they not the smallest right whatever to constrain that other man, nor to extort from him even the shadow of a farthing, if he do not *consent* to join them.

56. If that other man commit a fraud or an out-

rage, or an injury, then have the ten thousand the right to interfere with him, inasmuch as *he* has originated interference, and interference must be *prevented*. And if the ten thousand were to commit a fraud or an injury, and that other man had the *power*, then has that other man the same right to interfere with the ten thousand that they had to interfere with him. The law of justice knows neither majority nor minority, but whosoever has the power may carry it into execution, at all times, and in all circumstances. It is God's law written on the human intellect at the period of its creation, and man as man may carry it into universal effect.

57. But the law of benefit is restricted wholly and solely to those who have consented to the scheme of benefit. The law of *justice* treats of the *immutably right*; the law of *benefit* only of the purchase of a certain advantage at a certain outlay, and no man has a right to compel another to purchase even an advantage.

58. CONSENT in the law of justice is altogether superfluous; in the law of benefit or utility it is altogether essential.

59. A deliberative assembly, then, if it be freely chosen and elected by society, may justly tax society, provided such taxation be made without partiality; and provided also that taxation was one of the ends for which it was elected.

60. But it neither is just, nor ever can be just, so long as the constitution of the human mind remains the same, that the man who had no opportunity of

electing the deliberative assembly should be taxed by it contrary to his consent.

61. These principles being established, there can be no difficulty in determining what is *the right of the majority*.

62. The *right* of the majority, in a matter of *justice*, has no existence, neither was it ever any other than a form of the *right of the strongest*.

63. Strength no more makes right than custom makes morality. Both right and morality are altogether independent of any observed fact or concrete condition that can be appreciated by any process of *a posteriori* observation whatever.

64. It may be laid down as a principle of universal application, whether in the mathematical or the moral sciences, that "no observed fact or concrete condition can ever go one step towards establishing an abstract principle."

But inasmuch as *right* and *wrong* are based upon abstract principles, either they must be abandoned altogether as having no existence, or they must have their origin in the axiomatic convictions of the human mind, which never alter nor vary, although, like some of the axioms of mathematics, they may slumber unheeded and neglected.

65. Let it be granted that any action whatever is either *right* or *wrong*, no matter which, and the *right* of the majority immediately disappears. Let the action be murder. Suppose it *wrong*—of the most heinous character,—unprovoked—in cold blood—the murder of a friend. Now, no *majority* of all the

men who ever existed, or who ever shall exist, can make this murder a good, lawful, and proper action. If all, with one consent, were to shout a hurricane of universal approbation, the action remains the same, a murder, a crime, and an INJUSTICE.

66. There is a *right* independent of all majorities, of all wills or consents, of all human practice, and of all human approbation.

67. And yet, nevertheless, there is a *right* of the majority.

68. In all matters that relate to human rights (that is, to the equal right of every man to natural liberty and to natural property), the majority is as incompetent to alter or to change, as it is to make the two sides of a triangle equal to the third. Neither depends on the will of man; both are the necessary conditions of thought, from which no man can emancipate himself, if his intellect perceive the relations of the propositions, but which any man may *deny*, as every *other* truth has been denied.

69. But in all matters that relate to the consent of mankind, then has the majority a right based on that consent. The right is no more in the *majority* than it is in the rulers. It depends entirely and exclusively on the consent of the general body who have *agreed to abide by the decision of the majority*.

70. And if the general body have not so agreed, then is there no such thing whatever as the *right* of the majority, inasmuch as the majority cannot change justice into injustice, nor injustice into justice, nor can they ever justly compel any minority

to purchase even a *benefit* at an outlay, against the will of the minority. The right of the majority, then, is not a right to *coerce* the minority; neither is it a right to impose upon the minority any measures that they, the majority, may imagine to be for the general benefit.

71. But if the body general, the whole volume of society, *have agreed* to be guided and directed in their public operations by a majority of their *own number*, then has that majority a right, based upon the general consent, in which no individual abandons or foregoes his rights, but merely exercises them in the way most befitting to his judgment and his will.

72. In the law of *justice*, therefore, the right of the majority is null and void, has no existence, is incompetent to appear, and ought never for a single moment to be taken into consideration.

73. But, on the contrary, in the law of *benefit* the right of the majority is supreme and absolute, inasmuch as it is neither more nor less than the expression of the will of the whole body of society who did previously consent to abide by the decision of the majority.

74. And in this light alone can the minority be viewed as not suffering injustice, when they do not obtain the object of their desire.

75. For, all men are *equal* in natural rights, and no man has a right to interfere with another against that other's consent.

76. But if all do consent to form an association, or a *nation*, for the purpose of carrying into execu-

tion the public works that are for their common benefit, and for the better security of the rights of each individual, then must there be provided some means of determining the works that are to be carried into execution, and the particular means of securing the individual rights of the members of the community. And as it is possible for one part of the nation to esteem one class of means the best, and for another part to esteem another class of means the best, it is necessary to determine beforehand what principle of selection shall be put in force, and what *rule* shall regulate the final decision. But now it must be observed that the limits of the question have been extremely curtailed. The question is no longer one of justice, for we have supposed justice to be paramount to all majorities; nor is it one of choice, for we have supposed all to have given their consent. It is then a question of judgment as to what works are really the best, and what means are really the most efficient.

77. And consequently there is no longer any question of injustice, or of interference against the will of any individual, but only a *calculation of the amount of benefit* that is likely to arise from any particular measure when carried into effect.

78. This calculation in many cases is susceptible of numerical expression (witness cases of fever in localities *drained* or *undrained*), but in other cases there have not yet been made *statistics* on which to base a decision that should assume the form of an ascertained rule.

79. It is therefore necessary that some provision should be made for those cases that have not yet assumed their place in any system of science. Let the question be, "Is a national church beneficial?" and it may at once be perceived that the data affecting such a question are of far too limited an extent to enable any person whatever to arrive at a conclusion based on the calculation of probabilities.

80. Because the rule for any question of the kind is, "Take the whole number of cases of a national church, and if the majority have been beneficial, then is it more probable than not that a national church is beneficial."

81. But churches are not *numerous* (an essential in every question of probabilities), and also churches are so various in character, that no decision on such a question could be listened to by any one, were it professedly based on the numerical statistics of national churches.

82. But on such a question as this it is possible to put the case in another light, "The deficiency in number may be compensated by the length of duration;" and if any one single church (that of England and Ireland, for instance) be taken in the whole period of its duration, it might furnish an approximate result, derived not, of course, from the character of *churches*, but from the character of this church during a long course of years, each of which years might be made a unit in the calculation.

83. But even in this case we have only one class of units, whereas, in a calculation of probabilities, two

classes are required. There must not only be a numerical expression for the duration, but a numerical expression for the *benefit* (or value).

84. Now, it is evident that on such a point no man would wish to risk a numerical judgment, and therefore it is necessary that some provision should be made for those cases that are not susceptible of a numerical expression, or are not of such a nature as a man chooses to reduce to a mere question of numbers—numbers which here must in all probability be empirically assumed. Therefore, the question is, “Is this public work likely to be beneficial to the community?” Five hundred answer YEA, and one hundred answer NAY. Now, what is to be *done*? If there were no previous consent amongst the *six* hundred that the majority should determine the final decision, then have the majority no right whatever to enforce their Yea. But seeing that there was (by supposition) a previous consent amongst the whole of the six hundred that a majority of their number should determine, then must it be maintained that when the majority do determine, even without reason alleged, the minority not only suffer no injustice, but actually do choose and select the work, because they had previously agreed to abide by the decision of the majority.

85. The case is one of very simple reduction to signs. A, B, C, D, and E, do will and choose that one of the measures, x or y , should be carried into execution, according to the judgment of a majority amongst them; which is equivalent to A, B, C, D, and E, do

will and choose "*the measure selected by the majority.*" A, B, and C select x , and A, B, and C are a majority of A, B, C, D, and E, consequently x is the measure selected by the majority. But "*the measure selected by the majority*" was what A, B, C, D, and E did will and choose, consequently x is the measure that A, B, C, D, and E did will and choose.

86. This principle, so clear in itself, is frequently lost sight of when men speak of the injustice done to the minority. The injustice (if there be any) consists not in the fact of a minority, or majority, but in the absence of that previous consent by which *all* had agreed to be regulated by the judgment of the greater number. (In Britain, for instance, the injustice consists in the absence of universal suffrage.)

87. But let us suppose that another view is taken. Suppose the majority do not press their measure, but ask the minority to allege reason. It is clear that if the majority are not to determine the final decision, the *minority* cannot have so good a claim to carry *their* measure. Consequently there remains but one alternative, namely, to *abandon both*. But to abandon both is contrary to the supposition that all had agreed to associate together for their common benefit, and brings us back to the point from which we started, namely, the point where all men were equal, but had not yet consented to join in association. And consequently as either x or y may represent *every possible public work*, where the whole of society are not *unanimous* (an event scarcely to be looked for at any time), every public work would have to be abandoned un-

less society were altogether unanimous. But to abandon every *public* work would be to dissolve society, and what we desire is not to *dissolve* society, but to point out the principles on which society ought to associate.

88. There are, then, four, and only four, possibilities, one of which must necessarily be adopted:—

1st, Public works are to be selected according to the statistical evidence of their benefit. [Many public works are susceptible of this basis; but in case any one should assume that *all* public works are capable of being based on statistical data, we give a question for solution—“Of all known forms of government, which is the best?”—the answer to be founded on the statistics of the various *forms* as distinguished from the accidental circumstances that have accompanied them. Yet one form or other *must* be chosen.]

2d, Public works are to be selected according to the decision of the majority.

3d, Public works are to be selected according to the decision of the minority.

4th, Public works are to be altogether abandoned. Let it be distinctly remembered that the question is not one of *justice*, but one of *benefit*. We are not supposing the work to be *right* or *wrong*, in which case it would have to be carried into execution, or refrained from, independently of any inquiry into its probable effects. But we are supposing the work to be one that may, or may not, benefit the public, and that is to be carried into execution wholly

and solely because it is beneficial, or refrained from wholly and solely because it is not beneficial. Such, for instance, as the construction of a harbour, the erection of a lighthouse, or the selection of a monarchy or democracy, in a case where such selection is offered to a people, as happened to the North Americans, when they severed their connection with Britain.

89. The four propositions will be found to include all the possibilities. One of them must be chosen. [There is one other possibility, and the one that has down to the present time played the most important part, namely, "that the public work should be selected according to the *WILL of the ruler*," king, government, or what not. This is the fact *that is*, but we inquire not into the fact *that is*, which is a matter of *history*, but into the fact that *ought to be*, which is a matter of *political science*. What *is*, no more alters what *ought to be*, than the actual conditions of matter alter the abstract truths of mathematics.]

90. Now, let us choose the *fourth*.

If "public works are to be altogether abandoned," then is there no longer an association, for an association without an object (of some kind or other, however insignificant,) is not an association, consequently, there is no longer a nation, but only a large number of separate individuals having no civil connection with each other. This case, therefore, we leave, for we do not pretend to inquire whether men ought, or ought not, to associate, but only "on

what principles they ought to associate, if they *do* associate."

Let us now choose the *third*, and suppose "that public works are to be selected according to the will of the minority." Upon what principle? In a case of right and wrong, the minority might justly claim a preference if they had evidence that their proposition was *just*, and the others *unjust*; but here the question is of a different character, and must be settled on other grounds. We have supposed the case not to involve right and wrong (that is, preservation and recovery of human rights, or encroachment on human rights), but only to involve profit or loss—not to be a question of *pure politics*, but a question of *political economy*.

91. Now, if we consider for a moment, we shall see that the whole question resolves itself into this, "Whose *judgment* is *most probably* correct?" And the answer to this question will definitely settle the point at issue.

92. It is clear that there is nothing whatever in a minority (as a *minority* is the *smallest* number) to make it *more* probable that their judgment is correct; because if it were so, the probability would increase in the inverse ratio of the number, that is, would increase as the number decreased, and consequently, the less numerous the members of the minority, the more probably they would be correct. [It is a fact, however, that in matters involving justice and injustice, the few have often been more correct than the many. Look at the Crusades; at the civil wars

of religion in France; at the universal (with the exception of the Quakers, to their everlasting honour, and to their everlasting reward, it is to be hoped,) approbation with which Britons and Frenchmen regarded the *slave trade*. Nay, look at the whole history of man in any country, or in any age, and there is staring us in the face a huge image of INJUSTICE, high as the golden image which Nebuchadnezzar set up in the plain of Dura, in the province of Babylon. The Shadrachs, the Meshachs, and the Abed-negos, have ever been the few rare worshippers of TRUTH, while "all the people, the nations, and the languages" have fallen down and worshipped some idol of man's invention.

93. Let us now choose the *second*, and suppose "that public works are to be selected according to the decision of the majority." On what principle? Answer,—On the principle that their judgment is *more probably* correct.

BUT, it must be clearly understood that the *will* of the majority is of no more consequence than the will of the minority. *Will* no more makes right than strength does. So far as *will* is concerned, the majority have only a right to dispose of their *own property*. Their numerical preponderance gives them no right whatever that does not reside in each of them as individuals; and no individual amongst them has the smallest right to interfere with, or dispose of, his neighbour's property, consequently no number of individuals can have that right, as no number of *no rights* can ever make a right. Two

men who have *no* money do not make one who has. The public work, therefore, is not to be selected because the majority *will* it (as their *will* extends over their own property alone), but because their judgment is more probably correct as to the character of the work in question. If it be merely a calculation as to the profit or loss likely to arise from the execution of the work, then is it to be assumed that the judgment of the minority is not so correct as the judgment of the majority. It is a mere calculation of probability as to the correctness of judgment in the members of the two parties. And this probability is capable of being reduced to mathematical expression.

94. Grant that the human judgment is capable of pronouncing on the probable benefit of a work.

[This is taken for granted not only in every public act that men perform, but in every private one, if it have profit and loss as its regulating motive.]

95. Let then a work *a* be proposed to two men whose capacity of judging its benefit, *x*, is presumed equal. To propose it to *one* would be to attempt to determine the absolute probability, which cannot be found in this manner; all we can determine is its *relative*, and not its absolute probability.

There are two men, and we put the whole number in the denominator and the portions in the numerator, according to the judgment of *Aye* or *No*.

One man thinks it probable that the work is beneficial; the other man thinks that it is not beneficial.

The probability is then in favour of work, $\frac{1}{2}$.
 _____ and against the work, $\frac{1}{2}$.

Consequently, the probability on each side is EQUAL.

But let us introduce another man who pronounces, Aye.

The probability is then for x , $\frac{2}{3}$.
 _____ against x , $\frac{1}{3}$.

Introduce another Aye and we have, *for*, $\frac{2}{3}$, *against*, $\frac{1}{3}$, or three to one (that is, three out of four) in favour of the probable benefit, and one to three (one out of four) against the probable benefit.

96. With these small numbers, however, the *limits of error* are so great, that nothing could be properly ascertained by comparing the judgment of three, four, six, or eight men.

97. The greater the number, the less the limits of error; consequently it is advantageous that wherever a question depends on *judgment*, there should be the greatest possible number of persons called upon to pronounce Aye or No, provided always those persons are equally competent.

[Those who plead for the extension of the suffrage should ask a mathematician to calculate *the limits of error* in the small constituencies. The *limits of error* in this case would mean the probability of the wrong man being elected. It is rather curious that the argument based on the *law of great numbers* should not have been enlisted in the cause of universal suffrage. It is purely mathematical, and yet it is capable of exhibiting some curious results, as M. Poisson showed, with regard to the French juries.

In England, it requires a *unanimous* jury to condemn a man, but not so in France. There, a *majority* decides. Now, suppose a man is condemned when eight out of twelve pronounce "guilty," and that out of ten men put on trial there are actually five condemned. Suppose this to have been the case for a series of years, and somebody proposes to alter the law, so that, instead of eight to four being required to condemn a prisoner, seven only shall be required to find him guilty, that is, seven to five, or $\frac{7}{12}$. It might perhaps be supposed, that a man's real guilt or innocence would be tolerably well ascertained, whether seven or eight were required; but not so, M. Poisson showed (and almost got into a scrape for it) that there was a relation between the *required majority* and the *number condemned*. That is, suppose with a majority of eight to four, fifty are condemned out of a hundred accused; when the law is altered to seven to five, there will not be more accused, but there will be more out of the hundred condemned—*more than fifty*. The *probability* based on the mere relations of the *numbers* was, we believe, shown to have been actually verified in *fact*. It is a thousand pities that so many passions should interfere to prevent men taking a *rational* view of the numerical matters of politics. There is *one fact* connected with the representation of Great Britain, which is not generally known, and which some may perhaps attempt to deny, although it is merely an *arithmetical* truth, independent of any system of politics or party—a truth that can be demonstrated according to the

laws of numbers. The fact to which we refer is this. According to the present system of representation, there may be a majority of the whole body of electors in the kingdom of one opinion (say, for instance, conservative, or liberal, no matter which)—this majority shall vote freely, and without any interference whatever—everything connected with the election shall be the essence of justice and fair play, and yet it is possible that this majority of all the electors of Great Britain shall only return ONE member to Parliament. This is an *arithmetical fact*, and certainly it is rather a singular one. There is no hidden meaning in the assertion, the proposition can be exhibited as a mere matter of arithmetic—and without departing so very far from what actually *does* occur. We say it *may* occur, that is, it is within the limits of the *present system*, exercised according to the actual provisions of law. It may, however, have been mentioned in some previous publication, but we have not seen it, nor ever met any one who had noticed the fact.]

98. Thus, when 200,000 pronounce Aye, and 100,000 pronounce No, a probability assumes a very different aspect from the case where there are only three persons, and two pronounce Aye, and one pronounces No. In the latter case, the probability *based on human judgment* is nothing, and may be altogether neglected, as the numbers are so small. The *proportion* is the same in both cases, but the value of the fact is very different.

99. For instance, suppose 1000 balls are placed

in a box. Some of them are black, and some of them are white. We wish to discover as near as possible how many black balls, and how many white balls are in the box; but we are only allowed to draw 500 of them out, consequently we must be satisfied with a probability, that is, a *reason for thinking* that there are so many of each kind. Suppose we draw two, a black and a white. The probability here is, that there are 500 black and 500 white balls in the box; but we should be egregiously mistaken if we were to base our conclusion on this small number, because it is quite possible that we should draw one of each colour, even if there were 900 black and only 100 white in the box.

But now we draw a third, a black one, and the proportion of the balls drawn is, *black* $\frac{2}{3}$, and *white* $\frac{1}{3}$. Now, remark, that be the proportion of the balls in the box what it may, the third ball drawn *must* be either a white or a black one, and consequently *must* alter the probability of $\frac{1}{3}$ to $\frac{2}{3}$ on one side or other, whatever may be the proportion in the box. But to extend this to the 1000 balls, would immediately alter the $\frac{500}{1000}$ which we had before, to $\frac{333\frac{1}{3}}{1000}$ and $\frac{666\frac{2}{3}}{1000}$. Now, the leap from the one fraction to the other is immensely too great to base a judgment on, and it *depends* entirely on the drawing of *one* ball. Suppose we draw the fourth. It also *must* be a black or a white one. In the first case, the new probability (*reason for thinking*) would be, *black* $\frac{2}{3}$, and *white* $\frac{1}{3}$, or, extended to the 1000, black $\frac{750}{1000}$ and white $\frac{250}{1000}$. Suppose, however, that the fourth ball

had been white, we should then have two black, and two white, and the probability would have been equal on either side, namely, $\frac{1}{2}$, or extended to the 1000, $\frac{500}{1000}$. Here the drawing of *one* ball makes a difference of 250 on the probable number of each of the colours in the box, and this immense variation depends entirely on the smallness of the number of balls drawn.

Let us now suppose that we have drawn 200 balls, 150 of which prove to be black, and 50 white. The probability then is, *black* = $\frac{150}{200}$, and *white* = $\frac{50}{200}$, or extended to the thousand $\frac{750}{1000}$ and $\frac{250}{1000}$,—exactly the same proportion as we had with three black balls and one white one. But there is a difference, and a very important difference, in the value of the judgment; for let us now ask how many balls it would take to make a difference of 250 on the probable number of each of the colours in the box. As 1000 is to 200, so is 250 to 50,—that is, it would now take *fifty* balls all of one colour, to be drawn *one after the other*, to make the same difference that *one* made necessarily when we had only drawn three. Now, if we had drawn 150 balls out of a box, 50 of which were white, and 100 black, and there remained 850 to be drawn, it is immensely improbable that we should draw fifty of a colour, without one of the other colour. And what is here *immensely improbable* was *absolutely necessary* when we had only drawn three. When we had drawn four balls, the last ball (namely the fourth) made *one-fourth* of the whole number drawn; but when we have drawn 200, the last ball (the 200th) makes

only a *two-hundredth* of the whole number ; and if we draw all we are allowed to draw, the last ball makes only a 500th of the whole number, and consequently makes only a difference of *two* on the probable number of each colour in the box.

100. The principle which we have here attempted to exhibit, and which is purely arithmetical, applies not only to balls in a box, but to individuals engaged in pronouncing judgment. If the number be great, the arithmetical limits of error are so much the smaller. A jury composed of *three* persons would be more likely to err than a jury composed of thirty-one (*cæteris paribus*), because the third person has the whole decision in his hand whenever the other two are opposed. But a difference of *one* on thirty-one is of much less consequence, because the cases of fifteen to fifteen will be very much more rare indeed than the cases of one to one. In *every* case where the two differ, the third decides the whole, but not so whenever there is a difference amongst the thirty. This difference may be from one against twenty-nine, to fifteen against fifteen ; and in fourteen cases out of fifteen, where there is a difference, the *one* has it not in his power to decide the whole, as he has *whenever* there is a difference between the two.

101. We have said that the judgment of the majority is to be chosen, because it is more probably correct than the judgment of the minority. Now, a probability is only a *reason for thinking* one way or another. It has nothing to do with the intrinsic

and *unknown* probability of the fact itself, but is only that probability that exists in the human mind, and not in external nature. To inquire into the nature of things as they are in their own essence, is the characteristic of the antiquated metaphysician.

True wisdom is to speak, not of things as they are in themselves, but of the qualities by which we know them.

102. Consequently, the question resolves itself into, "What reason is there for thinking that the work will be beneficial?"

103. This *reason* may assume two different forms:—

1st, A form not yet reduced to statistical expression.

2d, A form that is reduced to statistical expression.

The first includes two kinds of public works, namely, those whose statistics are desirable and possible, yet are not sufficiently perfect; and those whose statistics are so totally imperfect as to render it a question whether they can ever be made at all.

104. Now let us distinctly express that we do not esteem it either a reproach or a commendation to any public work that it cannot present numerical statistics based upon the benefit it has done; because there are some public works that have for their end a something that cannot be reduced to a mere exhibition of physical abundance. It is not *their province* to make men rich, or to increase the corn, the wine, and the oil of the land. They have a different, and sometimes a higher object, and it would

be an outrage on every better feeling of our nature to cross-examine their approvers as to the grounds of their approbation. We have no right to do so. Differ we may, but we may not encroach on that sacred liberty of opinion which is every man's birth-right, and England's peculiar glory.

It will easily be perceived that we refer to the ecclesiastical establishments of our country. But not only to them, as there are many other works placed in similar circumstances, although seeking ends of a different nature. Such are the public exhibitions, works of ornament, royal progresses, &c., which can produce no *statistics* of benefit conferred, although executed at the public expense.

We do not at present inquire into the character of those things. What we desire is to show that there are such things, and that some *just* means must be provided for their selection, or otherwise they ought not to *be*.

105. We have, then, two classes of public works presenting no sufficient statistics, namely, those that we expect will produce them hereafter, and those that are not of a nature to produce statistics, either because the unit of benefit must be assumed, or because men (very properly) refrain from attempting numerations where numerations might be esteemed profane.

First, Of those that we do not expect to produce statistics. What is to be *done*? We reply, In every case that does not interfere with the equal rights of man, the voice of the majority must determine the

execution or non-execution of those works that do not produce statistics. Because, if the human judgment be supposed capable of estimating benefit or detriment, then is it more probable that the majority are correct than the minority, in the proportion of their respective numbers, plus or minus the limits of error. And in those cases where no sufficient statistics are yet forthcoming, the voice of the majority must also determine the execution or non-execution of the public work; but it is especially advisable that the statistics should be perfected without delay, and laid before the public.

106. But what is to be done in those cases where the statistics are sufficient to exhibit the amount of benefit likely to accrue from a work?

Let us, in the first place, understand what is meant by *statistics* as applied to *politics*.

First, *Life* is valuable.

Second, *Liberty* is valuable.

Third, *Property* is valuable.

Fourth, *Pleasure* is valuable.

[Some may maintain that life, liberty, and property are valuable, *because* they are desired,—that is, in fact, because they are pleasant. This may or may not be the case, but even if it were so, *politics* cannot possibly take this view of the matter. It is possible that a man's life shall be a burthen to him, his liberty a thing altogether indifferent to him, and his property a source of trouble and vexation,—that neither from the one nor the other shall he derive pleasure, and shall even resolve to terminate his

earthly existence by his own hand. But this does not alter the political question; for, grant that a man's life is a burthen to him, such an unhappy condition does not give another the right to interfere with his existence; grant that his liberty is indifferent, such a state of degradation does not give another man a right to make him or keep him a slave; grant that his property brings only trouble and vexation, no other man has a right to interfere with it. And, consequently, life, liberty, and property, are viewed as *essentially* valuable,—not valuable from the accident of their being desired or agreeable, but valuable because they form the essential substantives, without which there would be no science of politics whatever. It is a question, however, whether the argument is more sound in philosophy than it is in politics. We know little of the philosophy of man, except through revelation, and by that revelation we are informed that man's present condition is one of *probation*. Now, let us imagine that a seed could *think*, it also might arrive at the conclusion that things were valuable only as they were agreeable; and during the progress of its germination, it might estimate that germination only as it was agreeable or disagreeable. And yet how false is the conclusion! Germination is the necessary condition, without which there would be no tree to spread its branches, no corn to wave in the field, no flower to bloom on the meadow, and no plant to sustain the vast system of animated nature that finds its nutriment in the vegetable creation. Pleasure is the measure of value only when we know

its amount throughout eternity. The *sum total* of happiness may, it is true, be the ultimate standard of value, and the principle may, with every propriety, be applied where that sum total can be ascertained. But in the matter of existence and liberty, the sum total is incapable of exact appreciation, for the moral welfare of mankind is involved in them, and the unseen world beyond the grave must be accurately surveyed, before we can dare to pronounce that life and liberty are only valuable because they afford gratification in this present lower world. Life, liberty, and property, therefore, are the substantive elements of politics, valuable in themselves, and not from any accidental conditions of any kind whatever. The true freeman loves liberty, not because it is pleasant, but because it is *liberty*, just as the true philosopher loves truth, not on account of its advantages, but because it is *truth*.]

107. We use the word pleasure to represent that lawful gratification that may be derived by the general body of society from matters *indifferent*—that is, *non-essential*. LIFE, LIBERTY, and NATURAL PROPERTY are the essentials of politics. The *non-essentials* are physical benefit and mental gratification. [It is more than probable that *Education* can only enter a system of politics, as it tends to the physical benefit or mental gratification of the recipient, and through him of the community. Many things are essentially right and good in themselves, and yet only enter into politics on very restricted grounds; because it is not the province of politics to consider any thing, except

just in so far as it affects society. In the same way a portion of matter enters *arithmetic* only as a *unit*, and yet that portion of matter has many qualities, chemical properties, commercial value, artistic beauty, &c., &c., all of which belong to the matter, and yet are laid aside and forgotten when the single mass, the unit, enters into an arithmetical calculation. Arithmetic has only to do with the *numerical* value, and politics only with the *social* value, as limited to this present world. To introduce any thing else into politics is to depart from its essential nature, as much as if we were to introduce form and colour into arithmetic. And though it has taken men a thousand years to learn this truth, we must at the same time remember that chemistry has had its alchemy, astronomy its astrology, physics its speculations, religion its heresies, and every other thing that is *true*, some false image of its form, which the credulous have believed and the interested have turned to advantage. That there has been a *false* system of politics is no more argument against a true one, than the existence of alchemy, only three centuries ago, is (or ever *was*) an argument against the truth of scientific chemistry, based on accurate observation and rational induction.]

108. Life, liberty, property, and pleasure, then, we consider as having a social value—that is, as being the things that society has associated together for the purpose of *preserving* or *procuring*.

109. Now, let the distinction be clearly remarked. Association is not for the purpose of *procuring* life,

liberty, or property, but for the purpose of *preserving* life, and liberty, and property *from interference*.

110. And, in addition, association is for the purpose of *procuring* pleasure or benefit.

111. This distinction forms the essential difference between the *abstract* science of politics, and the *inductive* science of political economy.

112. Politics treats of life, liberty, and property.

Political economy treats of pleasure and benefit, (commonly called *utility*, an improper term in political phraseology, as we shall show hereafter).

113. Now, be it also remarked (for this is an important part of our whole argument), that *preservation* is negative, and *procuration* is positive. Politics, therefore, is a negative science—that is, treats of what ought *not* to be done. Political economy is a positive science—that is, treats of what may be done beneficially. Politics does not treat of the *absolute* preservation of life (*that* is the business of the physician), but of its *relative* preservation—that is, of its preservation from every kind of forcible interference originating from another.

Thus a man's life in politics is viewed as a something which others may interfere with and take away. And all that politics has to do is to *prevent* such interference. Now, prevention is negative—that is, it does not *do* any thing, but only prevents something from being done. If there were no interference, there would be no necessity for prevention, and consequently no necessity for associating together to prevent.

A man's liberty and property are viewed exactly in the same light: they are to be *preserved*. They are not granted by association, they are anterior and paramount to association. Association is for the very purpose of preserving these things, and consequently they originate association, and association does *not* originate *them*.

114. We have here, then, the *essential* object of association, namely, the preservation of life, liberty, and property. And this preservation is not to be attained by any *positive* means, but by the prevention of every kind of interference that would tend to injure life, liberty, or property. So long as there is no interference, society need not perform any act whatever, but stands only on a footing of general self-defence—that is, purely passive until some one shall have trespassed on the rights of another.

115. But exactly the reverse of this is the case in those matters which relate to BENEFIT, and which form the *non-essential* objects of association.

116. Benefit is to be *procured*, and positive means are necessary for procuring it, and positive information is requisite to enable us to determine that a work is calculated to benefit society.

117. If no man interfered with another's life, liberty, or property, we should have the perfection of *justice*, and society need not interfere or perform any act whatever for the preservation of life, liberty, or property.

118. But *benefit* must first be ascertained, and the

work that is to produce it must be carried into execution, consequently society must *act*.

119. The perfection of justice supposes a *passive* state of society in which there is no *social* action—that is, no interference whatever between man and man—that is, a state of society in which every man acts for *himself*, and with his *own property*. So soon as any man becomes *active* in his *social* capacity (except by *persuasion*), he acts on the life, liberty, or property of another, and consequently commits an act of injustice.

The perfection of benefit, on the contrary, supposes a state of society in which the whole body politic is *active*.

120. This activity is only competent on the *consent* of those who associate, and who agree to procure a public benefit at their common expense.

121. It is *essential* that the life, liberty, and property of every man should be preserved, without interference of any kind or from any quarter.

122. But it is not essential that society should agree to procure benefit at the public expense. It is *beneficial* for society so to do, but not *essential*. Society may agree to procure benefit, or society may agree not to procure benefit, but society has no option whatever in the matter of preserving life, liberty, and property. Every man is bound to refrain from interfering with the life, liberty, and property of another; and so to refrain, is to preserve the life, liberty, and property of that other.

123. But if *every* man is bound to refrain from in-

terfering with the life, liberty, and property of another, the whole body of society is so bound, because the term *every* includes all who can form society.

124. But if *every* one refrained from such interference, there could be no injustice, and consequently there would be no necessity for laws relating to justice.

125. Laws respecting *justice*, therefore, relate to evil-doers, and not to well-doers. Consequently, every law that relates to the well-doer must be based on his consent, or else it must be an interference based on *will*, backed by *power*.

126. We have said that the perfection of justice supposes a passive state, and the perfection of benefit an active state. There is no contradiction between the two.

127. The perfection of justice supposes that no man shall interfere with the rights of another, consequently, if none interfere with another, all must be passive in their *social* capacity.

128. But when every man's life, liberty, and property are in his possession, each may agree to execute a public work at the common expense, and thereby to become active without giving up his *rights*—that is, each chooses to devote a certain part of his wealth for a common purpose. But if he part with his wealth on his free consent, he sacrifices no portion of his rights, because he has a right to part with his right according to his choice.

129. But when society becomes socially active, the same law of justice must still be adhered to. No man's rights must be interfered with, and no man

must be called upon to part with his property, unless he have previously given his consent. If he have given his consent, and the public work is executed on the faith of that consent, then is he bound to *pay*, because otherwise his neighbour would be injured, and he has no right to injure his neighbour. Therefore, although society may become socially active for the common benefit, yet is not the right of any man interfered with, provided he have given his consent to abide by the decision of the majority.

130. But if the right of no man be interfered with, then is the perfection of justice realised, and consequently, the perfection of justice and the perfection of benefit may be coincident with each other and exist together.

131. Let it be remembered, however, that the perfection of justice is *non-interference*, which is passive, whereas the perfection of benefit supposes that each member of society should part with a portion of his wealth, and give to another the right to demand that portion from him, in which case society must be active.

132. We may now determine the character of political *statistics*.

133. It is not the province of statistics to determine any thing whatever concerning the *rights* of men. But it is the province of statistics to determine concerning the *benefit* of men.

134. Statistics can never prove any thing to be *right* or *wrong*, inasmuch as these are abstract qualities, not learned or determined through observation.

But statistics can prove a thing to be beneficial or prejudicial, inasmuch as benefit and prejudice can be *observed* and *measured*, and expressed in *numbers*.

135. Consequently in all matters that relate to the benefit of society, it is of the utmost importance that statistics should be made for the guidance of society in its determinations.

136. But what are statistics?

Let us take an example:—

Suppose it is found that, in quarters of a city which are undrained, one person in 100 is attacked with fever in the course of five years.

And in the quarters of the same city which are drained, only one person in 500 is attacked with fever in the same period.

A solitary case of one city, during so short a period, would afford us no sufficient ground for drawing a conclusion; but suppose we find the proportion of cases to hold constant in all cities, and suppose we find that, by draining the unhealthy quarters, the cases of fever diminish from $\frac{1}{100}$ to $\frac{1}{500}$ in a given period.

Then we have statistics to found a conclusion on; which conclusion is, that fever is five times more prevalent in undrained quarters of a city than in those that are drained; and consequently that it is *beneficial* to drain all quarters of a city if fever is to be avoided.

137. *Mere* numbers, however accurately collected, do not form *political* statistics. It is necessary that those numbers should involve *social benefit* or *social*

detriment, and that a conclusion relating to such benefit or detriment may be drawn. For instance, if we were informed that 10,000 persons died of cholera in certain given localities, this would not afford us a conclusion respecting social benefit, inasmuch as the fact is absolute, and not comparative. Or, again, suppose we were informed that ten vessels were lost in each year between 1st January 1810 and 1st January 1820, on a certain reef of rocks, and that the average loss of life in each year was fifty. We could draw no political conclusion, nothing whatever, from *these* facts to guide us in forming a judgment relating to the benefit of society. The first is merely a case of *medical* statistics; the last, of *maritime* statistics.

138. Now, it is possible that, by the addition of some other information, these facts shall be transformed into *political* statistics. For instance, let us add that, on the 1st January 1820, a light was established on the reef where the vessels had been lost, and that from the 1st January 1820 to the 1st January 1830 the average loss of ships for each year was only one, and the loss of life five. We have here data for drawing a conclusion in which the benefit of society is implicated. First, as to the loss of property:—Suppose the vessels to have averaged £1000 a-piece, it is clear that, in the first period of ten years, £100,000 of property was lost; that, in the second period, only £10,000 worth was lost, and consequently that £90,000 has been saved. If the lighthouse were the only difference in the *condi-*

tions, then would the saving of the £90,000 be attributed to the lighthouse,—that is, it would (socially) be credited with that sum. But it must be debited with its cost and charges. Suppose its cost to have been £15,000, and its annual expense £1000; we have then (exclusive of any calculation of interest), lighthouse *Cr.* by £90,000, and lighthouse *Dr.* to £25,000, leaving a balance of £65,000 in favour of lighthouse, on a period of ten years. Life, however, cannot be weighed against gold, and we cannot compare the value of the lives saved with the expense of the means adopted for preventing their loss. But we have an absolute balance in favour of lighthouse of 450 lives, saved through its instrumentality. But what are the political conclusions to be drawn from these facts? *1st*, The lighthouse has proved itself to be beneficial to society, and consequently may be continued with the same probability of benefit. *2d*, In a new case where another dangerous reef is found to occasion the loss of ships, the above statistics may be of great service in enabling any person to arrive at a much more correct judgment than if he had no facts of the kind to guide him.

139. Be it remarked, at the same time, that statistics cannot be transplanted from one locality to another, without taking into consideration those different *conditions* that the respective localities present. For, suppose a new reef is brought forward as requiring a light. It might be supposed that the *same* proportional advantage would necessarily fol-

low from its construction. Not necessarily. There may be in the vicinity of this latter reef a current, or a deep bay, or some other *condition*, that did not exist in the former case; and a large portion of the loss may, perhaps, be really attributable to the current, or the embayed lee-shore, and not merely to the absence of a light. Consequently these new conditions must be taken into consideration, and as no man can, *à priori*, determine exactly what difference they may occasion, the erection of the new lighthouse must still be partially a matter of *judgment*, although the previous statistics limit the liability to error. In the first case, *the whole* was supposed to be a matter of judgment previous to the erection of the lighthouse; but in the second case, the *difference made by the new conditions* (the current or bay) are all that remain to be estimated.

140. Suppose the new lighthouse *has* a dangerous current in its vicinity, and its statistics are ascertained on a term of years.

It will immediately be seen that the limit of error has still further diminished; for, let the question now be concerning the erection of a third lighthouse, in whose vicinity there is also a dangerous current. In the first case of the current, we had to estimate, by rough judgment, the whole effect of the current; but in the latter case, having the statistics of the first, we have not to estimate the whole effect of the current, but only its differential effect as compared with the first.

141. Now, remark how the limit of error decreases with the increase of the statistics.

In the case of the first lighthouse, before its erection (supposing it to be the first) the whole effect of the light was a matter of *a priori* judgment, and not of ascertained truth.

In the case of the second lighthouse, we have only to judge of the *difference* made by the current, and, in the case of the third, of the difference made by some difference between two currents. But to judge of the difference between two currents as likely to cause the loss of a ship, is a much less difficult matter than to judge of the whole causes that tend to produce the loss. Suppose the benefit obtained by the first light was represented by 6; then the benefit of the second light will be = 6, plus or minus current. Suppose the current = - 1: then benefit of second light = 5. The second current may be a very dangerous one; yet we have some grounds to arrive at a nearer conclusion than if we had had no previous case of a current. Suppose we take the first light only, and compare it in the first place. First light = 6; third light = 6 - effect of second current. Now, suppose second current even to be three times as dangerous as first one (a far greater allowance than probably ever occurs in nature, provided the first current be estimated to diminish the whole benefit one-sixth)—then, third light = 6 - 3 = 3,—that is, the statistics of first light brought us within 3 of the benefit of third light. But, comparing second and third light, we have, second light = 5;

difference between effect of second and third light, = 2; consequently, the statistics of second light brought us within 2 of the benefit of third light. Now, if the second current have been pronounced by nautical men to be of the most dangerous kind with which they are acquainted, a new current (a third one) must come in between 0 and 3. Now, we have *two* currents with which it may be compared, and consequently the liability to error is so much diminished. Next time, in all probability, we should not be further than 1; and if we continue the course of statistics, we should arrive at a fraction, diminishing constantly as the statistics were perfected.

142. Political statistics are therefore numerical exhibitions of the probable benefit likely to arise from a public work, based on ascertained facts, relating to public works of a similar description.

143. If statistics do not exhibit the probable *benefit* (or prejudice) likely to result to *society*, they are not *political* statistics, but belong to geography (in its larger sense), medicine, the art military, the art maritime, &c. &c.;—that is, to something else than *politics*. The exhibition of social benefit or prejudice is absolutely essential to constitute *political* statistics.

144. We now give the reason why the term *utility* is objectionable in politics.

[The question is not altogether one of mere words, but of the true understanding of the province of political science, and what we wish to remark is, that if *utility* be retained in politics, it must have a tech-

nical meaning. There are *two ideas* involved, and there might advantageously be *two terms* used to represent them.]

145. A thing is *useful* when it tends as a means towards an end. This we suppose to be the generally accepted meaning of the word *useful*, and what we maintain is, that the idea required in politics involves *more* than merely a means towards an end. It involves a means towards an end *beneficial to society*, (or the reverse, namely, *prejudicial to society*.)

146. Guns, and swords, and poison are *useful* if we wish to murder. This is merely a question of physics and physiology, and *not of politics*.

147. Guns and swords are *beneficial* when employed in a just cause for the defence of life, liberty, and property. [Supposing, of course, that *defence* is orthodox,—a proposition we take for granted merely to illustrate the necessity of employing *two* words to express things that differ.]

148. *Fraud* is *useful* if it obtain for us a desired object. Fraud never can be *beneficial to society*. Force unjustly applied is *useful* as a means of obtaining possession of another's property. Force unjustly applied can never be *beneficial*.

149. That is, swords, guns, and poison do conduce towards the end we have in view, and, consequently, are *useful*, because the definition of *useful* is general, and inquires not into the character of the end, but only into the character of the thing considered as capable of conducing to *any* end.

150. But in politics there is a *certain definite end*

to which a thing must conduce, before it can become one of the substantives of political science.

151. This definite end is, "*the benefit of society*," divided into the most efficient means for the preservation of life, liberty, and property, the increase of physical wealth, and the procuration of mental gratification.

152. *Utility* belongs not to politics, but to the natural history of the world (in its larger sense), and though often employed to signify *benefit*, that signification is technical and ought to be abandoned, if *utility* be also retained to represent "the power of producing an end."

153. Anything whatever that enables man to arrive at any end whatever, is *useful*, but what is required in politics is a word to signify the power or tendency to produce the *benefit* or *prejudice of society*.

154. The same kind of distinction holds good in the medical sciences of physiology and therapeutics. The physiologist inquires into the absolute action of a substance, the therapist only into its *remedial* action. The physiologist inquires into the effect on the human frame, without inquiring whether that effect be good, bad, or indifferent, provided merely the effect be proven to exist. He inquires merely, is or is not this particular symptom an effect of the administration of the substance? Whether the effect be *beneficial* or *prejudicial* to the patient, he has no business to inquire as a physiologist.

The therapist, on the contrary, cares nothing whatever about the detail of the symptom, provided

the effect be beneficial to the patient—that is, tends to his recovery from disease. All that he has to do as a therapist is to discover and exhibit those substances (medicines) which tend to the patient's recovery. If any substance have no effect tending to advance or retard *recovery*, that substance comes not within the province of the therapist, although at the same time it may be one of the most interesting to the physiologist. Physiology includes *all* effects, therapeutics only those that relate to *recovery* from disease. The same individual, however, may be both a physiologist and therapist—at one moment studying truth, the next studying how to cure his patient. In a similar manner, *utility* is universally applicable to *means*—that is, to things that conduce to any end whatever; *social benefit* applies to those means which conduce to the preservation of the life, liberty, and property of men, to the increase of physical wealth, and to the procuration of mental gratification.

155. We have said that life, liberty, and property are to be preserved. This preservation is essential, and forms the first and primary end of politics.

156. But there still remains to be ascertained, “What are the most *efficient* means of preserving life, liberty, and property?”

157. It is essential that the thing be done, and now remains the question, What is the best way of doing it? What means are the most effectual, and what means are the most economical? Shall every man walk about with arms in his hand, as do the Arabs? or shall the whole mass of the population

confide the arms to a certain particular class, and instruct that class to prevent every kind of interference with life, liberty, and property?

158. And again, if a certain class (a government) be appointed, it still remains to be determined what *kind* of government is the best—that is, which is the least likely to abuse the power confided to it, and the most likely to act for the general benefit.

159. But not only are life, liberty, and property to be preserved. Positive benefit is to be procured by the execution of public works which are too extensive and too expensive for any individual to execute.

160. Consequently it remains to be proven what works *are* beneficial to society, and in *what proportion*.

161. And again, as public works cost money, and a government costs money, what is the best mode of raising that money? Is it by taxing labour, and repressing industry, or by taxing natural property (the land, &c.), so that no man's labour shall, in anywise whatever, be interfered with?

162. All these questions require to be solved according to *evidence*, or otherwise according to the *judgment of the majority*. [We have already explained how the judgment of the majority comes into play, where there is no sufficient evidence. When there are no statistics relating to the *work*, we must fall back on the statistics relating to those who approve or disapprove of the work, and, provided no principle of *justice* be infringed, the majority carry with them the greater probability of correct judgment,

and consequently must determine the execution or non-execution of the work. If the majority infringe a principle of justice, then is their voice of no validity whatever. There are things which the majority are *competent* to determine, and there are things immutable as the constitution of the human mind, over which neither majority nor minority, nor whole community, nor kings, nor governments, nor *laws*, can justly exercise the smallest portion of control.]

163. We now return to the question, "What is to be done in those cases where the statistics are sufficient to exhibit the amount of benefit likely to accrue from a work?"

164. It strikes us at once, that if a work be proven beneficial, it ought to be carried into execution, and if proven prejudicial, it ought not to be carried into execution.

165. Let us inquire, however, how this principle would operate if carried out.

Suppose the minority are in possession of statistics proving a certain public work beneficial, and that the majority do not consent to its execution, what is to be done? Grant that the work is clearly proven to be beneficial (as was the case with the *abolition* of the corn-laws, some years before the majority were convinced of the *impolicy*, as well as of the scandalous iniquity of those infamous enactments), and that the majority are still so bigoted and blinded that they persist in rejecting it. The minority have proof that their work is a good one, but upon what principle can they carry it into effect? Let us sup-

pose the work to be a *positive* one, and not the repeal of an unjust law—to be a work requiring execution, such as the erection of a public hospital.

166. The principle must never be forgotten, that “no man has a right to compel another to *purchase* even an advantage without his consent.”

167. But if the minority were to determine the execution of the public work (supposing they had the power), upon the statistical evidence of its benefit, clearly they would be making others purchase without the consent of those others,—because the community had not consented (and never would consent) to abide by the decision of the minority.

168. We must conclude, therefore, that statistics *alone* cannot determine the execution of a public work. Let those statistics be as satisfactory as possible, they cannot (in a *positive* work) *overbear* the voice of the majority. What, then, is their use?

169. The use of statistics is to convince and enlighten men, but not to govern them.

170. Man is a rational being, and is therefore convinced by rational evidence. If he were not convinced by rational evidence he would not be a rational being, and only in so far as he is convinced by rational evidence is he a rational being.

171. Rational evidence, is either deductive or inductive. When deductive, it rests on the intuitive axioms of the human mind, which are self-evident and universal, or on the generalizations obtained through induction. When inductive, it rests on the observed conditions of external nature, to

which the axioms of the human mind have been applied.

Knowledge is either perceptual or rational. Perceptual knowledge is either external and obtained through the senses, or internal and obtained through psychological observation and intuition.

Perceptual knowledge is immediate, and teaches us the *existence* of things expressed in language by nouns substantive.

Rational knowledge is mediate, and teaches us the necessary *relations* of things in the abstract qualities of equivalence, number, quantity, distance, direction, force, value, benefit, equity, &c.

[The first and simplest elements of rational knowledge are *both* perceptive and rational. Thus the simplest, and *only* the simplest forms of reasoning are capable of being practised without a technical language, such as figures, algebraic and geometric signs.]

Rational evidence involves a *calculation*, and every calculation is performed by the reasoning powers, and not by the organs of sense.

When we reason, we depart farther and farther from the facts of immediate perception, and arrive at propositions which could not possibly be learnt through mere observation. It is impossible for us to *observe* the distance of the sun from the earth; but we can observe the conditions of the planetary bodies, from which conditions the distance follows as a necessary consequence. It is impossible for us to *observe* that the areas of two circles are to each

other as the squares of their diameter, yet that proposition can be proven as an *à priori* truth, capable of universal application. This truth is *abstract*, and we must learn through observation whether there are or are not any real circles in the external world to which the truth can be applied.

Every axiom is common to man as man, and is necessarily admitted to be true as soon as it is understood. And every *necessary* consequence of an axiom is also admitted to be true when the proposition is abstract, provided the *relation of consequence* be apprehended by the mind. Man has no power to shape his intellectual belief in the matter of axiomatic truth; but *necessarily* believes as soon as he comprehends.*

And also as the necessary consequence is merely another form of the axiom, or a case of its application, man necessarily believes the consequence in

* This necessary belief in intellectual truth, must not be confounded with a doctrine which sophistically attempts to make it appear in *language* that "man is not responsible for his belief," meaning thereby his *religious* belief. Religious belief is not merely belief in a *dogma*, nor in a *fact*; but in the testimony of God. Many propositions may be so sophisticated by the use of ambiguous terms, that *opposite* conclusions may be made to result apparently by a fair use of logic. And thus in one department it may be proven that man is *not* responsible for his belief, and in another that he *is* responsible; both of which, in fact, are *true*. But the fallacy lies in confounding the one kind of belief with the other, and arguing from one to the other, as if what were true of the one were necessarily true of the other. The question of responsibility, however, is not so fairly argued in the region of belief (where the principal term is eminently ambiguous), as in the region of *action*, because action is the first event that introduces the theory of responsibility. Belief *may* mean *passive perception*, and for this man is not responsible; but it may also mean *active confiding*, and for this man is responsible, because the voluntary activity of the mind is involved. Mr Isaac Taylor has a noble lecture on "Man Responsible."

the same manner as he is constrained from his constitution to believe the *axiom*. A *demonstrated* proposition, can no more be doubted by the man who comprehends the process of demonstration, than can the primary axiom on which the proposition is ultimately made to rest.

An abstract science is nothing more than the series of propositions that may be constructed by the application of the axioms of the human mind to the fundamental concept that forms the subject-matter of the science. This fundamental concept is primary, simple, and incapable of being defined—that is, it cannot be analysed nor separated into a plurality of concepts. The fundamental concept in arithmetic is *unity*; in algebra, *quantity*; in geometry, *space*; in statics, *force*; and in ethics, *equity*.

172. Equity is the fundamental concept of all moral science that is *rational*—that is, of all moral science originating in the application of the axioms of the human reason to the primary concept, which makes men believe that an action *ought* or *ought not* to be performed.

173. But inasmuch as the moral nature of mankind has undergone a change, by which his perception of equity has become obscured (though not *obliterated*), it is possible for human beings to sink into a state of degradation, in which they lose sight of the moral character of an action, and are incapable of perceiving more than its relations of time, place, circumstance, &c., which constitute the *ontological* character of a phenomenon.

174. Nevertheless, mankind is endowed with the concept of *equity*, and its propositions may be constructed in the same manner as the propositions of the mathematical sciences, by the application of the axioms of the reason to this fundamental concept.

175. The abstract sciences are universal, and may be discovered without the observation of any condition of matter whatever, farther than to supply the substantive element of thought.

176. The fundamental concepts which form their subject-matter, exist universally in human beings, and the axioms also exist universally in human beings, so that every man has the materials of the abstract sciences within his reach.

The science of politics is the science of *equity*, and treats of those actions which men may do, or may not do *equitably*.

177. The science of politics, therefore, is an abstract science, taking its origin in the application of the universal axioms of the reason to the substantive concept *equity*.

178. The science of politics is independent of all observation, and of every condition of matter whatever, save that the conception of human action is requisite to originate the *circumstances* of equity.

179. And the materials of the science of politics are within the reach of every human being.

180. It is therefore evident that *statistics* do not in any way whatever enter into the science of politics, inasmuch as statistics are records of the observed conditions of matter or of men.

181. But there is another science connected with society, that is based exclusively on observation.

182. That science is *Political Economy*.

183. The science of politics is deductive, the science of political economy is inductive.

184. The science of political economy treats of "what is beneficial to society."

185. The science of politics does not treat of what is *beneficial*, but of what is *equitable*. The science of political economy, on the contrary, does not treat of what is equitable, but of what is beneficial.

186. The science of politics is purely rational, and *à priori*, like the mathematical sciences. The science of political economy is a mixed science, like mechanics, optics, or astronomy.

187. The principles of *politics* can in nowise be inferred from observed facts. The principles of *political economy* can never be deduced from the axioms of the human reason.

188. At the same time, there is between the two sciences a harmony, based upon the universal fact that "*that which is just is beneficial*," and that "*that which is unjust is prejudicial*." God has so constructed the material creation and the mind of man, that the axiomatic rule of *equity* does invariably coincide with the observed condition of *benefit*, and thus the two distinct sciences are linked together in such a manner, that they mutually afford perpetual illustration of each other's truth.

189. The first necessary inquiry for men in society is, "What is just?" When the *just* is esta-

blished, men may take into consideration, "What may we do for our mutual benefit?"

190. But inasmuch as the political progress of mankind is a progress from the excess of injustice to a continual diminution of injustice, and as the history of every society in Europe is the history of the gradual and slow recovery of human rights, in which course of progress each country is at a more or less advanced point, varying with the knowledge and virtue of its population,—statistics (that is, the facts of political economy) are of great value in hastening the progress of equity, because men who *will not* do what is equitable, are frequently induced to do what is *beneficial*.

191. Laws may be known for centuries to be unjust, and yet remain unrepealed, until they are shown by the observed evils that follow in their train, and that are reduced to the form of statistics, to be productive of actual detriment to society.

192. We have said that in the abstract sciences men *necessarily* believe when they comprehend an axiom, or a demonstrated proposition.

But it is possible for men to *deny* almost any proposition whatever, when that proposition interferes with their passions, or what they conceive to be their self-interest. Thus the priests of Rome denied that the earth revolved in an orbit round the sun, and the physicians of England denied that the blood circulated in the arteries. And in the present day men deny the *equal right* of all men to natural liberty and natural property,—a proposition as certainly based on

the axioms relating to *equity*, as the proposition that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third is based on the axioms relating to *space*.

193. Where self-interest is concerned, then, we must ever look for contradictory assertion, until the time comes when the interest of denial shall have ceased,—that is, when equity shall be so perfectly established, that no class of men shall have an injustice to defend.

194. But in the sciences that are not abstract,—that is, in the sciences that depend on external observation for their primary facts,—a process of valid proof is also capable of being exhibited, and of being held up to the world as the rational evidence that ought to produce conviction.

195. The *extension* of the abstract sciences depends on the deduction of new propositions from the primary axioms of the reason, applied to the various forms of the substantive concept that distinguishes each particular science.

196. The extension of the inductive sciences, on the contrary, depends on the observation of the conditions of the external world, and of the phenomena that constantly accompany the same conditions; as well as on the process of reasoning that generalises from a fact to a law.

197. Statistics are nothing more than the records of observed conditions, and of the phenomena that accompany them.

198. Statistics are absolutely essential to the existence of a science of political economy, as an induc-

tive science, and their use is to point out what things are beneficial to society, and what things are prejudicial to society.

199. Now, although it is possible for some men to deny a proposition that is proven, inasmuch as their intellect is (really or professedly) blinded by the influence of self-interest, it must always be remembered that the great majority of men are *not* interested in injustice, and consequently are capable of perceiving or admitting truth.

200. The use of statistics, therefore, is to convince the great body of the community that their interest lies in a certain direction.

201. When they are thus convinced on sufficient grounds, they have an inducement to act, and also a power of argument to meet those who oppose themselves.

202. Let us now suppose the minority of a community to be in possession of statistics proving a certain work to be beneficial. It cannot be the duty of the minority (supposing they had the power) to execute that work at the public expense, because no man has a right to compel another to purchase an advantage; and if the minority rule, it must be by compulsion, for no society will agree to be ruled by the decision of the MINORITY. They may be obliged to *acquiesce*, but they will never *agree*. What, then, is to be done, to bring about the execution of the beneficial work?

203. The minority must convince the majority, by means of the rational evidence contained in their

statistics, and if those statistics are really conclusive, there can be little doubt that the majority of a *large* community will be convinced. We have taken the least favourable case for our argument, because a principle, to hold good, must be applicable to all cases.

204. Let us now reverse the conditions, and suppose, as is almost invariably the case, that it is the minority who oppose themselves to the execution of the beneficial public work.

205. We shall suppose that, as is the case in all European governments (except perhaps some of the Swiss states), the minority happen to be invested with the *power*. The majority of the nation are in possession of statistics proving a work to be beneficial. Of course, the true line of conduct for a nation is to establish a government that is based on the choice of the majority, with whose decision the whole have agreed to coincide. But as this is not actually the case, and as it is not *legal* (we do not mean *lawful* by *legal*) even for a majority to abolish a government, we shall suppose for a moment things as *they are*, and not as they *ought to be*.

206. The minority who are in power oppose themselves to the will of the majority, which will is based upon rational evidence contained in statistics.

207. Now, it will be observed that the majority without evidence stand on a very different footing from the majority with evidence.

208. This country happily is in possession of the first element of freedom, namely, free discussion.

When evidence is publicly brought forward, it may for a time fail to convince those who are in power, because they may have some self-interest at stake. But in a country like Britain, where absolutism has almost died away, it is not possible for evidence to be long before the public without producing an effect corresponding to the amount of interest that is taken in the question at issue. Evidence (if conclusive) will sooner or later convince even that minority who do not wish to be convinced, and, at all events, it will certainly increase the power of those who have it, because it will throw the balance of argument invariably in their favour; and rulers must listen to reason, who would be deaf to mere will, because a man who has reason on his side is an opponent not to be trifled with.

209. Statistics, therefore, are valuable as a means of producing changes, as well as for the purpose of teaching what works are beneficial.

210. Without statistics we should not be able to ascertain what works were beneficial, unless they involved some principle of justice or injustice, which we have supposed not to be the case in the present discussion.

CHAPTER V.

ON PROPERTY.

IN endeavouring to arrive at a *natural* theory of property, it is necessary to remind the reader that as yet the whole theory of property is involved in palpable obscurity. The whole subject is at present only a *superstition*. *Practical* rules are followed, but those practical rules are based on *fictions*, and this is admitted even by the expositors of *law*.

The question of property is not, "*To whom does the earth rightfully belong?*" for this question can receive only one answer, namely, "*To its Creator;*" but, "*What ought to be the distribution of the earth among the living inhabitants?*"*

The feudal system, from which the present system takes its origin, assumed that all the lands belonged of right to the king. And this assumption was

* The question is entirely one of the *relations* of the various individuals who happen to tenant that globe at any given period, one man's right of occupation being limited by another man's right of occupation. To ascertain these *relative* limits is the whole practical research of political science with regard to *property*.

based on the supposition, that the king, as head of the State, derived his rights from God. The national lands, or *State* lands invested in the Crown, were by various processes alienated from the State, and transformed into the property of private individuals; and thus *the taxation* or public revenue of the country, instead of being derived from the lands, came to be derived from articles of consumption. That is, in fact, the rents of the lands were made the private property of certain privileged individuals, and an amount of taxation equal to the rents of the lands was imposed on the *labour* of the country by means of customs and excise, &c.

When political economy shall come to be better understood, it will be perceived that the rents of the soil paid to the non-labouring landlords are neither more nor less than deductions made from the profits of the labourers of the country. And consequently, that when the State or king granted or sold lands in perpetuity to individuals, the grant was nothing less than the grant of the future profits of future labourers. And consequently, whenever land is *sold* (and the price of purchase is regulated by the value of the annual *rent*), that which is sold is really *not* the substantive earth, but the *productive power*, and this productive power is the power of producing *value*, and this power of producing *value* is entirely created by the labours of those who *do* labour, and not in any respect by those who *do not* labour. Consequently, when land is sold, that which is sold is nothing less than the profit of labour, the annual

rent value being entirely and exclusively *created* by the whole labours of the country.

This view of landed property, however, is so completely opposed to the ordinary system established by law, that many years must in all probability elapse before it establishes itself as one of the great fundamental truths of political economy.

Political economy, however, can take into consideration only the *fact* of possession and the *law of beneficial possession* (that is, what kind of possession produces the greatest amount of benefit to the community)—political economy can never legitimately take into consideration the concept *property*, as property is a concept extra-economical and super-economical. Political economy determines *who creates* value and *what* value is created; it then remains for politics to determine *who ought to possess the created value*.

That mankind is merely emerging from superstition on the subject of property is plainly evident from the fact that slaves (men—moral beings) have been esteemed *property*, and that human laws have given their sanction to the *right* of one man to buy and sell another man, and have fully acknowledged the *sacredness* of this right by using the armed force of the State in support of the institution called slavery.

When, among the most civilised communities in the earth, it has only *recently* been determined that one man cannot be the *property* of another man, we may expect, as a matter of course, to find the whole theory of property with regard to other objects a mere arbitrary superstition. When the moral and

intellectual perceptions of the race have only recently perceived the truth, that a moral being cannot be the property of a similar moral being, it is plainly evident that a theory of property is only *beginning* to dawn on the reason of mankind; and as the slave was the object that presented the erroneous credence in its most plain and palpable form of criminal injustice, the slave would be the *first* object whose condition would be rectified by the enlightened reason. The slave was the *worst* exhibition of an erroneous theory; but there remain many other objects to which a theory of property extends, all of which must undergo examination in course of time, exactly as the enlightened intellect of humanity sees further and further into the true relations of men. *Land, capital, and labour* have yet to be regulated by a rational system that bases its propositions on something else than mere prescription, custom, or legal fiction.

THE GENERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY.

The theory of *Liberty* treats entirely and exclusively of the relations of *man to man*, and determines the rules by which men should be regulated in their actions towards each other. One man is here the *agent*, and another *man* is the *object*. The action is here supposed *direct*, without any intermediary. If A and B represent two men, the theory of Liberty determines their relations, and exhibits the laws by which they should be regulated in their mutual action and reaction upon each other.

The theory of *Property* extends the theory of

Liberty into a new region, by introducing a new concept or new term—namely, *the objective world*.

The question is now to determine the relations of the two men, with regard to the objective world.

As we have previously observed, the objective world may be viewed in several different aspects which are perfectly distinct, and which involve fundamental nouns substantive—primary and absolute.

First.

The objective world may be viewed as involved in the mathematical and physical sciences.

In the mathematical sciences, form, extension, and relations in space are taken into consideration, including relations of number and quantity.

In the physical sciences, action and reaction are taken into consideration, involving the fundamental concepts *resistance* or *passive power*, and the agencies or *active powers*, which reveal themselves in real mechanics, chemistry, electricity, and physiology.

Second.

The objective world may be viewed as involved in economical science.

In economical science, *value* and *the power of producing value* are taken into consideration. *Value* is an abstraction not capable of being appreciated by the senses, but apprehended by the reason.

In the physical sciences, the relation of matter to matter was taken into consideration; but, in economical science, the first and simplest form of the

relation between man and matter is taken into consideration. Matter is here viewed as *useful* to man; and the powers of matter, and the actions of man on matter, are determined according to their *utility*. Economy superadds the concept *utility* to the physical sciences.

Third.

The objective world may be viewed as involved in political science.

In political science, *property* and the power of man to *create* value are taken into consideration. *Property*, like *value*, is an abstraction apprehended by the reason, and it gives a *moral* value to the objective world; that is, makes it capable of becoming the object of a *duty* or a *crime*.

Economy takes into consideration the relation of man to matter and of matter to man. Politics superadds the concept *property*, and takes into consideration the relations of *men* with regard to matter.

Fourth.

The objective world may be viewed as involved in theology.

In this aspect, man and the world are viewed as the creations of God, and as belonging absolutely to the Divine Being.

Fifth.

The objective world may be viewed as involved in philosophy.

In this aspect, matter is viewed as substantial or phenomenal, as cause or effect, as finite or infinite, as originating in time or not originating in time, &c. &c.

Taking a science as consisting of a nomenclature, classification, and series of syllogisms, these five divisions will be found to include every possible proposition with regard to the objective world, inasmuch as all natural history (description) enters the *classifications* of the sciences.

We have here, then, a definite region of investigation. The theory of economy is assumed as completed—as telling *how* value is created, and what individuals actually do create it; and then politics takes up the question of *property*, and determines by a general theory *to whom the objective world* (the land, &c.) *ought to be allocated*.

The concept *property* as an abstraction, is incapable of definition; but the object to which it is applied, may be described as an object which it is every one's *duty* to refrain from interfering with, without the consent of the proprietor, such interference being a *crime*.

It remains, then, to ascertain *how* man can become a proprietor,—that is, how he can establish such a right to any individual portion of the objective world, as makes it a crime for other men to interfere with that object without his consent, tacit or explicit.

The whole speculative theory of PROPERTY is based on one fundamental axiom or major proposition which is a universal and necessary *intuition of direct belief*.

AN OBJECT IS THE PROPERTY OF ITS CREATOR.*

This proposition is universal in its application, and indubitable in its certitude.

We have then to inquire what it involves, and how it can be made applicable as a rule of practice, that is, how it can be transformed out of a theoretic *dogma*, into a practical rule of life.

I.

An object is the property of its creator.

Hence,—*The creator of an object is its proprietor.*

II.

Rights involved in the relation between the proprietor and the object of property:—

1. A proprietor may justly *give* his property.
2. A proprietor may justly *lend* his property.
3. A proprietor may justly *exchange* his property.

III.

Rights of the recipient from the proprietor:—

* This axiom is a pure instance of what Kant terms a synthetic judgment *a priori*, or synthetic proposition. That is, let the idea of creation be given alone to the human reason, and the reason cannot discover in it the idea of property; or let the idea of property be given alone, and the reason cannot discover in it the idea of creation. But let both ideas be given, and the human reason makes a *synthesis* which it intuitively believes to be absolutely necessary, and absolutely universal. Without these axioms, it would be impossible for man to make abstractions function or operate in the reason.

1. He who receives a gift from the proprietor becomes the proprietor of the object.

2. He who loans from the proprietor becomes just lessee of the object.

3. He who exchanges with the proprietor, becomes proprietor of the object *received* in exchange, provided he was proprietor of the object *given* in exchange.

Such are the principles which constitute an abstract doctrine of property, and the practical question is to apply these principles to the real circumstances of man. The theory must be transformed into a rule or canon, so that we can determine, by a method which is not arbitrary, *to whom the various portions of the objective world ought to be allocated.*

IV.

The theory of *possession*.

[*Property* is a quality which cannot be appreciated by observation in the object itself. But *possession* can be appreciated by observation, and we have therefore to determine in the general *what objects* ought each individual *to possess.*]

Axiom of possession.

Right should lead to possession.—This is the *general* principle that determines every question of possession, so that we have only to inquire how a particular right to an object can be *generated*, to ascertain what ought to be the distribution of objects among the individuals of the human race.

We can now connect property and possession. Property is that object to which an individual has a right, and right should lead to possession, consequently the proprietor ought to be *in possession* of his property.

How then does a right *generate*?

Postulate.

Man can create value in raw material.—This is a principle of political economy. Political economy is based on the principle, that man can and does create value, and the inquiry of political economy is into the law of such creation.

But by axiom, an object is the property of its creator, consequently, whatever is created by an individual is his property, and ought to be in his possession.

Let it then be clearly and definitely understood, that the value created by an individual is his *property*; and probably there will be little dispute about this proposition. But the great inquiry, and the one which has yet to play a prominent part in the history of mankind, is this,—“*Upon what material has each individual a right to expend his labour so as to create value?*”

Here is the great problem of modern society,—a problem which must be solved both in theory and in practice, at whatever cost to the generation that undertakes the solution. Here is the region where prescription and superstition determine the whole of the practical rules. In this question the welfare of mil-

lions is implicated. In this question may be the secret of British pauperization and Irish decimation. In this question may lie hid the elements of a strife as deadly as those contests for freedom to which modern society owes the liberties it enjoys; a strife which must come not merely from theories, or systems, or authorship, or doctrines, but from the very necessities of the human race. The problem lies in the pathway of mankind, and solved it must be, sooner or later. In attempting its solution, we are perfectly aware of the nature of the conclusion at which we have arrived. We know it to be considered dangerous by the great mass of society. We believe perfectly that it will be rejected at first, but we believe as perfectly that it will ultimately be adopted,—and more, we believe it *true*, and only because we believe it true do we present it to the reader's attention.

Admitting, then, clearly and fully, and to the utmost extent, that whatever an individual *creates* by the exercise of his labour is his property, absolutely sacred, and on no account to be interfered with by other men's force or fraud, we have yet to determine, or rather to ascertain upon *what object* each individual may justly expend his labour, for the value created must reside in some *object*, which *object* must be possessed.

What, then, is the rule for the equitable occupation of the substantive earth? The earth *must* be occupied, because this is the condition of human support; but it may be occupied *equitably* or *unequitably*, and

hence the necessity for a general rule which is not arbitrary nor partial, nor the mere dictum of those who happen to have the power.

To whom, then, does the substantive earth belong as property absolute?

This question, as we have before observed, can have but one answer,—namely, to its Creator, to Almighty God, who made the world and all things therein. And *man* also belongs to God, and is bound to obey Him.

The question then is, if man and the earth belong to God, *what ought to be the distribution of the earth among its inhabitants?*

Two lines of argument are open for the solution of this question:—

1st, On the supposition that God has given the earth to the children of men.

2nd, That men *find* themselves on the surface of the globe, in presence of an object capable of supplying their wants, and with the intuitive axiom that “an object is the *property* of its creator.”

First.

On the supposition that God has given the earth to the human race, or to some portion of the race:

1. The gift must be either special or general, or a mixture of both.

2. The gift *special* must necessarily require indubitable evidence. And this evidence must extend to the determination of the special portion (whole or part) of the earth contained in the gift. Otherwise

the gift must be held as unsubstantiated, and the special claim must be held void and null.

In the one case of the Hebrews alone is it advanced, that this special gift has been made, and in that case the land was divided on a system approaching nearly to a system of equality. We may therefore leave the case of the Hebrews, and inquire what rules apply to the rest of the world.

3. If the gift be *general*. In this case it is to all individuals alike, or else it is not a gift at all. We have supposed the case of the Hebrews to be *the only* case of special gift (and certainly no man in *this* country can allege special gift), so that if there be in deed and in truth a gift of the earth from God to the human race, it is to *every* member of the race, and not to a few individuals who might happen to be prior in time, or to be dignified by vague titles in ages of superstition.

In this case, then, the gift is to all men alike, and the gift can only be parted with on the consent of each individual.

But it must be observed that on this supposition no individual can advance a claim to any one specified portion of the earth, (nor any claim whatever beyond the duration of his own life), he, as an individual having no more claim to any one particular portion than has any other individual. The gift being *general*, *all* special claims must be rejected.

On this supposition, then, we arrive at a *general* equality of rights to the earth. But it still remains

to ascertain *how* the earth may be equitably allocated for the purposes of cultivation, &c.

Second.

Let us now examine the other supposition, namely, that men *find* themselves on the earth, and that they do not take into consideration the divine proprietorship, but endeavour to allocate the earth by the natural reason.

In this case the facts are, that they are in presence of an object capable of supplying their wants, capable of being allocated to individuals for the necessary purposes of cultivation, &c.; and that they are endowed with the axiom, "An object is the property of its creator." In this case, then, they leave out of account all considerations as to a divine gift, and although admitting that the earth is the property of *its* Creator, we suppose them for the moment as being unacquainted with who the Creator of the earth really is.

In this case they will arrive at exactly the same practical conclusion as in the case of a gift-general, only there will be this *logical* difference, namely, that whereas a gift-general from the Creator will establish a system of *positive* equality, the supposition that there is no gift would establish a system of *negative* equality; but both would exhibit the rights of the whole race of men as practically *equal*.

The right of all men to the natural earth being then *equal*, it remains to be ascertained *how* the earth should be allocated according to a principle of equity exactly the same for all individuals.

The conditions, then, are:—

1st, All men are equal in their right to the natural earth.

2nd, No man can substantiate a right to any one specified portion of the earth.

3rd, Men require to occupy the earth specially for the purposes of cultivation, &c.

4th, Men may occupy the earth equitably or unequitably.

5th, The produce of each man's labour is his own property, and ought to be absolutely sacred from the forcible or fraudulent interference of other men.

And the question to be solved is, "*How, with these conditions, can men equitably allocate the earth?*" seeing that an immense advantage attends the division of the population into *cultivators* and *non-cultivators*, a fraction of the population (greater or less) being sufficient to do the cultivation for the whole.

The answer to this question is plain. By ASSOCIATION, and by making the rent-value of the soil, &c. the *common property* of the whole associated community.

This we affirm to be the only possible solution of the great question of natural property, and we hesitate not to affirm also that every country in the world, as its population increases, and with the population the *rent-value* of the lands, will be driven *by pauperism* to approach more and more nearly to the practical application of this theoretic solution.

We have here the genuine explanation of the causes of pauperism, and the consequent ruin, both

physical and *moral*, of vast masses of the population,—the cause that is decimating Ireland, expatriating Scotland, and gradually but surely demoralising the labouring classes of England.

But let us endeavour clearly to understand the operation of the principle of Association, so as to perceive its practical working. For this purpose let us take an illustration.

Let A, B, C, D, E, and F, represent six men, or six thousands of men, or six millions of men, or sixty millions of men; for the mere number is of no moment.

Let these men be located on a new territory, to which they have of course an *equal* right. Let them make as equitable a distribution as they can of the soil in all fairness and honesty. At first it may take the labours of the whole six to produce their maintenance, and this maintenance is the natural return for their expended labour. In these circumstances, the soil can have *no* rent, as there is no one to pay rent,—each producing what he requires for his own consumption. In a short time, however, it would be found that, by the expenditure of labour, the soil was more easily wrought, or that the men, by employing in the manufacture of implements that portion of their time which could not be employed in cultivation, could work the soil to more advantage. And, in consequence of this, it would not take the labour of six to supply six with food. The labour of *five* might support the whole six as easily as the labour of six did previously, consequently *one* may quit agriculture and devote his time to manufacture

needful articles, such as the five are willing to pay for in food, &c. But what is to become of the *land* he occupied? It is plain that if he does not withdraw from agriculture, the community must lose the benefit that would accrue from his devoting himself exclusively to produce those articles which the community requires. But he would not withdraw unless he also is to be a gainer. Let us suppose that he does withdraw for the purpose of making spades, ploughs, harrows, &c. &c., and that he exchanges these articles for food. He has left his land, and if there were not a superabundance of unoccupied land immediately at hand, his portion would be *worth a rent*. He, by withdrawing to produce articles which the cultivators require, has created the rent-value of land, and this rent-value will be equal to the produce of one person's labour, for the six farms, or to one-sixth of the produce for the one farm; that is, the rent of his portion will be equal to the remuneration of *one* individual divided by six.

But, although it is true that the circumstance of his withdrawing to manufacture articles creates a rent-value for land, *he* is not the only person who creates its rent-value. The *cultivators* must produce his support, and this they can only do by labouring the land which he occupied, or, at all events, by expending *more* labour than would be sufficient for their own support, and *they*, as well as he, contribute to create the rent-value, exactly in proportion to their labour, and they, as well as he, are entitled to reap the natural remuneration of their exertions.

The rent-value, then, is in the common result of the whole expended labour, and it ought to be divided among the whole, so that each shall receive exactly the produce of his labour, and neither more nor less. And, in this way, if one man, by greater skill, or greater industry, or greater enterprise, were to produce more than his fellows, he would receive his natural remuneration, proportioned to his industrial merits; and this, not by any artificial estimation of his *talents*, but, by the common law of supply and demand for his *produce*, whether his produce were corn, or clothes, or implements, or music, or pictures, or books, or legislation, or any other article or service that society might require and be willing to pay for.

According to the present disposition of the soil, a man may have one or two hundred thousand a-year of rent from land; and for this he labours not, nor ever did labour, but enjoys this vast revenue by the gift or charter of a king—the representative of the nation—who, in consequence of that gift, was obliged to place on the industrious classes an amount of *taxation* equal to the annual value of the alienated lands. And this annual value, be it remarked, is not a stationary sum, but a sum that goes on increasing and increasing with the whole labours of the country. So that, in fact, to alienate the soil is only to deprive the labourers of their *profits*, and to allocate those profits to privileged persons who are thus supported at the expense of the industrious classes.

Let us now endeavour to determine the LAW OF RENTS, and to estimate according to a general rule

the natural mode by which rent-value is produced, and the natural *amount* of that rent-value, supposing the soil of a country to be the property of the permanent State, and not the property of private individuals.

[From the consideration of this question of landed property, we believe it flows as a necessary consequence—as a great and universal fact belonging to the human race—that the Creator of mankind, in constituting man and the earth, intended human society to be a *community*, an associated society, in the matter of *natural property* as well as in the matter of *liberty*; and, if so, the natural laws of property have necessarily to be *discovered*, exactly as man requires to discover the laws which regulate the phenomena of the material world. There is a *divine* arrangement with regard to property, just as there is a divine arrangement with regard to *gravitation*. And we are no more bound to accept the superstitious credences of men (even when backed by all the formalities of legislation), in the region of man's relation to man, than we are bound to accept the superstitious credences of men in the region of astronomy. In both regions the laws must be *discovered*—not *made*; and where vast systems of practical rules are put in operation, based on false or groundless interpretations of nature, we can anticipate no other results than those of pauperization, and misery, and want, and moral degradation, and all the other evils which the British Islands exhibit the such aggravated malignity.]

THE THEORY OF RENT.

First, What is rent ?

Second, How does rent originate ?

Third, What is its *natural* amount ?

Fourth, To whom should it be allocated ?

1st, *What is Rent ?*

The following definitions of Rent have been given.
[See *Whately's Logic*, 7th ed.] :—

Adam Smith—(book i. chap. 6.)—Rent. What is paid for the license to gather the produce of the land.

Say—(*Traité d'Ec. Pol.*, tome ii. p. 169, 4 line edit.)—Rent. Le profit resultant du service productif de la terre. (The profit arising from the productive use of the soil.)

Storch—(*Cours d'Ec. Pol.*, tome i. p. 354.)—Rent. Le prix qu'on paye pour l'usage d'un fonds de terre. (The price paid for the use of land.)

Malthus—(*Principles*, p. 134.)—That portion of the value of the whole produce of land, which remains to the owner after payment of all the outgoings of cultivation, including average profits on the capital employed. The excess of price above wages and profits.

Mill—(*Elements*, 3d ed., p. 33.)—Rent. The difference between the return made to the most productive, and that which is made to the least productive portion of capital employed on the land.

Torrens—(*Corn Trade*, 3d ed., p. 130.)—Rent.

That part of the produce which is given to the land-proprietor for the use of the soil.

M'Culloch—(*Principles*, p. 265.)—Rent. That

portion of the produce of the earth which is paid by the farmer to the landlord for the use of the natural and inherent powers of the soil.

Ricardo—(*Principles*, 3d ed., p. 53.)—The por-

tion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil.

Sismondi also gives a definition of rent, in which he assumes the landlord to be the cultivator of the soil,—a supposition so perfectly inapplicable to Britain (though applicable to France), that we may omit it. He analyses rent into, (1) the price of the labour; (2) the price of monopoly (a portion of the subject which ought not to be overlooked); (3) the difference between the values of good and bad soil; (4) the return for capital sunk in land.

These definitions are all valuable, as exhibiting certain aspects in which rent may be considered; but only one of them is scientific, namely, that of Say. It, however, is inadequate. M'Culloch's and Ricardo's contain important views of rent—views which will no doubt hereafter lead to curious considerations—as it would, at all events, be difficult for a few thousand proprietors to establish their right to the “whole of the *natural and inherent powers*,” or to the “whole of the *original and indestructible powers*” of the soil.

It is plain that rent may be defined (or described) *as to what it is*, or *as to how it is measured*. That is, we may have a determination of the meaning of the word *rent* (for instance, let the word *rent* stand for the price, or value, or amount of produce, paid for the use of the soil), or we may have a determination of the generic value for which rent is paid. The word *rent*, in English, means "price paid for the use of," and it is a mere truism to advance such a proposition as a definition of rent. This gives us the mere *fact*—the mere primary circumstance, out of which the science has to arise; it tells us, not what rent is, but *how it is measured*, namely, by the price paid by the farmer for the use of the soil. But when this empirical definition has been made, the real definition is still requisite, namely, "*What does the price paid for the use of the soil consist of?*" and Say has here advanced a real, though inadequate definition, "Rent is the *profit* resulting from the use of the soil,"—a proposition which, if true, ought to follow from the general definition of profit. But this definition is still unsatisfactory, although it approaches the real character of rent; because, advanced in this form, it requires a proof that rent is the equivalent of profit. The definition given by Torrens is the correct one, so far as the meaning of the word is concerned, and, if it were accepted, Say would proceed to prove that "the part of the produce given to the landlord" was "the *profit* of the productive use of the soil."

With so many great names before us, let us

endeavour to go to the bottom of this mystery of *rent*, and, if possible, to ascertain what rent really is.

Nominal definition—“*Rent is the price paid for the use of.*”

The rent of the soil is then the price paid for the use of the soil. This gives us the *measure* of the rent-real, that is, the rent-real is *measured* by the *price paid for the use of the soil*. Let us now endeavour to discover what this rent-real is.

Rent is *a value*, but the value of *what*? It is clear that the above nominal definition gives only one member of an equation, with its *name*; but what is the specification of that other member *for* which rent is paid. It also is a value, but the value of what? *Of the productive capacity of the natural soil, which productive capacity represents the natural profit of human labour*. So that the rents of the lands are neither more nor less than the *profits* of labourers; that is, the profits intended by Nature (or rather by God) *for* the labourers, and not for the non-labourers. Let us endeavour to make good this proposition.

The first great fact belonging to the terrestrial economy, in this department, is the fact that *the earth is capable of producing more than the cost of the labour expended on it, the cost of the labour being that which the human frame requires to consume, to maintain it in proper health according to climate, &c.* This is one of the great fundamental facts of man's earthly home and man's physical constitution, as benevolently constructed by Almighty God. God

has not only made man a feeding animal, but a rational and moral creature, with an intellect to study the universe that surrounds him, and affections which require their appropriate gratification. And it would appear that *therefore* God has constituted the globe in such a manner as sufficiently to supply man with food, and yet leave him time to satisfy his intellect, and to furnish to his affections their appropriate objects. That man is by *nature* a mere labouring animal is a false and wicked doctrine, calculated to produce evils of the worst and most pernicious character.

The moment this great fact is seen in its true light, we see also that the earth, as constituted by God, contains within itself the elements of *improvement*,—that is, that man, if he act rightly and in accordance with the constitution of Nature, may continually *amend his condition*. Savages must be poor and degraded, but civilised men may continually go on to a higher and nobler destiny.

And this doctrine we affirm, in the face of all that has been written and said on the dangers of a surplus population. And to bring *that* question to issue at once, and to show how false premises may lead to monstrous conclusions, we put the case thus, in opposition to Malthus and his geometric ratio. It is a *fact*,—a fact which cannot be denied, though terribly overlooked,—that *the higher a nation attains in civilization, the less is the proportion of inhabitants devoted to the production of food*. And this being the case, it is plainly evident that the increase of

food has a greater velocity than the increase of population; and this is true even in the British Islands, where population is so dense. Great Britain employs only *one-third* of her population in agriculture, and this one-third produces food, not only for itself, but for nearly the other *two-thirds*,—a proportion unknown in any other great country. And so far from the population increasing *faster* than the food, the imports of grain greatly *diminished* from the beginning of the century to 1835, although about *nine millions* were added to the population of the United Kingdom. (See Porter's Progress.) But even if the imports of grain had remained stationary, or even slightly augmented, the fact would still have been sufficient to upset the whole doctrine of the Malthusian school; and, until they can explain the fact on *their* principles, their doctrines must be ranked among these curious fallacies which never fail to astound us, when men *begin* to study a particular department of nature. Almost every science in its infancy has shocked the world with some preposterous falsehood, and theories of population have not escaped the common frailty. Thus the sceptics proved that there could not possibly be a miracle; the idealists, that there could not be a material world; the astronomers, that there could not be a Christian religion; the geologists, that there could not be a Biblical creation; the phrenologists, that there could not be a soul; the metaphysicians, that there could not be a *cause*; the economists, that there could not be a conscience: and so each has

come with its own great discovery, for which the world is no doubt much the wiser. And, last of all—grandest, most wonderful, and most consistent—comes the German phenomenologist, who proves triumphantly that there cannot possibly be anything at all.

Now, can any one possibly explain the fact that Great Britain has been able to withdraw about *two-thirds* of her population from the production of food, on any principle whatever that assumes population to increase even as fast as food? Such a principle is a monstrous and ridiculous fallacy, contrary to all we learn from history of the earlier stages of society, and contrary to all we know of new countries and colonies, where at first nearly *all* are *food-producers*. And it is only as nature has been made to yield her wealth in return for expended labour, that a greater and greater proportion of the inhabitants can withdraw from agriculture, and devote their energies to the production of those articles which give a higher tone to man's terrestrial existence—which make him less of an animal and more of a mind.

It is plainly evident that more labour expended on the soil will make it produce more; and, consequently, if England were to employ another million of her population in agriculture, she could produce, out of her own soil, *much more food than would be requisite for the abundant support of all her inhabitants*. And consequently the true reason why, in England, the soil does not produce as much food as the nation requires is, that so large a proportion of the popula-

tion has withdrawn (or rather *been driven*) from the production of food. With only one-third of the labour of the country expended on the soil,* it is perfectly absurd to speak of a surplus population for whom there is not food enough, and still more absurd to suppose that civilization and an increased population lead necessarily to the shame and degradation of the labouring classes—to their destruction by famine and disease—to their expatriation—or to their old age of bone-breaking and oakum-picking in poor-law bastiles. Such doctrines are false interpretations of the world which God has given us, as wicked as they are false.

When we have firmly laid hold of the fact *that the earth, as constituted by God, is capable of producing more than the cost of the labour expended on it*, we may proceed to make the first great division of a *natural science* of Political Economy.

As we stated in a former treatise, every function necessarily divides itself into,

The Agent, The Object, The Product ;

* Taking machinery into consideration, instead of the labour expended on the soil being the *third*, it is probably not the *tenth*, possibly not the *twentieth*. Fifty men ploughing the waters with one of our great steamers get through an immense deal more *work* than fifty men ploughing the land with horses. And this can easily be brought to a comparison or equation. For, let us unyoke the horses from the ploughs and put them to waggons for the purpose of conveying the same quantity of goods as the steamer. Taking extra capital, extra risk, &c. into consideration, it is universally found that steamers are cheaper than waggons wherever they can find their way and have full employment. And to say that they are *cheaper* is only to say that one man in the steamer (though not using more exertion or working *harder*) is producing a greater result. He does not work *nature*, he only guides the machine that works nature.

and here the general classification is,

Man, The Earth, The Produce ;

or, specially in Political Economy,

Human	}	The productive capacity	{	The produce
labour.		of the soil.		of the soil.

To make these function or operate in the human reason, a *common measure* is assumed under the name of *value*, and this value is itself measured by the outward fact of *exchangeability*. For instance, "How much labour will you give for a certain quantity of productive capacity? or for a certain quantity of produce? or, how much produce will you give for a certain quantity of labour? or, how much productive capacity will you give for a certain quantity of labour or of produce?" &c. &c.

This *exchangeability* is again measured by a common term called *money*, and this money is made to consist of some article which is tolerably *constant* in the quantity of labour required to procure it, and at the same time so scarce as to present little bulk, while its physical characteristics qualify it for ordinary currency. Gold, silver, &c., are *nationally* selected as representatives of value, and *paper* may again be employed to represent gold and silver.

When the above propositions are clearly apprehended, we may fix the language in which the terms may be expressed, put the quantities in equation, and proceed to *reason* with them.

But before doing so, we must justify the rejection

of the term *productive power*, and explain the reason why *productive capacity* ought to be employed.

In political economy we reason of *human action*, and of the result of that action when employed on the material globe. Consequently, as *power* is an *agent*, human labour must be the power operating—the earth, the *capacity* operated upon—and the produce, the resulting product.

Those who care little for the precision of language, provided they understand the subject, may deem this a superfluous refinement. Not so. Science progresses exactly as its language is made more perfect; and, besides, there is another and a very important reason why *capacity*, and not *power*, should be applied to the soil.

When we consider the earth by itself, and leave human labour out of account, the earth is then a *power*, that is, a power which produces *of its own accord*, as we express it. But in that case we are engaged with the science of the physical earth, and not in any respect with *political economy*. What *was* a power when the earth alone was in the field of observation, *becomes* a capacity when *man* is super-added. *Man* becomes the power, and the soil becomes the capacity. And if the reader have seized what we formerly advanced, on the metamorphosis of a consequent into a major, he will readily understand how a similar law prevails with regard to the terms, and how an agent becomes transformed into an object, and afterwards into a product.

Agent, object, product, are the universal and neces-

sary *relative* terms of human cognition, and, provided the relation is preserved between them, they may slide backward or forward, like the major, minor, and consequent of the syllogism.

The abstract form of this metamorphosis is as follows:—

1st, Inductively—1st Function.

- A. The Product—A condition or event resulting.
- B. The Object—An object capable of a condition.
- C. The Agent—A producing power.

2nd Function.

- B. Pro.—The condition of the former object viewed as product.
 - C. Ob.—The former agent viewed as object.
 - D. Ag.—A new producing power.
- Which formula may be pursued as far as an ultimate agent.

Concrete Example—1st Function.

- A. The Product—Death, the produced phenomenon.
- B. The Object—The body, *capable* of being wounded.
- C. The Agent—The shot, as *power* to wound.

2nd Function.

- B. Pro.—The *condition* of the body—the wound.
- C. Ob.—The shot, as *capable* of being fired.
- D. Ag.—The man who fired, as *power* to fire.

3rd Function.

- C. Pro.—The shot, as produced phenomenon.
- D. Ob.—The man, as capable of being influenced by motive.

E. Ag.—Malice, the motive, as power to influence. To convert this into a *deductive* series, it must be read from the bottom upwards.

Now, it will be observed that what in one function was considered as an object, may in another function be considered as a product or an agent. And the very meaning of these terms implies this, namely, that at one moment we may consider an object in itself, at another in its agency, and at another in its condition resulting from some other agency. Not, of course, that one object becomes transformed into another *object*—the shot does not become transformed into the wound, nor the wound into the death—but that all objects (save ultimates) may be considered in the three aspects of agent, object, or product. And thus what in one science was a power, becomes in another a capacity, and in another a product. And we affirm, that what in physical science is a producing power, becomes in political economy a productive capacity, and in politics proper a *produced value*, having an owner.* This most interesting law of metamorphosis is a universal phenomenon

* In *physical science*, the earth is a *power* capable of producing vegetation; in *agriculture*, the earth is a *capacity* capable of producing vegetation in return for expended labour; in *private economy*, a capacity capable of producing value in return for expended value; in *political economy*, the facts of private economy are investigated as they affect the condition of *man*, and the earth is a capacity capable of producing *social value* in return for expended value; and, in *politics*, the earth is a capacity of producing value, *which capacity is itself capable of being produced or increased by the expenditure of human exertion*. And in the latter form *alone* is it possible to arrive at a theory of *property*.

of rational cognition well worthy of a much fuller development than we have attempted, inasmuch as it explains the growth of science, and the mode by which propositions are condensed into terms and made to function as substantives, whereas they are perhaps events, or relations, or conditions, or perhaps even functions, or series of functions.

We have, then, as the terms with which we must reason:—

Human	}	The productive capacity	}	The produce
labour.				

And these are taken in their most general signification; for instance, the productive capacity applies as much to the capacity of producing *minerals*, as to the capacity of producing *corn*; and *produce* includes minerals, fish, and *rents* (the equivalents of actual produce), quite as much as wheat or potatoes.

To labour, to the productive capacity of the soil, and to the produce of the soil, we have to assign values, so that the three items may have a common measure, this common measure being the abstraction *value*, which again in concrete cases requires a concrete measure.

Let, then, the expenditure which man requires to make during the time he labours be called the *cost* of his labour, and the surplus return which he receives in the value of the produce be called the *profit*, the *natural profit* of his labour—that is, the profit which the earth as constituted by God is intended to return to him.

This distinction is clearly evident—that the return

which man receives from nature is the *cost* and the natural *profit* of labour.

First equation, then,

The produce of the soil } equal to { the cost and natural profit of human labour.

But having assumed the indisputable fact that the earth, as constituted by God, has in itself a *capacity* to produce more than the cost of the labour expended on it, we arrive easily at the value of this capacity, through the

Second equation :

The produce, equal to { the cost of labour, plus the value of the productive capacity of the soil.*

* In this argument it will be seen that we take *the productive capacity* of the soil, as that capacity which enables the land to pay a *rent*. But there are lands which may be supposed capable of producing only the value of the expended labour, and the term *capacity* may be applied more correctly to the *whole capacity* of production, whether that be more or less, whether there be a loss, or an exact remuneration, or a profit. Using the term capacity in *this* sense, we arrive at the very same conclusion, although we are obliged to divide the productive capacity into *two* items—namely, the capacity of producing *cost*, and the capacity of producing *profit*. The argument will then stand more correctly thus:—

Produce ... equal to ... Cost and profit, and
Produce ... equal to ... Productive capacity.
Productive capacity equal to ... Cost and profit.

But,

Rent ... equal to { Productive capacity, minus cost of production.

Therefore,

Rent ... equal to ... Produce, minus cost of production.

But,

Produce, minus cost of production, } equal to { The natural profit of labour.

Consequently,

Rent ... equal to ... Natural profit of labour.

Hence, from the two equations,

The productive capacity of the soil } equal to { The natural profit
of human labour.

And again,

The productive capacity of the soil } equal to { The produce, minus
the cost of production.

But *rent* (as a value) by definition is *the value of the productive capacity of the soil*. Hence,

Rent ... equal to { The produce, minus the cost
of production.

And *Rent* ... equal to { The *natural profit* of human
labour.

And *rent* is *measured* by the price paid for the use of the soil.

But *labour* considered as merely the exertion of man, is not the only expenditure actually employed in cultivation, or in extracting from the earth the objects man requires. True. Men employ not only labour properly so called, but **CAPITAL**, which they embark in houses, implements, roads, &c. &c. This capital, however, may all be resolved into labour which has at some anterior period been expended, and the profits of which have been accumulated—*saved*. This *capital* is a convenient term, as it stands for a long series of propositions, which are thus condensed into one term or sum total. This capital may be gold, or *credit*, or cattle, or in fact any accumulated facility that tends directly to enhance the value of the produce, either by the increase of quantity, or by the increase of the rate of value.

Consequently, as actual labour and actual capital may appear together in effecting the production of the articles required by man, the actual cost of production will include the current value of the capital, so that the general formula becomes transformed into one more specific, to suit it to the circumstances of old countries, where capital (or hoarded profit) forms a considerable, perhaps even it may be the most considerable item.

Thus, then, more specifically,

Cost of pro- } equal to { Cost of labour, plus in-
duction } { terest-value of capital.

Hence,

Rent ... equal to { Value of produce, (minus cost
of labour, plus interest-value of
capital.)

But,

Productive capacity } equal to { The produce, minus
of the soil } { the cost of produc-
tion.

Therefore,

Productive capacity } equal to { Produce, (minus cost
of the soil } { of labour, plus inte-
rest-value of capital.)

Hence, assuming capital to be not only capable of a current value (*interest*), but also of a legitimate *profit* over and above the interest—no unfair assumption, certainly—

The produce } equal to { Cost of labour, plus interest-
of the soil } { value of capital, plus profit
of labour, plus profit of ca-
pital.

And rent ... equal to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Value of produce, (minus} \\ \text{cost of labour, plus value of} \\ \text{capital.)} \end{array} \right.$

Consequently, throwing out of both members “cost of labour, plus value of capital,”

RENT ... equal to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Profit of Labour, plus} \\ \text{Profit of Capital.} \end{array} \right.$

Or, assuming capital to represent only so much accumulated *natural profit* of formerly expended labour, we have finally—

RENT ... equal to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{The Natural Profit of} \\ \text{Labour.} \end{array} \right.$

And this proposition, whatever may be made of it, or however it may be misunderstood or nullified by those who would not wish it to be *discovered* (for they cannot prevent it being *true*), lies at the bottom of the non-remuneration of labour, and accounts for the pauperization of the labouring classes. The landed aristocracy are exclusively maintained on the *natural profits* of the labourers of the country.

2nd Question—How does rent originate?

A certain price is paid for the use of the soil. This is an actual fact of social economy.

Let this price be *called* RENT. This is a mere matter of *nomenclature*. It gives the *nominal* definition of rent.

But what does the price paid for the use of the soil really represent?

It represents, *first*, the productive capacity of the soil, and, *second*, the equivalent of that capacity, namely,

the natural profit of labour—that is, the surplus produce which God in his bountiful construction of the terrestrial economy has added over and above what man requires to consume while employed in labouring.

When, therefore, we inquire, “How does rent originate?” we inquire, *first*, into the origin of the fact that a price is paid for the use of the soil, and, *second*, into the origin of the profit of labour.

The latter question comes first in natural order, as, if there were no *profit*, there could be no *rent*. It is a *fact*, as we have before stated, that the earth is capable of producing *more* than the cost of the labour expended on it. This fact is at the bottom of all human amelioration, and it is the foundation-truth of a natural science of political economy.

The origin of *profit*, then, is in the fact that God has benevolently constituted the world and made it of such a nature that it will yield a surplus to human exertion intelligently expended. And wherever a nation does not derive a profit, and a large profit, it is because the labour is *not* intelligently expended. The want of profit is in the fact of man’s ignorance and injustice, and not in the constitution of the globe.

This profit, then, is the origin of its representative—the price paid for the use of the soil. And we have to inquire into the *mechanism* by which a price comes to be paid for the use of the soil.

Let us now revert to our six men, or six millions of men—A, B, C, D, E, and F.

It is plain that if all are food and raiment pro-

ducers, and if they produce only sufficient for their own respective requirements, there is no profit, and there can be no rent.

Let us suppose, however, that they have so far improved their means of cultivation as to produce one-fifth more than they require. In this case they can remain one-fifth of their time idle (not by any means a profitable mode of expending time); or each may devote this fifth of time to produce articles for himself; or, finally, a much better plan, *five* may remain cultivators, while *one* devotes his whole time and attention to the production of those articles which will still further facilitate the labours of the five. In the latter case, the whole society will have food, plus the produce of one man's labour on other articles. The account will stand thus:—

1st Case.—All food-producers.

Six men produce six maintenances.

2nd Case.—All, minus one, food-producers. Five men produce six maintenances, and one man produces articles of exchange to *purchase* his food from the five.

Rent has now become possible, and not only possible, but it is the only mode by which a just arrangement can be made, so as to *equalise the terms of exchange*. The man who *withdraws* from producing food is as much the creator of rent-value as the five who remain to produce the food; and it will always be found that rents are *highest* where there is a larger proportion of the population *not engaged in producing food*.

Rents, then, originate in this manner:—

According to the constitution of the terrestrial world, as framed by God in its suitability to man's requirements, the earth produces *more* than the cost of the labour requisite to obtain the productions. This *more* is the surplus produce which remains in excess over and above what man requires to consume while engaged in labouring. This surplus is the *natural profit* of labour, and it represents the extra productive capacity of the soil—that is, the capacity of the soil to furnish more produce than the labourer required to consume. The surplus produce is the measure of the extra capacity, and it is this extra capacity (which represents the *natural profit of labour*) for which rent is payable.

We have here, then, two terms, which are perfectly distinct, but which are mutually correlative, namely,

PRODUCE, divided into 1st, Repayment of <i>cost.</i> 2d, Profit.	}	PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY, di- vided into capacity of re- producing cost; capacity of producing profit.
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The capacity of producing profit (for *profit* it is into whatever hands it may fall) is that for which *rent* will be paid; and, as soon as we ascertain how the *capacity for producing profit* originates, we have ascertained how *rent* originates.

It is plain that where the whole of a population are food-producers, and each produces for his own requirements, there can be no *rent*. If there were a chief, or ruler, or king, or regulator (whatever he

might be called), and if this chief were supported at the expense of the rest, there might be a payment in kind of so much grain, or sheep, or fish, or *produce*; but this is not *rent*—it is *taxation*, and taxation in its first rude and imperfect form.

But let us suppose a country or district brought to the point where five-sixths of the inhabitants can supply the whole six with food; there is then possible a profit of one maintenance on the labour of five, and the capacity of producing this profit will immediately become worth a rent, as it gives the power of purchasing the productions of the one, who devotes himself to manufacture articles to exchange against food.

And if four-sixths can supply the whole six with food, the capacity of producing profit is immediately *increased*, and, of course, is worth a higher rent; and if three-sixths can supply the whole, the profit still increases in the same proportion, and the rent follows in the exact ratio of the profit. This would hold good, even if it were possible so to increase the facilities of food production, that *one* out of six should produce food for the whole six. At present the highest proportion of those who do *not* produce food is found in England, where about *two* are food-producers, and *four* are not food-producers.

Let us, then, clearly understand that rent originates in the fact, that the earth is (or has become) capable of returning for one man's labour, not only as much as will support one man, but as much as will support two, or three, or more men, so that the man who

labours on the earth receives not only the *cost* of his labour, but a profit *equal* to the cost, or *double* the cost. And rent is the price paid for the capacity of producing this profit.*

We are now able to attack our third question, namely, "What is the *natural amount* of rent?" And this question we shall endeavour to solve by a method which is not arbitrary or empirical, but scientific, for there is a law of rent quite as much as there is a law of gravitation.

It is a very common fallacy to suppose that the rent of the soil (which we take as the type or form of rent most convenient for argumentation) depends on the amount of labour, skill, or capital that has

* It must be observed that the surplus produce is *profit*, to whatever person it may be allocated. Now, in saying that the cultivator receives this *profit*, of course we understand that it is not profit *to him*, unless it remains in his hands. The word *profit* has thus an ambiguous meaning, according to whether we use it subjectively or objectively. The surplus produce (or its equivalent value) is profit objectively in all circumstances; but it is not profit to the cultivator (subjectively), if he have to pay it to a landlord who does nothing. To the landlord (who did not earn his estate by working for its value) it is *profit* of the highest and most absolute nature, that is, it is a pure *benefice*—a *profit without a cost*.

This may be expressed technically, thus:—the *labourer* expends x , and receives $x + y$, and y may be equal to $\frac{x}{20}$, $\frac{x}{10}$, $\frac{x}{2}$, x , $2x$, &c. Now, in the case of the *landlord* (for instance, many of the British aristocracy at present), the landlord *expends* nothing, and receives the profit, so that with him x becomes nothing, thus $x = 0$.

He therefore expends 0 and receives $0 + y$, where y is of course incommensurable with x , and infinitely greater than x . But even where the landlord expends *the rent*, he does not expend x ; he only expends y to receive $y + y'$, or again $y + y'$ to receive $y + y' + y''$, &c. &c. Nothing can be more certain than that the rents of the landlord are only the *profits* of the labourer.

been expended on the portion of soil itself which pays the rent. Nothing can be more fallacious. The rent of any one portion of soil does *not* depend on the labour or capital that has been expended on that portion, and this point must be made clear before we can proceed to examine the doctrine of amount. For instance, if, in the heart of London, a space of twenty acres had been enclosed by a high wall at the time of the Norman Conquest, and if no man had ever touched that portion of soil, or even seen it from that time to this, it would, if let by auction, produce an enormously high rent. Hampstead Heath, for instance, in the immediate vicinity of London, would, at this moment, let for an enormous rent, which rent in nowise depends upon any labour or capital hitherto expended on the Heath. The lands in the neighbourhood of London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester, Birmingham, and all the large towns, have increased, not from expenditure upon the soil itself, but from the labours of those who are unconnected with the soil; and were those labours to cease, the rents would decrease, and, in some cases, disappear. It is a well-known and commonly observed fact, that the establishment of manufactures greatly increases the rent of the surrounding soil,—in fact, that this increase of rent has been *created* by the manufacturers. But a fact of much greater importance, and one not commonly made the matter of distinct reflection, is this, *that manufactures create all the legitimate rent that can possibly exist*,—all other payment being in reality

either *taxation* or *robbery*. And thus the present rents of the landholders are really and truly *transformed taxation*—that is, the amount now paid to the landlord in the shape of rent is the modern representative of what was formerly paid to the State in the shape of taxation, the tax for the State service being transformed into the rents of the individual landlords. And thus the labouring classes, who formerly paid only taxation, now pay both rent and taxation, and consequently are *robbed*, for *robbery* it is (see Whately's Logic), of the *profits* of their labours. With a purely agricultural population there can be no *rent*,—there may be *taxation*, that is, *payment out of the profits of labour for the service of the State*, or there may be *robbery*, that is, *payment extracted by force out of the profits of labour to support a non-labouring aristocracy*. And as human society, in its present form, grew gradually out of the feudal constitution of society in which the aristocrat was the state-soldier, the lands which were the *benefices* of the state-soldier were transformed into the *property* of the individual, independent, and non-responsible landlord,—a few thousands of whom now enjoy what was formerly the *taxation* of the kingdom, while the labourers have to pay *another taxation* equal to the rents of the soil.

Leaving out of consideration, however, the actual distinction between taxation and rent, we have to inquire what ought to be the amount paid for the use of the soil, that is, for the exclusive liberty of extracting the surplus produce which the earth natu-

rally returns for labour intelligently expended. And this amount, we affirm, does *not* depend upon the quantity of labour or capital that has been expended on the particular portion of soil that pays rent. Labour and capital expended on a particular portion of soil will create a *differential* rent, that is, a rent over and above what would be paid were such labour or capital not expended, but this is a question of relation between one portion of soil and another; whereas the main question is, Why does the whole extent of soil pay a rent? and what is the natural amount of that rent? Here, then, we have to deal with an *average* of rent, and we endeavour to determine what should be the amount of the whole mass of rent according to the circumstances of a country.

That which determines the whole amount of rent in a country is the whole amount of the whole labours of a country. So that every new improvement in machinery, every means of facilitating labour, every means of producing the same quantity of goods in less time or at less expense, every increased facility of transit, every means of doing *more* than could formerly be done, increases the amount of rent us directly as improvement of the soil itself. *Demand* is only the *empirical* measure of the rent. The rent depends not on the *demand*, but on *that which causes the demand*, and that which causes the demand is *the consumption of those who are not food-producers*, and the consumption of those who are not food-producers depends on their *number* and their *social condition*. So that ultimately the rent of the food-producing

soil depends on the number and social condition of those who are not food-producers.

This is the first great principle of rent—that is, of rent proper—we do not speak of *robbery*. There may, it is true, be robbery where there ought to be little or no rent—as in Ireland, or in the dominions of the East India Company, where there is a vast system of robbery, and the natural consequence is, that in these cases the tillers of the soil are reduced to the most dreadful condition of necessitous misery. But robbery, whether assuming the form of State Taxation or of Landlord's Rent, is not really RENT (any more than judicial murder is *justice*, or the worship of an idol is *piety*), and the distinction must be clearly drawn, or otherwise there can be no real understanding of this great question of social science.

It is clear that, if a small but very strong party (so strong as not to be resisted, like the East India Company,) assume to itself the power of taxing the soil unlimitedly, the cultivators are under the absolute necessity of labouring for the merest return of food that will support their frames. As no other means of livelihood can be substituted for the soil, the limit to which such taxation may be carried (whether under the name of *taxation* or of *rent*, for this makes no possible difference) is the *limit of starvation*, and as occasionally years necessarily occur when the produce falls below the average, starvation actually does occur, and that to no small extent. But such taxation is not *rent*, it is pure unmitigated

robbery, systematically carried on through the medium of a standing army, the army being in fact only the tax-gathering force, as it is in British India.

Rent, on the contrary, is a just and equitable payment (not to the *landlord*, as we shall show presently), — a payment which, if society were equitably constructed, would be the great means (nature's great method) of equalising exchanges between the producer of food and the producer of articles to exchange against food; and also the means of determining in every country the relative proportion between the food-producers and the non-food-producers in the matter of *number*.

1st, Rent depends on the whole labours of a whole community.

And 2d, The whole labours of the whole community depend on the proportion between the food-producers and the number of those who produce articles to exchange against food. That is, the fewer the food-producers the higher the rents, provided the food-producers furnish food for all. Thus rents will always be highest in the country that has the greatest proportion of manufacturers and traders, for the manufacturers are the creators of the rent quite as much as the cultivators, nay, much *more*.

The amount of rent that ought to be paid (and that *would* be paid were the land the inalienable property of the whole associated community) depends on the proportion between the food-producers and the non-food-producers, and hence we may derive a

non-arbitrary law of the amount of rent. This point we must illustrate by examples. Before doing so, however, we must apprise the reader that in actual fact—that is, in the natural constitution of the globe and of man—there is a very important circumstance to be taken into consideration, a circumstance which complicates all calculations on this subject. This circumstance is the difference between *skilled labour* and *unskilled labour*. The labour of the *skilled* labourer (for instance, the man who designs the ship, or engine, or machine, or process) is not to be compared to the labour of the *unskilled* labourer (for instance, the man who cuts the tree, or merely hammers, by brute force, where he is directed) on any such principle as the comparison of mere *number*. Where one man could be found to invent a steam engine, a thousand could be found to construct it, and a million to dig the ironstone out of which it was ultimately produced. On this point we have at present only to *apprise* the reader of the difficulty, remembering always that the terms “skilled” and “unskilled” are *relative*, so that the constructor is *unskilled* in comparison to the inventor, but *skilled* in comparison to the miner. The miner again may be *skilled* in comparison to the lowest labourer, and so forth. In the possibility of man becoming *skilled* lies the secret of human improvement; and it might be proven that, in the development of *skill*, lay hid the true reason for the continual increase of rent. But this we leave in abeyance at present. RENT, we say, depends on the relative number of the non-food-producers as

compared with the number of the food-producers. And as, by previous demonstration, RENT is *equal to the natural profit of labour*, the natural profit of labour depends on the comparative numbers of these two great classes of society—that is, assuming that the average skill developed and excited by each class is the same. If the skill be greater on the part of the agriculturists, then the rent would fall *below* the amount indicated by the formula; and if, as is really the case, the skill exerted be greater on the part of the manufacturers, then the rent would *exceed* the amount indicated by the formula. And as all machinery is only *brute matter made to exert skill and labour* (by the direct creation of the human reason), if the non-food-producers employ machinery of a much higher and more efficient character than that employed in agriculture, the *rent* will increase in a corresponding ratio, for machinery increases rent quite as much as any human labour. Hence, again, rents will always be highest in that country where the greatest amount of machinery is intelligently employed.

But, leaving out of consideration those refinements, which, though necessary to make the argument *accurate*, tend to obscure it, and make it at first less intelligible to the reader, the first great principle of rent is, that its amount depends on the relative number of food-producers and non-food-producers. [Always, of course, bearing in mind the plus or minus differences which depend on the circumstances of skill and machinery, &c.]

We are now able to take certain theoretic examples.

Let the whole population be six.

1st Case.—The whole population engaged in the production of food and the necessaries of life, each family labouring for itself. No rent.

2nd Case.—Five-sixths engaged in the production of food, and one-sixth engaged in the production of articles to exchange against food. Rent has now become possible, and it ought to be equal to *the cost of the maintenance of one-sixth of the population.*

3rd Case.—Four-sixths engaged in the production of food, and two-sixths engaged in the production of articles to exchange against food. Rent equal to the cost of the maintenance of *two-sixths* of the population.

4th Case.—Three-sixths engaged in the production of food, and three-sixths engaged in the production of articles to exchange against food. Rent equal to the cost of the maintenance of three-sixths (or one-half) of the population.

5th Case.—Two-sixths engaged in the production of food, and four-sixths engaged in the production of articles to exchange against food. Rent equal to the cost of the maintenance of four-sixths (or two-thirds) of the population.

6th Case.—One-sixth engaged in the production of food, and five-sixths engaged in the production of articles to exchange against food.

Rent equal to the cost of the maintenance of five-sixths of the population.

We have now to justify the above propositions, and to exhibit the principle on which they rest. [Of course, the determination of the actual rent in any given country, whether theoretically or by statistical observation, is a problem of immense, perhaps, of insuperable difficulty. But this is no valid objection to the determination of a *law of rents*. For instance, all the observers in the world, with all the most accurate instruments that could possibly be made, and all the mathematicians to aid with their powers of calculation, could never calculate the actual phenomena that result from the lighting a single taper in a single chamber. The *actual* reflection of the light from the innumerable surfaces—from every inequality of the paper on the walls—from every fibre of wool in the carpet—and from every vagrant particle of dust that floats indolently in the air,—all this transcends the utmost ingenuity of man. And yet this by no means prevents the discovery of the *laws* by which light is reflected, nor does it prevent many useful applications of those laws. And so it is with *rents*. We cannot rush into the complexities of actual societies, and thence proceed to extract a simple law of rents; but we must commence with constructing or supposing the most simple and least complex circumstances possible, and endeavour from those simple circumstances to ascertain what the operation of rents really is—that is, to discover the *law* of rents.]

Let the *cost* of labour be that which man requires to expend during the time he labours. And let the cost of *production* be the cost of labour, plus that which man requires to expend (or consume) during the time he *waits* for the produce: [For man may not only have to *labour* for his return, but to *wait* for it.]

And let *produce* be that which man receives in return for his expenditure:

And let the difference in excess of the *produce* over the expenditure be called *profit*:

Then—postulate—The *earth*, as constituted by God in its relation to *man*, is capable of returning a *profit* for expended labour.

This is the first fundamental principle of political economy—that is, of political economy as a *natural science*—a natural science as independent of human opinion as is chemistry. The Malthusians, overlooking this principle, have asserted that with the progress of society there must also come a greater scarcity of food, which is in direct contradiction to what we know of civilised society; for the most advanced nations are those which employ the *smallest* proportion of their inhabitants on the production of food. And it is, in fact, this very circumstance of employing a smaller and smaller proportion of the population on the mere production of food, that lies at the bottom of all advancement, of all progress, and of all improvement.

Let us, then, assume a common measure, and assign a *value* to the various items. The first de-

finite unit which we encounter is the cost of the maintenance of an individual. This, it is true, may be assumed higher or lower. In one country it may mean a scanty supply of rice and a few yards of cotton; in another it may mean potatoes and salt, rags and wretchedness; and in another it may mean a constant supply of wheaten bread, with a respectable quantity of beef, beer taken for granted, and other little articles too numerous to mention. But let it be what it may, it is *the* unit of calculation. Its *natural* determination is,—such a sufficiency of food, clothing, shelter, &c., as shall keep the labouring powers at their fullest extent for the longest period. When it falls below this, it is too little.

Let us, then, assume the cost of maintenance of an individual at £12 for a year. We choose twelve for the convenience of division, and also because it is perhaps not very far from the actual cost of maintenance, taking the labouring population overhead.

Let the population, then, be six—(six thousand, or six hundred thousand, or six millions, or sixty millions).

Then six, engaged all in producing food and the articles they require for maintenance, produce six maintenances:—Rent impossible. The cost of maintenance and the produce are equal to each other. Some savage tribes and quite new colonists are in this condition. We have then the equation—

$$\text{Cost} = £72 = \text{Produce} = £72.$$

Let us now suppose that improvements take place, so that the labour of five will produce six mainten-

ances ; consequently one retires from agriculture for the purpose of manufacturing articles to exchange against food. We have now to assign a value to the labour of the one who retires. If we suppose him to possess only the average skill of the cultivators, whatever he may produce will purchase from them only his own maintenance, because they, having all the food, will constantly endeavour to acquire his productions at the cheapest rate ; but if they did not exchange at such a rate as to allow him at the least one maintenance, he will return to agriculture. It is therefore the interest of both parties that he should be maintained as a manufacturer. We divide the population, then, into *cultivators* and *manufacturers*—that is, food-producers and producers of articles to exchange against food. And we assume the produce of the manufacturer at the lowest rate, namely, equal to one maintenance.

The cost of maintenance remains the same as before, namely,

Cost of six maintenances = £72

But the produce has increased as follows :—

5 Cultivators produce 6 maintenances = £72

1 Manufacturer produces articles = 12

It is now plainly evident that if each were to keep what he has in possession, or its equivalent value, the manufacturer is in worse circumstances than the cultivator, because he receives only £12, whereas each cultivator receives £14, 8s., and this because the cultivators have the advantage of the soil and its powers to produce more than the value of the labour

expended on it, whereas the value of the manufacturer's goods is determined by the amount of labour only. This is the true origin of *rent*.

We have then—

5 Cultivators produce	£72	}	£84
1 Manufacturer	„ 12		

And we affirm that the rent of the whole soil under cultivation ought to be £12, and that this will exactly *equalise* the receipts of each member of the community, so that every one shall receive his share of the natural powers of the earth (the natural profit of labour), and also the result of his *own* skill and industry.

No system of political economy will ever be satisfactory until it can solve this problem, “How can each individual have his share of the natural powers of the earth as well as the produce of his own labour?” The present systems actually in force in the various countries of Europe are based on miserable superstitions, which have no authority from reason and no confirmation from nature. They are nothing less than vast systems of organised robbery, by which labour is deprived of its reward.

Before, however, taking into consideration how the rent should be divided, and to whom it should be allocated, according to the law *that those who create it ought to have it*, we shall proceed to determine its amount in the various forms of a community. As the manufacturers *increase* in proportion to the cultivators, the rents become greater and greater. Let us, then, suppose that four cultivators

can produce food enough for the whole six inhabitants. This is about the proportion of Ireland. We have then—

4 Cultivators	produce	£72	} £96
2 Manufacturers	„	24	

We see here that wealth is beginning to grow, and that the condition of the people *ought* to be better than where all are mere food-producers. So long, however, as the rents (the profits of labour) are paid to a class that does not labour, the amelioration intended by nature as the reward of skill and industry is a hopeless impossibility. Although rents increase fifty or a hundred times, the unskilled labourer will never be able to better his condition, so long as the rents are continually escaping. *He* will receive only a maintenance.

Where two-thirds of a population are cultivators, and one-third manufacturers, the rent of the whole soil ought to be equal to the maintenance of one-third. Rent = £24.

In France about one-half of the population are engaged in agriculture, and we have the following distribution:—

3 Cultivators	produce	£72	} £108
3 Manufacturers	„	36	

In this case the rent ought to be equal to the maintenance of half the population.

The greatest known produce in the world, probably the greatest that ever has existed, is in England, where two-thirds of the population are non-food-producers, and one-third only are employed in the

cultivation of the soil. But it must be remembered that, according to the present monstrous distribution of the lands,* England does not produce quite sufficient food for her own consumption, and we must reckon among *her* food-producers a certain number of Americans, Poles, Dutchmen, &c., who send us their corn, cheese, and cattle; Chinese, who send us tea; Negroes, who send us sugar; and various others of the many coloured sons of men from whom we obtain spices, wines, tobacco, fruits, fish, and many other articles of consumption.

Notwithstanding this drawback, however, England is placed in the most favourable circumstances ever

* We use the term "*monstrous*" advisedly. We affirm that the present system of private landed property is *not* the system that will cause the earth to bring forth her increase, or to maintain the largest population. At present the only question with the landlord is that of *rent*. If the lands are worth a rent, they are *for the most part* cultivated. But there are millions of acres which, although capable of supporting a large population in plenty, are yet capable of producing very little surplus over and above the cost of production. They will not produce *rent*. These lands are, in many cases in Scotland, reserved as *game deserts*; nay, worse than this, the people have been driven off, the sheep have been driven off, and the very land that produced both food and—mark it well!—that produced some of the best and bravest soldiers that ever stepped, has been turned into desolation and solitude. The long farewell of the exile has swept through his native glen, and the place that knew him shall know him no more for ever. We say again that *this* is a monstrous system of society, and the day may come when even this country may want, and want in vain, the brawny arms, the sinewy limbs, and, above all, the dauntless hearts now beating in the wildernesses far away. True, the Highlands might not be able to produce *rents*, but they could produce *men*; and when the day of struggle comes, as come it will, assuredly, some time or other, Britain may curse the day that ever she allowed to be depopulated the finest nursery for soldiers that the earth has ever seen.

known for the production of wealth—that is, the same amount of *human* labour *produces* a greater value in England than in any other country in the world. Not that the labourers *receive* this value, for the profits of labour have to support the whole of the aristocracy. The aristocracy of England, the most numerous and wealthy in the world, are entirely supported out of the profits of the labourers, and, consequently, it is no wonder that the labourer receives no advantage from the prodigious amount of work which machinery enables him to perform. The mere labourer will never receive more than a bare maintenance, so long as there is a constant absorption of his profits in the shape of rents.

But in England the labourer *ought* to be better off than in any other country, on account of the vast inheritance of accumulated facilities which he derives from formerly expended capital and labour. Every harbour, every road, every building, every useful outlay that has ever been made so as permanently to benefit the country, ought to make labour of more value in England than in any other part of the globe—taking any nation overhead. And it really *is* of more value, although the labourer's remuneration is not greater, nor even so great; for we have only to ask what is the annual amount of value *produced* in England, year by year, and no doubt it is greater than in any other country. Now, what is produced is produced by those who labour, and we assert that the labour of England turns out a greater value every year, in proportion to the inhabitants, than the

labour of any other nation, and consequently that labour is more valuable, although the labourer does not receive more money. The landlords, placemen, and capitalists receive it, *instead* of the labourer.

But, supposing the English population be divided into two cultivators and four manufacturers,—and this is at all events tolerably near the mark,—we have the following :—

2 Cultivators	produce	£72	} £120
4 Manufacturers	„	48	

And the rent ought to be £48.

As it appears probable that the proportion of manufacturers will go on constantly increasing in England, and that the cultivation of the soil will be performed with fewer and fewer hands, (until a species of garden cultivation shall become more general, in which case a much larger number of hands might be profitably employed on the soil), the day is probably not far distant when one-sixth of the population will be able to do the cultivation, leaving five-sixths at liberty to engage in the production of the conveniences and luxuries of life. In this extreme case, (a case that has not yet been reached by any nation, and that could not possibly be reached without a most favourable combination of circumstances, involving the extensive employment of machinery, the perfection of agricultural methods, and, at the same time, the great expansion of free institutions, the removal of customs, restrictions, and the establishment of a just system of taxation), we should have the following proportion of production:—

1 Cultivator,	produce £72	}	£132.
5 Manufacturers,	„ 60		

We see here a very important principle, namely, that all the manufactures in the world can never equal in value the whole amount of *food*. Never the *whole*. However nearly they may approach, they can never become exactly equal, because food is the essential of existence, and the cultivators will always retain *their own maintenance*, which no manufactured article, or service, or luxury, or temptation, will ever induce them to exchange away. “Skin upon skin, yea, all that a man hath will he give for his life.”

Thus if one man out of a hundred were able to produce food for all, the other ninety-nine could only produce articles approaching in value to the food produced by him, because the value of all manufactured articles is determined by their power to purchase food; and taking the whole world over, the *necessaries* of life will always be more valuable than anything else whatever. If one could produce food for a hundred, we should have

1 Cultivator,	produce £1200
99 Manufacturers,	„ 1188

It is true that with what is termed a foreign trade, the manufactures of a country may be more valuable than the food produced *in that country*, but in this case, either food must be imported, or there must be a market open from whence it *could* be imported if required. [Thus the repeal of the Corn Laws has tremendously enhanced the value of manufactures; for what would formerly purchase only one bushel of

wheat will now purchase two bushels, and this, not because so much grain *is* imported, but because it *can* be imported, if required. Verily the manufacturers have been wise in their day and generation, and some of them have been well-paid for their anti-corn-law efforts. A thousand pounds a-speech is perhaps less than some have received. Their next great effort should be to abolish the Customs altogether. Were they to succeed in this, their trade would probably double, for they would become the brokers of the world as well as its manufacturers and machine-makers. Were the ports of Britain opened without a duty of any kind whatever—and they easily *might* be opened, by the substitution of a land-tax for the Customs-revenue—Britain would become the wholesale merchant of the world, and instead of our being dependent on the Continent for food, the Continent would be dependent on us for all foreign and Colonial produce, because the capital of Britain would command the produce of the earth. That country that has the lowest rate of interest would—with a perfectly free trade—become the great intermediary between the producer and the consumer. Almost all American and Asiatic productions would come *first* to England, and even then proceed *cheaper* to the Continent than they do now; and almost all Swiss, German, and French productions, would come here first to our merchants, and through them pass to America, India, China, &c.* A perfectly free

* “England might do much in affording us an outlet for this branch of industry, (as well for her home consumption as for her

trade without any Customs' interference whatever, should be the next great object of commercial Britain; and certainly the agriculturists would reap their full share of the benefit. Those who would suffer would be the great landlords—those who are too high, and mighty, and fine, to work, but who live on the profits of other men's labours.]

§ Having determined what the amount of rent ought to be, we have still to determine *who creates it*—that is, who creates the *value* of the soil?

The mere *produce* does by no means determine the *value*. A thousand bushels of wheat in one country may be worth only a hundred in another, although Colonies), if she granted a *dépôt* for our goods, subject to better regulations than those which actually exist. And England might so act without any injury to her own productions of a similar description, because, English works have a particular character and finish which is almost inimitable, and which our workmen could with difficulty attain. On the other hand, English speculators would certainly find a great advantage in being able to complete with far greater facility their assortments for foreign exportation; *while our own merchants would prefer trading directly with the English, rather than to carry on a direct commerce with distant nations.* Though there is in London a bonding *dépôt*, it offers too many disadvantages and impediments to permit us to make use of it."—*From M. Houriet's interesting account of the Swiss Watch Manufacture, given in Dr Bowring's Report on Switzerland.*

One of the greatest advantages of an absolutely free trade, would be its tendency to abolish standing armies. Confidence between nations is not to be expected, so long as each surrounds itself with a hostile barrier, designed to curtail that naturally free and *profitable* intercourse which is the evident intention of Providence. A perfectly free trade would envelope nations in a network of amity through which none would be inclined to break, whereas, the present system of Customs isolates their interests, and leaves them at liberty to fight with each other, in the vain imagination that what the one loses the other must gain. Were England to open her ports without restriction to all the world, it would change the moral tone of Europe on the subject of war.

it may take ten times the labour to produce them. A sheep in Australia may be as large and as fine as a sheep in England, but it is not of the same *value*; and as the rent of the soil is dependent on the *value* and not on the *quantity* of the produce, we see at once that a thousand acres of land in one country may be worth a rent of £500 or £1000 per annum, while a thousand acres in another may be unable to furnish any rent at all, although producing the same *quantity* of stock.

Who, then, *creates the rent-value*?—for this is, in fact, the value of the soil; and the question might be put thus,—Who is it that makes the soil to be worth what it is worth?

We affirm, in the first place, that it is *not* the landed proprietor, and *not* the cultivator. The landed proprietor, for the most part, does nothing to make the earth valuable. If he be only a landed proprietor, and have no other source of income, all that he can expend on the land is only what he has already received from it; and consequently it is the land, and not the proprietor, that furnishes the funds for those improvements which pass under the name of landlord's improvements. To sum up all that a real landlord can do, we may say that he consents to receive less rent, in the meantime, for the purpose of receiving more at some future time. The landlord is only a consumer of rent, not by any means a producer of it, although some landlords may consume a larger and some a smaller proportion. But to bring this question to a definite issue, we have

only to ask, What would be the result if *the whole* of the landlord's rent were expended on the improvement of the soil? The soil would benefit, the rent would rise, and the landlord would have nothing.

All that a landlord can do to make the soil more valuable, is only *to consent to consume a less proportion of the rent*; and assuredly he is *not* the person who gives to the soil its rent-value. The landlord, as such, produces *nothing*.

Neither is it the *cultivator*, although the cultivator is in very different circumstances from the landlord. The cultivator produces the articles, but he does not produce their *value*; he creates the grain, and bullocks, and sheep, but he does not create that exchangeable value of the grain, bullocks, and sheep, which alone gives to the soil its marketable value. He helps to do so, like every other labourer; but it does not depend on him alone to make the earth worth a rent and worth a price. An acre of land in western America may have the same capacity for producing *corn* as an acre of land in the county of Kent; but it has not the same capacity for producing *value*, and consequently it is not worth the same rent, nor the same purchase-price. Nay, land that has never been cultivated at all, may be worth much more rent, and would fetch a higher price, than the best and most productive agricultural soil. Hampstead Heath, for instance, that lies almost in a state of nature, *is worth* a very large amount of money, and certainly it is neither the lord of the manor, nor any cultivator, that has created this value in the

Heath. And that Heath, lying all untilled and unimproved, has probably been increasing gradually, but progressively, in value, since the time of the Norman conquest,—increasing in value, not from its increased fertility—for it produces nothing; not from anything that the landlord has expended on it—for he has expended nothing on it; but because the whole labours of the country have constantly increased, and the soil has become of value for other purposes than those of mere cultivation. And hence the amazing value of land in towns and cities, which is not, in the slightest degree, dependent on the landlord* or cultivators, but on those labourers who carry on the commerce and manufactures of the country, and who as clearly create the value of the soil as they create a new value in raw material.

To determine who it is that creates the rent of the soil, we have only to suppose the absence of each of the three classes of society:—first, the non-labouring landlord; second, the food-producers; and, third, the producers of articles to exchange against food: in other words, the aristocracy, the agriculturists, and the manufacturers.

First, Let us suppose the absence of the landlords. Let us take, for instance, a Scottish proprietor who *owns* (as it is called) a Scottish county. Let us suppose him removed altogether. He disappears, and leaves no representative. The lands will be

* Country landlords who *reside* in towns, of course create a new value in town lands—that is, they transfer the value from the country to the town.

worth quite as much rent as when he was present, and, whatever might be done with the rent, there would be found plenty of farmers to offer the fair market value for them. It is therefore plain, that if the rent would not be diminished by the absence or disappearance of the landlord, it is not the landlord who creates the rent. He creates nothing; he is only a consumer. The production of rent is in no respect dependent upon him.

Second, Let us now suppose that *the farmers* disappear. Let us imagine that one and all emigrate to another country. In this case, the rent would suffer a certain diminution, because *so* much competition had been removed; but by far the greater portion of rent value would still remain, because in Britain there is so large a proportion of the population not engaged in agriculture, and these would immediately offer a fair rent for the vacant lands.

Third, Let us suppose, on the other hand, that the whole population were to remove *except* the landlords and the agriculturists. (We omit, of course, the supposition of a *foreign* market for produce.) What would *now* be the result?

It is plain that, if there were no consumers except the agriculturists themselves and the landlords, there would be no market for surplus produce, and consequently no possibility of any other rent than a rent in kind. But a rent in kind could only extend to the articles produced out of the soil,—that is, to the mere feeding of the landlords. If there were no population except agriculturists, all that the landlord

could have would be his maintenance, and the proprietor of 1000 acres would have this as abundantly as the proprietor of 10,000. Unless the landlords were to *create a class* of non-agriculturists (servants to work for them), they *could* have only as much of the produce as they could personally consume. More than they could *consume* would be utterly without a value. The corn might be stored up to rot, but, if there were no purchasers, it could not be sold or exchanged, and, if it could not be exchanged, its *value* is no more. Corn, it is true, might be exchanged against meat, fish, or game; but out of this routine of eatables there could be no exit, unless there were a class producing articles to exchange against food. There would be nothing to purchase *with* the produce; consequently it would be valueless, and consequently the *rent-value* of the soil would sink down to the mere animal support of the landlords. Suppose the whole population were one million, and the capacity of the soil were equal to the support of ten millions, there would be no inducement to produce more than would supply the one million with food. The food that would support the other nine millions would be valueless, even if produced, because there would be no person to consume it.

But now, let us make this supposition. There are a million of agriculturists and landlords, and the soil is *capable* of affording food to ten millions of people by the labour of one million. The rent is a mere trifle as it must always be, where the surplus produce can-

not be disposed of. But let us suppose the nine millions of other persons suddenly introduced and engaged in producing articles to exchange against food. The rent would instantly be enormously enhanced, because the landlords would have in their hands the food (or soil capable of producing the food) of these nine millions. The agriculturists would derive *some* benefit; but the great, the enormous sum, would at once *go to the landlords*, not from any labour on their own part, but because the nine millions require food, and cannot purchase it except from the proprietors of the soil, through the agriculturists. Every individual who came, and who could produce articles that would exchange against food, would contribute to raise the rent of the soil, and consequently the wealth of the non-labouring landlords. The rent *created* by these nine millions would be equal to the value of their whole food, minus the cost of its production; and if one million of agriculturists could support nine millions of other population, the value of the food would be equal to the maintenance of nine millions, while the cost of production would, at the utmost, be equal to the maintenance of one million; so that the landlords, by the introduction of these new nine millions, would receive the value of eight millions of maintenances, without ever exerting one single effort to produce any thing that was valuable to mankind.

Consequently the great amount of *rent-value* (which determines the value of the soil) is created, not in any degree by the landlords—in a small de-

gree by the agriculturists—and in its principal degree by those who create or produce *articles to exchange against food*.

It is not to be expected, however, that the great masses of people in this country will ever clearly see this general theory of rent. They see lands increasing in value, by the expenditure of labour and capital, and they naturally enough attribute the increased value to that expenditure. They see a moor *improved*, and from half-a-crown an acre becoming worth twenty or thirty shillings of annual rent, and they jump at once to the conclusion that, because in this instance they can clearly trace the creation of rent-value, therefore *all* rent-value must originate in the same manner.

Two things, however, they do *not* see. First, that the moor is improved *because* of the increased *demand*, which demand is created neither by the landlord nor the cultivator, but by the manufacturing classes; and, second, they do not see that the general rent-value, even of improved and cultivated lands, is undergoing a *constant* process of increase, exactly as the whole industry of the country increases. A crucial instance often determines a question, and such an instance is found in Hampstead Heath, on which *no* money has been expended; or the Links of Edinburgh, which forms a small portion of the misappropriated Town-Muir. Both of these lands would now let for a very large sum of money, for building purposes, and this ground-rent which the land is *worth* has not originated in any degree whatever from any expenditure

that has been made upon the soil. Improvements create at best only a *differential* rent, and it must be remembered that this differential rent is not the rent of the *soil*, but of *the capital and labour* actually invested in it. Exactly as we should say that an ounce of gold is worth £3, 17s. 10½d.; but if that ounce of gold presented itself in the shape of a brooch made by a Birmingham jeweller, it might be worth £10, or, if made by Benvenuto Cellini, it might be worth £50. The differential value is the value of the skill, labour, and capital employed in the construction.

It is an undoubted fact, that, with the increase of the population, and consequently the increase of trades and manufactures, the rent of the soil also increases. The landlord may sit still and do nothing—he may disappear from the country—may reside at Paris, Rome, or Florence—he might even go to sleep, and sleep on; yet, through the labours of other men, his rents will undergo a constant process of expansion. Every ship that is built, every house erected, every steam engine constructed, every railway, every mechanical improvement, every new art, every thing, in fact, that produces, or facilitates to produce any new article that will exchange against food, enhances the landlord's rent, because rent is the natural profit of *labour*, and the more the *labour* increases the more the *rent* increases. The law allocates this increase to the non-labouring landlord, and this is the true and genuine reason why the labouring man receives no more for his labour, in a country that produces three, six, or ten times as much as

another country (with the same number of inhabitants), than in that other country where industry is confined to agriculture. So long as the rent of the soil is allocated to a non-labouring landlord, the mere labourer can receive no more than his maintenance. The savings-bank of Nature—nay, of Providence—is closed against him, and the bounty which Heaven had attached to *his* labour is awarded to another.

Let us see, then, how this continual increase of rent operates.

Let us suppose that, about 154 years since, the king granted certain lands to a foreigner, who happened to be a favourite—say a Bentinck, for instance. Let us assume the income of the family from those lands at £10,000 per annum, when the grant was made from the crown lands of England. The value of the lands—that is, of the *rent*—has gone on continually increasing, not from any exertions on the part of the Bentincks, but from the expansion of industry in the country. The income is now say £250,000 per annum, and if we add the extremes and multiply by half the number of years, say 77, we ascertain the enormous amount of money that this one family has derived from the labours of England. Two hundred and fifty thousand, plus ten thousand, multiplied by seventy-seven, will give twenty millions and twenty thousand pounds, drawn from the wealth of England by one family alone, because William III. gave his Dutch follower the manors of Grantham, Dracklaw, Torrington, Parting-

ton, Pevensey, &c. &c., all which belonged to the nation of England.

Thus: $(250,000 + 10,000) \quad 77 = 20,020,000.$ *

Now, for this vast sum the Bentincks have done nothing. The first was a follower of William III., another was prime minister (for which he was *paid*), another was a great horse-racer, and another, with an impertinence which is ludicrous, asked the greatest Statesman of his day, in the House of Commons, "What was the state of his income?" So superabundant, in fact, did the wealth of the family become, that the present Duke of Portland is rumoured to have said, that "he allowed himself £50,000 a-year for Tomfool's money."

In the above example, I have assumed that the rent has increased twenty-five times, within the last 154 years, and I can adduce evidence that even a greater increase has taken place—for instance, in Ayrshire and other parts of the West of Scotland.

I quote from the "*Second Report of the Children's Employment Commission*" (page 145, § 773), where it will be seen how the degradation and deterioration of the mass of the people has kept pace with the increase of the landlord's wealth. I quote the whole paragraph.

"773. In certain localities of the west of Scotland the population has of late years increased with unprecedented rapidity, and the value of property has

* In making this estimate, we assume that the increment has been equable, which is not the case, the great increase having taken place since the first American war.

been augmented in a still more remarkable degree, chiefly by the establishment of mines and iron-works, as examples of which may be cited the great iron-works of Gartsherrie, Sommerlee, Calder, Dundyvan, and Chapel Hall. These works receive a great quantity of ironstone from Rochsilloch, the property of Sir W. Alexander. The black-band here yields from 30 to 40 per cent. of iron. The output at Rochsilloch alone is 4,500 tons per month, and the annual income to the proprietor is about £12,600 per annum, from a property which, if let only for tillage, would yield but a few hundreds per annum. By a table in Robertson's *Description of Cunninghame*, it appears that on an average of all the parishes of that district, the rental was eighteen times more in 1809 than in 1653; and in Stevenson parish, the rental had become *forty-five times greater*. Villages and towns have sprung up on what at no distant period was a barren moor, containing works which give employment to hundreds of people, and for whose labour many thousand pounds per month are paid in wages." Previous institutions can of course have made no provision for the education of a population recently established in these new localities. The employed having been paid for the work done, have no further legal claim on the employer,* and have been left for the means of education to their own resources, according to the clergymen and other witnesses in the

* See on this subject an admirable little book, called "*The Race for Riches*," by the Rev. W. Arnot of Glasgow, published by Johnstone & Hunter, Edinburgh.

district, with the following result :—" Our educational and religious means have not kept pace either with the advancing population or the growing degeneracy. The means of public religion and of pastoral superintendence are not adequate to the exigencies of a growing population." "That beautiful parochial economy which the fathers of the Scottish Reformation handed down as a most precious boon to their successors, has become little more than a shadow." "The population has been left to increase, with a signal disregard not only to the comfort, but to the morality of the human machines, thus aggregated by the demand for their labour." The sub-commissioner adds, "The instances cited are only samples of the astounding change of circumstances which has occurred in certain localities within the last fifty or a hundred years. What wonder if those interests which are not the most palpable, nor the first thought of, have been overlooked?—that the ancient institutions of our country have not kept pace with such unprecedented changes?"—(*Tancred, Report Mines: App. part i., pp. 345, et seq., §§ 102, et seq.*)

Now, let us suppose that the king, instead of granting *lands* to Lord Portland, had granted £10,000 per annum in perpetuity, out of the general taxation. This would have been regarded as a hardship on the nation, although the payment would *yet*, in all probability, have been repealed, for we still find noblemen drawing so many thousands a-year from the Post-office revenues. But a grant of ten thousand per annum out of the general taxation would

have cost only £1,540,000 for one hundred and fifty-four years, so that if the increase of rent consequent on the increased industry of the country had fairly been applied to the public good, the nation would have saved between ten and twenty millions of money.

But another circumstance must be taken into consideration. A family that received a grant of land from the king cannot be *taxed* at all. It is a pure abuse of language to apply the term *taxation* to such a case. For instance, suppose the king gave lands to a family, worth £10,000 per annum, and the Parliament taxed the *lands* at £1000 per annum, I say that there is *no* tax whatever on the family,—the only effect is, that the pure benefice is reduced to £9,000 instead of being £10,000 per annum; but the £9,000 *itself* is a pure benefice. And suppose, as in the case adduced, the rental had increased to £250,000, and a tax of £100,000 were put upon the *lands*, there would not be one penny of taxation on the *family*, not one penny of deduction from anything *they laboured for*. There would only be a gift of £150,000 per annum, instead of £250,000; but the whole of the first sum is *itself* a benefice, and, however it might be diminished (even if it were to the original value at the time the grant was made), there would be *no taxation* on the family—only they would not receive so much from the nation.

But, on the contrary, when a man labours for his wealth, every penny taken from him is a tax on the *man*, and he has an undoubted right to inquire

why he is taxed, and what is done with the money.

§ We have now to determine to whom the rent-value of the soil *ought* (equitably) to be allocated.

To this there can be but one reply,—*to those who create it.*

I have said in a former work (*Theory of Human Progression*, p. 19), “It is quite evident that the earth cannot function in political economy until it is transformed into a *power of production having a value.* And to carry it forward into the science of politics, all that is requisite is to apply the axiom, ‘An object is the property of its creator;’ so that, when political economy has determined, by a scientific method which is *not* arbitrary, what value is created, and *who* creates this value, politics takes up the question where political economy had left it, and determines, according to a method which is not arbitrary, *to whom the created value should be allocated.*”

First, then, as to an objection that assumes the difficulty, or impossibility, of making an equitable distribution of the rents of the soil,—that is, of the common profits of the labour of a country.

The whole question resolves itself into this,—Has God established in the moral world of politics a moral order and system analogous to the order found in physical nature? For if so, then we must *discover* what that moral order is before the social world can be in the condition intended by Providence.

We cannot conceive for a moment that the social

world is naturally and irrevocably condemned to disorder and confusion,—to the continual struggle and warfare of adverse interests,—to an endless and hostile competition of man against his fellow,—to perpetual disunion and strife. Such may be the actual condition of society; but assuredly, if we believe in any analogy of nature, and, above all, if we believe in the possible realization of Christianity, we must believe that there *is* an order that would allow the social world to function harmoniously,—an order in which man should be the co-operator of man, and not his adversary,—an order that would bring into efficient play and actual realization the highest feelings of our nature, and the highest precepts of religion. Nay, even though, at first sight, it should appear that the principles of Christianity were contradicted by the ordinary necessities of life, let us rather believe that the world has still to find some genuine and true solution of the great problems of liberty and property,—a solution which, so far from controverting the unselfish motives prescribed for human conduct by our Lord and his apostles, shall eventually transform society into a vast exemplification of those very motives, and exhibit the world as realising, in actuality, the very fact of Christian brotherhood.

Such, at all events, is our hope. Let us never renounce our faith in the divinity of truth, or in its power to elevate mankind to a higher, a better, and a nobler state of being.

We believe, then, in the possibility of a right con-

dition of society. We believe that God, who has made harmony in nature, has not made confusion and disorder the necessary condition of human life, or human association.

To whom, then, *ought* the rents of the soil to be equitably allocated?

I do not hesitate to say, to THE NATION. For the service of the nation, taxes must be derived from some quarter or other; and if the taxes had always been derived from the rents of the soil, there never would have been any tax upon industry, any Custom-house, any Excise, or any of those restrictive measures that repress industry, while they eminently contribute to separate nation from nation, and to prevent the commercial intercourse that ultimately would have abolished war. National *property* there must be *somewhere*, and assuredly it is more *just* to take that property from the natural value of the soil, than from the individual fruits of labour. From one or other it *is* and *must be* taken; and if there would be injustice in taking it from the impersonal rent of the soil, there is certainly more injustice in taking it from the profits of individual exertion.

But let us consider what a nation is. A nation is an *association*, more or less perfectly constructed. Its construction may be accidental, moulded into more and more perfect form in the lapse of ages; or it might be theoretic, rationally and consciously devised beforehand. The old countries of Europe exhibit the first form; the colonies might have ex-

hibited the second; and, in fact, many of their arrangements are *à priori* attempts to determine the structure of the societies.

Now, if we suppose the formation of a new nation—say, a population of three millions planting themselves down in Australia or elsewhere—we can see at once what is the equitable allocation of the soil. It is evident that there ought to be a division of labour. Some ought to produce the food, some the raiment, some the dwellings, some the furniture, some the wares and articles required for all the purposes of civilised life. But how can the equitable *adjustment* be made between all the classes? To sell the land to the capitalist, is to kill the goose that would lay golden eggs for ever afterwards; it is, in fact, to cut the throat of the national prosperity, because the *value* of the soil will go on constantly increasing with the increase of the national labour, and the *future* rents have been alienated from the society for a minimum price that was the value, not of the *soil*, but of its *then* rent. If the soil, in the first instance, were worth *a rent* of a penny an acre, its *price* would be, say, 2s. 6d.,—that is, thirty years' purchase. But by the labours of the whole community (*not* of the purchaser) the rent of the same soil may come, in a few years, to be £1 per acre, and its then price would, at the same rate, be £30 per acre, the whole of the difference between 2s. 6d. and £30 having been *alienated* from the society to private individuals.

To *sell* the land is unjust to all future generations,

to every new colonist, and to every child that is born to labour. It is sacrificing the *society* for the sake of individuals. Such is *not* the just mode of arrangement.

Let us consider the question in another light. Let us suppose that our three millions divide into two *classes* : first, those who are to cultivate the soil and produce the food ; and, second, those who take *no* soil, (save, perhaps, a house *site*, &c.) What is the fair adjustment between these two classes, and how can the adjustment be brought into operation, so that each man shall have his share of the *natural* advantages, besides the produce of his own labour? I say that there is no other possible way than to reserve the rents of the soil in perpetuity to the whole community, and to expend the same for the benefit of the whole—in paying the government, the judicature, &c. ; in providing for national defence and internal police ; in constructing roads, bridges, harbours, and public works ; in providing a universal and sufficient system of education ; and in facilitating the progress of the whole community.

One million say, “ We will take the soil and produce the food ;” the other two millions say, “ We agree to take only our labour, and what we can make by our industry, provided the soil is put up to auction at stated periods, and the rents paid to the directors of the association, for the benefit of all.” This would *equalise*, at all times, the relation between the two classes, the food-producers and the producers of articles or services to exchange against

food. For, if the agriculturists were deriving too much profit, there would immediately be competition for the soil, and the rents would *rise*. If the profits from agriculture were less than the profits of other branches of industry, some would forsake agriculture and enter into competition with the traders, &c. Perfectly free competition (with the rents allocated *to the whole community*) would for ever preserve a perfect balance, and enable each man to obtain his exact share of nature, as well as the whole proceeds of his own labour. Tax upon labour there would be none; tax upon industry none; no Custom-house, no Excise, no restriction. There would only be a *land-rent*, which would be the common revenue of the association, because it is the common *produce* of the association.

This principle of allocating the rent to the community, instead of to individuals, has been partially but very imperfectly carried into operation in the gold fields of Australia. A certain advantage, of course, will accrue from paying the produce of the licenses into the colonial exchequer. This is a proper and beneficial step, and it should relieve the colony from all import duties. But the best feature of the management is the letting the soil in such minute portions that it can be available to every labourer. This of itself tends to equalise the profits of all, and to produce a *general* in opposition to an *individual* prosperity. On the whole, the arrangements are perhaps as good as could have been expected, and, though they might have been better, let us congratu-

tulate the British labourer that, in one instance, at least, he has had his fair share of the earth's advantages, and let us hope that the principle now realised for the first time may be carried into more and more extensive operation.

But let us imagine that the gold fields of Australia had been allocated to certain individuals instead of to the whole community. And what, after all, is the difference between a portion of soil that produces *gold*, and one that produces *corn*? It is neither the gold nor the corn, but the *value*, that is the real object of research; and whether that value be produced by a gold that can purchase corn, or by a corn that can purchase gold, appears a matter of the most perfect indifference. What would have been the result if the gold fields had been allocated to individuals in the same manner that corn, coal, iron, and copper fields have been allocated to individuals? The result would have been that a few would have acquired enormous wealth and retired with their families into idleness and non-production, like the landlords of other countries; while the *labourers*, the persons who actually brought the gold out of the earth by the sweat of their brows, would have received only an ordinary day's wage, like the labourers in Britain. Australia, if properly managed with regard to its *property*, might take as great a start ahead of the rest of the world as the United States did with regard to their *liberty*. The true principle, however, is partially at work, and time will show the result.*

* At the same time there is, in regard to the Australian soil, a

Several special advantages would attend the allocation of the rents of the soil to the nation.

First, All Customs and Excise might be abolished. This would permit a perfectly free trade with all countries, and a perfectly free trade would unite the various nations in a bond of amity which would not be the less secure because attended by commercial and pecuniary advantage. It would also set at liberty all persons engaged in the collection of customs, preventive service, &c., and as these are utterly unproductive in their present occupation, the nation would make a clear profit of their future labours.

Second, It would make one simple tax, which could be collected without expense, as the renters of the soil should be ordered to pay the rents into district exchequers, and be accountable for all expenses if they did not do so.

Third, It would unite the manufacturing and agricultural classes into one common interest. The more the manufactures, the more the rents of the soil would increase, and the greater would be the principle at work which, if not checked in time, will alienate the whole of the sheep-lands from the state. If the sheep licences are made renewable at a fixed rent, the soil, from leasehold, will become copyhold, and ultimately, no doubt, as good to the tenant as freehold. This disastrous result would be nothing else than robbing the community of the value of the soil for the benefit of those who may chance to hold *runs*. The only mode of equitable adjustment is to put up the runs to auction once, say, every twenty years; and surely they are more valuable to the incumbent tenants than to another person, who would have to re-settle and re-stock. A *fixed* rental, the same for all runs, is of itself utterly absurd; but if made perpetual, it would, in fact, be the grant of the soil, minus a trifling yearly payment. The Australian authorities ought to see to this most important point.

national revenue; and the greater the revenue, the more would be expended on public works, which would still farther increase the facilities for manufacture. The greater the revenue, the *better* it would be for the nation; whereas now, the greater the revenue, the worse for the nation.

Fourth, It would secure the utmost possible production that the soil was capable of affording. Millions of acres in England, Ireland, and Scotland are uncultivated, either because the proprietors are already so wealthy that they can afford to leave large tracts of land in parks, game preserves, or game muirs, or because the land, although capable of supporting a population, is not capable of producing sufficient rent to render the rent an object to the wealthy landlord. Hence the Highlands of Scotland are rapidly becoming depopulated.

Fifth, It would eminently tend to secure the education of the people; because—as the state would be directly interested in the labours of every man, and an educated population would always be more productive than an ignorant population—the state would immediately have a direct interest in raising the character of the people; in suppressing all that was detrimental to their welfare; in encouraging skill, industry, and talent, and, consequently, in providing the fullest possible instruction for the whole nation; for the more the people were educated, the more intelligent would all labour become, and the more would the national revenue increase under the influence of intelligent labour.

Sixth, It would secure to every labourer his share of the previous labours of the community. It is quite evident that a greater amount of outlay has been made on the island of Great Britain than on any other part of the world of similar extent. In harbours, roads, railroads, land improvements, houses, towns, &c. &c., England is unequalled. Yet the labourer who inherits all these facilities is not so well off as in Arkansas or Wisconsin, where no capital has been previously expended. This in itself is a sufficient proof that there is something wrong in the very construction of society; for undoubtedly a man born in a country where thousands of millions have been expended in rendering the country more suitable for man's requirements, ought to find his labour better remunerated than in a country that remains in a state of nature. All the previous expenditure of Great Britain goes to swell the landlord's rent, instead of tending to improve the condition of the labourer. On the contrary, if the rents were allocated to the nation, the condition of each man would improve, not merely through his own labours, but through the labours of all who had gone before him, which is fair and just, and which, in fact, constitutes a *nation*. Only under such circumstances can there be any moral obligation on one generation to defray the debts or liabilities incurred by a previous generation, for a *national debt* may morally be a debt on the **PROPERTY** of the country (the property, for instance, having been preserved from the effects of foreign invasion), but a national debt can never be

morally a debt on those who inherit nothing but their labour.

Seventh, The allocation of the rents of the soil to the nation is the only possible means by which a *just* distribution of the created wealth can be effected. It is true that this is not the only requisite—for a systematic co-operation in the whole field of labour is also needful—but is the first main requisite, the first necessary arrangement of society which would prevent the profits of labour from escaping, as they now continually do, *from* the labourers *to* a class that labours not, yet constantly increases in wealth. So long as the rents of the soil are allocated to individuals, there is a continual drain upon the natural profits of labour,—a drain that perpetually condemns the unskilled labourer to receive no more than a maintenance,—a drain that robs industry of its true reward, and that only tends to swell the revenues of a small number of families who could be removed from the nation without leaving the nation one shilling the poorer. But if, on the contrary, the rents of the soil were allocated to the nation—that is, to the whole associated community—the condition of the labourer would continually improve, because he would inherit a continually improving country. Every expenditure upon the country, if judiciously made, would make the country produce *more* with the same amount of labour, exactly as the improvement of a machine enables it to do more work with the same expenditure of human labour—and, in fact, the soil of a country is only a vast and complicated

machine that manufactures, under human skill and labour, the various necessaries and luxuries of human existence. Now, if England be the most improved machine in the known world, the labourer in England ought to receive a higher reward than elsewhere,—and for this reason, that he *produces* more with the same amount of labour. But so long as mere labour is separated from what it produces, it never can receive its legitimate reward—nor would its remuneration rise even if the productions were a thousand times greater than they are. The labourer would receive only his maintenance, and the extra profits would go to the landowner and the capitalist.

And *Finally*, It is the law of God, as declared in the constitution of the terrestrial world, and the law of Christianity, as declared in the written Scriptures, that the industrious man should be rich, and that the man who labours not should be poor. The whole economy of Britain is a direct infringement of this great law of property—of this great and fundamental principle which God established for the economical government of the world, when he made the earth to yield its riches in return for human labour. The richest men in England are those who do *not* labour, and who never did labour. And their wealth is secured in such a manner that it descends from generation to generation, and goes on constantly increasing without any exertion on their own part. Were they to sleep for a hundred years, they would wake more wealthy than ever; and if they did wake, they would wake only to encumber the industry of

the country, to retard its progress, to prevent the amendment of its institutions, and to maintain a party warfare against its real prosperity. As a class they are antagonistic to industry, enemies to freedom and to progress, barriers to the civilization of the world, living on the fruits of other men's labours, yet hating the toil which alone endows them with wealth. They are the evil remnants of the feudal system, who, in their faded power, have sunk into the bribers and corrupters of the electors of the country. They are the fatal heritage which France was obliged to remove, and which America, happily for herself, has never known. They are the true "*surplus population*"—ever consuming, nothing producing—fed, clothed, and sheltered at the expense of the nation, and returning to the nation nothing but hindrance to its welfare.

Such a system—a shilling a-day to a labourer who *does* labour, and a thousand pounds a-day to a lord who does *not* labour—such a system contains within itself either the elements of national decay, or the elements of national disaster. Either the nation must be sacrificed to the landed interest, or the landed interest (composed of thirty or thirty-five thousand families, in Great Britain) must be sacrificed to the interests of the nation. Either the population will found or seek new countries where labour shall meet with a more equitable reward, or a war of classes will ultimately ensue, having for its theme, not *liberty*, as in former days, but *property*. If the population diminish—and it seems already to

have that tendency—England must relatively decay, and, notwithstanding all her wealth, fall into the rear of those younger nations, where the spirit of man is esteemed of more importance than the mere wealth he can create. And if, on the contrary, the labourers of England go on increasing as heretofore—the wealth of the few standing out continually in stronger and stronger contrast with the poverty and degradation of the many—there must come a time when the classes will enter into a struggle of which none can foresee the results. It may be a peaceable struggle, but for the time it must be attended by those disasters which—like the fevers that cure a long course of constitutional derangement—bring many latent evils to the surface, disfigure the aspect of society, and for a time engender a tumultuous life of present suffering—although, it *may be*, of future health.

The great requisite, then, is to return to the laws of Nature, of Providence, of God—to let the skilful and industrious man be rich, and not to accord wealth to those who produce nothing for the welfare of mankind. If, as I have endeavoured to prove, the rents of the soil are only the common profits of the whole labours of the community, the rents of the soil are the only legitimate source of taxation—the only possible source from which the revenues of the nation can equitably be derived. To tax labour is to disunite society—it makes the nation only an aggregation of unassociated individuals. To tax the rents of the soil is to unite society—it makes the

nation a community bound together by the ties of a common interest, and a common welfare. This is the true, and the only true, theory of a *Nation*—that the soil belongs to it in perpetuity, and never can be alienated from it; and that he who will give the greatest rent for the soil becomes its cultivator, and pays the rent to the nation for the benefit of the whole community. Then, but not till then, will labour reap its natural reward—the reward appointed by Providence in the divine constitution of the terrestrial economy. Then will the welfare of one be the welfare of all—then will men be banded together by a true citizenship—and then will the first great step be taken towards that mighty brotherhood which springs from our common parentage, and which is at once the promise and the prophecy of the Christian faith—

“And man to man the world ower
Shall brothers be, an’ a’ that.”

SEPARATE DISSERTATION.

MORAL DYNAMICS;

OR, THE GENERAL THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION, WITH THE APPLICATION OF THAT THEORY TO EXISTING INSTITUTIONS.

[THE reader must carefully remember, that *an institution* is only *a mode of human action*, and every action of *present* men requires a justifying reason as much as if the action were now performed for the first time. The name *institution* adds no extra validity to the reason of the action.

“There is a presumption in favour of every existing institution.”

By *institution* we must understand, in politics, an institution established *by law*, or established through custom, and sustained and enforced by law. And by the substitution of an equivalent we get rid of the term *institution*, and supply its place by a term expressive of its general value, namely, *a mode of human action*. Consequently, we must consider the above proposition of Archbishop Whately to mean, “There is a presumption in favour of every existing *mode of*

human action, systematically established or supported by human laws." Having thus reduced the *term* of the question, it is plain that the question itself must be reasoned as a portion of moral dynamics, for no conclusion would be possible were we to omit *the action of men* in originating the institution.]

"There is a presumption in favour of every existing institution."—(*Archbishop Whately's "Rhetoric,"* p. 100.)

"Christianity being nothing *new* to him, and the *presumption** being in favour of it, while the burden of proof lies on its opponents, he is not stimulated to seek reasons for believing it, till he finds it controverted."—(*Whately's "Logic,"* p. 442, 7th edition.)

We deny the propositions.

We deny, *1st*, that there is a presumption in favour of every existing institution (that is, institution *established by men*); and, *2d*, We deny that the onus of proof lies on the objector. [That is, on him who objects to a human institution which requires *money to be paid, service to be rendered, or liberty to be restricted*. We confine our remarks, of course, exclusively to those institutions that *interfere* with men. Where there is no *interference*, either by force, fraud, or defamation, the institution does not come within the region of probabilities.]

Archbishop Whately is, in our estimation, one of the best and most useful authors of the present day; and having said this, we shall be free to controvert

* The italics are in the original.

what we conceive to be an erroneous principle, even though it have for its supporter so able and so distinguished a writer.*

We shall view the propositions in two lights: *1st*, As to where the onus of proof lies, when an existing institution is called in question. *2d*, As to the *probability* that exists in favour of already established institutions.

We presume that the propositions must mean, either that "existing institutions are probably beneficial," or that "the onus of proof lies on those *who object* to existing institutions."

[We use *beneficial* as a general term, to signify any of the conditions that would warrant the continuance of the institution.]

We deny both of these propositions. We maintain that the history of political institutions makes it more probable than not that an existing institution is *not* beneficial.

And we also maintain that the onus of proof invariably, and in every circumstance whatever, lies on him who causes the institution to exist, or to continue to exist, provided it be of a political nature and affect society.

* Dr Whately, in fact, appears to have abandoned the above positions, if we may judge from the following quotation:—"As no clear and strong case has been made out of important advantage to the public from such restriction, I take my stand on the broad general principle, that *every restriction is an evil in itself*—the burden of proof lying on the advocates of *any restriction to show its necessity.*" . . . "You are at liberty to refer to me as approving of the abolition of the restriction on marriage to which you allude."—(Archbishop Whately, in a Letter to G. A. Crowder, Esq.)

The application of this question is of far greater extent than at first sight appears. It not only involves one of the most radical principles of knowledge, but extends to the institutions of every country in the world, and to the process by which bad institutions ought to be abolished. No apology, therefore, is requisite in bringing it to a definite discussion.

We hold it to be one of the first principles of all true philosophy, "that the onus of proof lies on him who comes forward with the *positive* proposition, however much or however little that proposition may be connected with existing credence or existing institutions."

A proposition believed on sufficient evidence is *Truth* or *Knowledge*.*

A proposition believed without sufficient evidence is *Superstition*.

And a proposition believed contrary to evidence is *Error*.

* The terms *truth* and *knowledge* are not always synonymous. Knowledge is always viewed as existing *in the mind*, as being one form of *credence*; truth, on the contrary, is sometimes viewed (and spoken of) as external to the mind, as being in fact *reality*. The terms *subjective* and *objective* would express the distinction, and we might say, "Knowledge is always subjective—truth is sometimes viewed as subjective, sometimes as objective," were it not that the terms subjective and objective have assumed an almost technical sense in some of the higher speculations of philosophy. The expression, "Knowledge is subjective," would, to a certain class of philosophers, be tantamount to an admission of what is called *philosophic scepticism*; its opposite, to an admission of *philosophic dogmatism*. In philosophy, instead of speaking of the subjectivity or objectivity of knowledge, it would be much better to substitute the terms, subjective *veracity* of knowledge, objective *veracity* of knowledge.

An existing institution must have been established at some period or other. At the period of its establishment, there either were or were not sufficient reasons *for* its establishment. If there were not, clearly the institution ought not to have been established. But if there were, those reasons, being the only grounds of the existence of the institution, must ever remain extant and forthcoming; for if they be forgotten or unknown, the institution will of necessity fall into the case of existing without grounds or reasons. And if it exist without grounds or reasons it ought to be discontinued. An institution, therefore, that has not sufficient reasons of existence, ready for production, ought to be abolished by those who have the power, provided that institution cost money or trouble to society.

It must be observed that an institution which continues to affect society—costs money or trouble—is very different from one that was established by a first outlay, and does not continue to cost money or trouble. Let us take a museum, for instance. Suppose a collection of almost *worthless* articles had been made a hundred years ago by the king, and his majesty had erected a very costly edifice for the reception of his lumber; let us suppose the amount of outlay to have been far beyond the value of the institution, are we now called upon to *abolish* that institution because the reasons for its existence were insufficient at the first? By no means; what we have to do with is, how much does the institution now cost compared with the benefit it now produces?

The collection may, to a certain extent, be worth something as a public exhibition, or as a "curiosity shop;" and its present cost for a conservator may be very trifling. If the building is not required for some better purpose, all we have to take into consideration is the present amount of benefit weighed against the present amount of expense. The first great outlay has nothing whatever to do with the question of present continuance or abolition. And why? Because we cannot recover it by abolishing the institution. An institution that *costs nothing* is negative, and the man who objects to it must prove it to be *prejudicial*, if he wish it abolished. If it cost nothing, and be not prejudicial, it would be absurd to require any one to prove it to be *beneficial*, because we have only to let it alone—it does not interfere with us.

Suppose any person were to propose pulling down the pyramids, because the first cost of their erection must have far exceeded the benefit produced, we immediately see that this objector to the pyramids is holding the *positive* proposition, and is wishing to produce the *positive* action. On him the onus of proof must lie.

But suppose any person were to propose that the bears of Berne should be struck off the pension list, and no longer kept at the public expense. [Taking the bears "*extensively*" to signify *all who consume at the public expense.*]

It is easy to perceive an essential difference between the position of the objector to the pyramids and the objector to the bears.

Bears *eat*, and pyramids do not eat. The objector to the bears occupies the negative position, and says, "Why am I to pay money?" The patron of the bears is continually compelling him to pay money; and if he have no good reason for the compulsion, most assuredly the compulsion is unjustifiable. The onus, therefore, lies on him who occupies the positive position, whether he be *the conservative* or *the abolitionist*. The principle is universal, and of universal application, "that the onus of proof lies on him who advances the positive proposition." And every institution that requires money now to be expended, labour to be done, or liberty to be restricted, is occupying a *positive* position, and consequently is obnoxious to the onus of proof.

Let it be remembered that an institution is only *a name*, and however long that name may have been in use, every new payment and every continued restriction is as much a positive act, requiring a justifying reason, as the very first payment that was made, or the first restriction that was enforced.

What distinguishes modern science from ancient superstition? The one single fact that the positive proposition is not to be admitted until accompanied by evidence. And what is *observation*? Merely the getting of *evidence*. In fact, Bacon's principles of induction are neither more nor less than "get evidence, and be sure that it *is* evidence."

Between truth and superstition there is no difference whatever, except that the propositions of truth are backed by evidence, and the propositions of

superstition are groundless assumptions of the fancy or the passions.

But in the matter of institutions that affect society there is a superadded substantive that must not be forgotten—*Justice*.

It is true that the whole question is a question of the proof of a proposition : settle where the onus lies, and the question is decided. But it must not be forgotten, that in that proposition more is involved than mere speculative truth or error. Human rights, and human liberties, and human emancipation from the reign of power, are at stake. Pain is involved, and degradation is involved, and tyranny, and injustice, and slavery.

The proposition with regard to institutions is not one of *credence* merely, but of *politics*,—of human action in the figure of society ; and any institution whatever, political or ecclesiastical, that does in any way interfere *positively*, whether by compulsory payment or compulsory restriction, ought at once to be abolished, however long it may have existed, if it cannot now produce sufficient reason, that is, now a valid ground of existence, and that would, so far as the institution is *now* positive, be a valid ground of new establishment, if the institution did not exist.

The question, “Why am I to pay, and why am I restricted?” must always meet a sufficient answer, or otherwise the payment and restriction must necessarily be unjust.

But let us view Archbishop Whately’s proposi-

tion in the other light as to the *probability* that has, up to the present day, existed *in favour* of existing institutions.

And here the question may again be viewed generally, as to the probability of human credence being *correct*, or particularly as to human action in the matter of politics being either just or beneficial.

A *probability* (which we suppose is intended by *presumption*) depends on the relative number of the whole cases in the generic category, as compared with those cases that belong to the specific category involved in the question.

The question now becomes a matter of *history*, and assumes the form, "Have men generally believed *truth* concerning politics, and have men generally established *just* or *beneficial* institutions?"

If they have, then is the probability in favour of an existing credence or existing institution; and if they have *not*, then is the probability not in favour of an existing credence or existing institution.

It can scarcely be denied that the progress of human belief has been a progress from superstition towards truth, and that the progress of human action in society has been a progress from the extreme of injustice to the continual diminution of injustice.

We say *superstition*,—we might have said *error*. It would be strange, indeed, if the probability were *in favour* of existing credences.

Let us understand, in the first place, how the probability can be measured.

The question is not as to all credence, but as to that credence that relates to institutions which affect society,—“What have men *believed* (or professed to believe) on the subject of political and religious institutions, and what have men done towards each other, systematically?”

If the generality of men in all ages have held true propositions concerning the equitable relations of men, then is the probability in favour of an existing credence; and if the generality of social institutions established by men have been just (equitable), then is the probability in favour of an existing institution, when we are supposed to know nothing more of it than that it exists.

The word *presumption* appears to indicate that probability (either for or against) that may be ascertained without investigating the specific evidence that relates to the individual subject in question,—*e. g.*, The man mentioned in a certain history was a negro, therefore it is to be *presumed* that he was black; but exceptional cases do occur, and a negro is not *necessarily* black, although the vast majority are. Again, it is to be *presumed* that an infant will speak (if it live) when it arrives at the age of two or three years,—and why? because the vast majority of infants do speak when arrived at that age, and the probability of the presumption is equal to the number of all who do so speak, divided by the whole number who are born and live to that age.

Now, in the matter of human credence or of human institution, is there any such probability as

this (or any probability of a similar *kind*) *in favour* of their correctness?

The whole history of human credence has been a history of error.* Men have always held *opinions*, and no age of the world can be adduced as the time when men were content with that legitimate state of doubt, which is the proper attitude of the human mind when it has not satisfactory evidence before it. Men have always believed, and believed when they had no means of knowledge. Such belief is error, and such error has been universal, even in those departments whose laws and measures are now correctly ascertained.

Where was truth, except among the Hebrews? One small race, amid the nations of the earth, still preserved some knowledge of the true Creator, and who even sunk so low that the number who had not bowed the knee to Baal scarcely surpassed the number of human beings who are born in a midnight watch. And even when the night of error was dispelled by the manifestation of the incarnate Deity, and when truth was published in every land and in every tongue,—when the prince of this world was seen to fall like lightning from heaven,—and when the glorious tidings of life and immortality were proclaimed throughout the earth, where was that acceptance of the truth that would make it more probable than not that existing credence is

* Including superstition, which we know to have been error, although it was sometimes only superstition in those who had *no evidence* either for or against.

correct? Three-fourths of the world are still professedly serving another than Jehovah, and even those who would seem to fear that Holy Name are, for the most part, steeped in superstition, and given over to a blinded heart, by the delusions of that strange system of iniquity, whereby the priest is exalted above all that is called God, when he forgives sin by a bloodless sacrifice,—for without blood there is no remission of sin.

Error and idolatry have been almost universal in the matter of religion, and therefore it is more probable than not that an existing credence is not correct.

And if from religion we turn to nature, do we behold men believing *truth*, or even opinionless, in doubt, and without belief; or do we observe them believing with the most extreme credulity, with the most perfect faith, and teaching *error*, as if to *err* were an impossibility? The wildest notions have been believed realities, and that not merely by the unlettered multitude,—not by the superstitious vulgar,—but by the man of intellect and education,—by those, in fact, who possessed most knowledge in the times in which they lived.

But, if men have almost universally held erroneous propositions on the subject of their relations to the Deity, and on the subject of nature and her laws, we find the universality of error as rampant and as broadly marked on the subject of man's relation to man. If idolatry has been almost universal, it has had a sister evil, and the two have walked hand in hand—*Slavery*.

What country in the world can be adduced (except Canaan, before the monarchy) where the political constitution was based on the principles of equity?

There have been theocracies and monarchies, and aristocracies and democracies, and where is the single one amid all the nations of the earth that has exemplified the principles of equity? Where is the bright spot on earth's fair surface where men have refrained from systematic injustice, and which has not been polluted by the step of the oppressor?

As men have partially emerged from the cloud of superstition that encircled the sciences, so are they now just commencing to emerge from the false beliefs of political superstition; but certainly the progress has not reached the point (even in Britain, the freest state that ever formed an association) where it can be justly said that the probability is in favour of an existing institution.

Till Cromwell's time there was a tyranny, and since that time there has been the gradual and slow destruction of those exclusive privileges that the few had grasped by power to the fatal detriment of the many.

The history of liberty has been exclusively a history of *destruction*—of the destruction of licentious power. So far from men having commenced their association by the gradual establishment of institutions which were supposed to be beneficial, all history teaches us that men commenced at the farthest possible remove from equity, and that every step in

the onward progress of improvement has been only an abolition of injustice. From the time that Cain lifted the unrighteous hand of power against his brother, the history of mankind has been little more than a repetition of the dread offence, varied with time and circumstance, it is true, but essentially the same in all its attributes of wickedness.

The reign of WILL (on earth) is always and in every case a tyranny, and the reign of will has been almost universal. Democracies have been little or no better than monarchies or aristocracies, for the *privileged citizen* is only one tyrant out of many, and the man who was not a citizen was wholly or partially a slave. Even in that great republic of the Western Continent, where men boast of *liberty*, and blaspheme the sacred name of *freedom*, they have yet to learn the first element of justice, which is the paramount supremacy of *law* made *equally* for all men, and *equally* administered.

One by one, the institutions of the darker ages have been cast down by the pressure of popular intelligence, stimulated by the suffering that ever accompanies injustice. One by one, these institutions have been found inequitable and detrimental; and one by one have they been found to require remodelling and reforming,—a process that has ever taken place against the will of those in power, and that has only been achieved by the absolute necessity of concession.

New institutions are not often established in the present day; but old ones are frequently destroyed, and destroyed because, so far from their being bene-

ficial, they are so detrimental that their existence can no longer be tolerated.

It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the presumption is in favour of an existing institution, when we see existing institutions melting away one after the other, in a constant succession, which is more or less rapid, according to the progress of the community in knowledge and in virtue.

England is undoubtedly the freest great State that history presents to us. The process of destroying all that appears as *restriction on liberty* is fast drawing to a termination. And the political institutions that shall remain after the process is complete, will then have a presumption in their favour, provided the anterior period of history be left out of the account. There are questions, however, that still remain to be discussed, and that involve the elements of a social struggle, which may or may not lead to a revolution, according to the pertinacity of the privileged classes. Those questions are, "Whose is the land, and how should it be divided?" The institutions of England, so far as *liberty* is concerned, have undergone so much improvement, that the questions which remain in that category are, for the most part, questions of expediency rather than of justice. But the struggle concerning *property* (*natural property*) has now to be commenced, and it is altogether impossible for any one to predict how many transformations may take place, before the time arrives when every unprivileged man shall have recovered his natural property as well as his natural liberty.

But while we maintain that the majority of human institutions have been of such a character as to make it more probable than not that the average of existing institutions are bad, and ought to be abolished, there remains a much higher view of the question, and one that must not be overlooked.

God has made institutions as well as man. The institutions of God are the institutions of nature, which ought never to be departed from without sufficient reason.

There is in every case, (except in the one case of man's moral depravity) a presumption in favour of the institutions of *nature*.

It is true that much misunderstanding may arise concerning this view of the question, inasmuch as some men are so constituted as not to distinguish the *principle* of nature from the actual illustration of the principle found in the works of creation. And it may be conceived by some that we intend to laud a state of savagism, and to depreciate the blessings of civilization.

Nothing can be farther from our thoughts. In nature we find no ships, no steam-engines, no clocks, no looms, no telescopes, &c. &c., and yet the principles of nature are the essential principles without which those varied mechanisms could be of no possible utility. They do not *infringe* the principles of nature, they only *apply* them to a particular case.

And what more artificial than a steam-engine, or a chronometer, or a cotton-mill?

There is, therefore, no *antagonism* between the

principles of nature and the most complex application of these principles, as exhibited in the beautiful results of human ingenuity.

And so with politics. We plead not for the actual conditions of men, in what is erroneously called a state of nature, but for the natural principles that may be gathered from those conditions.

The *conditions* of matter exhibit the crude material from which man makes his mechanism. Instead of the chronometer we have the iron ore, instead of the lens the sand and the silex; and it would be as absurd to reproach the mechanic with a desire to reduce his mechanism back to its first material form, when he was studying the laws of *nature* in its construction, as it is to reproach the politician with a desire to re-establish savagism when he studies the principles of nature, and maintains that human institutions, however complex or however artificial, should be made in the nearest possible accordance with such of those principles as have been correctly ascertained.

Let us for a moment view nature in the three forms of substantial, intellectual, and moral. [We are well aware of the utter ambiguity of the human language when applied to morals. *May, can, ought, capable, competent, power, cause, reason, &c. &c.*, are all ambiguous terms, employed to signify *both* or *either* of the two great classes of human thought, that relate to *what is*, or to *what ought to be done*. Language may improve hereafter with the perfection of the science of morals, but in the meantime it is scarcely possible to be so explicit as not to convey

some meaning that was not intended, or to fail to convey some meaning that was intended. And therefore we profess only to attempt an elucidation which may, or may not, be understood, according to the intellectual habits of the reader. If he have been accustomed (as some men we have met) to view nature exclusively in the light of ontology, and to view morals as a mere fancy of the imagination, and not as one of the original essentials of the human constitution, we cannot hope to render our view intelligible, much less to render it instructive.]

When we survey external nature, we find that everything has a *natural condition*, although that natural condition is very rarely exemplified in the *actual conditions* of matter. The natural or negative condition of matter is matter in a state of *rest*, and yet it is impossible to find any matter whatever that is in an *actual state* of rest. All matter that we are acquainted with (in the solar system, at all events) appears to be in a state of continual motion. And why? Because it is acted upon by what men term *force*. Force is requisite to move matter, and wherever motion is perceived, man invariably infers force as the agent that causes a change in the natural condition. The state of rest is *negative*, the state of motion *positive*, and a cause is invariably requisite to change the negative into the positive state, which cause men term force.

The natural condition of fluids, again, is a state of general equilibrium, producing a perfectly level surface. Yet how small a quantity of the real fluid on

the globe presents a level surface? The ocean *never* does.

Again, the natural condition of the atmosphere appears to be a state of darkness, requiring some exciting *cause* to render objects visible. The same principle may be carried throughout nature, and what we wish to fix the reader's attention on is the universal and necessary credence of man that every change from the natural condition must have a sufficient cause. These causes are supposed universally present whenever there is an *action*.

We now turn from the world material to the world intellectual.

The *natural condition* of the mind is one of absolute ignorance or non-credence. The abstract preparation exists in the mental constitution, but the exciting cause must first be presented before the mind changes its *negative* for its *positive* state. Now, let us remark that we have stepped out of a region where every action had a sufficient cause (the phenomena of nature are *constant*), into a region where the same effects do not always follow from the same causes. And yet we feel that there is a propriety in the matter of credence, exactly analogous to that of the actions of matter; that is, *credence* should follow a sufficient cause, exactly in the same manner as *motion* succeeded a sufficient cause. Which is equivalent to—the negative state of the mind should only be departed from, when a positive force or cause is brought to bear on it.

The cause of motion is called force.

The cause of true credence is called evidence.

But from some derangement in man's nature, credence (although never originating without a cause) does not follow exactly in so constant a manner as to enable us to say that every credence has a sufficient cause. That is, man is superstitious, and believes the far-off proposition, without being able to trace all the links that ought to connect that proposition with his perceptions or his axioms. And yet we never hesitate to assert dogmatically that every credence *ought* to be based on sufficient evidence. All men accustomed to reason at all, immediately posit the proposition that credence should be based on evidence. But what does this mean? Merely that the *negative* state of non-credence should not be exchanged for the *positive* state of credence, without a sufficient cause, which cause is here called evidence, or a *reason*, or, by analogy, an intellectual *force*, because it makes the mind progress or change its place in a manner analogous to external force, which makes matter progress or change its place; force of evidence, force of argument, &c.

We have now one form of the word *ought*. It has been said that credence *ought* to follow, and that if there be no evidence there *should* be no credence. It is evident, however, that the words *ought* and *should* apply to man's conception of intellectual propriety, which is in fact nothing more than the intuitive principle of causation applied to the mind instead of to external nature. It is only a portion of the universal axiom, "Every change must have a cause,"

where the word *must* is endowed with an ambiguity that permits it to apply to both cases. We do not attach to this form of the word *ought* the conception of moral *responsibility*, but only of intellectual responsibility, and we view that man to be pitied rather than blamed whose intellectual belief does not respond to the evidence before him. It will be observed that we have come to material action, and to intellectual action, but that we have not yet come to *moral* action, and have not yet had to do with the *will*.

It must be observed, that although the belief in the existence of external causes is intuitive or axiomatic, yet the *cause* is never capable of appreciation, except through the produced phenomenon. The substantives are appreciable—the conditions of the substantives are appreciable—and the phenomena, that is, the *changes in the conditions of the substantives*, are also appreciable. But the *cause* of the change is not appreciable, and is only inferred by the universal axiom, "Every change must have a cause." The *character* of this cause is inferred from a comparison of phenomena, and such a character must be assigned as coincides with the character of all the phenomena that can be observed. When a cause is assigned that would, by acting *regularly*, produce the observed changes in the observed conditions, the phenomenon is said to be *explained*. The ancients assigned particular causes to particular phenomena. The moderns, on the contrary, have shown that the same cause, acting according to a certain regular law, is sufficient to produce a whole class of phenomena,

or perhaps, indeed, *the whole* class that can be assembled together in the same category.

It is now customary for scientific men to reject the *cause*, and to study exclusively the law of the phenomenon—that is, the measure of the change that invariably accompanies the same conditions. Nothing can be more proper than this mode, although, like every thing else, it has been brought to bear against religion, and arguments against a First Cause have been in the most silly manner based upon the exclusion of causes from science. It must be remembered, however, that each science is only a single branch of knowledge, and so long as that branch is considered alone, and the first principle *assumed*, the cause may afterwards be left out of account in every succeeding investigation that does not go beyond the limits of that one particular science.

Thus the mechanic assumes the existence of force, the chemist the existence of affinity, and the physiologist the existence of vital force, and all that then remains to be done is to measure the law of sequence. Now, force cannot be proven to exist, except through the axiomatic judgment of mankind, that “every change has a cause.” Muscular resistance gives rise to the notion of mechanical *force*; but what is meant by force?—(we do not mean what is its definition, because force is a simple concept, and cannot be defined, but what is force, when we cannot appreciate it, as we can the substantives that are acted upon by force, and the changes in the conditions of those substantives or portions of matter?)

The change in the mechanical condition of matter is called Motion.

The change in the chemical condition of matter is called Combination, &c.

And the change in the physiological (not the pathological) condition of a material organ is called Function.

Now, the motion, the combination, and the function being changes, must have causes (axiomatically).

And the cause of motion is called *Force*.

The cause of combination is called *Affinity*.

The cause of function is called *Vital Force*.

Now, of force, affinity, or vital force, we know absolutely nothing *immediately*, and only arrive at them by this process of axiomatic judgment that teaches us their *existence*, or leads us to assume their existence in obedience to a law of our constitution. Human language must follow the law of man's mental constitution, and causes, forces, affinities, &c. &c., must all be made *nouns substantive*, although no man can appreciate directly either the one or the other. Let us suppose that the natural philosopher were to abandon the substantive *force*, and the chemist the substantive *affinity*, and the physiologist the substantive *vital force*, and that they were to confine themselves (as they might, in inductive observation) to the *measure of the change*, which measure can be expressed in statistics and reduced to a law.

Let us suppose these substantives altogether excluded from the physical *sciences*. Would there be the slightest change in the character of human cre-

dence as to the necessity of causes to produce motion, combination, or function? Assuredly not. An inductive science in its own department may leave the cause out of the account; but when we go one step farther back, we must come again to the universal axiom, "Every change must have a cause."

We said that the substantives were appreciable. We do not mean the *matter*. Matter is in much the same circumstances as force or causes. We can no more *appreciate* matter than we can appreciate *force*. Both are inferred according to certain laws of the human constitution. We appreciate *properties*, but we know nothing whatever about the *substantia* to which the properties are axiomatically referred by the universal intuition. "Wherever there is an appreciable property, there is also a substance"—just as, "Wherever there is a motion, there is a force."

The intuition of *causation* is one of the essential conditions of man's rational nature. It is of universal existence in the human race, and of universal application to every object of human thought.

It applies, first, To substantial existence.

Second, To the existence of phenomena.

Third, To the existence of human thought.

Fourth, To the existence of human action.

Human thought, inasmuch as it is an action, is an intellectual phenomenon.

Human action is divided into non-moral and moral. [A word is required to distinguish what is here signified by *non-moral*; we mean such action as has for its essential character the production of an

end *merely*. Moral action, on the contrary, takes the character of the *end* as well as of the *means* into account. Utility is one of the nearest words to the intended signification, but utility has been employed to signify *beneficial end* as well as *any end*, and it is necessary to distinguish between action as well calculated to produce a desired end, and action as well calculated to produce a good end. A *bad end* may be *desired*, and the means taken to produce that end may be admirably adapted to the purpose. In which case the rule of the action is *correct*, but the whole action is *improper*.]

The principle of causation assumes various forms, according to its application to these four classes of thought.

The *universal* form of causation is, "Every change must have a cause."

And according to the various character of the *changes*, the human mind gives a particular form and name to the *cause*.

Thus, "Every thing that commences to *exist* must have a cause of existence." From non-existence to existence there is a *change*, and the cause of that change, when applied to a primary substance (matter or mind), is called the creator. When matter exists it may change its place. This change is called *motion*, and the cause of motion is called *force*.

But matter may not only change its position in space, but also change its intensive character by *combination* with other matter of a different character. This change of intensive composition is called com-

bination, and the cause of combination is called affinity.

But matter may assume a certain form calculated to produce a certain end. The matter is then called organic, and the changes it exhibits in the production of the end are called *functions*, and the cause of a function is called a vital or organic force. This process may be pursued throughout every branch of knowledge relating to the actions of matter, and the principle is found universal, that "wherever man observes a change, there he infers a cause."

The same principle applies to *mind*, but unfortunately man is no longer in the condition in which God created him, and the harmony that exists universally in the material creation is found to be only partial in the world of mind.

The term, *sufficient cause*, has frequently been objected to, and perhaps not altogether without reason. But it still appears to have a very definite signification in the natural sciences when we reflect that although *causation* is *à priori*, all particular *causes* are *à posteriori*, and sufficient cause is only a name for that cause that *does* invariably the same change in the same circumstances. Thus the cause of gravitation is called *weight*, and we have no difficulty in conceiving what is meant by a sufficient weight. Suppose we have three cubes of gold so similar in weight that any two placed in the opposite scales of a true balance hold each other in equilibrium. *One* of these cubes is *sufficient* (or a sufficient cause) to maintain both the other cubes in equilibrium, if it be

removed twice the distance from the fulcrum. And this holds *constant*.

The *constancy* of phenomena is at the basis of all that is intended by sufficient cause in the natural sciences.*

When we turn to mind, however, we find *irregular*, or *non-constant* phenomena.

The cause of credence is evidence. And yet the same evidence does not invariably produce the same credence; and what is more, credence, to an immense extent, exists, not without some cause, but without the existence of that evidence without which the credence is superstition. That is, the evidence is not sufficient.

We have here, then, the basis of a distinction, namely, between the cause that *does* produce credence, and the cause that *ought* to produce it.

Nothing analogous is found in the world of matter, where all is regularly constant and perfectly harmonious.

It forms no part of our intention to inquire whether men *do* or *do not* really believe such propositions as are unsupported by sufficient evidence; all we have to do with is, "They profess to believe them, and act on their profession."

The character of such belief may, perhaps, ever

* Not that *constancy* is at the bottom of man's principle of causation—for this is perfectly absurd and untenable; but that it is at the bottom of our determination of all *particular causes*. Primary and underived reason gives us *causation*; but the observation of constants alone gives us the connection between particular causes and particular effects.

remain one of those mysteries from which the inquiring mind is obliged to retire, after all its investigations, without a single gleam of further light.

And yet, notwithstanding, the whole theory of science *communicated* is based upon the principle that sufficient evidence must produce a corresponding credence, which, in this case, is called *knowledge*. A demonstration is nothing more than the exhibition of the evidence that ought universally to produce credence in the person who comprehends the demonstration. And here, again, we may observe the distinction that a demonstration is perfect, even though it should fail to produce credence in the minds of even the majority of those to whom it is presented. The fact that a demonstration does or does not universally convince, is not necessary to the sufficiency of the demonstration. In nature, the constancy of the effect was the only measure of the sufficiency of the cause. But in knowledge, a demonstration may be perfectly complete, and yet fail to produce credence; and one person may know the demonstration to be sufficient, although another shall still continue to deny the demonstrated proposition.

It is admitted on all hands, however, that a demonstration *ought* to produce credence, even though it should fail to do so. And it is also admitted (by those who have habituated their minds to a regular process of proof) that a proposition ought not to be credited unless accompanied by sufficient evidence.

But what is the essential meaning of these propositions? Nothing more than that the mind should

only progress from its natural state of non-credence to its positive state of actual credence by the force of sufficient evidence. Every change must have a cause.

But in the case of a proposition being believed *without* sufficient evidence, every man accustomed to rational investigation immediately pronounces that such a proposition ought to be abandoned, and abandoned not because it is proven false, but because it has not been proven true. The absence of its proof is quite sufficient reason for abandoning it, because where there is no proof there can only be superstition. And this is only one form of the universal dogma, that "the positive proposition must be proven."

In the matter of physical science, we inferred the sufficiency of the cause from the constancy of the effect ; but in the matter of mental science the effect may be non-constant, while we may know the sufficiency of the cause.

A sufficient cause failing to produce a corresponding effect, appears to be a contradiction. By no means. The verb has been changed. The verb is no longer the substantive verb *is*, but the verb *ought*.

The principle is universal, that every thing that begins to be has a sufficient cause for its *being* ; but *being* does not imply *ought to be*.

The necessity of giving different names to different causes is here apparent. The cause that ought to produce the credence is called *the reason* of the proposition ; while the cause that does produce the

credence is called by its generic name, *the cause*, as *being* is the most extensive case of causation.

The ambiguity of the word *must* may be seen in its application to the *cause* and the *reason*. "Every thing that commences to exist must have a cause." That is, *de facto* does have a cause. "Every proposition must have a sufficient reason." That is, every proposition *ought* to have a sufficient reason. It has a sufficient cause for existence, but it has not a sufficient reason for credence.

We now pass to human action. The natural condition of man is a condition of rest, or non-activity.* And the axiom, "Every change must have a cause," is applicable to human action as well as to the motions of matter.

The cause of action is called a *motive*; identically the same with the cause of motion,—a *motive* force, or *motive* power.

And here it may again be observed that the cause that *does* produce the action is supposed to be universally present; while the cause that *ought* to produce the action may or may not be present, because

* When we say that the natural condition of man is a state of inactivity, we are well aware of the misunderstanding that may arise from such a mode of expression. Man naturally loves action, and requires it; and it might be said, "Where do you find men in this natural state of rest?" Nowhere. We do not say that man is in a state of rest, but that he would be if he were not impelled by motives; and the fact that he is *not*, proves that he *is* impelled by motives. Where is *matter* in a state of rest? Matter in a state of rest has never been seen, felt, nor handled by any individual of the human race. Yet the state of rest is the point of departure for all reasonings on the motions of matter.

man is a fallen creature, and acts from insufficient motives.

Were man *perfect*, there would be no discrepancy between the cause and the motive; for he would never act without a justifying motive as well as a sufficient cause.

Let it be remembered that the cause of credence is anything whatever that produces the credence, and that the *reason* of the credence is the cause that *ought* to produce the credence.

It may be posited as a universal proposition, that a justifying motive should be based on a sufficient reason. That is, the man moral should *act* when the man intellectual is convinced by a sufficient reason, and not otherwise. This is the condition by which an action is or is not *correct*—(another ambiguous term, signifying either natural or moral correctness.)

We frequently hear, “a ship ought to be built in such a manner, a field ought to be cultivated in such a manner, an instrument ought to be made of such a form,” as well as “a man ought not to murder, a man ought not to steal, a man ought not to lie.”

The former signifies that there is a certain form of ship or mode of culture adapted to produce a certain end; the latter, that the end ought not to be produced. To secure speed and the other requisite qualities of a good ship, a vessel *ought* to be constructed in a certain manner, whether intended for the purposes of piracy or of fair trading; but a ship

ought not to be employed in piracy. In the one case, the word *ought* points out the relation of a means to an end; in the other, it is intended to point out the *character* of the end. The means were *correct*, but the end was not *correct*.

The universal axiom, "Every change must have a cause," includes both of these significations when applied to human action. Every action must (*ought* to) have a justifying motive, and every motive to be included in that category must have a sufficient reason. The individual who performs the action acts according to his motive; but what the world has to do with, is the reason why the action should be performed, and not the motive that influences the performer. God alone is the judge of motives, while it is man's duty to inquire into the reason. The reason is objective, and may be ascertained. The motive is subjective, and can only be presumed.

We come, therefore, to the conclusion, that every passage from the negative state of inaction to the positive state of action should, so far as the individual is concerned, be preceded by a justifying motive based on a sufficient reason.

In what we term *non-moral* action, the reason must exhibit the adaptation of the means to the desired end, and if the means are then put in action, such action is said to be *correct*. And here the same observation may be made that was made with regard to credence, that if the reason be insufficient, the action *ought* not to be performed, or, if already

commenced, should be discontinued. It is not necessary that the action should be proven incorrect; but if it have not been proven correct, there is no reason for its performance, and consequently it ought not to be done. Of course, *reason* here includes all or any sufficient reason. Experimental action has its sufficient reason, as well as that action which is performed for a definite and already known end. A farmer may sow various new kinds of grain in the same field, to discover which succeeds best, as well as other grain concerning which he has every evidence that it will succeed, based on the probability derived from past experience. His *reason* is sufficient. [This kind of experimental action is always necessary in matters that relate to *means*. It is never allowable in matters that relate to an *end*.] The question is not as to the *character* of a sufficient reason, but as to its absolute necessity to justify the action; for, in the case of the farmer, he does not know the result, and therefore sows his grain to discover it. But let us suppose him sowing *without a reason*, and if there be no reason, he may as well sow gravel or sawdust. The reason is absolutely necessary to justify the action, even though it be experimental, and the result veiled in the future. (Justify, also ambiguous.)

We now come to the last and most important sphere of the axiom, "Every change must have a cause," namely, *morals*. We say most important, meaning thereby that the welfare of the human race is involved in the question. The axiom now assumes

the form, "Every action must have a justifying motive," which motive must be based on a sufficient reason. And the word "*must*" still follows the contraction of the sphere into which the axiom is transplanted, and means *ought* in the *moral* sense of that term.

It may perhaps be worth while here to advert to the form in which the distinguishing characteristic of morals is sometimes announced. It is said that the ontological sciences answer the question, "what *is*," and that the science of morals answers the question, "what *ought to be*." This is not exactly the case. The science of morals does not answer the question, "what *ought to be*," but the question, "what ought to be *done*." On a close examination, it will be found that *action* is invariably involved wherever man pronounces a moral judgment, and where *action* is *not* involved, it is impossible to pronounce or even to conceive a moral judgment.

This is important. It points out to us that morals is the science of man's voluntary *function*; and if a question be merely a question of *existence* or *non-existence*, it does not come within the limits of morals. Applied to institutions, this teaches us that such portions of an institution as do *not* involve human *action* are outside of the science of morals. For instance, let the question be, "Ought or ought not the Bastile to be continued?" If the *Bastile* be intended to signify the *building*, the question is not within the limits of morals; if, on the contrary, the *Bastile* be intended to signify the system of im-

prisonment performed by men, the question is (or may be) within the limits of morals. Let the question now be presented in another light, "Ought the Bastille to be *destroyed*?" Human action is implied in the *destruction*, and the question, presented in this form, may be a question of morals, although not so, when presented in the other form.*

We posit the principle, therefore, "that every moral action performed by man ought to have a justifying motive, based on a sufficient reason." The sufficient reason is absolutely essential to the justifying motive.

And to apply this principle (which is only the moral form of the universal axiom, "Every change must have a cause," where the word *must* becomes the moral *ought*), we posit another—"Every departure from the negative state of moral inaction must be preceded by a sufficient reason, or else the action is improper and ought not to be performed."

* The importance of this principle may at first sight be overlooked; but, when we affirm that the whole theory of *property* is involved in it, it assumes a character that entitles it to prominent attention. *Property*, without taking into consideration *human action*, is a mere *physical* object, and cannot be the object of a duty or a crime. The theory of property can never be elucidated, so long as we make the object itself the main element of discussion. We *must* fall back on human action, and discuss the character of the mode of action by which the physical object (the earth) is made one man's property rather than another man's. The whole theory of landed property is at present only a superstition, and it never can be other than a superstition, until the moral theory of human action is evolved, and reasons altogether *non-arbitrary* are discovered and assigned for the possession of large portions of the earth by one man, while another is excluded from the opportunity of exercising his industry on the soil which man did *not* create.

We now come to the application of our argument in favour of the *institutes of nature*; and we maintain that every action of man, and every institution established by man, that departs from the institutes of nature, without a sufficient reason ready for production, is infringing the moral laws of the Deity, and ought to be discontinued.

But what are the institutes of nature? The same principle that guided us in distinguishing between the natural conditions of matter and the actual conditions of matter—the natural conditions of mind and the actual conditions of mind, will also enable us to distinguish between the natural conditions of men and the actual conditions of men. The actual conditions of men present slavery and degradation, crime and vice, and injustice and tyranny; yet these are not the natural conditions of men.

The natural condition of man is, "Every human body is subject to its own indwelling mind, and to no other." Another condition, "The fruits of a man's labour are naturally in his own possession, and at his own disposal." Another, "Man requires food from the earth, and has a body and a will to labour for it." And we maintain, as a universal principle, that these conditions can never justly be departed from without a *demonstrative** reason exhibited as the grounds of departure. If they are departed from, the moral laws of God written in the mental constitution of man are also infringed,

* We mean "demonstrative," for politics is an *abstract* science.

and the action ought to be discontinued. And why? Because every positive action must have a justifying reason before the action can be just. The negative condition that implies *no action* requires no demonstrative reason, but the positive condition that does imply an action can only be right from the known existence of the demonstrative reason. The reason and its absolute sufficiency are the only possible conditions that can render an action just or a proposition true. The principle is universal, with regard to matter, that every motion must have a sufficient force (from the intuitive or axiomatic credence of the mind), and, with regard to man, that a proposition to be true, or an action to be just, must have a sufficient reason. The proposition may be believed, or the action may be performed, without the reason, and if they are, the credence is a superstition and the action is a crime. There is no other distinction between truth and superstition, except that the proposition of truth is demonstrated, and the proposition of superstition is assumed; and there is no other distinction between innocence and crime, except that the just action has a justifying motive based on a sufficient reason, and that the crime is a spontaneous action of the passions without a reason and without a law.

To apply these principles to the condition of men in society we have only to inquire what is the negative condition of men as regards each other, and when that negative condition is ascertained, we posit the universal principle in politics, that that condi-

tion is the institute of God, the Creator, from which man may not lawfully depart without a demonstrative reason.

The negative condition of men as regards each other is the condition of non-interference, in which all men are free and equal. Whatever interference is exercised by one man towards another, requires therefore a justifying reason, without which the interference is a crime. No other principle of determining the character of *crime* is open to the reason of mankind. Inductive science may exhibit the prejudicial *effects*, but it is the exclusive province of deductive and *à priori* science to determine the character of the *action*, and to pronounce that moral judgment which can only spring from the axiomatic reason framed by the hand of the Creator in man's inmost constitution.

To exhibit the basis of our argument at one view we give the following table, which will help to explain the origin of the ambiguity of words, as well as the process of their restriction when transplanted from one sphere to another. The four divisions will probably be found to contain the different regions into which everything relating to man, and the created value with which man is acquainted, may be primarily classed.

1st—Being.

2d—Knowing.

3d—Acting (non-moral).

4th—Acting (moral).

1.	2.	3.	4.
<i>Being.</i>	<i>Knowing.</i>	<i>Rational Acting.</i>	<i>Moral Acting.</i>
right	right	right	right
right } line }	{ correct { credence	{ correct { action	{ correct { moral action
clear	clear	clear	clear
beautiful	beautiful	beautiful	beautiful
great } extensive }	great	great	great
change	change	change	change
light of vision
light in weight
true	true	true	true

1. Is this gun-barrel true?
2. Is this proposition true?
3. Tyranny is the true cause of revolt.
4. This is a true man—one who can be trusted.

1. A great ship.
2. A great thought.
3. Napoleon's victories were *great*, but in their *morality* questionable.
4. True greatness is in self-sacrifice.

1. The sunset from that hill is beautiful.
2. There is a beauty in reason as well as in poetry.
3. He brought his ship into action beautifully.
4. There was a moral beauty in his conduct, which spoke powerfully to the hearts of his parishioners.

The axiom, "Every change must have a cause," is universal when applied to being. That is, everything that commences to exist must have a cause of existence; that is, from *nothing*, nothing comes; that is, the state *negative* must have a cause to change it into the state *positive*.

It will be observed that when we reason in the first sphere, *cause* means only cause of *existence*; and as *being* is common to everything expressed by a noun substantive of a positive character, the axiom is absolutely universal, "Everything that commences to be has a cause for its *being*."

When we pass to *knowing* (the second division), the question is no longer one of *being*, and the axiom assumes a form that adapts it to the sphere into which it is transplanted. "Every thing to be *known* must have a cause of being *known*." That is, "*Credence* must have a cause, not merely of *being*, but of *credence*." Otherwise expressed, "Every proposition must have a reason for credence as well as a cause of existence;" which means, a proposition is *true* when it has a reason, and not otherwise. But as a *proposition* signifies not only the credence that *commences*, but the credence that does not commence, only those propositions that commence are the propositions that require *reasons*. The same is true of *being*. A being that does not commence requires no cause of existence, and a credence that does not commence requires no cause of *credence*. If it *exist*, it requires a *cause of existence*; but if it does not commence to be credited, it requires no *cause of credence*.

This is the foundation of all human knowledge,—namely, that *credences* which do not commence to be *credited*, require no reason for credence. If they (as they *do*) commence to *be*, they require a cause of *being*; but if they do not commence to *be credited*, they require no *cause of credence*.* The abstract preparation of the human mind for the appreciation of real nature, enters this category. There are certain propositions which, though commencing to *be*, do not commence to *be credited*. *Axioms* are these propositions. They have a *cause of being* (that is, a creator); but they do not commence to be credited, and therefore require no reason for credence. The existence of a being who does not commence to exist, is called *necessary*; and the credence of propositions that do not commence to be credited, is also called *necessary*. Their *credence* is necessary, but their *existence* is not necessary. That is, we can conceive them not to exist at all; but if they exist, we cannot conceive them not

* There are some propositions which it is difficult to express in language, until they have been so long before the public that a conventional mode is agreed on and understood. The statement in the text is perhaps one of these. A "*proposition that never begins to be credited*," seems almost absurd; and so it is when "*begin*" refers to *time*; but in all knowledge there are two parallel courses, and the language that is true in the one is false in the other. These courses are the course of *time* and the course of *logical analysis*; or, it may be, the course of *reality* and the course of *reason*. What we mean by a credence that never begins to be credited is this,—“Let the proposition be presented to the mind, and the mind believes it at once intuitively, and without any logical antecedent.” A proposition that begins to be credited is one which does not bear with it its own authentication, but requires others to substantiate it.

to be credited. The belief in their truth is absolutely necessary, and no power of man can alter that condition.

When we go forward another step into the sphere of *action* (the third division), the question is no longer one of *being*, nor of *being credited*, but of *being done*; and the axiom, "Every change must have a cause," assumes the form, "Every being that commences to act must have a motive for his action." Were there any action that did not commence, it also would be called necessary, and would require no motive. Now, here the same distinction is to be observed that was remarked with regard to credence. The question is not in the sphere of *existence*, but of *action*; and all the language follows into that sphere. The existence or non-existence of an action is included in the universal category; and, of course, every action has a cause for its *being*. But what we require to distinguish is, not merely *the action* (which, being made a *noun substantive*, is included in the category of *existence*), but the *agent*. And here, motives must be divided into two kinds,—namely, those that are *rational*, and those that are non-rational. A motive, to be rational, must have a sufficient reason. Both kinds of motive exist, and, of course, both have causes for their existence; but one kind has a reason—the other has no reason.

Something of an analogous character to the axiom exists, also, in the matter of action. There is a kind of motive that is based, not on any objective reason, but on a subjective impulse,—a kind of mo-

tive that never commenced to impel, although it commenced to be—in fact, a congenital motive, just as the axiom is a congenital credence. This is instinct, *irrational* instinct,—most wonderfully beautiful in those beings that are incapable of appreciating a *reason*, but suitable for man only in those circumstances that limit him with the animals.

With motives that do not commence, an axiom does not interfere, as they are necessary in the same sense as an axiom or an eternal existence is necessary. We can conceive such motives not to have existed; but, if they do exist, we cannot conceive them not to produce an action.

There remain, then, two classes of motives, which depend on the will to produce an action: those that are rational, and those that are not rational. Those that are rational have a law outside of the agent,—namely, *the reason*. The will acts, and the reasoning faculty is outside, or independent of the will in its functions. The reason is objective, and may be known and understood by all men, and may be tried whether it is or is not a sufficient reason for the performance of the action. An action is said to be “*correct*” when it has a sufficient reason, and not otherwise. This *correctness* is intimately allied with the word, or, rather, concept *ought*; and the same idea may be expressed,—“Every action *ought* to have a sufficient reason.” But what does *ought* mean? Merely that if the action have not a sufficient reason, it is not correct. Apply this form of “*correct*” and “*ought*” universally, and it holds good.

These remarks apply to action generally; but we have divided action into non-moral and moral, and it now remains to separate the two, and inquire into the meaning of "*correctness*" and "*ought*" in each kind of action.

Non-moral action has for its object the production of an end *merely*. If the evidence be sufficient to prove that the end will be produced, the action is *correct*,—that is, the reason is sufficient. The correct way of drawing a circle, constructing a ship, cultivating a field, &c. &c.,—all of which are assembled under the name of *right*,—a word that will be found in all the four divisions with four essentially distinct significations.

Be it remembered that non-moral correctness applies merely to the sufficiency or non-sufficiency of means to produce an end,—any end whatever that may be desired. Now, if we reflect that man as an agent may act either in reference to the external world or to *his fellow-man*, we shall perceive the whole ground of distinction between non-moral and moral action;—that is, moral action whose correctness can be determined in the same manner as the other kinds of correctness,—by the natural exercise of the human faculties, unaided by revelation. Non-moral science treats of the relations of man to the external world. Moral science treats of man's relation to man. Religion treats of man's relation to God. We do not take religion into account at all, as it is unnecessary to our argument.

In moral science the question is, "*What ought to*

be the end?" In non-moral science, "How can the end be produced?" The *efficiency of means* is the exclusive inquiry of non-moral science; the *propriety of the end*, the exclusive inquiry of moral science. In non-moral science, therefore, the question of correctness depends exclusively on the sufficiency of the reason (or evidence) to exhibit the connection between the action (or means) and the desired end. If the reason be sufficient to exhibit that the desired end will follow from the action, the action is correct, and not otherwise.

In moral action, if the reason (or evidence) is sufficient to prove that the end is correct, the action is correct, and not otherwise.

It is evident that the word "correct" (right) has a different signification when applied to the two different classes of action. In the one it has a *moral* signification, in the other a *non-moral* signification.

The term *moral* is used in various senses by different writers, and by different nations. In France, it generally signifies the being, or man *impulsive*, without any particular regard to the concept *duty* usually implied in Britain. All motives that induce the individual to *act*, are assembled together under the general signification of *morale*, and *l'homme moral* means rather the character of the man with regard to his *disposition* than with regard to his *duty*. All very proper, provided it be understood. In Britain it sometimes means religion, and sometimes only certain portions of religion; sometimes the natural sentiments of modesty, &c.; and perhaps it

is sometimes applied to "that which is beneficial." Of course it is to be desired that language should become more definite on such a subject, but it must not be forgotten that accuracy of language succeeds, and does not precede, accuracy of thought. Until the science of morals is developed in the same manner as the other sciences, how can it be expected that the language it employs should be more correct than theirs was a century or two ago?

So far as we here employ the term morals, we mean nothing more than the science of *equity*. We take into consideration no duty that is merely personal—(that is, no duty that would still be such if only *one* man existed)—neither do we take into consideration man's duty to his Creator (which may very possibly be based on *equity*, although that view would require a more impartial investigation than men are in the habit of giving to the subject), but only "the rule of correctness that should regulate man's action to man in society." There are, of course, actions that ought to be performed, and actions that ought not to be performed, not depending on what is generally understood by equity, but arising from sentiments (of decency, for instance) implanted in the human mind. But inasmuch as these motives are original and underived, we must class them with instincts, and allow that they are not primarily based on an objective reason. Our axiom does not apply to them, because they do not involve a change of credence. If they exist as sentiments, belief in their correctness is neither open to

proof nor to dispute. They form part of the natural condition of man, from which he should depart only on a reason.

The whole question, then, resolves itself into the ascertainment of *the rule of correctness* for action, non-moral and moral. If that can be ascertained, not only is the possibility of reducing morals to the form of a science (a real *science*, in the same sense in which geometry is a science) made manifest, but the rule for trying all political institutions is laid down in a manner that has nothing to do with party considerations, and is no more arbitrary than the truths of geometry are arbitrary.

This rule of correctness *must* be within the reach of man, or else actions are indifferent, and possess no character that would make them either good or bad. If there be no *rule*, a man may do anything.

There are some in the present day who would endeavour to get rid of the terms *duty, conscience, moral right, &c.*, on the same kind of ground that scientific men exclude the term *cause*. Quite proper, provided the first principle be *assumed*. All that then remains to be done is to inquire into the order of sequence. But as the *total* obliteration of *duty* and *conscience* is rather too extensive an operation to be passed over without some remark, let us inquire whether there be or be not any rational grounds for the use of those terms. Many discussions are embittered by the misunderstanding that arises from the want of a little preliminary explanation; and a man who cannot *see through* the line of argument

that his opponent is taking, immediately brands him as a heretic, instead of endeavouring to ascertain the point of divergence at which they separated in their credence. Almost every principle broached by man has some truth at the bottom of it. But the error may be quite as flagrant when based upon a truth as when it is a mere assumption, a groundless and vain assertion, devoid of all pretension to rational credence. Let us observe, that the process of exclusion is not confined to *morals*. Under the influence of a sceptical method, the *axioms* of mathematics have had to undergo their process of exclusion, as well as the *causes* of physical science, and the *axioms* of morals. Now, this process is actually a proper one in *science*, because science *takes for granted* the existence of its object, and the existence of the *human mind*, such as it is. Let this be definitely understood. Let us take any science whatever, and we shall find that it is not the province of that science to prove the existence of the fundamental substantive of the science, but only to prove that certain relations are constant (in the physical sciences), necessary (in the abstract sciences), between the various forms of that fundamental substantive. Who ever heard a geometrician attempt to prove the existence of *space*? His office is to inquire into the *relations of spaces*, not to prove the existence of that fundamental concept, or noun substantive, without which there could be no geometry. And so with *matter*. Does the natural philosopher attempt to prove the existence of matter, or only to

inquire into the relations of the various portions of matter? Or the arithmetician with *number*, or the algebraist with *quantity*, or the statist with *force*, or the optician with *light*, or the chemist with *affinity*, or the economist with *value*, &c.? But if these things are not proven *to exist* by the various sciences specially devoted to treat of them, who proves their existence? No person. No scientific man ever does attempt to prove the very first essential, without which there could be no science. And yet it will be rather a difficult operation, we imagine, to obliterate all these primary substantives. Now, in science, the principles of reason are also taken for granted, as well as the noun substantive. Without the noun there is nothing to operate on, and without the reason (the faculty), there is nothing to operate that distinguishes man from a monkey. A monkey can *see*, but he cannot make a science. And why not? Because he does not reason.*

In case it should be imagined that morals assumes too much, let us ask how many substantives are necessary to geometry before there can be any proof?

Space (including *position*, *distance*, and *direction*), *number*, *quantity*, *equality*. These four concepts are absolutely essential to geometry, and no science re-

* We remember a very apt distinction being made by a workman in Paris, who saw a monkey in the *Jardin des Plantes* biting through the rope by which he was suspending himself in the monkey's palace. He cried, "See! see! that monkey shows us the difference between animals and men. He sees what he is doing, but he does not see the consequence"—namely, that down he would fall.

lating to space is possible unless their existence is *assumed*.

Now we defy any man in the world to give a definition of *distance, direction, unity, quantity, or equality*; that is, a *real* definition, not a *spurious* one. Every attempt to define one of those terms involves the term in both members of the definition, and is in fact nothing more than $x = a + x - a$.

Statics adds another substantive, viz., *force*, which is also incapable of *real* definition (by *real*, we mean the opposite to *spurious*), because the copula of the definition of a noun substantive is the substantive verb *is*, with only substantives for terms. Force is nothing but one of the numerous *causes* that men conceive, according to the law of their constitution; and, if the sceptical doctrine be right, it ought to be excluded from mechanics exactly in the same way as *affinity* is excluded from chemistry. The man of *science* has only to do with the *measure of the motion*, not the cause. The definition of *force*, namely, "Force is the cause of motion," is spurious, when presented as a definition of the concept *force*.* Let us reverse or convert the terms, and

* Because it means, "Force is that which *does* move matter;" but what we want a definition of is, "That which does move matter," viz., *force*. A real definition gives the analytic composition of the concept to be defined, not merely an event relating to it. Events can never enter the definition of a substantive; *cause* is a simple concept, perfectly incapable of any real definition whatever. Some attempt to give a definition of "cause," by telling us what it *does* (viz., precede change), but what is it that precedes change?

To attempt to define a *simple* concept is much the same as to attempt to prove a *primary* axiom. Neither is possible; but as

we shall learn something. All men have the intuition of *causation*, and all men can observe *motion*. To enable men to hold communication, language is necessary, and the proposition is merely, "Let the *cause of motion* be called force;" "Let the cause of combination be called affinity." Of force and affinity we know just as much and just as little as of *cause*; it is a primary concept, indefinable, but its *measure* is capable of being *reasoned* out of the *effect*.

Now, with regard to the fundamental concept of morals, it is quite out of the question to require more from it than from the fundamental concepts of the other sciences. The fundamental concept of political morals is *equity*, and we no more attempt to demonstrate the *existence* of equity than the geometer attempts to demonstrate the existence of space. If any man happen to be born without the concept of *equity*, he is not a moral being. He may be an intellectual animal, but he is not a moral being. He may know the means that do invariably lead to certain ends; but it is impossible for him to have the slightest conception as to whether the end be *good*, *bad*, or *indifferent*.

If a man have not the concept equity, he must confine himself to those branches of science that involve such concepts only as he may happen to

two persons can only communicate through the medium of language, that language must be settled by agreement, and the agreement must be made in terms mutually intelligible. Simple concepts, therefore, require an *active verb* to allow one person to explain to another that such and such a simple concept is the one he refers to, by force, cause, equity, &c.

have received from nature. For our own part, we do not believe that any *sane* man is without the primary concept in question. We believe it as universal as the concept space, or force, or affinity, and we also believe it one of the primary essentials of man's constitution. But what is *equity*? It is "a primary and simple concept, incapable of all definition that does not involve itself, like distance, direction, quantity, equality, and unity."

Now let us observe, that when a question occurs in the natural world, it presents itself in the form, "What is the relation of these objects *in number, in quantity, in extent, in direction, in force, in weight, in utility?*" &c. The discovery of the *relations* in these abstract concepts is the whole object of science. And we may reason in number, or in quantity, or in extent, or in value, &c.; *e. g.*, one sovereign is equal to one shilling *in number*, but not *in value*. Twenty shillings are equal to one sovereign *in value*, but not *in number*, not *in the quantity* of metal they contain, not *in the space* they occupy.

To apply this to *equity*, we give the same kind of definition to the science of politics that is given to other sciences. Politics is a moral science, and relates to *men*. It is therefore the "knowledge of the relations of men *in equity*." As an abstract science, it is the science of *equity*; and, as an abstract science *applied*, it is the science of the relations of men in equity, or of the equitable relations of men.

It is no more impossible to ascertain the *rule of correctness* in *equity*, than it is to ascertain the rule

of correctness in number, quantity, value, &c. ; nor is the difficulty in ascertaining the *rule* so great as that of inducing men to adhere to it.

At the same time, it appears that the sciences are discovered in the order of their complexity, and there is apparently a good reason for believing that human knowledge is now extended to the verge of moral science, and that moral science will now begin to assume the same form and regular ordination as the other sciences.

Let it be remembered that human science has been reduced to order, and has assumed its present scientific form according to a law of complexity that renders the more simple science absolutely necessary before the more complex science can be discovered. The analytic necessity of an *order of discovery* may be exhibited, and we may pronounce without hesitation that logic must precede arithmetic, that arithmetic must precede algebra, that algebra must precede geometry, and that geometry must precede statics ; and again, that statics must precede dynamics, that dynamics must precede chemistry, that vegetable (architecture, dynamics, and chemistry) physiology must precede animal physiology. There is a certain increase of complexity in this order of the sciences, and, to make human knowledge complete in its various steps, leaving no voids, this order must naturally be followed in the order of discovery. Now, the complexity is capable of being measured by the number of nouns substantive absolutely essential to any given science. Logic involves only *one*, namely,

identity (and its opposite, *non-identity*); arithmetic involves two, namely, equality and unity; algebra involves three, equality, number, and quantity, and so the process of complexity may be continued in a manner that is not in the least arbitrary, but depends on the necessary form of thought that belongs to the race of men.

Now, let us suppose that logic commenced somewhere about two thousand years ago. How many sciences have men vanquished in that period? Where are they *now*? Somewhere about animal physiology and political economy. And what have they to investigate next in order? Political science.

Let the reader run over the *order of nature* in a rapid glance, and he will perceive the natural order of the sciences to be,

1st, The abstract mathematical sciences.

2d, The sciences that relate to inorganic matter.

3d, The sciences that relate to vegetable organization.

4th, The sciences that relate to animal organization.

5th, The sciences that relate to *man*.

Man is the highest and most complex object with which we are acquainted; and the sciences that relate to man are the most complex and the last in the order of discovery.

When we know what a man *is*, we may turn to what a man *does*;—exactly as the *anatomy* of an organ is studied before its *physiology*.

Now, what is political economy in its general

form? Nothing more than the science of *human action*, non-moral. It excludes the necessary or constant operations of nature, over which man has no control, and it also excludes all consideration as to the end of human actions, including only the *calculation of the effects of human action*, without pronouncing whether the effects are good, bad, or indifferent. Political economy teaches *how* the corn, the wine, and the oil of the land may be increased or decreased, by human action in the figure of society. But it is *not* the province of political economy to decide whether the increase or decrease of wealth is a good or a bad *end*. The *measure of the sequence* is the exclusive object of political economy, but what the desired end *ought* to be, political economy can never possibly decide, without stepping out of its province and invading a sphere of *a priori* knowledge. It may assume its first principle; but that first principle is abstract, and forms no part whatever of the *inductive* science. The first principle *assumed* by some political economists is, "The greatest good of the greatest number *ought* to be the end of the legislator." The verb *ought*, in its moral sense, has no more to do with political economy than it has to do with mechanics. "The greatest good of the greatest number *ought* to be the end of all mechanism," is just as true and just as appropriate. Political economy has only to measure *the law of sequence*. What the end *ought* to be, it is the province of morals to determine. But morals can never, by any possibility, pronounce upon

the *means* by which the *positive* end can be arrived at; and thus political economy and true politics are perfectly distinct but absolutely necessary to each other, before they can be brought to produce their maximum of benefit to society.

We say *maximum* of benefit, because, although politics can teach us the figure of society that would involve *no injustice*, it cannot teach us what *positive* acts are beneficial; and this must be ascertained by experiment, or statistics. The whole theory of statistics belongs exclusively to political economy; but the whole theory of the equitable relations of men belongs to politics. And politics can do this—namely, point out those limits within which men *may* experiment, and those limits within which they *may not* experiment. It is sometimes the apparent object of writers to found *all* political truth on statistics. We deny the possibility, and we are convinced that the political economists who hold this view are holding the most palpable absurdities, even by their own showing, and assuming extensive propositions for which they have no inductive proof whatever. (We refer to the Benthamites.) For instance,—“Would, or would not, the transportation of all political economists be a beneficial act?”—the answer to be founded on evidence that such and such political economists had been transported, and the result was so and so. Now, the evidence must be insufficient to decide the question—therefore, *let us make the experiment*; and the statistics would, of course, be got up in the very best

style by the gentlemen themselves. Why should they not be transported, if no sufficient evidence is adduced that the act would be detrimental? * Not *presumptive* evidence, but evidence founded on ascertained facts relating to the transportation of political economists. Why should they not? Because human rights are involved. We may experiment with inorganic matter, but not with MEN; and unless we are allowed to experiment with *men*, we can never found the whole order of society on statistics, because the evidence is necessarily insufficient. The same principle applies to every case whatever in which men and men's rights are involved; and statistics can never prove the benefit or detriment that would arise from a new course of experiment on *men*; yet every man immediately pronounces that the experiment on men ought not to be made.

Again,—“What is the *value* of human life in political economy?” Is life (one of the first essen-

* Or, if they can adduce evidence relating to transportation, why should they not be *executed*, for the purpose of furnishing us with statistics? Those who attempt to include the primary laws relating to life, liberty, and property, in political economy, are obliged to assume all their first principles as to *the value* of life, liberty, and property. Political economy has only to do with the *increase* or *decrease*, in certain given circumstances; but whether the increase or decrease be a good or a bad thing, political economy must assume. This assumption belongs to *à priori* dogmatics. No abstract principle whatever can be learnt through observation,—it must necessarily be *à priori*. In political economy, *food* is a good thing, because it conduces to human life; but what makes human life good? It is assumed that the preservation of life is a good thing (properly enough), and then all that remains is to measure the law of sequence. But inductive science does not prove life to be good, unless as *conducing* to some other end whose goodness is assumed.

tial subjects of politics) to be measured by its exchangeable value, like the life of a bullock? If not, then is the whole principle of political economy abandoned, and admission is made of some higher and more important law.

To conclude our argument in favour of the institutes of nature, based on the universal axiom, "Every change must have a cause," we shall attempt to reduce the various forms of that axiom to one.

There are four regions of nature—1st, Being; 2d, Knowing; 3d, Acting rationally; 4th, Acting equitably or morally.

In each of these regions we have a *substantive* that must have a cause of existence; and by *must* we mean not *ought*, but that the human mind invariably infers the antecedence of a cause as the necessary condition without which the substantive could not *be*.

These substantives are—Existence, Knowledge, Rational Action, Equitable Action. Each of these must have a cause, without which it cannot possibly *exist*.

The cause of existence is called the creator.

The cause of knowledge is called a reason.

The cause of rational action is called a rational motive.

The cause of equitable action is called an equitable motive, or *just* motive.

We maintain that wherever existence, knowledge, rational action, or equitable action commences, there

the human mind invariably infers the antecedence of the respective cause.

But *knowledge* is only one form of *credence*; consequently there must be language to express the various forms.

[We treat, of course, only of that existence, knowledge, or action that *commences*. If any do not commence, it is *necessary*, and requires no cause.]

Credence is a simple term, and incapable of definition.

Correct credence is called knowledge; and whatever knowledge *commences*, can only commence through its cause, called a reason.

Knowledge that does not commence is *necessary* credence, called axiomatic credence; but credence may exist in two other forms, namely, without a reason, or contrary to a reason.

Credence without a reason is called superstition, and credence contrary to a reason is called error; consequently, any credence that commences without a reason is *not knowledge*.

Rational action is only one form of action. Action, like being or credence, is a simple concept, and cannot be defined.

Correct action is called rational action; and whatever rational action commences, can only commence through its cause, called a rational motive. A motive is called rational when based on knowledge, that is, on correct credence.

But action supposes an agent.

And this agent may (like the intellect) be in one

of several states:—1st, A state of correct action; 2d, A state of action when it has a motive that is not rational; 3d, A state of action when its motive is contrary to reason. To these may be added a state of *rest* when the agent has a *reason* for action but not a motive.

A motive without a reason, a motive contrary to a reason, and a state of non-action when there is a reason, are classed in the various kinds of imbecility or lunacy. Consequently, any action that commences without a reason, as well as a motive, is not rational action, is not correct action.

Action based on credence that has not a reason, is action based on superstition; and action based on credence that is contrary to a reason, is action based on error.

Equitable action is only one form of moral action. *Correct* moral action is called equitable or just action.

Equity or justice is a simple concept, and is incapable of definition, like existence, credence, and action.

Whatever equitable action commences, must have a cause, without which the action cannot possibly be an equitable one.

The cause of an equitable action is an equitable motive, and a motive is called equitable when based on a reason sufficient in equity. Every action to be equitable, therefore, must have an equitable reason; and such actions as have not an equitable reason are not equitable.

But actions in morals may be performed that have not an equitable reason, and such actions are termed unjust actions. Motives in morals may be rational or irrational. When rational—that is, when the correct means are employed to arrive at an end that is or is not equitable—the agent is said to be responsible. When the motive is irrational, the agent is said to be insane, and not accountable. The motive may be *rational* and yet *unjust*, that is, it may be based on a correct credence that a certain end will follow, and yet the end may have no equitable reason.

We have then—

Existence, and its opposite, non-existence.

Credence, divided into knowledge, superstition, error.

Action, divided into rational and irrational.

Rational action, divided into non-moral and moral.

Moral action, divided into just and unjust.

Equitable or just action must have an equitable reason, and action that has not an equitable reason is not an equitable action.

These, we presume, are the abstract conditions under which the human mind pronounces judgment.

But, inasmuch as every matter of science must be made objective, the motive of action must be left out of the account, like the cause in physical science, and the action, with its reason, or want of reason, must be made the whole object of contemplation. Action in the agent is subjective, and means not the substantive *action*, but the participle *acting*.

Hitherto we have considered the agent, and the conditions under which he must act to act equitably; we now turn to the action, and endeavour to determine the rule of correctness in equity.

Correct credence is either necessary, or based upon a reason. Correct credence is called knowledge.

Correct action is based upon correct credence.

In the abstract sciences there are axioms without which the sciences cannot be reduced to necessary and primary propositions.

These axioms may or may not be stated. If stated, they facilitate the formal exhibition of a science; if not stated, they are invariably assumed as portions of the mental constitution of all mankind.

We conceive that equity has its axioms, in the same manner as equality, number, quantity, space, &c.

Politics is the science that treats of the relations of men *in equity*.

Men may act towards each other equitably or unequitably. (Postulate.)

And men may possess the earth equitably or unequitably. (Postulate.)

The axiom relating to action in equity is only one form of the universal axiom, "Every change must have a cause."

"Every just action must have a just reason;" or, in negation, "No action can be just unless it have a just reason."

The axiom relating to possession is, "An object is the property of its creator." We maintain that

these principles are universal, in the same sense in which the principle, "Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other," is universal.

The axiom relating to action involves all human *liberty*.

The axiom relating to possession involves all human *property*.

Now, so far as the institutes of nature are concerned, we maintain, as a universal proposition, that "No action performed by man in the region of equity (that is, of interference between man and man) is just, unless it have an equitable reason." The *reason* is absolutely essential to the *justice* of the action; and, consequently, no institution established by man for the purpose of interference is an equitable institution, unless it have an equitable reason.

And, consequently, if the reason of an existing institution be not forthcoming, and be not sufficient in equity, the institution ought not to exist.

And, consequently, the onus of proof invariably lies on the institution, and not on the objector, who says, "Allow the conditions of men to remain as they have been established by the Creator, until a sufficient reason in equity is produced to justify the change."

From this argument there is no escape. The Creator has established certain conditions of men in the physical form of society: the Creator has endowed man with a power of rational judgment, and the Creator has also endowed man with the primary

concept of equity. If men act in accordance with the principle of equity, they can never possibly depart from the original and natural conditions in which they have been created, unless they have a *reason* that is sufficient, in the axiomatic judgment of mankind, to justify the departure.

To suppose that men may originate institutions affecting their fellow-men, without a reason in equity, is to suppose that equity has no existence, and that all acts are equally indifferent. But this condition of the moral judgment is absolutely impossible, and although the most various opinions may be entertained as to what particular acts are right, and as to what particular acts are wrong, inasmuch as the rule of correctness may be unknown or neglected, yet the abstract conception of right and wrong, justice and injustice, is no more capable of obliteration, than the abstract conception of *causation*, when men differ as to particular causes.

The general form is universal, and belongs to all men; the particular cases are matters of scientific investigation, where men differ only because they are ignorant.

To suppose that men may originate institutions at *will*, is as monstrous an absurdity as to suppose that men may originate credences at will; and though the history of mankind has been a history of error and superstition, surely there is a difference between truth and falsehood that men consider to be immutable. And if the ancient superstitions of our race have fallen before the one simple principle, that the

positive proposition, if not axiomatic, is to be credited *only on a reason*, where, in the whole circle of the earth's circumference, is the *institution* that must not be tried by the same principle as the credence, and that must not also give way and be forgotten, if it have not now a reason sufficient for its existence?

To suppose that men may recklessly originate institutions, according to the mere dictates of their *desires*, is to suppose that the harmony of nature and man's intellect is the unintentional accident of chance, and not the work of a designer. If men *may* do justly whatever they have the power to do, and this is the origin of the institutions of men, then let morals be abandoned, let duty be forgotten, let responsibility be cast away, and let the strongest do as he pleases, merely because there is not a stronger to control him.

The natural conditions of men have the authorization of the Creator of our system; and to suppose that those natural conditions may be departed from at the will of any man, or of any body of men whatever, is a blasphemy against the elements of truth implanted by the same Creator in the constitution of our mind.

Why has the world been made in its present form, and why have men been placed in their natural conditions? Is there no reason for the form of nature—no reason for the conditions of the human race with regard to each other?

And if we do admit that there is design in nature, and the adaptation of the means to its end, shall we

not also add, that the same Cause that endowed man with the power of judging of the end, is also and of necessity a *moral agent*, and intends that the ends produced in nature shall be considered by man as the expression of His will ?

It is true that the whole history of man has exhibited superstition or credence without a reason, and also that the moral actions of mankind, in the figure of society, have been almost universally based on that superstition. But if the superstition of credence has been uprooted by a return to the negative state of doubt when there was no evidence, and if assumption after assumption has been abandoned, merely because men had learned to reject assumptions, shall not the very same principle be brought to bear on the institutions founded on the baseless credence, and shall not the assumption of unjust *power* be also destroyed, exactly in the same course of progress that has destroyed the superstitious credence ?

There is no difference between knowledge and superstition, except that knowledge *has its reason* ; and there is no difference between justice and injustice, except that justice *has its reason*. And in every positive credence whatever, and in every positive act of interference, this reason must be *extant*, or the credence is a superstition, and the action is a crime.

The measure of the reason may be, and no doubt *will be*, a matter of disputation, and the most opposite assertions are naturally to be expected. But it

is something to lay down the abstract conditions which must necessarily be fulfilled before an action can be just. If men must have a ruler, and if the nation must be subject, surely it is something to ascertain the abstract conditions, without which the ruler must be a tyrant, and the subjects must be slaves. Tyranny and slavery are susceptible of *degree*, and they may vary from the utmost possible extreme to the smallest possible departure from the rightful conditions of mankind. But the one single object that the true freeman must ever have in view is the absolute re-establishment of the equilibrium of equity on such a ground as affords hope of no after disturbance. Thousands of years of superstition have rolled over the human race, and the last few centuries alone have brought him back to truth; and thousands of years of crime and political superstition have exhibited the figure of the tyrant and the slave. But is it *possible* that the destruction of the baseless *credence* should not also entail with it the destruction of the baseless *power*? It is true that men may rail at principles which disturb the assumptions of their ordinary credence; but, if there be a principle of life-giving truth on which the freeman may hang his hope for the welfare of his race, it is that true *credence* will sooner or later restore *the freedom of mankind*.

The institution that has not its sufficient reason,—call it monarchy, or aristocracy, or democracy,—call it commercial law, or criminal law, or law of property, or law of nations,—is as certainly doomed to

pass away as truth is doomed to prevail. If knowledge be again obliterated, man may return to slavery ; but if knowledge be fated to increase, and to extend from land to land, it can no more fail to carry with it the principles of liberty,—which, after all, are only “prove your proposition,”—than it can fail to uproot and to destroy the present groundless credences that prevail throughout the globe.

What is licentiousness? Interference without a just reason. But what difference can it possibly make whether the interference come from a king, an aristocracy, a republican assembly, a priesthood, or a rabble? The king is but a man, and the majority are no more than men. What though systematic interference be established by a form of human enactment?—this only makes it the more certainly detrimental, and the more permanent in its pernicious effects. Although a Slave-State *may* pass a *law*, a human enactment, to counteract the established institutes of the Creator, is the negro one iota more justly a slave, in consequence of that *law*, than when he was only captured by the violence of a single individual? And if not, then are the institutions of men to be tried by their own inherent merits or demerits, and not by any sanction that they may have received from human enactment, however ancient or universal.

Suppose an Ephesian of the first century had been philosopher enough to investigate the evidence relating to the divinity of Diana. He would necessarily have found it insufficient. Now, what ought he to

do? Undoubtedly to return to the negative state, in which he would say, "I am willing to worship the true God; but there is no evidence that Diana is divine." But suppose all the Ephesians had investigated the evidence, and found it insufficient, what ought they to have done, according to the principles now universally admitted in matters of scientific truth? They ought to have abandoned the whole system of worship, and to have resigned Diana, not because any one had proven her merely an image, but because there was no evidence that she was any thing more than an image; or else, if they ought not to have abandoned her, then is every false credence to be believed, on the mere fact of its existence.

Let us observe the connection of this baseless credence at Ephesus with the *conduct* of the people. "For a certain man, Demetrius, a silversmith, which made silver shrines for Diana, brought no small gain unto the craftsmen; whom he called together with the workmen of like occupation, and said, Sirs, ye know that by this craft we have our wealth. Moreover, ye see and hear, that not alone at Ephesus, but almost throughout all Asia, this Paul hath persuaded and turned away much people, saying that they be no gods which are made with hands; so that not only this our craft is in danger to be set at nought, but also that the temple of the great goddess Diana should be despised, and her magnificence should be destroyed, whom all Asia and the world worshippeth. And when they heard

these sayings, they were full of wrath, and cried, saying, Great is Diana of the Ephesians."

Neither Demetrius nor the other craftsmen attempt for a moment to prove that "they *be* gods that are made with hands;" but as they were deriving profit from the superstitious credence, and Paul called the credence in question, they rush at once to the lawless exercise of *power*, and endeavour to put down an inquiry into the *credence*, instead of giving their minds to ascertain the truth.

The same principle prevails *universally*, with regard to politics; and the rabble-shout of the craftsmen whose craft is endangered, is the invariable accompaniment of an inquiry into the evidence on which institutions are presumed to be founded. The *rights* of slaveholders, and the *rights* of landed proprietors, are only the gathering-cries of the craftsmen, who would shout, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians," if they happened to derive their wealth from the image, instead of drawing their wealth from the unrighteous possession of their fellow-creatures, or of the land which God has given to all men equally.

We conclude, then, that the presumption is invariably in favour of the institutes of nature—

1st, Because the natural conditions of men with regard to each other are to be regarded as the expression of the will of the Creator of our system.

2d, Because, according to the axiomatic judgment of man (implanted by the same Creator), an act of interference cannot possibly be *just*, unless it have a sufficient reason.

And, therefore, no institution whatever that has been established by man for the purpose of interference (be it government, or law, or individual action), is a just institution, unless the reason for its existence be extant and be sufficient. And consequently the onus of proof invariably lies on the institution, and not on the objector, who says, "Allow things to remain in the relative conditions established by the Creator, unless there be sufficient evidence to justify a change."

And, consequently, every institution established by man,—that does not continue to preserve the relative conditions of men, as established by the Creator, and capable of being ascertained by the study of man's natural condition on the globe,—ought to be abolished, if it cannot produce a sufficient reason for departing from the institutions of nature.

But the science of equity being *primarily* exclusively negative, it is not possible that such reason should exist; and, consequently, the institutes of nature ought never to be departed from.

Brog.
& Yarranton, Andrew.

ACCOUNT

OF

ANDREW YARRANTON,

THE FOUNDER OF ENGLISH POLITICAL ECONOMY.

[As the Theory of Rent, advanced in the previous portion of this work, is based on the fact, "That the rent-value of a country depends on the proportional amount of the non-agricultural labours of the whole population," I have appended the following dissertation, which will serve two purposes:—*First*, it will prove that the theory is borne out by *historic fact*; and, *second*, it will give the reader some account of the genuine founder of English political economy. Andrew has been almost forgotten; let us restore to him at least some of those honours which are duly his, and which have been so lavishly bestowed on less deserving men.]

ANDREW YARRANTON, Gentleman, was the founder of English Political Economy, the first man in England who saw and said that peace was better than war, that trade was better than plunder, that honest industry was better than martial greatness, and that the best occupation of a government was to secure prosperity at home, and to let other nations alone. In the present treatise, I propose to give the reader a short account of his doings and his doctrines. But,

first, I shall say a word on his book, with its many titles. The volume is a small quarto of 195 pages, with no less than three separate dedications, a pre-fatory *Epistle*, and a valedictory address to the reader. It was licensed by Roger L'Estrange, October 4, 1676, and the copy in our possession has on the title page *J. Rex*, written in ink, and partly erased with a knife. It may therefore have been perused by James II. himself. The title in full is as follows:—

“England’s improvement by sea and land. To outdo the Dutch without fighting. To pay debts without moneys. To set at work all the poor of England with the growth of our own lands. To prevent unnecessary suits of law; with the benefit of a voluntary register. Directions where vast quantities of timber are to be had for the building of ships, with the advantage of making the great rivers of England navigable. Rules to prevent fires in London, and other great cities; with directions how the several companies of handicraftsmen in London may always have cheap bread and drink. By Andrew Yarranton, Gent. London, printed for the author, &c., 1677.”

In style, the book is as multifarious as the questions of which it treats: we have a little bit of autobiography, and a certain amount of dissertation; a few voyages and travels, with the preamble of a proposed act of parliament; a dialogue “betwixt a clothier, a woollen-draper, and a country yeoman;” a little of “theorick,” and a little of “practick;” some

ethic, some agriculture, and some considerations regarding rats and mice. The worthy Andrew, in fact, seems to have thought that when once in the garden of literature, it was only fair that he should taste as many sweets as possible, and, like a busy bee, he roves hither and thither, seemingly without method and without consideration. But go to what flower he will, Andrew contrives to find honey.

Andrew Yarranton is indeed a true practical Englishman—shrewd, but not subtle—enterprising, but not speculative—a man of business, enjoying the confidence of business men, yet in all his enterprises, and in all his experiences, carefully reflecting how each particular circumstance may be turned to the advantage of his country. He is a patriot, but not a partisan; he wishes to see England great, and her people happy; and as his opportunities for observation had been extensive, and he had made a good use of them, he endeavours to set his countrymen on the right track,—assuring them, that if they pursue it, they will attain a power and prosperity which, in Charles the Second's day, with France on the one hand, and Holland on the other, must have appeared chimerical, but which the future history of England was destined to verify. Above all, we must note his prospective sagacity, for he points out in detail the very course that England has pursued, and the very elements that were to contribute to her commercial supremacy. Although not a theorist, in the present acceptance of the term (for his theories are only careful inductions from his observations), he is a great

projector, and he chalks out the future course of Britain with as free a hand as if second-sight had revealed those expansions of her industrial career, which never fail to surprise us, even when we behold them realised.

But who was Andrew Yarranton, and what did he do? He shall tell us somewhat of his history in his own words :—

“ I was an apprentice to a linnen-draper when this king was born, and continued at the trade some years, but the shop being too narrow and short for my large mind, I took leave of my master, but said nothing. Then I lived a country-life for some years; and in the late wars I was a soldier, and sometimes had the honour and misfortune to lodg and dislodg an army. In the year 1652, I entred upon iron works, and pli'd them several years, and in them times I made it my business to survey the three great rivers of England, and some small ones; and made two navigable, and a third almost compleated. I next studied the great weakness of the rye-lands, and the surfeit it was then under by reason of their long tillage. I did by practick and theorick find out the reason of its defection, as also of its recovery, and applyed the remedy in putting out two books, which were so fitted to the country-man's capacity, that he fell on pell-mell; and I hope, and partly know, that great part of Worcestershire, Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Shropshire, and Staffordshire, have doubled the value of the land by the husbandry discovered to them; see my two books printed by

Mr Sawbridg on Ludgate Hill, entitled, *Yarranton's Improvement by Clover*, and there thou mayest be further satisfied.* I also for many years served the countreys with the seed, and at last gave them the knowledg of getting it with ease and small trouble; and what I have been doing since, my book tells you at large."

This modest account of himself would not, however, give us a fair idea of his position or importance. We find that he had been employed by Sir Walter Blount, Sir Samuel Baldwin, Sir Timothy Baldwin, Thomas Foley, Philip Foley, Thomas Smith, Joseph Newbrook, Samuel Whyte, Nicholas Baker, John Finch, and Nicholas Harrison, to visit the continent of Europe, for the purpose of studying such trades, manufactures, or improvements, as might be advantageously introduced into England, and that those gentlemen (whose names well deserve to be recorded) had, with a wise and patriotic liberality, maintained him and his interpreter. We find, also, that he had been associated with various noble lords, especially Thomas Lord Windsor, in rendering several rivers navigable; that he was consulted by those in authority with regard to the construction of harbours and canals; that no less a personage than "His Highness

* In the reign of William III., clover and the other plants called by farmers "artificial grasses," appear to have been common, as appears from the enumeration of Dr Edward Chamberlayne. "The fields are sufficiently full of tares, vetches, *clover-grass*, *hop-clover*, *sanfoil*, *ray-grass*, *trefoil*, *cinquefoil*, hops, wood, flax, hemp, rape-seed, *lucern*, Dantzick flax, canary seed, mustard seed, &c."—(*Angliæ Notitia*, 18th Edition, 1694.)

the Duke of York" undertook to recommend some of his schemes to Parliament; and that he was a commissioner for the examination of those fraudulent land-titles which had grown out of the civil wars.

Andrew's foreign observations were fruitful in results. He had "pryed into the curious intreagues of trade and the thriving politics of our neighbour nations," and he had made it his business to ascertain "how and which way the trade of England might be improved and advanced." With an intelligent eye, he had noted in Holland the "laws, customs, public banks, cut rivers" (his name for canals), "havens, sands, policies in government and trade, with their natural fortifications both by sea and land." He arrived at the conclusion that we could not beat the Dutch by fighting (not an unnatural conclusion when they had recently burnt our ships at *Chatham*), and thereupon he began to reflect:—

"And by long studying and weighing every part of their condition, and also knowing some of our failings in the advance of trade, and our weak laws conducing thereunto, I did see that all was out of joint; and pursuing the causes thereof, in a small time it appeared to me, that although we could not beat them with fighting, yet, on the other hand, it was as clear to me that we might beat them without fighting, *that being the best and justest way to subdue our enemies.*"

We shall therefore inquire how Andrew proposed to beat the Dutch without fighting, and to "force from them their beloved Mistress and delight, which

is *trade*, and *riches* thereby." To do him justice, he appears to have been actuated by a sincere desire to promote the welfare of the "mistress," quite as much as that of the master; for he cannot endure that so estimable a lady as Trade should "seat herself in that dull and flegmatick air," but rather that she should betake herself to "a place of better ports and healthfuller air." Deeply impressed with the truth that "all things are double, and all things for their use," when he sees in England so many noble ports and so many natural advantages, he patriotically concludes that she *ought* to have the trade; and finding that she has it not, he sets himself to work to discover how she may obtain the same. And we question whether any book of similar size in the English language contains as much masculine good sense on the subject of national wealth and commercial prosperity.

To beat the Dutch without fighting, was the new and the true idea of modern times,—as much entitled to the name of a discovery as the discovery of the law of gravitation. The law of gravitation solves a great problem in the physical world; the law of *mutual prosperity* solves a great problem in the social world. The first shows us harmony in the universe of matter; the second shows that the good of one country is not inconsistent with the good of another, but, on the contrary, that peace and unanimity are more fruitful of advantage than the barbarous appeal to the sword. The first leads us to believe that God governs the inanimate world on a principle of order;

the second leads us to believe that if man sows disorder, he will certainly not reap those benefits which he might have otherwise possessed, and which only an enlightened attention to the moral and economical laws of the world can permanently secure. Trade hitherto had universally been connected with fighting. Flanders in the north of Europe, Venice and Genoa in the south, had, some generations earlier, been the great traders and merchants of the world. Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres were the northern centres of industry, peopled by brawny arms which, by honest labour, worked wealth out of this world of ours, maintained a heroic contest with nature—beat her, and turned her to uses. From nature, Flanders had received little but space to grow upon,—bogs, marshes, and shores, with a hostile sea ever ready to play havoc, and wanton rivers watching, as it were, to catch man off his guard, that they might destroy the fruits of his toil. Out of these materials the Flemish man had made the Flemish country—a small but noble country, destined to preserve the industrial tradition from generation to generation. But Flanders had not solved the great problem of a nation's welfare. She had toiled and been successful. The assembled world of trade was seen in her great emporium, and her mark was good over the known world. She worked with care, and the bad workmen who made goods unworthy of Flanders, saw them hung up to the public gaze on a market day, and then distributed to the hospitals. But Flanders had not solved the problem, and from not solving it

she fell. Her hives, so busy in time of peace, were nests of hornets when animated by the insane desire to fight. The hand that could wield a hammer, would wield also a sword; and in the case of foreign invasion could wield it well and rightfully, and knock the chivalry of France on the head in the ditch of Courtrai, and hang up hundreds or thousands of gilded Gallic spurs as memorials in the cathedral. There the princely Artois, mad with vehemence, could rush to destruction; as his namesake, the brother of St Louis, had done, when he led the Templars to Egyptian graves. And had Flanders turned the point of her sword ever towards the foreigner, she might have told another tale in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—she would still have manufactured for the world, even if she could not retain the trade which was then finding a new home on the ocean. But two circumstances were fatal to her: first her feudal connection with her Counts, on which we say nothing; and second, the fatal jealousy of the towns and trades, which led to endless feuds, and finally to ruin. It seemed to be universally accepted as an indisputable truth (as in fact a true reading of the universe), that if one town prospered, the other must suffer; hence it was also an understood part of every workman's duty, that he was to be ready for attack or defence, his foe being his neighbour workman, who was either succeeding too well, or who was coming to destroy opposition in the most direct of all possible manners. Hence, also, in the hour of need, a short-sighted policy pre-

vented the towns from standing together—Bruges failed Ghent, and Ghent failed Bruges—the large towns failed the small ones, and the small towns, when they dared, failed the large ones; and so, when the enemy did come, he took them in detail, whereas had they stood shoulder to shoulder, they could have swept every hostile foot from the face of their land, as they ought to have done. Flanders was thus not a nation, but an aggregation of industrial clans, too often fighting and warring with each other, and helping each other on the road to ruin. The Fleming was not a citizen of Flanders, but a brother of a guild to which he owed his first and most sacred fealty; the guild and not the nation was the centre of his patriotism—its circumference was the ditch that surrounded his native town. A genuine and true workman he was—a workman in the midst of disorder and confusion; the elements of strife were ever at his door, for he had not discovered that God governs the world by order and harmony, and that the genuine prosperity of one man by no means entails the injury of another. Too often when the tocsin sounded it was for a “storm in Flanderland,” as the great bell of Ghent has it,—

“Roelandt, Roelandt, als ick kleppe, dan ist brandt,
Als ick luye, dan ist storm in Vlænderlandt.”

[“Boland, Roland, when I ring 'tis a fire,
When I toll 'tis a storm in Flanderland.”]

Too often indeed a storm—strife, contention, and confusion, out of which no good could come.

While Flanders carried on the trade of the north,

Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Marseilles, were the merchants of the Mediterranean. Venice and Genoa were the great navigators of the middle ages, the first in Europe who built great ships, manned them well, and put them to pacific uses. Necessity gave birth to enterprise,—enterprise gave birth to trade,—trade gave birth to wealth,—and wealth, duly directed by patriotism, gave birth to greatness. They thrived, and deserved to thrive—they wrought, and wrought well and fearlessly; and while emasculated Rome was obliged to cheat the world with lies for a subsistence, Venice and Genoa manfully encountered the responsibilities of life, and achieved for themselves a noble independence. Venice, like Flanders, had inherited little from nature, and, like Flanders, she was half amphibious, fighting with the ocean for room to stand upon. But, like Flanders also, Venice and Genoa had been born free, and that freedom was a priceless heritage, which in the days of their youth enabled them to take deep root and grow strong, and to develop the latent manhood which all European races have, and which would show itself much more generally in our own day, were it allowed free scope to direct its own career. Venice and Genoa could live, only as they lived by manhood. Whatever they had to sell had cost them honest labour. They had no indulgences which cost nothing, and sold for much—genuine frauds, in fact, which a strictly commercial tribunal would regard as such—they had no feudal tenants to labour for them, no rents and taxes bought with the blood and sweat of other men. What they

had was their own—they went into the world's market, and bought, and sold, and made profit, but they got nothing for nothing. If their wealth grew, it was because they had created it—because there was so much more wealth in the world which they had made by their wisdom and understanding, by their fearless activity and constant risk of life, fortune, or freedom. The crusades had brought them a golden harvest, but it was honestly won. They said to the world, "If you want to cross the seas, we are the men to take you. You, St Louis, want ships—here they are, the *Sancta Maria*, *Roccafortis*, *Sanctus Nicolaus*, &c., all good ships, well found and ready for sea, with a hundred and ten mariners to each. Lowest price, fourteen hundred marks for the voyage." The money was fairly earned; and if others wanted ships, but would not make them, Venice and Genoa were entitled to grow rich. But, we may ask, what became of the marks? They did not lie idle. Money makes money, and every trading people finds that out as a cardinal truth. Perhaps the marks went also on a crusade, and captured for their owners fourteen hundred marks' worth of infidel silks, which, when safely landed in Europe, were worth twice as much, for in those days of great risks men required large profits.

But Venice and Genoa had no more solved the problem than Bruges or Ghent—they also helped each other on the road to ruin. At the end of the thirteenth century, Genoa ruined Pisa, and for a hundred years maintained a warlike rivalry with

Venice, in which each party had its occasional successes and reverses. They fought—foolishly and insanely fought—on the very same principle as the Flemish towns, from a misinterpretation of the laws of nature. Pride, passion, and covetousness had blinded their eyes, and *they* also thought that the prosperity of the one was purchased by the adversity of the other. Venice triumphed, however, and Genoa, at the end of the fourteenth century, sunk from her place in the world's history. In 1401 she was occupied by a French garrison, and her traders were no longer to be the merchant princes of the earth. She dragged on a factious existence, it is true, but the vigour and freedom of her youth had departed, and though there were still Genoese, Genoa had gone for ever. But Venice, in so far contributing to the fall of Genoa, had only slackened the sinews of her own existence. Pride and presumption led to the infatuation which proverbially precedes destruction. She also had forsaken the genius of her earlier years, and the maxims that led to the greatness of her power. She would acquire, and plant her foot on the mainland, and spread the hem of her garment over possessions which belonged to others. Cyprus also—that moral antipodes of Britain—that land of beauty, that seems ever destined to be the home of tyranny, cruelty, and abomination—Cyprus also became hers, and she reared her haughty head, forgetful of the Providence that so long had spared her—the Providence which, though giving ample room and space for change, does always in the long run justify the

great moral laws of conscience, and prove by facts that lies are not truth, and that false readings of the universe will not and cannot stand. She ran her race of pride, but the day of reckoning was at hand. Pisa had fallen at the end of the thirteenth century, Genoa at the end of the fourteenth, and at the end of the fifteenth Venice was to prepare for the summing up of her account with the world. In 1509 Venice was swept from the face of Continental Italy. The Pope, the Emperor, the Spaniard, and the Frenchman divided her spoils, and henceforth Venice was to resign her claim to the name of the world's merchant.

It would be interesting to inquire how far—in addition to war, and, be it remarked, war based on the principle of commercial antagonism—two other great elements had contributed to the fall of Flanders, Venice, and Genoa. Those elements we shall mention, and only mention, as we must break ground in a new direction, and claim for an almost forgotten Englishman an honour which future generations will perhaps recognise more heartily than the present. We mean the two notable items, aristocracy and the Catholic religion. It may be questioned whether any country ever fell from the mere influence of external circumstances, unless, indeed, there be a total destruction—such as that of Tyre—a circumstance not to be looked for in modern times, when the influence of Christianity has, at all events so far, mollified the destructive passions of mankind. Flanders certainly did not fall from the arms of the French, nor even

from the arms of the Burgundians. There were other causes indubitably recognisable—home causes—inward complaints and maladies of the body politic, arising from *false* notions entertained by the intellect, and carried into outward realization. If Flanders had been let alone, she would have fallen all the same, and for a time would have sunk into anarchy, faction, and dissolution. And so with Venice. It is usual to regard the fall of Venice as consequent on the discovery of the sea passage to India. Such, however, is not the case. Venice had fallen before the sea route could have produced any perceptible difference on the trade of the Mediterranean. Ten years only elapsed between the return of Vasco de Gama and the battle of Agnadello, which effectually broke the power of the sea-girt City, or rather which effectually proved that her power was gone. Venice was not conquered, she died—died of aristocracy and inanition—she died for want of manhood—she had become modern Italian, which means all but what it ought to have meant. She had become reflectively vicious, and reflective vice is the most deadly of all the influences that can operate on a population. When she went down, she went down irremediably. It was otherwise, however, with Flanders. Flanders, had it not been for her political connection with Burgundy, Austria, and Spain, would, in all probability, have worked out the problem of national prosperity, through the very circumstance of her early failure. She would have adopted the new faith, would have become Protes-

tant, and Protestantism would have supplied her with that element which would have enabled her to remodel her industry, and to suit herself to the requirements of modern times. The next Continental country, in fact, that made a manful struggle for the trade of the north was Protestant Holland, which had grown out of the invincible dykes and marshes of northern Flanders.

The origin of Holland may be told in a few words. In 1363, Philip the Bold, son of King John of France, was created Duke of Burgundy, and in this dignity he was confirmed by his brother Charles V., who succeeded John in the following year. Philip married Margaret, daughter of Louis, Count of Flanders; and as Margaret was her father's heiress, Philip became feudal lord of Flanders, Franche Comté, Artois, Nevers, Antwerp, and Mechlin. On the death of Charles the Rash, who was killed at Nancy in 1477, Louis XI. seized the Dukedom of Burgundy, and would willingly, also, have acquired Flanders. Charles, however, had left a daughter, Mary, and with her Flanders was once more transferred to the foreigner. Mary of Burgundy married Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, hence the connection of Flanders with the Empire. Maximilian's grandson was the Emperor Charles V., who was also King of Castile and Aragon, hence the connection of Flanders with Spain. The seventeen provinces attached to Spain were the four Duchies of Brabant, Limburg, Luxemburg, and Gueldres, the seven Counties of Flanders, Hainault, Artois, Holland, Zealand,

Namur, and Zutphen, the five Baronies or Lordships of Mechlin, Friesland, Utrecht, Groningen, and Overysse, and the Marquisate of Antwerp. Then followed the Reformation—the butcheries of the Duke of Alva—the separation of the northern provinces from the southern—and finally, the establishment of the Seven Provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Gueldres, Groningen, Friesland, and Overysse, as a species of half-monarchical Republic, with William of Orange as Stadtholder. This union took place in 1579–80, but the war with Spain still continuing, it was not till 1597 that the United Provinces were fairly started in the world. The Dutch now went to work on their own account—worked and throve—(still fighting, however, and though, as Sterne says, “a Republic is only a woman,” yet she fought like a man)—built ships—established very extensive fisheries—traded to the East Indies—plunged into the Arminian and Calvinistic controversy—produced their Van Tromps and De Ruyters—faced old England herself—flaunted their new-born flag on the waters of Father Thames—burnt ships at Chatham, and thereby set Andrew Yarranton, Gentleman, to the consideration of the great problem—

“*How to beat the Dutch without fighting.*” *

* Professor Heeren of Göttingen, in his “Treatise on the Rise of the Continental Interests of Great Britain,” represents England as laying the foundation of her naval supremacy by the Navigation Act of 1651. He says (Talbot’s edition, p. 240),—“The relation in which England stood to the West Indian colonies, where the Dutch were in possession of nearly all the commerce of the British islands, and more especially that of Barbadoes, led to the passing of that famous Navigation Act, which

Andrew is a man of no preliminaries. He plunges at once to the bottom—"plumbs his depth," as the angler would say. He clearly expounds the general principles of commerce, and, as we shall endeavour to prove, exhibits a most masterly conception of the special capabilities of England. He knows the reasons "why and wherefore;" has facts at hand to bear out his logic; has few principles, but then they are good ones; and, as to his remedies, they are—with one exception, which we shall point out—at once simple, thorough, and such as commend themselves to the judgment of mankind. His nervous English contrasts favourably with the polished

not only secured to the mother country the whole trade of the colonies, but also forbade the introduction of European produce in any ships but those of the country from which it came, and thus gave the death-blow to the extensive carrying trade of Holland. This act was, therefore, little less than a declaration of war. The relations between the two states, however, had undergone a great change. Holland had all but secured the monopoly of the commerce of the world; and England, if she wished to have any share of it, could not avoid entering into a contest such as Cromwell engaged in. The dispute which arose respecting the rights of the flag, unimportant as it may appear, displays in a remarkable manner the rivalry of the two nations; but that England, by persisting in the Navigation Act, laid the foundation of her naval power, requires no proof."

It is not a little remarkable that, just after the shipowners have been lamenting the repeal of the Navigation Laws, ships should be in such active employment that crews cannot be found to man them. It is within our own knowledge that shipmasters from Liverpool have recently been seeking crews in Glasgow, because the available seamen of the former port had been all taken up. The shipping of England was probably never in greater demand than at the present moment; so much so, that vessels of less than a hundred tons are carrying passengers to Australia,—the *Boomerang*, for instance, from the little town of Girvan in Ayrshire.

insipidity that came soon after to be regarded as the perfection of style. Hear him:—

“ All kingdoms and commonwealths in the world that depend upon trades, common *honesty* is as necessary and needful in them as discipline is in an army; and where is want of common honesty in a kingdom or commonwealth, from thence trade shall depart. For as the honesty of all governments is, so shall be their *riches*; and as their *honour, honesty, and riches* are, so shall be their *strength*; and as their honour, honesty, riches, and strength are, so will be their *trade*. These are five sisters that go hand in hand, and must not be parted. All people that know anything of Holland, know that the people there pay great taxes, and eat dear, maintain many soldiers, both by sea and land, and in the three maritime provinces have neither good water nor good air; *and that in some of the provinces they pay fifty years' purchase for their lands*, and are many times subject to be destroyed by the devouring waves of the seas overflowing their banks. And notwithstanding all these strange and unheard inconveniences, yet they will not quit their station and remove to places of more safety and less taxes (though never so civilly treated). The reason whereof is,

“ *First*, They have fitted themselves with a public register of all their lands and houses, whereby it is made ready moneys at all times, without the charge of law or the necessity of a lawyer.

“ *Secondly*, By making cut rivers navigable in all

places where art can possibly effect it, thereby making trade more communicable and easie than in other places.

“*Thirdly*, By a public bank, the great sinews of trade, the credit thereof making paper go in trade equal with ready money, yea, better, in many parts of the world than money.

“*Fourthly*, A court of merchants to end all differences betwixt merchant and merchant.

“*Fifthly*, A lumber-house, whereby all poor people may have moneys lent upon goods at very easie interest.

“As I have showed you their strength before,” —(some considerations intended to prove that we could not beat the Dutch *by* fighting, based on the circumstance that their shores were protected by sands, and that, as their ships drew five feet less water than ours, we could not effectually attack them in their shallow waters)—“now in these five particulars you may see their policie, upon which lies all their happiness and welfare. By these policies of the Dutch, and the want of our lands being put under a register, one hundred pounds a-year in Holland at this present time will raise a family sooner, and drive a better and more profitable trade, than a man can do of a thousand pounds a-year in England. But if we write by their copies, we shall do the great things they now do, and, I dare say, outdo them too.”

Andrew says a great deal about *honesty*; but then he attaches a peculiar meaning to the term. He

does not mean that a man should be willing to pay his debts, or that he should *intend* to pay them. This may be the honesty of ethics; but Andrew wisely considers that something more is requisite in trade. He means that a man is honest when he *pays* his debts, and plainly he can not pay if he have not the wherewithal. Consequently, Andrew endeavours to find out the reason why the men of England had not the wherewithal, seeing that the Dutch, with less annual value, could raise a much larger capital. As this fact is of historical interest, and as our author was a land commissioner, and had every opportunity of knowing the real circumstances of the case, we shall give his account of the manner in which mortgages were managed in the reign of Charles II. :—

“Now, I will demonstrate to all men unbiassed the truth of what I assert, and show them the condition the gentlemen and people of England are in at this day, and also the condition the Dutch are in at this day, in all their provinces. Let a gentleman now in England, that hath a thousand pounds a-year in land, that owes four thousand pounds, come to a money scrivener and desire four thousand pounds to be lent on all his land, and produce his writings, and the estate hath been in the family two hundred years, I know at this day the answer will be, that by the law of England as it is now practised, no man can know a title by writings, there being so many ways to incumber land privately. And therefore the answer commonly is, ‘Bring us security for the

covenants, and we will lend you the moneys.' The gentleman gets such friends as he can procure to be bound for his covenants, whom, if they accept, then the procurator and continuator have their game to play: but if he bring not such security as they like, he goeth without his four thousand pounds, which is a sad and lamentable case, he having lands worth a thousand pounds a-year, and now he is put to his shifts, his creditors come upon him, the charge of law-suits comes on, all his affairs are distracted, his sons and daughters want money to set them into the world. At last, it is possible he gets two thousand pounds a-piece of two several persons, of one at York, and of the other at London, and mortgages all his lands to each man. This continues private for some years; the while the gentleman strives what he can to be honest, and prepare moneys to pay off one of the mortgages. But it commonly falls out otherwise, either through bad times or decay of tenants, great taxes, or the eldest son matching contrary to his father's will, or oftentimes it is worse. He is so debauched no one will match with him. Now the gentleman's miseries come on, and what must he then do? For the persons that have the land mortgaged will not stay, because by this time it is discovered the land is twice mortgaged. I tell you, the lawyers' harvest is now come in, and the estate torn to pieces, and the gentleman, his wife and family, and, it may be, creditors too, undone. For seeing all is in danger to be gone, the friends of the wife trump up a for-

mer title to the two mortgages, and fence to get all the estate that sheriff, bayliffs, solicitors, and lawyers leave to be to the uses intended or pretended in the private settlement. But you will ask me what the poor gentleman shall do to secure his person? I will tell you what some have done, and many more, I know, must do,—even turn over either to the *Fleet* or *Bench*. O pity and sin that it should be so in brave England! First, pity that a poor gentleman cannot have moneys at such interest upon his lands as the law directs, to pay his just debts, and for the good and comfort of his family. Secondly, it is a sin that a gentleman of a thousand pounds a-year should be the occasion of ruining so many families as he does, by putting them to such vexatious suits for their moneys lent, and, it may be, at last lose all.”

Seeing, then, that the Englishman with a thousand pounds a-year in land was in no very favourable circumstances when he required to borrow money, let us ask how the Dutchman managed; for there can be no doubt that this borrowing money on land was the true origin of that system which enabled a man to trade with two capitals—that system of *credit* which first placed trade on a secure footing, and enabled it to expand far beyond the possibilities of mere money transactions:—

“In this posture, as you see, are many poor men in England which cannot borrow four thousand pounds of a thousand pounds a-year land. I pray let us see what a posture a Dutchman stands in,

that hath one hundred pounds a-year, and wants four thousand pounds.

“Now, I am a Dutchman, and have one hundred pounds a-year in the province of West Friezland, near Groningen, and I come to the bank at Amsterdam, and there tender a particular of my lands, and how tenanted, being one hundred pounds a-year in West Friezland, and desire them to lend me four thousand pounds, and I will mortgage my land for it. The answer will be, I will send by the post to the register of Groningen your particular, and at the return of the post you shall have your answer. The register of Groningen sends answer, it is my land and tenanted according to the particular. There is no more words, but tell out your moneys. *Observe* all you that read this, and tell to your children this strange thing, *that paper in Holland is equal with moneys in England*. I refuse the moneys, I tell him I do not want moneys, I want credit, and having one son at Venice, one at Noremberg, one at Hamburgh, and one at Dantzick, where banks are, I desire four tickets of credit, each of them for a thousand pounds, with letters of advice directed to each of my sons, which is immediately done, and I mortgage my lands at three in the hundred. Reader, I pray observe, that every acre of land in the seven provinces, trades all the world over, and it is as good as ready money; but in England poor gentlemen cannot take up four thousand pounds upon his land at six in the hundred interest, although he would mortgage a thousand pounds a-year for it. No; and many

gentlemen at this day, of five hundred pounds a-year in land, cannot have credit to live at a twelvepenny ordinary. If this be so, it is very clear and evident that a man with one hundred pounds a-year in Holland, so convenienced as their titles are, and at the paying but three in the hundred interest for the moneys lent, may sooner raise three families, than a gentleman in England can either raise one or preserve the family in being, for the reasons already given. But were the free lands of England under a voluntary register, all these miseries would vanish, and the lands *would come to thirty years' purchase*, which I shall show you in its proper place."

The reader will easily perceive what Andrew is driving at. He proposes, as his first practical suggestion, (subservient, however, to an ultimate end, namely, that the whole mass of the population should have cheap bread and drink and constant employment), a general system of banking that should unite the following advantages:—1. Security to the bank for all advances; 2. Security to the capitalist, great or small, for all deposits; and 3. Facility of advance, based on the registration of freehold land, which would obviate all uncertainty as to title or encumbrance. This registration he would also have extended to houses, and especially to those houses which were built after the great fire of London. It is almost needless to observe that this is the very system that has enabled Scotland to assume her present position of commercial importance. The bank, in fact, as a means of progress and improve-

ment, is only second to the church and the school. The bank is the life of trade, as necessary, in one form or other, to the prosperity of a commercial country as the heart is to the circulatory system. Had the lands of England been registered, and had a general system of banking been established on such security, it would have saved many a broken fortune. Andrew, however, finds it necessary to enter on an argument to prove that a "bank may rise in London equal with that of Amsterdam."

"And I would have the mistaken world know" (hear it, ye British Linens, Royals, Nationals, and Commercials, ye Banks of England, Coutts's, Masterman's, Westminster's, and Joint Stocks), "that a bank is as safe and practicable in a kingdom as in a commonwealth, and particularly in an island that is convenient for trade. And the reason why it is so is, because it is a bank of credit and not of cash, as is the Chamber of London and the East India Company, whose treasures are abroad in trade and increasing, and only the books in the offices. I say it is impossible to keep a bank from rising in this kingdom, nay, many banks, if we were under a voluntary register. But now the land credit and the city bank credit are both disparaged,* therefore it is im-

* Andrew is quite right in saying that the city bank credit was disparaged, for in 1676 banking was at perhaps its lowest ebb. Ten years before, the goldsmiths had carried on a regular system of banking, borrowing money, say at six per cent., and advancing it to the government, say at eight and ten per cent. In 1667, when the Dutch sailed into the Medway, a panic took place, and a sudden run seriously affected the credit of the goldsmiths. Five years later, Charles II. shut the exchequer, and

possible that trade can any way be secured or sheltered. And for persons behind hand and in debt, they must expect misery."

Andrew was well aware that there were some parties whom a land register and a general squaring up of accounts would not suit, and he points out these parties as sagaciously as if he had studied the proceedings of the Irish Encumbered Estates' Commission:—

"I have met with many that have made these objections: *First*, The *Lawyers* will be against it. *Second*, All gentlemen in debt will be against it. *Third*, All the lawyers in the House of Commons, and gentlemen in the House in debt, will be against it. And *Fourth*, It will undo thousands of people, for in producing their writings, holes will be pickt in their titles."

These objections he answers in detail, but seeing the character of the persons from whom the objections were to come, we need not follow him through his refutation. Let us rather regard those branches of industry which he affirmed ought to furnish staple employment to the population. These he ranks as follows—(omitting, of course, stock farming and the

seized the money which should have repaid the advances, thereby ruining not only the banking goldsmiths, but several thousands of families. Andrew had therefore an uphill battle to fight in advocating a bank, and it does great credit to his judgment that he should have laboured to convince his countrymen that banks were necessary to trade, even when the *facts* of previous experience might appear to establish the ruinous nature of all such experiments. Banking never *had* succeeded in England,—how easily the "practical man" could affirm that *therefore* it never would succeed.

culture of the cereal grains, although, even in those departments, he is entitled to no little credit for his introduction of the clover husbandry): first, the growth of flax and the manufacture of linen; second, the production of iron and its manufacture; third, the manufacture of wool. These, Andrew Yarranton maintained, ought to constitute the great pursuits of industrial England; and if we substitute cotton for linen, we see that he has predicted as nearly as possible the actual employments of our present manufacturers. But even with regard to the culture and manufacture of flax, many intelligent persons are of opinion that this branch of industry would furnish profitable employment for a much larger capital than is at present embarked in it. The attention both of agriculturists and manufacturers has recently been turned in this direction; and for their benefit we shall give the result of Andrew's experience. Andrew was thoroughly acquainted with the linen trade. He knew it from the sowing of the seed to the production of the bleached web; had studied, both at home and abroad, the lands suitable for the flax, and the local requisites for its manufacture; he had studied the various modes of dressing and spinning, (he gives a most graphic description of a German spinning-school); he had studied the political economy of the trade, and, in fact, was thoroughly versed in all its details. He considers the soil and climate of England as well suited to the production of the plant, especially the counties of Warwick, Leicester, Northampton, and Oxford, and

he strenuously recommends these counties "as having no staple manufacture at present fixed with them, whereby their poor are idle, and want employment." He estimates one acre of flax to employ three persons, before the cloth is completed, and his calculation for the four counties is as follows. One acre of land will bear three hundredweight of flax. These three hundredweight well dressed, and made fine, will make four hundred ells of cloth, worth three shillings the ell, which will be in value sixty pounds. That in the four counties there are at least forty thousand acres of excellent flax land, and consequently that those forty thousand acres would employ one hundred and twenty thousand persons, and produce a gross value of £2,400,000. "And by this manufacture, we shall prevent at least two millions of money a-year from being sent out of the land for linen cloth, and keep our people at home, who now go beyond the seas for want of employment here. For wherever the country is full of people, they are rich; and where thin, there the place is poor, and all commodities cheap." Two millions seems a very large sum to have been paid to foreign countries for linens; but Andrew affirms, that in his day the linen trade of England had *declined* in consequence of foreign competition. He sums up the condition of the trade as follows. Fine linens were imported from Holland and Flanders. The flax was grown, dressed, spun, and wound in Germany, "where victuals are cheap." The yarn was then brought into Holland and Flanders to be woven and bleached,

“where people eat dear, and pay great rents.” The expense of the two latter operations he estimates at only one-tenth of the whole cost, so that the high price of provisions in Holland did not seriously affect the price of the article. The process of spinning and sorting the threads was much better understood in Germany than in England, and consequently the foreign cloth was much more even than any made at home. Andrew’s account of the spinning-school is too good to be omitted : “*First*, There is a large room, and in the middle thereof a little box like a pulpit. *Secondly*, There are benches built round about the room as they are in our playhouses ; upon the benches sit about two hundred children spinning, and in the box in the middle of the room sits the grand mistress, with a long white wand in her hand. If she observes any of them idle, she reaches them a tap, but if that will not do, she rings a bell, which by a little cord is fixt to the box, and out comes a woman, she then points to the offender, and she is taken away into another room and chastised. And all this is done without one word speaking. And, I believe, this way of ordering the young women in Germany, is one great cause that the German women have so little of the twit-twat ; and, I am sure, it would be well were it so in England. And it is clear, that the less there is of speaking, the more there may be of working. In a little room by the school, there is a woman that is preparing and putting flax on the distaffs, and upon the ringing of the bell, and pointing the rod at the maid that hath spun off her flax,

she hath another distaff given her, and her spool of thread taken from her, and put into a box unto others of the same size to make cloth."

From France were imported "canvases, lockrums, and great quantities of coarse cloths," so much so, in fact, "that it hath almost laid aside the making of linen cloth in England." Twine and yarn were also imported to make sail-cloth and cordage, "which hath taken off the labour of multitudes of people in Suffolk and thereabouts, and hath so lessened the trade that it is almost lost." Narrow coarse cloths were imported from north Germany, "the cheapness whereof hath beaten out the linen trade formerly made in Lancashire, Cheshire, and thereabouts, about forty years since, a very great trade." Bed-ticking was also imported, which had "almost destroyed that trade in Dorsetshire, and Somersetshire, so the spinners are idle, and the lands fall price." Yarns were imported from Germany. "Formerly the clothiers made use of linen yarn spun in that country, (the neighbourhood of Kidderminster), to make their lynsey-woolseys, but now the cheapness of the foreign threads hath put them upon making use of German yarn. Great quantities of thread (yarn) also are used at Manchester, Maidstone, and in other parts of England to mix with woollen; with infinite other commodities, and all the benefit of the labour of these threads is applied to foreigners."

The modern doctrine of political economy is, that industry requires for its development, land, labour, capital, and skill. To these ought to be emphati-

ally added another item which all experience proves to be equally necessary,—namely, liberty; that is, the liberty of development under the laws of nature. Whether it be advisable, from moral considerations, to lay restrictions on any particular branch of industry, is a question on which we shall not enter; but we consider it proven by the whole history of trade, that where political restrictions are put in operation, there the trade also will be restricted, and a less number of persons will find profitable employment in it. In proposing to manufacture linen, at home, instead of buying it from foreigners, Andrew Yarranton clearly perceived the relations of the above four items. He said, we have the land, we have the labour, we have, or may have, the capital; all, therefore, that is necessary is to *import the skill*. He therefore gives the following advice:—

“Send for one man from Friburgh to put you in the true way and method of making the tape, and to bring over two engines,—one to weave narrow tape, and the other to weave broad tape, with wheels to spin. (The German wheels were much superior to the English.)

“Send for one man from Dort in Holland to put you in the true way of ordering the fine threads.

“Send for a spinning mistress out of Germany, to order and govern the little maids, and instruct them in the art of spinning.

“Send for a man from Harlem in Holland to whiten (bleach) your tapes and threads.”

The man who had introduced the clover culture, and who proposed to beat the Dutch in fair competition, by *importing their skill*, scarcely deserved to be forgotten in a commercial country like ours.*

Next to the linen trade, to which Andrew attached primary importance, on account of the number of persons it was capable of employing as manufacturers (an anticipation completely verified in the cotton manufactures of Britain), he advocated the extension of the iron trade. This trade, although himself an iron-master, he had studied as much for the improvement of England as for the improvement of his private fortune. Hence he dwells especially on the capabilities of England for becoming a great iron-producing country; but here, also, he is obliged to anticipate the objections of those who admired "the good old times,"—that is, the good old times when no iron was made in England. Let us hear him on the iron trade:—

"The second manufacture to be encouraged to set the poor people at work, being the growth and product of our own kingdom, is that of iron. But

* Dr Chamberlayne (*Angliæ Notitia*, p. 45) affirms that, in the reign of William III., England had succeeded in manufacturing sufficient linen for her own use. If so, Andrew's advice had been successful. Chamberlayne says:—"It (England) wants not linen for all uses, at least not ground to produce flax and hemp, although there hath been much linen imported, with much paper, and fine paper made of linen, to the shame and damage of the nation. But there are lately many paper mills erected, and very much fine paper made in several places of England; and the papermakers are incorporated by a royal patent into a society. The same encouragement hath also the linen manufacture, *and already we have so much made at home, as we need not send abroad for any.*"

now I am sure I shall draw a whole swarm of wasps about my ears. For, say some (and many, too, who think themselves very wise), it were well if there were no iron-works in England; and it was better when no iron was made in England—(. . . but when that was, neither I nor the objector knows; for in the forest of Deane, and thereabouts, the iron is made at this day of cinders, being the rough and offal thrown by in the Roman's time;—they then having only foot-blasts to melt the iron-stone; but now, by the force of a great wheel that drives a pair of bellows twenty foot long, all that iron is extracted out of the cinders which could not be forced from it by the Roman foot-blast)—and that the iron-works destroy all the woods, and foreign iron from Spain will do better and last longer. And I have heard many men, both rich and sober, often declare these things; *and it hath been, and is the opinion of nine parts of ten of the people of England that it is so;* and by no arguments whatever will they be beat from the belief of it, although there is not one word true. As to the first, the iron-works at present in England are of the same value, and, I believe, much more to the public than the woollen manufacture is, and is the cause of employing near as many people, and much more lands for horses and oxen to carry and recarry those heavy commodities of which the iron is made, and the iron and the things made of the iron.”

Andrew is not so minutely explicit on the iron trade as on the linen trade. He gives us, however, a

certain amount of information. This trade, also, was diminishing, in consequence of foreign competition.

“Consider,” he says, “how many iron-works are laid down” (abandoned), “both in Kent, Sussex, and Surrey, and many more must follow. The reason is, the iron from Sweadland (Sweden), Flanders, and Spain, comes in so cheap that it cannot be made to profit here.

“Now I have showed you the two manufactures of linen and iron, with the product thereof, and all the materials are with us growing; and these two manufactures will, if by law countenanced, set all the poor in England at work, and much enrich the country, and thereby fetch people into the kingdom, whereas now they depart,” (yes, honest Andrew, and *now* also they depart) “and thereby deprive the Dutch of these two great manufactures of iron and linen. I mean, iron wrought into all commodities, so vastly brought down the Rhine into Holland from Liege, Gluke, Soley, and Cologne, and by them diffused and sent all the world over. And these two trades being well fixed here, will help to beat the Dutch without fighting. I pray, consider the charge England is now at with the poor, and observe what they now cost the public; but if employed in these two manufactures, what advance by their labour might the public receive! Admit there be in England and Wales a hundred thousand poor people unemployed, and each one costs the public four pence the day in food, and, if these were employed, they would earn eight pence the day; and so the

public, in what might be gained and saved, will advance twelve pence the day by each poor person now unemployed. So a hundred thousand persons will be to the benefit of the public, if employed, one million and a half yearly in these two manufactures of iron and linen. And as these two manufactures are now managed in Saxony, they set all their poor at work. I, travelling aworter and across Saxony, did not see one beggar there; and these two manufactures being prudently, and by good laws, there supported and encouraged, they are become two-parts in three of the revenue and benefit of that Duke, and they are sent into England at this time in great quantities, all paying customs in ten several places before they come here.

“But there is something that may be of worse consequence than ordinary, if the iron manufacture be not encouraged. At present, most of the works in Sussex and Surry are laid down, and many in the north of England, and many in other parts must follow, if not prevented by inclosing commons to supply them with wood. And when the greatest part of the iron-works are asleep, if there should be occasion for great quantities of guns and bullets”
—(always guns and bullets,

“As if the metals were intended
For nothing else but to kill men dead,”)—

“and other sorts of iron commodities for a present unexpected war, and the Sound happen to be lockt up, and so prevent iron coming to us, truly we should then be in a fine case!”

The next branch of industry to which Andrew directed the attention of his countrymen was the woollen trade; and this he proposes to improve by the adoption of the processes which enabled the foreigner to make a handsomer cloth than was made in England. Here his advice was, "*import the machinery.*" Two pieces of the same web of cloth may be so differently dressed, that the one shall be coarse, hard, unpleasant to the wear, unattractive to the eye, and comparatively unsuited to the market. The other piece, although made of the same wool, and woven in the same loom, may be so judiciously treated as to assume qualities of an entirely different character. Dressing, in fact, is the education of cloth—the woollen fabric, like the man who wears it, may grow up a boor or a gentleman. Andrew, then, tells his countrymen how they may dress their cloths, and make them of a superior quality, and this he does in a dialogue which would do no discredit to Isaac Walton. Before considering his method, however, we must notice one of his statements, so contrary as it is to the common supposition that manufacturers were flocking into England. This they *had* done a century before; but Andrew assures us that, in his day, the manufacturers were actually emigrating to Germany, Ireland, and Holland. His statements on this head, although concise, are quite explicit. We shall cite only one, premising that he is speaking of those practices which were calculated to injure the trade of England:—

“Another trick there is of carrying fullers’ earth

from Woborne to Lynn in Norfolk, as they pretend; and then ship it to be carried to the clothiers in the West, and when at sea, a west wind blows the ship into Flushing, in Zealand. And we will have more fullers' earth carried from Arundel in Sussex to Portsmouth or to Chichester, and there shipped to secure the clothiers in the north of England; and when that ship is over against Hull, a west wind shall blow her over to the Brill, or into the Texel, into Holland. And these two loadings of earth, with a little that shall be brought over for ballast for ships, will do mischief enough, *for trade will go where it is most encouraged, and where the merchant and clothier can get most by it.*

“*Draper.*—True, old friend, these tricks there are, and there are bad (?) men enough that will be apt enough to leave the land where they were born; but let us see to help these matters, for if you should be one of them, all the poor of this country will be bound to curse you, and so will the rich too; *for we have had men bad enough of our own trade (but it will not become me to name persons), who have provoked many clothiers to sell their estates, and transport themselves into the lower Palatinate and other parts of Germany, and there set up the clothing trade, which hath already spoiled our coarse cloth trade eastward, and the trade at Hamborough too; for if their trade be spoiled in England, they must try if they can make it out somewhere else, as in Ireland, Holland, and Germany, &c.*”

To do Andrew's dialogue justice, we must give

rather a formidable quotation, but we feel assured that the commercial reader will not peruse it without interest. The clothier and the draper are discussing the merits of the land register; and the clothier, rejoicing in its probable effects, declares that "now we may be honest if we will, for as things are, *the lawyers cannot make us honest.*" Remember that, all ye disorderly souls, who are given to litigation, "lawyers cannot make you *honest.*"

"*Draper.*—The bill is to be carried into the House the next sitting of Parliament; and some lords, parliament-men, and gentlemen, and some honest and great lawyers are for it, because it will pay the gentlemen's debts without money, and beat the Dutch without fighting, and bring honour, honesty, riches, and strength, and a great trade to England; and it is said it will double the king's revenue, and make him potent and strong.

"*Clothier.*—Bores, this is the best news that ever I heard,—I'll go home to Salisbury now and tell all my friends of this; and I hope to see then this good voluntary register brought to pass.

"*Draper.*—Well, old acquaintance, I am glad to see you so well satisfied now; if you once get a voluntary register, you will want men of your own trade in Parliament, to let them know what is best to be done for the good of the trade, which lawyers and gentlemen cannot tell how to do; for in Queen Elizabeth's time, a cobbler taught the council how leather might be ordered, tanned, and dressed for the good of the public, and thereupon many good laws were made

for that purpose; you may see the story in print. It is a discourse between my Lord Burley and a cobbler.

“*Clothier.*—Now you speak to the purpose; for what you say has been in my noddle these six or seven years; and I am sure I have told a neighbour of mine I did not like it; and I feared our parliament-men did not know where our grief lay. But now I see the old saying is true, ‘*Every man is a fool when he is out of his own way.*’ Come, let us clothiers be all for the good old way again, and if ever it should so fall out to have men of our own trades for members of Parliament, then up goes the golden fleece again.

“*Countryman.*—(Andrew himself.) I like your discourse very well, and now you have brought your discourse to something. I was the silenter because I did see all tended to the good of the wool, and the trade, and the manufacture. And all these things being upon the wheel for the public good, truly I will give my clothing friend home with him to Salisbury, two problems of falling-mills: * one to go by water, to be set up in a barge upon the river Avon, at Harnam-bridge, by the city, to scour and thicken their coarse cloths; and another to go by wind, to be set up near the town side, to full and thicken the fine cloths,—which will much outdo all other mills now in use in England, as to make the cloth feel fine and soft. The problem of the windmill for thickening

* Or fulling-mills,—called *falling*-mills from the fallers or beaters that worked vertically on the cloth.

fine cloths, is taken from the Dutch at Harlem in Holland; the problem of the mill in a barge to thicken and scour coarse cloths, is taken from one upon the Elbe near the bridg at Draidsen in Saxony.*

“*Clothier.*—Sir, I am now infinitely beholding to you; and this you say of a windmill to scour and thicken our fine clothes, and make them feel fine and soft, will do our business; for, indeed, they are the Dutch that outdo us that way; and you say it is so done at Harlem, and I hear at Blackwell Hall that the fine clothes were made at Harlem. Good sir, how are these mills made, and in what manner? and what do they do when the wind ceases blowing, the cloth being in the middle of its thickening? and what do they do for water to come into the cloth, when it is thickening and scouring?

“*Countryman.*—Sir, I will acquaint you with all particulars, and then I will give you afterwards the description of the mill in the barge, and the mill that goeth by wind. At Harlem in Holland they have windmills to thicken and scour their fine and superfine clothes, built close by the city side; the mills are made in all points as the saw windmill on the bank side in Southwark, over against the Savoy; and it turns round, that is, the whole fabric turns, whereby it catches the wind at all points; and there are six or eight fallers (or feet), which are taken and lifted up by the axle-tree which the fanns are fast-

* In 1634 a Dutchman who had set up a wind sawmill on the Thames, was compelled to discontinue it, because it deprived the labourers of employment.

ened in, and so fall downright into a box or chest wherein the cloth lyeth; and the chest is so made and ordered, and the fallers so fitted, that the cloth turns round in the chest, and the square or hole the faller drops into is so curiously and close made, that a man cannot get his knife into the chest betwixt the wood and the faller, and all other parts of the trough and chest where the cloth lyeth is made close and tight, and whereby the wind and air is kept from coming into the chest when the cloth is thickening; and in case the wind ceases blowing, they do either take the cloth out of the chest and lay it on drift, whereby it takes no harm, or else keep it close in the chest that no air can come to it; but the mills are so ordered, that they are made to scour more clothes than they thicken, and if the wind ceases, they let the fallers that are to scour stand still; and for water, it is pumpt up by force of the wind to a good height, and so conveyed into the chest to the cloths, by little spouts, as there is occasion. In Germany, near Poland, by reason of the dryness of the country, and smallness of the rains in summer time, most rivers are much wanting in water; therefore the mills for grinding corn and thickening of clothes are made and fixt in barges, upon the Elbe, near some bridg, (or in a quick stream), and near the bridg at Draisdén in Saxony, there they scour and thicken their cloths in barges; the mill is fixt in a barge, and in some barges are two mills. Observe the pattern, and I will save my labour of writing, for by it you will see how it is in every particular. . . .

“*Clothier*.—I have beat my noddle a good while, considering of the reasons why the mills by wind should make the cloth look the more fine, and feel more soft, than if fulled with our mills by the open flect, (or fullers), and I have it now, and I will send some queries to the *virtuosoes* about it, but I will tell you how the trick is; and if I had not been an old clothier, and a fulling boy when I was young, I could not have learnt it out. And it is sure, our fulling-mills that we now have, our fullers are taken up a great height, and so fall down into the stock upon the cloth, and in its quick motion down, it contracts wind, and brings it down with it into the stock where the cloth is, and so the wind and the air being forced upon the cloth, makes it hard and cools it, and the stock being open, and the cloth in it turning round in the stock, doth also by the wind and the air it attracts help to cool and harden the cloth; whereas the mills that go by wind, the fallers, or feet, fall down perpendicular into the stock through a square hole where the cloth is, and so attracts no wind, nor can any air get into the stock or chest where the cloth is; and, therefore, the cloth is always kept in a constant heat and temper, which must of necessity bring it to good proof, and make it look very fine, and feel very soft. I am resolved, now I have got this knack, I’ll pay the reckoning.”

Andrew, however, not satisfied with recommending a general system of banking, and pointing out the necessity of improving and extending the three great trades of England, now turns his attention to the

means of transit. "That nothing may be wanting that may conduce to the benefit and encouragement of things manufactured, as in cheap carriage to and fro over England, and to the sea at easy rates, I will in the next place show you how the great rivers in England may be made navigable, and thereby make the commodities and goods carried, especially in winter time, for half the rate they now pay." In this matter also he joined practice to theory, and personally engaged, both as surveying engineer and as capitalist, in an attempt to improve the inland navigation of the country. His first advice was, that a water communication should be established between the Thames and the Severn; and for this purpose his son twice "surveyed the river Thames and the Charwel, and it is very evident and clear, that the Charwel may be made navigable to Banbury, and the river Stower from Shipton clear into Avon river, two miles below Stratford, the Avon being already made navigable into the Severn; and so there will be, by making the Charwel navigable from Oxford to Banbury, and the Stower from Shipton to Avon, a communication of these two great rivers for water carriage within eight miles." As capitalist, he had expended a thousand pounds in making the "river Stoure completely navigable, from Sturbridge to Kederminster," but this scheme appears to have been partially unsuccessful, for want of sufficient capital to carry on the works. He had surveyed the river Slane in Ireland, and speaks in terms of admiration of "that great and good wood called shelela," (rather

a notable *wood* in the social history of Ireland, with this exception, however, that the Irish sheela is generally made of a Scottish blackthorn), affirming, that if the Slane were made navigable, these great quantities of timber might be employed in building ships for the Royal Navy, "which may, if his Majesty please, be kept either in an admiralty at Wexford, or in some port near, or in Milford Haven, and there they will be ready to sail upon any occasion, either to preserve the West India trade, or into the Mediterranean, and thereby give great comfort to all trade that is used in those seas, as also encourage the people, and drive away their present fears." Andrew had also surveyed the river Dee, and he projected a plan for connecting it with the Severn. He had found "the river so choked with the sands, that a vessel of twenty tons could not come to the noble city of Chester, and the ships forced to lye at Neason in a very bad harbour, whereby the ships receive much damage, and trade made so uncertain and changeable, that the trade of Chester is much decayed, and gone to Liverpool, and that old great city in danger of being ruined, if the river Dee be not made navigable by Act of Parliament, and ships brought to the city." Dublin harbour had engaged his attention, and he also dwells at some length on the local advantages of Christchurch in Hampshire, for the construction of a great naval dockyard and arsenal—esteeming it even superior to Portsmouth, as the timber from the New Forest could be conveyed there at much less expense. The gentlemen who

have, or rather perhaps who had, the management of this forest, have saved the country all anxiety about its timber; they having reduced sixty thousand acres of fine land and oak wood to a value somewhat less than nothing. On this New Forest, which seems to have been blighted with the curse of crime and inutility, ever since William the Norman destroyed its villages and expelled its population, we shall have another word to say.

Such were Andrew Yarranton's recommendations for the advancement of England's commerce. *First*, A general system of banking, made secure by a general land register. *Second*, The improvement and extension of the linen trade, the iron trade, and the woollen trade, including production and manufacture. *Third*, The improvement of inland navigation by the construction of canals, by connecting the larger rivers with each other, and by deepening the beds of the smaller ones. And *Fourth*, The construction of suitable harbours. And he prophetically affirms, that if his recommendations were reduced to practice, the lands of England would rise from sixteen years' purchase to thirty years' purchase.*

But Andrew, unlike some of our modern economists, does not consider the extension of trade as an ultimate end,—he looks on it only as a means,—as a

* The royalist lands appropriated and sold by the Commonwealth did not fetch sixteen years' purchase. The chapter lands had been sold at ten, the rectory lands at twelve, and the crown lands at thirteen years' purchase. Andrew, therefore, does not underestimate the value of land in the reign of Charles II., when he fixes it at sixteen years' purchase.

means capable of contributing to the welfare of the population. And he affirms that there is one primary requisite without which the mere extension of trade would fail to produce that desirable result. This requisite is, "cheap bread and drink, and always certain." This he plants as his radicle—as the root out of which the prosperity of the working population was to grow. He considers this as an indisputable end. He never dreams of discussing whether cheap bread and drink are good things, but assumes that they are so—that they are unquestionably good, and that the cheapness of the necessaries of life is at once an end in itself and the standard by which the value of other things must be measured. Why, for instance, *improve* trades or manufactures? Merely that food may be made cheaper, by enabling the workman to do more or better work in the same time. Why improve the inland navigation? Merely to diminish the cost of food, or to diminish the cost of the articles that purchase food. "Make meat and drink cheap," says Andrew, and you can command all else that you require, provided, of course, that other advantages remain the same. Cheap food, however, he associates, and wisely associates (perhaps he was the first who saw the full import of the association), with cheap money. Make food and money cheap, and you can command the trade of the world; "cheap bread and drink, and always certain, and moneys at low interest,"*—such is the doctrine of Andrew Yarranton.

* We are informed by commercial men that money is so much

Having thus enumerated some of the good advices which Andrew gave to his countrymen,—and all parties, we presume, will agree in admiring his solid sense and singular sagacity,—we must now exhibit him in a new phase. Andrew had another remedy in store which he proposed to apply to England's ailments. This remedy was, "tax all foreign manufactured articles imported into England." He was, in fact, the literary founder of the commercial system first exposed and exploded by Adam Smith. He was the propounder of *protection*, and, so far as we know, the earliest English writer who, treating specially of national welfare, broached the principle that we ought to tax foreign goods for the sake of our own manufacturers. And though Andrew's name appears little in English history, we cannot help thinking that his writings must have been studied, and that many after measures, actually reduced to practice, must have been borrowed from his unpretending treatise, which in all probability would have made a greater figure in the world, had it contained a little more of the element called quackery,—some portion of which seems almost essential to popularity in all departments of life. From Andrew Yarranton to Adam Smith there was

cheaper in London than in Scotland, that the bills drawn on Scotch houses, which were formerly discounted in Scotland, are now sent to London. If this is the fact, the Scottish banks must bestir themselves, otherwise they will find their business travelling southward, like the grouse, and salmon, and other good things which John Bull draws so voraciously to his great centre of consumption. In the battle-field of commerce, cheap money will always win in the long run.

exactly a century, and in that century had grown up the commercial system, which was as genuine a warfare with other nations as the old system of "guns and bullets," except that the weapons were changed. The guns and bullets were only occasionally used, and the foreigner was fought with laws, restrictions, prohibitions, customs, duties, and the other devices by which men attempted to improve the order of nature. Andrew, however, was a moderate man, and he would have applied his protectionist theory with caution. He would have given the manufacturers a fair start—would have excluded foreign goods *for a time*—would have allowed the trades at home to be fairly established, and then he assumed that they would be able to support themselves. Temporary laws, however, are at all times dangerous things to tamper with; and in this case a vast system of European restriction grew out of the very measures which Andrew recommended. In proposing protectionist taxes, Andrew had two principles: *First*, That we are rich when we keep our money at home,—a proposition refuted by the experience of every private merchant and of every banking company; and *Second*, That national prosperity can be procured by positive legislation,—a proposition which may be believed when any instance of success can be adduced. Let us then understand how Andrew intended to apply his principles:—

"And that the linen and iron manufactures may be so encouraged here by a public law, as that we

may draw these trades solely to us, which now foreign nations receive the benefit of, there ought in the first place to be a tax or custom at least of four shillings in the pound put on all linen yarn, threads, tapes, and twines for cordage that shall be imported into England, and three shillings in the pound upon all linen cloths under four shillings the ell; *and this law to be and continue for seven years.* And by virtue of this tax or imposition, there will be such advantage given to the linen manufacture in its infancy, that thereby it will take deep rooting and get a good foundation on a sudden. And as to the encouragement of the iron and iron manufactures, there should be three pounds a tun custom laid on all foreign bar-iron imported, and six pounds the tun on all the manufactured iron imported into England; and by these two ways, namely, by a tax being laid upon the imported bar-iron, iron wares, and thread, tape, twine, and linen cloth of all sorts, all the trade of these things will be here, and all the poor set at work, the Dutch robbed of one of their greatest flowers, and to the king and people in general at least six millions a-year advantage.

“ Consider what quantities of fine linnens are made in Holland and Flanders, and here worn and consumed; . . . consider that if these fine cloths were made here, how it would employ the poor, raise the price of land, and *keep our moneys at home*, for the Dutch take nothing from us in exchange, wherein the benefit is any way considerable to the publick.

“ Consider the French taking nothing of any value

from us, but it is ready money for their linnens. . . . But if a tax were laid upon their coarse linnen clothes, then what is brought out of France into England would be made here of our own growth, to the nation's great enriching."

"A tax upon those Easterling (German) clothes."

"A tax upon foreign bed ticking, &c. . . . A tax upon foreign iron is absolutely necessary."

As our present object is merely to point out the historical fact, that Andrew Yarranton was the propounder of the protectionist doctrines, that have done more to retard the friendly intercourse of the nations of Europe than any national antipathies whatever, we shall only contrast a passage from Adam Smith—literally the first that presents itself on opening the quarto edition of his great work.

"In every country it always is, and must be, the interest of the great body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been called in question, had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind. Their interest is in this respect directly opposite to that of the great body of the people; as it is the interest of the freemen of a corporation to hinder the rest of the inhabitants from employing any workmen but themselves, so it is the interest of the merchants and manufacturers of every country to secure to themselves the monopoly of the home market. Hence, in

Great Britain, and in most other European countries, the extraordinary duties upon almost all goods imported by alien merchants. Hence the high duties and prohibitions upon all those foreign manufactures which can come into competition with our own. Hence, too, the extraordinary restraints upon the importation of almost all sorts of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous; that is, from those against whom national animosity happens to be most violently inflamed.”—(*Wealth of Nations*, book iv., chap. iii.)

Before leaving our worthy friend Andrew, we may observe, that the same questions that agitate the commercial world in our own day, were as clearly apprehended two centuries since as they are now. Of these we shall mention only two: first, the spirit of disunion that so often prevails between the employed and the employers; and second, what Mr Porter so aptly termed “self-imposed taxation.” In the reigns of Charles II. and William III., these questions were discussed in much the same terms as they are at present. Let us hear what Andrew says to the working-classes of England. We might almost suppose him addressing the engineers, who were recently in a state of strike:—

“Now, my children, for so I must call you, for I now will take care for you all; art thou for revenge? I know thou art, for thou knowest where thy shoo hath pinched thee long. Well, in this case I think revenge is lawful, because I know what thou wilt be

at; but I ask thee this question, What is the revenge that will best fit thy temper, and by thee is most desired? ‘Sir, I desire to be revenged of some of the great men of our trade, but it is no further than I may have some part of the benefit of the trade, as well as they; *for it is not fit that some should have so much, and others so little, for it is we poor men that have most fingers.*’ My child, thou shalt have thy desire, if it be not thy own fault; I know you, and such as you, with your families, are the persons that work, labour, and toil, to make others rich. *Now, let me intreat thee to do the same for thyself as thou didst for others;* then, believe me, the work is done.” Excellent advice!

On self-imposed taxation we shall quote only a short passage from Dr Edward Chamberlayne’s “*Angliæ Notitia; or, The Present State of England,*”*

* In 1695 Andrew’s Land Bank was actually projected, and received the sanction of Parliament. The Bank of England, however, (founded only in the previous year) petitioned against it. Dr Chamberlayne obtained the credit of originating the Land Bank, but we have shown that Andrew Yarranton was the true projector of the scheme, he having personally imported it from Holland. Chamberlayne’s account of the Dissenters (although it has nothing to do with our subject), will be read in the present day with a smile: “When we speak of any of these sectaries indiscriminately, we call them *Dissenters* and *Nonconformists*, and they that speak more freely term them fanaticks and enthusiasts. It must be confessed that in all these sects there are some good moral men; nay, some of them zealous towards God, but in such a zeal as is not according to knowledge; neither are they all equally blameable in all respects. The *Presbyterians* come nearest to the church; the *Quakers* are the most peaceable; the Papists are the most mannerly,” (what does that mean?) “and the like; but take them all generally, and they are all *envious* at the Established Church, desirous perpetually of a change of government, willing to fish in troubled waters; *opiniating*, relying much

the eighteenth edition of which was published in 1694: "For the toys and trumperies of other nations, we likewise expend great sums of money, or lessen our effects abroad by bills of exchange. . . . Every way we are indeed too lavish of our silver and gold, not only expending great quantities needlessly, but wasting it prodigally and irreparably. About eighty years ago, upon examination, it was found that more than £80,000 *per ann.* was yearly wasted here in England, in silver thread, purles, spangles, &c., besides gold; and how much more we now spend, may be easily computed by the increase of our luxury; *for whereas we complain of taxes, it may reasonably be supposed that the superfluous expenses of women and children would almost half maintain the present war.*"

Andrew, among his other schemes for "England's improvement," offers some observations on the New Forest, the site selected by Mr Buckingham as suitable for the erection of his model town.* The idea of an industrial parallelogram is generally supposed to have originated with some of the recent French writers who have speculated on the possibility of organising society. We have, however, to point out

upon their own judgment; *ingrateful*, as not holding themselves beholden to any man, saying it is God that put such and such beneficence into their benefactors' hearts, which they, therefore, could not avoid doing; *proud*, as thinking themselves the only favourites of God, and the only wise or virtuous among men; *obstinate* to all manner of arguments and entreaties; *selfish, pragmatical, censorious* (!) and the like."

* "National Evils and Practical Remedies, with the Plan of a Model Town." By James S. Buckingham. London, 1849.

the fact, (and we have good reason for believing that Mr Buckingham was entirely unaware of the fact), that a model town and model settlement were actually projected more than a century since by an Englishman, and that he fixed on the very locality mentioned by Mr Buckingham. The coincidence is only one of those that may be found in every department of literature,—one of those that the ignorant and ill-natured so eagerly grasp, thinking to charge honester men than themselves with appropriating the fruits of other men's thoughts. In showing, then, that a model settlement was distinctly projected long before Fourierism was thought of, we acquit Mr Buckingham of all charge of plagiarism,—on the contrary, we believe him to have been much in the same circumstances as Andrew Yarranton; namely, that he was the first proposer of many excellent schemes, which other men were able to carry into execution, and to obtain great credit for.

As it is quite possible that model towns and model settlements may be formed in the course of no very long time, (we see, in fact, a constant approximation in that direction, in the New Town of Edinburgh, and in those beautiful little towns on the Clyde; what, for instance, can be more perfectly satisfactory than the new portions of Dunoon, where we have a collection of healthy and elegant residences not surpassed in Europe?), it may become a matter of historical curiosity to ascertain who was the first person that distinctly planned a town, not allowing its elements to arrange themselves by accident, or by indi-

vidual fancy, but constructing all things for the general convenience, and laying out its streets, gardens, and neighbouring fields, with express attention to the advantage of the whole population. We do not speak of a portion of a town, but of a whole town, of a whole nucleus of industrial population, with the land necessary to furnish food for the whole. This, then, we find in the "Tour through the whole Island of Great Britain," letter iii., p. 47, &c.*

"I cannot omit to mention here a proposal made a few years ago to the late Lord Treasurer Godolphin, for repeopling this forest, which, for some reasons I can be more particular in than any man now left alive, because I had the honour to draw up the scheme, and argue it before the noble lord and some others, who were principally concerned at that time in bringing over, or rather providing for when they were come over, the poor inhabitants of the Palatinate,—a thing in itself commendable, but, as it was managed, made scandalous to England, and miserable to those poor people.

"Some persons being ordered by that noble lord above mentioned to consider of measures how the said poor people should be provided for, and whether they could be provided for or no without injury to the public; the answer was grounded upon this maxim, that *the number of inhabitants is the wealth and strength of a kingdom*, provided those inhabitants were such as by honest industry applied them-

* "A Tour through the whole Island of Great Britain, divided into Circuits or Journeys." By a Gentleman. London, 1724.

selves to live by their labour, to whatsoever trades or employments they were brought up. In the next place, it was inquired what employments those poor people were brought up to? it was answered there were husbandmen and artificers of all sorts, upon which the proposal was as follows:—

“NEW FOREST in HAMPSHIRE was singled out to be the place.

“Here it was proposed to draw a great square line, containing four thousand acres of land, marking out two large highways or roads through the centre, crossing both ways, so that there should be a thousand acres in each division, exclusive of the land contained in the said cross roads. Then it was proposed to single out twenty men and their families, who should be recommended as honest, industrious men, expert in, or at least capable of, being instructed in husbandry, curing, and cultivating of land, breeding and feeding cattle, and the like. To each of these should be parcelled out, in equal distributions, two hundred acres of this land, so that the whole four thousand acres should be fully distributed to the said twenty families; for which they should have no rent to pay, and be liable to no taxes, but such as provided for their own sick or poor, repairing their own roads, and the like. This exemption from rent and taxes to continue for twenty years, and then to pay each £50 a-year to the Queen; that is to say, to the crown.

“*The form of the several farms would be laid out thus—*”

[Here follows a diagram of four thousand acres of land, laid out in the form of a parallelogram, the breadth being about two-thirds of the length. Cross roads divide it into four equal portions, and the centre, which is a circular area of eleven acres, is occupied by the church, and by the streets for tradesmen. There are also shambles, a market-house, a town-hall, several public wells, the stocks, &c. The land is divided into twenty farms, of two hundred acres each, the farm-houses being on the main road, and the fields running at right angles behind the houses.]

It was proposed that an advance of £200 in ready money should be made to each family occupying one of the farms, to purchase farming stock, and to enable them to get a first year's crop; and that they should be allowed timber out of the forest to build themselves houses, barns, sheds, and offices, also for carts, waggons, ploughs, harrows, "and the like necessary things." It was estimated that each farmer would require three servants, two men and a maid, and that with these they would soon clear as much land as would be necessary for their support. A division of labour, however, was contemplated. The farmers were to grow food for the whole community, and the tradesmen were to furnish agricultural implements, articles of dress, and the other requisites. Each division would require at least one wheelwright or carpenter.

"Thus by the way there would be employed three servants to each farmer, that makes sixty persons.

Four families of wheelwrights, one to each division, which, suppose five in a family, makes twenty persons; suppose four head carpenters, with each three men, and as at first all would be building together, they would to every house building have at least one labourer, four families of carpenters, five to each family, and three servants, is thirty-two persons, one labourer to each house building is twenty persons more. Thus there would be necessarily brought together, in the very first of the work, 132 persons besides the head farmers, who, at five also to each family, are a hundred more, in all 232.*

As the community was to be self-supporting in all the necessaries of life, it would require at least four butchers with their families, four shoemakers each employing two journeymen, a hat-maker, a glover, two ropemakers, four tailors, three weavers of woolen, three weavers of linen, two basketmakers, two brewers, ten or twelve shopkeepers for chandlery and groceries, and as many for drapery and mercery. Add to these two ministers, one clerk, one sexton or gravedigger, two physicians, three apothecaries, two surgeons, and *no* lawyers. It was proposed also, that, for the encouragement of all the handicraftsmen

* A Scottish arable farm of about 200 acres Scots, employs farmer (wife and children), four ploughmen, one odd man, a lad, a dairy-maid, and two domestic servants. This may be considered as the full complement of a well managed farm; very high farming will require more hands, and the lazy system will endeavour to do with less; but this number will be found tolerably correct. Mr Caird's "High Farming" is very much of a romance. Will he tell us in a future work how many of Mr M'Culloch's sheep *died*, and whether the deaths did not eat up the whole of the *estimated* profit?

and labourers, who, either as servants or day workers, assisted the farmers or other tradesmen, they should each have three acres of ground with lime to build cottages. Adjacent to the town was to be a certain quantity of common land for the benefit of the cottagers, that they might have cows or a few sheep. Smiths, millers, painters, plumbers, dyers, and other tradesmen, would naturally find their way to the town, so that each settlement of four thousand acres would employ six or seven hundred persons.

“This was the scheme for settling the Palatinates, by which means twenty families of farmers, handsomely set up and supported, would lay a foundation for six or seven hundred of the rest of their people; and as the land in New Forest is undoubtedly good, and capable of improvement by such cultivation, so other wastes in England are to be found as fruitful as that, and twenty such villages might have been erected, the poor strangers maintained, and the nation evidently bettered by it. As to the money to be advanced, which, in the case of twenty such settlements at £4000 each, would be £80,000, two things were answered to it:

“1. That the annual rent to be received for all those lands after twenty years, would abundantly pay the public for the first disbursements on the scheme above, that rent being then to amount to £40,000 per ann.”—(a mistake; twenty farms at £50 per ann. give £1000 per ann., and twenty settlements would have made £20,000, not £40,000 per ann.)

“2. More money than would have done this was

expended or rather thrown away upon them here, to keep them in suspense and afterwards starve them; sending them begging all over the nation and shipping them off to perish in other countres;* where the mistake lay is none of my business to enquire."

This scheme (which we have merely pointed out as being the earliest of the kind with which we are acquainted) was never carried into practice, and notwithstanding Andrew Yarranton, the Tourist, and Mr Buckingham, the New Forest remains much in its old condition.

In Mr Buckingham's work are many excellent things, which we have not at present space to notice as they deserve. Doubtless many of his suggestions will be realised in the future, as some that he proposed years ago are now in active operation. But we have a question to ask, To what does England owe her progress? or, to use Andrew's language, "her improvement by sea and land?" Some will answer that she owes it to her climate, her geographical position, her ports, her soil, her coal, her iron, &c.; that is, to the physical characteristics of the country. Some again will tell us that she owes it to her King, Lords, and Commons, and to the mutual

* "Thou wilt have no occasion for a lawyer, but mayest follow thy business quietly if thou wilt, and be in a condition to augment the number of thy hands, and so increase thy estate, and be able to set at work the idle poor which now beg and steal; then thy neighbours will love thee for taking thy poor off them, and thou wilt increase in riches, and at last it will be *strive as strive can* who shall have the poor, *even as now they strive at the sessions-house for persons to carry to Barbadoes or Virginia.*"
—(Andrew Yarranton—"England's Improvement," p. 172.)

checks which the various powers are supposed to exert on each other—that is, to the characteristics of her political institutions. Others again will tell us that she owes it to her church, including all the Protestant denominations—that is, to the moral and theological instruction of the people. Others again will tell us that she owes it to her wealth; and with foreigners we have always found that when they spoke of England's greatness, they were assuming that her wealth was the cause, and not the symptom of her power. Others again, confounding the agency with the product, will tell us that she owes it to the combination of all these—that is, to the accidental form into which they have moulded themselves in the course of ages. And so we may run through all the prominent features of the present British nation, and we shall find that something may be said in favour of the country, something in favour of our tolerably free and good institutions, and very much in favour of our churches, for in fact, *modern* Britain is most emphatically *Protestant* Britain. But granting, as indeed all must grant, that Britain has undergone her amazing development under the conditions of Protestantism (and be it remembered, Protestantism, not merely in the creed and the ritual, but Protestantism as a great principle, teaching us that in all departments there is a medium between absolute authority on the one hand, and the negations of anarchy on the other, whether the department be that of religion, politics, or philosophy), we yet think that there is another element that has greatly conduced to Eng-

land's welfare. This element is apt to be overlooked, inasmuch as it presents itself, not as a system, but as a series of isolated units, each one of which will fail to attract the attention of the world in the same degree as a *system*, but the sum of which is, and always has been, a notable power, incomparably more active in England than in any other European country. We mean the individual endeavours of private men to enlighten their fellow-countrymen—to advance the interests of the whole body politic, and to busy themselves with the affairs of the nation. No country in Europe can at all compare with Britain in this respect. In whatever else they may excel her, here she stands alone, unapproached and unapproachable. France can count some monarchs and some ministers who set before them the problem of their country's welfare, or their country's glory; but she can scarcely point to one private man who lived in the habitual and intelligent consciousness that the business of the country was *his* business, and that it was *his* duty to rectify the evils which he perceived more clearly than his neighbours. There is in our own day one illustrious exception, that of M. Arago, but his failure to influence his countrymen is only a surer proof that France does not, and cannot as yet, appreciate the value of individual exertion. Even the great Revolution, which might have been supposed to furnish a field where all might strive to do some worthy deed for France, has left scarce a single name on which we can dwell with satisfaction. True, there might be heroes, but there

were few true patriots. And if we turn to Germany, we find men deadened down into a stolid routine,—men who either do not think or dare not speak, or who, seeing the apparent hopelessness of one man's labours, devote themselves to science, or philosophy, or literature, or art, or criticism, or to something at all events removed from the practical question of the nation's daily good. It may be that the English and Scottish races have this peculiar characteristic in greater force than the races of the Continent, and if we were to assign a name to it, we might term it individual patriotism, or, in fact, individuality of character; but assuredly England owes her progress to this element in a degree which the continental nations do not understand. In Britain we see this individuality of character every where at work:—from the pick-pocket to the missionary—from Jonathan Wild, who dies at Tyburn, to John Williams, who dies at Erromanga—from the peasant poet, whose great heart sung those wondrous songs that thrill through the innermost soul of every true son of Scotland, to the princely English gentleman who directs his nation's destiny, and who proves to the world that truth, honour, and domestic virtue can dwell with the first statesman in the world—from Robert Burns, the ploughman, to Robert Peel, the premier. This individuality is the true and genuine heritage of the British race, and one of the best and most sterling elements that contribute to the glory of Britain and to the good of the world. We see it every where combined with the most opposite or most incompatible


accidents. Not to speak of Henry VIII., or Elizabeth, or Charles, or Hampden, Cromwell, Bunyan, or Milton, let us look at our own day, and we shall see it working wonders on all sides of us. In the church we have bishops, priests, and presbyters, not like the bishops, priests, and presbyters of the continent,—men not cast in a mould, nor wrought like clay into some plastic form of respectable uniformity, but genuine men, with characters of their own, working out their individual courses, and largely influencing the living congregation called the British nation. For the last hundred years who has heard of a French bishop, nay, of a French minister of religion, of any kind or character? Where is there a Henry of Exeter, an impracticable prelate who fears not to do battle on his own account against all comers? Where is there a Dr Wiseman, or a Dr Pusey, or a Mr Newman? Where do we find those isolated ministers who, in same form or other of Independency, gather together vast and flourishing congregations,—the Leifchilds, Strattens, Binneys, Jays, Jameses, Baptist Noels, &c.? Nay, to come nearer home, where do we find since the days of Luther a man like Dr Chalmers? Other men might be pious, other men might have genius, and other men might ardently desire the welfare of their fellows. But what was it that made the influence of Chalmers roll like a mighty wave of good over the whole surface of the land? It was his individuality, his manhood, his mighty heart that dared and did what his conscience and his credence taught him. Even Romanism, like

the slave whose shackles fall from his limbs when he plants his foot on the soil of Britain,—even Romanism herself seems to cast off the trammels of mere submission, and to emerge into a freedom which she knows no where else. The Romanist has again become almost a man. And if we turn to the bar, we shall find the same individuality marking the Briton. The French *avocat* is nobody—little better even in profession than a place-hunter. His voice is seldom heard for the public good, and when heard is suspected by the hearer. In the English bar, and the English judges, on the contrary, England has an insurance-company against wrong,—men so far removed from the suspicion of external influence, that the country has forgotten the day when judges could be directed or advocates intimidated;—men who can, when needful, face crown, or court, or parliament, or people;—men who do their duty to their country as her free-born sons, and who look on her welfare as their welfare. The career of a man like Brougham is only possible in England.

But to mention the church and the bar, would be to mention only two departments,—the most important, certainly, as the one preserves us from spiritual despotism, the other from legal wrong. Every department of British life has its men, whose busy brains are at work for Britain's good. The English merchant does not confine himself to the consideration of mere personal profit and loss. British commerce—that is, British welfare, as he understands it—is in all its aspects surveyed with minute and untiring atten-

tion. In Britain the merchant is a notable politician, exerting an influence utterly unknown in any continental country. He finds out in detail the practical effects of our commercial laws, and works a stupendous revolution in the country by the mere force of exhibiting that certain laws are detrimental to the great body of the population. He works like Wilson, Cobden, and Bright, for a free trade in corn, or like George Young, for protection to British industry; but in each case he works as an individual man, busying himself with the affairs of the nation, and contributing, to the best of his power and understanding, to the *good* of the nation. And, be it remembered, a question is best solved when all that can be advanced on both sides is fairly allowed a hearing. If, again, we go into the region of philanthropy, we find the same spirit of individual enterprise achieving the most remarkable results. A few good men resolve to let their voices be heard in favour of the negro, and straightway Britain hears of the wrongs done to the African. Granville Sharpe, Wilberforce, Clarkson, Brougham, Buxton, and others,—all that heroic band of fanatics, who were to produce such evils by the emancipation of Africa's injured sons,—all wielded a power that could have no existence on the Continent of Europe,—the power of private men denouncing the iniquity of public laws. The whole history of negro emancipation is only the history of the triumph of individual exertion over the wrong institutions of the State. In every department we see this living and vital principle at

work. We see Thomas Waghorn seizing the idea of an overland route to India, and achieving the great performance. We see Watts and Telfords, Brunels and Stephensons, Petos and Napiers, Cairds and Mechis, all working away, each one after his kind, to do things better than ever they were done before,—some in silence, and some loud-voiced, but all assuredly knowing that brave old England has eyes to see, and ears to listen, and sense to appreciate whatever they can do well, or better, or quicker, or cheaper, or more safely. Why, it may be asked, cannot men pursue their own business, and leave other things to those whom it concerns? For this one reason, simply, that the good of all, concerns all; and Britain is the only European country that fully understands this fundamental truth. To this she owes her progress. This, in fact, *is* her freedom—that he who thinks may speak, and that he who may speak is bound to think. Since the Reformation came into Britain, Britain has never wanted private men who sought her good, and lived in the daily knowledge that they had a country. Right-headed or wrong-headed they might be, but the country was *their* country, not the king's, nor the government's, nor the army's—but the nation's; and whether, like Howard, they pryed into the captive's miseries, or, like Nelson, burnt with the inexhaustible heroism of a patriot, who would rather have seen his country blown to atoms, than polluted by submission to a stranger—or, like Father Matthew, preached a crusade against intemperance—or, like Whitefield, car-



ried the everlasting gospel into the horrors of Bartholomew fair—or, like Mrs Chisholm, struggled with a woman's heart to lift her sisters from penury—or, like Malthus, wrote a questionable book on population—or, like Wesley, founded a religious sect—or, like Bakewell, made a new and better breed of domestic animals—or, like Andrew Yarranton, taught his country how to beat the Dutch without fighting—or, like our friend the Tourist, devised an industrial parallelogram—or, like Mr Buckingham, designed a model town—whether, in fact, they did this, that, or the other, there never have been wanting men to whom England's improvement by sea and land was one of the dearest thoughts of their lives, and to whom England's good was the foremost of their worldly considerations. And such, emphatically, was Andrew Yarranton, a true patriot in the best sense of the word, and who, though the first notable advocate of protection, was the author of (as we conscientiously believe) one of the best treatises that ever was written, and of a phrase which the whole world would do well to learn by heart,—“How to beat the Dutch without fighting, that being the best and justest way to subdue our enemies.”

THE END.

ERRATA.

- Page 130, line 5, for "We have not," read "We have now."
Page 131, line 3 from bottom, for "invariability," read "incapability."
Page 201, close bracket after "man's invention."
Page 242, Note, for "that globe," read "the globe."
Page 332, line 4 from bottom, for "probabilities," read "politics."

"27th December 1850."

"W. HAMILTON.

*From the Boston Commonwealth, by the HON. C. SUMNER, of Massachusetts,
Senator of the United States.*

"To the author of this important work we confess a debt of gratitude. We do not believe that any Christian lover of his race can read the volume without feeling the delight which springs from the confirmed assurance that the 'good time coming' is not merely a fancy of the poet, but the promise of religion and philosophy. Nowhere else has this subject been treated

with equal care and fulness. Such a work is at once an important contribution to the science of theology and to the science of politics. No clergyman can fail to be instructed and elevated by it; no politician can fail to find new light in it for his steps. As we perused it, we were forced to the conclusion that no philosophical production of our day surpasses it in interest or importance.

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
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
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