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A N
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ON THE
O R I G I N of E V I L.

By DR. WILLIAM KING, late Lord
Archbishop of *D U B L I N.*

Translated from the *Latin*, with large *Notes*; tending
to explain and vindicate some of the Author's Principles Against
the Objections of *Bayle*, *Leibnitz*, the Author of a *Philosophical*
Enquiry concerning Human Liberty; and others.

To which is prefix'd

A D I S S E R T A T I O N

Concerning the
Fundamental Principle and *immediate Criterion* of *Virtue.*

A S A L S O,

The *Obligation* to, and *Approbation* of it.

With some account of

The *Origin* of the *Passions* and *Affections.*

L O N D O N:

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
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T H E

Translator's Preface.



Have always look'd upon an Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil, as one of the noblest and most important Subjects in Natural Theology: It leads us into the most exalted Speculations concerning the Existence and Attributes of God, and the Original of Things. It first discovers the true Intent of the Deity in creating any Beings at all, and then pursues that Intent thro' the several Works of his Creation: it shews how this is fully answer'd by the Inanimate and Brute Part, and how it might and should be, and why, and in what respect it is not by the Rational. It contemplates the Divine Oeconomy in the Government of the Universe, searches into the various Schemes of Providence, and takes in the whole Compass of Nature. Neither is its *Usefulness* inferior to its Extent. It concerns every Man who pretends to act upon any serious Views here, or to entertain any solid Hopes of Futurity.

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Futurity. The Knowledge of it, in some degree, is absolutely necessary in order to the settling in our Minds right Notions of the Nature and Will of God, and the Duties we owe him; in order to the due Apprehension of his Design in creating, preserving, and directing us, and to the regular Conduct of our Lives, and Enjoyment of ourselves in that State and Condition wherein he has placed us. Nay, while we are ignorant of this one Point, what rational Pleasure can we take in knowing any other? When I enquire how I got into this World, and came to be what I am; I'm told that an absolutely perfect Being produced me out of Nothing, and placed me here on purpose to communicate some Part of his Happiness to me, and to make me, in some measure, like himself.—This End is not obtain'd;—the direct contrary appears;—I find myself surrounded with nothing but Perplexity, Want and Misery;—by whose fault I know not,—How to better myself I cannot tell.——What Notions of God and Goodness can this afford me?—What Ideas of Religion?—What Hopes of a future State?—For, if God's Aim in producing me be entirely unknown; if it be neither his *Glory*, (as some will have it) which my present State is far from advancing;—nor mine own *Good*, which the same is equally inconsistent with; how know I what I'm to do here, and in what manner I must endeavour to please him? or why should I endeavour it at all?—For, if I must be miserable in this World, what Security have I that I shall not be so in another too; (if there be one) since, if it were the Will of my Almighty Creator, I might (for ought I see) have been happy in both?—Such Thoughts as these must needs disturb a Person that has any Concern for his Maker's Honour, or his own Happiness; that desires to pay him a reasonable Service, and answer the End of his Creation: in short, that happens either to think at all upon these things, or to think for himself. And therefore an Endeavour to rid the Mind of some of these Perplexities, cannot sure be unacceptable, and a Solution of any one of these Doubts, is doing a piece of Service to Mankind, which can never be unseasonable.—But the Usefulness, as well as Antiquity, of the present Debate; and the Absurdity of the *Manichean* Scheme of accounting for Evil, have been often explain'd, and need
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not here be insisted on: all that ever seem'd wanting to an entire Conquest over these Hereticks, and their absurd Hypothesis, was only a tolerable Solution of the many Difficulties which drove them into it: and this our Author has effected, as I hope to make appear before I have done.

There are two general ways of Reasoning, called Arguments *a Priori*, and a *Posteriori*; or, according to what Logicians commonly stile the *Synbetical* and *Analytical* Method: The former lays down some evident *Principles*, and then deduces the several *Consequences* necessarily resulting from them: The latter begins with the *Phænomena* themselves, and traces 'em up to their *Original*, and from the known Properties of these Phænomena arrives at the Nature of their Cause. Now the former of these is evidently preferable, where it can be had, (and I think it may be had almost every where, but in the first Cause) since the latter must depend upon a large Induction of Particulars, any of which, when failing, invalidates the whole Argument, and quite spoils a Demonstration. "It is very true (says Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Natural Evil*, p. 79.) that this is not a strict Demonstration of the general Conclusion, because that can be had no other way than by trying all the Experiments that can possibly be made every where, which is infinite and endless; but it is the best that the Nature of the thing is capable of."

Now, if the Thing before us will admit of the *former* Method, then I think it is capable of a much better; and an Attempt to shew that it is so, must be very desirable: And this our Author seems to have done, without any precarious System, or ill-grounded Hypothesis whatsoever. His superior Excellence (as I apprehend) consists in having laid down, and previously establish'd such solid substantial Principles as may be drawn out, *in infinitum*, and easily apply'd to all the Difficulties that attend the present Question. He first of all enquires into the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, and his Design in the Creation; settles the true Notion of a Creature, and examines whether any could be perfect; and if not, whether all should have
been

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been made equally imperfect; or several in very different Classes and Degrees. Having proved the last of these Opinions to be the true one, he proceeds to the lowest Class of Beings: *viz.* *Material* Ones: He enquires into the Nature and essential Properties of *Matter*, and the Laws of its *Motion*, and thereby establishes such Rules as direct us to the Solution of all the Difficulties attending it, as distributed into various *Masses*, Systems and Animated Bodies. He shews the unavoidable necessity of *contrary Motions* in Matter, for the same Reasons that it had any Motion at all, and consequently of *Attrition*, *Corruption* and *Dissolution*, and all the *Natural* Evils that attend them. In the next place, from the Nature of a *Self-moving* Principle, and the manner of its Operation, he deduces all the Irregularities incident to *Volition*, and the Actions consequent thereupon. He states at large the true Notion of *Free-Will*, and demonstrates the absolute Necessity for it in every Rational Being, in order to its Happiness. Then accounts for the several Abuses of it, and the *Moral* Evils arising from thence. and examines all the possible Ways of preventing them; and upon the whole makes it appear, that none of these could have been originally avoided, or can now be removed, without introducing greater; and consequently that the very Permission of these Evils, and the Production and Preservation of these Beings, in the present State, is the highest Instance of infinite Wisdom, Power and Goodness. Now these are not mere Arguments *ad ignorantiam*: This is not telling us, that we must believe such and such things to be the sure Effects of an infinitely wise and good God, tho' no Marks of either Wisdom or Goodness appear in them; which, tho' it may be true, and all that perhaps can be said in some particular Cases, yet has, I think, but very little Tendency towards either the Conviction of an Infidel, or the Satisfaction of a true Believer. When a Person is seriously contemplating any Parts of Nature, and solicitously enquiring into their several Ends and Uses, no Pleasure surely can arise to himself, nor Devotion toward the Author of it, merely from the Perplexity and Unaccountableness of those Parts. Nay every such Instance, one would think, must cast a damp upon his Spirits, and prove an ungrateful

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grateful Reflection on his Weakness, a mortifying Argument of his Imperfection. Whereas one single Perplexity clear'd up, or Objection answer'd, is a piece of real Knowledge gain'd, upon which he can congratulate himself, and glorify his Maker.—Our Author therefore was not content with mere *Negative Arguments*, and barely *avoiding* Difficulties, by removing all Defects from external things to ourselves, and multiplying Instances of the Narrowness and Weakness of Human Understanding: (which any one that thinks at all will soon be convinced of, and heartily desirous of having it somewhat enlarg'd and improved, to which this manner of Argumentation, I fear, contributes very little.) But he attacks his Adversaries in their strongest Holds, and plucks up the *Manichean Heresy* by the Roots: he shews by certain pre-establish'd Rules, and necessary Consequence, that we can easily reduce all to one supreme Head, and clearly comprehend how the present state of things is the very best, in all respects, and worthy of a most wise, powerful, and beneficent Author: And why, taking the whole System of Beings together, and every Class of them in its own Order, none could possibly have been made more perfect, or placed in a better. He proves, in the first place (as we observ'd) that no created Beings could be absolutely perfect, and in the next, that no manner of Evil, or Imperfection, was tolerated in them, but what was, either in their Class and manner of Existence, absolutely unavoidable, or else productive of some Good more than equivalent: In both which Cases there will be the same Reasons for the Creation of such Beings in such Circumstances, together with their concomitant Evils, as there was for any Creation at all: For which the sole Reason will appear to be an Intention in the Creator of communicating Happiness to as many Beings as could be made capable of it, on the very best Terms; or a Resolution not to omit the least Degree of *pure* Good on account of such Evils, as did not counterballance it: Or (which is the very same, since 'twill be evident, that the Prevention of all the present Evils in any conceivable Manner, would have been of worse Consequence than the Permission of them) an Intention always to choose the least of two Evils,

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Evils, when both cannot be avoided.——This must be granted, to come up to the Point; and when it is once made apparent, will be a full and sufficient Answer to that old triumphant Question, *Πίσθεις τὸ κακόν;* 'twill be an ample Vindication of the Divine Providence, a Demonstration of the Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness of God, in the Production, Preservation, and Government of the Universe; and as much as a reasonable Man can either expect or desire. And I heartily wish this Method had been taken by more of those Authors that have wrote on the present Subject, and the Argument pursued a little farther by *Natural Light*, in order to give some Light and Confirmation even to Revelation itself, in these inquisitive Days, wherein a great many seem unwilling to be determined by its sole Authority; wherein Men are not a little inclined to call every thing into question; and a weak Argument is sure to be exploded.——Even the most learned and ingenious Writer on this Subject often flies to Scripture when a Difficulty begins to press him: which, in my Opinion, is deserting the Argument, and owning, with Mr. *Bayle* (in his Explanation touching the *Manichees* at the End of his Dictionary) “that the Question cannot be defended on any other foot.”——Whereas, if the Difficulty be really unanswerable by Reason, or a plain Contradiction to our natural Notions of God; if (as the fore-mentioned Author often urges) “we perceive by our clear and distinct Ideas, that such a thing is entirely repugnant to his Nature and Attributes,”——referring us to Scripture, which declares that an infinitely perfect Being did constitute it thus, will be no manner of Satisfaction, since (upon this Supposition) we cannot have greater Assurance that this Scripture comes from him, than we have that the Doctrine therein contain'd is absurd and impossible. And what that ingenious Person's Intent might be in representing the Matter thus, and then referring us to Scripture for an Answer, I cannot determine. But sure I am, that his Account of it serves rather to betray the Cause, and undermine the Authority of both Reason and Revelation, and is enough (if no better could be given) to make a Person that argues consequentially reject all kinds of Religion. Farther, every one must have observ'd, that most Authors upon this Subject treat of God's Dispensations toward Man, as

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as if they were speaking of one Man's Behaviour toward another. They think it sufficient to make the Almighty choose the most prudent, likely Means of bringing Man to Happiness; and act upon the highest *Probability*, tho, upon what account soever it matters not, he fail of his End. This may indeed be the best manner of acting in all finite, imperfect Beings, and sufficient to acquit the Goodness and Justice of God, but is very far from satisfying his *Wisdom*. To a perfect Being who foresees the Effects of all possible Causes and Means, as the same Authors allow God to do, these only appear fit and eligible for the effects and Ends which they will *certainly* produce. Nor is it any reason why I should pursue a Method which is apt and wont to succeed in most Cases, if I *know* it will fail in this. To a Person therefore that takes all the Attributes of God together, and considers the whole Scheme of Providence from end to end, it will not appear a complete and satisfactory Vindication of them, to assert that God either now makes Men, or suffers them to make themselves miserable, for rejecting that Happiness which he at first made them capable of, and endow'd them with such Powers, and placed them in such Circumstances as render'd it naturally possible and even easie to be attain'd by them: tho' this may indeed clear his Justice and lay the Blame upon ourselves: And yet these Writers generally content themselves with going thus far: They bring all our Sin and Misery from the abuse of Free-Will, *i. e.* a Power whereby Man might have acted otherwise, and prevented it; without ever explaining the Nature of this Principle, or shewing the Worth and Excellence of it, and proving that, as far as we can apprehend, more Good in general arises from the donation of such a Self-moving Power, together with all these foreseen Abuses of it, than could possibly have been produced without it. To demonstrate this was an Attempt worthy of our Author, who has at least laid a noble Foundation for it, and seems to be the first that has propos'd the true Notion of human Liberty, and explained it consistently: All the Doubts and Difficulties attending which intricate Question, will, I hope, be tolerably cleared up; or at least, such Principles establish'd as may be sufficient for that Purpose, by this Treatise of his, and the Notes upon it. But so much for the Subject and our Author's way of treating it.

As for the *Translation*, 'tis barely Literal: I endeavour'd to keep close to the Author's Sense, and generally to his very Words: so that the

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Reader may be pretty sure of finding Dr. King here at least. I once intended to have cut off every thing that I could not defend, especially about the Beginning (which used to discourage most Readers from perusing the rest of his valuable Book, and might perhaps as well have been omitted;) but considering that he had involv'd it so closely in the rest of his Scheme, that the whole would seem confused without it—that others might perhaps have a different Opinion of it—and that some, probably, would be desirous of seeing even the most imperfect Notions of so great a Philosopher;—I contented myself with omitting only part of his first Note, and obviating the rest all along, both from other Authors, and such Observations of my own as occur'd upon the Subject.

Some perhaps may think the frequent and long Quotations very tedious, and introduced only to stuff up.—I can only answer, that I intended the Notes, and References together, to point out a sort of *Compendium of Metaphysics*, or Speculative Divinity; by directing the Reader to a Set of true Notions on the various Subjects which our Author touch'd upon; and which could not be found in any one particular Book, nor collected from several, without much Trouble and Confusion, and unnecessary Reading. I chose rather to quote the very Words of the Authors, than either use worse of my own, or pretend to discover what had been often discovered before; or repeat the same things over and over again, which is endless. I hope the Reader will find that a citation of two or more Authors on the same Point is not always tautology: and I believe it will appear, that in the multitude of *References* more than one is scarce ever made to the same Place, except upon a very different Occasion, or in some different Light. A Writer seems to me to do more good to the Public by shewing the use of some of those many Volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones; tho' this be of much less Advantage to his private Character. I determin'd therefore not to say any thing myself where I could bring another conveniently to say it for me; and transcribed only so much from others as I judg'd absolutely necessary to give the Reader a short View of the Subject we were upon, and by that Sketch to induce those who have leisure, opportunity and inclination to go farther, and consult the Originals; and to afford some present Satisfaction to those who have not.

But how judiciously this is perform'd, the Notes themselves must testify, for all that I can say by way of Preface will never mend the matter.

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION.

Concerning the

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE

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VIRTUE or *MORALITY*.

TH^O' all Writers of Morality have in the main agreed what particular Actions are virtuous and what otherwise; yet they have, or at least seem to have differ'd very much, both concerning the *Criterion* of Virtue, *viz.* what it is which denominates any Action virtuous; or, to speak more properly, what it is by which we must try any Action to *know* whether it be virtuous or no; and also concerning the *Principle* or Motive by which Men are induced to pursue Virtue.

As to the former, some have placed it in *acting agreeably to Nature*, or *Reason*; others in the *Fitness of things*; others in a Conformity with *Truth*; others in promoting the *Common Good*; others in the *Will of God*, &c. This Disagreement of Moralists concerning the Rule or Criterion of Virtue in general, and at the same time their almost perfect Agreement concerning the particular Branches of it, would be apt to make one suspect, either that they had a different Criterion (tho' they did not know or attend to it) from what they

profess'd; or (which perhaps is the true as well as the more favourable Opinion) that they only talk a different Language, and that all of them have the same Criterion in reality, only they have express'd it in different Words.

And there will appear the more room for this Conjecture, if we consider the Ideas themselves about which Morality is chiefly conversant, *viz.* that they are all *mixed Modes*, or compound Ideas arbitrarily put together, having at first no Archetype or Original existing, and afterwards no other than that which exists in other Mens Minds. Now since Men, unless they have these their compound Ideas, which are signify'd by the same Name, made up precisely of the same simple ones, must necessarily talk a different Language; and since this difference is so difficult, and in some Cases impossible to be avoided, it follows that greater Allowance and Indulgence ought to be given to these Writers than any other: and that (if we have a mind to understand them) we should not always take their Words in the common Acceptation, but in the Sense in which we find that particular Author which we are reading used them. And if a Man interpret the Writers of Morality with this due Candor, I believe their seeming Inconsistencies and Disagreements about the Criterion of Virtue, would in a great measure vanish; and he would find that *acting agreeably to Nature, or Reason*, (when rightly understood) would perfectly coincide with the *Fitness of things*; the Fitness of things (as far as these Words have any meaning) with *Truth*; Truth with the *Common Good*; and the Common Good with the *Will of God*.

But whether this Difference be real, or only verbal, a Man can scarce avoid observing from it, that Mankind have the Ideas of most particular Virtues, and also a confused Notion of Virtue in general, before they have any Notion of the Criterion of it, or ever did, neither perhaps can they, deduce all or any of those Virtues from their Idea of Virtue in general, or upon any rational Grounds shew how those Actions (which the World call Moral, and most, if not all Men evidently have Ideas of) are distinguish'd from other Actions, or why they approve of those Actions call'd Moral ones, more than others.

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But since the Idea of Virtue among all Men (however they differ in other respects) includes either tacitly or expressly, not only the Idea of *Approbation* as the Consequence of it; but also that it is to every one, and in all Circumstances, an Object of *Choice*; it is incumbent on all Writers of Morality, to shew that *that* in which they place Virtue, whatever it be, not only always will or ought to meet with Approbation, but also that it is always an Object of *Choice*; which is the other great Dispute among Moralists, *viz.* What is the Principle or Motive by which Men are induced to pursue Virtue.

For some have imagin'd that that is the only Object of Choice to a rational Creature, which upon the whole will produce more Happiness than Misery to the Chooser; and that Men are and ought to be guided wholly by this Principle; and farther, that Virtue will produce more Happiness than Misery, and therefore is always an Object of Choice: and whatever is an Object of Choice, that we approve of.

But this, however true in Theory, is insufficient to account for Matter of Fact, *i. e.* that the generality of Mankind do approve of Virtue, or rather virtuous Actions, without being able to give any Reason for their Approbation; and also, that some pursue it without knowing that it tends to their own private Happiness; nay even when it appears to be inconsistent with and destructive of their Happiness.

And that this is matter of Fact, the ingenious Author of the *Enquiry into the Original of our Idea of Virtue* has so evidently made appear by a great Variety of Instances, that a Man must be either very little acquainted with the World, or a mere *Hobbist* in his Temper to deny it.

And therefore to solve these two Difficulties, this excellent Author has supposed (without *proving*, unless by shewing the insufficiency of all other Schemes) a *Moral Sense* to account for the former, and a *public or benevolent Affection* for the latter: And these, *viz.* the Moral Sense and Public Affection, he supposes to be implanted in us like *Instincts*, independent of Reason, and previous to any

Preliminary Dissertation.

any Instruction; and therefore his Opinion is, that no account can be given, or ought to be expected of them, any more than we pretend to account for the Pleasure or Pain which arises from Sensation; *i. e.* Why any particular Motion produced in our Bodies should be accompany'd with Pain rather than Pleasure, and *vice versa*.

But this Account seems still insufficient, rather cutting the Knot than untying it, and if it is not a-kin to the Doctrine of *Innate Ideas*, yet I think it relishes too much of that of *Ocult Qualities*.—This ingenious Author is certainly right in his Observations upon the Insufficiency of the common Methods of accounting for both our *Election* and *Approbation* of Moral Actions, and rightly infers the Necessity of supposing a Moral Sense (*i. e.* a Power or Faculty whereby we may perceive any Action to be an Object of Approbation, and the Agent of Love) and public Affections, to account for the principal Actions of human Life. But then by calling these *Instincts*, I think he stops too soon, imagining himself at the Fountain-head, when he might have traced them much higher, even to the true Principle of all our Actions, our own *Happiness*.

And this will appear by shewing, that our Approbation of Morality, and all Affections whatsoever, are finally resolvable into *Reason*, pointing out *private Happiness*, and are conversant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and that whenever this end is not perceiv'd, they are to be accounted for from the *Association of Ideas*, and may properly enough be call'd *Habits*.

For if this is clearly made out, the Necessity of supposing a Moral Sense, or public Affections to be implanted in us, since it ariseth only from the Insufficiency of all other Schemes to account for human Actions, will immediately vanish. But whether it be made out or no, we may observe in general, that all Arguments *ad Ignorantiam*, or that proceed *a Remotione* only (as this, by which the Moral Sense and public Affections are establish'd to be Instincts, evidently does) are scarce ever perfectly satisfactory, being for the most part subject to this Doubt, *viz.* Whether there is a full Enumeration of all the Parts; and liable also to this Objection, *viz.* That tho' I cannot
not

not account for Phænomena otherwise, yet possibly they may be otherwise accounted for.

But before we can determine this Point, it will be necessary to settle all the Terms: We shall in the first place therefore enquire what is meant by the *Criterion of Virtue.*

S E C T. I.

Concerning the Criterion of Virtue

THE Criterion of any thing is a Rule or Measure by a Conformity with which any thing is known to be of this or that sort, or of this or that degree. And in order to determine the Criterion of any thing, we must first know the thing whose Criterion we are seeking after. For a Measure presupposes the Idea of the thing to be measured, otherwise it could not be known (since what is the proper Measure of one thing is not so of another) whether it was fit to measure it or no. Liquids, Cloth, and Flesh, have all different Measures; Gold and Silver different Touchstones. This is very intelligible, and the Method of doing it generally clear, when either the Quantity or Kind of any particular Substance is thus to be ascertain'd.

But when we extend our Enquiries after a Criterion for abstract, mix'd Modes, which have no Existence but in our Minds, and are so very different in different Men; we are apt to be confounded, and search after a Measure for we know not what. For unless we are

are first agreed concerning the thing to be measur'd, we shall in vain expect to agree in our Criterion of it, or even to understand one another.

But it may be said, if we are exactly agreed in any mix'd Mode, what need of any *Criterion*, or what can we want farther? What we want farther, and what we mean by the Criterion of it is this; *viz.* to know whether any inferior or particular thing do belong to this mix'd Mode or no. And this is a very proper Enquiry. For let a Man learn the Idea of Intemperance from you never so clearly, and if you please let this be the Idea, *viz.* the Eating or Drinking to that degree as to injure his Understanding or Health; and let him also be never so much convinc'd of the Obligation to avoid it; yet it is a very pertinent Question in him to ask you, How shall I know when I am guilty of Intemperance?

And if we examine this thoroughly, we shall find that every little difference in the Definition of a mix'd Mode will require a different Criterion, *e. g.* If Murder is defined the *wilful* taking away the Life of another, it is evident, that to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how we shall know when the Life of another is taken away *wilfully*; i. e. when one who takes away the Life of another does it with that malicious Design which is implied by *Wilfulness*. But if Murder be defined the *Guilty* taking away the Life of another, then to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how it shall be known when *Guilt* is contracted in the taking away the Life of another. So that the Criterion of Murder, according to one or other of these Definitions, will be different. For *Wilfulness* perhaps will be made the Criterion of *Guilt*, but *Wilfulness* itself, if it want any, must have some farther Criterion, it being evident that nothing can be the Measure of itself.

If the Criterion is contain'd in the Idea itself, then it is merely *nominal*, *e. g.* If Virtue is defined, The acting agreeably to the Will of God: To say the Will of God is the Criterion of Virtue, is only to say, what is agreeable to the Will of God is *call'd* Virtue. But the *real* Criterion, which is of some use, is this, How shall I know what the Will of God is in this respect?

From

From hence it is evident, that the Criterion of a mix'd Mode is neither the Definition of it, nor contain'd in it. For, as has been shewn, the general Idea is necessarily to be fix'd; and if the *Particulars* comprehended under it are fix'd or known also, there remains nothing to be measured, because we measure only things unknown. The general Idea then being fix'd, the Criterion which is to measure or determine Inferiors, must be found out and proved to be a proper Rule or Measure, by comparing it with the *general Idea* only, independent of the inferior things to which it is to be apply'd. For the truth of the Measure must be proved independently of the Particular to be measured, otherwise we shall prove in a Circle.

To apply what has been said in general to the Case in hand. Great Enquiry is made after the Criterion of *Virtue*; but it is to be fear'd that few know distinctly what it is they are enquiring after; and therefore this must be clearly stated. And in order to this, we must (as has been shewn) first fix our Idea of *Virtue*, and that exactly; and then our Enquiry will be, how we shall know this or that less general or particular Action to be comprehended under *Virtue*. For unless our Idea of *Virtue* is fix'd, we enquire after the Criterion of we know not what. And this our Idea of *Virtue*, to give any Satisfaction, ought to be so general as to be conformable to that which all or most Men are supposed to have. And this general Idea, I think, may be thus express'd.

Virtue is the Conformity to a Rule of Life, directing the Actions of all rational Creatures with respect to each other's Happiness; to which Conformity every one in all Cases is obliged: and every one that does so conform, is or ought to be approved of; esteemed and loved for so doing. What is here express'd, I believe every one, or most, put into their Idea of *Virtue*.

For *Virtue*, among all, or most, does imply some relation to *others*: where *Self* is only concern'd, a Man may be *prudent* but not *virtuous*; and an Action which relates immediately to *God*, is stiled *Religious*.

I think also that all Men, whatever they make *Virtue* to consist in, yet always make it to imply *Obligation* and *Approbation*.

The Idea of Virtue being thus fix'd, to enquire after the Criterion of it, is to enquire what that Rule of Life is to which we are oblig'd to conform or how that Rule is to be found out which is to direct me in my Behaviour towards others, which ought always to be pursued, and which, if pursued, will or ought to procure me Approbation, Esteem, and Love.

But before I can answer this Enquiry, I must first see what I mean by *Obligation*.

S E C T. II.

Concerning Obligation.

Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting any Action in order to be happy: i. e. when there is such a relation between an Agent and any Action that the Agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that Action, then the Agent is said to be *obliged* to do or omit that Action. So that Obligation is evidently founded upon the prospect of *Happiness*, and arises from that necessary Influence which any Action has upon present or future Happiness or Misery. And no greater Obligation can be supposed to be laid upon any *free Agent* without an express Contradiction.

This Obligation may be consider'd four ways, according to the four different manners in which it is induced: First, that Obligation which ariseth from perceiving the natural Consequences of things, *i. e.* the Consequences of things acting according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, may be call'd *Natural*. Secondly, that arising from Merit or Demerit, as producing the Esteem and Favour of our Fellow-Creatures, or the contrary, is usually stiled *virtuous*. Thirdly, that arising from the Authority of the Civil Magistrate, *Civil*. Fourthly, that from the Authority of God, *Religious*.

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Now from the Consideration of these four sorts of Obligation (which are the only ones) it is evident that a full and complete Obligation which will extend to all Cases, can only be that arising from the Authority of *God*; because *God* only can in all Cases make a Man happy or miserable: and therefore, since we are *always* obliged to that conformity call'd *Virtue*, it is evident that the immediate Rule or Criterion of it is the Will of *God*. But is the *whole* Will of *God* the Criterion of *Virtue*? No. For tho' the whole Will of *God* is equally obligatory; yet, since *Virtue* was defined to be the conformity to a Rule directing my Behaviour with respect to my *Fellow-Creatures*, the Will of *God* can be no farther concern'd about *Virtue*, than as it directs me in that Behaviour.

The next Enquiry therefore is, what that Will of *God* in this particular is, or what it directs me to do?

Now it is evident from the Nature of *God*, *viz.* his being infinitely happy in himself from all Eternity, and from his Goodness manifested in his Works, that he could have no other Design in creating Mankind than *their* Happiness; and therefore he wills their Happiness; therefore the means of their Happiness: therefore that my Behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the Happiness of Mankind, should be such. Here then we are got one Step farther, or to a new Criterion: not to a new Criterion of *Virtue* *immediately*, but to a Criterion of the *Will of God*. For it is an Answer to the Enquiry, How shall I know what the Will of *God* in this particular is? Thus the Will of *God* is the immediate Criterion of *Virtue*, and the Happiness of Mankind the Criterion of the Will of *God*; and therefore the Happiness of Mankind may be said to be the Criterion of *Virtue*, but *once removed*.

And since I am to do whatever lies in my Power towards promoting the Happiness of Mankind, the next Enquiry is, what is the Criterion of this *Happiness*: *i. e.* how shall I know what in my Power is, or is not, for the Happiness of Mankind?

Now this is to be known only from the *Relations* of things, (which Relations, with respect to our present Enquiry, some have call'd their *Fitness* and *Unfitness*.) For some Things and Actions are apt to produce Pleasure, others Pain; some are convenient, others inconvenient

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for a Society; some are for the good of Mankind, others tend to the detriment of it: therefore those are to be chosen which tend to the good of Mankind; the others to be avoided.

Thus then we are got one step farther, *viz.* to the Criterion of the Happiness of Mankind. And from this Criterion we deduce all particular Virtues and Vices.

The next Enquiry is, How shall I know that there is this Fitness and Unfitness in things? or if there be, how shall I discover it in particular Cases? And the Answer is, Either from Experience or Reason. You either *perceive* the Inconveniencies of some Things and Actions when they happen; or you *foresee* them by contemplating the Nature of the Things and Actions.

Thus the Criterion of the Fitness or Unfitness of things may in general be said to be *Reason*: which Reason, when exactly conformable to the things existing, *i. e.* when it judges of things as they are, is called *Right Reason*. And hence also we sometimes talk of the *Reason of things*, *i. e.* properly speaking, that Relation which we should find out by our Reason, if our Reason was right.

The expressing by outward Signs the Relations of things as they really are, is called *Truth*; and hence, by the same kind of Metaphor, we are apt to talk of the *Truth*, as well as *Reason of things*. Both Expressions mean the same: which has often made me wonder why some Men who cry up *Reason* as the Criterion of Virtue, should yet dislike Mr. *Wollaston's* Notion of *Truth* being its Criterion.

The Truth is, all these just mention'd, *viz.* the Happiness of Mankind; the Relations, or Fitness and Unfitness of things; Reason and Truth; may in some sense be said to be Criteria of Virtue; but it must always be remember'd that they are only *remote* Criteria of it, being gradually subordinate to its immediate Criterion, the Will of God.

And from hence we may perceive the Reason of what I suggested in the beginning of this Treatise, *viz.* That the Dispute between Moralists about the Criterion of Virtue, is more in Words than Meaning; and that this Difference between them has been occasion'd by their dropping the immediate Criterion, and choosing some a more remote,

remote, some a less remote one. And from hence we may see also the Inconvenience of defining any mix'd Mode by its Criterion. For that in a great measure has occasion'd all this Confusion, as may easily be made appear in all the pretended Criteria of Virtue above-mention'd.

Thus those who either expressly exclude, or don't mention the Will of God, making the immediate Criterion of Virtue to be the Good of Mankind; must either allow that Virtue is not in all Cases *obligatory* (contrary to the Idea which all or most Men have of it) or they must say that the Good of Mankind is a sufficient Obligation. But how can the Good of Mankind be any Obligation to *me*, when perhaps in particular Cases, such as laying down my Life, or the like, it is contrary to my Happiness.

Those who drop the Happiness of Mankind, and talk of Relations, the Fitness and Unfitness of Things, are still more remote from the true Criterion. For Fitness without relation to some *End*, is scarce intelligible.

Reason and Truth come pretty near the Relations of things, because they manifestly presuppose them; but are still one step farther from the immediate Criterion of Virtue.

What has been said concerning the Criterion of Virtue as including our Obligation to it, may perhaps be allow'd to be true, but still it will be urg'd, that 'tis insufficient to account for matter of Fact, *viz.* that most Persons, who are either ignorant of, or never consider'd these Deductions, do however pursue Virtue themselves, and approve of it in others. I shall in the next place therefore give some account of our Approbations and Affections.

S E C T. III.

Concerning Approbation and Affection.

MAN is not only a *sensible* Creature, not only capable of Pleasure and Pain, but capable also of *foreseeing* the Pleasure and Pain in the future consequences of Things and Actions; and as he is capable of knowing, so also of *governing* or directing the Causes of them, and thereby in a great measure enabled to avoid the one and procure the other: whence the Principle of all Action. And therefore, as Pleasure and Pain are not indifferent to him, nor out of his Power, he pursues the former and avoids the latter; and therefore also those things which are *Causes* of them are not indifferent, but he pursues or avoids them also, according to their different Tendency. That which he pursues for its own sake, which is only Pleasure, is called an *End*; that which he apprehends to be apt to produce Pleasure, he calls *Good*, and approves of, *i. e.* judges a proper means to attain his end, and therefore looks upon it as an Object of choice; that which is pregnant with Misery he disapproves of and stiles *Evil*. And this Good and Evil are not only barely approved of, or the contrary, but whenever view'd in Imagination (since Man considers himself as existing hereafter, and is concern'd for his Welfare then as well as now) they have a *present Pleasure* or Pain annex'd to them, proportionable to what is apprehended to follow them in real Existence; which Pleasure or Pain arising from the prospect of future
Pleasure

Pleasure or Pain is properly call'd *Passion*, and the Desire consequent thereupon, *Affection*.

And as by reflecting upon Pleasure there arises in our minds a *Desire* of it; and on Pain, an *Aversion* from it (which necessarily follows from supposing us to be sensible Creatures, and is no more than saying, that all things are not *indifferent* to us) so also by reflecting upon Good or Evil, the same Desires and Aversions are excited, and are distinguish'd into *Love* and *Hatred*. And from Love and Hatred variously modify'd, arise all those other Desires and Aversions which are promiscuously stiled Passions or Affections; and are generally thought to be implanted in our Nature *originally*, like the Power of receiving Pleasure or Pain. And when placed on inanimate Objects, are these following, Hope, Fear, Despair and its opposite, for which we want a Name.

S E C T. IV.

Approbation and Affection consider'd with regard to Merit, or the Law of Esteem.

IF a Man in the pursuit of Pleasure or Happiness (by which is meant the Sum total of Pleasure) had to do only with inanimate Creatures, his Approbation and Affections would be as described in the foregoing Section. But, since he is dependent with respect to his Happiness, not only on these, but also on rational Agents, Creatures like himself, which have the Power of governing or directing Good and
and

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and Evil, and of acting for an End ; there will arise different means of Happiness, and consequently different Pursuits, tho' tending to the same End, Happiness; and therefore different Approbations and Affections, and the contrary; which deserve particularly to be consider'd.

That there will arise different means of Happiness, is evident from hence, *viz.* that Rational Agents, in being subservient to our Happiness, are not passive but voluntary. And therefore since we are in pursuit of that to obtain which we apprehend the concurrence of their Wills necessary, we cannot but approve of whatever is apt to procure this Concurrence. And that can be only the Pleasure or Pain expected from it by them. And therefore, as I perceive that my Happiness is dependent on others, I cannot but judge whatever I apprehend to be proper to excite them to endeavour to promote my Happiness, to be a means of Happiness: *i. e.* I cannot but *approve it*. And since the annexing Pleasure to their Endeavours to promote my Happiness is the only thing in my power to this end, I cannot but approve of the annexing Pleasure to such Actions of theirs as are undertaken upon my account. Hence to approve of a Rational Agent as a means of Happiness, is different from the Approbation of any other means, because it implies an Approbation also of an Endeavour to promote the Happiness of that Agent, in order to excite him and others to the same concern for my Happiness for the future.

And because what we approve of we also desire (as has been shewn above) hence also we *desire* the Happiness of any Agent that has done us good. And therefore *Love* or *Hatred*, when placed on a rational Object, has this difference from the Love or Hatred of other things, that it implies a desire of, and consequently a pleasure in the Happiness of the Object beloved ; or, if hated, the contrary.

The Foundation of this Approbation and Love (which, as we have seen, consists in his voluntarily contributing to our Happiness) is called the *Merit* of the Agent so contributing, *i. e.* that whereby he is entitled (upon supposition that we act like rational, sociable Creatures, like Creatures whose Happiness is dependent on each other's Behaviour) to our Approbation and Love: *Demerit* the contrary.

And

And this Affection or Quality of any Action which we call *Merit* is very consistent with a Man's acting *ultimately* for his own private Happiness. For any particular Action that is undertaken *for the sake of another*, is *meritorious*, i. e. deserves Esteem, Favour, and Approbation from him for whose sake it was undertaken, towards the Doer of it. For the presumption of such Esteem, &c. was the only Motive to that Action; and if such Esteem, &c. does not follow, or is presum'd not to follow it, such a Person is reckon'd unworthy of any favour, because he shews by his Actions that he is incapable of being *obliged* by Favours.

The Mistake which some have run into, *viz.* that Merit is inconsistent with acting upon *private Happiness*, as an ultimate End, seems to have arisen from hence, *viz.* that they have not carefully enough distinguish'd between an inferior and ultimate End; the end of a particular Action, and the end of Action in general: which may be explained thus. Tho' Happiness, private Happiness, is the proper or ultimate End of all our Actions whatever, yet that particular means of Happiness which any particular Action is chiefly adapted to procure, or the thing chiefly aim'd at by that Action; the thing which, if possess'd, we would not undertake that Action, may and generally is call'd the *End* of that Action. As therefore Happiness is the general End of all Actions, so each particular Action may be said to have its proper and peculiar End: Thus the End of a Beau is to please by his Dress; the End of Study, Knowledge. But neither pleasing by Dress, nor Knowledge, are ultimate Ends, they still tend or ought to tend to something farther; as is evident from hence, *viz.* that a Man may ask and expect a Reason why either of them are pursued: Now to ask the *Reason* of any Action or Pursuit, is only to enquire into the *End* of it: But to expect a Reason, i. e. an End to be assign'd for an *ultimate* End, is absurd. To ask why I pursue Happiness, will admit of no other Answer than an Explanation of the Terms.

Why *inferior Ends*, which in reality are only Means, are too often look'd upon and acquiesc'd in as *ultimate*, shall be accounted for hereafter.

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Whenever therefore the *particular* End of any Action is the Happiness of another (tho' the Agent design'd thereby to procure to himself Esteem and Favour, and look'd upon that Esteem and Favour as a means of private Happiness) that Action is meritorious. And the same may be said, tho' we design to please God by endeavouring to promote the Happiness of others. But when an Agent has a view in any particular Action distinct from my Happiness, and that view is his *only Motive* to that Action, tho' that Action promote my Happiness to never so great a Degree yet that Agent acquires no *Merit*; *i. e.* he is not thereby entitled to any Favour and Esteem: Because Favour and Esteem are due from me for any Action, no farther than that Action was undertaken upon my account. If therefore my Happiness is only the pretended End of that Action, I am imposed on if I believe it real, and thereby think myself indebted to the Agent; and am discharg'd from any Obligation as soon as I find out the Cheat.

But it is far otherwise when my Happiness is the sole End of that particular Action, *i. e.* (as I have explain'd myself above) when the Agent endeavours to promote my Happiness as a Means to procure my Favour, *i. e.* to make me subservient to his Happiness as his ultimate End: Tho' I know he aims at my Happiness only as a means of his own, yet this lessens not the Obligation.

There is one thing, I confess, which makes a great alteration in this Case, and that is, whether he aims at my Favour *in general*, or only for some particular End. Because, if he aim at my Happiness only to serve himself in some particular thing, the Value of my Favour will perhaps end with his obtaining that particular thing: And therefore I am under less Obligation (*cæteris paribus*) the more *particular* his Expectations from me are; but under Obligation I am.

Now from the various Combinations of this which we call Merit, and its contrary, arise all those various Approbations and Aversions; all those Likings and Dislikings which we call *Moral*.

As therefore, from considering those Beings which are the *involuntary* means of our Happiness or Misery, there were produced
in

in us the Passions or Affections of Love, Hatred, Hope, Fear, Despair, and its contrary: So from considering those Beings which *voluntarily* contribute to our Happiness or Misery, there arise these following. Love and Hatred, (which are different from that Love or Hatred placed on involuntary Beings; that placed on involuntary Beings being only a Desire to possess or avoid the thing beloved or hated; but this on voluntary Agents being a Desire to give Pleasure or Pain to the Agent beloved or hated) Gratitude, Anger, (sometimes call'd by one common Name, Resentment) Generosity, Ambition, Honour, Shame, Envy, Benevolence: and if there be any other, they're only, as these are, different Modifications of Love and Hatred.

Love and *Hatred*, and the Foundation of them, (*viz.* the Agent beloved or hated being apprehended to be instrumental to our Happiness) I have explain'd above. *Gratitude* is that Desire of promoting the Happiness of another upon account of some former Kindness receiv'd. *Anger*, that Desire of thwarting the Happiness of another, on account of some former Diskindness or Injury received. And both these take place, tho' we hope for, or fear nothing farther from the Objects of either of them, and this is still consistent with acting upon a Principle of *private Happiness*.

For tho' we neither hope for, nor fear any thing farther from these particular Beings; yet the Disposition shewn upon these Occasions is apprehended to influence the Behaviour of other Beings towards us; *i. e.* other Beings will be moved to promote our Happiness or otherwise, as they observe how we resent Favours or Injuries.

Ambition is a Desire of being esteem'd. Hence a Desire of being *thought* an Object of Esteem; hence of *being* an Object of Esteem, hence of doing *laudable*, *i. e.* useful Actions. *Generosity* and *Benevolence* are Species of it. Ambition in too great a Degree is called *Pride*, of which there are several Species. The Title to the Esteem of others, which ariseth from any meritorious Action, is called *Honour*. The Pleasure arising from Honour being paid to us, *i. e.* from others acknowledging that we are entitled to their Esteem, is with-

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out a Name. *Modesty* is the fear of losing Esteem. The Uneasiness or Passion which ariseth from a Sense that we have lost it, is called *Shame*. So that *Ambition*, and all those other Passions and Affections belonging to it, together with *Shame*, arise from the Esteem of others: which is the Reason why this Tribe of Affections operate more strongly on us than any other; *viz.* because we perceive that as our Happiness is dependent on the Behaviour of others, so we perceive also that that Behaviour is dependent on the Esteem which others have conceiv'd of us; and consequently that our acquiring or losing Esteem, is in effect acquiring or losing Happiness, and in the highest Degree. And the same may be said concerning all our other Affections and Passions, to enumerate which, what for want of Names to them, and what by the confusion of Language about them, is almost impossible.

Envy will be accounted for hereafter, for a Reason which will then be obvious.

Thus having explain'd what I mean by *Obligation* and *Approbation*; and shewn that they are founded on and terminate in *Happiness*: having also pointed out the Difference between our Approbations and Affections as placed on involuntary and voluntary Means of Happiness; and farther, that these Approbations and Affections are not innate or implanted in us by way of *Instinct*, but are all *acquired*, being fairly deducible from supposing only sensible and rational Creatures dependent on each other for their Happiness, as explain'd above: I shall in the next place endeavour to answer a grand Objection to what has here been said concerning Approbations and Affections arising from a prospect of private Happiness.

The Objection is this.

The Reason or End of every Action is always known to the Agent; for nothing can move a Man but what is perceiv'd: but the generality of Mankind love and hate, approve and disapprove, immediately, as soon as any moral Character either occurs in Life, or is proposed to them, without considering whether their private Happiness

piness is affected with it, or no: or if they do consider any Moral Character in relation to their own Happiness, and find themselves, as to their private Happiness, unconcern'd in it, or even find their private Happiness lessen'd by it in some particular Instance, yet they still approve the Moral Character, and love the Agent; nay they cannot do otherwise. Whatever Reason may be assign'd by speculative Men why we should be grateful to a Benefactor, or pity the Distress'd; yet if the grateful or compassionate Mind never thought of that Reason, it is no Reason to him. The Enquiry is not why he *ought to be* grateful, but why he *is* so. These after-reasons therefore rather shew the Wisdom and Providence of our Maker in implanting the immediate Powers of these Approbations (*i. e.* in Mr. Hutcheson's Language, *a Moral Sense*) and these Public Affections in us, than give any satisfactory account of their Origin. And therefore these Public Affections, and this Moral Sense, are quite independent on private Happiness, and in reality act upon us as mere Instincts.

Answer.

The Matter of Fact contain'd in this Argument, in my Opinion, is not to be contested; and therefore it remains either that we make the matter of Fact consistent with what we have before laid down, or give up the Cause.

Now, in order to shew this Consistency, I beg leave to observe, that as in the pursuit of Truth we don't always trace every Proposition whose Truth we are examining, to a first Principle or Axiom, but acquiesce, as soon as we perceive it deducible from some known or presumed Truth; so in our Conduct we do not always travel to the ultimate End of our Actions, *Happiness*: but rest contented, as soon as we perceive any Action subservient to a known or presumed *Means* of Happiness. And these presumed Truths and Means of Happiness, whether real or otherwise, always influence us after the same manner as if they were real. The undeniable Consequences of Prejudices are as firmly adhered to as the Consequences of real truths
or

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or arguments; and what is subservient to a false (but imagin'd) means of Happiness, is as industriously pursued as what is subservient to a true one.

Now every Man, both in his Pursuit after Truth, and in his Conduct, has settled and fixed a great many of these in his Mind, which he always acts upon, as upon *Principles*, without examining. And this is occasion'd by the Narrowness of our Understandings: We can consider but a few things at once; and therefore, to run every thing to the Fountain-head would be tedious, thro' a long Series of Consequences. To avoid this we choose out certain Truths and means of Happiness, which we look upon as RESTING PLACES, which we may safely acquiesce in, in the Conduct both of our Understanding and Practice, in relation to the one, regarding them as *Axioms*; in the other, as *Ends*. And we are more easily inclined to this by imagining that we may safely rely upon what we call *Habitual* Knowledge, thinking it needless to examine what we are already satisfy'd in. And hence it is that Prejudices, both Speculative and Practical, are difficult to be rooted out, *viz.* few will examine them.

And these RESTING PLACES are so often used as Principles, that at last, letting that slip out of our Minds which first inclined us to embrace them, we are apt to imagine them, not as they really are, the *Substitutes* of Principles, but Principles themselves.

And from hence, as some Men have imagin'd *Innate Ideas*, because forgetting how they came by them; so others have set up almost as many distinct *Instincts* as there are *acquired Principles* of acting. And I cannot but wonder why the *Pecuniary* Sense, a Sense of *Power* and *Party*, &c. were not mention'd, as well as the *Moral*, that of *Honour*, *Order*, and some others.

The Case is really this. We first perceive or imagine some real Good, *i. e.* fitness to promote our Happiness in those things which we love and approve of. Hence (as was above explain'd) we annex Pleasure to those things. Hence those things and Pleasure are so ty'd together and associated in our Minds, that one cannot present
itself

itself but the other will also occur. And the *Association* remains even after that which at first gave them the Connection is quite forgot, or perhaps does not exist, but the contrary. An Instance or two may perhaps make this clear. How many Men are there in the World who have as strong a taste for *Money* as others have for *Virtue*; who count so much *Money*, so much *Happiness*; nay, even sell their *Happiness* for *Money*; or, to speak more properly, make the *having Money*, without any Design or Thought of using it, their ultimate End? But was this Propensity to *Money* born with them? Or rather, did not they at first perceive a great many Advantages from being possess'd. of *Money*, and from thence conceive a Pleasure in having it, thence desire it, thence endeavour to obtain it, thence receive an actual Pleasure in obtaining it, thence desire to preserve the Possession of it? Hence, by dropping the intermediate Means between *Money* and *Happiness*, they join *Money* and *Happiness* immediately together, and content themselves with the phantastical Pleasure of having it, and make that which was at first pursued only as a *Means*, be to them a real *End*, and what their real *Happiness* or *Misery* consists in. Thus the Connection between *Money* and *Happiness* remains in the Mind; tho' it has long since ceased between the things themselves.

The same might be observ'd concerning the Thirst after Knowledge, Fame, &c. the delight in Reading, Building, Planting, and most of the various Exercises and Entertainments of Life. These were at first enter'd on with a view to some farther End, but at length become habitual Amusements; the Idea of Pleasure is associated with them, and leads us on still in the same eager Pursuit of them, when the first Reason is quite vanish'd, or at least out of our Minds. Nay, we find this Power of *Association* so great as not only to transport our Passions and Affections beyond their proper bounds, both as to Intensity and Duration; as is evident from daily Instances of Avarice, Ambition, Love, Revenge, &c. but also, that it is able to transfer them to improper Objects, and such as are of a quite different Nature from those to which our Reason had at first directed them. Thus being accusom'd to resent an Injury done to
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our Body by a Retaliation of the like to him that offer'd it, we are apt to conceive the same kind of Resentment, and often express it in the same manner, upon receiving hurt from a Stock or Stone, whereby the hatred which we are used to place on voluntary Beings, is substituted in the Room of that Aversion which belongs to involuntary ones. The like may be observ'd in most of the other Passions above-mention'd.

From hence also, *viz.* from the continuance of this *Association* of Ideas in our Minds, we may be enabled to account for that (almost diabolical) Passion called *Envy*, which we promis'd to consider.

Mr. *Locke* observes, and I believe very justly, that there are some Men entirely unacquainted with this Passion. For most Men that are used to Reflection, may remember the very time when they were first under the dominion of it.

Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which arises in the Mind from observing the Prosperity of others; not of *all* others indefinitely, but only of some particular Persons. Now the examining who those particular Persons whom we are apt to envy are, will lead us to the true Origin of this Passion. And if a Man will be at the Pains to consult his Mind, or to look into the World, he'll find that these particular Persons are always such as upon some account or other he has had a *Rivalship* with. For when two or more are Competitors for the same thing, the Success of the one must necessarily tend to the Detriment of the other, or others: hence the Success of my Rival and Misery or Pain are joined together in my Mind; and this connection or association remaining in my Mind, even after the Rivalship ceases, makes me always affected with Pain whenever I hear of his Success, tho' in Affairs which have no manner of Relation to the Rivalship, much more in those that bring that to my Remembrance, and put me in mind of what I might have enjoy'd had it not been for him. This may possibly cast some Light upon the black Designs and envious Purposes of the fallen Angels. For why might not they have formerly had some Competition with their Fellows? and why may not such Associations be as strong in them as us?

Thus

Thus also we are apt to envy those Persons that refuse to be guided by our Judgments and persuaded by us. For this is nothing else than a Rivalship about the Superiority of Judgment; and we take a secret Pride both to let the World see, and in imagining ourselves, that we were in the right.

There is one thing more to be observ'd in answer to this Objection, and that is, that we do not always (and perhaps not for the most part) *make* this Association ourselves, but *learn* it from *others*: *i. e.* that we annex Pleasure or Pain to certain Things or Actions because we see others do it, and acquire Principles of Action by imitating those whom we admire, or whose Esteem we would procure: Hence the Son too often inherits both the Vices and the Party of his Father, as well as his Estate: Hence *National* Virtues and Vices, Dispositions and Opinions: And from hence we may observe how easy it is to account for what is generally call'd the *Prejudice of Education*; how soon we catch the Temper and Affections of those whom we daily converse with; how almost insensibly we are *taught* to love, admire or hate; to be grateful, generous, compassionate or cruel, &c.

What I say then in answer to the Objection is this: " That it is necessary in order to solve the principal Actions of human Life to suppose a Moral Sense (or what is signify'd by that Name) and also public Affections; but I deny that this Moral Sense, or these public Affections are innate, or *implanted* in us: they are acquired either from our own *Observation* or the *Imitation* of others. But whether I have rightly deny'd it or no must depend upon the Arguments, and the Reader is to judge impartially for himself. I think this Matter deserves a fair Examination; and if what has been said already put others upon thinking of it I have my End.

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8	'Tis shewn that this may arise from Prejudice.	<i>ibid.</i>
9	<i>Without</i> , supposes Space; while therefore we conceive something to exist without us, we cannot annihilate Space in Thought.	31
10	Things are conceiv'd to be annihilated by substituting something else in the room of them; but we have nothing to substitute for Space.	32
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15	The Mind-reflect'd upon itself has no relation to Space, nor any necessity for it.	36
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- ¶ 1 The Parts of the Body fly off, it stands in need therefore of Reparation, *viz.* by Food. 117
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- 5 This is a Sign that the present Life is a Prelude to a better. 128
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- 5 Ancient Histories declare, that Wild-Beasts and Venomous Creatures were made for the Punishment of Mankind. 133

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- 6 'Tis the fault of Mankind that these multiply: Countries laid waste by War, &c. to the disgrace of Man, of right belong to them. 133
- 7 We may more easily avoid Wild-Beasts and Venomous Creatures than, other Inconveniencies of Life about which we never quarrel with Providence. *ibid.*
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- 4 Man is not therefore miserable because expos'd to Errors. *ib.*
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- 6 Our Knowledge is adapted to our State. 138
- 7 We prefer Life with all its Inconveniencies before Death. 140
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- 6 The Evils which do arise from thence are permitted for the Good of the Universe, and also of Man himself. 147
- 7 Mortality, Hunger, Thirst, Diseases, &c. are for the Good of the World in this corrupt Estate. *ibid.*

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Of Moral Evil.

Introduction containing the Substance of the Chapter.

S E C T. I.

Concerning the Nature of Elections.

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A View of their Opinion who admit of Liberty from Compulsion only, but not from Necessity.

- 1 That it is not easy to understand or give a true Representation of the Opinions concerning Liberty. Some acknowledge a Liberty from *Compulsion* only, others from *Necessity* also. 150
- 2 The Authors of the former Opinion suppose that there are Appetites implanted in us by Nature; what is agreeable to these is called Good, the contrary Evil. 151
- 3 Things are agreeable to the Appetite in a threefold respect; hence three kinds of Good. *ibid.*
- 4 That which is actually agreeable to the Appetite is called *Pleasant*. *ib.*
- 5 That which is connected with something which is of itself agreeable, is called *Profitable*. *ibid.*
- 6 That which is judg'd by the Understanding to be the best, all things consider'd, is absolutely good, and called *Honest*. *ibid.*
- 7 Instances in Health, Medicines, and such things as are agreeable to the Rational Appetite. 152
- 8 He that can act as his own Judgment directs, is free according to these *ib.*
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- 9 But they suppose that we are determin'd to choose either from the Goodness or Disagreeableness of Objects perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senses, and that therefore we are not free as to the Acts of the Will, but only of the inferior Faculties which are subject to the Determination of the Will. *ibid.*
- 10 If this be so, all our Actions are absolutely necessary. 154
- 11 That human Actions are free, not from Necessity but Compulsion. 155
- 12 According to their Opinion there is no Contingency in things, nor could any thing be done otherwise than it is. 156
- 13 By Evil they understand nothing more than hurtful. *ib.*
- 14 Villanies are to be plac'd to the Account of human Miseries, and not look'd upon as Crimes, properly so call'd. 157
- 15 A Malefactor is reprov'd, not because he deserv'd it, but because Reproof may drive him from Evil. *ib.*
- 16 Punishments are apply'd as Medicines to the Sick, neither are Laws useless since they prevent Vice. 158
- 17 We are oblig'd to be grateful only in prospect of a future Benefit. *ibid.*
- 18 According to this Opinion human Happiness is impossible, since it depends upon things which are not in our Power. *ibid.*
- 19 Its Consequences are hard, and tho' the Argument from Consequences be generally a bad one, yet these bring some Prejudice against an Opinion which seems to be attended with them, especially if they be acknowledg'd
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- 20 All those who declare that the Will is *passive* in its Operations, will be esteem'd to be of the same Opinion with the former, and are press'd with the same Consequences. *ibid.*

SUBJECT II.

An Opinion is propos'd in general, asserting a Liberty from Necessity as well as Compulsion.

- 1 This agrees with the former in most Cases, especially in those relating to the Appetites, to *good, pleasant, profitable, and honest*; but determines this to be the difference between a Man and Brute, *viz.* that the one is determin'd by his Bodily Appetite, the other by himself. 161
- 2 The chief Good is necessarily desired, but others are not, because they may be represented by the Understanding in different Lights. 162
- 3 Tho' therefore the Will follows some Judgment of the Understanding, yet it is not necessarily determin'd by it. 164

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- 4 This Opinion establishes Liberty, but there are some things in it not sufficiently explain'd. 166
- 5 Such a Liberty as this seems to be of more Prejudice than Benefit to Mankind. *ib.*
- 6 It takes place only in doubtful Matters, and then 'tis of no use or importance. 168
- 7 We are left in doubt concerning the way which leads to Happiness, and a Man can have no Help from Liberty. *ibid.*
- 8 Since that is Good which is agreeable, and this is to be judg'd of by the Understanding, if the Will follow this Judgment it is not free, if it does not, it acts against Reason. We had better therefore be without such Liberty. 169
- 9 If the Will could suspend its Act contrary to the Judgment of the Understanding, it would run directly into Evil; it seems therefore necessary for it to act at the time, and in the manner which the Understanding directs. 170
- 10 There are Answers offer'd to these Difficulties, but such as are far from being clear. On this account many have gone over to the former Opinion. 171

SUBJECT. III.

Another Notion of Liberty and Election is proposed.

- 1 The Appetites and Powers attain their proper End by exercise, which is the greatest Perfection of them, and their best Estate. 172
- 2 There is a certain agreeableness fix'd by Nature between some Appetites, and their Objects, whereby they act upon the presence of them, and cease from Action upon the Removal of them. *ib.*
- 3 Liberty would be of disservice to an Agent endow'd with such Appetites, &c. as these only. 173
- 4 We may conceive a Power between which and any particular Object there is naturally no other Agreeableness but what may arise from the determination of the Power itself. *ib.*
- 5 Such a Power as this cannot be determin'd by any Goodness in Objects, since the Goodness of 'em depends upon the determination. 175
- 6 Nor by any Uneasiness. *ib.*
- 7 Nor by the Understanding. 176
- 8 Yet such an Agent has need of Understanding in order to distinguish possible things from impossible. 177

- 9 If the Agent be of infinite Power, he needs no other Limitation. 177
- 10 But an Agent of finite Power must also consult his Abilities. *ib.*
- 11 Such an Agent cannot be determin'd by his other Appetites. 178
- 12 This Power is superior to all the Appetites, and subdued by none. *ib.*
- 13 It seems to be given for this End, that the Agent might have something to delight himself in when the natural Appetites must necessarily be frustrated. *ib.*
- 14 This Power, by its accession, increases the Pleasure of the other Appetites; by opposition removes, or at least alleviates the Pain. 179
- 15 The rest of the Appetites are not to be baulked unnecessarily. 180
- 16 Such an Agent as this is Self-active. *ib.*
- 17 Is determin'd by himself, and things are not chosen because they please him, but please him because they are chosen. 181
- 18 Yet he is not determin'd by *chance*. *ib.*
- 19 Is the true Cause of his Actions. 182
- 20 Is capable of Happiness. *ib.*
- 21 An imperfect Understanding is sufficient for his Happiness, if he do but distinguish between Possibilities and Impossibilities, things agreeable and disagreeable to the Senses, and consult his Abilities. 183
- 22 Tho' Liberty would be a Prejudice to other Agents, yet it is a sure foundation of Happiness to this, whose convenience depends not on Objects but Election. 184
- 23 These things are clear enough, tho' they may appear to be a little too subtle. *ib.*

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That there is an Agent who is pleased with Objects only because he chooses them.

- 1 God is such an Agent as this. 185
- 2 Because nothing external is either good or bad to him before Election. *ib.*
- 3 Because his own Will is the Cause of Goodness in the Creatures. *ib.*
- 4 They are not to be regarded who declare that this Goodness determines the Will of God. 186
- 5 If he had not a Power of pleasing himself in Election, he could never have made any thing. 187
- 6 If he were moved by the Goodness of things to create the World, he would be a necessary Agent. 188
- 7 But

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77. But if things are good because he has chosen to make them, his whole Work will be free.	188
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89. And determine himself to Action.	189
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14. As he is of infinite Goodness, he also wills the Good of all things which he has determin'd to create, as far as possible.	192
15. When the World therefore is once made, it is impossible that those things should please him which tend to the confusion, &c. of his Work.	<i>ib.</i>
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17. This is no bar to the Divine Liberty.	<i>ib.</i>
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- 10 That we can conquer not only our Appetites and Senses, but also our Reason by the force of Election. 204
- 11 This appears from Instances. 205
- 12 That the Understanding admits not only Evil things for Good, but Fallities for Truths, viz. being under Subjection to the Will. *ib.*
- 13 'Tis prov'd that we have this Power from a Consideration of these Reasons which are supposed to determine the Will. 206
- 14 These are enumerated. *ib.*
- 15 First, Errors of the Understanding: these are shewn to depend upon deprav'd Election rather than cause it. 207
- 16 Secondly, Obstinacy: which is shewn to be nothing else but persevering in a deprav'd Election. *ib.*
- 17 Thirdly, The violence of Passions, viz. Desire of Fame and Glory, &c. all which are prov'd to derive their inordinate force from Election. 208
- 18 The same is shewn of Hatred, Love, &c. 209
- 19 Of Envy and Revenge. *ib.*
- 20 Fourthly, *Madness*: 'tis prov'd on the contrary, that these Men are in their Senses who choose absurdly. 210
- 21 All these things cannot be explained otherwise than by admitting a Principle of this kind in ourselves. *ib.*
- 22 As much Good arises from this Principle, so it is attended with this Evil, viz. a Power of sinning. 211
- 23 This mistake, that the Will follows the Judgment of the Understanding arose from hence, viz. that it would be imprudent in us to act without consulting the Understanding. *ib.*
- 24 We can act in order to shew our Liberty, which is prov'd to be the same as acting without any reason at all. 212

S E C T. II.

Where it is shewn that Happiness consists in Elections.

- 1 The more free any Being is, the less he is expos'd to external Motions from without, and meets with less Inconvenience. 215
- 2 Happiness arises from the proper use of the Faculties, &c. If therefore a Power of choosing be the most noble of all, the greatest Happiness will consist in the Exercise of it, i. e. in Elections. *ib.*
- 3 Election is the Cause why things please us. 216
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- 4 He therefore that has a free power of choosing, can always please himself. 216
- 5 We can change our Elections to make them conformable to things, and so can attain Happiness. 217
- 6 Care of the Body, and the natural Appetites disturb Elections in this present state, and hinder our Happiness from being perfect. *ib.*
- 7 We have reason to admire the Divine Wisdom which created an Appetite that has wherewith to please itself in its own Nature, howsoever external things be disposed. 218

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Concerning undue Elections.

- ¶ 1 To fall short of what we choose is Misery; we choose amiss therefore when we choose what cannot be enjoy'd; This is done 1st when such things are chosen as are *impossible*. 219
- 2 2^{dly}. When those things are chosen which are *inconsistent* with each other. 220
- 3 3^{dly}. If the things chosen be not in the Power of the Elector. *ib.*
- 4 4^{thly}. If any choose that which is pre-occupy'd by the lawful Choice of others. *ib.*
- 5 5^{thly}. When those things which tend to Natural Evils are chosen without any Necessity. 221

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- ¶ 1 This is done five ways. 222
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- 4 Thirdly, By giving too great indulgence to the exercise of Election. *ib.*
- 5 Fourthly, By *Obstinacy*, or a *Habit*. *ib.*
- 6 Fifthly, By the importunity of the natural *Appetites*. *ib.*
- 7 Why every thing ought not to be chosen, and why Elections are not easily chang'd. 224

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How Evil Elections are consistent with the Power and Goodness of God.

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Proposes the Difficulty, with a Preparative to the Solution of it.

1. The Evils of Free-Agents are not necessary, and therefore seem to be permitted by God voluntarily. 226
2. Moral Evils have no necessary Connection with a free Nature, nor are of any Advantage to it. 227
3. Here then lies the stress of the Difficulty, viz. why did God permit those Evils which are neither necessary nor useful? *ib.*
4. We don't know so much of the Nature of thinking Beings, as of material ones, and therefore are less prepared for an Answer to this Difficulty than to the former. *ib.*
5. The abuse of Free-Will may be conceiv'd to have been prevented three ways, which are consider'd in the three following Subsections. 228

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Why God has created Free-Agents.

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2. But without those the World would have been a mere Machine, and every thing passive. *ib.*
3. Objection from these who declare that the Understanding is active, tho' it be necessary, as also God himself. 230
4. Answer to the former part of the Objection. *ib.*
5. Answer to the latter. *ib.*
6. God has a Complacency in his Works, and if nothing were free, that wou'd be wanting in them which is most agreeable to the Deity. 231
7. Necessary Evils do not always hinder the Creation of things, much less those which are only possible. *ib.*
8. Natural Evils are greater than Moral ones, and Free-Will a greater Good than the Natural Appetites. 232
9. The state of Man wou'd be worse if Free-Will were taken away. 233
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- 10 Free Agents are capable of perfect Happiness, therefore it is better to enjoy Liberty. 234
- 11 The Benefits of Free-Will cou'd not be had without a Power of sinning. 235
- 12 The Will could not be determin'd to Good by Objects, since the Goodness of them generally proceeds from Election. 236
- 13 The Intellect often finds nothing good in things, except that they help towards the attainment of an Election, the Will therefore could not be determin'd to Good by the Understanding. *ib.*
- 14 The Goodness and Wisdom of God being equal to his Power, hinders him from choosing amiss. 238
- 15 But Man may choose amiss, since his Goodness and Wisdom neither are nor can be adequate to his Power. 239
- 16 'Tis better to be sometimes deceiv'd with Pleasure, than to be always solicitous. 240
- 17 'Tis better to be in danger of sinning than to cease from Election. *ib.*

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Why God does not interpose his Omnipotence, and occasionally restrain the Will from depriv'd Elections.

- ¶ 1 More and greater Evils would arise from thence than from the abuse of Free-Will. 242
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C H A P. I.

Containing some Principles necessary to be known in order to the Understanding and Solution of the difficulty about the Origin of Evil.

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Of the knowledge of External Objects.

I. **T**HIS allow'd that external Objects are made known to us from without by the Senses; but we have entirely forgot how *Light, Colours*, and other external Things at first affected our Senses and Minds; nor can we easily recollect the rise and progress of our Knowledge concerning these things.

That sensations represent external things to us, or at least discover the presence of them.

However 'tis agreed that the *Conceptions* which we have of these either represent to us the things themselves, or at least discover the *presence and operations* of them: That the sensation of *Light*, for instance, arises from its being presented to the Eye; and so in all other Objects of the Senses.

That these are confused and complicated, but afterwards separated and distinguish'd by the understanding; an instance of this in burning Wax.

II. But it is to be observ'd that the Representations of things, which we have from the Senses, are by no means simple, but very much confused and complicated; for Example, the Eye represents to the Mind *burning Wax*, i. e. a thing that is hard, round, capable of being melted

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in the Fire, red, and when softened by heat, changeable into any Figure, susceptible also of various colours, and lastly resolvable into *Smoke*. The Eye exhibits all these properties in the burning Wax almost at one glance, but the *understanding* separates those things by Reflection, which the sight had convey'd to the Mind collectively. For it perceives that the Wax preserves its Essence and Denomination, tho' from round it be turn'd into square, from hard and red, into soft and black. From whence it appears that all these properties are *extrinsecal* to it, but that which continues under all these changes is call'd its *Nature and Substance*.

The first distinction of our conceptions into sensible Qualities and Substance.

III. By *Substance* I here understand a thing which the Mind can conceive by *itself* as *distinct* and *separate* from all others: For that thing, the conception of which does not *depend* upon another, nor does include or suppose any other, is to us a *Substance*; (1) and accordingly we distinguish it by that name: But that which implies *dependence* in

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(1) *Substance* in general is a thing or being which can *subsist* by itself without dependence on any other thing as a *Subject*. Our Idea of the word *Substance*, according to Mr. *Locke*, is only a supposition of we know not what *substratum* or *support* of such *Qualities* as we have observed to exist united together, and are capable of producing simple ideas in us, which qualities are commonly call'd accidents. Now because we cannot easily conceive how these accidents should subsist alone or in one another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some unknown common *substratum* which inheres not in any thing else, and which we denote by the name *Substance*. See his Essay, B. 2. C. 23. §. 2. and the Notes annex'd.

This is our usual manner of conceiving things as they are distinguish'd into *Substance* and *Accident*: But what foundation there is in nature for such a distinction I know not: In particular what this same *Substance* is, or whether it be really any thing at all different from these *Accidents*, or only a relative Idea founded on the *modus* of their existence, or rather on the manner of our considering their existence, we shall not pretend to determine.

Mr. *Locke*, who does not not much approve of the foregoing distinction between substance and accident, * seems generally to take it for an *unknown Cause of the union* of what we call Properties or Accidents. The Author of the *Procedure, Extent, and Limits* of H. U. supposes it to be nothing but the union of these very Properties, or all these constituent Properties collected together. --- "As far as we directly know the Essential properties of any substance so far we have a direct knowledge of the Substance *itself*: And if we had a direct knowledge of all the essential properties of any Substance, we should have an adequate knowledge of that Substance; for surely, if there be any meaning in words, the knowing any of the essential properties of a thing, is knowing *so much* of its very Substance or Essence." B. 1. C. 3. p. 80. 81.

Whatever is meant by the word *Substance*, Mr. *Locke* thinks it ought not to be apply'd to *God, Spirits, and Body*, in the same Sense † and the Author of the *procedure, &c.* would have us when we talk of *Spirits* to substitute the word *Being* instead of it ‖ and I must believe

* B. 2. C. 13. §. 18. 19. 20.)

† Ibid. §. 18:

‖ Pa. 77, 78.

in the conception of it we call a *Mode*, or *Accident*. For instance, we can conceive a certain portion of *matter*, such as Wax is, setting aside all others, and also without any particular *Figure*: But are not in like manner able to conceive any particular *Figure* without matter. Wax therefore is a *Substance*, for our conception represents it as *distinct*, *divided* from, and *independent* of, all other things: Nor is it necessary to the knowledge thereof, that we join the conceptions of other things when we think of it; for the conceptions of that and these, *contribute* nothing to, nor stand in need of, each other in order to their being understood. But *Colour*, *Figure*, *softness* and *hardness* are *modes* or *accidents*, since they cannot be conceiv'd without something that is *coloured*, *figur'd*, *soft*, or *hard*; but they enter not into the *Substance* or *nature* of Wax, for *that* remains, whatever may become of *these*.

IV. But when this is resolv'd into *smoke*, or *flame* it has no longer the name of Wax given to it; we call the thing *Wax*, which is applicable to a certain peculiar use; but when it is once resolv'd into *smoke* or *flame*, it becomes unfit for that use to which Wax is subservient; and therefore changes its *Essence*, and *appellation*, and is no longer to be called Wax. What therefore does it carry along with it under all mutations? 'Tis always *extended*, and capable of *motion* or *rest*; and has always parts which are *separable*, and *exclude* one another out of the same place; the Substance therefore which carries along with it those *Qualities* and *Properties* is called Matter. (2).

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that these and the like terms, especially *Substratum*, are very apt to mislead us in these inquiries and confine our Imagination to some gross Properties which belong to Matter only. See also *Watts's Logic*, Pt. 1. C. 2. §. 2 and 3, and N. 13.

(2) This comes nearer to the Idea of Body, according to Mr. *Locke*, than that of Matter. "Body, says he * stands for a solid, extended, figured Substance, whereof Matter is but a partial, and more confused conception; it seeming to me to be used for the Substance and solidity of Body, without taking in its Extension and Figure." Tho' it must be

confess'd that these two words are often used promiscuously. It may not be improper to observe here that the various significations of these general Terms *Body*, *Matter*, *Essence*, &c. in different Authors, as well as the uncertainty of what these Authors intend to signify by them, will serve to convince us, in the first place, that these words don't denote the manner how things really exist, but only our manner of conceiving them; and Secondly, that there are no real Existences strictly conformable to this our way of conceiving them, *i. e.* in *generals*. For if either these general terms stood for real things, or this our way of conceiving things,

* B. 3. C. 10. §. 15.

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What it is.

V. What is observable in Wax, may also be observ'd in every other Substance, which we know by the *Senses*. For all things that are perceiv'd by the Senses admit of the like changes, and the above mention'd properties continue both *under*, and *after* all these motions and mutations. Any sensible Object, howsoever chang'd, is always *extended, moveable, consisting of solid, distinct and divisible parts*.

That this Definition does not reach the Idea of Matter, but only shews us the Mark to distinguish it by.

VI. Not that this is a Definition, *A.* or *Idea* (4) of *Matter*, any more

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(in Generals) was fix'd by nature, neither of them would be so various and uncertain as we find they are. But as these terms stand only for our conceptions, and our fixing them to this or that conception, is merely arbitrary; the same term may often be apply'd to different conceptions, or several terms to the same conception. These Conceptions also, as they are not of nature's forming, must be form'd by the Mind itself, and of consequence are arbitrary too, and so may easily be different from each other, in different Men, and perhaps different from the real nature of things in all Men. The end of making these general conceptions is to range things into *sorts*, for the convenience of Language. The manner of acquiring them is as follows.

We are at first acquainted only with particular substances, but observing, that as these particular substances differ in some Ideas, so they agree in others (*i. e.* tho' this particular excites in the Mind some Idea or Ideas, which another does not, yet there are some Ideas excited equally from both of them) we take no notice of those Ideas in which two or more particular Substances differ, but select those only in which they agree, and connect them into one complex Idea, by giving them one name. Which complex Idea becomes general, *i. e.* it may be affirm'd of, or belongs to, or is found in, more than one particular substance. And the Substances of which it is affirmed, &c. are said to be contain'd under that general Idea. General Ideas of Substances are made therefore by leaving out those Ideas in which two or more particular Substances differ, and retaining those in which they agree. And from General Ideas thus made we may proceed to more

general ones, in the same way, *viz.* by always leaving out the particulars wherein they differ. Thus by observing a certain agreement among Individuals, and leaving out the rest, we form an Idea of the several Species. In like manner, by leaving out the distinguishing marks of each species we get the Idea of Animal in general: And again, by dropping that by which Animals are distinguish'd from all other things which are the objects of our Senses, we acquire the Idea of Matter or Body: and so on.---- When any of these General Ideas are found in a particular thing, 'tis call'd the *Essence* of that thing; *Essence* therefore is only that general abstract Idea in the Mind by which we determine any thing to be of this or that *sort*; and which we signify by such a general Name as *Animal* or *Matter*. So that the same Quality may be Essential or not Essential to any thing, according as that thing is rank'd under a different *Sort*. This shews us both the absurdity of taking these general terms for signs of real Existences, which, we see, are signs of our Ideas only; and also the necessity for distinguishing between a Collection or Combination of our own Ideas, and real Qualities, as they are found in Nature; between *Thoughts* and *Things*. If this last Distinction were sufficiently attended to, I believe we should not be so ready to conclude from any Ideas which we may have of *infinite space, Infinite Duration, &c.* that these must needs be real *Properties, or Attributes* of some Being.--- Of which hereafter: See N. 5.

A. God seems to have endowed us with senses and understanding in order to distinguish things from one another, and to perceive the presence and uses of them. It is not therefore necessary

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necessary that they should be made known to us as they are in themselves, but only so far as they regard and can affect us: For it signifies nothing to us what they are in *themselves*, but only what effects they may have upon us: And the report of the senses must be looked upon as true, when they represent these effects to us uniformly, *i. e.* when the *Object*, *Medium* and *Organ* continuing in the same state, they produce the same sensation in us: For by this means we may perceive the presence of sensible things, and the distinction of them from each other, which seems to be the end for which we had senses given by nature.*

We come then to the Knowledge of things two ways, by Sensation and Reflection. We are conscious to ourselves that we exist, from thence we have the notion of *Existence*. † Nor do we seem to mean any thing else when we call a thing a *Being* or *Thing*, than that it is like us in that whereof we are self-conscious, *viz.* *Existence*. For Universals are, I think, neither to be interpreted by words alone, nor by conceptions, nor by the particular things themselves, but *by Analogy*. For Example, when one affirms that *Peter* is a *Man*, he observes the Idea of some particular Man, perhaps of himself, or the Neighbour he saw last; and when he affirms *Peter* to be a *Man*, he means nothing else but that *Peter* is like himself or his Neighbour, (and he calls those things alike which have the same effects as to him) After the same manner he that says *Man* is an *Animal*, must be supposed to have the Idea of some particular Man and Brute in his Mind, and to mean nothing more when he says, *Man* is an *Animal*, than that this particular Man and those that are like him, are in some respects also like the particular Brute, the Idea of which he had in his Mind. Thus we learn the Analogy of things by Reflection, but are acquainted with all external things by the sensations or Conceptions which they produce in us; and according to these various Conceptions we distinguish them from each other, and divide and define them

into various Species. Now we come to the Knowledge of some things by immediate Sensation, Proportion, or Connection with what we perceive by the Senses; || When we perceive any thing in the former way, we are said to know it by *Idea*; when in the latter, not by *Idea*, but *Reason*. The Case will be clearer perhaps by an Instance: I know a certain King, because I have seen and heard him, and his Countenance and Voice are fixed in my Mind: by these therefore I can distinguish him from others, and know him again when I see him; for he is known to me by *immediate sensation*, that is, by *Idea*. But I know *Cæsar* only by his actions, *i. e.* by Similitude and Connection with the things of which I have a Sensation; nor should I know him again if I met him; for immediate sensation has not impress'd those marks upon me whereby I might distinguish him from other Men. I affirm therefore that I have no *Idea* of him. I know him (as far as is necessary) by reason alone, *i. e.* from *Similitude* and *Connection* with those things which I perceive by my Senses.

Thus the Vulgar shew us sufficiently, that they distinguish between *Idea* and *Reason*, when they deny that they have any Ideas of God, Infinite, Spirit, and Substance. And yet they don't disown all manner of knowledge of those things; for they can't deny but that they have certain *Marks* from the Similitude or Relation to, or connection with, sensible things whereby they may distinguish Finite from Infinite, Substance from Accident, and Soul from Body. When therefore they deny that they have any Ideas of them, they shew that they mean no more than that these are not yet made known to them by immediate sensation. For they look upon such a perception of a thing as this only, to be the *Idea* of it; but reckon what they acquire by similitude, proportion or connection, no more an *Idea*, than *Algebraic species* are *Ideas* of *Quantity*, for which they are used, and by the assistance of which we know several things of infinite quantities whereof we can have no

* Concerning the *reality* of our sensitive Knowledge in general, and how far it reaches, see *Locke*, B. 4. ch. 2. §. 14. and C. 11. For instances wherein the Senses are not to be depended on, see N. 6.

† See *Locke's* Essay, B. 2. C. 7. §. 7.

|| See Mr. *Hutchinson's*

Essay on the nature and conduct of the Passions, &c. p. 3. N. †.

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Ideas; except we will abuse the word *Idea* contrary to the common Sense of Mankind.

Neither are those Men excusable who speak otherwise. They pretend indeed that they may use words in their own Sense; but they have no right to do it; for we are oblig'd to speak with the Vulgar, since they are to prescribe the Rules of Speech; nor must we expect that Readers should change the Notions which have been joined to Words from their Childhood, and approved by common use, at the pleasure of every Writer. 'Tis to be observ'd farther, that these Men generally put a trick upon us, for they define Words in their own Sense, but in discoursing use them in the common one; hence proceed quarrels among the learned, and among the half-learned, most pernicious Errors: For hearing from celebrated Writers, that all *Knowledge* is by *Ideas*, and taking an *Idea* with the Vulgar, for a *Mark* imprinted on the Mind by immediate Sensation, when they find no such *Mark* impressed on their Minds by *God*, by *Substance*, by *Infinite*, by the *Mysteries* of Religion, they deny that we have any knowledge at all of these things.

But we are to observe, that things are as properly known by *Reason* as by *Ideas*; for the *Marks* which things imprint on the Mind by immediate sensation are not the things themselves, but the effects of them upon the Mind and Senses; by these then we only know what Effects a thing has upon us, not what it is in itself. Now the things which are known by reason are also discovered by their Effects, not produced in us by immediate sensation, but in other things that are *connected* with what we perceive by the Senses. For instance; that is *Lucid* which produces the sensation of *Light* in me; *Sweets*, which produces that of *Sweetness*; But it is the *Sun* which emits the *Light*, and *God* that made the *Sun*, i. e. I know *Light* by its effect upon me; the *Sun* by its effect upon the *lucid Body*; *God* by his effect upon the *Sun*. Thus a Man knows his Father by immediate *sensation*, or by *Idea*; the Man that begot his Father, is his *Grand father*; and the Person that begot his *Grand-Father* is his *Great-Grand*

Father: These then are known by *reason*, and as properly as the Father is, tho' never seen by him.

When therefore one asks the *Genus* of any thing, he desires the Person ask'd to shew some thing or things which the Matter enquired after resembles: When he enquires into the *Difference*, he desires to have that sensation shewn him, which the thing sought, if present, would produce in him, and which would distinguish it from any thing else: And if this cannot be done, that at least a *Mark* may be produced which is in some manner connected with the sensation. Definitions therefore regard ourselves, and the effect which things have upon our Senses and Minds. When we have the *Character* or *Mark* of any thing whereby the sensation or conception produced in us by it, may be distinguished from the sensation or conception of other things, and by which we certainly know for the present that it is here, and are informed what to do or expect upon the presence of it, we know as much of it, as our imperfect State requires. Nay, such Knowledge is of much more use than the Philosophical discovery of *Genus* and *Difference*. He has a far more useful Knowledge of a Man that knows his Countenance, Name, Temper and Condition, than he that is acquainted with the *Principle of Individuation**. Tho' therefore I have no Idea of Substance, nor can assign a definition which will explain the Essence of it; yet if I can produce a *Mark*, whereby I may distinguish it for the present from every other thing that I meet, I must be judged to know it sufficiently. Now such a *Mark* I think I have already given. (3)

(3.) I omit the rest of our Author's long Note, since it contains only some Arguments for *innate Ideas*; which Hypothesis is now almost universally exploded. We may observe, that most of his Reasoning is built on a different Signification of the Word *Idea*. He will use it in the *old Platonick* meaning for a *Species*, *Phantasm*, or *Corporeal Image*, as it were painted on the Brain: The Application of the Mind to which is properly call'd *Imagination*, and

comes

* See *Locke's Essay*, B. 2. C. 27. §. 3.

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comes far short of *Knowledge*. Whereas, if we take the Word *Idea* in the more enlarged modern Sense, as it commonly stands for a *Representation of any Thing in the Mind*, or whatsoever is the immediate Object of the *Understanding* when a Man *perceives* or *thinks*; we can have no manner of *Knowledge* without both the actual Perception of *Ideas*, and also of their *connexion* with, or *repugnancy* to, each other.

According to Mr. *Locke*, our Apprehension of the Existence of any Being (beside ourselves) which we have *seen*, *felt*, or *heard*, may very properly be call'd *sensitive Knowledge*. But our Assurance of the Existence of any other (except God) which we do not so perceive by the Senses, is no *Knowledge* at all, but only *Faith*, *Presumption*, or *Probability*, &c.

Our Author's Method of forming *Universals*, or (as we commonly term them) *abstract Ideas*, by making the Idea of one particular Thing stand for all of the same Kind, will appear to be wrong, I think, from this single Argument, *viz.* that according to the foremention'd Scheme *Universals*, such as *Animal*, *Genus*, &c. would have a real Existence in Nature, whereas they are evidently the Creatures of our own Minds, and can exist no where else. We have therefore nothing at all to do with Analogy in forming general Ideas, we can never come at them by substituting one Particular for another, but must rather conceive them to be made by removing all Particularities of Existence, and leaving only what remains in common; according to *Locke's* Account of *Abstraction*, B. 2. C. 11. §. 9. See also *Watts's* Logic, Pt. 1. C. 3. §. 3. or N. 2.

By a due Attention to the Nature of these abstract Ideas, and our Way of acquiring them, we shall find that they are all mere *entia Rationis*, or form'd by the Mind alone, and of course will perceive that Duration, Space, Number, &c. which evidently are such, can have no real Existence in Nature, no proper *Ideatum* or *Objective Reality*, nor consequently be a Proof of any Thing beside that Power which the Mind has to form them, as will be shewn below.

To return: Our Author, in the same Place also doubly misapplies the Word *Reflection*, first, by making it stand for that particular Operation of the Mind call'd *Reasoning*, whereas we now commonly use it for the *internal Sense* or *Consciousness* both of the Existence of the Mind, and of all its Operations †: And, secondly, by making this Reflection or *Reasoning* to be without *Ideas*; Whereas, according to the present Sense of the Word *Idea*, 'tis absurd to suppose the Mind to reason, imagine, apprehend, or think at all, without them.

Tho' the Novel use of these terms might (as he here complains) occasion some disorder and confusion at their first introduction, yet since the Authority of Mr. *Locke* has chang'd the custom, and happily determin'd their signification, we have nothing to do now with the *old* one; but must take them in his sense if we would be understood. And since it is often impossible for an Author to find *old* words exactly correspondent to the Ideas which he wants to express; and very difficult to invent *new ones*: Every Man is certainly at liberty to fix what Sense to his words he pleases and finds most convenient for his purpose, tho' never so different from the derivation and original Sense of them, provided he at first sufficiently explains them, and sticks to that Explanation: Which I think Mr. *Locke* has generally done.

He has also put it past dispute, in opposition to *Des-Cartes* and others, that these Ideas are not *innate* and pre-existent in the Mind, and so only raised and refresh'd by the presence of external Objects; but that they are entirely form'd and produced *de novo* by them; or at least, that these Objects give occasion to the forming of them; that there is no manner of innate, (or as some will have it) *connate* Idea, no general Truth, or first Principle inherent in the Soul and created with it (and the same I think may be affirm'd of Passion, Appetite, Affection, &c.) at least none that ever appears in our present State; no immediate Object of the Mind before external things offer themselves to it, and it perceives, or becomes conscious of them. *

Our

† See *Locke*, B. 2. C. 1. §. 4.

* See *Locke*, B. 2. C. 9. §. 4.

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more than the former was of *Substance*, but that hereby we are acquainted with its presence, and distinguish it from every other thing; as we know a Man by his Countenance, and other Circumstances: Nor is it necessary that these should be applicable to all *Substance*, at all times, and to that alone: For it is enough if for this particular Time and Occasion we know the peculiar *Substance* we are talking of by them; and sufficiently distinguish it from other things.

How we come to the knowledge of Space.

VII. It is to be observed farther, that when a part of this matter is removed another succeeds into its Place, but is not in the same Place consistent with it. *Place* therefore seems to be something beyond, beside and distinct from, the *Matter* which it receives. For as from hence that Wax was successively capable of different forms, figures, colours and changes, it appears that something is in it beside, and different from all these, which we call the *Matter* of the Wax: So in like manner from hence that the same *Place* or *Space* receives more and different Bodies and Particles of matter successively, but cannot admit more than one at the same time, it will appear that *Place* or *Space*, is as distinct from *Matter* or *Body*, as Wax is from the Colours successively receiv'd; nor is dependent on them any more than Wax is on any particular Form.

VIII.

N O T E S.

Our Author's chief Objection against this is, that there seems to be no manner of *relation*, *resemblance* or *connection*, between the parts and motions of external Objects; and those Ideas, which they are said to produce in the Mind. But is there any more connection between the *raising* and *recalling* an *old Idea* by these motions, than producing a *new one*? Is it harder to conceive how they may *generate fresh Ideas*, than how they can *excite the latent ones*. [See N. 7.]

(4) By the word *Idea* the Author seems here to mean immediate, intimate, perception, or the same with *intuition*, as he explains himself in his Note, B; but this, as we have observ'd, is much better explain'd by *Locke*, who comprehends all our Author's *Notes*, *Marks*, *Characters*, and *Conceptions*, as well as his *Images*

and *Ideas*, under that general word *Idea*. This was much more convenient for Mr. *Locke's* System, and the liberty, I apprehend, ought to be allow'd him till a better System be produced on some other Principles. But his, I fancy, will yet be generally embraced, notwithstanding what the ingenious Author of the *Essay on the Imagination*, and some others, have of late advanc'd to the contrary. As for my part, I cannot conceive what occasion we have to quarrel, as some do, with the great Author above-mention'd for not distinguishing between an *Idea* and a *Notion*, &c. when one and the same word if we please may easily serve for all. For an account of the different Opinions of Philosophers about Ideas and their Origin, see the word *Idea* in *Chambers's Cyclopædia*,

(5.) Tho'

VIII. If therefore we set aside, or annihilate *Matter*, whatsoever What it is. still remains will all belong to the nature of *Space*; as in the former case when we had set aside the Properties of *Wax*, that which belong'd to the *Matter* or substance of it remain'd. If you ask what that is? I answer, first *Local* Mobility is to be set aside, for that seems peculiar to *Matter*. Secondly, an actual *separation* of Parts, for what is immoveable cannot be divided. Thirdly, *Impenetrability*, or Solidity, for that supposes Motion, and is necessary to the Production of it. It remains therefore that *Space* (as we conceive it) be something extended, immoveable, capable of *receiving* or *containing* *Matter*, and penetrable by it. Tho' therefore we have not a *Definition* or *Idea* * of *Space*, properly so call'd; yet we can hereby sufficiently distinguish it from every other thing, and may reason about it as much as we have occasion. (5)

* *i. e.* in his own Sense of the word *Idea*, See *N. A.* or *N. 4.*

IX. These

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(5) Tho' so much noise has been made about *Space*, which *Leibnitz* justly calls an Idol of some modern *English* Men; and so great use has been made of it in demonstrating the divine Attributes, in a way which some stile *a Priori*; yet, I'm forc'd to confess that I cannot possibly frame any other Notion of it, than either, first, as the mere *negation* or *absence* of *Matter*, or secondly, as the extension of *Body*, consider'd *abstractly*, or separate from any particular *Body*: As *whiteness* without a *white Body*, &c. or thirdly, as a *Subject* or *Substratum* of that same *extension in abstracto*, for which last Notion, See *N. 16.*

Now according to the first Supposition we may indeed have a *positive Idea* of it, as well as of *Silence*, *Darkness*, and many other Privations; as Mr. *Locke* has fully proved that we have, and shewn the Reason of it. B. 2. C. 8. §. 4. But to argue from such an *Idea* of *Space*, that *Space* itself is something external, and has a real existence, seems altogether as good Sense as to say, that because we have a different *Idea* of *Darkness* from that of *Light*; of *silence* from that of *sound*; of the *absence* of any thing, from that of its *Presence*; therefore *Darkness*, &c. must be something positive and different from *Light*, &c. and have as real an Existence as *Light* has. And to deny that we have any

positive *Idea*, or, which is the very same, any *Idea* at all, of the Privations above-mention'd (For every *Idea*, as it is a perception of the Mind, must necessarily be positive, tho' it arise from what *Locke* calls a privative Cause) To deny, I say, that we have these *Ideas*, will be to deny Experience and contradict common Sense. There are therefore *Ideas* and *simple* ones too, which have nothing *ad extra* correspondent to them, no proper *Ideatum*, Archetype, or objective reality, and I don't see why that of *space* may not be reckon'd one of them. To say that *Space* must have existence, because it has some properties, for instance, *Penetrability*, or a capacity of receiving *Body*, seems to me the same as to urge that *darkness* must be something because it has the power or property of receiving *Light*; *Silence* the property of admitting *Sound*; and *Absence* the property of being supply'd by *Presence*, *i. e.* to assign absolute Negations, and such as by the same way of reasoning, may be apply'd to *nothing*, and then call them positive properties; and so infer, that the *Chimera* thus cloath'd with them, must needs be something. Setting aside the names of its other pretended properties (which names also are as merely negative as the supposed properties to which they belong) those that attribute *extension* to *space* seem not to attend to the true notion of that

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Property,

These three Conceptions, viz. of sensible Qualities (v. g. Motion, &c.) of Matter and Space, seem to be the chief of those that are external.

IX. These three conceptions, namely, of sensible Qualities (*viz.* Motion, &c.) of Matter and Space, seem to be the chief of those which

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Property, which, as the School-men define it (and let them who like not this definition try to give us a better) is to have *partes extra partes*, and as such, *i. e.* as including *parts* (which parts, as they differ in situation from each other, may have things predicated of some of them different from those which can be predicated of others) it appears plainly inconsistent with their own Idea of simple, uniform, indivisible space, and applicable to Matter only: And to attribute Extension, or parts, to space, according to the first notion of it laid down by us, will be the same as to talk of the extension or parts of *Absence*; of *Privation*, or of *mere Nothing*. Lastly, to ask if Space under the second Notion of that word, *i. e.* as Extension in the Abstract, be extended, or have parts, is apparently absurd; 'tis the same with that noted Question of the Man, who being told that to have Riches was to be rich, ask'd if Riches then themselves were Rich? Well, but tho' we can't assign any positive or consistent properties to space, yet, say they, we have a Clear Idea of *Distance* itself, and of *different* distances one greater than another, which proves that this is something real. Let us examine our Idea of *Distance* a little farther, and I believe, we shall find it to be only the Conception of a mere *possibility* for a line of such a certain *length*, or a Body of such *dimensions*, to be contain'd between two other Bodies, by mentally applying a *material measure* of so many inches, feet, &c. to the supposed *distance* between these two bodies; of which *material measure*, and of its *increasableness*, we have, indeed, a clear Idea, as also of the possibility of its being placed between these two bodies, tho' at present it be not so placed: And this seems to me to be all the conception or Idea, that we can possibly frame about it. Well, then, according to the first Supposition, Space will be mere *non entity*, or nothing, *i. e.* nothing can be affirm'd, but every thing deny'd of it: According to the second, it will be only an *abstract Idea* form'd in the mind from a

property peculiar to matter, which property, abstracted in Idea cannot itself admit of any other properties, nor be applicable to the *Divine Nature*, nor capable of positive Infinity in any respect.

" If Space, says Dr. Cudworth, be concluded to be nothing else but the *Extension* and *Distance* of *body*, or matter considered in *general* (without respect to this or that particular *body*) and *abstractly* in order to the Conception of *Motion*, and the mensuration of things, then do we say that there appeareth no sufficient grounds for this *positive Infinity* of Space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the World, or any figurate body, never so great, it is not impossible but that it might still be greater and greater without end. Which *Indefinite increasableness* of body and space seems to be mistaken for a *positive infinity* thereof. Whereas for this very Reason, because it can never be so great, but that *more* magnitude may still be added to it, therefore it can never be positively Infinite.

" To conclude therefore, by Space without the finite World, is to be understood nothing, but the possibility of body farther and farther, without end, yet so as never to reach to Infinity."

Hence appears the Weakness of that common Argument urg'd by *Gassendus*, Dr. *Clarke*, and *Raphson*, for the *absolute infinity* of Space, viz. From the impossibility of setting *bounds* or *limits* to it; since that, say they, would be to suppose Space bounded by *something* which *itself* occupies Space, or else by *nothing*, both which are contradictions.

Which Argument, either first of all supposes that Space is really some *thing*, or some positive Quality; which wants to be proved: Or else improperly applies bounds and bounders to mere non-entity, or bare possibility; which has nothing to do with the Idea of Bounds.

If

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which we have from without, and so natural to us that there is no reasonable Man but perceives them in himself. There are some who deny

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If therefore we take Space in the first Notion laid down, then its unboundedness, will (as Dr. Cudworth says) signify nothing but the possibility of Body farther and farther without end; according to which Sense, Let us state their usual Question in other Words, and the great fallacy and impropriety of it will appear. What is there, say they, *beyond* this Space? You must either imagine more such Space or *nothing*. What is there, say we, *beyond* this possibility of Existence? You must either imagine *more* such possibility of Existence or mere *nothing*, i. e. *non Existence*. What Consequence can possibly be drawn from such an odd Kind of Argumentation?

But if Space be taken in the second Sense, i. e. as Extension in *abstracto*, then the meaning of our *not being able to set bounds to it* will only be, that we have a power of enlarging our abstract Idea in *Infinitem*, or that we always find in our selves the same ability to add to, or repeat it, and if we always find that we can add, we shall never find that we cannot add, which (as a very eminent Writer on the Subject observes) is all the Mystery of the Matter, and all that can be understood by infinite Space. But it is farther urg'd that there must be something more in the present Case; for *we find not only a Power of enlarging the Idea, but find it impossible to set bounds to the thing; whereas, we can enlarge the Idea of Matter to infinity, but can also set bounds to the thing it self.* In answer to the first part of this Objection 'tis ask'd, What thing, I pray you, but the thing in your own mind, that is, the Idea? Prove it to be thing; and then we'll enquire whether it has bounds or not; but to say the thing is infinite or boundless, before you have prov'd it to exist, or to be a thing, is too large a step to take. The above-mention'd excellent Writer solves the Difficulty arising from the second part of the Objection by another parallel Case. "When I consider the number of the Stars, I can go numbering on in my thoughts still more and more Stars in *Infinitem*, But I can also set bounds to them, can suppose their numbers

" finite, but to number itself I can set no
" bounds. Yet what is Number? Nothing
" but an Abstract Idea, nothing *ad extra*, and
" to say to that number is infinite, comes only
" to this, that we can set no bounds to our
" Faculty of Numbering, it being always as
" easy to add to a thousand, or a Million, one
" more, &c. as to One. Well then, to set
" bounds to number in the abstract, is to set
" bounds to the Faculty itself, and to deny that
" it is in my Power to add, when I plainly
" perceive that I can; and so is a direct Con-
" tradiction. But as to the Number of Stars,
" or Hairs, or Men, or any thing, I can set
" bounds to that, without any contradiction,
" because it still leaves me in possession of the
" power of numbering, which I find I have;
" and which does not require any subject *ad*
" *extra*, but may go on independent of any,
" and indifferent to all. Now to apply this to
" other cases: the Mind finds in itself the fa-
" culty of enlarging and extending its Idea of
" extension. It can apply it to Matter, or can
" let it alone; can suppose Matter infinitely ex-
" panded, or can set bounds to it: But to set
" bounds to all Extension, as well imaginary
" as real, is cramping the Faculty, is denying
" it the power of enlarging, which is always
" present to the mind, and which she can ne-
" ver lose; and, in a word, is a contradiction.
" Any, either imaginary, or real, Subject is
" sufficient for the mind to exercise its Facul-
" ties upon; and so if you either suppose God
" or Matter, or Space to be infinitely extend-
" ed, it is equally satisfied with any. All
" that she requires is that she may be able to
" enlarge the Idea of Extension. But, if you
" take from her Extension itself, that is the
" Idea of it, and the Power of adding to it,
" you deprive her of her Faculty, and deny
" her a power which she finds she has. In a
" word, we can set bounds to any thing that
" still leaves the power of enlarging or ex-
" tending infinitely, as we find, we always
" can: and if we would speak strictly, it is
" not number that is infinite nor extension in-
" finite,

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that Space is any thing distinct from *Matter*, nor. is it much to our purpose

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“ nite, which are nothing but *notions* abstracted
 “ from things: But the mind of Man is able
 “ to proceed numbering or extending infi-
 “ nitely, that is, without ever coming to any
 “ Stop or Bounds. For to set bounds is to
 “ deny and destroy the Faculty itself: if it
 “ could not always do it, it could not do it at
 “ all. He that can add one to one, as often
 “ as he will, can never find an end of num-
 “ bering, nor he that can double an Inch as
 “ often as he will, find an end of enlarging;
 “ it is all nothing more than repeating one of
 “ the easiest operations or exercises of the
 “ mind, and it will always be a contradiction
 “ for any rational Mind to want it: ----- The
 “ Case being plainly thus, I think it should
 “ not be ask'd, why a Man cannot set bounds
 “ to Number or Extension, but how he comes
 “ to have the Faculty of Counting and Re-
 “ peating, which is really tantamount to the
 “ other, and what it ultimately resolves into.
 “ And then, I suppose, the Answer is very
 “ easy, and we need not go to the utmost
 “ Limits of the World to enable us to resolve
 “ the Riddle. - - -

“ I cannot but smile to observe how grossly
 “ we are imposed upon by Words standing for
 “ abstract Ideas, for want of considering how,
 “ and upon what Occasions, these abstract
 “ Ideas were invented for the Help of weak
 “ and narrow Conceptions, and have been used
 “ so long till they are thought to stand for real
 “ Things. ----- I forgot to add, that we find
 “ much the same Case with respect to the *Di-*
 “ *visibility* of Extension, as in regard to the
 “ other. For when we have mentally divided
 “ our imaginary Space into 10, 20, or 30
 “ parts, we are not in the least hinder'd from
 “ dividing and subdividing every part, as
 “ often and as long as we please. For by this
 “ Artifice of the Mind, *Divisibility* is brought
 “ under *Addition*, and there is no End of that.
 “ We can always be adding to the number of
 “ divisible parts one way, as well as to en-
 “ larged parts the other. They are both but
 “ the same work of the Mind. And hence
 “ come many notable demonstrations of the

“ *Divisibility* of *Extension* (and sometimes,
 “ *Matter*) in infinitum: the English of all
 “ which is no more than this, that whenever
 “ we begin to add, we know not when to
 “ have done, because its nothing else but do-
 “ ing the same over and over again, and we
 “ do not lose, but rather improve, our Facul-
 “ ties by the Exercise of them
 “ To conclude this Point: I hope it suffi-
 “ ciently appears that the Power the Mind has
 “ of *adding* and *repeating* does abundantly
 “ account for our not being able to set bounds
 “ to *Ideal Extension*, any more than to *Number*,
 “ in the abstract, or to *Divisibility*, all arising
 “ from one and the same Principle, and owing
 “ to the same Cause.”

“ This, I think, is a solid and ample confuta-
 “ tion of the Argument drawn from the Idea of
 “ *Space* and its imaginary *infinity*. We shall only
 “ add a Word or two to shew that *Duration*, as
 “ well as *Space*, *Number*, and all *Quantity*; any
 “ thing which can be considered only by way of
 “ parts, or in succession; is absolutely repugnant
 “ to, or incapable of, true positive infinity in
 “ any respect. Now by a positive, or *Metaphy-*
 “ *sical*, *Infinite* we always mean that which is ab-
 “ solutely *Perfect* in its kind, which cannot ad-
 “ mit of *Addition*, or *Increase*. 'Tis an Idea of a
 “ certain Quality in the *Abstract*, which has no
 “ mixture of the contrary Quality in it, no *fail-*
 “ *ure* or *defect*: and which therefore is our *Stan-*
 “ *dard* to which we always refer, and by which
 “ we try, all imperfections, all mix'd or finite
 “ Qualities, which are for this reason called im-
 “ perfect, because they fall short of our original
 “ Standard, and are properly *negations* of it:
 “ Consequently our Idea of *Perfection* must be a
 “ positive one, and prior to that of *Imperfection*;
 “ as will appear from *Cudworth* cited in *Xe*,
 “ where the Reader may find a full account of
 “ this positive Infinity, and how we get the Idea
 “ of it, and are able to distinguish it from that
 “ negative one explain'd by Mr. *Locke*, which is
 “ frequently confounded with it.

“ To return. If then a *Metaphysical Infinite*
 “ means *perfect*, or *that to which nothing can be*
 “ *added*, 'tis plain that *Duration*, *Number*, and
 “ all

purpose whether it be or no: yet we cannot without offering Violence

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All Quantity, the very Nature and Idea of which includes perpetual *Increaseableness* or *Addibility*, must be essentially incapable of this absolute or positive Infinity, in like manner as *Cudworth* has shewn of Space and Body in the Passage refer'd to above. Farther, if we attend to the Notion of an *Infinite Series*, and take a view of the manifold Absurdities which accompany it, in any manner of conception (from which absurdities we draw our only Proof of a *first Cause*, or *God*) we shall be necessarily led to exclude from Infinity all such things as exist *Serialim*, or must be conceiv'd as consisting in, and compos'd of, *successive parts*, i. e. such as *Duration*, *Number*, *Space*, *Motion*, *Magnitude*, &c. all which, when said to be infinite, are nothing but so many *infinite Series*, and therefore liable to the same absurdities; as the abovemention'd Author has demonstrated of them altogether. *Intell. System*, p. 643, &c. and of *Motion* in particular, p. 843. The same is shewn of *Duration* or *Time*, by *Dr. Bentley*, *Boyle's Lect. Sermon* 3. p. 104, 105, 5th Edit. Where speaking of *Infinite Generations* of Men supposed to be *already past* (and the Argument is the very same in *Years* or *Ages*) "Whatsoever, says he, is now past, was once actually present; so that each of those infinite Generations, was once in its turn actually present, therefore all except one Generation were once future; and not in being, which destroys the very Supposition: For either that one Generation must itself have been infinite, which is nonsense; or it was the finite beginning of infinite Generations, between itself and us, that is, infinity terminated at both ends, which is nonsense as before. Again, Infinite past Generations of Men have been once actually present, there may be some one man, suppose then, that was at infinite distance from us now, therefore that man's son likewise, 40 years younger, suppose, than his father, was either at infinite distance from us, or at finite: if that Son too was at infinite distance from us, then one infinite is longer by 40 years than another; which is absurd: if at finite, then 40 years

" added to finite makes it infinite, which is as absurd as the other. "

These and a great many more Arguments of the same kind occur in *Sir M. Hale's* Primitive Origination of Mankind, § 1. c. 4. and *Stillingfleet's* Origines Sacrae, B. 3. C. 1. prop. 7, 8. See also the Confutation of an Infinite Series of successive Beings in the beginning of N. 18. and *Xb.* (How this Reasoning is consistent with the Eternity of God, and what the true meaning of that Attribute is, see N. 18. *X. c.* or *Dr. Bentley's* 3d Sermon at *Boyle's* Lecture, prop. 1. or *A. Bp King's* Sermon on Predestination, &c.) The like is shewn of *Number* and all *Quantity*, by the ingenious Author of the *Impartial Enquiry into the existence and nature of God*, p. 24, &c. " If any Number be absolutely or infinitely great, it can be for no other reason than because 'tis absolutely or in its very nature incapable of increase without an absolute contradiction. But the very nature of all Quantity infers on the contrary a necessity of the increase of its Greatness on the supposition of the least addition: For since no Quantity is more or less such, or possesses more or less of the nature of Quantity, than another, it follows, that all Quantities being of the same general Nature must severally bear a proportion to each other. For example, that can be no Unit which by the addition of an Unit will not become two: and by parity of reason, that is no Million which by the addition of a single Unit will not increase to the greatness of a Million and an Unit. For if it be but a Million after the Addition of an Unit, 'tis plain it must be before that Addition have been less than a Million by an Unit. ----- The like may be said of all other Quantities. p. 25. "

The Learned *Dr. Clarke* endeavours to evade all these Arguments about *Parts*, &c. by denying that any Number of *Years*, *Days*, and *Hours*; or of *Miles*, *Yards*, or *Feet*, &c. can be consider'd as any *aliquot*, or *convenient parts* of infinite *Time* or *Space*, or be compared at all with it, or bear any kind

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lence to our Understandings, deny but that the *conception* of *Space* is distinct from the conception of *Matter*.

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“ of proportion to it; or be the foundation of
 “ any Argument in any Question concerning
 “ it.” *Demonstr. of the Divine Attr.* p. 37,
 38. 5th Edit. But does not this look some-
 thing like avoiding one great difficulty by
 admitting a greater? For how do we come
 at our confus'd Idea of infinite Quantity but by
 first having a clear Idea of some certain part of
 that Quantity, in *Space*, For instance, of such
 a stated Length, as a *Foot*; in *Time*, of an *Hour*,
&c. and then by doubling, trebling, or any
 way multiplying, that same Idea as long as we
 please, and still findin^g as much room for, or
 possibility of, multiplying it as we did when
 we began: “After the utmost enlargement of
 “ that Idea we can possibly make, we find
 “ no more reason to stop, nor are one Jot
 “ nearer the End of such enlargement, than
 “ we were when we first set out. *Locke B. 2.*
 c. 17. § 3. But does this Idea of Infinite
 (which seems to be the only one the Doctor
 ever thought of) when applied to *Time* or *Space*,
 alter the very nature, essence, and idea of that
Time and *Space*? Don't we still consider it as
 an *infinity* of the same *Time* and *Space*; or as
 consisting in a continual *addibility* of such por-
 tions of *Time* and *Space*; or as a *Whole* (if
 that word did not imply *limitation*) made up of
 numberless such parts of *time* and *space* as are
 of the same kind with these hours and feet?
 To say that infinite *Space* has no parts, is (as
Leibnitz urges in his fourth Letter to *Dr. Clarke*
 N^o. 11. p. 99.) “ to say that it does not consist
 “ of finite Spaces; and that infinite *Space*
 “ might subsist, tho' all finite spaces should be
 “ reduced to nothing. It is as if one should
 “ say, in the Cartesian supposition of a mate-
 “ rial, extended, Unlimited World, that
 “ such a World might subsist, tho' all the Bo-
 “ dies of which it consists, should be reduced
 “ to nothing.” 'Tis therefore impossible to
 conceive, that hours and feet, &c. should not
 be *aliquot parts* of infinite *Time* and *space*, and
 that these parts should not bear some kind of
 Proportion to this *Infinity*. These parts in-
 deed will never reach our *positive absolute Infi-*

nity (i. e. that to which nothing can possibly
 be added) because they include a perpetual ad-
 dibility, as we observ'd, which is call'd their
Infinity, and which is a direct contradiction to
 what we call a positive *Infinite*: And therefore
 positive *Infinity* apply'd to them is very wrong
 apply'd, and a positive infinity of *Matter*, num-
 ber, time, space, any quantity or quality that
 consists of parts, or must be consider'd in suc-
 cession, i. e. to which this negative infinite, and
 this only, is and must be apply'd, are all con-
 tradictions. Now instead of answering this
 Argument against the absolute *Infinity* of *Time*
 and *Space*, *Dr. Clarke* first of all *supposes* that
time and *space* are absolutely infinite, and then
 because, according to this our way of conceiv-
 ing infinity, (which yet is the only way we
 have of conceiving it in these things) they
 could not possibly be infinite: He argues that
 we must not consider them in this way, namely
 as if their *parts* had any relation at all to their
Infinity. But should not the Argument rather
 be revers'd, and the consequence of it stand
 thus? This is our only way of conceiving any
 infinite applicable to these Things, but this way
 we cannot conceive these to be positively infi-
 nite (or positive *Infinity* cannot be apply'd to
 these) without a contradiction; therefore we
 cannot at all conceive these to be positively
 Infinite without a contradiction, or therefore
 these are not positively infinite.

There is indeed a certain use of the term in-
 finite among Mathematicians, where this rea-
 soning of *Dr. Clarke's* might be admitted, but
 that is only where they consider Quantities, re-
 latively, and not absolutely, and therefore that
 can have no place where we are considering
 real Existences. Thus when Geometricians
 say that one Quantity is infinitely less than a-
 nother, they mean that their infinitely small
 Quantity is no aliquot part of, bears no pro-
 portion to, or cannot be compared with the
 other; but proportion is (nothing real but)
 purely relative, and therefore the term infinite
 apply'd here must be so too. Thus for instance,
 the Angle of Contact made by a Curve and its
 Tangent

S E C T. II.

Of the Enquiry after the First Cause.

I. Supposing these three, *viz.* *Motion*, *Matter*, and *Space*, we are in the next place to examine whether they be of themselves, or of something else? If of themselves, the thing is done, and we are to enquire no farther about it. For those things that exist by *Nature* are causes of *Existence* to themselves, *i. e.* do not stand in need of any *external cause*; if they depend on something else, there will be a question about that also, what it is, and what are its properties.

An enquiry concerning Motion, Matter, and Space; whether they exist of themselves.

II. We must presume that all our conceptions of simple Objects without us are true, that is, represent the things as God would have them known to us, except we elsewhere discover some *Fallacy* or *Prejudice* adhering to them. (6) For we can judge of things no otherwise than from our Conceptions. Nor are we to seek for any other (B.)

We are to form our Judgment of things whether they exist of themselves, or require a Cause, from our simple Conceptions when there is no ground to suspect a Fallacy.

Criterion

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Tangent is infinitely less than any rectilinear Angle, *i. e.* bears no proportion to it, is no measure of it, or cannot any ways be compared with it. --- If this were not the sense of Mathematicians here, I cannot see how there could be a difference of Infinites amongst them, but 'tis well known that they have infinitely little quantities, which yet are infinitely great ones, *i. e.* with respect to other Quantities: And thus they may have an infinite succession of increasing quantities, every one of which shall be infinitely greater than the other that is lower in the series: * But all this is nothing to absolute Metaphysical Infinite which cannot be consider'd in that manner, and therefore what relates to the former infinites cannot be the foundation of any Argument concerning this. The equivocal use of the word Infinite in these different senses by jumbling Mathematics and Metaphysics together, has, I believe, occasion'd most of the Confusion attending Subjects of this kind.

(6.) Thus in *Sight* we find the *shape* and *size* of a visible object are very much varied upon us according to its distance, and the situation of the place from whence the prospect is taken. When the Picture of Objects being prick'd out by the *Pencils of rays* upon the *Retina* of the *Eye* do not give the true Figure of those Objects (as they not always do, being diversely projected, as the *Lines* proceeding from the several points happen to fall upon that *concave surface*) this, tho' it might impose upon a Being that has no faculty *superior to sense*, does not impose upon our *Reason*, which knows *how* the appearance is alter'd, and *why*. Reason may be apply'd to over-rule and correct sense in this and the like cases. *Wollaston Rel. Nat. delin.* p. 54. &c. see more impositions of this kind in *Locke's Essay*, B. 2. C. 9. §. 8, 9.

(B.) They who look for any other Criterion of Truth or Certainty lose their Labour; they who say that a *Clear, distinct, or determinate Idea* is the Criterion, are never the higher, for the

Question:

* Vid. *Newton Princ. Math.* L. 1. §. 1. *Keil Introd. ad ver. Phys.* §. 3. and *Hayes's Fluxions ad Princip.*

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

Criterion of Truth than that a Conception of any thing offered to the Mind

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Question returns, *viz.* by what Criterion are we certain that this Idea is clear, *distinct* or *determinate*, or that this is to be look'd upon as the Criterion; and so on in *infinitum*: we must therefore stop somewhere, and determine of the *Intellect*, as of the *senses*, that an Object by its presence, according as it is represented to the *Mind*, whether it be *clear*, or *obscure*, *distinct* or *confused*; whether it be *determinate* or *indeterminate*, effectually determines that to exert the act it should exert, and that there is no need of any Criterion. For instance, if any one would be certain whether the Sun shines, whether the Light be clear, or obscure, he need use no other Criterion beside his *Eyes*, let him open them, and whether he will or no, he'll perceive whether it shines or not, and also what that Light is, nor can he otherwise avoid perceiving this, and being certain of it, than by shutting or turning away his *Eyes*. The same Method is to be observed in *Intellectuals*. Let him that wants to know whether any Proposition be true or false, apply it to his *Mind*, with the Reasons which prove or disprove it (if there need any Reasons) and he'll be forc'd whether he will or no, to *assent* or *dissent*, or *suspend* his assent, according as the Condition of the object requires; nor can he avoid passing his Judgment but by diverting his *Intellect*. For since *perception* of Objects is an Act of the *Mind* itself, and *clearness* or *obscurity*, *determinateness* or *undeterminateness*, are *modes* or *affections* of this Act of *conceiving* Objects, not of the *Objects* themselves, we can judge of the Acts of our *Minds* and their affections no otherwise than from the *Sense* and *Indication* of the *Mind* itself. For as by a power of the *Mind* we are conscious that we *perceive* a thing, so by the very same power we are no less conscious whether we perceive the thing *obscurely* or *clearly*, *determinately* or *undeterminately*.

Nor do they come off better who put the *Agreement* or *Disagreement* of *Ideas* for a Criterion; nay worse, for they think to dispatch a matter of the greatest Consequence by a *Metaphor*, which is unworthy of Philosophers. Nor

yet do they attain their End; for the Question recurs as before, by what Criterion are they assur'd of the *Agreement* or *Disagreement* of *Ideas*, or whence did they learn the Truth of this proportion, *viz.* That this is the Criterion of Truth? If they say, 'tis evident to the *Mind* of itself, and needs no other Criterion, why are not other Truths after the same manner discovered without a Criterion? Setting aside *Criteria* therefore, we must necessarily attend to the *Conceptions* themselves, and in all things follow the *Guidance* of our *Mind*. For it will as certainly embrace Truth duly offer'd to it, as Fire will consume combustible Matter: And there's no more necessity for a Criterion for the *Understanding* to distinguish Truth from Falseness, than for the Fire to distinguish between combustible and incombustible Matter: Apply an Object, and the thing will be done of itself. A Person may reply, that there is something in the combustible Matter which fits it for the reception of the Flame, namely *sulphur*, or something of that nature; after the same manner also there is something in things whereby they are naturally fitted to determine the Assent of *Understanding*, and this is the *Agreement* or *Conformity* of *Ideas*, which therefore discovers the Truth, and is the Criterion by which the *Understanding* is determined. I answer, all Logicians (as far as I remember) used to found *Affirmation* in the *Agreement*, *Negation* in the *Disagreement* of the *Terms* between themselves, and *Illation*, in their *Agreement* in the same third. But since this *Conformity* or *Agreement* of the *Terms* may be either *real* or *apparent*, here is the proper place and use of a *Criterion*, namely to distinguish the *apparent* from the *real*: For a verbal affirmation of the agreement between the *Terms*, when the *Mind* perceives none, is a *lie*; when 'tis only apparent, an *Error*; but in both a *Falsity*.

If any one can produce any other Criterion to distinguish this apparent conformity, or disagreement, from the real, beside the application and attention of the *Mind*, he might be thought to have discover'd something truly useful to Mankind;

Mind forcibly extorts assent; as there is no other Criterion of Objects perceived by the Senses, than that an Object, by its presence forces us to perceive it even against our Wills. If therefore the Conceptions

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Mankind; but instead of that to put upon us the very Agreement or disagreement of Ideas, is to lay down the thing itself as done, about which the Query is how it can be done? For that is what we enquire after, *i. e.* how we may be certain that we are not deceiv'd in taking *apparent* Conformity for real. I know, there is a certain Art of proposing Truths to the Understanding by which it may more easily perceive and judge whether they really agree or no; as there is an art of placing the Fuel so as to take Fire more readily, but this is nothing to the Criterion of Truth; nay it proves that there is none other beside the Mind duely apply'd.

'Tis to be observ'd also that the Antients placed *Affirmation* in the Agreement of the *Terms*, much more properly than the Moderns do in the Agreement of *Ideas*: For as we have shewn before, * we know several Truths of things whereof we have properly no Ideas; unless they will abuse the Word *Idea* contrary to common use, and the sense of Antiquity. For according to *Plato*, who seems to have been the first that introduced *Ideas* into Philosophy, Knowledge by Ideas is peculiar to God, who alone perceives things immediately by their Essences: But we (as was shewn before, †) by *Marks* and *Characters*, which whether they be impress'd on the Mind by immediate sensation from the Things themselves, or collected from the similitude, proportion, or relation to the Things which are perceived by the Senses, cannot more properly be call'd the Ideas of Things, than the very Words can: For they are often no more like the Essences of things, nor is it necessary that they should; since they sufficiently answer the ends for which Knowledge was given us, if they distinguish things from one another and discover their Uses.

And in reality this seems to be the only difference between *Words* and these *Marks*, that

we connect Sounds with the things by voluntary imposition, but the *sensations* of the Mind, which are the *Marks* whereby the Understanding distinguishes things from each other, are join'd by Nature to the Presence of them. 'Tis from Institution, for Instance, that we call a Body from which Light is diffus'd, the Sun: But nature imprints the sensation of Light, and a Globe of two Foot upon the presence of it, which are the marks from whence the Mind reasons about it, and perhaps resemble its Essence no more than that very sound of the Word Sun does.

'Tis to be observ'd farther, that these *Marks* are produced in us at various times, and by different Faculties, and sometimes have no manner of connection with each other. When this happens, we are in doubt whether they belong to the same thing: sometimes also they are equivocal, and belong to more things, and then we enquire whether the things with which they are connected be different. That we be not impos'd upon by these, there's need of *Enquiry*, *Attention*, *Observation* and *Re-search*: By application to these, the Understanding discovers Truth, and embraces it when discover'd, without any Criterion, beside the Power implanted in it by Nature, whereby 'tis naturally adapted to perceive the Truth duely proposed (as the Sight does Colours, a Taste favours) and to distinguish, by Marks, the real from the apparent Congruity of Things. (7)

(7) Tho' our *Author* seems to have been arguing strenuously against *Locke* in most of this Note; yet the whole, I think, is a dispute only about Words, and will come to the very same thing, whether we take his, or *Locke's* Account of it. Our *Author* says, a Conception offer'd to the Mind forces its assent, without any other Criterion of its reality or conformity to the Thing. *Locke* tells us, that Truth, or Certainty, consists entirely in the Con-

* Note A:

† Note A.

tions which we have of these three before mention'd, represent them to us as existing *necessarily*, so that they cannot be separated from Existence (C.) even in Thought, we must affirm that these exist of *themselves*,

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Connection, Relation or Agreement of our Ideas, of which connection, &c. we have no other evidence than the real perception of it by the Mind. Our *Author* affirms, that the Application or Attention of the Mind is sufficient to distinguish Truth from Falshood. *Locke* says, a clear perception of the Mind is all that is required to that end. Our *Author* tells us, in the last place, that Truth or Affirmation was much better placed in an agreement of *Terms, Marks, or Characters*, than of *Ideas*. *Locke* distinguishes Truth into *Verbal* (which is the conformity of Ideas to the Terms) and *Mental* (which is the conformity of Ideas to each other) and *Metaphysical*, or *real*, (which is their conformity to the real existence of things) of which last kind of Truth we have no Criterion, so that there seems to be no other difference between these two Authors, than what lies in the different use of the Word Idea (as was above mentioned in the Notes 3 and 4.) which, according to the Latitude 'tis usually taken in by Mr. *Locke* and his Followers, comprehends all our Author's *Marks, Characters, Sensations, and Conceptions, &c.* For a more compleat answer to that old Question, *What is the General Criterion of Truth?* see Mr. *Watts's* Logic, P. 2. c. 2. §. 7. p. 173, 174. 2d. Edit.

(C.) This way of Reasoning is different from that of *Des Cartes*: for he applies this Argument to Complex Ideas made by the Mind out of simple ones, but this proceeds upon simple ones only. The ground of the difference lies in this, the Mind may erroneously join such things together as neither are nor can be join'd in nature: for example, the most perfect Being is made up of a Collection of all the Perfections which the Mind has observ'd dispersed all over Nature: But whether such a Collection does really exist any where may well be question'd; (8.) nor can it be proved from that very collection or *Idea*, which is a Work of the Mind alone. But the case is different in a simple Idea produced by the Object itself.

For since this comes not from elsewhere, we cannot attribute any other manner of Existence to it than that which it brings along with it into the Mind.

When I think of a Man present, I cannot but believe that he exists, *i. e.* I attribute *actual Existence* to him; but that he will exist for the future, I perceive, may either be or not be, *i. e.* I assign him *possible Existence*; but if there be any thing, which, from the Idea that I have of it, I cannot consider otherwise than as *existing*, I am as certain that it does always exist, as that the Man exists when I see him. For, the reason why I believe the Man that is present to exist, is, because I cannot even in my Mind conceive him not to exist, while I perceive that he is present. If therefore there be any thing which I cannot so much as conceive in my Mind not to have existed, or not to exist for the future, 'tis manifest that I believe this to have existed always, for the very same reason that I believe the Man to exist who is now present.

Now it is to be observed, that something must exist of itself and include *necessary Existence* in its Nature; in the next place we enquire what that is; nor can it be determin'd otherwise, than by the conceptions which we have of things: If any thing which we know to exist, implies Existence in its very notion, and cannot mentally be separated from it, we must conclude, that this hath always existed, and does not require a Cause distinct from itself. But if I have any reason to suspect that, I do not see the presence of a Man, but a *Statue*, and so may be mistaken; I find this is possible, and in that case would not attribute *actual Existence* to it without Examination. So if there be any reason why I cannot conceive a thing not to have existed, or not to exist for the future, tho' in reality it once did not exist, and perhaps does not now; in this case I may suspect myself to be mistaken, and to attribute necessary Existence to it from an erroneous Conception.

selves, and require no Cause of their Existence. But if we can conceive these once not to have been, to have begun to be, or to be capable of Annihilation, 'tis plain that *Necessary Existence* belongs not to them, nor are they of themselves, they must therefore have their Being from

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It must be confess'd, this Suspicion is stronger in *Complex Ideas* form'd by the Mind, than in those *simple* ones that are produced in it by the very Objects themselves, and without its assistance; yet it may have place in both, as may be seen below. Care also must be taken, that we do not rob things of their existence rashly, and without Examination; for who doubts but we may be mistaken in separating Existence from, as well as attributing it to, them. But if, after due Attention, we plainly find that our Conceptions of certain things do not attribute necessary Existence to them, we must conclude, that we are either mistaken in every thing, or not mistaken here. If then we find that neither the Idea of *Motion*, nor of *Matter*, includes Existence in itself, nor is connected with it; nay, if after our greatest diligence and enquiry, they appear plainly separable, it is as certain that *Matter* and *Motion* do not exist of themselves, as any thing can be: For nothing is otherwise certain than from the conceptions which we have of every thing.

It may be objected, that there are some who doubt of, some who deny, the Being of a God; we cannot therefore conclude, because we may conceive something not to exist, that Existence is not included in its nature; For, by this Means, not only *Space* and *Matter*, but also God himself, would not be *self-existent*, since we see some bereaving him of his Existence, *i.e.* conceiving him not to exist, whereas he necessarily must be *self-existent*: 'Tis not a right Conclusion therefore, that *Space*, &c. do not exist of themselves, because we can in our Minds separate Existence from them.

There are, I own, who deny the Being of a God, (for what is there so absurd that some may not imagine;) but in the interim, that they really believe him not to exist, I very much doubt. However, supposing God to have existence, there are none but do acknow-

ledge that he exists necessarily; nor do any seek for a cause of his Existence: all see that 'tis of such a nature as excludes a Cause.

But in *Space*, *Matter*, and *Motion*, 'tis quite another thing; almost all Men grant that these do now exist, yet these same Men own that they may not exist; which cannot be said of God, if He be but granted to exist. Why can I, mentally at least, deprive *Space*, &c. which are conceiv'd actually to exist, of their Existence, and consider them for the future as non-existent, but cannot separate the Idea of God from Existence even in thought, if I once grant that he does exist? There's certainly no other reason, but that the *Divine Nature* includes Existence in itself; whereas the nature of *Space*, *Matter* and *Motion* does not.

For 'tis to be observ'd, that we are no farther solicitous about the Cause of things, than as the nature of them appears to be such as must require a Cause: We enquire, for instance, from whence the *Tide*, and *Saltiness* of the Sea proceed, and search for the causes of them: But why do we suspect that these really have a Cause? Is it because we observe the Sea sometimes toss'd with the *Tide*, or *Salt*; and sometimes still, or sweet? Nothing like it: For, who ever saw the Sea perfectly still, or sweet, so as from thence to raise a doubt about the Cause? Why then don't we rest without enquiring after Causes, persuaded that things have always been as they are, and that those which are Eternal require no Cause? Whence is it, that the Mind does not at all acquiesce in this, nor is any one so stupid, as to be moved by it to lay aside the Search of Causes? Is it not from hence that the Mind remonstrates against it, and declares to us, even against our Wills, that the *Tide*, or *Saltiness* of the Sea, is not essential to it? Nor does it otherwise distinguish whether an *Affection*, *Mode*, or *Quality*, be extrinsic to the thing, or require a Cause

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something else. For, since they may either exist, or not exist, Existence is not of their Nature, and if it be not of their Nature they must have it from without; and there wants a Cause by which the Indifference,

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Cause, than as this is not included in the Essence of that thing in which it happens to inhere. This appears plainly enough from hence, that it troubles not itself about the Sea's being extended, since it sees that is essential to it, but is in the interim solicitous why it is Salt; for no other reason, but because it can conceive that it may be either salt, or sweet.

The same must be said of *Matter*, and its *Affections* or *Modes*. If any things be contain'd in the conception of its Nature, or have a necessary connection with it, our Mind enquires not after their Cause, but acquiesces as soon as ever it perceives that necessity or connection: but it seeks solicitously after the Causes of others, and rests not till it has found them. For Example, when it thinks of the Existence or Mobility of Matter it looks for no Causes of them, for it perceives that these are included in the nature of it, or flow necessarily from it; But it demands a Cause of its Existence, Fluidity and Motion, for it judges these to be as foreign to *Matter*, as the Tide and Saltness are to the Sea.

And if any say these have been always so, and therefore require no Cause, he'll appear to talk no less absurdly, than he that should say the same of the Tide and Saltness of the Sea; nor will he satisfy our Thoughts any better: For whether the Tide and Saltness be supposed eternal or temporary, since they proceed not from the very nature of the Sea, they must necessarily have a Cause, if we will believe our own Minds. After the same Manner, whether the Existence, Motion and Fluidity of Matter be supposed eternal or temporary, since they are not included in its Nature, nor flow necessarily from it, any more than the Tide and Saltness of the Sea do from its Nature, 'tis equally necessary that they have a Cause. Either all Enquiry into the Causes of things is entirely to be rejected, or to be admitted in these. Either we must imagine that nothing has any Cause, or grant that these require one: For, 'tis unreasonable to expect a Cause in some particular

things, and to pronounce it unnecessary in others, which are exactly alike.

I know, some think that these things come by Nature, and that we must seek for no other Cause beside it, and I think they say true: All these come by Nature, but by the Nature of what? Let them tell us. Not by their own; Not by the Nature of Space, or Matter; for they have no necessary connection with these, nor are included in them. We must therefore suppose another Nature from whence they proceed and derive their Origin.

Hence it appears, that if we will trust our own Thoughts, and follow their direction, we are no less certain of a Cause distinct from Matter and Space, which gave Existence and particular Qualities to each of them, than that the Tide and Saltness of the Sea must have another Cause beside the Sea itself. Nay, we must either change our whole Method and procedure of investigating causes, or admit a Cause of these, which Cause can be no other than God himself, in whose Nature the causality of all things is contain'd. (9.)

(8.) That is, might be question'd, if there were no better proof of its Existence than that Conception only. However, this Notion has been very much insisted on, both by the *Cartesian* and several of our own Philosophers, who were not willing to part with any one Argument which seem'd to have the least tendency towards the support of so good a Cause. The Sum of their Argumentation seems to be this. We can have no Idea of anything, but what has either an *actual* or a *possible* Existence; but we have an Idea of God, *i. e.* of a Being of Infinite Perfections, which might possibly exist; therefore he must have an actual Existence: For actual Existence is a degree of Perfection, and the foremention'd Idea, according to the Supposition, includes all possible Perfection, therefore it must include that, otherwise we should have an Idea of something absolutely perfect without one possible Degree of Perfection, which is a contradiction in terms.

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rence or Possibility of Existence, or non-existence, may be determin'd. Nor do we judge a Cause in things to be otherwise necessary than as they are in their own Nature *indifferent*, that is, *passive*, in regard to Existence. For, if our Conceptions represent something to us as necessary in its own nature, we enquire no farther about the Cause whereby it exists.

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But this is all begging the Question. For it is not the bare possibility of *supposing* it to have all possible perfections that infers its *actual existence*, but the *proving* it to have them. Indeed if we suppose it to have all possible perfections, we must at the same time necessarily suppose it to exist, since Existence is a possible perfection; otherwise we should suppose it to have all possible perfections, and yet to want one, which is a Contradiction. But still this is only an Existence, *ex Hypothesi*, a true consequence from doubtful premises, and which will as easily follow from the supposal of its having but any *One* perfection, since that must necessarily imply existence. The certainty then of such actual existence, does by no means follow from the supposed *possibility* of it, as these Men would be understood: This Conclusion will never hold good; what cannot be supposed without a Contradiction certainly does not *exist*, therefore what can be supposed without a Contradiction certainly *does*.

Others endeavour to prove the *existence* of God from our *Idea* of him after this manner. Whatever we have an *Idea* of, that either *is*, or if it be not, it is *possible* for it to be; but we have an *Idea* of an *Eternal* and *necessarily Existent Being*; therefore such a Being either *is*, or it is *possible* for it to be. But if such a Being either now *is not*, or once *was not*, or ever will *not actually be*, it would not be *possible* for it to be at all (except it could make itself, or be made by Nothing) contrary to the *former* part of the Supposition; nor would it be either *Eternal* or *necessarily Existent*, contrary to the latter. Therefore such a Being now *is*, and always was, and ever will be.-----Or, shorter, thus: Our *Idea* of God is an *Idea* of something which implies no contradiction, and therefore

such a Being may *possibly be*: and therefore he *must actually be*, or else he *could not possibly be*, which is contrary to the Hypothesis. Now to make this and the like Argument of any force, it must be clearly prov'd, that we have such an *Idea* of a *necessarily Existent Being*, as will infer its actual existence; (which may perhaps appear to be something doubtful from Note 14.) and also, that this *Idea* is *strictly innate* or *connate* with us, and consequently capable of being urged *a Priori*, for a Proof of the Existence of some Being correspondent to such an *Idea* (which is now generally given up) For if this *Idea* be only gathered *a posteriori*, viz. by a deduction of Arguments from our own Existence, then it is only a Consequence of these Arguments, and cannot of itself be alledg'd as a distinct one. For how can any *Idea* consequent upon some certain proofs of something *a Posteriori*, be an antecedent, independent proof of the same thing *a Priori*? Besides, either these arguments are enough to convince any Man of the Existence and Perfections of God, or they are not; if they *are*, this is *unnecessary*; if they *are not*, this is *insufficient*; nay, it is *none at all*, since 'tis a bare consequence of these, and entirely *founded* in them, and therefore must stand or fall with them. But there is no occasion for this or any such *Quibble*, a *Priori*, in order to demonstrate the Being and Attributes of God, since numberless irrefragable Arguments occur, *a posteriori*, and such as are obvious to all capacities. [For a particular Deduction of the Divine Attributes, see N. 18. Those that have a Mind to be farther acquainted with the proofs of a Deity drawn from the *Idea*, may find the Question fully discuss'd in *Cudworth*, p. 721, &c. or, in *Fiddes's Theol. Spec.* B. 1. P. 1. C. 9. or, in the impar-

tial

'Tis prov'd
that *Motion*
requires a
Cause, tho' it
be suppos'd
eternal, and
that Matter is
not the Cause
of it.

III. If we apply this to our Conceptions of the Things in Question, it will appear whether they be self-existent, or require a Cause. In the first place, let us examine *Motion*, which is really *Action*, but in all Action it is necessary, if we may trust our thoughts, that there be an *Agent* and a *Patient*, without these we have no Notion of Action. In *Motion* therefore, since that is Action, there is required an *Agent* and a *Patient*. We have indeed the *Patient*, namely Matter; we must
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tial Enquiry into the Existence, &c. of God, B. 2. P. 1.]

(9.) What our Author has been endeavouring to prove in all this Note, is, That we cannot apprehend either *Matter* or *Motion* (and he will shew the same by and by of *Space*) to be independent or self-existent, and consequently that they require some cause of their Existence distinct from and antecedent to themselves: And tho' he frequently makes use of that confused equivocal Term, *necessary Existence*, yet he seems to apply it only in a negative sense for *Self-Existence*, or *Existence without a Cause*, as appears from the latter end of the second and sixth paragraphs of this Section, and which is as much as his Argument requires. For, where any thing appears to be an effect, as Matter and Motion do, we must require a Cause; where no such *Causedness* can be discovered, we call the Thing *Self-existent*, tho' perhaps it really be not so, but did proceed from something else; and where an absurdity would follow from supposing any Being not to have existed once, or not to exist for the future, we say there's a *necessity* for supposing that it did and will always exist: or we stile that Being *necessarily Existent*: which is perhaps as far as we can go. But as these Words, *Necessary*, *Necessity*, &c. seem to have been taken to denote some *positive*, *extrinsic Principle* of Existence; and which accordingly is often stiled *antecedent*, *absolute*, *original Necessity*, a *Necessity simple*, and *uniform*, and *absolutely such in its own nature, in itself*, &c. It may be of some use to consider the several Things to which these Terms are apply'd, and what Ideas we fix to them; which may perhaps convince us that they are all merely *relative*.

Necessity is chiefly and perhaps primarily apply'd to *Means*: and when it is thus apply'd, it evidently has *Relation* to some *End* to be attain'd by those *Means* of which its affirm'd. Thus, when we say such a thing is necessary, we mean, that some *End* cannot be attain'd without the Existence of that thing. Thus Religion is *necessary* to a Rational Creature, or more properly, to the Happiness of a Rational Creature, *i. e.* a Rational Creature cannot attain Happiness, its ultimate End, without Religion. Farther, Means being a Relative Idea, whatever is affirm'd of Means *as Means*, must be Relative also; or which is much the same, must be an Affection of a Relative Idea. v. g. When we say, any Action is *Good*, *Fit*, *Right*, *Reasonable*, &c. all these terms are apply'd to it, as it is conceiv'd to be a Means to some End, and consequently are relative; therefore to call any Action *fit*, &c. *in itself*, will be the same as to affirm any thing to be *relative in itself*, which is nonsense.

Necessity is also apply'd to *Truth*, and then it has relation to some other Truths, either antecedent or consequential, according to the different manner in which that Truth is prov'd to be *necessarily true*, *i. e.* according as the Proof is direct or indirect. When the proof is direct, *i. e.* when the truth of any proposition is shewn to follow by unavoidable Consequence, from some other truth before known; then the *Necessity* of that Truth ariseth from the Relation which that Truth has to some antecedent Truth: When the proof is indirect, *i. e.* when the Truth of any Proposition is shewn, by shewing that the supposition of the contrary to that Truth, *i. e.* the Denying that Truth, would imply the Negation of, or be inconsistent with,
some

in the next place see what is the Agent: *viz.* Whether Matter produces Motion in itself; or (to speak properly) Whether Motion be coeval with it, natural, and necessarily adhering to its Essence, as Figure is to Body. But if we remember what was laid down above † and carefully examine the Sentiments and Conceptions of our Mind, it will appear that the nature of Matter (as far as we know of it) is indifferent to *Motion*, or *Rest*, and moves not except it be moved.

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some other known Truth; then the *Necessity* of that Truth arises from the Relation which that Truth has to some consequential Truth. *Necessity* is also apply'd to Axioms; and then it has Relation to the terms themselves, *i. e.* it arises from the Relation which is between the terms themselves; and means, that supposing or laying down those Terms, that Relation or Connection between them cannot but be. Farther, the same may be said of *Truth*, as of *Means*, Truth being relative also; consequently such Phrases as these, *true*, or *false in itself*, a *contradiction in itself*; or *absolutely such*, &c. are very absurd ones.

Necessity is also apply'd to Existence, and then it arises either from the relation, which the Existence of that thing of which it is affirm'd has to the Existence of other things; or it arises from the relation which the Existence of that thing, of which it is affirm'd has to the *Manner of its own Existence*. In the former Signification, when Necessity of Existence has Relation to the Existence of other things, it denotes, that the Supposition of the Non-existence of that thing of which Necessity is affirm'd, implies the non-existence of things which we know to exist. Thus some Independent Being does *necessarily Exist*. Because to suppose no independent Being implies that there are no *Dependent Beings*; the contrary of which we know to be true, so that Necessity of Existence, in this Sense, is nothing else but Necessity of Truth as related to Consequential Truth. And this sort of Proof is call'd, *Demonstratio a Posteriori*.

When the Necessity of Existence arises from the Relation which the Existence of any thing has to the *Manner of its own Existence*; then

Necessity means, that that thing of which it is affirm'd exists after such a Manner that it never could have not existed. Thus every *Independent Being*, or every Being existing without a Cause, is *necessarily* existing. Because such a Being, from the *very manner* of its existing, could not *begin* to exist, therefore must *always* have existed, *i. e.* does necessarily exist. For to suppose a Being to *begin* to exist, is to suppose a *Mutation*, *viz.* from Non-Entity to Entity; and to suppose a *Mutation* is to suppose a *Cause*; For if there's no Cause, every thing must continue as it was: Therefore every Being which had no *Cause* of Existence, *i. e.* which is Independent, cannot begin to exist, consequently cannot be supposed not to exist, *i. e.* is *necessarily* existent*. Whether this is *Demonstratio a priori* I leave to be determin'd by the learned. I think it is; because Necessity of Existence follows from Independency, or Existing without a Cause. No matter whether Independency is prov'd *a Posteriori*, or *a Priori*.

N. B. Necessity, as apply'd to Existence in these two ways, must carefully be distinguished. For tho' an Independent Being cannot be necessarily existent in the former Sense, without being so in the latter also: yet it may be necessarily existent in the latter Sense, without being so in the former. There may be two or more necessarily existent Beings in the latter Sense, though in the former there can be but one necessarily existent Being: which shews the inconclusiveness of Dr. Clarke's seventh proposition: And upon the whole, I think we may be convinc'd, that no Ideas can possibly be fix'd to this Proposition, *Necessity absolute in itself*. [See also the Notes 14, and 18.]

† In the Author's last Note.

* See Note 14.

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ved. Motion therefore does not follow from its nature, nor is it contain'd in its Essence, nor do we conceive it to arise from thence; Matter is therefore merely passive in regard to Motion, and an Agent must be sought elsewhere. If you say it has been in Motion from Eternity, you'll be never the nearer; for Duration alters not the nature of things. If it has been mov'd from Eternity, it has had an eternal Cause, and since Matter is only passive with respect to the Motion which is in it, if it was from Eternity, it was still, *passive, only*, and there wanted an eternal Agent to produce eternal Motion (10.) in it: for eternal Action cannot be more easily conceived, without an eternal Agent, than temporary, without a temporal one. But, you'll say, what is eternal, since it was never made, requires no Cause. Does it not so? Suppose the Sun to have shin'd from Eternity, and the Earth, nourished by its heat, to have undergone eternal vicissitudes of Seasons; had those vicissitudes therefore no Cause? Would they be ever the less dependent on the Sun as their Source and Original? Hence it appears that Eternity of Action does not exclude an active Cause; and it is so far from truth that such Action was never produced, because it is conceiv'd to have been from Eternity, that we must rather say it has always been produced. For, in the Instance given, it appears that the Sun did always, and from eternity, cause the change of Seasons: Not that I think the Sun really was, or could be eternal, but if Motion should be supposed eternal (which is the only subterfuge left to them that deny the necessity of an Agent, in order to the existence of Motion) the Sun might equally be eternal with its light and their effects. And if this be granted, it will plainly appear, that *Eternity of Action* does not exclude an *active Cause*. If then we follow the guidance of our thoughts, we must acknowledge

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(10.) Eternal Motion seems to be a contradiction, [See Infinite Series in N. 5. and S. C's Impartial Enquiry, c. 7. and x b.] unless we could conceive two Eternals, one before the other; as every mover must, in the order of our Ideas, necessarily operate before they moved: These things therefore which im-

ply Beginning, Change, Succession, or Increase, are finite as well as in Duration, as in any other respect, and consequently the Suppositions here and below are all impossible ones. Concerning the Equivocation which arises from using the Words *Motion* and *Action* promiscuously, as our Author seems to do, see N. 62.

ledge that there is something beside *Matter* and *Motion*, which must be the *Cause* of *Motion*.

IV. Secondly, as to *Matter* itself, if we may suppose it to have had a beginning, or to be annihilated; *necessary* Existence will manifestly not be imply'd in its Nature, for that may be taken from it, at least in thought; but a thing cannot be separated from its Nature or Essence even by the Mind: If therefore Existence were *essential* to *Matter*, it could not be divided from it even in thought, that is, we could not conceive *Matter* not to exist. But who doubts whether he can do this? Is it not as easy to conceive that *Space* which the Material World occupies to be *empty*, that is, void of *Matter*; as *full*? Cannot the Understanding assign to the Material World a beginning and an end? They who admit of *Space*, or a *Vacuum* (11.) cannot deny but

That *Matter* requires a Cause of its existence.

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11. These two Words, *Space* and *Vacuum*, tho' they ought perhaps to have both the same meaning, *i. e.* neither of them to mean any real thing or quality existing in Nature, but only a Negation of *Matter* and its Qualities, yet as the former is more evidently a positive term, it is apt to convey an Idea of something positive, and thereby leads us to frame some imagination of that something, and so at length draws into a Notion quite different from that, which the latter Word more naturally offers, and which comes nearer to the truth of the Case; and therefore I think it not quite so convenient to use these two Words promiscuously. It may be doubted whether our substituting the former of these terms for the latter, when the Ideas usually fixt to them have in reality nothing to do with one another, may not have given rise to most of the Disputes against a *Vacuum*, which have been carried on by many able Writers. *Vacuum*, in Natural Philosophy, is (according to the true import of the Word) only *Emptiness*, or absence of *Matter*, *i. e.* a Term that implies mere Negation; tho', when we come to prove that *Matter* exists not every where, or that there is really any such emptiness or absence of *Matter*, we are oblig'd, thro' the defect of Language, to

make use of positive Terms about it, *viz.* that there is a *Vacuum* in this or that place, or that there is a real foundation in Nature for supposing it, &c. Hence, probably, Metaphysicians, when they come to consider it, being us'd to contemplate real Essences, are led to understand it, as something positive; which might properly be said to be *here* and *there*, &c. Their next step is, to bring it under the *Imagination*, and so finding the Idea of *Space*, or *Extension*, in some measure connected with this Emptiness, they easily substitute one for the other, and often change the negative Idea into a positive one, and define *Vacuum* to be *Extension void of Solidity*, or *Space without Body**, Whereas the Ideas of *Vacuity* and *Extension* have no real connection with each other, as was said before, tho' they be very apt to go together. Well then, these two distinct Ideas being both included under the Word *Vacuum*, it becomes equivocal, and consequently that may be affirm'd or deny'd of it according to the one Idea, which cannot according to the other, and here's room for endless Juggle. *v. g.* It may be said that there is a real foundation in Nature for supposing a *Vacuum* in the negative sense of the Word, *i. e.* as signifying mere emptiness; but the same thing may be deny'd of it.

E

id.

* Locke, B. 2. C. 13. §. 22.

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but Matter is at least mentally separable from Existence. For Space may be conceived either full or empty; that is, with Matter, or without it. The Notion therefore of the Creation of Matter, is no more repugnant to our Conceptions, than the Creation of Space.

V. But whether there be any such thing as Space or no, we are certain that we have an *Idea* of it, tho' whence we had it, Philosophers are not agreed. Those that deny any distinction between it and Body,

That it is not necessarily existent, as appears from the Confession of those Persons who suppose Space to be the Image of the Body.

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in the positive, *i. e.* as standing for pure extension, which is an *abstract Idea*, form'd by the mind itself, and, as such, has no foundation any where else. Again, Philosophers, who take a Vacuum for Space or Extension in the abstract, stily deny that there is a Vacuum in Nature, which is true indeed of absolute Space, which exists only in the Mind, but is not so of Vacuity or absence of Matter, which has as real a foundation in nature as Matter itself has: except we'll argue that it cannot be said to *be* or to have *existence* predicated of it, because 'tis only a negation; which is playing upon, and puzzling one another with words. To illustrate what has been said of the disputes about a Vacuum, I shall present the Reader with some Arguments brought against it by Mr. Green and Bayle; which may be of use to us, so far as they overthrow the Reality of absolute, simple Space, which they do effectually, tho' I take them to be mere quibbles with regard to the End for which these Authors seem to have urged them. They may serve also for another Instance of the great confusion caus'd by a jumble of Mathematics and Metaphysics together: an Example of which was given before in the Word *Infinite*, N. 5.

“ Extension into Length, Breadth and
 “ Thickness, or what is call'd mere Space, or
 “ Distance, is a Quantity abstracted by the
 “ Mind, as all other Mathematical Quantities
 “ are; as a Line, or Superficies; and can be
 “ no more imagin'd to exist in nature alone,
 “ than Length or Breadth can. A Line is
 “ produced from the flowing of a point; a
 “ Surface from the flowing of a Line; and a

“ Space or Mathematical Solid from the flow-
 “ ing of a Surface: But 'tis own'd that there
 “ is no such real point, and consequently no
 “ such Line in being, therefore no such Sur-
 “ face. And what reason can there be assign'd
 “ why we may not go one Step farther, and
 “ from the same principles conclude there is
 “ no such Solid. For how is it possible for a
 “ Superficies which has not a being, and is i-
 “ maginary and abstracted, to produce an ef-
 “ fect which is not equally so?

“ We have said, that Length, Breadth, and
 “ Thickness, is the Definition of Imaginary
 “ Space; and it is likewise the Notion we
 “ have of a *Vacuum*, as to the nature and essence
 “ of it: for the foreign properties of Light,
 “ or Heat, or Sound, &c. are not included in
 “ the conceptions our Minds have form'd of
 “ Room to move in, or simple Space. If
 “ therefore the Definition of Imaginary Space
 “ and a *Vacuum*, are the same, and a *Vacuum*
 “ is real Space, it follows, that real Space and
 “ imaginary are the same, which is a contra-
 “ diction. Since to abstract any thing in the
 “ Mind from Beings as they really exist, is
 “ not to consider Beings as they really ex-
 “ ist.

“ From this Idea of Space, being only an
 “ abstracted one, it is easy to give an account
 “ of what *Place* is, namely, that it is only a
 “ portion of this abstracted Space, we have
 “ mentioned, separated from the rest, and ap-
 “ ply'd to that body which it considers as a
 “ measure of its capacity. Therefore primary
 “ or absolute Place also, as well as Space, is a
 “ creature of the mind, and nothing really
 “ existing,

Body, bid us imagine Matter or the World to be annihilated; and then, if we remember the things that did exist, without considering of what kind they were, but only that they were without the Mind, we have what we call *Space*. If this be true, then it will be certain

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that

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“ existing, as some Philosophers imagine.”
 Mr. Green's *Principles of Natural Philosophy*,
 B. 1. C. 4. §. 8, 18.

“ Let us rummage as much as we please into
 “ all the recesses of our Mind, we shall never
 “ find there any Idea of an unmoveable, indi-
 “ visible, and penetrable extension. And yet
 “ if there is a *Vacuum*, there must exist an
 “ Extension essentially endued with these three
 “ Attributes. It is no small difficulty to be
 “ forced to admit the existence of a Nature, of
 “ which we have no Idea, and is besides re-
 “ pugnant to the clearest Ideas of our Mind.
 “ But there are a great many other inconve-
 “ niencies which attend this. Is this *Vacuum*,
 “ or immoveable, indivisible, and penetrable
 “ Extension, a Substance or a Mode? It must
 “ be one of the two, for the adequate Divi-
 “ sion of Being comprehends but these two
 “ Members. If it be a Mode, they must then
 “ define its Substance; but that is what they
 “ can never do. If it be a Substance, I ask
 “ whether it be created or uncreated? If crea-
 “ ted, it may perish without the Matter, from
 “ which it is distinct, ceasing to be. But it is
 “ absurd and contradictory, that a *Vacuum*,
 “ that is, a Space distinct from Bodies, should
 “ be destroy'd, and yet that Bodies should be
 “ distant from each other, as they may be af-
 “ ter the destruction of the *Vacuum*. But if
 “ this Space distinct from Bodies is an uncrea-
 “ ted Substance, it will follow either that it
 “ is God, or that God is not the only Sub-
 “ stance which necessarily exists. Which part
 “ soever we take of this Alternative, we shall
 “ find ourselves confounded. The last is a
 “ formal, and the other, at least, a material
 “ Impiety: for all extension is composed of
 “ distinct parts, and consequently separable
 “ from each other; whence it results, that if
 “ God was extended he would not be a sim-

ple, immutable, and properly infinite Be-
 “ ing, but a Mass of Beings, *Ens per aggrega-*
 “ *tionem*, each of which would be finite, tho'
 “ all of them together would be unlimited:
 “ He would be like the Material World, which
 “ in the *Cartesian* Hypothesis, is an infinite
 “ Extension. And as to those who should
 “ pretend that God may be extended without
 “ being material or corporeal, and alledge, as
 “ an Argument, his Simplicity, you will find
 “ them solidly refuted in one of Mr. *Arnault's*
 “ Books, from which I shall cite only these
 “ Words: *So far is the Simplicity of God from*
 “ *allowing us room to think that he may be ex-*
 “ *tended, that all Divines have acknowledged,*
 “ *after St. Thomas, that it is a necessary conse-*
 “ *quence of the Simplicity of God, not to be ex-*
 “ *tended.* Will they say, with the School-
 “ Men, that Space is at most no more than a
 “ privation of Body; that it hath no reality,
 “ and that, properly speaking, a *Vacuum* is
 “ nothing? But this is such an unreasonable
 “ Assertion, that all the modern Philosophers
 “ who declare for a *Vacuum*, have laid it aside,
 “ tho' never so convenient in other respects.
 “ *Gassendus* carefully avoided any reliance on
 “ such an absurd Hypothesis; but chose ra-
 “ ther to plunge himself into the most hideous
 “ abyss of conjecturing, that all Beings are not
 “ either Substances or Accidents, and that all
 “ Substances are not either Spirits or Bodies,
 “ and of placing the extension of Space a-
 “ mongst the Beings, which are neither Cor-
 “ poreal nor Spiritual, neither Substance nor
 “ Accidents.
 “ Mr. *Locke*, believing that he could not
 “ define what a *Vacuum* is, hath yet given us
 “ clearly to understand, that he took it for a
 “ positive Being. He had too clear a Head
 “ not to discern, that nothingness cannot be
 “ extended in length, breadth, and depth.

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that Matter is not Self-existent: for we may consider it as annihilated, neither can we attribute any other nature to it, than such as answers to our Conceptions of it. If Space therefore, according to them, be a Phantasm of the Body, that is, an Idea of Body recall'd to mind, which formerly was, but now is not, or is not suppos'd to be, 'tis certain, that Body or Matter, so far as we know any thing of its

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“ Mr. *Hartshaker* hath very clearly apprehended
 “ this Truth. *There is no Vacuity in nature,*
 “ saith he, *this ought to be acknowledged without*
 “ *difficulty, because it is utterly contradictory to*
 “ *conceive a mere non-entity, with all the proper-*
 “ *ties which can only agree to a real Being.* But
 “ if it is contradictory, that nothingness should
 “ be endued with extension or any other Qua-
 “ lity, it is no less contradictory, that Exten-
 “ sion should be a *simple Being*, since it con-
 “ tains some things of which we may truly
 “ deny what we may truly affirm of some o-
 “ thers, which it includes. The Space fill'd
 “ up by the Sun is not the same Space that is
 “ taken up by the Moon; for if the Sun and
 “ the Moon fill'd the same Space, those two
 “ Luminaries would be in the same place, and
 “ penetrated one with another, since two
 “ things cannot be penetrated with a third,
 “ without being penetrated betwixt them-
 “ selves. It is most evident, that the Sun and
 “ Moon are not in the same place. It may
 “ then be said truly of the Space of the Sun,
 “ that it is penetrated by the Sun; and it may
 “ as truly be deny'd of the Space penetrated
 “ by the Moon. There are then two portions
 “ of Space, really distinct from one another,
 “ by reason that they receive two contrary de-
 “ nominations of being penetrated and not be-
 “ ing penetrated by the Sun. Which fully
 “ confutes those who venture to assert that
 “ Space is nothing but the immensity of God:
 “ and it is certain that the Divine Immensity
 “ could not be the place of Bodies, without
 “ giving room to conclude that it is compos'd
 “ of as many real distinct parts as there are
 “ Bodies in the World.
 “ It will be in vain for you to alledge, that
 “ Infinity hath no parts; this must necessarily
 “ be false in all infinite Numbers, since Num-
 “ ber essentially includes several Units. Nor
 “ will you have any more reason to tell us
 “ that incorporeal extension * is wholly con-
 “ tain'd in its Space, and also wholly contain'd
 “ in each part of its Space: for it is not only
 “ what we have no Idea of, and besides,
 “ thwarts all our Ideas of Extension; but also
 “ what will prove that all bodies take up the
 “ same place, since each could not take up its
 “ own, if the Divine Extension was entirely
 “ penetrated by each Body numerically the
 “ same with the Sun and with the Earth. You
 “ will find in † Mr. *Arnauld*, a solid refuta-
 “ tion of those who attribute to God the diffu-
 “ sing himself throughout infinite Space. *Crit.*
Dist. p. 3083, 3084. See also *Episcop.* p. 294.
 If any Person wants any more Arguments a-
 gainst the Existence of simple Extension, or
 the application of it to a Spirit, he may find
 enough in *Bayle*, p. 2790, 3077, &c.

* *Tota in toto, & tota in singulis partibus*: that is, what the School-Men say of the presence of the Soul in a human Body, and of the presence of Angels in certain places.

† *Arnauld*, Letter 8 and 9 to Father *Malebranche*. See also a Book of *Peter Petit*, de *Extensione Animæ & rerum incorporearum natura*. And *M. de la Chambre's* Answer to it, which he publish'd at Paris, Anno 1666. 4to. with this Title, *Defence de l'Extension & de parties libres de l'ame*, all the reasons he alledges to shew, that extension and Spirituality may be together, are so weak, that they are only good to shew the falsity of his Assertion.

its nature is indifferent to existence or non-existence. It has not therefore Existence of itself; for that which exists by necessity of nature, Existence enters into its *Idea* (12.), nor can it be conceiv'd otherwise than as existing.

VI. Others deny that *Space* is distinguishable from Matter, any other way than as a *general Quantity* is from a *particular* one; For, as when *Individuals* are changed, the *Nature of Man or Animal remains unchang'd: so when Body is chang'd or translated into an other place,*

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place,

And of those who deny Space to be distinguishable from Matter, any otherwise than as Extension in general is from a particular Extension.

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(12.) We cannot allow of this or any such Argument drawn from this necessity of nature, taken in a positive sense, for the reasons which will be given in Note 14. And tho' Matter itself perhaps cannot strictly be prov'd not to be *Eternal*, yet any *Body*, or *System of Bodies*, formed out of it, as the ingenious Author of the *Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion* has fully prov'd* must necessarily have had a beginning; and that matter, or any material substance, is not eternal, independent, &c. may be made probable from some such Argument as this. We conclude from the faculties of our mind (viz. *thinking, volition, &c.* all which are in a perpetual flux, and as it were made up of Successions, and consequently incapable of Eternity, by Notes 5, and X. c.) that it did not exist from Eternity, therefore it had its existence from some Cause, (which Cause, if itself was not eternal and independent, had its existence from another, and that from another, and so on till we come at one which was) from the same cause that it had its existence, it had also all its faculties; the perception or knowledge of matter is one of these Faculties, therefore it had the perception of matter from the above mention'd cause. Now it could not have the perception of Matter from the foremention'd cause, unless the cause itself had it, therefore that cause also had the perception of matter. But if matter was eternal, independent, &c. that cause, as far as we can apprehend, could

not have any perception of it: for as that cause itself was also eternal, independent, &c. it could not possibly be any ways affected *ab extra*, nor consequently by matter, nor consequently have any notices or perceptions of matter, unless matter proceeded from that cause itself, and was created by it, which is contrary to the Supposition of its Eternity: But that cause has the perception of matter, because we have, therefore matter must have proceeded from that cause, or been created by it, and consequently was not eternal, independent, &c. Or thus:

If Matter were an eternal, independent principle, it seems impossible for God to have had any manner of knowledge of it, because it could no ways affect him; since he also is independent: but he has knowledge of it, because we have; therefore it is not an eternal independent Principle.

'Tis here taken for granted, that Matter is essentially incapable of thought, nor can possibly have any thinking Quality super-added to it, and consequently that the first Cause cannot be Material; which will appear by the same Argument which is brought to prove a thinking Being incapable of Extension, in Note n. Besides, from all the proofs of a Vacuum, both external and interspersed, it appears that all Matter is every way limited or defective, and consequently requires a Limiter or External Cause, and therefore cannot belong to the first Cause. See X f.

* See the Note X d.

place, the Extension of the place which it occupied remains unchang'd, namely empty, or fill'd with another Body. I would not spend a Centure on this reasoning; but granting it to be true, it would follow, that Body or Matter contains nothing in the Idea of it, which might induce us to believe, that it is of itself, or exists by the Necessity of its Nature: but on the contrary, that it may be annihilated at least in Conception.

If therefore we consult our Ideas, we must confess that Matter does not exist necessarily, but is as indifferent to Existence, or Non-existence, as to *Motion* or *Rest*, i. e. is in that respect merely passive. It requires a Cause then which may determine it to *Existence* no less than to *Motion*. For that which is not of itself must necessarily be of another, nor can we know that any thing is of itself, otherwise than from the Ideas which we have of its nature, if these represent the nature of any thing as necessarily existing, so that we cannot conceive it not to be, we enquire no farther about its cause; if not, we fly to a Cause; nor is the Understanding satisfy'd till it has found one. Why are we inquisitive about the Original of Man, or any thing else? but only because our Conceptions represent these as indifferent in themselves to *Being*, and therefore, as requiring some Cause of their being distinct from themselves. From the Nature then of *Matter* as well as *Motion*, we are forc'd to admit of another Principle to be the Cause of both.

That Space seems at first fight inseparable from Existence.

VII. Thirdly. As to *Space*, many doubt whether its Nature be distinguishable from Existence. Whether it can be annihilated even in thought, or conceived not to have been. For when the whole material World is annihilated in the Mind, the Idea of Space remains, as of a thing yet existing; it obtrudes itself upon the Understanding, and suffers us not to assign any beginning or end of its Existence. It forces us therefore to confess, whether we will or no, that it exists; nor does it seem to require a Cause why it exists, since it is of such a Nature as, being self-sufficient, must have existence of itself. For what will be self-existent, if that be not, which cannot even be conceiv'd not to exist?

*Tis shewn, that this may arise from Prejudice.

VIII. This seems to argue strongly for the *Self-existence* of Space. Yet a doubt may arise, whether this Inability of our Understanding, to separate the Nature of *Space* from Existence, proceed from that

same.

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same Nature of Space, or rather from the *imperfection* of our Reason. For, tho' all our simple Conceptions must for the most part be look'd upon as true, as we said before *, yet these are to be excepted from this Rule in which we find any grounds of fallacy or *prejudice*. And in this reasoning about Space, it is to be suspected that we connect Existence with its Nature merely out of *prejudice*.

IX. We may understand how this comes to pass, if we consider, *1st*. That our Conceptions come for the most part *from without*, when therefore something is presented to our minds, we always conceive it as without us: this Notion therefore of *external* and *internal* adheres to all our Conceptions, and we continually assign a *Place* to every thing which we happen to think of, but that there should be any thing external, or which has a *Place*, and no *Space*, is inconceivable. As long then as we think of any thing external, we cannot but at the same time believe that Space exists, in which Space we conceive *that* thing to exist. For while we suppose any thing existing beside ourselves, that necessarily seems to be without us; but imagine all externals removed, and turn the Mind upon itself, and that *without* will be taken away, and, together with it, the necessity of *Space* or *Place*. For, while we conceive nothing to exist beside ourselves, *i. e.* our *Minds*, we don't think of this *without*, that is, of *Space*, nor see any necessity for its Existence (13.).

Without, supposes *Space*; while therefore we conceive something to exist without us, we cannot annihilate *Space* in Thought.

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(13.) From hence, I think, it appears sufficiently that Space, were it granted to have any real Existence at all, I mean, to be any thing more than an Idea in our Minds, (which some perhaps will not be very ready to grant, from an attentive consideration of the Notes, 5 and 11.) yet it cannot be supposed to exist necessarily, in Dr. Clarke's sense of *necessary Existence*. For, according to him, " † Whatever

" Therefore, the supposing any thing possibly
" to exist alone, so as not necessarily to in-
" clude the presupposal of some other thing,
" proves demonstrably, that *that* other thing
" is not necessarily existing: because, whatsoe-
" ver has necessary Existence, cannot possibly,
" in any conception whatsoever, be supposed
" away. There cannot possibly be any notion
" of the existence of any thing, there cannot
" possibly be any notion of existence at all,
" but what shall necessarily preinclude the
" notion of that which is necessarily exi-
" stent.

" Now, if we can consider our own Souls as
" existing alone, and without this *Space*, with-
" out

* §. II. paragr. II.

† Answer to the first Letter, p. 10.

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That things are conceived to be annihilated by substituting something else in the Room of them; but we have nothing to substitute for Space.

X. It is to be observed farther, that when we would annihilate any thing in our Mind, we consider it as something evanescent, and remov'd out of sight; but yet we look upon some other thing as substituted in the room of that which disappeared; thus when *Accidents* are removed, we conceive the *Substance* remaining; setting aside *Matter*, we substitute *Space*; but when *Space* is removed, we have nothing to substitute in its stead, except material or external things; but all these suppose *Space*, and cannot be conceiv'd without it; no wonder then that we cannot annihilate *Space*, while we conceive these as existing. If therefore we would come at a right understanding of the nature of *Space*, we must not apply our Minds to any thing *material* or *external*, but attend to our own thoughts and sensations, which have no relation to external things, or to *Quantity*: And when our Minds are thus employed, there will appear to be no more necessity for the existence of *Space* than of *Matter*.

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out considering it as a *causa sine qua non*, or in any other respect; without *presupposing*, or any ways including it: This (according to the Dr. himself) will prove demonstrably, that *Space* is not necessarily existent. But let any one shew us what necessity there is for the existence of *Space*, in order to the supposal of the existence of a *Spirit*. Let him try whether he cannot conceive an *immaterial, thinking substance*, without the Idea of *Space* or *Extension*; nay, whether he can possibly conceive it with them; whether these Ideas are at all applicable to an immaterial Being, and not rather repugnant and contradictory to the very notion of it; whether they belong not solely to *matter*, and if that were annihilated, might not easily be supposed away. Few, I believe, beside Dr. Clarke, can apprehend how *Space* is (as he calls it in his 4th Reply to Leibnitz, N^o. 29. p. 141.) the *Place of all Ideas*. I'm sure, *Space* and *Spirit*, and the distinct properties of each, appear to me as distant and incompatible, as the most remote and inconsistent things in nature; and an *extended Soul* seems just such another proposition as a *green sound*, an *Ell of Consciousness*,

or a *Cube of Virtue*. Dr. Clarke grants*, that *Extension does not belong to Thought*, (as our Author has indeed prov'd in many of its Modes, in parag. XIV. and XV.) and at the same time endeavours to shift off the consequence by answering, that *Thought is not a Being*. But where's the difference in this respect? Don't we frame our Idea of the *Being* from its essential *Properties*? and if these have no manner of relation to *Extension*, why should the *Being* to which these *Properties* belong have any? † I'm apt to think, that our conceiving *Substance* by way of some *Substratum* (concerning which, see Note 1.) has led us into the Notion, that all kind of *Substances* must be *extended*; and 'tis perhaps impossible for us to *imagine* any such thing as an *Unextended Substance*; but yet reason convinces us, that there are many real things of which we can form no imagination. And that there are *Beings* in nature to which no manner of *extension* can possibly be apply'd, we find sufficiently prov'd by *Cudworth*, from p. 823 to 832. Among the various arguments there produced, this is the Substance of one. "If the *Soul* be an *extended Substance*, then it must

* Answer to the second Letter, p. 16:

† See X.h. at the end of this Chapter.

XI. It proceeds therefore from *Prejudice*, and an unwary way of thinking, that we couple *necessity of Existence* with *Space*; neither do we observe, that for this very reason we cannot conceive *Space* not to exist, because we imagine those things still existing, which cannot exist without *Space*: which is no greater a Wonder than if any one intent upon the *Mobility* of the *Heavenly Bodies*, should complain that he could not annihilate the *Matter* of them, while the *Motion* continued; for material and external things, have no less dependence on, and connection with, *Space*, than *Mobility* has with *Matter*; if then we conceive God only to exist, while He contemplates himself as existing alone, he can no more be judg'd to stand in need of *Space*, or be

We attempt to annihilate *Space* while those things continue which suppose *Space*, and therefore it cannot be annihilated.

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“ must of necessity be either a *Physical point* (for a *Mathematical point* has no *extension*) or *minimum*, the least extension that can possibly be; or else it must consist of *more* such *Physical points* join'd together. As for the former of these, it is impossible that one *single Atom*, or *smallest point* of extension should be able to perceive distinctly all the *variety* of things, *i. e.* take notice of all the *distinct* and *different* parts of an *extended Object*, and have a *description* or *delineation* of the whole of them at once upon itself, (for that would be to make it *divisible* and *indivisible* at the same time) As for the latter, if the *Soul* be an *extended Substance* consisting of *more points*, one without another, all concurring in every *sensation*, then must every one of those *points* either perceive a *point* and *part* of the *Object* only, or else the *whole Object*: Now if every *point* of the *extended Soul* perceives only a *point* of the *Object*, then is there no one thing in us that perceives the *whole*; or which can compare one part with another. But if every *point* of the *extended Soul*, perceives the *whole Object* at once consisting of many *parts*, then will the former absurdity return: and also there would be innumerable *Percipients* of the same *Object* in every *sensation*, as many as there are *points* in the *extended Soul*: And from both these suppositions it would alike follow, that no *Man* is one *single Percipient*, or *Person*, but that

“ there are innumerable distinct *Percipients* or *Persons* in every *Man*. Neither can there be any other supposition made besides those three foremention'd: As that the whole *extended Soul* should perceive both the *whole sensible Object*, and all its several *parts*, no part of this *Soul* in the mean time having any perception at all by itself; because the whole of an *extended Being* is nothing but all the *parts* taken together; and if none of those *parts* have any *life*, *sense*, or *perception* in them, it is impossible that there should be any in the *whole*. But in very truth, to say that the whole *Soul* perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be *extended*, but to be *indivisible*, which is the thing we contend for.”

From hence also, that an *indivisible Being* or *Substance*, is not capable of receiving a *Divisible Quality*, nor a *Divisible Substance* an *indivisible One*, he makes it fully appear, that neither *Matter* can possibly *think*, nor *Spirit* be *extended*. Ibid. p. 827, 828, 829.

Where *S. C.* might have found a sufficient answer to his Argument for the *Soul's extension*, from its receiving *Ideas of extended Things*. *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 222. And to his Maxim, that *like is known by like*, and by consequence a Subject absolutely void of extension could have no *Ideas* of extended things, p. 223.

“ Nay the *Soul* (says *Cudworth*) conceives *extended things* themselves *unextendedly* and *indi-*

be conscious of it as actually existing, than we are, while we contemplate only the reflex acts of the Mind. But when he will'd external things, he made *Place* or *Space* for them to exist in*.

XII. It may be objected, that *we can separate Existence from God* after the same manner as we endeavour to remove it from Space. For, the mind being reflected on itself, and solely intent upon contemplating its operations, may deny God to exist as well as Space. If therefore we deny Space to be self-existent, because we can consider our mind as existing alone in nature, and consequently Space as not existing; why may not we, by the same way of reasoning, deny that God is *self-existent*. I answer, we are conscious that we do not exist of ourselves, while therefore we contemplate ourselves, and our intellectual operations, we are necessarily carried to some Cause; being certain that we have Existence from another, and not of ourselves;

we

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“ *indivisibly*; for as the difference of the whole
 “ *Hemisphere* is contracted into a narrow com-
 “ *pact* in the pupil of the eye, so are all dis-
 “ *ances* yet more contracted in the Soul itself,
 “ and there understood *indistinctly*: for the
 “ *thought* of a Mile distance, or 10,000 Miles,
 “ or semi-diameters of the Earth, takes up no
 “ more *room* in the Soul, nor *stretches* it any
 “ more than does the thought of a *foot* or *inch*,
 “ or indeed of a *Mathematical point*.” p. 827,
 829, &c.

The foregoing Arguments against the simplicity of *extension*, as well as those in N. 5 and 11. conclude equally against S. C's *Amplitude* or *Expansion*. † Since, if it be any thing real, it must have parts really distinct from one another; which distinct parts can never be the subject of an undivided Quality, nor any addition of them ever reach a positive Infinity. But in truth, these Words *Expansion*, *Amplitude*, &c. don't seem to imply any positive thing or quality, or indeed to have any determinate meaning at all; like the *Ubi* of the School-men, which was not *place* but something else, they did not know what, and must belong to *Spirits*, tho' how, or why they could not tell.

† *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 212.

The abovemention'd S. C. has a second Argument for the *Amplitude* or *Expansion* of the *Divine Nature* grounded on another Maxim, *viz. Nothing can bestow what it has not in itself*: but God has created *material expansion*, therefore he must be expanded himself, p. 223. Which Argument he may see answer'd by our Author in the 18th Paragr. and Note D. who shews that such *Expansion* is a mere *imperfection*, as well as *materiality*, and consequently is equally inconsistent with the perfection of the Divine Being. See also X h.

That no Collection or Combination of Atoms can think, and the same reason holds against any thing which can be conceiv'd by way of parts, see proved at large in *Bayle's* Dict. p. 1924. under the Article *Leucippus*, Remark E. See also Dr. *Clarke's* Letters to *Dodwell* concerning the immortality of the Soul, &c. or *Religion of Nature*, *Delin.* p. 186, &c. or *H. Ditton's* appendix to his Excellent Discourse concerning the Resurrection.

* We conceive Space to have no real Existence, and therefore think that it cannot properly be said either to be made, annihilated, bounded or measured, &c.

we cannot therefore exert even one act of the Understanding but it must have a necessary connection with some *Cause* distinct from us.

XIII. We cannot therefore conceive ourselves as the only Beings in nature, for we must admit, along with us, the Cause from which we derive Existence, which is a confused conception of God. But the same cannot be said of Space, for the operations of our mind are so intimately perceiv'd by us as to have no necessary connection with Space, and we understand clearly enough that these may be, tho' there were no Space, and do not stand in need of it for their Existence. If we conceive ourselves as consisting of both *Body* and *Mind*, 'tis certain we stand in need of Space for our Existence, and during that conception, 'tis impossible for us to conceive Space to be annihilated; *viz.* because such a Conception has a necessary connection with Space. After the same manner, if we conceive ourselves to be *Mind* only, yet we must own the Existence of God. For a finite Mind requires a Cause *from* which it may exist, no less than a Body does a Place *in* which it may exist; and from hence, in reality, *it is* that we attribute *Self-existence* to Space, because, whenever we think of ourselves, we imagine ourselves to consist of both *Body* and *Mind*. While therefore we are conscious of our own Existence, we form our Belief of Space also as necessarily existing, insomuch as it is connected with the conception of *Body*, i. e. of *ourselves*.

Because we are conscious that we do not exist of ourselves.

XIV. Secondly. It is remarkable, that the Conceptions which we have from *hearing*, *smelling*, or *tasting*, tho' they be produced in us by external Objects, yet have no connection with the conceptions of *Space*; for, who can imagine the longitude, latitude, or profundity of *Sound*, *Smell*, or *Taste*? If then we had only these three Senses, we should not so much as imagine that there was any Space. Our Conceptions therefore abstract from all Extension, nor do the notions of external and internal adhere so closely to our thoughts but we may lay them aside; and if we set these aside, the Self-existence of Space does not necessarily obtrude itself upon us. Now, as the common People attribute *Smells*, *Tastes*, *Colours*, and other *sensible Qualities* to the Objects themselves, and believe that they exist in them; while they who attend better to their thoughts, know that these exist only in the Mind, and are nothing in the things by which they are produced,

Smell, Taste, Hearing, do not give us any notice of the existence of Space.

ced; besides the peculiar Motion and Texture of their parts: after the same manner, 'tis probable, we are impos'd upon in attributing necessary existence to Space, because we observe, that almost all our Thoughts are produc'd in us from without, and thereby accustoming ourselves to join Space with them, while we are conscious that we think we conceive also that Space exists: whereas, if we remember that all our sensations, even those produc'd by external things, such as *Smells, &c.* do not bring along with them the notion of Space, we may easily lay aside this prejudice, and, with drawing our thoughts from the contemplation of Space, may conceive it not to be.

XV. And this will appear 3dly. if by a reflex act we view the *Mind itself* and its *operations*; for nothing of Extension or Space offers itself in these; nor does the Mind; when employ'd about them, think at all of Space, nor is it conscious that it occupies Space; it withdraws therefore from the conceptions of *internal* and *external*, and may conceive nothing to be in the world besides *itself*, and its *Cause*; i. e. can imagine Space to be non-existent. Thinking Beings then may exist without Space; it proceeds therefore from *Prejudice* that we join *Necessary Existence* with it (14.).

XVI.

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(14.) As to that *necessity of existence* which the learned Dr. *Clarke* and others have so largely insisted on, I must confess that I was never able to consider it in any *positive* sense, nor to form any clear argument from it, which could either affect the nature of *Space, Matter, &c.* or help to demonstrate the *existence* and *attributes* of God *a priori*. With regard to the first of these perhaps too much has already been said, in Notes 5, 11 and 13. As to the last, we gather indeed a *Posteriori* that an *infinite*, i. e. an *absolutely perfect* Being, must *necessarily* have existed *always*, because it would have been always a Contradiction for him not to have existed; namely, he himself, and all the things that are, must have arose from nothing. But this is only a *Consequential* Necessity, and from hence to infer any thing concerning the *Manner* of his *existence* seems to be building a great deal more on this argument than it will bear. This is indeed a *Reason* by which we find, and

for which we believe, that he *must* have existed always, but it is a reason to *us* only, and does not affect *his* nature, or the cause of it, and when it is apply'd to that, I think 'tis used equivocally. Conceiving that he cannot possibly be supposed not to Exist, is far from conceiving *how* or *why* he actually does *exist*; we can easily shew a reason for the one, but it seems above human comprehension to account in any respect for the other: Nay, the attempt to do it seems altogether as absurd and useless, as endeavouring to shew how or why a thing is what it is: how or why a First Cause is a First Cause; How a Triangle is a Triangle, or why Truth is Truth.

Farther: This *eternal Being*, we say, is *Independent*; or, which is the same thing, *Self-existent*, i. e. his Existence depends upon nothing *beside* himself? But does it therefore positively depend *upon* himself? Will it follow, that because he has no *external* Cause, therefore

he

The Mind reflected upon itself has no relation to Space, nor any necessity for it.

XVI. Fourthly. It is to be remark'd that Space, so far as it appears to our Conceptions, is of such a Nature. as cannot be annihilated by *Parts*, for they are in such a manner united to, and dependent upon one another, that if we suppose one part, it will imply a contradiction for the others not to exist. We can in Thought remove all Matter out of a Vessel, or Chamber, and the Space interjacent between the

We may conceive Space to be annihilated altogether, but not by parts..

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he must have an *internal* one? Or, because no ground or reason of his Existence can be drawn from any other Substance, therefore one must be contain'd in his *own Substance or self*? This is using the Word *Self-existence* in two different Senses, both as *negative* and *positive*, which have no manner of connection with each other, and the latter of which will perhaps appear to be no very good one. It is not then apparent yet that there needs any *Physical reason* at all for the *existence* of the *eternal, independent Being*. Nor, 2dly, if there did, would this *Necessity of Nature* usually assign'd as such, serve for that purpose. For, first, it is not the *Substance* itself, that would be to make the same thing the *ground* of itself; which is nonsense. 'Tis therefore a *perfection, property* or *attribute* of that Substance (we know no other distinction) and as such, must, in the Order of our Ideas, be Consequent upon the existence of that Substance in which it inheres. Whatever it is, it has in some respect or other a *Relation* to the Subject to which it belongs. Let it then be an *Attribute, sui Generis, cujus cunq; generis* (if we mean any thing at all by this word) it must be *predicated* of, and *presuppose* its Subject, and consequently cannot, according to our Ideas, be the antecedent *ground* or *foundation* of it. And to endeavour to clear it (as some do) by making it not an attribute of the *Substance*, but of the *attribute* of the Substance; or as they phrase it, a *Property* of a *Property*; is only thrusting it still farther back, and making it posterior in conception to both the Substance and its Attribute or Property.

But 3dly, supposing this *Necessity*, this *Ground* or *Reason*, could be consider'd as *antecedent* to the Divine Nature, and inferring its actual *existence*, we are got but one Step farther yet; for, will there not be the same necessity for

demanding a *reason* for that reason, a *ground* for that ground, and so on *in infinitum*? And what shall we get by such an endless progression? Why should we not stop at a first *Being*, as well as at this *Ground*, which must itself want a foundation if the other does, since there cannot be any intuitive knowledge in either; and the same reasons which are given for stopping at this *ground* will hold equally for stopping before we come at it, and convince us, that we might as well, or perhaps better, acquiesce in the actual Existence of the first Being. We must then rest some where: We must either admit one first cause of all Things and Qualities, itself *existing* without cause (for that is imply'd in its being called the first) or an *infinite series* of Beings existing without any original Cause at all; *i. e.* either *some one* thing must be without a Cause, or *every thing*.

Here then are two difficulties- the less is to be chosen; let us see which that is. Now, if the *Manner of existence* in all these Beings were entirely the same, I grant it would be as easy to suppose *all* of them *existing* without a Cause, as *One*: But here I think lies the difference: There was a time when all of them, except one, were indifferent either to *existence* or *non-existence*; were nothing: Therefore for them that were once indifferent to *existence* or *non-existence*, to be actually determin'd into Existence, to be brought from *nothing* into *something*, or *made* what they once were not; is a real *change*, an *action*, an *effect*, and as such, must require some *changer, agent, cause*. But on the other hand; all that we know of this *one Being*, is, that it *now exists*, and *always* did so; that it never had a *Beginning* of its *existence*, was never *changed* from what it is, never *made* or *produced*; Here is no *effect*, and therefore no *reason*

the Walls remains extended in length, breadth, and depth: But the Space cannot be removed, since it is of its own Nature immovable,

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son, nor room, for a ground or cause. Nay, to assign one in any respect prior to its existence, as it must be suppos'd to be if consider'd as a Cause; (and it must be consider'd as a Cause, or extrinsic Principle, if consider'd at all: I mean, so as to be made any use of in the present Question, or to infer any thing concerning actual Existence) I say, to assign any Ground prior to the existence of this Being, would be to prove this Being not eternal, nor the first Cause: as attempting to prove a self-evident proposition is endeavouring to shew that proposition not to be self-evident by assigning a clearer.

Now to lay down some necessity, ground, or reason of Existence, must either be to propose it by way of Causality, or to fix no manner of Idea at all to these Words: and indeed no manner of Idea seems possible to be fix'd to them (as has been observ'd by the Ingenious Author of the Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion) which is not utterly inconsistent with existing without Cause, as that Being is prov'd to exist. For, why do we consider that Ground or Reason in the Order of our Ideas, as antecedent to the Existence of the Being, otherwise than as it seems in the Order of Nature antecedently necessary to the Existence of that Being? To which nevertheless we allow, that no Thing, Mode, Quality, &c. can be really antecedent. The Case will be no better, if we imagine this necessity co-etaneous, or co-existent with the Existence of the Being which is supported by it; Since this is to suppose that actually existing already, in order to the Existence of which this necessity is introduced: and also seems much the same as an effect co-existent with its Cause. For, as was said before, this Necessity must either be a Cause, or nothing at all to the present purpose. And that it was propos'd, by the formention'd Author, as some sort of a Cause (if he would have spok'd out) is I think pretty plain.

The whole Case then seems to stand thus. On the one hand here is a certain alteration

made, a positive effect produced, without a Cause; which is a clear contradiction. On the other hand there is a difficulty indeed, but not an apparent contradiction: There is somewhat existing of which we can give no account (the manner of whose Existence is different from that of any thing else) which will admit of no Cause, the Idea of which is entirely repugnant to that of Causality.

This may be hard to conceive, but cannot be deny'd without affirming something worse, namely, an express contradiction, as has been shewn above. In order to set this in as clear a light as is possible, I shall take the Liberty to insert a passage from the learned Writer cited in Note 5, &c. "The Idea of a Self-Existent Being is the Idea of a Being that always was, is, and will be, because he always was, is, and will be infinitely able to be. If you ask why he is so, I know not; Why I believe so, I think I know; it is, because he has in fact existed from all Eternity, which he could not have done, had he not been infinitely able to exist. If you ask after the ground or foundation of this infinite Ability, it is the same that is the ground or foundation of all his other Perfections, his Infinite Nature, Essence or Substance, if you ask farther for the ground of that, I must call it trifling: if you assign absolute necessity, I must ask what's next? Or what that means? or refer you to the Indian Philosopher's Elephant and Tortoise, as the best comment upon absolute, antecedent Necessity."

Neither need we run ourselves into such absurdities as these: This Independent Being exists because it does exist; or, it exists by chance. Since it is enough for us to say, There can be no Reason why it does exist; or, which is the very same thing still, no Cause, no Causal Necessity, or antecedent Ground of its Existence.

But if we grant the first Being to be now existing, there will be a reason (contrary to what Dr. Clarke asserts in his last Letter) why he should exist to morrow, and to all Eternity, since

able, (15.) nor can it be annihilated; for distance would still remain between the bounds which cannot be without Extension, nor Extension without a Subject; but Space, as far as we can conceive it, is the primary

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since ceasing to be is an alteration from Existence to Non-existence, *i. e.* a Positive Effect, and consequently must require a Cause; unless it can be effected and not effected at the same time. Now, as the existence of this Being depends upon no cause, no cause can ever affect or destroy it, and for him to destroy himself, will be the same absurdity, as to suppose him to make himself: therefore he must always exist, and in the same manner that he does *. The rest of the learned Dr's Arguments contained in the same Letter, will be considered in the Notes to the 3d Section of the first Chapter of this Book †. I shall only beg leave to observe one thing more in this place, namely, that all the above mention'd reasoning about necessary existence seems to be built upon that false Maxim which Leibnitz lays down as the foundation of all Philosophy, (and which Dr. Clarke was very ready to grant him, since it was the foundation of his own Book on the Divine Attributes) namely, that *Nothing is without a reason, why it is rather than not, and why it is so rather than otherwise.* Tho' the Dr. is soon forced to deny this very Principle, when (in his way of considering Time and Space) he proposes the mere Will of God, as the only reason why the World was created at such a certain period of time, and in such a particular point of Space †. Of which Divine Will, or of its determination, according to himself, there can possibly be, no manner of reason, since he supposes these effects of the Divine Will to be, in every possible Manner of Conception, absolutely equal and indifferent, and consequently it would be absurd to suppose any reason of such special Will, or such particular determination. If then we may suppose two things in nature absolutely, and in every respect, equal; (which Leibnitz, to

be consistent with himself, and I believe for no sufficient reason else, found it necessary to deny) the preference of one of these before the other must be absolutely without a reason. And tho' there may be a sufficient reason for a person's acting in general, rather than not acting at all, yet (as Leibnitz well observes **) except there be one also for his acting in a certain particular manner, which in the present case there cannot be (according to Dr. Clarke's concession ††) the above mention'd principle is entirely overthrown. See more of this in the latter end of Note 18. and Note 62.

The same Argument will hold against Locke's Hypothesis of Anxiety, if it be consider'd as the sole and absolute determiner to all Action † †, since it can never determine the Mind to Will one Action before another, where both are entirely equal; of which kind numberless occur in life, as will be shewn at large in its proper place.

(15.) That is, as I have often hinted, if we suppose it to have any real Nature, or to Exist at all, it must, as our Author says, exist every where, and cannot be remov'd by parts. And in this Sense should the Words of Sir Isaac Newton be understood †††. "The order of the parts of Space is immutable; remove these from their places, and you will remove them, as I may say, from themselves." For to suppose it at all once away, seems so far from amounting to that absurd Supposition mention'd by Dr. Clarke † † †, that it is no more than what must be conceiv'd in every Annihilation of any thing, which is the total destruction or taking away of its Existence, the removal of it, as we may say, from itself, or from Being: which is a Supposition that is generally thought to carry no absurdity along with it.

* See X e. at the end of Chap. I. † See the latter end of Note 18. † † 3d Reply, N^o. 5. p. 81.

* 5th Letter, N^o. 17. p. 169. † † N^o. 1, 2. p. 12. of his 4th Reply.

† † See Note 65. † † † Princ. Schol. ad def. 8. † † † Answer to the 5th Let. p. 39.

primary Subject (16.) of Extension, therefore it necessarily continues with Distance, nor can it be annihilated, unless we would have Extension without a Subject, that is into *Length, Breadth, and Depth*, without any thing *Long, Broad and Deep*. Hence it appears that Space cannot be *partially* annihilated, and from hence the Opinion of its *self-existence* might arise:

XVII. For

NOTES.

(16.) Dr. Clarke affirms †, that *Space* is not a *Substance*; and yet declares that it has real *Qualities* ‥. Is not this either to suppose *qualities* or *properties* inherent in one another? or else, with *Gassendus*, to imagine some *middle* thing between *Substance* and *Accident*, which is neither of them, but partakes of both?

The learned Writer refer'd to in Note 5. is of the same opinion with our Author in this place, *viz.* that we are apt to conceive *Space* to be a sort of *Substance*, or *Substratum* of *Extension*, and so are used to attribute that and other imaginary *Qualities* to it. "The Idea of *Space* is not the Idea of *Extension*, but of something extended, it is the *Substratum* of *Extension*, and not *Extension* itself. But when I say it is the *Substratum*, do not imagine I make it to be any thing without; it is an *Ideal Substratum*, and nothing more. When the Mind has been considering the *Idea* of *Extension* abstracted from the extended *Bodies*, from whence it first receiv'd the *Idea*, (whether as they are *causes* or occasions of it I consider not now) it is a very easy Step for the Mind to make farther, to frame an *imaginary Substratum* to support an *imaginary Extension*. And this is the more easy, because the *Idea* we have of a *real Substratum* or *Substance*, the support of real *Qualities* is dark and confused, an *Idea* of *somewhat*, and that's all. Now it is but joining the *Idea* of *somewhat* with the *Idea* of one *Quality* only, namely *Extension*, and we have an *imaginary Substratum* presently formed, that is, an *Idea* of *Space*, or an *Ideal* extended something. Whether this be

"not the very Case, I must leave to any Man to judge, by reflecting on his own *Ideas*.

Again: To this Question, *Why may not Space be rather defin'd Extension in the Abstract, or imaginary Extension, rather than the imaginary Substratum of imaginary Extension?* He answers, "Extension in the general, or in the abstract, is an *Idea* of *pure Intellect*, i. e. is to be understood, but cannot be imagin'd any more than *Whiteness* in the general: or a thousand other the like abstract *Ideas*. But as soon as *imagination* comes to deal with this general abstract *Idea* (or *Ideas*) it supplies it with an *imaginary Substratum*, and so makes the *general*, which was *invisible*, be conceiv'd as a *particular*, for the help of the Understanding. So if the *imagination* comes to conceive any certain degree of *Whiteness*, it supplies the Mind with some *imaginary white Surface*, and brings down the general *Idea* to a particular *Object*. In like manner, when it comes to conceive a *Length*, a *Breadth*, a *Thickness*, it supplies the Mind with a *Substratum, pro hac vice*, such as may serve the purpose, otherwise the Mind must rest in *pure intellect* only, as in numbers; and there is nothing more tedious or uneasy to the Mind generally than to be wholly abstracted; which is the reason, by the way, that *Arithmetical Demonstrations*, tho' as clear and certain as any, are less delightful than *Geometrical*, and nothing more irksome than abstract numbers. Now *Space* being the *Object* of the *Imagination*, and not of *pure Intellect*, as are all general, abstract *Ideas*, it is properly the *imaginary Substratum* of an *imaginary*

† Answer to the 3d Letter, p. 22. and to the 4th. p. 28.

‥ Answer to the 6th Letter, p. 38.

XVII. For since it is of such a Nature as must be annihilated either altogether, or not at all, they that attempted to annihilate it only by *Parts*, saw that it was impossible to be done, the nature of the thing remonstrated against a partial annihilation, and if one part be supposed, all others might be demonstrated to exist by necessary connection. But if any one should suppose all extended things to be removed together and at once, he would find nothing impossible in that supposition: For one may imagine nothing to exist in Nature beside his own Soul, and the cause on which it depends; which, as a thinking Being, includes nothing of Extension in it: every thing that is extended may therefore be separated from Existence. But they that attempted this by parts, when they found it impossible, did not scruple to resolve the Cause into the self-existence of Space, tho' in reality it did not arise from thence, but from this, that they attempted to separate things naturally inseparable, namely, the parts of Space one from another.

Hence arose the prejudice for its self-existence.

XVIII. But whether there be any such thing as Space, or no; whether its Extension be distinguish'd from the Extension of *Body*, or not: Be it nothing at all: Be it mere *privation of Contract*, as some are pleas'd to term it; be it mere *Possibility* or *Capacity* of existing, as others; be it, lastly, either something *created*, or of *itself*, and *necessarily existing*, yet still, as far as we know any thing of the nature of it, 'tis an *indolent* thing, it neither *acts*, nor is in the least *acted upon*;

We are certain of a first Cause, in what manner soever the dispute about Space be determin'd

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“ *ginary Extension*, or the general Idea of Extension particulariz'd in an *imaginary Subject*; and hence it is that *Space* is said to be extended, which would be nonsense to say of Extension itself: and Bodies are said to be in *Space*, which would likewise be nonsense to say of *Extension*. And so it is conceiv'd as *immoveable, indivisible, infinite*. Immoveable, &c. all properties of Substances; which makes it plain that it is conceiv'd after the manner of Substance, and therefore is, because it can be nothing else, an *imaginary Substratum*, which the Mind takes to parti-

“ cularize, and thereby render conceivable, its general Idea of Extension; which could not otherwise fall within the Imagination, nor be estimated any way but by abstract numbers, so many Yards, or so many Miles, 10, 20, 30; without attending to any thing but the numbers, and the meaning of the Words, Yards, Miles, &c. as it is when we reckon Ounces, Pounds, &c. of Weight.-- Thus then you see how we come by the notion of Space, and what it is.” See also Note 5.

G

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

on; it cannot therefore, as mere *Extension*, under which notion only it appears to us, be the *Cause* of *Matter*, or impress *Motion* on it, (D.) There

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(D.) There are some, who considering Space as *self-existent*, imagine it to be the *immensity* of God: And indeed, if we grant it to exist of itself, it must necessarily be refer'd to God. For whate'er has *self-existence*, must at the same time be believ'd to have all *Perfection*. For what can limit a self-existent Being? Self-existence is the greatest perfection, and no reason can be conceiv'd why all perfections should not be ascribed to him who has that: We must therefore entirely deny Space to be *self-existent*, or else refer it to God: These Men urge farther, in defence of their Opinion, that every *Faculty* which is in any degree *conscious*, is to be refer'd to God, and has him in some respect for its *Object*. For they think it absurd to suppose, that the Creatures should be perceiv'd, and the Author, whose Workmanship they are, not perceiv'd in the least. All *Faculties* therefore which are in any respect *perceptive*, perceive God some way or other: some in a greater degree and more clearly, others less and more obscurely, according to their native Perfection. Now our *senses* being very imperfect, can apprehend nothing in God beside his *Immensity*, and that very obscurely: But our *Understanding* perceives his *intellectual Attributes*, namely, *Wisdom*, *Goodness*, &c. and an Intellect more perfect than that of Man may apprehend some properties as much unknown to us as *Wisdom* and *Goodness* are to the *Senses*: Nay, pious Men, and such as are endow'd with the Holy Spirit, especially the inspired Prophets, behold such Marks of the Divine Presence, as neither can be perceiv'd nor believ'd by the Impious.

When they are ask'd how *Space*, to which no *Action* can be attributed (as far as we know any thing of its nature) may belong to God, who is entirely and essentially *active*; they reply, that an *Object*, when perceiv'd by different *Faculties*, leaves *Tokens* of itself, which have no more connection with one another, than if

they proceeded from the most different *Objects*, and hence it comes to pass, that we often take a thing which is perceiv'd by many *Faculties*, to be more than one. A blind Man that felt *Snow* to be *cold*, and when his eyes were open'd, perceiv'd the same under the appearance of *white*, would not know it to be the same, without a new Experiment. But, after comparing and examining it, he would easily apprehend that the same thing seem'd *cold* to the *touch*, and *white* to the *Eyes*, tho' *Cold* and *Whiteness* have no more connection with each other than the *Mind* and *Space*: He therefore that apprehends *God* by his *Senses* as *extended*, by his *Reason* as a *Spirit*, may not observe without Examination, that these tokens belong to the same Being, any more than the Man that was lately blind, but now sees, can perceive that the tangible and visible *Qualities* inhere in the same Substance; namely, the *Snow*: but upon Examination he will find, that this *Space* is *self-existent*, and also *eternal*, *infinite*, *immoveable*; and that an *infinite Mind*, such as *God* is, has the very same *Attributes*. Since then there cannot be *two* Infinite and Self-existent Beings, they will have it to be plain, that these are partial perceptions of the same thing, and belong to the same Substance, no less than *Cold* and *Whiteness* to the *Snow*.

But to these we reply,

1st. That the Self-existence of *Space* is not certain, which being taken away, the whole Reasoning falls to pieces.

2^{dly}. 'Tis affirm'd, without a Reason, that every *perceptive Faculty* has *God* in some manner for its *Object*: for how can they prove this in *Hearing*, *Smell*, or *Taste*, since *Space* is not perceiv'd by them, nor any thing that can be refer'd to *God*?

3^{dly}. 'Tis true, a thing may be apprehended by different *Faculties*, under *Tokens* that have no connection with one another, and thereby we are often deceiv'd, believing that there are different

There must then necessarily be another *Cause* of *Matter* and *Motion*, that is, *active, self-existent*, and the *Cause* of all *Things* and *Actions*, which, since they are not of themselves, require a *Cause*.

N O T E S.

different Objects perceiv'd by our Faculties, when it is but one and the same. But tho' these Tokens be *disperate*, yet they are not contrary and inconsistent: Whereas *Space* and *Spirit* seem entirely inconsistent; since one appears by its nature equally incapable of acting or being acted upon; the other self-active, and inseparable from Action:

ably. Those Objects that are perceiv'd by different Faculties, under Tokens which have no connection with one another, may also be actually separated; for instance, a thing may be cold and not white, white and not cold; and since *Space* and *Spirit* are in the Mind as

independent as Cold and White, they may be separated, and have a separate Existence, which cannot be said of any Divine Attribute.

sibly. It seems *useless*, and to no manner of purpose, that God should be the Object of the Senses, for Brutes, that are held thus to perceive him, worship him not, nor acknowledge him as the Author of their Beings, which must be esteem'd to be the only End of perceiving the Creator. From hence, I think, it appears, that this Opinion is by no means probable.

S E C T. III.

Of the First Cause.

I. **W**HAT this *active Principle* is we cannot apprehend otherwise than by *Reason*, for it occurs not to the Senses, unless by its *Effects*, nor is it perceived by them any more than *Light* is by the Ears: our Reasonings therefore about this Principle will be like those of a *blind Man* about *Light*. A *blind Man* may be assur'd that there is a certain thing call'd *Light*, which the Eye can perceive, as the Nose can Smells; he may be taught also by them who see, to understand many Advantages of *Light*, namely, that it can *direct* the Steps, that it can *warm*, that it derives its Origin from a large remote

Our Reasonings about the first Cause are like those of a blind Man about Light, since it is not an object of Sense.

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Body, *i. e.* the Sun (17.), that by the help of it very *distant* Bodies may be perceiv'd, with their *Forms* and other *Qualities* unknown to him; and that *Fire* which affords only *heat* to him, can give *light* also to them who see: Lastly, that it arises from some Motion in the minutest Particles of a *Fluid* (17.).

Yet we know a great many things concerning it.

II. From these *external* Properties he might discourse of Light, and in some measure understand the reasonings of other Men upon it: he would believe it to be distinct from *Heat*; he would eagerly desire, and willingly undergo many hardships, to enjoy the benefit of it; yet would he never have any such sense of it as those who see. After the same manner we may know many things about this active Principle, which we are compell'd, by the force of Reasons, to believe certainly to exist, tho' we are no less ignorant of what it is in itself, than the blind Man is of the Sensation which Light produces in those who see*.

That all other Beings proceed from it.

III. For instance; In the *first* place we are certain, that all other things come from this *active Principle*: For nothing else, as we have shewn before †, contains in itself *Necessary Existence*, or *active Power*, entirely independent of any other; as therefore itself is from none, so all others are from it. For from hence we conclude, that this Principle does Exist; because, after considering the rest of the things which exist, we perceive that they could neither *be* nor *act*, if that had not existed, and excited Motion in them.

IV. See.

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(17.) These two particulars seem neither necessary to be mentioned here among the *advantages* that Light affords, nor will the *latter* of them be thought to be exactly *true*, if understood of the *Cartesian* Subtle Fluid. Tho' perhaps in effect the *Cartesian* and *Newtonian* doctrines of *Vision* may in this respect be consistent. For, Sir *Isaac Newton* supposes, that *Vision* is perform'd chiefly by the vibrations of a fine *Medium*, which penetrates all Bodies, excited in the bottom of the Eye by the rays of Light, and propagated thro' the Capillaments of the *Optic Nerves* to the *Sensorium*: and *Des Cartes* maintains, that the Sun pressing the *Materia Subtilis*, wherewith the World is fill'd every way, the Vibrations or Pulses of that Matter reflected from Objects are communicated to the Eye, and thence to the *Sensory*. So that the Action or Vibration of a *Medium* is equally suppos'd in both, *Chambers*.

* This Comparison is farther illustrated by the Author of the Procedure of Human Understanding, in his Introduction.

† §. 2. Paragr. 3, 4, 5, &c. and Note 14.

IV. Secondly, we are certain that this Principle is *One*, Similar and Uniform; For *Matter* is, as to its *Essence*, every where *One* and *a-like*; the same must be said of *Space*, if we grant it to be any thing distinct from *Matter*: much more must the Cause, which fills *Space* with *Matter* be *One*, *simple* and *uniform* (18.).

G 3.

V. Thirdly,

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(18.) This Argument, (as well as some others hereafter mention'd) were the *foundation* of it true, can but be call'd a probable, presumptive one at best: nay, the contrary will rather follow from the *multiplicity* and *diversity* of created *Substances*. We shall therefore endeavour to give a distinct proof of the *Being* and *Attributes* of *God*, so far, at least, as the knowledge of them may affect our present Subject.

Now these seem capable of a clear deduction from this one *self-evident* Principle *, *I Exist. I my self exist*: therefore *something* exists. If *something* exists *now*, then *something* has existed *always*, otherwise, that *something* which now exists, must *once* either have been made by *nothing*, i. e. been *caused* by no *Cause*, which is absurd; or else have *made* itself, i. e. have *acted* before it *existed*, or been at once both *Effect* and *Cause*; which is also absurd; or, lastly, (which is the only supposition left) it must have been produced by *something*, which had its Existence from *something else*, which also depended on some *other Cause*, and so on in an *infinite Series* of *Caus'd* or *Successive Beings*, without any eternal or first Cause, which is also absurd. For either *some one* part of this infinite Series has not been *successive* to any other, or else *all* the several parts of it have been successive: if *some one* part of it has not, then there was a *first*, which destroys the Supposition; if *all* the several parts of it have been successive to each other, then they have all once been *future*, and if they have been once all future, then there was a time when *none* of them existed; and if there was a time when none of them existed, then either all the *parts* of this *Infinite Series*, and consequently the

whole, must have arisen from *nothing*: which is absurd; or else there must be something in the *whole* beside what is contain'd in all the *parts*; which is also absurd. This *infinite Series* therefore is, in the whole, and in every part, an express contradiction. Or thus: Since all the parts of this *infinite Series* are *successive* or *future* to one another, they must once either have been all future, i. e. *non-existent*, (and then the second absurdity will follow, i. e. *that this whole Series arose from nothing*) or else *all* but *some one*, (and then the first will follow, i. e. *that it had a beginning*) which *one* added to the rest, either makes them *infinite*, which is absurd, or they are *infinite* without that one, and then that one added to them makes one more than *infinite*, which is also absurd †.

Hence we gather the *Eternity* † of *some one Thing* or *Being*. That *every one* is not in like manner *Eternal a parte ante*, (as the Schoolmen improperly speak) or, *never had a Beginning*; particularly, that no *Body* or *material System* can be so (and the same reasons hold equally against any *finite immaterial Substance*) is sufficiently prov'd in the *Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion* ††.

From *Eternity* comes *Independence* or *Self-Existence*. For that which never had a beginning of Existence, could not possibly have any *Cause* of that existence (for then it would not be the *first Cause*, contrary to what we have prov'd above) or could depend upon no other thing for it, i. e. must be *independent* of all others; or, which is the same thing, must exist of itself, i. e. be *self-existent* ††.

Eternity a parte post, or *necessary Existence*; or an impossibility of ever ceasing to be, is a necessary consequence of *Independence*. For,

wha†.

* See X a: at the end of Chap. I.

† X b.

‖ X c.

†† X d.

‖‖ X e.

Infinite in
Nature and
Power.

V. Thirdly, That it is *Infinite* both in *Nature* and *Power*: For since it exists of *itself*, there is nothing that can bound its *Nature* or *Power*.

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what depends upon no Cause can never be alter'd or destroy'd by any, as was shewn in Notes 9 and 14, and X e.

From Independence comes also *Omnipotence*. For a Being that depends upon no external Cause for his Existence, and has *active Power*, (as was shewn at the same time that we prov'd his Existence, and by the same Medium) cannot depend upon any for the exertion of that power, and consequently no *limits* or defect can be apply'd to *either* his Existence or *Power*. For *Limitation* is an *effect* of some *superior cause*, which in the *present* case there cannot be: consequently to suppose *limits* where there can be no *limiter*; is to suppose an *Effect without a Cause*; which is a Contradiction †.

To suppose this Being limited in or by its own *Nature*, is to suppose some *Nature antecedent*, or *limiting Quality superior*, to that Being, to the Existence of whom, no Thing, no Quality, is in any respect *antecedent*, or *superior*: which is another Contradiction. And to suppose that there is no such thing as *action* or *power* in a Being which appears to be the fountain of all action and power, is (if possible) the worst supposition of all.

Liberty is also included in the Idea of *Omnipotence*: *Active Power* implies *Freedom*. *Infinite Power* is *absolute Freedom*. What therefore has no bounds set to its power, what can have no opposition made to its Will, nor restraint laid on its Actions, must both will and act *freely*. This Attribute is also prov'd from the beginning of Motion, and the creation and disposition of indifferent things ‖. But tho' this Being is *free*, and as such, the Author of *Change* in other Beings, yet he must himself be *Unchangeable*. For all *changes* have a beginning, and consequently are Effects of some *prior Causes*: But there can be nothing *prior* to the Existence of this Being, as he is *Eternal*, neither any *Cause* of it, as he is *independent*;

nor consequently any *change* in it: except we could suppose him to *change himself*, which is the same absurdity as to *produce himself*, i. e. to be at the same time both *Effect* and *Cause*.

Thus we come to the Knowledge of an *Eternal, Independent, Omnipotent, Free, and Unchangeable Being*.

Omniscience, as well as some of the foregoing Attributes, may be more easily deduced thus: We find in ourselves such Qualities as *Thought* and *Intelligence, Power, Freedom, &c.* of which we have *intuitive Knowledge*, as much as of our own *Existence*; and that to have these is a *perfection*, or, better than to be without them: We find also, that these have not been in us from *Eternity*, consequently they must have had a *Beginning*, and consequently some *Cause*, (for the same reason that a *Being*, beginning to exist in time, requires a Cause) which Cause, as it must be *superior* to its *Effect*, has them in a *superior Degree* ††; and if it be the *first Cause*, as itself can depend upon no *other*, must have them in *perfection*, or in an *infinite* or *unlimited Degree* (if these Words can properly be here apply'd ‖‖.) Since *Bounds* or *Limitation* would be without a *Limiter* (as has been shewn) i. e. an Effect, without a Cause.

The *Phænomena* of *Nature* also lead us up to *one*, such first Cause, which is sufficient for their production, and therefore none else are *necessary*; and tho' *several* more *independent* Beings might possibly exist, yet would they be no *Gods* to us; for they would have no manner of Relation to us, nor we any thing to do with them*. Since therefore the same reason holds for no more than *One* such, to suppose more than one is at least *unreasonable*.

These seem to be all the *simple* Attributes observable in the Divine Nature, which, as they are differently combin'd by us, come under different names. Thus the unlimited exercise of *Gods Knowledge* and *Power* demonstrates

† X f.
part of X k.

‖ See Note 20. and our Author's Note F. and the references.
‖‖ See X l.

* X g.

†† See the latter

Power. 'Tis to be observ'd farther, that the number of *possible* things is conceiv'd by us to be infinite at least in *Power*, but nothing can be *possible*,

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frates him *Omnipresent*, i. e. at all times and in all places so present with every Creature, as to have an absolute *Knowledge* of, and *Power* over it; always to *superwise* and govern it †.

His enjoying all conceivable perfections in an entire absolute manner, denotes him infinite, or absolutely *perfect* †; and, which is the same thing, his being capable of no *want*, *defect*, or *unhappiness* whatsoever, defines him *all sufficient*.

And since we can never fully comprehend the *nature* of such an infinite or perfect Being, nor conceive the *manner* of his *Existence*, we stile him *Incomprehensible*. To doubt whether his *Nature*, and *manner* of *Existence* may be in reality thus *incomprehensible* to us, is to doubt whether the *less* may not contain the *greater*; and whether our Ideas of things all existing *with* a Cause, may not shew us the *manner* of a thing's existing *without* a Cause, existing in a *manner* quite *different* from every other thing. He that can doubt of this, may doubt also, whether twice two may not be equal to twenty; and whether he may not know how the Sun shines by his being always in the Dark.

The *Moral Attributes* of God, are deducible after the same manner from his *Natural* ones. All of them (except Goodness) are consider'd only as consequences of the former, when exercised on some other Beings, and seem to be the Perfections of his *External* Acts, rather than any new internal perfections of his Nature or Essence; and are very properly term'd, his *secondary, relative* Attributes*.

And tho' the Existence of any moral Quality or Action is not capable of strict Demonstration, because every moral Action or Quality, as such, depends upon the Will of the Agent, which is absolutely free. Yet, we have as great an Assurance that there are Moral Qualities in God, and that he will always Act according to these Moral Qualities, as the nature

of the thing admits, and may be as absolutely certain of it, as if we could demonstrate it ††.

I shall begin again, with a Self-Evident Proposition:

Pleasure is different from *Pain*; consequently there's a *difference* in things. Pleasure is *fit* for, or *agreeable* to, the Nature of a sensible Being, or is a *natural Good*; Pain is *unfit*, or is a *natural Evil*: consequently, there's a *natural fitness* and *unfitness* of things; or (which is the very same, and what these terms should always mean) *Natural Good* and *Evil*.

The voluntary *application* of this *fitness* and *unfitness* to any *Rational* Being, or the Production †† of this *Natural Good* and *Evil* by a *Rational* Being, is *Moral Fitness* and *Unfitness*, or *Moral Good* and *Evil*: consequently there is such a thing as *Moral Good* and *Evil*. An *Inclination* to, and *Approbation* of, this *Moral Good*, is implanted in every rational Creature, and is *perfective* of its Nature, and therefore it must be communicated by, and consequently be inherent in, the Creator †††:

To Will and Act agreeably to this Affection and Approbation, is also a Perfection; the contrary an imperfection; consequently the former, as it is a Perfection found in some degree in the Creature, must belong to, and be, in the highest degree, in the Creator, who has been already proved to exist in the best manner possible, or to have all *natural* perfections in an infinite or perfect Degree †††; and therefore he must have all *moral* ones so too.

As his *Knowledge* and *Power* are *perfect*, he must always both perceive and be able to pursue this *Moral Good*: And as his *Happiness* is *complete*, there can be no possible reason why he should ever *will* the contrary; nay, there is a good reason why he should not, namely, otherwise a perfect Thing would contradict itself, and will a *defect* or *imperfection*, i. e. be perfect and not perfect at the same time: And

† X h. † See Wollaston, p. 70, 93.
†† See Ditton on Moral Evidence, p. 1, 2.

* See Impartial Enquiry, p. 29, 68, &c;
†† X i. ††† X k. †††† X l.

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possible, to which there is not some *Power correspondent*, that might actually effect it, since therefore the things that are possible, cannot be

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And a Being infinitely happy, and who loves and approves himself, because he is so, would hate and disapprove the very same thing in others, *i. e.* would love his own Nature, and yet hate any thing that resembles it; which is absurd*. It follows then, that he must always *know*, be *able*, and *willing* to do, and therefore *actually* do what is absolutely *best* to be done, *i. e.* produce the greatest Sum of Happiness, or be absolutely and completely Good. This also was included in Benevolence, and the moral Sense above mentioned †.

For if he has implanted Benevolent Affections in us, and a Sense which approves them, he must himself have both the same Affections, and the same Sense of them ||.

Again: The Idea of *Goodness* properly implies an inclination of communicating happiness to others; if then this Being be *Good*, he must actually have communicated happiness to others; and *vice versa*, if he have communicated happiness to others, he must be *good*: But this Being has communicated happiness to others, therefore he is *Good*.

The Idea of *Wisdom* implies his knowledge and observance of the most proper methods of effecting this, and is included in his *Omniscience*; it being nothing but that very knowledge consider'd, with relation to practice. It appears farther, from considering the only *causes of imprudence* in Men, which are either *Ignorance*, *Partiality*, or *Inattention*; none of which can have place in God: He cannot be *ignorant* of any thing, since both all things, and their *Relations* to each other, proceed from him: he cannot be *aw'd* by any *Power*, or *sway'd* by any *interest*, since (as has been shewn) he is *independent* and *all-sufficient*; and he cannot be *inattentive*, since he always sees every thing *intuitively* and at once; and consequently he

must always *know* and *do* what is *fittest* and *wisest* to be done.

From which also follows his *Justice*: For he that sees all the *circumstances of things*, and the *qualifications of persons*, and has *ability* to regulate these, and no manner of *temptation* to do otherwise, must certainly suit these *Circumstances* to those *Qualifications*, or, provide that persons receive the natural and proper consequence of their *Actions*; or (which is the same) do with every person what is exactly just and right.

The same also holds for his *Holiness* and *Vercacity*, or rather *Faithfulness*. As to the former, he must always dislike and detest Evil, since it can never become in the least *agreeable* to his *Perfections*, or *serviceable* to his *Use*: As to the latter, he must adhere to *Truth*, as it is a *Perfection*, and co-incident with *Good*, &c. since he can have no possible *reason* or *motive* to deviate from it. "The reason why Men break their Words (says Bp. Wilkins) is either because of their *rashness* and *inconsiderateness* in making Promises, or their *forgetfulness* in not minding them, or their *inconstancy* in not keeping them, or their *impotence* to perform them: But now the Divine Nature being infinitely *wise*, and *all-sufficient*, can have no temptation to be otherwise than *true* and *faithful*, his infinite *knowledge* and *wisdom* secures him from being deceiv'd *himself*, his *Omnipotence* doth exempt him from standing in need of deceiving *others*, and his *Goodness* secures us from the least suspicion of any *inclination* thereto ††."

Thus may we reason about the several perfections of the supreme Being, but that which should chiefly direct us in these our Enquiries, is the Idea of his *Infinite Goodness*. "This (says the same learned Person ||) is the first and clearest Notion we have of him, the

found-

* See Scot's Works, Vol. 2. Disc. XIV. p. 303.

†† Nat. Relig. Ch. 10. p. 142. 6th Edit.

† See Xi.

|| Ibid.

||| Ibid. p. 138.

be limited, there must also be a Cause infinitely powerful. For as one Possibility

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“ dation of all our Worship and Religion; and “ without which all his other Attributes “ would not afford sufficient grounds for our “ Love and Adoration.” Power without Goodness is attended only with the Idea of Terror; Justice, of Rigour and Severity; Wisdom, of Artifice and Cunning; and Truth will be nothing but rigid Inflexibility in arbitrary Decrees*. So that there is no other Attribute, when consider'd separately from it, capable of giving the Heart any kind or amiable impressions; and all the other moral Attributes (if they can properly be call'd Attributes) are so far from existing apart from it, that they may be consider'd only as so many different Views of the same Goodness in the Creator, and various Sources of Happiness to the Creature. Nay, farther, the rest of the moral Attributes seem as it were sub-ordinate to, and regulated by, this one principal Perfection, and brightest ray of the Divinity. Thus we conceive his Justice to be exerted on any Being no farther than his Goodness necessarily requires, in order to the making that Being, or others, sensible of the venious nature and pernicious effects of Sin; and thereby bringing either it, or some others, to as great a degree of Happiness, as their several Natures become capable of †. His Holiness hates and abhors all Wickedness, only as the necessary Consequence of it is absolute and unavoidable Misery; and his Veracity or Faithfulness, seems to be no more concern'd for Truth, than as it is connected with, and productive of, the Happiness of all rational Beings; to provide the properest Means for attaining which great end, is the exercise of his Wisdom. Thus, tho' we are certain, that all the Divine Attributes proceed equally from one and the same principle, and are united in one Essence; yet when we consider that Essence as exhibited to us in different respects; we also conceive it partially under the distinct Ideas of Superior, and Inferior, antecedent and consequent,

&c. In which Sense, Goodness is superior and antecedent to, and as it were, the root and foundation of, all the Moral Attributes.

I have all along declin'd the Argument a priori, drawn from the antecedent necessity of Existence, as well for the reasons given above in Note 14. as also, because it seem'd not to carry some Attributes, so far as they might be deduced a Posteriori, and to be scarce consistent with others. That the Self-existent Being, for instance, is not a blind, unintelligent Necessity, but in the most proper Sense, an understanding and really active Being, cannot be demonstrated strictly and properly a priori, as Dr. Clarke says †, with a great deal of reason; and how absolute Necessity is reconcilable with absolute freedom, seems hard to conceive. For why should not this necessity extend to all the Operations, the Will, the Decrees, as well as the Existence of the first Cause: and take away that Freedom of determination, that entire Liberty of Indifference, which our Author has sufficiently proved †, to be a property of God himself, as well as Man? And, if we cannot admit it in one case, why should we in the other? I don't say this Necessity is inconsistent with perfect Freedom, as the former is an Imperfection, since we do not conceive it to be such, any farther, than as it proceeds, ab extra, from some superior Cause imposing it. But, this I say, that, be it what you please, the very Nature and Idea of it seems repugnant to that of Freedom, i. e. the power of determining in cases absolutely indifferent, without any previous reason, or necessity whatsoever; and consequently these two can never be co-existent in the same Cause: He that considers this attentively, will, I believe, find it to be more than a mere quibble on the Words † † †.

Lastly, This Necessity of Existence, being (as Dr. Clarke contends *) Simple and Uniform, without any possible difference or variety, should admit

* See Tillotson's 90 Sermon. vol. 2. Fol. p. 679. † † Chap. 5. §. 1. Subj. 4. and elsewhere.

† X m.

‡ Demonstr. p. 52.

‡ ‡ See Notes 14 & 62.

* Demonstr. Prop. 7.

Possibility requires a Cause, so infinite Possibilities require a Cause infinitely powerful (19).

Free.

VI. Fourthly, Since *Space* is conceiv'd as merely *idle* and *indifferent*, with respect to *Repletion* or *Vacuity*; since the *Matter* which fills *Space*, is in like manner merely passive and indifferent with respect to *Motion* and *Rest*; it follows, that the *Cause* which fills *Space* with *Matter*, and produces *Motion* in that *Matter*, is perfectly *free*; so that the *Creation* and *Motion* of *Matter* must be *Works* of free *Choice*, and not *Necessity*, in the *Agent*. For, if the *Agent* effected these by *Necessity*, they would also be necessary *Effects*, and could not be conceiv'd to be in themselves indifferent to *Existence*

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admit of no difference or variety of any sort, or in any respect, and consequently must exclude all *diversity*, or *different kinds of perfection* (as well as different *Persons*) from the Divine Nature, which is suppos'd to exist thereby. It must be utterly inconsistent with that Variety of Attributes, such as *Knowledge* and *Power*, &c. which we conceive to be very *distinct* Properties, and which *Dr. Clarke*, and every one else, concludes to be essentially in *God*.

If the *Learned Doctor's* Notion of *absolute Necessity* proves all this, I humbly conceive it proves too much, and if it does not prove this I cannot apprehend how it proves any thing at all. See *S. C's Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 170.

(19.) I shall give the Reader this Argument as it is propos'd after another manner, by *Dr. Fides*, and the Answer to it, by *S. C.*

“ To say a thing is possible, is to say, there is some *thing*, some *power* or other capable of producing it. For *nothing*, or what has no power, can produce *no effect*. The power therefore, which is to bring what is possible into *Being*, is necessarily suppos'd already to exist; otherwise a *Perfection* might arise out of *non-entity*, or without a Cause;

“ and what we conceive possible; would be *really impossible* *.”

Which the *Author* of the *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. confutes, by a parallel instance.

“ If a person having first proved the existence of a Power that is perfect, and made it appear, that a perfect power cannot but extend to whatever is a capable object of power, or includes not a contradiction; should proceed to prove, that the *Act of Creation* implies no contradiction, and then at last should conclude, that therefore *Creation* is a possibility (*i. e.* effectible by the exercise of that perfect or almighty power, whose Existence he had before demonstrated) I conceive there could be no reasonable exception against such a method of Arguing. But if, on the contrary, he should say, I plainly perceive there's no contradiction in the Supposition of the Creation, or production of a thing that was not, and should from thence immediately infer, that a power capable of Creation exists, this would be a very preposterous way of Demonstrating: which yet is the same method with that of the present Argument ||.”

* Theolog. Spec. p. 15.

|| *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 178.

istence or Non-Existence, as proceeding from a necessary Cause, (20.)

VII. Fifthly: Tho' by our outward Senses, and the notices which they convey to us, we cannot go beyond *Space, Matter, Motion, sensible Qualities*, and this *Active Principle* which we are speaking of; yet, if we inspect our own Minds, we may contemplate a *Self-conscious and thinking Principle* within us, whose Actions are, to *will, refuse, doubt, reason, affirm and deny*, which carry nothing of Extension along with them, nor necessarily include it in them, nor have any relation to *Place or Space*; but are entirely abstracted from the Notions of *external or internal*. That there is such a Principle in us we are certain, not only from our senses, or the impulses of external objects, but also from Reflection and Self-Consciousness. 'Tis to be observ'd farther, that we can at our pleasure move some parts of Matter, and shake the Limbs of our Body by thought only, that is, by Volition*, whence it appears, that Motion may be produc'd in Matter by thought; and that something of this kind is to be attributed to the first Cause, in order to put Matter into Motion, nay, to bring it into Being. *Cogitation* also, *Will* and *Consciousness*, or Faculties equivalent to these, are necessary to a *free Cause*, and on that account to be attributed to the first Cause, being (as shall be shewn below) perfectly Free: which Cause, since it is infinite (as we have proved) in its Essence and Power, it must be so likewise in *Intelligence*, viz. *Omnipotent* and *Omniscient*.

That it is a conscious, intelligent Being, and omniscient.

VIII. Sixthly: Since this Principle (which we call *God*) is the Cause of all things, and infinite in *Knowledge* as well as *Power*, it follows, that he acts, not by blind impulse but, *for an End*; and has order'd his Works by such Wisdom, as to be consistent with themselves, and not destructive of each other.

That he acts for an End.

H 2

IX. Se-

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(20.) For an excellent illustration of this Argument, see Dr. Clarke's *Demonstrat.* p. 24, 25, 26. and 65, 66, 67. 5th Edit. See also *Cudworth*, p. 667, &c. and the *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 31, 32, &c.

* That *Volition* and *Action* are perfectly distinct, and must proceed from two different Powers, See Note 61. That *Action* also is two-fold, See Note 62.

That the end of Creation was to exercise the power, and to communicate the Goodness of the Deity.

IX. Seventhly: Since God is perfect in himself, since all things subsist by his Providence, and stand in need of him, but he of none; and, since he can neither be profited nor incommoded by his Works, nor affected by their Good or Evil; it follows, that he made these things for no Advantage of his own, and that he neither receives nor expects any Benefit from them. For by creating things without himself, he must necessarily have sought either their Benefit or his own; but what Benefit can God seek for himself, who possesses all Good? That certainly which was wanting to him, and necessarily must be wanting, to a Being even absolutely perfect, till he has created something; I mean the Exercise of his Attributes *without* the communicating of his Power and Goodness: That therefore only must he be supposed to have sought in the Creation and Disposal of his Works (21.). Not that *Externals* can add any thing to God, for

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(21.) Some have objected here, that according to this Notion, there must have been a Time before the existence of any created Beings, when God was neither infinitely *happy*, nor absolutely *Good* *. But the one part of this objection evidently arises from a mistake of our Author's Notion, who has often told us, that he does not suppose any thing external to the Deity, to *add* the least to his own Happiness, or Essential Perfections; (and indeed, to think otherwise, would be worse than to imagine the Fountain fed by its own Streams; or the Sun enlighten'd by its own Rays) but only to *manifest* them to us his Creatures, and increase our happiness and perfection, by our *knowledge* and *imitation* of them. The *other* part cannot be of force against Creation in any *particular* time; because it will hold equally against it in *all* times: Against the very possibility of Creation in General, since with God there is no *prior* and *posterior*, no difference of time applicable to his Existence, as we have endeavour'd to prove in X c. Besides, is it not absurd to talk of *time*, before the beginning of things, which time (as we have shewn in

the same place) can only be conceiv'd as *co-existent with*, or rather *consequential to*, the Being of these things? 'Tis in vain therefore to ask, why were not Beings created *sooner*? Since no part of Duration conceivable can ever be assign'd, when some were not Created; and every period of time has equal relation to Eternity. "As to the second Sense of the Question (says *Cudworth*) Why the World, tho' it could not possibly be from Eternity, yet was no sooner, but so lately made? We say, that this is an *absurd Question*, both because Time was made together with the World, and there was no *sooner* or *later* before Time; and also, because whatsoever had a beginning, must of necessity be once but a *day old*. Wherefore, the World could not possibly have been so made by God in time, as not to be once but *five* or *six thousand* Years old and no more, as now it is." p. 887. See the same more at large in *Fiddes's Theolog. Spec.* B. 3. Part 1. Ch. 2. and in *Bentley's Boyle's Lect.* p. 232, 235. 5th Edit. or *Jenkin's Reasonableness of Christianity*, Vol. 2. C. 9. or *Sir M. Hale's Prim. Originat. of Mankind*, S. 1. C. 6. Where

* See *Bp. Pearson on the Creed*, 2d Edit. p. 62, 63.

for they have no manner of Proportion to his *Power* or *Nature*: but he has in himself the adequate Exercise of his Powers, namely in the Contemplation and Love of himself. Externals therefore can neither encrease nor diminish the *Exercise* of his Powers, which before was *infinite* (22.) God is indifferent therefore as to these, nor does his Exercise *without* please him, otherwise than as he has chosen to exercise himself thus; as will be shewn below *. And hence it manifestly follows, that the World is as well as it could be made by infinite *Power* and *Goodness*. For since the Exercise of the Divine Power, and the Communication of his Goodness, are the Ends for which the World is fram'd, there is no doubt but God has attain'd these Ends.

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X. I.

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Where you have all the absurd Queries of that kind solidly and acutely answer'd.

(22.) The *Powers* or *Attributes* themselves were in some Sense *Infinite*, but I don't apprehend how the *Exercise* of them can properly be said to be so. It seems impossible to suppose any Divine Attribute, either Natural or Moral, to be exerted infinitely on a finite Subject, since that Subject must necessarily be incapable of receiving it. Whence appears the absurdity of imagining any Man to be the object of God's *infinite Justice*, and at the same time, of his *infinite Mercy* too, in an infinite manner, as some love to speak; which with them raises a mighty difficulty about *Hell Torments*: Whereas, if we should allow that the Divine Justice is an Attribute entirely distinct from Goodness, and also, that a person may be at the same time the object of both; concerning which see X m. Yet still we can easily suppose these two Attributes in such a Case *bounded* and *balanc'd*, as it were, by each other, without any *defect* in either; all the limitation here only rising from the limitation or *finiteness* of the *Subject* on which they are suppos'd to be *exerted*; which, as 'tis finite, manifestly cannot receive an infinite Exercise of an infinite Power.

The same Observation will help us to solve the Difficulty which some bring against the very notion of infinite Power in God, which, say they, implies this Contradiction, *viz.* that he *cannot* do all that he *can* do: He could not make the World ever so soon, but that it was possible for him to have made it sooner: he can never make it so large, that it will be impossible for him to make it larger: which is absurd. To which we answer; If these terms, *can* and *cannot*, were applied to the same thing, in the same *respect*, it would indeed be a plain contradiction; but in the present case 'tis otherwise. The *former* is apply'd to the *Objects* of power in general, which are included in this Idea, *i. e.* 'tis affirm'd, that the Power of God is perfect, or extends, and is commensurate, to all objects of Power, or that he can do whatever is in the nature of things possible to be done. The latter is affirm'd only of some *particular Subject*, which is in its own nature incapable of Perfection, or incommensurate to this infinite Power, and on which therefore we may truly say, that this infinite Power cannot be employ'd, or that this Perfection can never be completely exhibited, or exhausted in it: So that in the present Case, these two
Words

* See Chap. 5. §. 1. Subj. 4.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

When the World is said to be created for God's Glory, 'tis after the manner of Men.

X. I know 'tis commonly said, that the World was made for the *Glory of God*: but this is *after the manner of Men*. For *Desire of Glory* is attributed to God in the same manner as *Anger, Love, Revenge, Eyes, and Hands*. When therefore the Scripture teaches us, that the World was created for the *Glory of God*, 'tis to be understood, that the Divine Attributes, namely, *Power, Goodness and Wisdom*, shine forth as clearly in his Works, as if he had no other intent in making them, beside the *Ostentation of these Attributes*; nor could they have answer'd that End more fitly, if they had been design'd for *Glory*: but, strictly speaking, the *Power of God* is infinite, and when he acts for the *Good of his Creatures* according to that infinite *Power*, he is *infinitely Good*. Infinite knows no bounds, nor has the *Goodness of God* any other bounds besides his *Wisdom and Power*, which are also infinite. And in reality, this makes most for the *Glory of God*, viz. to have created a World with the greatest *Goodness*. (23.)

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Words may be used, without any Contradiction: and infinite, or rather perfect, Power may properly enough be term'd, *not able to do several things* without supposing a defect in that power, but only in the Subjects which are incommensurate to it, or essentially incapable of receiving it. Now, that the *Material World*, and every part or property thereof is, in every respect, incapable of this Infinity, has, I think, been prov'd in Note 5. and that *no created Being* whatsoever can be capable of it, will be shewn in Note 28.

(23.) "The reason why God made the World (says the *learned Person* so often cited above) was from his own overflowing and communicative *Goodness*; that there might be other Beings also happy beside himself, and enjoy themselves." And afterwards, "*God did not make the World merely to ostentate his Skill and Power, but to communicate his Goodness, which is chiefly and properly his Glory,*

"as the Light and Splendor of the Sun is the *Glory of it* †."

We have a fine Paragraph or two to the same purpose in Mr. *Wolaston's Delin. of the Religion of Nature*, p. 115—120.

The same *Notion* is well stated in *Scott's Christian Life*; where the *Glory of God* and the *Happiness of Man* are shewn to be *co-incident* †. As this seems to be very often misunderstood, it may not be improper to insert a Passage or two from that excellent Author. "A true Survey and Inspection of God's *Nature*, will intrust us, that being *infinitely perfect*, as he is, he must be *infinitely happy* within himself; and so can design no self-end without himself; and consequently, that the end for which he requires our Service, is not any advantage he expects to reap from it, or farther addition to his own happiness, he being from all Eternity *past*, as completely happy as he can be to all Eternity *to come*; and

† *Intell. System*, p. 886.

‡ See Vol. 1. p. 4, 5.

* Vol. 2. Chap. 6. p. 434, 435.

XI. By *Good*, I here understand that which is *convenient* and *commodious*, that which is *correspondent* to the *Appetite* of every Creature. God therefore created the World with as great convenience, and fitness, with as great congruity to the Appetites of things, as could be effected by infinite *Power*, *Wisdom*, and *Goodness*. If then any thing inconvenient or incommodious be now, or was from the beginning in it, that certainly could not be hindered or removed even by infinite *Power*, *Wisdom*, and *Goodness* (24.).

That God made the World as well as it could be made by the highest Power, Goodness, and Wisdom.

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“ and therefore, what other end can he be sup-
 “ pos’d to aim at, than our Good and Happi-
 “ nesses? It is true indeed, he designs to Glo-
 “ rify himself in our Happiness; but how?
 “ Not to render himself more glorious by it
 “ than he is in himself, for that is impossible;
 “ but to display, and shew forth his own essen-
 “ tial Glory to all that are capable of admiri-
 “ ring and imitating him; that thereby he
 “ might invite them to transcribe that Goodness
 “ of his into their Nature, of which his Glo-
 “ ry is the Shine and Lustre, and thereby to
 “ Glorify themselves; and what can more ef-
 “ fectually display the Glory of a Being who
 “ is infinitely wise, and powerful, and good,
 “ than to contrive and effect the Happiness of
 “ his Creatures, and especially of his rational
 “ Creatures, who, of all others, have the most
 “ ample capacity of Happiness?

And again: “ † But, doth not the Scripture
 “ tell us, that he doth all things for his own
 “ Glory, and that he obtains this end, as well
 “ by punishing, as by rewarding, his Creatures?
 “ very true; but then it is to be consider’d,
 “ that the Glory he aims at, consists not in
 “ receiving any Good from us, but in doing
 “ and communicating all Good to us. For
 “ infinite Goodness can no otherwise be glori-
 “ fied, than by its own overflowings and free
 “ communications, and it can no otherwise be
 “ glorified in the punishment of its Creatures;
 “ but only as it doth good by it: For, should
 “ it punish without good reason, it would re-
 “ proach and vilify itself; but if it doth it

“ for good reason, it must be because it is
 “ good either for itself, or others: for itself it
 “ cannot be; for how can an infinitely happy
 “ Being, reap any Good from another’s Mis-
 “ ery? And therefore it must be for the Good
 “ of others, either to reduce those who are pu-
 “ nish’d, or to warn others, by their Example;
 “ from running away from their Duty and
 “ Happiness. So that to do Good is the end of
 “ God’s Punishment; and because it is so, he
 “ is glorify’d by it: and considering that he is
 “ so infinitely happy, that he can no ways serve
 “ himself by our Miseries, it is impossible he
 “ should have any other end in concerning
 “ himself about us, but only the Great; God-
 “ like one of doing us Good, and making us
 “ happy.” See also Discourse 14 in the same
 Vol. p. 302;

To the same purpose is Smith’s Excellent
 Discourse of the Existence and Nature of God,
 Ch. 4 and 7. †: And D’Oyly’s first Dissertation,
 p. 122. and Rymer’s General Representation of
 Reveald Religion, p. 260—267. and p. 511.
 and Bp. Burnet’s Exposition of the Articles, p. 27.
 4th Edit. and our Author’s Sermon on Divine
 Predestination, &c. §. 33. For a sufficient An-
 swer to the Objection drawn from Prov. 16. 4.
 see Tillotson’s 2 vol. of Sermons, Fol. p. 681.

(24.) Our Author rightly concludes from the
 Nature and Will of God, as discover’d above;
 that nothing can be made by him (by whom
 are all things made) really unworthy of, or in-
 consistent with, these; however unaccountable
 and irregular things may at present seem to us:

For;

† Vol. 2: p. 204. Fol.

‡ See Select Discourses, p. 136, and 147.

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For, having demonstrated the Divine Perfections in one Sense *a Priori*, i. e. prior to the Examination of particular Phænomena, no seeming difficulties or objections whatsoever *a Posteriori*, i. e. from these Phænomena, ought to invalidate the belief of them, but should be all over-ruled by, and give way to, these; ex-

cept they amount to an equal degree of *Clearness* and *Certainty*, with the proofs of these themselves; and also cannot possibly admit of any manner of *Solution* consistent with them; neither of which Cases can ever be made out, as will, I hope, appear in the following Chapters of this Book.

REMARKS, referr'd to in Note 18.

[X a.] That this Proposition must be allow'd for *self-evident*, and as such, incapable of proof, appears from the *absurdities* which all run into who attempt to prove their own Existence from any other *medium*, viz. from any of their *operations*. I think, say they, therefore I am, i. e. I, who am, think; therefore, I, who think, am. I being supposed to exist, do think, therefore this thinking proves that Existence. Is not this plainly arguing in a circle, and proving a thing by presupposing it? And is it not full as clear to me that I am, as that I think? Tho' perhaps I could not be certain of my Existence except I perceiv'd something: yet sure the perception of my own Existence must be both as *early* and as *evident* as any other perceptions. The first Proposition therefore is *self-evident*, and if the second be not so too, 'tis however necessarily connected with one. I begin with our own Existence, because we have *Intuitive Knowledge* of no other.

[X b.] See the absurdity of this Infinite Series, as to Generations, Motion, Number, Magnitude, &c. in the Notes 5, and X d. All, or any of which Arguments demonstrate the Absurdity of it, as it is fairly and fully stated by Dr. Green in his late *Philosophy* *. Where you see the true old *Atheistic Series* in a different dress from that in Dr. Clarke's 2d Proposition.

The same way of reasoning is made use of in a *Philosophical Essay towards an Eviction of the Being and Attributes of God*, by S. W †. " That
" the World was not eternal, but created, is
" demonstrable from things that are visible:
" Our Argument shall be from Generation,
" Whatsoever is begotten, was begotten of
" some other; for nothing can possibly beget
" or make itself, otherwise it will follow,
" that the same thing is, and is not, both at
" one instant, seeing it is both the producer,
" and the thing to be produced. It is to be
" produced, and so it is not yet, it is like-
" wise a producer, and that supposeth that it
" is in Being: It is therefore in Being, and
" it is not in Being, that's a manifest contra-
" diction. Wherefore, nothing can generate,
" make, or produce itself: wherefore, every
" thing that is begotten, is begotten of some
" other, and then the other which begot it,
" either was itself in the same manner begot-
" ten, or it was not; if it was not, we are al-
" ready come to the first Principle, which
" was, unbegotten, and so have discover'd a
" God-head. If it was begotten, either we
" must follow up the Course of successive Ge-
" neration to some first Production from a
" Cause eternal, or else we must necessarily
" say, that the Course of Generations had no
" beginning, and consequently, that infinite
" Successions are already past, which is as
" much as to acknowledge, that an infinite
" Number

* B. 6. C. 5. §. 8. p. 763.

† 2d Edit. Oxford, 1655.

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“ Number of Successions, are past, and if past, then they are at an end; So we have found an infinite Number, which hath had an end, that is another Contradiction. Again: if any shall affirm, that the course of Generation had no beginning, but that the number of them hath been Infinite: let us put a Case, and reason with him: We will imagine the Generations of *Abraham*, for example, and *Joseph* the Son of *Isaac*, the Son of *Abraham*. I demand therefore, whether before the birth of *Abraham* there had past an infinite Series of Generations, or not? If the Series was finite, the Work of Generation had beginning; which is the Conclusion I contend for: if the Series past was infinite; then, at the birth of *Joseph*, 'tis evident, that more Generations were past, so we have found a Number greater than that which was suppos'd to be Infinite: and consequently that was not Infinite; so it was both Infinite and not Infinite, a manifest contradiction.

“ But if we say that *Abraham's* was Infinite, and that so was *Joseph's* also, then it will follow, that the Number of *Abraham's* was equal with the number of *Joseph's*, but *Abraham's* was but a part of *Joseph's*, wherefore the part is equal to the whole. Else admit that *Abraham's* was finite, but when it came to *Joseph*, that then the number was Infinite, it follows then, that a finite number added to a finite, shall make an Infinite, which likewise is against the common light of reason. We see therefore, that supposing the Eternity of the World, or the Infinity of Generations, doth force the Mind to contradictions, and consequently the Fiction is vain and utterly impossible. And, as we have argued in the way of Generation, so we may likewise in every thing where there is a Motion, or Mutation, that is, in all the parts of the visible World. The Creation therefore of the World, from the visible things thereof, is manifest. Q. E. D.” p. 19. And again, p. 22. Well, having concluded the Creation and Beginning of the World, we see it follows, that thence we conclude

“ the Eternal Power and God-head; that is, the Eternity and Power of the God-head. As for Eternity, we have, by undeniable consequence, resolv'd all Motions in the World into the bosom of a first Mover, and if we suppose him a first Mover, the Supposition will evidently conclude, that he is Eternal, *i. e.* that he is without Beginning of Essence, or without any term or limit of Duration. For if it had any beginning of Essence or Duration, that beginning of Being presupposeth a priority of not-being, (that is, actual Being is not of the Essence of it) and so that we may, without any contradiction, suppose it not to be yet in Being; that is, we may bring our Understandings, without error, to the apprehension of it, as being yet in the State of Power only, or Potential-being, so as things are in their Causes. So then, let us conceit it in this State, and compare this State with the other when it had Being; and it is evident, that this passage, or transition from want of Being to a Being, cannot be without a Motion, nor Motion without an actual Mover: but that which moves a thing from not being to a State of Being, is necessarily a precedent Mover to that which from it receives its Being: So then that which is supposed to be the first original Mover will have a Mover, which shall of necessity have gone before it, and consequently it will be both a first and not a first Mover, which is a plain Contradiction. Instead of multiplying Arguments without necessity, we will only return by the Footsteps of our Analysis, and so from the Being of a first Mover, conclude the Eternity. If it be a first Mover, then it had no former Mover; and if so, then it never was produced from Nothing into Being; and if so, then it never had any beginning of its Being, then it is Eternal. Therefore, whatsoever is the first Mover, it must of necessity likewise be eternal: but from the common affections of things visible, we did before demonstrate an Original and first Mover: Wherefore, the visible things of this World,

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“ World, they likewise do evict the Eternity of the God-head *.

“ And that God was a God of Power, it was demonstratèd then, when we found him to be the first Cause, and Original Mover, and Creator of the World †.”

[X c.] The generally receiv'd Notion of *Eternity*, as consisting in a continual addibility of *successive Duration*, is, I think, the very same thing as an *infinite Series*, and consequently liable to the same objections: We must therefore try to rescue this Divine Attribute from such an absurd interpretation.

Now, if we attentively examine our *Idea of Eternity*, I believe we shall find that it amounts to thus much: *viz. uniform, invariable Existence*: or, *simple Existence* join'd with *Necessity*: by which last Word we only understand an *Impossibility of having ever begun, or of ever ceasing*. This I apprehend to be all that can consistently be affirm'd of the Divine Existence in this respect, and perhaps we may more easily and safely determine what the manner of it is *not*, than what it is; v. g. that it continues not by *time*, or in *place*: Indeed *local Extension* and *successive Duration*, are modes of the Existence of most Beings, and therefore we find it very difficult to consider any existence without them: But as we have endeavour'd to shew the possibility of removing the *former* from the Divine Essence, in Notes 5. 11, & 13. So here, I think, it may be shewn also, that the *latter* has no necessary connection with it, but rather the contrary.

In order to do this, it will be necessary to explain what we mean by *Time*, which (according to Mr. *Locke*) is of the very same kind with *Duration*; and may properly be term'd a part of it: This is very well defin'd by *Leibnitz*, to be the *Order of Succession of Created Beings*. We manifestly get the Notion of it, by reflecting on the Succession of Ideas in our Minds, which we are apt to conceive as a *Chain* drawn out in length, of which all the particular Ideas are consider'd as the *Links*, Whereas, had we but one *invariate perception*,

without any such Succession of Ideas in our Minds, we could have no such notion as this of *Duration*, but that of pure *Existence* only. Now *Existence* being evidently a simple Idea, (tho' perhaps *Duration* be not) is consequently incapable of a Definition, and we need, I think, only observe of it here, that if we join our Idea of *Duration* to it, we still add nothing to the Idea of it as it is in *itself*, but merely a *relation* to external things; which Idea of *Duration* therefore seems purely accidental to it, and no necessary Ingredient of the former Idea, which is complete without it. *Time* then, or *Duration*, is an Idea entirely resulting from our Consideration of the Existence of Beings, with reference to a real or imaginary *Succession*. Whence it will follow in the *first* place, that we cannot possibly frame any Idea of this kind of *Duration*, without taking in *Succession*; and secondly, that we can't easily separate the *Existence* of any finite, changeable Beings from this kind of *Duration*.

Our next Enquiry must be, whether this Idea of *Duration* be connected with the Existence of those Beings entirely as they *exist*, or only as they exist in such a *particular manner*: Whether it belongs to all *Existence*, as *Existence*, or only to a particular *Sort* of Existence, *viz.* that Existence which includes the fore-mention'd relation to *Succession*. The latter, I think, will appear more probable, when we reflect that it is only from the *variableness* and *contingency* of our own Existence, that all our Successions spring: whereas, were we entirely *independent*, we must be absolutely *immutable*, and *invariably permanent*; and also, that we can contemplate even this Existence of ours without any Succession, *i. e.* we have a power of confining our thoughts and attending to this Idea *alone* for some small *time* (if that Word be excusable here) exclusive of all other Ideas, and consequently exclusive of *Succession*. This Mr. *Locke* allows, being what he calls an *Instant*, which, says he, “ is that which takes up “ the time only of one Idea in our Minds, without “ the Succession of any other, wherein there- “ fore we perceive no Succession at all ||.”

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Succession therefore does not appear to be necessarily join'd with the Idea of absolute existence, since we can consider *one* (for how small a time soever) *without*, and *independent* of, the *other*. Nay, lastly, there is a certain Existence to which it cannot possibly be in any sense apply'd, and that is a *Perfect* one. Suppose this perfect Being *alone* in nature, as we must believe him once to have been, and then what *change* of Nature, or *Succession* of Ideas can be found? What *flux* of Moments, what *alteration* or *increase* can we imagine in his own uniform, invariable Essence? What Idea have we of *Duration* as apply'd to his Existence, antecedent to his *Willing* and *Creating* External things? Such Duration then as we are acquainted with, can, I humbly apprehend, have no manner of relation to this immutable Being, while suppos'd to exist alone: But as soon as he determin'd to exercise his several Attributes in the production of something without himself, then we have reason to think, that *Time*, *Succession*, and *Increase* began. "Tho' the Eternal Being had no necessary Succession in his own Nature, yet being perfectly *Self-active* and *free*, thence it proceeded, that the exercise of his freedom in decreeing and producing the Creatures, in such a manner and order as was judg'd fit by his most perfect Wisdom, became the Original of whatever real Succession has been in Nature, and such Succession as we are apt to conceive to have *preceded*, is no other than imaginary." *Impart. Enq.* p. 208.

To the several Objections against this Notion drawn from God's Eternal *Wisdom*, *Ideas*, *Decrees*, &c. see a sufficient Answer in the same place.

I shall transcribe this excellent Author's reply to the most common and considerable one about the Schoolman's *punctum stans*, which we also esteem as indefensible an Hypothesis as the other.

"Some will possibly object, that if there was once no real Succession in Nature, it will follow, that the Divine Existence was then at least (as 'tis usually said to be) *in-*

stantaneous. But to this it may be reply'd, that Existence is nothing, if distinguish'd from the Being which exists. Consequently, there can no real quantity belong to it as so distinguish'd. Wherefore it cannot properly be denominated either *finite* or *infinite*, *successive* or *instantaneous*. For these are Attributes which have a Reference to *Quantity*, and can no more agree to existence, which is but a *Mode* of Beings, than they can to *Necessity*, or *Contingence*, which are Modes of Existence. To define *Eternity* or *Necessary Existence* by *Infinity* or the *Negation* of *Limits*, seems to be no less impertinent, than to define *Virtue* by the *Negation* of *Red* or *Blew*. For Existence (which has no *Quantity* or *Dimensions*) hath no more Analogy to *Extension* and *Limits*, than *Virtue* (which hath no *Colour*) hath to *Red* or *Blew*. And, for the same reason, it is no less improper to define it to be *instantaneous*, since even an *Instant* (as likewise an *Atom*) is conceiv'd as *quantity*, tho' the minutest imaginable. But if it cannot properly be denominated *instantaneous*, much less can it be *successive*.*"

See also *Episcop. Inst. Theol.* L. 4. C. 9.

To which give me leave to add the Testimony of *Cudworth*, *True Intell. Syst.* p. 644, &c. Where, having confuted the absurd Notion of the World's *Eternity*, he adds: "Here will the *Atheist* think presently he has got a great advantage to disprove the *Existence* of a *God*. Do not they who thus destroy the *Eternity* of the *World* at the same time also destroy the *Eternity* of the *Creator*? For, if *Time* itself were not *Eternal*, then, how could the *Deity* or any thing else be so? The *Atheist* securely taking it for granted, that *God* himself could not be otherwise *Eternal* than by a *successive flux* of *infinite Time*. But we say, that this will on the contrary afford us a plain *Demonstration* of the *Existence* of a *Deity*. For, since the *World* and *Time* itself were not *infinite* in their *past Duration*, but had a *Beginning*, therefore were they both certainly made together, by some other Being, who

is

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" is, in order of Nature, senior to Time, and so
 " without Time before Time: He being above
 " that successive Flux, and comprehending in
 " the Stability and immutable Perfection of his own
 " Being, his Yesterday, and to Day, and for ever.
 " Or thus: Something was of necessity infinite
 " in Duration, and without a Beginning; But
 " neither the World, nor Motion, nor Time, i. e.
 " no Successive Being was such; therefore is
 " there something else, whose Being and Dura-
 " tion is not successive and flowing, but perman-
 " ent, to whom this Infinity belongeth. The
 " Atheists here can only smile, or make faces;
 " and shew their little Wit in quibbling upon
 " *nunc stans*, or a standing Now of Eternity; as
 " if this standing Eternity of the Deity (which
 " with so much reason hath been contended
 " for by the ancient genuine Theists) were no-
 " thing but a pitiful small moment of Time stand-
 " ing still; and as if the Duration of all Be-
 " ings whatsoever must needs be like their
 " own: whereas the Duration of every thing
 " must of necessity be agreeable to its nature:
 " and therefore, as that whose imperfect nature
 " is ever flowing like a River; and consists in
 " continual Motion, and changes one after ano-
 " ther, must needs have accordingly a succes-
 " sive and flowing Duration, sliding perpetually
 " from present into past, and always posting
 " on towards the future, expecting something
 " of itself which is not yet in Being, but to
 " come; so must that whose perfect Nature is
 " essentially immutable, and always the same,
 " and necessarily existent, have a permanent Du-
 " ration; never losing any thing of itself once
 " present, as sliding away from it; nor yet
 " running forwards to meet something of it-
 " self before, which is not yet in Being, and
 " it is as contradictory for it ever to have be-
 " gun, as ever to cease to be."

After all, it must be again confess'd, that the
 Idea of Succession (as S. C. observes) so insin-
 uates itself into our Idea of Existence, and is
 so closely connected with the existence of all
 finite Beings, that we find it extremely diffi-
 cult to imagine the Eternal Existence of God,
 any otherwise than as an Eternal continued
 Series or Succession:

Our constant conversation with material Ob-
 jects, makes it almost impossible for us to con-
 sider things abstracted from time and place,
 which (as we observ'd before) are Modes of
 the existence of most things, and therefore we
 are apt rashly to apply these considerations to
 the great Author and Preserver of all things.
 We seem to think, that as the most exalted I-
 dea we can form of God's Eternity and Omni-
 Presence must be infinite Duration, and unbound-
 ed Extension, so these are to be strictly and
 positively attributed to him; whence must fol-
 low all the absurdities of past, and future, Ex-
 tension in this and that place, as compatible
 with the Divine Essence. Whereas absolute po-
 sitive Infinity (such as belongs to God*) does,
 in its very notion exclude the consideration of
 Parts; since no addition of any parts whatso-
 ever can amount, or in the least degree ap-
 proach to it. (Tho' such negative Infinity as
 belongs to all Quantities, cannot possibly be
 consider'd otherwise †.) So that whosoever ac-
 knowledges God's perfections to be strictly in-
 finite, does, by that confession, deny that they
 may be consider'd as made up of parts: that
 Immensity can be compos'd of any finite Exten-
 sions, or Eternity consist of multiply'd Dura-
 tions, and consequently, that there can be
 Length or Space, Distance or Time, past or future,
 with the Eternal God †. When therefore we say
 that God always was, or ever will be, we don't
 mean, by these and the like Words, that his
 Existence has strictly any relation to times past
 or future, that it is at all increas'd, alter'd, or
 affected thereby; but only thus much is intend-
 ed, viz. that whenever we suppose any other
 Beings existing, or time and Succession begun,
 then it was, is, or will be proper for these
 Beings to affirm in any part of this their Time
 or Succession, that God also exists. In the same
 manner as it may be affirm'd of some Proposi-
 tions, that they always were and will be true,
 that they are true in this or that, and every
 place: tho' such assertions are exceedingly im-
 proper, because Propositions, or necessary
 Truths, have no manner of Relation to either
 time or place. All Expressions therefore
 which

* See Note 5, and X 1.

† Ibid.

‡ See Locke on H. U. B. 2. C. 15. §.

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which imply Succession, such as, *was, will be, always, when, &c.* as well as those that imply Locality, such as, *Ubi, where, &c.**, can only be apply'd to finite temporary things, which exist in time and place: with which things so existing, as well as every point of time and place, the Deity is suppos'd to be *co-existent, or commensurate*; tho' his own Nature and Essence be very different from these, and have properly no manner of relation to, or connection with them. If then we will attribute *Duration* to him, it must be *permanent, unsuccessive* Duration, *i. e.* Duration of a quite different kind from what we meet with here. But it is to be remember'd, that we don't pretend to explain the *Nature* of Eternity, or to determine the *manner* of such Existence as excludes all *Succession*; since it is sufficient for us here to shew the possibility of conceiving the thing in general, the certainty of it having been demonstrated already, when we prov'd that something must be *Eternal*, having also shewn, that Eternity could not consist in successive Duration.

If then the Divine Existence cannot include succession of parts, or our kind of Duration, (which perhaps by this time may not seem altogether improbable) neither can his *essential Attributes*. His *Knowledge*, *v. g.* can have no relation to times *past or future, to fore or after*; nor can any object be said to be at a *Distance* from it, or any imaginary distance set *bounds* to it.

The chief reason why *we* don't perceive and know any thing that has a real Existence, is, because that Existence is remov'd from us by the distance of *time or place*: But this reason cannot hold with God, who is (tho' in a manner far different from his Creatures) always *present to all times and places*, and consequently must behold all things existing therein; as well as we see any object at due distance directly before us. Thus he that is travelling on a Road cannot see those who come behind, or are gone far before him; but he who from some *Eminence* beholds the *whole* Road, from end to end, views at once all the distant tra-

vellers succeeding one another. But this, I think, is so evident in itself, that neither Argument nor Simile can make it more so.

Hence then appears the impropriety of those terms, *Divine Prescience, Predestination, &c.* which have so long puzzled the World, to no manner of purpose: and the only conclusion at last must be, that all things which ever *were, or will be*, which, with respect to some former or latter times, and to persons placed therein, may be call'd *past or future*, are always equally and at once *present* to the view of God; that to him, strictly and absolutely, *a thousand Years are as one Day, and one Day as a thousand Years*; and that whatever difficulties seem to attend this conception of things being successive to us, and not so to him, can be no Argument against the matter itself, which is demonstrable; but only one of the many Instances of the Weakness of Human Understanding in things pertaining unto God:

Against the common Notion of *Eternity*, see the *Spectator*, N^o 590. or Sir *M. Hale's Primæ Orig. of Mankind*, §. 1. c. 6. p. 123. or a *Philosophical Essay, &c.* by *Seth Ward*, p. 23. or *Grew's Cosmologia Sacra*, B. 1. c. 1. par. 9.

Both this Attribute and Omnipresence are also well treated of by *J. Smith*, in his Discourse concerning the *Existence and Nature of God*, C. 2. §. 4, 5. *Select Discourses*, p. 125, 126, &c.

[X d.] " Here we find certain *Chains* of *Causes* and *Effects*, and many *parts* of this *System* owing their *Existence*, and the *manner* of their *Existence*, to a preceding *Cause*, consequently we can't, with any possibility of reason, assert, that the *whole* System exist without a *Cause*; for this is the same as to assert, that the *parts* do not belong to the *whole*. Again, a material System compos'd of parts that are *changeable*, cannot exist without a *Cause* *distinct* from, and *prior* to such a System. For, wherever there is a *Change*, there must be a *Cause* of that *Change*, otherwise there would be a *Beginning* without a *Cause*. The *Cause* of this *Change* cannot

* Sec. X h.

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“ be in the *materials* of this System for the very same reason: therefore it must be in something *distinct* from, and *prior* to, the System itself. The same will be the Case as to *Motion* in a Material System; there is no Motion but what is the effect of a *former* Motion, consequently there is no Motion in such a System which has been from *Eternity*, or which has not been *Caused*, &c. *

“ From the *Imperfection* also, or *Unhappiness*, which we see in this System, in *Man* particularly; from the *frame* and *constitution* of it, 'tis evident that it did not exist without a Cause.

“ The Question then will be, What is the Cause of its Existence? Now that cannot be in *itself*, for then a thing would be before it was, which is a contradiction. It follows then, that some *other* Being is the Cause of its Existence; and the next Question will be, *who* is this Being? Now as whatever began to exist, must owe its Existence to some *preceeding* Cause; so that Cause if it has not existed eternally, must likewise owe its Existence to some *other* preceeding Cause, and that to *another*, and so on till we ascend to (the *first* Cause, or to) a Being that is *Eternal*, and exists absolutely *without* Cause. And that there is such a Being is evident, otherwise, as nothing could begin to exist without a Cause, so nothing that is not *Eternal* could ever have existed †.

[X e.] That the Idea of *Self Existence* can imply nothing more than a *Negation* of *Dependence* on any *External* Cause; and that there can be neither *external* nor *internal* Cause of the Existence of an *Eternal* Being, neither *antecedent* nor *concomitant* Necessity, nor any positive *permanent* Ground or *Reason* whatsoever, See Note 14.

To what has been said already on the head of *Necessity*, I shall add a Passage from the *Philosophical Essay*, &c. from which we may perceive

what was formerly understood by that Attribute, and how it was us'd to be prov'd. “ I say then that the Godhead is a *Necessary Being*, that is, that it is impossible it should fail, and implies a Contradiction, that it should not be. That is it which Divines mean, when they say it is *Eternal a parte post*, as well as a *parte ante*: for if it be not a *Necessary Being*, that is, if Necessity of Being be not included in the Essence of the God-head, then it is not impossible that it should lose its Being, *i. e.* it is in the power of something to cause it to lose its Being: But nothing can pass from Being to not Being, without Change, or Motion; so then, the Motion of it is in the power of some other, and consequently, this is not the Original of Motion, but that other; but we suppos'd that to be the Original of Motion, consequently, it is not possible it should be depriv'd of its Being, that is, it is a necessary Being in respect of others: and as impossible it is that it should lose its Being of itself. Indeed it is a manifest Contradiction, that any thing should have a power over its own Essence, and needs no farther conviction, or opposition, seeing the active power of any thing is founded in the Essence of it, and consequently cannot exceed the Essence, or bring it not to be †.”

[X f.] For a Being to be *limited*, or *deficient* in any respect, is to be *dependent* on some *other* Being in that respect, which gave it just so much and no more *; consequently, that Being which in *no* respect depends upon any other, is not limited or deficient at all. For tho' *Figure*, *Divisibility*, &c. and all manner of Limitation, is in *one* Sense (*viz.* in Beings *essentially* Imperfect) as Dr. Clarke observes †, properly a mere *Negation* or *Defect*; yet in another, *viz.* in a Being *essentially* and *absolutely* perfect, Finiteness must be conceiv'd as a *positive Effect* of some Cause, restraining it to a certain

* See S. C's *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 31, 32, &c.

† *Enquiry*, p. 11, 12, 18, &c. See also Dr. Bentley's Boyle's Lect. *Serm.* 6. p. 127, &c. 5th Edit. and the other Authors refer'd to in Note 5.

‡ *Philosoph. Essay*, p. 26, &c.

* See Scott, in Note 32.

† *Demonst.* p. 56, 57. 5th Edit.

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certain Degree. In all Beings capable of Quantity, Increase, &c. and consequently *uncapable of Perfection or absolute Infinity*; Limitation or Defect, is there a necessary consequence of Existence, and closely connected with it, and is only a Negation of that Perfection which is entirely incompatible with their Essence; and therefore in these it requires no farther Cause. But in a Being naturally capable of Perfection or strict Infinity, all Imperfection or Finiteness, as it does not necessarily flow from the Nature of it, must have some ground or reason, which reason must therefore be foreign to it, and consequently is an effect of some other external Cause, and consequently cannot have place in the First Cause. That this Being is capable of Perfection, or absolute Infinity, appears, I think, from hence, that he is manifestly the Subject of one Infinite or perfect Attribute, viz. Eternity, or absolute Existence. His Existence has been shewn to be perfect in this one respect, and therefore it may be perfect in every other also. Now that which is the Subject of one Infinite Attribute or Perfection, and may have others too, must have all of them Infinitely or in Perfection: Since, to have any Perfections in a finite limited manner, when the Subject and these Attributes are both capable of strict Infinity, would be the forementioned absurdity of positive Limitation without a Cause. This method of arguing, will prove any Perfection to be in the Deity *infinite modo*, when we have once shewn that it belongs to him at all: at least, will shew that it is unreasonable for us to suppose it limited, when we can find no manner of Ground for any Limitation, which is perhaps as far as we can go.

[X g.] That the Word God is *relative*, see *Newton Princ. Schol. Gen. sub. fin.* p. 525, &c. 3d Edit. or *Maxwell's Appendix to Cumberland*, p. 106.

To shew that there is only one Eternal Self-Existent Being, which bears the Relation of God to us, seems to be going as far as either is

necessary, or natural Light will lead vs. As Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of this and several other Attributes is entirely founded on his Idea of Necessity of Existence, of Space, &c. *, they must stand or fall together. They who endeavour to deduce it from Independence or Omnipotence evidently presuppose it in their definition of these Attributes.

[X h.] We cannot include any such Notion in Omnipresence, as makes the Deity present in his simple Essence to (or co-extended with) every point of the boundless Immensity †; Since this Idea of Extension or Expansion, seems plainly inconsistent with that simple Essence ‖. Not that we suppose these Attributes of Knowledge and Power acting separate from his Essence, but we suppose his Essence to have no more relation to the Idea of Space, Place, where, &c. than either of these Attributes has *.

Dr. Clarke's Query, "How it can be shewn upon any other Principle than that of Necessary existence, that his governing Wisdom and Power must be present in those boundless Spaces where we know of no Phænomena or Effects to prove its existence †?" is well answer'd by *Episcopius*: I shall give it in his own Words. "Hic (nempe Deum esse extra mundum) non modo prorsus est *καταλίπτον* sed etiam valde absurdum, quia totum atque omne illud spatium quod extra hunc mundum esse dicitur, nihil omnino reale est, sed pure *pute imaginarium*, & prorsus nihilum; ut autem Deus esse dicatur in pure *pute imaginario*, & prorsus *nibilo*, per se absurdum est; quia esse in dicit *realem habitudinem aut denominationem ab eo in quo quid existit: Realis autem habitudo & denominatio a nibilo, sive ab eo quod nihil reale est, accipi nullo modo potest. Dicere Deum ibi habere intrinsecam & absolutam presentiam qua in seipso realiter existit, est fingere presentiam sine Relatione aut denominatione ad id, cui quod præsens esse dicitur, quod implicat contradictionem. Intrinseca enim sive absoluta presentia, qua quid in seipso realiter existit, non est præsens in nibilo; sed mera essentia sive existia.*"

* See Notes 5 & 14. † Dr. Clarke's *Demonst.* p. 47. ‖ See Note 11: * See Note 13: †† Answer to 7th Letter, p. 49c.

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“*sentia extra nihilum. Nihil enim sibi ipsi præ-
sens esse potest* ||.”

Now to urge upon us the *old Maxim*, that *nothing can be where it is not*, is still supposing a Spirit existing *somewhere*, or in some *Ubi*, or *co-extended*, or *co-expanded*, with some part of *Space*, and *acting* in some other part of such imaginary Space (which Suppositions we have long ago discarded) 'Tis confining its existence to one particular *Modus*; and, as we conceive, to a *wrong* one: concerning the *Modality* of whose existence we can only think and argue *negatively*: *viz.* that it is not by way of *Extension* in any sense.

To the trite Objection, that what has no *magnitude*, or is *no where*, is therefore *Nothing*, see a sufficient Answer in *Cudworth*, p 770, to 778, &c. How this agrees with *Philo's Paradox*, that *God is every where and yet no where*, see *ibid.* p. 773. But the strongest confirmation of this Opinion, which *Dr. Moore* stiles *Nullibism*, may be drawn from the learned *Dr's* Arguments against it in his *Enebir. Metaph. C. 27.*

[X i.] By the above mentioned pleasure or *natural Good*, I mean that pleasure which every one feels in himself. By the *production* of it here, I understand both the producing such in himself, and also in others: to both which he is equally determin'd by his Nature, tho' from quite different Principles. To the former he is directed by *Self-Love*: To the latter by a certain disinterested Benevolent Instinct or Affection, and that which determines him to approve the Affection and the Actions flowing from it is called his *Moral Sense*. The former of these Instincts, as it implies increase of Happiness, is only applicable to finite, imperfect Creatures: the latter seems to be common to us and the Deity. Who could have been determin'd to create us only by such a disinterested Benevolent Affection, as this is supposed to be. This is always approv'd by the *Moral Sense*; tho' it may be doubted whether that be confined entirely to it.

The Object of both these Instincts is *natural Good*; and, I think, *moral Good* may be al-

low'd to consist in the prosecution of either, or both of them together, so long as the former is in due subordination to the latter. As for my part, I cannot extend the Notion of *Virtue* so far, as totally to exclude all manner of regard to *Self*, or *private Good*, consider'd as such, and therein to overlook the tendency of all such private Affections as the All-wise Author of our Being has thought fit to implant in us, as necessary helps and inducements to *Self-Preservation*. I see no reason why a particular endeavour in any Man to perfect his Faculties both of Body and Mind, to improve and advance his own Happiness in the whole, (which is in some respect answering the End of his Creation and co-operating with the Will of his Maker) may not deserve the Name of *Virtue*; at least of *Duty*; the discharge of which will make a Person the proper Subject of Reward, even abstractedly from Benevolent or Publick Affections*. Tho' these indeed are intitled to it in a much higher and sublimer degree, because they are productive of more universal Good. Nay, the kind Author of Nature has inseparably annex'd such a pleasing Sensation, or agreeable Consciousness, to the Performance, or even Remembrance of these Benevolent Actions, as is scarce distinguishable from the Instinct or Affection itself, which impels us towards them: and therefore to have some attention to this *Self-complacency*, this inward Satisfaction, and Delight, which accompanies our noblest Actions; to be in some degree directed by it in the performance of them, does not appear to detract from their Worth, and moral Excellency. For a full proof, as well as a beautiful Explication of this moral Sense, see *Mr. Hutcheson's Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good*, together with his *Illustrations*.

That all the Notion we can possibly frame of *Moral Good* or *Evil*, of *Virtue* or *Vice*, &c. consists entirely in *promoting* or *procuring* this natural *Good* or *Evil*, see sufficiently confirmed by *Sherlock* †. “Whereas, says he, we distinguish between *Moral* and *Natural Good* and *Evil*; the only difference between them is
“ this,

|| *Inst. Theol. L. 4. c. 13. p. 294.*

* See *Mr. Jackson's Defence of Human Liberty*, p. 2.

† *On Judgment*, p. 20 to 25.

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“ this, that *Moral Good and Evil* is in the *Will*
 “ and *Choice*, *Natural Good and Evil* is in the
 “ *Nature of things*; that which is *good or hurt-*
 “ *ful* to ourselves or others, is naturally *Good*
 “ or *Evil*; to *love*, to *chuse*, to *do* that which is
 “ *good or hurtful to ourselves or others*, is morally
 “ *Good or Evil*; or is the *Good or Evil* of our
 “ *Choice or Actions*. If you will but recollect your
 “ selves, you will find that you have no other
 “ notion of *Good or Evil* but this: when you
 “ say such a Man has done a very *Good* or very
 “ *Evil Action*, what do you mean by it? Do
 “ you not mean, that he has done something
 “ very good or very hurtful to *himself* or *others*?
 “ *When* you hear that any Man has
 “ done *Good or Evil*, is not the next Question,
 “ what good or what hurt has he done? and
 “ do you not mean by this, *Natural Good* or
 “ *Evil*? which is a plain Evidence, that you
 “ judge of the *Moral Good or Evil* of Actions,
 “ by the *Natural Good or Evil*, which they do.”
 See more on this Subject, deliver'd in the same
 place, with an Elegance and Perspicuity pecu-
 liar to that Author.

To the same purpose is Turner's excellent
Discourse of the Laws of Nature, and the *reason*
 of their *Obligation*.

This seems to be the ultimate *Criterion* of
 that *Fitness, Congruity, Reasonableness* and *Rela-*
tion of Things, so often repeated by some late
 Writers, *without or beyond* which I can fix no
 meaning at all to these Words. And this *Crite-*
rium should, I think, have been more distinct-
 ly specify'd. For when you say any thing is
fit; must we carry our enquiries no farther?
 Is it not a very proper Question, to ask, *for*
what is it fit? *Fit, Congruous, &c.* (as well as
 the Word *Necessary*) are mere relative terms
 (as we observ'd in Note 9.) and evidently refer
 to some *End*, and what can the end be here but
Happiness? These *Relations, &c.* may perhaps
 in some tolerable sense be call'd *Eternal* and
Immutable, because, whenever you suppose a
 Man in such certain Circumstances, such Con-

sequences and *Obligations*, did, or will, al-
 ways certainly follow*.

What is good for me now in these Circum-
 stances and *Respects*, will always be so in the
 same Circumstances and *Respects*, and can ne-
 ver be alter'd without altering the Nature of
 things, or the present System: but we cannot
 imagine these *Relations* therefore to be any real
Entities, or to have existed from all *Eternity*,
 or to be antecedent to, or independent of the
 Will of God himself; as some Writers seem to
 have done, if they had any determinate mean-
 ing at all †. We cannot, I say, imagine them
 to be either strictly *eternal* or *independent* of the
 Will of God, because they must necessarily
 presuppose a determination of that Will, and
 are in truth only consequences of the existence
 of things, which things proceed entirely from
 that determination †. Much less can we ap-
 prehend how these *Relations, &c.* “ *Are to be*
 “ *chosen for their own Sakes and intrinsic Worth*;
 “ *or have a full obligatory power antecedent to a-*
 “ *ny reward or punishment annex'd either by na-*
 “ *tural Consequence or positive Appointment to the*
 “ *Observance or Neglect of them* *.” Since the
 Natural Good or Happiness, consequent upon,
 and connected with, the observance of them,
 or the immediate rational pleasure which they
 produce, is to us the grand *Criterion* of them;
 the *Argument and Indication* of their *Worth*, the
 Ground of all their *Obligation*.

This Notion is pretty well handled by Tur-
 ner. “ *The Laws of Nature* [or, which is the
 “ same, *Natural Right and Wrong*] are such
 “ *Laws and Rules of Life*, as to the breach of
 “ which there is a natural Punishment annex'd.
 “ For to say a thing is essentially good or evil,
 “ to call it by hard Names, and to affirm that
 “ it hath a Natural Turpitude; or, to pass a
 “ Compliment upon it, and call it a Moral
 “ Restitute, and such like fine Scholastic
 “ Terms—without assigning a particular Rea-
 “ son of Interest, why we should do the one
 “ or avoid the other, is as much as to say, a
 thing

* See Locke's *Essay*, B. 4. C. 11. §. 14. or Turner on the *Laws of Nature, and their Obligation*,
 §. 20. or N. 76.

† See Hutcheson's *Illustrat.* §. 2. p. 250, 251.

‡ See our Author, C. 1. §. 3. par. 9. and C. 5. §. 1. par. 23, &c. and Notes 75, 76.

* *Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion*, prop. 1. §. 7. p. 218.

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“ thing is good-for nothing; or, it is bad, but we know not why; or, it is good or bad, for a Woman's Reason, because it is: and this Reason will serve as well to prove, that Murder or Adultery are good things, as that they are bad ones ††.

“ The Laws of Nature, therefore, have every one of them their Sanction in themselves *, i. e. some things naturally tend to our Happiness, and others to our Misery, and for that Reason they become natural Laws to us, or are Rules to direct our Actions by; and we are oblig'd to do the one and avoid the other, “ Upon a Principle of Self-happiness, and Self-preservation, which is the very root and spring of all Obligation whatsoever †.

“ From whence we may discern the Vanity and Folly of those learned Men, who are used to talk so loudly of essential Reëtitudes, and eternal Notions, and I know not what phantastical Idea, in an abstracted way; where as there is indeed nothing which is either good or bad merely by itself, but every thing which is good, is good, that is, useful to something; and every thing which is bad, is so with reference to some Nature or other, to which it is more or less pernicious and destructive: from whence it follows (the nature of Obligation being a result arising from the usefulness or hurtfulness of a thing proposed to be the object of a free Agent's choice, with respect to that Agent which is conversant about it) that all Obligation must be not of a simple, but of a compound, or concrete nature, and must always have an inseparable respect to the Interest or Happiness of those to whom that Obligation is binding. And it is not only true, that our Interest and our Duty are both of them the same, but that it is absolutely impossible any thing should be our Duty, which is not our Interest into the Bargain; for no Man can possibly be obliged to that which, all things considered; will be to his Disadvantage †.

Farther, most Authors who treat of the Production of this Natural good or evil in such a manner as to constitute Right or Wrong, mo-

ral good or evil, &c. appear either to equivocate in a double meaning of the Words: viz. as they imply producing Happiness either in ourselves alone, or in others, (which are two very different things, and should accordingly be always distinguish'd) or else to be deficient in pointing out a Rule, and proving an Obligation to it in the latter Sense, viz. with regard to others. This great defect in their Systems, seems to arise from not sufficiently attending to the above mention'd Moral Sense or Conscience, (as the meaning of that Word is well fix'd by Mr. Butler|||) which is of itself both Rule and Obligation. As an Instinct, it directs us to approve such Actions as tend to produce Happiness in others, and so is a Rule whereby we determine all such Actions to be virtuous; as it gives us pain, or makes us uneasy at the neglect of these Actions, or at the Practice of the contrary ones; it obliges us to pursue them, or makes the practice of them absolutely necessary to our Happiness: which is the true meaning of the Word Oblige, as was shewn in the preliminary Dissertation; and is proved more at large by Cumberland*.

That therefore, and that only, must be said to oblige us, which is necessary to our Happiness. Now, as the Sum of our Happiness depends upon the whole of our Existence, that only can be a complete and indispensable Obligation, which is equal and commensurate to the Sum total of our Happiness. Or, that Being only can, absolutely and effectually, oblige us, who has it in his Power to make our whole Existence happy or miserable; and of consequence, the Deity, who alone has that Power, must necessarily be taken into all Schemes of Morality, in order to super-induce a full, adequate Obligation, or such an one as will hold at all times, and extend to every action; and an endeavour to exclude the Consideration of his Will, or to deduce all Obligation from any Principles independent of it, has, I think, occasion'd another great defect in most of our modern Systems.

That this Moral Good is a Perfection in any Being, i. e. agreeable to, or perfective of, its Nature,

†† *Laws of Nat. &c.* §. 1. * *Ibid.* §. 2. † *Ibid.* §. 6. || *Ibid.* §. 14. See also Mr. Clarke's *Foundation of Morality, &c.* ||| *Serm.* 2d and 3d. * *C5.* §. 27. See also Puffendorf, B. 1. C. 6. §. 5. Note 4. and §. 8. Note 1.

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Nature, appears by the very Terms: also, that this *Moral Sense* is the greatest Perfection of *Human Nature*, and that there is something *analogous* to it, in the *Divine Nature*, may be seen in the above mention'd *Enquiry*, and *Illustrations of the Moral Sense*, p. 239, &c. See also *Scott's Christian Life*, Vol. 2. p. 33, 37, &c.

N. B. What has been here said about *Instincts*, *Affection*, *Moral Sense*, &c. may seem to imply, that these are all *innate*; contrary to what was proved in the *Preliminary Dissertation*: and indeed this was drawn up at first upon the supposed Validity of that Notion, which many may, perhaps, esteem valid still, and therefore I let the Argument stand in the old Terms; especially as it is not at all affected by the Truth or Falsity of that Notion; since it will really come to the same thing, with regard to the Moral Attributes of God, and the Nature of Virtue and Vice, whether the Deity has implanted these Passions, Instincts, and Affections in us, or has framed and disposed us in such a manner; has given us such Powers, and placed us in such Circumstances, that we shall necessarily *acquire* them; they'll be alike natural in either Sense, just as all moral Axioms, &c. are equally certain upon *Locke's Hypothesis*, as upon the old footing of innate Principles.

And tho' I take implanted *Senses*, *Instincts*, *Appetites*, *Passions*, *Affections*, &c. to be a remnant of the *Old Philosophy*, which used to call every thing Innate that it could not account for; and therefore, I heartily wish that they were all eradicated, (which was undoubtedly the aim of that great Author last mention'd; as it was a natural Consequence of his first Book, tho' he might not then think proper to speak out;) yet, as common use has fix'd this Notion of Innateness to them, I am oblig'd to follow my Author, and treat of them in the common Language. Only let it be observed here once for all, that every Argument which is built upon these Passions, Senses, &c. will be equally conclusive, whether they be implanted

or acquired. As to the present point in particular, Mr. *Hutcheson* has fully proved, that we are led insensibly, and by the constitution and circumstances of our very Being, to love and approve certain Actions, which we call *Virtuous*: which is enough for my purpose, as was hinted above. Against the Notion of *implanted Instincts*; see *Veltbuisson de Principiis justitiae & decori*, p. 73, &c. *Amstel.* 1651.

[X k.] That God must have the same Judgment and Approbation of this Moral Good, which all Rational Beings naturally have*; and that we must judge of the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, only by that Nature and those Perfections which we derive from him, is, I think, very plain: I mean, that we must not endeavour to conceive the several Attributes of God by *substituting* something in him of a quite different kind, and *totally diverse* from that which we find in ourselves, (as the learned Author of the Procedure of Human Understanding, seems to declare, p. 138, and elsewhere) tho' that be in some respects similar and *analogous* to this: But we are to suppose somewhat of the very same kind and sort, the same Qualities or Properties in general to be both in him and us, and then remove all manner of defect or imperfection which attends the particular *Modus* only of their Existence, as they are in us. Thus we ascribe to God all kinds and degrees of apparent Perfection observable in his Creatures, except such as argue at the same time Imperfection (v. g. Motion, which necessarily implies Limitation) or are inconsistent with some other and greater Perfection (v. g. the Exercise of punitive Justice in such a degree as would exclude Mercy; or, Materiality, which excludes Knowledge and Liberty †.) We also remove from him all want, dependence, alteration, uneasiness, &c. In short, all that results either from simple finiteness, or from the mere Union of two finite imperfect Substances, such as constitute Man. And when we have thus apply'd every thing in every manner of existence which seems to

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* See *Scott's Christian Life*, Part 2. C. 1. p. 21, 22. 1st Edit.

† See *A. Bp. Tillotson, Sermon* 76. 2d Vol. Fol. p. 569, &c. Dr. *J. Clarke on Moral Evil*, p. 95, &c. and *Scott's Christ. Life*, Part 2. C. 6. §. 2. p. 447, &c. 1st Edit.

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imply Perfection, and excluded every thing in every manner of Existence which implies or includes the contrary, we have got our Idea of an absolutely perfect Being, which we call God. 'Tis therefore attributing to God some real Qualities of a certain determinate kind, (v. g. Knowledge or Power, Goodness or Truth) the nature of which Qualities we do perceive, are directly conscious of, and know, which gives us an Idea or Conception of him, and a *proper* one too, (if any such distinction of Ideas are allow'd) and not imagining some others, we cannot tell of what sort, totally different in nature and kind from any that we ever did perceive or know; which would give us no Idea or Conception at all of him, either proper or improper.

In like manner we frame a partial conception of a Spirit in general (which we confessedly have) not by substituting some properties *different in kind* from those which we perceive in our own Spirit; but by supposing the very *same* properties, *i. e.* in kind, (*viz.* Cogitation, and a power of producing Motion) to be also inherent in some other immaterial Beings which we therefore call by the same Names. Now this is (as far as it goes) true, real knowledge, and may be apply'd and argu'd on intelligibly: but the other would, I fear, take away all possibility of arguing from the several Attributes or Properties of the Deity, to those of ourselves, and *vice versa*, all our reasonings upon them (as the learned Author expresses it, p. 134) would be precarious, and without any solid foundation in the Nature of things. Such analogical Knowledge then as that, is (according to my Notions of Knowledge) strictly and properly none at all; and if the Author uses analogy in that Sense, 'twill, I believe, be still taken only for a sort or degree of *Metaphor*, after all he has said in the last Chapter of his first Book, to distinguish them.

I would here be understood to affirm thus much of the simple *Nature* only, or *Kind*, or our *abstract* Idea of these Qualities *themselves*, and not of the *manner* of their Existence: which two (tho' this Author is pleas'd to use them promiscuously in p. 84, &c.) seem yet very different Considerations. For we apprehend several

Properties, or Qualities, as existing in our own Nature, independent of any particular manner; nay, in very *different manners*: v. g. Knowledge, either by Sensation or Reflection, by Deduction or immediate Intuition: Love attended with a certain degree of Pleasure or Pain, &c. and therefore we suppose that these Qualities may exist in the Divine Nature, in a manner entirely different from what they do in us, and yet be the very same Qualities still; which *Modus* of the Divine Being, or of any of his Attributes, is totally unknown to us, and we can only guess at it by some distant resemblance or *Analogy*; which Analogy I would therefore apply to this *Modus* of Existence, and to this *only*; which seems sufficient for all the great Purposes of Religion, and in which Sense the Notion may perhaps be just and useful, but cannot, I think, be extended to our Idea of the *whole Nature* and *Genus* of the Attribute itself. For, if the Divine Attributes be, *totò genere*, distinct and different from those Qualities which we esteem perfections in ourselves or others, if (as the same Author urges, p. 82.) the greatest perfections of those Creatures which fall under our Observation, (and these he will grant to be all that we have any Idea of) are really "*but so many Imperfections, when refer'd or attributed to the Divine Nature, as it is in itself, in any meaning whatsoever, even with the most exalted meaning we can possibly annex to them,*" (the Author understanding, I suppose, as usual, the *whole Nature* and *distinguishing kind* of those Qualities in themselves.) Then, how shall we discover which kind of Qualities God prefers before the contrary? How can we be certain that these in particular are agreeable to him? or how shall we hope and endeavour to make ourselves like him? Can we know the nature of one thing by another, entirely different from it? or can we imitate what we don't at all apprehend. "*It is foolish (says A. Bp. Tillotson) for any Man to pretend that he cannot know what Justice, and Goodness, and Truth in God are; for, if we do not know this, 'tis all one to us whether God be good or not; nor could we imitate his Goodness: for, he that imitates, endeavours to be like something that he knows, and must of necessity have*"

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“have some Idea of that to which he aims to be like; so that if we had no certain and settled Notion of the Justice and Goodness and Truth of God, he would be altogether an unintelligible Being: and Religion, which consists in the Imitation of him, would be utterly impossible*.”

Which destroys the Notion of Analogy (as was observ'd long ago by the *Free-thinker*, p. 50, &c.) as it is beautifully deliver'd by our Author in his Sermon on *Divine Predestination* &c. if he did not intend by that Word something in God really parallel and equivalent to what we find in some of his Works, and so very like it, that nothing can be liker, except that which exists in the very same manner too, *i. e.* in a perfect one. If this could be his meaning, (which may not appear improbable from his Answer to the like Objection, §. 22. where he declares, that these Attributes have much more Reality and Perfection in them, than the things by which we represent them, &c.) then is he perfectly consistent with the other great Author cited above. I wish the most learned Author of the Procedure, &c. were shewn to be so too, who is supposed to have pursued this Notion of Analogy farther than almost any will be able or willing to follow him.

But this is no place for a full Examination either of that Notion, or this learned Author's Application of it. I shall only add an Observation, which perhaps may serve in some measure to shew directly (as he is pleas'd to require, *Introduct.* p. 17.) that the Foundation upon which he has placed his Analogy is false and groundless: which Foundation is, as I apprehend, the Nature of the Being, instead of the *Modus* of its Existence. To carry the face of an Argument, let it stand thus. The Nature of the foremention'd Qualities is either wholly the same in God and us, or wholly different: if the former be maintain'd, then this analogical Sense is turn'd into an *Identical* one; if the latter, then can no manner of Resemblance or Analogy be drawn between them: since one nature (as has been observ'd) cannot in the least help to represent or explain another quite different from it; I mean, in those very points

wherein they differ; for that is to be different and not different, alike and unlike in the very same respect, at the same time: And then this analogical Sense is turn'd into a *disperate* or quite opposite one, *i. e.* into no analogy at all: Or, lastly, they must be partly the same, and partly different, or alike and unlike in different respects, (which is the thing we contend for) *viz.* alike in Perfection, unlike in Defect, or imperfection; or the same in Nature, or Essence, and different in Degree, or the manner of Existence. If therefore the Author founds this Analogy on the very Nature of the thing, he seems to incur the foremention'd absurdity, of supposing a nature contradictory to itself; if, with us, he will please to distinguish between the Nature of the thing in general, and the particular *Modus* of its Existence, he must with us also remove this analogy from the former foundation, and fix it upon the latter. Farther, no Similitude whatsoever, whether deduced from human Reason or Holy Scripture, can have force enough to persuade us, that the whole nature of these things is quite different from what we apprehend or can conceive them to be; since it is universally allow'd, that no comparison can (as we commonly say) run upon all four; or (which is the very foundation and design of this whole analogical Scheme) can ever constitute a proper and conclusive Argument, in order to prove to us such a paradox: and if so great Stress is to be laid on any, *v. g.* that of a *Looking-Glass*, used in a strict Philosophical manner, (as the Author of the Procedure seems to do, p. 112, &c.) why may not some urge it still farther, and argue, that as the Image of your Face supposed to be seen in the Glass, is nothing real, solid, and substantial contain'd in the Glass itself, but barely an appearance exhibited in the Brain; so all the conceptions which we pretend to have of the Divine Nature and Attributes, are nothing at all in God himself, but mere Phantasms and delusive Images, existing only in our own Mind. This, will these Men say, must appear absurd at first Sight, and yet may be drawn from the Similitude with as much Propriety as the

* See A. B. Tillotson's Sermon. 76. Vol. 2. Fol. p. 572. and p. 678.

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the rest; consequently the whole Scheme of this *Analogy* is to be rejected as entirely false, and at last the true Medium of all our Knowledge in the Nature of these things, will be what we truly and properly perceive of them, in some small degree in ourselves: If it be objected here, that the *Nature* and *Modus* of any thing must be the very same, since by different Natures are only meant different *Manners* of Existence.

I answer: By the Nature of any thing, I understand its several *distinguishing Properties*. By the Nature of any *Property*, I understand some certain positive *Mark* or *Character* which distinguishes that property from any others. Thus, by the nature of *Body*, I mean solid, divisible, figur'd and moveable Extension. By the Nature of *Solidity*, I mean Resistance, or a power of excluding other Bodies out of its place; which Mark sufficiently distinguishes it from *Divisibility*, or any other property belonging to the same *Body*, as well as all the foremention'd properties distinguish a *Body* from something else: both which we may therefore properly enough be said to perceive or *know*; tho' perhaps we may never in like manner, know *how* these several Properties are united together, and come to form one Aggregate or Substance; nor *whence* this Power or Property of Resistance proceeds, or how it is *caus'd*, which is what we understand by the *Modus* of each. So that, knowing or having a clear determinate Idea of a certain Thing or Quality, so as to be able to distinguish it from another Thing or Quality, and always to perceive it to be really *thus*; is quite different from knowing how the said Thing or Quality comes to be thus: *How* or *Why* it is, are Modes of Existence, and differ plainly from *what* it is, or what *Idea* we have of it, which denotes its *Nature* or *Essence*. But any Man, I think, that has a mind, may apprehend what we mean by this distinction without any more Words, whether he will approve of it or not, is another Question.

Against this Notion of *Analogy*, as apply'd to the whole Nature of the Attributes of God,

see *Fiddes's Body of Divinity*, B. I. Part 2. c. 13. and his *Practical Discourses*, Fol. p. 234, &c. or, *J. Clarke on Moral Evil*, p. 95, &c. or *Chubb's Tracts*, p. 146, &c. or, *the present State of the Republic of Letters for July 1728*; or, *a Vindication of the Divine Attributes*, London 1710.

[X 1.] By the Words, *Infinite Degree*, here and above, we don't mean any *indefinite Addition*, or increasableness of these several Attributes partially consider'd (to which such terms are vulgarly, tho' not so properly apply'd) but only an entire absolute *Perfection*, without any kind of *failure* or *deficiency* in these respects: which we have intimated in Note 5, and elsewhere, to be our Notion of Infinity, as apply'd to any of the Divine Attributes. "Thus
" *Infinite Understanding* and *Knowledge*, is no-
" thing else but *perfect Knowledge*, that which
" hath no defect or mixture of *Ignorance* in it, or
" the knowledge of whatsoever is knowable.
" *Infinite Power* is nothing else but *perfect*
" *Power*, that which hath no defect or mix-
" ture of *Impotency* in it: a Power of produ-
" cing and doing all whatsoever is *possible*, i. e.
" whatsoever is *conceivable*, and so of the
" rest*.

" Now, that we have an Idea or Concep-
" tion of *Perfection*, or a *perfect Being*, is evi-
" dent from the Notion that we have of *Im-*
" *perfection*, so familiar to us: *Perfection* being
" the *Rule* and *Measure* of *Imperfection*, and not
" *Imperfection* of *Perfection*, as a *straight Line* is
" the *Rule* and *Measure* of a *Crooked*, and not
" a *Crooked Line* of a *Straight*. So that *Per-*
" *fection* is first *Conceivable* in order of nature,
" before *Imperfection*, as *Light* before *Darkness*,
" a *positive* before the *privation* or *defect*. For
" *Perfection* is not properly the want of *Im-*
" *perfection*, but *Imperfection* of *Perfec-*
" *tion*.

" Moreover, we perceive several Degrees of
" *Perfection* in the *Essences* of things, and
" consequently a *Scale* or *Ladder* of *Perfections*
" in Nature, one above another, as of *living*
" and *animate* things above *senseless* and *inani-*
" *mate*,

* *Cudworth*, p. 647.

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“*mate*, of *rational* things above *sensitive*; and that by reason of that *Notion* or *Idea*, which we first have of that which is *absolutely perfect*, as the Standard, by comparing of things with which, and measuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more or less near thereunto. Nor indeed could these gradual *Ascents* be *infinite*, or without End, but they must come at last to that which is absolutely perfect, as the top of them all. Lastly, we could not perceive Imperfection in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had Sense or Experience of in our Lives, had we not a *Notion*, or *Idea* of that which is *absolutely perfect*, which secretly comparing the same with, we perceive it to come short thereof*.

“Wherefore, since *Infinite* is the same with *absolutely perfect*, we having a *Notion* or *Idea* of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also, that tho’ the Word *Infinite* be in the form thereof *Negative*, yet is the Sense of it, in these things which are really capable of the same, *positive*, it being all one with *absolutely perfect*: as likewise, the Sense of the Word *Finite* is negative, it being the same with *Imperfect*: So that *finite* is properly the *Negation* of *Infinite*, as that which in order of nature is before it, and not *Infinite* the *Negation* of *Finite*. However, in those things which are capable of no true *Infinity*, because they are essentially *finite*, as *Number*, *corporeal Magnitude*, and *Time*; *Infinity* being there a mere *imaginary* thing, and a non-entity, it can only be conceiv’d by the *Negation* of *Finite*, as we also conceive *Nothing* by the *Negation* of *Something*, that is, we can have no *positive Conception* at all thereof †.”

Now, all this, is not attempting to make the Attributes of God *positively Infinite*, by superadding a *Negative Idea* of *Infinity* to them (as the Author of the *Procedure*, &c. justly urges against Mr. *Locke*, in B. 1. c. 3. p. 82. and the same might with equal Justice be objected to Dr. *Clarke*, when he applies *infinite*

Space and *infinite Duration* to the Deity, and calls one his *Immensity*, and the other his *Eternity*.) But it is making them positively and absolutely *perfect*, by first proving them to have some *real Existence* in the Divine Nature, and then by removing from it all Possibility of *Want*, or *Deficiency*, *Mixture*, or *Allay* ||.

[X m.] By the Word *Justice*, as it relates to Punishment, we mean, the *Exercise* of a *Right*, or doing what a Person has a *Moral Power* to do. *Mercy* implies his *receding* from that *Right*, or not exerting that moral power. When we apply these Terms to the Deity, we consider his *Dispensations* in a partial View, *viz.* only with Relation to the Person offending, and himself the offended, or as mere Debtor and Creditor, exclusive of all other Beings, who may be affected thereby, and whom therefore we should suppose to be regarded in these *Dispensations*. In this Sense, these two Attributes have a distinct Meaning, and may both be always subordinate to Goodness, but can never be repugnant to each other. Thus, where a Creature has forfeited its *Right* to a Favour, or incurr’d a Penalty, by the breach of some Covenant, or the Transgression of some Law, the Creator, consider’d with respect to that Being alone, and in those Circumstances, has always a *Right* to withdraw the Favour, or to inflict a Penalty; and will prosecute that *Right*, whenever he finds it necessary, to some farther End: But yet his Goodness may incline him often to remit it, on some foreign Motive, *viz.* on account of the present Relation between the Criminal and other Men, in very different Circumstances, or in view of a future Alteration in the Circumstances of the Criminal himself. Now as these Motives belong to, and are generally known by, God alone, tho’ they may influence his Actions towards us, yet they don’t at all affect his *Right* over us, and therefore, ought not to diminish our Love, Gratitude, &c. to him in any particular Instance, either of Judgment or of Mercy. Whenever we suffer for our Crimes, we have no Reason to complain

* *Cudworth*, p. 648.

† *Ibid.* 649.

|| See X. k.

Concerning the Origin of Evil.

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plain of any Injury, nor can he, when, upon the formention'd Motives, he forgives us, ever injure himself. For Justice, consider'd barely as a *Rights* or *Moral Power*, evidently *demand*s nothing, nor can properly be said to *oblige* one way or other: and therefore, the Being possess'd of it, is at liberty either to suspend or exert it; but he will never use this Liberty, otherwise than as his Goodness requires, consequently Justice and Mercy in such a Being can never clash.

Whether this way of conceiving these Divine Attributes be not attended with less Difficulty than the common manner of treating them, under the Notion of two Infinities diametrically opposite, must be left to the Judgment of the Reader.

As to the Nature of *Distributive Justice*, or the true Reason of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, see *S. C's Impartial Enquiry, &c.* B. 1. c. 11. prop. 12:



CHAP.

C H A P. II.

Concerning the Nature and Division of Evil, and the Difficulty of tracing out its Origin.

I. **G**OOD and *Evil* are Opposites, and arise from the Relation which things have to each other: For, since there are some things which profit, and others which prejudice one another; since some things agree, and others disagree; as we call the former Good, so we stile the latter Evil. Whatever, therefore, is *incommodious* or *inconvenient* to itself, or any thing else; whatever becomes *troublesome*, or frustrates any *Appetite* implanted by God; whatever forces any Person to do or suffer what he would not, that is *Evil*.

By Evil we understand whatsoever is incommodious, inconvenient or troublesome.

II. Now these Inconveniencies appear to be of three kinds, those of *Imperfection*, *Natural* and *Moral* ones. By the Evil of *Imperfection*, I understand the Absence of those Perfections or Advantages which exist elsewhere, or in other Beings: By *Natural* Evil, Pains, Uneasinesses, Inconveniencies and Disappointments of Appetites, arising from natural Motions: By *Moral*, vicious Elections, that is, such as are hurtful to ourselves, or others.

Evils are of three kinds, those of Imperfection, Natural, and Moral.

III. These Evils must be consider'd particularly, and we are to shew how they may be reconcil'd with the Government of an infinitely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For, since there is such a Being, 'tis ask'd, as we said before, Whence come Evils? Whence so many *Inconveniencies* in the Work of a most *good*, most *powerful* God? Whence that perpetual War between the very *Elements*, between *Animals*, between *Men*? Whence *Errors*, *Miseries* and *Vices*, the constant Companions of human Life from its Infancy? Whence

The difficulty is, how these come into the Work of a God of the highest Goodness and Power.

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Good to Evil Men, Evil to the Good? If we behold any thing irregular in the Works of Men, if any Machine answers not the End it was made for; if we find something in it repugnant to itself or others, we attribute that to the Ignorance, Impotence, or Malice of the Workman: but since these Qualities have no place in God, how come they to have place in any thing? Or, Why does God suffer his Works to be deform'd by them?

Some that were unable to solve this difficulty, have deny'd the Existence of a God, others have supposed a double One.

IV. This Question has appear'd so intricate and difficult, that some finding themselves unequal to the Solution of it, have deny'd, either that there is any God at all, or at least, any Author or Governor of the World. Thus *Epicurus*, and his Adherents: nor does *Lucretius* bring any other Reason for his denying the *System of the World to be the Effect of a Deity*, than that *it is so very faulty**. Others judg'd it to be more agreeable to Reason, to assign a double Cause of things, rather than none at all. Since it is the greatest Absurdity in Nature, to admit of Actions and Effects, without any Agent and Cause. These then perceiving a Mixture of Good and Evil, and being fully persuaded, that so many Confusions and Inconsistencies could not proceed from a good Being, supposed a malevolent *Principle*, or God, directly contrary to the good one; and thence derived Corruption and Death, Diseases, Grievs, Miseries, Frauds and Villanies; from the good Being nothing but Good: nor did they imagine, that Contrariety and Mischief could have any other Origin than an Evil Principle. This Opinion was held by many of the Ancients, by the *Manicheans*, *Paulicians*, and almost all the Tribe of ancient *Heretics*, (25.).

V. And

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(25.) In order to give some light into the Opinions of these Men, concerning the Origin of Evil, I shall transcribe a Paragraph from *Bayle's Dictionary*, in the Article *Manichees*, Remark D. where he introduces *Zoroaster* defending the two opposite Principles above mention'd. "*Zoroaster*, says he, would go back to the time of the Chaos, which is a State as to his two Principles, very like that which *Hobbs* calls the State of Nature, and which he supposes to have preceded the first Establishment of Societies. In this State of Nature, one Man was a Wolf to another, and every thing belong'd to the first Possessor; none was Master of any thing, except he was the strongest. To get out of this Confusion, every one agreed to quit his Right to the whole, that he might have a Property.

* B. 2. v. 130.

V. And there are some still who think this Difficulty unanswerable. They confess, indeed, the Supposition of a double Principle to be absurd, and that it may be demonstrated that there is but one Author of all things, absolutely perfect and good; yet there is Evil in things, and this they see and feel: but whence, or how it comes, they are entirely ignorant; nor can human Reason (if we believe them, in a-

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There are some who are of opinion, that it is unanswerable, and that the *Manichees* offer'd a better solution, by supposing two Principles, than the *Catholics* do by owning only One

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“ Property in something, they transacted one
 “ with another, and so the War ceas'd. Thus
 “ the two Principles weary of this Chaos,
 “ wherein each confounded and overthrew
 “ what the other would do, came at last to an
 “ Agreement; each of them yielded something,
 “ each had a share in the Production of Man,
 “ and the Laws of the Union of the Soul:
 “ The good Principle obtain'd those which
 “ procure to Man a thousand Pleasures, and
 “ consented to those which expose him to a
 “ thousand Sorrows: and if it consented that
 “ Moral Good should be infinitely less in
 “ Mankind than Moral Evil, he repair'd the
 “ Damage in some other kind of Creatures,
 “ wherein Vice should be much less than Vir-
 “ tue. If many Men in this Life have more
 “ Misery than Happiness, this is recompenc'd
 “ in another State; what they have not under
 “ an human Shape, they shall recover under a-
 “ nother. By means of this Agreement, the
 “ Chaos was a passive Principle, which was
 “ the Field of Battle between these two ac-
 “ tive Principles. The Poets * have represen-
 “ ted this disentangling under the Image of a
 “ Quarrel ended. This is what *Zoroaster*
 “ might alledge, boasting that he does not at-
 “ tribute to the Good Principle the produc-
 “ tion of a Creature at his own Pleasure,
 “ which was to be so wretched and miserable;
 “ but only, after he had found by Experience
 “ that he could do no better, nor better oppose
 “ the horrible Designs of the Evil Principle.
 “ To render his Hypothesis the less offensive,
 “ he might have deny'd that there was a long
 “ War between the two Principles, and lay

“ aside all those Fights and Prisoners which
 “ the *Manicheans* speak of. The whole might
 “ be reduced to the certain Knowledge of the
 “ two Principles, that one could never obtain
 “ from the other but such and such Condi-
 “ tions: and thus an Eternal Agreement might
 “ have been made upon this Foot.

For a farther Explication and Amendment of their Hypothesis, and Replies to several Arguments urg'd against it, see the Words, *Manicheans, Marcionites, Paulicians, Origen* and *Zoroaster*, in the abovemention'd Dictionary.

That there is no *Occasion* for any Hypothesis of this kind, will be shewn in the following Chapters. Let it suffice in this place, to point out the absurdities of the Hypothesis itself. And first, it may be observ'd, that the Supposition of an *absolute* and *infinitely Evil Principle* (if these Words mean such a Being as is totally opposite to the Good One) is an express contradiction. For as this Principle opposes and resists the infinitely Good One, it also must be independent and infinite: It must be infinite or absolute in Knowledge and Power. But the notion of a Being infinitely Evil, is of one infinitely Imperfect; its Knowledge and Power therefore must be infinitely Imperfect; *i. e.* absolute Ignorance and Impotence, or no Knowledge and Power at all. The one of these Beings then is absolutely perfect, or enjoys all manner of positive Perfections, consequently the other, as it is directly the Reverse, must be purely the negation of it, as Darkness is of Light; *i. e.* it must be an *infinite Defect*, or *mere nothing*. Thus, this *Evil Being* must have some *Knowledge* and *Power*, in order to make any

* *Hanc Deus & Melior Litem Natura diremit.* Ovid. Met. l. 1.

ny measure discover. Hence they take Occasion to lament our Unhappinefs, and complain of the hard Fate attending Truth, as often as a Solution of this Difficulty is attempted unsuccessfully. The *Manicheans* solve the Phænomena of things better, a hundred times better (as these Men think) with their most absurd Hypothesis of two Principles, than the Catholics do with their most true Doctrine of One

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any opposition at all to the Good One; but as he is directly opposite to that Good or Perfect One, he cannot have the least degree of Knowledge or Power, since these are Perfections: therefore, the Supposition of such an Existence as this, implies a contradiction.

But supposing these Men only to mean (what any understanding Person among them must mean) by this Evil Principle, an absolutely Malevolent Being, of equal Power, and other natural Perfections with those of the Good One, "It would be to no purpose (says *Til- lotson* *) to suppose two such opposite Principles.—For, admit that a Being infinitely Mischievous, were infinitely cunning, and infinitely powerful, yet it could do no Evil, because the opposite Principle of infinite Goodness, being also infinitely wise and powerful, they would tie up one another's Hands: so that upon this Supposition, the Notion of a Deity would signify just nothing, and by virtue of the Eternal Opposition and Equality of those Principles, they would keep one another at a perpetual Bay, and being an equal Match for one another, instead of being two Deities, they would be two Idols, able to do neither Good nor Evil.

I shall only produce one argument more as to Moral Evil, out of *Simplicius's* Comment on *Epicætetus*, which, by the Confession of *Bayle* himself, strikes home at the Doctrine of Two Principles, tho' it be consider'd with the greatest Simplicity.

He says †, "It entirely destroys the Liberty of our Souls, and necessitates them to Sin, and

"consequently implies a Contradiction. For, since the Principle of Evil is eternal and incorruptible, and so potent that God himself cannot conquer him, it follows, that the Soul of Man cannot resist the Impulse, with which he moves it to Sin. But if a Man be invincibly driven to it, he commits no Murder or Adultery, &c. by his own Fault, but by a superior eternal Fault, and in that Case he is neither guilty nor punishable. Therefore, there is no such thing as Sin, and consequently this Hypothesis destroys itself; since if there be a Principle of Evil, there is no longer any Evil in the World. But if there be no Evil in the World, it is clear there is no Principle of Evil; whence we may infer, that those who suppose such a Principle, destroy, by a necessary Consequence, both Evil and the Principle of it."

More of this may be seen in *Bayle's* Explanation concerning the *Manichees*, at the End of his Dictionary, p. 66, &c. See also *Mr. Gurdon's Boyle's Lecture*, Sermon 5. or *Stillingfleet's Orig. Sacrae*, B. 3. C. 3. §. 10, 12. See also *Sherlock on Judgment*, 1st Edit. p. 173.

Neither does *Mr. Bayle's* amendment of this Hypothesis free it from the Difficulty. He supposes the two Principles to be sensible of the above mention'd Consequence arising from their Equality of Power, and therefore, would compound the Matter, by allowing an equal Mixture of Good and Evil in the intended Creation. But if the Quantity of Good and Evil in the Creation be exactly equal, neither of the Principles has attain'd, or could expect to attain, the End for which it was suppos'd to act. The Good Principle design'd

* 2 Vols. of *Serm.* Fol. p. 690.

† p. 152. Ed. Lond. 1670.

One perfect, absolutely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For the *Manicheans* acquit God from all manner of Blame, as he was compell'd by the contrary Principle to suffer Sin and Misery in his Work, which in the mean while he opposes with all his Power. But, according to the Catholics, as their Adversaries object, he permits these voluntarily, nay, is the Cause and Author of them. For if, as these Men argue, there be but one Author of all Things, Evils also should be refer'd to him as their Original; but it can neither be explain'd nor conceiv'd, how infinite Goodness can become the Origin of Evil. If God could not hinder it, where is his Power? If he could, and would not, where is his Goodness? If you say, that Evil necessarily adheres to some particular Natures; since God was the Author of them all, it would have been better to have omitted those with the concomitant Evils, than to have debas'd his Workmanship with an Allay of these Evils, (26.).

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sign'd to produce some absolute Good, the Evil One some absolute Evil; but to produce an equal Mixture of both, would be in effect producing neither: One would just counter-balance and destroy the other; and all such action would be the very same as doing nothing at all: and that such an exact Equality of Good and Evil must be the Result of any agreement between them is plain: For, as they are by Supposition perfectly equal in *Inclination*, as well as *Power*, neither of them could possibly concede, and let its opposite prevail: The Creation therefore cannot be owing to such a Composition.

But the best Confutation of this Scheme may be found in the Chapter before us; where our Author shews, that it does not at all answer the End for which it was introduced. This completes the absurdity of it.

(26.) Since this Objection contains all that can be said upon Evil in general; and it appears to me absolutely necessary for every Man

to do Justice to Objections, who expects that others should receive any Satisfaction from his answers, I shall insert it, as it is propos'd in its full force, by *Cudworth* *. “The supposed Deity and Maker of the World, was either willing to abolish all Evils, but not able, or he was able and not willing: or, thirdly, he was neither willing nor able: or, lastly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that answers fully to the Notion of a God. Now, that the supposed Creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all Evils, is plain, because then there would have been no Evils at all left. Wherefore, since there is such a Deluge of Evils overflowing all, it must needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was *impotent*; or else he was able and not willing, and then he was *envious*; or lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both *impotent* and *envious*.”

Almost

* *True Intell.*, Syst. p. 78, 79.

This difficulty has exercised the Philosophers and Fathers of the Church, and some deny that it is answer'd yet.

There is more Good than Evil in the World.

*Tis no less repugnant to Infinite Goodness to have created these things which he saw would be corrupted by another, than such as toward the

VI. It is well known, that this Difficulty has exercised both the ancient Philosophers and Fathers of the Church (27.): and there are some who deny that it is yet answer'd; nay, who undertake to refute all the Solutions hitherto offer'd; nor do I promise a complete one in every Respect, tho' I hope to shew, in the following Part of the Treatise, that it is not wholly unanswerable.

VII. It is manifest, that tho' Good be mix'd with Evil in this Life, yet there is much more Good than Evil in Nature, and every Animal provides for its Preservation by Instinct or Reason, which it would never do, if it did not think or feel its Life, with all the Evils annex'd, to be much preferable to Non-existence. This is a Proof of the Wisdom, Goodness, and Power of God, who could thus temper a World infested with so many Miseries, that nothing should continue in it which was not in some measure pleas'd with its Existence, and which would not endeavour by all possible Means to preserve it.

VIII. Neither does the Supposition of an Evil Principle help any thing towards the Solution of this Difficulty. For the Asserters of two Principles maintain, that the great and good God tolerates Evil, because he is forced to it by the Evil One, and that either from an Agreement between themselves, or a perpetual Struggle and Contest with each other. For, since the Beneficent Author of Nature was

would corrupt themselves. The Supposition of a double Principle is therefore of no Service Solution of this Difficulty.

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Almost the same occurs in *Lactantius* *, and is cited, and sufficiently refuted by our Author in C. 5. §. 5. *Sub.* the last: See also *Prudentius* in *Hamartigenia*, v. 64c.

The Substance of all *Bayle's* Objections may be seen in a Book call'd *Free Thoughts on Religion, &c.* C. 5. p. 104, &c. See also the following Note. The Answers to them will follow in their proper places.

(27.) Any one that wants to be acquainted with the Antiquity of this Dispute, or the Persons engaged in it, or the way of managing

it, made use of by the *Fathers*, may consult the beginning of *Dr. J. Clarke's* Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil: and *Bayle's* Dictionary, in the Articles *Minicbeans*, Remark B. *Marcionites*, Remarks F, and F Δ. *Paulicians*, Remarks K, and K Δ. and *Zoroaster*, Remark E. Or *Cudworth*, from p. 213, to p. 224. or *Stillingfleet's* *Origines Sacrae*, B. 3 C. 3. §. 8, 9, 11, 12, &c. or *Fabricij* *Biblioth. Græc.* v. 5. p. 287, &c. or *Delectus Argumentorum*, &c. C. 15.

* *De Ira Dei*, C. 13. p. 435. Edit. Cant.

was hinder'd by the Evil Principle, from producing all the Good he was willing to produce, he either made an Agreement with it, to produce as much as he was allow'd, but with a Mixture of Evil, according to the Agreement between them; or else there is a Mixture of Good and Evil proportionable to the Power which prevails in either. Hence they think the good God excusable, who confer'd as many Blessings on the World as his Adversary permitted, and would have tolerated no manner of Evil, unless compell'd to it by the adverse Power. So that he must either create no Good at all, or suffer an Allay of Evil. All which very great Absurdities have this farther Inconvenience, that they do not answer the End for which they were invented. For he is no less culpable who created any thing which he knew would be render'd miserable by another, than if he had made that which he foresaw would bring Misery upon itself. If therefore God might, consistently with Goodness, create Things which he knew the Evil Principle could and would corrupt, as the *Manicheans* asserted; then he might, consistently with the same Goodness, have created Things that would corrupt themselves, or were to perish in a Tract of Time. If then, according to the Defenders of this Hypothesis, God ought to have omitted, or not created those Beings, in whose Natures Evil or Contrariety is inherent, he ought also to have omitted those, whose Natures he foresaw the Evil Principle would corrupt. And if there was so much Good in these, as made him think it better to create them, tho' they were to be corrupted some time or other by the opposite Principle, he might also judge it preferable to produce the same, tho' they were at length to perish by their inherent Evils. - Nor will God tolerate Evil in his Works, as forced to it more, according to the *Manicheans*, than the *Catholics*. For, as he might have not made those Beings which have Evils necessarily adhering to them, so he might also have not made those which he foreknew the contrary Principle would corrupt. After the same manner in both Cases he could have prevented Evil, and since he could, why did he not? The Supposition of two Principles conduces nothing at all therefore to the Solution of this Difficulty.

If it can be shewn, that it does not contradict infinite Power and Goodness to permit Evils, or that these necessarily arise from the exercise of them, then may the Difficulty be answer'd.

IX. But if we can point out a Method of reconciling these Things with the Government of an absolutely perfect Agent, and make them not only consistent with Infinite Wisdom, Goodness and Power, but necessarily resulting from them (so that these would not be Infinite, if those did not or could not possibly exist) then we may be supposed to have at last discover'd the true Origin of Evils, and answer'd all the Difficulties and Objections that are brought on this Head, against the Goodness, Wisdom, Power, and Unity of God. Let us try therefore what can be done in each kind of Evil ; and first, concerning the *Evil of Imperfection.*

CHAP.

C H A P. III.

Of the Evil of Defect.

I. **A**S for the Evil of *Imperfection*, it is to be consider'd, that before the World was created God existed alone, and nothing beside him. All things therefore are out of nothing, and whatsoever exists, has its Existence from God; neither can that Existence be different either in Kind or Degree from what he gave*.

Things can be no otherwise than as God pleased.

II. Secondly, God, tho' he be omnipotent, cannot make any created Being *absolutely perfect*, for whatever is absolutely perfect, must necessarily be Self-existent. But it is included in the very Notion of a Creature, as such, not to exist of itself, but from God. An absolutely perfect Creature therefore implies a Contradiction. For it should be of itself, and not of itself, at the same time (28.). Absolute Perfection is therefore peculiar to God, and if he would communicate his own peculiar Perfection to another, (E.) that other would be God.

All Created things are necessarily imperfect, since they do not exist of themselves.

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(28.) A *perfect Creature* is a contradiction in terms. For if it be *perfect* it is *independent*; and if it be independent, it is no *Creature*. Again; to suppose a created Being *infinite* in any respect is to suppose it *equal* to its Creator in that respect; and if it be equal in one respect, it must be so in all, since an Infinite property cannot inhere in any finite Subject, for then the Attribute would be more perfect than its subject, all which is absurd. Granting, therefore, this one Principle, which cannot be deny'd, (*viz.* that an Effect must be inferior to its Cause) it will appear, that the Evil of Imperfection, supposing a *Creation*, is necessary and unavoidable; and consequently, all other Evils which necessarily arise from that, are unavoidable also. What our Author has advanced upon the following Head, seems perfectly conclusive.

(E.) This Position seems very agreeable to the *Catholic Faith*, which teaches that the *Father* did communicate his Nature, and all his

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* See Scott in Note 32.

The *Evil of Imperfection* must therefore be tolerated in Creatures, notwithstanding the Divine Omnipotence and Goodness: for Contradictions are Objects of no Power. God might indeed have refrain'd from creating, and continu'd alone, Self-sufficient, and perfect to all Eternity, but his Infinite Goodness would, by no means allow it; this oblig'd him to produce external things; which things, since they could not

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Perfections to the *Son*, and with him to the *Holy Ghost*: each of them therefore is very God under a different *Subsistence*. The Divine Nature which is inherent in them, may be conceiv'd to be of itself, but the Modus of Existence cannot. Now the Church looks upon the Nature thus subsisting, as a *Person*. Not that it is a Person in the same manner as the human Nature subsisting by itself, but by Reason of a certain Similitude and Analogy which they have between them. Since Divine Matters are not objects of the Senses, they cannot, as we said before *, be known by Marks impress'd upon us by Sensation; they are therefore conceiv'd by a Similitude, Relation, Proportion, or Connection with sensible things: The Passions, Affections, Intellect, and Will, are the Principles of our Actions, and therefore we attribute these to God. For if we were to do those things which God performs, these would be the Principles and Causes of them: We attribute therefore to God something analogous, or equivalent to these, but we know that it is as distant as finite is from Infinite. Nay, 'tis demonstrable, that neither Will, nor Love, nor Anger, nor Justice, nor Mercy, are in God, after the same manner, as they exist in, and are conceiv'd by, us †. But we must make use of these Words, because we have no better, and they sufficiently answer the End for which God would have us to know him. Now, after the same manner we point out the distinction declared in Scripture between the *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, by the Word *Person*, because we have nothing nearer to compare

them by; and the Representation under this Analogy shews us very well what we may hope for from each of them, and what Worship we ought to pay them. Tho' at the same time we are certain, that these differ no less from human Persons, than the Divine Intellect does from human, or the Principles of Divine Actions from human Passions; for instance, Anger, Hatred, and the like. 'Tis strange therefore, that Men who would be esteem'd learned, should dispute against a Plurality of Persons in the Deity, after the very same Way of Reasoning with which *Cotta* in *Cicero* argues against the Intelligence, Prudence, and Justice of God †, namely, because they cannot be in God after the same manner as we conceive them to be in Men; forgetting, in the mean time, that these are attributed to God by a kind of Analogy and Accomodation to our Capacity, and rather from the resemblance of things done by God, to those done by us, than of the Principles from which they proceed. But the Scriptures and the Church have sufficiently forewarn'd us to beware of this erroneous Way of Reasoning. For when God is described under these Figures, Similitudes, and Analogies, lest we should take Images of things for the things themselves, and so fall into absurd Reasonings about them, the same things are deny'd of God in one Sense, that are affirm'd of him in another. Thus God is often said to repent, and in another place 'tis deny'd that he repents as a Man. Thus Light is ascribed to God, as his habitation, and elsewhere, Thick Darkness. He is often said to be seen, and yet is call'd Invisible.

* Note A.

† See *Woelaston*, p. 115, 116. and *Episcopius Inſp. Theol.* L. 4. C. 22. p. 310. or our Author's *Sermon on Predestination*, &c.

‡ *Qualem autem Deum, &c.* (*Cic. de Nat. Deor.* §. 15. Ed. Lond. — See our Author's *Serm.* §. 37.

not poffibly be perfect, the Divine Goodnefs preferr'd imperfect ones to none at all. Imperfection then arofe from the Infinity of Divine Goodnefs. Had not God been infinitely Good, perhaps he might not have fuffer'd imperfect Beings; but have been content in himfelf, and created nothing at all.

III. Thirdly, There are infinite Degrees of Perfection between a Being *absolutely perfect* and *Nothing*: of which, if Exiftence be conceiv'd as the *First*, every thing will be fo many degrees diftant from nothing, as there are *Perfections* to be found in it joined with Exiftence. In this Scale then God will be the *Top*, and Nothing the *Bottom*; and how much farther any thing is diftant from nothing, it is fo much the more perfect, and approaches nearer to God. How much any thing can refemble God in Perfection, or how nearly approach to him (F.) we know not; but we are certain that there is always an in-

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finite

'Tis to be determin'd by the Divine Pleasure what Degrees of Perfection every thing must have, fince all things are neceffarily at an Infinite diftance from the higheft Perfection.

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visible. The Father is God and Lord, and alfo the Son and the Holy Ghoft, and yet it is faid there is but one God and Lord. All which and more of the fame kind, we muft believe to be thus exprefs'd, for no other Reafon, but to hinder us from imagining them to be afcribed to God in the fame manner as they are in us, (29). But Smatterers in Learning reject and ridicule thefe forms of Speech as *Ænigmas*, being ignorant of both the Sacred and Ecclefiastical *Dialect*, which they refufe to learn, tho' we muft make ufe of it in Divine Matters, or elfe entirely refrain from all Reasoning about them. For fince they are known no otherwife than by fimilitude and analogy, they cannot be described otherwife, as any one will find who tries. But it is no wonder if thefe Men, while they take fimilies for the things themfelves, fhould eafily imagine that they difcover abfurdities in them. If they do this on purpofe, cunningly, and with an ill Intent, they are Villains; but if thro' Ignorance or Error, they deferve Pity, if they did not fwel with a

proud conceit of Science, and exalt themfelves above the Vulgar; who yet are much wifer than thefe Philofophers. For they fear the Anger of God; love his Goodnefs, embrace his Mercy, adore his Juftice, and give Glory to the Father, Son and Holy Ghoft, and yet believe in and worship one God, moft perfect, and free from Paftions. Whereas, the Smatterers in Science have got nothing to place in the Room of thefe, which they themfelves, much lefs the Vulgar, can underftand; or, which can equally excite the Affections of the Mind, or promote Piety.

(F) Suppofing the World to be Infinite, there would be, as far as appears to us, Infinite Orders of Creatures defcending gradually from God to Nothing: but fince neither our Underftanding can comprehend, nor does the Nature of Quantity and Motion feem to admit of Infinity or Eternity; 'tis better to refer the Matter to the Divine Will. For if an Infinity in Creatures be impoffible, 'tis the fame thing wherever we flop. For all Finites are equally diftant

(29) This is a good Inference from thefe and the like Expreffions, but can hardly be fuppofed to have been the principal defign, much lefs the only reafon, of them. For more inftances of this kind, fee the fircmention'd Sermon, §. 23, 27.

finite distance between them. It must have been determin'd therefore by the Will of God, where he would stop, since there is nothing but his own Will to bound his Power. Now it is to be believ'd, that the present System of the World was the very best that could be, with regard to the Mind of God in framing it (30.). It might have been better.

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distant from Infinite. If therefore God had created twice, thrice, or a thousand thousand times as great, and as many Beings, and a thousand thousand Ages sooner than he has, the same objections might be made, Why not before? Why not more? The World therefore must either have been created Infinite and from Eternity, which the very Nature of the thing seems not to allow, or it is all one when and how great it might be, and not determinable by any thing besides the Divine Pleasure. See Chap. 5. §. 1. Subf. 4. and *J. Clarke* on *Nat. Evil*, p. 90, 93, 280, &c.

(30.) In order to confirm this belief, and come to a right Knowledge of the whole Question before us, it is necessary to enquire a little into the meaning of these Words; to consider (with reverence) what this Mind of God might be in framing the World, and what was the most proper Method of answering it. Now it appear'd from the Conclusion of the first Chapter, and Note 23. that the sole Design of Almighty God in creating the Universe, was to impart Felicity to other Beings: and in the beginning of this Chapter it was proved, that any Happiness thus communicated could not be *Infinite*. His Design then is completely answer'd, if the greatest Degree of Happiness be imparted, of which created Beings are capable, consistent with one another; or when the utmost possible Good is produced in the Universe collectively. This also shews us what we are to understand by *the very best System*, viz. one that is fitted for, and productive of, the greatest absolute-general Good: The manner of effecting which comes next under consideration. As to this, it is queried in the first place, whether all Animals ought to have been created equally perfect; or several indifferent

Ranks and Degrees of Perfection; and secondly, whether God may be supposed to have placed any Order of Beings in such a fix'd unalterable condition, as not to admit of advancement: to have made any Creatures as perfect at first as the Nature of a created Being is capable of. The former of these doubts is fully discuss'd in this and the following Chapter, §. 2. The latter seems not so easy to be determin'd. They who hold the affirmative argue from our notion of Infinite or *absolute Goodness*, which must excite the Deity always to communicate all manner of *Happiness*, in the very highest Degree, for the same reason that it prompts him to communicate it ever in any degree. But this, say they, he has not done, except he at first endow'd some Creatures with all the Perfection a Creature could possibly receive, and gave to every subordinate Class of Beings *, the utmost *Happiness* their several Natures were capable of. Neither can this Opinion be confuted from Holy Scripture, which declares that God made innumerable glorious Orders of *Cberubim* and *Seraphim*, all far above our Comprehension, and some, for any thing that we know, in the very next Step to the *Top* of the great *Scale of Beings*, and only *Second* to the Almighty. Those that hold the contrary Opinion, distinguish between *Happiness* and *Perfection*, and think that these do not either necessarily imply, or inseparably attend each other. They deny therefore the consequence of the former Argument, and assign this Reason for it, viz. because a Being produced in the highest degree of natural Perfection which a Creature is capable of, and still continued in the *same*, will not receive as much *Happiness* in the main, as others that were placed in a much inferior State at the first. This, tho' it

* Concerning these Classes, see Notes 33 and 35.

ter perhaps in some Particulars, but not without some new, and probably greater Inconveniencies, which must have spoil'd the Beauty, either of the whole, or of some chief Part.

IV. Fourthly; From hence it appears also, that all Beings cannot have equal Perfections. For the World must necessarily be compos'd

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All things could not be equally of perfect, since some are Parts of others.

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may appear something like a Paradox, yet, upon farther consideration, will perhaps be judg'd not improbable. Thus, for a Creature conscious of no deficiency of any thing necessary to its well-being, to meet with a perpetual accession of new, unknown Pleasure, to reflect with comfort on its past Condition, and compare it with the present, to enjoy a continued Series of fresh Satisfaction and Delight, and be always approaching nearer and nearer to Perfection, this must certainly advance the Sum of its *Happiness*, even above that of others, whose condition is suppos'd to have begun and to continue in that degree of perfection, where this will end (if there could be any end in either) and which never knew defect, variety, or increase. A finite Being fix'd in the same State, however excellent, must, according to all our Conceptions (if we be allow'd to judge from our present Faculties, and we can judge from nothing else) contract a kind of *Indolence* or *Insensibility* (*i. e.* cannot always be equally affected by an equal degree of Good in the Object) which *Insensibility*, nothing but alteration and variety can cure. It does not therefore seem probable, that God has actually fix'd any created Beings whatsoever in the very highest degree of Perfection next to himself. Nay, it is impossible to conceive any such highest Degree, and the Supposition is absurd. That which admits of a continual addibility, can admit of no *highest*; and to ask, why God created nor all Beings with the very highest Perfection? is the same absurdity as to ask, why he did not make as many Creatures, or as many Worlds as he could? For which see

Note 22. Since then the Creation cannot be Infinite; and finites, how much soever amplified, can never reach Infinity or absolute Perfection*, we can set no manner of bounds to the Creating Power of God: but must refer all to his Infinite Wisdom and Goodness: which Attributes we know can never be exhausted, nor will, we believe, produce any Beings in such a State, as shall not leave room enough for them to be still growing in Felicity, and for ever acquiring new Happiness, together with new Perfection.

This notion of a growing Happiness is embraced by most Divines, and affords the strongest Motive for endeavouring to improve and excell in every Christian Grace. 'Tis beautifully touch'd upon by Mr. Addison, Spectator No. 111. "There is not, in my Opinion, a more pleasing and triumphant Consideration in Religion, than this of the perpetual Progress which the Soul makes toward the Perfection of its Nature, without ever arriving at a Period in it. To look upon the Soul as going on from Strength to Strength; to consider, that She is to shine for ever with new Accessions of Glory, and brighten to all Eternity; that She will be still adding Virtue to Virtue, and Knowledge to Knowledge, carries in it something wonderfully agreeable to that Ambition which is natural to the Mind of Man: Nay, it must be a Prospect pleasing to God himself, to see his Creation for ever beautifying in his Eyes, and drawing nearer to him by degrees of Resemblance."

That the Happiness of Saints and Angels may be continually increasing, see Tillotson's 77th Sermon, Vol. 2d. Fol. p. 578, &c.

From:

* See Note F: and Dr. Bentley's Boyle's Lect. Sermon. 6: p. 236, 237. 5th Edit.

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of various *Parts*, and these *parts* of *others*, and so on. But a Part must needs come short, both of the *Divine Perfection*, and the Perfection of the *whole*. For it is nothing with regard to all the Perfections which it has not, whether these be Divine, or Created; and since one Part is not another, nor the *whole*, 'tis plain, that every part wants the Perfections not only of the whole, but of other Parts also. And that the *whole* is more perfect than a *part*, is evident from hence, that it necessarily includes the multiplied Perfection of every part; and

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From these Considerations, and some which follow in the remainder of this Note, it may perhaps seem probable, that in us, and all Beings of the like nature, changes from worse to better, must be attended even with greater degrees of Pleasure than a settled permanence in any, the highest State of Glory or Perfection, and consequently become necessary to the completion of all finite Happiness. But in opposition to all this, *Bayle* urges, that increase or alteration is not in the least requisite to a lasting Felicity even in ourselves.

“ That 'tis no ways necessary that our Soul should feel Evil, to the end it may relish what is Good, and that it should pass successively from Pleasure to Pain, and from Pain to Pleasure, that it may be able to discern that Pain is an Evil, and that Pleasure is a Good thing. We know by Experience, that our Soul cannot feel, at one and the same time, both Pleasure and Pain; it must therefore at first either have felt Pain before Pleasure, or Pleasure before Pain. If its first Sensation was that of Pain, it found that State to be uneasy, altho' it was ignorant of Pleasure. Suppose then that its first Sensation lasted many Years, without Interruption, you may conceive that it was in an easy Condition, or in one that was uneasy. And do not alledge to me Experience, do not tell me that a pleasure which lasts a long time becomes insipid, and that a long pain becomes insupportable: For I will answer you, that this proceeds from a Change in the organ which makes that pain, which con-

“ tinues the same as to kind, to be different as to Degrees. If you have had at first a Sensation of six Degrees, it will not continue of Six to the end of two Hours, or to the end of a Year, but only either of one Degree, or of one Fourth part of a Degree. Thus Custom blunts the Edge of our Sensations; their Degrees correspond to the Concussions of the parts of the Brain, and this Concussion is weaken'd by frequent Repetitions: from whence it comes to pass, that the Degrees of Sensation are diminish'd. But if Pain or Joy were communicated to us in the same Degree, successively, for an hundred Years, we should be as unhappy, or as happy in the hundredth Year, as in the first Day; which plainly proves, that a Creature may be happy with a continued Good, or unhappy with a continued Evil, and that the *Alternatior*, which *Lactantius* speaks of*, is a bad Solution of the Difficulty. It is not founded upon the nature of Good and Evil, nor upon the Nature of the Subject which receives them; nor upon the nature of the Cause which produces them. Pleasure and Pain are no less proper to be communicated the second Moment than the first, and the third Moment than the second, and so of all the rest. Our Soul is also as susceptible of them after it has felt them one Moment, as it was before it felt them, and God who gave them, is no less capable of producing them the second Moment than the first †.”

As

* Note 103.

† *Critical Diss.* p. 2486:

and besides the parts when join'd together, and connected, acquire a new and peculiar Perfection; whereby they answer their proper Ends, which they could not do asunder, they defend themselves much better, and assist each other. The Perfection of the whole therefore, is not only more *extensive* than that of the parts, by the accumulation of many parts, perhaps equal to one another; but more *intense* also, by

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As this is one of the strongest objections, and applicable to all kinds of Evil; I have quoted it at length (tho' some parts may not relate immediately to our present purpose) and shall endeavour to give a full answer to it in the following Notes. It will be consider'd with respect to Moral Good and Evil, in Notes 90, 106, and 108. Let us confine ourselves at present to Natural Good, which may be divided into sensitive and intellectual. As to the former, we perceive that the Mind, for the augmentation of its Happiness, is endow'd with various Senses, each of which is entertain'd with a variety of Objects; now, any one of these Senses can convey so much Pleasure for some time, as is sufficient to fill our present narrow Capacity, and engross the whole Soul. She can be entirely happy in the Satisfaction arising from the Sight, Hearing, &c. or from the Memory, or any other Mode of Perception by itself. If therefore any one of these Organs could (as *Bayle* supposes) continue to communicate the same Degree of Pleasure to us for an hundred Years, all the rest would be unnecessary: but an All-wise Being, who cannot act in vain, has implanted this Variety of Senses in us; this then is a good Argument, that none of these particular Senses could continue in its present State, and always communicate the same Degree of Happiness. Farther, this Supposition will appear to be impossible, from considering the Nature and Properties of that Matter of which the sensitive Organs are compos'd. If there be (as *Bayle* maintains) so close a connection between the Soul and certain Modifications of Matter, as that the Degrees of sensitive Pleasure are diminish'd by a *Change* in the Organ, by weakening the Concussion of some parts of the

Brain by frequent Repetitions; then we say, 'tis plainly impossible, that the same Degrees should be continued by this Organ, which, as it is material, is perpetually exposed to this *Change*, and liable to Dissolution, and necessarily weaken'd by these frequent Concussions. Every Motion in it must in time be stop'd by contrary ones, as our Author has fully shewn in Chap. 4. §. 1.

If he supposes that the same Degree of Pleasure may still be communicated tho' the Organ alters, he supposes that there is no such Connection between any portion or position of Matter, and our Spirit; which is directly contrary to his former Supposition, and also to Truth, as will perhaps appear from the following Chapter. If then *Bayle* imagines, that the same, or different Matter, when moved or at rest; or when moved in different Directions, may still affect the Mind in the very same manner, he must either take it for granted that the Affections of Matter are no Causes of the Sensations of the Mind, that is, contradict his former Supposition; or else he must suppose the same Effect to proceed from different Causes; either of which will tend equally to advance his System. But in reality, this decrease of Pleasure in Familiarity and Custom, does not entirely depend on any Change of the corporeal Organs, but on the original Faculties of the Soul itself, as may be gathered from some such Observations as this which follows. View a delightful Landskip, a pleasant Garden, or any of those Figures which appear most beautiful, renew the Prospect once, or twice, to Day, to Morrow, and at several distant Periods; it shall afford a great degree of Pleasure for some time, while any Novelty may be supposed to remain; but that Pleasure perishes together with

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by the Addition of certain Degrees, whereby the whole must of Necessity excell the Parts. As therefore we have proved, that an absolutely perfect Creature is an Impossibility, so it may be proved from hence, that all cannot have an *equal Degree* of Perfection. For the World consists of Parts, and those again of others, perhaps divisible *in infinitum*: but that every single Part should have the Perfection of all,

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this Novelty, tho' the external Organs of Vision still continue perfect, and your Sensations are most evidently the same the last Day as the first. You are able to behold the same Scenes over again, with the same ease and acuteness, but not with the same Intensity of Delight. To attempt a Mechanical Solution of this by a supposed alteration of some imaginary Traces in the Brain (which yet, if they were allow'd, cannot mend the matter a jot, as was just now shewn) will only throw us into still greater difficulties, as any one that attentively considers the whole of that Chimerical Hypothesis, must conclude, and of which *Bayle*, who soon perceiv'd the Defects and Absurdities of most other Systems, was undoubtedly convinc'd. It seems to me much more properly resolvable into a native Property of the Soul itself. Is it not probable, that the mind of Man is originally framed with an Appetite or Disposition for *Variety*? that it cannot be always on the same Bent, but as it is endow'd with different Faculties, so these relieve one another by turns, and receive an additional Pleasure from the Novelty of those Objects about which it is conversant; and that by this means it enjoys a greater Sum of Happiness than it could otherwise attain to? See the *Spectator*, N^o. 600. N^o. 626. or N^o. 412. or *Watts on the Passions*, §. 4.

I shall only add an Observation on this Head from the ingenious Author of the *Vindication of God's Moral Character*, p. 21. which shews us the necessity for this Variety or Increasableness of Perfection, in order to our *Intellectual Happiness*, since most of that arises from our past Defects. "By Intellectual Happiness, I mean the Discovery and Contemplation of Truth, with regard to which I have this to observe, that all the Pleasures we taste of this kind are

"owing either to our preceding Ignorance, to the care and Pains we take in the Discovery of Truth, or to the Degree of our Knowledge, when we attain to a greater measure than other Men. All Truth, when consider'd separate from these, is alike as Truth (tho' not of the like Importance to us) the Object of the Understanding, and as such, it must afford the same Delight. If we all could, with equal ease and clearness, see all the Relations of things, they must all in the nature of the thing equally affect us. We should taste as much Pleasure in knowing or contemplating that two and two makes four, as in knowing or contemplating any Proposition which now appears the most difficult, and so affords the most Pleasure: or rather, we should not have Pleasure from any of them. Now if this be the Case, then it is evident, that the Capacity we have for tasting this kind of Pleasure, renders us capable of its contrary. We could not be delighted in the Discovery or Contemplation of Truth, if we were not capable of being ignorant, and of the Unhappiness which arises from it."

This is the Consequence we would draw from all that went before: but of this more at large under the head of *Moral Evil*.

We reply then to *Bayle*, that this *Alternative* or Variety of either Good or Evil, as far as concerns the present Argument, is founded on the Nature of the Subject which receives them, and that our Soul in its present State, is not so susceptible of them, after it has felt them two or three times as at first. What it might have been made capable of, is nothing to the Purpose, since (as it was observ'd before, and must often be repeated) we are to consider Man as we find him at present; and draw all our Arguments, not from such Faculties as are per-

or many, is impossible; and we are not to arraign the Power or Goodness of God for not working Contradictions. There must then be many, perhaps infinite (31.) Degrees of Perfection in the Divine Works; for whatever arises from *Nothing* is necessarily imperfect; and the less it is removed from nothing (taking *Existence* for one Degree, as we said before) the more imperfect it is. There is no occasion therefore for an Evil Principle to introduce the Evil of Defect, or an Inequality of Perfections in the Works of God: for the very nature of created Beings necessarily requires it, and we may conceive the place of this Malicious Principle to be abundantly supplied from hence, that they derive their Original from *Nothing*, (32.).

V. Fifthly,

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perhaps in other Beings, but, from these only which we perceive and experience in him. If these cannot be alter'd and improved consistently with each other *, nor subjected to any general Laws more suitable to his present circumstances, and productive of more good to the whole System †, then, all Arguments built on this Topic against the Divine Attributes, must fall to the Ground. These and the like Suppositions therefore, *viz. that the same Degree of Pleasure might be communicated to us successively for a hundred Years; if understood of one uniform Cause producing it: That our Pleasures, meaning sensitive ones, might not depend upon the Fibres of the Brain, —and, That these Fibres should not wear out at all* ||,—or, if these Fibres did not wear out, *that the Pleasure should never decay*, are all unreasonable Suppositions: They offend against the Rule laid down above, and always to be remember'd, of taking the whole of human Nature as it is; of considering our present Body and Spirit, and the obvious Properties of each, and the known Laws of their Union together. All such Objections therefore are beside the Question; and founded upon the old absurdity of reducing us to a different Class of Beings, when (as will appear presently) all conceivable Classes and Orders are already full.

Thus much for one Query about the manner of Creating things, *viz.* Whether any should have been fix'd immutably in a certain Degree of Perfection: Our Author proceeds to examine the other, *viz.* Whether all things could and ought to have been at first created in the same Degree of Perfection?

(31.) That is *Indefinite*, or greater than any assignable Number; for neither the Universe itself, nor any thing that belongs to it, can be properly and absolutely Infinite, as our Author maintains in his Note F, and we have largely proved from *Cudworth, &c.* in the former Chapter.

(32.) It is scarce necessary to observe, that this must all along be understood only *Materially*, i. e. that these things were not produced from any matter *præ-existent*, but were made *ἐξ ἐκ ὄντων*, and brought into Being from mere *Non-Existence*. For the possibility of which, and the Opinion of the Antients on this Subject, see *Cudworth, C. 5. §. 2. p. 738, &c.* The other Senses of the Words, *viz.* That any thing can come from nothing, *casually*, or be produced *by nothing, or by itself, or without an Efficient Cause*, are manifestly absurd, as is demonstrated at large in the same excellent Section. For an Illustration of our Author's Notion before us, see *Scott's Christian Life's*.

* See Note 42.

† See Note 37.

|| See Bayle's *D:ct.* p. 2487.

Things necessarily are of unequal Perfections with regard to their Attributes; but it is agreeable to the highest Goodness to create those which are least perfect, if they are no hindrance to the number or convenience of the more Perfect ones.

V. Fifthly: 'Tis plain, that Creatures are not only unequally imperfect in respect of their *Parts* and *Under-parts*, and so on, which by continual Sub-division, approach in a manner to nothing; but a necessary inequality arises among them also in respect of their *Attributes*. For a conscious or thinking Substance is more perfect than one that wants Sense or Understanding. If it be ask'd, How is it agreeable to the Divine Goodness to have created these also? I answer, If the Creation of these be no impediment to the production of the more perfect; if neither the Number nor Happiness of the more perfect be diminished by the Creation of those that are less perfect, why will it be unfit to create these too? Since God does what is best to be done, nothing more or greater can be expected from the most benevolent and powerful Author of Nature. If therefore it be better, *cæteris paribus*, that these more imperfect Beings should exist, than not, it is agreeable to the Divine Goodness, that the best that could be should be done. If the Production of a less perfect Being were any hindrance to a more perfect one, it would appear contrary to the Divine Goodness, to have omitted the more perfect and created the less; but since they are no manner of hindrance to each other, the more the better, (33.).

VI. An

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Life, Part 2. Vol: 1. C: 6. §. 2. p. 446, 447. 1st Edit. " God is the *Cause of Perfection* only, but not of Defect, which so far forth as it is *natural* to created Beings hath no *Cause* at all, but is merely a *Negation* or *Non-entity*. For every created thing was a *Negation* or *Non-entity* before ever it had a *positive* Being, and it had only so much of its *primitive* Negation taken away from it, as it had *positive* Being conferr'd upon it; and therefore, so far forth as it is, its *Being* is to be attributed to the *Sovereign Cause* that produced it; but so far forth as it is not, its not being is to be attributed to the *Original Non-entity*, out of which it was produced. For that which was once Nothing, would still have been Nothing, had it not been for the *Cause* that gave *Being* to it, and therefore, that it is so far Nothing still, *i. e.* *limited and defective*, is only to be attributed to its own *primitive*

" Nothingness. As for instance, If I give a poor Man a hundred pounds, that he is worth *so much* Money is wholly owing to me, but that he is not worth a hundred more, is owing only to his own Poverty, and just so, that I have such and such *Perfections* of Being is wholly owing to God who produced me out of Nothing; but that I have such and such *Defects* of being, is only owing to that *Non-entity* out of which he produced me."

The same Notion is also largely discuss'd in *Eilhardi Lubini Phosphorus*, &c. Chap. 6, 7, and 17. From whom it appears, that most of the ancient Philosophers meant no more than this by their *Evil Principle*.

(33.) A good Illustration of this occurs in Dr. J. Clarke's Discourse on *Nat. Evil*, p. 289, &c. Now from the Supposition of a Scale of Beings

VI. An Instance will make this more clear, Suppose that God made the World *finite*; suppose that *Spirits*, or pure immaterial thinking Beings, are the *most perfect* Species of Substances: suppose, in the last place, that God created as many of this sort as were convenient for the System he had made, so that if there were more, they would incommode one another; yet there would be no less Room for Matter, than if there were none at all. This Supposition is by no means absurd; for since these may be conceiv'd without *local Extension*, and have no relation to *Space* or *Place*, as Bodies have * in whatever Number they were created, they would contribute nothing at all

This confirm'd by an Instance of Matter, which is no Impediment to pure Spirits.

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Beings gradually descending from *Perfection* to *Non-entity*, and compleat in every intermediate Rank and Degree (for which see Note 35.) we shall soon perceive the absurdity of such Questions as these, Why was not Man made more perfect? Why are not his Faculties equal to those of Angels? Since this is only asking why he was not placed in a quite different Class of Beings, when at the same time all other Classes are supposed to be already full. From the same Principle also, we gather the Intent of the Creator in producing those several inferior Orders under our View. They who imagine that all things in this World were made for the immediate use of Man alone, run themselves into inextricable Difficulties. Man indeed is the Head of this lower part of the Creation, and perhaps it was design'd to be absolutely under his command. But that all things here tend directly to his own use, is, I think, neither easy nor necessary to be proved. Some manifestly serve for the food and support of others, whose Souls may be necessary to prepare and preserve their Bodies for that Purpose, and may at the same time be happy in a Consciousness of their own Existence. 'Tis probable, that they are intended to promote each others Good reciprocally: Nay, Man himself contributes to the Hap-

pinefs, and betters the Condition of the Brutes in several respects; by cultivating and improving the Ground, by watching the Seasons, by protecting and providing for them, when they are unable to protect and provide for themselves ||. Others of a much lower Class, may, for ought we know, enjoy themselves too in some degree or other; and also contribute to the Happiness even of superior Beings, by a display of the Divine Attributes in different ways, and affording ample matter of Reflection on the various Ranks and Degrees of Perfection discoverable in the animal World; wherein the highest order may with pleasure contemplate numberless Species infinitely below them: and the lower Class can admire and adore that Infinity of Divine Wisdom and Goodness and Power which shines forth in so many Beings vastly above them. They may conduce to the Beauty, Order, and Benefit of the whole System, the general Good of which was the aim of its Creator, and with regard to which, every part is chiefly to be esteem'd †. They may have Ten thousand Uses beside what relates to Man, who is but a very small part of it: Several Instances might be given, which would make this very probable; at least, the contrary, I think, cannot ever be proved. See C. 4. §. 2. Subf. 4, 5.

* See Note 13.

|| See Chubb's Supplement, &c. p. 12; and Dr. J Clarke, p. 284, 285.

† See Cudworth, p. 875, 876.

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either to the filling up of Space, or excluding Bodies out of it, yet they would have a certain *System* or *Society* among themselves, which might require a determinate Number, which if it were exceeded, they must become troublesome to one another, by too great a Multitude in a finite World. Nay, if the World were supposed to be *infinite*, and as many such Spirits created as were possible, yet would they be no impediment to Matter, nor Matter to them, neither would their Number be less, nor their Conveniencies fewer, because Matter did or did not exist. Since then material and immaterial Beings consist so well together, is it not agreeable to the greatest Goodness to have created both? Let Matter be stupid and devoid of Sense, as it is; let it be the most imperfect of all Substances, and next to nothing, (since not to perceive its Existence is little different from Non-existence) 'tis better to be even so, than not at all; for Existence is, as we said, the Foundation, or first Degree of Perfection, and the next, as it were, to this, the second, is perception of Existence. But you'll say, Why did not God add this second Degree to Matter? I answer, if that could, it is probable it would, have been done: But since we see that Matter is in itself a passive, inert Substance, we must believe that its Nature would not admit of *Sense*, or if it had been capable of Sense, that greater Inconveniencies would have flow'd from thence, than if it had been made insensible, as it is, (34).

However

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(34.) *Matter*, as such, is at present incapable of, or has Properties totally inconsistent with thought and self-motion, (as is at large demonstrated by the Authors refer'd to in Note 13.) it is therefore in a Degree below Animals, or (as our Author says) next to Nothing. But yet, such as it is, 'tis first, absolutely necessary for many Animals, and secondly, would not be so convenient for their uses, if it could think. It is the *Basis* or *Support* of Animals in this our System; it is, as we may say, the *case* and *covering* of their several Souls; it serves for the *clothing* of that Case, for their *Food*, their *Defence*, and various uses.

But were it all Life, or conscious (not to insist on the Absurdities of such a Supposition in itself) what Misery and Confusion would arise? If all were Animals, what must these Animals subsist on? If they were of the same Nature with such as we are acquainted with, they must also be sustain'd after the same manner, *i. e.* they must live by *Food*, and consequently live upon, and continually torment and consume one another; and consequently more Happiness would be lost than got by such Life, which is as plentiful at present*, as seems agreeable to the System. If Matter, as Matter, were endow'd with the Power of *Self-Motion*.

* See Note 39.

However, without this, there would be a kind of *Void* in the Universe, and something wanting which might exist: but it was better that there should be Matter than nothing at all, and since one Side was to be chosen, the Divine Goodness preferr'd Matter, because that was the greater Good. For, since it is no hindrance to the multiplication or convenience of thinking Beings, nor diminishes the number of the more perfect, 'tis plain it adds to the perfection of the Universe, and whatever it be, tho' the most imperfect thing in Nature, 'tis gain to the whole. It was therefore agreeable to the greatest Power and Goodness to have created this also; nor need we the *Demiurgus* of the antient Heretics to produce it; as if unworthy of the great and good God. The Evils of Imperfection then must be permitted in the Nature of things; and inequality of Perfections must be permitted also, since it is impossible that all the Works of God should be endow'd with equal Perfections.

VII. If you say, God might have omitted the more imperfect Beings, I grant it, and if that had been best he would undoubtedly have done it. But it is the part of infinite Goodness to choose the very best; from thence it proceeds therefore, that the more imperfect Beings have Existence; for it was agreeable to that, not to omit the very least Good which could be produced. *Finite* Goodness might possibly have been exhausted in creating the greater Beings, but *Infinite* extends to all. The infinite Power and Goodness of God then were the Cause why imperfect Beings had Existence together with the more perfect. 'Tis plain therefore that the System of the World may be the *Work of a Deity*, tho' it has this Fault. Nay, that it was

'Tis less agreeable to the Divine Goodness to have omitted, than to have created, these more imperfect Beings.

N. 3. created.

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Motion, what use could we put it to? What clothing or Habitations? What Instruments or Utensils could we make of it? But this, I think, needs no farther Explanation. Matter then, in its present State, as united with, and subservient to, such Spirits as we conceive ours to be, is in general more conducive to the Good and Happiness of the whole, than it would be in any other conceivable manner of Existence. To ask yet why some certain Portions or Systems of it might not have been made more perfect, or why it was not farther sublimated, refined, and so unaccountably modify'd, as to be render'd capable of Thought; is the absurd Question above mention'd, *viz.* why was it not made something else, or removed into a higher Class? when at the same time there appears so much reason for the Existence of such a thing as this now is; and all the superior Classes are concluded to be full. What reason there is for this last conclusion may be seen in the following Note.

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created is evident for this very Reason, because it is *imperfect*; for if it were *Self-existent*, it would be *absolutely perfect*. (35.)

N O T E S.

(35.) The chief Argument of the foregoing Chapter is beautifully illustrated by Mr. Addison in the *Spectator*, N^o. 519. As frequent use will be made of this Observation concerning the *Scale of Beings*, I hope the Reader will excuse my transcribing so much of the above mention'd Paper as is necessary to explain it.

“ Infinite Goodness is of so communicative a Nature, that it seems to delight in the conferring of Existence upon every Degree of perceptive Being. As this is a Speculation which I have often pursued with great pleasure to my self, I shall enlarge farther upon it, by considering that part of the *Scale of Beings* which comes within our Knowledge. There are some living Creatures which are rais'd just above dead Matter. To mention only the Species of Shell-Fish, which are formed in the fashion of a Cone, that grow to the surface of several Rocks, and immediately die upon their being sever'd from the place where they grow. There are many other Creatures, but one remove from these, which have no other Senses besides that of feeling and taste. Others have still an additional one of Hearing. Others of Smell, and others of Sight. It is wonderful to observe, by what a gradual progress the World of Life advances thro' a prodigious variety of Species, before a Creature is form'd that is compleat in all its Senses; and even among these is such a different Degree of Perfection, in the Sense which one Animal enjoys beyond what appears in another, that tho' the Sense in different Animals be distinguish'd by the same common denomination, it seems almost of a different Nature. If after this we look into the several inward Perfections of Cunning and Sagacity, or what we generally call Instinct, we find them rising after the same manner imperceptibly one above another, and receiving additional Improvements according to the Species in which they are implanted.

“ This Progress in Nature is so very gradual, that the most perfect of an inferior Species comes very near to the most imperfect of that which is immediately above it. The exuberant and overflowing Goodness of the supreme Being, whose Mercy extends to all his Works, is plainly seen, as I have before hinted, from his having made so little Matter, at least what falls within our Knowledge, that does not swarm with Life: nor is his Goodness less seen in the Diversity than in the Multitude of living Creatures. Had he only made one Species of Animals, none of the rest would have enjoy'd the Happiness of Existence, he has therefore specified in his Creation every Degree of Life, every Capacity of Being. The whole Chasm in Nature, from a Plant to a Man, is filled up with diverse kinds of Creatures, rising one over another, by such a gentle and easy ascent, that the little transitions and deviations from one Species to another, are almost insensible. This intermediate Space is so well husbanded and managed, that there is scarce a Degree of Perfection which does not appear in some one part of the World of Life. Is the Goodness or Wisdom of the Divine Being more manifested in this his Proceeding? There is a Consequence, besides those I have already mentioned, which seems very naturally deducible from the foregoing Considerations. If the Scale of Beings rises by such a regular Progress, so high as Man, we may, by a parity of Reason, suppose that it still proceeds gradually thro' those Beings which are of a superior Nature to him; since there is an infinitely greater Space and Room for different Degrees of Perfection between the Supreme Being and Man, than between Man and the most despicable Insect. This Consequence of so great a variety of Beings, which are superior to us, from that variety which is inferior to us, is made by Mr. Locke, in a passage which I shall

|| To which we may add, Will and Liberty. See Bayle's *Dict.* p. 2609, 2610.

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“ shall here set down, after having premised, that notwithstanding there is such Infinite Room between Man and his Maker, for the creative Power to exert itself in, it is impossible that it should ever be filled up, since there will be still an Infinite gap or distance between the highest created Being and the Power which produced him.”

The fine Passage there cited from Mr. Locke, occurs in the 3d Book of his Essay, Chap. 6. §. 12.

See also Notes 38, 39.

From the foregoing Observation, that there is no manner of Chasm or Void, no Link deficient in this great Chain of Beings, and the reason of it, it will appear extremely probable also, that every distinct Order, every Class or Species of them, is as full as the Nature of it would admit, and God saw proper. There are (as our Author says) perhaps so many in each Class as could exist together without some inconvenience or uneasiness to each other. This

is easily conceivable in Mankind, and may be in superior Beings, tho' for want of an exact knowledge of their several Natures and Orders, we cannot apprehend the manner of it, or conceive how they affect one another; only this we are sure of. that neither the Species nor the Individuals in each Species, can possibly be Infinite; and that nothing but an *Impossibility* in the Nature of the thing, or some greater *inconvenience*, can restrain the exercise of the Power of God, or hinder him from producing still more and more Beings capable of Felicity. When we begin to enquire into the Number of these and the Degrees of their Perfection, we soon lose ourselves, and can only refer all to the Divine Wisdom and Goodness: from our previous Notices of which Attributes, we have the highest reason to conclude, that every thing is as perfect as possible in its own kind, and that every System is in itself full and complete.



C H A P. IV.

Concerning Natural Evil.

S E C T. I.

Of Generation and Corruption.

A Creature cannot complain of its Fate, tho' it be less perfect than others.

I. **I**T appears from the foregoing Observations, that created Beings must necessarily be *defective*, i. e. some must want the Perfections which others have, and that it was impossible for them to enjoy either an absolute or equal Perfection; also, that there is no occasion for an Evil Principle opposite to Infinite Goodness and Power. And from hence we may affirm, that God, tho' infinitely good and powerful, could not separate things from the concomitant Evils of Imperfection, and did not esteem it unbecoming himself to create the Good, tho' that brought some Evils along with it, so long as these Evils are less than the Good with which they are connected. Nor can the Creature justly complain of its Condition, if it have not all, or equal Perfection, with some others; since 'twas necessary that it should fill the Station wherein it was placed, or none at all. This we have shewn sufficiently, I think, in the former kind of Evils, *viz.* those of *Imperfection*.

The Origin of things from Matter, is the source of Natural

II. The same must be attempted in the second kind, *viz.* the *Natural*. Now, as all created Beings are made out of Nothing, and on that

Evils, as their rise from Nothing is the Cause of those of Imperfection.

that account are necessarily imperfect; so all natural things have a relation to, or arise from, *Matter*, and on this account are necessarily subjected to natural Evils: nor is the rise of all created Beings from Nothing a more fruitful and certain Cause of the Evils of Imperfection, than the rise of all natural things from *Matter* is of natural Evils, (36.). If therefore we can shew that these Evils are so necessarily connected with this Origin that they cannot be separated from it, it follows, that the Structure of the World either ought not to have been framed at all, or that these Evils must have been tolerated without any Imputation on the Divine Power and Goodness. But it is better that they should be as they are, since they could not be more perfect. Let us examine the particular Sorts of natural Evils, and if there be nothing in them which could be removed without greater damage to Nature, and introducing a larger train of Evils, the Divine Goodness may securely applaud itself, since it has omitted no manner of Good, nor admitted any Evil which could possibly be prevented, *i. e.* hath done in every thing what was best.

III. God has accomplish'd this in the Creation of *Matter*, as we said before; nor has he been less beneficent in what relates to the *Motion* of *Matter*. In the first place, *Matter*, tho' in itself unactive, is nevertheless capable of Action, *viz. local Motion*, for Motion is the Action that belongs to *Matter*. But 'tis better that it should act as far as it is capable, than be entirely still and sluggish: if it were without Motion, rigid and fix'd in the same place, we cannot conceive what benefit it could be of either to itself or any thing else: But when 'tis put into Motion, it may be of use, as is plain from Experience, tho' not always without a Mixture of Evils: But Action is, *cæteris paribus*, preferable to Inactivity; it is therefore agreeable to the Divine Goodness to produce Motion in *Matter*, if the Good arising

Matter is
useless except
it have Mo-
tion.

N O T E S.

(36.) From hence it may be observ'd, that there was some Foundation for that old and almost universal Notion, that all natural Evils arose from *Matter*; which in effect they do, but not from it as an eternal independent Cause, or the Evil Principle of the *Manichees*, as will be shewn below. See *Bayle's Dict.* p. 978.

from thence do but over-balance the Evil, so long as no Evils are permitted which are separable from Motion, nor such as can affect Spirits, which are purely immaterial.

Such Motion was to be rais'd in Matter, as might separate it into Parts. Hence the Generation and Corruption of Bodies naturally arises.

IV. Now, if it be granted that God could, consistently with his Goodness, both *create Matter* and put it into *Motion*, it necessarily follows, that its Motions must interfere with one another. If you say that Matter might move uniformly and altogether, either in a *direct Line* or in a *Circle*, and the contrariety of Motions by that means be prevented: I answer; The whole Mass of Matter would be no less rigid and useles with such a Motion as this, than if it were entirely at rest; it would neither be more fit for Animals, nor more adapted to the uses which it now answers. Such a Motion therefore was to be excited in it, as would separate it into parts, make it fluid, and render it an Habitation fit for Animals. But that could not be without contrariety of Motion, as any one that thinks of it at all will perceive: and if this be once admitted in *Matter*, there necessarily follows a *Division* and *Disparity* of parts, *Clashing* and *Opposition*, *Comminution*, *Concretion* and *Repulsion*, and all those Evils which we behold in *Generation* and *Corruption*. God could indeed have removed all these from Matter, by taking away its Motion, but they are either to be tolerated, or Matter must remain fix'd and immoveable in the same Situation. Some may ask, why God would not produce such Motion in Matter as might render all its Concretions so perfect as not to be liable to *Dissolution* or *Corruption*. For, since the Power of God is infinite, nothing on his side hinders this from being done, what hinders therefore on the side of Matter? I answer; Its *Motion* and *Divisibility*. For, if you suppose any sort of Motion in Matter, it must necessarily be either *useless*, as we said before, or in *opposite Directions*. The mutual clashing of these Concretions could therefore not be avoided, and as they strike upon one another, whether we suppose them hard or soft, a concussion of the parts, and separation from each other, would necessarily be produced: But a Separation or Dissipation of the parts is *Corruption*. This therefore could not be avoided without violence done to the Laws of Motion and the Nature of *Matter*. For, to hinder moveable things from interfering, and the

Parts which are separable in themselves, from separating by mutual repulsions, would require a *perpetual Miracle*, (37.).

V. Secondly; Since it is proper that Matter should be put into Motion, 'tis better that this should be done according to some certain Laws, and in an orderly Course, than at random, and as it were by chance. For by this means, the Systems compos'd of Matter will have both more durable and more regular Periods. The first Evil arising from Matter was, we said, the *jarring* of Elements; from whence comes their Corruption and Dissolution, Instability and Vicissitude. It may be surprizing, that all these should proceed from a stable, fix'd and uniform Good. But we have made it appear, that Matter could not move at all without these, and it was more eligible that the World should be liable to them, than destitute of Animals. And that these Evils should not multiply beyond Necessity, the Divine Goodness has taken care, by restraining its Motion under certain Laws, so as to make it steady, and as constant as could be; so that the Machines compos'd of it might be as little shock'd with contrary Motions as possible, and endure for a long time; nay, some of them in certain places and circumstances for ever. For if no parcels of Matter were directed by any certain and determinate Rule, such a confus'd Motion would jumble every thing together, nor could any thing last for ever so short a time. On this account God establish'd certain Laws of Motion, and perpetual Rules; and framed

Motion under certain Laws tends more to the preservation of things, than if it was left at random: hence God has distributed Bodies into various Systems.

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(37.) That is, there could be no general pre-establish'd *Laws of Nature* but God must continually interpose, and effect every thing by his own direct and immediate Power: The bad consequences of which are very obvious. There could be no *Arts and Sciences*, no *Skill or Industry*; no regular Methods of providing for our Bodies, or improving our Minds in the Knowledge of things. All which evidently presuppose, and are entirely founded on, some settled, certain Laws of the Universe discoverable by us.

“ We are so far acquainted (says the Author of the *Religion of Nature Delin.* p. 96.)

“ with the *Laws of Gravitation and Motion*,
 “ that we are able to calculate their Effects,
 “ and serve ourselves of them, supplying up-
 “ on many occasions the defect of Power in
 “ ourselves by *Mechanical Powers*, which ne-
 “ ver fail to answer according to the Esta-
 “ blishment, &c.” What the known Laws of
 Nature are, see in *Cbeysse's Phil. Prin. Keil's*
Introd. to Phys. &c. Concerning the necessity
 of the present Laws of Motion, and the fitness
 of them to attain the intended Ends, see
 Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Natural Evil*, p. 92, &c. and
 150, 158.

the great Mass of Beings into certain Machines and Systems, which have such an exact correspondence, as to contribute their mutual Assistance towards preserving the Motion and Order prescribed by the Deity. Neither was it convenient that Matter should every where consist of the same kind of parts; but rather that it should be in one place very fluid, similar and homogeneous, such as we believe the *Æther* to be; in another, solid and compact, as the Earth is, and perhaps the Stars; in another, mix'd with heterogeneous Particles, such as we find the Air and Water.

It appears from Light and other Phenomena, that the System of this World is the very best and most beautiful.

VI. We must confess, that such a Mass as the Earth is, seems not so beautiful, or so fit for Motion, as the pure fluid *Æther*, 'tis also more liable to Corruption and Changes; yet it is most certain, that the Earth was not constituted in this manner for no reason at all, or unnecessarily: perhaps the *Mundane* System could no more consist without these solid Masses, than the human Body without Bones. No sober Man doubts, but God could have disposed this Material World into other Systems; and of what kind soever these had been, our Reason could never have comprehended the contrivance of them. For, since our Planetary System is incomprehensible to us, much more will the Fabric of the whole Universe be so; but, as far as we do understand the disposition of it, all is well, elegant and beautiful: and if, among all the Phænomena of Nature, we were only acquainted with Light, that would shew us the just and admirable Structure of it. It is reasonable therefore to believe, that this is the very best, and attended with the least Inconveniencies.

'Tis rash to affirm that Matter might be distributed into better Systems, since we do not thoro'ly understand the present.

VII. You'll say that some particular things might have been better. But, since you do not thoroughly understand the whole, you have no right to affirm thus much. We have much greater Reason to presume, that no one part of it could be chang'd for the better, without greater detriment to the rest, which it would either be inconsistent with, or disfigure by its Disproportion*. For we have shewn before, that all manner of Inconveniencies could not be avoided, because of the Imperfection of Matter; and the Nature of Motion. That State of things was therefore preferable, which was attended with the fewest and least Inconveniencies. And who but a very rash, indiscreet Person will affirm, that God has not actually made

* See Note 42.

made choice of this? Nay, who can do it with any shadow of Reason, unless he thoroughly understands both this and that other which he would prefer to it? Whoever pronounces upon them before this, gives Sentence before he has look'd into the Cause, and is at the same time both a partial and an incompetent Judge.

It concern'd us the more to have this well explain'd, that being convinc'd of the Convenience or *Meliority* of the whole Material System, we may more easily perceive the Origin of those Evils which necessarily follow from the *Contrariety* of Motion, and the *Corruption* of things.

S E C T. II.

Concerning Animals and the Variety of them.

Since Matter is not Self-conscious, nor able to enjoy itself, nor capable of receiving any benefit from itself, it follows, that it was not made for itself, but for something else, to which it was to be subservient in Sensation, Thought, or Fruition. We find by Experience, that Matter can be thus serviceable to a thinking Being, tho' stupid and insensible itself: 'Tis probable therefore that God design'd and directed all Matter to this end as far as was possible. Hence comes the Union of sensible and thinking Beings with the Particles of Matter, as we experience in ourselves. The same may be said of all its parts, as far as the order and constitution of things allow'd. There is nothing therefore in vain, nothing idle, nor any Region without its Animals. For supposing, as we said, so many pure Spirits, separate from Matter, to be made as were convenient; as these occupy no Place*, there would be no less Room for other thinking sensible

Matter does not seem to be made for its own sake, since it is not Self-conscious, 'tis therefore design'd for the use of Animals.

* See Note: 13.

Substances devoid of Matter to exercise their Faculties, and enjoy themselves, which for the future let us call Souls, (38.)

'Tis probable that Animals vary according to the variety of those regions which they are destin'd to inhabit: Therefore the Æther and Air, in all probability, have their proper inhabitants, as well as the Earth.

II. Now, since the Structure of this visible World consists of various Bodies, *viz.* pure Æther, Air, Earth, &c. 'tis highly probable, as we said before, that each of these has its proper Inhabitants, *viz.* by the Union of Souls with the Particles of Matter. Without such an Union, we cannot apprehend how there should be either Æthereal or Aerial Animals. For the most fluid Bodies, if not united to an immaterial Soul, or compacted together, would be immediately dissolv'd, and every blast of Wind would dissipate such Animals: either then these vast Fields of Air or Æther must be entirely destitute of Inhabitants, which very few will believe, who behold every clod of Earth stock'd with Animals, or furnish'd after some such Manner as we con-

NOTES.

(38.) " God, if he pleas'd, could have made
 " nothing but immortal Spirits: and he could
 " have made as many of these as there are indi-
 " vidual Creatures of all sorts in the World;
 " but it seem'd good to the wise Architect, to
 " make several Ranks and Orders of Beings,
 " and to display his Power and Goodness and
 " Wisdom, in all imaginable variety of Crea-
 " tures; all which should be good in their
 " kind, tho' far short of the perfection of An-
 " gels, and immortal Spirits. He that will
 " build a House for all the Uses and Purposes
 " of which an House is capable, cannot make
 " it all Foundation, and great Beams and
 " Pillars; must not so contrive it, as to make
 " it all Rooms of State and Entertainment:
 " but there must of necessity be in it meaner
 " Materials, Rooms, and Offices, for several
 " uses and purposes, which, however inferior
 " to the rest in Dignity and Degree, do yet
 " contribute to the beauty and advantage of
 " the whole: So in this great Frame of the
 " World, it was fit there should be variety
 " and different Degrees of Perfection in the
 " several parts of it: and this is so far from
 " being an impeachment of the Wisdom and
 " Goodness of him that made it, that it is an
 " evidence of both. For, the meanest of all
 " God's Creatures is good, considering the
 " Nature and Rank of it, and the end to which
 " it was design'd; and we cannot imagine
 " how it could have been order'd and framed
 " better, tho' we can easily tell how it might
 " have been worse: and that if this or that had
 " been wanting, or had been otherwise, it had
 " not been so good; and those who have been
 " most conversant in the contemplation of na-
 " ture, and of the Works of God, have been
 " most ready to make this acknowledgment*.
 " But then if we consider the Creatures of
 " God with relation to one another, and with
 " regard to the whole frame of Things, they
 " will all appear to be very good; and not-
 " withstanding this or that kind of Creatures
 " be much less perfect than another, and there
 " be a very great distance between the Per-
 " fection of a Worm, and of an Angel, yet
 " considering every thing in the same Order
 " which it hath in the Creation, it is as good
 " as could be, considering its Nature and
 " Use, and the Place allotted to it among the
 " Creatures." *Tillotson*, Sermon 91. p. 683.
 Vol. 2. Fol. See also *Ray* on *the Creation*,
 Part 2. p. 423. 4th Edit.

* v. g. *Boyle, Wilkins, Cheyue, Derham, Grew, Ray, Necessity, &c.*

conjecture. (39.) If you say, here's Room for pure Spirits, I answer; Since these do not fill up Place, nor have any Relation to it, 'tis the same thing wherever they be, and Material Substances have nothing at all to do with them: It is not therefore necessary to suppose such large tracts of Air or Æther void of Animals, in order to make Room for these, for which it would be no less commodious, if replenish'd with, than if destitute of Animals. If then this be granted us, we must affirm, that there is as great variety of Souls, as of Animals, and that it is one Species which exerts its Operations by the help of Æthereal Matter, and another which stands in need of Aereal, and a third of Terrestrial. Neither will every Element be fit for every Animal, but each will have its proper Inhabitants: Nor can there be any just cause of Complaint that they are uneasy out of their proper Element, that Men cannot live any while commodiously in Æther, nor perhaps Æthereal Animals upon the Earth: For 'tis sufficient

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(39.) We have a beautiful Description of what our Author here conjectures, in the *Spectator*, N^o. 519. " If we consider those parts " of the Material World which lye the nearest to us, and are therefore subject to our " Observations and Enquiries, it is amazing " to consider the Infinity of Animals with " which it is stock'd. Every part of Matter " is peopled; every green Leaf swarms with " Inhabitants. There is scarce a single humour in the Body of a Man, or of any other Animal, in which our Glasses do not discover myriads of living Creatures. The " Surface of Animals is also covered with other Animals, which are, in the same manner, the Basis of other Animals that live upon it; nay, we find in the most solid Bodies, " as in Marble itself, innumerable Cells and " Cavities that are crowded with such imperceptible Inhabitants, as are too little for the naked Eye to discover. On the other hand, " if we look into the more bulky parts of " Nature, we see the Seas, Lakes and Rivers, " teeming with numberless kinds of living " Creatures: we find every Mountain and " Marsh, Wilderness and Wood, plentifully

" stocked with Birds and Beasts, and every " part of Matter affording proper necessaries " and conveniences for the Livelihood of Multitudes which inhabit it. The Author of the *Plurality of Worlds* draws a very good " Argument from this Consideration, for the " peopling of every Planet; as indeed it seems " very probable from the analogy of Reason, " that if no part of Matter which we are acquainted with, lies waste and useles, those " great Bodies which are at such a distance " from us, should not be desert and unpeopled, " but rather that they should be furnished " with Beings adapted to their respective Situations. *Existence* is a Blessing to those Beings only which are endowed with Perception, and is in a manner thrown away upon " dead Matter, any farther than as it is subservient to Beings which are conscious of their " Existence. Accordingly we find, from the " Bodies which lie under our Observation, " that Matter is only made as the Basis and " Support of Animals, and there is no more of the one than what is necessary for the " Existence of the other." See also *Dr. Scott's Works*, Vol. 2. Discourse 15, p. 308, &c. Fol.

Concerning *Natural Evil*.

cient if every one nourishes its proper Inhabitants, according to the Nature and Constitution of each.

The Earth, as being the least part of the mundane System, is not to be chiefly regarded; but yet is not made to no purpose, or without design.

III. That is a foolish Objection therefore of the *Epicurean Lucretius* (40.), that the World owes not its Original to a Divine Power and Goodness, because Mountains, Woods and Rocks, large Fens, and the Ocean cover so great a share of it; that the *burning heat*, viz. of the *Torrid Zone*, and the *eternal Frost*, viz. of the two *Frigid*, take up almost two Parts of it; since the Sea, the Rocks, Winds, and Mountains, are not entirely usefess in their present Situation; for this was requisite for the good of the Universe, and the order of the Mundane System. Neither was the Earth or its Inhabitants to be regarded in the first place. For, since it is but a small Part of the whole, and almost a Point, where would have been the Wonder if it had not been fit for any Inhabitants at all? if it did but promote the good of the whole, while itself was barren and empty. If this had been the Case, it would not have proved an usefess part of the World, any more than a Nail is of a Man's Body; and it is as absurd to desire that all parts of the Universe should immediately afford Habitation to Animals, as that every Part and Member of an animated Body should by itself constitute an Animal; 'tis sufficient if every particular Member conspire with the rest, and exercise its own proper Function, and consequently that the Earth, which is a member of the Universe, have its peculiar use in promoting the Good of the whole. If therefore the whole Earth was serviceable, not to preserve Animals, but only Motion, nothing could be objected from thence against the Goodness of its Author. Neither would it appear strange to any that considers the Immensity of the Works of God, and how minute a Portion of them the Earth is, if it were entirely destitute of Inhabitants: nor would it therefore be in vain. How much more then may we admire the Goodness and Wisdom of God therein, who has fill'd the whole and every part of it with Life.

IV. He

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(40.) See Dr. *Bentley's* Eighth Sermon. §. 10. | 1st Part, F. ff. 7. par. 5, &c. and 2d Part, F. ff. 4. p. 329. 5th Edit. or *Bates on the Existence of* | par. 5, &c. and the *Authors* mentioned in *God*, &c. Ch. 1, 2, and 3. or *Cockburn's Essays*, | Note 42.

IV. He knew best what Creatures every part of it was fit for, and has assign'd to each its proper place, as is evident to every Observer: The Mountains, the Woods, the Rocks, the Seas, have their proper Inhabitants, which they supply with Nourishment. The System of the World required a Globe of solid Matter such as the Earth is, and we have reason to believe that this is, as it were, a Wheel in the great Automaton, without which its Motion would be very imperfect. But besides this principal End, the Divine Wisdom saw that it might serve for Nutriment to several kinds of Animals, that no manner of Good therefore might be omitted which was consistent with the primary End, he filled it with all those Animals that it was capable of, nor could the Earth afford Sustenance to any superior or more proper Beings. God has given those parts to the Brutes which were unfit for Men; and that these might be nothing useles, which yet could not be alter'd without detriment to the whole, he has adapted Animals to every Part and Region of it; and since the Habitations could not conveniently be converted into any other form, he provided such Animals as wanted, and were agreeable to these Habitations. Hence Mountains, Woods and Rocks give Harbour to wild Beasts, the Sea to Fishes, the Earth to Insects. Neither ought we to complain that the whole Earth is not of use to Man, since that was not the principal End it was made for, but on the contrary, Man was for this reason placed upon the Earth, because it afforded a convenient Receptacle for him. And what if it had been totally unfit for Man? Would it therefore have been in vain? By no means. On the contrary, we are certain that God would have given it other Inhabitants, to whose Maintenance it might have been subservient. (41.)

The Earth may be conceiv'd as a Wheel in this Automaton of the World, without which its motion would be defective: in the interim it affords an habitation and food to Animals.

V. Those

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(41.) Our Author's Argument here might be carry'd much farther, and the Infinite Wisdom of the Creator demonstrated, not only from his having made nothing in vain, or useles in *itself*, but also from the distinct and *various* relations which every thing bears to *others*, and its contribution to the good of the whole: from the double, the *manifest* apparent *Uses* of almost every thing in Nature. Thus the Mountains mention'd in the Objection of *Lucretius*, and which many Moderns also have misrepresented as deformities of Nature, have not only their own peculiar Inhabitants *, but also afford to other Animals the most

See §. 5. par. 7. of this Chap. or Derham's *Physico Theol.* B. 3. C. 4.

The Earth is made not for Man alone, but for the Universe: to think otherwise savours of human pride.

V. Those therefore who urge the Unfitness of certain Parts of the Earth for the Sustenance of Man, as a Fault and Defect of the Divine Skill in making them, are oblig'd to prove that the Earth was made for the sake of Mankind only, and not of the Universe, and that every thing in the World is uselefs which does not immediately tend to the Use of Man. But this is absurd, and what no one would object, who is not blinded with Pride and Ignorance †. We ought rather to admire the Power and Goodness of God, who has so temper'd his Works, tho' they be immense and infinitely various, that there is nothing in them which exists not in the very best manner with respect to the whole; and which he has not replenish'd with its proper Inhabitants. And since the Variety of the constituent Parts and Regions of the Earth is no greater than the Nature of the whole Machine.

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most commodious Harbour and Maintenance, the best Remedies and Retreats. To them we owe the most pleasant Prospects, the most delicious Wines, the most curious Vegetables, the richest and most useful Metals, Minerals, and other Fossils; and, what is more than all, a wholesome Air, and the convenience of navigable Rivers and Fountains.

The Ocean, besides the support of its own Inhabitants (which are, in all probability, as numerous and various as those of the Earth) provides also vast Quantities of Vapours, which refresh and fructify the Earth itself, and nourish and support its Inhabitants, producing Springs, Lakes and Rivers. The lesser Seas, Fenns and Lakes, are so admirably well distributed throughout the Globe, as to afford sufficient Vapours for Clouds and Rains to temper the Cold of the Northern Air, to cool and mitigate the Heats of the Torrid Zone, and refresh the whole Earth with fertile Showers: As is fully proved by the excellent Author above mention'd*.

As to the variety of Uses which the same thing is render'd capable of, and manifestly design'd for, by its All-wise Author, see the ingenious S. C's *Impartial Enquiry into the Existence, &c. of God*, p. 80. "To obtain a great

number of Ends by as few means as may be, is the highest point of Wisdom. But nothing can be imagin'd more admirable in this respect, than the present frame of things. Thus tho' the human Body is compos'd of a great variety of Parts, yet how much more numerous are their Uses? How many are the Uses of the Hand, which directed by Reason is instead of all other Instruments? How many Advantages do we owe to the Eye, the Ear, and the Tongue? And if we take a deeper View, and look into the minuter parts of which these are compos'd, what can be more admirable than the Variety of Aims and Intentions that may be observ'd in each? The several Uses of the Structure and Position of each single Muscle have been computed by *Galen* in his Book *de Formatione Fœtus*, to be no less than ten: The like may be observ'd with reference to the Bones and other similar Parts, but especially with respect to the Members of such as are heterogeneous or dissimilar." p. 81.

The same is shewn at large by *Dr. Grew*, *Cosmologia Sacra*, B. 1. C. 5. par. 13, 14, &c. or *W. Scott* on the *Wisdom and Goodness of God*, Sermon 1. p. 15, &c. or *Wilkins Princ. of Nat. Relig.* C. 6.

† See Note 33.

* *Physico Theol.* B. 2. C. 5:

Machine required, nor the Species of Animals fewer than the Food would supply, we must conclude that there is nothing deficient or redundant in it. (42.)

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(42.) Hence I think we may safely conclude with our Author in general, that there could have been no partial alteration of this System but for the worse, as far as we know, at least not for the better. They who hold that there might have been a total one, that the whole Scheme of things might possibly have been alter'd or revers'd, and that either the direct contrary, or a quite different One, would have been equally, or more worthy of God; the Men, I say, that hold this, are oblig'd to shew the possibility of conceiving it, and to explain the manner how it may be, before we are oblig'd to believe them. They must shew, that the same things which are now conducive to our Happiness, and consequently the Objects of our Love, might as easily have tended to our Misery; and consequently have been as reasonably the Objects of our Aversion; that bitter might have been sweet, and sweet bitter; that the same Passions, Objects, Exercises, and Inclinations, &c. which now create Pleasure in us, might have produced a different, a quite contrary effect, or no effect at all. This they are oblig'd to do, and when they have done all this, and completed their System, and made a total alteration of things, as they imagine, for the better, they are at last only got to the above mention'd absurdity of putting this System into a higher *Class*, whereas all the different Classes in every conceivable Degree of Perfection, were supposed to be entirely fill'd at the first. We must therefore take things as they are, and argue only from the present Nature of them, collectively. In which View we shall find no possible alteration of any thing but what would produce greater Inconveniences, either in itself or others, to which it bears a strict Relation. Instances of this kind are every where to be met with: particular proofs of it in the natural World, occur in Dr. Ben-

tleys *Boyle's Lect.* particularly with regard to the five Senses of the human Body, p. 95, 96. see also *Locke on Humane Understanding*, B. 2. C. 23. §. 12. with respect to the figure and stature of it, in *Grew's Cosmologia Sacra*, B. 1: C. 5. §. 25, &c. and as to the several Parts of it all over *Boyle, Cheyne, Derham, Newentyl, Ray, Cockburn, Edwards, W. Scott, or Pelling.*

The same might easily be shewn in the immaterial World, and in the most exceptionable Part of it; *viz.* the Soul of Man, its Knowledge, Freedom, Affections*.

On this occasion I shall take the liberty to borrow a Section from Mr. *Maxwell's* general Remarks on *Cumberland*, C. 5. "The Nature of things in the natural World is so exactly fitted to the natural Faculties and Dispositions of Mankind, that were any thing in it otherwise than it is, even in Degree, Mankind would be less happy than they now are. Thus the dependence of all natural Effects upon a few simple Principles, is wonderfully advantageous in many respects. The Degrees of all the sensible Pleasures are exactly suited to the use of each: so that if we enjoy'd any of them in a greater degree, we should be less happy; for our Appetites of those Pleasures would by that means be too strong for our Reason; and, as we are framed, tempt us to an immoderate enjoyment of them, so as to prejudice our Bodies. And where we enjoy some of them in so high a degree, as that it is in many cases very difficult for the strongest to regulate and moderate the Appetites of those Pleasures, it is in such Instances where it was necessary to counterpoise some disadvantages, which are the consequences of the pursuit of those Pleasures. Thus the pleasing Ideas which accompany the Love of the Sexes, are necessary

* See Sir M. Hale's *Prim. Orig. of Mank.* C. 2. *De Homine*, p. 52.

NOTES.

" ry to be possess'd in so high a degree, to bal-
 " lance the *Cares of Matrimony*, and also the
 " Pains of Child-bearing in the Female Sex.
 " The same may be said of our *Intellectual*
 " *Pleasures*. Thus did we receive a greater
 " Pleasure from Benevolence, Sloth would be
 " encouraged by an immoderate Bounty. And
 " were the Pleasures of our Inquiries into the
 " Truth greater, we should be too speculative
 " and less active. It seems also probable, that
 " the Degree of our Intellectual Capacity is
 " very well suited to our Objects of Knowledge,
 " and that had we a greater degree thereof, all
 " other things remaining as they are, we should
 " be less happy. Moreover, it is probably so
 " adapted to the inward frame of our Bodies,
 " that it could not be greater, without either
 " an alteration in the Laws of Nature, or in
 " the Laws of Union between the Soul and
 " Body. Farther; were it much greater than
 " it is, our thoughts and pursuits would be so
 " spiritual and refin'd, that we should be taken
 " too much off from the sensible Pleasures.
 " We should probably be conscious of some
 " Defects or Wants in our Bodily Organs, and
 " would be sensible that they were unequal to
 " so great a Capacity, which would necessarily
 " be follow'd by uneasiness of Mind. And
 " this seems to hold in the Brute Creation:
 " For, methinks it would be for the disadvan-
 " tage of a Horse to be endued with the Un-

" derstanding of a Man: such an unequal U-
 " nion must be attended with continual disqui-
 " tudes and discontents. As for our Pains,
 " they are all either Warnings against Bodily
 " Disorders, or are such as, had we wanted
 " them, the Laws of Nature remaining as they
 " are, we should either have wanted some Plea-
 " sures we now enjoy, or have possess'd them
 " in a less degree. Those things in Nature
 " which we cannot reconcile to the foregoing
 " opinion, as being ignorant of their Use,
 " we have good reason from Analogy to be-
 " lieve, are really advantageous, and adapted
 " to the Happiness of Intelligent Beings of the
 " System: tho' we have not so full and com-
 " plete a Knowledge of the entire System, as
 " to be able to point out their Particularities.
 " From these Observations we may conclude,
 " that all the various Parts of our System are
 " so admirably suited to one another, and the
 " whole contrived with such exquisite Wis-
 " dom, that were any thing, in any part there-
 " of, in the least otherwise than it is, without
 " an alteration in the whole, there would be a
 " less Sum of Happiness in the System than
 " there now is."

See also the Ingenious Author of *the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, p. 179, 201, 202.

But this will be more fully considered in the 4th Section.

S E C T. III.

Of Death.

I. **W**E know by Experience, that Souls united to Bodies move them some way or other; *viz.* by Thought and Volition: for thus we move our own. And 'tis probable, that the Gravity, Solidity, and Hardness of our Bodies, together with the Resistence of the adjacent ones, are the Causes why we cannot move them every way as we please.

'Tis probable that the Solidity of our Bodies is the cause why we cannot move them whither we please.

II. A Soul then united to a portion of Æthereal, uniform, and perfectly fluid Matter, free from the Impediment of Gravity and Resistence, may in all probability move its Body whithersoever it pleases. Such a Body therefore would be perfectly obsequious to the thought and will of the Soul that inhabits it: and if it receiv'd any detriment from the neighbouring Bodies, it could repair it by its Will alone; at least so long as the Æther continued in its Fluidity and Purity. Unless the Animal therefore will'd the contrary, its Body would be *incorruptible*, and always fit for Union, *i. e.* *immortal*. If any one object, that the Bodies of the Blessed, which we call *Cælestial*, need no Motion or Change of Condition, since they enjoy continual Pleasure; for no one moves or changes his State, but in order to remove some present Uneasiness. I answer; These Bodies are not therefore immortal because they are naturally incorruptible (for that would be incompatible with the Nature of that Matter whereof they are composed) but because they are put into such Places and Circumstances by the Deity, that they can, even with Pleasure, foresee and prevent all such things as might tend to introduce either *Corruption or Pain*. Neither does their Pleasure or Happiness consist in Rest properly so call'd, but in Activity, in such Acts and Exercises of their Faculties as they choose: Now, since they may exercise themselves perpetually according to their own

A Soul united to a portion of Æthereal Matter, &c. can move it whither it will, and preserve its Union: such a Body therefore is immortal.

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own Choice, and there is nothing to hinder them, they may be perpetually happy; as will be declared below. All which are different in solid Bodies.

The Body of a terrestrial Animal is a kind of Vessel, which may be broke, the humours may flow out, and the circular motion cease. Such Animals then are naturally mortal.

III. We cannot certainly determine what Life is in these Animals which have solid Bodies, but we sufficiently apprehend *where* it is, from certain Marks and Tokens. For where there is a circular motion of the Fluids, there is Nutrition and Increase, there is, as I conjecture, some sort of Life. Now, 'tis evident, that this circular motion may be interrupted by the force of adjacent Bodies: the solid Body of an Animal is a kind of Vessel in which the humours have a flux and reflux thro' certain ducts and channels framed by Divine Skill, in the motion of which Life consists. Now this Vessel may be broke in pieces by the impulse of other Bodies, since by the native imperfection of Matter it is capable of Dissolution; but when the Vessel is broken, the Fluids therein contain'd must necessarily flow out, the circular motion must cease, and together with it animal Life. Such Animals therefore as have solid Bodies, are by Nature Mortal, and cannot last for ever, without violence done to the Laws of Nature, of Matter, and Motion. There must then have been either none at all created, or such as are naturally Mortal. The imperfection of Matter could not suffer it to be otherwise. For the hard and solid parts belonging to these Bodies are of such a frame as must necessarily be shaken and separated by others of the same bulk and hardness. Every thing therefore that consists of such kind of Parts, may be corrupted and dissolved. (43.) Therefore the Divine Power and Goodness did the very best

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(43.) This point is very well illustrated, by Dr. J. Clarke on *Natural Evil*, p. 245, &c. whose Reasoning is entirely built upon Sir J. Newton's Experiments. "Human Bodies, as well as those of all other Animals, and of Plants, are compounded of very different Materials, fix'd and volatile, fluid and solid; as appears by the resolution of them into their constituent Parts; and they are nourish'd in the same manner, *viz.* by attraction. For, as a Sponge by Suction draws in Water, so the Glands in the Bodies of all Animals, draw different Juices out of the Blood, according to the particular Nature and constitution of each of them: So long therefore as the nourishment is proper to assimilate itself to the several parts of the Body, as it approaches them in its several channels; or, so long as the solid particles (suppose of Salts, which are absolutely necessary to the preservation of all Creatures) retain their form and texture; so long Life is preserv'd and maintain'd. And when the nourishment becomes unfit to assimilate; or the

" saline

best even in creating Beings that were mortal: for an Animal subject to Death is better than none at all.

IV. But God, you'll say, created Men at first immortal, as we understand by sacred History: Mortality is not therefore an inseparable attendant on solid Bodies. I answer; It does not appear to us of what sort the Bodies of Mankind were before the Fall, and consequently nothing can be argued from thence against the necessary Mortality of all terrestrial ones. Farther, we should remember that our first Parents were naturally mortal, but that God covenanted with them for Immortality as matter of Favour, and upon particular Conditions. (44.)

This Hypothesis reconciled with sacred History, concerning the immortality of the first Man.

Not

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“ saline particles (which towards the Center are very dense, and therefore capable of strongly attracting the Fluids to them) lose their power of Attraction, either by being divided into less particles (as they may be by their watry parts insinuating themselves into their Pores with a gentle heat) or else by having those watry Parts violently separated from them: in either of these Cases all their Motion will cease, and end in Corruption, Confusion and Death. And this is abundantly confirm'd by Experience, in that every thing which is corrupted or putrify'd is of a black Colour; which shews, that the component Particles are broken to Pieces, and reduced so small, as to be unable even to reflect the Rays of Light. Thus we see, that *Death*, or the Dissolution of the Body, is the necessary Consequence of those Laws by which it is framed and generated: and therefore is not in itself properly an *Evil*, any more than that Fabric can be stiled *ill*, the Materials, or manner of building of which, would not permit it to last a thousand Years, nor was originally intended to continue half so long.” See the latter part of Note 56.

The Objections drawn from the History of our first Parents in their State of Innocence, as often urg'd by Mr. Bayle against the present Question, are inconclusive: Since whatever State they were created in, it was extraordinary, supernatural, and peculiar to them, as the first of human Race: and what, their Creator knew, would at length turn to the same which Mankind is in. at present. Nay, it is scarce possible to conceive how they could have been preserv'd and propagated, govern'd and directed by any general Laws of Nature (which yet are necessary to the whole System *) in any other Condition than they now are. Not to speak here of their moral Part, if they were compos'd of the same Materials of which all their Posterity consist, they must have been at least naturally Mortal; tho' God might, if he had seen it proper, have interfer'd in some preternatural way, and thereby alter'd the circumstances of their Mortality †. And accordingly the Sentence pronounced upon Adam, (Gen. 2. 17.) *In the Day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt dying Dye, or shalt die a Death*, might not imply that he should never have died at all had he not eaten; but that he should die both a more *speedy* and a more *painful* Death than otherwise he might have done: as that emphatical Phrase often signifies in Scripture. See more of this in §. 8. par. 6. and N. 56, and at the end of this Chapter.

(44.) See *Curcellæi Inst. Rel. Christi*. L. 3. C. 8. §. 12, 13, 20, &c. p. 110. or *Limborch, Theol. Christi*. L. 2. C. 24. §. 10. p. 137, 138.

From hence, I think, it will appear, that all

* See Note 37.

† See *Sherlock on Death*, Ch. 2. §. 1.

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Not that they should have continued upon Earth for ever; but that God promised to translate them at a proper time by his especial Favour, and preserve them in a place fit for the enjoyment of Eternity: as we believe he did with *Enoch* and *Elias*. But as soon as this Covenant with God was broken by Sin, Man was restor'd to his Native Mortality, and subjected to those other Inconveniencies to which the order of Nature, and the chain of Natural Causes, render'd such Bodies as these of Mankind obnoxious. For tho' God has not so far tied himself up to the Laws of Nature, but that he may in many Cases suspend and supersede them, yet this is not done frequently, nor to be expected for the sake of Sinners. God can indeed preserve Man from *actual Death*, but that a solid Machine consisting of heterogeneous Parts, such as the human Body is, should not be *naturally Mortal* is impossible: 'Tis a Contradiction therefore that Man, in the present State of things, should be by Nature immortal.

S E C T. IV.

Of the Passions.

Our Souls require Bodies of a peculiar *Crafts*, when that is disorder'd or removed, the operations of the Soul are either hinder'd or destroy'd.

I. Supposing the Union of a thinking or sensitive Soul with Matter, its Thought and Will must necessarily be affected by the Motions of that, as Body must be again by these. For, since the Soul is of such a Nature as to require Matter of a peculiar *Crafts* and *Figure*, in order to discharge its Functions, it follows, that when this Disposition is faulty, or quite fails, the Operations of the Soul must be impeded, or entirely cease; nor can it possibly be otherwise while the Soul and Body are of such a Nature as they really are.

II. Since therefore it is no diminution of the Divine Goodness to have assign'd such a Nature to them, as was shewn before; we must also admit of a mutual Sympathy between them. Now, if they mutually

The Soul and Body admit of a mutual Sympathy:

hence it is the first care of the Soul to keep the Body free from harm.

tually affect each other, the consequence will be, that it is the principal business of the Soul to preserve the Body from harm: In order to this, 'tis necessary that the Soul should have a perception of what is good for, or prejudicial to, the Body; and this could not be more effectually procured, than by providing that those things which tend to its preservation should communicate an agreeable Sensation to the Soul, and what is pernicious, a disagreeable one. For, otherwise, the first thing we met with might destroy us, while we were not apprehensive, or regardless of it; nor should we be solicitous to avoid a River or a Precipice. (45.)

III. 'Tis necessary therefore that the Soul and Body should affect each other mutually, that the impairing or Dissolution of the Body should create uneasiness, which, by its importunity, might recall the Soul that was indisposed or otherwise engaged, to take care of the whole; nor ought it to cease urging, till what was hurtful be removed: without this Importunity perhaps the strongest Animal would not last even a Day. The Sense then of Pain or Uneasiness produced in the Soul upon the Mutation or Dissolution of the Body is necessary for the preservation of Life in the present State of things. It may be proved from the same Principles, that the aversion to, or dread of, *Death* is not in vain, since it cannot even be conceiv'd how a frail and mortal Body, tossed by continual Motions, and tumbled among other hard Bodies, should escape

The sense of Pain is necessary to preserve Life, as also the dread of Death.

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(45.) This Subject is very well handled by Dr. J. Clarke, on *Nat. Evil*, p. 256, &c. See also Mr. Huchefson on *the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, p. 51, 52. or *Watts on the Use and Abuse of them*, §. 13, &c.

I shall transcribe a Passage from the Author last mention'd. "The Passions are design'd for the Service of the Body, because they awaken not only all the animal Powers, but the Thoughts and Contrivances of the mind, to prevent whatsoever is hurtful to the Body, and to procure what is pleasant and useful for its Support and Safety; that is, in more compendious Language, to obtain Good, or avoid Evil. While our Body is in such a feeble State, surrounded with Dangers, and

liable to so many troublesome Accidents, Disorders, and Death, God has not only furnish'd us with the *Sensations of Pleasure* and *Pain*, to give us speedy Notice of what hurts or relieves the Body, but he has also given us the *Passions of Joy and Sorrow*, of *Desire and Aversion*, to assist in this Work, that the Body may be better provided with what is necessary to its Health and Life, and may be better guarded against the Danger of Wounds and Bruises, Distempers and Death."

Thus much for the use of what our Author calls the *Sympathy between Soul and Body*, the *Passions, Affections*, &c. with respect to the *Body*. Concerning the use and necessity of them in regard to the *Mind*, see Note 47.

Q

scape Dissolution, if the Soul which moves that Body were not forewarn'd to avoid Death by the natural horror of its approach. (46.)

IV. Now

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(46.) To this *Bayle* objects *, " That the Consequences above mention'd might as readily and certainly be avoided by the sole attraction of Pleasure encreas'd or diminish'd in certain Proportions. Would not a Foretaste of more exquisite Pleasure in removing your Chair from a great Fire, make you quit the vicinity of this great Fire, without any necessity for the feeling inconvenience? Another Expedient is, That the Soul, in the very nick of time should have a clear Idea of the peril which environs her Machine, that this Idea be attended with the same Promptness of the Animal Spirits which now accompanies the Sensation of Pain; we should then be always as far from Danger as was necessary, in the same manner as we fly from it at present."

We reply, that according to the present frame of human Nature in general (which System ought always to be taken together) neither of these Expedients would answer the end proposed. As to the former, this Author has often observ'd in his Dictionary †, that a little Pain is able to counterbalance a great deal of Pleasure; that one hour of Sickness is more poignant than several Days of Health. And, p. 1053. That four Afflictions, mix'd with twenty Felicities, would be sufficient to engage a Man to wish an alteration of his condition.

Whence it follows, that such an encrease of Pleasure could not make us avoid the many Mischiefs incident to the Body, so readily and certainly, as the Excitements of Pain. A moderate degree of Pleasure often satisfies the whole Man, and makes him content to forfeit a superior Happiness, or regardless of undergoing an infinitely greater Misery to come: But the smallest sensitive Pain immediately urges him to desire its removal. Four degrees of Misery therefore will, according to *Bayle* himself, move a Person more effectually, than

twenty degrees of Happiness; and consequently, since all kinds of Misery cannot be avoided, the present Method of Providence is the best, as it avoids the most and greatest. As to the second Expedient, tho' it were granted, that a clear Prospect of ensuing Misery would prove as effectual an Excitement of our Endeavours to prevent it as a present Uneasiness, yet the Mind, in order to have a clear Idea of these Perils which environ the Body, must also have a complete Knowledge of the several properties and effects of all the circumambient Bodies, which I believe, will be esteem'd something too much for a Soul placed in this inferior Class of compound Beings. And, lastly, in answer to what he frequently urges, that there will be no need of such a Method of preventing Death and Misery in the future State of the Blessed, where we expect pure unmix'd Felicity; and consequently there was no absolute Necessity for them here; we need only refer the Reader to the Observations in Notes 30 and 35. viz. that there are several different Systems of rational Beings, one above another, which we believe to be gradually growing up, and ascending after each other, and acquiring new Degrees of Happiness and Perfection to all Eternity: and therefore, when we speak of the future State of the Blessed, we suppose them exalted to a far nobler kind of Existence, or placed in a quite different Class, and consequently endow'd with different Faculties from these which we experience here below: and therefore, to argue from one to the other, is only confounding quite different Orders of created Beings: and supposing that what is possible and agreeable in one, may and ought to be so in another, and, by the same way of reasoning, alike in all. This Argument then drawn from that State of our Fore-Father in Paradise, or us in Heaven, is always inconclusive. See Dr. *J. Clarke*: on *Natural Evil*, p. 257, &c.

* *Reponse aux Questions d'un Provincial*, Fol. p. 650.

† Under the Article *Xenophanes*, particularly at p. 3051.

IV. Now the rest of the Passions are Consequences of Pain, Uneasiness, and dread of Death; *viz.* Anger, Love, Hatred, &c. An Animal in the present State of things, must therefore either be obnoxious to these, or quickly perish. For 'tis impossible that the Soul should have a disagreeable Sensation, and not be angry at the Cause which produces it: and so of the rest.

The rest of the Passions are connected with these.

V. God could have avoided all this by ordering that the Soul should not be affected by the Motions of the Body; or at least, that every thing done therein should be agreeable: But how dangerous this would be to Animals, any one may understand, who recollects how very short their Lives must be, if they died with the same Pleasure that they eat or drink or propagate their Species. If upon tearing the Body, the Soul had either no Sensation at all, or a pleasant one, we should be no more aware of Death than of Sleep, nor would it be more injurious to kill a Man than to scratch him. And thus Mankind would quickly fail. We must then either have been arm'd with these Passions against Death, or soon have perish'd: But the Divine Goodness chose that Animals should be subject to these, rather than the Earth be entirely destitute of Inhabitants. (47.)

The Passions could not be avoided otherwise, than by ordering that the Soul should not be affected with the Motions of the Body: By these means Animals would be very short lived.

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VI. Behold

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(47.) Besides the Health and Preservation of the Body, the Passions in general are necessary to the Happiness and Well-being of the Soul also: Wherein, besides the immediate Pleasure which arises from the very Exercise of them, and their Power to alter even the Nature of things, or at least, their Relations to us, and often make that easy and agreeable which would otherwise be distastful and intolerable: they are farther necessary to urge and excite the Mind to laudable Enterprises, and so support it in the execution of them; to fix and fortify it against all Difficulties and Dangers, and enable it to proceed and persevere in the constant pursuit of still higher Degrees of Happiness and Perfection. "The Soul (says Mr. Addison *) considers abstractly from its Passions, it

" of a remiss and sedentary Nature, slow in its Resolves, and languishing in its Executions. " The use therefore of the Passions is, to stir up " and put it upon Action, to awaken the Understanding, to enforce the Will, and to make the " whole Man more vigorous and attentive in the " prosecution of his Designs." See also the Spectator N^o. 408.

For a particular Account of all the Passions, and their final Causes, and the Necessity of each, see Mr. Hutcheson's incomparable Essay, §. 2. p. 48, 50. &c. and §. 6. p. 179. or Watts on the use and abuse of them, §. 13. or Chambers's Cyclopaedia, under the Word Passion, or Scott's Christian Life, Part 2. C. 1. §. 2. par. 3. But what relates to this Subject will come more properly under the Head of Moral Evil.

* Spect. N^o. 255.

It is not contrary to the divine Goodness to permit these Inconveniencies, since they could not be avoided without greater.

God therefore compared the Good in things with the Evils which necessarily attend them; and tolerated those Evils which were inseparable from the Good.

The Axiom about not doing Evil for the sake of Good, does not take place where the least Evil is chosen.

VI. Behold now how Evils spring from and multiply upon each other, while infinite Goodness still urges the Deity to do the very best. This moved him to give *Existence* to Creatures which cannot exist without *Imperfections* and *Inequality*. This excited him to create *Matter* and to put it in *Motion*, which is necessarily attended with Separation and Dissolution, Generation and Corruption. This persuaded him to couple Souls with Bodies, and to give them mutual Affections, whence proceeded Pain and Sorrow, Hatred and Fear, with the rest of the Passions, yet all of them, as we have seen, are necessary.

VII. For, as *created Existence* necessarily includes the Evil of Imperfection, so every Species of it is subject to its own peculiar Imperfections; that is, to Evils. All the Species of Creatures then must either have been omitted, or their concomitant Evils tolerated: the Divine Goodness therefore put the Evils in one Scale and the Good in the other: and since the Good preponderated, an infinitely good God would not omit that because of the concomitant Evils; for that very Omission would have been attended with more and greater Evils, and so would have been less agreeable to infinite Goodness.

VIII. The least Evil, you'll say, ought not to be admitted for the sake of the greatest Good. (For to affirm that God does Evil that Good may come of it, is Blasphemy.) Neither does the Distinction between *Moral* and *Natural* Evil help any thing toward the Solution of this Difficulty: For what we call *Moral* Evil, as shall be shewn below, is that which is forbidden; now nothing is forbidden by God but generally, at least, on account of the *Inconveniencies* attending the forbidden Actions: These *Inconveniencies* are *Natural* Evils, therefore *Moral* Evils are prohibited on account of the *Natural* ones, and for that Reason only are Evils, because they lead to *Natural* Evils. But that which makes any thing to be such, is itself much *more such*: therefore the *Natural*, you'll say, are greater Evils than the *Moral*, and cannot with less Blasphemy be attributed to God: Granting all this to be true, yet tho' Evil is not to be *done* for the sake of Good, yet the *less* Evil is to be chosen before the *greater*: And since Evils necessarily surround you whether you act or not, you ought to prefer that Side which is attended with the least. Since therefore God was compell'd by the necessary Imperfections of created Beings, either to abstain from creating them at all, or to bear with the Evils consequent

upon them; and since it is a less Evil to permit those, than to omit these: 'tis plain that God did not allow of Natural Evils for the sake of any Good; but chose the least out of several Evils; *i. e.* would rather have Creatures liable to *Natural Evils*, than no Creatures at all. The same will be shewn hereafter concerning Moral Evils.

S E C T. V.

Of Hunger, Thirst, and Labour.

I. **A** Terrestrial Animal must, as we have said, necessarily consist of mix'd and heterogeneous Parts; its Fluids also are in a perpetual Flux, and a kind of Ferment. Now 'tis plain that this cannot be without the Expence of these Fluids, and Attrition of the Solids; and hence follows *Death* and *Dissolution*, except these be repair'd: a new Accession of Matter is therefore necessary, to supply what flies off and is worn away, and much more so for the Growth of Animals.

The parts of the Body fly off: it stands in need therefore of Reparation, *viz.* by Food.

II. But Animals have particular *Constitutions*, and cannot be nourished by any sort of Matter: some *Choice* therefore must be made of it, to which they are to be urg'd by an Importunity strong enough to excite their Endeavours after it. Hence *Hunger* and *Thirst* come to affect the Soul; Affections that are sometimes indeed troublesome, but yet necessary, and which bring more Pleasure than Pain along with them.

Choice must be had in Food, since all things are not equally proper.

III. But why, say you, are we oblig'd to *labour* in quest of Food? Why are not the Elements themselves sufficient? I answer; they are sufficient for some Animals: but Mankind required such a disposition of Matter as was to be prepared by various *Cocktions* and *Changes*, and that

The Materials of Food are soon corrupted: they cannot therefore be procured without Labour.

daily, because 'tis soon liable to Corruption, and if kept long, would be unfit for Nutriment. Hence Labour becomes necessary to provide Victuals in this present state of things: neither could Hunger, or Thirst, or Labour *, (which are reckon'd among *Natural Evils*) be prevented without greater Inconveniencies. The Divine Goodness therefore had the highest Reason for affixing these to Animals.

Every Animal is placed by God where it may have its proper Nourishment, hence almost every herb

IV. Now, as Animals require different sorts of Food, as was shewn, according to their different Constitutions, so God has placed every one of them where it may find what is proper for it: on which account there is scarce any thing in the Elements but what may be Food for some. Every Herb has its Insect which it supports. The Earth, the Water, the very Stones, serve for Aliment to living Creatures †.

maintains its proper Insect.

Some Animals are produced for Food to others, and would not have existed on any other terms.

V. But some stand in need of more delicate Food: Now God could have created an *inanimate* Machine which might have supplied them with such Food; but one that is animated does it much easier and better. A Being that has Life is (*cæteris paribus*) preferable to one that has not: God therefore animated that Machine which furnishes out provision for more perfect Animals; which was both graciously and providently done: for by this means he gain'd so much Life to the World as there is in those Animals which are Food for others: for by this means they themselves enjoy some kind of Life, and are of Service also to the rest. An Ox, for instance, or a Calf, is bred, nourished, and protected for some time, in order to become fit Food for Man. This certainly is better and more eligible, than if the Matter of its Body had been converted into an *inanimate* Mass, such as a Pompion, or continued in the state of unform'd Clay. Nor is it hardly dealt withal, by being made for the Food of a more noble Animal, since it was on this Condition only that it had Life given, which it could not otherwise have enjoy'd. Matter which is fit for the Nourishment of Man, is also capable of Life; if therefore God had denied it Life, he had omitted a Degree of Good which might have been produced without any Impediment to his principal Design: which does not seem very agreeable to infinite Goodness. 'Tis better

* See Note 51.

† See Notes 35 and 39.

ter therefore that it should be endow'd with Life for a time, tho' 'tis to be devoured afterwards, than to continue totally stupid and sluggish. The common Objection then is of no force, viz. That inanimate matter might have been prepared for this Use; for 'tis better that it should be animated; especially as such Animals are ignorant of Futurity, and are neither conscious nor solicitous about their being made for this Purpose. So that so long as they live, they enjoy themselves without anxiety; at least they rejoyce in the present Good, and are neither tormented with the Remembrance of what is past, nor the Fear of what is to come; and lastly, are kill'd with less Pain than they would be by a Distemper or old Age. Let us not be surpris'd then at the Universal War as it were among Animals; or that the Stronger devour the Weaker, for these are made on purpose to afford Aliment to the others. (48.)

VI. As.

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(48.) What is here hid down will, upon Examination, be found to be perfectly consistent with our Observation in Note 34.

As the Point before us is set in a very good Light by Dr. J. Clarke*, I shall not scruple to transcribe the whole Paragraph. "If we consider the effect of Animal Creatures being thus made Food for each other, we shall find that by this means there is the more Good upon the whole: For under the present Circumstances of the Creation, Animals living in this manner one upon another could not have been prevented, but a much greater Evil would have follow'd. For then there could not have been so great a Number, nor so great a Variety of Animals as there are at present, some of which are so very minute, and the Quantity of them such, that, mixing themselves with Herbs and Plants, and Grain, on which themselves feed, and with the Water and Liquids which they drink, they must necessarily be devour'd by other larger Animals who live upon the same Food, without so much as being seen or any way perceiv'd by them. It is therefore much better upon the whole, that they should live upon

" one another in the manner they now do,
 " than that they should not live at all. For if
 " such Animal Life is to be esteem'd superior
 " to not existing at all, or to a vegetable Life;
 " and the more there is of such Animal Life,
 " the more of Good there is in the World; it
 " is evident that by this means there is Room
 " for more whole Species of Creatures, at least
 " for many more individuals of each Species,
 " than there would otherwise be; and that
 " the variety of the Creation is hereby much
 " enlarged, and the Goodness of its Author
 " displayed. For the Constitution of Animal
 " Bodies is such as requires that they should
 " be maintain'd by Food: Now if this Food
 " can be made capable of Animal Life also, it
 " is a very great Improvement of it. A certain
 " Quantity of Food is necessary for the pre-
 " servation of a determinate Number of Ani-
 " mals: which Food, were it mere vegetable,
 " would perhaps serve for that Purpose only:
 " but by being so form'd as to become Animal,
 " tho' it be in a lower Degree, and the enjoy-
 " ment of Life in such Creatures less, yet is it
 " more perfect than unform'd Clay, or even
 " than the most curious Plant. Thus the A-
 " nimal

* Discourse concerning Natural Evil, p. 289.

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All parts of the Earth could not have afforded Nourishment and Reception for Men, whatever situation they had been plac'd in.

VI. As for the *Difficulty* of procuring Food, and the *Want* of it in some Places, 'tis to be observ'd that the state of the Earth depends upon the light and heat of the Sun; and tho' we do not perfectly understand the Structure of it, yet we have reason to conjecture, (G.) that it is carried about its Axis by a *Diurnal*, and about the Sun by an *Annual* Motion: that its Figure is a Sphæroid described by the Revolution of a Semi-Ellipse about a conjugate Axis; and that this proceeds from the Laws of Motion and Gravitation. Now in such a Situation, some Parts of it must necessarily be unfit for such Inhabitants as Men, since the Parallelism of its Axis is preserv'd in the annual Motion, and the Revolution about the same Axis in the diurnal. If these should undergo the very least Alteration, the whole Fabric of the Earth would be disorder'd; the Ocean and Dry Land would change Places to the detriment of the Animals. Since therefore neither the annual nor diurnal Motion of the Earth could be alter'd without harm; 'tis plain, that some parts of the Earth must necessarily be less convenient for the habitation of Mankind, namely those about the Poles; and that others must require much Labour to make them convenient, as we find by Experience in our own Climate; but it will evidently appear to any considering Person, that in what situation or motion soever you suppose the Earth to be, either these or worse Evils must be admitted; 'tis in vain therefore to complain of these Inconveniencies which cannot be avoided without greater. (49.)

VII. Neither

NOTE S.

“ nimal Part of the Creation has its several Degrees of Life, and as much Variety in it as is to be found in the inanimate and vegetable Part; so that in this respect there is so far from being any just ground of Complaint, that the Wisdom and Contrivance of the Animal World is admirable, and plainly shews the excellency of the whole, and the suberviency of all the Particulars, in order to obtain the greatest Good that they are capable of.”

See also the beginning of the *Speſtator*, N^o. 519.

(G.) What is said about the Motion of the Earth should be looked upon as an Hypothesis

only, and not a fundamental Principle; that the Argument might have the same Success, whether the Earth stood still or moved; and our assurance of the Divine Goodness may not seem to depend on the Conjectures of Mathematicians.

(49) Thus if the *Figure* of the Earth were chang'd into a perfect *Sphere*, the Equatorial Parts must all lie under Water. If it were of a *Cubic*, *Prismatic*, or any other *Angular* Figure, it would neither be so *capacious* for habitation, nor so fit for *Motion*, nor so commodious for the Reception of *Light* and *Heat*, for the circulation of the *Winds*, and the *Distribution* of the *Waters*; as is obvious to any one that is acquainted

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VII. Neither are *Earth-quakes, Storms, Thunder, Deluges* and *Inundations* any stronger Arguments against the Wisdom and Goodness of God. These are sometimes sent by a just and gracious God for the Punishment of Mankind; but often depend on other natural Causes, which are necessary, and could not be removed without greater Damage to the whole. These Concussions of the Elements are indeed prejudicial,

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quainted with the first Elements of Natural Philosophy, and is at large demonstrated by Dr. Cheyne, Mr. Derham, Ray, &c. If its Situation were removed, its Constitution must be alter'd too, or else, if placed considerably farther from the Sun, it would be frozen into Ice, if nearer, 'twould be burnt to a Coal. If either its annual or diurnal Motion were *stopp'd, retarded, or accelerated*, the useful and agreeable Vicissitudes of *Summer and Winter, Day and Night*, would cease, or at least cease to be so useful and agreeable as they now are. The immoderate length or shortness of the Seasons would prove pernicious to the Earth, and the stated times of Business and Repose would be as incommodious to its Inhabitants: as disproportionate to the common affairs of Life, and the various Exigences of Mankind †: If, in the last place, we alter the *Inclination of the Earth's Axis*, the like Inconveniencies will attend the *Polar Parts*: if we destroy the *Parallelism* of it, besides destroying at the same time the useful Arts of Navigation and Dialling, we bring upon us much worse Consequences: A Description of some few of them from Dr. Bentley's Sermon above cited may perhaps not be disagreeable. " We all know, from the very Elements of Astronomy, that this inclin'd position of the Axis, which keeps always the same Direction, and a constant Parallelism to itself is the sole Cause of these grateful and needful Vicissitudes of the four Seasons of the Year, and the Variation in length of Days. If we take away the *Inclination*, it would absolutely undo these Northern Nations, the Sun would never come nearer us

" than he doth now on the 10th of *March*, or the 12th of *September*. But would we rather part with the *Parallelism*? Let us suppose then that the Axis of the Earth keeps always the same Inclination towards the Body of the Sun: this indeed would cause a variety of Days, and Nights, and Seasons, on the Earth; but then every particular Country would have always the same diversity of Day and Night, and the same Constitution of Season, without any alteration. Some would always have long Nights and short Days, others again perpetually long Days and short Nights: One Climate would be scorch'd and swelter'd with everlasting *Dog-Days*, while an eternal *December* blasted another. This surely is not quite so good as the present Order of Seasons. But shall the Axis rather observe no constant Inclination to any thing, but vary and waver at uncertain times and places? This would be a happy Constitution indeed! There would be no Health, no Life nor Subsistence in such an irregular System: By those surprising Nods of the Pole, we might be toss'd backward or forward, in a Moment, from *January to June*, nay, possibly, from the *January of Greenland*, to the *June of Abessinia*. It is better therefore, upon all accounts, that the Axis should be continued in its present Posture and Direction; so that this also is a signal Character of Divine Wisdom and Goodness.

See also Cheyne's *Phil. Princ. C. 3. §. 24, 25, 26, &c.*

† See Dr. Bentley's *last Sermon*, p. 312, &c. 5th Edition.

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prejudicial, but more Prejudice would arise to the Universal System by the absence of them. What the genuine and immediate Causes of them are I dare not determine: they seem in general to derive their Origin from the unequal heat of the Sun, from the Fluidity, Mutability, and Contrariety of things*. To these we may add the Asperity and Inequality of the Earth's Surface, without which nevertheless the whole Earth, or the greatest Part of it, would be uninhabitable. For instance, we complain of the Mountains as Rubbish, as not only disfiguring the Face of the Earth, but also as useless and inconvenient; and yet without these, neither Rivers nor Fountains, nor the Weather for producing and ripening Fruits could regularly be preserv'd †. In Mountainous Countries we blame Providence for the Uncertainty of the Weather, for the frequency of Showers and Storms, which yet proceed from the very Nature of the Climate, and without which all the Moisture would glide down the Declivity, and the Fruits wither away. The Earth then must either not be created at all, or these things be permitted. (50.)

VIII. The

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(50.) The several Objections mention'd in this Paragraph are solidly refuted by Dr. J. Clarke in his Treatise on *Natural Evil*, part of which I shall take the Liberty to insert as usual, and refer the Reader to the Book itself for the rest.

Having described the Nature and Use of the Air's *Elasticity*, and the *acid, nitrous, and sulphureous* Particles with which it is impregnated, which are the Cause of *Fermentation*, he proceeds to account for Earthquakes, &c. p. 190. " Thus the internal Parts of the Earth being " the only proper Place for containing so large " a Store of Sulphur and Nitre, and Minerals " as is required for so many thousand Years as " the Earth in its present State has, and may " yet continue: it must necessarily be, that " when that *Fermentation* is made in such subterraneous Caverns as are not wide enough " for the particles to expand themselves in, or " have no open Passage to rush out at, they " will, by the foremention'd Law, shake the " Earth to a considerable distance, tear those " Caverns to pieces; and according to the

" depth of such Caverns, or Quantity of Materials contain'd in them, remove large pieces of the Surface of the Earth, from one place to another, in the same manner, tho' to a much higher degree than artificial Explofions made under Ground; the effect of which is " sensible to a great distance. If it happens " that these Fermentations are in places under the Sea, the Water mixing with these Materials, increases their Force, and is thereby " thrown back with great violence, so as to " seem to rise up into the Clouds, and fall " down again sometimes in very large drops, " and sometimes in whole *Spouts*, which are " sufficient to drown all that is near them. If " the *Fermentation* be not so violent, but such " only as raises large Vapours or Steams, which " can find their way thro' small occult passages of the Earth; these near its Surface, by " their continual Expirations, are at first the " Cause of gentle Winds; and these afterwards " by their continual Increase, become perhaps " Storms, and Whirl-winds, and Tempests, " which many times destroy the Fruits, tear

* See Note 50.

† See Note 51.

VIII. The same must be said of the *Lakes* and the *Ocean*. For 'tis manifest, that Fruits, Vegetables, &c. which are the Food of Animals, depend upon Moisture, and that this is exhaled from the Sea, and watry places, by the Sun; and since the Showers and Dews thus elevated, are not more copious than suffice for the Vegetation of Plants, 'tis plain that the Seas and Lakes do not exceed what is necessary, and could not be diminished without detriment to the whole. Vain therefore is the Complaint of *Lucretius*, who arraigns all these as *faulty*. Neither was the Earth too narrow, nor needed it too much Labour to sustain its Animals: For it was sufficient for those Animals which God had given it*. But when they multiply above the proportion of their Food, 'tis impossible that it should be sufficient; it would not be enough if it were all converted into Food. For a certain Proportion is to be observ'd between the Provision and the Eaters, which if the Number of Animals exceed, they must at length necessarily

The Number of Animals to be nourish'd, was to be proportioned to the Food, and not the Food to the Animals.

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cessarily

NOTES.

“ up the Trees, and overthrow the Houses:
 “ But if they be still more gentle, there being
 “ always some sulphureous Exhalations, especially if the Earth be dry, they then ascend
 “ along with the lighter Vapours, into the upper Region of the Air, where, when a large
 “ Quantity of them is gathered together, they ferment with the acid Nitre, and taking
 “ Fire, cause Thunder and Lightning, and other Meteors. This, as far as can be gathered from Experience and Observation of
 “ the Works of Nature, is the Origin and Cause of those Imperfections and Evils,
 “ which the present Constitution of the Air, and the Laws of Motion observed by those
 “ Particles mix'd with it, unavoidably subject it to. They are the natural and genuine effects
 “ of the Regulation it is under, and without altering the primary Laws of it (that is,
 “ making it something else than what it is, or changing it into another Form: the Result
 “ of which would be only to render it liable to Evils of another kind, against which the
 “ same Objections would equally lie) or in a supernatural manner, hindering it from pro-

“ ducing such Effects, it is impossible to prevent them. And if we add to this, that these
 “ Evils are the fewest that in the Nature of things could be, without hindering a much
 “ greater Good: that they are in the most convenient Parts, and the most guarded against
 “ doing Mischief that could be; and that there are also good Uses to be made of them; we
 “ shall have no Reason to complain of, or find fault with them. Were the Quantity of Sulphur and Nitre much diminish'd, there would
 “ not be sufficient to fill the Region of Air for the purposes of Vegetation and Life;
 “ but the Ground would grow barren, and the Animals would waste and die: And if there
 “ were a much greater Quantity, the contrary Effect would happen, the Earth would be
 “ too fat, the Plants would grow too gross, and the Animals would be suffocated and
 “ choaked. The Temperature is therefore as exact as it could be, all Circumstances considered; and the small Inconveniencies are
 “ nothing, compared with the general Good.”
 See also the Word *Earth-quake* in *Chambers's Cyclopaedia*.

* See Derham's *Phys. Theol.* B. 4. C. 11:

cessarily perish with Hunger. Want of Provision then ought not to be made an Objection: for if the Number of Creatures to be provided for be enlarged above this Proportion, the greatest Plenty would not suffice; if this Proportion betwixt the Food and Animals be kept up, the least would be sufficient. 'Tis our own fault therefore, not God's, if Provisions fail; for the Number of Men may be confined within the bounds prescribed by Nature, as might easily be shewn, if it were worth our while.

The hundredth part of Mankind which might live upon the Earth, does not yet inhabit it:

IX. But there's no need of Artifice on this Occasion; for by our fault things are come to this Pass, that even the hundredth part of those Eatables which might be had, don't meet with any to consume them. The Divine Beneficence has therefore dealt bountifully with Mankind in respect of Provisions.

Vain therefore is the Complaint about Seas and Desarts.

'Tis absurd for any one to desire a different place or Station from that which is allotted him; since he was made to fill that place, and would otherwise have had none at all.

X. 'Tis to be observ'd in the last place, that Animals are of such a Nature as to delight in Action, or the Exercise of their Faculties, nor can we have any other Notion of Happiness even in God himself*. Since then the Faculties of both Body and Mind are to be exercis'd in order to produce Pleasure, where's the wonder if God destin'd that Exercise in part for procuring of Food, and connected this Pleasure with it, (51.). The infinite Power of God was able to produce Animals of such

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(51.) Beside the Necessity there is for labour, in order to restrain Man in his present State from an Excess of Folly and Wickedness, (which our Author considers in the two last Paragraphs of this Chapter) the use and advantage of it appears also from the manifest tendency it has to preserve and improve the Faculties of both Body and Mind. If used in a moderate Degree, it preserves our Health, Vigour, and Activity; gives us a quick Sense and Relish of Pleasure, and prevents a great many Miseries which attend Idleness. This is well described by the *Guardian* N^o. 131. and the *Spektator*, N^o. 115. "I consider the Body as a System of Tubes and Glands, or, to use a more ru-

stic Phrase, a bundle of Pipes and Strainers, fitted to one another after so wonderful a manner, as to make a proper Engine for the Soul to work with: This Description does not only comprehend the Bowels, Bones, Tendons, Veins, Nerves, and Arteries, but every Muscle, and every Ligature, which is a Composition of Fibres, that are so many imperceptible Tubes or Pipes interwoven on all sides with invisible Glands or Strainers. This general Idea of a human Body, without considering it in the Niceties of Anatomy, lets us see how absolutely necessary Labour is for the right Preservation of it. There must be frequent Motions and Agitations, to

* See Ch. 1. §. 3. par. 9. and Ch. 5. §. 1. Sub. 4.

such Capacities; and since the Creation of them was no Inconvenience to other Beings who might exercise themselves in a more noble Manner, may not the infinite Goodness of God be conceiv'd to have almost compelled him not to refuse or envy these the Benefit of Life? Some of this kind were to be created, since there was Room left for them in the Work of God, after so many others were made as was convenient. But you may wish that some other Place and Condition had fallen to your Lot; perhaps so: but if you had taken up another's Place, that other, or some else, must have been put into yours, who, being alike ungrateful to the Divine Providence, would wish for the Place which you now have occupied. Know then that it was necessary that you should either be what you are, or not at all. For since every other Place and State which the System or Nature of Things allow'd, was occupied by some others, you must of necessity either fill that which you now are in, or be banish'd out of Nature. For, do you expect that any other should be turn'd out of his Order, and you placed in his Room? that is, that God should exhibit a peculiar and extraordinary Munificence toward you to the prejudice of others. You ought therefore not to censure, but adore the Divine Goodness for making you what you are. You could neither have been made otherwise, nor in a better Manner, but to the Disadvantage of some others, or of the whole.

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“ mix, digest, and separate the Juices contain'd
 “ in it, as well as to clear and cleanse the Infinitude of Pipes and Strainers, of which it is
 “ compos'd; and to give their solid Parts a more firm and lasting Tone. Labour or Exercise ferments the Humours, casts them in-
 “ to their proper Channels, throws off Redundancies, and helps Nature in those secret Distributions, without which the Body cannot
 “ subsist in its Vigour, nor the Soul act with Cheerfulness. I might here mention the
 “ Effects which this has upon all the Faculties of the Mind, by keeping the Understanding
 “ clear, the Imagination untroubled, and refining those Spirits that are necessary for the
 “ proper Exertion of our Intellectual Faculties, during the present Laws of Union be-

“ tween Soul and Body. It is to a Neglect
 “ in this particular that we must ascribe, the Spleen which is so frequent in Men of studious and sedentary Tempers, as well as the
 “ Vapours to which those of the other Sex are so often subject.”

He proceeds to illustrate both the Wisdom and Goodness of God, from his having fitted and obliged us to this Labour and Exercise, which is so necessary to our well-being: which Observation will help us to account for the second and third Evil arising from the *Fall*, mentioned in §. 9. par. 5. The Fitness of a State of Labour for fallen Man, is shewn at large by *Sherlock on Judgment*, C. 1. §. 8. p. 179. and *Mr. D'Oyly in his first Dissertation*, C. 9. p. 98, &c. 2d Edition.

S E C T. VI.

Concerning Propagation of the Species, Childhood, and Old-Age.

Animals may be repair'd three ways; 1st. If Death were prevented by Omnipotence: 2dly, by Creation: 3dly, by Propagation.

I. FROM what has been said it appears, that Animals which have solid Bodies are naturally mortal; tho' the Earth therefore were at first fully stock'd with them, yet their Number being continually diminish'd by Death, it would at length be quite destitute of Inhabitants. There might, it seems, have been a threefold Remedy for this Evil: First, if God by his Omnipotence should prevent the Natural Effects of the mutual Percussion of solid Bodies, *viz.* the Corruption and Dissolution of themselves, and the Change or Effusion of their Fluids. For from these the Destruction of Animals necessarily arises, as these do from the Composition of Bodies, and their acting on each other. Secondly, by leaving Nature to itself, and letting it act by Universal Mechanic Laws; and when these brought on a dissolution of Animal Bodies, that others be substituted in their Room by Creation. Thirdly, by ordering that an Animal should generate its like, and provide another to supply its Place when it declined.

This third Method is the best, because it can be effected without doing violence to the Laws of Nature.

II. Who does not see that this last is the best Method of preserving a constant Number of Inhabitants upon the Earth? For 'tis the same thing, *cæteris paribus*, with regard to the System, whether the Earth have these Inhabitants which it has at present, or others equal in Number and Perfection: but it is not the same thing whether the Laws of Nature be observ'd or violated*. In the former Methods God must have interfered every Moment by his absolute Power, he must have done

* See Note 37.

done infinite violence to the Laws of Nature, and confounded all the Constitutions and Orders of things, and that without any Benefit; nay with extraordinary detriment to the whole in the main. For since the universal Laws of Motion are the best that could possibly be establish'd, they would seldom be revers'd without damage to the whole*. Neither does it become the Wisdom of God to have left his Work so imperfect as to want continual mending, even in the smallest Particulars. 'Twas better therefore for it to be made in such a manner as we see it is, viz. that a new Offspring should be propagated, out of the Animals themselves, and by themselves.

III. And herein we may admire the Divine Wisdom and Goodness which hath so prudently and effectually contrived this End. For it has implanted in all Creatures (as we see), a strong and almost irresistible appetite of propagating their kind, and has render'd this act of propagation so useful and agreeable to them, who perform it, that Posterity becomes dearer to many than Life itself, and if it were left to their Choice, they would rather die than lose their Offspring and the Rewards of Love: nay there is scarce one that would not protect its Young at the hazard of its own Life. God has therefore, by one single Law, and a sort of Mechanism, replenish'd the Earth with living Creatures, and provided that a sufficient Number should never be wanting, without the Intervention of a Power, which would be irregular, and an Imputation on the Skill and Wisdom of the Architect. Who would not prefer such a piece of Mechanism, where one Machine generates another, and continually produces a new one in its turn, without any new and extraordinary Intervention of the Artificer, before one which would immediately and every Day require his assistance and amendment?

The Divine Goodness and Wisdom admirable in the contrivance of it.

IV. This Method, you'll say, is fit enough for the Brutes, many of which must necessarily die, not only by the Law of their Nature, but also for the sake of others, for whose use they were created to serve as Food. But Man is hardly dealt withal, who from his very Infancy is troubled with Fear and Dread more bitter even than Death; and who frequently foretastes, and by ruminating, thoroughly digests, whatever bitterness there is in Death itself. Neither does the Hope or Care of Offspring, nor the Enjoyment of these Pleasures, compensate for so many

Why Men are tormented with the continual dread of Death, while Brutes are not at all concern'd about it.

* See Note 37.

Concerning Natural Evil.

many Miseries and Evils: The Divine Goodness might therefore have either conceal'd from Man his Mortality, or else removed that innate Terror arising in our Minds from the prospect of Death, which is always dreadful. (52.)

This is a sign that the present Life is a prelude to a better.

V. 'Tis to be confess'd indeed, that these are indications that Man has some relation to Immortality, and that the State in which he is placed at present is not entirely natural to him, otherwise he would not be so uneasy in it, nor aspire so eagerly after another. The present Life of Men is therefore either assign'd them for a time, by way of Punishment, as some think, or by way of *Prelude* to, or *Preparation* for a better, as our Religion teaches, and our very Nature persuades us to hope and expect. This is presumed, you'll say, and not proved. Be it so. But if by the Supposition of a future State this Difficulty may be solv'd, and Providence vindicated, when it is arraign'd as dealing hardly with Mankind, who is so foolish as to be willing to call in question the Power and Goodness of God, rather than admit of so probable an Hypothesis? To which we may add, and believed by almost all Mankind. But if it were not so, God has bestow'd other Benefits of Life upon us, which, in our own Judgments, are not at all inferior to the preservation of Life; and this appears from hence, that we often prefer these Benefits to Life itself, which we should never do, if we did not sometimes esteem them dearer to us.

To

NOTES.

(52.) A sufficient answer to this Objection may be found in the last Chapter of Dr. *Sherlock's* admirable Treatise on *Death*. I shall insert a little of it. "There are great and wise Reasons why God should imprint this aversion to Death on human Nature; because it obliges us to take care of ourselves, and to avoid every thing which will destroy or shorten our Lives: this in many Cases is a great Principle of Virtue, as it preserves us from all fatal and destructive Vices; it is a great instrument of Government, and makes Men afraid of committing such Villanies as the Laws of their Country have made capi-

tal; and therefore, since the natural Fear of Death is of such great advantage to us, we must be contented with it, tho' it makes the thoughts of Dying a little uneasy; especially if we consider, that when this natural Fear of Death is not encreas'd by other Causes, it may be conquer'd or allay'd by Reason and wise Consideration." p. 329. 4th Edition.

For a farther Account of both the rational and irrational Fear of Death, what it is, and what it ought to be, the Ends and Effects, and also the Remedies of it, see *Norris's* excellent Discourse on *Heb. 2. 15.* *

* *Practical Discourses*, vol. 4th.

To come to a conclusion: Without an universal confusion of Nature, without violence offer'd to the Laws and Order of it, the same Animals could not prolong their Life for any considerable time, it remained therefore that some supply the Place of others successively, and that the *Species* be perpetuated, since the *Individuals* could not, lest the whole Animal kind should prove a thing of but one Age's Duration.

VI. From hence it appears, that the Race of Mortals is to be perpetuated by the propagation of their Species; and since every Animal is in a perpetual Flux, and may either increase or decay, it was proper to proceed from less Beginnings to greater; for by this means the new Offspring would be less burthenfome to the Parents, and the *Young* and *Old* agree better together. I confess indeed Men are born defenceless and unable to protect themselves, and less qualified to provide for themselves than any other Animals: But God has assign'd us Parents, Guardians, and Faithful Guides, so that we are never more happy than when under their Protection. Hence *Childhood*, bless'd with the simple enjoyment of good things, and void of Care, becomes more pleasant to us than any other Age. Hence also comes Reverence and Relief to the Aged, hence proceeds Comfort to the *Mature*, and Support to the *Decrepit*. Nay the Seeds and Principles of Social Life are all laid in this appetite of Generation. To this propension we owe almost all the benefits of Society. Nothing therefore could be more desirable to Creatures mortal (as we are by the necessary Condition of terrestrial Matter) and obnoxious to Miseries, than to be born after such a manner as in the first Part of Life, while we are tender, unacquainted with things, and put under the Guardianship of others, to enjoy the Sweets without the Care; in the *middle*, to please ourselves as much in taking care of others; and in the *decrepit*, feeble Age, to be assisted in our turn by others whom we have educated. This Part of the Divine OEconomy is so far therefore from needing an Apology, that it is rather a *Demonstration* of his Goodness. The Race of Men was to be repair'd, since Death could not be prevented without a greater Evil; and that Reparation is order'd in so wise and beneficent a way, that nothing can be more worthy of the Divine Power and Goodness, nothing deserve greater Admiration.

'Tis expedient for Men to be born weak and helpless, hence the foundation of social Life, &c.

The chief Appetites are those of Self-preservation, and propagation of the Species.

VII. Now these two Appetites, *viz.* of *Self-preservation*, and the *Propagation* of our Species, are the primary, the original of all others. From these spring Pleasure and an agreeable Enjoyment of things; from these come almost every thing that is advantageous or desirable in Life. But all these are mingled with some Evils, which could not be avoided without greater.

S E C T. VII.

Of Diseases, Wild-Beasts, and Venomous Creatures.

Bodies are liable to dissolution, and humours to corruption; hence Pains and Diseases.

I. **W**E must observe (as before *) that our Bodies consist of solid and fluid Parts, and that these solid Members may be either cut or broken to Pieces, disjointed, or otherwise render'd unfit for Motion: whence *Weakness*, *Languishing* and *Torments*; that the Fluids also are liable, not only to Consumption, but Corruption too, to Ebullition, by too intense Heat, or Stagnation by Cold: whence proceed various Maladies and Diseases.

The strength of poisons and such Juices as are noxious to Animals, arises from the contrariety of things which could not be removed, without taking away Motion.

II. Now there are certain Juices in the Earth which we inhabit, from a mixture of which arise Changes and Coagulations. There are other Bodies also which fly asunder with greater violence when mix'd. Thus Milk, by the infusion of a little Acid, turns to Cheese and Whey: thus Spirits of Wine and Gun-powder, when touched by the Fire, run into Flame; and there is nothing to hinder the same from coming to pass in the Blood and Humours of a human Body. Now those

* Sect. 13.

those things which, by being mix'd with them, resolve, coagulate, or render them unfit for Circulation, we call Poisonous. And if we consider those contraries by which we are nourish'd, and in the Struggle or Opposition of which Nature consists, 'tis scarce conceivable how these should not often happen. Nor can all contrariety be taken away, except Motion be taken away too, as we have shewn; nor could all these things that are contrary to our Constitution be removed, except some Species of Creatures were extinct, or never created; that is, our Security must have been purchased at too dear a Rate. For if every thing that is in any respect repugnant to us were removed, it would cost either the whole System, or ourselves, more Evil than we receive from it at present, as will sufficiently appear to any one that enumerates the Particulars.

III. 'Tis to be observ'd, that the Parts of this mundane System which are contiguous to us, *viz.* the Air, Waters, and the Earth itself, are liable to Changes; nor could it possibly be otherwise, if the whole Machine, of which these are but small Parts, be thro'ly consider'd: nor could these Changes, especially the sudden ones, always agree with the Temperature of the Humours of human Body. For they enter into the very constitution of the Body, and infect its Fluids according to the Laws of Nature: whence it is that the due Crasis of the Blood, and Health of the Body, depend upon the temperature of the Air and Weather. Hence arise *pestilential* and *epidemical* Diseases; nor could they be avoided, unless the Animals had been made of a quite different Frame and Constitution. Nay, whatever State they had been plac'd in, they would have been subject either to these, or others no less pernicious. For Marble, and the very hardest of Bodies, are dissolv'd by the vicissitude of heat and cold, moist and dry, and the other Changes which we are insensible of; how much more the humours and animal Spirits of Man, on a right temperature of which Life depends. God might indeed, by a favour peculiar to us, have expell'd all the contagions arising from these alterations, or provided that they should not hurt us. But what reason have such Sinners as we now are, to expect it. 'Tis more agreeable to the Justice of God, to leave the Elements to themselves; to be carried

Of epidemical Diseases

according to the Laws of Motion, for our Punishment, (53.). Neither ought we to wonder that God denies the Guilty a Favour, which even the Innocent have no Right to: nay, we ought to think that he has inflicted a very light Penalty on rebellious Man: for since the Natural Evils we are forc'd to struggle with, are for the most part of such a nature as could not be warded off, but by the particular extraordinary favour of the Deity, God should seem rather to have resumed a free Gift, than inflicted a Punishment, when he is pleas'd to permit them.

Rocks and
Desarts are
given not to
Man but o-
ther Animals
for their Ha-
bitation.

IV. If the Earth had been made for the use of Man alone, we might have expected that there should be nothing in it that was prejudicial or useles to him; but since it was made, as we have observed*, for the Benefit of the Universe, Man is placed therein, not because it was created for him only, but because it could afford him a convenient Habitation; for God must be supposed in this case not to have adapted the Place to the Inhabitants, but the Inhabitants to the Place. If therefore Man can dwell commodiously enough in these Regions of the Earth which are fit for his Purpose, he must allow God in his Goodness to give the Earth as many other Inhabitants as it can sustain consistently with the Good of Men. Neither is he to repine, that the Rocks and Desarts, which are of no use to Men, supply the *Serpents* and *Wild-Beasts* with Coverts. But these, you'll say, sometimes invade the Countries which are most delightful, and best stored with conveniencies for human Life, destroy the fruits and cultivated

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(53.) Our Author's Argument here seems to be framed rather in compliance with the common forms of speaking, than in strict conformity to his own Scheme of the τὸ βέλτιον, or absolute *Meliority* in things: which System maintains that God is still infinitely beneficent, or as kind as possible to all, or dispenses every thing for the very best in the main. Tho' what is here introduced by way of Punishment, may, if rightly understood, be defended as an instance of the greatest possible Kindness; since the only end of all the Divine Judgments is either the Correction and Amendment of the

Offenders themselves, or admonition to others, or both: and consequently is a means of the greatest Good to Mankind in general, and the very best dispensation towards them in this degenerate corrupt Estate, and the most proper method of fitting them for, or directing and drawing them to a better. And if all this can be effected by the same general Laws of Nature, which also bring Plenty, Health and Happiness to the World, here is a double demonstration of the absolute Wisdom and Goodness of its Author.

* Chap. 3. Note 33.

vated Fields, and kill the Men themselves by *Bites* and *Poisons*. I grant it; but it may be question'd whether it has been always so.

V. For in the first Place, this Evil might have had its Origin from Man himself; *viz.* Rage might be given to the Lion, and Venom to the Serpent, for the Punishment of Mankind, and this antient Histories both sacred and prophane declare. But since this Question was first agitated by such as either denied reveal'd Religion, or at least were ignorant of it, I would not call that in to our assistance, nor make any other use of it than as a bare Hypothesis.

Ancient Histories declare, that Wild-Beasts and venomous Creatures were made for the punishment of Mankind.

VI. We may affirm then in the second Place, that these things happen thro' the fault of Men, who, by Wars and Discord, make fruitful and rich Countries void of Inhabitants to till them, and leave them to the possession of Wild-Beasts and venomous Insects: Since therefore they neither cultivate them themselves, nor allow other Persons to do it, what wonder is it, if God, for the reproach of Men, give them up to be inhabited by Brutes, Wild-Beasts and Insects? Those Parts which we have deserted belong by right to them, nor do they otherwise multiply more than is proper.

'Tis the fault of Mankind that these Countries laid waste by War, &c. to the disgrace of Man, of right belong to them.

VII. Thirdly: 'Tis no more repugnant to the Divine Goodness to have made an Animal, by the bite of which a Man might be destroy'd, than a Precipice. There's nothing in the whole Earth but what may hurt or kill a Man, if it be not used with caution: Meat, Drink, Water, Fire. Must these then not be created because they may hurt a Man? Nor is it more difficult to be aware of Poisons and Wild-Beasts than of these: Nay, scarce one is killed by Poison, or torn by Wild-Beasts, of a thousand that die by the Sword; and yet we don't at all blame the Divine Goodness for this. It may be said, that Iron, Earth, Water, Meats and Drinks, are necessary, and on that account the Evils attending them may be tolerated. And who will undertake to assure us that venomous Animals and Wild-Beasts are not necessary? Must we reckon them entirely useles because we do not know the use of them? Must we say that every Wheel in a Clock is made for no manner of Purpose, which a Rustic understands not the design of? But suppose we grant that these are of no Service to us, yet do they not please and enjoy themselves †?

We may more easily avoid Wild-Beasts and venomous Creatures, than other Inconveniences of Life, about which we never quarrel with Providence.

VIII. You

* See Note 54.

† See Note 33.

All Animals
are under the
divine Care:
to think o-
therwise fa-
vours of
Pride.

VIII. You may urge that these are not worth the Notice of the Divine Providence. Thus indeed proud Mortals, admirers of themselves alone, despise the Works of God: But 'tis not so with the Divine Goodness, which chose that some Inconvenience should befall Mankind, rather than a whole Species be wanting to Nature.

Wild-Beasts
and veno-
mous Crea-
tures are of
use to Men.

IX. If you insist that a Lion might have been made without Teeth or Claws, a Viper without Venom: I grant it, as a Knife without an Edge; but then they would have been of quite another Species, and have had neither the nature, nor use, nor genius, which they now enjoy. In short, I say, once for all, they are not in vain. The very Serpents, tho' a Race hateful to us, have their uses; among the rest, they gather the Poison out of the Earth, (54.). Nor is the Country less habitable where they are than where they are not. Now, *cæteris paribus*, Animals ought to multiply; for Life is a Perfection, and since it is as noble a one as Matter will admit of, 'tis preferable to none at all. 'Tis therefore the Work and Gift of God, wherever he has bestow'd it, and does not stand in need of an *Evil Principle* for its Author.

N O T E S.

(54.) For an account of the various ends and uses of these noxious Animals, poisonous Plants, Minerals, &c. see *Derham's Answer to the a-* B. 2. Ch. 6. with the References, and *Ray* on the *Creation*, Part 2. p. 432, &c. 4th Edition, or *Chambers's Cyclopædia*, under the Word *Poison*.
bove mention'd Objection, in his *Phys. Theol.*

S E C T. VIII.

Concerning the Errors and Ignorance of Man.

I. Since Man (nay every created Being) is necessarily of a limited Nature *, 'tis plain that he cannot know every thing. The most perfect Creatures therefore are ignorant of many things: Nor can they attain to any other Knowledge than what is agreeable to their Nature and Condition: innumerable Truths therefore lie hid from every created Understanding. For perfect and infinite Knowledge belongs to God alone; and it must be determin'd by his Pleasure, what degree every one is to be endow'd with: for he only knows the nature and necessity of each, and has given what is agreeable thereto. *Ignorance* is therefore an *Evil of Defect*, and no more to be avoided than the other kind of *Imperfection*; for an imperfect Nature (as that of all Creatures is) understands also imperfectly.

II. As to human Knowledge, 'tis confess'd that we acquire it by the Senses, and that certain Characters denote, not so much the *Natures*, as the *Uses* and *Differences* of things †. Now, since things very different internally, have sometimes the same external Marks, we must of necessity be often doubtful, and sometimes deceiv'd by the Similitude of the Marks.

Neither is it sufficient to the avoiding of Error, that we suspend our assent in doubtful Cases, for 'tis often necessary for us (especially if we have to do with other Persons) to act upon conjecture, and resolve upon action, before we have thoro'ly discuss'd the Point, or discover'd the Truth: on which account it is impossible that we should totally

Human Understanding is necessarily ignorant of many things.

We are sometimes forced to make use of conjectures, therefore we may not only be ignorant, but also mistake.

* See Note 28.

† For a right Understanding of this Section, review our Author's Note A.

totally avoid Errors. God must therefore either have made no such Animal as Man is, or one that is liable to Errors. As Contrariety results from Motion, which is as it were the action of Matter, so a possibility of Error is consequent upon the Action of a finite Understanding.

God could not guard us always from Errors without violence done to Nature.

III. If any one reply, that God can immediately reveal the Truth to us in such Cases: I answer, he may so, nor can it be denied that he has done, and will do it sometimes: but that this should be done always, would be a violence repugnant to the Nature and Condition of Man, and could not possibly be done without more and greater Evils arising from an interruption of the course of Nature. Now we must distinguish between those Errors which we fall into after our utmost diligence and application, and such as we are led into by carelessness, negligence, and a depraved Will. Errors of the former kind are to be reckon'd among Natural Evils, and not imputable to us: for they arise from the very State and Condition of the Mind of Man, and are not to be avoided, unless God would change the Species of Beings, and order that different things should not affect the Senses in the same manner, that is, that there should be no more Species nor Individuals, than there are Sensations in us: for if the Number of these exceed the Discrimination or Combination of our Sensations, variety of them must necessarily produce either the very same Sensations in us, or none at all, and a great many answer to the same Sensation, so that we must certainly be sometimes imposed upon by the similitude of things. Either then the Distinctions of our Sensations must be multiplied *in infinitum*, or the infinite variety of sensible Objects taken away. But 'tis evident that neither could have been done in this present State. We must therefore bear the Inconvenience, not only of being ignorant of innumerable things, but also of erring in many Cases.

Man is not therefore miserable because exposed to Errors.

IV. To this it may be replied, that Error is a Defect in that part of Man, in the perfection of which his Happiness chiefly consists; if therefore he may naturally fall into Errors, it follows, that Man may be naturally miserable without his fault. But I answer: Any particular Evil does not bring Misery upon us, otherwise every Creature would be miserable, as of necessity labouring under the Evils of *Imperfection*. He only therefore is to be denominated *miserable*,

rable, who is oppressed with more and greater Evils than his Good can requite with Happiness. So that upon ballancing the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies of Life, it were better for him not to be than to be.

V. 'Tis to be observ'd also, that God has in his Wisdom and Goodness so temper'd our present State, that we very seldom, if ever, fall into grievous and pernicious Errors without our own fault. But if this ever come to pass, as soon as the Evil preponderates, Life is taken away together with the benefits of Nature. Now 'tis to be esteem'd an Happiness, and an Argument of the Divine Goodness, that the Natural Benefits of Life cannot be taken from us, but Life is taken also. Life then can be a burden to none; nor is it necessary that any one should withdraw himself from natural Evils, by voluntarily putting an end to his Life. For if these Evils be such as take away the Benefits of Life, they also bring it to an end. God produced all things out of nothing, and gave us Being without our Advice, he seems therefore obliged in Justice not to suffer us to be reduced to a State that is worse than Non-entity. (55.) When therefore any State is overwhelmed with Evils which outweigh the Good, 'tis reasonable that God should remit us to our former State, that is, let us return to nothing. Neither ought we to accuse the Divine Power and Goodness which has bestow'd as many Blessings and Benefits upon us, as either the whole Universe or our own Nature would admit of; and since it was impossible but that some time or other, upon the increase of Evils, his Gift (*viz.* Life) must become burdensome, when this happens he breaks off its thread.

Those Errors which we fall into without our fault are seldom pernicious.

VI. But

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(55.) It would be so indeed if this were our only State: but as it is at present, I fear many have nothing but the hopes and expectations of another to support them under almost complete Misery; to comfort and encourage them to undergo Evils infinitely greater than all the benefits of Life: Evils, which make Life itself an Evil, and (as our Author says) put them into a State worse than nothing. Witness the long and acute Torments of numerous Martyrs, the Pains of Confessors, the Labours of common Galley-Slaves, &c. But the least hint of this is sufficient, and the common answers to it very satisfactory: as will perhaps appear from the References to the last Chapter of the Appendix to this Book, where this Question comes more properly under consideration.

T

Concerning Natural Evil.

Our Know-
ledge is adap-
ted to our
State.

VI. But Man, you'll say, is ignorant of those things which it was his greatest Interest to know, namely, of Truths that are necessary to the attainment of Felicity. It was convenient for our present State to understand these; and who will affirm that God has not bestow'd upon us all the Knowledge which is agreeable to our State? We ought therefore never to be deceiv'd about such Truths as these, while we apply all proper diligence to the Search. I answer; If this be understood of the Happiness due to us in this Life, 'tis very true; nor is our Understanding ever so far mistaken, as not to inform us of the Truths necessary to this kind of Happiness, if proper care be not wanting. But, such Happiness ought to suffice us, as may serve to make Life a Blessing, and better than the absence of it. A greater indeed was promised to the first Man by a *gratuitous Covenant*, (56.) but

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(56.) Tho' the first Man might have been created more perfect in all his Faculties than any of his Posterity (which, as some think, cannot be easily proved from the account we have of him in *Genesi*: *) Tho' this knowledge might have been at first much clearer, as coming entire and adult from the immediate hand of his Creator; yet it seems highly probable, that this could not have been propagated in a natural way, that is, by any general pre-establish'd Laws, as our present Faculties are, but Mankind, as a successive Body, must necessarily have been left to the known Rules of Propagation, and the present Method of improving their Intelleſis, and deriving all their Notices from the common Sources of Sensation and Reflection. And so our bountiful Creator may be suppos'd to have deprived Mankind of no Blessings he could, consistent with his other Attribute, and the order of the Creation, possibly have bestow'd. Nay, why may not he be thought to have converted even this necessary, unavoidable Imperfection in us, compared with the first *Adam*, into a greater Perfection arising both from our notions of his Fall, and the

consequences of it, and of the wonderful Remedy prepared for it, and promised in the second *Adam*? We seem to be made more highly sensible of the infinite Wisdom and Goodness of God, and more thankful for our Condition, from our knowledge of his just permission of so deserv'd a Fall; and his gracious undeserv'd *Exaltation* of us again to a superior State, than if we had conceiv'd the Misery attending human Nature to be (as perhaps most of it was) a necessary consequence of our being created in this inferior Class. But whether this Notion be allow'd or not, the Scheme of Providence relating to *Paradise*, &c. as deliver'd in Holy Scripture, if taken altogether, can be no just Objection against the moral Attributes of God. He created Man entirely innocent, and absolutely free, which Freedom was absolutely necessary to his Happiness (as will appear under the head of Moral Evil.) He gave him the Means and Abilities to complete his Happiness, and placed him in a World every way suited to his Condition. This Liberty made it possible for him to lose that Innocence, tho' he had but one single opportunity of doing it †, and

* See Bayle under the Word *Adam*, Remark D: And Curcellazi *Instit. Rel. Christ.* l. 3. C. 8. p. 108, &c. And *Dissert. de Pecc. Orig.* §. 11. or *Episcopius Inst. Theol.* l. 4. C. 6, 7. p. 358, 359.

† See Nichols's *Conference with a Theist*, p. 220, 221. 1st Edition.

but when that was once broken by Sin, he and his Posterity were re-
manded to those imperfect Notices which could be had from an im-
perfect Understanding, and the Information of the Senses; which yet
are not in the least to be despised, neither had Man a Right, nor could

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and it was highly reasonable and necessary that he should have that †. This one Opportunity he embraced, (which it does not seem possible for God himself, tho' he foresaw it, to have prevented, consistently with that Freedom he had for good reasons given him, and determin'd thus to exercise) and so alter'd his Nature and Circumstances, and consequently made it necessary for God also to change his Place and Condition, and to withdraw such extraordinary favours as his infinite Wisdom and Goodness might otherwise have thought proper to bestow. Thus, with his Innocence, Man lost all Title to a Continuance in Paradise, and of consequence became naturally liable to the common Evils and Calamities of a transitory Life, and the Pains attending its Conclusion. Those that descended from him, and partook of the same Nature, must necessarily partake of the same Infirmities; in particular, they must inherit *Corruption* and *Mortality*. Which Evils, tho' we now lament them as the chief Parts of our Fore-fathers Punishment, yet could not in the present Circumstances of things be prevented; nor indeed, were such a Prevention possible, would it be in the main desirable; as will appear immediately: nay these, by a most wonderful Scheme of Providence, are infinitely outweigh'd, and made the means of bringing us to much greater Happiness, by Faith in him who was promised from the Beginning, and hath in these latter Days brought *Life* and *Incorruptibility* to Light. " Since the Fall of Man (says the incomparable *Sherlock* on *Death*; " p. 101.) Mortality and Death is necessary to the good Government of the World: no-
" thing else can give a check to some Men's
" Wickedness, but either the Fear of Death or

" the Execution of it: some Men are so out-
" rageously wicked, that nothing can put a
" stop to them, and prevent the Mischief they
" do in the World, but to cut them off: this
" is the Reason of Capital Punishments among
" Men, to remove those out of the World
" who will be a Plague to Mankind while
" they live in it. For this reason God de-
" stroy'd the whole Race of Mankind by a De-
" luge of Water, excepting *Noah* and his Fa-
" mily, because they were incurably wicked:
" For this reason he sends Plagues and Fa-
" mines, and Sword, to correct the exorbi-
" tant Growth of Wickedness, to lessen the
" number of Sinners, and to lay Restraints on
" them. And if the World be such a Bedlam
" as it is under all these Restraints, what would
" it be were it filled with immortal Sinners!
" And again, p. 105. " When Man had sin-
" ned, it was necessary that he should die, be-
" cause he could never be completely and per-
" fectly happy in this World, as you have al-
" ready heard: and the only possible way to
" make him happy, was, to translate him into
" another World, and to bestow a better Im-
" mortality on him: This God has done, and
" that in a very stupendous way, by giving his
" own Son to die for us; and now we have
" little reason to complain that we all die in
" *Adam*, since we are made alive in Christ,
" &c."

A great many more Arguments on this Sub-
ject may be seen in the same Book, Chap. 3.
§ 2. All which must be observ'd to relate
chiefly to the Government of Man *after* his
Fall: the Fall itself will be accounted for in
the next Chapter. See Note 106.

† See Dr. J. Clarke on *Moral Evil*. p. 211. Sec. and *Limborch Theol. Christi.* L. 3. C. 2. § 2.
and *Jenkin's Reason of the Christi. Relig.* vol. 2. C. 13. p. 253, 254. 5th Edition.

he naturally attain to greater Perfection. For when the Faculties of our Souls were injured, and the health and vigour of our Bodies impair'd by our own Vices, as well as those of our Parents; our natural Perfections must necessarily be impaired also. For since our Knowledge is to be acquired by Care, Industry and Instruction, if Mankind had continued innocent, and with diligent care communicated true Notions of things to their Posterity; and had not infected their Offspring by Example, Instruction, or any Contagion attending Propagation, we should have been less liable to Errors; nay free from pernicious ones; and have enjoy'd a more perfect Knowledge of things. For our native intellectual Faculty would have been stronger, and being better furnish'd both with the Means and Principles of Science than we now are, we should more easily have prevented the Occasions of Error. All pernicious Errors therefore, at least in Matters of Necessity, are to be imputed to our own Guilt, or that of our Parents*.

We prefer
Life, with all
its inconve-
niencies, be-
fore Death.

VII. If any be so ungrateful as to murmur still, and affirm, that he would not accept of Life on these Conditions, if he might but have his Choice; and that himself is the best Judge of his own Interest, and he no Benefactor that obtrudes a Gift upon a Man against his Will: that consequently he owes no thanks to God on account of Life which Life he would refuse: We must reply; that thus indeed impious Men and Fools are used to prate, but this does not come from their Hearts and Consciences. For none are more afraid of Death, none more tenacious of Life, than they that talk thus idly. A great many of them profess that they don't believe a future Life, and if so, they may reduce themselves to the wish'd-for state of Annihilation as soon as they please, and cast off that *Existence* which is so disagreeable. No Person therefore, except he be corrupted in his Judgment, and indulges himself in Error, can seriously prefer Non-existence to the present Life. (57.)

VIII. But

NOTES.

(57.) " Self-murder is so unnatural a Sin, | " many sad Examples what a disturbed Imagi-
" that 'tis now-a-days thought reason enough | " nation will do, if that must pass for natural
" to prove any Man distracted. We have too | " Distraction; but we seldom or never hear,
" that

* For what relates to the Doctrine of Original Sin, &c. see the latter end of the next Section, and Note 58:

VIII. But if any one think so from his Heart, he is not fallen into this Opinion from any natural Evil, but from others which he brought upon himself by *wrong Elections*. We see many Persons weary of Life, but 'tis because of their bad Management, lest they should be ridiculous for missing of Honour, of Riches, or some empty End which they have unreasonably propos'd to themselves. But very few have been excited to Self-murder by any natural and absolutely unavoidable Evil or Error. Life therefore, of what kind soever it is, must be look'd upon as a benefit in the judgment of Mankind, and we ought to pay our grateful acknowledgments to God, as the powerful and beneficent Author of it. Nor will it be any prejudice to the Divine Goodness, if one or two throw Life away in despair. For it is to be supposed, that this proceeds not from the greatness of any natural Evil, but from Impatience, from some deprav'd Election; of which more hereafter. For none of the Brutes which are destitute of Free-will, ever quitted its Life spontaneously, thro' the uneasiness of Grief, or a Distemper. If any Man therefore has killed himself voluntarily, we must conclude that he did this, as all other wicked Actions, by a deprav'd Choice.

Some put
th mselvcs to
Death, not on
account of
natural, but
voluntary
Evils.

IX. As to the second sort of Errors, into which we are led, not by nature, but carelessness, negligence, curiosity, or a deprav'd will, the number of these is greater, and their effects more pernicious: nay 'tis these only which load and infest Life with intolerable Evils, so as to make us wish that we had never been. But since they come upon us thro' our own fault, they are not to be reckon'd among *Natural Evils*, but belong to the third kind, *viz.* the *Moral*, to which we hasten: But we must first sum up what has been deliver'd in this Chapter.

Those Errors
which we fall
into by our
own fault,
are to be
reckoned a-
mong Moral
Evils.

N O T E S.

“ that mere external Sufferings, how severe so- “ die when they pleas'd, yet Nature taught
“ ever, tempt Men to kill themselves. The “ them to live as long as they could; and we
“ Stoics themselves, whose Principle it was to “ see that they seldom thought themselves mi-
“ break their Prison when they found them- “ serable enough to die. *Sherlock on Provi-*
“ selves uneasy, very rarely put it into practice: “ *dence*, C. 7. p. 249, 250. 2d Edition. See also
“ Nature was too strong for their Philosophy. Note 104. and Ch. 2. par. 7.
“ and tho' their Philosophy allow'd them to

S E C T. V.

*Containing the Sum of what has been said on
Natural Evils.*

The whole
Universe one
System, of
which every
thing is a
part.

I. **I**N order to give the Reader a better view of what has been said already, we must conceive this whole World as one System, whereof all particular things are the parts and Members, and every one has its place and office, as the Members have in our own Body, or the Rafters in a House, the Doors, Windows, Chambers and Closets: Neither is there any thing usefess or superfluous in the whole: and in order to unite all more closely together, nothing is self-sufficient, but as it is qualified to help others, so it stands in need of the help of others for its more commodious Subsistence. And tho' in so immense a Machine we do not clearly perceive the connection or mutual dependence of the parts in every respect, yet we are certain that the thing is so. In many Cafes 'tis so evident, that he will be esteem'd a Mad-man who denies it. Since therefore the World is to be look'd upon as one Building, we must recollect, how many different parts, and how various, so grand, so magnificent an Edifice should consist of. We may design a House, divided into Halls, Parlours and Closets; but unless there be a Kitchen too, and places set apart for more ignoble, more uncomely Offices, 'twill not be fit for Habitation. The same may be affirm'd of the World and the frame of it. God could have filled it all with Suns: but who will engage that such a System would be capable of living Creatures, or proper to preserve Motion. He could have made the Earth of Gold, or Gems: But in the mean while *desitute of Inhabitants*. He that has lived a Day or two
without

without Food, would prefer a *Dungbill* to such an Earth. God could have created Man *immortal*, without Passions, without a Sense of Pleasure or Pain; but he must have been without a *solid Body* also, and an inhabitant of some other Region, not the Earth. He could have made the whole human *Body* an *Eye*, but then it would have been unfit for Motion, Nutrition, and all the other functions of Life. He could have taken away the contrariety of *Appetites*, but the contrariety of Motions (nay Motion itself) must have been taken away with it. He could have prevented the frustrating of Appetites, but that must have been by making them not *opposite*; for 'tis impossible that contrary Appetites, or such as desire what is at the same time occupied by others, should all at once be satisfied. He could, in the last place, have framed Man *free from Errors*, but then he must not have made use of Matter for an Organ of Sensation, which the very Nature of our Soul requires.

II. In short, if the mundane System be taken together, if all the Parts and Seasons of it be compared with one another, we must believe that it could not possibly be better; if any part could be changed for the better, another would be worse; if one abounded with greater Conveniencies, another would be exposed to greater Evils; and that necessarily from the natural Imperfection of all Creatures. A Creature is descended from *God*, a most *perfect Father*; but from nothing as its *Mother*, which is Imperfection itself. All finite things therefore partake of nothing, and are nothing beyond their Bounds. When therefore we are come to the bounds which nature has set, whoever perceives any thing, must necessarily perceive also that he is deficient, and seek for something without himself to support him. Hence come Evils, hence opposition of things, and, as it were, a mutilation in the Work of God. Hence, for the most part, Men fear and desire, grieve and rejoyce. Hence Errors and Dark-ness of the Mind. Hence Troops of Miseries marching thro' human Life: whether these grow for the punishment of Mortals, or attend Life by the *necessity* of Nature; that is, whether they proceed from the constitution of Nature itself, or are external and acquired by our Choice. Nor need we the bloody *Battle* of the *Ancients*, nor the *malicious* God of the *Manichees* for Authors of them. Nor is it any Argument against the Divine Omnipotence, that he could not free a

If the whole and all its parts be taken together, none could be changed but for the worse.

Creature

Concerning Natural Evil.

'Creature in its own Nature necessarily imperfect, from that native Imperfection, and the Evils consequent upon it. He might, as we have often said, have not created mortal Inhabitants, and such as were liable to Fears and Grievs: nor, as will be declared below, such as by their depraved Elections might deserve Punishments: but with regard to the System of the whole, 'twas necessary that he should create these or none at all: either the Earth must be replenish'd with these, or left destitute of Inhabitants. Nor could any of the foregoing particulars be omitted, but that very Omission would bring along with it much greater Evils.

Hence the Error of the Epicureans who knew only the least and worst part of it.

III. From hence sprang the Error of the *Epicureans*, who pretended that this World was unworthy of a good and powerful God. They, we may believe, knew only the least part, and as it were the Sink of the World *viz.* our *Earth*. They never considered the good and beautiful part of Nature, but only contemplated the Grievs, Diseases, Death and Destruction of Mortals, when they denied that God was the Author of so many Evils: In the interim they forgot that the Earth is in a manner the Filth and Offscouring of the *Mundane System*: and that the Workmanship of God is no more to be condemn'd for it, than a Judgment is to be form'd of the beauty of an House from the Sink or Jakes. They were ignorant also that the Earth was made in the manner it now is, not for itself alone, but in order to be subservient to the Good of the whole; and that it is filled with such Animals as it is capable of, with a due Subordination to the Good of the Universe, and the Felicity of Souls that inhabit the purer and brighter Parts of this Fabric, *viz.* the *Æther* and the *Heavens*. These are as it were the Gardens, Parks, and Palaces of the World; this Earth, the *Dungbill*, or (as some will have it) the Work-house. Nor is it a greater wonder that God should make these, than the *Intestines*, and less comely, but yet necessary Parts of human Body. Lastly, they are unmindful that more and greater Good is to be found here than Evil, otherwise they themselves would reject Life: and he that has more good than Evil is not miserable except he will. If therefore we would compare the Good things with the Evil: if we could view the whole Workmanship of God: if we thoro'ly understand the Connections, Subordinations,

dinations, and mutual Relations of things, the mutual assistance which they afford each other; and lastly, the whole series and order of them; it would appear that the World is as well as it could possibly be; and that no Evil in it could be avoided, which would not occasion a greater by its absence.

IV. We have endeavour'd to clear up these Points, and I hope effectually, as to this kind of Evil. For, upon the supposition of our Principles, which, by the way, are commonly acknowledg'd, some natural Evils must inevitably be admitted; and if even one could arise in the Work of an infinitely wise and good God, there's no occasion for the *Bad Principle* as the Origin of Evil, for Evil might have existed notwithstanding the Divine Omnipotence and Infinite Goodness. The difficult Question then, *Whence comes Evil?* is not unanswerable. For it arises from the very nature and constitution of created Beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction. And tho' we be not able to apply these Principles to all particular cases and circumstances, yet we are sure enough that they may be applied. Nor should we be concern'd, that we are at a loss to account for some particulars; for this is common in the Solution of almost all natural Phænomena, and yet we acquiesce. For presupposing some Principles, such as Matter, Motion, &c. tho' we are ignorant what Matter and Motion are in any particular Body, yet, from the variety of these, we take it for granted that various Compositions and Qualities proceed. In like manner also we are persuaded, that from the various kinds of Imperfection necessarily inherent in things, various Species of Evils arise, tho' in some the manner in which this comes to pass does not appear, agreeable to what we experience in Light and Colours; we are certain that Colours arise from the different disposition, refraction and reflection of Light; but yet none can certainly tell how it is reflected or refracted when it forms a blew, a green, or any other Colour: So that I dare affirm, that the Origin of natural Evil is more easily assign'd, and more clearly and particularly solv'd, than that of Colours, Tastes, or any sensible Quality whatsoever.

V. I confess, that according to this Hypothesis, Natural Evils proceed from the original Condition of things, and are not permitted by

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God,

not attribute all kinds of natural Evil to the fall of the

Hence a reply to the Difficulty, *Whence comes Evil?* Since it arises from the very nature of created Beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction.

This reconciled with the *Mosaic History*, which does not attribute all kinds of natural Evil to the fall of the first Man.

God, but in order to prevent greater, which some perhaps may think repugnant to sacred History, and the Doctrine of Moses. For they will have it, that the abuse of Free-will was the Cause of all natural Evils, and that when God created every thing good and perfect in its kind, it was afterwards corrupted by Sin, and subjected to natural Evils: but this is asserted without Proof. For the Scripture no where teaches that there would have been no manner of natural Evil, if Man had not sinned. God indeed made all things good and perfect in their kind, that is, he created and still preserves every thing in a state and condition suitable to the whole System of Beings, and which it need have no Reason to repent of except it will. But neither the Goodness of God, nor the Perfection that belongs to the Nature of things, required that all natural Evils should be removed: for some created Beings have Evils inherent in their very Natures, which God must of necessity either tolerate or not create those things in which they do inhere. If therefore the sacred History be carefully examined, it will appear that some kinds of Evils are attributed to the Sin of the first Man, but others not. Of the former kind are, *first*, the *Mortality* of Man, who would otherwise have been immortal by *Grace*. *Secondly*, the *Barrenness* of the Earth, and growth of *noxious* and *unprofitable Plants* in the Room of such as were fit for *Food*, for the punishment of Mankind. *Thirdly*, that hard *Labour* necessary for providing *Food*, which is a consequence of the former. *Fourthly*, that *impotent Affection* and Necessity of Obedience whereby *Women* are made subject to *Men*. *Fifthly*, the pains of *Child-birth*. *Sixthly*, the *Enmity* between Man and the Serpentine kind. *Seventhly*, Banishment out of Paradise, *i. e.* as appears to me, an Expulsion out of the State of Grace, in which the Favour of God had placed Man above what was due to his Nature. These, and some others, are expressly enumerated as punishments of the First Fall. (58.) But besides these there

N O T E S.

(58.) For an account of the Scripture History relating to the Fall of Adam, and the consequences of it, both upon himself and his Posterity, see *Ibbot's Boyle's Lect.* Sermon. 5. 2d Set. *Rymer's general Representation of reveal'd Religion*, Part 1. C. 4. and Dr. *J. Clarke on Moral Evil*, p. 224, &c. or *D'Oyly's four Dissertations*, C. 1. p. 3. Note b, and C. 9. p. 97, &c. or *Bp. Taylor's Polemical Discourses*, p. 614, 615, 623. See also *Limborch's Theol. Christ.* L. 3. C. 3, 4, 5. or *Episcopius de Libero Arbitrio*, &c. or *Carcellæi Rel. Christ. Instit.* L. 3. C. 14, 15; 16, and his *Dissert. de Pecc. Originis*.

there are many consequent upon the necessity of Matter, and concerning which the Scripture has nothing to induce us to believe that they arose from Sin.

VI. 'Tis to be observ'd farther, that these are not permitted by God to no purpose, but for the good of the Universe, and at the same time of Man himself. For as to Mortality, it was by no means expedient for the System, that a sinful Creature should enjoy Immortality, which was not owing to its nature, but granted by an extraordinary favour of the Deity. Nay, God seems to have forbidden our first Parents the use of the Tree of Life out of mere Compassion, lest if their Life should by virtue of it be prolonged, they should live for ever miserable. Even this Punishment, as all others, contributes to the restraint of bad Elections, and the preparation of a new way to Happiness. For when Man transgressed, and a perverse abuse of his Free-Will was once introduced, there would have been no end of Madness if the Divine Goodness had continued to preserve Life, understanding an easy Food, and the other Gifts of the Primæval State, to the abusers thereof, as well as to the Innocent. 'Tis notorious how exorbitant bad Elections are even amongst the Cares and Labours which Mortals undergo in providing the Necessaries of Life; and how pernicious strength of Parts becomes, when, upon a corruption of the Will, it degenerates into Cunning: how much more intolerable then would it be if the Fear of Death were away; if the same facility of procuring Food, the same vigour of Intellect, which our First Parents enjoy'd were continued to their corrupt Posterity. (59.)

The Evils which do arise from thence are permitted for the good of the Universe, and also of Man himself.

VII. Nay, to confess the truth, it could not possibly continue; for, let there be never so great Plenty of Provision, it might be all corrupted by the voluntary Act of one Man. When our First Parent had therefore once transgressed, what hopes could he conceive of his Posterity? Or, by what Right could they claim these supernatural Gifts of God? certainly by none. All then are made mortal, not only thro' the *Justice*, but the *Goodness* of God. For, while Men are oblig'd

Mortality, Hunger, Thirst, Diseases, &c. are for the good of the World in this corrupt Estate.

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lig'd

NOTES.

(59) See *Skerlock* upon *Death*, C 2. §. 1. | ferr'd to in the beginning of Note 56, particularly Mr. *D'Oyly's* first D'fert. C. 9. our First Parent's Intellect, see the Authors re-

Concerning Natural Evil.

lig'd to struggle with Hunger, Thirst, Diseases and Troubles, few of them are at leisure to run quite mad, and leap over all the bounds of Nature by their depraved Elections. 'Tis better therefore for us to undergo all these Inconveniencies, than to be left to ourselves without restraint in this corrupt Estate. For by that means we should bring upon ourselves still greater Evils. But these belong to reveal'd Religion, and this is not a proper Place to treat on them at large. (60.)

N O T E S.

(60.) Thus our Author has, I think, sufficiently accounted for all sorts of Natural Evil; and demonstrated the *τὸ βέλτιον*, or Meliority of things in the Universe, taking the whole (as we always ought) together: at least, he has laid down such Principles as may be easily and effectually applied to that excellent End. He has clearly proved, and closely pursued this one single Proposition thro' all the above mention'd Particulars, *viz.* that *not one of those Evils or Inconveniencies in our System could possibly have been prevented without a greater*: which is an ample Vindication, an evident Proof of all the Divine Attributes, in the original Frame and Government thereof. And indeed this seems

to be the best and most convincing, if not the only proper Method of handling the Argument and examining the Works of God, so as to attain a due sense of, and regard for the Author of them. Which Maxim therefore, we conclude from the numberless instances of its apparent Validity, ought to be allow'd, and may be safely insisted on, tho' by reason of our great ignorance of Nature, it cannot always be so clearly applied. However it has been already applied successfully to the Solution of the most material Difficulties in the present Question, as may appear more fully from the Authors refer'd to in the foregoing Chapter.



C H A P.

C H A P. V.

Of Moral Evil.

Introduction, containing the Substance of the Chapter.

HAVING given some Account of *Natural* Evils, the *Moral* come next under consideration: we are now to trace out the Origin of these, and see of what kind it is, whether they flow from the same Source with the Natural, *viz.* the necessary *Imperfection* of created Beings; or we are to seek for some other entirely different from it.

By *Moral* Evils, as we said before, are understood those Inconveniencies of Life and Condition which befall ourselves or others thro' wrong Elections. For it is plain that some inconveniencies happen without our knowledge, or against our Wills, by the very Order of natural Causes; whereas others come upon us knowingly, and in a manner with our Consent (when we choose either these themselves, or such as are necessarily connected with them.) The Moral are to be reckon'd among the latter kind of Inconveniencies; and he must be esteem'd the Cause of them, who knowingly, and of his own accord, brings them either upon himself or others by a depraved or foolish Choice.

But,

Concerning Natural Evil.

But, in order to make this whole Matter concerning Moral Evils more fully understood, we must consider in the

1st Place, *What the Nature of Elections is.*

2dly. *That our Happiness chiefly depends upon Elections.*

3dly. *What kind of Elections may be said to be made amiss, or foolishly.*

4thly. *How we come to fall into depraved or wicked Elections.*

5thly. *How such Elections can be reconciled with the Power and Goodness of God.*

S E C T. I.

Concerning the Nature of Elections.

S U B S E C T. I.

A View of their Opinion who admit of Liberty from Compulsion only, but not from Necessity.

That it is not easy to understand or give a true representation of the Opinions concerning Liberty. Some acknowledge a Liberty from Compulsion only, others from Necessity also.

IF there be any thing obscure and difficult in Philosophy, we are sure to find it in that Part which treats of Elections and Liberty. There is no point about which the Learned are less confident with themselves, or more divided from each other. Nor is it an easy Matter to understand them, or to give a certain and true representation of their Opinions. I think they may be distinguish'd into two Sorts, both admitting of a Liberty; One of them from external *Compulsion*, and not from internal *Necessity*; but the other from both.

II. As

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II. As far as I can understand the Opinion of the former, it is this: First, they observe that there are certain *Appetites* implanted in us by Nature, which are not to be esteem'd useless, but contributing toward our Preservation, as was shewn before; and that some things are naturally agreeable, some contrary to these Appetites: that the former, when present, please and impress a delightful Sense of themselves; the latter displease and create uneasiness. These therefore are called incommodious, troublesome and Evil; and those commodious, convenient and Good.

The Authors of the former Opinion suppose that there are Appetites implanted in us by Nature: what is agreeable to these is called good; the contrary, Evil.

III. Secondly, That Nature has given us *Reason*, a *Mind* or *Intellect*, whereby to distinguish Conveniencies from Inconveniencies, Good from Evil. And since these may be consider'd by the Mind in a three-fold Respect, hence also arise three kinds of Good and Evil; namely, *Pleasant*, *Profitable* and *Honest*.

Things are agreeable to the Appetites in a three-fold respect. Hence three kinds of good.

IV. For if Good be consider'd only with regard to the Appetite, which is delighted with the Enjoyment of it, and acquiesces in it, 'tis called *Pleasant*.

That which is actually agreeable to the Appetite is called Pleasant.

V. But if it be not agreeable to the Appetite of itself, but only *connected* with something else which is of itself agreeable, or produces Pleasure, and on that account only be desirable, then 'tis called *Profitable*. For tho' the Appetite cannot come at the immediate Enjoyment of it, yet the Mind makes use of it in order to procure those things which it can enjoy, and from thence it is esteem'd *convenient*, *i. e.* Good.

That which is connected with something which is of itself agreeable, is called profitable.

VI. But, since that which is agreeable to one Appetite, may be repugnant or less agreeable to others; and that which pleases now, may have some things connected with it, which may be displeasing afterwards, there is need of enquiry and deliberation, in order to procure an absolute Good, *i. e.* one which, all Appetites and Times consider'd, will afford as great, as certain and durable a Pleasure or Delight as possible. For this end therefore was the Mind or Understanding given us, that we might be able to determine what appears fittest to be done upon a view of all such things as create pleasure or uneasiness for the present or the future. And what is thus judg'd by the Understanding to be the best, if there be no Error in the Case, must be look'd upon as *Honest*. For that is honest which is agreeable to a rational

That which is judg'd by the Understanding to be the best, all things consider'd, is absolutely good, and called Honest.

rational

tional Agent; but it is agreeable to a rational Agent, and Reason itself directs, that, all things consider'd, we should prefer that which brings the greater; the more certain and more durable Advantages.

Instances in Health, Medicines, and such things as are agreeable to the Rational Appetite.

VII. The Defenders of this Opinion reckon these three kinds of Good to be *Moral* so far as they respect Man, because they fall under the Government of Reason. But since all things cannot be always had together, a comparison must be made between them, and that embraced which appears to be the best. Now the kinds may be compared together, as well as the particulars of each kind. For instance, Health is a thing pleasant in itself, and desirable above all things that relate to the Body, but for the preservation of it Medicines must be sometimes taken, which of themselves are far from being agreeable to the Appetite, but as they are means to an End which is in itself delightful, they are said to be profitable, and on that account fit to be chosen. Now the Goods of the Mind are greater, more certain and more durable than those of the Body; if therefore they cannot be had without the Loss of Health, or even Life, right Reason dictates, that Health, or even Life must be despised in regard to these. For this appears to be the most convenient, all things consider'd, and on that account is *honest*: and as Goods of a different kind may be compared together, so may also particulars of the same kind, as any one will find that considers it.

He that can act as his own Judgment directs, is free according to these Men.

VIII. As to *Liberty*, the Men of this Sect will have it to consist in this, that among all those Goods an Agent can embrace that which pleases him best, and exert those Actions which his own Reason approves: For, according to these Men, he that can follow his own *Judgment* in Matters is free. For example, he that is bound in Body, and has his Faculties and Limbs entire, if all external Impediments be removed, is at liberty to walk: for he can if he *will*, and nothing but his will is wanting to exert that Action.

But they suppose that we are determin'd to choose either from the goodness or disagreeableness of objects, perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senses; and that therefore we are not free as to the Acts of the Will, but only of the inferior Faculties, which are subject to the determination of the Will.

IX. But as to the Actions of the *Will* itself, namely, to will, or to *suspend* the Act of Volition, they think that it is determin'd to these, not by itself, for that is impossible, but from without. If you ask from whence? They answer, from the *Pleasure* or *Uneasiness* perceiv'd by

by

by the Understanding or the Senses; but rather, as they imagine, from the present or urgent *Uneasiness*: since therefore these are produced in us *ab extra*, not from the Will itself, and are not in its power, but arise from the very things; 'tis manifest, according to these Men, that we are not free to *will* or *not to will*, at least from *Necessity*, with regard to the immediate Acts of the Will. Some of them therefore expressly deny that Liberty belongs to Man with regard to these Acts, or that an Election can be said to be free, or Man himself in that respect: They will have it therefore; that *Liberty* belongs to us properly with respect to the *inferior* Faculties which are subject to the Government of the Will, and discharge their Functions when the Man himself has willed: that is, a Man is free to walk who can walk if he pleases; but not to will; for he receives the Will to walk from elsewhere: nevertheless, he that can do what he wills, according to them, is free, tho' he be necessarily determin'd to will. (61.)

X. If

NOTES.

(61.) The most remarkable Defenders of this Opinion, among the Moderns, seem to be *Hobbs*, *Locke*, (if he be consistent with himself*) *Leibnitz*, *Bayle*, the *Authors* of the *Philosophical Enquiry concerning human Liberty*, and of *Cato's Letters*. But in order to have a more distinct Notion of the different Schemes of Authors all professing to treat of *Human Liberty*, *Free-will*, &c. Let us in the first place recite the several Powers or Modifications of the Mind, and observe to which of them Liberty is or may be apply'd. These are commonly distinguish'd into *Perception*, *Judgment*, *Volition* and *Action*. The two former are generally *necessary*, or at least always *passive*: For I cannot help seeing a Light when my Eyes are open, nor avoid judging that two and two make four, whenever I think of that Proposition; tho' I may hinder that Perception by shutting my Eyes, as well as prevent that Judgment by refusing to think of the Proposition. The Will then may properly enough be said to influence or impede these†, but this does not make them less *passive* in them-

selfes; nay, the more it does influence them, the more evidently they are so. The third will appear to be the exercise of a *Self-moving Principle*, and as such, cannot properly be moved or influenced by any thing else. The last is the exercise of the *inferior Powers*, the actual production of Thought or Motion: this is generally directed by, and an immediate consequence of Volition, on which account several Authors have confounded them together; but tho' they be properly both Acts of the Mind, yet they are certainly distinct ones: the former is an ability of choosing some particular Thoughts or Motions, the other is a power of producing these Thoughts or Motions pursuant to the act of choice, or of putting that choice in execution. A careful distinction between these will help us to judge of all such Authors as have either used them promiscuously or been content to treat of the last only, as most of those Persons have that are cited in the 14th and following Pages of the *Philosophical Enquiry*.

These

* See Note 65.

† See Note 82.

If this be so,
all our Ac-
tions are
absolutely
necessary.

X. If it be granted that this is the Nature of our Elections, there's no doubt but all our Actions are really and truly necessary. For as to the proper Actions of the Will, to will or suspend the Act of Volition, the Men whom we are speaking of, give up Liberty with respect to these, while they assert that it does not belong to them. For they are of Opinion, that when any thing is proposed by the Understanding

to.

N O T E S.

These two last then being the only active Powers, or rather the only Powers at all, are the only proper subjects of Liberty: to which again it is variously apply'd. With regard to the Will, some content themselves with asserting its Freedom from external Compulsion only, from being forced contrary to its own bent and inclination; and indeed it would be very strange to suppose it otherwise: For to say that it may be drawn a contrary way to that which the Mind prefers and directs, is to say, that it may tend two contrary ways at once, that a Man may will a thing against his Will, or be oblig'd to will what at the same time he does not will: but then such a Freedom as this equally belongs to the two former Powers, which cannot be forced to perceive or judge otherwise than they do perceive or judge, otherwise than as Objects appear, and their own Natures require; it may be apply'd to any thing the most necessary, nay the more necessary the better. Others therefore have contended for an absolute exemption of the Will from all imperceptible Biases or Physical Inclination, from all internal necessity, arising either from its own frame and constitution, the impulse of superior Beings, or the operation of Objects, Reasons, Motions, &c. which appear'd to them the very essence of human Liberty, the sole Foundation of Morality. And indeed these seem to be the only Persons that speak out, and to the Point, as shall be shewn in the following Notes.

Lastly, a great many will confine their Idea of Liberty to Action only, and define it to be a power of either actually taking up or laying down a Thought, of beginning Motion or stopping it according to the preference of the Mind or Will. But if this be all the Liberty

we have, 'tis of small consequence, since we are conscious that in fact all such Actions, supposing the Organs to be rightly disposed, follow the determination of the Will; and also, that in reason they are no farther moral, nor we accountable for them than as they do so; we must therefore go up higher than this before we come at any valuable Liberty, and the main Question will be, Whether Man is free to think or resolve upon, to will or choose any thing proposed, as well as to exert his other Faculties in consequence of such a Resolution, Will, or Choice. This is the only Point worth disputing, and indeed if Liberty be not here 'tis no where. For if the Mind be absolutely determin'd to choose in a certain manner in any given Circumstances, its other subordinate Faculties can scarce be supposed to be undetermin'd; but the several Actions which depend thereon will all follow by necessary consequence. Nay, upon this Hypothesis there is properly no such thing as choice or action in Man; but all are Passions propagated in a chain of necessary Causes and Effects. And indeed all who suppose any external Determination of the Will (meaning always a necessary and irresistible one) whether they place it in the Desire of Good, Anxiety for the absence of it, or the last Determination of the Judgment, are involv'd in the same consequence, how many Steps sooner they may take to remove the Difficulty. For it is equal to me, if what I call my Choice or Action be necessary, wherever that Necessity be placed. 'Tis the same thing whether I be acted upon and over-ruled by one immediate Cause, or drawn on by several successively. Suppose, v. g. that I am necessitated to obey the last result of my own Judgment. From the Existence of things follow certain Appearances, those

to be done, we either will it, or suspend the Act of Volition concerning it, according to the prospect of Happiness or importunity of the Uneasiness which appears to the Mind, in the present State and Circumstances; by these therefore our Election, according to them, is determin'd.

XI. But when the Election is made, if we can effect what we will, then they say we are free, in respect of such Actions, not from necessity, but only from Compulsion; for it is plain that nothing but our will is wanting, and supposing us to will them, they necessarily follow. For instance, when nothing hinders a Man from walking but his own Will, supposing this Volition, it cannot be conceiv'd but that he must walk, nor can he rest while this continues. If therefore, according to them, all acts of the Will are necessary (as being determin'd from without itself, *viz.* by the convenience or inconvenience of things or circumstances) the actions of the inferior faculties will be no less necessary, for they will depend on the same circumstances and acts of the Will, which, as they are necessary, these actions will be necessary also. (62.) Tho, according to them, there-

That human Actions are free, not from Necessity, but Compulsion.

X 2

fore,

NOTES.

those *Appearances* cause certain *Perceptions*, i. e. of pleasure or pain; these *Perceptions* form a *Judgment*, this *Judgment* determines the *Will*, this *Will* produces *Action*. All this is fix'd and inevitable, every Link of the Chain is equally necessary, and 'tis all one to me on which my Determinations hang: 'Tis as good to take them from the first as last, since the supposed choice or action is as much out of my power, or as incapable of being alter'd or prevented by me, as the existence of external things. 'Tis easy to observe how destructive this and the like Schemes must prove, as well of Morality as Liberty, both which must stand and fall together, and can, I think, only be secured effectually upon the Principles laid down by our Author; of which in their proper place.

See also Mr. Cabb's Reflections on Natural Liberty. *Collection of Tracts*, p. 379, &c. or Notes 65, 68, 82.

(62.) To call an Action *necessary*, is properly speaking to affirm, that it is no Action: For by the Word *Action* we mean an immediate effect of what is metaphorically stiled a *Self-moving Power*: or, the exercise of an ability which a Being has to begin or determine either *thought* or *Motion*. Now, the Idea of this Power in any Being, and of such exercise of it, is directly repugnant to that of *Necessity*, which supposes the *Thought* or *Motion* to be already begun or determined, and to be obtruded on this Being by something else, and consequently implies a Negation of any such Self-moving Power in this Being, or of its exercise by this Being in the Cases above mentioned. "To be an *Agent* (says Dr. Clarke,*) signifies to have a *Power of beginning Motion*, and *Motion* cannot begin *necessarily*, because *Necessity of Motion* supposes an Efficiency superior to, and *irresistible* by the thing moved, and conse-

quently

* *Remarks on the Philosophical Enquiry*, p. 6.

fore there be no *Compulsion* of the Will, yet there is *Necessity*, from which *Necessity* nothing in the World will be free; nay a great many of them openly profess to believe that this is the Case.

According to their opinion there is no *contingency* in things, nor could any thing be done otherwise than it is.

XII. Now, from this Hypothesis, which they extend to the Divine as well as Human Will, the following Corollaries seem deducible. First, that nothing in Nature could be done otherwise than it is. For, the whole Series of things being as it were connected together by Fate, there's no Room for Chance or Liberty, properly so call'd: *Contingency* then is removed out of Nature.

By Evil they understand nothing more than hurtful.

XIII. Secondly; That nothing more can be understood by wicked or wrong made Elections, than that they are prejudicial to the Elector or some others; which Sense is very remote from the vulgar one; for

NOTES.

“quently the *beginning of Motion* cannot be in that which is moved necessarily, but in the superior Cause, or in the efficiency of some other Cause still superior to that, till at length we arrive at some *Free Agent*.” Where, tho' the Doctor's Definition of Agency seems to be imperfect, that Word generally including the power of beginning *Thought* as well as *Motion* (which are two distinct Species of Action, and proceed from different Powers, tho' they be often confounded together, and comprehended under the same general term) yet it shews us an evident contradiction in these two Words *necessary Agent*, in either Sense: Unless he uses the Word *Agent* in both Senses together, and then his Reasoning will be false, since what is acted on and determin'd by another in regard to its *Thought, Will, &c.* and in that Sense *mov'd by a superior Efficiency*, may yet have a power of beginning real corporeal Motion (which is a quite different sort of Action) in consequence of such pre-determin'd *Thought, Will, &c.* and in that sense be an *Agent*, tho' not a moral one. But what ever the Dr. might mean by the Word *Agent*, his Argument will hold in either of these two Senses separate, *viz.* that nothing can be said to *act* either in thinking or moving, which does not properly *begin* the *Thought* or *Motion*, but is put into

Thought or *Motion* by something else, and also, that every thing cannot be so put either into *Thought* or *Motion*; and therefore, that there must be some first Cause of both *Thought* and *Motion*.

And will not the same Argument hold equally for some first Cause of *Existence*? If the Dr. can suppose a first Cause of all *Thought* and *Motion* (as he does here, and we think very reasonably) why may he not also suppose a first Cause of all *Existence*; and so entirely exclude that *antecedent Necessity* which he has often Recourse to as a kind of support of the existence of the first Cause, but is oblig'd to exclude from its Will and Actions? Is it harder to conceive how an Eternal Independent Being, or First Cause, may exist without any antecedent *Necessity*, than how it can will or act without any?

But to return to the chief Design of this Note. We see how necessary it is for us to fix the precise meaning of the Word *Action* in a Controversy of this kind, and if the Signification of it as laid down above be allow'd, then necessary Action is the same as passive Action, or beginning a thing and not beginning it at the same time, and in the same respect; in which terms every one perceives it to be a contradiction.

for in that Evil Elections are blamed, not for being hurtful, but for being hurtful without Necessity, and because they are made otherwise than they ought to have been: In this Hypothesis then there is no Election made amiss. (63.) Nor can any thing be said to be done otherwise than it ought to be: for what could not possibly be done otherwise, is certainly done as it ought; since it is done according to the exigence and necessary order of things.

XIV. Thirdly; By the same Principle all Evil wou'd be in the strictest sense *Natural*, for it would derive its Origin from natural and necessary Causes. The distinction then would be lost between natural and moral Evil, as commonly understood. There would be no Moral Evil at all. For that only is reckon'd Moral by the common consent of Mankind, of which the Man himself is properly the Cause; but no body looks upon himself as properly the Cause of a thing which he could not avoid, or to which he was necessitated by natural Causes, and such as were antecedent to the Will. For every one blames himself only on this account, because he was of himself necessarily the Cause of Evil to himself or others. Those Inconveniencies which come by Necessity, he looks upon as Miseries, as Misfortunes, but never as a Crime. Thefts therefore, Adulteries, Perjuries, nay the Hatred of God himself, and whatever we esteem base in Villanies (as well as the disgrace and punishment attending them) must be placed to the account of human Misery and Unhappiness, but by no means reckon'd criminal, nor any more repugnant to the Will of God, to his Justice, Purity or Goodness, than Heat or Cold.

Villanies are to be placed to the account of human Misery, and not look'd upon as crimes, properly so call'd.

XV. Fourthly; When therefore we blame a Thief, Adulterer, Murderer, or perjurd Person, when these Crimes are arraign'd as scandalous; this is not done because they have deserv'd it, or because these things are in themselves really shameful or culpable; but because that Infamy may be a means of deterring the guilty Persons or others from

A Malefactor is reprov'd, not because he deserv'd it, but because reproof may drive him from Evil.

N O T E S.

(63.) *Leibnitz* declares it to be his settled Opinion *, " That whenever we resolve or will contrary to an evident Reason, we are carried by some other Reason stronger in appearance." If this be always the Case, we certainly can never will amiss or unreasonably, since that Reason which appears to be the strongest ought always to determine us.

* *Remarques sur le Livre de l'Origine du Mal.* p. 483.

the like Elections. And this is the only Reason why we reproach a Thief, &c. and not a sick Person, with Infamy; because Reproach may cure a Thief, &c. but can do no Good to a sick Person.

Punishments are apply'd as Medicines to the Sick; neither are Laws uselefs, since they prevent Vice.

XVI. Fifthly; Malefactors are punish'd, not because they deserve Punishment, but because it is expedient, and Laws are made use of to restrain Vices, as Medicines to expel Diseases; Men sin therefore after the same manner as they die, *viz.* because an effectual Remedy was not apply'd. And yet Laws are not entirely uselefs, since they prevent some Vices, as Medicines protract the Deaths of some diseas'd Persons: and a Person infected with the Plague may be as justly cut off by the Law, as a Witch, when by that means there's hope of avoiding the Contagion. (64.)

We are oblig'd to be grateful only in prospect of a future Benefit.

XVII. Sixthly; We are oblig'd to repay good Offices, since by being thankful we may excite the Benefactor to continue or increase his Benevolence, and also induce others to do us Service. And hence it comes to pass, that we are oblig'd to be grateful towards God and Men, but not to the Sun or a Horse, namely, because God and Men may be excited by thanks to some farther Beneficence, whereas the Sun or a Horse cannot. Thus no regard is to be had to a Benefit receiv'd, but only to one that may be receiv'd; nor are we oblig'd to be grateful towards a most generous Benefactor for what is past, but only for the prospect of what is to come. All sense of Gratitude then, as commonly understood, is destroy'd, for the Vulgar reckon him a cunning, not a grateful Person, who returns one favour merely out of hopes of another.

According to this Opinion, human Happiness is impossible.

XVIII. Seventhly; If this Opinion be true, we must despair of human Felicity, for it will not in the least be in our own Power, but entirely
entirely
since it depends upon things which are not in our Power.

N O T E S.

(64.) All this, and a great deal more to the same purpose, is expressly asserted (as indeed 'tis a necessary consequence of their Hypothesis) by *Hobbs* *, by the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, &c. p. 91, &c. and much the same by *Bayle*, *Critical Dictionary*, p. 2609, &c. The bare recital of such Principles will, I hope, be judg'd a sufficient refutation of them.

* See his *Treatise on human Liberty*, or *Bp. Bramhall's Works*, p. 678.

entirely depend on external Objects. Our Happiness (if there be any) must, according to them, be conceiv'd to arise from the perfect fruition of those things which are agreeable to the Appetites. Where the contrary to these are present, or the agreeable absent, we must necessarily be uneasy, and while we struggle with Anxieties we cannot be happy. According to this Hypothesis therefore it follows, that our Happiness necessarily requires such an Enjoyment as we have spoken of, and that this is at the same time impossible. For who can hope that all external things (with which he has to do) should be so temper'd as in every respect to answer his Wishes, so as never to want what he desires, or be forced to endure any thing contrary to his natural Appetites? If Happiness arises from the Enjoyment of those things which are agreeable to the Faculties and Appetites, and which can move Desire by their innate, or at least apparent Goodness; if also the Will is necessarily determin'd to these, according to the Judgment of the Understanding, or Importunity of Appetites, every Man must necessarily want a great many things which he has chosen, and bear a great many which he willingly would not, than which nothing is more inconsistent with Felicity. For we cannot possibly conceive any State of Life wherein all things answer to the natural Appetites. In vain then do we hope for Happiness, if it depend upon external Objects.

Its consequences are hard, and tho' the Argument from consequences be generally a bad one, yet these bring some prejudice against an Opinion which seems to be attended with them, especially if they be acknowledged.

XIX. This, and a great deal more that might be added, must seem hard and repugnant to the common Notions of Men, and cannot be believ'd without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I confess indeed, that, for the most part, one cannot argue well against an Opinion from its consequences, since a great many things are true which have consequences hard enough: not to mention how easily we mistake in deducing consequences. But yet when these are acknowledged by the Authors themselves; and, if believ'd, would prove detrimental to Morality, they bring no small prejudice against an Opinion which is attended with them, and recommend us to some other as more probable, tho' it be not supported by any stronger Reasons.

XX. 'Tis to be observed also, that among the foregoing Authors I reckon those who declare that the Will is determin'd by the last Judgment

All those who declare that the Will is passive in its

Operations will be esteem'd to be of the same Opinion with the former, and are press'd with the same consequences.

ment of the Understanding*, which has taken with a great many Philosophers; and, in short, all who maintain that the Will is *passive* in Elections. For these must be esteem'd to have the same Sentiments of Liberty with the former, which way soever they explain their Opinion; as may appear from hence, that most of 'em expressly deny that *Indifference* belongs to the Nature of the Will; their Opinion therefore is attended with the same consequences as the former. (65.)

SUBJECT.

NOTES.

(65.) As Mr. *Locke* has particularly labour'd the point before us, and seems to defend by turns the several Principles which our Author attacks here and in the following Section, we shall examine a little into his Method of treating the Subject. Having first of all defin'd Liberty to be "A power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferr'd to the other ¶." He takes a great deal of pains to prove, that such Liberty does not belong to the Will: which is very certain, granting his sense of Liberty to be the right and only one, since by his Definition it is evidently subsequent to the choice or preference of the Mind, and only relates to the execution of such choice by an inferior faculty †. But then, beside this Idea of Liberty, which is nothing to the present Question, there is another previous and equally proper one, which regards the very determination, preference or direction of the Mind itself, and which could not possibly be overlook'd; he proceeds therefore to state the Question concerning that, which he would not have to be put, whether the Will be free? but whether the Mind or Man be free to will? both which I think amount to much the same thing with common Understandings, since in the first place we only ask, Whether this Will be properly an active power? (*i. e.* as oppos'd to Mr. *Locke's* passive Power) and in the second, Whether the Mind be *active* in exerting this Power call'd Will? and both which will be

equally improper Questions with regard to his former sense of the Word *Free*, *i. e.* as only applicable to the Actions subsequent on Volition. However, he goes on in the second place to enquire, whether in general a Man be free "To Will or not to Will, when any Action is once propos'd to his Thoughts, as presently to be done." In which respect he determines that a Man is not at liberty, because he cannot forbear Willing*; which, if taken absolutely (not to mention its inconsistency with his notion of suspension ††) tho' it comprehends (as he says) most Cases in Life, yet is not of the least Importance. For, what does it signifie to me that I must necessarily take one side or the other, right or wrong, so long as I can choose either of them indifferently? If I can will or choose either of the two, here's full room for the exercise of Liberty; and whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr. *Locke's* next Question. The Answer to which seems pretty easy, tho' perhaps not so reconcilable with his Hypothesis. However, instead of meddling with it, he slips this absurd Query into its Room, *viz.* Whether a Man be at Liberty to will which of the two he pleases? or, which is the same, Whether he can Will what Wills? Sect. 25. ¶¶. and then, instead of telling us in which Cases the Will is free, or the Man free to Will, or whether he be so in any Case at all (as might have been expected) he goes on to give us another Explanation of the word Liberty, which is still confin'd to Action, and consequently foreign to the present Question.

In

* Against this Notion see Sect. 5. Subsect. 2. par. 13.

¶ C. Of Power, §. 8.

† See Note 6.

* §. 23, 24.

†† §. 56. l. 14, &c.

¶¶ See Mr. *Strutt's* Remarks on *Locke's* Chapter of Power, p. 38, &c.

S U B S E C T. II.

An Opinion is proposed in general, asserting Liberty from Necessity as well as Compulsion.

I. **T**HIS Opinion determines almost the same with the former concerning the Goodness or agreeableness of Objects to the Appetites, nor is there much difference in what relates to the distinction of Good into Pleasant, Profitable, Honest: Except that it refers **Honest** This agrees] with the former in most cases, especially in those relating to between
the Appetites, to Good, Pleasant, Profitable and Honest; but determines this to be the difference between a Man and Brute, *viz.* that the one is determin'd by its bodily Appetite, the other by himself.

N O T E S.

In the next place he defines the Will over again*. "Which (says he) is nothing but a power in the Mind to direct the operative Faculties of a Man to Motion or Rest, as far as they depend on such direction." By which Words if he mean, that this Power of directing the operative Faculties, is properly *active* (in the sense above mention'd) or Physically *indifferent* to any particular manner of directing them, *i. e.* is an ability to direct them either to Motion or Rest, without any natural Byass to determine it (or to determine the mind to determine it) toward one side always rather than the other: If, I say, he intends to imply thus much in this definition of Will, then may Freedom be justly predicated of that same Will (or of the Mind in the exercise of it) not indeed his kind of Freedom, *i. e.* that of *acting*, which belongs to another Faculty; but Freedom in our sense of the Word, *i. e.* a certain physical Indifference, or Indeterminateness in its own exercise; which is what most Men understand

by *Liberum Arbitrium*; and whether there be such a Liberty as this in human Nature, would here have been a very proper Question. For if there be, then we have got an absolutely self-moving Principle which does not want any thing out of itself to determine it, which has no physical connection with, and of consequence, no necessary Occasion for that grand Determiner *Anxiety*, which he has afterwards taken so much pains to settle and explain, and which shall be consider'd by and by. But here he flies off again, and instead of determining this, which is the main point of the controversy, and wherein Liberty must be found, or no where, as we observ'd in Note 61. I say, instead of stating and determining this great Question, Whether the Will, or the Mind be absolutely independent upon, and physically indifferent to all particular Acts, Objects, Motions, &c. or necessarily require some foreign Mover; he seems to take the latter for granted, and immediately proceeds to the following Question,
What

* §. 29.

Honest to the Duty which a Man owes to God, himself and other Men, as a Member of Intellectual Society, rather than to the natural Appetites; and thinks that we are to judge of the Agreeableness of things from that, rather than from these. As to the Election which the Will makes on account of these, it asserts that this proceeds from the Will itself, and that a free Agent cannot be determin'd like natural Bodies by external Impulses, or like Brutes by Objects. For this is the very difference betwixt Man and the Brutes, that these are determin'd according to their bodily Appetites, from whence all their Actions become necessary, but Man has a different Principle in him, and determines himself to Action.

II. This Principle whereby Man excells the Brutes is thus explain'd by the Defenders of the following Opinion, if I take their Meaning right:

That the chief Good is necessarily desir'd, but others are not,

because they may be represented by the Understanding in different respects.

NOTES.

What determines the Will? The Meaning of which, says he *, is this, "What moves the Mind in every particular instance to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular Motion or Rest?" This Mr. Locke calls, for shortness sake, *determinating the Will*; and declares, that what thus determines it either first to continue in the same state or action, is only the present *Satisfaction* in it: or secondly to change, is always some *Uneasiness* †. By which Words if he only meant, that these Perceptions are the common *Motives*, *Inducements*, or *Occasions* whereupon the Mind in fact exerts its power of willing in this or that particular Manner; tho' in reality it always can, and often does the contrary (as he seems to mean by speaking of a *Will* contrary to Desire ‡, of raising Desires by due Consideration *, and forming Appetites ††; of a Power to suspend any Desires, to moderate and restrain the Passions, and hinder either of them from determining the Will and engaging us in Action †††: Then, as we said of him before, he is only talking of another Question, and what he has advanc'd on this head may readily

be granted, at least without any prejudice to human Liberty. For, in this sense to affirm, that the Will or Mind is determin'd by something without it, is only saying, that it generally has some *Motives* from without, according to which it determines the above mention'd Powers, which no Man in his Senses can dispute.

But if he intended that these Motives should be understood to rule and direct the Will absolutely and irresistibly in certain Cases. That they have such a necessary influence on the Mind, that it can never be determin'd without or against them; in short, that the Soul of Man has not a physical Power of willing, independent of, and consequently indifferent to all Perceptions, Reasons and Motives whatsoever; which the general drift of his Discourse seems to assert, particularly §. 47, 48, 49, 50. where he confounds the Determination of the Understanding with the exertion of the self-moving Power throughout. As also §. 5. where he asserts, "That all the Liberty we have or are capable of lies in this, that we can suspend * our Desires, and hold our Wills " unde-

* §. 29. † *Ibid.* †† §. 30. * §. 46.

* * Concerning which Suspension see Note 68.

†† §. 53. ††† §. 47, 50, 53:

right: In the first place, they declare that there is some *Chief Good*, the Enjoyment of which would make a Man completely happy; this he naturally and necessarily desires, and cannot reject it when duly represented by the Understanding. That other things which offer themselves have a Relation to this Good, or some Connection with it, and are to be esteem'd Good or Evil, so far as they contribute to, or hinder our obtaining it; and since there is nothing in Nature but what, in some respect or other, either promotes this End, or prevents it; from this Indifference they declare, that we have an Opportunity of rejecting or embracing any thing. For tho' we can choose nothing but under the Appearance of Good, *i. e.* unless it be in some manner connected with the Chief Good, as a Medium or Appendant; yet this does not determine the Choice, because every Object may

Y 2

be

NOTES.

“ undetermin'd, till we have examin'd the “ Good and Evil of what we desire; what “ follows after that, follows in a Chain of “ Consequences link'd one to another, all de- “ pending on the last Determination of the “ Judgment.” And when he speaks of Causes not in our Power, operating for the most part *forcibly* on the Will, §. 57, &c.

If from these and the like Expressions, I say, we may conclude this to have been his Opinion, *viz.* that all the Liberty of the Mind consists solely in directing the Determination of the Judgment, after which Determination all our Actions (if they can be call'd such *) follow necessarily: then I believe it will appear, that at the same time that he opposed the true Notion of Free-Will, he contradicted common Sense and Experience as well as himself. For in the first place, is it not self-evident, that we often do not follow our own Judgment, but run counter to the clear conviction of our Understandings, which Actions accordingly appear vicious, and fill us immediately with regret and the stings of Conscience. This he

allows, §. 35, 38, &c. to make Room for his *Anxiety*. But, upon the foregoing Hypothesis, How can any Action appear to be irregular? How can anything that is consequent upon the final Result of Judgment, be against Conscience, which is nothing else but that final Judgment †? Nay, upon the supposition of our being inviolably determin'd in willing by our Judgment (and, according to Mr. Locke, our Constitution puts us under a necessity of being so, §. 48.) it would be really impossible for us to will amiss, or immorally, let our Judgments be never so erroneous; “ The “ Causes of which (as he also observes, §. 64.) “ proceed from the weak and narrow consti- “ tution of our Minds, and are most of them “ out of our Power.” Farther, there are innumerable *indifferent* Actions which occur daily, both with respect to absolute choosing or refusing; or to choosing among things absolutely equal, equal both in themselves and to the Mind, on which we evidently pass no manner of Judgment, and consequently cannot be said to follow its Determination in them. To will

* See Note 62:

† See *Limborch Theol. Christi.* L. 2. C. 23. §. 16. and for an Answer to the latter part of Locke's 4th Sect. see the same Chap. §. last.

be varied, and represented by the Understanding under very different Appearances.

III. Secondly, When therefore any Good is propos'd which is not the Chief, the Will can *suspend** the Action, and command the Understanding

Tho' therefore the Will follows some

Judgment of the Understanding, yet it is not necessarily determin'd by it.

N O T E S.

will the eating or not eating of an Egg is a Proof of the former; to choose one out of two or more Eggs apparently alike is a proverbial Instance of the latter: both which are demonstrations of an active or self-moving Power; either way we determine and act when the Motives are entirely equal, which is the same as to act without any Motive at all. In the former Case I perceive no previous Inclination to direct my Will in general, in the latter, no Motive to influence its Determination in particular; and in the present Case, not to perceive a Motive is to have none (except we would be said to have an Idea without being conscious of it, to be anxious and yet insensible of that Anxiety, or sway'd by a Reason which we do not at all apprehend.) Neither is it necessary to a true Equality or Indifference here, that I be supposed to have no Will to use any Eggs at all (as the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, &c. absurdly puts the Case) for, granting in the first place, that I have not a Will to use any Eggs at all, 'tis indeed nonsense to suppose afterwards that I should choose any one; but, let me have never so great an Inclination to eat Eggs in general, yet that general Inclination will not in the least oblige me to choose or prefer one Egg in particular †, which is the only point in question. Numberless Instances might easily be given, where we often approve, prefer, desire and choose, and all we know not why: where we either choose such things as have no manner of Good or Evil in them, excepting what arises purely from that Choice; or prefer some to others, when both are equal Means to the same End: in

which Cases the Judgment is not in the least concern'd, and he that undertakes to oppose the Principle by which our Author accounts for them, must either deny all such Equality and Indifference, or grant the Question. But one Instance is as good as a thousand, and he that desires more, may find them describ'd in the clearest manner by Dr. *Cheyne* ||. Now to urge, that such Elections as these are made on purpose to try my Liberty, which End, say some, becomes the Motive, is in effect granting the very thing we contend for, *viz.* that the Pleasure attending the exercise of the Will is often the sole reason of Volition. Besides, that Motive (if it can be call'd such) is one of the Mind's own making; and to be able to produce the Motive for Action, is the same thing with regard to Liberty, as to be able to act without one. If by trying our Liberty be meant, an Experiment to assure us that we really have such a Power; we answer, that there can be no reason for trying it in this sense, because we are sufficiently conscious of it before any such Trial.

“ The Mind (says the Author of the *Essay on Consciousness*, p. 208.) before ever it exerts its Will or Power of choosing, is conscious, and knows within itself, that it hath a Power of Choice or Preference, and this is a necessary Condition of willing at all, inasmuch that the very first time I had occasion to exert my Will, or make use of my elective Power, I could not possibly exercise it, or do any voluntary Act without knowing and being conscious to myself [before hand] that I have such a Faculty or Power in myself.

* See Note 68.

† See Leibnitz's fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke, N^o. 17. and 66. Ch. 2, §. 13.

|| *Phil. Principles*, &c.

derstanding to propose some other thing, or the same under some other Appearance: which may be always done, since every thing except the chief Good is of such a Nature, that the Understanding may apprehend some respect or relation wherein it is incommodious. Notwithstanding therefore that the Will always does follow some Judgment of the Understanding, which is made about the subsequent Actions,

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“self. A thing that seems at first sight very strange and wonderful; to know I have a power of acting before ever I have acted, or had any trial or experience of it: But a little Reflection will quickly satisfy any one that in the nature of the thing it must be so, and cannot possibly be otherwise; and which is peculiar to this Faculty: For we know nothing of our Powers of Perceiving, Understanding, Remembering, &c. but by experimenting their Acts, it being necessary first to perceive or think, before we can know that we have a Power of perceiving or thinking.” The Author proceeds to shew, that this *Fore-consciousness* of a power of *willing* or choosing does most clearly demonstrate that the Mind in all its Volitions *begins* the Motion, or acteth *from itself* †.

To argue still that some *minute* imperceptible Causes, some particular Circumstances in our own Bodies, or those about us, must determine even these seemingly indifferent Actions, is either running into the former absurdity of making us act upon Motives which we don't apprehend; or saying, that we act mechanically, *i. e.* do not act at all: and in the last place, to say that we are determin'd to choose any of these trifles just as we *happen* to fix our Thoughts upon *it* in particular, at the very instant of Action, is either attributing all to the self-moving Power of the Mind, which is granting the Question; or else referring us to the minute and imperceptible Causes above mention'd; or else obtruding upon us that idle unmeaning Word *Chance* instead of a Physical Cause, which is saying nothing at all. How hard must Men be press'd under an Hypothesis when they fly to such evasive shifts as these!

How much easier and better would it be to give up all such blind, unknown, and unaccountable Impulses, and own what both common Sense and Experience dictate, an Independent, Free, Self moving Principle, the true, the obvious, and only source of Action?

With regard to Mr. Locke's Inconsistencies, I shall only add one Observation more, *viz.* that he seems to place the Cause (Motive, or whatever he means by it) of his Determination of the Will after the Effect. The Cause of that Determination is, according to him, *Anxiety*; this he sometimes makes concomitant, sometimes consequent upon Desire; and §. 31. he says the one is scarce distinguishable from the other.

But this same Desire appears to me to be the very Determination of the Will itself; what we absolutely desire we always will, and *vice versa*, whether it be in our Power to pursue that Will, and produce it into Act or no; and indeed Desire seems to be no otherwise distinguishable from Volition, than as the latter is generally attended with the Power of Action, which the former is consider'd without. This I think is all the Distinction that they are capable of, which yet is only nominal: Nor do his Instances in §. 30. prove that there is any real Difference between 'em. Thus when I am oblig'd to use persuasions with another, which I wish may not prevail upon him, or suffer one Pain to prevent a greater, here are two opposite Wills, or a weak imperfect Volition conquer'd by, and giving way to a stronger: I will or desire that this Man may not be prevail'd upon, but yet I will or desire more powerfully and effectually to use these persuasions with him: Or rather, here is but one actual

* *Essay on Consciousness*, p. 209. 210.

tions, yet it is not necessarily determin'd by any, for it can suspend its Action, and order some other Judgment, which it may follow. Since therefore it can either exert or suspend its Act, it is not only free from Compulsion, but also indifferent in itself, with regard to its Actions, and determines itself without necessity.

IV. It must be confess'd, that this opinion establishes Liberty, and on that account is more agreeable to reason, experience, and the common sense of Mankind, yet some things in it seem to be presum'd and not explain'd clearly enough.

This Opinion establishes Liberty, but yet there are some things not

sufficiently explain'd in it.

Such a Liberty as this seems to be of more prejudice than benefit to Mankind.

V. For, in the first place, 'tis said that the Will *determines itself*; but we are not informed how that is possible, nor what use such a Power would be of, were it admitted: nay, it seems rather prejudicial than beneficial to Man. For that Goodness which it is supposed to pursue, is in the things themselves, and arises from their connection with the chief Good; it is not therefore to be form'd, but discovered

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actual Desire or Will in the Case, and the other is only Hypothetical. Thus I should will to be cured of the Gout, if the cure would not throw me into greater Pain; but in the present circumstances I do not really will it, nor exert any one act which may serve to remove it: nay, in this Case, I will or desire to bear the Gout rather than a worse Evil that would attend the removal of it. His Axiom therefore, that wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it, is not absolutely true.

Again, I should refuse a painful Remedy or disagreeable Potion, if I could enjoy perfect Health without them; but as I manifestly cannot, I choose the less Evil of the two. Nor can I indeed be properly said to choose or desire both in the present Circumstances, or, to will one and desire the contrary, since I know that only one of them is possible, which therefore I now certainly will or desire, tho' I should as certainly have will'd the contrary had it been equally possible. These then and the like Instances are not sufficient to prove any oppositi-

on between Will and Desire, except the latter be only taken for a mere passive Appetite or Affection of the Mind: in which sense the Words *choose, prefer, &c.* must then be very improperly apply'd to it. But, in reality, I believe Mr. Locke here sets the Word *Desire* to signify what we commonly mean by *Will*, as he does in §. 48. where 'tis call'd *the Power of preferring*: and puts Volition into the place of *Action*; as seems probable from his description of Willing in the 28th and 30th Sect. as also, C. 23. §. 18. where he defines the Will to be a *Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought*. And the same Notion, I think, runs thro' all his Letters to *Limborch*. To conclude, whatever he means by Desire, he manifestly postpones it to Volition in §. 56. "When a Man (says he) has once chosen a thing, and thereby it is become a part of his Happiness, it raises desire, and that proportionably gives him uneasiness, which determines his Will, and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer." If *chosen* stand here

covered by the understanding. If then the understanding performs its Duty right, it will discover what is best: but it is our Advantage to be determined to that which is best; it had therefore been better for Man, if Nature had given him up absolutely to the determination of his Judgment and Understanding, and not allow'd that Judgment to be suspended by the power of the Will. For by that means he would have obtain'd his End with greater certainty and ease. I grant, that if a Man were absolutely determin'd in his Actions to the best, there would be no room for virtue, properly so call'd; for virtue, as it is commonly understood, requires a free Act, and this Liberty is the very thing that is valuable in virtue; and with good reason, if a free Choice be the very thing which pleases: (For thus it would be impossible to attain the end of choosing, *i. e.* to please ourselves, without Liberty, since that very thing which pleases in Actions, *viz.* Liberty, would be wanting.) But yet, if any thing which the Understanding can discover, be the very best before or independent of our Choice, it were proper for us to be necessarily determin'd to it; for the fruition of it, howsoever obtain'd, would make us happy, and be so much the more valuable, as it would be certain, and not dependent

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here for *willed*, his usual Method of explaining the Cause of Volition is inverted, and the Effect comes first; or, if chosen be made only to signify *desired*, he must suppose desire to raise itself, which is bad again. How can these Words be understood in any Sense consistent with §. 31 and 71. and with his whole Hypothesis? *

Dr. Clarke's Argument for absolute Freedom, because all Motives or Sensations are mere abstract Notions, and have no physical power ||. seems not conclusive, or at least not clear. For who knows, say the Fatalists, how far reasons, motives, &c. may affect a Spirit? Why may not one immaterial Substance determine another by means of thought, as well as a material one can move another by means of Impulse?

Nay, his adherent Mr. Jackson grants †, “that abstract Notions will, by a forcible and irresistible impulse, compel the Mind to move the Body whether it will or no.” Which impulse, if it were constant, would sufficiently acquit the Maintainers of Necessity. But that there can be no such forcible impulse, will, I hope, appear below, where it will be shewn to be both agreeable to reason to suppose that there are Self-active Beings, which, as such, must have a physical power of resisting what we call the most cogent Motives: and to be confirm'd by Experience, that our own Minds exert such a Power; which is sufficient for our purpose. For an Explanation of the true Notion of Liberty, see the following Subsections of this Chapter, and Note 82.

* See our Author's Subsect. 3d. par. 6.

|| Remarks on the Philosophical Enquiry, p. 10.

† Defence of human Liberty, p. 198.

dependent upon *Chance*, as all the Actions of Free-will are in a manner supposed to be: nor need we much regard the *Glory* arising from a well made Choice; since the fruition of the greatest Good would give us Happiness without it; nay such *Glory* would be vain and despicable in competition with the greatest Good. Hence it appears, that Free-will, according to this Hypothesis, cannot be reckon'd any Advantage.

It only takes place in doubtful matters, and then 'tis of no use or importance.

VI. Secondly; If it be said, that the Understanding is dubious in many Cases, and ignorant of what is the best, and in these Liberty takes place; neither does this clear the Matter. For if the things to be done be Good or Evil in themselves, but unknown to the Intellect, there's no help in the Will; nor does its Liberty assist us in discovering or obtaining the better Side; if they be indifferent, it is no matter what we do, since the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies are equal on both Sides. If then we admit of Liberty in these Cases, it will be of no use or importance to Life or Happiness: Nay, it must be esteem'd an Imperfection, as deriving its Origin from the Imperfection of the Understanding. For if the Understanding could certainly determine what were best to be done, there would be no room for Liberty. (66.)

We are left in doubt concerning the Way which leads

VII. Thirdly; They are not well agreed what this *Chief Good* is, from the connection with which the Understanding must judge of the Goodness of other things, as may appear from the various and contradictory Opinions about it. (67.) We must necessarily therefore fluctuate,

to Happiness, and can have no help from Liberty.

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(66) These, with some of the following consequences attending such a confused Hypothesis of Liberty, are well urg'd by Mr. *Locke* (tho' I think they return upon himself) in his *Chapter of Power*, §. 48, 49, 50. and in the *Philosoph. Enquiry*, p. 63, &c. and seem to be unavoidable in any other Scheme but that of our Author; who supposes, that in most Cases, all the Goodness of an Act or Object entirely depends upon, and is produced merely by our choosing it; and of consequence Liberty, or a power of choosing, is according to his Princi-

ples, so far from being unnecessary, or an Imperfection, that it is our noblest Perfection; and constitutes the greatest part of our Happiness: For an Explanation of this, see §. 2. of this Chapter.

(67.) This uncertainty about the *Summum Bonum* is own'd and well accounted for by Mr. *Locke*, B. 2. C. 21. §. 55. "Hence it was that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire, whether *Summum Bonum* consisted in Riches or Bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation? And they might have as reasonably

fluctuate, and be solicitous, and rebel against Nature itself, which has neither granted us a certain End, nor certain Means thereto, but left us anxious and uncertain about the way which leads to Happiness; neither is there any help here in our Liberty, since it is blind, and can do nothing towards bringing us back into the right path.

VIII. Fourthly, 'Tis confes'd by all, that Good in general is what agrees with every one, and what all things desire. Every Good then answers to some Appetite, and according to these Authors, Objects are good on account of a natural and necessary conformity which they have to our Appetites. The Understanding therefore does not make good, but finds it in the things themselves: and when it judges any thing in Nature to be agreeable, that, according to them, must necessarily be in respect of some natural Appetite. All the Good then which is in things will be the Object of some Faculty or Appetite, *i. e.* of the Understanding, Sense, &c. But all these are determin'd by Nature in regard to the Appetite or Faculty to which they relate, *i. e.* in regard to their *Pleasantness*, or Agreeableness; and as to the relation which they bear to each other, *i. e.* as to their *Profitableness* and *Honesty*, they are to be judg'd of by the Understanding, and directed when and in what manner they must give place to each other, or afford their mutual Assistance. Free-will then appears to be of no manner of use; for if it certainly follow the decree of reason it is not free, at least from necessity, since that very reason which it follows is not free: if it does not necessarily follow that, we had better be without it, for it perverts every thing; and disturbs the Order of Nature, which is the very best and fittest to be follow'd, such a Liberty as this would therefore

Since that is good which is agreeable, and this is to be judg'd of by the Understanding, if the Will follow this Judgment it is not free, if it does not, it acts against reason. We had better therefore be without such Liberty.

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“ reasonably disputed, whether the best relish
 “ were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or
 “ Nutts, and have divided themselves into
 “ Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes de-
 “ pend not on the things themselves, but their
 “ agreeableness to this or that particular Palate,
 “ wherein there is great variety; so the great-
 “ est happiness consists in the having those
 “ things which produce the greatest Pleasure;
 “ and in the absence of those which cause any
 “ disturbance, any pain. Now these to differ-

“ rent Men are very different things.” To
 the same purpose are the 3d and 4th obser-
 vations in the *Religion of Nature delineated*,
 p. 33. which may serve to confirm the Notion
 which our Author proposes in the next Subsec-
 tion, *viz.* that most of the Good or Agreeable-
 ness in things arises not from their own Na-
 tures, but our choice of them, or that Objects
 are not chosen because they are good, but are
 generally good only because they are chosen.

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fore be prejudicial to Mankind; it would make them liable to do amiss, and produce no kind of Good to compensate for so great an Evil.

If the Will could suspend its act contrary to the Judgment of the Understanding, it would run directly into Evil, it seems therefore necessary for it to act at the time and in the manner which the Understanding directs.

IX. Fifthly, It is supposed that the Judgment of the Understanding concerning the Goodness of any thing, is a condition without which the Will is not directed to the Object, but yet that it can either exert or suspend its act about any Good whatsoever. Let us suppose then that the Understanding has determin'd it to be good to exert some certain Action, and Evil to suspend it; while this Judgment continues, if the Will can suspend its Act, it chooses Evil; if it cannot, it is not free. You'll say, it can command the Understanding to change its Judgment; let it be so. But it is evident, that the Man suspends his Action before he can command the Understanding to change its Judgment, *i. e.* he suspends the Action while the Judgment determines that it is Evil to suspend. He therefore chooses that directly which his Reason judges to be Evil, which seems to overthrow their whole Hypothesis. (68.)

X. I confess

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(68.) Farther, if the Mind can suspend the Satisfaction of any urgent desire (which Mr. Locke allows *, and therein places all its Liberty) then it can as easily quite stop, or run counter to any natural Appetite, since no greater Power seems to be requisite for the one than for the other. If we can hinder the Will from being determin'd by any desire of absent Good without any appearance of greater Good on the other Side, which might raise an opposite desire able to counterbalance it, as our Author has shewn that we can; then we shall be equally able to prevent its following even the ultimate determination of the Judgment, without any reason for so doing; and consequently good, whether absolute or comparative, is neither the adequate efficient Cause, nor a necessary Means or Motive to the determination of the Will. This act of suspension therefore must either be solely founded in the self-moving Power of the Mind, and of consequence be naturally independent on all Motives, Reasons,

&c. and an instance of the Mind's absolute Freedom from any external Determination; which is, I believe, a contradiction to Mr. Locke's general Hypothesis; or else itself must be determin'd by some external Cause, and then it will be difficult to make it free in any sense. Let us observe how Mr. Locke endeavours to reconcile these two Notions together. Our Liberty, according to him, is founded in a general absolute Inclination of the Mind to Happiness, which obliges us to suspend the Gratification of our Desire in particular cases, till we see whether it be not inconsistent with the general Good. "The stronger Ties, says he, §. 51. we have to an unalterable pursuit of Happiness in general, which is our greatest Good, and which, as such, our Desires always follow, the more are we free from any necessary determination of our Will to any particular Action, and from a necessary compliance with our Desire set upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till

* Book 2. C. 21. §. 47, and. 50.

X. I confess, they offer some Solutions here, but such as are so subtle, so obscure, and so much above the comprehensions of the Vulgar, that most Persons have taken a distaste to them, given up the cause of Liberty as desperate, and gone over to the former Sect: but if any one will undertake either to give a more clear and full Explication of the common Opinion, or bring Solutions of those Difficulties which occur in it, he will find me so far from being his Adversary, that he may expect my assent, encouragement and assistance. This indeed were very much to be wish'd, but in the mean time I shall try, as far as I am able, whether these things cannot be explain'd more clearly in another manner.

There are Answers offer'd to these difficulties, but they are far from being clear. On this account many have gone over to the former Opinion.

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“ till we have duly examin'd whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real happiness.” And again, §. 52. “ Whatever Necessity determines to the pursuit of real Bliss, the same necessity, with the same force, establishes Suspence, Deliberation and Scrutiny, of each successive desire, whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true Happiness, and mislead us from it.” If by the Word *Necessity* he means absolute *physical Necessity* (which it must be, if it be any at all, or any thing to the present purpose) he has discover'd a pretty odd foundation for his Liberty. Nay, if this force which draws us towards Happiness in general, be absolute and irresistible, as his Words import, it will draw us equally towards all particular appearances of it, and consequently prove as bad a ground for

Suspension as for Liberty. But in truth this Suspension is neither founded in any Necessity of pursuing Happiness in general, nor is itself an original power of the Mind distinct from that of Volition, but only one particular exercise or Modification of it: “ 'Tis willing (as the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry* rightly observes) to defer willing about the matter proposed,” and is no otherwise different from the common cases of willing and choosing except that it is the most evident demonstration of the Mind's perfect Liberty in willing, and so obvious that Mr. *Locke* could not get over it, and therefore stiles it the source of all our Liberty, &c. §. 47. tho' he soon explains it away again, by endeavouring to force it into his System.

S U B S E C T. III.

Another Notion of Liberty and Election is propos'd.

The Appetites and Powers attain their proper End; by exercise, which is the greatest perfection of them, and their best Estate.

I. **I**N order to make my meaning better understood, we must observe, in the first place, that there are certain Powers, Faculties and Appetites implanted in us by Nature, which are directed to certain Actions: and when these exert their proper Actions about Objects, they produce a grateful and pleasant Sensation in us. The exercise of them therefore pleases us; and from hence probably all our Pleasure and Delight arises; consequently our Happiness, if we have any, seems to consist in the proper exercise of those Powers and Faculties which Nature has bestow'd upon us: for they appear to be implanted in us for no other end, but that by the use and exercise of them those things may be effected which are agreeable. Nor can they be at rest, or enjoy themselves, otherwise than as those things are produced by or in them, for the production or reception of which they are design'd by Nature. Now every Power or Faculty is directed to the prosecution of its proper Acts. They attain their End therefore by Exercise, which must be esteem'd the greatest Perfection, and most happy State of any Being. For that is a State of Happiness, if any such can be conceiv'd, wherein every thing is done which pleases, and every thing absent which displeases; neither does it seem possible to imagine a more happy one.

There is a certain agreeableness fix'd by Nature between some Appetites, &c. and their Objects, where by they act upon the presence of

II. Secondly, It is to be observ'd, that among our Appetites, Faculties and Powers, some are determin'd to their Operations by Objects peculiar to them. For upon the presence of their Objects they necessarily exert their Actions, if rightly dispos'd, and cease from Operation upon their absence, and have no tendency towards any other Objects but their own. Thus the Sight perceives nothing but Light, Colours, &c. and, upon the Removal of these, its Action

them, and cease from Action upon the Removal of them.

tion (69.) ceases. The Understanding itself distinguishes those Objects which are communicated to it by the Senses, or perceiv'd by reflection from one another, disposes and reposes them in the Memory; but yet has certain bounds which it cannot exceed: and so of the rest. There is therefore a certain natural Fitness, a fixt conformity between these Powers and their Objects, on which account they exert their Actions upon the presence of the Objects, and please themselves in Exercise: but are uneasy at the presence of those things which hinder it. If then there be any natural force in any Object to promote or hinder the exercise of any Power or Faculty, that Object is to be esteem'd Good or Evil in regard to it.

III. Those Objects which thus promote or impede the Action, are sufficiently distinguish'd from each other by the Power or Faculty itself; those that are absent or future, are judg'd of by the Understanding, and what the Mind determines to be the best in them that we are oblig'd to pursue. He that does otherwise disobeys the Law of Reason. If therefore all our Powers and Faculties were thus determin'd to their proper Objects, it would seem an Imperfection for Man to be free, and he would have been much more happy without such a Liberty: for he receives no Benefit from it, but one of the greatest Evils, *viz.* a Power of doing amiss.

Liberty would be of service to an Agent endow'd with such Appetites, &c. as these only.

IV. It seems not impossible to conceive a Power of a quite different Nature from these, which may be more indifferent in respect of the Objects about which it exerts itself*. To which no one thing is naturally more agreeable than another, but that will be the fittest to which it shall happen † to be apply'd: Between which and the Object, to which it is determin'd, by itself or by something else, there is naturally no more suitableness or connection than between it and any other

We may conceive a Power between which and any particular Object there is naturally no other agreeableness but what

may arise from the determination of the Power itself.

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(69.) It may be observ'd here once for all, that our Author seldom uses this Word *Action* in a strict Philosophical Sense (according to which these should rather be call'd Passions) but generally takes the vulgar expressions, when they will serve to explain his meaning.

* See Sect. 5. Subsect. 2. par. 12 and 15.

† That this Word is not intended to imply what we commonly mean by Chance, see par. 18.

other thing, but all the *Suitableness* there is, arises from the *Application* or *Determination* itself. For as the Earth is no Man's Right by nature, but belongs to the prime Occupant, and the Right arises from that very Occupation; so there may possibly be a Power to which no Object is by Nature peculiarly adapted, but any thing may become suitable to it, if it happen to be apply'd; for its Suitableness proceeds from the Application, as we said before. Now it does not seem any more absurd for a Power to create an Agreeableness between itself and an Object, by applying itself to that Object, or that to itself, than for a Man to acquire a Right to a thing by occupying it. For, as in Civil Laws, some things are forbidden because they are inconvenient, others are inconvenient and Evil because forbidden; so it may be in Powers, Faculties and Appetites; *viz.* some may be determin'd by the natural Suitableness of the Objects; and in others, the Suitableness to the Objects may arise from the Determination. For this Faculty may be naturally inclin'd to Exercise, and one Exercise be more agreeable than another, not from any natural fitness of one rather than the other, but from the Application of the Faculty itself: for another would often be no less agreeable, if it had happen'd to be determin'd to that. Nothing hinders then but that there may be such a Power or Faculty as this, at least with respect to very many Objects. (70.)

V. Fourthly,

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(70.) Our Author's Notion of *Indifference* has been grossly misunderstood by all his Adversaries, who have accordingly rais'd terrible Outcries against it, as destroying the essential, and immutable distinction between Good and Evil; subverting Appetites, making Reason and Judgment usefess, and confounding every thing. We shall just observe here, that if it be apply'd to the *whole Man*, it cannot possibly be extended, nor was design'd by our Author to include all manner of external Objects, Actions, and Relations of things, as they seem to have understood it. For every Man in his Wits must be sufficiently sensible, that all things don't affect him in the same manner, even before he has will'd any of them. I cannot be indifferent to Meat, or Drink, or Rest, when I am Hungry, Thirsty, or Weary. Some natural Objects are agreeable, and produce pleasure in me, and others the contrary, whether I will or no; and the same may be said of the *moral Sense*. Nay our Author every where allows their full force to what he calls the *Appetites*; and asserts that whatever contradicts them must be attended with Uneasiness. 'Tis not an absolute indifference therefore of the *Man* or Mind in general, nor of the *Senses*, Perception or Judgment, which he contends for; but it relates wholly to that *particular Power* of the Mind which we call *Willing*, and which will appear to be in its own Nature, or *Physically indifferent* to acting or not acting, notwithstanding all these different Affections or Passions of the Mind rais'd by the different Objects. Let a thing seem never so pleasant and agreeable, never so reasonable, fit, and eligible

V. Fourthly, If then we suppose such a Power as this, 'tis plain, that the Agent endow'd with it cannot be determin'd in its Operations by any præexistent Goodness in the Object; for since the agreeableness between it and the Objects, at least in most of them, is supposed to arise from the Determination, the agreeableness cannot possibly be the Cause of that Determination on which itself depends. But the congruity of the Object with the Faculty is all the Goodness in it, therefore there is nothing Good in regard to this Power, at least in these Objects to which it is indifferent, till it has embrac'd it, nor Evil till it has rejected it: Since then the Determination of the Power to the Object is prior to the Goodness and the Cause of it, this Power cannot be determin'd by that Goodness in its Operations.

VI. Fifthly, Such a Power as this, if it be granted to exist, cannot be determin'd by any *Uneasiness* arising from the things about which it is conversant. For it is supposed to be indifferent, not only in respect of external Objects, but also of its own Operations, and will please itself,

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gible to us, yet there is still a natural possibility for us to will the contrary, and consequently the bare *Power of willing* is in itself indifferent to either Side; which is all the indifference that our Author contends for. Now such an Indifference as this Mr. *Locke* allows to be in the operative Powers of Man, tho' he confines it, I think, improperly, to them alone*.
 " I have the ability, says he, to move my hand,
 " or to let it rest, that operative Power is indifferent to move or not to move my hand:
 " I am then in that respect perfectly free. My
 " Will determines that operative Power to
 " rest, I am yet free, because the Indifferency
 " of that my operative Power to act or not to
 " act still remains; the Power of moving my
 " hand is not at all impair'd by the determination of my Will, which at present orders
 " rest, the Indifferency of that Power to act
 " is just as it was before, as will appear, if
 " the Will puts it to the trial, by ordering the
 " contrary." The same, I think, may be apply'd to the *Will* itself in regard to Motives,

&c. with much more Justice than to these operative Powers. Nay these can scarce be call'd indifferent to Action after the determination of the Will; but follow instantly (as we observ'd in Note 61.) in most Cases when they are in their right State. What I Will or Resolve to do, that I certainly effect if I have Power to do it, and continue in the same Will or Resolution. However, this Indifference of the operative Powers is what can never constitute Morality (as was observ'd in the same place) since their Operations are no farther moral than as they are consequent upon, and under the direction of the Will.

There must then be another Indifference prior to them, in order to make even the exertion of them indifferent, or free in any sense.

For a more complete View of this Question, see *Episcop. Instit. Theol.* L. 4. C. 6. and *Traët. de Libero Arbitrio*. There's also a good defence of our Author's Notion of Indifference in *P. a Limborch, Theol. Cbrist.* L. 2. C. 23. §. 20, &c.

* B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 71.

self, whether it accepts the thing or rejects it; whether it exerts this Act or another. These Objects then will neither please nor displease till this Indifference be removed, but it is suppos'd to be removed by the Application or Determination of the Power itself; therefor Anxiety does not produce but presuppose its Determination. Let us suppose this Power to be already determin'd (it matters not how) to embrace a certain Object, or to exert the proper Actions relating to it, *Desire* manifestly follows this Determination, and *Desire* is follow'd by an Endeavour to obtain and enjoy the Object pursuant to the Application of the Power. But if any thing should hinder or stop this Endeavour; and prevent the Power from exerting those Operations which it undertook to discharge in relation to the Object, then indeed Uneasiness would arise from the hindrance of the Power. Anxiety would therefore be the *Effect* of the Determination of this Power, but by no means the *Cause* of it*.

Nor by the
Understanding

VII. Sixthly, Supposing such an Agent as this to be endow'd also with Understanding, he might make use of it to propose Matters fit to be done, but not to determine whether he should do them or not. For the Understanding or Reason, if it speak Truth, represents what is in the Objects, and does not counterfeit what it finds not in them: Since therefore, before the Determination of this Power, things are suppos'd to be indifferent to it, and no one better or worse than another; the Understanding if it performs its Duty right, will represent this Indifference, and not pronounce one to be more eligible than another; For the Understanding directs a thing to be done no otherwise than by determining that it is better; as therefore the Goodness of things, with respect to this Power, depends upon its Determination, and they are for the most part good if it embraces, evil, if it rejects them, 'tis manifest that the Judgment of the Understanding concerning things depends upon the same, and that it cannot pronounce upon the Goodness or Badness of them, till it perceives whether the Power has embraced or rejected them. The Understanding therefore must wait for the Determination of this Power, before it can pass a Judgment, instead of the Power's waiting for the Judgment of that Understanding before it can be determin'd.

VIII. Seventhly,

* How far this Argument will affect Mr. *Locke's* Hypothesis of *Anxiety*, may be observ'd from the latter part of Note 65.

VIII. Seventhly, But tho' this Power cannot be determin'd in its Operations by any Judgment of the Understanding, yet the Understanding is necessary, in order to propose Matters of Action, and to distinguish possible ones from those that are impossible. For tho' the Goodness of things with respect to the Agent, proceeds from his Determination, yet the Possibility or Impossibility is in the things themselves, and this Agent stands in need of the Understanding to distinguish between Objects, lest it light upon Absurdities, and so create itself Uneasiness. Not that an Object is therefore Good because 'tis possible; for if it were rejected it would be Evil; nor will it be immediately disagreeable because impossible, for, attempting an Impossibility may be pleasing to us, (for we may prefer the exercise of this Power, which is the thing that pleases us, as we said before) but he that makes this Attempt, must necessarily be unhappy in the Event; for since the thing which the Power undertakes is impossible to be done, Uneasiness must necessarily follow the hindrance of its Exercise, and the final Disappointment of its End.

Yet such an Agent has need of understanding in order to distinguish possible things from impossible.

IX. This then must be assign'd as the *first Limitation* of such a Power, *viz.* that it confine itself to Possibilities, and there needs no other, if the Agent be of infinite Power, in order to the obtaining of its End.

If the Agent be of infinite Power, he needs no other Limitation.

X. Eighthly, But if the Agent's Power be finite, it has need also to consult its Abilities, and not determine itself to any thing which may exceed them, otherwise it will be as much disappointed in its Endeavour as if it had attempted absolute Impossibilities. And this is the *second Limitation* of this Power. It is impossible, you'll say, for an Appetite to pursue such things as the Understanding evidently declares not to be in the Power of the Agent. I answer, the Senses and natural Appetites are gratify'd with their Objects, and please themselves, tho' Reason remonstrates against them, and condemn that pleasure as pernicious. How much more easily then may this *fastidious Appetite*, which arises in the Agent from Application only, be conceiv'd to delight in its Good, tho' the Understanding oppose it, and condemn that Delight as foolish and of short Duration. Why Nature granted such a Liberty to this Power, and how it conduces to the Good of the whole, will be shewn afterwards.

But an Agent of finite power must also consult his Abilities.

Such an Agent cannot be determin'd by his other Appetites.

XI. Hitherto we have either consider'd this Power alone in the Agent, or as join'd with the Understanding. But the Agent endow'd with it, may also have other Powers and Appetites which are determin'd to their Objects by a natural Congruity; yet neither can it be determin'd in its Operations by these Appetites. These, when rightly dispos'd, must necessarily exert their Operations upon the presence of their Objects; but it is not at all necessary that they should delight and please themselves in these Operations. For instance, a bitter and nauseous favour is disagreeable to the Taste: but tho' this be felt, yet urgent Hunger makes it pleasant, Importunity of Appetite overcoming the Disagreeableness of the Savour. This Pleasure indeed is not pure, but mix'd and diluted proportionably to the Excess of the prevailing Appetite. For, suppose that there are three Degrees of Uneasiness from the Hunger, and two from the Bitterness, the Agent, to avoid three, must necessarily bear two, which being deducted, there remains only one Degree of solid Pleasure; whereas if he had met with suitable and sweet Food, there would have been three.

This Power is superior to all the Appetites, and subdued by none.

XII. Since therefore the Pleasure which arises from the Satisfaction of these natural Appetites, may be overcome by a stronger Appetite, there's no Reason to doubt but this Power which is indifferent to Objects may overcome all the other Powers and Appetites. For all these are limited by their Objects, and therefore have certain Bounds and Measures in their Operations; but this Power has no Bounds*, nor is there any thing wherein it cannot please itself, if it does but happen to be determin'd to it. Now since the natural Appetites themselves may be contrary to each other (as we have shewn) and one of them be overcome by the Excess of another, how much more easily may this Power be conceiv'd to go against these Appetites, and since it is of a very different and superior kind, 'tis probable that it can conquer all others, and be itself subdued by none.

It seems to be given for this End, that the Agent might have something to

XIII. Nay we may imagine it to be given for this very End, that the Agent might have wherein to please itself, when those things which are agreeable to the natural Appetites cannot be had, as it very often
often.

delight himself, in when the natural Appetites must necessarily be frustrated.

* i. e. in its Objects, see Note 71.

often happens. As the natural Powers and Appetites receive Pleasure and Pain from Objects, they must necessarily be deprived of Pleasure, and undergo Pain; according to the Laws of Motion, and the order of external things. Since then they are often frustrated, they must render the Agents possess'd of them liable to Misery, as well as make them capable of Happiness: But the Agent can have this always to delight itself in; and 'tis an advantage to it to be able to quit the other Appetites, and please itself in restraining them, or acting contrary to them. For since every Faculty is satisfy'd in its exercise, the Strength of this cannot be more signally display'd in any thing, than in running counter sometimes to all the Appetites. For this must either be sometimes done, or the Agent must be destitute of all manner of Good, and remain entirely miserable; namely when, according to the Laws of Nature, such things must be endured as are quite contrary to the Appetites*.

XIV. And from hence it is very evident how desirable such a Power as this would be: for if it happen to be determin'd to such things as are agreeable to the Appetites, it augments, it multiplies the Enjoyment; but if it should be determin'd to undergo those things which are repugnant to the Appetites, and which it must necessarily bear sometimes, it might diminish, nay quite remove the Uneasiness, or convert it into Pleasure. (71.)

A a 2

XV. It

This Power, by its accession, encreases the pleasure of the other Appetites; by opposition, removes, or at least alleviates the pain.

NOTES.

(71.) This is not much more than what *Locke* asserts † in answer to the Enquiry, “ Whether it be in a Man's power to change the Pleasantry and Uneasiness that accompanies any sort of Action? And to that, says he, 'tis plain in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their Palates, and give a relish to what either has, or they suppose has none. The relish of the Mind is as various as that of the Body; and like that too may be alter'd; and 'tis a mistake to think that Men cannot change the displeasingsness or indifference that is in Actions into Pleasure and Desire, if they will but do what is in their Power.” But it is objected by *Leibnitz*, against our Authors Notion, that if it could create Pleasure by an arbitrary Determination and bare Election, it might for the same reason produce Happiness *in infinitum* ||, and then how could we be ever miserable except we chose to be so? Which Argument seems to be founded on a mistake of our Author's meaning, as if he had intended to assert, that all the good and agreeableness in every

* viz. in *painful Remedies, disagreeable Potions, &c.* see Subsect. 5. par. 9.

† B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 69.

|| *Essais de Theodicee*, p. 466, 467.

The rest of the Appetites are not to be balked unnecessarily.

XV. It must be confess'd, that some kind of struggle will be hereby excited in this Agent; but a struggle attended with some Pleasure, tho' it be qualify'd and not perfectly pure, is better than to be under absolute Misery. Nay, the consciousness of a Power to please itself against the bent and Inclination of the natural Appetites, may excite a greater Pleasure than could arise from the fruition of those things which would, if present, gratify these Appetites. Yet this Agent is oblig'd to have some regard to the Appetites, and not to disturb them unnecessarily, nor restrain them from a due enjoyment of their proper Objects. He that does this will bring upon himself uneasiness, and a needless contest. Tho' therefore it be not at all proper that such a Power should be absolutely determin'd by the natural Appetites yet it is fit that they should persuade it, and that some regard be had to them in its Determinations. And this may be reckon'd its *third Limitation*.

Such an Agent as this is Self-active.

XVI. Ninthly, An Agent possess'd of such a Principle as this would be *Self-active*, and capable of being determin'd in its Operations by itself alone. Now there is sometimes an absolute necessity for it to be determin'd; for when any thing is propos'd to be done immediately,

N O T E S.

every thing or action, proceeds absolutely and entirely from our Will: and also, that this will is as unlimited in its *Exercise* as in its *Objects*, and consequently that we might have any way, and at any time, as much Happiness as we pleas'd, purely by willing it; all which Propositions are as false as they are foreign to the Intention of our Author, who insits only upon this, that the act of willing, like the exercise of all our other Faculties, is in itself delightful to a certain Degree. This, when apply'd to an Object which is in itself agreeable, must add to the Pleasure arising from it; when determin'd to a contrary one (both which kind of Objects he always supposes) must deduct from the Pain; when to an indifferent one, it must make that positively agreeable, by conferring so much absolute and solid Happiness.

But still this exercise of the Will, and of consequence the Pleasure attending it, must in all finite Creatures be essentially and necessarily

finite, as well as the exercise of all their other Powers: and tho' it has no bounds as to the number and kind of its Objects, yet it must be limited as to its own Nature and the degree of its exercise. This appears to me easily conceivable, and matter of experience. We find ourselves generally able to turn our thoughts to any Object indifferently, but does any Person from hence imagine, that he can fix his thoughts upon any particular Object, with an unlimited Intensity, or think *infinitely*? granting the Words Intention and Remission to be applicable here in any tolerable sense: which will perhaps, upon Examination, appear very doubtful. However, it is evidently no good consequence to infer, that because I can will, or choose a thing absolutely and freely, therefore I can will it *in infinitum*. May I not as justly be said to perceive or understand a thing *in infinitum*, because I perceive or understand it at all?

ly, it must necessarily either act or suspend its action, one of them must necessarily be *; but when either of them is done, the Power is determin'd by that very act; and no less force is requisite to suspend than to exert the act, as common sense and experience may inform any one †. A determination then about a thing once propos'd to be done, is unavoidable; and since it can neither be determin'd by any Good or Evil pre-existent in the Objects, nor by the natural Powers or Appetites, nor by their Objects; it must of necessity either continue undetermined, or else determine itself. But tho' it be naturally free from any determination, yet the Nature of the thing requires, that it should be determin'd on every particular occasion; and since there is nothing external to do this, it remains that it determine itself. We shall call this Determination an *Election*; for as it is naturally indifferent to many things, it will please itself in electing one before another.

XVII. Nor is it a proper Question to ask, What determines it to an Election? For if any such thing were suppos'd, it would not be indifferent, *i. e.* 'tis contrary to the Nature of this Agent, that there should be any thing at all to determine it. In relation to a *passive Power* ††, which has a natural and necessary connection with the Object, the presence of which determines it to act, we may reasonably enquire what that Good is which may determine it to exert any particular action; but it is not so in an *active Power*, the very Nature of which is to *make* an Object agreeable to itself, *i. e.* good, by its own proper act. For here the Goodness of the Object does not precede the act of Election, so as to excite it, but Election makes the Goodness in the Object; that is, the thing is agreeable because chosen, and not chosen because agreeable: we cannot therefore justly enquire after any other cause of Election than the Power itself.

Is determin'd by himself, and things are not chosen because they please him, but please him because they are chosen.

XVIII. If these things be true, you'll say, this Agent will be determin'd by *Chance*, and not by *Reason*; but in reality here's no room for Chance, if by Chance be understood that which happens beside the intention of the Agent; for this very Election is the Intention of the Agent, and it is impossible that a Man should intend beside his Intention. As for *Reason*, he that prefers a less Good to a greater, must be judg'd to act unreasonably; but he that makes that a greater Good by choosing

Yet he is not determin'd by Chance.

* See Locke, B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 23, 24.

† See Note. 63.

†† See Locke, Ch. 21. Sect. 2.

choosing it, which, before his choice, had either no Good at all in it, or a less, he certainly chooses with reason. You may urge that *Contingency* at least is to be admitted; if by this you mean, that this Agent does some things which are not at all necessary, I readily own a Contingency, for that is the very Liberty I would establish.

Is the true
Cause of his
Actions.

XIX. Tenthly, 'Tis evident that such an Agent as this, if it be allow'd that there is such an one, is the true *Cause* of his actions, and that whatever he does may justly be imputed to him. A Power which is not Master of itself, but determin'd to act by some other, is in reality not the *efficient* Cause of its actions, but only the *instrumental* or *occasional* (if we may use the term of some Philosophers) for it may be said that the thing is done in it, or by it, rather than that it does the thing itself. No Person therefore imputes to himself, or esteems himself the Cause of those actions to which he believes himself to be necessarily determin'd: If then any inconvenience arise from them, he will look upon it as a Misfortune, but not as a Crime; and whatever it be, he will refer it to the Determiner. Nor will he be angry with himself, unless he be conscious that it was in his power not to have done them: but he cannot be conscious of this (except thro' ignorance and error) who is determin'd by another. For no others ought to be look'd upon as true Causes, but such as are *free*. For those that operate necessarily, are to be conceiv'd as *passive*, and we must recur to some other which imposes that necessity on them, till we arrive at one that is free, where we may stop. Since then the Agent endowed with this Power, is determin'd by himself and no other, and is free in his Operations, we must acquiesce in him as a real Cause, and he ought to be esteem'd the Author of whatever he does, either well or ill.

s capable of
Happiness.

XX. Eleventhly, 'Tis manifest that such an Agent as this is capable of *Happiness*. For that Person must be happy who can always please himself, but this Agent can evidently do so. For since things are supposed to please him, not by any necessity of Nature, but by mere Election, and there is nothing which can compel him to choose this rather than another; 'tis plain that the Agent endow'd with this Power may always choose such things as it can enjoy, and refuse, *i.e.* not desire, or not choose those things which are impossible to be had. And from hence it appears of how great Importance it is, whether that
whereby

whereby things become agreeable to the Appetites, be establish'd by Nature, or effected by the Agent himself. For if Good and Evil proceed from Nature, and be inherent in Objects, so as to render them agreeable or disagreeable, antecedent to the Election, the Happiness of this Agent will also depend upon them; and unless the whole Series of things be so order'd, that nothing can happen contrary to his Appetites, he must fall short of Happiness. For his Appetites will be disappointed, which is the very thing that we call Unhappiness. But if Objects derive their agreeableness or disagreeableness from the Choice, 'tis clear that he who has his Choice may always enjoy the thing chosen, unless he choose impossibilities, &c. and never have his Appetite frustrated, *i. e.* be always happy. Not that *all* things are indifferent with respect to this Power, for it admits of some Limitations, as was observ'd, beyond which it must necessarily deviate from Happiness.

XXI. Twelfthly, It is to be observ'd, that Agents, whose Felicity depends upon the agreement of external Objects to their Appetites, stand in need of a perfect and almost infinite Knowledge, to comprehend distinctly all the relations, habitudes, natures and consequences of things; if they come short of it, it is impossible but that they must often fall into pernicious Errors, and be disappointed of their Desires, that is be often miserable: Hence anxiety and disquiet of Mind must necessarily arise, and they would be agitated with continual doubts and uncertainty, lest what they choose should not prove the best. These Agents then were either to be created without a prospect of Futurity, or to be endow'd with a perfect Understanding; if neither were done, they must of necessity be very miserable; for we can scarce conceive a greater Misery than to be held in suspense about Happiness, and compell'd to choose among Objects not sufficiently known, in which nevertheless a mistake would be attended with unavoidable Misery. There's none but is sufficiently apprehensive how anxious, how solicitous, how miserable it must be to hang in such a doubt as this; but if the agreeableness of things be supposed to depend upon *Election*, a very imperfect understanding will serve to direct this Agent, nor need he to comprehend all the natures and habitudes of things: for if he do but distinguish possible things from impossible, those things which are pleasant to the Senses from them that are unpleasant, that which is agreeable to the Faculties from what is disagreeable, and consult his

An imperfect understanding is sufficient for his happiness, if he do but distinguish between possibilities and impossibilities, things agreeable and disagreeable to the senses, and consult his Abilities.

his own Abilities, *viz.* how far his power reaches ; (all which are easily discovered) he will know enough to make him completely happy. Nor is there need of long deliberation, whether any thing to be done be the very best ; for if the Election be but made within these bounds, that will become the best which is chosen.

XXII. He that enjoys this Principle of pleasing himself in his Choice cannot reasonably complain of Nature, tho' he have but a very imperfect Understanding ; for there will always be Objects enough ready to offer themselves within these bounds, upon which he may exercise his choice, and please himself: that is, he may always enjoy Happiness. Tho' Free-will then be of no use, as was said before, to an Agent capable of being determin'd only by the convenience of external things, nay, tho' it be pernicious, as only tending to pervert Reason and produce Sin ; yet to an Agent whose convenience does not depend upon the things, but the choice, it is of the greatest Importance, and as we have seen, the sure and only Foundation of Felicity. And from hence it appears how valuable and how desirable such an active Principle as this would be.

XXIII. All this seems to be coherent enough, clear enough, and easy to be understood, tho' some may look upon it as a little too subtle. It remains that we enquire whether this be a mere Hypothesis, without any Foundation in fact, or there be really such a Principle to be found in Nature. (72.)

NOTES.

(72.) For an Explanation of our Author's Principle of *Indifference*, above what has been said in Note 70, and will be enlarg'd on in Note 82. we shall only observe here, that most of the objections brought by the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, p. 69, &c. are built upon the old blunder of confounding this Indifference as apply'd to the Mind, in respect of its Self determining Powers of *willing* or *acting* with another, which is falsely refer'd to the passive Powers of *Perception* and *Judgment*, with respect to the former Faculties all things are physically indifferent or alike, that is, no one can properly affect, incline or move them more than another ; with regard to the latter, most things are not indifferent, but necessarily produce Pleasure or Pain, are agreeable or disagreeable, whether we choose them or not : Our Author is to be understood only in relation to the former, in this and the following Sections, tho' he often uses general terms.

SUBJECT.

S U B S E C T. IV.

That there is an Agent who is pleas'd with Objects only because he chooses them.

I. **W**E have seen in the former Subsection, that some things are adapted to the Appetites by the constitution of Nature itself, and on that account are good and agreeable to them; but that we may conceive a Power which can produce Goodness or Agreeableness in the things, by conforming itself to them, or adapting them to it: hereupon things please this Agent, not because they are good in themselves, but become good because they are chosen. We have demonstrated before, how great a Perfection, and of what use such a Power would be, and that there is such a Power in Nature appears from hence, *viz.* we must necessarily believe that *God* is invested with it. God is such an Agent as this.

II. For in the first place, nothing in the Creation is either Good or Bad to him before his Election, he has no Appetite to gratify with the Enjoyment of things without him. He is therefore absolutely *indifferent* to all external things, and can neither receive benefit nor harm from any of them. What then should determine his Will to act? Because nothing external is either good or bad to him before Election. Certainly nothing *without* him; therefore he determines himself, and creates to himself a kind of Appetite by choosing. For when the Choice is made, he will have as great attention and regard to the effectual procuring of that which he has chosen, as if he was excited to this Endeavour by a natural and necessary Appetite. And he will esteem such things as tend to accomplish these Elections, Good; such as obstruct them, Evil.

III. Secondly, the Divine Will is the Cause of Good in the Creatures, whereon they depend, as almost every one acknowledges. For created Beings have all that they have from the Will of God; nor can they be any thing else than what he will'd. 'Tis plain then that all these are conformable and consonant to his Will, either efficient or permissive, and that their original Goodness is founded in this Consonancy. Because his own Will is the Cause of Goodness in the Creatures.

nancy. And since all things proceed from one and the same Will, which cannot be contrary to itself, as it is restrain'd within its proper bounds by infinite Wisdom, 'tis also certain that all things are consistent with each other, that every thing contributes as much as possible to the preservation of itself and the whole System; which we must reckon their *secondary Goodness*. All the Goodness then of the Creatures is owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it, for we cannot apprehend how they could be either Good or Evil in themselves, since they were nothing at all antecedent to the act of the Divine Will: and they were as far from being good with regard to God himself, till upon willing their Existence, he, by that act of Election, both constituted them Good in relation to him; and, by an unity of Will, made them agreeable to one another. 'Tis evident that the Divine Will was accompanied in this, as in all other Cases, by his Goodness and Wisdom, and the immediate consequence of this is, that things please God, *i. e.* are *Good*. For many things are not at all agreeable to his Goodness and Wisdom, because he did not will them, and while he does not will any thing, it cannot be good.

From whence it appears undeniably, that his Will could not be determin'd to Election by any Goodness in the Creatures. For before that Election which is declared to be the Cause of Goodness in created Beings, nothing could be either Good or Bad; but when the Election is made, that only is Evil which obstructs the execution of it; and that Good which promotes it. The Goodness of things is therefore to be determin'd by their agreeableness to the Divine Will, and not that by the agreeableness or goodness of things.

They are not to be minded who declare that this Goodness determines the Will of God.

IV. Thirdly, We must not therefore attend to such as declare that God chooses things because they are Good, as if Goodness and the greater Good, which he perceives in Objects, could determine his Will. (73.) If the Matter had stood thus, it does not seem possible for the

NOTES.

(73.) This Notion is advanc'd by Dr. Clarke in his *Demonstration of the Divine Attributes*, Prop. 12. and afterwards explain'd, as far as it seems capable of Explanation, in his *Evidences of Natural and Reveal'd Religion*, Prop. 1.

The same is insisted on by *Leibnitz*, *Grotius*, *Mr. Chubb*, and many others. We have enquired a little into it already in X i. see more in Note 75, &c.

the World to have been made at all. For they who acknowledge God to be the Author of it, confess also, that he is absolutely and completely happy in himself, and does not stand in the least need of other things. Now it is inconceivable how external things can be of use to God, who comprehends in himself all things which tend to perfect Happiness. He must of necessity therefore be indifferent to all external Objects, nor can any reason be assign'd, with regard to the things themselves, why he should prefer one to another. 'Tis plain that things are made by God with Goodness, that is, with a certain congruity to his own Nature; but they are so far from being made on account of any agreeableness antecedent to the Divine Will, that, on the contrary, they are necessarily agreeable and pleasant because they are made by his free Choice. For since they are nothing in themselves, they must of necessity have both their Existence and their agreeableness from that Will, from which they solely proceed; and it is impossible but that they should be conformable to the Will which effected them. For God, by willing, makes those things pleasing to him which were before indifferent.

V. Unless therefore we attribute to him such a Power as has been described (namely, an ability to please himself, by determining himself to action, without any other regard had to the Quality of the Object, than that it is possible) it seems impossible that ever he should begin to effect any thing without himself. For, as far as we can apprehend there can be no reason assign'd why he should create any thing at all*, why a World, why at that particular time when it was created, why not before or after, why in this and no other Form: he receiv'd no advantage or disadvantage from these, no benefit or harm; in short, nothing that could move him to choose one before another. Except therefore we attribute to God an active power of determining himself in indifferent Matters, upon every particular Occasion, and of pleasing himself in that Determination according to his Choice; he would do nothing at all, he would be for ever indolent in regard to all external things, and the World could not possibly have been made, since no reason could be imagin'd, why a God absolute-

If he had not a power of pleasing himself in Election, he could never have made any thing.

B b 2

ly

* i. e. no reason drawn from the particular Nature of the thing created. See Note 74.

ly perfect in himself, and absolutely happy, should create any thing without him.

If he were moved by the Goodness of things to create the World, he would be a necessary Agent.

VI. Fourthly, If we suppose that there was a reason, and that God was moved by it to produce external things, 'tis manifest, that, according to this, all things will proceed from him necessarily. For he that is determin'd *ab extra* to do any thing, acts by necessity, he is passive, and must necessarily both do and suffer, not what he himself, but what the determining Cause has effected in him: But this Goodness (which is supposed to be in things antecedent to the Divine Election, and to determine it) is something External, with regard to the Will of God; if therefore that be the Cause which determines the Election, it follows, that the act of Election, and every thing which depends upon it is necessary.

But if things are good because he has chosen to make them, his whole Work will be free.

VII. But if things be good and agreeable to God for this only reason, because he has chosen to make them so, he himself will be at liberty, his whole Work will be free. The World will be produced, not by necessity, but choice; neither will it be impossible to be effected, tho' it be in itself unprofitable to the Deity, for he will have a complacency in his own Choice. And from hence it sufficiently appears of how great importance it is, that all the Goodness of the Creatures should depend on the Divine Election, and not that upon the Goodness of them, for we see that by this means Fate is destroy'd, and Liberty establish'd.

External things are in themselves absolutely indifferent to God, but he has a complacency in his Choice.

VIII. Fifthly, If he expected no advantage, you'll say, from the Objects of his Choice, why should he choose them? Is it not more probable that he should do nothing at all, than busy himself in things that are like to be of no benefit? It may be answer'd, That it is no more trouble to him to will things than not to will them; and hence it comes to pass, that when he wills them, they exist; when he retracts that Will, they drop into nothing. Which reason, as it supposes an indifference of things in respect of God, so it asserts his Liberty to produce or not produce them, and proves, that that will be agreeable to him which he shall choose. But we have a better yet at hand, *viz.* that God chose to create external things, that there might be something for him to delight in without himself. For every one receives Satisfaction from the Exercise of his Powers and Faculties.

Faculties. (74.) Now God is invest'd with infinite Power, which he can exercise innumerable ways, not all at once indeed (for all are not consistent with each other) but such as are consistent are for the most part indifferent, nor is there any reason why he should prefer one before another ††, it must therefore be his own Choice which makes one more agreeable than another; nor is it otherwise conceivable how a thing that is in itself indifferent to the Elector, should prove more pleasing than any thing else.

IX. Neither ought we to enquire for any reason of the Election, *i. e.* why he chooses this rather than that; for upon supposition that there is a reason, the indifference would be destroy'd, and the Election And determine himself to Action.

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(74.) This reason is very consistent with what our Author had deliver'd in C. 1. §. 3. par. 9, 10. where he asserted, that the end and intent of God in creating the World, was to exercise his several Attributes, or (which is the same thing) to communicate his Perfections to some other Beings: which Exercise or Communication could proceed from no other Cause beside his own free Choice; and therefore he must be absolutely and physically indifferent to it, in the same respect as Man was shewn to be indifferent towards any Action *, only with this disparity, that Man, as a weak imperfect Agent, may easily be imagin'd to will Absurdities or Contradictions, but God can never be supposed to will or act either inconsistently with his Nature and Perfections, or with any former Volition (as our Author observes in the 12th and following Paragraphs) and consequently cannot be said to be indifferent to such things (as some have misunderstood our Author) any more than he is indifferent towards being what he is †. *Leibnitz* urges farther ‖, that it could not be in any sense indifferent to God whether he created external things or not, since his *Goodness* was the Cause (according to our Author himself in the place above cited) which determin'd him to the Creation. But

what do we mean by his *Goodness* here? Is it any thing more than an intent to exercise his Attributes, or an Inclination to communicate his Happiness or Perfection? And is not this the very Determination or Election we are speaking of? To say then that God is determin'd by his Goodness, is saying, that he determines himself; that he does a thing because he is inclined to do it; 'tis assigning his bare Will and Inclination for a Cause of his Action; which is all that we contend for. Whereas they that would oppose us should assign a Cause for that Will or Inclination itself, and shew a natural necessity for the operation of the Divine Attributes (for a moral one is nothing to the present Question) a strict physical connection between the Existence of certain Perfections in the Deity, and their determinate Exercise. If therefore God had no other reason for the creation of any thing but his own Goodness, he was perfectly free and naturally indifferent, to create or not create that thing; and if he will'd, or was inclin'd to exert his Perfections thus freely, he must be as free and indifferent still in the actual Exercise of them. As to the particular manner of his exerting them, see the following Note.

†† Instances of this Indifference may be seen in our Author's Note F, and the 5th precedent Paragraph.

* See Note 65, and 70.

† See Note 75.

‖ *Remarques*, p. 473.

tion would not be free. For if we suppose that there is such a thing as better and worse in the Objects themselves, who would affirm that the Goodness and Wisdom of God will not necessarily determine him to choose the better? For who can honestly postpone the better, and prefer the worse? As then in indifferent Matters there can be no reason why one is chosen before another, so there is no need of any: for since the Divine Will is self-active, and must necessarily be determin'd to one of the indifferent things, it is its own reason of Action, and determines itself freely. Nay so great is the Power of God, that whatever he shall choose out of infinite Possibilities, that will be the best, it matters not therefore which he prefers.

The difficulty of conceiving how a power can determine itself to action ought not to hinder our assent to the truth of the proposition.

X. Sixthly, But you urge that you are still unsatisfy'd how a Power can determine itself; *i. e.* you are ignorant of the *Modus*; but a thing must not be deny'd because we do not know the manner how it is done, we are entirely ignorant how the Rays of the Sun produce the Idea of Light in the Mind by moving the optic Nerves; nor is it better understood how the Members of the Body can be moved by a Thought of the Mind, and at the Direction of the Will. Yet no body denies these things, because he knows not the manner in which they are perform'd. If therefore it be manifest that the Divine Will does determine itself, we shall not trouble ourselves much in enquiring how it can be.

'Tis as difficult to conceive how a thing can be moved by another, as by itself, we are prejudiced by being accustomed to material, *i. e.* passive Agents.

XI. But to confess the truth, 'tis no less difficult to conceive a thing to be moved or determined by another than by itself; but as we are accusom'd to material Agents*, all which are passive in their Operations, we are certain of the Fact, and not at all solicitous about the manner of it: whereas, if we consider the thing thoroughly, we shall find ourselves as far from apprehending how Motion is communicated from one Body to another, as how the Will can move itself: but there seems to be nothing wonderful in the one, because it is observ'd to happen at all times, and in every Action, whereas the other is look'd upon as incredible, since it is seldom perform'd, *viz.* by the Will alone. And tho' both Reason and Experience prove that it is done, yet we suspect ourselves to be impos'd upon, because we know not the manner of it. The ground of the mistake is this, that since

* See Note 62 and 63.

since the Will is the only active Power which we are acquainted with, the rest being all passive, we are not easily induced to believe it to be really such, but form our Judgment of it from a Comparison with other Agents, which since they don't move but as they are moved, we require a Mover also in the Will of God: which is very absurd, since it is evident, that if there were no *active* Power in Nature, there could not be a *passive* one; and if nothing could move without a Mover, there would have been no Motion or Action at all †. For we cannot conceive how it should begin. Now it is much harder to conceive how Motion can be without a Beginning, than how an Agent can move itself. Since then here are Difficulties on both Sides, neither ought to be deny'd, because the manner of it is above human Understanding.

XII. It is to be observ'd, that what we have said concerning this Indifference of things in regard to the Divine Will, takes place chiefly in those Elections which we apprehend to be the *Primary*, but not always in the subsequent ones. For supposing God to will any thing while that Election continues, he cannot reject either the same, or any thing necessarily connected with it, for that would be to contradict himself. In order to apprehend my Meaning the better, we must remember that the Divine Power can effect innumerable things equal in Nature and Perfections. For instance, we may conceive numberless Men equal to one another in all respects: and also numberless Species of rational Beings equally perfect, nothing but the Will of God could determine which of these he should create first. But when it was determin'd to create Man such as he now is, *i. e.* with the Faculties, Appetites, and integral Parts which he consists of at present, it is impossible that God should will or choose any thing repugnant to human Nature, while that Election continues.

What is said about indifference, with respect to the Will of God, takes place in his primary Elections.

XIII. For when we conceive any thing proposed to the Knowledge of God as fit to be done, he must also necessarily have under his Eye, as it were at the same Glance, all those things that are necessarily connected with it, or consequent thereupon to all Eternity;

God may have all things at once in his view which are connected with the thing chosen, and

and either will or refuse them by one simple Act.

* See Dr Clarke's *Demonstrat. of the Attributes*, p. 82, 87, &c. or S. Fancourt's *Essay concerning Liberty*, &c. p. 28, 29, and Note 62.

and must will or reject them all by one simple Act. If therefore he determin'd to create Man, he must also be suppos'd to will that he should consist of a Soul and Body, that he should be furnish'd with Reason and Senses, and that his Body should be subject to the general Laws of Matter: for all these things are evidently included in the Choice to create Man.

As he is of infinite Goodness, he also wills the good of all things which he has determin'd to create, as far as possible.

XIV. Nay this primary Act of Volition must be suppos'd to contain not only those things which have a necessary connection with what is chosen, but such things also as tend to promote its benefit and happiness, as far as they can be made consistent with the benefit of the whole. For since God is infinitely Good, 'tis certain that he wills that his Creatures should exist commodiously as much as that they should exist at all. He therefore will'd such things as are agreeable to the Natures, and tend to preserve the Constitutions of his Creatures in the same Election whereby he determin'd to create them.

When the World therefore is once made, it is impossible that those things should please him which tend to the confusion, &c. of his Work.

XV. We have said before, that there is a double Goodness in things, the first and principal is that which renders them well-pleasing to God, as they are conformable to his Will: the other is that whereby they agree with one another, whereby they afford each other mutual Assistance, whereby they promote the Convenience, Preservation and Perfection of the whole: but both these proceed from the Choice and Will of God. For when the Deity had once determin'd to please himself in the Creation and Preservation of the World, he must be suppos'd at the same time to have willed all such things as contribute to the Benefit and Perfection of his Work, otherwise he would contradict himself, and thereby be the Cause of frustrating his own Election. For he is now suppos'd to have chosen that there should be a World, that it should continue as long as he himself had determin'd, that every Being should attain the End assign'd to it, and all things act according to the Nature he had given them, and conspire together to preserve and perfect the whole. It is impossible therefore that he should will the reverse of all this, or that such things should please him as tend to the confusion, mutilation, or detriment of his Work. For 'tis impossible

sible to conceive that he should choose the Existence of things, and yet refuse the means necessary thereto. (75.)

XVI. When

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(75). This is a sufficient Answer to *Leibnitz* who objects, that it will follow upon our Author's Principles that there is such an absolute Indifference in the Deity as must make him regardless whether the World were well or ill made; Mankind Happy or Miserable, &c. Whereas our Author having made it appear that the Exercise of his Attributes, or Communication of his own Perfections, is the sole End of his Action*, it follows that whenever he does act, he must act agreeably to that End; if he exercise these Attributes at all, the Effects of them must be conformable to the Cause. His absolute Power can effect nothing which implies a mere defect of Power, his Infinite Goodness can produce nothing but Good or Happiness in general, and his perfect Wisdom must choose fit and proper means thereto. All this is included (as our Author says) in the very first Act of the Deity, or rather in his Will to act at all, and to suppose him to will at first, or to act afterwards in any respect contrary to this, is supposing him to will and act against his own Nature, and in contradiction to himself; or, which is the same, imagining an Effect to be quite different from, or contrary to its Cause. The *Moral Perfections* of the Deity are therefore immediate consequences, or rather the genuin Exercise of his natural ones, and consequently can never produce any thing in the main repugnant to them. And thus, I think, it may be shewn how all the Actions of the Deity must certainly be Good, Just, &c. without recurring to any such *Fitnesses* or *Relations* of things as are by some unaccountably supposed to be antecedent and absolutely necessary to the determination of the Will of God himself.

But don't we, when we speak of God's *Wisdom* choosing fit and proper means, evidently suppose, that some things are in themselves good and eligible, and *vice versa* even before

any determination of the Deity about them? Where is the room for Wisdom and Preference in God, if all things be alike and indifferent to him? I answer, first, If by things being in themselves Evil, &c. be only meant, that some particular ways of acting may be conceiv'd, which would, if the Deity could be supposed to will them, be necessarily and essentially opposite, and have a tendency directly contrary to his present method of acting: we grant that some such things may be imagin'd, but then it will be an absurd and impossible supposition, that God should ever will them, as he has already will'd the contrary; and therefore, in regard to him, they must still be only imaginary. Nay they would be so far from being independent of, or antecedent to the Will of God in any sense, that the very Essence and Idea of them would proceed entirely from, and presuppose its Determination; since we can only conceive any Relations or Consequences of things to be Good or Evil, so far as they are consistent with, or contrary to the present System pre establish'd by the Will of God. I answer in the second place, that the primary Intent of the Creator being, as was shewn above, to communicate his Perfections to various Creatures (to which communication he was nevertheless absolutely free and indifferent, and therefore could be determin'd to it by no external Cause) while that Intent continues, the necessary consequence of it is, that Creatures be so made and constituted as to attain that End, and endow'd with such Powers as will make them resemble him as much as possible in their several States and Orders. All this is only prosecuting the same Volition, or continuing to communicate *himself*; and what we mean by choosing *fit* and *proper* means for this, is only, that he is not a blind and unintelligent Agent, but conscious of his own Nature and Operations, and therefore able to act

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* See the last Note:

When Man is made of such a nature as requires him to be just, sober, &c. God is not at Liberty not to will these things.

XVI. When therefore Man was made what he is, by that very Act of constituting him of such a Nature and Condition, 'tis plain, God also willed that he should be pious, sober, just and chaste. These and the like Laws of Nature then are immutable, *viz.* conformable to the Will of God, and contain'd in the very first Act of Election, wherein he determin'd to create Man. Nor is God at liberty not to will these during his purpose to continue Man such as he is: For by this means the same thing would please him, as being agreeable to his first Choice of creating Man, which is supposed to stand yet, and displease him, as being repugnant to another, which rejects the very same things that are contain'd in the first; that is, he would at the same time will and not will the same thing, which cannot be attributed to God.

This is no bar to the Divine Liberty.

XVII. Yet he is never the less free, because he cannot will that a Man be perjurd, a Murtherer, &c. for he is no otherwise determin'd than by his own Choice; nor does a thing please or displease him on any other account than because it is agreeable or contrary to his Will. For while that Election of the Deity which constitutes me a Man (*i. e.* an Animal that is oblig'd to be pious, just and sober) remains,

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in a certain *determinate manner*. Now such determinate Action must produce a regular System, the several Parts whereof will be related to, and connected with each other, and by a mutual dependency render'd subservient to the Good and Perfection of the whole. Tho' this whole System might at first perhaps be indifferent to the Agent in regard to several other Systems equally possible, and which might have been made equally perfect in its stead. It is not then as *Leibnitz* argues†, the natural and necessary Goodness of some particular things *represented by the Divine Ideas* which determines God to prefer them to all others, if understood of his *first* Act of producing them; but 'tis his own free, arbitrary Choice which, among many equal possibilities, makes some things *actually good*, and determines them into Existence. When these are once supposed to exist, every

thing or action becomes *good* which tends to their Happiness and Preservation. Hence also in respect to us certain consequences and relations arise, which, by the very frame of our Nature and Constitution, or by certain Instincts, Affections, &c. we are directed to approve, and obliged to pursue, if we expect to be happy. Thus all *moral Obligation* is ultimately refer'd to the *Will of God*, which seems to be the only sure and adequate foundation of it, and from which I think it may be deduced with much more clearness and consistency than from that *Hypothetical Necessity* of the relations of things, which evidently presupposes, as was observ'd before, and is itself only founded on the Will of God. See the *Preliminary Dissertation*, and Xi. and Note 76. or *Puffendorf of the Law of Nature and Nations*, B. 1. C. 1. §. 4. Note 7. and B. 2. C. 3. §. 20.

† *Remarques*, p. 447.

mains, 'tis impossible that he should will me to be perjur'd, or a Murderer; nor can the latter Choice take place in God so long as the former stands, since it is repugnant to the former. When therefore we acknowledge that things are good, and assert that some Actions are grateful to God, and others odious; this is not because we believe the Divine Elections to be determin'd by them, but because we suppose them to be comprehended in the very first Act of his Will of creating things, and to be pleasing or displeasing to him, so far as they are agreeable or opposite to that Election. Nor does this destroy the Liberty of Good, that he must necessarily will these while he does will them: For every thing, while it is, necessarily is; but this Necessity is consequent upon, and not antecedent to the Divine Will. The Divine Election therefore is not determin'd by the Goodness of things, but the Goodness and Fitness of them arises from that Election, and that is best for them which is most agreeable to that Choice of the Deity, whereby he will'd them to be what they are. From hence, I think, it appears sufficiently, that God is such an Agent as delights in things merely because they are chosen. (76.)

C o 2

XVIII. Yet

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(76) To what has been said on this subject in the precedent Notes, I shall only add here, that their Argument seems to be of very little force against our Author, who urge, that if all Good and Evil depended upon the *Arbitrary Will* of God, then it would not be impossible for God to will that Vice be Virtue, that two and two make five, &c. For allowing that God at first made all things what they are, and still continues to them the same Existence, (tho' perhaps no reason *a priori* can be assign'd why he made them in this rather than some other manner) Vice must be Vice, &c. that is, while things are as they are, the same Consequences and Relations will result from them; and to suppose the contrary, is to suppose that things may be different, or have different consequences, while they continue the same; or that they may be what they are and what they are not at the same time. Thus all the present *Relations* are evidently *subsequent* to the

present Order of Nature, and must continue with it; and this consequential Necessity is all the *Fitness* that I know of.

To stile this *Eternal* and *Immutable* can therefore only mean thus much, *viz.* suppose things to be at any time what they now are, and at the same time the very same consequences would flow from them which we now find. Suppose a Set of Beings constituted like ourselves, and framed with the like Capacities for Happiness, and the same relative Duties must be incumbent on them in order to attain that Happiness. If they be imperfect dependent Creatures, and perpetually standing in need of each others assistance; if also they have such Passions, Instincts and Inclinations as tend to unite them to each other, and oblige them to act in concert: if they be thus framed, I say, they will of consequence be thus related, and subject to all the moral Obligations which we now are. But still this necessity is only Hypothetical,

A Being endow'd with this Power is more perfect than one that wants it: yet this does not imply infinite Perfection, therefore it is communicable.

XVIII. Yet it is to be remark'd, that this self-determining Power is not of such a Nature as to imply infinite Perfection; for it may be consistent with an imperfect Understanding, and other Appetites, as we have shewn before: There is no reason therefore for us to doubt whether a Creature may partake of it; if God were pleased to communicate it, there seems to be no contradiction in the thing for a Creature to be capable of it. Now that Being which has this gift bestow'd upon it, will manifestly be more noble than the rest, and a more perfect resemblance of the Deity: since therefore God has created the less perfect Beings, we may, without any absurdity, believe that he has not omitted the more perfect. Let us see then whether there be any Tokens of this Power among the Divine Works*.

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pothetical, and like the necessity of any certain Consequence resulting from certain Premises; which Premises being alter'd, a different, a quite contrary one will be equally necessary. Thus in the former Instance, if any rational Creatures be constituted social Beings, they will indeed be obliged to act as such; but let some be made independent of each other, and unsociable, endowed with, or so made as necessarily to acquire Passions, Instincts and Inclinations, quite opposite to the former, and their Duties will be quite the reverse. The great Virtue of *Selfishness* will then occupy the place of *Universal Benevolence*, and that Method of Life perhaps produce the greatest Sum of Happiness to each individual, and consequently be the most eligible to every one, which has now the direct contrary Effect. If such a supposition be conceivable, 'tis sufficient to shew that these Relations are not *absolutely necessary in themselves*, but only conditionally and consequentially to the present Order of the Creation. See *Puffendorf*, B. 1. C. 2. §. 6. and the Note 2. p. 20.

If those Authors who treat of the necessary Relations of things independent of the Will of God, mean only, that it was always impossible for God to prevent or alter them whenever the things themselves were supposed to exist; this is a necessity which may very safely be granted, but will serve little to their purpose: 'tis a necessity which is applicable (as our Author observ'd above) with equal propriety to any thing. 'Tis just as much as to affirm that while a thing is, it necessarily is; while the whole is the same, the parts must be so too. If the Objection goes yet farther, and it be urg'd, that according to us it will not be impossible for God to change his *primary* Will of creating these things, and so to alter the whole System together. I answer, 'tis scarce worth disputing whether such a Chimerical Supposition be possible or not, since however things might have been at first, yet as they are now constituted, it does not at all shake the foundation of Morality, nor affect our present Duties to God, ourselves, or one another: These must all necessarily be what they now are,

* For the possibility of such a Power, and of its being communicated, see Dr. Clarke's *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, p. 82 and 85. 7th Edit. For the Perfection of it, see Note 82. and §. 2. of this Chapter.

S U B S E C T. V.

That Man partakes of this Principle of pleasing himself by Election.

I. **I**T appears, I think, from what has been said, that there is such a Principle as this in Nature, and that it is also communicable. We are now to enquire whether Nature has conferr'd it upon us: If we consult our own Minds, we may possibly entertain a doubt whether we are always passive in our voluntary Acts: namely, whether the Goodness of Objects determines our Elections, according to the Degrees of it, which are, or are believed to be in them; or, to speak more plainly, whether we always choose things because they please us, or seem convenient; or whether they sometimes appear indifferent in themselves, or inconvenient before the Choice, and acquire their Goodness from it, and are for this reason only agreeable because they are chosen. We have seen that there is in Nature such a Power as this, which can produce a Convenience or Goodness in things by willing them; but, whether we partake of it or no is the doubt. Now, that we do partake of it may I think be evinced from the following Reasons. First, If we be conscious of an inherent Liberty.

Some reasons are offer'd to shew this.

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are, while this Universal System continues as it is; which is sufficient for our Purpose. Nay, I think, we may go a step farther, and assert, that the foremention'd supposition is impossible. For God, supposing him to be good and wise, by once choosing this System (whether the first Choice were necessary or indifferent) has demonstrated to us, that it was at least equally perfect with any other which might possibly have existed; otherwise that other would have been actually preferr'd to it: as therefore there can be no better System placed in the

room of the present one, there can be no reason in Nature for this Change, and therefore there will be none, tho' such a Physical Power of changing it were allow'd to be inherent in the Deity: Nor need we be so much afraid to allow that Being to be in the strictest sense *Arbitrary*, which we have before proved to be *absolutely perfect*.

Upon this Subject see *Puffendorf* of the Law of Nature, &c. B. 2. C. 1. §. 3. and C. 3. §. 4, 5. with the Notes.

erty. Secondly, If we experience in ourselves those Signs and Properties which have been declared to attend this Principle. Thirdly, If the Causes which are supposed to determine the Will be evidently insufficient, or arise from Election, instead of producing it.

II. As to the first; We experience in ourselves a Principle of this kind, *i. e.* a free one, to such a degree of certainty, that if our Minds be consulted we can hardly doubt of it; and from hence it is, that all Men of all Nations, while they follow'd the Guidance of Nature, and attended to the Perceptions of their own Minds, have constantly asserted their Liberty, at least in some particular Actions: nor has any one, unless he were forc'd to it, and as it were circumvented by Philosophical Subtilties, ever deny'd, either that he was free, or that he could please himself in choosing one or other out of many Objects presented to him, tho' that which was preferr'd were no ways preferable to others in respect of any intrinsic worth.

III. In this therefore, as in many other Cases, the Vulgar seem to be much wiser, and to reason more justly than Philosophers. For the Vulgar generally follow the natural Sense of the Mind; and, tho' they be dull enough in forming long Deductions, yet in such things as are the immediate Objects of Sense and Experience, they are often more acute than Philosophers themselves. For these being either puff'd up with the Vanity of appearing wise above the Vulgar, or impos'd upon by their own Subtilty, often frame Monsters of their own, and deny things that are the most manifest: while they are striving to pursue Truth thro' Coverts impervious and inaccessible to human Wit, they leave her behind their Backs, and are blind in full Light. Hence some have deny'd Motion, and others Rest, others Space †, others all Sense in Brutes, and others all manner of Truth: and on the same account, some have deny'd Liberty, *viz.* because they were not able to unravel the Difficulties in which they themselves,

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† By the deniers of *Space* our Author should only mean such as deny that we have an *Idea* of it, not them who deny it to have a *real Existence*, otherwise he himself will be one of the Philosophers lately mention'd, since he has often asserted in C. 1. §. 2. (and I think with reason) that we may easily conceive it all away: whereas it must evidently be necessarily existent, if it have any Existence at all. See Notes 5, 11, and 13.

First, Experience.

The vulgar often judge better of matters of Fact than Philosophers

selves, by their Subtilties, had involv'd it. The ignorant and unlearned do much better in flighting all such Arguments, and judging of things ingenuously according to the dictate of their Senses and Experience; and if their Judgments be taken we have clearly gain'd the Cause: for all these declare that they are conscious of this free Principle within them, which yet cannot, as we have shewn, be well explain'd otherwise than we have done: The Sense of our unprejudic'd Mind agrees with these, nor is the common Testimony of Mankind to be esteem'd of little importance in a matter of Fact. (77.)

IV. Secondly,

NOTES.

(77.) The Substance of what *Leibnitz* objects against this Argument *, amounts to thus much, *viz.* That it is no proof of the non-existence of a thing because the Vulgar don't perceive it; they are no Judges of any thing but what is perceiv'd by the Senses; they believe the Air to be nothing when it is not mov'd; they know nothing of the subtle Fluid which causes Gravity, or of the magnetic Matter, much less of immaterial Substances: and therefore the several Causes of Action, the secret Springs, the Reasons and Inclinations, may be all unknown to them, and yet we be absolutely determin'd (as he believes we always are) either by the constitution of our own Bodies, or of those about us, or by a thousand little things which, upon due attention and reflection, we might be able to discover.---We reply, that tho' in many Cases our not perceiving a thing be no Argument that it does not really exist, yet in some Cases, in this particularly, it is: To feel no Pain, to be conscious of no Idea, is to have none: and in like manner to perceive no motive or reason of Action, is the same as not to act upon any, or to perceive that we act without one. If any one (whether Philosopher or Peasant) be thinking upon a Subject, he must, at that instant, know the Subject that he is thinking on, or however, that he does think on something: 'tis likewise self-evident, that every reasonable Man, when he resolves upon some View, or follows an Inclination, must be conscious of that View, or at least be sensible

that his Resolution was form'd upon some View or other. In these Cases therefore, and in all the modifications of Thought, not to be, and not to be perceiv'd, is the very same thing. But beside the absurdity of being influenc'd by a Motive which we know nothing of; beside the Impossibility of reconciling these imperceptible Movers with any kind of Liberty, (for which see Note 65.) we reply, secondly, that our Author does not conclude against the Existence of a thing because the Vulgar do not perceive and take notice of it, but on the contrary argues, that there must be such a thing as a Liberty of Indifference, because they do continually perceive and acknowledge it; because they clearly perceive and experience it in themselves, or at least imagine that they do so; nay, because they have as great Evidence of such a self-determining Power, as they have of any thing, even of their own Existence: and consequently they must either be deceiv'd in every thing, or not deceiv'd in this †. The present Argument is therefore built on matter of Fact, and will be conclusive here, tho' our Ignorance be never so great in other Cases. Our assurance of a Truth which we do clearly perceive, is not the less for there being a great many other Truths which we do not perceive: and tho' our not perceiving a thing were no Argument that it does not exist, yet our actual perception of it is a Demonstration that it does. It is not, therefore, *because we do not consider the Causes that communicate Motion to the Soul,*

* *Remarques*, p. 477.

† See Note 82.

'Tis proved that we partake of this Power, because we discover the Marks and Properties of it in ourselves

In the first place, we impute our Actions to ourselves, whereby we own ourselves to be the true Causes of them. Hence it is that we distinguish Misfortunes from Crimes.

IV. Secondly, If we experience in ourselves the Signs and Properties which belong to this Power, it cannot be question'd but we have the Power itself: Now these are a Self-consciousness that we are the true Cause of our Actions; an Ability to act and please ourselves in contradicting our natural Appetites, our Senses and Reason. If it be evident from Experience that we can do these things, it will be too certain that we have such a Power as is able to please itself barely by Election.

V. In the first place then, we have declared that a Being endow'd with this Principle is the only true efficient Cause of its Actions, and that whatever it does can be imputed to it only. Now all Men impute the Actions of their own Will to themselves, and esteem them truly and properly theirs, whether they be good or bad; which is a certain Sign that they do not perceive themselves to be determin'd from elsewhere to the Choice or Exertion of them, otherwise they would not look upon themselves as the Cause, but the Determiner. It cannot be otherwise than from a consciousness and firm persuasion of this Truth, that wrong Elections give us more trouble than such things as proceed from Ignorance and inevitable Error. 'Tis on this account only that a light Evil occasion'd by our own Choice grieves and afflicts us more than a very great one from the Action of another. If we expose ourselves to Poverty, Disgrace, or an untimely End, by an Act of Choice, our Conscience remonstrates against it, Remembrance stings us, and we cannot forgive ourselves, tho' we were secure both from human Punishment and the Wrath of God. But when the same Evils befall us by external Force or the Necessity of Nature, we bewail our Condition indeed, and complain of Fortune, but have none of that wounding Anxiousness, and vindictive Reproach of Conscience, which scourges those that become miserable

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Soul, or are not able to delineate the precise manner of that Communication, that we assert the Soul to be self-motive (as the Author of the late Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity argues, p. 15.) But we assert that it is self-motive, because we feel it to be so, and have as great Evidence of it as we could expect or conceive ourselves to

have, were it really so. And that Author unreasonably begs the Question, in supposing that there are such Causes and Communicators in a Case where he has, where he can have, no Evidence at all of them. But this *Dissertation* is fully confuted by Mr. *Jackson*, to whose excellent Answer I refer the Reader.

ferable by their own fault. As therefore he that enjoys this Principle must necessarily blame himself if he bring any Inconvenience upon himself by his own Choice; so he that does blame himself, demonstrates that he has this Principle. For as it is impossible but that he should accuse himself, who believes that he is the true cause of his own Misery, so on the other hand, 'tis certain that he who does accuse himself, thinks that he himself is the true cause of his Misery: otherwise he would grieve, complain, and be angry with the Person that compell'd him to commit such things as he finds make him uneasy, but would never condemn himself as the Cause and Author of them, unless he were conscious that he could have hinder'd them. If the grief arising from a Crime be distinct from that which is occasion'd by a Misfortune, 'tis plain that this can be on no other account, than because the Crime proceeds from a free Agent, *i. e.* one who determines himself to Action, but the Misfortune from a necessary one.

VI. 'Tis plain then from our *Conscience* of Good and Evil Actions, that we have this active Principle in some respect within us. For we not only rejoice in such things as are done well, and grieve at the contrary, but also impute them to ourselves, and either blame or applaud ourselves as the Authors and true Causes of them: which is the first and surest Sign that our Minds are sensible of their Liberty, and that they could have pleas'd themselves in doing otherwise than they have done. (78.)

VII. The

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(78.) 'Tis pleasant to observe how the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry* endeavours to answer this Argument, by confounding the two Ideas of Sorrow and Self-accusation; of a Misfortune and a Crime, as his great Predecessor *Hobbs* had done before. "Conscience (says he) being a Man's own Opinion of his Actions, with relation to some rule, he may at the time of doing an Action contrary to that rule, know that he creates that Rule, and consequently act with reluctance, tho' not sufficient to hinder the Action. But after the Action is over, he may not only judge his Action to be contrary to that rule, but by the absence of the pleasure of the Sin, and by finding himself obnoxious to Shame, or by believing himself liable to Punishment, he may really accuse himself; that is, he may condemn himself for having done it, be sorry he has done it, and wish it undone, because of the consequences that attend it*." Where, not to insist upon the perpetual abuse of the words, *do,*

* *Philosophical Enquiry concerning human Liberty*, p. 105, 106.

The second token of this Power, that it can go against the Appetites, &c.

VII. The second Sign or Property of this Power is, that it is able to oppose the natural Appetites, Senses and Reason, and can please itself in the Opposition. If we experience this Ability in ourselves, we may be certain that we partake of such a Power.

'Tis shewn that we can do this in regard to our Appetites.

VIII. With respect to the natural Appetites, we have said before *, that this Principle, when it happens to be join'd with natural Appetites in the same Person, often runs counter to them, and pleases itself in restraining them; if we find that we can do this, 'tis a Sign that we have it. But who has not experienc'd this in himself? who has not sometimes voluntarily suffer'd such things as are hard, incommodious, and painful to the natural Appetites, and taken delight in such Sufferance, as if that were some kind of Good superior to the

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do, ad, &c. which upon this Hypothesis must have a Signification directly opposite to that which they now commonly bear; what can we mean by a Man's accusing or condemning himself, when he is sensible that he has done nothing which he could have alter'd or avoided; or rather done nothing at all, but only suffer'd all the while from some other? He may indeed perceive and judge himself to be miserable, and be sorry that he is so, and wish himself otherwise; but what is all this to a Criminal Shame, Remorse, and Self-conviction? Is this all that we understand by a *Guilt* Conscience? Can he blame, reproach, or be angry with himself for being only what another made him, and what he knows he could not possibly help?

As this is matter of Fact and Experience, we appeal to the common Sense of Mankind, whether the Ideas of Guilt, Remorse, &c. be not entirely different, and evidently distinguishable from these? The same holds with regard to our blame or accusation of another, as has been shewn at large by Bp. Bramhall, to whose *Cassigations* of T. Hobbs I must refer this

Author. "I ask'd (says the Bp. †) why do we blame free Agents? since no Man blameth Fire for burning Cities, nor accuseth Poison for destroying Men. First, he returneth an Answer, *We blame them because they do not please us.* Why? May a Man blame every thing that doth not please his Humour? Then I do not wonder that T. Hobbs is so apt to blame others without Cause. So the Scholar may blame his Master for correcting him deservedly for his Good. So he who hath a vitious Stomach may blame healthful Food. So a Lethargical Person may blame his best Friend for endeavouring to save his Life. And now, having shot his bolt, he begins to examine the Case. *Whether blaming be any thing more than saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect.* Yes, moral blame is much more, 'tis an Imputation of a Fault. If a Man be born blind, or with one Eye, we do not blame him for it: but if a Man has lost his Sight by his Intemperance, we blame him justly. He enquireth, *May we not say a lame Horse is lame?* Yes, but you cannot blame the Horse

* Subject. 3. par. 11, 12.

† p. 762.

the Gratification of the Appetites. (79.) Nay the Pain itself arising from the Violence offer'd to these natural Appetites, if we do but choose to bear it, becomes in a manner agreeable, which would otherwise be very irksome. From whence it is most apparent that this Pleasure depends upon the Choice for while that continues, it continues too; when that is chang'd, 'tis gone. Now such Elections as these are made every Day, and none can be so much a Stranger to himself, as not to be conscious of them. (80.)

IX. It is to be observ'd farther, that we do not only embrace with pleasure such things as the Appetites refuse, and reject such things as they desire, but alter, as it were, Nature itself, by an obstinate Election, and make these Appetites pursue what they naturally avoid, and fly what by Nature they desire. And this takes place not only

D d 2

That we can do it also in our Senses, and in a manner change the nature of things by an obstinate Election.

N O T E S.

“ Horse for it, if he was lam'd by another, without his own Fault. *May not a Man say one is a Fool or a Knave (saith he) if he be so, tho' he could not help it?* If he made himself a Sot, we may blame him; tho', if he be a stark Sot, we lose our Labour. But if he were born a natural Idiot, it were both injurious and ridiculous to blame him for it. Where did he learn that a *Man may be a Knave and cannot help it?* or, that Knavery is impos'd inevitably upon a Man without his own fault? If a Man put fire to his Neighbour's House, it is the fault of the Man, not of the Fire. He hath confess'd formerly, that a *Man ought not to be punish'd but for Crimes*, the reason is the very same, that he should not be blamed for doing that which he could not possibly leave undone; no more than a Servant whom his Master hath chain'd to a Pillar, ought to be blam'd for not waiting at his Elbow. No Chain is stronger than the Chain of *Fatal Destiny* is supposed to be.”

See the same Author's Definitions of Liberty, Necessity, &c. with his Defence of them, p. 756, &c. and his Reply to all *T. Hobbs's* Evasions (since transcrib'd by the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, p. 91, &c.) in his *Vindication*, p. 679, &c.

(79.) To this *Leibnitz* answers, “ That it is only opposing or ballancing one Appetite with another. We sometimes bear Inconveniencies, and we do it with pleasure, but this is only by reason of some hope, or some satisfaction which is join'd to the Evil, and which surpasses it.” We reply, if by hope be meant an expectation of some future Good, 'tis plain that we can oppose and resist any natural Habit without any such Expectation, as may be experienc'd when we please, in Hunger, Thirst, &c. The prospect of the bare pleasure of willing to do so cannot be the Good hoped for, since that is a sure attendant on every such Volition; all the satisfaction then which appears to be join'd with the Evil, and to counterballance it in any such Cases, can only be the pleasure arising from the actual Exertion of the self-moving Power, which is the thing our Author contends for. See the latter part of Note 65.

(80.) 'Tis a common and just Observation, that Men as well as Children bear any Labour or Fatigue which they undertake voluntarily, with half the Uneasiness and Grief which the very same thing would give them, if they were forc'd to undergo it; which cannot, I think, be accounted for, but upon our Author's Principle.

in Appetites, but also in the Objects of the Senses. Some things are naturally unpleasant to them, some things bitter, nauseous, deform'd, yet these are made tolerable by the force of Election, and by a change of the natural Propensity, at length become Delights*. On the contrary, what was sweet, beautiful, &c. being rejected by the Will, becomes at length disagreeable. We could not possibly do this, if we had not a Power of pleasing ourselves by other Means, than the agreement of Objects to the Appetites and Senses. For, whence comes it that such things as are sweet, comely, excellent, commodious; nay, all that are grateful to the Appetites and Senses should be rejected; and when once rejected, should become irksome and offensive? On the contrary, whence is it that Grievs, Pains, Torments, nay Death itself should be agreeable when voluntarily undergone, unless from this Principle which pleases itself in its Election? If it be granted that we have such a Principle, it may be easily shewn how these things can be effected; for natural Good may, by the Power of it, be chang'd into Evil, and Evil into Good: for it has a Good in itself superior to these, by the Power of which it can overcome and alter the Nature of them: but that this cannot admit of any other Explanation will be shewn below †.

That we can conquer not only our Appetites and Senses, but also our Reason by the force of Election.

X. These things are generally supposed to be done by the Power and Prescription of *Reason*; and 'tis thought, that the Will is thereby directed to embrace things disagreeable to the natural Appetites and Senses: I confess this sometimes is, and always ought to be done according to reason; for we have hinted above, that some regard should be had to these things in Elections; but very often the Case is far otherwise. We have shewn before, that a Power which is capable of pleasing itself by Election, cannot be determin'd by reason; for the Understanding depends upon it, rather than it upon the Understanding. 'Tis therefore the *third* Mark and Property of this Power, that it can run counter, not only to *Appetites* and *Senses*, but also to *Reason*. If we can do this, we must own to our Sorrow, that we partake of it. But that we can, by the force of Election, conquer not only the Appetites and Senses, but the Understanding too, daily

* See Mr. Locke's Chapter of Power, §. 69. Tho' all this may be effected by the sole Power of Election, and without the Reasons which he there assigns for it.

† See the following Section.

daily Experience teaches, and we have reason to lament that it can be prov'd by so many instances that we please ourselves in Elections contrary to the natural propensity of Senses and Appetites, and at the same time against the dictate of Reason.

XI. We have seen an Atheist supported by the Obstinacy of a perverse Mind, enduring Torments, Confinement, and Death itself rather than abjure his beloved Impiety: We have seen a great many Persons voluntarily throwing away their Fortunes, Life and Soul, lest they should be disappointed in a foolish Choice. We have beheld not a few disregarding the Intreaty of their Friends, the Advice of their Relations, the Dictates of their own Mind, Dangers, Distresses, Death, the wrath of God, and the pains of Hell; in short, despising all that is Good, or could appear to be so, when set in competition with such things as, exclusive of the Goodness which they receive from Election, are mere Trifles, and worth nothing at all; such as have no manner of Good, or pretence of Good in them. There have been Persons, who knowingly, without any kind of hope, any kind of belief, have destroy'd themselves and their Relations, and yet were in their right Mind, and consistent with themselves, if a right Mind may be judg'd of by sober Words, and a serious tenor of Action. Did these Men follow Reason, or any other Good beside the fruition of their Choice? We have shewn already that this Power may produce these and greater Absurdities; for since it is suppos'd to be of such a Nature as can also please itself in its Act, wherever it can exert that Act, it can please itself, even in opposition to the natural Appetites, the Senses and Reason. If then such a Principle be granted to be in us, it will not seem strange that we should be able to do things that are repugnant to these; if this be not allow'd, it cannot be made appear how so many Absurdities, so many things disagreeable to Reason, to Sense; so many things contrary to the dictate of the Mind, should every Day be committed by Mankind.

XII. Nay, which may seem more strange, the Will appears to have so great a Power over the Understanding, that the latter is so far subdu'd by its Choice, as to take Evil things for Good, and forc'd to admit Falsities for Truths. Neither will this appear impossible to

This appears from Instances.

That the Understanding admits not only evil things for good, but Falsities for Truths,

viz. being under subjection to the Will.

one who recollects that the Senses are no less natural Faculties, and have by Nature as quick a Relish of their proper Objects, and can as well distinguish those that are agreeable from them that are disagreeable, as the Understanding. If therefore we sometimes please ourselves in choosing what is repugnant to the Senses, 'tis also possible for us to take pleasure in embracing what is dissonant to Reason. The Senses are forced to admit and tolerate such things as are disgustful to them, which things they take for agreeable by use, having as complete Enjoyment of them as of those that are adapted to them by Nature*. The same may happen sometimes to the Understanding, viz. to be compell'd by the Will to admit Falsities for Truths, to believe them thro' custom, and at last make use of them seriously as Truths. Hence comes that common Saying, *that we easily believe what we eagerly desire*; and some take a pleasure in subduing not only Sense but Reason too. I confess, he that does this, acts foolishly, and is much to blame; but from this very thing, that we act foolishly, that we are to blame, 'tis evident that we not only can but actually do please ourselves in Elections, which are made contrary to Reason; and that the Judgment of our Understanding depends upon the Will, rather than that the Will is determin'd by it. From hence it is evident that all the Signs and Properties of this Self-pleasing Power agree to us, and therefore we certainly partake of it.

*Tis prov'd that we have this Power from a consideration of these reasons which are supposed to determine the Will.

XIII. The same will appear thirdly, from considering the Reasons which move us to the choice of these Absurdities, according to the Opinion of those Men who think that the Will is *passive* in Elections. For if, while they are labouring to assign Reasons for these and the like Determinations, they produce nothing for Reasons, but the very Elections themselves, or their Effects, it will be apparent that they are in a Mistake, and offer Effects for Causes; which will appear more fully from an Enumeration of those Reasons which are supposed to move the Will in such Cases.

These are enumerated.

XIV. The Principal of these Reasons are *Errors of the Understanding, Obstinacy of the Mind, the force of Passions, and Madness*; on these

* Nay generally more so: 'Tis a common Observation, that such things as were at first the most disagreeable of all to the Pa'ate, become by use the most delightful: viz. Wines, Tobacco, Olives, &c.

these are charg'd all the unreasonable, absurd, and impious Actions of Men; these are esteem'd the Causes of all such Elections as cannot be allow'd to proceed from the intrinsic Goodness of the Objects which are chosen: but this is all groundless.

XV. For in the first place, as to *Errors of the Understanding*, 'tis certain that we sometimes choose hurtful Objects by mistake, which we often lament, but never impute to ourselves, except we be conscious that this Error was voluntary, *i. e.* in some respect ow'd its Origin to Election. Election then is prior to all culpable Error, for that depends upon it. 'Tis not therefore always by mistake that we choose Absurdities, but by choosing Absurdities we mistake the Truth. But to confess the Truth, we are hurried on in an absurd Election, tho' we see and know all that we are about to do: if then there be any Error, 'tis only this, that we judge it better to enjoy a free Election, than to be exempt from natural Evils. Hence it is evident, that there arises so much Pleasure from Election as is able to impose upon the Understanding, and induce it to prefer that to all kinds of natural Good, nay to Life itself. But whether this be done erroneously or wisely, 'tis the strongest Argument that we have such a Self-pleasing Principle as this within us.

First, Errors of the Understanding: these are shewn to depend upon deprav'd Election rather than cause it.

XVI. Secondly, as for *Obstinacy*, by which they suppose that we are moved to choose absurd things; 'tis plain that this is nothing else but the perseverance of a bad Election: neither can Obstinacy and Perverseness be explain'd otherwise than by Elections. If it be granted that things please us because they are chosen, we see clearly enough what Obstinacy is, *viz.* an unnecessary adherence to an Election, and a Self-complacency in it contrary to the dictate of Reason, and with the loss of natural Good. (81.) But if the Will be determin'd

Secondly, Obstinacy: which is shewn to be nothing else but persevering in a deprav'd Election.

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(81.) *Leibnitz* (in his Remarks frequently cited above) argues *, " That Obstinacy is not " barely the continuance of a bad Election, " but a disposition to persevere in it, proceed- " ing from some Good that a Man forms to " himself, or from some Evil which one sup- " poses to attend the change. The first Elec- " tion, says he, was made perhaps thro' *mere* " *Levity*, but the resolution of adhering to it " comes from some stronger Reasons or Im- " pressions." But if this be all that is meant " by Obstinacy, how come the World, to fix so " bad

* p. 482.

min'd from without, there will be no such thing as Obstinacy. By an obstinate Person we shall only mean one that has continued a long time in a pernicious Error, without any Motive to change his Judgment. Now he that does this is miserable indeed, but cannot be call'd in the least degree obstinate, according to the common Notion of Mankind.

Thirdly, The violence of Passions, viz. Desire of Fame and Glory, &c. all which are prov'd to derive their inordinate force from Election.

XVII. Thirdly, since neither Errors nor Obstinacy are sufficient to explain the Nature of these Elections, they fly to the *Power of the Passions*; viz. the Desire of Fame, or Glory; Anger, Hatred, &c. These are the Causes, say they, why we choose absurdly, and by them the Choice is determin'd. But Fame, or Glory have no manner of Good in them, especially to those who believe that they shall not exist after Death: why then are these Men content to purchase Glory with Life? Certainly from no other Cause beside Election; 'tis by Election that we have form'd these Idols to ourselves, and from thence they derive whatever Good is in them. To be talk'd of after Death, to mount upon the Wings of Fame, to extend our Name to distant Regions; these things please us on no other account but because we will them. Obscurity, Oblivion, Retirement will be as pleasing

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bad a Notion to that Word? If it be a disposition always proceeding from a prospect of Good, or dread of Evil, and founded on second thoughts and stronger reasons: how can it ever be esteem'd a Crime? Again, if the first Election can be made without any external Motive, (which he seems to allow by assigning *Levity* as the sole Cause of it) why may not the perseverance in it be so too? may not the same Cause be suppos'd to produce the subsequent Elections, as well as the first? In short, *Leibnitz*, after all his seeming opposition to our Author on the head of Liberty, most evidently grants the Question both here, and p. 480: where he affirms, that in effect we are able to change the Natures of things, and make these transformations above mention'd. "But this (says he) is not as among the *Fairies*, by a simple Act of that Magic Power, but because "a Man darkens or suppresses in his Mind, "the representations of the good or ill Qua-

lities naturally join'd to certain Objects, and "because we only regard those which are agreeable to our Taste, or our Prepossessions; "or even because we join by force of thought, "certain Qualities, which are only found united by accident, or by our customary way "of considering them." Now what is it to darken or suppress the representations of good or ill Qualities,--to regard some only and neglect others,--and to join Qualities to Objects by the force of thought,--but to exert this very Power in debate? Which often chooses the fruition, or even the consideration of some one out of many equal and indifferent Objects, and by that simple Act makes it agreeable to our Taste, and joins such Qualities to it as could neither proceed from Chance nor Custom, nor any Association of Ideas whatsoever. See the Conclusion of this Subject, in the following Note.

pleasing to the Man that chooses them, and have been so. Those Persons then who imagine that these determine Elections, take Effects for Causes. For these, which are nothing in themselves, shew us that they acquire so much Goodness from Election as makes them overballance all kind of natural Good.

XVIII. The same must be said of Anger, Hatred, Love and Despair, whereby many believe they are driven into Absurdities. But in reality all that is absurd and pernicious in these Passions proceeds from Election. Nature has given us Passions which are generally innocent, while solicited only by their proper Objects, and natural Opportunity, as we see in Brutes; but they are compell'd to change the natural Objects by the Power of Election: thus Anger and Hatred are excited by the Will, and apply'd not to such things as are naturally hurtful: nor Love and Desire to such as are naturally desirable, but to others of a quite different kind, with which they have no natural Congruity, such as Fame and Glory after Death. Of this kind also are most of the Instruments of Luxury, which are commonly said to please, purely by the strength of *Fancy*, that is in reality, by Election. Hence it is that Men pursue with so great Eagerness, and such an impetus of Passion, things which are in themselves trifling, pernicious, and absurd. Nay they barter away Life itself for Trifles, and when they cannot enjoy them, cast off that in despair. 'Tis the Election itself which substitutes these things as fit to be prosecuted by these Passions instead of their natural Objects, and while they are hurry'd on, not according to the exigence of Nature, but the command of the Will, they confound every thing, transgress the bounds of reason and utility, and in despite of these, rage without limits or restraint.

XIX. As for Envy and Revenge, they are not owing to Nature, but the Will, and setting aside Election, are mere nothing. For whatever is pretended to the contrary, there can be no other account given why any one should undergo Labours, Dangers, Grievs and Difficulties; why he should lose his Reputation, Family, Country, nay his Life, for the Satisfaction of his Envy or Revenge, but that he resolv'd within himself, but that he *chose* to satisfy them. 'Tis evident that the most unexperienc'd Person is sufficiently convinc'd of this. But these, when once embrac'd by Election, become more agreeable than

those things which Nature has made necessary. Those absurd Elections then are not made by the force of these Passions, but the absurd and irregular force of these proceeds from the Elections.

Fourthly,
Madness: 'tis
prov'd on the
contrary, that
these Men
are in their
Senses who
choose ab-
surdly.

XX. They who perceive that these Causes are insufficient, have recourse to *Madness* and *Phrenzy*, in order to account for absurd Elections: but this is playing upon Words, and taking *Madness* in a different Sense from that wherein it is commonly understood. He that is so far disorder'd in his Mind as not to be able to deduce one Idea from another, nor make Observations upon what he sees, is look'd upon as a Mad-man, but these Men who do so many absurd things enjoy the above mention'd Powers, and have their Understanding and Senses strong enough by Nature: what is it therefore which drives them into Absurdities? The power and prevalence of the superior Faculty, *viz.* the *Will*, which has a Good peculiar to itself, which it produces by Election. This it pursues regardless of all that Reason, the Body, the Condition, Appetites and natural Faculties require. For while it can provide for and please itself, it is not at all solicitous about any thing which may prejudice these, but has a certain Complacency in its own Exercise, and endeavours to augment its Happiness by the pursuit of such things as are repugnant to them. For the more Difficulties and Absurdities it encounters, the more it applauds itself in a consciousness of its own Abilities; which seems to be the very thing that we call *Vanity* and *Pride*. Hereupon it compels the Senses, Reason, natural Appetites, to be subservient to its Elections: nor can he be call'd a Mad-man who acts against Reason, thro' the force of a superior Faculty, any more than he that falls from a Precipice by the violence of a superior impulse. For it is not every one who acts against reason, that must immediately be look'd upon as Mad, but only he that acts absurdly from some injury done to the understanding Faculty itself, or an Impediment to the Use of Reason; he that could have follow'd the dictate of Reason, and yet knowingly violated it, must not be reckon'd mad, but wicked, unless we will impose upon ourselves by changing the customary Names of things.

All these
things can-
not be ex-
plained other-
wise than by

XXI. If it be granted that we have this superior Faculty, 'tis plain enough that all these things may come to pass. For he that is en-

dow'd,

admitting a Principle of this kind in ourselves.

dow'd with it, will be able to please himself in the Prosecution of his Elections, even to the detriment of both Body and Mind; to the prejudice of Senses, Appetites and Reason; which we often see done to our Amazement; but, unless we have this Faculty imparted to us, it does not seem possible for us to create Good to ourselves by Election, and to prefer what is thus created to all natural Good whatsoever.

XXII. These things, I confess, ought not to be done; but if nothing could be done which ought not, there would be no such thing as a Fault. As therefore much Good arises from this Principle, so there is this Evil also, that by it Crimes and Follies are committed: And it has this Inconvenience, that it can do what it ought not.

As much good arises from this Principle, so it is attended with this Evil, viz. a Power of sinning.

XXIII. From these and other Arguments which might be brought, I think it is evident that God has given us a Principle of this kind, and that our Will is only determin'd by itself. They are mistaken therefore who affirm that either the Appetites, Passions, or Understanding, determine Elections. What probably gave occasion to the Mistake was, that other things please or displease us, viz. such as are agreeable to the Appetites or Senses, beside those which we choose: Now it being observ'd that we have regard to these in Elections, and do not choose any thing repugnant to them, but upon necessity, and that all Men are of Opinion, that the Judgment of the Understanding ought to be made use of in choosing, and being accusom'd to this kind of Choice, we become at last persuaded that it is absolutely necessary, and that our Wills are always determin'd by some Judgment of the Understanding: at least, that is is a Condition requisite in the Object, that the Mind judge the thing chosen to be good and agreeable to the Appetites. Whereas the contrary to all this is generally true, viz. that the Mind judges things to be good because we have willed them, because we have form'd an Appetite in ourselves by some antecedent Election, and those things which we embrace by this *factitious Appetite*, as we may call it, give us equal Pleasure with that which we desire by the Necessity of Nature.

This mistake, that the Will follows the Judgment of the Understanding arise from hence, viz. that it would be imprudent in us to act without consulting the Understanding.

We can act in order to shew our Liberty, which is prov'd to be the same as acting without any reason at all.

XXIV. Nay we choose Objects which are contrary to all the Appetites, contrary to Reason, and destitute of all Appearance of Good, perhaps for this only Reason, that we may assert our Liberty of Election. 'Tis certain that every one can do this, and he that does it, proves by an Experiment that he is free, and has a Power of pleasing himself in Election. Nor can he be said to be determin'd by the Judgment of the Understanding; for this reason is made by the Mind itself, and may serve equally for every Election, since it is drawn from the Indifference of the Will itself: and he who does any thing upon a reason which is made by himself, and is indifferent to either Side, must be esteem'd to act in the same manner as if he had done it without any reason at all. 'Tis evident therefore that we have this Power, and make use of the Appetites and Senses only as Spies and Informers; of Reason as a Counsellor; but that the Will is Master of itself, and creates pleasure for itself in Objects by Election. (82.)

SUBJECT.

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(82.) Upon the whole it appears that the true description of Free-will must include thus much. A Power of choosing or not choosing, or of choosing either Side in any given Case; naturally independent of any mediate or immediate, external or internal force, compulsion, or necessity; physically indetermin'd by either bodily Sensations, Appetites, &c. or mental Perceptions, Reason, Judgment. 'Tis an Ability of determining either among equal and indifferent Objects, or of preferring the pursuit of some before others that are entirely different from or contrary to them: or lastly, of preferring the very consideration of some unknown Objects to all the rest; of deliberating upon, or attending to some particular Ideas, and resolving to overlook others, tho' equally presented to the Mind, and suppos'd to be of equal Importance.

All this is contain'd in the very Notion of a *Self-moving Power*; (tho' none perhaps have given so full and distinct an Explication of it as our Author) for that which in strictness moves itself, is properly and physically inde-

pendent of, and indifferent to all external Movers, as long as it continues to do so; what is determin'd in certain circumstances by particular Sensations, Motives, &c. and cannot possibly be determin'd either without or against them, is so far, and in such circumstances, only moved, acted upon, and purely passive. If then there be any such thing, properly speaking, as an active Principle, it must be endow'd with such an absolute Indifference as our Author supposes: and when we speak of the *strongest Motives*, we don't mean such as have the greatest physical Influence or Weight in turning the ballance of the Will (since we suppose none of them to have any at all) but only such as the Mind most commonly determines itself upon in fact; and to argue from such determinations, that these Motives must have such an Influence both absolutely and comparatively, *i. e.* whether taken by themselves, or in opposition to each other; is manifestly to beg the Question, and still to suppose that it cannot move or direct itself, notwithstanding our most evident perception and experience

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experience of the contrary. And that we have such experience, a little reflection on ourselves will convince us. "I think (says S. C.) I may appeal to any considering Man, whether he be not in all ordinary Cases sensible of an ability of darting his thoughts upon any particular Object, even antecedently to any deliberation, and then, whether after deliberation about particular Objects he cannot resume his deliberation, and sometimes vary his Judgment; and whether, after the clearest Judgment, and most deliberate Choice of particular things or actions, he be not still conscious of a power of suspending his practice, of resuming the consideration of the Objects whenever he pleases, or of immediately choosing or practising the contrary, without being determin'd by impressions from without, or impediments from within. But we have no clearer proof of our own Existence than *Consciousness*. and I conceive we need not expect greater Evidence of any thing than we have of our Existence *."

If then our Mind has such a power of selecting some particular Ideas out of many perceiv'd by the Understanding, and attending to them only without any previous apprehension of their nature and tendency, without any special Reason, Motive or Inclination, or any Inducement whatsoever to such particular Choice; if the Mind, I say, does in some Cases exert such a power as this, then it is in these Cases absolutely free. It cannot here be directed by the Judgment, since it is suppos'd to act independently of it: nay it may be properly said sometimes to influence and direct, or rather to obstruct and subvert the Judgment itself, for as much as it confines that to some particular Objects only, and of consequence renders it partial, and precipitates it in the Choice of these, and withdraws others from it, which were absolutely necessary to a complete View of the Subject, and an exact determination about it. Hence the spring of all Errors, at least all criminal ones, hence vitious, absurd Elections, and a Labyrinth of Woe.

From the same Power also duly apply'd, proceeds the happy consciousness of Desert. and in it is entirely founded all the reason of Reward. Its usefulness then, and necessity, appears both for the establishment of Morality, the ground of all rational Happiness; and also, that we might always have wherein to please ourselves, which (as our Author has shewn in the latter end of Subject. 4.) otherwise we very often could not. Hence it appears I think sufficiently, that this Power is one of our greatest Perfections, tho' (like all other Perfections that come short of Infinity) it be liable to the greatest abuse, and so capable of being turn'd into the worst of Imperfections.

It remains to be enquir'd with our Author, whether all the Happiness arising from it counterballances the Misery, and consequently, whether we and all other rational Creatures might not have been as well or better without it. But for this see §. 2. and §.

We shall here only add a Word or two in vindication of this Principle, against the three principal Opposers of Liberty above mentioned. In the first place then, we don't assert that by this Power the Mind can choose Evil as Evil, or refuse Good as Good, i. e. that the former, as such is or can be a Motive for Choice, or the latter for Refusal: But we say that it can choose the one and refuse the other without any particular Motive at all; nay, in opposition to the strongest Motive (*viz.* that Motive which presents the greatest Happiness, and which it usually does, and always ought to follow) purely by the force of its active and self-moving Power †:

You'll say it does this to prove its own Power, and the pleasure attending such proof is the strongest Motive in these Cases. I answer, that granting this to be so (which yet is not very probable, as appears from what was observ'd from the *Essay on Consciousness* in Note 65.) yet this, as our Author observes, must be a Motive of its own creating, which, with respect to Volition, is the same as none at all. Nay this is the very thing we are endeavouring

* *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 42, 43. See also an *Essay on Consciousness*, p. 205, &c.

† See Jackson's *Vindication of human Liberty*, p. 49, &c. or the beginning of E. Strutt's *Defence of Dr. Clarke's Notion*, &c.

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ing to prove, *viz.* that the Soul has a power of determining itself to will or to act, and of pleasing itself in such determination, without any other Motive or Reason but what is produced by itself, and follows that very determination; without any external Cause whatsoever; in which Power all its Liberty consists, and the greatest Part of its Happiness, as will appear in the next Section.

Nor, secondly, will such a Power as this only make us liable to mistake the true Good which is in things (as the Author of the *Philosoph. Enquiry* and *Leibnitz* argue) but on the contrary, it often makes true Good or Happiness in those things which of themselves had none at all; and improves those things which have, and alleviates those which have the contrary Qualities; and of consequence is not a mere *Imperfection*, but a very valuable and necessary Perfection. Our Author does not suppose us left to an absolute, blind indifference in all Objects (as *Leibnitz* often urges) without any Guide or Direction in the Choice of them; which would indeed be an Imperfection; but affirms that the Mind or Man is sensibly and necessarily affected by some, and informed by his Understanding of the Nature and Effects of others, and so is sufficiently directed to the Choice of these which are in themselves good and agreeable to his Constitution, and *vice versa*; yet still with the reservation of a full Power of following or not following that Guide, of neglecting or refusing that Direction: Which Power therefore, even in these Cases, remains still unaffected. In other Objects, he shews that the *Man* is totally indiffe-

rent, which yet, by an arbitrary Choice, he can make to be no less constituent Parts of his Happiness.

Whence, in the third place, a reply may be form'd to the common Question, *What Benefit* is there in a Power of choosing freely among things that are really indifferent, and exactly alike? We answer the Benefit of enjoying *any one* of them; which Enjoyment a Man could not possibly have without such a Liberty, but must necessarily hang in perpetual Suspense, without any Choice at all? This *Leibnitz* owns to be an unavoidable consequence of his Opinion *, and to avoid this Absurdity, is driven to a greater, *viz.* to deny that there are any such indifferent and equal things in Nature †; the contrary to which has been abundantly evinc'd already with respect to both God and Man.

Lastly, to the Argument against the *possibility* of such a Liberty, so frequently repeated by the two Authors above mention'd, *viz.* that Actions done without any Motive, would be Effects without a Cause. We reply, in short, that it is a plain *Petitia Principij*, in supposing Motives to be the real physical efficient Causes of Volition or Action, which we deny; and yet are far from supposing these Acts to be absolutely without a Cause; nay we assign them another, and affirm that their only true and proper Cause is this self-moving Power, and the only Cause of this is the Creator who communicated it.

On this Subject see *Dr. Clarke's Demonstrat.* p. 136 *ſc.* 2d Edit. or his *Remarks, &c.* p. 28, *ſc.* or *Chubb's farther Reflections on Natural Liberty.* *Collection of Tracts*, p. 388, *ſc.*

* *Essais de Theodice*, p. 161, *ſc.*

† See his 4th Letter to *Dr. Clarke*.

S E C T. II.

Where it is shewn that Happiness consists in Elections.

I. FROM what has been said above, it appears that a Being endow'd with a Power of choosing, is more excellent and perfect than one that is without it: For that which neither acts, nor is acted upon, is the farthest from Perfection, since it is of no more use in Nature than if it were nothing at all; that which is purely passive in its Operations, is one degree more perfect, but that which has the Principle of its Actions within itself, since it approaches, as it were, nearer to God, and is more independent, is also more *of itself*, *i. e.* it seems to be made for its own sake, and chiefly to respect its future benefit, and on that account to be more noble and perfect. Nor does it seem possible for a greater Perfection to be communicated than the fruition of such a Principle. The more free any one is, and the less liable to external Motions, the more perfect he is: God has therefore multiply'd this kind of Creatures as far as the System and Order of his Work allow'd, and decreed, that such as are passive in their Operations should be subservient to these.

II. Since therefore Happiness, according to the common Notion of it, is granted to arise from a due use of those Faculties and Powers which every one enjoys; and since this Power of determining ourselves to Actions, and pleasing ourselves in them, is the most perfect

noble of all, the greatest Happiness will consist in the Exercise of it, *i. e.* in Elections.

The more free any Being is, the less he is expos'd to Motions from without, and meets with less inconvenience.

Happiness arises from the proper use of the Faculties, &c. If therefore a Power of choosing be the most

fect of all, whereby we are the most conscious of our Existence, and our Approach towards God, our chief Happiness will consist in the proper use of it, nor can any thing be absolutely agreeable to us but what is chosen. It is to be confess'd that many external Objects, many that are offer'd by the Senses, please us; but if we look into the thing more narrowly, this will appear to arise from hence only, that these are as Motives which induce us to exert an Act of Election, whereby we embrace them as if they were agreeable to the natural Appetites: for tho' the Will cannot be determin'd to Election by any thing but itself, yet it may be *persuaded to determine itself*, in order to avoid what is absurd and disgusting to the Natural Appetites.

Election is the cause why things please us.

III. For 'tis certain that we make use of the Assistance of the Understanding in Elections, and hold it as a Light before us to distinguish Good from Evil; but we use it as a Judge and a Counsellor, not as a Sovereign and Dictator: and to speak the truth, in order to avoid foolish and hurtful things, rather than to acquire what is good and agreeable. For whatever we choose will (as was shewn before) be *ipso facto* good and agreeable, except it lead us into something contrary to the Appetites, or otherwise absurd. The Understanding therefore points out and admonishes us (as we said before) to avoid these external Evils, or to embrace the Good: but till we have exerted an Act of Election about them, these do neither become absolutely agreeable, nor the other odious. We have prov'd before that this is the Case, and it will be evident from Experience to any one that considers it. If then nothing please us but what is in some respect chosen, 'tis manifest that our Happiness must be sought for in Election.

He therefore that has a free power of choosing, can always please himself.

IV. We have shewn above, that an intelligent Creature, which is merely passive in its Operations, cannot be made entirely happy: for as it is liable to external Motions, it must necessarily meet with hurtful as well as useful Objects; for all things cannot be useful. It remains therefore, that a Creature which is to be exempt from all kind of Grief should have the Principle of his own Happiness within him, and be able to delight himself, in what manner soever external things be dispos'd, *i. e.* that he have the Government of his own Actions, and may please himself by willing either this or something

thing else: Such an Agent as this is, will be satisfy'd with any Object that occurs; since Objects are not chosen by him because they please him, but on the contrary, please him because they are chosen. Whoever therefore has free Choice may make himself happy: *viz.* by choosing every thing which befalls him, and adapting his Choice to things.

V. And it is by this Means only that Creatures seem capable of being made completely happy: for since the things themselves are necessarily fix'd by certain Laws, and cannot be chang'd, it remains that the Elections be alter'd, in order to make them conformable to things, *i. e.* to the Will of God: for thus free Agents will have a Power in themselves of attaining Happiness. Hence it is that we are so frequently admonish'd in Holy Scripture to be *conformable to God**; on this Point our Salvation and Happiness turn: And with good reason; for what is Happiness if not to be in every thing as we will or choose? But he who chooses to conform himself in all things to the Divine Will, must certainly be always what he would be, and will never be disappointed in his Choice: however external things fall out, a Person thus dispos'd may enjoy Happiness, nor does any one seem to have been capable of it on other terms.

VI. But perfect Happiness, may some say, is not to be expected; for those Beings which are united to terrestrial Matter, must necessarily be affected with the Motions of it, as was shewn before, and cannot bear the dissolution of the Body, or the impairing of its Organs (which yet are unavoidable) without some Pain and uneasy Sensation. I confess, absolute Felicity is by no Means to be hoped for in the present State: But yet the more our Elections are conformable to things, the more happy we are; if then our Elections were perfectly free, we should also be at Liberty to enjoy perfect Happiness: but since the care of our Bodies, and the natural Appetites disturb our Elections, and sometimes byass them to one Side, we cannot please ourselves in Elections absolutely, and without a Mixture of Uneasiness. For tho' they afford Delight, and even greater than the natural Appetites, yet they do not remove all manner

We can change our Elections to make them conformable to things, and so can attain Happiness.

Care of the Body, and the natural Appetites disturb Elections in this present state, and hinder our Happiness from being perfect.

* Rom. 12. 2. Coloss. 3. 1, 2, &c.

of Uneasiness, nor extinguish the sense of Pain. While therefore we are in this State, we must acquiesce with a mix'd and imperfect Happiness, such as the present State of things affords; and it is plain that this, such as it is, arises only from Elections. For tho' we cannot by mere Election always extinguish the Pain and Uneasiness which arises from our being forc'd to bear such things as are disgustful to the natural Appetites, yet we can choose to bear these things, and please ourselves in that Choice; the Consciousness of our Powers in bearing these surpassing the Uneasiness of Pain, may perhaps augmenting the Pleasure so far as that the Excess of it shall overcome the Pain arising from the frustrated Appetites, by so many Degrees as could have been obtain'd, if there had been no contrariety between them and the Election. For instance, if one feel two Degrees of Pain from a Distemper, and receive six Degrees of Pleasure from an Election to bear it with Patience and Decorum; subtracting two Degrees of Pain from these six of Pleasure, he has four of solid Pleasure remaining: He will be as happy therefore as one that has four Degrees pure and free from all Pain. If this be granted to be possible, we may be as happy with the natural Appetites, as if we had been without them, nor shall we have any reason to complain of them.

VII. And here, by the Way, we may admire the Divine Goodness and Wisdom, which (since Objects are generally fix'd and confined under certain Laws) could create an Appetite that should have wherewith to satisfy it within itself; and might render any State agreeable, barely by willing it. Now Free-Will has this Effect by accommodating itself to Objects, when the Objects themselves cannot be chang'd. For the Man will be no less happy who chooses what he knows will come to pass, than he who brings that to pass which he chooses; the one may be always done, the other is often impossible: this therefore, or none, is the Way to arrive at Happiness. 'Tis hard to comprehend how he can fail of Happiness who has it in his Power to please himself. This seems to have been the Opinion of the ancient *Stoics*, who had the same thoughts of Liberty with those laid down above, but did not explain them distinctly, nor comprehend the whole Series of the Matter.

However.

We have reason to admire the Divine Wisdom which created an Appetite that has wherewith to please itself in its own Nature, howsoever external things be disposed.

However, 'tis very plain that they placed Happiness in the Use and Election of such things as are in our own Power, which yet would be impossible, if we were not able to please ourselves in Election. (83.)

NOTES.

(83.) Our Author's mentioning the *Stoics* here, might probably give *Leibnitz* his reason to suspect him of maintaining all the absurd Consequences which that Sect are said to have drawn from the above mention'd Principle. They indeed (if they be not greatly misrepresented) urg'd it so far as to assert, that nothing external could hurt or incommode us except we pleas'd: That all Good and Evil was entirely in our Power, and of our making, and consequently that all outward things were indifferent and alike to us, antecedent to our own Choice. Which Notions, being contrary to every Day's Experience in Pleasure and Pain, led them on to deny that the latter was properly an Evil, or rather that there was any difference at all between them. This Doctrine is indeed liable to *Leibnitz's* Objections of confounding all the distinctions of

things,—of contradicting the natural Appetites,—making Reason and Understanding useless,—and subverting all the other Faculties of the Mind.—These and the like Reflections, I say, are justly made upon the Doctrine of the *Stoics*, as they have generally express'd themselves, and overthrow a total, *absolute Indifference* of the Mind to will in all Cases; but are nothing at all to our Author, who never contended for it; but on the contrary, insists upon a necessary, fix'd, and unalterable difference in the Natures of things, according to the present System; and has allow'd their full force, both to Reason and the natural Appetites, all over the last Section, as well as in the foregoing Chapters of this Book.

But this has been explain'd in the Notes above. For an application of this Sect. see §. 5. Subsect. 2. and the Notes to §. 5. Subsect. 3.

S E C T. III.

Concerning undue Elections.

I. FROM hence it is sufficiently evident what kind of Elections are to be called *undue* ones: For it appears that God has given us this Faculty of choosing, that we may please ourselves in the use of it, and be happy in the fruition of those Objects which we choose. For it is Happiness to obtain the things chosen, and Misery

To fall short of what we choose is Misery; we choose amiss therefore when we choose what cannot be

F f 2

enjoy'd: This is done 1st. when such things are chosen as are impossible.

to be frustrated and fall short of them. Whensoever therefore we make such a Choice, as not to be able to enjoy the things chosen, 'tis plain that we choose foolishly and unduely: for we bring upon ourselves unnecessary Misery, since we could have chosen otherwise with equal Pleasure. Whoever then chooses, knowingly what he cannot obtain, or what may produce unnecessary trouble to himself or others, he must be esteem'd to choose unduely. And this may be done, first, If any one choose *Impossibilities*. It may seem strange, that any Person should choose a thing which is impossible, knowing it to be so; but 'tis very probable that this has happen'd sometimes, as was said before*.

Secondly,
When those
things are
chosen which
are *inconsistent*
with each o-
ther.

II. Secondly, If he choose such things as are *inconsistent* with each other: he that does this contradicts himself, and evidently cuts off all hopes of Enjoyment. When we will any thing, we must take all its necessary consequences together with it. But all things here are of a mix'd kind, and nothing is pure from all degrees of Bitterness: we often therefore will that part in a certain thing which is agreeable to the Appetites, and refuse the rest: but this is in vain, since the agreeable Parts cannot be separated from the disagreeable ones: we must therefore either choose or reject the whole. He that does otherwise cannot possibly satisfy himself, since he must bear with what he would not: He is therefore voluntarily unhappy by an undue Election.

Thirdly, If
the things
chosen be not
in the power
of the Elec-
tor.

III. Thirdly, he must be esteem'd to choose unduely, who aims at such things as he knows not to be *in his Power*. For it is a hazard whether he enjoys those things that are not in his Power; and it is foolish to commit our Happiness to Chance; while therefore it is in our Power to choose only such things as we are certain of obtaining, we risk our Happiness, or throw it away when we pursue Uncertainties: Now we owe as much Happiness to ourselves, as is in our Power, and ought to use our utmost Endeavours to attain it; but we lose this by desiring those things which we know to be out of our Power.

Fourthly,
If any
choose that
which is
pre-occupy'd
by the lawful
Choice of others.

IV. Fourthly, That also is an undue Election, which obliges us to seize those things that are lawfully *occupy'd* by the Elections of other Men.

* §. I. Subsect. 5. par. 10, 11, 12.

Men. 'T'o be disappointed of an Election is Misery, as we said before; to enjoy it, Happiness. Every one therefore that is endow'd with a Power of choosing, has a right to the enjoyment of the thing chosen, so far as is necessary to the Exercise of his own Faculties, and is no impediment to the Good of others. But he must be esteem'd an impediment to the Good of others, who will appropriate to himself what is common, or assume more and greater Advantages from the common Stock, than fall to his Share. Those things then which are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of other Men, belong to the Choosers, and cannot justly be taken from them: therefore he that covets them would have what is not his due: *i. e.* endeavours by an undue Election to rob others of their Right. This is to be referr'd in an especial Manner to such things as are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of the Deity; for these are to be esteem'd by all as sacred and prohibited: nor can any one meet with Success that opposes himself to God, and chooses what God disapproves. For what God wills must necessarily come to pass, but God wills the Happiness of all Men as far as it is possible; therefore he that offends unnecessarily against the Happiness of any one, is suppos'd to offend against God, and to choose what is not his due.

V. Fifthly, On this account it is unlawful for us to desire those things which are *hurtful* to ourselves or others. By hurtful things I understand those that lead to natural Evils, *viz.* such as are prejudicial to the Body or Mind. It appears from what has been said, that things please us because they are chosen, but Reason persuades us to abstain from such Elections as may prove pernicious to our own Minds, or those of others, or such as defraud the Appetites unnecessarily: for we owe a Gratification to these Appetites, when it can be procured without greater Detriment. Therefore an Election opposed to these *gratis*, and without any reason, must be judg'd an undue one, because it deprives us of the due Enjoyment of our Appetites.

Fifthly. When those things which tend to Natural Evils, are chosen without any Necessity.

S E C T. IV.

How it is possible for us to fall into undue Elections.*

This is done
five ways.

I. **T**IS difficult to comprehend, as was said before, how one can fall short of Happiness who has it in his Power to please himself, yet if he choose in the foregoing Manner, or the like, he must necessarily fail of his Choice, and his Appetite be frustrated, *i.e.* he must be unhappy. But how is it possible, you'll say, that any one should make such a Choice? I answer, This may proceed first, from *Error* or *Ignorance*. Secondly, from *Inadvertency* or *Negligence*. Thirdly, from *Levity*. Fourthly, from a contracted *Habit*. Fifthly, from other *Appetites* implanted in us by Nature. Not that the Will can be determin'd by these or any thing else which is external; but that from hence it takes an handle and occasion of determining itself; which it would not have had otherwise.

First, By Er-
ror or culpa-
ble Ignorance

II. First, As to the first of these, we have prov'd before that we are liable to Errors and Ignorance; and that this is to be reckon'd among the natural Evils. When therefore we are forc'd to choose among things not sufficiently known, our Errors are not to be charg'd upon us, nor is it credible that God will suffer them to prove fatal to us. But when we are under no manner of Necessity, an Election often presents itself to us in Matters sufficiently understood, and

* See Locke's Chapter of Power, §. 57, &c.

and then we hurry on without a strict and careful Enquiry, and choose Impossibilities, &c. and therefore are not entirely free from Fault, since we ought to deliberate and examine things before Election.

III. Secondly, These undue Elections therefore happen thro' Inadvertency, for by due Care we might perceive the Good and Evil which is in Objects; but being negligent and supine, we are frequently imposed upon, and suffer for our Negligence, by falling into the fore mention'd Inconveniencies. Secondly, By Negligence.

IV. As to the third, Since the Pleasure of a free Agent consists in Election, 'tis no wonder that he gives himself as large a Scope as he can in the Exercise of it. Neither will it be any thing surprising, if in this full Exercise of Election, he sometimes transgresses the Bounds prescribed him by God and Nature; and light upon some things which are attended with no very prosperous Issue (*viz.* Absurdities and Impossibilities) since he will attempt every thing. For he pleases himself in the Trial, tho' he be unfortunate in the Event; but this is no Excuse; for every one is oblig'd to take care of himself, lest he be too fond of indulging new Elections, and from Levity become unduely offensive to himself or others. Thirdly, By giving too great Indulgence to the Exercise of Election.

V. Fourthly, We see that frequent Choice creates an Habit; this seems to proceed from hence; that as we delight in an Election often repeated, we are easily induc'd to hope that the same Pleasure will always follow the same Act, whereupon we grow supine and negligent, and disregard the Alterations of things; and he that does this may easily fall into such Elections as will not be attended with Success. Beside, 'tis difficult for us to change those Elections, the Delight of which is fix'd and, as it were, riveted in the Mind by frequent Experiment: Yet we are not excusable for rushing upon absurd and impossible things, in order to avoid the Uneasiness attending the Change of Election. And if we search into the Case more narrowly, we shall find that most undue Elections arise from this unreasonable Perseverance, all which come justly under the Censure of a culpable Obstinacy. Fourthly, By Obstinacy, or a Habit.

VI. Fifthly, It has been often hinted; that we consist of a Soul and Body, that these are mutually affected by each other, and that Fifthly, By the importunity of the natural Appetites.

from hence various Appetites arise in us, such as the Preservation of the Body, Desire of Offspring, and the like; and whatever is an impediment to these, *that* we esteem hurtful. If therefore we be not upon our Guard, we are hurried on, by the Importunity of them, to Absurdities, or when we give a loose to our Elections, we grasp at such things as offer an unnecessary Violence to them: hence arise an immense train of Uneasinesses to ourselves and others; hence comes Violence and Injury to our Nature and the Natural Appetites, to which we owe at least a moderate Indulgence: hereupon we rashly and unlawfully seize those things that are pre-occupied by the Elections or Appetites of other Men; nay, are not so cautious as to refrain from what is determin'd by the Will of God himself: from these and the like Occasions it happens that we abuse our Liberty, and by undue Elections bring natural Evils upon ourselves or others. For as we are endow'd with Liberty in these and the like Cases, we may either use it according to the dictate of Reason, or abuse it: this Power seems to be included in the very Notion of created Liberty.

VII. It appears from hence how cautiously Elections ought to be made; for tho' nothing pleases us but what is chosen, yet we do not only take delight in *choosing*, but much more in *enjoying* the things chosen, otherwise it would be the same thing whatever we chose: we must take care then that our Elections be made of such things as we may always enjoy. For if they be of perishable Objects, or such as are not in the least answerable to the end of the Elector, he that chooses them must necessarily grieve at the Disappointment. He may avoid this, will some say, by changing his Election, when the thing chosen perishes or fails; but it is to be observ'd, that Elections are not chang'd without a Sense of Grief and Remorse. For we never think of altering them till we are convinc'd that we have chosen amiss. When therefore we are disappointed of the Enjoyment of that which we have chosen, we despair, become miserable, penitent, and conscious of an Evil Choice, and then at last begin to alter our Choice, which cannot be done without an anxious and uneasy Sense of Disappointment, and the more and longer we have been intent upon any Election, so much the greater Pain it will cost

Why every thing ought not to be chosen, and why Elections are not easily chang'd

us to be forced to change it. Hence proceeds the Difficulty which we feel in altering Elections; hence many had rather persist in absurd Elections than undergo the trouble of altering them: For things please us because we will them, but to reject what we have once willed, is contradicting ourselves, and cannot be done without a very disagreeable struggle and convulsion of the Mind: as any one may learn from Experience. (84.)

NOTES.

(84.) Any one that attentively considers the Workings of his own Mind, will soon be satisfy'd of the truth of all that our Author here advances; he will observe what difficulty and reluctance he feels in receding from what he has once firmly resolv'd upon, tho' perhaps he can perceive no manner of Good in it except what arises purely from that Resolution. To make a Visit at a certain time; to walk to any particular place; to recreate ourselves with this or that kind of Diversion; may be Actions in themselves perfectly indifferent and trivial: but when once propos'd, even upon mere whim and caprice, and resolv'd on with as little reason, they become often as much the Objects of our Hope and Desire; the thoughts of prosecuting them give us as great pleasure and satisfaction, and we are as unwillingly withdrawn from them, and as much disappointed when we fall short of the fancied enjoyment of them, as we should be in Matters of the last Importance. Every Man that has taken the least notice of what passes within him, is able to give numberless Instances of the truth of the foregoing Observation: which

may serve to convince us how great the force and power of *Volition* is, and what excellent use it may be of in Life. How it supplies us with courage and constancy in the most arduous Undertakings, and enable us to surmount the greatest Difficulties: how it qualifies and alleviates our Pain, and augments the Sum of our Happiness; and makes us run contentedly the Round of low and otherwise tedious pursuits, and bear with pleasure the otherwise insupportable load of human Woes. This shews the great usefulness and necessity of such a Principle, and will lead us to consider with our Author, in what a cautious manner it ought to be exerted, lest it fall upon wrong and improper Objects, and thereby, instead of lessening, increase our Misery, and become itself the greatest part of it. That this Principle of Liberty, tho' frequently attended with these consequences, is yet a Gift worthy of the most beneficent Donor, must appear from a general computation of its Good and Evil Effects, with regard to the whole System, which will be the Subject of the following Sections.

SECT.

S E C T. V.

*How Evil Elections are consistent with the
Power and Goodness of God.*

S U B S E C T. I.

*Proposes the Difficulty, with a Preparative to the Solu-
tion of it.*

The Evils of
Free-Agents
are not neces-
sary, and
therefore
seem to be
permitted by
God volun-
tarily.

I. WE have shewn that moral Evils arise from undue Election; that Elections are free; and that it is not at all necessary for any one knowingly and willingly to pursue the worse. Moral Evils cannot therefore be excused by necessity, as the natural ones, and those of Imperfection are. 'Tis plain that created Nature implies Imperfection in the very terms of its being created (since what is absolutely perfect is very God) either therefore nothing at all must be created, or something imperfect: and that God, agreeably to what infinite Power and Goodness required, permitted no manner of Evil in Nature, the absence whereof would not have introduced more or greater Evil. Since therefore Inconveniencies attend either the presence or absence of it, God made that which was attended with the least. There are no Evils then which could possibly be avoided, and therefore they must be look'd upon as necessary, since the Imperfection of a Creature did not admit of pure and absolute Good. But this Necessity does not appear in free Agents: For the Evils incident

to them seem to proceed, not from imperfection of Nature, but *free Choice*, and are therefore permitted by God voluntarily, when neither the Nature of Things, nor the Good of the Universe require the permission of them, that is, the World would be as well without as with them.

II. 'Tis to be observ'd, that God permitted the former kind of Evils because they were inseparable from things; either therefore the things must not have been created, or their inherent Evils tolerated. But Evil Elections have no necessary connection with the free Acts of the Will: neither does the Nature of Man require that he should choose amiss: nor does any benefit accrue to him from these Elections which could not be obtained without them, as it does in Hunger, Thirst, Fear, and the rest of the Passions; for without these Affections, as was shewn, the Animal would soon perish; but no Evil would befall us (nay what Good would not?) if we always attended to Reason, and never chose amiss. Since therefore Man might bring the greatest pleasure to himself, and exercise his faculties by choosing always well, how comes it to pass that God suffers him to hurt himself and others unnecessarily by Evil Elections? If it be said that a Power of choosing either Side is contain'd in the very Notion of Liberty; this must be allow'd, but yet there seems to be room enough for the Exercise of Liberty, tho' the Will were confin'd to the choice of what is lawful and convenient; what need is there then of such a Power as may extend to the choice of Evil?

Moral Evils have no necessary connection with a free Nature, nor are of any advantage to it.

III. This seems to be the main stress of the Difficulty, here is the hardest point in this Affair, *viz.* Whence come Moral Evils; *i. e.* those that are not necessary? If they be said to be necessary, how are they free? If they be not necessary, why does God permit them? The latter seems repugnant to the Goodness of God, the former to the Nature of a free Agent.

Here then lies the stress of the Difficulty, *viz.* why did God permit those Evils which are neither necessary nor useful?

IV. It must be confess'd, that we are less prepared for a Solution of this Difficulty than the former; for the Nature and Systems of the Intellectual World are less known to us than those of the purely Material

We don't know so much of the Nature of thinking Beings as of

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material ones, and therefore are less prepared for an Answer to this Difficulty, than to the former.

terial one: Material Objects furround us, and occupy all the Inlets to Knowledge, and are the only things that immediately affect our Senses. They intrude upon us with an infinite Variety, and produce many and various Sensations in us. But of intellectual Beings of their Operations, or of the mutual connection between them, we have but very few, and those very obscure Notions, *viz.* such as arise only from the reflection of our Understanding upon itself, or are collected by the use of Reason deducing one thing from another: For, of all intellectual Beings, our own Mind alone is immediately perceiv'd by us; nor can we (as in Bodies) compare the Notions arising from it, with them that proceed from other Sources: all our Knowledge therefore of Spirits or thinking Beings is derived from this alone. 'Tis no wonder then if we be very much in the dark in our Reasonings about these and their Operations: and do not so clearly perceive the necessity of allowing Free-Will to them, as contrariety in the Motions of Matter; nor so easily apprehend what Inconvenience would follow from restraining the exercise of Liberty, as we see the consequence of taking away the motion of Matter. We know that without Motion the whole Mass of Matter would prove entirely useless, and that there would be no room for so many Animals as now we find receive their Origin and Subsistence from it; which is justly esteem'd a greater Evil, and more intolerable than all the natural Evils arising from Matter and Motion: and we should find the same thing in the prevention of the use of Free-Will, if we understood the System of the Intellectual as well as that of the Material World. But if we can shew that more Evils necessarily arise from withdrawing or restraining the use of Free-Will, than from permitting the abuse of it, it must be evident that God is oblig'd to suffer either these or greater Evils. And since the least of these necessary Evils is chosen, even infinite Goodness could not possibly do better.

V. Let us try then whether the abuse of Free-Will could be prohibited with less detriment to the whole System, than what arises from the permission of it. There are three Ways whereby God may be conceiv'd able to have prevented bad Elections; first, If he had created no Free Being at all. Secondly, If his Omnipotence inter-
pose,

The abuse of Free-Will may be conceiv'd to have been prevented three ways, which are consider'd in the three following Subsections.

pos'd and occasionally restrain the Will, which is naturally free, from any wrong Election. Thirdly, If he should change the present state of things, and translate Man into another, where the occasions of Error and incitements to Evil being cut off, he should meet with nothing that could tempt him to choose amiss.

S U B S E C T. II.

Why God has created Free Agents.

I. **A**S to the first, 'Tis certain that God was not compell'd by any necessity to create any thing at all, he might therefore have prevented all Moral Evils, if he had not endow'd any Being with Free Choice; for so there would have been nothing that could sin. But such a monstrous Defect and *Hiatus* would have been left in Nature by this means, *viz.* by taking away all Free Agents, as would put the World into a worse Condition than that which it is in at present, with all the Moral Evils that attend it, tho' they were multiply'd to a much greater Number.

God might have prevented Moral Evils, if he had refused to create any free Being.

II. For in the first place, if we set aside Free Agents, *i. e.* those which have the Principle of Action within themselves, there is properly nothing at all Self-active, for all other Beings are merely passive: there is indeed some kind of Action in Matter, *viz.* Motion; but we know that it is passive even with regard to that; 'tis therefore the Action of God upon Matter, rather than of Matter itself; for it does not move itself, but is moved. Without Free Agents then the whole World would be a mere *Machine*, capable of being turn'd any Way by the Finger or Will of God, but able to effect nothing of itself. Nay the whole Work of God could not of itself exert one single Act or Thought, but would be totally brute and stupid, as much as a Wheel or a Stone: it would continue sluggish and incapable of Action, unless actuated by external force. Second Causes could therefore effect nothing which might be imputed to them, but all would be done entirely by the first. We need not say, how much

But without these the World would have been a mere Machine, and every thing passive.

much a World thus constituted would be inferior to the present, nor how incommodious and unworthy of its Divine Author.

Objection from these who declare that the Understanding is active, tho' it is necessary as also God himself.

III. Man, you'll say, necessarily assents to this Proposition, twice two make four; but tho' his Mind is necessarily driven to this Assent, and consequently is not *free*, yet he is *active*: for it can scarce be said that a Man is passive in giving his Assent*. The same may be affirm'd of God, who, tho' we suppose him to be absolutely free in his primary Elections, yet when these are once fix'd, he must necessarily execute what he had decreed: nevertheless he is properly Self-active in all Cases, consequently there may be something active in Nature, tho' there were nothing free.

Answer to the former part of the Objection.

IV. As to the former Part of the Objection, 'tis not very clear what may be the Cause of intellectual Assent; if the Object, then the Mind is merely passive in the Act of Understanding: nor is Assent imputable to it any more than Descent to a Stone; but if the Object be esteem'd only a Condition upon which the Understanding acts, we shall want a Cause to determine the Understanding; for that cannot be supposed to determine itself, any more than the Fire determines itself to burn combustible Matter †. For no body judges the combustible Matter to be active when it is set on Fire, or that the Fire burns of itself without being kindled by something else. The World then without Liberty will be a piece of Mechanism, where nothing moves itself, but every thing is mov'd by an external Cause, and that by another, and so on till we come at the first, namely God; who will be the only Self-active Being and must be esteem'd the real Cause of all things: neither can any thing, whether well or ill done, be ascribed to others.

Answer to the latter.

V. As to the latter part of the Objection, That Being must be denominated Free, who is held by no other tie than his own Election: But God is no otherwise oblig'd to execute his Decrees, therefore he is free, if he did but make his Decrees freely; and is purely active in every Operation wherein he executes them. For he suffers nothing by necessity, nor from any other beside himself, and is determin'd to act by his own Liberty.

VI. Secondly,

* See Note 61.

† See our Author's Note B.

VI. Secondly, We believe that God created the World in order to exercise the Powers he is possess'd of for the Good of the Universe; the Divine Goodness therefore delights and applauds itself in its Works, and the more any thing resembles God, and the more 'tis Self-sufficient, it is to be esteem'd so much the more agreeable to its Author. But any one may understand how much a Work which moves itself, pleases itself, and is capable of receiving and returning a Favour, is preferable to one that does nothing, feels nothing, makes no return, unless by the force of some external Impulse: any Person, I say, may apprehend this, who remembers what a Difference there is between a Child caressing his Father, and a Machine turn'd about by the hand of the Artificer. There is a kind of Commerce between God, and such of his Works as are endow'd with Freedom; there's room for a Covenant and mutual Love. For there is some sort of Action on both Sides, whereby the Creature may in some measure return the benefits of the Creator, at least make an acknowledgment for them; and if any thing in the Divine Works can be conceiv'd to be agreeable to God, this must certainly be so. One such Action as this is preferable to all the Sportings of Matter, or the Labyrinths of Motion; if then there had been no free Creatures, God must have been deprived of this Complacency, which is almost the only one worthy of him that he could receive from the Creation. 'Tis therefore as much agreeable to God that he should have made such Beings, as it is to the World that they should be made: for if nothing of this kind had been created, the very best thing among the Creatures, and that which is most agreeable to the Deity, would have been wanting. 'Tis better therefore to permit the abuse of Liberty in some than to have omitted so much Good. For the Defect and Absence of such Agents is to be esteem'd a greater Evil than all the Crimes which are consequent upon the abuse of Liberty.

VII. Thirdly, From what has been said, we learn, that some Evils which necessarily adhere to things, *viz.* Natural ones, and those of Imperfection, did not hinder the Divine Goodness from creating the Good with which they were connected, since the excess of Good

God has a complacency in his Works, and if nothing were free, that would be wanting in them which is most agreeable to the Deity.

Necessary Evils do not always hinder the Creation of things, much less those which are only possible.

compensated for the fewer and less Evils which were unavoidable: Thus God chose such Animals as were Mortal, afflicted with Hunger, Thirst, and other Passions, rather than none at all. If then those Evils which were *necessary* and foreseen did not hinder God from creating the Good that was annexed to them, how much less should the *possible* Evils arising from the abuse of Free-Will hinder his Goodness from creating Free-Agents? To enjoy free Choice is a greater Good than simple Life, but we willingly accept this latter with all the train of Natural Evils, how much more gratefully should we embrace the Gift of Liberty, attended only with some Danger of Evils, but not with the Evils themselves, as in the former Cases, (85.)

Natural Evils are greater than Moral ones, and Free-Will a greater Good than the Natural Appetites.

VIII. Fourthly, It must be observ'd that Elections are therefore esteem'd Evil, because they lead us into Natural Evils. For if an Election contain nothing absurd or prejudicial, 'tis not a wrong one. Hatred of God, Rebellion against his Commands, Murther, Theft, Lying, are Sins, because they are hurtful to ourselves or others, because they deprive us of natural Good, and lead into Evil. Elections therefore are wrong and undue on account of the natural Evils which sometimes attend them; Natural Evils then are greater than Moral *: For that which makes any thing bad must necessarily be worse itself: But Free-Will is better than natural Appetites, and a Gift more worthy of the Deity, it is not therefore to be deny'd to the Creatures on account of the concomitant Evils, any more than the natural Appetites and Propensities: both of them indeed sometimes

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(85.) In relation to *us*, indeed, a Gift which is attended only with the possibility of some Inconveniencies, appears to be of more dignity and value than one that brings some degree of unavoidable Misery along with it, and as such it ought to be receiv'd with proportionable gratitude by *us*. But with respect to a Being who foresees all the Abuses of Free-Will, all the contingent Evils consequent thereupon, are as certain as the natural and necessary ones, and therefore ought to be equally provided against. This Argument therefore about the *Contingency* of Moral Evil, so far as it relates to the Deity, need not be insisted on, since our Author allows the Divine Prescience, and consistently with that, offers reasons sufficient for the Vindication of the other Attributes of God in the present Case.

* See Chap. 4. §. 4. par. 8. and Xi.

times lead us into the same Evils, but with this Difference, that the one, *viz.* the natural Appetite, loads us with Evils by necessity; but the other, *viz.* Free-Will, not of necessity, but only if we please. These might have been avoided since they are contingent, but those could not, since they force themselves upon us against our Wills: As therefore it became God to create an Appetite which was join'd with necessary Evils; how much more agreeable was it to his Goodness to have endow'd us with Free-Will, by which these may be avoided, or at least alleviated? If the natural Appetite be a greater Good than what these Evils which flow from it can overballance, and therefore worthy to be implanted in Animals by the Deity; how much more excellent a Good will Free-Election be, by which alone we become capable of Happiness, tho' join'd with the danger of falling into Evils by abuse?

IX. Fifthly, If the State of Man would be worse without Free-Will than with it, 'tis plain that Liberty diminishes instead of increasing the Sum of Evils, and is bestow'd upon us for that end. But how much more miserable the State of Man would be without Liberty than it is with it, will appear to any one who considers what sort of Creatures we should be without Election. For if Man were not free, he would be driven by the Violence of Matter and Motion, and sooner or later be quite overwhelm'd with those natural Evils which necessarily arise from the Nature and Laws of Motion. But it is better to struggle with some of these with Liberty, than all of them with necessity; the former is the Condition of Men, the latter of Brutes*. If by being deprived of Election we should be freed from all kind of Evil, we might complain of God for giving it; but seeing that whether we be free or bound by the chain of Fate (while we have Bodies) we must necessarily endure those Evils which are consequent upon the affections of Bodies; (nay those very Evils which we were afraid of falling into by a wrong Choice) 'tis in vain to desire the absence of Liberty, by relying upon which, and using it aright, we may avoid the most bitter part even of these necessary Evils.

The State of Man would be worse if Free-Will were taken away.

X. For

* Only in some Degree, see the Observation from Bayle in Note 35.

Free Agents only are capable of perfect Happiness, therefore it is better to enjoy Liberty.

X. For in the Sixth place, it is most manifest that the greatest Good, and that whereby Men excel other Animals, is owing to Liberty. By the assistance of this we rise above Fate, and when attack'd from without by adverse Fortune, we find our Happiness within ourselves. Other Animals have nothing to oppose to a Distemper, Death, or Pain, nothing to delight themselves in, except Sleep, Food, and the Appetite of propagating their Species. But a free Agent, in the midst of Pains and Torments, of Hunger and Thirst, nay Death itself, has wherewithal to please itself, and to blunt the Edge of all these Evils. We complain of our Bodies, that by being tied to them, we are oblig'd to undergo very many and great Hardships; how much more full of Complaints should we be if we were entirely subjected to them, and hurried into Evils without any Remedy or Relief? Is it not better for us to have our Happiness in our own Power, than to be oblig'd to seek it elsewhere, nay rather to despair of it? Which Happiness is only to be found in a Free Choice, as was shewn before. From hence it appears, I hope, sufficiently, why God created Free Agents notwithstanding the abuse which they were liable to. For he chose a Creature which would sometimes do amiss, rather than that every thing should be drawn on by Fate, and a Chain of Necessity, into inevitable Evils. (86.)

XI. But

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(86.) Our Author having shewn in §. 2. that the greatest part of our Happiness consists in this Principle of Election, here points out some of the many Inconveniencies that would attend the loss of it. First, If there was no such thing as a free Agent, all would be mere Mechanism and necessary Effects of the first Cause, *i. e.* the best and noblest part of Nature would be cut off, that which of all others is most worthy of and agreeable to the Deity. There would be no Creatures capable of making any kind of return, of paying any reasonable Obedience and Duty to God; no possibility for him to display his Wisdom, Goodness and Mercy in the Government of them, nor any means of bringing them to the sublimest Degree of Intellectual Happiness, *viz.* that which arises from Morality. Secondly,

Those passive Beings themselves would be in a much worse Condition than they now are. They would be deprived of all the Happiness which they now enjoy from the choice of indifferent Objects; they would be necessarily exposed to all the natural Evils arising from the general Laws of Matter and Motion, *viz.* Distempers of the Body, Inclemency of the Seasons, Hunger and Thirst, &c. which Liberty enables them frequently to guard against and avoid, and frequently to bear with pleasure, and even to convert to their superior Good: nay, they must inevitably undergo the greatest part of those very Evils which at present, by this Power, they have at most only a possibility of incurring. Thirdly, Without Liberty, the other most exalted Powers of the Mind would be entirely useless, and often aggravations of our

XI. But, you'll say, that you desire the Pleasure and Advantages arising from free Elections, but would not have the Power to Sin; *i. e.* you would have a Liberty restrain'd by Nature within certain bounds, so as never to extend to Evil. But it may be justly doubted whether this was possible in the present state of things: For Free-Will is naturally an active Power, and determines itself to Action, and requires nothing more in Objects, than that they should give occasion for the Exercise of Elections; 'tis therefore active in its own Nature. Now whatsoever is limited by another admits of bounds, and is therefore passive with respect to the Limiter; it seems equally absurd then for a Free Agent to be thus limited, as for Matter, which is in itself and of its own Nature passive, to determine itself to Action, and is perhaps no less impossible. (87.)

The benefits of Free-Will could not be had without a Power of Sinning.

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XII. Secondly,

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our Misery. "A Faculty of Understanding (says Dr. Jenkin*) without a Will to determine it, if left to itself, must always think of the same Object, or proceed in a continued series and connection of thoughts without any Aim or End; which would be a perpetual Labour in vain, and tedious Thoughtfulness to no purpose: but if it should be sometimes determin'd by some thing external to new Objects, yet what use of Reason could there be in Contemplations, which were merely obtruded and forc'd upon the Mind?" And to foresee a train of Evils, without any power of acting against and opposing them, must be only anticipating Misery, and adding the future to the present, and a sense of our Inability of ever helping ourselves to both. These Considerations are sufficient to prove, that the want of Liberty in general would be an irreparable Damage to any conscious System.

C. 10. or Dr. Jenkin in the Chap. above cited.

The next Enquiry must be, what Consequences would attend either the Limitation of this free Power to some particular Objects, or the Infringement and Suspension of it on particular Occasions.

(87.) If Matter were made active, it would be no longer Matter: in like manner if a self-moving or active Being were render'd passive, it would be no longer what it is. Hence appears the absurdity of supposing a Liberty, properly so call'd, to be determin'd to some particular ways of acting, 'tis the same as the Liberty of a Stone to some particular Ways of moving, *i. e.* no Liberty at all. The very Essence of Liberty includes an absolute Physical Indifference to either Side in any given Case. Such a Liberty as this has been shewn to belong to Man in respect of *Willing*. He can will or choose any thing in Nature, he can also either choose or refuse any thing, and therefore to determine his Will to some Objects, or incline it to one Side in any given Circumstances, would be so far to destroy it. The Question then is not, whether a Man might be necessarily inclin'd to some.

For a fuller Explication of them see Mr. Jackson's *Defence of human Liberty*, p. 79, &c. and Scott's *Christian Life*, Part 2. C. 4. §. 3. p. 318, &c. See. or Sherlock on *Providence*, C. 7. p. 240. 2d Edit. or D'Oyly's *First Dissertation*,

* Reasonableness of the Christian Religion, 2d vol. C. 12. p. 238. 5th Edit.

The Will could not be determin'd to Good by Objects, since the Goodness of them generally proceeds from Election.

XII. Secondly, If the Will were naturally restrain'd to choose Good only, it must have this restraint either from the *Object* or the *Understanding*: But neither could be done. If some things were in themselves always Good, and others Evil, it might be possible indeed that the Will should no more admit of Evil than the Sight does of Savours: But Moral Good and Evil are very frequently not absolute things, but merely relative: for there is almost no Action which proceeds from Choice, but what may be Good or Evil upon a change of Circumstances *. Even Natural Evils themselves are sometimes good and eligible. Free-Will then must needs be indifferent to all external Objects, and those things which are now agreeable, become shortly disagreeable, according to the infinite variety of Circumstances and the Exigence of Affairs. The Will therefore cannot be determin'd to Good by Objects. Nay, to confess the Truth, we generally do not choose Objects because they are Good, but they become Good because we choose them. The Goodness of them therefore is for the most part determin'd by the Election, and not that by the Goodness. For we have shewn before †, that this is the Nature of an Elective Faculty, and such it ought to be, otherwise we could not have the least possibility of attaining Happiness in so great a variety and uncertainty of outward things ‖.

The Intellect often finds nothing good in things, except that they help towards the attainment of an Election, the Will therefore could not be determin'd to Good by the Understanding.

XIII. Thirdly, The Will was no more capable of being determin'd perpetually to Good by the *Understanding*, than by Objects. For the Under-

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some particular thing or act, and yet continue to have Free-Will; for that, I think, is a contradiction. But whether he should have this present power of willing destroy'd on some particular Occasions, or whether he should be sometimes alter'd and made what he now is not. Whether this Change of Man's Nature would in the main prove worthy of the Deity, or beneficial to the World, will be more fully examin'd in the following Subsection: our Author now proceeds to enquire *how* this determination could possibly be effected in the present State of things, and if, upon Enquiry into all the imaginable Methods of effecting it, they appear to be either insufficient for the End propos'd, or attend'd with worse Consequences than the present Establishment, this must be a very strong Argument against them.

* See Turner's *Discourse of the Laws of Nature, and the reason of their Obligation*, §. 23, 24. or *Puffendorf of the Laws of Nature*, &c. B. 1. C. 2. §. 6.

† Sect. 1. Subsect. 3.

‖ See par. 16 and 17 of this Sect.

Understanding acts necessarily, and represents nothing as Good but what proceeds from Objects; if therefore the Will were determin'd by it, it would neither be free nor always able to please itself. For the Understanding often represents all external things as sad and unprosperous, and could never make us take natural Evils, such as Death, Labours, Torments, for real Good, tho' it might induce us to bear them in prospect of a farther End. But to endure a thing in view of a farther End, is to undergo present Misery in hopes of future Happiness; *i. e.* to weigh a present Evil against a future Good, and of two Evils to choose the less, which Reason indeed persuades us to do, since it is necessary that it should be done: but this helps nothing towards a Vindication of the Divine Goodness, which has imposed this Necessity upon us: nor can he be happy by the Judgment of his own Understanding, who must undergo these things. But if it be granted that things please us, not because the Understanding judges them to be eligible, but because we resolve to exercise our Free-Will in performing them, even these will become agreeable by Election, and the Understanding will perceive them to be made so, and not make them to be so. 'Tis not therefore the Office of the Understanding to govern the Will, but to discover means for the attainment of that which is chosen, and to give warning when it chooses such things as are absurd or impossible: For the Understanding, as we said before, judges that to be good which is agreeable to our Choice, except this lead us into Absurdities. In order therefore to avoid Absurdities, we make use of the Understanding as a Monitor, not a Master.

And from hence, I think, it appears how inconvenient it would be for the Choice to depend in all cases upon the Understanding. For since the Judgment of the Understanding depends upon the Objects themselves, and the natural congruity which they bear to the Appetites; if the Choice were to be determin'd by its Judgment, 'tis evident that we must necessarily want a great many things which the Understanding judges to be good, and could never hope for solid Happiness, (88.)
since

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(88.) That is, if every thing which the Understanding represented as good in itself, made a necessary Part of my Happiness, I should be always unhappy, since I could never attain to all the Good I saw. Whereas by this Power of willing, I cut off several of these apparent Goods,

since Objects are fix'd, as we said before*, and can never answer to our natural Appetites in every Particular. In order therefore to the attainment of continual Happiness, it was necessary that we should be able to please ourselves in some respect, independently of the Understanding, and by Election to constitute those things good and agreeable to us, which the Understanding, if there had been no such Election, would have pronounced offensive, disagreeable and painful: From hence it appears how fit it is that this Power should be freed from the Government of the Understanding; but if it is freed, it could not be determin'd by it.

The Goodness and Wisdom of God being equal to his Power, hinders him from choosing amiss.

XIV. Fourthly, It is to be observ'd that the Divine Power is Infinite, and that there are innumerable things possible to it, which are repugnant to one another, and destructive of each other, and cannot by any means be consistent. If therefore God should act according to the Infinity of his Power, without any regard to his other Attributes, he would effect nothing at all, or else immediately destroy what he had effected. His infinite Wisdom and Goodness therefore gave bounds and restraint to his Power, which would otherwise confound every thing; and these must of necessity be equally Infinite with his Power, otherwise infinite Evils must certainly arise from infinite Power. But a Creature, as his Elective Power necessarily extends farther than his Wisdom and Goodness, is made naturally liable to fall sometimes into Evils. 'Tis well known that Mathematicians sometimes suppose a Line to be infinite in which they may take a Point wherever they please. Now since our Election may be made as we please,

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Goods, and only make such to be constituent parts of my Happiness as I choose, and if I chose only such as I could obtain, I might be always Happy. This Proposition, *viz. that all Good does not make an Essential Part of our Happiness, because we do not will it*, is asserted by Mr. Locke †; and well urg'd as a Reason why the greater Good does not absolutely determine the Mind: and the same, I think, might as justly be affirm'd of *Pain*, viz. That the removal of all Pain does not make a part of our present Happiness, since we do not always absolutely *will* or *desire* to remove it. But on the contrary choose to bear it, and by that Choice, often produce a Pleasure, which does more than counterbalance it. See C. 5. §. 2. par. 6. and Note 65.

* Sect. 1. Subject. 3. par. 2.

† Chapter of Power, §. 43.

please, the Wisdom and Goodness whereby it is to be govern'd, ought to be infinite: for if the Line be finite, a Point may be pitch'd upon beyond it: and in like manner, if the Goodness and Wisdom be finite, the Choice may be made without and beyond them, that is, amiss. But since all created Wisdom and Goodness must necessarily be finite, it follows that there wants a sufficient restraint upon Elections, and that every *free* Creature is necessarily *defectible*. As then all created Beings are necessarily imperfect in general so every one has its own peculiar Defect. And this kind of Imperfection, *viz.* the Power of Sinning, is proper and peculiar to such as enjoy Free-Will: nor can they be conceiv'd separate from each other, any more than Contrariety from Motion. (89.)

XV. From hence it appears that a Faculty of pleasing itself by Election cannot be determin'd to Good by *Objects*, in the same manner as the Sight is to Light, or Taste to Savours, (since Goodness is not always an absolute Quality in things, like Light and the Objects of Sense) nor by the *Understanding*, since many things must be chosen in which the Understanding can perceive no manner of Good, except that they are capable of being chosen, and when chosen please, because they exercise the Faculty. And tho' the Objects of Election are not Infinite, yet there are infinite respects in which Good or Evil may be produced: There's need then of infinite Wisdom and Goodness to direct the Choice, lest it deviate into Evil. Since therefore a Creature endow'd with Wisdom is finite, it is not possible but that it may sometimes do amiss in choosing.

But Man may choose amiss since his Goodness and Wisdom neither are nor can be adequate to his Power.

XVI. Fifthly,

N O T E S.

(89.) As Motion without Contrariety would be of no use, so Liberty without a Power of doing amiss, if such a thing were possible, would be of no value: it would not have the good Effects and Ends for which Liberty was given: particularly it would not be attended with the happy consciousness of *Desert*, or the Idea of receiving a Benefit, by way of reward, conferr'd upon us for having done what was right and good, and what we might as easily have not done. From which Idea, as inclu-

ding *Self-Approbation*, &c. we frequently feel a far more exquisite Pleasure, than from the intrinsic Value of the Benefit itself: Nay, without this Idea, to be loaded with Favours would prove even an Uneasiness to a generous Mind. This Notion will be farther explain'd and vindicated in the following Subsection; but for the Truth of it we must appeal to the constant Experience of the ingenuous part of Mankind.

XVI. Fifthly, If the Will was confin'd to the Choice of those things only which the Understanding declares to be good, or was restrain'd from choosing till the Goodness of the Objects were apparent, we must of necessity hesitate in many things, and be anxious and solicitous in all. For since things are connected together by a long chain of Consequences, it is impossible for us to form a right Judgment of the absolute Goodness of them, without a foreknowledge of these Consequences: we must therefore have been oblig'd to use all possible Disquisition before every Election, and suspend the Choice where any suspicion of Error or ground of Doubt should appear: But such a Disquisition and continual Solitude would be a greater Bar to Happiness than many Errors and natural Inconveniencies. For if the Will can produce Good to itself by choosing, the Errors and Inconveniencies to which it is expos'd by a bad Choice, may be compensated by the Pleasure which arises from the Sense of Liberty. But if we were oblig'd to all possible Enquiry, more inconvenience would be felt from that Oligation, than from some Errors in Election; nor would all of them be by this means avoided; for after all possible Examination, a finite Understanding may be deceiv'd. Evil Elections are to be avoided on account of the Uneasiness consequent upon them, if therefore such a Disquisition as is necessary to discover the Good, and a Suspension of the Elective Faculty till that Good be discover'd, would bring greater Uneasiness than some wrong Elections, a Man will be more happy with a Power of doing amiss, than if he were oblig'd to wait for the determination of the Understanding in every Case. For it is better that some Persons should sometimes do amiss, and suffer Uneasiness from the Conscience of having done so, than that all Men should in every Case be always afraid, uncertain, and solicitous, nay generally cease from all manner of Action.

XVII. Such is the Nature of our Will that it can please itself in Election, and by its own Power make the things chosen agreeable, tho' in themselves disagreeable to the Appetites. And tho' this cannot be done at all times, and in every Object, yet it is better to run the hazard, than to be deprived of so useful a Faculty, or to be restrain'd from Election till an imperfect Understanding, such as that of Man necessarily is, were clearly convinced of that Impossibility.

It

'Tis better to be sometimes deceiv'd with Pleasure, than to be always solicitous.

'Tis better to be in danger of Sinning, than to cease from Election.

It is therefore convenient for us to derive our peculiar and chief Happiness from the Will itself; for if it depended on the Understanding, it would come with Difficulty, Pains and Anxiety, and we could seldom enjoy it pure and unmix'd. 'Tis better therefore for us to be able to please ourselves without a long Speculation of Antecedents and Consequences, tho' with a danger of Sinning, than to cease from Election, and be restrain'd from the Exercise of our Faculties, till a whole train of these were perfectly apparent, which if it could be at all, yet would not be without Pain and Anxiety, as any one will find that tries. (90.)

SUBJECT.

NOTES.

(90.) All that *Bayle* objects to this*, is taken from the Nature of Good Angels, and Glorified Souls, who, according to him, are no less happy in themselves, nor perform a less acceptable Service to the Deity for the want of it; and why therefore might not we?—To what was observ'd about the Inconclusiveness of all such Arguments as are drawn from Beings of a different Order in Note 46, we shall here add, first, that it is more than we are oblig'd to grant, that either Angels or Saints in Heaven are absolutely devoid of Liberty. They may have more clear Impressions of Good and Evil on their Minds, more enlarged Understandings, fewer and less Temptations, &c. without being less free †; nay they must be more free, the more they are so qualify'd ‖. This way of reasoning therefore proceeds upon a false, or at least uncertain Hypothesis.

Secondly, Tho' it should be granted that these glorious Beings, supposing them all necessary, might have as ample Knowledge, as ardent Love of the Divine Perfections, and consequently be as happy in the Enjoyment of God and themselves, as if they were all free; tho' they might have no occasion to see or experience Vice, in order to their being fully ac-

quainted with the Excellence of Virtue, and made sensible of the Infinite Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of the Deity, shewn in the Government and Suppression of the former, and in the Production and Improvement of the latter: Tho, I say, these exalted Beings could be supposed to have a thorough Intuition of all the Attributes of God without any such manifestation of them in his Works; (against which Notion see *D'Oyly's First Dissertation*, C. 8. and *Conclusion*, p. 123.) yet it does not seem possible for such imperfect Creatures as we are, to attain unto this excellent Knowledge, and enjoy the happy Effects of it on any other Terms than the present; we could not sure have had so lively an Idea of the *Mercy* of God, if there had never been any proper Objects of it. We could not have been so thoroughly conscious of our Dependency or Danger; nor had so grateful a sense of our constant Support, our frequent Deliverances, nor consequently have arrived to so great a degree of Happiness, either in this Life or the next, by any other Method, as will be further shewn in Notes 103, and 108. Either then these Happy Beings are still perfectly free, which Freedom constitutes the greatest part of their Happiness; and let any

* See his *Answer to the Quæris of a Provincial*, and *Crit. Di& Article Marchionites*, Remark F. &c.

† See *A. Bp. Daws's 5th Sermon*. p. 73, 74.

‖ See the beginning of Note 95.

S U B S E C T. III.

Why God does not interpose his Omnipotence, and occasionally restrain the Will from depraved Elections.

More and greater Evils would arise from thence, than from the abuse of Free-Will.

I. **T**IS evident from what has been said, that it was agreeable to the Divine Goodness to have created Free Agents, for without these the System of Nature would have been imperfect: nor could their Actions have been determin'd to Good by any natural Propensity or Limitation, in the same manner as the Senses are limited by Objects: But yet it is certain that they depend upon God for their Actions, and if he should suspend his Influence, they would not act at all. Since therefore he could so easily hinder the abuse of Liberty, why does he suffer it? Why does he not restrain Elections when they tend to Vice and Absurdity? We grant that this Objection cannot be satisfactorily answer'd, otherwise than by shewing that more and greater Evils would befall the Universe from such an Interposition, than from the abuse of Free-Will. In order to which it is to be consider'd,

It would be as much Violence to prevent the Action of Free-Will, as the

II. In the first place, That this cannot be effected without *Violence done to Nature*. 'Tis allow'd that Elections ought to be free, and that thinking Beings cannot otherwise be happy: God himself in creating them has determin'd, as it were by a Law, that they should

Motion of the Sun.

N O T E S.

any Man try to prove the contrary; or at least they once were so, in order to their greater Perfection, and are now only alter'd by being translated into another State, and put out of farther Tryal; and consequently they belong to our Author's third Expedient, which will be examin'd in Subsect. 5. to which we must refer the Reader.

should be free. For by giving them a Nature endow'd with Choice, he allow'd them to make use of it. They cannot therefore be hinder'd without Violence done to the Laws of the Creation. I grant that God can dispense with the Laws of Nature; but who will require or allow this to be done frequently? The bounds of this World, and the number of Thinking Beings are unknown to us, but we believe that the System of Nature will endure for ever. Now as all things depend upon the Will of God, we cannot have any other Security of our Happiness, and of the Duration of the World, than the Divine Constancy and Immutability: the Universal Laws of Nature are the Assurances of this Constancy, and upon them does the Security and Happiness of the whole Work depend. It is not therefore to be expected that God should lightly dispense with these Laws, much less alter them by his Omnipotence every Moment. Since then it is provided by an Universal Law, that Free Agents should procure to themselves Happiness by the use of Election, and it is impossible but that these, being left to themselves, should sometimes fall into depraved Elections, would it not be an Infringement and a Violation of this Law, if God should interpose and hinder the use of that Faculty which by the Law of Nature he had established? We dont expect that the Situation of the Earth, or Course of the Sun, should be alter'd on our account, because these seem to be things of great Importance, and we apprehend it to be unreasonable, that, for our private Advantage, the Order and Harmony of things should be chang'd, to the detriment of so many Beings. But to alter the Will, to stop Election, is no less a Violation of the Laws of Nature, than to interrupt the Course of the Sun. For a Free Agent is a more noble Being than the Sun, the Laws of its Nature are to be esteem'd more sacred, and not to be chang'd without a greater Miracle. There would then be a kind of Shock and Violence done to Nature, if God should interfere and hinder the Actions of Free-Will; and perhaps it would prove no less pernicious to the Intellectual System, than the Sun's standing still would be to the Natural. His Goodness therefore does not suffer him to interpose, except when he foresees that the Evils arising from our depraved Elections are greater than those which would ensue upon an

Interruption of the Course of Nature, which he only can know who knows all things. (91.)

God by interposing in the Elections of his Creatures, would quite invert the Method of treating Free Agents.

III. Secondly, Such an Interruption as this would not only do Violence to Nature, but quite invert the Method of treating Free Agents. This Method is to hinder or excite Elections by Rewards and Punishments: To divert them from unreasonable or absurd things, and draw them to better by the persuasion of Reason. But it is doubtful, whether the Nature of the thing will permit an Election to be determin'd by Impulse, or, as it were, by immediate Contact. For it seems equally absurd to attempt a change of Election by any other means than those above mention'd, as to desire to stop the Impetus of Matter by Intreaty, or offering Rewards. May we not with the same reason expect that Matter should be moved by Rewards and Punishments, as the Will influenc'd by *Physical Impulse*, as they call it? For it is by these Means that they would have God to stop or alter the Choice. So preposterous an Interposal would con-
found

N O T E S.

(91.) By this last Concession our Author evidently allows that God may sometimes have sufficient reason to interpose in matters relating to our Elections (tho' perhaps he never acts upon the Will by *Physical Impulse*, or irresistibly, which will be consider'd in the next Subsection) his Design therefore is only to shew that this ought not to be done frequently, or as often as Men choose amiss. Now this may be illustrated in the same manner as we treated of the Laws of Motion, &c. That there are general Mechanic Laws in the Natural World, the Establishment and Preservation whereof tends more to the Happiness of the Creation, and is every way more worthy of the Deity, than to act always by *particular Wills*, was shewn in Note 37. If these Laws were frequently alter'd and unfix'd, they would cease to be Laws, and all Action, Labour, Contrivance which depends upon the Stability, and computes the future Effects of them, must cease, or at least prove insignificant. In like manner *Liberty* has been proved to be an Universal Law of Intellectual Beings, and the great Use and Excellence of it evinc'd, and

therefore we have equal reason to suppose that it could not be, at least not frequently, suspended, without as great Inconvenience as would attend the Violation of these Laws of Mechanism. If this were done in the Rational World, all Studies, Enterprizes, Arguments; in short, all kind of Reasoning would be vain and useles, all rewardable Action, and its concomitant Happiness (of which in Note 89, and more below) must entirely cease. Nay, perhaps to deprive a rational Being of Free-Will, would be altogether as absurd and inconvenient, as to endow a Machine with Reflection, or an Edifice with Self-motion. But our great Ignorance of the Intellectual World must render any Argument of this kind very uncertain. However, thus much we are sure of, that so great Violence done to the Will, would be directly contrary to the general Method of God's treating reasonable Creatures, and quite opposite to the end of all those Manifestations he has made of his Nature and Will; the very Reverse of all those Arguments, Exhortations, Promises and Threats, which are the Subject of Reveal'd Religion: a
Man

found every thing, and leave nothing certain in Nature. How fatal such an Experiment would be, and how it would effect the Minds of the Observers, or what Suspicions concerning God and their own Security, it might suggest to the whole System of thinking Beings, God only knows. We see that human Laws cannot be dispens'd with, without very many Inconveniencies, which yet, as they are made upon an imperfect Foresight, and can provide for few Cases, seem naturally to require some Interposal: how much greater Evils may we apprehend from a Dispensation with the Divine, the natural Laws; on the Observance of which the Good of the whole depends? This seems to be the reason why God makes use of so much Labour and Pains, so great an Apparatus of Means, (92.) so many Precepts, Persuasions, and even Entreaties for the Amendment of Mankind; which nevertheless he could effect in a Moment, if he were pleas'd to apply force; and he would undoubtedly do it, if he had not foreseen more Inconveniencies from a Change in the Order of Nature, and Violence done to Elections.

IV. Thirdly, That which gives us the greatest Pleasure in Elections, is a Conscioufness that we could have not chosen; without this 'tis no Choice at all: but such is the Nature of us rational Beings, that nothing pleases us but what we choose. In order therefore to make any thing

He would take away that which is the most agreeable to us in Elections, viz. a Conscioufness that we might have not chosen.

N O T E S.

Man that believes any thing of these (upon the Belief of which I am now arguing) can never imagine that they are all made use of to no purpose, as they must be in a great measure, if the Will could be over-ruled occasionally without any considerable Inconvenience. This is what our Author endeavours to prove in the following Paragraph.

(92.) The History of the Jewish Nation affords good Instances of this. What an apparatus of outward Means was continually made use of in the Government of that stiff-necked People? What frequent Murmuring, Rebellions and Apostacys were permitted, and then

punish'd? What numerous Miracles, both of the remunerative and vindictive kind were apply'd, in order to bring them to some tolerable sense of their dependence on God, and a suitable practice of the Duties resulting from it? All which would have been unnecessary at least, if one Miracle exerted on their Minds could have done the business; if their Understandings could as well have been illuminated and their Wills reform'd at once, and if their Practice produced by this means, and as it were, extorted from them, would have been equally agreeable to the Deity.

thing agreeable to us, 'tis necessary for us to be *conscious* that we choose it voluntarily, and could have refused it: But if God determine our Election extrinsically, the most agreeable Part of all is taken away. For we must either be conscious that God determines our Will or not; if we be conscious, how can that be agreeable which is obtruded on us by force? If we be not, we are deceiv'd in the Operations of our own Minds; neither can we know whether the Elections be our own or God's. Nay the force of Laws, together with the Efficacy of Rewards and Punishments, would be quite destroy'd. For who would regard Laws or Rewards, when he was certain that God would hinder him from doing any thing which might occasion the Loss of Rewards, or make him incur the Punishments? But however this be, 'tis very certain that our greatest Pleasure, nay our very Reward, consists in being conscious that we have used our Choice aright, and done those things which we might have not done, and which another under the same Circumstances would perhaps not have done. On the other hand, 'tis the greatest Grief and Affliction to have omitted such things as would have tended to our Happiness, and were in our Power: one of these could not be had without the other, and if none were suffer'd to grieve for a bad Election, none would rejoice for a good one. But it is better that some few should grieve for their own folly, than that all should be deprived of the Rewards of their good Actions. That Privilege then of doing well, and pleasing ourselves in what is well done, could not be had without the hazard of Sinning; if God should take away the one, the other would vanish of itself.

But you would have the Pleasure which arises from Election without the Danger; that is, the End without the Means: Neither do you observe that the greatest Pleasure in this Case is, that you could have done otherwise: and this arises from the very Nature of Pleasure, which seems to be nothing else but *a Sense of the Exercise of those Faculties and Powers which we enjoy*. The more therefore any Action is *ours*, the more it pleases us; and since a Free Action (which we could either exert or omit) is the most of all ours, it must necessarily please us most: But if the Will were confined to one Side, or detain'd from the other, the Action would cease to be ours, and the Pleasure

Pleasure would perish together with the Sense of Liberty. A Mind conscious of Virtue is the Pleasure and Reward of good Actions, but unless it were possible for it to become conscious of Vice, 'tis plain it cannot be conscious of Virtue. (93.)

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NOTES.

(93.) In opposition to what our Author has here advanc'd, *Bayle* * brings a great many Arguments drawn from the Tenets of *Calvinists*, *Spinozists*, &c. who believe that all their Actions are necessarily determin'd, and yet are no less pleas'd with them. Nay some, says he, rejoice in this very thing, that they are under the absolute Direction of the Deity. *Dij me tuentur* --- †, and to be naturally determin'd to the best was always look'd upon as a peculiar Happiness, and they that came nearest it were esteem'd the best Men, as the known Compliments to *Cato* and *Fabritius* declare. Some are as well pleas'd with what they have by Lot or Inheritance, as what they get by their own Labour: Witness the Pride of antient Families, &c. *Gaudeant bene nati*—is a common Proverb, and among the Things—*quæ vitam faciunt beatiorum*, *Martial* reckons *Res non parva Labore sed relicta*. And again: If, says he, we did take delight in choosing things, yet it would be enough for us if God conceal'd his determination from us, and we only believ'd that we were free to choose and act. ---

We need not, I think, spend much time in answering such Arguments as these. For the *Calvinists*, &c. notwithstanding all their absurd Tenets, have evidently this Consciousness of Choice within them, which is the secret source of the Pleasure that attends their Actions, and cannot be extinguish'd by any of their Principles, but overcomes them all, and constantly puts these Men upon such Endeavours as are vain and useless upon the Supposition, and inconsistent with the Belief of Fate and absolute Predestination: which shews us that these Notions are neither acted upon in Life, nor pursued to their utmost Consequences; that they

rest in pure Speculation, and are generally laid aside in Practice; in short, that they are absolutely inconsistent with human Nature, as well as human Reason.

Secondly, Some Persons may rejoice in being under the particular Care, Protection and Government of the Deity; but then their Joy proceeds not so much from a bare Contemplation of what the Deity does for them, as from considering on what account he does it, viz. because they are agreeable to him, and proper Objects of his Favour, and that on account of something which they themselves have done. If *Horace* meant otherwise by his *Dij me tuentur*, he had small reason for what he adds in the next Line, *Diis Pietas mea & Maja cordi est*. But in truth this and most other of *Bayle's* Testimonies are Rhetorical or Poetic Flourishes, rather than Philosophic Truths, and consequently not worth a serious Examination. To draw any thing like an Argument from another's Words, we should at least be sure of his determinate Meaning, of the precise number of his Ideas, as well as the justness of their Connection together, which we must never expect from such kind of random Quotations. It may not therefore be improper to observe here once for all, that *Bayle's* usual Method of reasoning from Authorities must be very weak and unphilosophical; and calculated rather to blind Mens Eyes, than to inform their Understandings.

Thirdly, We are pleas'd indeed with what we call *Good Fortune*, when a great Sum of Money comes to us by Lot, or a large Estate, or a Title by Inheritance; and are perhaps the more delighted, the greater the Change is in our Circumstances; and the less Expectation

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* Answer to the Queries of a Provincial, p. 665. Fol.

† *Horace*, B. 1. Ode 17.

You may urge, that you had rather want this Pleasure than undergo the Danger; that is, you had rather be a Brute than a Man: neither could you by this means avoid these natural Evils which you dread so much as foolishly to wish yourself a Brute, lest you should fall into them. But supposing it were convenient for you to be a Brute, yet it could not be convenient for all Nature: The System of the Universe required free Agents: without these the Works of God would be lame and imperfect; his Goodness chose the Benefit of the Universe rather than that of yourself; especially when this is better for you too, tho' you be so ungrateful as not to confess it.

V. Fourthly, As it would be prejudicial to Man, to all Nature, for God to hinder bad Elections by his absolute Power, so nothing can be conceiv'd to be more disagreeable to himself. We have said that

Free Agents are placed as it were out of the reach of Divine Power, the lights.

Government of these therefore is the proper Exercise of the Divine *Wisdom*, wherein God de-

N O T E S.

we had of it †. But is this Pleasure comparable to that Intellectual or Moral Pleasure, that sublime Satisfaction and Self-complacency, which we feel upon acquiring a like Sum of Money by some laudable Act, or egregious Undertaking, that may properly be call'd *our own*? Is it equal to that solid Comfort, and Self-approbation which every ingenuous Mind is sensible of from his doing what *deserves* an Estate or Title, and receiving these as the proper Remuneration and due Tribute of such Deeds? The Man that can value himself more upon his Descent from an antient Family, than upon being by these means the Founder of a new one, is a disgrace to his Descent, and unworthy of the Arms he bears. But to return:

There is undoubtedly an agreeable and exalted Consciousness attending all the Blessings which we ourselves are instrumental in procuring, infinitely beyond all the Satisfaction which they could afford us, if we knew ourselves to be unconcern'd in the Attainment, and unworthy of the Enjoyment of them.

This is the great Spur and Incitement to many noble Actions here, and will be part of the Crown and Reward of them hereafter (as is illustrated at large by Dr. Scott in the first Vol. of his *Christian Life*, and by Dr. Jenkin, in his *Reasonableness of Christianity*, 2d vol. C. 12. prop. 2.) And tho' we cannot properly merit any thing at the hand of God, yet the Consciousness of having perform'd such Actions as are in themselves acceptable to, and rewardable by him, and of receiving Blessings from him in return for such Actions, must very much increase our Happiness in the Enjoyment of these Blessings, both in this World, and the next (as is shewn in the same places) Nor, lastly, could we receive this Pleasure which now results from our Choice and Action, if we were determin'd in every thing by the Deity, supposing that Determination conceal'd from us, and we only made to believe that we were really free to choose and act. For, as our Author observes, this would be to

† See Note 30.

that God made the World in order to have something wherein to exercise his Attributes externally. His Power therefore exerts itself chiefly in one thing, and his Wisdom and Goodness in another. He exercised his Power in creating the World, and putting it into Motion; his Goodness and Wisdom in the Order and Agreement of things: But the Divine *Wisdom* seems to have set apart the Government of *Free Agents* as its peculiar Province. Herein it fully exercises itself, and acts up to its Infinity; for if it were finite it would not be equal to so great a Task. It does not seem a very extraordinary thing for God to be able to govern and absolutely direct such Beings as are merely passive, and deprived of all Motion of their own, whereby they might make any Resistance. For those things obey easily which do not move but when they are moved. Neither is there need of infinite Wisdom to govern them, for infinite Power, with a moderate use of Wisdom, would have been sufficient. That there might be a Subject therefore whereon the infinite Wisdom of God should display itself, he created Free Agents; which, being as it were put out of his Power and left to themselves, might act in a manner independent of his Will. 'Tis evident to any Person how much more difficult it is, and how much greater Exercise of Wisdom it requires to direct a Multitude of these to a certain End, and make them conspire to the common

NOTES.

to arrive at the End without the Means, and to have the Effect without the Cause. All our Ideas of Merit arise from, and are entirely founded in *Free Choice*: this (as far as we can apprehend) is the necessary Medium to such Moral Happiness; and we can no more conceive how one should come without the other, than how we should see without Eyes: and for us to have this Pleasure, tho' another did the Action, would be the same as for one Man to be conscious of his doing what some other really did, or for him to see by some other's Eyes. Such Suppositions as these would breed endless Confusion. For we must either know whether another did this Action or not; if we do know this, then how can we attribute that to ourselves, or pride ourselves in that which we know belongs

to another? If we do not know this, then how can we attribute to ourselves, or please ourselves in any thing? Since every thing in and about us may, for what we know, be done by another, and so we in reality may never deserve either praise or blame. The natural consequence of which is, that we might as well never aim at Desert, or strive to do any thing at all: and this is the genuin Product of all such Suppositions as question the Veracity of our Faculties, and would make us suspect that we may be imposed upon even in the regular Operations of our own Minds. The same Arguments with those of *Bayle*, as well as the like method of reasoning, are made use of by the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, &c. p. 98, &c. and p. 71, 72. Where he thinks,

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common Good, than to order Brute Beasts, and such as have no Power of themselves, in what manner you please. To them that consider the vast Multitude of Free Agents, which is almost infinite, and their Independence (since every one is, at least in many Cases, absolute Master of his own Actions, and is permitted by God to act according to that Liberty) God seems to have given a Specimen of the Extent of his Wisdom, which is able thus certainly and effectually to bring to the End proposed, so many Free Spirits, so many Agents that were in a manner set at Liberty from his Dominion, and committed every one to his own Government. Here is the proper place for Wisdom, wherein (setting aside, and in a manner suspending the Exercise of his Power) he attains his Ends by Prudence only, by mere Dexterity of acting, and brings it to pass, that so many jarring Wills depending on themselves alone, and no more inclined to either Side by the Divine Power, than if there were no such thing, shall yet conspire together to promote the Good of the Universe. 'Tis impossible that this Exercise of Wisdom should not be very agreeable to the Deity, if any thing in his Works may be esteem'd agreeable to him. But if he were oblig'd to interfere with his Power, that would seem to argue a Defect of Wisdom; for what occasion is there for him to interpose and stop the Liberty of Election before granted, if his Wisdom could provide sufficiently for the Good of the whole, without altering his Design*?

VI. From

N O T E S.

“ It may not be improper to observe, that
 “ some of the Pleasures Man receives from
 “ Objects are so far from being the Effect of
 “ Choice, that they are not the Effect of the
 “ least Premeditation, or any Act of his own,
 “ as in finding a Treasure on the Road, or in
 “ receiving a Legacy from a Person unknown
 “ to him.” But has a Man the same Pleasure
 in these Cases as if he had done something to
 deserve a Treasure of the Public? or had the
 Legacy conferr'd on him as a Reward for his
 good Deeds to the deceased Person, his late
 lov'd Beneficiary, or his intimate Friend? If
 this Author can find a difference in these two
 Cases, this Observation of his must be improper:
 if he cannot, I am sure he has a different
 Sense of things from the rest of Mankind, and
 of consequence is not to be argued wth. And
 so I take my leave of him.

* See Dr. Jenkin, 2d Vol. Ch. 12. p. 240. &c.

VI. From hence it seems sufficiently evident why God would not interpose his Power, or intermeddle with our Elections, since that could neither be advantageous to ourselves nor to the whole System, nor agreeable to God. 'Tis no wonder then that absolute Goodness permits Evil Elections, since for the most part they could not be prevented without greater Evils. But if that can ever be done, there's no doubt but God will take care that the very best shall be done. (94.)

It would therefore be neither agreeable to God, nor useful to us, that God should always hinder bad Elections.

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SUBJECT.

NOTES.

(94.) What has been urg'd in the foregoing Subsection about the Divine Interposition in human Elections must be understood in a limited Sense, viz. as relating only to an immediate Influence, or an absolute Determination of the Will, i. e. to such an intermeddling with Elections as would make them to be no Elections at all. For it appears from the following Subsection, that our Author did not intend to exclude all kind of Interposition in the Government of Free Agents, but only that particular sort which would subvert their natural Powers, or be destructive of their Freedom. Tho' God has establish'd general Laws both in the animate and inanimate World; yet he has not left these entirely to themselves, but influences, directs, and governs them in such a manner as is most conducive to the great End for which he design'd them; which End could not be attain'd without such a particular Influence, as will be shewn below. In determining the manner of this Government we must beware of the two Extremes of supposing either first, that the Deity always influences second Causes or Acts (as Malebranche terms it) by particular Wills, in the Natural or Moral World; which would dissolve all Laws of Nature, destroy the Liberty of the Creature, and reduce every thing to Fate: or, secondly, that he never interposes in the Government of either World, but lets the general Laws of Mechanism or of Liberty take

their natural Course, and operate as it were independently of himself; which would entirely destroy a particular Providence, and render the general one in a great measure useless. The bad Consequences which would attend the former of these Schemes have been touch'd upon above: The latter (which is particularly espous'd by Leibnitz in his System of Pre-establish'd Harmony, and by Mr. Whiston in his New Theory of the Earth) will be obviated in the following Subsection. I shall here only add the Opinion of S. C. on the present Subject: " * 'Twas highly suitable to the Divine Wisdom in the Government of the World, both to pre-ordain some of the principal Events with relation to the entire human Community, or to the more considerable parts of it, and to reserve to himself a Right of interposing and influencing particular Agents, as in other Cases, so more especially in order to the accomplishment of these Events. That he has actually done so is abundantly clear from Scripture-Prophecys, and Histories. And that in so doing he has acted in a manner most worthy his Wisdom, is no less manifest. For hereby it appears that the Divine Government is equally opposed to Chance and Destiny. Had the Deity taken no Care of Futurity, but left every Man to the Conduct of his own Inclinations, and natural Effects in general to the Influence of their Causes, without ever interposing

* *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 115.

S U B S E C T. IV.

Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer.

Devout Men
hope for a
change in the
course of
Nature,
thro' their
Prayers.

I. **S**OME may apprehend that God is not so averſe from interpoſing immediately in the Affairs of this World as is here aſſerted; and that the Laws and Order of Nature are not of ſo great conſequence with him, but that he may be eaſily and frequently induced to diſpenſe with them contrary to what we have here advanc'd. For this ſeems to be the common Opinion of Mankind. Every Suppliant that addreſſes himſelf to God, believes that this is effected by the Deity, on account of his Prayers: for if he perceiv'd it to be otherwiſe, he could hope for nothing from the Prayers he offers to the Deity. For if all came to paſs according to the natural Order of things, and the Series of Cauſes, who could hope to be delivered from a Diſtemper or Calamity; from Evil Affections or Temptations, by

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“ interpoſing to direct them to the attainment
“ of his great Deſign; this would have been
“ almoſt in effect to divest himſelf of the Go-
“ vernment of Rational Agents, and to ſubject
“ their Affairs to Chance, and to the hazard
“ of the utmoſt Diſorder and Confuſion. Or
“ had he, on the contrary, abſolutely or fa-
“ tally determined every Event, tho' this
“ would have been far enough from divesting
“ himſelf of the Government of the World,
“ yet it would have been a Government un-
“ worthy of the Deity, a Government entire-
“ ly excluſive of all proper Sin and Punish-
“ ment, Virtue and Rewards: wherein him-
“ ſelf would in effect have been the only A-
“ gent, and all the Creatures ſtupid and paſſive.
“ Whereas, by pre-ordaining the moſt material
“ Events, and ſuffering the Creatures freely
“ to exert their Faculties in all convenient

“ Caſes, he appears moſt wiſely to have choſen
“ the middle way, and thereby to have equal-
“ ly avoided the Miſchiefs of both Extremes.”
See alſo p. 116.

All the Difference between this ingenious Writer and our Author is, that in the Govern- ment of the World he ſuppoſes the general Law of Liberty to be ſometimes ſuſpended, as well as the Laws of Motion, &c. Whereas our Author, tho' he aſſerts the ſame of the latter, yet he denies it of the former; at leaſt does not grant that ſuch an Abridgment of Liberty is neceſſary to the aforeſaid Government: How on this Principle he accounts for that which we generally mean by a *Particular Providence*, answering the Prayers, and thereupon often influencing and over-ruling the Affairs of Mankind, will be ſhewn in its proper place.

by virtue of a Prayer? These things are either effected by the immediate Interposition of the Divine Power, or are requested of God in vain. For if they depend upon their own proper Causes, which may not be alter'd, those Causes would produce their Effects, as well upon the omission as the offering of these Supplications. But if God sometimes vouchsafes to suspend or change the Order and Laws of Nature to gratify his Votaries; why may not the same be done to prevent the abuse of Free-Will and Natural Evils? Either this Interposition must be admitted in order to oppose these Evils, or it must be rejected with regard to Prayers. This Difficulty deserves an Answer. We attempt to solve it in the following manner.

II. 'Tis to be observ'd then, in the first place, that all *Prayers* are not heard by God, nor do we hope that all things shall be done which are requested of him, but only such as he has declared to be agreeable to his Will, and has in some respect promis'd to perform. Those things then which are unnecessary, trifling, inconsistent, hurtful or petitioned for in an unlawful Manner, are not to be expected by the Petitioners, tho' they be requested never so frequently. God does not hear all Prayers.

III. Secondly, God may be under a two-fold Obligation to his Creature, first from his Goodness, whereby he is oblig'd so to order all external things, that Existence shall be better than Non-existence to all who duely perform their Duty. Secondly, By some Covenant or Agreement, whereby he engaged, under certain Conditions, to bestow some Favours upon Men, notwithstanding they were Sinners: Which Covenant, tho' it may not be esteem'd a natural one, yet it cannot be judg'd to be against Nature, or to offer Violence to it. God is oblig'd to the Creatures, by his Goodness and by Covenant.

IV. Thirdly, The things which are requested of God either belong to the Mind, *viz.* that the Mind be sound and vigorous, and able to govern the Affections, &c. or to the Body, that Life and Strength be prolong'd, &c. or to external things, that the Weather be serene and seasonable for the Fruits of the Earth, &c. Now these differ from each other, and ought not to be prayed for under the same Conditions. What may be requested of the Deity relates either to the Mind, the Body, or external things.

V. Fourthly,

God does not give Assistance to our Minds at random, but under as certain Laws as those of the Natural World.

V. Fourthly, As to the Mind, since the Elective Power is the chief Part of Man, and is self-motive, 'tis scarce conceivable how it should be determin'd from without itself. For that which determines itself is entirely different from that which stands in need of another to move it, and these appear to be no more applicable to the same thing, than a Square and a Circular Figure are to the same Surface, at least, their Natures must be chang'd to make them compatible. But yet this Faculty, as well as others, may be vitiated by abuse and a perverse manner of acting, and when it is thus vitiated, 'tis probable that God only can restore it, for it is suppos'd to be subject to him alone.

This Assistance must be afforded to Mankind in such a manner that no blemish be thereby cast upon the Divine Constancy, nor any Prejudice done to his Wisdom in establishing the Laws and Order of Nature. Now that all kind of Interposition does not prejudice these, appears from hence, *viz.* that it is most worthy of the Divine Majesty to have reserved to himself a Power over Nature, especially while the Beings over whom this Power is reserv'd enjoy their Liberty; it seems not only proper that God should be at Liberty to act in this manner with them, but also necessary, provided this be not done at random, but under some known and certain Conditions. And here the Divine Wisdom has exerted itself in a wonderful manner, and devised a Way to reconcile the Constancy of God, and the Sanctity of the Laws of Nature, with that Assistance which is occasionally afforded to Mankind upon their Request. Man might presume upon some Method of effecting this, before Revelation: but 'tis to this alone that we owe the clear and undoubted Manifestation of it. From hence we learn that God will give his *Holy Spirit*, under some certain Laws and Conditions, to those that are fitly disposed: which would be as certain and constant a Principle of Spiritual Actions, to them that are endow'd with it, as Nature itself is of the Natural. Since therefore this Spirit by its Grace assists our depraved Will, and in some respect restores it to its Vigour, it cannot be judg'd to violate the Order of Nature, any more than when its Influence sustains natural Causes. If it be ask'd what those Laws are, under which the Influence of this Spirit is promised. I answer, all such things as are necessary

necessary to Salvation are promised to them who make a right use of their present Abilities,---that pray to God thro' *Christ* for an Increase of them,---and that celebrate the *Sacraments* as the Law of God requires. Upon these Conditions this Spirit descends into the Minds of Men, and by its holy Inspiration forms them to Piety.

VI. The giving of this Spirit, and obtaining it by Christ, was a most miraculous Work of Divine Power, but the Operations of it, since they are now produced according to fix'd Laws and a settled Order, as regularly and constantly as the Works of Nature, cannot be reckon'd a *Miracle* any more than these are: For I call a Miracle a sensible Operation of God, which is perform'd in a Way contrary to Nature; and as it happens beyond all certain and fix'd Order, it proves God to be the immediate Cause and Author: But the Interposition of the Divine Power exerted about the Will is not an Interposition of this kind, for it is done, as we said, according to a certain Rule and Order, and therefore cannot be miraculous. I confess that this is indeed an Exception from the general Law of Free Agents, (95.) but it is no less regular than the Law itself, nor any more

The Aid of the Holy Spirit is not miraculous.

NOTES.

(95.) He does not mean that this is an Exception from the Law of their *Liberty*, as appears from what immediately follows; but from their being left entirely to themselves, or to the casual Impressions of those external Objects and Agents which surround them; from their acting solely upon Principles of their own Formation or Discovery, and following the Guidance of their natural Understanding, without any internal Assistance: which seems to be the general Law of this their present State of Probation. The *Holy Ghost* then, according to our Author, does not subvert and supersede, but rather strengthen, preserve and perfect our natural Freedom; it repairs the breaches made therein by the Violence of Temptations, by the Force of Evil Habits, &c. counterbalances as it were the Influence of Evil Spirits, and restores the Mind to its native *Equilibrium*, or Indifference. How these Effects may be suppos'd to be produced in us, and of what kind the Influence of the

Holy Ghost, of Good and Evil Angels is, will be consider'd by and by. We shall first give the Opinion of an Author or two concerning what the Holy Spirit's Operations *are not*, or that they cannot be in any respect destructive of our natural Powers,

In the first place, "The manner of the Spirit's Operation is not inconsistent with the Nature of Mankind, which (says Dr. *Stebbing*) is a Truth so fully and so liberally granted by all Parties, that nothing needs to be said to prove it. Now Man we know is an *intelligent* and *rational* Being, able to discern between Good and Evil; he has also such a *Freedom* or *Liberty of Will* as makes him accountable to God for his Behaviour in this Life. By consequence the Spirit must not be supposed to operate in such a manner as not to make the least use of the Understanding, nor must it be so far inconsistent with Freedom and Liberty, as that

more repugnant to their Nature. From hence it appears how God may interpose in Matters relating to the Will, and yet not violate the Order of Nature, nor injure his Constancy. Not that God actually determines the Will by an immediate Influx, for by this means the Act of Election would change its Nature, and be imputed to God rather than to the Will of the Creature, but that in some manner he restores the Faculty to its Perfection, and makes it, when thus fitly dispos'd, exert its proper Actions according to the Rectitude of its Nature, without any Diminution of its Liberty.

VII. Fifthly,

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“ that a Man’s Actions may not properly
 “ be call’d his own *.” Again, “ such
 “ is the manner of the Spirit’s Operati-
 “ ons, that they do not make our own Care
 “ and Diligence after Virtue and Godliness
 “ unnecessary, but that on the other hand the
 “ Operations of the Spirit will do us no
 “ Good, if our own Endeavours be wanting.
 “ Thirdly, He does not produce his Effects
 “ in us all at once, but in such Order, and by
 “ those Degrees that suit with our Capacities
 “ and Qualification †. Lastly, His Motions
 “ are not discernable by us from the natural
 “ Operations of our Minds. We feel them no
 “ otherwise than we do our Thoughts and
 “ Meditations, we cannot distinguish them by
 “ the manner of their affecting us from our
 “ natural Reasonings, and the Operations of
 “ Truth upon our Souls, so that if God had
 “ only design’d to give the Holy Spirit to us,
 “ without making any mention of it in his
 “ Word, we could never have known, unless
 “ it had been communicated to us by some
 “ private Revelation, that our Souls are mo-
 “ ved by a Divine Power when we love God
 “ and keep his Commandments ||.”

This is a Confirmation of what our Author has declared above, particularly that the Holy Spirit’s Operations cannot be call’d *miraculous*. A larger Proof and Illustration of the forego-

ing Propositions may be seen in the same Chapter. The Consequence resulting from them, *viz.* that the Spirit does not operate *irresistibly*, is clearly proved and defended against *Turretin* in Chap. 8, 9, &c.

To proceed: “ It hath been the antient
 “ Opinion of the Church of God (says R.
 “ *Battell* **) that the Will is not destroy’d by
 “ Grace, but only repair’d. A dislocated
 “ Joint, when it is set again, doth not lose
 “ the Nature of a Joint, but rather is restored
 “ to its former use and comeliness, so the
 “ Grace of God healing the Will, doth not
 “ take away the Nature of the Will, but only
 “ makes it able to obey God’s Will. So that
 “ when God co-operates with the Will, Man
 “ is left in the hand of his own Council, to
 “ turn or not to turn to the Lord: God sets
 “ Life and Death before him, and bids him
 “ reach out his hand to whether he will.”

And again, p. 77. “ Neither Sin nor
 “ Grace take away the natural Power of the
 “ Will; but only thus it is, Sin hurts and
 “ weakens it, especially ill Habits; Grace
 “ heals and strengthens it, and brings it near-
 “ er to its primitive Goodness, &c.” This is
 very agreeable to what our Author asserts in
 the Conclusion of this Paragraph. See also
Scott’s Christian Life, Part 2. Ch. 4. par. 5.
 p. 237. “ God (says he) in the ordinary
 “ course

* *Treatise Concerning the Operations of the Spirit*, C. 7. p. 123. 8vo.

† *Ibid.* p. 124.

|| *Ibid.* p. 125, 126.

** *Vulgar Errors in Divinity removed*, p. 74.

VII. Fifthly, It may be demonstrated that the *Prayers* themselves have some natural Power and Efficacy with regard to the Will: For Prayers are certain Endeavours towards the Exercise of Liberty, and contain in them Acts of Election, tho' perhaps imperfect ones; and such is the Nature of all Powers, that they acquire Strength by trial and exercise, and every Act, tho' imperfect, is a Step to a more perfect

Prayers naturally tend to perfect the Mind.

NOTES.

“ course of his Government doth as well leave
 “ free Agents to the natural Freedom with
 “ which he first created them as necessary ones
 “ to these Necessities which he first impress'd
 “ upon their Natures. For his Providence is
 “ *succedaneous* to his Creation, and did at first
 “ begin where that ended, and doth still pro-
 “ ceed as it began, ordering and governing all
 “ things according to the several Frames and
 “ Models in which he first cast and created them.
 “ Nor can he order and govern them otherwise
 “ without unravelling his own Creation, and
 “ making things to be otherwise than he first
 “ made them. For how can he ordinarily ne-
 “ cessitate those Agents whom he first made free
 “ without changing their Natures from free to
 “ necessary, and making them a different kind of
 “ Being than he made them? So that tho' in
 “ the course of his Government God doth
 “ powerfully importune and persuade us, yet
 “ he lays no Necessity on our Wills; but leaves
 “ us free to choose or refuse; and as the Tempta-
 “ tions of Sin incline us one way, so the Grace
 “ of God inclines us another, but both leave us
 “ to our own Liberty to go which way we
 “ please.”

Lastly, what may be expected from the Spirit is (according to Dr. Rymers *) contain'd in these heads, 1st. Faith in its several Degrees. 2^{dly}. Support against Temptations. 3^{dly}. The promotion of Virtue. And, 4^{thly}, The Advancement of Piety. All which are produced as he there shews, in a manner perfectly consistent with the free use of our Faculties. I shall cite a Paragraph or two in relation to the 2^d and 3^d of these Heads. “ As the Spirit

“ never offers Violence to the Soul, it may
 “ sometimes happen that the Light it gives,
 “ the Importunity it uses, may be so far over-
 “ come by some glaring Vanity, or some noisy
 “ Passion, as not to be observ'd: But general-
 “ ly in Minds well prepar'd by its former In-
 “ fluence, it opposes the Delusions of Temptations with good Success, by bringing all
 “ the Arguments of Religion into view.—
 “ And as the Spirit may thus discountenance
 “ particular Temptations, it may likewise pre-
 “ serve us from all vicious Habits, by familiar
 “ Representations of the Reason and Nature
 “ of things, and by many secret Influences
 “ both on our Minds and Bodies; diverting
 “ dangerous Thoughts, and moderating such
 “ Appetites and Affections as usually tend to
 “ Vice, and often dispose us for it. On the
 “ contrary, 'tis easy to conceive how it may
 “ forward us in Virtue, by presenting to our
 “ Minds such Thoughts as lessen our Esteem
 “ for this World, and excite our Zeal for the
 “ other. The Apostle, when he bids us not
 “ quench the Spirit; represents it as a Flame
 “ that both lights and warms us; shews us
 “ useful Truths, and gives us a suitable Con-
 “ cern for them; and all this consistent with
 “ the Liberty of our Minds, p. 215, 216.”

See also Bp. Burnet on the 10th Article of the Church of England, and A-Bp. Tillotson's 169th Sermon. p. 455. vol. 3. or 147th Sermon. p. 310. 3d Edit. Fol.

If the foregoing Observations be true, it follows that the ordinary Operation of the Spirit cannot be any *Physical Influence*, or immediate Determination of the Will; it must therefore

* General Representation of Revocal'd Religion, C. 9. p. 210, 211.

fect one, till they have attain'd to a Habit and Facility of acting. The constant Exercise of Prayer may therefore tend, by a natural Efficacy, to restore the proper use of Free Will, and regain its native Vigour.

And to sub-
due the Affec-
tions.

VIII. Sixthly, The same may be said concerning the Government of the Passions and Affections, which constitutes so great a Part of human

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therefore be only a *Moral* Influence, or mediate, rational Determination. The manner of effecting this may be by injecting Ideas, representing Arguments, exhibiting Motives, and assisting the Understanding in its apprehension of them. This I think is all that Mr. *Wollaston* could mean by the Words *Suggestion, Impulse, or silent Communication of some Spiritual Being* ||: and seems to be the only intelligible Notion of the Influence of either Good or Evil Spirits: in which sense I believe that we are very frequently acted upon and over-ruled in order to promote the Good of the whole, and compleat the Designs of a particular Providence. The Author last cited has given us a fine Description of the manner in which this Government of Free Beings may be exercised and apply'd to the Ends above mention'd. "It is not impossible (says he*) that many things suitable to several Cases may be brought to pass by means of secret, and sometimes sudden Influences on our Minds, or the Minds of other Men whose Acts may affect us. For instance; If the Case should require that N should be deliver'd from threatening Ruin, or from some Misfortune which would certainly befall him, if he should go such a way at such a time as he intended; upon this occasion some new Reasons may be presented to his Mind why he should not go at all, or not then, or not by that Road; or he may forget to go; or if he is to be deliver'd from some dangerous Enemy, either some new turn given to his Thoughts, may divert him from going where the Enemy will be; or, the Enemy may after the same manner be

"diverted from coming where he shall be, or his (the Enemy's) Resentment may be qualify'd, or some proper Method of Defence may be suggested, or Degree of Resolution and Vigour excited. After the same manner, not only Deliverances from Dangers and Troubles, but Advantages and Successes may be confered. Or on the other Side, Men may, by way of Punishment for Crimes committed, incur Mischiefs and Calamities. I say, these things and such like may be. For since the Motions and Actions of Men, which depend upon their Wills, do also depend upon their Judgments, as these again do upon the present Appearances or Non-appearances of things in their Minds; if a new prospect of things can be any way produced, the Light by which they are seen alter'd, new forces and directions impress'd upon the Spirits, Passions exalted or abated, the Power of judging enliven'd or debiliated, or the Attention taken off, without any Suspension or Alteration of the standing Laws of Nature; then without that, new Volitions, Designs, Measures, or a cessation of thinking may also be produced, and thus many things prevented that would otherwise be, and many brought about that would not."—See also *Sherlock* on *Providence*, p. 51. 2d Edit. Again †, "That there may be possibly such Inspirations of new Thoughts and Counsels may perhaps appear farther from this, that we so frequently find Thoughts arising in our Heads, into which we are led by no Discourse, nothing we read, no clue of Reasoning, but they surprise and come upon us from we know

|| *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 106:

* p. 105.

† p. 107.

"not

human Felicity : we have shewn that the Elective Power is superior to all others, and has the Government of them, and that when the Mind is corrupted with Vice, the Will in a great measure falls from that Power which Nature gave it. Yet the inferior Affections of the Mind have not quite shaken off the Yoke, they still obey, tho' with some difficulty, but use and exercise are necessary to implant an Habit of Obedience in them. Since therefore Prayers contain in themselves an exercise of Election, they have a natural Efficacy to strengthen the Elective Acts, and by the same means accustom the Affections to obey : for a repeated Act augments the Power and overcomes Resistance. (96.)

L 1 2

IX. Seventhly,

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“ not what Quarter. If they proceed from the
 “ Mobility of Spirits stragling out of Order,
 “ and fortuitous Affections of the Brain, or
 “ were of the Nature of *Dreams*, why are they
 “ not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as
 “ they are ? ” Is it not much more reasonable
 to imagine that they come by the Order and
 Direction of an all-seeing and all-gracious God
 who continually watches over us, and disposes e-
 very thing in and about us, for the Good of our-
 selves or others ? Not to speak of the agreeable-
 ness of this Notion to the Opinions and Belief
 of the best and wisest Men in all Ages. The
 Consequence Mr. *Wollaston* draws from the
 whole is perfectly agreeable to the Scope of
 our Author. “ If this be the Case, as it seems
 “ to be, that Men’s Minds are susceptible of
 “ such Insinuations and Impressions as fre-
 “ quently by ways unknown do affect them
 “ and give them an Inclination towards this
 “ or that, how many things may be brought
 “ to pass by these means, without fixing and
 “ refixing the Laws of Nature, any more than
 “ they are unfix’d when one Man alters the
 “ Opinion of another, by throwing a Book
 “ proper for that purpose in his way ? ”

To the same purpose see *Scott’s Christian
 Life*, Part 2. Vol. 2. §. 1. p. 81, 82. Concer-

ning the Operations of the Spirit, as distin-
 guish’d into such as are *previous, concomitant,*
 and *subsequent* to our Conversion and Sanctifi-
 cation, see *S. Fancourt’s* Essay concerning *Li-
 berty, Grace, and Previdence*, Letter 2. §. 2. p.
 43. &c.

I hope the Reader will excuse us for in-
 sisting so long on this Point, since false No-
 tions concerning it have produced the most
 pernicious Consequences to Religion in gene-
 ral, as well as the principal Objections against
 our Author’s System.

(96.) *Prayer* puts us upon making good Re-
 solutions, and endeavouring to subdue our vi-
 cious Inclinations : it animates our Zeal, and
 enflames our Affections ; it exercises and im-
 proves our Faith, our Hope, and Charity ;
 and therefore is in itself a Means of strength-
 ning our Faculties, and removing all Impedi-
 ments to a due Exertion of them. It also
 makes us sensible of our strict Dependence on
 the Deity, of our manifold Wants, and the
 great Benefit of his Supplies, and of conse-
 quence it naturally fits us for them, and in-
 clines us to make a right use of them when we
 do receive them. “ It is not only a Means,
 “ (says Dr. *Barrow* *) by Impetration acqui-
 “ ring for us, but it is an effectual Instrument
 “ working

* First Vol. Fol. 1st Edit. p. 493:

The Actions of Free Beings will produce a contingency in material things, yet this does not offer any Violence to Nature.

IX. Seventhly, As to Material Objects, *viz.* our own Bodies and the Elements, 'tis plain that the intellectual World is more noble than the Material, and consequently that this latter was made for the sake of the former, and is subservient to its use: But since the Actions of Beings endow'd with Understanding and Will are free, and on that account contingent, they necessarily produce a Contingency also in material Substances which depend upon them. For we can excite certain Motions in our own Bodies, and communicate them to the adjacent ones, which Motions are not in this Case produced merely according to Mechanic Laws, but the direction of the Will.

Nor

NOTES.

“ working in us all true Good. It is the
 “ Channel by which God conveyeth Spiritual
 “ Light into our Minds, and Spiritual
 “ Vigour into our Hearts, It is both the
 “ Seed and the Food of Spiritual Life, by
 “ which all holy Dispensations of Soul, and
 “ all honest Resolutions of Practice are bred
 “ and nourished, are augmented and strengthened
 “ in us. It exciteth, it quickneth, it
 “ maintaineth all pious Affections. The love
 “ of God can no otherwise than by it be kindled,
 “ fomented or kept in Life (without it
 “ we certainly shall have an Estrangement and
 “ Aversion from him) it alone can maintain
 “ a constant reverence and awe of God, keeping
 “ him in our Thoughts, and making us
 “ to live as in his Presence. It chiefly enlighteneth
 “ and exerciseth our Faith in God; it is that
 “ which begetteth in us a savoury Relish of
 “ Divine things, which sweeteneth and endeareth
 “ to ourselves the Practice of Piety; which only
 “ can enable us with delight and alacrity, to obey
 “ God's Commandments: It alone can raise our
 “ Minds from the Cares and Concernments of
 “ this World to a sense and desire of Heavenly
 “ things. By it God imparteth Strength to
 “ subdue bad Inclinations, to restrain sensual
 “ Appetites, to compress irregular Passions;
 “ to evade the allurements to Evil, and the
 “ discouragements from Good which this
 “ World always presenteth; to support also
 “ with Patience and Equanimity, the many
 “ Crosses we must surely meet with therein.
 “ It is, in short, the only strong bulwark
 “ against Temptation and Sin; the only sure
 “ guard of Piety and a good Conscience.”
 “ God's End (says Mr. Chubb) in requiring
 “ this Duty of Prayer, is wholly and solely
 “ the Good and Benefit of his Creatures, *viz.*
 “ that it may be a Means to work in the
 “ petitioner a suitable frame and temper of
 “ mind, and to dispose him to a suitable
 “ Practice and Conversation, and so render
 “ him a suitable and proper Object of God's
 “ special Care and Love. For as Prayer is
 “ an Address or Application of a dependent
 “ Being to his supreme Governor and original
 “ Benefactor, so when this Duty is performed
 “ with seriousness and application of Mind,
 “ it naturally tends to work in Men an awful
 “ sense of the Being and Attributes of God,
 “ of our dependence upon him, and of the
 “ many Obligations we are under to serve
 “ him. It tends to awake in us a lively
 “ sense of the Sovereignty and Power, of the
 “ Knowledge and Wisdom, of the Holiness,
 “ Truth and Righteousness, of the Mercy and
 “ Goodness, and Loving-Kindness of the
 “ Lord. It naturally draws forth our Souls
 “ in filial Fear, in Hope and Trust, in Love,
 “ Delight, and Joy in God, and creates in us
 “ a just.

Nor would they have happen'd at the time or in the manner they do, if the Will had not by its own Liberty excited them. Neither do we suppose that any Violence or Disorder happens hereby to the Laws of Nature; for Nature itself has provided that the less should give way to the more noble, that is, local Motion to the Action of the Will, as being the more excellent of the two. We must believe the same concerning Agents of a superior Nature, and the more noble Order they are of, the greater Sphere of Action is to be attributed to them. Such little Creatures as we Men are, can convey Water in Canals, drain such Parts of the Earth as are naturally cover'd with Water, drown the Dry-Land, and produce a great many other Changes, both in the Earth, the Water and the Air, who then can affirm but that there may be other Agents who could change almost the whole Elements, if they were not prohibited by certain Laws? All who acknowledge the Existence of such Beings, are agreed that these things are possible; now it must be allow'd, that whatever is perform'd by these Beings is done according to the Laws of Nature, and that no manner of Violence is hereby offer'd to the Order of it, any more than by the Actions of our own Will.

X. Eighthly, And as all material Beings are connected together, and by mutual Influence act upon each other; *viz.* the Superior upon the Inferior, the Sun upon the Æther and the Moon, and that upon the Air, Water, and Earth; and perhaps, *vice versa*, so 'tis in like manner

There is a System of intellectual as well as material Beings, which act

as much upon each other.

N O T E S.

“ a just Concern to please him, and to ap-
 “ prove ourselves in his Sight; and conse-
 “ quently to put on that Purity and Piety,
 “ Humility and Charity, which is the Spirit
 “ and Practice of true Christianity. And as
 “ this is God's End in appointing this Duty,
 “ so for this End he requires the frequent Re-
 “ turns of it, that the Mind of the Petitioner
 “ may be habitually seasoned with a sense of

“ himself *. See also Ep. *Patrick's Discourse*
 “ concerning Prayer, Ch. 8 and 9.

These Effects and Uses of Prayer, most of which are discoverable by natural Reason, prove sufficiently, I think, that Prayer is a *natural Duty*. Concerning the *Efficacy* of it, and the manner whereby Providence may be supposed to answer our particular Requests, see the following Notes to this Subsection.

* *Chubb's Tracts*, p. 180, &c.

manner probable that there is a certain Order and System of intellectual Beings constituted, who are no less subordinate to one another, and operate upon each other by a mutual Influence, according to the Laws establish'd by Nature.

God makes use of the Ministry of Angels in the Government of Mankind, nor is this any Violence to Nature.

XI. Ninthly, There seems to be no reason why God should not make use of the Ministry of those Beings in the Government of this World * whenever it may be expedient. This we see is done in some measure upon our Earthly Globe. For he makes use of Men to govern other Animals, and some Men are set as Guardians over others. And as the Attendants of Princes and Judges perform their Office, not as they themselves please, but according to the Appointment of their Masters, or the Laws; so in like manner we are to believe that Agents more excellent than us (which we stile ministring Angels) discharge their Office according to the Laws prescribed by God. Suppose therefore this about assisting such as regularly apply to God, to be one of these Laws; let them be commanded to relieve those who make their humble Addresses to him, and let the manner of invoking him be prescribed by Nature, or some positive Law: Can it be doubted whether they would not as readily exert their Powers for the Assistance of these Supplicants, and as diligently discharge the Duty of relieving them, as a Judge's Officer, or a Prince's Servant performs the Commands of his Master? And so long as these things are done according to the general Order, and under such Conditions as are agreeable to Nature and Reason, they can be no more deem'd repugnant to the Order of Nature, or the Laws appointed for the Government of the World, than civil Government and the Laws among Men are. Here is nothing contrary to or inconsistent with the Laws of universal Nature: for it does not seem any more repugnant to these, that Angels should use their Powers for the Relief of such as pray to God, than that Men should help each other according to their Abilities. If it be granted that these things are so, it will be very apparent how our *Prayers* may have their Effect, and the desired Changes may be produced in our Bodies, and the Elements, without doing Violence to Nature, or disturbing the Order established by God. Nay it may be provided by a Law, that our Wishes be thus fulfill'd:

* See the *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 108, 109.

fulfill'd: and we need not declare how much this Power over external things granted by free Agents, may tend to raise our Affections and incline the Wills themselves. 'Tis very well known how great an Influence the Temperature of the Blood and Motion of the Spirits have over these. Since then our Bodies are by a Law of Nature capable of being moved by free Agents, at least when we desire it, 'tis not impossible but that by the Means of these Bodies, they may have Access to the Soul; and though they cannot act upon the Will immediately, yet they may indirectly excite it to exert its own Acts. (97.)

XII. Tenthly, There's neither any occasion nor room to explain how agreeable this is to Reason and the Holy Scriptures. Let it suffice to observe how large a Field is hereby open'd for Prayer, and how effectual it may be for obtaining the Assistance not only of God himself immediately, but also of his Ministers.

God is not oblig'd to take away the abuse of Free-Will, since he has establish'd a Method

of assisting his Worshipers.

It must be confess'd that God sometimes relieves the Distress'd, and when apply'd to, interposes in Matters relating to the Will: but these things are effected according to the Universal Law of Nature. And tho' this be superior to that which is implanted in the particular Nature of some Beings; yet it is no less natural with regard to the System of Universal Nature; neither are we to believe that this is often done, but only in Cases where a particular Nature cannot be left to itself without Detriment to the whole. Nor is God, because he sometimes vouchsafes to interpose and help the Suppliant, also oblig'd entirely to remove the abuse of Free-Will; that is, in reality, to destroy the Nature itself. By a Law of Nature, the Exercise of that Faculty belongs to such Agents as are endow'd with

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(97.) That is, as a Man is excited or inclin'd to any thing by a Prospect of the Pleasure or Pain which may attend the Prosecution or Omission of it; or, as we commonly say, by another's *working upon* his Passions, his Hopes, or his Fears: For that superior Beings act upon us in no other sense—that their Influence consists only in occasioning pleasant or disagreeable Ideas in us—in representing Arguments, Motives, &c. to us, may perhaps be gather'd from Note 95. And, I think, it must be allow'd that this is very consistent with that Physical Indifference, or absolute Freedom of the Will above described.

with it, and tho' that Law admit of an Exception, yet it cannot be quite abrogated, without greater Damage done to the whole than what may happen from the abuse of it. Nor is God obliged, because Prayers have their Effect with him, to relieve such as don't pray to him at all.

XIII. Eleventhly, This seems to establish the *Efficacy of Prayers* much better than their Opinion who hold that all is fix'd by God in a fatal Concatenation, and that such things as are requested of God, and seem to be obtain'd, are not in any respect owing to the Prayers, but that God has by his Foreknowledge join'd the Actions of the Will with corporeal Motions, in such a manner that they should happen together, but without any other relation to each other than what arises from his Pre-ordination, as appears in the Agreement between the Index of a Watch and the Sun.

For instance: God has pre-ordain'd a Storm from necessary Causes, and that some notorious Offenders shall be sailing in it; when they are in danger they shall repent and pray to God, and at length the Wind shall cease.

Thus a Calm ensues upon the Prayers of the Petitioners, but without any Connection or Dependence on each other, merely by the force of pre-dispos'd Causes, which do not require any Interposition of the Divine Power. (98.)

The

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(98.) The foremention'd Hypothesis of a pre-determin'd and necessary Connection between Corporeal Motions and the Operations of the Will, is advanc'd by *Leibnitz* in what is commonly call'd his System of the *Pre-establis'd Harmony*, which occurs in several of his Works, an account of which may be seen in *Fabricius* *. An Explanation of it by *G. Hanscius* may be found in the *Present State of the Republic of Letters*, Vol. 4. for Octob. 1729. There are some Objections against it in *Bayle's* Dict. Article *Rozarius*. Rem. L. — But as the

whole of it is built upon a Supposition that the Mind has not a Liberty of *Indifference*, and of consequence no proper Liberty at all, we need not spend any time in confuting it, having, I hope, sufficiently establish'd the contrary Principle above, and thereby remov'd the Foundation of it.

Mr. Whiston in particular has espous'd the Opinion which our Author alludes to, and enlarg'd upon it in the following Manner †.
 " Our Imperfection is such, that we can only
 " act *pro re nata*, can never know beforehand
 " the

* *Delectus Argumentorum*, &c. p. 387, &c.

† *New Theory*, B. 4. C. 4. Solution 87.

The Assertors of this Opinion are oblig'd from the common sense of Mankind to allow that God is to be invoc'd; and that such as duly offer up their Prayers have their Requests granted: but as they are of Opinion that things go by Fate, and that there is no room for *Contingency*, or a *particular Providence*, they have invented this Scheme that there might be, or at least might seem to be some room for Prayers. But all this is to no purpose: For since God has made Agents free, and allow'd them the use of Liberty, he must also have reserv'd to himself a Liberty of treating them according to what their Nature requires, which cannot be done without a peculiar Providence, and immediate Interposition; without these no Efficacy will be left to Prayer, no Worship to God, no Honour to Religion; For if the Production of those things which we request depend upon antecedent

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<p>“ the behaviour or actions of Men, neither “ can we foresee what Circumstances and Con- “ junctures will happen at any certain time “ hereafter. And so we cannot provide for “ future Events, nor predispose things in such “ a manner that every one shall be dealt with, “ or every thing done, no otherwise than if “ we were then alive and present, we should “ think proper and reasonable, and should ac- “ tually do. But in the Divine Operation it “ is quite otherwise. God's Prefcience ena- “ bles him to act after a more sublime man- “ ner, and by a constant Course of Nature “ and Chain of mechanical Causes to do every “ thing so as it shall not be distinguishable “ from a particular Interposition of his Power, “ nor be otherwise than on such a particular “ Interposition would have been brought to “ pass. He who has created all things, and “ given them their several Powers and Facul- “ ties, foresees the Effects of them all; at once “ looks thro' the entire Chain of Causes, Ac- “ tions and Events, and sees at what Periods, “ and in what manner 'twill be necessary and “ expedient to bring about any Changes, be- “ stow any Mercies, or inflict any Punish-</p>	<p>ments on the World. Which being unques- “ tionably true, 'tis evident he can as well “ provide and predispose natural Causes for “ those Mutations, Mercies or Judgments: he “ can as easily put the Machine into such Mo- “ tions as shall, without a Necessity of his “ mending or correcting it, correspond to all “ these foreseen Events or Actions, as make “ way for such Alterations afterwards by gi- “ ving a random Force to the whole: and “ when these two ways are equally possible, I “ need not say which is most agreeable to the “ Divine Perfections, and most worthy of “ God.” <i>And again:</i> “ * We pray to God “ for Fruitful Seasons, for Health, for Peace, “ for the Success of our Endeavours, for a “ Blessing on our Food and Physick, and de- “ precate the contrary Miseries from us. Yet “ at the same time we see the Seasons depend “ on the settled Course of the Sun, or other “ natural and necessary Causes; we find our “ Health or Sickness to be the proper Effects “ of our Dyet and Regimen: we observe Peace “ and War subject to the Intrigues of Princes, “ and the plain Results of visible Conjunctions “ in human Affairs: we know that worldly “ Prudence</p>
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* Ibid. *Corollary*, p. 562. 1st Edit.

tecedent, natural, and necessary Causes, our Desires will be answer'd no less upon the Omission than the offering up of Prayers. Vows and Prayers therefore are made in vain. If it be said that the Suppliants could not omit them, since they were pre-ordain'd. I answer: He that could omit them could not possibly offer them: his Omission therefore is not culpable: And he that is employ'd in Prayer to God undertakes a superfluous Office: for these Petitions in reality contribute nothing to the Effect, and no reason can be given why that should be required which is of no Benefit. (99).

XIV. 'Tis

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“ Prudence and Cunning has a main stroke in
 “ the Success of Mens Labours: we feel the
 “ advantageous Effects of some Food and Phy-
 “ sic, and have reason to believe that the same
 “ does very much result from the Goodness of
 “ the Drugs, the fitness of the Proportion, and
 “ the Skill of the Physician, and can frequent-
 “ ly give a plain and mechanical Reason of
 “ the different Operation of all these things;
 “ neither do we hope for the Exercise of a
 “ miraculous Power in these or the like Cases.
 “ In short, “ Second Causes, says he, will
 “ work according to their Natures, let Mens
 “ Supplications be never so importunate: and
 “ to expect a Miracle in answer to every Pe-
 “ tion, is more than the most religious dare
 “ pretend to.” See also Mr. *Wollaston's* excel-
 “ lent Illustration of this Hypothesis, p. 104. or
 “ Dr. *Fiddes's Body of Divinity*, 1st vol. p. 154.

We shall propose an Answer to it in the following Note. Let it suffice at present to observe, that this particular Interposition of Divine Power which our Author contends for, is very improperly stiled *miraculous*, as may be seen from Note 95. and the 6th Paragraph of this Subsection.

(99.) Tho this Answer is very solid, and may by some perhaps be thought sufficient; yet, as the Point before us is of the greatest Importance; since wrong Notions concerning it cause Perplexities which disturb the Minds of most Men, as Mr. *Whiston* observes *; and since

the Scheme of Providence so elaborately display'd by this Author, will not, I fear, help to clear them as he here promises, but rather occasion worse;—on these accounts it will not be improper to give a fuller Confutation of it from such Authors as endeavour to prove that the foremention'd Scheme of Providence is both impossible in itself, and attended with Consequences destructive of the very Notion of Prayer, and most other Duties of Religion. † The Abettors of the mechanical Hypothesis, † says Dr. *Jenkin*, argue, that he is the best Artist who can contrive an Engine that shall need the least meddling with after it is made. † But it ought to be consider'd what the Nature of the Engine is, and what the ends and uses of it are; and if the Nature of it be such that it cannot answer the Ends for which it was framed, without sometimes an assisting hand, it would be no point of Wisdom in the Artificer, for the Credit of his Contrivance, to lose the most useful Ends design'd by it. As if, among other uses, this curious Engine were design'd to reward the good, and punish bad Men; to remove the Punishment upon Amendment, and to renew it upon a relapse: since brute Matter is incapable of varying its Motion, and suiting itself to the several States and Changes of free Agents, he must assist it, unless he will lose the chief End for which it is to serve, † It is no defect in the Skill and Wisdom of
 “ the

* *New Theory*, p. 362.† *Reasonableness of Christianity*, 2d vol. p. 218. 5th Edit.

XIV. Tis scarce possible for one who reads this not to think of that famous Difficulty, *viz.* how the Contingency of things can be consistent with the Divine *Prescience*: Neither is it proper to meddle with it in this Place: For it would require a whole Book. Let it suffice to give a hint, that the Solution of it depends upon considering the

An Intimation that this is not repugnant to the Divine *Prescience*.

M m 2

Manner

N O T E S.

“ the Almighty, that Matter and Motion have
 “ not Free Will as Men have; but it would
 “ be a great defect in his Wisdom not
 “ to make them the Instruments of Rewards
 “ and Punishments, because it is impossible for
 “ them of themselves to apply and suit them-
 “ selves to the several States and Conditions
 “ of Free Agents. The Nature of Matter and
 “ Motion is such, that they cannot serve all
 “ the Designs of their Creator, without his
 “ Interposition, and therefore he constantly
 “ doth interpose according to a certain Tenor
 “ which he hath prescrib'd to himself,” *And*
again, “ * We may well suppose that God
 “ has as much Regard to his Wisdom in his
 “ Government of the Moral as of the Material
 “ part of the Creation; and yet he has added
 “ supplemental Laws to enforce the Moral
 “ Laws, and these additional Laws have been
 “ chang'd as the Condition and Circumstances
 “ of Men requir'd. Why then should the
 “ Laws of the Material World be so much
 “ more sacred, as that he should never inter-
 “ meddle with them? He assists Moral A-
 “ gents with the continual Supplies of his
 “ Grace, and Natural Agents with that Help
 “ which is needful for them to perform his
 “ Will: God may hasten and assist natural
 “ Causes upon our Prayers, he may quicken
 “ the Motions, and enforce the Powers of Na-
 “ ture, and remove secret Impediments, to
 “ help and make way for natural Operations;
 “ or he may suspend or retard natural Cau-
 “ ses, &c.

He proceeds to a particular Examination of the *Pr.-establish'd Order* in p. 221. which he opposes with much the same Arguments as these that follow from Dr. *Fiddes*†. “ As to the

“ Opinion of those who say, God upon the
 “ Foresight of the Prayers of Men to him, dis-
 “ posed the Order of things in such a manner,
 “ that what they pray for shall happen, or
 “ what they deprecate be averted, this is alto-
 “ gether inconceivable; or rather, in the Na-
 “ ture of things, supposing Men free Agents,
 “ impossible. For tho' God does foresee which
 “ way Men will act, yet nothing upon the
 “ Mechanical Hypothesis can follow from his
 “ Action, but according to the Laws of Me-
 “ chanism. In case any one, for instance,
 “ should pray to be deliver'd from the danger
 “ of some infectious or pestilential Distem-
 “ per, the Vapour whereby 'tis propagated,
 “ will, notwithstanding, pursue its natural
 “ Course, and produce its Effect wherever it
 “ falls upon a proper Subject; it can make no
 “ manner of Distinction between him that *sac-*
rificeth and him that *sacrificeth not*. God
 “ may indeed, by some secret Impulse on the
 “ Mind of Man, which yet he is at Liberty
 “ to follow, be the occasion of diverting him
 “ from the Scope of its Motion; or perhaps,
 “ on some extraordinary Exigence, by an in-
 “ visible Power, retard, accelerate, or obstruct
 “ its Course; but still, if all things operate
 “ mechanically, whether Men pray or no, it
 “ will unavoidably have its proper Effect.
 “ There is another Case wherein the Motives
 “ to Prayer, if all things come to pass by the
 “ fix'd Laws of Mechanism, appear still more
 “ evidently groundless. A Man in the Heat
 “ of Battle, prays that God would preserve
 “ him from the Instruments of Death, which
 “ fly every where about him; yet a Ball from
 “ a Cannon or a Musquet will necessarily pur-
 “ sue the line of its direction; it depends
 “ however

* p. 220.

† *Theol. Spec.* B. 3. Part 2. C. 4: p. 292.

Manner by which we apprehend the things of God. (100.) He that understands that manner rightly will never stick at this Difficulty.

The

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“ however on the choice of Man, whether he will give it such a particular Direction as by the natural tendency of it will take away the Life of the Person who deprecates the Danger wherewith he finds himself surrounded. In this Case it is impossible, upon any foresight of his Prayers, that the order of Causes, which are in themselves of arbitrary and uncertain Determination, should be dispos'd after such a manner as certainly to produce the desired Effect of them.” Concerning the Impossibility of adapting a fix'd and immutable Law to the State and Condition of Free or mutable Agents, see B. 2. Part 1. p. 154.

Lastly: “ It is of great use to us (says Dr. Sberlock †) to understand this which teaches us what we may expect from God, and what we must attribute to him in the Government of Nature. We must not expect in ordinary Cases that God should reverse the Laws of Nature for us; that if we leap into the Fire it shall not burn us; or into the Water it shall not drown us: and by the same reason, the Providence of God is not concern'd to preserve us when we destroy ourselves by Intemperance and Lust: for God does not work Miracles to deliver Men from the evil Effects of their own Wickedness: But all the kind Influences of Heaven which supply our Wants, and fill our Hearts with Food and Gladness, are owing to that good Providence which commands Nature to yield her Increase; and those Disorders of Nature which afflict the World with Famines, Pestilence and Earthquakes, are the Effects of God's Anger and Displeasure, and are order'd by him for the Punishment of a wicked World. We must all believe this, or confess that we mock God, when we bless him for a healthful Air and fruitful Seasons, or deprecate his Anger when we see visible Tokens of his Vengeance in the Disorders of Nature. For did not God immediately interpose in the Government of Na-

ture, there would be no reason to beg his Favour or deprecate his Anger upon these accounts.”—And to the same purpose he urges, p. 71. That without this Belief, that God takes a particular Care of all his Creatures in the Government of all Events that can happen to them (which Belief appears to be impossible upon the *Mechanical Hypothesis*) there is no reason or pretence for most of the particular Duties of Religious Worship, as is fully proved in the same place. See also C. 9. Concerning the true *Notion*, as well as the *Reasonableness* and *Necessity* of Prayer, see p. 381. *ib.*

(100.) He means the Scheme of *Analogy*, concerning which see his Note E. We have given our *Notion* of the *Word Prescience* in Note 18. X e. see also Mr. Jackson on *Human Liberty*, p. 62. But tho' we cannot perhaps determine the precise manner of God's knowing the free Acts of Men, yet we are certain that he does and must always know them: since otherwise he would know many things now which he did not know once, and consequently his *Omniscience* or Infinite Knowledge would receive addition from Events which (as we have made appear in X e.) is contrary to the true *Notion* of Infinity. This general Argument drawn from God's infinite or *perfect* Knowledge, seems to me the only one which can come near to a Proof that he must always have a compleat and equal Knowledge of such actions as are in themselves absolutely contingent, as all those evidently are which depend upon the Free-Will of the Creature. These actions (as we formerly observ'd) may properly be call'd *Future* with respect to us or other Men, and the Knowledge of them in the same respect be stiled *Fore-Knowledge*. But with regard to the Deity, whose Existence and Attributes can have no relation to time, *i. e.* to which nothing can be at a distance, I think, the Expression is absurd; and we must necessarily either admit the fore-mention'd absurdity

or

† On Providence, p. 38. 1st Edit.

The Reader may observe, that in this and other Places, I interperse some things which belong to *Revealed Religion*, contrary to what I intended at first; which happen'd because some Objections seem'd to arise from reveal'd Religion, in opposition to the Principles and Arguments here laid down. Since therefore I had determin'd to produce nothing but what was perfectly agreeable to the Articles of Faith, and the Principles of the Christian Religion, I found it necessary to call in the Scripture to my Assistance, that the Answer might come from the same Quarter with the Objections.

One that knows nothing of *Reveal'd Religion* cannot bring these Objections; one that does not believe it has no right to urge them. For if he be sensible that the Objections are of any force, he must of necessity also admit the Solutions, since both of them depend upon the same Authority. (101.)

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of supposing his Knowledge limited, or else allow that all things are at all times equally in his view; and consequently that Knowledge, as in him, hath nothing to do with *fore* and *after*.

If we admit this Notion of things being always present to God, tho' successive to us, which seems to be the only way of conceiving how Contingencies can possibly be Objects of any Knowledge; If this, I say, be allow'd, then all things, actions, &c. which can properly be said to exist, will be equally proper Objects of God's Knowledge, since he is hereby supposed not to know them *in fieri*, or in their Cause; but *in esse*, or in their actual Existence. Which at the same time gives us the Medium of their being knowable, *viz.* Their real Existence; and makes it as easy for us to imagine how God should always know them, as how we should ever know a thing when it is immediately presented to us.

'Tis submitted to the Reader, whether this

old Notion of the Schoolmen be not still the best we are able to frame upon the present Subject.

(101.) This general Argument lies against all those who bring Objections from the Scripture Account of the *Creation, Fall, &c.* *viz.* either they believe the Truth and Divine Authority of those Books, or they do not; if they do, then they must believe them also when they declare that all the Works of God are holy and just and good; and consequently that the foremention'd Difficulties are no real Arguments against the Divine Attributes: if they do not; then the whole falls to the Ground. For to admit one part of an account and reject the other, when both depend upon the same Authority, is evidently unreasonable.

Objections therefore drawn from the Scripture account of these Matters can but be mere Arguments *ad hominem* at best: and are of no force either to make or justify an Unbeliever.

S U B S E C T. V.

Why God does not translate Man to some other Place, where nothing would occur that could tempt him to choose amiss.

I. **T**IS plain, that in the present State of things it is impossible for Man to live without natural Evils, or the danger of erring. 'Tis a common Question, why does not God change this State, and translate Man to some other, where all Occasions of Error, and Incitements to Evil being cut off, he might choose only Good; *i. e.* in reality, Why has he placed Man upon the Earth? Why did he not leave it to be inhabited by the Brutes alone? There are some perhaps who expect such things as these from the Divine Goodness, but without any Sense or Reason; since it manifestly appears to be better that we should contend with the present Evils, than that the Earth should be void of all rational Inhabitants. (102.)
some

This is the same as if it were ask'd, why God did not give the Earth to be inhabited by the Brutes only.

N O T E S.

(102.) To ask why Man was placed in such a World as this? is to ask why he was created at all? Since, if he was to be made what he is, *i. e.* consisting of a Soul and a Body, this World was a proper place for him. To the Question, Why should he be made of such a Nature as denominates him: *Man*, or placed in this lower Class of Beings? a sufficient Answer is given in Note 35. where, I think, it is render'd probable, that the same Goodness which excited the Deity to create Beings of the highest Order, would induce him both to create as many of that Order as could commodiously exist together, or be consistent with the Good of the whole; and likewise to produce a Series of as many inferior Orders, and as many particular Beings in each of those Orders as could be conceiv'd to exist between himself and nothing: or so long as Existence in the very lowest Order might be a Benefit either to the Beings of that Order, or to those of some other. The Consequence of which is, that we must either have been placed in the Class we are in at present, or no where, since by the Supposition every other Class is full. And there will appear sufficient reason for our being created in this Order, and placed where we are, rather than not created at all, provided that

Some make it a Question, why so great a Part of the Earth is given away to the Brutes; but these Men would have it all left to 'em; and Mankind itself extinct.

II. We have often declared that Evils are chiefly to be avoided, nay that they are prohibited by God, because they are prejudicial to human Nature, but how much worse would it be to take that Nature entirely away? They therefore who require this of the Divine Goodness, desire the greatest Evil of all as a Remedy for Evils. The same Persons also, that with such Earnestness desire a Change of their Condition, are afraid of Death, forgetting that this Change of their Condition is what they dread the most of all in Death.

God in due time will translate good Men to a better State, but the present is as necessary as Seed-time is to Harvest.

III. Mankind believes indeed from the Light of Nature, that God will translate good Men into a better State, but it is necessary that they should be prepared here, as Plants in a Nursery, before they be removed into the Garden where they are to bear Fruit. God has therefore decreed this Life to be as it were the Passage to a better. Thus this Earth is replenish'd with Inhabitants, who being educated under Discipline for a while, till they have finish'd their Course, shall depart into another State suited to their Deserts. They who find fault with this in God, seem to me to do the same as if one who is ignorant of Agriculture and Harvest should laugh at the Sower

This is totally extirpating Mankind.

N O T E S.

that Existence be a Blessings to us, or that we receive in general more Happiness than Misery in this present State: which point will be consider'd in the next Subsection.

That these several Classes may be supposed to advance gradually towards Perfection, and of consequence that we in time may be removed into some better State, see Note 30.

These Considerations will supply us with an Answer to Bayle's Objection against what our Author advances in this Paragraph. " This (says he) is just like as if a King should condemn several of his Subjects in his Dungeons, till they were 60 Years old, because these

" Dungeons would otherwise be empty. But to make any likeness at all in these two Cases, it must be made appear in the first place, that we really meet with more Evil of all kinds than Good in this World; and consequently, that it were better for us to be out of it than in it: contrary to what our Author has proved in Ch. 2. par. 7. Ch. 4. §. 8. par. 7. and in the following Subsection: and secondly, it must be shewn also, that we might have been placed in some better World, without any Inconvenience to the rest of the Universe, contrary to what may be concluded from the former Part of this Note, and that other to which it refers.

Sower for throwing away his Corn. For there is no doubt but the present State of things is as necessary, not only to the Earth lest it should be void of Inhabitants, and to the Animals, which for the most part depend upon the Labours of Men, but also to Men themselves: and as requisite in the Divine Administration, in order to some better Life, as Seed-time is to Harvest. (103.)

SUBJECT.

NOTES.

(103.) *Bayle* objects, that our Author's comparison here is not a just one, since God cannot be ty'd to the use of common means, and a slow Progress of second Causes. He is not obliged to nurse us up as a Gardener does his Plants, but might as well have produced us adult and ripe in Perfection, and have made us happy at once.—But perhaps it may appear a little doubtful to a Person who attentively considers Note 30, whether this could be done even in *natural* Pleasure. However, I think, 'tis absolutely inconceivable how it should be effected in *Moral* Happiness. If we consider the Nature of Virtue and of Man, it will not be possible for us to imagine how this could be implanted in him at first, or infused into him afterwards, or he be in any wise made morally perfect or *good* on a sudden. The Idea of Virtue consists in a repetition of free Acts, and therefore it cannot be receiv'd *passively*: and tho' the Disposition might be thus communicated, yet to compleat its Nature, and make it actually productive of true moral Happiness, there must necessarily be requir'd due time for Exercise, Experience and confirmed Habits, as may be gather'd from the *Preliminary Dissertation*; and will farther appear from Notes 106 and 108.

From the Nature of Man also, or a Being in his imperfect State, we may fairly infer, that he could not have so great an Idea of the moral Perfections of the Deity, nor so clear an apprehension of the contrary Qualities, nor

consequently, a suitable affection for the one, and an abhorrence of the other, if he had not some experience of both*.

We know not the real Value of a good thing, we cannot be duly sensible of its Excellence, except we have been in some measure acquainted with its Opposite, or at least have perceiv'd the want of it on some occasion. "Does any one (says *Leibnitz* †) sufficiently relish the Happiness of good Health who has never been sick? Is it not most times necessary that a little Evil should render a Good more sensible, and consequently greater?" See also Note 30. The same holds stronger still in *Moral* Good: which is a confirmation of the *Alternative* that *Lactantius* speaks of †; and which is well describ'd by *A. Gellius* ††. It does not therefore seem possible for us to have a due Knowledge of Virtue if we never had seen Vice. Without this Knowledge of Virtue, we could not ardently desire it, without such a desire, and a sedulous prosecution of that desire, we could not attain to the proper exercise of it, and without this attainment we could not have any consciousness of desert, any comfortable self-approbation, or true *Moral* Happiness.

It appears then that Virtue is an Act of our own, that a Series of these Acts is requisite to constitute an habit of Virtue, and of consequence that this cannot be *inspired* into any Being, or however not produced in one of our weak frame on a sudden: and in the last place, that

* See Note 50.

† *Memoirs of Literature*, v. 3. Art. 25. p. 118.

‡ *De Ira Dei*, §. 13. sect. sub fin. and 15.

†† B. 6. Ch. 1.

S U B S E C T. VI.

Concerning the Scarcity of Happy Persons, and the General Corruption of Mankind.

I. **B**UT it may seem strange, that of so great a Multitude of Men, so few should attain to Happiness. For whether that be supposed to arise from the fruition of such things as are agreeable to the natural Appetites, or from free Elections, 'tis manifest, that not even one of a hundred thousand is truly happy. In vain then do we enquire about the Means which lead to Happiness; the Power of Election is bestow'd on Man to no purpose, since it so rarely attains the end for which it was imparted.

Some Objections proposed concerning the Rarity of Happy Persons.

II. Secondly, The far greater part of Mankind neglecting this Power of pleasing themselves in Elections, or rather, to confess the truth, not in the least observing that they have it, or that Happiness is to be expected from the use of it; give themselves up entirely to the Government of their natural Appetites and Senses, and are plainly hurried on according to the Impetus and Direction of the *Animal Nature*,

That the power of Election is not regarded.

N O T E S.

that this present State is necessary (as our Author says) to train us up, and fit us for a better. That this Life is properly a State of *Trial* and Probation, and the Virtues of it absolutely necessary to the Happiness of the next, see *Rymer's General Representation of Revealed Religion*, Part 2. Ch. 3. p. 385, &c. and *Scott's Christian Life*, Vol. 2. Ch. 4. §. 3. p. 321. 335. &c. 8vo. and *Shirlock on Death*, C. 1. §. 3. p. 77, &c. 4th Edit.

To the same purpose is that excellent Paper in the *Spectator*, N^o. 447.—“ The last use I shall make of this remarkable Property in human Nature, of being delighted with those Actions to which it is accustom'd, is to shew how absolutely necessary it is for us to gain habits of Virtue in this Life, if we would enjoy the pleasures of the next. The State of Bliss we call Heaven will not be capable of affecting those Minds which are not thus qualify'd for it;”

we

Nature as much as Brutes. If therefore we have this Power in us, it seems to be given us in vain, *i. e.* to such as neither use it, nor are conscious that they have it.

That there is
an universal
Corruption.

III. Thirdly, Hence all Mankind lie polluted and immers'd in Vice and Wickedness; and 'tis not one or two, but every one, that deviates from the right use of Election. How can these things be reconcil'd with the Care and Providence of an infinitely good and powerful God?

These are best
answer'd by
reveal'd Re-
ligion.

IV. I confess, that this Corruption of Manners, and almost universal Deviation from the way to Happiness, is better solv'd from Reveal'd than Natural Religion, and that the necessity of a *Revelation* is from hence rightly proved. For since the true Cause which gave rise to this is a matter of Fact, *viz.* the Fall of the first Man, it cannot be discover'd merely by the Strength of Reason; but we stand in need of *Historical* Tradition to transmit this, as well as other matters of Fact, down to us. But tho' there had been none such, and we were ignorant of the Fall of the First Man, yet we should have been furnish'd with a proper, tho' not so clear an Answer, since the Misery or Corruption of Mankind tho' really lamentable, yet is not so great but that it may be reconciled with the good Providence of God.

Many attain
to a moderate
Happiness.

V. For as to the first Objection taken from the fewness of them that attain to Happiness, we may reply that Happiness is two-fold, *perfect* and *absolute*, or *moderate* and *partial*. I call that perfect which answers in every respect to our Wishes, and that moderate which, tho'

N O T E S.

" we must in this World gain a Relish of
" Truth and Virtue, if we would be able to
" taste that Knowledge and Perfection which
" are to make us happy in the next. The seeds
" of those Spiritual Joys and Raptures which
" are to rise up and flourish in the Soul to all
" Eternity must be planted in her during this
" her present State of Probation. In short,
" Heaven is not to be look'd upon only as the
" Reward, but as the natural Effect of a Reli-
" gious Life." See also *Tillotson's* Sermon. 1st
vol. Fol. p. 51, 82, 85, &c. and the 78th Sermon.

2d vol. p. 591. Concerning the true End of Man, and the Means of obtaining it, and the Nature both of those Virtues which will constitute the greatest part of Heaven, and of those *Instrumental Duties* by which we are to acquire, improve, and perfect these Heavenly Virtues, or make our own Heaven, see *Scott's* incomparable Treatise of the *Christian Life*, vol. 1. particularly Ch. 3. which Notion is also well defended by Dr. *Rymer* in the Chap. above mention'd. See also Dr. *Laughton's* Sermon on *Rom.* 6. 23.

tho' it does not equal our Desires, yet is not quite destitute of agreeable Enjoyments, with which Life being accompanied, and sweeten'd as it were by the Mitigation of its Evils, and the Alleviation of its Cares, becomes a Blessing, and worth a prudent Man's Choice. As to the former, 'tis certain that it cannot fall to the Lot of any Man in this present State, nor is it a Debt due from God to a Creature, tho' never so innocent. Since the Condition of Men is, and must necessarily be such (while we inhabit this Earth in its present State) as will by no means admit of this absolutely perfect Happiness. For Pains, Grievs, and the rest of those which we call natural Evils, cannot, as things now stand, be totally avoided, but by the preternatural Favour of the Deity. The Earth then must either be left destitute of Inhabitants, or we must take up with a moderate share of Happiness; this also is a Gift worthy of God, and fit to be accepted and embrac'd by Man. Neither is this a rare Felicity, and which happens to few Men; for all may enjoy it, and most actually do; especially if they will make a prudent use of their Elections. For if there be any bitter thing in Life, it generally flows from deprav'd Elections, and by a right use of these, any thing which creates uneasiness, or can make us weary of Life, might be mitigated or remov'd. To conclude, tho' we complain of the Miseries of Life, yet we are unwilling to part with it, which is a certain Indication that it is not a burden to us, and that not so few attain this moderate Happiness, as the Objection would insinuate. (104.)

N n 2

VI. As

NOTES.

(104.) To calculate whether the Sum of Happiness in this World exceed the Sum of Misery, upon the whole, would be an endless piece of Work, and what no Man perhaps is able precisely to determine: I shall therefore only produce the Opinion of one or two Authors on the Question, which may serve at least to confront the Testimony so often and so largely repeated by *Bayle* in all his Works,—

“ I am sure (says Dr. *Sherlock* †) we are very ungrateful to Almighty God if we do not acknowledge that bountiful Provision which he has made for the Happiness of Mankind in this World. For what is wanting on God's part to make Man as happy as he can be here? We want no sense which is useful to Life? we want no Objects to gratifie those Senses, and which is very considerable, the
“ most

† *On Providence*, Ch. 7. p. 243, &c. 2d Edit.

Men make
use of this
Elective
Power tho'
they do not
observe it.

VI. As to the second thing objected, *viz.* that most of us are either ignorant or regardless of this Power of pleasing ourselves by Election; upon a thorough Enquiry it will be manifest, that the use of this Power is neither disregarded, nor so rare as might appear at first Sight. I own there are few who take notice of this in themselves, or observe, that the Pleasure which they feel in acting arises from the Exercise of it. But nevertheless they do exercise it, and taste the Pleasure arising therefrom. And the same thing seems to befall us in the Exercise of this Power which happens in some Organs of Sense, tho' we are entirely ignorant which they are, or of what kind, yet we use them, and by the use of them perceive external things. Thus we please ourselves in choosing, tho' we are not aware that things please us because they are chosen. Now that this is so will be evident, if we examine those things which afford Pleasure to both young and old, wise as well as foolish. For if the far greater part of them have no manner of Connection with the natural Appetites, nor with the Necessities of Nature, it will appear that they have pleased us no otherwise than by virtue of Election. Let us weigh the trifles of Children, and the serious Affairs of Men; the Temerity of Fools, and the Counsels of the Wise; and it will be evident almost in all of them, that they please by Election only*. This, among other things, may

NOTES.

“ most useful, and necessary, and delightful
 “ Objects, are most common, and such as
 “ Mankind pretty equally share in. There is
 “ not such a mighty Difference as some Men
 “ imagine, between the Poor and the Rich:
 “ in Pomp, and Shew, and Opinion, there is
 “ a great deal, but little as to the true Plea-
 “ sures and Satisfaction of Life: they enjoy
 “ the same Earth, and Air, and Heavens;
 “ Hunger and Thirst makes the poor Man's
 “ Meat and Drink as pleasant and relishing as
 “ all the Varieties which cover a rich Man's
 “ Table: and the Labour of a poor Man is
 “ more healthful, and many times more plea-
 “ sant too, than the Ease and softness of the
 “ rich.—These indeed at best are but mean
 “ Pleasures, the Pleasures of Sense, which are
 “ the lowest a reasonable Soul is capable of;
 “ but yet they are so entertaining, that the ge-
 “ nerality of Mankind think it worth living
 “ to enjoy them.—And yet there are more no-
 “ ble and divine Pleasures which Men may en-
 “ joy in this World; such as gratify the no-
 “ bler Faculties of the Soul, the Pleasures of
 “ Wisdom and Knowledge, of Virtue and Re-
 “ ligion; to know Pleasures which Men may en-
 “ temple the Art and Beauty and Perfection
 “ of his Works, and to do Good to Men.
 “ These indeed are Pleasures that do not make
 “ us very fond of the Body, nor of this World;
 “ for

* See more of this in Sect. 1. Subject. 5. par. 11, 12, &c.

may appear from the Diversions of *Cards* and *Dice*. Nothing is more agreeable to all, or pleases more; but upon no other account, if we examine it thoroughly, than because we *will* be thus employ'd.

Nay that *dire Lust of Rule* which bewitches mortal Minds, and transports them beyond themselves, which cannot be satisfy'd unless the whole World be subdued, and even not then; this neither receives its Origin nor Approbation from Nature or any innate Appetite.

But the force of Election is never more apparent than in some Men's insatiable Avarice, and continual Study to heap up unprofitable Riches, for no use, no end, but to satisfy their Choice. Behold the covetous Man brooding over his Gold; a Curse to his Relations, a Jest to his Neighbours, a Reproach to Nature; depriving himself of Food, Sleep, Rest, and other Necessaries, and yet applauding himself still. Why do these things please which are so unnatural, so absurd, so preposterous? This is felt, this is pursu'd, tho' he that does this be not conscious that he is doing it, neither observes what it is which pleases him. It is not therefore the Direction of the Senses, or the Impulse of Animal Nature only, which transports us into Vices and unlawful Acts; these are commonly done against the
Remonstrance

N O T E S.

“ for they do not arise from the Body, nor
“ are they confin'd to this World. We have
“ reason to hope, that when we get loose
“ from these Bodies, our intellectual Facul-
“ ties will be vastly improv'd; that we shall
“ know God after another manner than we
“ now do; and discover new and brighter
“ Glories which are conceal'd from Mortal
“ Eyes; but yet the Pleasures of Knowledge,
“ and Wisdom, and Religion in this World,
“ are very great and ravishing, and therefore
“ we either do or may enjoy at present such
“ Pleasures as make Life very desirable: Were
“ there no other nor happier State after this,
“ yet it were very desirable to come into this

“ World, and live as long as we can here, to
“ enjoy the Pleasures and Satisfactions which
“ may be enjoy'd in this Life.”

An Explication of *Ecc. Ch. 4. v. 2, 3.* may be found in the same excellent Chapter, see also p. 225.

Leibnitz, Essais de Theodicee *. “ It will
“ be said, that Evils are very great and nume-
“ rous if compar'd with good things; but it
“ is a Mistake; Want of Attention is the on-
“ ly thing that lessens our Happiness; and
“ 'tis necessary that this Attention should be
“ rais'd by a mixture of Evil. Let us supply
“ by Reflection what is wanting to our Percep-
“ tion, to be more sensible of our Happiness.
“ Were

* *Memoirs of Literature*, V. 3, p. 118.

Remonstrance of those Appetites which are implanted by Nature, against the Remonstrance of Sense and Instinct, no less than Reason, and the least Crime we commit is in obeying them. We may learn then, to our great Misfortune, that we are not entirely driven by the *Impetus of Animal Nature*, and that this Power of pleasing ourselves by Election does not lie idle; but rather that it is the too great and inordinate use of it which transports us into Wickedness.

VII. As to the third Objection, *viz.* that the *Corruption* of Mankind is almost *universal*; it is to be observ'd in the first place, that Elections produce the same effect in the Moral, as Motion does in the Natural World; neither is it any more to be expected, that in our present State all Elections should be consistent and uniform, than that all Motions should be so. Now as contrariety of Motion is a necessary Cause of natural Corruption, so the interfering of Elections is of Vice or Moral Corruption. God could indeed take away both, *viz.* by destroying Motion and free Choice; but while these are permitted, neither of the Evils could be prevented in the present State of things.

VIII. Secondly, We may observe that things are connected together, and have a mutual dependence on each other, on this account, a Defect in one affects many others.

NOTES.

“ Were it not for the Knowledge of a future
 “ Life, I believe most People would be wil-
 “ ling at the point of Death to begin a new
 “ Life, upon condition that they should en-
 “ joy as much Good, and undergo as many
 “ Evils, especially if they were of another
 “ kind. They would be contented with a
 “ Change, without requiring a more happy
 “ Condition.”

The same Conclusion is drawn by Mr. *Hutcheson* after an accurate Enquiry into the Frame of human Nature, and a Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains attending its several Senses †

“ Here Men are apt to let their Imaginations
 “ run out upon all the *Robberies, Piracies, Mur-*
 “ *thers, Perjuries, Frauds, Massacres, Assassina-*
 “ *tions,* they have ever either heard of or read
 “ in History; thence concluding all Mankind
 “ to be very wicked; as if a *Court of Justice*
 “ were the proper Place of making an Esti-
 “ mate of the Morals of Mankind, or an *Ho-*
 “ *spital* of the Healthfulness of a Climate.
 “ Ought they not to consider, that the Num-
 “ ber of honest *Citizens* and *Farmers* far surpass
 “ that of all sorts of Criminals in any State;
 “ and that the innocent or kind Actions of e-
 “ ven Criminals themselves surpasses their
 “ Crimes in number? That 'tis the *Rarity* of
 “ Crimes, in comparison of innocent or good
 “ Actions, which engages our attention to
 “ them

† *Essay on the Passions*, p. 177, &c. and in particular p. 184.

Elections produce the same effect in the Moral World as Motion does in the Natural.

Things are connected together, and

as Machines which require the most Workmanship may be stopped or disorder'd by the defect of a single Nail or Wheel: so the Error or Offence of one Man puts the rational System or Society of Mankind out of Order. Any Person, by almost one single free Act, may destroy a House or Ship, nay a City or a Fleet by Fire or Wreck. Any King or Governor can, by an easy and free Act, overwhelm whole Nations with War, Rapine, Slaughter and Villany. A Father may beget Sons, who being yet unborn, are sure of inheriting his Diseases and Infirmities as well as his Goods. Nor could it be otherwise while the Nature and Condition of Men and of the Earth are such as we experience them to be. Either therefore Liberty and the Connection of things must be destroy'd, or these Evils tolerated.

IX. Thirdly, 'Tis certain that God does not permit any bad E-lections, but such as may be reconciled with the Good of the whole System, and has digested and order'd every thing in such a manner, Vice and Wickedness, tho' deform'd in themselves, do not impair the Beauty of the whole.

NOTES.

“ them, and makes them to be recorded in
 “ History; while incomparably more honest
 “ generous domestick Actions are overlook'd
 “ only because they are so common; as one
 “ great *Danger*, or one *Month's Sickness* shall
 “ become a frequently repeated Story, during
 “ a long Life of Health and Safety. The
 “ Pains of the *external Senses* are pretty fre-
 “ quent, but how short in comparison of the
 “ long Tracts of Health, Ease, and Pleasure?
 “ How rare is the Instance of a Life with one
 “ Tenth spent in violent Pain? How few
 “ want absolute Necessaries, may have not
 “ something to spend on *Gaiety and Orna-*
 “ *ments*? The Pleasures of *Beauty* are expos'd
 “ to all in some Measure. These kinds of
 “ Beauty which require *Property* to the full
 “ Enjoyment of them are not ardently desir'd
 “ by many. The Good of every kind in the
 “ Univerſe is plainly superior to the Evil.

“ How few would accept of *Annihilation* ra-
 “ ther than Continuance in Life in the middle
 “ State of Age, Health, and Fortune? Or
 “ what separated Spirit who had consider'd
 “ human Life, would not, rather than perish,
 “ take the hazard of it again, by returning in-
 “ to a Body in the State of Infancy?”

“ *Who would lose*
 “ *For fear of Pain this intellectual Being,*
 “ *Those thoughts which wander thro' Eternity*
 “ *To perish rather, swallow'd up and lost*
 “ *In the wide Womb of uncreated Night;*
 “ *Devoid of Sense and Motion?* —
 Milton's *Par. lost*, B. 2.

See also Mr. Chubb's Supplement to the
 Vindication of God's Moral Character ††, or
 Lucas's Enquiry after Happiness, V. 1. §. 2.
 C. 2. p. 41.

†† *Tracts*, p. 281, &c.

Of Moral Evil.

manner, that these very Faults and Vices shall tend to the Good of the whole. For as in Musick Discords, if heard separately, grate and offend the Ear with harshness, but when mix'd in consort with other Notes, make a more sweet and agreeable Harmony; in like manner bad Elections, if consider'd alone, are look'd upon as odious and detestable, but compared with the whole System, they promote and increase the Good and Beauty of the whole. For when they are temper'd they become medicinal to each other by that very Contrariety, and those which would poison separate, when mix'd become a Remedy*.

For instance, One by a depraved Choice raises an immense Sum of Money, and a vast Estate, and either the same Person or his Heir, by his Vanity and Profuseness, compensates for what he had acquir'd by his Extortion, and perhaps does as much Good by squandering away his ill-gotten Wealth to the most idle Purposes, as if he had bestow'd all upon the Poor. For he applies a Spur to Industry, whereas he would otherwise afford an handle to Sloth. The rich Man offends in Luxury and Idleness: the Poor transgresses no less by too much Labour and Solitude, which he indulges perhaps for no other End than to provide Instruments of Luxury for the Rich: but each of them pleases himself in his Choice, and 'tis almost the same thing with respect to the benefit of the Universe, as if one had converted to pious Uses what he spent in Luxury, and the other had labour'd moderately to provide only what was useful. The same almost may be said of all Vices, they are prejudicial, but only to the Criminals themselves, or those that deserve to suffer; nay they are often beneficial to others; and so long as the whole comes to no harm, 'tis fit to allow every one the use of their own Will, and let them suffer for their Sin. God could indeed cut off all Occasion of Sin, by taking away free Elections: But it is plain that this would be far from an Advantage to intelligent Agents. 'Tis our Business to prevent bad Elections, and if we will not, we suffer for our Folly:

But

* See Leibnitz in the *Memoirs of Literature* refer'd to above.

But God will procure the Good of the whole by our Folly no less than by our Wisdom. (105.)

X. If

NOTES.

(105.) We may add, and by our *Sin* no less than by our *Righteousness*. Thus it may be said in a good Sense that *private Vices* (as well as private Misfortunes) often becomes *public Benefiter*; tho' the Authors be no less liable to Punishment: But it will be objected, that this makes Vice to be necessary for the Public Good, and therefore to be no Vice at all; nor consequently punishable. For a tendency or opposition to the general Happiness of our System, is the very Criterion of Virtue and Vice: If then what is call'd my Wickedness tends to the Good of the World, how can I be punish'd for it? And if my Action promotes the Glory of God, *why doth he yet find fault?* We answer, Vice naturally and in general tends to the Misery of any System; so that if *all* were vicious, all would be wretched; and on the contrary, if every one were virtuous, all must be happy; to be vicious and to be productive of Pain or Misery, would then be convertible terms. But in a mix'd irregular State, where some pursue the Rules of Virtue and others do not, the Case is very much alter'd, there Pain or Evil, and such Actions as produce it, may often be the most proper means to remedy some greater Evil, or procure some superior Good; to reform a Vice, or improve a Virtue; in which Case, tho' that way of acting which in general tends to Misery, happens to be productive of some real Happiness which could not have been produced without it, yet this is not sufficient to excuse or justify it, nor is it so much the consequence of its own Nature, and attributable to its immediate Author, as an effect of the superintendency of some other Agent, who applies it, and makes it instrumental to some End of his own, who brings Good out of Evil, or from Evil takes occasion to do still more Good than he could be conceiv'd to have done without that Evil.

and yet the different Natures of Good and Evil continue fix'd: Man, who cannot see all the Consequences and Connection of things, must be oblig'd to some general Rules of acting, and whenever he deviates from these Rules he does amiss; at least when he intends to act against the very *End* of these Rules, *i. e.* the general Good, he evidently sins, let the Consequence of his Acts be what it will. Thus the Actions of a Man may be often morally Evil to himself, tho' they prove naturally Good to some others: they may proceed from a bad Intention in him, or he may be a Transgressor by acting against his Rule; and tho' God may have an occasion of *Glorifying* himself thereby, of displaying his Wisdom and Goodness, &c. to a higher degree than they could otherwise have been exhibited; and therefore may reasonably permit the Actions of this Man, and convert them, either to the Punishment and Correction of himself or other Sinners, or to the Blessing of some righteous Persons; yet the immediate Author is nevertheless accountable both to God and Man for such his Actions. Instances of this kind are innumerable, and may be seen in *Sherlock on Providence*. See particularly what is required from God's Goodness in a State of Discipline. p. 221, 224, 230, &c. 2d Edit. or in *Simplicius on Epictetus*, p. 83. 4th Edition, Lond. 1670.

What has been said here only relates to God's *permitting* Moral Evil, so far as it is a means of some prepollent Good.

S. C. in his *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. carries the Matter farther, and supposes that God may for the general Good *decree* some such Acts as seem to be morally Evil; which I can see no reason or necessity for supposing. How he endeavours to make this out and reconcile it with the *Holiness* and *Justice* of the Deity, may be seen in Part 1. Ch. 11. prop. 9. p. 94, &c.

All this I think may be supposed of God,

If this be apply'd to particular Cases, it accounts for the universal Corruption.

X. If this be true, it is a sufficient Vindication of the Divine Goodness, notwithstanding such a plentiful Crop of Vices be permitted; nor need we insist upon a longer enquiry how this may be applied to particular Cases; for whether this Corruption was occasion'd by the *Fall of our first Parents* as Truth itself declares, or by any other Cause whatever, 'tis certain that God would never have permitted it, if it could have been prevented without greater Damage to the whole. (106.) We may wonder indeed that almost all Mankind

NOTES.

(106.) Perhaps such a Scheme as this of the *Fall* appears to be from the Representation given of it, and its effects in Scripture, was necessary to make us duly sensible of the Nature of Good and Evil, to acquaint us more fully with the Moral Perfections of the Deity (which could not have been so clearly exhibited to us if there had never been any room for the Exercise of them) and consequently to bring us to an Imitation of these Perfections, and thereby to the greatest and most refined Happiness that our better part is capable of. Man (as we observ'd in Note 103.) is a very imperfect compound Being, who, by the constitution of his Nature, seems incapable of being made truly wise and virtuous, or which is the same thing, *morally* happy on a sudden, he must therefore receive Improvement gradually, and as he is to compleat his good Habits by a Series of virtuous Acts, so it seems proper for him to be train'd up by various Dispensations, and a Series of Events adapted to the several Faculties of his Body and Mind; the various constituent Parts of his Nature, and different Sources of his Happiness: accordingly we find that the Happiness of Man in his first Estate was chiefly *Animal*, to which an Earthly Paradise was exquisitely fitted; a Change in this was probably requisite to introduce the *rational* or *moral* kind into the World, and to make him direct his Thoughts to something higher than mere sensitive Delights. This we are told was the Method of Divine Providence with the *Jewish* Nation in particular, who had

a Law of Carnal Ordinances to exercise them for a while, and lead them on to the Expectation of better things; to spiritualize their Notions by Degrees, and prepare them for the Heavenly Doctrines of *Messiah*. And why might not the like Method be made use of in the Government of Mankind in general, or even all rational Beings? What if God, willing to make known the greater Riches of his Glory, suffer'd our first Parents to fall soon from that Condition wherein he created them at first, in order to raise them and their Posterity to a much higher State of Glory and true Happiness after? And who can prove that the former was not conducive to the latter? We believe that the Bliss of Heaven will infinitely exceed the Pleasures of a Terrestrial Eden; why then should we not suppose that the less might be in some manner useful and introductory to the greater? Why might not a short Life in Paradise be as proper a State of Probation for the Virtues of this present World, as this World is for the Glories of another? There is a Passage concerning Paradise in *Scott's Christian Life* * which confirms this Notion: But it is the most fully explain'd by Mr. D'Oyly in his *first Dissertation*, C. 3. p. 31, &c. I shall transcribe so much as may be necessary to shew his general Design. " If we consider our Nature as it came in *Innocence* out of the hand of its Creator, God foresew how very soon it would fall from its primitive Purity, and therefore design'd it farther for a *much happier* State, raised and

* Vol. 1. p. 26.

Mankind are polluted in Wickedness, and that God puts no stop to the Progress of those Vices which deform his Work; but in reality this is no more to be wonder'd at, than that this inferior World is by Motion univerſally ſubjected to natural Corruption. For as Contrariety of Motions neceſſarily works a Change in ſolid and heterogeneous Bodies, and tranſpoſes them into another Form and Condition, whence neceſſarily proceed Diſſolution and Concretion, Cor-
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 ruption

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“ and refined by a clearer and more extenſive
 “ *Manifeſtation* of himſelf: But had it ſtood
 “ the Reward (at leaſt as far as we know)
 “ would have been the indefeaſible Poſſeſſion
 “ of a Paradife in this World, the enjoying of
 “ an immortal Life here on Earth, chequer'd
 “ as it were with Spiritual and Sensitive, or
 “ Animal Pleaſures. And for their Conduct
 “ in that State God ſeems to have left them
 “ (one or two Inſtances excepted) under the
 “ Direction of the *Law of Nature*, the *Spiritual*
 “ or Religious Part of which taught them to
 “ look up to him as the Creator of the World;
 “ the Lord and Author of their Being, and to
 “ fear and obey him as their Almighty So-
 “ vereign. The *Civil* part of it furniſh'd them
 “ with right Reason, dictating what was ne-
 “ ceſſary to be done in order to their well-
 “ being in this World. So that had they
 “ ſtood, their Happineſs would probably have
 “ been—what that of Mankind was afterwards—
 “ a mixture of *rational* and *ſenſitive*, or bodily
 “ Enjoyments. And as to any Knowledge of
 “ God, farther than that now mention'd; it
 “ may, I conceive, be thought reaſonable to
 “ preſume that they had the ſame awful ſenſe
 “ of his *Veracity* as of any other Attribute:
 “ and yet how very eaſily were they wrought
 “ into a Belief by the firſt Story they heard,
 “ and from they know not whom, that he had
 “ acted *colluſively* in barring them the Fruit of
 “ the *Tree of Knowledge*, deſigning by it only
 “ to keep them down under the Veil of Igno-
 “ rance, and that there was no ſuch imminent

“ Danger of Death conſequent to their taſting
 “ it, as they were at firſt made to believe?
 “ Whatever ſuch Knowledge therefore we ſup-
 “ poſe them to have had, it may be doubted,
 “ its Impreſſions were not vivid and forcible
 “ enough to influence their Wills to ſuitable
 “ Efforts in *loving* and *cleaving* ſteadily to
 “ him: ſince no *one* can love whom he does
 “ not believe, and without Faith 'tis as im-
 “ poſſible to *love* as to *pleaſe God*: So that
 “ thoſe Impreſſions could not conſequentially be
 “ very inſtrumental in making an Addition to
 “ their Happineſs, as has been ſhewn above.
 “ Nay as to *Adam* himſelf in particular, it
 “ may perhaps ſeem reaſonable to think he
 “ had not that profound Reverence and awful
 “ regard for the Divine Majeſty which he
 “ might juſtly have been expected to expreſs,
 “ (tho' not under the Circumſtances of a *Cri-*
 “ *minal*) ſince after the Faſt committed, he
 “ ſeems attempting to ſcreen his Guilt, even
 “ by throwing the blame *obliquely* upon God
 “ himſelf, where he answers, *The Woman* whom
 “ *Thou* gaveſt to be with me, *ſhe gave me of the*
 “ *Tree and I did eat* *.”

The Author proceeds to enquire into the State of Religion in the Antedeluvian World, the Patriarchal Ages, and down to the *Jewiſh* Diſpenſation, and ſhews that Mankind could not from the Works of Creation and Providence only (which yet were their only means of Knowledge) have ſo extenſive and perfect a Knowledge of God as was requiſite to advance their Happineſs properly

* Diſſert. 1. p. 33.

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ruption and Generation: In like manner free Choice necessarily administers occasion of Sin to Agents endow'd with an imperfect Understanding, and obnoxious to Passions and Affections. And as in the natural World, the Corruption and Contagion of one thing extends itself to others, and acquires Strength by spreading; so also in the moral, if Election once deviate to Evil, the Poison is diffused along with it, and seizes and infects all about it.

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properly so call'd, as rational Agents, to any considerable Degree; nor consequently to be the foundation of a Worship worthy of him. From whence he concludes, "The Faculties of our rational Nature must have lain dormant and useless as to the greatest Happiness it was capable of attaining by the Exercise of them; and as to the highest Honour and most exalted Worship it was in itself qualify'd to pay to the Divine Majesty, unless he had pleas'd to make provision for the farther Manifestation of himself: which, in what manner he has in his infinite Wisdom and Goodness determin'd to effect, will appear by laying open the most advantageous Changes which has been made as to these and other respects, by the appearance of Christ in the Flesh. For if it be shewn, that by that amazing Transaction he has so display'd the infinite Excellencies and Perfections of his Nature, as to give the utmost possible Scope to the whole rational Creation, to exert their noblest Faculties, and strain them up to the most exalted astonishing Thoughts of, and seraphical Devotion to him: if farther he has thereby apply'd the most proper and forcible means to rectify the Moral Errors, reform the Vices, and overcome the daring Wickedness of Mankind; and lastly, if it be shewn that he has done all this in such a manner that it could not have been effected to so great Advantage any other way, then will it be demonstratively evident, that whereas he foresaw from all

"Eternity, that Man whom he had decreed to create would abuse his natural Liberty, and so, being tempted, fall into Sin: There was infinite reason on this account as well as that mention'd before, why he might have pleas'd also, in his infinite Wisdom and Goodness, to have decreed to permit it, thereby to open a way for the stupendous Manifestation of himself, as above express'd. And particularly—that by what follow'd from it, Mankind might become capable of attaining far greater Happiness than they would have been had our first Parents continued innocent." p. 43.

How this Author makes out the fore-mentioned Particulars may be seen in the remainder of his Dissertation.

See also Dr. Jenkin on the same Subject*.

Now this is not, as Bayle objects †, "To compare the Deity to a Father who should suffer his Children to break their Legs, on purpose to shew to all the City his great Art in setting their broken Bones. Or to a King who should suffer Seditions and Factions to encrease thro' all his Kingdom, that he might purchase the Glory of quelling them." But rather like a King who permits some of his Subjects to put their seditious Designs in practice, and to promote a Revolt, in order to illustrate his Wisdom, Power and Goodness more fully in reducing them to their Duty, and to convince them more clearly of the Expedience and absolute Necessity of obeying him, and thereby to confirm them, or at least

* Reasonableness of Christianity, 2d vol. C. 12.

† Crit. Diss. p. 2488.

But yet both *natural* and *moral Corruption* have their Bounds, neither does God permit them to spread farther than is conducive to the Good of the whole *. It may seem strange to us that he suffers both of them to wander over this World of ours without Restraint; but what is our World to the whole System of the Universe? How small a Part! how next to nothing! (107.) Let this whole Earth of

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least all the rest of his Subjects, in a well grounded Obedience to his Government, in which their Happiness entirely consists: Or like a Father that finding his Children obstinately disobedient, suffers them sometimes to wander astray, and to fall into some Dangers and Inconveniencies, and lets them smart under the Misery which they bring upon themselves, in order to make them more sensible of their need of his Assistance and Direction, and thereby more dependent on him for the future, and more subject to him, and therefore more fure of Happiness. This Comparison is well explain'd by *Sherlock on Providence*, Chap. 7. p. 262.

Hence then it will perhaps appear that we have reason to suppose, that the Fall of Man from Earthly and Animal Delights, was design'd to raise him to a Rational and Heavenly State of Happiness, and to make way for such a wonderful Display of all the Divine Attributes in that Expedient, as could not have been exhibited at all, or not to so high a Degree without it; and consequently that this Method was the very best even for *our own* System. But if this Supposition seem improbable, or insufficient, yet still why may not all the Misery in this System of ours promote and encrease the Happiness of some others †? We have good reason to believe that there is some Connexion between the different Systems of the Universe; but have small ground to imagine ours the best, why then may it not be subservient to a better? This indeed is

only Conjecture; however, I think it would be no easy Matter to confute it, till which be done, we may very safely conclude with our Author, that the *Fall itself*, as well as all the Sin and Misery consequent upon it, could not have been prevented without greater detriment to the whole: and one may lay the same of *Eve* as the Poet did of the hand of *Matius Scævola*: *Si non errasset, fecerat illa minus*.

(107.) " It will be objected, that even after
" this Life Misery will prevail above Happi-
" ness (since there are but few *Electi*) which
" appears inconsistent with the Goodness of
" the supreme Being. " In answer to this
" Difficulty, granting that the Number of
" those who are to be tormented in Hell will
" be incomparably greater than that of the
" Blessed, the Evil will still appear like no-
" thing if compared with the Good, consider-
" ing the true Extent of the *City of God*. The
" Ancients had a narrow Notion of the Works
" of the Author of Nature; and St. *Augustin*,
" for want of knowing the modern Discove-
" ries, was not a little perplex'd when he un-
" dertook to justify the prevalence of Evil.
" It was in former times a common Opinion,
" that the Earth was the only part of the World
" furnished with Inhabitants; nay the Antients
" were afraid of admitting any *Antipodes*: they
" believ'd that the rest of the World did only
" consist of some shining Globes and Crystal-
" line Spheres: But in our Days it will be
" acknowledg'd that there is an innumerable
" Number of Globes, as large and larger than
" ours,

* See *Sherlock on Providence*, Ch. 7. p. 261. 2d Edit. and *Scott's Christian Life*, V. 2. Ch. 4 par. 3. p. 318, &c. *See*.

† See the next Note.

‡ See *Leibnitz Essais de Theodicee*, Part 2. §: 239.

of ours be stain'd with Corruption of both kinds; suppose it clouded and benighted with Darkness and Vice, yet it will but be like a very small Spot in a very beautiful Body, which is so far from lessening, that it encreases the Comeliness and Beauty of the whole. The Earth, notwithstanding its Obscurity, has its Use and Place in Nature, which it could not commodiously fill if those things which render it liable to Darkness and Corruption were removed. The same must be said of Men, they have their proper Use and Station, and in order to fill it commodiously, they were to be created of such a Nature and Disposition as might easily be corrupted with Vice. Neither have we any more reason to conclude that all free Agents are involv'd in Evil Elections, because this happens almost universally to Men, than that all the Regions of the Heavens are subject to the same Changes that our Air is liable to. The whole Work of God may be bright and beautiful, tho' that Point which constitutes our World seem by itself rude and unadorn'd: and tho' some Parts appear to us who have not a View of the whole Contexture, larger or less than the just Proportion requires, yet they may agree with others in the most perfect Symetry. Nor need we presume upon the Divine Wisdom and Goodness in the *Moral*, any more than

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<p>“ ours, which may be inhabited by rational “ Creatures, tho' it does not follow that they “ are Men. Our Earth is only a Planet, that “ is, one of the six principal Satellites of our “ Sun. And because all fix'd Stars are so “ many Suns, 'tis plain the Earth is a very “ inconsiderable part of the Universe, since “ it is only an <i>Appendix</i> of one Sun. Perhaps “ all the Suns are inhabited by happy Crea- “ tures, at least we have no reason to believe “ that many of their Inhabitants will be dam- “ ned. Besides, considering that there is no “ reason to affirm that there are Stars every “ where, it may very well be, that there is a “ vast Space beyond the Region of the Stars. “ Whether it be the <i>Empyreal Heaven</i> or not, “ that immense Space which surrounds all that</p>	<p>“ Region may be filled with Glory and Hap- “ piness. It may be conceiv'd like an Ocean, “ which receives the Rivers of all happy Crea- “ tures, when they have attain'd to their Per- “ fection in the System of the Stars. What “ will then become of the Consideration of “ our Globe and its Inhabitants? Will it “ not be a thing incomparably less than a “ Physical Point, since our Earth is like a “ Point with respect to the distance of some “ fix'd Stars? And therefore the Proportion “ of that part of the Universe which we know “ being lost in a kind of Nothingness, it may “ very well be said that all Evils are almost “ <i>nothing</i> in comparison with all the good “ things that are in the Universe †.</p>
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† Leibnitz in *Memoirs of Literature*, Vol. 3.

than in the *Natural* World. The Crimes and Vices themselves are very few in comparison of the free Agents, and may contribute to the Good of the whole, no less than natural Corruption does to the Preservation of the System. Nay one Man's Fault is very often corrected by the Vices of another, and the Deformity stamp'd upon the Works of God by the Wickedness of some, is obliterated by the supervening Iniquity of others. By the vitiated Elections of some, a Stop is put to the Wickedness of many; and the Virtue and Happiness of a great many is confirmed and increased by the Misery of a few; nay an Opportunity of doing Good is offer'd to such as are so disposed, which never could have been if none had abused their Choice. (108.)

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(108.) Upon the whole, from that little which we know of the Scheme of Divine Providence in the Formation and Government of the *Moral* World, it seems very reasonable for us to conclude concerning this, in the same manner as we did concerning the *Natural* World, *viz.* That no considerable part of it can be alter'd for the better; or that no Evil in it could either have been originally avoided, or may now be removed, without introducing greater—Since the whole Controversy depends upon the truth of this general Conclusion, 'tis proper that we should be as fully satisfy'd as possible about the ground of it.

But to attempt to demonstrate it by an Induction of Particulars would be infinite, I shall therefore choose rather to illustrate it by a review of some of the Principles before laid down. In the first place then the Deity is supposed out of pure Benevolence to have created as many immaterial Beings of the noblest kinds as were agreeable to the Order and Convenience of his System; for his Benevolence being unbounded, seems to require this as much as it does the Creation of any Beings at all: The same Benevolence also prompted him to produce more imperfect, mixt ones, because even those were better than none. He en-

dowed these with an absolutely free Principle of *Volition* and *Action*, because such Freedom was absolutely requisite to that Happiness for which he design'd them; *viz.* Goodness, Virtue, or a resemblance of his own Moral Qualities, which is the only true Happiness of a rational Being.—He continues this Freedom to them, tho' many abuse it to the Corruption of their Natures, and Introduction of the greatest Misery; because this abuse proportionably improves the Nature, and increases the Felicity of *others*, and so Liberty still tends to the Good and Perfection of the whole: and this it may be conceived to do in the following manner. The miserable Effect of the abuse of Freedom by some in this World, makes all others much more sensible of the Nature and Consequences of Sin, and thereby renders them conscious of a double Pleasure in using their Powers aright: it exerciseth some Virtues in them which could have no place without it; it improveth and exalteth others, and consequently raises their whole Nature to an higher degree of Perfection than it could otherwise acquire. By parity of Reason we may believe that in the next World also, the Happiness of them, as well as of some other Systems, will be infinitely advanced by reflections naturally arising from their
View

S U B S E C T. VII.

Wherein the Principles before laid down are apply'd to the Solution of some Objections.

Moral Evils are not necessary in respect of Free-Will, but they are necessary with regard to God, so that he must either tolerate these or greater.

I. FROM the foregoing Principles it seems not impossible to answer such Objections as are commonly brought against the Goodness and Providence of God. For in the first place, when it is objected

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View of the Misery which some shall undergo: (which seems to be the best, the only solid reason that can be assign'd for the Creation of those Beings who shall be finally miserable, and for the continuation of them in their miserable Existence *)

“ To have escap'd Hell, and to find ourselves in the unchangeable Possession of Salvation by the free Mercy and Goodness of God, and by the Death of his own Son, are Thoughts which must create a new Heaven as it were in Heaven itself; I mean, they will enlarge our Souls to the utmost Capacity of our Natures, and fill and actuate them with such Divine Ardors of Love, as if we had been kept necessarily from all Sin, seem impossible to have been rais'd in us †.

This then we may with Reverence presume to have been the principal Design of God in

permitting all Mankind to bring themselves into such a dangerous Estate, and some of them to suffer under it; and perhaps the same reason will hold for his permitting the *Fall of Angels*: For I think it plainly appear'd from Note 23. that the Good, or rather *Goodness* of the Creature, is properly the ultimate End of all the Dispensations of God, and not his own *Glory*, as some love to speak: This *Glory* seems to be display'd no otherwise than as it is subservient and necessary to that End; and necessary it is (as has been partly shewn above.) For Goodness is of our own making, and must require Knowledge, Love, &c. as Motives and Means to further us in the gradual Formation of a suitable Temper and proper Habits here, the Enlargement and Improvement of which will constitute our Heaven hereafter, as *Scott* and *Dr. Rymer*. have shewn at large:

Virtue

* See the Appendix, §. 2. par. 9.

† *Jenkin*, 2d vol. Ch. 12. p. 244, &c. 5th Edit.

objected, that Moral Evil is not a necessary concomitant of human Nature, and therefore is voluntarily permitted by God, and that no Benefit arises from the permission of it, as there does from Hunger, Thirst, and the Passions: We must reply, that Liberty of Choice is a necessary Concomitant of our Nature, and that the Exercise of it cannot be hinder'd, as we have seen, without greater Evils: In respect then of our own Will, Moral Evil is not necessary, but in respect of God it is, *i. e.* he must either tolerate this Evil or a greater; from hence also proceeds no small Advantage to universal Nature, as well as to Mankind.

II. Secondly, Hence we perceive the Answer to Cicero's Objection in his third Book, *De Natura Deorum*, where Cotta is introduced arguing

Cicero's
Objection
proposed
which is taken from a

Physician who gives his Patient Wine when he knows that he will dye of it. Or a Father who leaves his Estate to a Prodigal Son.

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Virtue therefore or *Moral Good* cannot (as *Bayle* imagines) be *infused into us* miraculously; neither could God, according to the Order of our Ideas, have acquainted us with so much of his adorable Nature, his Mercy, Long-suffering, Goodness and Truth (as he himself describes it *) nor consequently have brought us to so great a resemblance of it by any other Method. The sole Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, &c. (as *Bayle* objects †) would not do the Business, nor if it were perceiv'd and would have been attended to, could it be of sufficient force to influence the Minds of Men, and regulate their Practice, as is evident from daily Experience. The present Scheme of Providence was therefore necessary, in order to produce in the generality of Men the greatest degree of Goodness in this Life, which is the ground and foundation of their Happiness in the next. Even there also may the Memory of their former Trials (as was hinted above) the Consciouf-

ness of their own happy Choice, when others did, and they had the same Power and the same Temptations to have done otherwise: the joyful Reflection on their past Dangers and present Safety, and the natural Consequence of all this Love and Gratitude, and Glory to God in the Highest, and mutual Congratulations of each other.—These and the like Contemplations will (as *Dr. Jenkin* says) create a new Heaven in Heaven itself.

And tho' in one respect a view of the Misery which the damned undergo, might seem to detract from the Happiness of the Blessed, thro' Commiseration, &c. Yet under another, a nearer, and much more affecting Consideration, *viz.* that all this is the Misery which they themselves often exposed themselves to, and were in imminent Danger of incurring; in this View, why may not the sense of their own Escape so far overcome the Sense of another's Ruin, as quite to extinguish the Pain that

* Exod 34. 6, 7.

† Crit. Dict. p. 2488.

going in this manner : “ If a Physician knows that his Patient, who
 “ is order’d to drink Wine, will drink too much and dye of it im-
 “ mediately, he is greatly blameable for allowing him it. Thus is
 “ this Providence of yours to be blamed, which has given Reason
 “ to such as it knew would make a perverse and wicked Use of it.”
 He proceeds also to confute those Persons who endeavour to excuse
 Providence, by saying, “ that it does not follow that we are not ve-
 “ ry well provided for by the Gods, because a great many use their
 “ Gifts perversely ; since many make a bad use of their Paternal
 “ Estates, and yet these cannot be said to have no Benefit from their
 “ Fathers.” To which he replies in these Words: “ I wish the
 “ Gods had not bestow’d that Cunning upon Men which very few
 “ make a right use of : In so much that this Divine Gift of Reason
 “ and Deliberation may seem to be imparted for a Snare and not a
 “ Benefit to Mankind.” He adds, “ We leave Estates to our Chil-
 “ dren in hopes of leaving them well, wherein we may be deceiv’d ;
 “ but how can God be deceiv’d? ”

‘Tis shewn
 that the Com-
 parison is ill
 put between
 Reason and
 Free-Will,
 and the giving
 of Wine ; and
 that God, if he
 took away Lib-
 erty for fear
 we should be
 like a Man that
 kills his Son
 for fear he
 should be sick.

III. To all which we reply, First, That it is very unfair to com-
 “ pare the Reason which is granted to Man with Wine given to
 the

and the giving of Wine ; and that God, if he took away Liberty for fear we should
 be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he should be sick.

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that usually attends the Idea of it, and even render it productive of some real Happiness? To this purpose apply that of *Lucretius*, B. 2.

*Suave mori magno turbantibus æquora ventis
 E terra alterius magnum spectare laborem,
 Non quia vexari quæquam est jucunda voluptas.
 Sed, quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere sua-
 ve est.*

But however this be, most of the foregoing Reflections seem just and unexceptionable.

I shall conclude with another Passage from *Dr. Jenkin**, which sets them in the strongest Light.

“ It must advance the Happiness both of
 “ Angels and Men in Heaven, that upon
 “ Choice and Trial they have preferr’d God
 “ before all things, and upon that find them-
 “ selves confirm’d and establish’d in the per-
 “ petual and unalterable Love and Enjoy-
 “ ment of him. This very Consideration,
 “ that they might once have fallen from his
 “ Love, inspires them with the highest Ar-
 “ dors of Love, when they rejoice in the
 “ infinite

* p. 242.

the Sick. For a sick Person may enjoy Life, and even recover, without Wine; but Man cannot be what he is without Reason. The Comparison therefore is very improperly made between things that are *disperate*. Neither is there a less difference between *sinning* and *dying*. 'Tis very true, that no body would let a sick Person take Wine which he knew would kill him: but yet any prudent Physician would allow his Patient to take some Meat, without which he knew that he certainly must die, tho' he understood, that upon taking it the Fever would encrease a little. In like manner God has given Reason to Men, without which they would not be Men, tho' he foresaw that some Evils would arise from it. Reason therefore ought to be compared to Life, and natural Evils to the Distemper. If then God were to take away Reason lest Men should use it amiss, he would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he should be sick.

IV. Secondly, Human Reason is improperly compared to a *Patrimony*, since it is the very *Being* and Life of Man: and who would rather put his Son to Death than suffer him to lead a sort of an irregular Life?

Reason is no less improperly compar'd to an Estate.

V. Thirdly, We ought to remember that we are not born for ourselves alone, but are subservient to Nature as Parts of the Universe, 'tis reasonable therefore that we should bear such things as

It tends to the good of the whole, and of ourselves too, that we should have or without

P p 2

tend

the use of Free-Will: for we had rather be what we are than in the Condition of Brutes, Reason.

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“ infinite Rewards of so easy and short a
 “ Trial: and the Reflection upon the Dan-
 “ gers escaped, heightens even the Joys of
 “ Heaven to them, and makes an addition to
 “ every Degree of Bliss. The remembrance
 “ of their past Sins and Temptations, and
 “ the Sense of their own Unworthiness aris-
 “ ing from that Remembrance, will conti-
 “ nually excite in the Blessed fresh Acts of
 “ Love and Adoration of God, who has rai-

“ sed them above all Sin and Temptation,
 “ and fix'd them in an everlasting State of
 “ Bliss and Glory. The Trial that the Right-
 “ teous underwent here, makes up some part
 “ of their Happiness in Heaven; and in
 “ what Degree soever their Happiness can
 “ be supposed to be, yet it is in some
 “ measure increased, and as it were en-
 “ deared to them, by reflecting on their
 “ former State of Trial, in which they
 “ were

Of Moral Evil.

tend to the Good of the whole, tho' they be a little inconvenient to us. Now we have shewn before that the Abuse of Reason cannot be prevented without Violence done to the Laws of the Universe, without Detriment to Mankind and to ourselves. If therefore a Father could not refuse a Son his Inheritance, without breaking the Laws of his Country, without injuring his Family, and lastly, without the Loss of his Son's Life, he would not deserve to be blamed for giving him it, tho' he understood that he would make a bad use of it: Especially if he foresaw that the Brothers of this Prodigal would take warning by his Error and become frugal, and that the Estate which he spent would turn to their Benefit. The same must be said of the Physician who gives his Patient a Glass at his Request; which if he did not give, the Patient would immediately stab himself. Is he culpable if he compound for a less Evil, in order to avoid a greater? More especially, if many labour under the same Distemper, and would not be convinc'd of the danger of using Wine but by Experiment: would it not be better to let one or two make the Experiment than that all should perish? God therefore knowingly permits us sick Persons to use Wine; for tho' we abuse it, yet our Condition will be better than if he had not bestow'd it upon us. If any urge, that it is better not to be at all, than to be miserable, and consequently that 'tis more proper to deprive us of Life, than to suffer us to abuse it. I answer-as before, That we must make a Distinction in Misery; for where there is more Evil than Good, it is indeed preferable not to be, than to be involv'd in this kind of Misery, but that which attends human Reason is not such, by our own Judgment. For we had rather be what we are than not be at all, or be without Reason. Else why are we unwilling to change our Condition with

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"were subject to Temptation and Sin." *Eternity of Hell-Torments*, Argument the 4th.
 See the same handled more distinctly in *p. 73, &c.* or *Scott's Christian Life*, Vol. 5.
 the first of Mr. *D'Oyly's* four Dissertations, *p. 100.*
 Ch. 10. or A-Bp. *Dawes's* 5th Sermon on the

with the Brutes, or Mad-men, if we do not think it better than theirs?

VI. But to conclude, *Cotta* in *Cicero* has neither brought pertinent Similitudes, nor given good Advice to Providence. For God, as a Physician, does not give Wine to the sick Person to kill him; but to one that will die, in order to prevent his dying sooner. Neither has the Divine Father given an Inheritance to his Sons that they may waste it, but has bestow'd it upon such as will waste it, lest they should want Necessaries. Whereas, if *Cotta* had been Counsellor to Providence, he would have advised Physicians to let their Patients die with Thirst, lest some of them should drink too much; he would have persuaded Parents either to kill their Children, or never beget them, lest they should make a bad use of their Estates when they came to Age. (109.)

Cicero has neither brought apposite Similes, nor given good Advice to Providence.

VII. From

N O T E S.

(109.) The same holds good against all *Bayle's* Comparisons, *Crit. Diss. Art. Paulicians*, *Rem. E. F. K Δ Δ, &c.* p. 2488. where he says, that to permit Men to sin rather than over-rule their Wills, is like a Mother that lets her Daughters go to a Ball, where she is sure they will lose their Honour, and then pleads in her own Justification, "that she had no mind to restrain the Liberty of her Daughters, nor to shew any Distrust of them." *Again* †, If a Son should see his Father ready to throw himself out of the Window, either in a fit of Frenzy, or because he is troubled in Mind, he would do well to chain him, if he could not restrain him otherwise. If a Queen should fall into the Water, any Footman that should get her out of it, either by embracing her, or taking her by the Hair ††, tho' he should pluck off above one half of it, would do a very good Action; she would not certainly complain of his want of Respect to her. If any one should suffer a

"Lady finely dress'd to fall into a Precipice, would it not be a very foolish Excuse to say, that it had not been possible to stop her without spoiling her Ribbons and Head-dress?" *And to name no more**, "To have regard to the Free-Will of a Man, and carefully to abstain from laying any restraint upon his Inclination, when he is going to lose his Innocence for ever, to be eternally damn'd, can you call that a lawful Observation of the Laws of Liberty? You would be less unreasonable if you would say to a Man who gets a Fall near you, and breaks his Leg, *that which hinder'd us from preventing your Fall is, that we were afraid to undo some Folds of your Gown, we had so great a respect for its Symmetry, that we would not undertake to spoil it, and we thought it was much better to let you run the hazard of breaking your Bones,*" &c-

In all which this Author evidently mistakes the Case, by comparing the *Destruction of Free-Will*

† *Crit. Diss.* p. 2497.

‡ Thus *Q.* Christina was taken out of a Lake at Stockholm.

* p. 2497.

VII. From the same Principles we may solve that strong Objection of *Epicurus* against Providence, which *Lactantius* enforces in his Book *De Ira Dei* †, and, as some think, does not sufficiently answer. It stands thus: “ Either God is willing to remove Evils, and not able, or able and not willing, or neither able nor willing. If he be willing and not able, he is impotent, which cannot be apply’d to the Deity: If he be able and not willing, he is envious; which is equally inconsistent with the Nature of God. If he be neither willing nor able, he is both envious and impotent, and consequently no God. If he be both willing and able, which is the only thing that answers to the Notion of a God, from whence come Evils? Or why does he not remove them?”

VIII. We must take the third of those four Branches of his puzzling Argument; *viz.* That God neither will nor can remove Evils. (110.) Yet we deny the Consequence. He is neither to be esteemed Envious nor Impotent, because he does not work Contradictions:

’Tis a Contradiction, that all Evils be removed from created Beings: God is not impotent, therefore because he does not remove them.

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Will (for that is the only thing, as we have prov’d, that can prevent the abuse of it) which *Will* has been shewn to be the very Life and Soul of Man; to such mere trifles as tearing his Hair, or discomposing his Habit: Whereas, from the foregoing account of the inestimable Worth of Liberty to each Individual, and the many Advantages that arise in common, even from the abuse of it, it plainly appears, that to abridge, or which is the very same, to deprive a Man of Liberty for fear he should abuse it, would, in regard to him, be just as good as to knock him on the Head for fear he should maim or disfigure himself. And with respect to the Publick, he would be far more unreasonable who should desire the absence of this Liberty, because of its frequent abuse, than he who should wish that there were no such things as Fire, Wind, or Water, in the World, because so many Men, Houses, and Ships are destroy’d by them.—As the rest of *Bayle’s* elaborate Similes are founded on the same Misrepresentation, one hint of this kind is, I think, enough to invalidate them.

(110.) *Leibnitz* would rather say, “ that God could take them away, but he was not willing to do it absolutely; and for a very

† §: 12. p. 435. *Cambr.* Edit.

dictions: But it is a Contradiction that all Evils should be removed, without removing the whole Universe; which would be the greatest of all Evils. For some kind of Evils adhere (as we have often declared) to the very Natures of things, and cannot be removed while any created Nature continues. For when a Circle is once made, all the Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference, must necessarily be equal; neither is God impotent because he cannot make them unequal while it continues to be a Circle: In like manner, when he has made a Creature, he must necessarily tolerate the Evil of Imperfection in it, which is as essential to it as an Equality of the *Radij* is to the Circle. When therefore Matter, Motion and Free-Will are constituted, he must necessarily permit Corruption of things, and the abuse of Liberty, or something worse. For these cannot be separated (as was shewn) without a Contradiction. God therefore is no more impotent because he cannot remove these Evils from things while the things themselves remain, than because he cannot separate an Equality of the *Radij* from a Circle. The Consequence then is false which charges God with Impotence because he cannot remove Evils.

IX. Neither is that Assertion less false which attributes it to Envy that he will not. For he that always wills the best, and the least of many Evils, is absolutely Good, and the farthest from Envy: and we have shewn that this is the Case with respect to God. If a Person

God always chooses the least of Evils, and therefore is not envious.

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“ very good reason, because he should have
 “ taken away the Good at the same time, and
 “ because he should have taken away more
 “ Good than Evil †.”

The Answer of Lactantius is as follozes. “ De-
 “ us potest quicquid volet, & imbecillitas vel
 “ invidia in Deo nulla est: potest igitur ma-
 “ la tollere, sed non vult, nec ideo tamen in-
 “ vidus est, id circo enim non tollit quia fa-
 “ pientiam (sicut edocui) simul tribuit, & plus
 “ est boni ac jucunditatis in sapientia, quam
 “ in malis molestiæ; sapientia enim fa-

“ cit ut etiam Deum cognoscamus & per eam
 “ cognitionem, immortalitatem assequamur,
 “ quod est summum Bonum. Itaque nisi pri-
 “ us malum agnoverimus, nec poterimus ag-
 “ noscere Bonum, sed hoc non videt *Epicu-
 “ rus*, nec alius quisquam, si tollantur mala
 “ tolli pariter Sapientiam, nec ulla in ho-
 “ mine remanere virtutis vestigia, cujus ratio
 “ in sustinenda & superanda malorum a cerbi-
 “ tate consistit. Itaque propter exiguum com-
 “ pendium sublatorum malorum, maximo &
 “ vero & proprio nobis bono caretemus.

† *Remarques*, p. 488.

Person had his Choice either to abolish or not to abolish Evil, he would be malicious if he did not abolish it. But when the choice is between this and a greater Evil, he that choofes the less is far from being malicious. The Divine Goodness therefore reduces God to this Difficulty, that he must choofe to make either no Creature at all, or an imperfect one; either no such thing as Matter and Motion, or tolerate Contrariety and Corruption in things; either no free Agent, or admit a Power of sinning. He must necessarily have chosen one of these, and 'tis easy to say whether of them was more directly opposite to Envy.

God could neither be conceiv'd to be infinitely powerful, if he were not able to create imperfect Beings, i. e. Creatures, or things that are contrary to each other; i. e. Evils: nor infinitely Good, if he had been contented in himself, and deny'd Existence to every thing else.

X. To speak my Thoughts, I dare confidently, but with Reverence, pronounce, that God would nei her have been infinitely powerful nor good, if he could not have made any thing which we call Evil. For there are some things possible which are not consistent with each other, nay are repugnant and mutually destructive, i. e. are Evils to each other: If God were unable to produce any of these, how would he be infinitely powerful, since he could not do all that is possible? Nor would it be less injurious to his Goodness to be unwilling, for by this means his Power must lie idle and never effect any thing at all; since nothing can be simply Good and exempt from all manner of Evil, but God himself. If therefore the Divine Goodness had deny'd Existence to created Beings, on account of the concomitant Evils, he might really have been esteem'd Envious, since he had allow'd none to exist beside himself, and while he refused to admit of any kind of Evil, he would have rejected all the Good. Thus vanishes this *Herculean* Argument, which induced the *Epicureans* to discard the good Deity, and the *Manicheans* to substitute an Evil one.

XI. *Epicurus* then is both a Deceiver and deceived himself, when from the present Evils he concludes against the Omnipotence and Goodness of the Deity. Whereas on the contrary God would neither have been powerful nor Good if he had not tolerated Evils. From a competition or (if we may be allow'd the expression) a *Conflict of two Infinites*, i. e. Omnipotence and Goodness, Evils necessarily

Epicurus therefore is deceiv'd who endeavours to attribute impotence and Envy to the Deity, when he ought to have inferr'd the highest Power and Goodness.

cessarily arise. These Attributes amicably conspire together, and yet restrain and limit each other. There is a kind of Struggle and Opposition between them, whereof the Evils in Nature bear the Shadow and Resemblance. Here then, and no where else, may we find the Primary and most certain Rise and Origin of Evils; and here only must we look for that celebrated Principle of the Antients

Νεῖκος ἐλόμενον καὶ δῆρις αἱματόεσσα.

The Pestilential Strife and Bloody Fight.

Empedocles.

A P P E N .

A P P E N D I X:

Concerning the Divine Laws.

*Why God made Laws when he knew that they
would not be observ'd.*

The Divine
Laws are ei-
ther natural
or positive

I. **T**HE Divine Laws are either those which God has implan-
ted in the Nature of every Being, or those which he has
publish'd to Mankind in a particular manner, by certain
Messengers chosen and sent for this Purpose. For since a
Law is the Will of a superior sufficiently promulg'd to an Inferior,
and attended with the Hope or Fear of Reward or Punishment: 'tis
plain that God may be conceiv'd to have made this Declaration of
his Will to his Creatures two Ways: First, by giving them such a
Nature as requires that some things be done, and others avoided, in
order to its Preservation: those things which are made known to us
in this manner, are commanded or forbidden, we say, by the Law
of Nature: and that Law which thus discovers itself to our Under-
standing

derstanding we look upon as the Will of God promulg'd to his Creatures: For we are very certain that God, according to his Goodness, wills the Good and Preservation of all things which he himself has made, as far as is possible: and consequently hates any thing that is hurtful to the Creature.

II. Now it must be observ'd that these natural Laws are either *Universal* or *Particular*; and 'tis fit the particular ones should give way to the more *Universal*, and those of less Moment to the more important. For instance, 'tis of the Nature of Body that it be capable of Motion, that it be stopp'd and broken in Pieces by meeting with others in Motion, and this is the *Universal Law* of Bodies. But it is of the Nature of an Animal to preserve itself, and use its utmost Endeavour that the Parts of its Body be not separated or dissolv'd, and this is the *particular Law* of Animals.

Particular Laws ought to give place to more general ones, since all kind of Repugnancy could not be avoided.

Now since these Laws are sometimes inconsistent, it is reasonable that the latter, as being a particular one, and of less Consequence, should yield to the former: and this is evidently the Will of God. If it be ask'd, Why did God make Laws which in some respect interfere with one another? I answer, as before, That this could not be avoided without a greater Evil: Since therefore of two Evils the less is to be chosen, God will'd that particular Laws, and those of less consequence, should give place to the more *Universal* and those of greater Importance, rather than remove that Inconsistency, for there arises less Inconvenience to Nature from thence.

III. The same must be said of those Laws which relate to Morality. 'Tis the *Universal Law* of Free Agents, that they shall please themselves by Election, but there are some things eligible which may be prejudicial to some particular Beings. Now it is better, as was said before, that Particulars be injur'd, than that the *Universal Law* of Free Agents be violated. We must suppose then that God willed this as the less Evil of the two. Men are permitted therefore to abuse their Free-Will, and it is necessary that God should tolerate either this Inconvenience or a greater. But it is not at all necessary that Man should make an Evil Choice; therefore he alone is faulty; for it proceeds from his Act that God is reduced to a necessity of choosing the least among many Evils.

The same must be said of those Laws which relate to the moral World.

IV. From

Why God is
said to be an-
gry with Sin-
ners, since
his Will is
always done.

IV. From hence it appears that all the Laws of Nature are always observ'd according to the Will and Intent of God. For he will'd that the Particular should give place to the General ones, and that Man should sin rather than be driven from Sin by force. You'll say, Why then is he angry at Sinners, since nothing is done against his Will? I answer; When Anger is attributed to God, 'tis *after the manner of Men* †; whereas it is order'd and effected by the very Nature and Constitution of things, that whoever does any thing in opposition to any Law of Nature, tho' it be a particular one, shall bring some Inconvenience upon himself. By which contrivance God has taken care that the very least Law should not be violated rashly and without Necessity. When an Offender therefore, who willingly breaks a particular Law, brings certain Misery upon himself, God who wisely coupled these together is said to be *angry*: Because a Man in Anger would not take any other or more effectual Revenge on the Person that provok'd him; and the Evil which naturally attends a bad Election, is to be esteem'd a Punishment inflicted as it were by an Angry God.

God may al-
ter or add to
the Laws of
Nature, and
give us assu-
rance that he
intends to do
so; hence the
origin of po-
sitive Laws,
and a Reve-
lation.

V. As to the second sort of Divine Laws, *viz.* the *Positive*; 'tis certain, that God, who is the Author of Nature and establish'd the Laws of it, can either alter them or add to them when he sees it proper. Neither does he want Means whenever he pleases, to assure Mankind that he will do it. When therefore we find any Alteration in the Laws of Nature, we may from hence conclude that God demands our Attention. And hereupon we esteem the Promulgation of a new Law recommended to us by this Token, to be an authentic Declaration of the Will of God. In this manner were the *Mosaic* and *Evangelic* Laws established; *viz.* by *Miracles*.

Laws
are the
means of
informing
Free-Ag-
ents of
what is
useful or

VI. But it is usually ask'd, Why did God establish and promulge those Laws which he knew Men would not observe? It must be answer'd, That these Laws are Means of acquainting Free Agents with what is expedient for them, and of moving them to the choice

of
prejudicial to them

† See Chap. 1. § 3. par. 10. and Note E.

of it. Neither does their Nature admit of any that are more efficacious: for it is such as must be persuaded and not compell'd. Notwithstanding therefore God knew that his Laws would not be observ'd by all, yet he proposes them to all, for by this Means a great many learn their true Interest, thankfully embrace the Laws and obey them; and the rest are no worse for them, since they would be involv'd in the same Evils which they feel from the Sanction of the Laws, and perhaps greater, tho' these Laws had never been. (111.)
But

NOTES.

(111.) 'Tis a very useful Observation which our Author makes in this place, and illustrates in the following Section, par. 3. viz. that the Divine Laws (especially those of the *Christian* Dispensation) are chiefly *Declarations* of the natural and necessary Effects of Sin, or *Directions* and *Means* to avoid them; which necessary Effects are conceived to be the real *Sanction* of these Laws. Consequently these Laws cannot properly bring us into a worse State than we should have been in without them. — They do not introduce a new Train of arbitrary and additional Evils, but on the contrary are design'd in pure Goodness to lessen the Number of the old ones, — to forewarn us of the natural Consequences of our own Acts and Habits, and prevent those Moral Evils to which we are expos'd by the very constitution of our Being, — which the universal Law of Liberty makes it possible for us to incur, and impossible for God to hinder, by any other means, as has been shewn above. Farther; this Notion, that most of the Misery both in this World and the next, is the *necessary Consequence* of sinful Actions, according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, rather than any positive Punishment immediately inflict'd by the Deity, will, I am apt to think, have the greatest Influence on most Men to deter them from such Actions. I am sure I find myself more deeply affected with this Reflection, that Misery will follow of Course upon some certain

Practices, and that by indulging them, I naturally and necessarily destroy myself, than I should be by a Prospect of the very same Degree of Pain threatn'd as a Punishment for such Practices. And the Reason of this is evident: I am apt still to hope that the latter may possibly be remitted: but the former leaves no room for Hope. Again, A due attention to this Doctrine, that all our moral Happiness in this World must be of our own making, and that disordered, evil Affections, irregular and perverse Habits, &c. will constitute the greatest part of our *Hell* in the next, (which might be shewn in the same manner as was hinted concerning virtuous Habits, in Note 103. but is render'd unnecessary by the Authors there mention'd.) This Doctrine, I say, if rightly understood and apply'd, would discover the weakness of all such pretences to Salvation as are built upon the bare Belief of a Confidence in what any other has done or can do for us; or even of what we do ourselves purely by way of *Opus operatum*. i. e. as ultimately relying on the bare Discharge of or any Duty, and not using and applying it as a means to some farther End, v. g. on *Prayer*, as the mere Labour of the Lips, on the *Sacrament* as a Charm, on *Repentance* as a simple Act entitling us to Happiness, &c. In short, of any thing which does not enter the Heart and improve the Temper. If Heaven be not so much the *Reward* of Religion, as the *natural*


A P P E N D I X.

granting that some who transgress the Laws meet with greater and more Inconveniencies than they would have done without them, 'tis better that some should suffer Inconveniencies thro' their own fault, than that all should be deprived of the Benefit of the Divine Laws; God therefore, out of infinite Goodness, which is always inclined to the best, promulg'd those Laws which he knew all Men would not observe.

N O T E S.

tural Consequence of a Religious Frame of Mind, and *vice versa*; then how absurd is it for us who are aspiring after that State, to stop by the way, to rest in any particular Acts of Religion as arbitrary Institutions procuring, and as it were *purchasing* it for us, instead of using them as, what they really are, fit Instruments to *work out* our Salvation, by *producing*

this frame of Mind in us, as proper Helps and Assistances enabling us to *acquire* this Heavenly Temper? And on the other Side, how vain must be our Hopes of escaping Hell by any such Methods as these, if we still carry our Hell within us. See par. 11. of the following Section.



S E C T.

S E C T. II.

Concerning Divine Rewards and Punishments.

I. IT was proper to say something concerning these, since Punishment is a natural Evil, *viz.* Pain, Disappointment of Appetite, or Damage annex'd to a wrong Choice, by a Foresight whereof we might be deterr'd from making a wrong Choice. In these consists the Power and Efficacy of Laws, nor would they be of any force without them. Now Good or Evil, *i. e.* Rewards and Punishments, may be annex'd, either by Nature, or by Laws of positive Institution.

Punishment is a natural Evil connected with a depraved Choice.

II. As to *Nature*, all Evil is prejudicial to it, *i. e.* interrupts its Course: Evil therefore proceeds from some Violence done to Nature, and that which offers Violence must necessarily suffer it; for every natural Action has Re-action join'd with it. According to the Laws of Mechanism then Evil done to another is for the most part repair'd with Evil to the Doer, *i. e.* with Punishment. By which piece of Machinery or Contrivance, God has manifested both his Wisdom and Goodness. For by this means he has taken effectual Care that none should transgress the Laws of Nature without Punishment, or offer unnecessary Violence to the Appetites of others; or if it were necessary to offer it, yet that it should not be without some Inconvenience to him that does offer it. For it is better that a Creature should be able to provide for its own Safety with some Inconveniencies,

Evil is violence done to Nature; but every natural Action has re-action correspondent to it: therefore he that does Violence must necessarily suffer Violence, that none may sin without Punishment.

A P P E N D I X.

conveniencies, than that it should be at Liberty to offer needless Violence to others, and the Laws belonging to their particular Nature be broken to no manner of end: For by that means there would be more Evils in Nature than there are at present, and they would be multiply'd unnecessarily. Hence it appears how worthy it is of God to have framed the Nature of things in such a manner, that from the very Constitution of them, the Intemperate, Injurious, the Thief, Robber, Adulterer, Proud, Envious, &c. should have something to dread. If any one ask; why there are not such Punishments as might effectually imprint a lively sense upon our Minds, and thereby totally restrain us from a wrong Choice? I answer: A greater Evil must not be done on account of a less; but if the Punishments and Dread of them were increas'd to such a Degree, as to be sufficient to prevent all kind of Evil, they themselves would be the greatest of all Evils, and the dread of them would more deeply affect, and be a greater Affliction to the Minds of Men, even of those who would not do amiss, than the Evils themselves are, for the Prevention of which these Punishments are proposed by God. It was therefore fit that there should be some measure in Punishments; viz. lest by being always present to the Minds of Mortals, they should prove a greater Prejudice to our Ease and Happiness, than those very Evils which are prohibited under the Penalty of them would be, were we forced to undergo them.

III. As to the Punishments which God has affix'd by way of *Sanction* to *positive Laws*, we must affirm, that they are to be esteem'd as Admonitions and Notices of the Mischiefs consequent upon evil Elections, rather than that God himself will immediately inflict them. Natural Conscience is for the most part sufficiently able to inform us what is Good and what is Evil: but it was impossible for Nature to acquaint us with all the Consequences which attend our Actions in an infinite Train and Continuance of things. Now, lest we should be involv'd in Evils unawares, and contrary to our Expectations, God has inform'd us by positive Laws what our Condition must be if we will indulge ourselves in Evil Elections. And has promulg'd them by way of *Punishments* denounc'd, rather than by simple *Prediction* that

Positive Laws acquaint us with the Punishments which attend deprav'd Elections from the Nature of the thing, rather than inflict new ones.

that they might enter more deeply into our Minds, and oblige us to take care of ourselves.

IV. But if there be any thing which is not reducible to this head, and seems to prove an *immediate Infliction* by the Deity, neither is that done without Reason. For it is fit that God should remove that Being out of the World which cannot be made consistent with the Good of the Universe: and reform that by Chastisement which would otherwise, thro' its irregular Motion, prove offensive to the Author, and all about it. Punishments then are annex'd to Evil Elections, in order to *prevent* them, and inflicted to *correct* and *amend* the Offenders, or to *deter* others from the like Offences. If therefore the Appointment and Infliction of Punishments prevent greater Evils than they are themselves; it follows that God has chosen the better Part in establishing and exacting them.

V. It may be ask'd, how this can agree with the Punishments of the Wicked, which the *Christian Religion* declares to be *Eternal*. For in the first place, 'tis plain that they are not inflicted either to reform the Guilty (for there is no room for Reformation in Hell) or to deter others from the like Guilt: for Sin will be at an end, and the very possibility of sinning taken away before they shall be inflicted. They can neither be of use to the Dead therefore, nor to the Living; for they are kept secret while they might be of any use. Consequently there seems to be some other end of these Punishments, *viz.* to make Satisfaction to the Divine *Vengeance* for the Injury and Affront offer'd to his Majesty.

VI. Secondly, These Eternal Torments appear to be not very agreeable to the Divine OEconomy in another respect. For it is to be observ'd that God has fram'd all things, and dispos'd them in such a manner, that nothing can repent of its having been made by him: for when it is come to this, that its Misery exceeds its Pleasure, the Being perishes, and is withdrawn from both. Not to *exist* therefore, or not to perceive any means of Relief, is the very worst Condition, as was shewn before †. A violent Object not only destroys

the manner that nothing might repent of its being created.

† Ch. 4. § 8. par. 5.

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the Senfory, but takes away the Senfe itfelf; the Divine Goodnefs providing that no Creature fhould be worfe by its Exiftence than if it had not exifted. And as far as appears, thinking Beings ought to be dealt with after the fame manner, *viz.* When Pain, Sorrow, Fear, Anxiety, and the reft of the Paflions and Affections increafe to fo great a Degree that the Mind receives more Evil than Good from the Senfe of its Exiftence, 'tis reafonable that the Excefs of thefe fhould extinguifh Thought itfelf, as the Excefs of bodily Pains deftroys the Senfe: Otherwife thefe miferable Beings feem to receive no Benefit from God, fince Providence has reduced them to a State worfe than that *Non-exiftence* in which it found them*. Neither does it feem a fufficient Vindication of the Divine Goodnefs, to fay, that this befalls them thro' their own Fault, for it is hardly agreeable to Goodnefs to have placed any Being in that State which was obnoxious to fuch exceffive Mifery: For who would choofe Exiftence attended with a danger that fo very much overballances it? He is not a wife Man that expofes all his Eftate to hazard, nor a good Man that obliges any one to do it.

'Tis ask'd, thirdly, how Punifhments can fubfift without a natural caufe.

VII. *3dly.* Whatever is perpetual muft have a *natural* and *perpetual* *Caufe*; for a perpetual Miracle is not to be expected. If therefore the Punifhments of the Wicked be eternal, it feems neceffary for thefe Punifhments to arife from the Laws and Conftitution of Nature. For it is fcarce conceivable how a State of Violence fhould be perpetual. I have propofed thefe Objections at length, left I fhould feem to have declined them on account of their Difficulty, (112.)

VIII. As

N O T E S.

(112.) The chief of thofe Authors who feem to oppofe the ftrict, abfolute Eternity of Hell-Torments, are A-Bp. *Tillofon*, *T. Burnet*, *de Statu Mort.* Ch. 10. p. 290, &c. *T. Swinden* in the *Appendix* to his Book on Hell. The Author of the Annotations on *Lux Orientalis*, p. 73, 74. *S. Collier* in his *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 105, &c. and his *Eflay on Reveald Religion*, p. 142, &c. *Whitby* Appendix to the 2d *Treff.*

Bayle, *Epifcopius*, and the *Fratres Poloni*. See alfo *Fabricii Delectus Argumentorum*, &c. C. 47. p: 720. concerning fome Pieces in the *Phoenix*, &c.

Some of thofe who have particularly infifted on the Defence of it are A-Bp. *Darwes*, *Jenkin*, *Fiddes*, *Lupton*, *Lake*, *Sherlock* on *Providente*, Ch. 2. and Difcourfe concerning the Happinefs of good Men and Punifhment of the

* See Matth. 26. 24. and Mark 14. 21.

VIII. As to the first Objection, I answer: It appears from the Light of Nature, that there shall be *future Punishments* but not that these shall be *Eternal*; we must not therefore enquire of Natural Reason why they are inflicted; for they belong to reveal'd Religion, by which they are denounced: that is, there may be a Reason for them, but such as is beyond the mere natural Sagacity of Man to discover. Now we find many things of this kind in Nature; it does not therefore follow, because the Goodness of God has reveal'd to us that the Punishment of the Wicked shall endure for ever, that he is also obliged to reveal why and how that comes to pass. For perhaps it may be above the Power of our Mind to conceive it in the present state of Things.

To the first 'tis answer'd, that eternal Punishments are made known to us by Revelation, and that God is not therefore oblig'd to reveal how or why they are

so: for perhaps the Reason is above our Comprehension.

IX. Secondly, Who will undertake to shew that the Eternal Punishment of the Wicked has no Tendency towards confirming good Men in the Choice of their Duty? (113.) If God make use of *Means* for that End, and do not immediately exert his Omnipotence alone, scarce could any other more effectual means be found out to make the Blessed approve themselves in their Choice conformed to the Divine Will, and persevere therein, than the continual Contemplation of those miserable Beings who have done otherwise. Election is matter of Freedom, and not to be excited or prevented by other means than

It does not appear but that the Punishments of the Wicked may be of use to the Good.

R r 2

a Repre-

N O T E S.

the Wicked, &c. *Rymer*, Part 1st. Chap. 7. *Nichol's Conference with a Theist*, Part 3. p. 309. &c. *Scott's Christian Life*, vol. 5, p. 91, &c. 8vo. and Discourse 22d. p. 435, &c. 2d vol. of his Works, Fol. *Patrick, Witnesses of Christianity*, Part 2d. *Bates on the Existence of God*, &c. Ch. 12.

(113.) See A-Bp. *Dawes's* Sermon. 5. p. 73. &c. or Note 108. Or it may be for the perpetual Benefit and Improvement of some other Systems; see the latter end of Note 106. Or perhaps for a standing Monument and Warning to the Heathen World during their State of

Probation, which, for ought we know, may be extended beyond this Life, tho' we Christians have no reason to expect any farther Tryal.

See *Scott's Christian Life*, 8vo. 2d Vol. p. 351.

Something of this kind, I humbly apprehend, must be conceiv'd as the Reason for Hell-Torments, in order to make them consistent with perfect Goodness †, whatever we suppose the Nature of these Torments to be; of which below.

† See Note 23.

a Representation of *Good* or *Evil* to the Understanding. Since therefore God has undertaken to conduct and preserve an almost infinite Multitude of thinking Beings to all Eternity, thro' all the Changes and Successions of things, in as great a degree of Happiness as possible, without Violence done to Elections; where is the Wonder if he leave a few to the Misery which they brought upon themselves, thereby to give the rest a Warning how much they ought to stand upon their guard against the like? There's no necessity therefore to attribute eternal Punishment to the Divine *Vengeance* (nor is there properly any such thing in God, but it is ascribed to him, as other human Passions are in condescension to our Capacity.) For since these Punishments may be conceiv'd to promote the good of the whole, they may arise from the *Goodness*, and not the *Vengeance* of the Deity.

X. As to the second Objection, The Matter is yet in debate, whether it were better to be miserable than not to be at all, and there are Arguments on both Sides. (114.) 'Tis manifest, that what the Objection mentions, *viz.* those Evils which overballance the Desire and Happiness of Life, put an end to Life itself, and that such Objects as are hurtful to the Sense at length destroy it. The same seems to hold good in thinking Substances, *viz.* those things which affect the Mind to a higher Degree than it is able to bear, may in like manner put an end to it. For they may be supposed either to drive us to Madness, or so far to disorder the thinking Faculty, as to make us think of nothing at all. Who can tell then whether the Punishment of the Wicked may not lead them into a kind of Phrensie and Madness; Thus they may indeed be very miserable, and become a sad Spectacle to others; they may be sensible of their Misery also, and strive against it

To the second 'tis reply'd, that the matter is yet in debate whether it is preferable to be miserable or not to be at all. The Misery of the Damned may be like that of Mad-men

NOTES.

(114.) A most elaborate Disputation on this Subject may be seen in Bp. Barlow's Remains, p. 470, &c. But our Author, in the last Subject of his Book, par. 5, &c. very reasonably grants, *That Non existence becomes preferable to Existence whenever the Sum of Misery exceeds that of Happiness, and Evil becomes predominant in the whole*; and therefore, if he takes this Que-

stion in the same Sense, he had no great occasion to start it. Nay the Question will be about an absolute *Impossibility*, if any Misery which overballances the Happiness of Life do *ipso facto* put an end to Life, as our Author maintains in this very Paragraph: Concerning which Notion see Note 55.

it with all their Power; but while they don't observe or believe that it is founded in perverse Election, they may hug themselves in the Cause the Effects whereof they abhor; being still wise in their own Opinion, and as it were pleasing themselves in their Misery.

Thus, the more they labour under it, the more they embrace the Cause of it, and thereby become their own hindrance from ever getting free; and will not suffer themselves to be any thing but what they are. This we see done daily by mad and frantic Persons, and reckon it a part of their Unhappiness. The Divine Goodness therefore is not to be charg'd with Cruelty for letting them continue in that Existence, tho' it be very miserable, when they themselves will not have it remov'd: or for not altering their Condition, which they utterly refuse to have alter'd. 'Tis better for them indeed not to be than to be; but only in the Opinion of wise Men, to which they do not assent. For they indulge themselves in their obstinate Election, and tho' every way surrounded and oppress'd with Woes, yet will they not alter what they have once embraced. We have frequent examples in this Life resembling this kind of Obstinacy.

XI. We see perverse People voluntarily undergoing Pains, Afflictions, Torments, and even Death itself, rather than repent of their Resolution and change what they have once determin'd in their Mind. Nor is it uncommon for some to indulge, and in a manner *please* themselves in their very Miseries. Thus the sorrowful love all such things as aggravate and foment their Grief: and in like manner the Envious, the Angry, the Ambitious, the Despairing: not that they are insensible of Uneasiness under these Passions, or don't believe themselves to be miserable; but because they had rather have that Misery so long as they enjoy their Choice, than want it and them too; or at least they can persist in it, because they do not observe that this Misery arises from thence. When therefore the Wicked obstinately oppose themselves to God, and refuse to make their Elections conformable to his Will, they take delight perhaps in that very Opposition: to hate God, to disobey his Commands, and strive against him with all their Power, is pleasing to them; and tho' they see themselves overwhelm'd with innumerable Evils, yet they had rather endure them all than repent. As Men that are desperately in Love, ambitious, envious, choose to bear Torments, loss of Estate, and hazard of Life, rather

The Damned choose their miserable State, as Lovers, angry, ambitious, envious Persons indulge themselves in those things which increase their Misery.

A P P E N D I X.

rather than lay aside these foolish and bewitching Affections. We may easily conceive then how the Wicked in Hell may be in very great Misery upon the increase of their Obstinacy and Folly, and yet unwilling to be freed from them. All see and exclaim against the Folly, Misery, and Madness of those Men who spend their Estate in Vice, impair their Health, and bring on an untimely Death; who involve themselves in Labours, Dangers, Deaths; and for no other end but because they will do so: yet they persist in this, and their Obstinacy increases with their Evils. These are some *Preludes* of the Misery of the Damned, and from hence we may understand that these Persons are extremely miserable, and yet will not be set at Liberty. (115.)

It may be objected, that these miserable Beings may receive some kind of *Pleasure* from their *Elections*. But we place Felicity not barely in the *Act* of *choosing*, but much more in the *Enjoyment* of the Objects chosen. The more obstinately therefore any one chooses absurd and impossible things, the more miserable will he be when frustrated of

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(115.) From hence likewise we may understand what a natural, absolute, and indispensable Necessity there is for watching over all our *Habits, Affections, Appetites, &c.* for curbing our Passions, and correcting our Desires by *Reason*; for taking a strict and constant care that these be neither violent, irregular, nor fix'd on improper Objects in this Life, if we hope to avoid Misery in the Life to come. For if these accompany us into the other World, (and if we consider what *Scott* and *Rymer* have said on the Subject, it will appear infinitely probable that they do) the same or greater Unhappiness must unavoidably attend them there. If we shall have any Memory in the other World of what pass'd in this (which we must have, in order to give us either a good or evil *Conscience*, and to make us capable of Reward or Punishment in that respect) how probable is it that we shall then also feel the force of all those *Habits* and *Associations* which in this Life were so strong as to raise Passions,

Affections, &c. in us, and make us constantly proceed upon them for self-evident Principles, and pursue them for ultimate *Ends* of Action, as appear'd from the *Preliminary Dissertation*?

“ And this being so, of what unspeakable consequence are the Actions of Men, that thus draw after them a Chain of Joys or Woes, as long as Eternity? And how careful ought we to be to what course of Life we determine ourselves, considering that our *Eternal Fate* depends upon what we are now doing, that every moral Action we perform is a Step *Heaven* or *Hell-wards*, that in every bad Choice we make, we are planting our *Tophet*, or our *Paradise*, and that in the Consequents of our present Actions we shall *rue* or *rejoyce* to eternal Ages?

“ *Scott*, 2d vol, p. 26. See also 4th vol. Ch. 6, p. 692, &c. Fol. Edit, or *Hutcheson* on the Conduct of the Passions and Affections, §. 4, and 6. or Note 103, 111, 116. and par. 14, 15 of this Sect.

of his Choice; and we may imagine the damned to be always frustrated: nevertheless, after so much Warning and Experience, they don't intend to alter their Elections, but still persist in them, oppressed with the Sense and Weight of their Misery, and plung'd in deep despair. For it is possible that they may be regardless or ignorant that there is no other Way for them to be freed from these Miseries, but by altering their Elections, and not know how to do this, so as to persist in them for ever, and become more desperate by Disappointments, and to augment and multiply their Misery by new Attempts, which prove no less unhappy. The Power of willing the State they are in is not therefore of any Service to them towards the Attainment of Happiness, but renders them capable of Eternal Misery. For such Election may have the same Relation to this kind of Misery, as the natural Appetites have to Pain.

XII. Now it is sufficiently consonant to the Divine Goodness to permit or inflict this kind of Punishment, nor would it be less subservient to the Ends for which Punishments are wont to be imposed, *viz.* that by a previous Apprehension of them we may learn to be wise, and others be deterr'd from offending by our Example. For who does not dread Fury and Madness as the most miserable state of Mind? Who does not condemn the Folly and Madness of Men in Love, of envious and ambitious Persons? Especially when he beholds them labouring thereby under innumerable Evils, from which they will not be delivered?

XIII. But allowing that Existence is worse than Non-existence to the Damned, let them imagine their Misery to be greater than it really is. Let it be a part of their Misery, to be conscious that they were the only Cause of all their Grief: yet since that could not be prevented without greater detriment to the whole, there's no room for objecting against Providence which always does the best. If God had made nothing at all, and been contented to have remain'd alone, there would have been nothing that could sin, that could choose amiss, that could be miserable. But since it is impossible that there should be more Gods, the Deity made *Creatures* such as the Nature of a Created Being allow'd. Now it was expedient, for the Good of the whole, that some of these should have a Power of bringing Misery upon themselves by evil Election. Nor can any thing be charg'd

Such Punishment is very great, and very well answers the End of Divine Punishments

God ought to prefer the common Salvation to that of particulars

A P P E N D I X

charg'd upon the Goodness of God in this, unless that he created *Men*, and not *Gods* equal to himself; and that he prefer'd the Salvation of the *Generality* to that of some *Particulars*. He chose therefore that some should regret their having been made by God, *viz.* thro' the abuse of their Free-Will, rather than that none should be happy by using it aright.

Answer to the third Objection. 'Tis probable that the Misery of the Wicked arises from the very Nature of Sin.

XIV. As to the third Objection, I believe it to be a great Truth that the Misery of the Wicked arises from the very Constitution of the Sinner, and that the Laws of Nature hold in evil Elections. We see that our Bodies may be maim'd for ever, and our Limbs dislocated and distorted to such a degree as to become totally incapable of those Functions for which Nature design'd them. Why should we not have the same Opinion of the Mind, *viz.* that by depraved Elections, Passions, and Affections, it may be so far diverted from the right way of thinking, as to become equally disabled and unfit for governing its Actions according to the Dictates of Right Reason, as a lame Man is for a Race? We may see every Day that right Notions of things are capable of being perverted by a perverse Habit of thinking; and it is evident from Experience that we mistake and are ignorant of useful things. We are wont to labour under Prejudices, and be averse to sober Counsels; in short, we are willing to endure any thing rather than alter our Choice. 'Tis a common thing for us to please ourselves in Dangers, in the Ruin of our Fortunes, in the Loss of Ease, and Life itself; and our Volition, perverse as it is, sometimes appears more desirable than Friends, Kingdoms, Pleasures, or even Life. If therefore God does not interpose his Omnipotence, the same Errors, the same Ignorance, the same habits of a perverted Mind and obstinate Propensity to Evil, which here draw us aside from the right Path, may continue with us for ever: nor will the Soul that is immers'd in this kind of Evil be capable of curing itself: For one that is infected with these Maladies, is as unfit to help himself, as one that has cut off his Hands and Feet is unable to run or feed himself. (116.)

XV. Secondly,

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(116.) This is the true Meaning of that *Macula Peccati* which always remains and sets us at Enmity with God, and under a natural Incapacity of Happiness, and seems to make it impossible

XV. Secondly, A Person of this Disposition of Mind hates God, for he sees that he has chosen such things, in the Enjoyment whereof he places his Delight, as cannot be consistent with the Divine Will. He therefore looks upon God as his Enemy, and consequently avoids all Commerce with him, and endeavours to abscond from him, but never thinks of changing his own Will: For thro' Error and Ignorance he knows not how to take delight in any thing else. Therefore he applies all his Endeavours to the Attainment of such things as cannot really be attain'd, and strives for ever in vain with a more powerful Being, *i. e. God*; nor ceases he from struggling, tho' full of Misery and Despair. For tho' he feels himself tormented with a most exquisite Pain, yet he dreads a greater from the change of his Resolution: he sees Misery invading him on each hand, and is forced either to oppose the Deity without any prospect of Success, or to give over the Contest, and lay aside all Hopes of enjoying the Object of his Choice: He embraces the former, as the less Evil of the two, and yet a greater can scarce be devised. The perverse Fool may be pleas'd with the very Contest, tho' it proves to no manner of purpose. In the interim God leaves such an one to himself, who, by pursuing absurd and impossible things, will become troublesome to himself and others, assaulting some, and being attack'd by others like himself. We see in this World how much bad Men delight in heaping Misery on others, and who are therefore bad Men because they take delight in Mischief. The Servant
of

The Wicked, thro' Ignorance and Error, will delight in such things as they cannot enjoy, and may not know how to take delight in any thing else.

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possible for future Punishments to have any other Period than the total Extinction or Annihilation of the Subjects of them: and what Ground there can be to hope for that may be seen from the Authors referr'd to in Note .12.

Our Author, in the following Paragraph, explains how this *Macula* may be conceiv'd to render God and good Men our Aversion, and 'tis easy to apprehend how utterly

incapable of Happiness that Man must be, whose whole Soul is bent another way; whose every Motion, Thought, and Inclination; whose Designs, Desires, and Hopes, are all fix'd and riveted to those Objects which can never satisfy them, which are either quite different from, or contrary to the very Nature and Idea of true rational Happiness. A view of the Consequences attending each inveterate evil Habit, each ungo-

vernable

of an absurd Master is unhappy, and so is he who lives near a malevolent and morose Neighbour. Suppose then the Wicked who are banished from God, and odious to all good Men, associating together, and 'tis easy to conceive what kind of Society that of Reprobates and Devils must be, how grievous and offensive to each other. We may observe how very pernicious a wicked Governor is in his Province, how miserable they that are subject to such: how much more wretched must the state of the Wicked be, who are subjected to, and joined with none but mad, malicious, envious and froward Beings?

The Wicked are confin'd to certain places and Companions by the Laws of Nature, as we are to the Earth.

XVI. 'Tis to be believ'd that God has provided a place that is suitable and proper for them, and to which they are as much confin'd by the Laws of their Nature, as Fishes to the Sea, or terrestrial Animals to the Earth. What sort of a Place that is we know not, but it is reasonable to believe that there is such an one. Men in this Life choose for themselves Habitations and Companions according to their own Genius, Temper, and Disposition of Mind: and likeness begets Love: and who can doubt but the same thing may attend the bad and good after Death? The Good resort therefore to the Society of *God, Angels, and Spirits of Good Men*, but the Wicked choose those *Ghosts*, which were Partakers in their Iniquity, and *Devils* for their Companions: And this may possibly be brought about by natural Instinct, and mere human Disposition. Nor is God wanting in Goodness if he suffers them to live in their own way, and enjoy

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vernable Passion, or Affection misapply'd, will shew the absurdity of supposing any Person in such a Case to be happy even in Heaven itself *. But this important Doctrine of the force of *Habits, &c.* in this World, as well as the Continuance of them in the next, has been so well stated and enforced by the Authors refer'd to above, that an attempt to give any further Illustration of it seems im-

practicable. I shall therefore dismiss it with a Passage from the *Causes of the Decay of Christian Piety*, Ch. 1. " Those immaterial Felicities we expect, do naturally suggest to us the necessity of preparing our Appetites, and hungers for them, without which Heaven can be no Heaven to us: For since the Pleasure of any thing results from the Agreement between it and the Desire, what

* See the Spectator, N^o. 90.

enjoy the Life themselves have chosen. For this could not be prevented without doing Violence to the Laws of Nature. And these Punishments which the Wicked voluntarily bring upon themselves, tend to the Benefit of the Universal System of Rational Beings.

XVII. So much for *Moral Evils, Laws, Rewards and Punishments*. In which some things may appear too subtle for common Apprehension; but we ought to remember that the Dispute is concerning one of the nicest things in Nature, *viz.* the Operations of our own Mind: and whatever is said in order to explain these, must necessarily be subtle. On this Account the Art of *Logic* is call'd subtle, because it has these for its Object, and any thing that is more subtle than ordinary, is reckon'd Logical. He that does not like any thing that is subtle therefore, ought not to dispute about what relates to our own Minds. *Moral Evil* is as it were the Distemper of our Minds arising from the irregular Motion of the cogitative Faculties; now, as 'tis difficult to discover the Causes of those Distempers which infect the Body, so it is much more difficult to find out the Causes and the Motions of those Maladies which afflict the Mind. For it is necessary that we perfectly understand our own Minds, the Notions, Operations, and Means whereby the Will is moved, and the Understanding operates, before we can hope to make a full Discovery of these Passions of the Mind, and the Causes of them. And 'tis evident to any one how difficult

The dispute about *Moral Evil* relates to the Mind and its Operations, and on that account must necessarily be somewhat subtle.

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that

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<p>“ what Satisfaction can <i>Spiritual</i> Enjoyments “ give unto a <i>Carnal Mind</i>? Alas, what “ Delight would it be to the Swine to be “ wrapt in fine Linen and laid in Odours? “ His Senses are not gratify'd by any such “ Delicacies; nor would he feel any thing “ besides the Torment of being with-held “ from the Mire. And as little Complacenc- “ y would a brutish Soul find in those “ purer and refined Pleasures, which can on-</p>	<p>ly upbraid, not satisfy him. So that could “ we, by an impossible Supposition, fancy “ such an one assum'd to those Fruitions, his “ Pleasure sure would be as little as his pre- “ paration for it was. Those Eyes which “ have continually beheld <i>Vanity</i>, would be “ dazled, not delighted with the <i>beatific Vi-</i> “ <i>ision</i>; neither could that Tongue which has “ accusom'd itself only to <i>Oaths</i> and <i>Blasph-</i> “ <i>mies</i>, find Harmony or Music in <i>Hallelujahs</i>.</p>
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'Tis

that is; what subtle Abstractions, and long Deduction of Consequences it must require. 'Tis no wonder then if the Investigation of the Causes, and Origin of the *Evil of the Mind* require some things which are too subtle for all to comprehend.

NOTES.

<p>“ 'Tis the peculiar Privilege of the pure in “ Heart, that they shall see God; and if any “ others could so invade this their Inclo- “ sure, as to take Heaven by Violence, it “ surely would be a very Joyless Possession “ to these Men, and only place them in a</p>		<p>“ Condition to which they have the grea- “ test Aversion and Antipathy. So that Ho- “ lines here is not only necessary to the “ acquiring, but the Enjoyment of Bliss “ hereafter.</p>
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SECT.

S E C T. III.

Concerning the Question, Why bad Men are happy, and good Men miserable.

I. **T**HIS Question seems to have some relation to the former. For if *Punishment*, that is, Natural Evils, be inflicted in Proportion to the desert of Evil Elections, whence come good things to evil Men, and Evil to the Good? 'Tis not so difficult to answer this Question upon the Supposition of a future State, as to make it necessary for us to insist much upon it. And it must be confessed, that it has been treated of in a very proper Manner by several Writers: (117.) so that there's scarce any Room left for Scruple. Nevertheless a few things shall be touch'd upon, and very briefly, that we may not repeat what has been said already.

This Question has been so well treated by many, that there is scarce any room for scruple.

II. In the first place then the matter of Fact is very often doubtful, notwithstanding the Complaints which many Persons make to the contrary. We see indeed good Men frequently miserable, but it is a Query whether their Goodness may not be owing to their Misery, and they would have prov'd wicked if they had been tempted by Prosperity?

The matter of Fact is often doubtful: for it is not good Men that are miserable, but rather reform'd by

by Adversity: Nor are bad Men prosperous, but made bad by Prosperity.

N O T E S.

(117.) V. G. Sherlock on Judgment, Ch. 1. Fol. 14 and 19. Scott, 2 vol. Ch. 4. §. 3. p. §. 3. p. 76, &c. 1st Edit. — on Providence, 331, &c. 8vo. and Discourse 16. p. 320, &c. Ch. 7. p. 258. 2d Edit. Cudworth, p. 877. 2d vol. Fol. Stillingfleet, Origines Sacrae, B. 3. Cockburn, Essay 5. prop. 7, 8. p. 137, &c. Ch. 3. §. 21. p. 326, &c. Fol. Green, Cæs. Wollaston, p. 71, and 110, &c. Cradock on mologia Sacra, B. 3. Ch. 2. §. 57, 58. Eccl. 9. 2. Seneca, Ep. 24. Fiddes Sermons,

Prosperity? it is not the Good then that are afflicted, but the miserable that are reclaimed. On the other hand, we behold happy, rich, and powerful Men that are wicked; but their Wickedness may be attributed to their Prosperity, and they would perhaps be very good if the Incitements to Evil were removed. 'Tis not the Wicked therefore that are happy, but the happy that are corrupted with Prosperity, and thereby fall into Wickedness.

We are partial Judges of Merit: from the instance of *Hannibal* and *Scipio*.

III. Secondly, We are blinded with Prejudice, and thereby render'd very *partial Judges* of the Goodness or Badness of other Men. He that is our Acquaintance and befriends us, is a good Man, he that favours our Enemies is a very bad one. Thus *Scipio* is celebrated by the *Roman* Historians, and if any hard or unprosperous Accident befall him, they begin to ask whether there be any Gods? Whether Divine Providence takes care of human Affairs? But *Hannibal* is condemn'd, his Victories are charg'd as Crimes on Providence, and they repine at his having been so long successful. Whereas 'tis really dubious whether of the two was the worst Man; both certainly were very bad: For their Aim was to put the World into Confusion, to subdue Nations by force of Arms, the one intending to make *Carthage*, the other *Rome*, Head of the World, by Slaughter, Rapine, War, and Injustice. Now the Man that studies to oppress the whole World in Servitude, and bring it under the Power of that Nation to which he belongs, this Man is truly wicked and unworthy of Success, however he may veil his Ambition, Pride, and Fury in some particular Instances, under the specious pretence of Clemency and Love of his Country.

We are bad Judges of the Happiness of Men: for those are often the most miserable whom we esteem happy: and the contrary.

IV. Thirdly, As we are partial Judges of the *Deserts* of other Men, so are we no less unqualify'd to pronounce on their *Felicity*. For we are taken with the pomp, and noise, and glittering outside of things, and consequently judge the Rich, the Potent, the Noble, and the Learned to be happy. And yet herein we are very frequently mistaken, since neither of them are what they appear to be. For Life is often attended with more Happiness among Cottages, Husbandry, and Trade, nay in the midst of Bodily Pains and Diseases; than among Sceptres, Diadems, high Pedigrees, and superfluous Heaps of Books; since, as we have shewn before, and Experience testifies, Happiness lies chiefly, if not solely, in Election.

V. Fourthly,

V. Fourthly, It is to be observ'd, that the greatest Part of the Happiness in this Life consists in *Hope*, and that the Fruition of the desired Object is not answerable to the Hope pre-conceiv'd, which must be esteem'd an Indication that complete Happiness is reserv'd by Nature for another Life; the more then we aspire after, and adhere to the present Objects, the less Care we shall take of those things which tend to our future Happiness. It was therefore wisely provided by God, that the Good should not be corrupted with too plentiful an Enjoyment of the things of this World, but that the Bad should have them in abundance: For by this means all may understand that their time ought not to be spent in these things, but that the Space of this short Life should be employ'd in looking after other Matters, *i. e.* such as regard Eternity.

The chief Happiness here consists in Hope; which is a sign that perfect Happiness is reserved for another Life, and all these things which befall good or bad Men, are means to it.

To conclude, we must affirm that nothing happens to good Men which may not prove a Means of greater Good; nor to the Bad, which may not be for their Punishment or Reformation.

VI. And I hope it appears from what has been said, that the Objections of the *Manicheans* and *Paulicians* are not so formidable as they have seem'd to some; and that human Reason is not so blind but that it can solve these Difficulties from the Principles laid down, and such Suppositions as are generally admitted; and tho' not absolutely certain, yet probable however, and such as we use to acquiesce in, in the Solution of other Phænomena.

Conclusion of the whole.

But I offer all these things to the Censure of the Learned: I submit them entirely to the Judgment of the *Catholic Church*, especially to the Governours of those Parts of it which constitute the Churches of *England* and *Ireland*. If there be any thing herein which seems not perfectly agreeable to their Faith, as I hope there is not, and would not have it, I desire that may be look'd upon as absolutely unsaid and retracted.

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
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ERRATA.

Page 6. Column 2. Line. 42. read *Platonîc*. p. 10. c. 1. l. 29. dele--or a Body of such Dimensions. *ib.* l. 30. dele--other. p. 12. l. 39. r. X l. p. 89. c. 2. l. 30. r. all at once. p. 41. l. 18. r. Contact. *ib.* l. 22. r. of it. p. 49. l. last, r. Subsect. p. 53. l. last, r. Subsect. p. 58. col. 1. l. last, dele (.) p. 61. col. 2. l. 36. r. exists. p. 67. col. 2. l. 8. r. *Veltbuysen*. p. 68. col. 1. l. 9. for are r. were. p. 76. col. 2. l. 8. r. external. p. 78. col. 1. l. 4. r. *Hamartigenia*. p. 81. l. 10. r. would. *ib.* l. 12. r. should. p. 92. l. 14. r. Existence. *ib.* col. 1. l. 9. r. for. p. 105. l. 14. r. there. *ib.* l. 23. r. because. p. 111. col. 2. l. 27. r. than. p. 114. col. 2. l. 39. r. the State. p. 115. col. 1. l. last, r. consider'd. *ib.* col. 2. l. 3. r. stir it up. p. 130. l. 4. r. comes. p. 138. col. 1. l. 22, dele (.) p. 142. r. Sect. IX. p. 154. col. 1. l. 28. r. Motives. p. 162. col. 1. l. 6. r. determining. p. 163. l. 8, for (.) r. (,) p. 164. col. 1. l. 14. r. could. p. 195. l. 10. r. God. p. 201. col. 1. l. 10. r. breaks. p. 203. col. 2. for Habit r. Appetite. p. 205. l. 24. dele--also: *ib.* l. 25. insert also. p. 258. col. 2. l. 22. r. debilitated. p. 271. *N. B.* the Contents of the 2d and 3d Paragraphs are transposed. p. 295. col. 1. l. 6. r. *velit*. *ib.* col. 2. l. 5. r. *vidit*. p. 301. col. 2. l. 20. r. or confidence. *ib.* l. 24. r. of any Duty. p. xxii. l. 2. for the Pleasur r. this Pleasure. p. 30. r. the Relations. p. liii. r. chargeth.

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