PERKINS LIBRARY

Duke University

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AN

ESSAY

UPON

REASON,

AND THE

Nature of Spirits.

By Richard Burthogge^ M. D.

L 0 N D 0 jyT:

Printed for %Ot^n J^UtttOH at the Ra^en

in the Voultrey. 1694.

'C ;0/v-.

To the Learned j7-^r

Mr. JOHN LOCK,

Author of the

ESSAY

Upon

Humane Underflanding.

SIR,

I Take the Liberty of ma-^ king a 'Prepnt of the followingEHky unto you, as to a Verfon who being ac^ A 3 km to-'

The Preface.

knowledged hy all the Learn- ed World for one of the Great eft Majiers of Reason, are therewithal allowed a mojt V roper arid Competent Judge of any Difcoarfe concerning it. Whatever my Performance />, the Defign / have is no fmall one J fince it is to fhow the true way of Humane Knowledge, and by jhewing that it is REAL NOTIONAL, to unite and reconcile the Expe- rimental, or Mechanical, Jth r/;^ ^cholaftical Tkf^- thod. This Thought, Sir, af^ fords me abundant matter of enlarging in many others ; hut I ought to remember, that I am

a

The Preface.

a granger to you, and this my Firft Vilit, and therefore I mafl make it fiort, which I will do, by haflning to own my felf among the Croud ofthofe who do admire yoti, and to af- fure you, that I am with great Kefpecl,

SIR,

Your very Humble &rvant RICH. BVRTHOGGE.

ERRA-

4i"0S0

ERRATA.

PAge 6. Line 3. for ToMng^ r. fouthiug* p. 10. 1. X5. for preception, r* perceptm,^* 15.1.14. /or, r-or elfe, p. 33. 1. 25. for ^0, r. doth, p. 42. 1. 22. for diffHfiOVHmy r- difafivum. Ibid. 1. 28. for e#, r. (^. p. 51. 1. 9. fotfpe^» r: refpeB. p. 57. 1. 7. for or, r. 0/. Ibid- 1. If. dele Ww^. Ibid' 1. 17 for >^/>/^f, r. ^pprehtndt. p. 6a 1. 24. r. cotiQ^ms as aw p. 52. 1. 24. dele the. p. 74. 1. 18. K)r ipW, r. world, p. 77. 1: 21; dele not.

Of Human Reafon.

The Firft Part.

Chap. I. Of Reafon in general. SECT. r.

In whatfenfe Reafon is taken and di/courfed of here. A double account of it -, the firfi, more Notional ; thefecond, more Real Of the Agreements ofRea/on, Senfe, and Ima- gination, (i.) That aU three are Cozitative and Conceptive Powers. Cogitation what. Monfieur des Cartes, and Honoratus Fa- btv, then Opinion, that Senfation U not Cogitation, confidered, ( 2.) That Senfe Imagtnatton, and Reafon are Mental and ^ptntual and not meerly Mechanickand Material Powers. The Differences of thoje Powers ; that all Senfation is Imagination, and what ,s commonly called Imagination, « Init Internal Senfation. htelleafon or Rea- jotttng, u Knowing without Imagination. Inflames, fettmg out thefe feveral Notions.

^ REASON

REASON taken for Human Mind, or Underftanding ( which is the fenfe I take it in now ) is defined by tnoft, the faculty whereby a Man is faid to be Reafonable, or Underftanding 3 in like manner as Sight is defined, the faculty whereby a Living Creature is Denominated Seeing, or Vifive, or Reafon is that faculty whereby a Man does E^tercife the afts of Reafon, or doth Underftand -, as Sight, the faculty whereby a Man or any pther Animal doth fee, or difcern Objefts.

Nor are they altogether without Rea- fon, who do fo define and explicate it 5 far A5ts of Perception properly fo called, are not Known, or Knowable, but in and by themfelves ^ we Know not, nor are capable of Knowing, what the Ad of See- ing is, but by feeing ^ nor what that of Hearing is, but by Hearing 5 or what the Ad ctf Underftanding is, but by Under- ftanding. And again, Perceptive facftUies are not Known, or Knowable, but by their Ads ; We Know not what the faculty or power of Seeing i^ but relatively^ with relation to the Ai^ of Seeing: Nor what the faculty or Power of Hearing is, but by the Ad of Hearing •, nor what the faculty or power of Underftanding or ReafoRing ig, but by Aas of Underftanding or Rea-

foning

en

foning: In a word, no Faculties, no Powers are Known, or Knowable, but by their refpedive Acls or Exercifes, and therefore they cannot be defined or fet out but by them. Ail this is certain.

However, fince this is but a notional fruitlefs way of Explicating ReafoHj and too fhort, too narrow to fatisfie a Curious and Inquilitive Mind ♦, therefore to fettle an Idea of it, that may be more to pur- pofe, more real, and more edifying^ I will fhow, in the firft place, the Agreements it hath with other Conceptive Cogitative faculties, what it holds in common with them *, and afterwards, fet out the Differ rences that do difcriminate and divide thefe feveral faculties, each from other, and this particularly from the Reft.

The Conceptive Cogitative Faculties that are in Man, (for fo I call the Faculties by which he makes acquaintance with exter- nal Objeils) are his external Senfe, Imagi- nation (as it is called) and Reafon or Un- derftanding : Three Faculties which do all Jgree and Concur in this, that they are Coticeptive and Cogitative, and confequent- }y Mental and Spiritual, and not meerly Mechanick^'dnd Material Powers,

Firft •, All three are Conceptive, Cogita- tive Powers 5 Senfation and Imagination, as well as Reafoning or Intelledion, are B 2 Cogitations^

C43

Cogitations. Cogitation is confcious Af- fection s Confcious Jffe5lion, is Affedion with Confcioufnefs of that Affedion •, and by another name is called Knojvledge. Knowledge, as it has a double relation, fo it may be confidered two ways, to wit, ei- ther in reference to the OhjcB, which is Known, and fo, properly, it is Jppre- henfion or Confcious Perception •, or, as it refpeds the Image and Idea, by means of which we do perceive or know that Ob- jeft, and fo it may be called Conception. Conception properly fpeaking, is of the Image, or Idea •, Apprehenfion,Knowledge, or confcious Perception is of the Obje<a:, by means of that Idea, or Image : It is as proper to fay, that the Senfe and Imagi- nation do conceive, as that the Reafon or Underftanding doth •, the former does as much conceive Images and Sentiments, as the latter does Ideas and Notions.

Conception and Cogitation, really are but one Aft, and confequently, all Con- ceptive are Cogitative Powers, and Co- gitative Powers Conceptive. Only,to clear the Notion of Confcioufnefs , by which Co- gitation or Knowledge is diftinguifhed,tho' never divided, from Conception^ we muft further confider the Way and Manner how Confcioufnefs Arifes, And it feems to me to arife^, ordinarily, from the diftinftion

and

[f ]

and difference that is in Conceptions ♦, for, (hould any perfon have his Eye perpetu- ally tied to oneObject.without ever doling of, or turning it to another, he would no more be fenlible that he farv that Ob- je<5l, or know any more what it was to fee^ than if he had been blind from his Birth. For fince Confcioufnefs of Seeing li nothing but a perceiving by the Eye, that one is Aifeited, or otherwife Affeded than he was, with the appearance of Light, or Co- lour. If a perfon had never feen but one thing, and never but feen it, he could have no perceivance (that) he is fo Affe(fled,that is, he could not be fenlible or confcious ('thatj he did fee. Thus, tho' in our Members the parts that do compofe them are contiguous one to another, and do al- ways touch, yet we do not feel them touch, that is, they touch, but we are not fenfible they do, becaufe no difference being in the Affedion, there is no Senfe, no Confciouf- nefs of it : But Diilocation is foon per- ceived ^ as alfo it is when any part is pref- fed unufually. I conclude, that as diffe- rence of Conception arifes from different Aflfedions of the Faculties by Objeifts, fo Confcioufnefs, or Senfe of Conception, arifes from the difference of Conception?. Did we know but one thing, or had but one A<a of Conception, we (hould not know B I that

C6]

that we did know that one , that is, that Conception would not properly be Cogitation, but would be, as touting ^ without feeling. However, fince there is fo great a diverfity of Objefe in the World, all-around us, and confequently, fo many various Impreflions made upon the Mind, by thofe Objeds, fo that its Concep- tive Power cannot but be diverlly Affected, and moved, and the ^Mind alfo have a per- ceivance of that diverfity ^ hence it comes to pafs, that Conception is always Cogi- tation. In fhort, Conception is Modifica- tion of Mind, and Cogitation is Concep- tion with Confcioufnefs of it. Confciouf- jiefs of Conception is a fenfe of the Alte- ration made in the Mind by that Concep- tion (of which it is confcious •, ) /nihil (^feys Cotta apud Cker. L i, de xVat. Deor.) inter Demn Q Deum differt, tiulla eji apud Z>e(7/ cognitio nuW^iperceptio,

I know very well that Monfieur Des Cartes^ the ingenious Honorato Fabric and many <>thers do differ from me, for deny- ing ( as they do) that Senfation is Know- ledge, and confequently, excluding both Conception and Confcioufnefs from the Idea of it, they muft alfo deny, that Senfe is a Cogitative or Conceptive Power. But then, it is hard to lay, what that Idea is, that they have of Senfation. Befides, 'tis

moft

[73 moft certain that in Men, Senfation is Con- cious Perception, for whatever Impreffion is made upon our Eye by any Objed, we do not for all that, difcern, or fee the Ob- jed, if we do not atend unto, as well as receive, the Impreffion-, that is, we do not difcern or fee, but when we Know we do. Then only we have a Senfation of Objeds, when we are Confcious that! hey do Imprefs us ^ that is, when our Organs being Imprefled, there arife and fpring up in us, by means of thofe Impreflions, cer- tain Images or Conceptions, that ( many of them ) by a Natural deiufion do feem as really to Exift without us, in the Objeds themfelves, as if they were indeed fo ma- ny real Affeilions of them, or Inherent Accidents in them. And thofe Images be- ing but Modifications of Mind, arife not in us upon any Impreifions but when the Mind Attends to them, for elfe they can- ftotAffeftit.

But happily it will be told me, that this Confcioufnefs of Impreifions, which is in men,when they do fee, or hear, or other- wife perceive Objefts, by the Affections of their External Organs, Arifesinthem only from the Concomitance of the Under- ftanding •, becaufe in men, whatevef Af- ^ feds the Senfe, is alfo perceived by theUn- derftanding •, but that there neither is,nor B 4 can

en

can be, any fuch thing in other Animals, which are as void of Confcioufnefs of any Impreflion made upon their Organs, as they are of that Reafon and Underftand- ing that makes it in Men. But as this may befaid, fo it may be as eafiiy Replyedto^ for 'tis as impoflible, that Men fhould have any clear, or indeed any Idea^ at all of Senfation, in other Species of Animals, but by that, which they have of their own •, as it is certain, that Senfation in Men cannot be underftood to be without Conception, nor Conception without At- tention of Mind. Attemion of Mindy is the Application of it unto Objeds, and therefore in Men , is called JDdindhig: Wi{hout Attention no Conception, and without Conception no Confcioufnefs^ Confcioufnefs being (f as I have (aid ) no- thing but aSenfe of Alteration made in the Mind, by fome new Affeiftion of it, that is, by a new Thought or Conception. Eefides, there are many other things that do make for this Opinion, that all Animal Senfation is Cogitation ^ particularly, that great Sagacity that is in fome Animals, which cannot be accounted for with any clearnefs, but by allowing to them a great degree of Knowledge and Confcioufnefs.

And hence it follows, that Senfe and

Imagination, as well as the Underftand-

^ ing

C9]

ing and Reafon, are Mental and Spiritu- al, not meerly Mechanick and Material Powers By Mechanick and meerly Mare- rial Powers 1 underltand fuch as do refult from Matter only, and the Modes of Matter 5 from Local Motion and' Reft, and from Size, Figure and Texture. By Mental Spiritual Powers , 1 underftand fuch as cannot be conceived to arife from Matter only, and the Modes of Matter, without the Influence of Mind-, and in the number of thefe I reckon Senfe, and Imagination, as well as the Underftand- ing or Reafon. It is true , the term QM/W] is Appropriated, by way of ex- cellency, to the Underftanding or Reafon, this being a faculty that hath the partici- pation of Mind in a higher degree than the others have : But yet, there is Mind, and as much of Mind in all the Conceptive Cogitative Ails of Senfe or Imagination, as there is of Conception and C ogitation in them. Thus I have (hewed how Senfe, Imagination, and Reafon do agree^ now I am to fhew how they differ.

Senfe, ( by which I mean the power of Seeing, of Hearing, of Tafting, of Smel- ling, and of Feeling, ) is that by which we make acquaintance with External Ob- jects, and have Knowledge of them by means of Images and Apparitions, or

(which

C 10]

(^ which is a better expreflion, as being more General and Comprehenfive, ) by5'e«- timents excited in the External Organs, through Impreflions made upon them from Objecfts. Imagination is internal Senfe, or an (^AfterjReprefentation of the Images or Sentiments ( that have been ) excited be- fore in the Senfe; This is the Ba(isand Founcfetion ofit-, Compofition, Divifion, and Enlargement of Images, is but Accef- fory, but Superftrudture, and an Improve- ment of Senfe. Reafon or Underftanding, is a faculty by w hich we know External Objecfts, as well as our own Afts, without framing Images of them*, s only by Ideas or Notions. In fliOrt, Senfation, properly, is Imagination, for every Senfe Imagines 5 and that, which commonly is called Imagi- nation, is but Remembrance, or Recol- ledion ofSenfation. Imagination, isRepe- tition of Senfation made from within, Sen- fation, is Imagination occaiioned by imme- diate Impreflions from without us. Rea- fon or Underftanding, is refined. Subli- mated Senfation, that is, a confcious pre- ception of things by Notions or Ideas, and not by Images, or fenfible Reprefentations. And thus, aH the cogitative powers that are in Man, may be reduced toTiPO, to Senfe and Reafon 5 the former compre- hending the Imagination, which is but

the

C "3

the power of Remembring SenfatiooS; and of Amplifying them 5 and the Letter c(xn--r. preliending intellectual Remembrance, which is only a recoiledion of Ideas or Notions.

But to make a Reflexion of more liglit, it may be minded, that when we look on a Eool^j ( to Inftance in a thing that is next to hand, ) and read any Sentence in it, as this, God h a Spirit, we have at that time in our Eyes the Figures of the Letters that compofe the Words, and fo do know by them^ what the words are,- and this, is Senfe. But if putting afide the Book we will endeavour to RecolkH thofe words, w^e muft do it one of two ways ^ either by Retrieving in our thoughts the very Fi- gures and Imagies of the Letters and Words before prefented to our Eyes 5 or (which we oftneft do J by recalling the Words and Sentence, and faying to our felves, or unto others, God is a Spirit, without thinking in tlie leaft, of any Fi- gures of the Letters that do make the Words, or of the Images of the Words that compofe the Sentence. In the for- mer we do imagitie the Sentence, asraifing again the Images of the Words that make it, and this is Senfihk Remembrance , but in the latter, though, when we Recoiled the Sentence, w^emuft withal (fomeway

or

[ 12 ]

or other ) mind again the words that com- pofe it, yet we do it without Imagining them, and this is Intelle5iual Remem- brance, or the aft of the Reafon. Add, that at the fame time that we do fee the Schemes and Figures of the Letters, and have the portraiftures and draughts of the words prefented to our Eyes, whic!i is Senfe, we have, or may have, in our minds the fenfe and meaning of thofe words, of wdiich fenfe or meaning however, we have neither Pi6lure or Figure -, and this is Un- derfianding: In the former we have /w^gej, in the latter only Ideas •, we Seethe words, but underftand themeaning This power of the Mind, ( of perceiving without Ima- gining,) is called Reafon, becaufe in thofe Afts in which if does converfe with things by means of words ( and thofe are moft of the Afts exerted by it ) the fenfe and meaning of the words is ( as it were ) In- ferred and Reafoned from them. What I have faid, fuffices to make the Notion or Idea of Reafon or Under (landing conceiv- able, by men who ufe Attention, and do think,, but nothing will be enough to ex- plicate and fet it out to fuch as cannot en- dure that trouble, but will fwallow all things without chewing-

SECT. II.

SECT. IL

Of Reafon as taken for Contrivance, Contri- vance, rchat , Sagacity what. Reafon taken hut for Contrtvance, not CharaBe- rijiical to Man. Of the Imaginative Con- trivance in Irrational Jnimals. An In- flame of it in a certain Hen. Apprehen- fion, Compofition, Illation, ABs of t helm a - ginationj as rcell as of the Reafon or U«- derjlanding, Compojition of Thantafms, how llluflrated by Mr. Hobbs. Ithat Rea- fon taken for the Underflanding ( in the Notion of Underftandingfetled before ) a- grees to no other Animal hut Man. Of Prince Maurices Parrot. The ASis of Reafon as taken for the Underflanding, re- duced to trvOy to vpit, Apprehenjion and Judgment.

IKnow very well, that moft Men, and even moft Philofophers do take Rea- fon but for Contrivance, or for Difcourfe, which is a fort of Contrivance ^ and that Contrivance ( a dexterity in which they call Sagacity,) is a thinking upon means to compafs and attain ends 5 as firft upon the neareft means, then upon the means to that, and fo on till all the necefTary means are thought upon. But thofe who

think

C 14]

think fo, ( to wit, that Reafon is nothing but Contrivance,) can neyer evidence that Reafon is the Charafter or fole Pre- rogative of Man, ( which yet it is com- monly behved, and faid to be 5) fince there is Imaginative, as well as Intelleftu- al Contrivance, and Imaginative Contri- vance muft be owned to belong to Inferior Animals, as well as to Men. My mean- ing is, that other Animals befides Men, and below them too, have a faculty or power by which, after a fort, they do con- ceive the next means ( though not under the Notion of a Means) to what they would have, and then the means to that, and foby a train of Phantafms, go on till they have found enough for compalTmg the thing which they defire and profecute. I have km an Hen whofe Chickeq^an from < her through a little hole that was in a Gate, through which fhe could not follow them, into a Court Inviorned' with a very high Wall, that being in a paffion to come to them, Hrft fhe looks to fee if Ihe could fly to the top of the Wall, which was the neareft way and means, but upon Trial finding that unfeafible, and fpying at fome diftance a Pent-Houfe, from which fhe was able to gain it, away fhe files to Thatj though it was to go farther than before trom her Chickens, and confequently, no

ways

[ '?]

ways for her purpofe, but as it was a means toreach the top of the Wall, which was the neareft means to get to them ; Thus did this Hen contrive for her pur- pofes.

The Inftance I have given is a fmall one, and in a Creature not remarkable as many others are for AcSs oi Sagacity 5 it is not an Inftance in the Elephant, in the Caftor, the Fox, the Dog, or fuch other fubtle Animals 3 and yet an Inftance ferving well enough for my defign, which is to fliew, that Reafon which is proper and Charafte- riftical to Man, is not meer Contrivance or Difcoufe, For this it plainly ftieweth, fince it manifefts, that Inferiour fenfitive Creatures are Contriving and Difcurfive, and capable of making network of their Sentiments and Fantoms 5 and withal fmanifefts) that Apprehenlion, Compofi- tion and Illation are in fome fort, as well the k&s of the Imagination, which is com- mon to all fenfitives, as of the Underftand- ing and Reafon, which is peculiar to men. More, and Nobler Examples may be had in Efrarif^, and in others of the Moderns^ and in Cmrol, 1, De Nam a Deomn, for the Ancients.

The way how Phantafms are com- pounded ^by the Imagination, is prettily though perhaps not adequately^ Illuftrated

by

C i6]

by M. Hohbsy in a Similitude taken from Water ♦, ' Water ( fays he ) when moved ^ at once by divers movements, receiveth ' one motion compounded of them all •, fo ' it is in the Brain or Spirits ftirred by di- ' vers objeds •, there is compofed an Ima- ' gination of divers conceptions ^ that ap- ' peared Tingle to the Senfe. As Senfe at ' one time fheweth the Figure of a Moun- * tain, at another of Gold, and the Ima- ^ gination afterwards compofes them in a ^ Golden Mountain.

But without determining that Images are compounded in the Imagination, juft the fame way as Mr. Hobbs has reprefent- ed, this is certain, a compofition of them there is, and contrivance too in that com- pofition ', and this as well in Animals that are called Irrational, as in Men, who may, in fome meafure, guefs at the latitude and extend thereof in other Animals, by what they find in themfelves, in common Dreams.

But whatever Contrivence ( that Re- fembles Reafoning ) fiich Animals as are called Irrational may have, certain it is, that Reafon taken for the Underftanding, as the Underftanding is a power of percei- ving without Imagining, cannot be evi- denced to be in them ; they may Imagine, and by force of Imagination, after a fort

Contrive!

C 17]

Contrive, but it cannot be fhewed that they Underftand, or that they do Con- trive the fame way that men do, who do it by vertue of their Qnderltanding. The Contrivance (and confequently the Dif courfe } of Irrational Animals, is a pure Effea: of Senfe and Imagination, and per- formed only by the Seciuel of Images. which Sequels is not properly Illation made by way of Judgment, but as ( in ef- fects of the Plafiick ) the Images follow one another by means of their Congruity 5 or of fome other Antecedent connexion ^ where - m the Memory, which is the Exchequer or common Treafury of all Senfations, and the difpofition and order of Images in it, ferves to good purpofe. Such Animals, as they have not that ufe oi words that Men have (of which hereafter,) fo they have not that Power of Underftanding which is termed Judicative •, a power that fo Efti^ mates, and Weighs and Ballances Things, and their proportions one to another, by Comparing and Conferring them, thatac cordmgly It pronounces upon them ^ Uis IS That, or. This is not That, and This is ^uch or, Thi^ is not Such 5 V^\iKhSente ri- ces fo pronounced, are called Proportions, or Enunciations, and are, really, Judg- ments. Whence it follows, that the fo much talkt of Sfdogi/me of Hounds, ( fo,

^ fo

[ i8]

fo Reifch in his Margarita Thilofophica calls it, when he fays, In hivio, feram alter^ declmajfe parte Sillogizant canes ^ ) is meer fallacy •, the Hare is gone either this way or that way, he fmells out the minor with his nofe, he is not gone this way, and therefore concluding he is gone the other, doth with open mouth run that way, with- out his putting Nofe to ground. All this is but Senfation, and following of the Scent^ without any thing of Enunciation or Judgment ^ there is not hing of Propojitionsy Major, Minor y or Conclujion, in the cafe : The Hound perhaps does put his Nofe at firft where the Scent is not, and not find- ing it, turns another way, where it hap- pens to be, fo that upon turning being pre- fently ftruck with the Scent, he follows it, with an out-cry ^ without putting of his Nofe to the ground, to feek for what he has found already.

I confefs, the ftory of Prince Maurice his Parrot is ftupendious, and if no Illufi- on was in it, as none Appears ♦, or that it was not an Efteft of Witchcraft, which I moft fufpefl, (the Country of 5y^7?// in which it was Afted, ( as all the Indies ) ha- ving many Diabolical Agents, that work by Magick •, ) I fliould think it a very Crofs Inftance to my former Difcourfe. But confidering it, as I do, only as an Ef-

fea

[ 19 ]

fedt of Diabolical power, I put it in the number of the Extraordinary Events, with the Tricks of the Divining Ape which Mr. Jerry writes of^ in his Relation of a Voy- age into the EalMndies 5 and then it may not be drawn into Argument. However^, that thinking men may have an Occafion to employ their Thoughts, and to make an Impartial Judgment, I will tell the fto- ry as I find it in Sir William Temples Me- moirs p. 5-7. Ed. 2. in his own Words, togetherwith theReflexion he makes.

'"• With the Prince of Orange ( fays he ) " returned moft of the General Officers to " the Hague , and amiong the reft Old " Prince Maurice of Majfaw^ who, as the *^ Prince told me, had with the greateft in- *' duftry that could be, fought all occafions " of dying fairly at the Battle of Senejfe " without fucceeding, which had given "him great regrets-, and I did not won - '^ der at it, confidering his age of about " Seventy Six, and his long habits both '* of Gout and Stone. When he came to " vifit me upon his return and before he " went to his Government of Ckve^ix. came *^ in my head to ask him an idle queftion, " becaufe I thought it not very likely for ^ * me to fee him again, and I had a mind " to Kown from his own Pvlouth the Ac- " count of a common but much credited C 2 ^ ': ftory,

[ 20 ]

" ftory, that I had heard fo often frofn ^^ many others of an old Parrot he had in " ErafiU during his Government there, ^^ that fpoke, and asked, and anfwered, "common queftions like a Reafonable '• Cteature ^ fo that thofe of his train " there, generally concluded it to be " Witchery or Poffelnon -, and one of the *' Chaplains^ who lived long after- '• v;ardsin Holland would never from that " time endure a Parrot, but faid thev all " had a Devil in them. I had heard many " particulars of this Story, and aflevered ^- by People hard to be Difcredited, which " made me ask Prince Maurice what there ^' was of it. He faid with his ufual plain- " neis and drynefs in talk, there was fome- " thing true, but a great deal falfe, of " what had been reported. I defired to ^^ Know of him, what there was of the ^^ firfl-, he told me fhort and coldly^, that " he had heard offuchan old Parrot when " he came to Brafill j and though he be- ^•^ lieved nothing of it, and it was a good " way off, yet he had fo much curiolity as " as to fend for it ^ that it was a very great " and a very old one ; and when it came " firft into the room where the Prince was " with a great many Dutchmen about " him, it faid prefently, What a company " of White men aye here ? They askt it what

"he

[ 21 ]

'' he thought that Man was > pointing at '^ at the Prince. It anfwered, So7ne Gene- <^ ral or other. When they brought it clofe " to him , he askt it, Dou venes, vous ? " [ Whence come you?] It anfwered, De " Marinnan. [ From Marinnan. 1 he '' Prince, A qui efi es zotis ? [ To whom '' do you belong ? ] The Parrot, A un For- ''tiigez. CTo a Portugez.] Prince (^^ '' fats tula ? [ What do you there ? ] Par- " rot, Je garde les pulles. [I look after '' the Chickens ? ] The Prince laughed ^^ and (aid, Fous gardes les pulles ? [ You '' look after the Chickens ? 1 The Parrot *'^ anfw'ered. Ouy rnoy tfje Scay bien faircy " [yes, I, and I know well enough how to '' do it.] And make the Chuck four or five " times that people ufe to make to Chick- " ens when they call them. 1 fet down the "- words of this worthy Dialogue in " French, jufl: as Prince Maurice faid them '' to me. I as :ed him in what Language " the Parrot fpoke ? And he faid in Bra- ^^filian. I asked whether he underftood '* Brafilian? He faid, no, but he had taken '^ care to have two Interpreters by him, " one a Durch-man that fpoke Brifilian, *^and the other a Brifilian that fpoke '\ Dutch '-y tliat he asked them feparately " and privately, and both of them agreed "in telling him juft the fame thing C 3 '' that

[ 22 ]

^' that the Parrot faid. I could not (fays ^' S'lT William) hut ttW this odd Story, be^ '* becaufe it is fo much out of the way, and ^' from the firft hand, and what may pafs ^' for a good one-, fori dare fay this Prince ^^ at leaft believed himfelf in all he told ^^ me, having ever pafled for a very honeft '' and pious man. 1 leave it to Naturalifts ^' to reafcn,and to other men to believe as ^* they pleafe upon it.

Thus that excellent Perfon. But to re- turn, (ifor indeed, what I have {aid in this Seftion is a Kind of Digreffion, as be- ing more proper for another place. )

The A<5ts of Reafon ("taking Reafon for the Underftanding ) may be aptly enough reduced to two, to wit, Apprehe^ificncind Judgment ; to the latter of which that dif- pofition of our Conceptions into order and m.ethod, which commonly is called Or- dinative Difcourfe^ as alfo Argumentation and Dedudion, which is termed Illative, and hath the name oiReafoning appropriat- ed to it, do ( both ) belong, as hifirumeKti mAMems.

CHAR

C ^-J ]

CHAP. II. Of Apprehenfion. SECT. I.

Apprehenfion , the firji i^B of Reafon. Of IVoYjisy the ordinary Means of Apprehenfi- on. The Ends and Ufes of Words, i,To diftinguifh things as they are in the Mind, in ivhichy words do ji and for things. Why Mind is called Under ft anding, 2. To ex~ prefs our Thoughts and Conceptions one to another, 7 he Importance of Words unto Knorvledge, in this fecondUfe of them. Of the Senfe of Words, Of Canting. All Ufeof Nevp Words ^ not Canting. The Senfe of Words twofold ^ Verbal , and Reall. This difiinBion of the Senfes of Words Illuftrated, and the Ufefalnefs there- of explained. Why the Meaning of Words is called Senfe,

Apprehenfion, or that Act of the Rea- fon or Underftanding, in refpeft of which it is (aid to fee or perceive things, is the fame in reference to this faculty, that feeing is unto the Eye : for the mind to ap- prehend, perceive, or know anyObje<^^ is the fameCtofpeak by wayof allufionand fimilitude ) as for the Eye to fee, or difcern one, C 4" \yhat

C M ]

W hat I have faid in the former Chapter, does caft fome Light on this Subjed ^ but yet to fet it out more fully, I will confider, lirft, the Ordinary Means the Underltand- ing ufes in its Acts of Apprehenfion, and thofe are Words. Secondly, The immedi- ate Objeft of Apprehenfion, and that is Notion, or Intellectual Sentiment ^ Senti- ment of the Mind. Thirdly, The two chief Afteftions of Apprehenfion, and thofe are clearnefs and diftinctnefs •, of which three confiderations ^ the Second properly is a SubjeCl: of Metaphyficks •, the Third ofLo- gick s and the Firft is common to both.

Apprehenlion properly and primarily is of things, as things are taken largely, for (external^ Objects of the Mind. By an (external^ Objeft of the Mind, I mean whatever any wife is without, and thought upon by, it. Now, the mind may think upon Objects, two ways. Firfl, it may think upon them nakedly and abftraftly, as they are in themfelves, ( without confi- dering them as marked and diftinguilhed by Words, or any other Charaders and Notes , that fhould betoken or fignitie them,) only by having the Idea or notion of them. And this is to apprehend an Ob- jed immmediately. For example, without <:onfidering of the Word [whitenefs, ] or having the leaft thought of it, one may

confider

[ 2? 1

confider the Image of VVhitenefs. as ir doth appear in Snow, in Paper, or on a White wall. But Secondly, the mind may alfo think of things, and confider them by means of Words, that fignifie them 5 as when having in our thoughts the word [whitenefs], we do not think of the thing or Im.age, but under that word, which fl:a!:ds for it •, or perhaps do think and fpeak of whitenefs, without having the I- mage of whitenefs at all •, for botli rcays we may think of things by means of words, fince words may be ufed to call the Images or Notions of things into our minds, for eife themlelves may ftand in our minds for thefe Images or Notions, and fo may be difcourfed of, or ufed in the Difcourfe of other things. This Inftance I acknovi^ledge is an Imaginative Apprehenlion^ and I ufe it rather than another that is Intellectual, becaufe the Underftanding in its Ads of Apprehenfion, if not always, doth very of- ten, fummon in the aid of the Imxagination^ as alfo, becaufe it ferves well enough to manifeftmy meanings which, in fhort, is, that the mind may think on things either immediately, without the help of words 5 or mediately by means of them.

Words are the Names of things, and of the Notions, Thoughts and Conceptions that w^e have of things. Names are Arti-

culat^

C 26]

dilate Sounds, appointed to fignifie things and Notions.

All Articulations of Sounds, all Voices (^for Articulations of Sound arecairdro/V^j) tho they be, or may, by compoiidon and conjugation, be multiplied, almoft to infi- nity, yet they are reducible within tiie compafs of the Alphabet, and can be ex- prelled by the four and twenty Letters, in their Combination •, which certainly was an excellent Invention, and full of Admi- ration. For Words, as properly they are but Sounds, fo, as Sounds they could not be fpoken, and confequently could not fig- nifie, but unto perfons that are prefent, and within hearing, and to them too but for the prefent Whereas by means of Lettersy becoming capable of being perma- nent and fix'd in Writing, they become com- municable, both to thole that arc prefent, and to thofe that are abfent ^ even to the mod remote, in time, and place. Jgain, Since Writing is a reprefentation of our Words , as , Words of our Conceptions and Thoughts ^ fo that Writings do figni- fie, and ftand for, our Words, as Words do fignifie, and ftand for, our Thoughts 5 therefore when I do difcourfe of Words, I would be underftood to difcourfe of thofe that are written, as well as of thofe that are ^ken. And in fine, lince thoughts

may

L 27 1 may be figni fed by geftures and other Signs, as well as by Words-, Cfor thee ai^e three ways of difcouding, or communicating of thoughts ^ to wit, by Words, by Writijig, and by meer Sig72s and Gejiures v) therefore what I fay oiWords muft be taken as inten- ded to be equally meant, lynuatis muta;?disy of Geftures and other Signs (fo far as they are ufed to fignify our thouglits j as well as of words themfelves.

The ZJfes of words are divers. The Firjij to be as fo many marks and tokens upon things, to fignihe and Ihow them •, fo that every maii-may be able to know them again in his own mind, and to diftin- guifh and difcern them in it.

For the clearing of this ufe, it muft be confidered; that the Underflanding hath not of its own^ (as the Imagination hath) any proper Images, any Figures of the things it converfes with, whereby to know or di- ftinguifli them •, the only Images it has of things (befides thofe of the i'enfe, or the Imagination^ are the Words which fignify them •, which do ftand therein for the very things themfelves. For to give an Exam- ple 5 There is no fuch thing in the Under- ftanding as an Image, or fenlible Figure, of iSubftance, or of mind, or of matter, or of colour in general,as there is in the fenfe, or imagination of white, of black, of red,

of

[ 2S ]

of green, or of other particular Colours : The ofjly Images it has of thefe, and of all things elfe that are purely intelligible and mental, are the Words that fignify them : Ay, the very Ideas the Underftanding hath of thmgs, are nothing but its definitive conceptions of them, or definitions -, and dehmtions as properly they are of Words j^ which Words lince they ftand in the mind ior thmgs, are commonly miftai^en for, and confequently mifcalled. Simple Ideas of thefe things 5 ) fo they are made by words. To fuch a degree, in this refpeil, are u ords of ufe to the underftanding, which cannot v/ork without them -, a thing fo certain, that even th^ denomination it (elf of [^under- fiandtng']atka{i in part, arifes from iience^ for the Mmd is called (thej Underftand- ing, becaufe it has a power of feeing things under Words that fiand for them Tas well as becaufe it has one of perceiving Subftan- ces under Accidents -, and had Beafts this power, they would come but little fhort of men, as to Acfts of mind.

But befides this ufe, (which is more pri- vate and particular, an ufe that every man muft have of Words for himfelf; there is a Second, an ufe that men have of them one for another ? to wit, mutually to exprefs their Sentiments and Thoughts -, m refped: of which, words are faid to be as Mony :

the

C ^-9 ] the meaning is^ That words ufed to con- vey our minds to others, murt: be fuch as are current, and in ufe, or elfe they will not pafs.

Speech or Language (the cloathing of our Sentiments and Thoughts in Words) iS; in refpe(5t of both the mentioned ufes, efpecially the latter, of fo much moment to Reafon (taken for Difcourfe, or Contri- vance at large ^ that fome have conceited, that men are little beholding to any thing elfe but the former j for that degree of the Latter,^ that doth divide and diftinguidi them from Beafts. Reafon in their Opini- on, in the Seeds and principles of it, being but as a Spark, which in m.en, by the ad- vantage of Speech, becomes improved and blown into fuch a flame as has engrofled the Title 5 fo that tho the fame Principles of Reafon are common to all Animals, yet this Imprevejmnt of themi^that only carries the Name ) is proper to man , becaufe Speech is. And in truth, by means of Speech, or communication of Sentiments and Thoughts, as one man becomes affifted and aided by another 5 fo if we do add Writing and Printings which are but Fixa- tions of Speech, it may be faid, that eve- ry man is affifted and aided with the Sen- timents and thoughts ot all ^ and how much help this may bring toward the im- proving

C 50 J

proving of Reafon, is nothing hard to be conceived by one that Ihall confider the great advantage a Confiilt has, for the ripening of Bufinefs, or making a judgment upon things, above the reafoning of any one particular folitary perfon ^ or hath ob- ferved the difference that Cultivation and Savagenes , do make, in men. should one permit himfelf to imagine that Ele- phants,, Caftors, Dogs, Foxes, and other fagacious Animals , which can contrive and do fo much fingly, as we find by ex- perience they can, and do) fhould have the united Ingeny of their feveral Kinds 5 it would be hard for him to fay, to what they might not improve, or to diftinguifh the near approaches that they would make to what commonly is called Reafon, from the real ufe and enjoyment of it, Efpecial- ly if he alfo confider, that lavage wild men, who want the benefit of Education, and of large Converfe 3 fo that tho they have the uk of Speech^ yet they receivenot this advantage by it, do very little excel fuch Animals, but come infinitely fhort of civilized and well bred men ; who living in great Societies, have all the furtherance that aid and mutual afliftance can give unto them.

Some in regard of the former ufe that Words have, do call them Notes^ or Marks 5

and

C 5' ]

and in refped of the latter, term them Signs 'j but in truth, in referenc to both their Ufes, Words are 6igns, iince, in both, they do fignilie, either to ones felfjas in the firft ufe, or unto others, as in the fecond. Words are Signs, but Signs that fignifie but by agreement, confent, and InTtitution: For (hould any do it by Nature, the Lan- guage thatconlifted of them would be uni- verfal fpoken and underftood of all, which none is : fo that the way of tryal in Herodo- tus, of the moft Ancient Language , was as ill grounded, as the Difcovery made by it ridiculous. Tis true, Jacob Lehman talks of a Language of Nattivey but I think he rather intended by it the Language of Signatures, than that of Words •, lincethe Language of Signatures^ if underftood, may be interpreted (as he affirms his Language of Nature may; in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Dutch, Euglijh , or any other vernacular Tongue : And in this fenfe too, That A- dam underftood the Language of Nature (as he fays he did) was a truth, and perhaps implied in the Hiftory , which tells us, That whatfoever Adam called every living Creature, that rvas the Name thereof. But tho this may be, as he fays, yet I cannot believe that That is fo which he adds. That Adam had the Gift [of underftanding the languages of Nature'] which was loft by

hi

C ?^ ]

his Fall, reftor'd to him by his Regenerati* on : For that the New Birth, that con- lifts in renovation of the Mind, after the Image of God in Chrift, has any thing to do with I'hilofuphy^ or the Knowledge of Nature, is a conceit that cannot enter into my thoughts ; I do not iind in the Holy- Scriptures, which can give us any certain- ty herein, that our Saviour Chrift himfelf did teach, or that his Apoftles and firft followers did profefs, Philofophy and Science of Nature. But enough (if not too much in this place, of the Language of Nature^ fince here we are to fpeak of the Language of men, and the Language of men is words, which are not natural but only inftituted and impofed, figns.

The ufe of words of ufual and current fignification is called fpeaktng ^ the ufe ei- ther ot uncurrent ¥t5litiom w^ords, or of current words ^k/e^' from their ufual com- mon fignitication, to a private particular meaning, is called canting. Of the for- mer fort of canting Bajilides, Valentinmy and all the Gfwjiic/{s, in Theology ^ Para- celfm^ Fan-Helmout, and all the Chymijls generally, with many others, in Philofopby and Medicincy are not only common, but juftly noted. Examples. Not that the ufe of every new Word is canting, or that we need be as nice as C. C£far in Auks Gelliusy

and

C ?3 D

and avoid a new word, tho neceffary to exprefs our meaning, as we would Charyh- disy or Sc)lla. Words are but the cloath- ing of Thoughts^ and therefore mufi: be made and fitted to them , and if we keep (as near as conveniently we can) to the or- dinary Rules and Laws of Speaking, the making of new Words, when none, or none fo apt, are ftampt already, to iignifie our Sentiments, is a pra^aice that calls for imitation , fince Cicero himfelf has fet us a Copy ; many of the Words that now enrich the R man Language, and do make it fo expreffive, were Innovations of his : And Epicurus did fo before him : For, (as C/rer(? tells us, /. i. de Nat: 'Deorum) he either invented, or firft applied the Word 7rpoX-/)-{i~'^ Sunt , fa\ s Cicero , rebus ncvis , nova ponenda yiomina, ut Epicurus^ ipfe ttpc A)rUv appellavity quarn ante a nemo eo verba nominarat.

The Ejfence of Words, if words are ta- ken, not materially, only for Articulate Sounds, but formally 5 for Articulate Sounds as they are 5'igns, do lie in their (jgnification 3 and their Jignifcation, (or that which is fignified by them) has the Name oifenfe or meaning.

The fenfe or meaning of words (the want

whereof we calliVonfenfe) is two fold 5 the

fenfe and meaning of words in reference to

L> ouf

[ 34]

our common ordinary Conceptions ^ and the jenfe and meaning of words in reference to the things exprefled and fignified by them : The former may be term'd Verbal, the latter realfenfe •, or Cperhaps to fpeak more pro- perly, > the former may be called the jenfe b^ meaning oi the words, the latter the conception^ the notion^ or the Idea of the thing, i'hould a Roman Catholtck. tell me he means by Iranjubjiantiation, that a real and fubflantial mutation of the Elements of Bread and Wine is made in the Holy Sa- crament, into the very Body and Blood of Chrift, but yet fo, that notvvithftanding this mutation, the Species or Accidents of Bread and Wine do ftill remain to affed our fenfes : Tis poflible I may conceive the fenfe and meaning of the feveral words he ufes, and alfo apprehend what it is he would have me believe, when yet at the fame time, I cannot apprehend that fuch a thing can really be, fince I fee a plain con- trad idion it fhould ; it being equally im- poilible to make a Conception •, (that is , to frame a coherent confiftent Notion or Idea j of the thing he means, and make all the parts of it to hang together, as to make one of a circular fquare, or of a 7 riangular Cir- ok. Ecquem, fays Cvtta in Cicero, /. ^. de Nat. Deorum' pag. up. tarn amentem ejfe put as ^ qui illnd^ quo fefcatury deum credat

# ; :: A

A Diftin6lion then there is ( and that a remarkable one too) between the verbal, and real, meaning of words -, which to fet out more fully, I will fhow, Firji, The the Occafion , and Rife of it, and then Secondly^ The Ufe and Benefit of it.

Firft then, this diftinftion Arifes from the Imperfedion and Inadequacy of Hu^ man Knowledge s we Knowing little of things but under words, and words being (immediately) thefignsbut, of our Con- ceptions, which are always ihort and nar- row, and, too often, indiftind and con- fufed. Now if the fentiments we have according to the Vulgar and Ordinary way of conceiving, which is but general and confiifed, do cohere and hang together, when one of them is affirmed or fpoken of another, fo that the Notions are compof- fible in common acceptation, we caH it fenfe, though really the things themfelves ( for which thofe words are underftood to ftand ) be Incompoflible, and repugnant each to other, and therefore indeed it is Nonfenfe. This is to be better underftood in Examples. Such Fropojitions as thefe, that Colours ( even as to their Images j are in the Objects in which they do appear 5 that Odours are in the things fmelled 5 that Sapors are in the things that are tafted 3 thefe and the like AiTertions are not com- D z men-

[ ?6 ] monly underftood, or faid, to be^Non- fenfe, becaufe, Knowing in the general and confufedly, what is meant by colour, what by Odor, and what by Sapor ^ as likewife what is meant by the thing feen, by the thing that is tafted, and by the thing which is fmelied 3 nothing appears in thofe confufed general Notions ( which we have,) to hinder us from thinking that Colours, Sapors, and Odours do as really Inhere in thofe external objefts, as they feem to do. And yet to a Perfon that hath diftind, real, and juft conceptions of the feveralfubjefts and predicates in thofe pro- pofitions, it is evident, that 'tis as grofs and palpable Nonfenfe to affirm that Colours, Sapors, Odours, and other Accidents, ( which are but Vhanomena and Inten- tional beings ) do really exifl: in the Sub- jects where they feem to be, as to fay, that there are Notions and Cogitations in a Wall , in a Figg , or in a Rofe, than which there cannot be a greater Bull or abfurdity.

The Ufefulnefs of this diftindion , is greater than moft will think ^ fince from the want of making, or of obferving it, it conies to pafs, that fo many do run into great miftakes and errours, in their dit courfes3 Z)(?skirmifh one with another, tonopurpofe, and without end, and of- ten

[ ?7 3

ten do differ from themfelves, as much as each from other. For few there are that do fix and fettle even the verbal Senfe of words, ( which often have a doublenefs of meaning, and then are called AfnbiguousO and fewer that do think of the real, with- out which yet, they can never come to any certainty 3 fo that, ( as Mr. Hohbs has in- genioufly faid -, words that are Wife Mens Counters^ become Fools Mony.

The meaning of words, as well the ver- bal, as the real, is called Senfe^ becaufe the Perception of it ought to be as Clear ^ and diftind , and as fteady and fixt, as that of Senfe is : For words, to be under- flood as they ought , muft have their fneanings be as clearly and diftinftly per- ceived, by the mind, as objefts of Senfe when they are Seen, or Heard, or Tafted, orSmeiled, are bythe SenfeSa

D s S{ECT, n,

[ 38 3

SECT. 11-

M Faljity is not Nonfenfe •, hut all impofphle Faljity is. Repugnance in the mind to yield ajfent to prope/itions that are Non- Jence. Whence it ari/es. Of ^yjtbujiafmj 06 it is a Kind ofNonJence. What Enthu- jiajm is. The diftri but ions of it. hxam- pies of the fever al Kinds of Enthujiaftrij cut of Dr. Fludd, and in the Magicl^ Apho- rifms of the Rofy-cru(ians. That Enthu- fiajis when they feem tounderjiand one ano- ther^ do fo by Sympathy only, and not by npay of Apprehen/ion and Judgment. How this mai he, fet out in aftory very Remarkable.

J Have fpoken of Senfe and Nonfenfe in the general •, but toward a further clearing of the Notions of them, andefpe- cially that of the latter, it muft be obfer- ved, that falfity and Nonfence are not Sy- nonimous terms 3 For all Falfity is not Nonfenfe, that is, every Propofition that is falfe, is not alfo Nonfenfical 5 for many things are poffible, that are not Aliual 5 and therefore many propofitions that are not adually true, might have been, or may hereafter be fo 3 and as what is true, is

Senfe

C 3P]

Senfe, (o Senfe is compojjlhilityy not aduali- ty •, not that only which at prefent is true, but whatever is any wife poifible to befo But though ail Falt/cy is not Nonfenfe 3 all impofihk Faliity is. I mean, every propo- fition is Nonfenfe, that is falfe to rhat de- gree, that it is impoflible ( abfolutely im- poflible ) it (hould be true 5 for no pro- polltion is abfolutely impolTible to be true but that which implies contradiction, and that Vv^hich implies a contradiction muft needs be Nonfenfe -, fince the Underftand- ing cannot frame any Notion or Idea of it, ^nd fo cannot make any real fenfe of the word^, that compofe it. Contradidion in lerms is plain or grofs Nonfenfe^ ( cal- led aJS«//inEnglifli,or anAbfurdity ^ ) and where the terms in common acceptation are not Contradiftory,yet if the thing they are defigned to exprefs do really imply a Con- tradiftion, the propofitions, though Ver- bal Senfe, are really Nonfenfe 3 as in the Inftances above.

Obferve again, that there is in the mind a certain fenlible Relu6lance to give affent to Propofitions that are Incongruous, and really Nonfeniical •> for whoever Attends to what does pafs within himfelf, will be Confcious of a Pain ( as it were of diflocati- on) upon a ferious predication of Abftrafe one of another 5 as when he fays, good- D 4 nefs

[ 40 ]

nefs is Juftice •, or of Contraries, as when he affirms, love is hatred, and the like iti other Inftances. The Reafon is plain. For as this is to fay, that one thing is another, fo he that fays that one thing is another, fays alfo, that neither is it felf, that is, fays a Contradidion, and a Contiadidion ( whither explicite or implicite, ) being Affirmation and Negation of the fame thing, and confequently an AfTent and Diffent at the fame time, and AfTent and piffent being contrary Motions, or Modi- fications, it follows, that to fay, or go about to AfTent unto, a Contradiaion^ is todiJiraB and diftort the mind, and put it to pain, becaufe it is to draw it contra- ry ways at the fame time.

Nonfenfein perfons who pretend to fu- pernaturai Afliftances^ may be called En- thufiafm, Enthufiafm properly, is a falfe conceit of being infpired ^ to hehfpired, is to receive immediate motions and in- flinfts from the Spirit of God; the perfon that has this falfe conceit of his being im- mediately Inftinfted, and moved by the Spirit of God, is called an Enthufiaft, A perfon may bean EmhuJFafi^s well in mat- ters of /"/^/fcy^j/^^v, asinthofe of Divinity, and many Examples there are of both forts of Enthufiafts, fome of which I have touched before ^ but I forbear to fay arty r :' . more

C 4' .1 more of them now, in reference to their Original^ or the Quality and Caiifes of their Diftemper, grV. ^'Since now, it is not my bufinefs to treat of Enthufiafni, and to fet out the Nature of it, under the Notion of an Imaginary hfpiratior], fo much as to fpeak of the Language oi Enthujiajls, which ufually is Nonfenfe.

And of this I find a full Example in Dr. Bndd^ in the third l- ook of his Mofaick, Philofophy, the hrft Sedion and fourth Chapter , when having cited the Seventh Chapter of the the Book of Wif- dom, the 25th, verfe. He infers in thefe terms, ' So that we may difcern by this ' Difcription of the Wife Man, what is ' the Spiritual Chrift, who is the Wifdora, ' Vertue, and word of God, and how by

* his Apparition out of Darknefs, that is,

* by the mutation or change of thefirft

* principle, ( which was in Darknefs, Qua- '^ fi'verlum in Frincipio, ) from. Dark Aleph ^ to Light Aleph, the Waters which were

* contained in the profound Bovv^is of the

* Abyfs were revealed, and were anima- ' ted, that is to fay, by the emanation or ^ emiflion of this felf fame Spirit of Eternal

* Fire or Light, and afterward by his ad^ < mirable aftivity, and reftlefs motion and ^ penetration (for by Solomonit is faid to ^ be Omnibus mohilibus mohiliory &c. Sap.

C 4^ 'J ^ 7. 24. ) It firft diftingui(heth and fepa- ' rateth the Darknefs from the Light, tiie

* obfcure and grofs Waters from the fubtle "^and pure, and then it difpofeth the ^Heavens into Spherees-, laftly it di-

* videth the grolTer Waters into Sublunary ^Elements, as by the words of the firft ^ Chapter of Genefis each Man may plainly ^ difctrn.

This is a full Example, and yet in fur- ther entertainment of the Curious, and for more variety, I will add another in the Magick^A^^fjorifms, ( for fo I find them cal- led ) of the Brethren of the Rofy-Crofs, which are as little capable of real Senfe ( at leaft in my Underftanding, ) as that I cited before from Dr.Fludd: And I will give them in the fame Language in which I find them, without pretending to the skill of Tranflating them exactly.

I. Ante Omnia ptm5lum extitit, non td cb^^^v aut Mathematicum, fed dijfujiovum ., monas erat expliate, implkite myrias > lux crat £5" nox, Frincipium ^ finis Principiiy omnia tsf nihil, efi if non.

z. Commovet fe monas in Diade^ if per Ujadem egreffa funt fades lumiy:isfecundi, ;. ^. Exivit ignis fimplexy IncreatuSy efi fub ^quis^indfiitfe tegttmento ignis multiplicis,

4. Refpexh

c 4n

*^4. Refpexh ad fontem fuperiorem iff infe- riorem , deduBo typo, tripltci mltu /jgilla-

vit.

5 . Creavit mum unitas, tlf in tria diftinx- ft, trinitas efi t> Quaternaniis nexm if me- dium reduEiionis.

6. Ex vifihiUhm prhnum e^uljit aqua, Fa- mina iyjcmnhentis ignis, ^ figurabilium grai-i- da mater.

7. Porofa erat interihs tf coYticibiis varia, cujus 'venter kahuit ccelos convolutos cjf aflra indifcreta.

8. Separatus artifex divlfit banc in am- pl(U regtones , tfapparentefatu difparmt ma- ter.

9. Peperit tamen 7nater filios lucidos, In- fluentes, in terram Cbai,

I o. Hi generant matrem in noviJ/itJiis^cttjus fons cant at in luco miraculofo.

11. Sapientitc condus efi hie : efto qui po- tespromuf,

12. Fater efl totius creati, tff ex filio ere- ato per vivam filii Analyfin pater generatur, Hahes fummum generantis circuit myfle- rium : filii Jilius eft , qui filii pater fuit.

This it fkems IS the Rofycrucean Creed, in which perhaps there may be much of deep myftery and fenfe 5 but for my part I can make none^ that is real 5 and I believe that

moft

C44 3 poft of my Readers will be able to make of it as little as 1 3 and therefore I have fet it down as an Inftance and Example of Nonfenfe, that Nonfenfe which I called tnthufiafm.

And here (fince it may be demanded if fuch Emhufiafms really are Nonfenfe, and conlequently unintelligible, how it comes topafs that Enthufiafis do underftand one another?) I conceive it fit toobferve, that when Entbufiafts think, that they under- ftand One Another ("as in truth they pro- fefs to do, and this fo lerioufly, that 'tis hard not to believe them to havefomeim- preffions common to them, which may fupport their Profeflion 5 ) yet for as much as no fober man, tho never fo fagacious or inquifitive, can underftand them, it muft be reckon d an efFed of Sympathy, and not <^i lntelle5lual Apprehenfion-:, I mean, they underftand one another not judicioufly, by conceiving ^ that is, by framing clear and confiftent Notions of what isfaid, but only fimfathetically, by having, upon fuch Ex- preffions, fome Notions, and confequent Thoughts, excited in them, that are con- formable to theirs that ufe theExpreflions; it being with Enthufiafls, who poffefe the fame Frame and texture of mind, as with mifon Lutes, OT other Inftruments fitly tuned^ in which to touch one, is to affedt and ftir all within a convenient diftance. To

L 4? ]

To evidence how much confomMty in Body and mind may fignifie to that purpoie I will make a relation of a very credible Story which 1 have read of Twins •, w ho exadly refembling each the other in all the Features and Lineaments of Body, and coofequently in Frame and Texture of mind, did z\{ofimpath,ze to a wonder j fa that being at great diftance one from ano- ther, they would notwithftanding be ftir- red with the fame Affections and motions. The Story is to be found in a Book enti- tuled, Remar liable Antiquities of the City of Exeter, ^pag, 42, 4^.) and is this •, He}2Y\ ' Tracy, an Inhabitant of the City aforefaid,

* had a numerous Iffue, being the Father

* of eight Sons, and eight Daughters ; the

* the Sixth and Seventh Sons were of one

* Birth Tmns, and fo well like in a all Li-

* naments, and fo equal in Stature, fo co- ^ loured in Hair, and fo like in Face and

* Geftures^ that they could not be known

* one from the other, no not by their

* FriendF, Parents, Brothers or Sifters, but

* privately by fome fecret marks, and open-

* ly by wearing fome feveral coloured Rib- ' bands aUke, which in fporc they would

* fometimes exchange to make tryal of their

* Friends Judgment 5 yet fomewhat more

* flrange was, that their Minds and Affe^ii-

* ons v,'ere as one^ for what the one loved,

^the

C46 ] ^ the other defired ^ andfo on the contrary^ ' the loathing of any thing by the owe, was

* the diftaftingof the fame thing by the o-

* ther ^ yea, fuch a ccnfideration, or in-

* bred Power or Sympathy was in their na-

* tures, that if Nicholas were fick or grie-

* ved, Andrew Mt the like pain, tho* hrdi- ^ ft ant and remote in their perfons, and that < too, without any intelligence given to ei- %ther party v;and 'twas alfo obferved that if

* Judrew were merry, Nicholas was like-

* wifefo affefted, al^ho' in different places ' which long they jtould not endure to be « afunder ^ for they ever defired to eat,

* drink, lleep and walk together; yea, fo

* they lived and died , for they both ferved

* the King in Arms againft his Barons i, and ' in a Battle, the one being flain, the other ' ftept prefently into his place ^ where in ' the height of danger ("no perfwafions able ' to remove or hinder him) was there like- ^ wife killed.

The like ( if not the fame^ Story I find reported by the Author of the Book, Enti- tuled, England's Worthies in Church and State, Printed London 1684.. {-pag, i6yO who tells it in thefe Words : ' Nicholas and ' Andrew fremane fays he) were Twins ^ alike in all Lineaments, and felt like ' pain, tho at diftance, and without any ' Intelligence given ^ they equally defired

^to

C 77 ] < to walk, travel, fit, fleep, eat and drink to- 'gether. In this they differed, that at ^ JSlew-Hdven in France, the one was Cap- ' tain of a Troop, the other but a Private * Soldier •, there they were both flain toge- 'ther Ann, 1564.

Thefe (two , if two^ Stories open a great light for the underftanding the Sym- pathies and Confents that are in the World of Nature, as well as in the World of men 5 but I think it not fo proper to infift any longer upon them at this time, fince the very occafion that I have taken of men- tioning them here , is but incident, and indireft.

SECT. III.

Of Queftionsy tk^ Mature , and their di- ftribution. That a Q^ueftion is neither true , nor falfe 5 fjeither AffirmattTe , nor Negative. An Ohje5lion re?no- ved. That pfoceeding by vpay ef Que- fiion , or as it vpere of Inquiry , in Common Difcourfe , is verf ufeful , as well as Civil Judgment required input- ting 'I ertinent Qnefiions,

A

S Words when they are joined and put together 3 for Example, a Ver-

tuous

c 4n

tuoiis Woman, an Excellent man, are cal- led Oration or Speech ^ and if joined by way of Affirmation, or Negation, are cal- led Propofittonsy and Proportions joined by a Conjun^ftion , a Compound Propofition ^ fo a Propofition when there is added to it a Sign of interrogation is cdiW^d'ei Qjieftion. For Initance , Whether the Baptifm of John is the fame wich Chrifl's? Whether the Heavens arefolid? or Fluid ? Whether the Sun is a Flame ? Whether the Earth move ? And fince a Sign of Interrogation may be added to any Propofition whatever, it follows, that Queftions are of as many I^nds as Propofitions themfelves, in refpefl: of their Subftance and quantity ^ fo that they are either Simple^ or Compound ^ Univerfaly or Particular •, Indefinite^ or Singular. On- ly as to the quality of Propofitions, as well the Verbal^ (which is the Affirmation, of the Negation is in them,) as the real^ (their verity, or falfity, j it muft be owned, that Queftions are not capable of the fame di- ftribution in refped of this, as Propofiti- ons are. For tho' Proportions may be divi- ded into true and falfe, and into Affirmative znd Negative^ Queftions cannot -:, fince he who only asketh the Queftion, whether a thing is fo? ornotfo? neither affirmeth, nor denieth it to be •, and he that neither affirmeth, nor denieth a thing to be, fpeaks

noi:

C 4P ]

nor true nor falfe of it. And yet ic muit be confelTed , that as a Queftion may be asked, there may be implication of Affirma- tion, or Negation in it ^ fo that in this re- gard a Queftion may have the Denomina- tion of being affirmative, or negative, ac- cordingly as it is made: But this is but accident, and arifes net from the nature of a Queftion, nor belongs unto it as fuch, but rather is contrary, and only fprings from the manner of putting the Queftion. I will give an Example in each : IhisOue- ftion, Is not Jefus Chrift the Son of God .^ may be called Affirmative, becaufe, being made in that manner, it feems to imply, that he who puts it, would have the An- fwer to be, he is -, and this is Jefus Chrift the Son of God ? efpecially as it is toned in pronouncing, may be termed a Negative Queftion, becaufe it feems to imply, he is not. But then either way of propofing the Queftion, is not barely the putting a Qjiefiiony but alfo a direfting the Anfveer : For to make a fair and naked Queftion, it fliould be worded thus 5 Whether Jefus Chrift be the Son of God ? elfe it may be only verbally a Queftion, but in effed an Aflertion. Otuftio (fays Cicero, lik 4. Aca^ demducefi,) efi Appetitio Cognitionif, Quafti^ onifque finis Invention

E But

I 50 J Biit to leave a Difcourfe that certainly will appear but dry and barren to fome, and to refer fuch others, who are better pleafed with it, and with the like, unto common Logicians and Summulifis % I will only obferve, that in common Difcourfe and Converfation, to make Objedions fay way of Queftion, as it is lefs offenfive than that of aflerting and dogmatizing, fo, being well managed, it is no lefs convincing and perfwafive. For this Reafon the way was much in ufe with the Ancients, efpecially with Socrates and PlatOy who preferr'd it before the Method of Syllogifm,and Oppo- iition-, and in truth, to queftion, fince it is not to affirm, or to deny, does not contra- dict, or put a miftake upon Any, but feems only a further Inquiry, rather than Oppo- fition of what is Affirmed ^ and yet as it requires a great proportion of Judgment, and of ftrength and clearnefs of underftand- ing, to do it pertinently and well 5 fo be- ing done in this manner, it gains more ea- fily, and as it were by furprize. Befides, the way of queftioning is broader and lar- ger than that of Syllogizing, which is con- fined to one medium, and which too is of- ten ufed to divert and carry one off from thebufinefs in hand, for which purpofe it ferves moft excellently well, if managed with dexterity.,

CHAP.

C ji ]

CHAP. III.

Of Notion, the hnmediate OhjeB cf Appre- henfion.

SECT. I.

That Notion jnay he confidered two ways, I ft. In general 'j and zly. more Jpecially. Of Notion in the general fenfe of the Word. No Original Native Notions. Why it feems as tf there were. The Notion of Appreheyjfion cleared. Of Notion in the fpecial and limited Senfe cf the Word^ what it is, Ihat the under ft anding apprehends things hat inadequately ^ and under Notions in the limited fenfe, this evidenced by fe- deral confiderations. An Ohje^ion againft it removed,

J Have fpoken of words the ordinary, but inftituted, means of Appreheofi- on ^ I am now to fpeak of Notion, the im- mediate Objed: (fome would call it the na- tural means) of Apprehenfion.

The word Notion, may be confidered two ways, either as it does fignifie more generally and largely, or as it is taken in a more reftrained, fpecial and particular fenfe, E 2 A

L J2 J

A Notion in the general and larger ac- xptation ot the word , is an) conception \3rmed by the Mind in reference to Objedts^ and lb taken, is the fame with a thought, or that, in refpeft of the Mind, that a Sen- timent largely taken, is, in refpedt of the fenfe. I fay a Sentiment largely taken 5 for infiance •, when Sentiment is taken in fpedt of theVifive Power, not ftridly and properly for light, or colour only •, but largely, for any perception that the Eye has, by way of fight, of things, or of their relations and habitudes. And fince there is fo great an Analogy between the Eye and theUnderftanding,and between the Senti- ments of the one,and of the other jt will be an eafy inference,that no rcafon can be gi- ven why there fhoald be OrigmdMnnateNo- tion^ in the U nderftanding(as feme imagine there muft) that it may be able to appre- hend, which will not equally argue, that there (hould h^ thtXv^.t onginal Figures and Images in the Eye, which Ihould enable it to fee 3 and yet none will Allow of thefe.

But to fhow how It comes to pals, ttiat there are (as there are appearances as if the mind had fome original innate Noti- ons, which for that reafon are cdWedProkp- fes^divA Anticipations, and withal to bring fome light to tiie bufmels of Apprehenhon,

which

[ 53 ] which (^as to the way of it> is obfcure e- nough, and but feidom touched to any pur- pofe : I will offer an Obfervation vet*y common , but ( as it may be applied^ very luciferous in reference to this Sub- jed.

Every body obferves, that if a Blow is aimed at the Head of any perfon, he will holdup his Arm to receive it, and keep it from his head; without thinking either that^ or why, he does fo^ and this is faid to be done Naturally , and by inilind •, becaufe, in truth; it is done without premedita ion, and fo at that time, without any actual conceived deli^n.

And yet again it is certain, that an In- fant will not do fo, or any Child before it has been taught and inftrudted to do it 3 v/hich makes it plain, that the doing foin thofe who are come to reafon, is no effedof natural infl:in6t, but of ufe 3 only the Child was taught to do it fo early, that by the time he comes to the Age of Difcretion, having forgotten, or rather, having made no obfervation, when it was firft taught, or firft did it. and upon whatiMotives, and doing it now without deliberation it hath the afped of a thing effeded by Nature, and not of a cujhm or habit.

In the fame manner in the bufmefs of 'Reafon^ w^e may, and often do proceed up-

E 3 on

C J4 3

on Principles inftilled into us very early ^ and are Aded by them, without Knowing f^owy or wby, it being no Effeft of pre- fent confideration. Eccperience confirms tnisjfincewemay be certain, if we do but at- tend to our own Anions, that^many^times, we are carried to the Aftedtion, or Dil- affedion of things, and the Approbation or Difapprobation of them, we Know not irhyy and yet all the paflions and Mo- tions of our Mind, have Reafons for them *, for all Effects muft have Caufes •, but thefe, fometimes, arefo early grafted in us, and, at other times, fo unavpares^ that we re- member not they were fo •, and then the Effedls ^ only being obferved, and the caufes lying deep , hidden and fecret , we do call it Nature, or Inftind, though in truth, it be Reafony and habit, as much as any thing elfe is.

/igain, much the fame way we do com- pute or reckon ^ for wlien w^e ufe any greater numbers, either in Addition, or in Subftraftion, or in any other Arithmeti- cal operation^ we do it without any a(Su- al confideration of what the leffer particu- lar numbers are that make the greater, for that we have done before, ( perhaps long, ) and confequentiy are poflefied of the Ideas ( m^ay I fo exprefs it ) without the Images of them. But at firft^ we had

C5S 3

a particular Knowledge. As, when we Multiply and fay, Six and Six is Twelve, and Twelve and Twelve is Four and Twenty, we do it without conlidering adually at that time, that fix is fo many unites, though at firft ( but poffibly fo long ago that w^edo not remember it ) we didfo, and muft (dofo^ to Know the particular value of that number 3 and the like is of others.

And thus alfo with an eafie Application may it be conceived, how rvords come to fland in the mind for things^ and that when we have the wordy we think we have the fimple Idea of the thing ♦, it is juft as the Figure [ 6 ] doth ftand for the number [ Six. 3 And that when once we have had a diftind Idea or Notion of the Numhery afterward, (without actual thinking thereof, ) we ufe the Figure inftead of it, and that as well, or better than if we did diftindly confider the Number it felf. Now, words do carry the fame Relation unto things, that Figures do unto Num- bers, and both Words and Figures feem to derive the power which they have of ftanding iu the Mind as Reprefentatives, from the connexion they have. Figures with Numbers, and Words with Things; after the fame manner as we hold up our Arm, or a Stick, to fave our Head, with- E 4 out

C 56]

out thinking of faving it. For though the A6lion prevents all adual thought of the End of it, yet 'tis done for ari End, in vertue of it its firft DireBion and life. This Difcourfe attended to, and well di- gefted, will open a great light into the zi^ay in which the Underftanding comes to have Appreheniion of things by the means of Words 5 and to form its Ideas and Notions, taking Notions largely for any 1 houghts or Conceptions.

But belides the former Senfe of the Word {_ Notion, ] there is Another which is more Reftrained and Limited 5 in which a Notion is Modus Concipiendi, a certain particular manner of conceiving ^ a manner of conceiving things that corre- fponisnotto them but only as they are OhjeBsj not as they are Jhtngs •, there be- ing in every Conception fome thing that is purely Obje^lhe^ purely Notional ^ in fo much that few, if any, of the Ideas which we have of things are properly Figures 'j our Conceptions of things no more refembling them in ftrid Propriety, than our Words do our Conceptions, for which yet they do ftand, and with which they have a Kind of Correfpondence and Anfwering ; juft as Figures that do ftand for Numbers , yet are no wife like them^

To

C f7 ] To make this clearer, it inuft be confi- dered that the Ey^ has no perception of things but under the Appearance of Light, and Colours, and yet Light and Colours do not really exifc in the things them- felves, that are perceived and feenby means or them, but are only in the Eye. Like- wife the Ear has no perceivance of things, as of a Bell, of a Luce, or of a Viol, but under founds and yet found is only afen- timent in the Ear that hears, and is net, or any thing like it, in the Bell, or Viol, or Lute that is heard. For as the Eye has no Perceivance of things but under Colours that are not in them, ( and the fame time with due alteration, muft be faid of the o- ther Senfes. ) So the UnderftarJirjg Appre- not things, or any Habitudes or Afpeds of them, but under Certain Notions that neither have that being in Objects, or that being of Objeds, that they feem to have 3 but are, in all refpeds, the very fame to the mind or Underftanding, that Colours are to the Eye, and Sound to the Ear. To be more particular, thellunderftand- ing conceives not any thing but under the Notion of an Enity, and this either a Suh- fiance or an Accident y Under that of a whole, ore of a part 5 or of a Caufe, or of an Effect^ or the like ^ and yet all thefe and the like, are only Entities of Reafon con- ceived

C 58 D ceived within the raind, that have no more of any real true Exiftence without it, than Colours have without the Eye, or Sounds without the Ear. Every perfon that hath the leaft Underftanding of the way in which we do apprehend things, will yield this to be true as to Whole and Party to Caufe and Effe5i, and to all the Notions which are commonly termed by Logicians the Second ^ and it is as certain- ly true in reference to Sub ft ance and Acci- dent ^ to Quantity y Quality ^ and thofe other General Notions under which the Under- ftanding apprehcuus its Objeds, though commonly they are called Brft ones , and in comparifon of the others are fo.

I have laboured the more to make the Notion that I have in this bufinefs plain and eafie, becaufe much of what is to be faid hereafter will depend upon it ^ and now taking it for granted that my mean- ing is Intelligible, what remains, is to evince true •, and this I (hall do, from the very Natm'e of Cogitation in general, ( as it comprehends Senfation as well as Intel- legion, ) fince that the Underftanding doth Finnits Notions upon Objeds, arifes not from its being Such a particular Kind of Cogitative Faculty, but from its being Cogitative at large -^ let us then refledt

again

C 5P ] again on the Nature of Cogitation at large.

It is certain that things to us Men are nothing butasthey doftand in our Jtialcgy that is, in plain terms, they are nothing to us but as they are known by us ^ and as certain, that they ft and not in our Ana- logy, nor are Known by us, but as they are in our Faculties, in our Senfes, Ima- gination, or Mind ^ and they are not in our Faculties, either in their own realities, or by way of a true ReJerMance and Re- prefentation, but only in refped: of certain yi/?/7e^r^«re/ or Sentiments, which, by the various impreflions that they m.ake upon us, they do either Occafion only, or Caufe, or ( which is moft probable ) concur unto in Caufing with our Faculties. Every Cogitative Faculty, though it is not the Sole Caufe of its own immediate [ appa- rant ] Objed, yet has a fliare in making it : Thus the Eye or Vifive Faculty hath a fhare in making the Colours which it is faid to fee 5 th^ Ear or Auditive Power, a fhare in producing founds, which yet it is faid to hear ^ the Imagination has a part in making the Imagies ftored in it ^ and there is the fame Keafon for the Under- ftanding, that it fliould have a like fliare in framing the Primitive Notions under v^'hich it takes in and receives Objeds : In

fum?

[ 6o ]

fumm, the immediate Ohje5ts o( cog\tationy as it is exercifed by men, are entia cogita- tionisy all Phirnomenci •, Appearances that do no more exift without our faculties in the things themfelves, than the Images that are feen in water, or behind a glafs, do really exift in thofe places where they feem to be.

But as this is a truth that Many will admit with more facility in reference to the Objevfis of Senfe, and hnagination, as Colours, Sapors, Sounds, tfc. Than to thofe of the Mind or Underftanding, fuch as Subftance, Accident, Quality, Aftion,&^c. So J iind my feif obliged to give a farther deinonjivation that it holjs in thefe, as well as in thofe ^ which I hope to. do by the following Confiderations.

Firft, the underftanding converfes not with things ordinarily but by the Inter- vention of the fenfe, and lince fentiments of fenfe are but Appearances, not Piftures, or proper Reprefentations. it is hard to conceive how fuch conceptions are fra- med only by their occalion, and only wrought out of them, fhould be pour- traits of the things themfelves, and made juft and exad to them.

Secondly, The underftanding is a power

of

of that nature that many think it doth not immediately Attinge (as they call it) or reach particular lingular beings, which yet are the only beings that compofe the Univerfe, as members or parts of'it^ and really, it ufes to proceed by way of M- ftraSiion^ and therefore doth more Conna- turally converfe with Univerfa's, that are not of Mundane exiftence, than with fin- gulars that are. Now, fmce things as they are in the mind, do undergo an Ah^^ fira5iion and fublimation, certain it is, they muft put on another drefs there, and fo appear in quite another (hape than that they have in the World. In fhort. All Agree that our conceptions of things are but inadequate^ as indeed they muft needs be, iince things have much Refraftion (may I lb exprefs it) both before they come, and after that they come, to the mind ^ and if they are inadequate, they cannot be ' commenfurate, that is, they cannot bo fo juft and exact, to things, as to fhowthem as they be, and in their own exigences.

Thirdly, It may be Argued from the very nature of an Idea- or notion 3 fince this after a fort is a fentiment of the mind, as a fentiment (properly fo called) is, after a fort, an Idea or Notion of the fenfe-, the

imme-

C 61 ]

immediate objeits of the fenfe ?i^e fenfibk fentiments, and thofe of the underftanding are Intelkhtial ones 5 which they muft needs be, becaufe the underftanding it felf is a kind of fenfe, only a more fubli- med and raifed. Mens ipfa (fays Cicero^ L 4. Academ. Quceft,) qn£ Jenfuum fans ejiy etiam ipft Senfus eft^ &c.

In fine, this is fo certain a truth, tliat whofoever reflects, tho' never fo little, cannot chufe but obferve, that as he takes in nothing by his fenfe but under fenti- mentSy which are the notions of fenfe, fo he receives in nothing in his underftanding, but under certain notions, which are the fentiments of the mind •, fince he knows nothing Intellectually but either in general only, under the notion of a things or more fpecially under that of a fubfiance, or elfe of an Accident ^ and what are all thefe but OhjeElive Notions ? as will appear in parti- cular upon the examination and Tryal of them.

Let us then inquire firji into the thingy (for we ftiall ftiew it of Suh fiance and Acci- dent hereafter) and what is thing but mo- dus concipiendi ? a notion or fentiment that the mind has, of whatfoever any wife is, becaufe it is ? Thing indeed is the moft ge- tmal notion, but then it is but a notiony becaufe it is generals and has the moft of

[ ^3 2

a notion, becaufe it is the mod: genera!. To be more particular ; If the Queftion be asked;, rvhat thing is ? or what is meant by that word ? Some have no other Anfwer but this, that a thing is that rvhich hath effence. JBut then it may be farther de- manded, what is meant by effmce, which is faid to be had ? What it is to ham ef- fence ? And what is meant by that^ which hath it? Or if it be faid, that a thing is that, which is, ("as it is by others •,;- the fame difficulties again occur : for it may be demanded, w hat that is, which is ? And what is meant, when it is faid to he ? And whether Exiftence be Effence ? efpe- cially fince Exiftence feems not the lirft conception of a things but is a fecond, or after-conception 5 as not being that, which makes a thing to be what it is, [a thing 3] but what only makes it a thing in being.

By this, it plainly appears, that the meaning of the word Uhlng;\ is but an inadeciuate conception, arifing 'in the mind upon its converfing with Objects, and fo doth fpeak a certain particular fentiment, which the mind has of them •, a fentiment better underftood, than defined bywords-, but a fentiment too, that doth not enter us into the knowledge of the Reality it felf (may I fo exprefs it,) of that- which IS ; which we only apprehend inadequately,

under

C 64]

under the Difguife and Mafquerade of no- tions. As, that it is th.a^ which is 5 or that which has eflence , or the hke ^ but not by any ade.mate exadt conception. And as for Subftance and Accident^ which yet are the hrit Iteps we make toward a diftinft Perceivance and knovv^ledge of things 5 what are they, but Ukewife Modi concipiendi> Entities of Reafon, or notions, that ^tistruej are not without grounds^ but yet that have, themfelves, no Formal being but only intheiVI/W, that frames them; there being no fuch thing in the World as a Snbjiance, or an Accident^ any more than fuch a thing as a SubjeB, or an JdjunB 3 and yet we apprehend not any thing but as one of thefe, to wit, as a Subftance, or as an Accident ^ fo that we apprehend not any at all, juft as they are, in their own realities, but only under the Top-knots and DrefTes of Notions, which our minds do pur on them.

But here it will be told me, that plain unlearned men, who yet do exercife the Ads of Reafoning well enough, and per- haps in the beft manner, as doing it with- out Art, and in a way the moft agreeable to Nature, do conceive and fpeak of things without conceiving or minding of Noti- ons, fuch as I have mention'd ; for they conceive and fpeak of mauy of good and

evil-,

E65 j

evil, of vertue and vice, and the like; without conceiving or minding of Subjian- cesy or Accidents. ' But this is eafily got over. For tho' unlearned plain men do not explicitely and in terms denominate goodnejs, vertue^ vice, tffc. Accidents, yet iince they do conceive them (as All do) all things that are in a rnan, or in fome o- ther thing, tho' they do not call them Ac- cidents, yet do they conceive them as Ac- cidents : And when they do conceive, or fay of a man, for inftance, that he is vex- ttwus or vicious, or the like, they do con- ceive him to have vertue or vice in him 5 that is, tho' they do not think of the name fubflance, yet they do really conceive that perfon to be one-^ fiiice a fubft nee is no- thing but a fubje5l, or a thing that has o- therthingsin itas Acdderlts^ whereas in truth, neither Accident, nor Subfiance hath any being but only in the mind^ and by the only vertue of cogitation or thought.

SECT.

[66]

SECT. II.

Inferences from the former Difcourfe 5 firfi^ that human l^ovpledge for the moft fart is but intentionaly not real. The ufefulnefs of this Inference ; an ObjeBion againfi it removed. {And yet) Secondly ^ That the immediate OhjeBs of the cogitative Povpers are fomewife external to t ho fe powers 5 and thUy both as to appearances y {which is fen- fibly demonjf rated) and as to their grounds. Two other Inferences added ^ the firft in re- ference to the grounds of the Doilrine of the old Academy 5 the fecond concerning the obligation we are under ordinarily to conceive and fpeak^ of things as they are in our Analogy y and do appear Po our facul* ties,

I Infer from the former Difcourfe 5 Firft, that human knowledge (at leaft for the moft part) is but Intentional, not Real 5 and that we have no Perception of any thing, (\n any degree to fpeak of,) jufi 06 it is in its own Reality and being. For all our notions and conceptions of things, are of them under fentiments 5 the underftanding it felf (as I argued before^

being

being but a higher and more fiiblimated fenfe j and fentirnents (as fuch) are in their own formalities but apparej^lly only, not exiftently, without the faculties that do conceive them. To be be particular, we have no perception or knowledge of any thing but as it is a Subftance, or an Accident, or a QuaHty, Ssfc. And thefe are only notions : for example, as to Ma- ter 3 we have no knowledge of it by all, or any of our fenfes, what really it is in it felf, juft as it is, and abfolutely fpeaking ^ for we are utterly ignorant i^otherwdfe than by Conjedure) of the Magnitude and fize of the little parts that com pofe it-. Ignorant of their figure and (hape-, and Ignorant alfo of the kind, and degree of motion they have •, all this we are Ignorant of, and yet this is all that is Real in Water But as Ignorant as we are of what it really is, in it felf, and abfolutely confidered, we have much Comparative Relative Know- ledge of it •, for we know it by fenfj to be fluid s to have fome degree of tenacity or vifcofity ^ to be moift •, in a v/ord, to have fo many Qualities (for fo we conceive and fpeak ) that all put together, do give the mind a fufficient rife to diftinguifh it, as a* different fubftance, from Earth, or Fire ^ So that a perfon that has at any time had F 2 the

C 68 1 the perception of them all, will not mi- ftake them afterward one for the other.

But here it muft be remembred, that (as I have fhewed before; tho' we do not fee the reality of things immediately, and juft as it is in the things themfelves, yet by means of fentimtnts and notions, we do, fomewife, perceive tt: as the Eye that fees not am thin:^ immediately but Light or Colours, yet by means of Light and Co- lours, difcerns Gold, Silver, Stones, Wood, asalfo the Magnitudes, the Figures, the mo- tions, the diftances of things •, with a thou- fand other Realities, fo the underftanding difcerns infinite Realities, infinite habitudes of things •, not indeed immediately, but ei- ther under the fentiments of fenfe, or by means of its own, v^ hich 1 call notions ^ as of Subftance, Quality, Caufe, Efteft, Whole, Part, b'c,

i have been fom.ewhat longer in the Ex- plication of this Inference, becaufe to know thenature of our Knowledge, muft needs be of great advantage unto us •, and much relieve us in our Inv^uiry after the nature of Things •, fince it frees us from the confufion, that our mind muft necefia* rilybe in, ftiould it take the Apparitions of things (for luch fentiments and notions are) to be external and real Exiftences. Would not a thinking man be much per- plexed^

[69]

plexed, to make a fatisfying conception, what that Image is, that he lees in a glafs, or in water, if he was perfwaded of its being a ReaUty (of Exiftence,) and not a meer Apparition ? The like mufl he be, who takes Objective Notions for real Ex- igences, and who confounds Attributes that are only Ci jedive, and that do be- long to things but as they are Objeds with thofe that do belong unto them as they are Things, and that are Real,

However, it will not follow^, as fome have weakly Objected, that then nothing is Real ^ for tho' the hnages themklves of Whitenefs, Blacknefs Rednefs, Greennefs, that dofeem inherent m vifible Objects, are not really fo, yet really there are Difpofi- tions and textures of particles in thofe Ob- jects, that, by the various Modifications which they give the Light, do occalion in the Eve, to which the Light is reflefted, all that diverfity of fentiments ^^ which we call colours that does appear in thofe Ob- ]t(Xs, The fame, 7nutatumutandUmu?i be faid of founds, fapors, odors, andofTan^ gible qualities, and in proportion will hold alfo in mental notions. For tho the very Notions of Entity, Subftance, Acci- dent, Whole, Part, Caufe, Efifect, and the like, do not really exift without the mind -, yet as they dofeem, Real, and fome F ^ more

C 703 more Real than others, fo r^^i^they have in things without us certain grounds or Foundations, that, upon our converfe with thefe things, do naturally Occalion, or Excite, fuch notions and fentiments in us. But I will fpeak to this matter more par- ticularly, becaufe it is of importance.

Firft then, the immediate Obje^s of Cogitation, both the Seniitive, and the Inteliedual, are, in appearance, ec^ternal to their feveral faculties ; that is, fucli Objetts do fo feem to be without their fe- veral faculties, to which they correfpond, that, in appearance, they are either the very ultimate ObjeBs themfelves of thofe faculties, or, at leafl, do Exifi in them, and upon this account are called ObjeBs 5 for Whuenefs feems to the Eye to be iu fnow; or in a white wall 5 and found to the Ear, to be in the Air-, a Man doth feem to the underftanding, to be really a Sublrance, or a thing that is invefted with Accidents.

If it be Inquired how it comes to pafs, that fentiments and notions, whicb really are not i'l the things that are without us, do yet appear as if they were, and confe- quently that they feem to be Objefts ? it muft be Anfmred, that this arifes from the very nature of cogitation it felf, and of

. the

C 71 ] I the cogitative faculties^ and that both I Reafon and Experience do evidence, it cnuft be fo.

Firft, Reafon (heweth that it muft befo^ for as we are confcious tliat we have a perceivance of Ob)ei5ts under certain hna- ges, and Notions, fo we are not confcious of any Aition by which our faculties fhould make thofe linages or Notions 5 and therefore being fenfible that we are Af- fected with fuch Images, and Notions, fo long asy and no longer than w^e do Attend to things without us, (which things are therefore called ObjeUs-^) and not being fenfible that we are fo by any Adion from within our felves, it cannot but appear unto us that we are Affeded only from the things without us, and fo, what really is only in our felves, muft feem to come from thofe things, and confequently to be really in them.

Experience alfo (hews 5 (to wit, that what is really but in the cogitative faculty, does yet feem without it^ for if the Eye by any accident becomes infeded with Co- loursy as, (to inftance in a more received, than often experienced. Matter,) with yeBoiVy by the yellow Jaundice, or with Green, (as I have fometimes obferved, be- fore the coming of Convulfions 5 ) that is, F 4 (for

[ 1% ]

(for this is the ReaUty) if the Vifive Spi- rits, or whatever other parts of the Eye, that are immediately concerned in the A(ft of Viiion, be Preter-naturally put into t:he fame motions with thofe, which by the Impreffions of Yellow or Green Ob- jeds they are naturally put into, in , either of thefe Cafes, the Oh]ed beheld by that Eye, will appear as yellow, or green, the* to every bodies elfe, it is but White, or Red, or of Ibme other colour. And whence comes this, but hence? that the images conceived in the Eye, ,for in the Inftances alledged, the Images of yellow and green are no where elfe,) are naturahy pnned upon the Objedt. As is farther evident in Dazltng"^ which is, when an Impreffion made upon the Eye by one Objeit, becomes tranflated to another 5 thus, cummg out of a bright Sun-fhine, on a Summers day, intoa darkifh room, one fees vifplendor in every corner, and upon every Objed. The like Appearance there is, upon the be- holding of Objeds thro' tinctur'd GUjfes : So that it muft be concluded, that the im- mediate Objects of cogitation, I mean the very Images and fentiments that are per- ceived, do, to ail appearance^ feem as ex- ternal to the cogitative powers, as even the ultimate Objects themfelves, that are .ei perceived

'lol J

t: 7] .1

perceived under them 5 which was thsfirll: thing to be fhewed.

The fecond point to be (hewed is, that the immediate Objeds of cogitation are external in their ground , as well as in ap- pearance, and in truth, . are therefore ex- ternal in appearance, becaufethey are fo really in their grounds. And thi^ is as certain, as that eve. y Effect muft have a Gaufe. For things without us, are the Caufes that do excite iuch hnages and Notions in us : In the order of Nature, we do fee a thing fo long as, and no lon-^ ger than, we keep our Eye upon it-, and therefore that we do fee it, muft come from feme imprefjion from the I hing \ and lince to fee a thing, is nothing but to have fome Image from it, and fo of it, in the Eye, and the Image is as the ImprelTion, and the Impreilion as the Thing that makes it, it follows that the grounas of the Image is in the Thing v^ithout us. And fince the Image (by which I mean Light or Colour) is the immediate objed of Vi- pon, and^ that what is inftanced in one Act of cogitation, will equally hold in all, it follows, that the immediate Objects of ail other cogitations, as well as of vifion, are ordinarily and naturally as external in their grounds, as in appearance 3 that is, are fundamentally external, as well as ap- parently. I

C 74 3

I thought once to have ended this Chap- ter here, but now before I do fo, I will add an Inference or two from the former Dod- rine , the firft is, that we learn from it the Foundation of that Opinion the Academicks of old were in,, That no judgment could be made of Truth 5 that things do feem to us, but cannot be perceived by us •, and that no certainty^ but gVQ^t probability only, is to be Attained unto by men. For as this O- pinion had all the Thcenomena of cogitation to give it countenance, fo thofe Fhtlofophers faw it 5 for they evidently pirceived, that they faw not the Realities, but only the Appearances of things 5 Flato the chief of them, one of the moft penetrating, as well as the moft elegant , of all that ever were, affirmed that the prefent, uas a word, oi Veri fimilitude only^ and not of Truth and Reality •, That the beings in this World were only Shadows^ but that the Subflances themfelves were in the IdeaL How far herein he went with the Truth, may eafi- ly be perceived by what I have difcourfed before, concerning the Nature of Cogitati- on •, as alfo, where he ftrikes out.

The Second Inference is, That fince Sen- timents, and Notions bottomed upon Rea- lities , do feem, the former to the Senfe, the latter to the Underftanding, to be Re- alities 5 and fince we are obliged to con- ceive,

E 7J 1 ceive, and fpeak, of things, ordinarily and popularly (for all are not Philofophers) in that way and manner that they feem to be 5 it follows, that we are obliged to conceive, and fpeak of Sentiments and Notions in Common Converfation, and to the people, as i/really they were the things themfelves that are perceived 5 or at lead were in them : And fo may fay , the Snow is white, the Emerald is green , and the like.

CHAP.

C 7^ ]

CHAP. IV.

Of the dijivihution of Notions in the Rejlraiaed fenfe of the Word.

SECT. I.

plot ions are either the Notions of things ^ or Notions xhout things. Of the Notions of things. Andfirftof Entity or Thing, The Pinax Entium, or general Table of things. Things are either Real, or cogitabk. And thefe either meer Cogi tables , or real Cogitahles, A Reality what' A Cogitable vrhat. Of Real Cogitables. Real Cogita- hies, either Proper, or Reductive. Proper Real Cogitables of trro forts -^ of the Sen fe, cr of the Mind, Thefe oftheSenfe, of tiro kinds^ 5 Connatural^ or Preternatural, Ap- parent colours, are real Connatural Cogita- bles, Real Cogitables of the Mind, lil^e thofeofthe Serife, oftrvo Kinds •, Connatu- ral. or Preternatural, Real Cogitables Re- duBive, fubdivided into thofe of fenfe (Ex- ternal, Internal j and thofe of the Unakr- Handing,

N

otions taken in the limited Senfe of the word, for ObjeBive Ideas, by

and

L 77 J and under which the Underftanding ap- prehends, and conceives, of, things, and which, for this reafon may be called Fun- damental as being efTential to the bufinefs of Knowledge, ) are either Notions of things ^ fuch as Entity, Reality, ^c. Or Notions about Things, fuch as whole, part, caufe, effect, ^c, of which the former are conceived as ahfolute, the latter more as re- lative Notions.

The Notions, {ov Modi conclpienc/i, that I call the Notions^ of things, may be re- duced to four, to Entity or thing, Reali- ty, Subftance and Accident.

Entity or thi?jg is taken in feveral fenfes-, either iirfl:, in the largeft, in which it is the fame Wnh fomething^ or Aliquid, Or idly, more llrictly, as it comprehends but fub- ftances, Accidents and Modes. Or jdly. Mofi: ftrictly, as it ftands for Suhftances on- ly. I take knot at this time in the largeft Senfe*

Thing in the largeft Senfe, is that which any wiCe /*5, or that is Knowable, directly ; for Nothing, no wife is, nor is Knowable, but indiredly, and by means of thing, of which it is a Negation 3 Nothing is Not a thing.

And

And thing, or Entity, taken in the lar- geft fenfe for

Meer Co- gitable,

'\ Some thing about

^ Thing J As

C Caufc, Effea, ^(r.

For that which any wife is, is either without the thinking of any one upon it 5 or it is no longer than while one is a thinking , and becaufe he is a thinking, on it.

That which is without the thinking of any one upon it, and whether it be minded or no, is ^real Thing, or a Reality 5 a thing that fo is in the world, as that it is a part, or Appurtenance of it, and fuch a thing is matter, and every Affedion, and every Sy- ftem of matter ^ and fuch a thing alfo is Mind.

That which no longer is than while one is a thinking, and becaufe he is a thinking, on it 5 [fo that tho it have that which is

called

[7p3

called in the Schools an objedive being, a being in the Cogitative Faculties , yet hath none without them in the World : ] this I name a Cogitable •, a Cngitable thing, or Entity. And thus, zWtht Sentiments of Senfe, thofe of the Mind, and even meer Obje(3:ive Notions, are Things, not things of Mundane and External Exiftence , but of Cogitation and Notion •, Intentional , not Real things. For fuch are Colours, Sounds, Sapors, Time, Place, Subftance, Accident, Caufe, Effeft-, fe'c. they are In- tentional things, things that, as fuch, have only an ejfe ObjeBivum, an ejfs Cogjiitum, as the Schoolmen phrafeit

Cogi tables, or Things that have being only in the Faculties that apprehend them, and by venue of their teing apprehended, are of tr^o forts 5 for either they have a being in Faculties by means of the Impref- fions made upon the??2 from external -Ob- jefts, and confequently have Grounds and Foundations in the things that are v^dthout us 3 or, they have a being in our Faculties, only by a working of the Faculties tbem- felves, without any fuch Grounds.

Thofe Cogitabies , that have being by means of Imprelfions made upon our Fa- culties, by External Objeds, I call Real Co- gitabies 5 Cogitabies , becaufe the being which they have, is, fcrmatiy a being in

Cogita-

C So ] Cogitation only 3 Ileal Cogitables, becaufe they have Grounds and Foundations, • in things that are Real. Thus the Sentiments df Senfe, fuch as Colours, Sounds, ^c the Funda?nental Notims of Mind , thofe of things, and thofe about them, fuch as Sub- ftance , Accident Caufe, Fffed:, Whole, Part, ^c, are Real Cogitables ^ Cogitables, for that the very [mages themfelves, the ve- ry Ideas, are Hnticies only of Cogitation , as having but an ejje cognitum'-, and Real Cogitables^ becaufe they have Grounds^ in things that are Real •, for, antecedently to any Operation of the mind concerning thefe Cogi ables, there do really exift, in the world, Things that in their own natures are fitted to produce, or to occafion thera in our Faculties, in a certain correfpon- dence to themfelves.

'Real Cogitables are either properly/^, or hut reduftively.

Real Cogitables proper, are fuch things as have being in our Faculties, by the im- prefnons of External ( aufes, that are Ob- je5lsj as well as Caufes, of the Ads that make thofe Cogitables- And thefe are of two forts. For E>:ample, (for things of this nature are beft conceived in Examples) there is Greenmfs in Grafs, asalfoin anE-

merauld.

C 8i 3

merauld, and there is Bowednefs in an Oar,^ or a i'taff, that is in the Water, fo, as that part of it is in, part out : Now both thefi [the Greens and the Bowednefs'^iive bat Ap- pearances, or Vodnomena; and having equals ly (one as much as another J their Grounds and Foundations in the things that are e:^:^ ternal to our Faculties, both aveequally Realg and yet every one that confiders muft Ac- knowledge, that they are of very different natures, and that Bowednefs is Not, in all refpefts, of the fame fort of Appearance that Green is, as to its General Na- ture.

The differences that are in fuch Appear- ances, depend upon the differences that are in their Grounds, and therefore muft be ac- counted for from thefe.

Some Appearances there are, that da Ari/e from fenfation (for f will begin with thofe of Jenfe) when it is made with all the Conditions and Circumftances tiiat are Re- quifite, to make it Right 5 and thefe I call Connatural Appearances-, fuch as the Greens in Grafs, or in an Emerauld : But there are others that arife from fenfation when it is not made with all the Conditions and Cir- cumftances that are requifite to its being right and natural •, as, when Vifion is made thro' a double Medium^ a thicker and a thinner •, and thefe Appearances I call Vre- G ternaturaL

[ 8i] ternaturaly of which fort is that ofBowednefs in the Oar, or St^ff. Thefe Appearances I call, the former Connatural, the latter Preternatural ^ not in reference to Nature as it is taken for the complex of all, or any, Caufes^ (for in relation to their proper Caufesj all Effeds are equally natural 5) but as Nature is taken in a more reftrained fpe- cial fenfe^fof which more hereafter)for a cer- tain particular order of Caufes and Effeds.

As for the Colours in a Rainbow^ thofe of a Pigeons neckj and others of like nature, tho' they are commonly call'd Apparent and Emphatical, and by that Denomination di- ftinguifhed in School Thilofophy, from thofe that are Real and Exiftent 5 yet I think not fit to make another ClaJJis for them. For thofe fugitive changeable Colours, tho' they are not fo fix d and permanent as others are, yet they areas Real,and as Connatural as they 5 the fugitive waving Colours of Changeable Taffata^ and thofe of ftanding Corn (while Green) Agitated and waved by the wind, are equally as real and Conna- tural, as the certain fixed Colour in Scar- let Cloth, or in Purple. Only,tho' all thefe Colours are equally Real, as having caufes of their Appearance that are equallyreal,and all equally Connatural,becaufe All(^ahke,are Refults of fenfations duly made, with all their requifite Circuniftances 3 yet, fince

their

Hh 1

their Caufes are not equally permanent and fixed, but fome are more, Ibme lefs 5 it follows, that fome of thefe Colours are niofe abiding and permanent, and fome but TranfienP and fugitive s for all Effedts muft be, as their Caufes Are. But to re- turn.

What I havefaid concerning Real Cogi- tables of Senfe^ as to their Diftribution, may likewife be faid of thofeofthe Under- ftanding, that fome are Connatural, fome Preternatural : Thofe I call Connatural that refult in theUnderftanding when it has all the requifite Conditions and Circumftan- ces 5 and thefe Preternatural y that arife from the working of the Underftanding when it wants at leafi: fome of the Requi- fite Conditions and Circumftances ; parti- cularly, when it is Prejudiced, or not well Ballajied wi'h Obfervations, and Experi- ments, made by fenfe: In a word, there are Fifa animi, as well as Vifa fenfus ; and fome of them Connatural, fome Preternatural 5 of the former, every one that is well weigh- ed, and well Grounded, is an Example $ and for the latter, we have as many Exam- ples, as there are ungrounded and fenfe- lefs diftindions, and Notions 5 of which the Schoolmen afford us but too ma- ny, in their Subjhntial Fwmf , Inherent Accidents^ &c.

G 2 Real

L »4 J Real Cogitables Reductive, are fuch as come from Caufes that are Caufes only, and not Objeds as well as Caufes, of the Act of Cogitation , which immediately produces them : And thefe as well as thofe that are proper, are either of the External Jenfe^ or of the Imagination , or of thtRea- fomnd Under]} anciwg: Since whatever is an Effeft of Cogitation, and withal arifes from an external Caufe that is but a Caufe, and not alfo an Objed, of that Ad, is a Real Cogitable Reductive, and not ^FiBion only of the mind •, and there may be fuch in the fenfe, and Imagination^ as well as in the Underftanding and Reafon.

Before I give any Inltancesof Real Cogita- bles Reductive, it may be neceffary that I fhou'd explain the meaning of aTerm thati haveufedto vj'it. [External CaufeQhy which I underfland whatever is vcithout the Facul- ty, and forreign to it-, tho'in other refpefts it may be internal, as being within the A- gent: To be plain, whatever the Under- fland ing, the Imagination, or any of the external Senfes conceive, by means of any ImprelTions, even of Caufes within the Agent, if they ad without its vpHI ) is inten- ded by me to come from an external Caufe^ and thefe Objedive Conceptions, if they come from Caufes , that are not alfo Ob- jqGcs, I call Real Cogitables Reductive.

In

f Sy 3

In this Claffis of Beings I do reckon Dreams , not only Divine if any fuch there be) and Angelical Dreams, Dreams that are the effeds of Divine, or of Ange- lical Impreflion, but alfo ordinary Dreams 5 as alfo the Vifions of the Feaveri(h, the Me- lanchoUy, and the Hyfterical : And here iikewife I reckon that Appearances in our ears, of the Ringing of Bells, which is only made by ^Agitation of the Internal Air , as alfo thofe Sparkles as of Fire, that do appear to the eye, upon a fmart percuf- fion or (haking of the Fibres of the Optick Nerves, either by a vehement Agitation of the fpirits within, or a violent Stroke, or a ftrong Frication of the eye from v^ith- out.

SECT.

[ 86 1

SECT. II.

Of meer Cogitahles, or FiStions. Wkat a Fi5lion is. That all Fi5Vwns are Creatures either of the Mind, -or of the Internal Senfe ^ None ?nade by the External Sen- fes. The Reafon of it. Two Phtlofophtcal Doctrines obfer^^ed^ one concerning fneer Cogitables, tie other about Real Cogita- hies ReduBive. Why the Reprefentations

' of things in Prophetical Dreams^ are al- ways made as if they rvere prefent.

ALL that I have faid ah'eady, relates to things that are in our Faculties, by virtue of impreillons made upon them from External Caufes, which Caufes are either Caufes and alfo Objeds, or Caufes only and not Objeds •, there are others that do arife in us from the working of our Faculties, ( of themfelves, ) without any grounds for it, in any thing that is external, either as a Caufe, or as an Ob- jeft 3 and thefe I call meer Cogitahles, or FiBions ; fuch as an Hirco-cerom , or a Cbiptfcra^ a Golden Mountain, and the like.

Fiiftions are all forged, either by the Mind and Underftanding, or by the Ima-

gination

C s? ]

gination and \ internal Senfe h there are none in the external, the Bye, the Ear, or the like 5 and the Reafon is evident, for Fidions are voluntary things, things that have always fomething of the If V// in them, and therefore cannot be created by any Faculty but That, which is under the Em- pire of the Will, which the External Sen- fesare not, but the other Powers are: For though we may think, and alfo imagine, what we will, we cannot See, or Hear, or Tafte, or Smell, or Feel, what we will. The Reafon of which difference may be this, that if the Underilanding, and Ima- gination, were not fome wife under the power of the Will, there could be no Dif- courfe •, and if the External Senfes were fo fo too, there could be no certainty 3 and therefore that there may be both Dit courfe and certainty, our Faculties are fo contrived, and fo ordered, with excel- lent Wifdom.

Here it muft be obfer ved,

( I ) That there is fome Reality even in meer Cogitables, (not indeed the fame that is in thofe that are veal y which have a reality of Grounds andFoundations^ but a reality ) both in refpeiS of the Co- gitative ABy which doth produce them, and of that Cogitable and Objedive Ex- iftmey which they have in the Mind-, G 4 fince

C 88 ] fince it is as truly faid, that one does think, or conceive fuch things, as it is of him that Dreams, or fees a Vilion, that he does Dream, or fee a Vilion. Where- fore fuch Cogitablesas thefe, in refpedt of their Ob)ed:ive Exiftence, may be referred to Realities of Appearance, as Dreams and Vifions are 5 for as the Ad^ of Dreaming Really is, and the thing Dreamt doth Re- d\\y feem -, fo the Act that produces a Ficti- on Really is, and the Fiftion alfo really i feems. However, meer Cogitables, and Real Cogitables Redudive, or more plain- ly^ meer Fidions, and Dreams, and Vifi- ons do nor agree in all refpeds, even in point of Appearance 3 but as in fome re- gards there is an Agreement, fo in others, there is a difference, betw^een them, in this point 5 for if any is to be made ('as doubtlefs fome is ) between Real feeming, and a feeming to be Real 3 there is this between the forefaid Cogitables 5 that Dreams and Vifions do not on- ly Really leem , but feem to be Real -, Whereas Fictions, do only really feem, but do not feem to be Real 5 at lead not al- v;ay„ and as Fidions.

2. It muft be alfo noted, that in the Real Cogitables which I call ReduBive, though their Caufes are not Objeds, yet they doimprefs our Faculties the fame

C 89 ]

r^ay, and with the fame kind of motions [^ that Objefts life to do, and that fuch Ob- jciSs as do feem ro nppear would really have done , had they been indeed the Caufes of thefe Images and Forms, that do Reprefent them, in fuch Inftances. Thus when we have the fotwd as of Bells in our Ears, and ye none are Ringing, the In- ternal Air in them, though Agitated only by a Vapor, Aifeds the Auditory Nerve the fam.e way it would have done, had the External Air been really Agitated by the Ringing of Bells, and the Internal moved by the External. Thus alfo a fmart Percuflion oftr.e Eye, Affects its A^eriwa parts the fame way, and with the fame kind of Motion, that a fpark of Fire beheld by it would have done : And thus too in ordinary Dreams, the Spirits of that part of the Brain ( if indeed it be the Brain ) that is the Organ of Imagination, are moved by the internal caufes of fuch Dreams, juft in the fame mannenhat they would have been, had they been im- prefled by Eternal Objeds ^ which alfo muft be faid of Angelical Dreamy and of Vifions.

And if our Faculties be moved by Ex- ternal caufes that are not Objeds, in the fame manner as they be by external caufes that are Objefts, it can remain no longer

a

L 90 3 a Wonder, that the Images and iForms ex- cited in us by fuch Impreffions, (hould feem as real, and as much external, as if they vyere excited by Objefts , Since our Facul- ties can make no difference. Hence it is, that in Angelical Dreams^ as alfo in Vtjiom^ all the Reprefentations which are made unto the Prophet, are as of things that Avem prefent, not of things that Shall he^ in Future-, I [aiv ^cjione cut out of the Moun- tain without Hands J fays Daniel j or if a declaration m.nft be made of fomewhac which is to come, that declaration is made by way of Difcourfe, by a perfonprefent, fo that ftill the Dream or Viiion is Narra- tive and Hiftorical •, as in that of the Angel to Jojephy Thou Jhalt call his Name Jejus. Many Divines have taken notice of this Appearance, in the OU leftament Prophe- fies, having obferved that thefe are always mdidiQm'ei Narrative ^Qim^ and as Repre- fentations of things prefent ^ but the Rea- fon which they give for it, which is, that it is done to fignihe, that the things Pre- dided Ihall as certainly come to pafs, as if they were already, le^ms not fo wdl grounded! as the Obfervation it felfs for I take it, the account [that I have given is the more Genuine and Natural, which is, that External Caufes that are not Obr je^Ss do yet impr^fs the Faculties which

they

[ PX ]

they A<fl upon, in the fame manner that Objects do ; and therefore al! the Images that do Arife from fuch Impreifions, muft be of things as prefent , and in being-, becaufe they Reprefent them as if Really they were Obje^s in Jet, that had excited and ftirred the Faculties.

SECT. II.

QfThhigfiriclly t^keri, and of the Dlffereuc^ hetmixt the Notions of things, andthofe that are only about things, Ofthj Idea of Subjiance, and that of Accident. Spi- noh^ISloti.n of Subflance^ and that of an Accident confidered. Maxims of Thing in general,

''T^Klng taken ftriftly, as it compre- ^ hends but Subftances, Modes and Acccidents, is whatever feemiS External to Eny Faculty, and confequently, feems to have Being in the World, as a Part, or an Appurtenance, of it, whither it be re- ally fo or no. And in this fenfeof the Word , as Real Things themfelves , (which are eminently called Things, i So Ukewife the Sentiments we have of thefe things^ as Colours, Sounds Sapors, ^c are Things ^ and thus alfo^ Notions are

Things,

C P2 ]

Things, both the more general and com- mon Notions, thofe of Subftance and Ac- cident, and the more fpecial, the Notions of the feverai Species of QuaHty^ and thofe of Relations, b'c-

But when I fay, that not only things themfelves, but the Sentiments and No- tions we have of them, are Things, it muft be underftood with dijiin5iion •, for the Things themfelves, (fo I call the grounds of Sentiments and Notions ) are Realities of TrueExijlence ^ but Sentiments and Notions bemg only Real Cogitables, are only feeming Realities ; ReaUties of Apparition only, not of Exiftence : Thus, the Notion of Subftance is a Reality of Appearance only , but the things that we apply it to , are Realities of Ex- iftence.

By the Notion of thing as taken ftriftly, we have a Rife afforded us to apprehend the difference between the Notions the Underftanding hath 0/ things, and thofe it hath only ^^(?«^ things ^ for the Notions that I call the Notions of things, appear to the Underftanding as things External unto it •, for ( not to mention Subftan- ces ) even feme Relations, and Intelligible Qualities do feem to the Underftanding, as really Inherent in the things they are Attributed to , as the fentiments of

Co-

L 9i J

Colours, Odors, and Sounds do unto the Senfes. But for Notions that are only framed by the Mind about Things, fuch as Caufe, Efleft, Meafure, Meafured, ^c. they feem not to it to have being in the things themfelveSjbut toarife from its own Reflexions, upon comparing and confider- ing of Things. lhus,at the fame time that the mind conceives of Almighty God, that he is the Caufe of all, as it does conceive, that the word [_ God ] is the name of a Real Being, fo it conceives alfo, than the term [ Caufe ] is not, but that it only fignifies a certain Kind of Relation be- tween God and Things, as thele do fpring from him, and fo is only the name of a certain Objeftive , and not of a Real, Being.

Of the things that do Appear unto our Faculties to have a Reality of being, fome are perceived by them iminediately, in their own proper Formal Natures, and thofe are either Modes, or Co?npleat Accidents 5 Others are not perceived by them immedi- ately, in their own proper Formal Na- tures ; but only by means of , and under, thofe that are perceived fo ^ and thefe are called Subjiances: Compleat Accidents and Modes are Appurtenances, Subftances are the things to which they do Appertain.

It

Cp4]

It is true, Spionofa is in another perfwa- fion •, who tells us, that he underftands by Suhftance^ that which is in it felf, and is conceived by it felf, that is, as he ex- preffes it, a thing in whofe conception that of another is not involved. Adding, that by Attribute he underftands the fame that he means by Subftance, to wit, a thing conceived in and by it felf, in whofe conception thai of another is not involved. Thus fays he, Extenfiofiy in as much as it is capable of being conceived in and by it felf, is an Attribute -, but Motion that can- not be conceived but as fomething in ano* ther thing, is None. Only he fays too, to prevent Objedtions ^ that a Notional diftindtion may be made between a Sub- ftance and an Attribute, in this manner, that a thing may be called an Attribute ira refpect of the Underjiandingy which doth Attribute fuch a certain Nature to a Sub- ftance 5 and then a -Subftance is the thing that thellnderftanding doth Attribute that Nature unto.

But as what this Philofopher fays on this occafion is not very clear, fo it is cer- tain, that the Notion of Subftance, as aifo that of an Attribute, is Relative •, nor are the Inftances he puts fo well adjufted, but that fome exceptions may be brought againft them. I can no more conceive

any

I 95 ]

any Real Extenfiofj, than I can any Mo- tion, but as a thing that belongs to another^ Extenfion to the thing extended, as Moti- on to the thing moved. And tho' I do not beUeve my Underftanding,the meafure of other mens ^ 'yet I cannnot but think, it will be found on tryal, as hard a task for any other, as it is for me, to think o- therwife 5 For what is meer Extenfion, but an Extenfion that belongs to nothing? And what is Extenfion that belongs to no*^ thing, but an Extenfion of nothing ? and certainly, an Extenfion of nothing, is no- thing really, whatever it may be in Ima- gination 3 but more of this in another place.

Maxims concerning Thing in general.

1. Nothing can be, and not be at once,

2. Things that but Appear, do equally Affect the Mind as thofe that really are.

3. Things are not to be Multiplied Un- neceflarily 3 as they are, when the Fidi- dns of Men, are made to pafs for the Crea- tures of God.

CHAP,

L96]

CHAP. V. Of Suhftance.

SECT. I.

Ihe Idea or Notion of Suhftance. SelfSuh- fiftence, hovp in the Idea of it, the Idea of Suhftance only Relative. Ktither Ex - tenfion nor Exiftence the Idea of it. Sub fiances are either Principles^ or Principi- ates, Ihe Grounds oft his Divifion. Suh- fiance that is a Prjnciple, is either Mind^ or Matter. Confederations premtfed for the hetter Under ft anding of this hifcourfe. Tihe Ideas of Mind and Matter. The Grounds cfthe difir'thution of Suhftance in- to Mind and Matter. AhftraBed Mind is 06 conceiveable as Matter, under the Notion of Suhftance. Spinofa'/ Notion of I^jind rejected.

THE Primary Notion or Idea which \\'e\\x,'toi Suhftance J is (^ as I have hinted in the former Chapter ) that of a thing which is a SubjeH, or ^n Ultimate Objed 3 that is, we have not any Real immediate Conception of it, but only a Notional. Or (to fpeak more plainly,

according

Z 97 3

according to the Principles laid before) j Subftance as fuch, is not a thing conceived ' juft as it is in its own Reality, but a thing conceived under a certain notion 5 that is, a fubftance is a thing that is a Subjed. For v/hen the Underftanding does think of the things we call Accidents (which are the only things that do immediately, and at firft prefent themfelves unto us,) for ex- ample, when it thinks of Odours, Co- lours,fapors,flgures, &fc. it dorh at the fame time conceive, that befides thefe there muft be other things that have them, in which thofeodors, colours, fapors, figures, ^c, are. And thofe things that are conceived to have thers, we call jUjiances 5 as thofe that are conceived to be had of others, or to be in them, we call Accidents : but what thofe things, which we do Denominate Subftan- ces, Are, in themfelves, ftript of all their Accidents, is no wife known 5 All we know of any fubftance is, that it is the lubjea: of fuch and fuch Accidents^ or that It is Qualified fo or fo ; and hath thefe, and the other Qualities.

This Notion of a fubftance [that it is the fame with a fubject,] I call Prima- ry, ^ becaufe though that [of fubfifting by It felf,] is deemed fo by others, yet, in ourordinary way of Reafoning. and In- yeftigating of things, this [of felf fubfift^ ing] isaconfequentone, to that of being

H con-

f P8 ]

a fubjedt. For converfing with things -, as the firft that do prefent themfelves to our confideration, are the Accidents of them 5 fo the firft Reflexion the underftanding makes, upon thefe Accidents, is, that o- ther things are under them, which do uphold and fupport them, and confequent- ly, that ave fulje5lfy or fubftances. But then indeed, when it comes again to con- fider, whether thefe fubjeds are alfo in fubje^ls, finding in its felf a certain Re- luftance to conceive (that) they are, be- caufe, if they were, there would be no end, things would be in one another in- finitely 3 therefore it concludes, that that, which is a fubjeft of Accidents, is it felf in no fubjeft •, that is, it is felf-fubfiftent. Thus the notion of being felf-fubfiftent, a- rifes from that of being a fubjed : Nor is the notion of Qbeing felf-fubfiftent] a more Real one, than that of [being a fubjeft.] For what is Self-fubfiftence but an Jttri- hute that belongs to fomething elfe ? but what that fomething elfe is, to which it belongs, I am willing to learn 5 and w^ill ever honour as my great Matter, that Per- fon who will effedually teach me. We have no Ideas of any fubftances, but fuch as are Notional and Relative 3 that is, fuch as do arife h'om them as they ftand in our Analogy, and arecloathed with Accidents.

A

[ 99 ] A truth that might be made to appear by a full Induftion of all the particulars -, But will inftance but in fome 5 but thofe the moft obvious, and moft commonly difcour- fed of For what Idea have we of Earth, but that it is fomething material, that it is fixt and taftlefs ? What of Salt ? but that of fomething fapid, and eafily foluble in water ? And what Idea have we of water ? but that it is fomething material, moift, and fluid in fuch a degree, and the like ? So that the Idea of a fubllance is that of a thing which is a fubjeft^ and this is a Relative Idea.

But many, who cannot fatisfie them- felves with the former, do conceit that they have found a Bet er, a Real, a Pofi- tive Idea of Subftance. Of thele, fome do hold, Extenfion is that Idea, fo that fubftance is Extenfion ^ and accordingly as Extenfion is either Penetrable, or Impene- trable, fo they frame the Notions of Spi- rit, and Body 5 or the fpecies of fubftance, as it is immaterial, or material. Others hold, that Exigence or Being is the {dea of fubftance in general, and that iubftan- ces of this or that particular fpecies, are only determinate Talities of Being •, for fince in being is the Idea of an Accident, bemg (fay they; muft be that of a fub- ftance, and as to be is to exift, fo being is TiQthinghut exifteme. H 2 I

C 100 ]

I (hall have another occafion hereafter to coniider the firft of thofe Opinions when I come to Anfwer a certain Objed- ion, touching the Idea of God -, but will fay of it now, that thofe who profefs it, cannot make out (as they ought to do) a clear and fatisfaAory Idea of t:>ctenfion m general, that (hall agree in common, both to that which is Impenetrable, and to that which is Penetrable. Befides, it is not conceiveable, that a Spirit fhould be only a Penetrable Extenfion, fince (as will ap- pear more fully hereafter) Extenfion has but little to do with mind or thought, which is ElTential to a Spirit, and without which a Spirit cannot be a Spirit : and Penetrability, and Impenetrability has all

as little.

Nor is the fecond Opinion more con- ceiveable. For not to Infift, that Exift- ence properly taken is only of Caufates, {exiftere properly being [_ejfe extra caufas,j and nothing properly is lextra caufas'] that was not firll (in caufis 3) I will take it at large, for an) being in aft^ yet even fo, it is not of the Idea, or firft Conception, of fubftance: for being! taken not as a Noun, but as a Participle, (as here it is ta- ken J is in the very fenfe of the term, a word of Relation •- king is not a thing, but of a thing-, not a thing, but a mode of it,

and

[ ICI ]

and confequently prefuppofing it-, and that which prefuppoles thing or fubftance, cannot poflibly be in the Idea, or tirft con- ception of it. In fhort. Accidents have being, tho' not the fame being as fubftan- ces ^ but to proceed.

Now, rf this is the proper notion of fubftance in general, that it is a thing that is a fubject of Accidents, it will fol- low, that we cannot frame any N^otioyis of fubftances in particular, or make any a- greeable Dijiributions of them, but accord- ing to thefeveral Accidents, of which they are fubjeCts. And this I delire may be no- ted, becaufe it will be of very great ufe in clearing what I ihall fay hereafter, in the profecution of this Difcourfe,

Of Subllances fome are Frinciplesy fome Frincipiates, By Frinaples, I mean fub- ftances that are caufes of other things, but are themfelves uncaufed. By hrinctpiates^ (^give me leave to make an Englifh word of one not very good Latin) I mean fub- ftances that are caufed, or compofed of Principles. Principles make, Principiates are made to be.

That there are fubftantial Caufes, and fubftantial Effeds, in the World, is evi- dent to fenfe ; For even to fenfe, fome fub- ftances begm to be, and fome do ceafe be- ing. Now that which begins to be, i^ H 3 made

fnade to be after having not been^ muft of neceffity have Something, fand this fome- thing muft of neceffity be another thing J that makes it to be-, that is, it muft have a Caufe. So that Caufes and Effeds there are 5 elfe nothing could begin to be, or ceafe being. And if there are Caufes, ei- ther thofe Caufes, all of them have Caufes aifo, and confequently, as they i^as Caufes) make other things to be^ fo, Cas things that have Caufes) themfelves are made to be by others 5 or elfe, at leaft fome of them have no caufes, but are felf-fubfiftent and uncaufcd. If all Caufes have Caufes, then an infinite Progreffion muft beov^ned in the account of Caufes, than which no- thing can be more repugnant to the mind of Man-, to Science-, and to the Order and Unity of the Univerfe. And indeed then, there muft be a number adlualiy in- finite, lince all Caufes are ailual. But if any Caufes are uncaufed, (as certainly fame muft be, for the reafons Alledged) thofe uncaufed Caufes are Principles^ or firft Caufes. More (hortly, either fome- thing in the Univerfe of being is uncaufed, and fo is a Principle, for what is uncau- fed is a Principle ^ or elfe, every thing is Caufed^ but every thing cannot be Cau- fed-, for if every thing is Caufed, Nothing muft be the caufe of Something. For if

every

C 103 3

every thing is caufed, every thing v^^as once nothing, for what is Caufed was no- thing before it was Caufed ^ and if every thing was once Nothing, either Nothing muft be the Caufe of fome, or, (which in effed is the fame) nothing may become fomething without any caufe, than which No thought can be more unreafonable.

Again, as nothing is more certain than that there is fome Principle, fo the Stokks (t\\Q Wifeft of all the Philofophers, as well as the moft Devout) affirmed, that there are two^ Mind, and Matter. Thus Seneca in his Epiftles (£/?. 65.) Unherfa ex Materia tsf ex Deo conftant. All things Cfays he^ are compofed, or, do Confift of God and Matter. And indeed, we cannot be more affured by all our faculties, that there is Action, and Fajjion in the VVorld, and that the World could neither be, or perlevere in being, without them, than we are to fpeak Philofophically, that there are two Principles, oue^ the Principle of all the Adtion^ the other j the Principle of all the Paifion is in it ^ the former the A5live Principle, or firft fubjea: of Adivity, the latter the Pafive Principle, or firft fubje^a of Paflivity ^ of which, I call the firft, Mindy the fecond, Matter. This Affer- tion Zeno in Laertius fully agrees unto, when he tells us, that the Principles of H 4 things

[ 104 ] things are tnVj to ttoiZu -^ to Trclcycr, the Adive, and the Paflive^ Nor doth the great Originift Mojes fay much lefs, when in his Geyiefis^ he vvriteth of the Spirit of God that moved, and of the Abyfi and Waters upon which he moved •, and me- thinks, in all Animal Generations^ in Vi^hich there muft be a Male and a female^ as who fhould fay, an Adtive and a PafTive Principle, there is fome (and this no very Dark or Obfcure) Adumbration of it.

Before I do proceed to a more particu- lar Contideration of thefe Principles, I would have it be obferved, that we ought to Difiinguijh wh^t is manifeft, certain, and of undoubted truth concerning them, from that which is but doubtful and uncertain. Now it is certain, that there is fuch a thing as we do call Matter ^ fuch a thing as Mind, fuch a thing as Motion ^ and that Matter is alter d, figured, textur'd, and infinite ways wrought upon & moulded by means of mo- tioa Again, it is certain that all things have not Mind in equal proportions, but that fome exert the ads of it in a higher way and degree, and fome in more ways for kind than others do ^ and alfo certain, that the exercifes of Ads of Mind in all the ways and all the degrees of them in Cor- poreal Animals, (for we are not fo well acquainted with others J do much depend

upon

C 105 ]

upon the Nature and Qualifications of t;heir Organs •, that is, upon Texture and Difpofition of matter. Thefe things we are as certain of, as that our felves be, and have a true ufe of our faculties. But if we advance farther, and to endeavour to Enter and Penetrate into the very nature of Matter, into that of Mind, and into the Nature of Motion 5 here being forl'aken and deftitute of fenfe to hunt for us, we are much at a lofs, and as unable to pro- ceed in our fearch an in.]uiry after them, as to their juft Realities, as we are in that of things, which are wholly out of our view. ^ It is hard to conceive juft what matter is in its own Pofitive Reality -, alfo what Mind is, and even what Motion is, (as taken for a fubordinate Principle.) Nor can it be Demonftrated, that as feme will have it • there is only one fubftance in the Univerfe, and that Matter and Mind are only feveral Modifications of that one fub- ftance •, nor be Demonftrated, that Mat- ter (for this I think they mean by fub- ftance ) is in its own Nature, a -oital Ener- getical thing ; and that the diverfe Grada- tions of Life, that are obferved in the feve- ral fpecies of Animals, arife only from the feveral Modifications of Matter, and of that^ life of nature fas thofe Philofophers call it) which is Effential thereto, and is

the

C io6 3

the root of thofe Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive Povi^ers that do drefs up being in all the Shapes and Forms in which it appears upon the Stage of the World. I will not build upon fuch Hypothe/is-j which being unevident, muft needs be doubtful and uncertain, if not falfe. A Philolophy that fhall hefolid, and found, muft have its Ground-work and Foundations firmly laid •, which none can have, but that which is bottomed, rais'd and built upon evi- dence ; I mean, upon the certain leftimony of our faculties. And therefore fince our faculties do rather go upon Notions^ than on Realities, and do plainly Diftinguijh be- tween Mind and Matter, and (as I will fhow in the Progrefs of this Difcourfe^ do Contradiftinguifh them, I hold my felf o- bliged to treat of thefe diftindly, but ftill in the Real Notional way.

Mind then is Cogitative, thinking, or perceiving fubftance ♦, or, Mind is the firft fubjed: of Cogitation. Matter is Exten- live, fpacious, fubftance , or, the firft fub- jeift of dimenfive fpacious Quantity. In other, but Equivalent terms ^ Mind is Aaive fubftance, Matter Paffive fubftance. I affirm, that thefe latter Definitions are e- ^uivalent to the former, becaufe, in effed:, It is the fame to fay, that Mind is Aclivey as to fay, it is Cogitative 5 and the fame to

fay,

[ I07 3

fay, that Matter is Fafftve^ as to fay, it is Spatiom Extenfive fubftance. Nor is Mind Cogitation, or matter extenfion, as Des Cartes makes them ^ but the former is Co- gitative, the latter Extenfive fubftance. We find a Reludance in our minds to con- ceive that Cogitation is a fubftance, as alfo to conceive Extenlion as one •, and yet we cannot conceive Mind and Matter but as fubftances.

The main Reafon why I do diftinguifh Subftance into Mind and Matter, as into frft, Original kinds, is, becaufe (as I hin- ted before) Cogitation and Extenfion, that do Conftitute their feveral Ideas, are of no Relation one to another, for what hath a Thought to do with a Cube, or a Tri- angle? or with Length, or Breadth, or Depth ? Certainly Cogitation and Exten- fion are quite different Accidents, with- out any thing in their Ideas, that is Cotn- 7non to both •, and therefore the firft fubjed of the one, cannot be conceived the firft fubjed of the other •, their fubjefts rauft be fubftances of quite as different kinds as themfelves are, at leaft to us ^ fince all the diverfity we can conceive in fubftances, is and muft be, taken from the accidents they have, thefe being the Charafters by, and under which alone, we do perceive and know, and by confequence, can only di- ftinmifh them, I

C ic8 ]

I infift herein the more, for that many think that Mind is only an Accident, and that taken for a fobftance, it is unintelli- gible, and a meer Chimera : fo that, tho' Matter is acknowledged (by them) to b^ a fubftance, it will not be yielded, that Abftraft, feparate mind can be one. But: thofe that think it fo, if they confider'd, that men have no conception of fubftance, nor can have any of it, but as it is a fub- jed of Accidents, they would foon change their Opinion. For the Accident of Cogi- tation, or of Adivity, that Mind is the fub- jed: of, is as diftincVly and clearly conceive- able, as that of Extenfion, or of Paffivity, which matter is the lubjed of. Nor is the thing it felfthatisthe fubjed of Extenfion, or of Paffivity •, any more Conceiveable but by, and under thist, that is, the fubftance of mind and matter are equally conceive- able, and equally unconceiveable. They know no more what that is in it felf, that is extended, than v/hat that is, that is Cogi- tative ; and may be as fure, that they do think, as they are, that they are fpacious, ay, they cannot know that they are fpaci- ous, but by thinking. But of fpatiofity or extenlion, ithe Accident that conftitutes matter,; I Ihall have occafion to difcourfe hereafter, when I come to fpeak of quantity, I proceed now to difcourfe of Mind,

The

The Idea I have given of Mind, that it is the Immediate fubect, or i as others per- haps would chufe to lay) the Immediate Principle; of Cogitation, Energy, or Adi- vity, is much more eafie to be conceived than that oiSpinoja, when he defines the human mind to be the Idea of a body, or thing, aiftually exifting; for Mind, even the human, is not fo properly faid to be an Idea, as to be the Principle, our Caufe efficient, of Ideas •, /ince all Ideas (even in common fenfe) are conceived •, and Mind is that, which conceives them. Thus it is in our F^efraded, Inadequate, Real-Notio- nal way of conceiving-, and for an Ade- quate and juft one, as it is above our facul- ties, fo I do not find that Spinofa, or Mai. ErancheciftQr all their Ambitious Refearches in that higher way.have edified the World thereby to any great Degree. This way of feeing all things in God, and in their own proper Realities, is a w^ay much out of the way. Otherwife, when they keep the lower way of fenfe, many of their thoughts are furprizing, and excellent.

SECT.

C no]

SECT. If.

A two fold Confideration of Mind 5 oney as it ' is Ahjlracled from Matter 5 th9 other as it is Concerned wtth Matter, What is meant hy Concernment of Mind with Matter- Of Mind. That is the Idea of God, God as pure Mind^ is in him/elf and direE}ly in- comprehenfible. However^ he is k^iovpahle as it were hy Refrachon^ and Reflexion 5 in an Hypotbejis, and hy way of Jitnilittide ^ That a Parabolical^ Comparative way of knowing God, ought to content us. Of the Divine Attributes ^ the true conception of them. 7he vanity ofthofe who talJ^ of feeing all things in God. Spinofa j Opi- nion that God is all fuhjiance RejeBed, for feveral Reafons. that this Opinion feems to imply, that God is no Jingular felf-exiflenty felffubjijient Being. The Ground of this Opinion touched. Another fentiment concerning God, that he is in- finite Extenfion indued with Goodnefsy IVifdom, and Power, confidered. The Ground of this under minded, and the na- ture of the Divine Omniprefence repre- fented'

Mind

C III 3

MIND may be confidered, either in it felf, as it is AbJiraB and fimple, free from all Concretion and Compofition with matter •, or eife as it is concreted or concerned therewith.

By the Concretion of mind with matter^ I mean nothing but the adting of Mind in this or that particular manner, by means of matter.- As it is in our felves, who do not fee, or hear, or feel, but by means of Organs, that is, of matter.

Mind as it is in it felf, Abftrad and Simple, free from all concretion or con- cernment with Matter, I call Ture Mind-^ IVIind Concreted with Matter, I term, Mind in Matter,

Pure Mind, is the Notion or Idea of God'^ as is implied by our Saviour, when he fays, John 4. 24. God is Spnit 5 he does not fay, God is a Spirit, but God is Spirit 5 Trrsvfj^ 0 ^-g:-:, All Spirit, nothing but Spirit. In like tmnner Seneca^ in the Pre- face to his natural Quefticns, firft demand- ing what God is ? Anfwers, he is Mens uniyerji, the mind of tbeUniverfe^ and being obliged, for the cleering of his no- tion, to (how the difference between the nature of God, and that of Man, adds, Mind is only the Principal (art of our na- ture, but the whole of Gods, which is no- thing

C 112 ]

thing but Mind God is pure Mind, all Reafon. In his own terms thus, Quid ergo intereft inter naturam Dei t^ nofiram ? No- ftri melior pars Animus eft, in ilio nulla pars extra anifnum. Again, in his Epifties {Ep. 65.) He has this expreflion, Nos nunc primam t!f Generalem caufam quccrimm, h<zc [implex ejfe debet ^ nam (sf materia /implex eft ^ now, fays he, we feek the firft Uni- verfal caufe^ which ought to be fimple (or uncompounded) for even matter it it felf is fimple. Only, I doubt, he (as many other Phiiofophers did) took God but for an immanent an ingredient Caufe of all 5 which perhaps is only true of the Mofaical Spirit of God.

But God as he is Pure mind, is an Inac-^ cejible Light y that dazzels all the eyes that behold it ^ and therefore, we can hope to acquire but very little particular know- ledge of him or acquaintance with him, under this notion. But then again, as the Sun that cannot be beheld dire611y, in its own proper light, may yet be feen by Re* fleSion *, fo may the Deity, in an Hypo- thefisy and by way of Parable ^ by fpeak- ing of him after the manner of men. The holy Scriptures themfelves go this way. They Reprefent God as an Infinite Al- mighty Perfon, (fuppofe a man?) that hath Uaderftanding, Will, and Affediions-, that

confults

confults and decrees ^ and that is touched ( as men are ) with the motions of Love, Hatred, Defire, Averfion -, and in confe- quence of this Notion, do further Repre- fent him , fometimes as a Father, fome- times as a Lord, or as a great King, that Governs the Univerfe, according to the Rules and Law^s that he himfelf hath iet, and by rewards and punifhments. Now% all this is Parabolical, and but Compara- tive Knowledge: However, we ought to fatisfie and Content our felves therewith 5 for though it is not to know the Deity in in the Reality, as he is in himfelf, yet it fuffices for the Principal End for which we fhould endeavour to know him ^ which is to Adore and Obey him. Eejides, it is well nigh the only particular Knowledge of him that we Mortals are capable of, in this Terreftial State 3 and, in fine, is 2I- mofl as much, in effeft, as that which w^e have of any thing elfe, even in the Corpo- real World.

It is true we nnderftand that /^latter and Motion are Real things, and that all others that are Corporeal, do refult from thefe 5 but this (atleaft) is only d.GeneralConfufeJ Kmvpledge , and 7io more than th.it we have of the Abftraded Pure Mind. For, as to the particular Natures of things, their Internal Fabrick and Texture, I and

( 114 ;

and that degree of Motion, that is in the particles whicb compofe them, ( of this ) we have only a weak imperfeft Conjedure, without certainty. All the particular Knowledge that we have of things by which we diftinguifh them one from ano- ther, both in reference to their Kinds, and to the Individuals of thofe Kinds, and by which we refolve their Operations, is of nothing ( to fpeak of) but of Acci- dents z, and Accidents are nothing but { as I have touched before, and fhall fhew again more fully hereafter ) the Sentiments we have of things 5 they be- ing not fo much as Grounds or proper Reprefentations of Grounds, but only certain Appearances^ under which our ieveral Senfes do drefs up things, and fo fhow them unto us: and this is e- nough for Ufe.

.As therefore any perfon would kpow but little of this Corporeal Worldy and no- thing ufefuUy, that would not take it irai by his Senfes, and know it ( as he only can ) under the Mafcarade of Sentiments^ that are not without him, but only in Ap- pearances, and in their Grounds ; fo, he fhall know but little of God, that will not condefcend to fee him in an Hypothefisy by way of Analogy and Similitude. What was faid by God himfelf umo Mofes. will

ho\6

c 115 ;

hold true in every Mortal 5 Ihoa fha/t fee piy Backparts, hut my Face Ooall not hefeen : AH our Knowledge ofhira atprefent, is but ev dniyfjLccn, we Can but RiMe at him •, the Ideas we have of him, are only Attributes ^ and Attributes are not Quali- ties really Inherent in him, but only zVb- ^/(?w/ of his Operations, and of the various Relations and Afpe(5ts which they bear, to one Another, and to Us, ) that are exci- ted into us, upon the view and confidera- tions which we take of his works. Thus the feverai Attributes of God, that we conceive and know him under, are, in re- ference to him, juft as the Accidents of things Corporeal, their Colours, their O- dors, their Sounds, their Tangible Quali- ties are unto them , we fee him but oJ^ h ^ eacTTTfooy as in a Glafs 5 and to fee a thing as in a Glafs , is not to fee the thing it felf , but only by Appea- rances 5 and yet, he that will look be- hind the Glafs, to fee more , (hall fee nothing at alL

What, then, muft be faid of thofe, who think, they See all things m God ? When God , though in himfelf he is Pure Light, without any Mixtnre of Darknefs, yet, as to us, in refped of any clear^ juft , diftina Knowledge of him , He dwells in the thickeft Darknefs : No I i ' Windows

Windows in the SanElum SanSlornm ] where the Seat of God was 3 and the very Heathen , many of them , Adored him with Silence, as one that w^as In- effable and Unconceiveabie : Methinks, it is meer Enthufiafm, to talk of ^ Seeing All Things in the Original, when we cannot fo much as look upon if •, God is Pure Mind, and Pure Mind is Pure Light, of too Tranfcendent Glory to be immediately beheld by us, but Blear-eyed, Weak-fighted Mortals.

There are two Opinions in reference to the Nature of God , that Differ from mine 3 both of w hich 1 will con- fider.

The Firft is, that of Spinofa , That he is all Subftance , and that Particu- lar Beings Q even formally taken ) are but ^ articipations of his •, as being only fo many feveral Modifications ctf the Divine Attributes. But this is a Notion ( of the Deity ) that I can- not receive, as for other Reafons , fo for this particularly , that it makes him to be the Ihiwerfe , and to 'be Matter , as well as Mind •, whereas, God is neither Matter , nor the WoM Or Univerfe, but only Pure Mind ; for

the

C 1*7 3 the Great World has a Mind , that made/ and Governs it, as well as the Little. Even Mr. Hoi?hs^ has faid, He that thinks this World vpithout a. Mind ^^ I fhaH thinks him without a Mind: And fays Seneca^ Nat, Quaft, LiL i. C. 45. Eundem quern nos JovenT intelligunty Cujio- dem, Re^loifemq^ Univerfi •, Animum ac Spi- ritmn, Mundani hujus operis Dominum ^ Jrtificem, cui nomen omne convemt , &c. Which I v^ould Render thus; God is the Father All-mighty , All-wife , All good 5 the Maker of Heaven and Earth , Soveraign Preferver and Gover- nor of All.

For my own part, I much doubt that thofe Philofophers, who profefs them- felves in this Opinion, C that God is all Subftance, or that he is the World, ] do really believe he has no Being at all , but, only in Fidion of Mind, and by way of Profofopaia ^ and that as Na- ture, Fortune , Chance , which yet are faid to do This, and to do That, do, really, only fignifie Caufes fo or fo con- fidered 3 fo, God^ with them, is only a Notion y a Name, a Mode of Expreffion, by which they mean all Caufes taken together 3 and fo no more the Name of a Real Individual fingular Being, than that of Nature, or Fortune. Sunt (fays I 3 Ijicilim

C liS )

hucilm in Cicero I 2. de NaP. Deor. ) Qui omnia NatuYtc nomine appellent , nt Epicurus, tifc.

The unwary ExprelTion of fome Theo- logues , and Theologizing Philofophers, who Denominated God Nature Naturing^ might give occalion to this improper con- ceit of him , among the moderns ^ as might alfo that miftaken Idea of Infinity ( as an Attribute of God ) that fome have given, which feems to fhock his difiin^ion and fmgularity of Being. For thence it is Argued, how can God, be Infinite Be- ing, if he be not all Beings ? And it he be, how can he be One by hirafelf? be a Singular Individual Being, diftind from all others? Thefe were the fpeculations> that obliged Spnofa to conceive of God, that he is the Ingredient, Immanent Caufe of all Things^ and the fpeculations too, that tempt others, to other miftakes con- cerning him. put when I come to dif- courfeof the Notions oi Finite and Infinite^ and to Reprefent in what Senfe the lattei; is truly AfcribedtoGod, I hope to mani- feft, that there is great M/ftake in fuch Speculations and Arguings, and to exempt the true received Notion of Infinity both from thefe, and from all the like intang- ling Embarrafments and Pifficulties.

The

( IIP ;

The Second Opinion, is that of Dr.' More and his Followers, who do hold, that God is an Infinite Extenjion ^ that he is in- dued indeed with all Goodnefs, VVifdom, and Power, but he is an Extenfion fo in- dued ; and of this they are fo confident, that fome require a belief thereof as of an Article as great as any in the treed ^ an Article that is the Foundation of all Religion 5 both revealed and Natural. But as I believe, that no Man hath known the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son hath revealed him, fo, fince among all the Revelations that the Son has pleafed to make of God the Fa- ther, this is none [ that he is an Exten- fion ] 1 cannot admit his being fo, to be a Notion fo Effential unto all Religion, as they would rnake it •, Efpecially when I confider, that it might as eafily have beenfaid, that God is £jcm;7?o«, as, that heisa Spirit j and Chrift hathfaid the lat- ter but not the former. Befides, I cannot underftand how VVifdom, Coodnefs, and Power (hould be faid of meer Extenfion, which is but fpace •, it feems to mealeffer Incongruity ( though even this is Incon* gruity enough ) to fay that God is Matter fo indued, than that he is Space fo indued ; feeing, even in common fenfe, there is more of Reality and Being in meer Matter,

than

C 120 ]

than there is in nieer Extenfion or Space, But to urge this Argument more home. By Extenfion, ( which the perfons who are in this Opinion do Attribute to God, ) they muft mean either ;;/e'er Space, or eife a thing that in the Idea of it is Spatiou6. Ifmeer Space is intended^ As this does no waj's differ from inane or vacuum, fo one may think, it might as well be faid ( which yet its hard to fay ) that God is znlnAnite inane or vacuum y thatis, in pla- in Enghfli, an Infinite Nothing indued with Wiiclom, Goodnefs and Power, as, that he is infiniteExtenfionfo indued. On the other fide, if by Extenfion is under- ftood a thing that in the idea and firft Conception of it is Extenfive, that is, a thing that does elTentially take up fpace, fo as that it cannot be conceived, but withal fpace muft be Imagined, as an Ap- purtenant of it 5 in this Senfe, I cannot fee how it differs from Matter •, and then to fay, that God is Extenfion, is to fay, that he is Matter 5 whereas, God is Pure Mindy not Matter, In fine, as it is cer- tain, that God is Mind, rather than Mat- ter 5 fo hkewife it is certain, that in the Ideas that we frame of Mind, and of all the things that properly relate to it, fuch as Wifdom, Goodnefs , Thought , ^c. We oever do once think of Extenfion or

Space,-

[ 121 ]

Space : And if at any time we do endea- vour to apply Extenlion or Space unto Mind, or to any thing properly mental, there always arifes a Repugnance in us, upon but the thoughts of it 5 an Inch, a Foot, a YardofUnderflanding, orGood- nefs, is a Bull.

I know it is Argued from the Omnipre- fence of God^ that he is Extended-, and in truth it is very hard to imagine any pre- fence with things that are extended, but withal, there muft be an Imagination of fome Extenlion in the thing that is pre- fent : but ftill , this is but Imagrmtmiy which is apt to impofe upon us, and there- fore it muft be examined by Reafon, And Reafon tells us , that we cannot have a diftind and clear conception of the prefence of God, if we have not ( as we have not ) fuch an one of his Ejfence, fince the pre- fence of God is but a Mode of hisEffence^ and if we have no diftiniland clear Con- ception of the prefence of God, nor con- lequently of his Omniprefence, or the way how he is prefent with all his Creatures, Where ever they are 5 I do not fee with what Cogency or Force an Argument can be Deduced from it, in this bufinefs- In Ihort, fince things are prefent one with another very differently, in proportion to their feveral Natures, it will follow, that

things

( I^^ )

things Mental, niuft be prefent with o- thers, in much another way than thofe th^t ^\:e Material^ and Confequently that God who is pure Mind, muft be prefent with Material Beings, much otherwife, than thefe themfeives are, one with ano- ther. Mind can no more be prefent the fame way that Matter is, than be the fame thing with Matter.

CHAP.

C 1^3)

CHAP. IV. Of Mind in Matter.

SECT. I.

Mind 06 concerned with Matter comes under a double conjideration^ i As it atimtes a moji fuhtle and more than Etherial Mat- ter^ that is diffused throughout the World, ily. As it a5luates fome particular Fee hide or Body. In the fir ft Notion of it, Mind in Matter is the Idea of the Mofaical 5^/- rit of God This Spirit according to the Scriptural Hypothefis, is the Immediate cauje of all things in the fir ft Creation ^ and ever fince. The Being of this Spirit E- vinced, both by Authority and by Argu- ment, Dr. Mores Diftin^lion, between the Spirit of Nature ( which he calls Principium Hylarchicum ) and the Spi- rit of God, confidered,

AFter a Confideration of Mind as it is in it felf, Pure and AbftraBy Exempt from all Intrinfecal concernment , and compofition with Matter : I come now to coufider it as concerned with Matter, that

C iM]

is> as Ading in, and by means of Matter 5 in which confideration Mind may be cal- led/eco;;^ Mind, as in the former, it may be termed the firji.

Mina concerned with Matter, may be confidered in two refpeds, either 06 it has for the Vehicle which it actuates, and by which it a6ts, all that moft fubtle Matter tliat does permeate the Univerfe, in the utmoft Extent and Capacity of it ♦, or, as it aduates fome particular fyftem of Mat- ter, that may be called a Body, and it is a particular Vehicle.

Mind in the former Confideration of it, as it doth aduate, and ad in, and by, a moft fubtle matter diffufed throughout the Univerfe, feems to me to be the Mofaical Spirit oi God, mentioned, Gen, i. v. 2. And the fame that in the Scriptural Hypo- the/is ( which never mentions Nature as the Efficient Caufe of any thing, but Re- prefents Philofophy onlyas a theology, that fwallows up the fecond Caufes in Contem- plation of thefirft,) is the Cjufe of allpro- dudicns, the Births, the Growths, and all the Alterations and Changes that come to pafs in the World. This, in that ac- count, is the Principle of Human Souls, Mai, 2. X 5*. Did he not mak§ one } Yet had he the Refidue, of the Spirit : As if he had faid^ he wanted not Spirit, [ he had more

left]

[ IM ]

left 3 to Animate more , had he been pleafed to make them, but he made but one 3 and the Principal too of all Corporeal Bffekr, even of Snow, of Hail^ of Ice, of Wind, &rV. PfaL 147. 15, 16, 17, 18. He fendeih forth his Comrriandmefit upon the Earthy his word runneth very fmftly. He giveth So72w like Wool hefcattereth the Hoar froji like JJhes. He Cafteth forth his fee iik^e Morfeh 5 who can ftand before his Cold ? He fendeth out his wo rd and melteth them ; he caufeth his Wind to blow and the Waters Flow.

To underftand this Text with the more dearnefs, we muft have Recourfe unto Genefisj Ch. i. v. 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 14, 20, 24, 26. In which wefind^ in, v. 2. men- tion made of the Spirit of God that moved upon the Face of the Waters, as the Aclive Trinciple that v/rought all 3 and in the ^. and the following verfes, of the Word or Cormnandment of God, that as a J^reBi've Frinciple, did regulate and order all. fo *h^t the 'Spirit afted accordingly 3 thus v. 5. God faid let there ke Light, and there was Light 3 and v. 6. God /aid let there be a 'Firmament J or rather an Expanfe, in the •midft of the Waters, and it was fo, and v. 9. ^Godjaidy Ltt tht Wat er s tmder the Hea- ven be gathered together into one pLce, and let the Dry Land Appear and it was fo.

The

C 126 )

The like in the following works. Now the World in the account of the Holy Scriptures, has the fame for its Confervingj that it had for its Procreating Caufe •, and therefore as God at firft did make AH by his Almighty Spirit through his Wordy fo the Pfalmift tells us, that, he ftill doth 5 for as at firft he faid, [ Let there he ] fo ftill, he Sendeth forth his I Commandment ,] and as all was ordered at firft by the Di- vine Word, L He Jaid, let there be Lightj He/aid^ let there be a Firmament, 6f c. ] So ftill his WORD Runneth veryfwiftlyi The Spirit of God doth ftill Execute, as he did at firft^ all the Diredions and Commands are given it 5 He Produces the Snow ^ the Hoar Froft 5 and Ice 5 he maketh Cold^ and Raifeth Winds 5 and caufes all the Alterations that are made in the Air, in the Earth, in a Word, in all the Elements, and in all above them. This is the Scriptural Hyfothefis 5 the meaning of which is, that God by his infinite Wifdom, as well as Power 3 both Made and Governs, the World 5 but to Return.

Of this Spirit, that Penetrates through all the World, and that doth All in it, not only Mofes has written, but many of the Old Philofophersy have alfo told. Fel- kirn in Cicero ^ Li.de Mat. Deor^ ac- quaints

r 1^7 ;

quaints us, concerning FythagoraSy Quod cenjuit animum effe per Naturam rerum om- nem intentum tsf Commeantem^ that he be- lieved a Mind diffufed throughout the whole Nature of things. The fame VeU teim alfo reports, concerning Zeno^ that he in fome of his Books^ difcourfed of what he called the Reafon of the Univerfe ; Q Rattonein per omnem perthientem Isatu- ram. ] In fine, ( to omit others ) Plutarch mentions a Spirit that Penetrates through- out the World, [ Trievfjia. Sir,xov oa x-cV/u-Sj*]

And what can this Spirit be, that Pene- trates throughout the Univerfe ^ that a- nimates it 3 and is as a common Reafon in it ( for I will unite the Expreflions, and fo compleat the Idea^ ) but the Mofa- ical Spirit ?

But not only Authority ( Sacred and Pro- phane) evinces, that thereisfucha S/>/V/>, an Energetical Vital Principle, diffufed throughout the World •, but £ocperie?ice alfo (hows it, if the Experience that we have of fuch a Principle Diifufed through- out one Region of it^ [ our own ] may be fufficient to conclude, it is fo in allj of which Experience I (hall fpeak hereafter, when alfo the Nature of this Spirit, and the Influence it has upon, and in things, will be fet out more clearly, and more fully,

I

C ii8 ]

I Know the Learned Dr. More hath told us of a Frincipium Hylarchicum-y which hedefines an IncorporealSubJiancejwith' out Senfe and Animadverjioriy that pervades the Matter of the whole Univerfey and ex- ercifes in it a Plaftical Fower according as the Fortions of the [aid Matter are Predif pofed 5 and this he calls the Spirit ofNa- turey and Diftinguiflies it from the Spirit of God '^ Affirming, that God doth actuate all the Matter of the Natural Corporeal World by the Spirit of Nature-, but that he acftually ads in and governs the world of Men and Angels by the Spirit of God. But I have (hewed already from the Scrip- tural Viypothefis^ that it is one |Spirit, [ the Mofaical^ that Aduates, and Ads in All, in Men and other Animals, as well as in the World of meer Nature, as to all the operations commonly called Natural 5 for as to thofe that are called Supernaturaly that come fi^om the Holy Ghojiy or the Comforter, thefe as they are of another Nature, fo the Confideration of them be- longs to another place : In fine, the Frin- cipium HylarchicuiUy or Spirit of Nature ( as this Learned perfon calls it, ) is but a Plafticl{ Facultyy of the Mofaical Spirit.

SECT.

L i'^9 J

SECT. ir.

Jn Inquiry into the Origin I and Rife of Mo- tion. What is meant by Mot /en in this Inquiry. That Motion comes from Mind in Matter^ or the Mofaical Spirit. This /hewed in many tnftancesy by the Connexi- on between Cogitation and Motion, Hovo Motion comes from a Principle at Rejiy and how Matter from Mind fet out in the Metaphyseal HypotheJJs, and by other 11- lujirations,

I Think I (hall not ftep much ( if I do at all) out of my way to make Inquiry in this place into the Or jj^/W and Rife of Motion. By Motion now I mean not Aftual Motion, or Motion as it is the ( aftual ) Tranflation of Bodies from place to place 3 which fome define [ The Succeffive Apflication of a Body in all it hath out wardlyy unto the fever al parts of the Bo- dies which touch it immediately 3 1 which is the moft ufual vSenfe of the word. But here I mean by it, that Force^\ Energy, or Motive Vertue, called in Latine Impetus^ from which this Aiftual Tranflation, or Succeflive Application of Bodies does im- mediately come. And my Enquiry now

K fliall

fhall be concerning the Original of This, not in particular as it is in this or that par- ticular Body, but the Rife of /;wpe^^ or Motive Force in generaly which having found, I WiWfirfi remove an Objedion, and then improve the Difcovery, to fhevv hoiv Matter comes from Mind, as well as how Motion doth from a Principle that is at reft.

It muft be acknowledged, that there is fome appearance (at firft fightj of caufe to believe, that as mind is the firft fubjed of Cogitation, and inatter the firft fubjeft of Extenfion, fo, fince Energy or Force ^^ the immediate Principle of Adion and of Act- ual motion 1 is neither Cogitation, nor Extenfion, that fome third fubftance Di- ftind: both from mind and matter, fhould be the firft fubjeft of />, and confequently, that there fhould be t^ree Principles, Mind, Matter, and the firft Mover. And indeed it looks as if tiie Scripture Hypthefis did countenance this-^ for there mention is made of the Spirit which wrought, as the firft fubjeft of motion 3 of the Abyfs of Waters wrought upon, as the firft Recipi- ent Subjed-, and of the zi?^r^ Reafon, or Wifdom which directed the Work. But on fecond Confideration, as it is clear, that all that Mojh fays in his Genefis, con- cernlns the vSpirit, andtheV/ord, is not

faid

c ij' ;

faid with defign to intimate, that really the Spirit was only a meer fenflefs inarti- ficial Force, or Energy, and that Wifdom or the Word was another diftincl Princi- ple, that direded and guided it in all its Motions^ buttofliew, iince w^emen (in our inadequate way of Conceiving^ do diftinguifh Wifdom and 'tower j that all the works of God were made in Both^ but Both united in one Vemiurgical Mind, or (to ufe Sefiecas ExprelTion) on Ratio fa- ciens. Thus, Ratio faciens is the Idea or Notion of the Mofaical Spirit, the true AV tura Naturans, that concurred to make the World, not in the manner that God him- felf did, who, in the Mofaical Hypothe- fis, A(5ted only as an External Efficient, but in the w^ay that the Soul would do in a living Creature, if firft by its Plaftic vertue it fhould form all the members of the Body of it, and afterwards, fhould inform it, and aft in it. And Cotta in Ci- cere has as finely as compendiouily expref- fed the Difference between thefe two feve- ral ways of working, even in Reference to the World. When L. -y de Nat. Deor. he fays, Ita prorfus exijiiniareinj fi tUum [mundum'] eedificatum, non qucmadmodum docehoy a natura conformatum yutarem.

It is this Spirit that is the OrtginalCaufe

of the hfjpetm^ that is the jieareji caufe of

K 2 Local

total Motion --, and indeed, it is the Ori- ginal Caufe of all Mundane A5livity and Energy : Motion comes from Energy or Adion, and all Energy and Aftion from the Mofaical Spirit •, [not from meer mat- ter, but from mind in matter.] In (hort^ Impetus or torce arifes from the fame Prin- ciple that Cogitation or Perception does -, as is evident by the following Confide- rations.

Firft, The firft ?nention that we have of motion, or Corporeal Aftion, is in Rela- tion to the Mofaical Spirit, mGen. j.2, where it is faid, that the Sprit of God moved upon the face of the waters. It is true, the word ufed in this Text for mo- tion, is feldom ufed, [but thrice in the whole Scripture, to wit, in this place, in Veut, 31. II. and in Jer. 23. 9.] And therefore the direct particular meaning of it will not be eafily agreed, but that it imports fome motion (which is as much as I do urge it for,) is beyond difpute ; Motum aliquem Notari, (fays Hotting, in Exam. Hift. Great. Queft. 3^.) non eft Vubitandum,

Secondly, Ic is farther Evident from the

very Ideas that w^e have of things : For

we cannot conceive mind as a Perceptive

. , Cogi-

C M5 ]

Cogitative fubftance, but withail, we muft conceive it as A^he, and that there is fomething Energetical in it 5 whereas, on the other hand, matter may (and iu its own proper Idea muft) be conceived as a thing that is only FaJJive, not Active^ there being nothing of Active or Energe- tical in it as it is but fpacious extenlive fubftance 3 and therefore Energy and AftJon cannot be conceived to proceed but from matter, which in its felf is Idle and unaftive-, but rather from mind, which is eftentially active and bufie.

Thirdly, It may alfo be argued from th^ relation, that (Experience alTures us,) is between Cogitation and Actual motion. For we clearly perceive, that all our vo- luntary motions do arife from Thought or Imagination ^ we do move our felves, or any particular part= that hath the proper inftruments of voluntary motion;, and thefe duly qualiiied, at our pleafure, when w^e will 5 that is, by imagination and thought. We go, we ftand ftill (which is by Tonic motion •,) we put our hands, feet, heads, eyes, and other parts of our bodies into mo- tion, and regulate them in their feveral motions, by will or thought, ay, even co- gitation it felf in all the feveral m.odes of it; as it is fenfation, imagination, or rati- K 3 ocination^

C n4) ocination, does ever bear a proportion to fome motion •, infomuch that as the rainujre parts of any Organ that ferves unto Cogi- tation of any kind, are more or iefs in mo- tion ^ or, (which is meant and is Equiva- lent J as the Organ is in more or Iefs Dif- pofition and Aptitude to receive impreiri- ons t fo anfvvera'^ly, the A6t of Cogitation is graduated. Organs that are aliened with heavinefs or torpor, fas thofe are whole Particles are too little in motion, and confequently indifpoled for receiving fitting imprefuons,) are anfwerably unde^' a Stupor, or Diminution of fenfe and per- ception : but inflamed Organs, whofe par- ticles have too much motion, and confe- quently are apt to be too eaJJly, or too much ftirred, thefe are exquiiiteiy fenfible and tender. In fine, Reajbn it felf, as to its grounds, is but Harmony 5 a certain mo- dification and turning of the parts, (either the Spirits, or the Filaments,) that are the immediate inftruments of that kind of co- gitation^ fo that they be not wound up too high, or let down too low 5 that is, that they be not in too much motion, or aptitude unto it, or in too little, but in a jufi: mediocrity 5 and this is to be in Tune, or in Harmony. The truth hereof is evi- dent. For if the Organ of Reafon is infla- medj fo thStt the Particles of it are top ' , ' .- ' ' much

( 135 ;

much in motion, the adion that it exerts in that inftance is not reafon, but madnefs of one fort or another , and again, if the Organ is torpid, through a defect of mo- tion in the Particles of it, the Cogitation that is exercifed in this inftance is piainy/^- pidity and folly-, and the power a dulnefs or fhortnefs of wit. Wherefore Anjioxe- nm the Mufician, who affirmed that the Soul was a Harmony, as he receded not from his Art, io he did not much wander from the true nature of the Soul. In truth, Harmony or Proportion is the Sotd of the World, For if we look well, we fhallfind that, that which formalizes things, and qualities, and *which makes them be of this or that kind, and to ad: in this or that way, is nothing but the Proportion or Logos that is in them -, that is, it is the Tuning of them in the world, and one to another, as to parts, and motions : moft, if not all the Specifical Qjialities and Opera- tions that are in the World, arife from hence •, which are therefore called Occult ^ becaufe this Spring and Original of them is fo little regarded 5 but of this more in another, and perhaps a more proper place^

But to more illuftrate the former Argu-

iTi^nt, and (how in a fuller light, the rela-

K 4 tion

c 136 :\

tion between Cogitation and adual mo- tion-, I will enter farther into the Conlide- ration of ??jotjo}2 5 and will manifeft, both the fuhtkty of it, and alfo the Correffondence which it holds with Mind, or the Percep- tive. I will not fpeak now of the motion that is Local to fuch a Degree, that it falls under Objervation of the fenfe, but of that motion (for motion it is) that contri- butes to the hein^^ of fenfe^ which for Di- ftindionfake may hQi:d\\tAhnpreJfm2. We are convinced by feafe, that in the hnpref fions that make it, there is a great deal of fubtlety, and this too in various Degrees 5 and we are equally convinced, that there are various feniitive Forrers to receive them^ in thofe feveral Degrees. Thus the im- preffion made upon the JE)^, that caufes f^ijiony is by many Degrees more delicate and fine than that which caufes the Feel- ing 3 fince the Objed: feen by the Eye, and Confequently making a Vifive impret fion (upon it) ordinarily doth not make any upon the fenfe of feeling. I fay ordi- narily, becaufe fometimcs, where the im- preflion of the vifible is very ftrong, as when one looks upon the Sur^, or on fome other very ftrong and vigorous Light, the feeling of the Eye is affesfted, as 'well as the Sights fo that there is a fenfe of pain^ from a folution of Continuity. Which plainly

evinces

C 137] evinces (to note it by the by) that allvi- fible impreflion, tho' it be not fenfibly a motion, yet really is fo^ lince even vKible impreflions, if ftrong and vigorous, are painful 5 and confequently, are motions ^ for nothing caufes pain but motion 5 pain being nothing but little Spaims and Ten- fions of the parts 3 and if ftrong impref- fions be motions, weaker ones are fo too , tho' in a lefs degree.

Again, The impreffion made upon the Ear, that causes foutjd, tho' it be by much a lefs fine and delicate one than that upon the Eye, which caufes Lighter Colour, it is however of far greater finenefs and de- licacy than that Impreffion which produces pain in the Ear ^ For as v/e fee without pain, fo, ordinarily we hear without it 5 that is, we are affeded by fonorous Ob- jeds, which do propagate their motions to our ears, with the fentiment of found, without being fenfible of this Affection any other way. And yet if the found be too intenfe, it always pains , and often breaks, or too much ft retches the "timpa- nam or Drum of the Ear. The obferva- tion that fom^e Philofophers have taken of this latter effeft, occafion'd them to make a Maxim, that an Excellent Obje5l deftroys the Senfe ^ but pofTibly this muft be under- ftood with Corredion, not fo much in re-

fpedl

( i.'S ) fpecl of the Faculty or Perceptive P^o^er, as of the Organ ^ for could the Organ bear thofe ftronger impreflions, without Aljte- ration or Hurt, the perceptive Faculty would not be offended 5 it is not the fenti- ment, either that of Light, or that of Sound, that offends, but the motion that caufes /V, which is too ftrong for the Or- igan, and diffolves or alters its Texture. In fine, the impreffion that caufes Intel- le5lion, is by much a iiner and more fub- tle one, than that which caufes fenfation, whether External, or Internal ^ and that by as many degrees as IntelleBual Ideas are more fine and fubtle than Images, and the Underftanding a finer and more delicate Fa- culty than the Senfe,

By Hiner and Delicater Impreffions, I mean fuch as have lefs of Local Motion. By Finer and Delicater Faculties, I mean fuch as are fenfible of Finer and Delica- ter Touches, or Impreffions.

In this fenfe, the Imagination muft needs be a finer and more delicate faculty than my external fenfe, for as much as it re- ceives the impreffions of External Objeds but by Reflexion, or Communication from the Senjories, but thefe have them direclly from the very Obje5ls themfelves ^ and by the fame Reafoa, the Underftanding, that receives impreffions from the internal fenfe^

muft

( UP)

Hiufl - needs be (as indeed it is) a much finer and delicater faculty than ihat.

Upon the whole, it is evident, that there is a near relation between aftual mo- tion and cogitation, and confequently, that it is no unreafonable thought to think, that as they are nejv of kin, fo both are Oft-fprings oi one Original caufe, [mind in matter^] but then it will follow alfo, that motion, and indeed all Energy whatever in the Spring and Principle of it is Refl^ for fo mind is. But this is tlie difficulty. For that motion fnould come from a Prin- ciple that is at reft, appears ?.s unintelli- gible, as that Froft ihould come from Fire, or Darknefs from Light.

Wherefore to make this clear, I muft coniider things in the Metaphyseal Hypo- thejisy as ail are underftood to come from one, by way of Emanation : and thus, all Created Being is compared to hight^ that flows from the Sun •> and then its Einana- tion is in the fame manner, as the Radiation of Light, which is from a Center into an Orb or Sphere, in Extenuating Lines, Now in this Hypothefis, as all Beings (^even thofe that are moftoppofite) do come from one, fo they come from it in this way, that the more Removed any is from the Central Being, the move Eo(.tenuated it is ; that is, as God or pure mind is the Central Being;, > ' ' '~ that

C 140 ]

that Sun J that is the Father of Lights 5 fo all the Being that proceeds from him, has lefs of Light and more of Darknefs, in proportion to the diftance it has^ upon the 6cale of Being, and in its utmoft Elonga- Hon or Removal from him, terminates in that, which in Appearance has nothing of Refemblance to the Original Light *, but (to be compared with it) is only Dark^iefs and fhadow 5 and this laft is the Idea of pieer matter j as that of the Central Light is ^ pure Mind. God is Lights Matter is Darkiiefs 3 all intermediate Beings are Light and Darknejs, in feveral propor- tions.

What I have faid is fenfibly fet out in thejhades of Colours, and in Colours them- felves, w^hich are but fhades of Light^j For the Extremes of any Colour, for Ex- ample, the Brightefl Red, and theDarl^efl-j or the Extreams of all Colours, as White and Blacky ^ compare them each with o- ther, and they are fo contrary, that no» thing can be more, efpecially the two lat- ter j and yet they do participate, the for- mer not only of Colour in general, but aifoofRed; and the latter, tho' of no particular Colour, yet of Light, which is the Ground of Colour in general •, and alfo the Darkeft Red, if it doth not come from the Brighteft , and the Blacked Co- lour

L 14^ ] lour from the Whiteft ^ yet, by the Gra- dation of Shades, or Participle, interme- diate Colours, they are fo continued one to another, that the Afcent and Defcent from one unto the other is moft Agree- able and Delightful, as made by eafie fteps, without any Patches, or Chafms. It is true, if we look on Contraries in their Phjjical Coniideration, fo they are of oppojite Natures^ oppofite Operations, and one expels the other, when they are immediately fet together *, but if we look upon them in their Metaphjfical Coniide- ration, fo they are but degrees of the fame nature, and capable of being United and Reconciled •, infomuch, that One in a right fenfe may be faid to come from Another ^ as Darknefs from Light. For however contrary Light and Varkjiefs are, each unto other, as to Qualities and Phyiical Opera- tion, and fo in their Phvfical Confidera- tion, yet as to their Meraphyfical, they differ but in degrees ^ both have the fame grounds; for Shadow really is but leffer Light, occafion'd by the interpofition of an Opaque Body, and Darknefs is but a great Shadow. And thus a flat and a Sharpy tho contrary founds, as to their Fhyfical Confideration, yet as to their me- taphyseal, they are but different degrees 5 the Sharp u greater, the Flat a leffer de- gree

C H^ ) gree of Celerity. And thus as Darknefi comes from Light, only by the Lefsning or Extenuating of it 3 fo may matter come from mind : ?m}id is pure Light, or, all Being in Eminence^ but matter, as it doth Participate nothing at all of mind, but only by meer Exiftence, foit is meer dark- nefs, without the leaft degree of Vitality or Life^ and all Beings between Mind and Matter, are as Cclours, in refped of Light, or as Sbadesy in refped of any particular Colour.

But to add fome further cleering to this Subject, and to fhew how actual local mo- tion may come from a Principle that is at reftj which being fhewed, will (hew with- all how Matter may come from mind, iince there is no greater Repugnance i even to common fenfe) in the one, than is in the other, I will conlider the Relation that the Center of a Circle has unto its Circum- ference, and how things are in the oney and how in the other -^ For this will afford it much Illuftration. In the Center then of a Circle, or of a moved Sphere, all is at Reft, and out of it all in motion, but in fuch proportion, that that portion of a RadiU5 which is at a farther diftance from the Center, is ?mre in motion, by reafon of that diftance, and that which is nearer

is

r 143 )

is lefs'^ which is evident even to fenfe, in the following Diagram.

In the three Concentrical Circles, JB.

C. D. E. F G. if the Ray A, B. D.

F. is fuppofed to be moved from F. to

G. it will appear to any that confiders, that in the fame time that in the inmoft Circle it doth move from B, to C. and in the middle from D, to E it moves in rhe outmoft from F. to G. that is, it moves fafter, and is more in m.otion, the farther it is from the Center J. and only becaufe it is fo. Again, on the Contrary, in the fame time that the Ra- dius moves in the outmoft Circle from F. to G. it moves in the middle but from

D. to JE. and in the inmoft (w^hich is neareft to the Center A. ) but from B. to C that is, it has more of Reft, and lefs of Motion, the nearer it is to the Center, and in the Center has no motion at all, but is at pure reft, Even fenfe acquaints us, that the Arch or Space F. G, is much Greater than the Space P. £. and that D.

E. is Greater than JB. C and fo on the contrary, that the Arch or Space B, G. is lefs by much than D. E. and Z>. £. (by much) than the Arch or Space. E G. and yet all the Spaces are fuppofed to be pafled by the Ray A. B. D. F. in the fame

time.

C 144 ]

time. Now that which paffes a grater fpacein the fame time, is more in motion, and has greater Celerity 3 and that which pafTes a lefs, is lefs in motion, and has lefs of Celerity •, and therefore fince the nearer the Ray is unto the Center, the lefs fpace it paffes in the fame time, - and the farther off it is, the more it pafles, and that more or lefs as it is farther off, or nearer-, it evidently follows, that farther off from the Center, a Ray has more of motion, and as it is nearer to ir, it has lefs, and in the Center has none.

C 14) ]

Well then, fuppofing that the Princi- ple of Energy and iMotion is in the Center of the Orb of Being, Cand we may well fuppofe it, fince even Nature has its Sphere of Activity, and Ads as from a Center to a Circumference 5 (^fo Seeds Ait, fo Light A(5ts and Diffufesitfelf •,) it is cer- tain that motion muft come from fome- thing not in Motion, but at Reft 5 for fd that is, which is in the Center j and in- deed, elfe there muft be infinite progref- fion in Motions. Again^ fince in the Orb of being, Pure Mind is in the Center, L and

[ H6 ] and matter in the utmoft Circumference, it follows^ that the nearer things are unta pure mind, and the more they do partici- pate of that, the more they have of Reft, and the lefs of motion •, but the farther off they are from pure Mind, and the nearer to matter, tlie more in motion they are. And indeed, all Energy in matter is Lo- cal Motion. Thus all the Effects of Me- chanifmj as they are purely material, fo they are performed only by Local Motion -, but the bu(inefs of Cogitation, even in the loweft ftep of it, which is fenfation, as it is of nearer Relation unto mind than to matter, fo it is performed rather by way of mutation^ than of Local motion ^ the Eye is not fenfible of any motion imparted to it, nor is the Ear, or the Nofe, or any other of our Senfories, and yet each is fenfible of a mutation made therein, (or rather in the Facuhy) which comes from motion. But tho' the more refined any Beings a?^, and the nearer that they are to the Central Mind, the more at refl they be, and the lefs in motion in their feveral i^sftions-, and confequently Ab- ftra<ft^ Spirits that do not live in grofs Elementary Bodies, are more at reft, and haye lefs of motion, in the exercifes ^ their feveral Powers, than Men have, who are ijnbodied ia Elementary Vehi-

cles 5

cles ^ yet no Spirit whatfoever but only God himfelf, who only is Pure Mind, is Jo wholly, fo Abfolutely at Reft, as that it fees all Things at once, by one Entire view and Intuition •, all Principles and all Conclufions in them •, all Ends and all Means and Motives to therri-, v;ithout the leafl: degree of Succelfion, or any Ad- dition. Only the Central Being fees foy and he doe's.

For feeing all the Circumference is in the Center, fo that all the Lines how- ever divided they be in the former, do meet together in the latter •, it is plain, that an Eye placed in the Center, muft needs fee all in the Circle , as clearly as any thing in it 5 and this too with one Individual, fingle Intuition, without Sug- ceffion, or. Addition 5 feeing the^e is no- thing of Motion, but all is Reft in the Center. And this properly is to fee in Eternity. Thus Gad fees. But all other Beings befide God, as they afe not God, or Pure mind, fo they are not in the Cen- ter, and not being the Center, but at Di- ftance from it, fome at Greater, fome at Lefler, but All at fome, they All have fomething of Motion , and confequently cannot Ad, or See, in the fame manner as Central Pure Mind, by way of Abfolute Reft^ without SucceflTion, or Addition, L 2 and

C 148 3

and without Diftinftion of paft, prefent, and to come : For tho' all the Lines do meet in the Center, yet there being no place without it in which they do fo. Creatures cannot fee as God fees, no more than they can be in the Center as God is. It is too Ihort and Inadequate a way of Ar- guing to Infer that any Creatures can fee All things at once, but from the notions (confufed enough) that we Mortals have of Time and Eternity ^ as that time is Suc- cefTive, Eternity a Permanent Duration 5 together with a Conceit, that all Sprits (^they being things Abftraft and Separate from Bodies,") both Are, and Ad, in JE- ternity^ as all Imbodied Beings Are, and do Aft, in lime. Certainly every Being but God, is in Time, tho' not in the fame Kind of Time 5 for as God only is in the Center, fo he only is Abfolutely in Eternity. And if Time is taken for all Duration that is not Eternity, God only is without Time, and fo without Succeflion of A(aions. But to Return.

SECT.

[ ^49 ]

SECT. III.

Of Mind as it Athiates a certain Particular Body-j Mind in this Notion called a Soul. Body is a Syftem of Organs, Soul and Body an Animal Body Confidered two ways. To wit, in Reference to Exter- nal Objeds, and in Reference to the In- ternal Principle that Acis it. In the Firfi Confideration of Body, the Ends and ufes of Organs are {hewed, and withal the Rea- fon of their vartety. This lUuflrated by feveral Inftances and Objervations. The ufe of Body in Relation to the Internal Prtnciple that Adiuates it, is to Individu- ate and Singuhrize that Principle. This fet out in fenfible and plain Refernblances. A Comparifon between Vital and Locomo- tive Energy ^ with a Recapitulation of the whole Difcourfey as it unfolds the Myftery of Animals.

T 7t 7E have Confidered Mind in the V V firft Step of Relation that it carries unto Matter, Namely, as it doe's Atluate a mofl fuhtle Matter diffufed throughout the Univerfe, in which Notion it is called Spi- rit fimply, as was (howed from Malachy^ Cki.v. 15. Come we now to Confider L J it

it in the next place, as it ABuates fame T articular Syslem of Matter^ in a Particu- lar Manner 5 and fo it is tailed a Soul-^ and that Particular Syftem of Matter, which it doth Adtuate , is a Body, or a Particular Vehicle 5 and the Refult of both an Animal. An Animal is nothing but Soul and Body together •, or a Body Aduated by a Soul. A Body is a Syftem of Organs ^ an Or;^m is Matter framed and Contrived after a Particular Manner for fome Animal Ufe, and End ^ fome Ufe, End, or Adion of a Soul : A Soul is a certain Determinate Vital Energy-, or a certain Portion of the Spirit of the Univerfe, Vefted in a Body, or particular Vehicle ^ in which Notion all Souls are Spirits ry as indeed they are ftiled in the Holy Scripture, wherein we Read of the Spirit of theiV.'i^.tho' it goes Downward, as well as of the Spirit of a Man that goes Upward.

This Difcourfe I fear will feem a little Myflerious ^ and therefore to Inlighten it, and withal to open Uho' but in general J the Myftery of the Animal Nature, and, by Analogy unto it. the Nature of other Fiventj I will Refume it from the Be- ginning, Lnd fpeak more DiftincSly : ta- king my Rife from Bodies, or Syftems of Org^iis^ which coming under Senfe, are

better

C i?i ]

better known unto us than Spirits or Souls.

Body then, as it is a Syftem of Organs, has a Double Relation, and fo may be Confidered two ways 3 either with Re- fpeC: to External Objects by which it felf is Affected, and by means thereof, the Mind^ or elfe with Refpect to the Internal Princi- ple that doth hiform and Aduate it, and Aft in it, which Principle it doth Indi- viduate and Singularize.

We will firlt C^onfider a Body in the Relation that it has unto External Obr jectSy and here we mufi: fet out the Na- ture y that is, the Ends and Ufes of the Or- gans which compofe a Body, as alfo the Reafon of the Variety y and number of thofe Organs ^ why any Organs at all, and why many : both which will be done with one Performance. An Organ properly, is Matter Particularly Textured , and Framed for fome Particular ufe ; And an Animal Or- gan is Particularly Textured, and Framed for art Animal ufe : 1 will give the Ex- ample in only 5'enfitive Animals, and in the A<5is of Senfation, as being beft under- ftood 3 but what is faid of Senfation, and of the Organs of it, will, by Proportion, hold in all the other Anions of Animals, and in all other Organs, with a due Al- teration, '^^. i'-'

L 4 In

C 152 ]

In all A5ts of Senfation there is firft an AffeBion of the Organ, and then a Percep- tion of that Affedion by the Soul ^ or rather, a Perception Excited in the Soul by means of that Affection •, and this is the Efid of the Orgatj, and the only Ufe of it, that the Soul makes, to wit, to come by means thereof unto a Perception of External Objefts ^ as, to fee their Co- lours, to hear their Sounds, to Relifli the feveral Tafts they have, and the like. In fhort, a Soul cannot but by the 7neaf2s of Organs, take any notice of External Objeds, nor th^ Organ be a means of con- veying any notice to the Soul, but by be- ing firft JffeBed it felf. Now the AjfeCiim of the Organ arifes from a Perception (^may I fo exprefs it ; or a Reception of the Mo- tions Communicated to it by Objeds 5 and a Capacity for this Reception from the Par- ticular Fto;/^ of the Organ. For fince all Matter indifferently is not capable of re- ceiving all kinds of Motions and Impreffi- ons ? but that for fome Particular Motions and Imprellions ( of which fort are fenfi- ble onesj there muft be Particular lex- iures^nA Frames of Matter to Catch them 5 it follows, th^t there muft he Organs -j and thefe too in (uch Variety and Number: there muft be Organs, to Receive the Im- preffion and Motions of Objeds, which - without

[ 153 ]

without a Particular Texture of Matter could not be Heceived ; and there muft be Variety of Organs, to Correfpond thefe va- rious Kinds of Motions and Impreffions that are in Coloured, in Sonorous, in Sa- pid, and in other Species of Objeds.

This will be better conceived in fome Inftances, by which it fhall be made ap- pear, that for the Reception of certain Particular Motions, there muft be certain Farticular Textures, and Difpoiitions of Matter^ fo that Matter in fome certain Frames and Difpoiitions of it will Catch, and be Affeded with, fome cer- tain Particular Motions, that in others, it will not be Touched with Ic is Gene- rally Obferved. that an Unijon ftring will Receive the Motion, and fo, Tremble, when another alfo Unifon is made to Sound, and yet all other Strings of the fame Inftrument, that are not Unifons, fhall remain infenfibleandunmov'd.C<^K^^;2 Obferved, that in a certain Church, in which were feveral Images of Wax, but one would move and Tremble, and one always would, at the Ringing ot a Sacring Bell. Mr. Eoile has taken notice of the like Mechanical Perception, in feveral Empty Drinking-Glalfes of Fine white Metal 5 he fays, that caufing the Strings of a Mufical Inftrument to be varioufly

fere wed

C 1,-4 3

fcrevved up, and let down, and briskly ftruck, he obferved, that the Motion of one String, when it was ftretched to ^ certain Note^ or Tone, would make one of the Glades Ring, and not the other -, nor would the found of the fame String Tuned to another Note, fenfibly Affedt the fame Glafs ^ tho* perhaps , fays he, it might have its Operation upon another. In fine, there are Jonical tchds^ that Re- turn not the Voice but u hen it has fome Peculiar Mulical Note, and then it doe's. Thus Organs are Matter Particularly Tex- tur'd, to the End to make them capable of Receiving fome Particular Motions : fo that a Senjittve Organ may be Defined, a Syftem of Matter Particularly Framed, Difpofed, and Textured for receiving fome Particular Motion of External Bodies, and for Conveying it to the Soul.

So much concerning Body in its Rela- tion to External OhjeHs •, come I now to Gonfider it in the Relation which it has to the Soulj ( the Internal Principle that Actuates it, and A6ts in, and by it ^ and fo, the Great work and Bufinefs of the Body is to Singularize and Individuate the General Vital Principle of the Univerfe, that it may become a Soul, or a Particular Vital Principle of a certain Particular Body. To underftand this it muft bs

Confider'd,

[ 155 ] Confider'd, that the Mofaical Spirit ( the Rife and Principle of all Created Cogita- tion,) as it is Extended- throughout the whole Univerfe ^ fo, to become in Parti- cular a 5"^/// , of any Particular Animal, it muft be Singularized, and Individuated, that is, it muft be Apprtioned (as it were) to that Particular Animal , which it comes to be by means of the Body. To Illuftrate this, it muft be P.emembred, that a Voice or Sound Diffufed throughout the whole capacity of the Medium ,as the Mofaical Spirit is throughout that of the univerfe is yet in the Pbonocamptick^ ChitsY or objed ( w^hich is nothing but a place conveniently Difpofed for this Pur- pofe,) fo Individuated and Singularized (^as the Mofaical Spirit is fuppofed to be by a Congruous fit Body, ) that Really ic has ether Affeciions and Properties, than thofe it owns, in all the reft of the Medium-, in- fomuch that by Vertue of it, this place inftead of being a Medium of Sound, be- comes to all Appearance a Principle of it, and fo a Speaker, and this is called an Echo. It may alfo be fet out in a Speculum or Looking-Glafs, Cfor a Body is to the Mofaical Spirit, what a Speculum or Look- ing-Glafs is to the Image of an Object in the Medium 3 ) A Speculum Catches the Diffufed Image, and /a Singular izes it, that

it

I '56 ]

it becomes a very Different thing, and puts on other very Different Properties than thofe it has in the Medium^ for in the Looking'Giafs it doth appear as an Objed which it doe s not out of it. But what doe's fet it out moft naturally, is, that it is fo in Man *, For the Soul or Co- gitative Principle of a Man, as it is Extend- ded throughout the whole capacity of the Body, in like manner as the Mofaical vSpi- rit is, throughout that of the Univerle 5 fo it is Singularized and Individuated, in, and by, the particular Organs : infomuch that the JE>'f only does See-^ the Ear only does Hear, and only the Tongue Tajis, in Vertue thereof^ for which Reafon thefe are owned to have feveral particular fa- culties, which are as fo many feveral Souls unto them. Now what the Organs are to the Soul in any Body ( that is but a Syftem of Organs, ) Bodies themfelves are, unto the Moiatcal Spirit, the great Soul of the Univerfe of which all par- ticular Bodies are Organs. But fince this Notion is of fo much Importance, that it will defer ve a more particular Coniidera- tion, and I defign to give it one in another Chapter, I fhall difmifs it at prefent, with- out further Infifting on it 3 and now will only add fome Improvement to the former Difcourfe, by making a Co?nparifon be- tween

L 157 J tween the Vital and the Mechanical E- nergy.

Firft then I lay it down as certain, that thereisfucha ti.ingas a/'/W, as well as a Mechanical Energy : by Vital Energy I mean all that is not meerly Mechanical •, and therefore do comprehend in that Term whatever is properly Mental ^ by Mechanical Energy I mean Impulfe or Springines, the neareft Phyiical Principle of Actual Local Motion. Now we are as fure by our fenfes, and by the Reflexion that we make upon cm- felves, and upon the Notices which we receive from Things vvithout^us, that there is fuch a thing as a Vital i^nergy, as we are that there is a Mechanical : Becaufe we are as much affured of the Effeds of the ofie, as we are of thole of the other 3 as much aiTured that there is Life, Senfation, and Intelledion, that come from a Vital ^ as we are that there are Actual Local Motions 3 Motions of Afcent and Defcent, Motions Direct, and Motions Circular, £ffc. which (as Motions ) come from Impulfe, the Me- chanical Energy*

Again 3 As it is Certain that Local Mo- tion, or that Impulfe which is the neareft Phyfical Principle of it, is -not Matter, or Materiate, but yet is in Matter, as United unto it : fo by this Confideration we may

become

become as certain, that Vital Energy ztlA the Effefts of it, though they be Immateri- al, je? they may be in Matter-, fince there needs no 'more of Hooks and Crooks to make the Latter, than to make the For- mer, toftick, and hold together

In the m^t place •, As the Mechanical, or Loco-motive Energy is Diffufed through- out the World ( for there is nothing in this, that is Entirely at Rett •, ) fo is the Vital : Since it is certain that \A'herever, and whenever, any Matter becomes Difpofed, the Vital Principle is chvays at hand to Aauate that Matter, and Aft in it, ac- cording as the Difpoiitions of it do Invite or Permit ; All Putrefat'iion or Digeftion any where, determines in InfeBs, or little Animals, (as Experience evinces, ) the Spirits being Unfettered and let Loofe thereby.

And yet as theMechanick or Loco mo- tive Impulfe is not Received in all Tex- tures of Matter indifferently, but that, ( as I have fhowed already ) there muft for fome certain Modifications of Local Motion, be certain particular Textures of Matter, fo neither is the Vital Energy Catcht and Received indifferently by all Textures of Matter -, but as all Life confifts in Motion, or in fomething Analogous, lo for certain Gradations and Exerc^fes of

Life,

[ 159 ] Life, there muft be cerain particular Fa- bricks and Textures of Matter, called Or. gansj and ulfo certain particular Difpofi, tions in the Mechanical Spirits ( for fo I call the fubtle Aflive Corpufcles in every Concrete) that are the immediate inftru- ments of the Vital Principle in all its Ani- ons of Lite, in this Corporeal World.

So that as Actual Motion, theEffedof Loco-motive Energy, and even Loco-mo- tive Energy it felt ( as taken for Im.pulfe ) is notMaerigl in this Senfe, that it does confifl of Matter, yet, if to be material be underftood of that which is Dependent on Matter, and fo Dependent that it cannot be without it 5 in the Senfe of the word, not only actual Motion, but even Impulfe ( the neareft Phyfical principle of Motion ) is material, lince neither of them can be but in, and by the means of Matter. In like manner, the Vital Frinciple that Ani- mates Corporeal Beings, though it is not matmal in this Senfe, that it is only Mat- ter, or a mode of Matter, yet in another it is, that it fo S)eperJs in all its Animal Operations, that it cannot exercife any bat by means of Mater, and according to the Texture and Quality of it. Nothing can be plainer than this is to Senfe, for in afl the Ads of Perception, not only the fenfi- tive, but the Intelledual, ^ the Organs

are,

L 160 J are, fo are the Actions ^ if the Organs are found and duly Difpofed, the .Actions are Conformable^ but if the Organs are out of Tune and Vitiated, the Actions arefb likewife ^ /^y, are Totally Aboliflaed, if the Organs are fpoiled ^ Befides, the fe- veral Kinds, and Degrees, of Deliration, that men themfelves are Subject unto, ac- cordingly as their Spirits are ill Qualified and Diftempered, do further Confirm it.

Upon the w hole, as the Vital Energy it Diffufed ( as Light is ) throughout the Univerfe •, fo according to the fe- veral Textures of Matter that do catch it, as a Speculum does the Light, it Exerts itfelf 5 and being Cateht and Retained by the Congruity of the Body, ( for it is Congruity only, not Hooks or Crooks, that holds them together, ) it is cal- led a Soul, and the whole Complex, [ of Body and Soul ] an Animal

What I have faid, does more particu- larly regard the Animals^ I call Vtfihky which we are better .-acquainted with, than with others of a Higher Nature •, but yet, with a very eafie Application, and by way of Analogy, it will alfo open the Nature of thefe : However, this Admoni- tion doth Remind me of the next Head to which I muft pafe^ and that is, the Difiri- hution of Animals,

CHAPo

C i^i ]

CHAP. VIL

Animals are either Invifible or Vifible •, in the Former fort 1 reckon Angels^ Good and Bad, which are Ether ial: As alfo the Genii, which are Aerial Anim/ils, In- vifible Animals, why called Spirit^ Jhat there are Spirits Evinced, i. from the general Tradition of the World. Mr. Hobbs'x Evafion of this Argument Confi- dered. 2. From Operations that cannot he Accounted for but from fuch Caufes. 3, From Intelligences and Notifications that cannot be Refolved but upon this Hy^ pothefis. 4. From Spe5lra or Apparitions. Of the way and manner how Spirits do Appear, that it is twofold, Real and Vifi- onal. that Good Angels when they do Appear are called irviv^oijaL or Spirits 5 and the Bad (pxvToio-fAciJoc or Fantomes.

SECT. IL

IHave fpoken of Animals in General, but to bring a greater Light toward thellnderftanding of the Animal Nature, I muft confider its Diftribution, and (how the General Kinds or forts of Animals M that

L 102, J that-are in the Univerfe. And Animals in Conformity unto the Bodies that do help to compofe them, are either Vifibky or Invifible. By Vifible Animals, I mean fuch as do confift of grofs matter, and fo have Bodies that naturally come under the perception of the external fenfe ^ by In- *vifihk Animals, I mean fuch as have Bo- dies fo '• if^fined, that naturally they come not under the perception of M^ or Any of the External Senfes.

Vifible Animals, which are the Ani- mals that compofe this hower Elemen- tary Worldy (for I will not undertake to fpeak of any fuch as may be in the o- ther, commonly called the Superiour and Celeftial,) the farther Difcourfe of them is properly referred unto Vhyficks^ and therefore I (hall enter no farther thereinto at this time, but proceed to treat of the Invijible,

By Invifible Animals, I mean Angels, good and bad, which I call iE herial Ani- mals, as alfo thofe iEreal ones (fome Lu- dicrous, fome Torvous") that are called Geiiii ^ all which, with the feveral kinds they farther branch into, \ will compre- hend under one name [of Spirits^] and fo fpeak fomething of their Nature 5 De- monftrate thdv Reality and Exiftencej and

in

i IS? 3

in fine, add fomething concerning their Apparitiouy and the ways of it.

As to their Nature in General, I think I (hall have faid all is necefiary for me to fay at this time, when I fhall have Ihew- ed, that there is a fenfe in which it may be truly faid, they are Incorporeal, < as faid they are, generally-,) and yet there is a fenfe too, in which, they muft be acknow- ledged to be Corporeal, if the having any mixture of matter in their Compoiition can fuffice (as I know it will be yielded me it doth) to make them properly deno- minated fuch.

The fenfe in which Spirits are truly faid to be Incorporeal, will be beft under- ftood by fhewing the reafon how the At- tribute of being Corporeal becomes Appro- priated unto vifible Animals-, to compre- hend which, w^e muft coniider, that in order to our converfing with Objefts, and taking Cognizance of them, we are en- dowed with two forts of Faculties, the Senfe, and the Underflanding •, and that the Senfe (even to Senfe) is an Organical Ma- terial Power, for we do fee the Organs it ufes, the Eye for Seeing, the Ear for Hearing, and the like for all the reft •, but that the Underflanding is ("to Senfe) an In- organical Immaterial Power, there not Ap- pearing any Senfibk Organ^ by means of M 2 which.

[ ^^4] which, it does exert or put forth its Adts. Now in conformity to this Dijiin^lton be- tween our Faculties, we do make one^ of their Objeds, (nor can we do it more a- greeably:) calUng the Subftances that do properly come under the notice and obfer- vation of our fenfe, Bodies 3 and thofe that do not, but are only inferred and per- ceived by the underftanding, Sj^irits : the former are corporeal material Subftances 5 becaufe perceived by fenfe, which is a ma- terial Organical Power-, but the latter, fuch as Angels and other Spirits, are faid to be immaterial, incorporeal, becaufe we cannot See, or Feel, or Taft, or Smell them in their own Subfiftences : In a word, we cannot perceive them in their own pro- per beings by any of the Senfes we have, but only by the Ratiocination and Dif- courfe of the Underftanding, which (to fenfe) is an Inorganical humaterial Power. And our Saviour Chrift, when after his Refurreftion, he appeared to his Difciples, and they apprehended that they had feen aVifion, to convince them of the Reality of his Corporeal Fxiftence, and that he was not a Spirit, or an Apparition only, as they took him to be, he Appeals unto their Senfe, and particularly to that of touchy Luke 24. 39. Behold, fays he, tny Hands J and my Feet, that it is 1 my

C r6s ]

felfy far a Spirit hath no flefh and Bones as you he me have : Wherein he goes upon theiai^otions, th^t a Spirit is an inviiible Thing, a Thing that in its own reality cannot be feen, nor be felt, but only be underftood^ and that, thacfubftance which comes under the notice and cognifance of the fenfe is a Body.

And in this fenfe of the word 1 Body ] all Spirits are really un*imbodied incorpo- real things •, thc:y have not fuch Bodies of Flefh and Bone, or Organs that come un- der the Obfervation and notices of fetife, as we have^ but in another fenie of the word, as Body is not taken reltrainedly, for that only which is fenfitki but more largely, for anySyftem of Matter whatever, ('whether fo refined and fubtle that it comes not within the compafs of any ex- ternal fenfe, or fo grofs, that it may be perceived by it^ fo Spirits are Corporeal and Embodied : That is, they are mate- rial ( as well as mentaly Beings •, minds in- deed they are, but Minds in Matter^ or Animals. In this, Scaliger confents with me, who in his Exercitations {Exerc. 3 : 7. ^. jS.") boldly {^ySj Spiritu^ Latinis is^ Gre- ets Omnibm^ Thilofophis, Medicis. Orato- ribusy Corpus eft : id eft^ Materia, & forma. This will be Evident, if we conlider (i.) That Abfolute Purity, or Exemption M 3 from

C i6^ 3

from aU Matter, is the peculiar Prerogative of God, who only is Pure Light, without any mixture of Darknefs ^ it is on]^ he^ the Central Being, (he that is abfolute pure being) that is pure unmixed mind 5 all other beings but he muft be impure, and have fome ingredience of ^natter in their Compofition ^ without which, as they would be pure Mind, fo (being pure mind^ they would be God. Secondly, Were all or any Spirits, except the infi- nite Almighty Center and Spring of All Abiblutely pure, without any mixture of Matter^ abfolutely iimple, without any Real Compoiition-, there could be no Di- jiinBion among them, either in Refped of Kinds, or of Individuals-, iince Alter ity ^and where there is Diftinction, there muft be Alterity 5 unus b' alius, eft alter ^ alter,) cannot confift with Abfolute fimplicity ^ Compofition is Unity , but fimplicity is Unictty.

To be more Particular ^ were Spirits Abfolutely Pure and Simple, without any ndmiinon of Matter, there could be no Diftinction among them in refpeft of Kinds. For what fhould difference them ? if there were nothing in them but that, w^herein they did all agree •, as there would be nothing elfe but that, if all of them were pure and hmple ; Things that Differ

in

C 167]

in fomething, and withal infomething Agree, cannot be P«re or Simple: for all have fomething that is Common^ in which they do agree, and all fomething not Com- mon, in which they differ 5 it is plain, that each of them Confifts of Thing, and Thing •, and Things that Confift of Thing and Thing are Compounded -, not Pure and Simple Things.

Again, were Spirits abfolutely pure and fimple, without any Concretion of Mat- ter, there could be no diftinftion among them as to Individuals^ as well as none in relation to Kinds. For fince all Individu- ation ("except only that of the Central pure mind) is Numerication, and all Numerica- tionarifes from Divifion, andDivilion has no place but in Matter, or in Things by means of matter. It is evident that there can be no diftindlion of Spirits as to Indi- viduation, if there be no ingredience of matter in their making. Things are faid to differ in number^ (and fo all Individuals differ, as well thofe of one and the fame, as thofe of divers Species,) that however identified they be in other Refpecls, yet do fo differ, that one is not the other 5 which cannot be without Divifion, of one from the other 3 nor Divifion be without matter : Unum is not only Indivifum in fey but Divifum a Quolibet alio. As for Meta- M 4 pbyfical

C i68 3

fhyfical Matter and Metaphyfical Form, or that diftindtion that fome make of ffub- ftantial i Power and aB, they are but meev Words^ without any fignification (at lead in my underftanding J if they are not re- duced to Matter and Mind •, which are the only Metaphyfical Principles of Things, that are Exijknt and Real In (liort, we may obferve m our /elves , (that Mind as I have noted beforej is Individuated hy Mat- ter^ fince even fenfe is feeing in the Eye 3 Hearing in the Ear-, Tafting in the Tongue, &c.

Another Confideration that Induces me to believe, that all Spirits are Animalsound vitally united unto Matter, of one lort or another, is, that the Apoftlef^w/, in a Difcourfe of his Concerning the Refur- redion, 1 Cor. 15. does Speak of a Spi- ritual Body, in Contradidion to a Natural^ as of the Body that All that do Arife in Chrift (hall be Cloathed withal 5 and Chrift himfelf tells us, that All that fhall Attain that glorious Refur region, fhall be la-czy- ysAci^ as Angels^ to wit, in Refped: of their Spiritual Bodies, that fhall Inveft them ; and if Glorified Men fhall be as Angels, Angels muft be as Glorified Men 5 that is, they muft have BodieSp tho' GIo- ripus and Spiritual bodies.

In

C i^p ]

In fine, that Spirits are Incorporeal Be- ings in this fenfe, that they have not fuch Grofs Elementary Bodies as we have, of Flefh and Blood and rones, doe's not in- fer, that they are /J? in every fenfe of that word ^ efpecially if we Conlider, that (as the Apoiile aflures us) there may be Spi- ritual Bodies ^ and there Appears not any Incoherence (m this,) that Spirits fhould have Spiritual Bodies. Befides, the Un- derftanding it felf, that, unto fenfe, is an Inorgankal Immaterial Faculty, is not Ab- folutely /(?, but has the Animal Spirits for an Organ, fince as thefe are Difpofed and Textured, well or ill, even fo the Exer- cifes of that noble power, are either right, or depraved ^ and from the differences in thefe Spirits do come the differences of Wits^ which are many. Ay, polfibly thofe Animal Spirits (ox fomething that refem- bles them) may compofe the Body Vv'hich accompanies the departing Soul : for that fome kind of Body does, which in the Greeks is called au^s^cfg?, the Learned Origen has told us, L. 2. Contra Celjhn: which Body he alfo fays, is that, the Sepa- rated Soul is ufed to appear in ^ but as to this, I fhall offer fomething hereafter.

By this Difcourfe it is Evident againft Mr. Hohhsy and others of the Sadducean Opinion, that Spirits in their own Nature

are

C ^70 3

are Real and Suhfijient Beings, and not meerly Towers y or Operations and ABions-^ tho' at the fame rime it muft be acknow- ledged, that in the Language of the Scrip- ture, fuch ABi'ue and Directive Qualities as are Intelligible only, and do not come diredly within the Cognizance of the fenfe are called Spirits •, thus we read of a Spi- rit oi Government and of Frophecy, that was firft upon Mofes, and afterward imparted to the 70 Elders, Numb, i j. of a Spirit of Wifdom, Deut. ]^, 9. of the Spirit of Un* derftanding •, the Spirit of Counfel and Might 5 the Spirit of Knowledge, and of the fe^r of theLord, Ifa, 11. 2. Ay, that vexatious Diftemper that afflided Saul^ and that feems to have been nothing elfe but melanchoily, is called an Evil Spirit from the Lord, i Sam, 16, 14. and in Luke i?j. II, 12. we read of a Spirit of Infirmity,

But tho' Spirit in the Holy Scriptures is often taken in the inftanced fenfe 5 and that the Name of Jngel is a Name oi Office^ rather than of Nature •, yet it is certain, that Angels are reprefented in thofe Sacred Writings as Real fubfifting Beings, all as real and fubfifting as men themfelves are, if the afcribing to them the like Affeftions, Offices, and Perfonal Operations, that

Men

[ 171 ] Men have, and do execute and exert, can prove them fo.

SECT. II.

That there are Spirits^ proved by General Tradition. Mr. Hobb j Anfiver to this Argument Jhewedto he hut an Eva/ion, from the Evangelijis Matthew, and Mark, ere.

AN D this reminds me of the Second Point I have propofed to Difcourfe on, in relation to Spirits, and that is, their Exiftence or Being-, wherein I ffiall endeavour to make it manifeft, that really there are fuchSubfiftent intellectual Beings, as are incorporated, but invilibie, which commonly we call Spirits y fo that the Names of Spirits, both of the Good ones, as Raphael, Gabriely t^c. And of the Evil ones, as Belzehuh^ tsfc are Names of Subjiances or Perfons, and not of Qua- lities only •, ay, are proper^and not (as Mr. Hohbs tells us, the name ot Sathan and Devil is) only Appellative Names.

The firft Argument that I will ufe to Evidence that there are Spirits, fliall be taken from the General tradition of the Worlds it being received among all Na- tions^ as well the Civilized^ as the Barba- rous,

rous, and among all Philofophers except the Epicureans y the Ancient and the Mo- dern, andy^^^e Peripateticks-, and to me it is very unintelligible, how fuch a Senti- ment fhouid obtain fo generally, if it had not fome foundation of Truth 5 for who (hould fpread the Opinion to fuch an ex- tent? and what fhouid make it to take?

Mr. Hobbs himfelf acknowledges it a truth, that the belief of Spirits was very general all the World over 3 only he has a w^ay (which is peculiar to him) of avoid- ing the Cogency and Force of the Argu- ment, and therefore I will here confider what he fays.

It is true, fays he, ^ that the Heathens, ' and all the Nations of the World have ^ acknowledged that there be Spirits,which ' for the molt part they hold to be incor- ' poreal, whereb) it may be thought that ^ di man by natural Reafon may arrive ' vv^ithout the Scriptures to the knowledge ^ of this, that Spirits are, but the errone- ^ ous Colledlion thereof by the Heathens, 'may pro:eed as I have faid before, from ^ th^ignorance of the Caufe of Ghofts and ' Fantoms, and fuch other Apparitions. ' And from thence had the ureaans their * number of Gods, their number of De- ^ mons good, or bad, and for every Man ^his GeniuS; which is not the acknowledg- ing

[ 173 D

* ing of this truth, that Spirits are, but a ' falfe Opinion concerning the force of Ima- ' gination.

1 hus Mr. Hobhsy in his Treatife of Hu- man Nature, Ck ii. S. 6. wherein he plainly Affirms, that Spirits and Ghofts are meer Fantomes, or Eflfeds of the ima- gination : a conceit, in which he feems to have the Concurrence of Seneca, for this Philofopher Epift. 24. tells us as Mr. Hobh doe's, Nemo tarn Puer eft tit Cerberum ti- meat, fjf Tefiebras, tff LARVARUM habit um nudis ofjibm Cok^erentium,

This Notion of Spirits, that Mr. Hobbs Infinuates, Reminds me of Anothery that a Perfon whom I knew, and who was Re- puted not of the Wifcft, had of them 5 for being Asked what he thought a Spirit was, He Anfwered, that it was the Shadow of Concfctence ^ and further Demanded, concerning a Good Arjgel, what that was 5 He Replied, a Good is the Shadow of a Good Confcience, and a Devil the Shadow oi a Bad one, And Methinks he comes near to Mr. Hobbs, But without jefting.

I Find, that Apfat'tions of Spirits are ftiled Fantoms \i(pxv^(7fA<x%'] by two Ef an- gelifts, Matthew and Mark, For when the Difciples of our Lord faw him walking upon the Sea, and believed him to be a Spirit, the Former of thofe Evangelifts tells

us

L 174 D

us that they faid on. (pxiraafxaL ecrJ, it is a

Phantafm, or, as our Tranflators Render it, a Sprite, Matt. 14. 26, And the Lat- ter has the fame Expreffion, when fpeak- ing of the fame Iviirade, he fays, they fupfofed him to be a Vhantafm, i^^^ccv (pcti^aafxcc efrcci ^ or as in our EngUfh Ver- fion, they Juppofed it had been a Sprite. Markz 6. 49. Whence it Evidently fol- lows, againft Mr. Hobhs , that Men that were not Ignorant of the power of Fancy ^ and of the Intereft it had in the Appari- tions of Spirits, yet believed their Real Exiftence. For the Difciples that believed our Lord to be a Spirit, Jppearingy and therefore faid he was a Phantafm (which it feems was the ufual ExprelTion at that time for fuch Apparitions,) did withal believe that a Spirit was a Reality^ and of great Power. For upon the fuppofed Apparition, They are faid, by one of the Evangelifts, to be much Difturhedy eToLpoi^' ^mccv fays Matthew, Chap. 14. 26. They were troubled and cryed out for Fear •, and the other fays no lefs, for he fays. They cried out, ( for They aU favp him and ivers Troubled,) Mark. 6. 4$?, 50. I would De- mand of Mr. Hobbs, were he Alive, what can be Conceived to occafion fo much Con- fternation, fo much AfFrightment, in the Difciples, at the Apparition of a Spirit,

if

L I7J J

if they did not take a Spirit to be fome- thing Real, tho' they called the Appear- ing of it a Phantome. Cenainly, when they werefo much Affrighted at it, They muft be Apprehenfive that it was a Thing of Great Power, that was come to hurt Them •, for elfe, had They believed it to be a meer Effed of Their own Imagina- tion, they would have been as UnconceYned^ as Mr. i7(9iij himfelf would be, at fuch an Appearance*

I Conclude then, that as Mr. Hohhs was not the Firft that called Spirits Vhantaf mat a, or Fantomes, but that they were called fo of Old, ( and indeed the w^ord SpeBrum in the Latin, and this of Appa- rition in the Engliih Tongue, does an- fwer very Properly to the word Phantafma in the Greek, a word too Adopted by the Romans^ in the fame fenfe-,) fo this De- nomination was Given to them, not with Defign to fignify their Nature and EiTence, (as Mr. Hohhs would have it,) but to fet' out the ufual vi^ay of Their Appearing, of which more hereafter. This is Evident from the Younger Tliny, who in one of his Epiftles, having put the Queftion, whether Apparitions or Ihantafmata ( for this is the word he ufes) were Real and fubfiftent Things, he Affirms they are, aind Inftances in feveral Remarkable Sto- ries

C 176 3 ries (^ as I (hall (hew hereafter ) to Prove it.

So that this Firft Argument for the Real Exi(tence of Spirits, taken from the General belief that all the World has of it (as Mr, Hobbs himfelf Acknowledges,) doe's hold Good and Conclufive, Notwithftand- ing all that this Philofopher has fuggefted againft it. And indeed what he Propofes, is faid fo Timor oujly by him, [for he fay's, the Erroneom Colle5iion thereof may f but may] Proceed &c ] and that fo Precari- <^H/by (being only an Aflfertion, without any- Proof;, that I need not have Given my felf the trouble of faying fo much in An- fwer to it, but that in Things of this Na- ture, fome have fo very (trong a Bya(s, both of Credulity on one hand, and Incre- dulity on the other, that if any Room were left for Cavil, they would be fure to make it.

SUB* t

L 177]

SUB. I. .

Another Argument to Tro^e Spirits. Of t^e

Converfion of an Indian Raja. A Ke-

rnarkable Story of Witchcraft^ out of Mi\ Gage's Survey.

AND Thus much for the Firft Ar- gument, I ROW proceed to the fe- cond. And the fecond Argument that I will ufe to Evidence that there are Spi- rits, (hail be taken from Operations we are certain of, uhich cannot be Accounted for but by fuppolitig fuch agents.

I have Read in Fnrchas, that a certain Indian, a Great Raja, and Greater Atheift, was brought to a Confeffion, as well as Conviaion of his Folly, by a ftrange Pro- vidence. The Relation in that Author, goes in thefe Terms. '' A Great Raja a '' Gentile, a Notorious Atheiji, and Con- '^ temner of all Deity, Glorying to pro- '/ fefs he knew no other God than the '' King, nor believing nor fearing none : '' fitting Dallying with his Women, one '* of them plucked a Hair from his Breaft, '' which being fait Kooted, Plucked off a " little or the Skin, that Blood Appear- '•ed^ this fmall Skar Feftred and Gan- *' grened Incurably, fo that in few days N '^h«

[.78]

''he Defpaired of Life, and being Ac- '* companied with all his Friends and " Divers Courtiers he brake out into thefe '*. Excellent words : Which of you would '^ not have Thought that I being a Man of " War Ihould have died by the Stroak of ^* a Sword > Spear, or Bow ? But now *' I am enforced to confefs the Power of " that Great God, Vv^hom I have fo long " Defpifed, that he needs no other Lance *' than a little Hair to kill fo BUfphemous ''- a wretch and Contemner of his Majefty, "as I have been. Tart. i. /. 4./! 600. Thus God, is known in the World, by the Judgments which he Executes

And as God is known by his Judg- ments, fo may other Spirits, by fome £- ojents that happen in the World, when they are fo Extraordinary, and out of common courfe, that they cannot be Afcri- bed but to fuch Caufes. I have here a very Large Field, but my Bufinefs being not to handle this Subjecft as a Common Place, {put only to Touch it by way of Argu- ment, 1 fliall content my felf with the General Mention of Prodigies, that all Hiftory, Ancient and Modern, abounds withal 5 and the ftrange Performances of Witches and Wizards s of which Laft I will give an Infiance or two, that carry great Credibility, and yet are Abfolutely ,', tlnaccount'

C I7P ]

tinaccountahle, if we do not Admit of Spi- rits, and in Truth not very Eafy to be Conceived if we do. But the Matter of Fa5i, being Related by an Author not ia every Bodies hand, I will lay it out at large in all its C'rcumftances, as I Find them fet down by him, that fo Ingeni- ous Men, who have the Curiofity to In- quire into Things of this Nature . may have the furer Grounds to go upon, in making their Judgment.

In Finola (fay's Mr. Gage in his new Survey of the Wefi-lndies, C 20.) there were fome who were much given to Witchcraft , and by the Power of the Devil did Ad ftrange things^ amongft the Reft there was one Old Woman Named Martha de Carillo, who had been by fome of the Town formerly Accufed for Be- witching many ; but the %w//fe Juftices quitted her , finding no fure Evidence agamft her-, v/ith this fhe grew worfe and worfe, and did much Harm ^ when I was there, two or three died, wtthering away^ Declaring at their Death that this Carilh had Killed them, and that they fan> her often about their Beds, threatning them with a Frowning and Angry Look. The Indians for fear of her durft not complain againft her, nor meddle with her 3 where- upon I fent word unto Don Juan da Guzman N 2 tfie

the Lord of that Town, that if he took not order with her, fhe would deftroy his Town. He Hearing of it, got for me a Commiflion from the Bifliop and another Oificer of the inquifition to make Diligent and Private Inquiry after her Life and i^.aions, which I did, and found among the ludiam many and Grievous ( om- plaints againft her,moft of the Town Affir- ming that certainly fhe was a Notorious Witch, and that before her former Accu- fation fhe was wont v^^itherfoever flie went about the Town to go with a Duck Fol- lowing her, which v. hen (he came to the Church would ftay at the door till fhe came out again, and then would Return home with her, which Duck they Imagi- ned was her Beloved Devil and Familiar Spirit, for that they had often fet Dogs at her and they would not meddle with her, but rather run away from her. This Duck never Appeared more with her, fince fhe was formerly Accufed before the Juflice, which was thought to be her policy, that Cae might be no more fuf- pea^d thereby. This Old Woman was a Widow, and of the Foorefl of the Town in outward (hew, and yet (he had always ttore of Money y which none could tell which way (he might come by it. Whilft I was thus Taking Privy Information ^,j " againft

againft her ( it being the Time of Lent, when all the Town came to Confeffion J fhe among the Reft came to the Church to Confefs her fins, and brought me the beft Prefentand Oftbring of all the Town^ for whereas a Riall is Common, ("he brought me four, and belides, a turkey^ ^ggh ^^P'^y and a little Bottle of Honey, She thought thereby to get with me a better Opinion than I had of her from the whole Town. I Accepted of her Great OfFering,and heard her Confeflion, w^hich was of nothing but Trifles, which could fcarcebe Judged finful Actions. I Examined her very clofe of what was the Common Judgment of all the Indians^ and efpecially of thofe who dying, had declared to my felf at their Death that She had Bewitched them^ and before their Sicknefs had Ihreatned them., and in their Sicknefs Appeared Threatning them with Death about their beds, none but they themfelves feeing her 5 to which (he Replyed Weeping that fhe was Wronged. I Asked her, how Ihe be- ing a Poor Widow without any Sons to help her, without any means of Lively- hood, had fo much Money, as to give me more than the Richeft of the Town •, how She came by that Fifh, Turkey, and Ho- ney, having none of this of her own a- bout her Houfe ? to which fhe Replied j N 3 that

that God Loved her and gave her all thefe Things, and that with her Money (hp Bought the reft, I Asked her of whom f She Anfivered that out of the Town flie had them. I Perfuaded her to much Re- pentance, and to forfake the Devil and all Fellowfhip with him *, but her Words and Anfwers were of a Saintlv and Holy Woman *, and fhe earneftly defired me to give her the Communion with the Reft that v/ere to Receive the next day. Which I told her I durft notdo, ufing Chrift's Words, Give not the Childrens bread unto dogs, nor caft your Pearls unto Swine s and it would be a great Scandal to give the Coni- munion unto her, who was fufpeited ge- nerally, and had been Accufed for a Whch. This llie took very ill. telling me that (he had many Years Received the Communion, and now in her Old Age it Grieved her to be Deprived of it, her tears were many, yet I could not be moved with them, but fiefolutely denied her the Communion, and fo DifmiiTed her. At Noon when I had done my work in the Church, I bad my Servants go to gather up the Offerings, and gave order to have the Fijh Dreffed for my Dinner which (he had brought, but no fooner was it carried into the Kitchen, when the Cook looking on it found it full of Maggots, and ftinking •, fo

thaft

that I was forced to hurl it a way ^ with that I began to fuped my Old Witch^ and went to look on her Honey ^ and Pouring it out into a Difh, I found it full oi Worms ^ her Eggs I could not know from others, there being near a Hundred Offered that day, but after as I ufed them, we found fome Rotten, fome with dead Chickens in them ^ the next Morning the Turkey was found dead ^ As for her four Rials, I could not Perceive whether flie had Bewitched them out of my Pocket, for that I had put them with many other, which that day had been given Given me, yet as far as I could I called to Memory who and Tfhat had been Given me, and in my Judg- ment and Reckoning I verily thought that I miffed four Rials ^ At Night when my Servants the Indians were gone to Bed, I fat up late in my Chamber betaking my felf to my Books and Study, for I was the next Morning to make an Exhortation to thofe that Received the Communion. After I had Studied a while, it being between Ten and Eleven of the Clock ^ on a fud- den the Chief door in the Hall fw^here in a Lower Room was ray Chamber, and the Servants, and three other doors) flew open, and I heard one come in, and for a while vpalk^ about ^ then was Another door opened which went into a Little Room, N 4 w^here

[ 184]

where my Saddles were Laid-, with this •I thought it might be the Black-More Miguel Dalva, who would often come late to my Houfe to . Lodge there, Efpecially fince my fear of Montenegro, and I Con- jeftured that he was La)ingup his Saddle, I called unto him by his Name two or three times, from within my Chamber, but no r^nfwer was made, but fuddenly Another door that went out to a Garden flew alfo open, wherewith I began with- in to /f^r, my joynts Trembled, my Hair flood up, J would have caikd out to the Servants,and my Voice was as it were flop- ped with the fudden Affrightment^ 1 be- gan to think of the Witch, and put my trufr in God againi't her, and Encouraged my feif and Voice, calling out to the Ser- vants, and knocking with a Cane at my doer within that they might hear me, for I durft not open it and go out ^ with the Noife that I made the Servants Awaked, and came out to my Chamber door s then I opened it, and a^^ked them if they had not heard fome Body in tlie Hall, and all the doors opened, they faid they were A- ^ep, and heard nothing,only one Boy faid he heard ail, and Related unto me the fame that I 'had heard •, I took my Candle then in my hand and went out with them into the Hallto view the doors, and I found them

all

C i8j ] all Jkut.jis the Servants faid they had left them. I hen I Perceived that the Witch would have Affrighted me, but had no power to do me any harm 5 I made two of the Servants lie in my Chamber, and went to bed 5 in the morning early I fent for my Efcal the Clerk of the Church, and told him what had happened thatNight, he fmiled upon me, and told me it was the Widdow Carillo^ who had orten played fuch Tricks in the Town with thofe that had offended her, and therefore he had the night before come unto me from her, defiring me to give her the Communion, left fhe ftould do me fome hurt, which I denied unto him, as I had done to her felf 5 the Clerk bad me be of good cheer, for he kr.ew flie had no power over me to do me any hurt. After the Communion that day, fome of the Chief Indians came unto me, and told me that Old Carillo had Boafted that fhe would play me fome trick, or other, bec^ufe I would not give her the Communion. But I, to rid the Town of fuch a Limb of Satan, fent her to Gua- temala, with all the Evidences and Wit- nefles which I had found againft her, unto the Prefident and Bifliop, who comman- ded her to be put in Prifon, where (he died within two months.

Many

C ^8^3

Many more Indians there were ir; that Town, who were faid in my time to do very jkange things. One called John Gon- zalez, was reported to Change himfelf into the fhape of a Lion, and in that lliape was one day fhot in the nofe by a poor harm- lefs Spaniard, who chiefly got his living by going about the Woods and Mountains, and fhooting at Wild Deer, and other Beafts to make Mony of them. He efpied one day a Lion, and having no other aim at him but his Snout behind a Tree, he fhot at him, the Lion ran away *, the fame day this Gonzalez was taken fick ; I was fent for to hear his Confelfion, I faw his face and nofe all bruifed^ and asked how it came ? lie told me then that he had fal- len from a Tree, and almoft killed him.- felf. yet afterwards he accufed the poor Spaniard for fhooting at him s the bufinefs was examined by a Spanifh Juftice, my Evidence was taken for whathonzaleztold me of his fall from a Tree 5 the Spaniard was put to his Oath, who fwore that he (hot at a Lion in a Thick Wood, where an Indian could fcarce be thought to have any bufinefs *, the Tree was found out in the Wood, whereat the fhot had been made, and was ftill marked with the (hot and Bullet*, which Gonzalez conteffed was to be the place ^ and was Examined how

he

C 1S7 3

he neither fell nor was feen by the Spam- ard, when he came to feek for the Lion, thinking he had killed him ^ to which he anfwered, that he ran away left the Spa- niard (hould kill him indeed. But his An- fwers feemed frivolous, the Spaniards in- tegrity being known, and the great fufpi- cion that wa5 in the Town, of Gonzalez his dealing with the Devil, cleared the Spaniard from v/hat was laid againit him.

But this was nothing to what after hap- pened to one John Gomez, the chiefeft In- dian of that Town of near fourfcore years of Age, the Head and Ruler of the Princi- palleft Tribe among the Indians, whofe Advice and Couf fel was taken and prefer- red before all the reft ^ who feemed to be a very Godly Indian, and very feldom miffed Morning and Evening Prayers in the Church, and had beftowed great Riches there. This Indian very fuddenly was ta- ken fick (I being then in my other Town of Mixco) the Mayordomos or Stewards of the Sodality of the Virgin, fearing that he might die without Coafeflion, and they be chid for their negligence, at Mid- night called me up at Mixco, defiring me to go prefently and help John Gomez to die, whom alfo they faid defired much to fee me, and to receive fome comfort from me.

C iS8 ]

me. I judging it a work of Charity, al- though the time of the night were unfea- fonable, and the great Rain at the prefent might have flopped my Charity, yet I would not be hindred by either of them, and fo fet forth to ride nine Miles both in the Dark, and Wet. When I came to FmoUy being thorow wet to the skin, I went immediately to the Houfe of Old Sick Gomezy who lay with his face all muffled up, thanked me for my pains and care I had for his Soul, he defired to con- fefs, and by his Confeffion and Weeping Evidenced nothing but a Godly Life, and a willing defire to die, and to be with Chrift, I comforted him, and prepared him for Death, and before I departed, asked him how he felt himfelf 5 he an- fwered that his Sicknefs was nothing but Old Age, and Weaknefs-, with this I wenr to my Houfe, changed my felf, and lay down a while to reft, when fuddenly I was called up again to give Gomez the Extream Undion, which the Indians (as they have been ignprantly taught) will not omit to receive before they die. As I Anointed him in his Nofe, his Lips, his Eyes, his Hands and his Feet, I perceived that he was fwelled, and black and blew, but made nothing of it, judging it to pro- ceed from the ficknefs of his Body ; 1 went

home

[ i89 ]

home again, being now break of the day, when after 1 had taken a fmall nap, fome Indians came to my door to buy Candles to offer up for John Gomez his Soul, whom they told me was departed, and was that day to be Buried very folemnly at Mais. I arofe with droufie Eyes after fo unquiet a nights reft •, and walked to the Church, where I faw the Grave was preparing. 1 met with two or three Spaniards who li- ved near the Town, and w^re come to Mafs that Morning, who went in with me to my Chamber, and with them I fell into Difcourfe about John Gomez, telling them what comfort I had received at his Death, whom I judged to have lived very Holy, and doubted not of his Salvation, and that the Town would much w-ant him, for that he was their Chief Guide, and Leader, Ruling them with good Ad- vice and Counfel. At this time the Spa- niards fmiled one at another, and told me I was much deceived by all the Indians^ but efpecially by the deceafed GomeZy if I judged him to have been a Saint, and Holy Man. I told them, that they, as Enemies to the Indians^ judged ftill uncharitably of them •, but that I who knew very well their Confciences, could judge better of them than they. One then Replyed, that it feemed I little knew the truth of John

Gomez

Gomez his death by the Confefliori which he made unto me, and that I feemed to be ignorant of the ftir which was made in the Town concerning his Death. This feemed fo ftrangeiinto me, that I defired them to inform nie of the Truth. Then they told me that the report went, that John Gomez was the Chief Wizard of all the Wizards and Witches in the Town, and that com- monly he was wont to be changed into the (hape of a Lion, and fo to walk about the Mountains. That he was ever a dead- ly Enemy to one Sebaflian Lopez an An- cient IndiaUy and head of another Tribe 5 and that both of them two days before had met in the Mountain. Gojnez in the (hape of a Lion, and Lopez in the (hape of a lyger , and that they fought moft cruelly, till Gomez .who was the older and weaker) was tired, much bit and bruifed, and died of it. And farther, that I might be a(rured of this truth, they told me that Lopez was in Prifon for it, and the two Tribes flriving about it, and that the Tribe and Kindred of Gomez demanded from Lopez and his Tribe and Kindred fa- tisfeftion, and a great Sum of Money, or elfe did threaten to make the Cafe known unto the Spanifh Power and Authority, which yet they were unwilling to do, if they could agree and fmother it up among

them-

L 191 ] thettifelves, that they might not bring an afperfion upon their whole Town. This feeraed very ftrange unto me^ and I. could not refolve what to beUeve, and thought I would never more believe an Indian^ if I found Juh}2 Gomez to have fo much Dif- fembled and Deceived me. I took my leave of the Spaniards^ and went my felf to the Prifon, where I found Lopez with Fetters. I called one of the Officers of the Town, who was Algnazil Majovy and my great Friend, unto my Houfe, and pri- vately examiined him why Lopez was kept fo clofe Prifoner ? he was loath to tell me, fearing the reft of the Indians ^ and hoping the buiinefs would be taken up and agreed by the two Tribes, and not noifed about the Country, which at thatinftant the two Alcades and Regidores, Majors, and Jurates, with the Chief of both Tribes were fitting about in the Town- Houfe all that Morning. But I feeing the Officer fo timorous, was more defirous to know fomething, and prefled more upon him for the Truth, giving him an inkling of what I had heard from the Spaniards be= fore. To whichheanfwered, that if they could agree amongft themfelves,they feared no ill report from the Spaniards againft their Town; I told him I muft know what they were agreeing upon amongft

them-

C ^9^ ] themfelves fo clofely in theTown-Houfe.He told me, if I would promife to fay nothing of him (for he feared the whole Town if they fliould know he had revealed any thing unto me) he would tell me the Truth. With this I comforted him, and gave him a Cup of Wine, and encouraged him, warranting him that no harm (hould come unto him for what he told me. Then he related the bufinefs unto me as the Spaniards had done, and told me that he thought the Tribes amongft themfelves would not agree 5 for that fome of Gomez his Friends hated Lopez, and all fuch as were fo Familiar with the Devil, and ca- red not if Gomez his diffembling Life were laid open to the W^orld 3 but others he faidj who were as bad as Lopez, and Gomezj would have kept it clofe, left they, and all the Witches and Wizards in the Town fhould be difcovered. This ftruck me to the very heart, to think that I fhould live amongft fuch People, whom I faw were fpending all they could get by their Work and Labour upon the Church, Saints, and in Offerings, and yet were fo privy to the Counfels of Satan •, it grie- ved me that the word I preached unto them did no more good ^ and I refolved from that time forward to fpend moft of my indeavours againft Satans fubtilty, and

to

to (hew them more than I had done, the great danger of their Souls who had made any Compaft with the Devil, that I might make them abandon and abjure his Works, and clofe with Chrift by Faith. / difmifled the Indian, and went to the Church to fee if the People were come to Mafs 3 I found there no body but only two who were making Gomez his Grave. I went back to my Chamber, troubled much within my felf, whether I fhould allow him a Chriftian Burial, who had li- yed and died fo vv'ickedly, as I had been informed. Yet I thought J was not bound to believe one Indian againft him, nor the Spaniards, whom I fuppofed fpoke but by hear-fay. Whilft I was thus mufing, there came unto me at leaft twenty of the Chiefeft of the Town, with the two Majors, Jurates, and all the Officers of Juftice, who defired me to forbear that day the Burying of John Gomez, for that they had refolved to call a Crown Officer to view his Corps, and examine his death, lea they fhould all be troubled for him, and he be again unburied. I made as if I knew nothing, but inquired of them the reafon •, then they related all unto me, and told me how there were Witnefles in the Town, who farv a Lyon and a 7yger Bghting, and prefently loft th& %ht- of

O the

[ ^P4 ] the Beads, and Jaiv John Gomez^ and Se^ bajiian LopeZy much about the lame tine parting one from another, and that imme- diately John Gomez came home bruifed to his Bed, from whence he never rofe more, and that he declared upon his Death-Bed untofome of his Friends tkat Sebaftian Lo- pez had killed him 5 whereupon they had him in fafe Cuftody. Farther they told me, that though they had never known fo much wickednefs of thefe two Chief Heads of their Town whom they had much re- fpected and followed 5 yet now upon this occafion, from the one Tribe and the o- ther they were certainly informed that both of them did conftantly deal with the Devil, which would be a great afperfion upon their Town, but they for their parts abjured all fuch wicked ways, and prayed me not to conceive the worfe of all for a few, whom they were refolved to perfe- cute, and not fuffer to live amongft them. I told them I much liked their good zeal, and incouraged them as good Chriltians to endeavour the rooting out of Satan from their 1 Ov\n. and they did very well in gi- ving notice to Guatemala^ to the Spanifh Pdwer of this Accident ^ and that if they hizd concealed it, they might all have been punifhed i^s guilty oi Gomez his death, and Agents With Satan, and his Inftruments.

I

C IP,- ]

i affured them I had no ill conceit of them, but rather judged well of them tor what they agreed to do. The Crown Otiicer was fent for, who came that night and fearched Goynez his Body 5 I was prefent with him, and found it all bruifed, fcratch- ed, and in many places Eitteu and fore wounded. Many Evidences and fufpicions were brought in againft Lopez by the In- dians of the Town, efpecialjy by Goiriez, his Friends, whereupon he was carryed away to Guatemala, and there again was Tryed by the fame Witnefles, and not much Denying the Fad himfelf, was there Hanged. kndGomez, though his Grave was opened in the Church, he was not Buried in it, but in another made Ready for him in a Ditch. So far in Gage.

There are multitudes of Inftances in ma- ny Authors, of a Nature all as ftrange, and as furprizing, as the former -, and tho perhaps rnoft of the Relations handed a- bout with great Confidence, do, upon impartial Examination, prove either /w- pft ures oiMdXxcioxxs, or iVI//?^4^j- of Igno- rant and Superftitious Perfons,- j^etfome come fo well Attefted, that it • were to : bid defiance to all Human Teftimony to refufe them belief. Among Forreign ! Writers I will mention only theLearned & Judicious Bodm in his Damonomania^ and O 2 the

the Curious Gafper Schotm in his Thyfica CuYtofa, Fart i. C. i6. ^ ^ and C. 17. ^2. Among our own, the Eloquent Mr. Glan- vil, in his Sadducifmm Trhmpham 5 and Mr. Baxter ( as Sagacious and Inquifitive a perfon as any ) his Hijiorical Difcourfe of Apparitions and Witches, who all a- bound with very Prodigious, but Credi- ble Relations. To all which I might add the ConfeflionsI have in Manufcript, (all Original Papers, and well vouched,) of a great number of Witches, ( fome of which were Executed ) that were taken by a jfufike of Peace in CornmU above thir- ty Years agoe : In which there are fo ma- ny Rare and Curious Paflages, that I find my felf under great Temptation of Pro- mifing to Annex them to the Second Part of this Difcourfe, when I fhall have Occa- fiop to fay more upon the prefent Sub^ jea, under the Head of Supernatural Pow. er. And Thus much for the Second Ar- gument, which leads me to the Third.

SUB. I

I ^91 3 SUBS. 11.

Ihe third Argument from Supernatural Ad^ vertijements. An Injiance out qf Simo- catto. Another J of a jirange Omen out of Sir VV. Rawleigh. Of the Corps-Can- dles in Wales, tsfc.

THE Third Argument to prove the Real Being of Spirits, (hall be taken from the ftrange Advertifements of Events, and as ftrange Premonitions, that are fome- times Given, which cannot be Refolved but upon that Hypothefis, I will but mention the Oracles of Old ^ the many /idmonifhing andPredidive Dreams ^ that fome Perfons, in all Ages, have been Fa- voured with, ( of which there is a Large Colledion by Strozzo Cicogna in his Magia Omnifaria^ Fart i. /, 2, C. 4. as alfo in Cicero, in his Firft Book of Divination •, ) and in fine, the Prodigious Omens that do often occur.

Nor will I infifton what I find in Mr. Stow and other Hiftorians, that WtUiamy Surnamed the Conquerour, though be died at Roan in Normandy, fooner than Was Expected, yet his Death was known at Rome the fame day he Died. But I lay more ftrefs upon an Advertifemem I find in O S IheophylaSl

C 1^8 ]

1heoph)la5l Swiocatta , concerning the Murther of the Emperour MauYittm, be- caufe the Relation of it being Particular and Circumftantial , carries Greater Evi- dence than the Former, and will endure the Teft. There happened,fays the Hilio- rian, on the very day in which Mauritius [theEmepror] waSxMurdred, a thing at Ale:xandria worthy to be Recorded. A certain Writing-Mafter or Scrivener ( for fo I do Adventure to interpret the word Calligraphus ) being ( that day ) at a Merchants Houfe at a kind of GofTips Feall, where he w^as obliged to ftay till the Fourth Watch of the Night •, as he was going homeward, being come to the Tycha- &niy a noted part of the City, ( about midnight ) he faw fome of the chiefeft Statues that flood there removing from off their Bafes, and at the fame time heard a Foice that feemed to come from the fame Statues, which called on him aloud, by Name, and withal, very flirilly, but brief- ly, Related the Accident that that day had befaln Mauritius, In the morning the Writing-Mafter goes to the Palace to Dif- coverwhat had happened to him, which coming to the Ear of Peter the Prefect of ^gyft then refiding there ( who was nearly Related to Simocatta ) he diligent- ly inquires concerning the whole Affair, . ' " . and

C ^99 ] and after he had fully informed himfelf thereof, injoyns the Relater to Secrecy, and then letting down, in his Note Book, the whole Relation, he waits the Event. Of this not long after, he was affured by an Exprefs, which on the Ninth day brought liim News of the Empcrours Death, and of the Time of it ^ and then he Declared Publickly, how that this Ac- cident had been Foretold by the Statues, or rather by the Demons, in the manner a- bove Related, and Vouched the Writing- Matter as the Author. This is the fum of the Story, as Stmocatta has Related it, ( Htft, Mauritian. /. 8. Cb. 13, j A Story that is not told at Random, or by an Ob- fcure Perfon, or by a Perfon Remote from the Scene, or from the time it was Aded on ; but a Story told by a Grave and Un- derftanding Hiftorian, who lived at the fame time 5 was well acquainted with the Perfons concerned ^ and who made a Fi- gure in the Government •, fo that he had all the Advantages that could be defired to render him certain of the truth of it. Luciiius in Cicero I, 2. de Nat, Deor. tells us a ftory of the like Nature, viz. That the Elder l\ Vatienm coming by night to Rome, was Advertized by the Ijndarida in the fiiape of two young men, on White Horfes, th^t that day Perfes was over-

O 4 come

come by the Roman Army, and taken Pri- foner 5 This he Reports to the Senate, by whom he was committed to Prifon for fpreading Falfe News •, but afterwards, when it Appeared by the Confuls Letters, that the Advertifement was true, he was both Releafed and Rewarded.

And as for Omens, than which nothing is more Ridiculous to the Epicureans, and all thofe that deny the Reality of Spirits, ( fo fays Gcero de Nat. Deor. 1. 2. Mhil tarn lerridet Epicurus quam VvcediBionem rerum futurarum '-, ) I will Inftance in one that leaves no Room for any Evafion, fince I take it from a Perfon who was very Con- fident of the Truth of it, and yet was a Perfon as little fubjeft to Superftition, or to Fancy, as any Epicurean whatever. Sir Walter Rawkigh (for it is he I mean j in his Hiftory of the Worldr^. 4. Cz. S. yOfays,

* The ftrangefl thing that I have Read of ^ in this kind [^ [peaking of Omens'] being

^ certainly true , was, that the Night be- . ^ fore the Battle at Novara, All, [not one,

* or fome^ which might he Chance , hut All^ ~\

* the Doggs which Followed the French

* Army Ran from them to the Smtzersy

* Leaping and Fawning upon them, as if *they had been Bred and Fed by them

* all their Lives. And in the Morning ^ Following. Trivulzi and Tremovilli Gene-

^ rals

C ^01 ]

* rails for Lems the i zth were by thefe ' Imperial Sivitzers utterly Broken and ' put to Ruine.

But to Proceed, What will an Epicu- rean, or meer So?72atijij fay to the Corps- Candles, or Dead Mens Lights in Hales ? if all be true that is Reported of them in Mr. jB s. Hiftorical Difcourfe. Ck 6. And Methinks his Vouchers are Good. I will Relate the Account they give in their own Terms 5 The Firrt is one Mr. Lerris, who in his Firft Letter to Mr. jB. (October 20.

1656.) fpeaking of the Appearance of thofe Lights which are called Vcad-Mens Candksy before Mortality, He fays, ' This is fo or- ' dinary in moft of our Counties Q of ' Wales] that I never fcarce heard of any ' fort young or old, but this is feen be- ' fore Death, and often obferved to part ' from the very Bodies of the Perfons, all ' along the way to the Place of Burial, and ' Infallibly Death will Enfue. In his nird ' Letter Dated Fehr. ^4. 16^6. He fays, ' as for the Candles, all the Parts I know ^ of Wales, as our Neighbouring Counties ' (as I hear) have Experience of them, I ' fcarce know any Gentleman, or Minifter

* of any ftanding, but hath feen them 5 ' and a Neighbour of mine, will fhortly ' be at Worcefier Abiding ( who hath feen

* them often, and I will Dived: fome to

^' Acquaint

C 2CI ]

* Acquaint you, and upon Oath, if need ^he,J a very Credible Aged Perfon-, for ' my Part, I never faw the Candles 5 ^ but thofe of my Houfe have, and on a ^ Time fome two years Paft, it was told

* me by them, that Two Candles were ^ feen, one Little, and a Great one, Paf- ^ fing the Church way, under my Houfe, ^ my Wife was then great with Child, and

* near her time, and (he Feared of it, and

* it Begat fome fear in us about her, but ^ juft about a Week after, her felf firit *■ came to me fas fomething joyed that the

* Fear might be over) and faid (as true it ^ was) an Old Man, and a Child of the

* Neighbourhood Paflfed that fame way to

* be Buried. This (he and I can Depofe.

Thus that Gentleman ^ who at that time (as Mr.JB. (tiles him) was a Learned Juftice of Peace, and feems by his Letters to have been a very Cautious Circumfpeft Perfon, and a Perfon of Great Veracity, and therefore a Perfon who cannot be Im- agined to go about to Deceive, or that could be Deceived himfelf in a matter Re- prefented to him (as this wasj as of Gene- ral obfervation. For it was Eafie for him to know if the thing were of fo General Obfervation or Note, ( fince it was but to Ask People,) and if it was, it could not be Falfe, as having the Te(timony of com- mon

[ 20Z 3

mon Knowledge and Experience to Avow it 3 and if it was not, it would be Teme- rity in him to believe it true •, fince it wanted even that Evidence that u as Pre- tended to ground it •, but it feems the Gen- tleman Inquired , and found the thing Confirmed ( as he fays ) by General Ex- perience, and I believe him too Honeft to fay it, if it had not been fo. Befides, what he mentions in Relation to his Wife and Family, if well Contidered, Adds no little ftrength to the whole Story. And in Fine, he brings one Mr. Da'vis for his Voucher.

This Mr. Davis in a Letter that he w^rote to Mr.B. at the Requeft of Mr.L£2v.«r, is more particular and Full than that Gen- tleman, in Reference to thofe Lights, and therefore ("the Matter being Rare and Curious, and well Deferving to be made a fubjeft of Inquiry by the Noblefi: Wits) I will Tranfcribe it at Large. M am to ^ give you, fays he, the Beft Satisfaction I ^ can touching thefe Fiery Apparitionsy

* which do as it were mark out the way ^ for Corpfes to their Y^oiiJJATcpiaj and that ^ fometimes before the parties themfel ves fall

* Sick, and fometimes in their Sickntfs. Of

* Thefe I could never hear in England^ ^ they are Common in thefe Three Coun- ^ lieSyCardigaH) Caermarthen^^ndPembrookey

^and

[ 204 ]

^ and as I hear^in fome other Parts of Wales,

^ Thefe (p<xvmrrijicc% in our Language

*we call Cankppyllau Cyrth {i.e.) Corps-

' Candles 5 and Candles we call them, not

* that we do fee any thing elfe befides ^ the Light, but becaufe that Light doth ' as much Refemble a Material Can-

* die Light, as Eggs do Eggs, faving that ' in their journey, thefe Candles be ^ modo Apparent&s, modo Difparentes^ Ef-

* pecially, when one comes near them 5 ^ and if one come on the way againft them,

* unto him they vanifli 5 but prefently ap- ^ pear behind him, and hold on their

* Courfe. If it be a little Candle, Pale or ^ Blewifh, then follows the Corps either

* of an Abortive^ or fome Infant^ if a Big ' one, then the Corps of fome one come to

* Age 5 if there be feen two^ or three, or ^ more, forae Big, fome Small together, ^ then fo many, and fuch Corps togetlier^ ^ if two Candles come from Divers Places, ' and be feen to meet, the Corpfes will ^ the like , if any of thefe Candles be ^ ktn to turn fometimes a little out

* of the way, or Path that Leadeth unto ' the Church, the following Corps will be

* found to turn in that very Place, for the

* Avoiding of fomeDirty Lane,or Pla(h,(^c.

* Now let us fall to Evidence, being about

* the Age of Fifteen, Dwelling at Lanylar,

' late

L 2.cy ]

* late at Night, fome Neighbours faw one ^ of thefe Candles Hovering up and down ^ along the River Bank until they were ^ weary in Beholding, at laft they left it ^ fo, and went to Bed, a few Weeks after ^ came a Proper Damfel from Montgomery ^ Shire, to fee her Friends, who Dwelt ' on the other fide of that River Iftwythy

* and thought to Ford the River at that

* very Place wliere the Light was feen 5 ' but being Diffuaded by fome Lookers on, ^ (fome its moft like of thofe that faw^ the ^ Light to Adventure on the Water, which

* was High by Reafon of a Flood-, (he walked ^ up and down along the River Bank, even

* where, and even as the forefaid Candle ^ did,waiting for the Falling of the Water, ^ which at laft (he took, but too foon for ^ her, forfhewas Drown'd therein

' Of Late, my Sexton s Wife, an Aged ' Underftanding Woman, faw from her ' Bed, a little Blewifh Candle upon her < Tables end, within two or three days ^ after, comes a Fellow in, Enquiring for

* her Husband, and taking fomething ''from under his Cloak, claps ic down ^ directly i^on the Tables end, where fhe ' had feen the Candle, and u hat was it

* but a Dead born Child : Another time ' the fame Woman , faw fuch Another ' Candle upon tlie other end of the felf

' fame

C 206 ]

' fame Table, within few days after, a ' Weak Child, by my felf newly Chrift- ' ned, was Brought into the Sextons Houfe, ' where prefently he died ♦, and when the

* Sextons Wife, who was then Abroad,

* came home , fhe found the Woman ' Shrouding of the Child, on that other ^ end of the Table, where fhe had feen the ^ Candle. On a Time my felf and a

* Kinfman coming from our School in « England, and being three or four Hours

* Benighted, ere we could reach home,

< were firft of all Saluted by fuch a hight

< or Candle, which coming from a Houfe,

< which we well knew, held his Courfe <■ { but not Diredly ) the High- way to

< Church -^ fhortly after the Eldeft Son in ^ that Houfe Deceafed, and (leered the ^ fame Courfe. My felf and my Wife in an

* Evening, faw fuch a Liglic, or Candle, ^ coming to the Church, from her Mid- ^ wifes Houfe, and within a Month, (he ^ her felf did follow 5 at which time my

* Wife did tell me a (tory of her own Mo- ^ ther, Mrs. Catharine Wyat, an Eminent ^ Woman in the Town of Tenbj'y that in

* an Evening being in her Bed-Chamber,

* ihe faw two little Lights juft upon her

* belly, which (lie Afifayed to ftrike off with

* her hand, but could not-, within a while

* they vanidied of themfelves. Not long

' after,

[ 207 3

* after, fhe was Delivered of two Dead- ^ born Children : Long lithcnce there hap- ' pened the like in uiy own Houfe^ but

* to a Neighbours Wife, whom my Wife ^ did fometimes call for, to do fome work ^ or other •, and ( as I Credibly heard ^ within thefe three days ) to fome Good ^ Gentlewoman alfo in this very Parifli 5 ^ where alfo not long (ince, a Neighbours ^ Wife of mine, being great with Child, ' and coming in at her own door, met ^ two Candles, a Little, and a Big one, ^ and within a little after, falling in La- ^ bour, fhe and her Child both Dyed.

* Some Thirty four, or Thirty five years ^ bygone, one Jane Wyat my Wives Sifters ^ being Nurfe to Baronet Rudds three ' Eldeft Children, and (the Lady Miftrefs

* being Deceafed ) the Lady Controuler of ^ that Houfe going late into a Chamber ' where the Maid Servants Lay, faw there ' no lefs than five of thefe Lights together. ' It Happened awhile after, the Chamber

* being newly Plaiftred , and a Great ' Grate of Coal-fire therein. Kindled to

* Haften the Drying up of the Plaiftring 5 ^ that five of the Maid-Servants went ' there to Bed, as they were wont •, but ' (as it fell out) too foon, for in the Morn- ' ing they were all Dead, being Suffocated [ ( I conceive ) in their Sleep with the

^ Steam

C 2C8 ]

fteam of the New Tempered Lime, and Coal. This was at LUngatben mCaer- martberjjljire.

' Some 1 hiity three or Thirty four ' years ago, upon a Tuefday coming towards home from Cardigan^ where I had been enjoyned toPreach the SeiTion-Sermon: In- cipente adhuc Crepufculo, and as light as Noon, and having as yet, Nine long Miles ^ to Ride, there feemed twice or thrice ^ from behind me, on my right (ide, and

* between my Shoulder and my Hat, to ' fly a little whitifh thing about the big- ' nefs of a Walnut, and that per hitervaUay ^ once in feventy or eighty pace : at firft I ^ took no notice of it, thinking it had been ' but the giimpiing of my little Ruff, for

* fuch then I wore, by degrees it waxed ^ reddifli, and as the night drew on. Red- der and redder, at laft not Ignis fatuusy

* (for that I partly knew^ but Purus -putus ' Ignisy both for Light and Colour. At ^ length I turned my Horfe twice or thrice ' to fee from whence it came, and whether ^ it would flafii into my face, then nothing

* I could fee ♦, but when I turned home- ^ wards it flafted as before, until I came ' to a Village called Llamijlid, where as « yet I did not intend to Lodge, though ^ there were four Lodgings, and

* onaof them (fave one^ the next Houfe

Mn

*in my way, which when I pafled by *clofe, being juft againft the door, my Fire

* did flafh again upon, or very near the ' Threfliold, and there I think it lodged, ' for I faw it no more^ home ftill i would ' go, but bethinking my felf, that fo I ' might tempt God, and meet a worfe ^ Companion than my former-, I turned to ' the farthelt Lodging in the Town, and ' there after a little reft, in a brown ftudy ' K becaufe mine Hoft was an underftand- ' ing Man, and Literate, and fuch as ' could,^ and had but lately read his Neck- ' Verfe in pure Roman Language) I could *not contain, but muft needs tell him of ' the Viflon, he the next day to fome go-

* ing to the SelTions, they to others there, 'at iaft it came to the Judges ears, info- ' much that the greateft News and Won- ' der at the then AiTizes was the Preachers ' Vifion. To come at length unto the Pith ' or Kernel (^for I have been too long a- ' bout the Husk and ShellJ at that very 'Seflions, ont John William hloyd, a Gen- ' tleman wh.o dwelt, and whole Son yet ' dwells within a Mile of Glaflerig, fell ' Sick, and in his coming homewards, was ' taken with fuch a violent Paroxifm, that ' he could Ride no farther than the Houfe, ' where I left my Fire to Entertain him, ' and there he lighted and Lodged, died

P about

[210 ]

^ about four days after. Ex Ahundanti, *you fhall underftand that fome Candles

* have been feen to come to my Church ' witHin thefe three weeks, and the Corp-

* fes nojt long after. , ., . ,x ,. .

Mr. Davis feems to have been a Learned ''and'Underftanding, as well as a Pious Re- ,'ligious Mwi^^y, and therefore his Tefti- mony muft needs carry, with Conffderate and tiiinking Men the more Authority and Forces but now I camiot ftay to prefs it ' farther.. In truth, I have ftaid fo long al- / ready on this Head of Argument, and efpecially on the Dead Mens Candles^ that nothing can excufe it, but the Rarity and Surprizingnefs of the Subjed. Wherefore I will only defire theAnti-pneumatifi toRefolve ' me, how thefe Dead Mens Candles come to be Lighted, and hoiv to be direfted to ', go fo right from the Houfe of the Perfon ' whofe Death they do prefage, to the Church, or Church-yard where he is to '"be Lodged, without the influence of Spi- rits, or fome Invilible, but Kjio wing and Sagacious, ay, Fore-Knowing Beings 3 I 2^0 w proceed to the next Argument.

SU&

1 111 3

SUBS. III.

The Third Argument from Apparitiofu. Three Stories of them from the Junior Pliny, tn his Epijiles. A Recent Story cf an Appa- . rition.

AND the next Argument fthe laft I will infift upon) to prove the Ex- iitence of Spirits, (hall be taken from their Apparition. By their Apparition, I mean , their fhewing of themfelves to Men in hu- , man (or other Animal; fhape, and fo ^.A^ppverfingand dealing with them 5 I know . the word is, and may be taken more largely, but this is the fenfe I take it in , now.

On this Occafion I muft mention again

the Epiftle of P%, which he fent his

In^nA Sura, to have his Opinion upon

. this Queftion, Whether really there were

p; apy fuch things as Spirits, that have a Fi-

I. gure of their ov/n, and are a kind of Nu-

,mens', or elfe, that all are meer fancies,

;,.and effe^s of fear, Vvithout any fubftan-

tial Real Being. P% himfelf declares,

that he believes their Real Subfiftence,

and owns he was induced to it by three

.&m>j, which he there relates, and I will

I Repeat.

P 2 The

[212 3

The firft is, concerning 2^ Curtius Ru- fus, to whom being in Jf/r/c^., ' where he followed the Qu<elloY, that had that Pro- vince affigned to him, there appeared as he was walking alone, a thing in the (hape of a Vv oman of great Beauty, and of a fize much larger than ordinary, which told him that he Ihould fee the City of Rome once again ^ fiiould bear very ho- nourable Charges-, and in fine, return unto Africk, with Supream Command, and there die. All which could not but much furprize a Perfon that was very mean and obfcure, (for fo was Q^Curtius at that time,) and yet fays Tliny, it came all to pafs to a Tittle. He adds, that Cur- tim Sailing to Carthage, as foon as he came on Oioar the fame Spe^re appeared to him a^ain •, and that afterward falhng Sick, with a Sicknefs which none about him thought any any danger of, he re- membring what the SfeBre had told hiin, and comparing paft Events with future, abandoned all hopes of recovery, and iff' fine, according to the Prediftion^of the Apparition, and to his own perlwafionj dies in Africk This Story is alfo m T^- citm. ^ . ^^ . .

The next is of a Magnificient Houle m Athens, that was Haunted, but in fo ter- ribie a manner, that all that dwelt in it

died

died with the fright ^ fo it lay void a long time. But at laft, a Philofopher called AthenodoYUf^ coming to Town, and want- ing a Houfe, and feeing an infcription upon this, that it was to be Lett, and for a very low price 5 he liking the Houfe, and admiring the lownefs of the price, inquires, and was fully informed of the Reafon He refolves however to take it, and the rather, for that it was faid to be Haunted. Accordingly, in the Evening he orders a Bed to be made for him in the forward part of the Houfe, next the door, and that a Writing-Table, and a ' tile to write with, as alfo Light fliould be pre- pared •, which being done, he difpofes all his Donneftlcks in the inner part of the Houfe, and then applies himfelf to medi- tation and Writing ^ by that means im- ploying both his Thoughts, his Eyes, and his Hands-, leaft other wife liis un-in'^^aged mind fhould be poffelTed of fear, and ihis impofe upon him. While he was thus occupied, all wasfilent, iiill, and quiet for a whiles but at laft he hears at a di- ftance the clattring of Iron, and jingling of Chains, which yet did not fo much di- fturb him, but that, without looking up, he continued his Writing, and incouraged himfelf all he could. In the mean time, the noife increafes, and comes nearer and P 3 nearer 3

C 214-3

nearer^ firft without doors, aftewards within, which makes him look behind him, and tlien he faw a nioft- teiTibl^ Spckrej in (hape the fame as had been re- prefented to him 3 to wit, a Lean, Meager, Deformed Old Man, with a Long Dang- ling Beard, his Hair ftanding an end upon his Head •, gives upon his Feet, and Chains' in his hands ^ this Old Gehtleirian flood* ft ill, and feemed to becken with his finger as if he had called to Athenodonu. Atheno- dorus anfwers him the fame way vvith his hand, intimating to him, thathefhould ftay a while, and then goes on writing. Bat the Spe^ire ratUng his Chains over the Philofophers Head, obliges him to look up the fecond time, when feeing the Specire ftiU beckning as before, he takes up the Light and follows him ^ who leads the way, but very foftly, as one loaded vi^ith Fetters-, and at laft, at a certain place in the Area of the Houfe, he Vanifhes, atid leaves JthenodoHs alone. Athenodor/ts being thus left, gathers fome Herbs and Leaves, and what he could f:rape together, and puts them on the place as a mark 5 and the next day applying himfelf to the Chief Magifti'ate, acquaints him with the Stcry, and advifes that the place fhould be digged, Which being done, there were fouild Ae Bonies of a Mdh-, and Chains,

but

L^i5 J

but theFlefh entirely Confumed5 they gather th6 Bones together and bury them, ' after which the Houfe was Haunted ' no ' Longer. ' ^yi^:jiicd i.-

The Two former Stories, tho' they are Related by Pliny but upon TraditionTeem very Credible, But the Third, which follows, he tells of his own Knowledge. He had, he fays, a Cer.ain Freed man, whofe Name was Marcus, a Learned Un- derftanding Perfon. This Marcus ont Time' a^ he was lying in Bed with his younger Brother, thought, that he faw fomething fitting on the fame Bed, that, with a Rafor, bhaved his Head all over 5- aiid in the Morning it was found, that Really his Head had been Shaved, the Hairs' Lying all about the Place. Not Long after fays Fihiy^ Another, the Like Acci- deilC Hapned, that Confirmed the Former. For a Certain Youth Lying with many Others in the Servants Lodgings, there came unto him through the Window, {for fo the Youth Related the Story ) two Per fons in white Tunicks, who, as he Lay, fell to Shaving of him, and having done it, B^eturned the fame vi^ay they came-, and that this was a Reall Thing, _^nd not a Dream only, or only a Fancy between Sleeping and Waking, was Mani- feft^d (fays the Author; by the Day/ for " "^ ' ~ "' ' ' P 4 ' ^ ' when

[ 2i6 ] when this came^ it was feen that the Youth was shaved, and that the Hairs lay Scattered about the Bed.

rhefe are the Inflances that Convinced Tliuy^ a Perfon ufed to Bufinefs, Wife, and Circumfpedl, not Credulous, or Eafie to be Impofed upon, and Abufed^ to w^hich 1 will Add bui: one more , but that (hall be a recent one, of our own 1 ime, and well Attefted : a Story Licen- fed by a Perfon of Quality, and of Great worth •, who I believe has more Honour than to fuffer the World to be Palm'd upon by what He knew a Falfity ^ and Greater Prudence than to give fuch a Story a Licenfe without fome Inquiry after the truth of it. The Story is This, ' The 2z oi February J jdyi, we ("fays the ^ Mailer that tells it ) Sailed from Graves-

* end ^ and the iCth^y Gods Providence we ^ Sailed over the Bar oiNewcaJile, and there ' Loaded the 2d. of March. About Nine ' or ten of the Clock in the Night Fol-

* lowing, we having made all clear and

* Ready for the Furtherance of our Voyage, ' fome time after Supper I went to keft, ^ when about twelve of the Clock in the ' Night 5 to the beft of my Remembrance, ^ I was Awaked out of my Sleep by a ^ Great Noife^ ( but faw nothing ) which I to the beft of my Capacity bid me Be gone^

^ and

C 2.17 ]

^ and that I had nothing to do there, but ^ being fo haftily Difturbed, and not cer- ^ tain what might be the Caufe, I gave it

* over for a Dream, and pad that Accident ' as Uncertain of the Truth. Now after ' the Firft Day was Paft, about Eight or ^ Nine of the Clock at Night I went to ' reft 5 and about Twelve, my Mate was ' ftrikinga Light to take a Pipe of Tobacco ' fas 1 fuppofe; and Expeding the Wherry ' to go up to the Town, being the Tide

* fell out about Tv/o in the Morning, 1 ^ defired the Candle might not be put out, ^ and bting as well Aiva^e as now I am, to

* the beft of my Remembrance, I was then ' Tulled by the hair of my head off from ^ my Pillow, and the fame words Declared

* unto me as before 3 and then I faw the Fer- ^ feci Face and Proportion of a Man, in a

* Black Hat, Stuif-Coat, and Striped Neck- ' Cloth, with Hanging down hair, and a ' fowre Down-looking Countenance, and ' his Teeth being fet in his Head, I had then

* time to fay. Lord have Mercy upon me, ' What art ? at which he Vaniflied, yet ' the Candle Burned very Blew, and al- ^ moft went out ; Hereupon being much

* Difcontented, I did by the Following

* Poft give my owners a juft Account of ' what had Befallen me.

The

[ 2l8 3

' The Fifth of that Inftant, we fet Sail: ^ about four of the Clock in the Day, the ' Wind at W. S. W. fair. Weather, and. a

* Brave Gale off the Shore, which, Con- ^ tinued until half an hour after Eleven on

* IVednefday night', at which time the Man ^at the Helm called out that he could not 'ftir the Helm : but after I had pulled off ' the Whip-rtaff 5 the Ship fleered as before, ' being ftill fair Weather, the Wind then ' coming to the N. W. and Snowing VVea-

* ther, but very fair and clear. I was yet ' Doubtful of more Wind •, and therefore

* caufed the Men to furl the Fore Top-fail,

* and Lower down the Main Topfail upon ^ the back of the Main, fail, but cou.ld^ript ' with all theftrength we had hale in ^ the ' Weather brake off the fore Top-feil, ' vvhen this was ftiU in my judgmenr, ^ that our Ship did hale as mucn, as whei^ ^our fails were out, then we haled up ^ our Main-fail, and ftill the Ship had the ' fame Lift $s with a Large Wind, whicl\ ' to my Judgment miight be half a ftreak, ^ or thereabout ^.

' By This time it was Two of the ' Clock, tiien o.ur Men tried the Pump, ' and found Little or no Water in her : ^ the Man at the Helm called out, that ' the Candle Burned fo Blew in the Lan-

' thorn ^

' thorii 5 that it gave Little or no Light,

* and three feveral times went out, fo that

* Lheld the Candle to the Look-out, which « Candle did burn very well, and iliewed ^ a good Light, but of a fudden our Ship

* would not feel the Helm fo kindly as ' before, and brought all our Sails Abacic,

* then- our Ship heeled as much to Wind- ^ ward, as before to Leeward : the Glafs

* being out, we went to the Pump, and ^ found no Water in the Ship, but fhe ' did not fteer well, Neither could I find ^ the Reafon, being ftill fo fair Weather, ^ this unkind fteerage made me Urgent

* to try the Pump yet more, but I could

* not get the upper Box to work, nor

* ftir, but having taken that up, and try- ' ing with the Pump-hook, we could not ^ come near the Lower Eox by a foot and ^ half, which to tny Judgment was Hin- ' dred by fomething like a Bull-fijh or ^ Woolfack, that as we forced down,gave

* up again with the Hook ; Whereupon

* Miftrufting that all v/as not well, I ' caufed our Men to keep the Coat of our

* Pump up 5 and my felf Loofned the lack,

* in the mean time I ordered two Men to

* Loofe the Boat, which they did being

* Lafhed in three Places : yet they do not

* Remember to this hour, that they Loof- ^ ned any of them but the Middlemoft 5

* and

C 2.ZO ]

* and with three Men in her, the Boat ' went over the Top ot ths Forefheet, ' which lay above the (tern, without «• Touching it, with fuch Violence, as

* even Amazed us that faw it^ And they

< that were in the Boat, gave fuch loud

* cryes, as frighted him at the Helm, who ' came Running out unknown to me,, but

* finding the Ship coming nearer the Wind

* then formerly, I Ran to the Stair-cafe,

* to bid him put the Helm over, but

* could not : and hearing one jump down

* at the Hatch, which was open-,. at the « half-deck, did fuppofe that the Helms- ^ man came Down again ^ and calhng him

* by his Name to come and help me, the

* word was no fooner out of my Mouth. ' but I Perceived the fame Perfon that I

* had formerly feen before we came out of ^ the Harbour •, who came violently to

* me, faying, be gone, you have no more « to do here. Throwing me in at the

< Cabbin door, clear upon the Top of

* the I able-. When I crying out, In the

* Name of God w^iat art, he Vanijbed ' away in a Flafh cf Fire •, thinking withal

* that the Ship had ffto in a Thoufand

* pieces, it giving fuch a Crack, i he Men i thereupon calling out, Mafter, if you be ' a Man come away, did fomething Re-

< vive me, and ftriving to have got to my

' Chert

L ^21 ]

* Cheft, being I had got fome Money ia ' it, 1 found that fomethin^ Hindred me,

* but what it was I could not tell. Then

* Perceiving the Main Sea coming in fo

* Faft, that I was up to the w^ift, before

* I could getojt of the Cabbin, and find- ' ing all our Men in the Boat but only ' one, I deiired him to get a Compafs ^

* which he did, yet could never after

* know what became of it. We were no

* fooner in the Boat, but the Ship San^i^ ^ Down, and yet having a Great Sea Fur ' Gown, which lay upon the Dicker, up* ' on the Ships going Down, the very up-

* fet of the Water brought it to the Boats

* fide, and one of our Men took it in, we ' Reckoned our felves to be Ten or Twelve ' Leagues E, S, E. from the Spern, 1 Per-

* ceived the Fane at the Main-top-Maft- ^ Head, when the Ship was funk: w^e ' Continued in the Boat from three in the ^ Morning till ten or eleven that day , ^ when we were taken up by a Whitby ' Ketch, who ufed us very Kindly, and

* towed our Boat at his Stern with two ^ Ends of a Haufer, till (lie brake away ; ^ She being Bound for Neivcafile, and the ' Wind being Contrary, did on the Satur- ^ dd) Following, fet us a Shore at Grimshy ^ in Hull River, v.here the Mayor gave us

* a Pafs for London. This is a True and

' Perfea:

L 222 3

^ Perfeft Relation to the beft of my know- ^ ledge in every Refpedt. John Vye Mafter. ^ And Attefted by Nine Men more ail Be-

* longing to my Ship.

' I Had forgot to Exprefs, that one fide

* of my Face is Burnt and Blafted forely,

* which I felt within half an hour after I

* was gone out of the Ship ; but hov/ it

* came upon me in the Ship I could not ^ tell being then in a Great Horror and

* Amaxement. Thus John Vye.

Thisfeems an Undeniable Evidence of the Reality of Apparitions.

SECT.

I ^-^? ]

SECT. III.

'The Apparition of Spirits twofold^ Real^ or Vifional 5 both vp.ys Explained. A Con- ceit about the Appearing of Ghofis Re" jected. that moji Apparitions of Spirits are Vifional^ not Real, Evinced by fever al .Con[iderations, 'Some - Phenomena of ' Apparitions Salved, Of the Dijiri- lution if Spirits,

I HIS Laft Argument for the Real Exiftence of Spirits taken from Apparition J Invites me to Confider the Jfiijx in which they ufe to Appear. And There are two ways in which they do, or may Appear^ the one Real, the other I call Vifional.

' I call it Real Appearing, when they prefent themfelves to Tome of the Out- wai'd fenfes , and ( particularly to the Eye,) in Tome thing' that- does -Really AfFed: it-, and To,. by means-of the fenfe, ( in the fame way^as all Corporeal External ObjeBs do) they Affed and ftir the Im'agi- nation. I tall their A{)peafing Fifional, when by Affeding or Stiring the Imagi- fiationy they bccafion fuch Appearances as ftem External: to thfefje, or other fenfes^

tho'

L 224 J

tho' indeed there is nothing that does re- ally afRa it, or them, from without. This Conception is grounded upon comon Ob- fervation. For tew are ignorant that things appear as external to the fenfe, not only when impretiicns are made upon it from without, by real Objects that move it, hut aljo when the imagination is fmart- ly ftricken by fomething from within, for fo it is in Dreams, in which all things do feem as really tranfaited for the time-, (and not feldom, where the impreflion is very ftrong, even after that men are a- wakenedj as when the External Senfe is affeded by Objeds.

Well then, in real Apparitions of Spi- rits, the external fenfe is immediately af- affefted •, but in thofe that are Vifional, the Imagination.

The real appearing of Spirits is gene- nerally thought to be performed, either by their aflfuming of Bodies that are al- ready prepared 3 or by Figuring the Air, or fome other Elementary Subftance into the (hapes in which they appear •, which latter is done by the Vlaliic Power of the Imagination ^ a Power a Spirit is believed to have, becaufe we truly experience fuch an one in our incorporated felves, not only upon the Sfirits in the brain, which are Figured into a Thoufand (hapes at our

pleafure,.

Z 225 1

pleafure, in the feveral things we do imagine-, but in fome cafes, upon exter- nal Bodies ^ as in the Signatures of the i£tu6 y not to mention other lefs certain, but ftrongly aflerted inftances.

And indeed, I take the former thought in this Matter, for a much more probable one, than that of fome others 3 which is, that Spirits do appear by Condenfation ot their Vehicles^ anddifappear by Attenu- ating them^ this being not a very eafie Conception, for of what Matter muft fuch Vehicles confift ? ay, of ivhat vaft Exten- fion muft the Vehicle of a Spirit be, in its own proportion ? if when it is Condenfed and Shrunk fo much, as it muft to be- come an Objea of Senfe, it is yet in !>/- meyifion Equal, and fometimes Superiour, unto thai of a Man.

Some are of the Opinion, that Ghofis (by which I mean the Apparitions of Souls Departed; do for the moft part by virtue of their Formative YlafHc Power, frame unto themfelves the Vehicles in which they appear, out of the Moifture of their own defer ted Bodies^ this being a Matter that is believed more Congenial to them, and more Sympathetica!^ and for that Reafon, they fay, it is, that Ghofts do often appear in Church-Tar ds -^ and that they do not appear but /or fomjhort time,

Ol to

[ 2^6 J

to mty before the moifture is wholly dried upi as alfo, that the Ancients ufed to Burn not to Burie the Dead ^ for Cardan tells us, that during that Cuftom, there was no fuch Appearing of Ghofts as is now.

But this Opinion has very little ground ^ for beildes, that it does account but for li-^e Apparition of Souls, and not that of Angels^ good, or bad ^ tho' it is very pro- bable that Departed Souls, if at any time they appear, they do it the fame way that Angels are ufed to do, fince there is the fame reafon they fhould. I fay befides this, it is certain (if any Srories of fuch a nature are certain; that pretended Ghofts have appeared fo long after their deceafe from their feveral Bodies, that nothing could remain of thefe but the Duft ^ and it is alfo certain, that many Perfons have been feen (to all Appearances) while alive, in their proper shapes and Meen, and with the very Cloaths they were ufed to wear-, and this could not be done by means of Vehicles framed of their Radical moifture In truth, this laft is a very crofs Phcenomenon-^ a Thanomenonth^t ren- ders all vpparition of Ghofts uncertain and queftionable, iince it feems to infer, that it is not the Departed Soul it felf that appears^ whenever there is fuch an

Appari-

L 2 27 3

Apparition, but fome other Spirit that PerJof2at£s it.

For my own part, I fee many Difficul- ties in the way, of the real Apparition of Spirits 5 for belides that of the ajjuming of Bodies, many times they do Eat and Drink, and perform federal other rital ABionsy that feem very hard to be account- ed for in that way •, fo that I am much inclined to believe, fthat) their Appari- tion is moftly, if not only Vifional 5 not by an immediate aftedion of the External Senfe, but by affecting and ftriking the Imagination in the way I have mentioned before. And herein 1 am confirmed, in that it feems to have been the common Sentiment of all the Ancients^ who did for this reafon (as I noted before) call the ^fparitions of Spirits Fbantafmata, or Idola ; to wit, becaufe they were rather Imaginative^ than Real , not as Mr. Hohbs ^ would carry it, as if they thought that all ^ Spirits were only Phantafmata^ or meer Fancies, but becaufe they thought that Spirits ufed not to Appear but by affeding and ftriking the Fancy. And this is Evi- dent, in that they did call Apparitions not only Fhantajmatay or Images, but alfo Fneumata or Spirits-, by the latter Expref- fion (ignifying the nature of the things that did appear, as by the former, the rvay in Q^x which

C 228 3

which they appeared. Thus Luke, when he would' iRtimate that the Difciples ( at the time they faw our Lord after his Re- furreftion) fuppofed that they had feen a Spirit, does not ufe the word Fhamafma, as the two other Evangelifts, Matthew^ and Mark, do, on the Uke occafion, but the vjQX^Vnetma, Luke 24. 37- But they [the Difciples] were terified and frighted^ and fuppcfed they had feen a Spirit. [ vr, €U|oic. O I add, that from the different ExprefiTions that thefe Evangelifts do ufe, on the like occafion •, Matthew and Mark exprefling the fuppofed feeing of a Spirit, by kdug of ^ Phantafm, [ (p^r'/ao-^a, ] but Luke, by feeing of a Spirit-^ L'^vsdf^cL,'] one may infer, that when they thought the Apparition to beof aGc^o^ Spirit, they called it 7nevu.cc, or a Spirit-, but when of a Bad, they called it Fhantajma, as who would fay, a Sprite, an Hob-Goblin, an illufion of Devils -, without conceive- ing, what perhaps fome others will judge as propable, that they had an Opinion (as, if I do not mif-remember, the Modern Flatonip had J that Good Spirits did ufe to appear really, but had ones, by diftur- bing and troubling the Faticy,

Another Confideration that induces me to think the Apparition of Spirits to be moftly (if not always) Vifional, is, that

all

[ 2.29 ]

all Appearance will be the fame in this bu- finefs of Apparitions, upon the Hypoihejis that they are but Vilional, as upon that, that they are real •, fmce Common Dreams, in thofe that fleep-, and waling on&s in the Melancholy, the Maniacal, and the Hyfte- rical, do feem as real to them, as any things that are moft fo. And as fome Ap- pearances will equally as well be falved upon one Hypothefis as upon the other, fo there are others, that will be better falved upon the Vifional, than on the Real Hypo- ihefis 5 particularly this,that%flra are oft- en faid to be feen by one t^'erfonin a Room, that are not by others in the fame Room, tho' they look where they are faid to be feen. A Spirit may be eafily Conceived to affed and ftrike the Imagination of one Perfon, without doing fo to anothers ^ but that the fame External Object fliould be feen by one, and not by another that has the fame advantage, is fomewhat har- der to think, and I had almoft faid, can- not be conceived without a double Mira- cle. In fliort, one can better conceive how Spirits fhould eat, and drink, isfc. in the Vifional, than in the Real Hypo- thefis.

I know it may be told me, that it is

more ufual for Spirits to appear by Night

than by Day, and in Dark and Gloomy

Q J places,

C 230 3

places, than in open and lightfome ; an4 thole who hold the real apparition of Spi- rits, will think that they can give a bet- ter account of this Phammenon^ than o- thers can, who do believe it but VilionaL For they will fay •, thofe of them that do hold the Opinion of a Spirits appearing by Condenjation of his own Vehicle, that the Cold of the Night, as alfo of umbragious and gloomy places, where the Sun does not enter, or of folitai'y uninhabited ones, where Fire is not ufed, does much contri- bute to the Confpiflation of the Spirits Ve- hicle : And 7hofe that hold the Opinion that Spirits appear by Forming to them- felves a Body of Air, will fay, that the Spiffitude of the Air, which is greater by Night than by Day ('when the prefence of the Sun attenuates it,) and greater in gloo- my and uninhabited, than in lightfom and inhabited places, does make the For- mation of a Body (and by confequence their Apparition^ more agreeable and eafie to them. But what can be faid of this appearance in the Vifional Hypothefis.

I cannot forefee how very acceptable, or Gtherwife, fuch a Difcourfe as this will be unto others, but to me it is of an Af- ped: (that is) not very Agreeable. For that the Angelical Vehicle (hould be obnox- ious to the impreffions of Heat and Cold,

(as

C 231 ]

(as is in the Firft Opinion,) feems fome- what a grofs Conception 5 nor can 1 fee how the Spiffitude, or the Tenuity of the Air fhould iignitie much, either to further or to hinder the making a body of Air by a Spirit, (as it is apprehended to do in the femid Opinion,) if a Spirit be conceived (as he muft) to work Magically, and not Mecamically, in it. But not to infift on

this, but to anfwer direftly. The Reafon

then why Spirits do appear in the Night ^"^ rather than in the Day, and in dark gloo- my folitary places rather than in others, is from the Jile}]ce and vacancy that is at 'Aich times, and in fuch places, fo that the Ima- gination not being p^iTelfed, or diverted, by External Objeas, is more atteniive unto, and Coniequentiy more fufceptive of internal imprelnons -, there being the fame Reafon for this Phienomenon, as there is for fome others, to wit, our bet- ter hearing a Sound by Night than in the Day, and our feeing of the Images in a Darkned Room upon a Paper, or Wall^ that Difappear as foon as a greater Light is admitted.

By thefe and other Confiderations, Tarn more inclined to a belief of the Vijional^ than of the Real Apparition of Spirits •, the Former being accompanied with fewer Difficulties;, and alfo being a thing that is Q 4 eaffly

C -32- 1

eafily eonceived •, for one that thinks, will more eaiily admit an Angel can affecl and flir the imagination, (which we fee both many Dijiempers, and more Meats and Drinks can do ^ ) than that it fhould Cre- ate a Body, or affume one Created 5 or in fine, be able to alter i"s own Vehicle, fo much from its proper Dimenfion^ that the fqueezing of an Elephant into that of 1 Moufe, is of no Comparifon witli it.

I confefs, I fliould be more inclined than I am to the Real Hyfothefis^ if I could believe the Spagivical Kejtirretlion of Plants, or the Reality of Apparitions refembhng Men, that are faid to be feen in Diftilling- Veffels, upon the Diftillation of Human Bloody of which Teter Eoreltm (a Curi- cus. but too C redulous Author; tdls us in his Obfervations, Ceut. 4. Obf. 62. I fear, with more prefumption, than cer- tainty. For my part, I mufl: acknowledge my unbelief as to it.

I will only add, for the fuller clearing of the Theory of the Apparition of Spi- rits, that what Gravity or weight is in refpe£fc of Elementary Bodies, That a flrong Inclination or Hahit^ and WiH or Paffion is u -to Souls 5 and Confequentlj, that we feldom hear of thg Apparition of Any but of fuch as went otit of the Body with great RekUance 5 with a violent Paf- ■ ' fion

C ^3] ]

fion oi Revenge -, or with a ftrong Defire of having fomething done, that was in their will, but not in their power. And of the appearing of fucb we often hear^ but rvhether the Apparition is of the De- parted Soul it felf, or of its Reprefentathe only, to wit, fome Geuius '} erfonating the Deceafed •, and vphy (often times) it ap- pears unto Perfons no way concerned, and not to thofe that are, when it would have fomething revealed ^ as alfo the Laws of the Spiritual World, (for Laws there muft be, which do confine and regulate the motions of Spirits ^ ) thefe, and many o- ther points in the bufinefs of Spirits are all unknown unto me, and perhaps are only known unto God.

Ifhould now proceed to the Dijiribution of Spirits-, but this entirely depends upon the Hiftory of them, and we know but little of that Hiftory : Befides, there is in what we are thought to know, fo much of Tale, Romance, and Invention, that, upon ftrict inquiry, not one Relation of a hundred holds true, even of their Appari- tions-^ an Obfervation which obliged Lu- cian of old, and 7Hauy now, to Ridicule them all. Wherefore i refolve to Omit, as a Task too hard for me, to difcourfe of their Kinds^ and their Orders 3 only in

General.

[ ^?4 J General, I will adventure to affirm (if this be to Adventure, to fay, what few will deny,) that that there are fe- veral Species •, Angels in Heaven, and Devils out of it •, and perhaps a Lower fort of Spirits than thofe v\ e commonly call Devils. But for the Celefiial Hie- rarchy, as Dionyfius (the True, or the Fahe ) has fet it out, and the Diftinct- ion in it, that he makes of Seraphim, of Cherubim, of thrones, of Dominations, of Vertues, of Povpcys, of Principalities, of Arch' Angels, and of Angels-^ as alfo of the Politick Government of Devils, and the feveral Orders that are in it : One had need be a Saint, and as illu- minated with Revelation as Dionyfius himfelf was, to underftand the for- mer s and for the Latter, he muft be a Conjurer of the Higheft Clafs, and poflibly more than a Conjurer, to have any, or any certain Account of it. One that is Curious may find many, and very ftr nge, things upon this Sub- ject in Cardan, in his Books, de varie- tate, and de fuhttUtate -, and in Come- lius Agrippa, in his, of Occult Philofo- phy, L. I. C. J I. Fernelius alfo has fomething, which h^ has gathered out of Tlato, and others, concerning the

Kinds

C ^^5 ]

iJinds of Spirits, in his Treatife De Ahditis rerum Cau/is, L. i. C. ii. but all is but Guefs and Conje^fture. See Gafpar Schottus his Vhyjica Curiofuy L. i. C. 12. t!fc.

CHAP.

C ^]6 ]

CHAP. Vill.

Another "Ejfay about the Nature of Jnimah and Spirits,

SECT. I.

The Subject farther lUuJlrated, by a Compari- fin of the Univerfe mth a particular Ani- mal. The Univerfe a whole ^ Particular Animals hut Members of that whole, A Particular Animal is as an Organ with its faculty •, the Univerfe ^as a Body compofed of fever al Organs, with a Soul that endues thefe Organs with f ever al faculties, A De- monftration even tofenfe^ of a common Prin- ciple that penetrates throughout the Univerfe, In what fenfe a Soul is a faculty, and in what a Principle of Faculties. Two fenjes of the word Soul, and how in both, it may be conceived as a Principle of Faculties, The Soul in its ft ate of feparation becomes a Spirit } roperly. Soul is the name of a part, a Spirit the name of a whole Subftance, God the Central Sun, and Fountain of ail Souls and Spirits. The Emanation of Souls and Spirits from God, or from his Spirit, fet out in the Co7?2parifon of Light and Co- lours. Not only Fhilofophers, and Poets, hut even many Chrijiian Doctors, and par- ticularly St. Auguftin, compared God inre- fpect of his influence in and over the Vni- "verfey unto the Soul in a Man,

IN

L ^J7 J

IN the Precedent Chapter, I have offer- ed to my Reader fomething concern- ing the nature of Animals, as well thofe that are Invifible, called Spirits^ as thofe that are Vifible-, but the fubjeft being Obfcure, I think my felf obliged to turn it every way, to fee what further Light may be Given to it ^ and therefore I will now Enlarge upon one Point , in Relation unto it, that I did but touch before, whereby I hope to Illuftrate it.

It is Received on all hands, except by Cartejians, that in every vifible Animal^ as well as in Man, there is a Body Compo- fed of feveral Organs, and there are feve- ral Faculties or Powers, according to the feveral Organs 5 and there is a Common Principle (called a Soul) that Permeat- ing throughout the Body, doth Furnifh it in its feveral Organs with thofe feve ral Faculties.

Now, As all the Organs of any Particu- lar Animal, tho' being Compared one with Another, they are feveral, not Parts one of Another, but a kind of wholes, and have their feveral Faculties •, yet in refpeft of the Bodyy they are but Parts, and all In- fluenced by a Common Principle, which giveth being to its feveral Faculties, but is none of them it felf. Why may not

all

C 2?S ]

all the Animals, themfelves (as well the In- vifible as the VifibleJ that do Exift in the Univerfej be, in refpeft of this but as fo many Varts^ fo many Organs, (fome more Simple, others more Compound ) Aduated by fome Common Principle that Penetrates throughout it 5 and yet, in Re- fpecl one of Another, be feveral wholes^ that have their feveral Powders and Faculties ? And then> as all the Particular Animals would, in truth, be but as fo many feve- ral Organs Endued with feveral Faculties, in which the Organ or Syftem of Organs would be the Body^ the Faculty or Syftem of Faculties the Soul •, fo all of them taken together, would be an Entire Body [ of the Univerfe 2 Actuated by an Univerfal Principle, (as by a Common Soul) that fhould Endow it with thofe feveral Powers and Faculties. In fhort •, why may not the Univerfe Really be Body and Soul, and every Particular Animal as a part thereof) be Organ and Faculty, in the fame fenfe that in our ordinary C ommon way of Conceiving, every Particular Ani- mal is Body and Soul, and the Parts of it, Organs and Faculties ? But to Pro- ceed.

This is Certain, that what in Animals, and particularly in a Man, we do Com- monly

t ^19 ] monly call a Faculty, is neither that which commonly is called the Soul, nor is it meerly the Body, or any Part of the Body, but a Refuk 5 fome Third thing Arifmg from them both in Conjundiion. For the hye, for Example, tho" never fo well Qualified, doth not fee, unlefs the Mind or Soul do Attend •, and again, the yiiind or Foul, tho' never fo Attentive, cannot fee, unlefs it has the ufe of an Eye, to fee with 5 fo that the Power of feeing neither is in the Eye barely, nor in the Soul barely, but belongs to the Animal^ which is Soul and Body: as arifing from the prefence of the Soul in fuch a Particular Part, or Organ, of the Body, And the like is to be faid of other Powers.

And yet if all the Faculties that are united in Man, were fuppofed Separated each from other, vpith their feveral Or- gans, and fo to be in the Nature of wholes, and this without the fuppolal of any Thing elfe 5 for Example, that the Eye could fee apart, the Ear hear apart, and the longue tafte apart from the i:ody •, there would, to all Appearance, be fo many feveral Ani- mals, and Confequently fo many feveral Souls: So that what is called a faculty only, while it is in a part, is Denomi* nat^d a Soul, in the whole ^ and then, where the Body is a Compage, or Syftem

of

C 24^ ]

of Organs, the Soul muft be a Sjftefn of Faculties : and yet be one ftill, in the fame fenfe as the Body is.

But here I muft expe(5l it Jhall he told me, that the True and commonly Receiv- ed Notion of a Soul is, that it is the Vrin- cifle of the Faculties called Vital and Ani- mal, and not any one of them it felf, or any Syftem of them All: To which I Anfwer, that this is indeed the Popular and Common Notion, but how true it is, and how much Adjufted to the Nature of the Soul, cannot be underftood but by making fome Diftindion in the fenfe of word [Soul.]

The word [Soul] may be takeu two iraysy the one of which I will call the ^hilofo-phicaly the Other the Popular fenfe of this Word.

Firft then , word [ Soul ] may be taken Fhilojophically, as a Name of aU the Caufes together, that are neceflary for the Producing of Vital and Animal Acti- ons, in the feveral Species of Animals: and fo, tho' it is commonly confidered as if it were fome Suhftantial thing , that Differed from them All, yet indeed it is nothing but a Modification of their Adi- on, as they are All in Conjundtion. And Dicearchus, who Affirmed there was no

fuch

t. 241 J

fuch thing as a Soul, if he mesnt but thus, was very ^xcufable5 for in this fenfe, a Soul is nothing but a Refulty that is, a Mode of Ctmceiving y for this I mean by RefultJ of all the Caufes that muft be Joyned for Animal, or Vital Aftions, as they do either Oualifie, or elfe Jid, each others Influence. And in this fenfe, as a Soul, in refped: of the ABion, of a Particular Organ, may be called a Faculty 5 fo in refped: of the whole Body^ a Sou/, is a Syftem of Faculties. Thus Life in Animals , arifes from the Con- currence of many things 5 which things therefore, in that Concurrence^ as they are the Prince of Life, fo they may be called the Soul-, [for by Soul, is meant nothing, but the Principle of that, we call the Life-,] if one of thefe is wanting ( that are neceflary, J the Life ceafes, and we fay, the Soul is go72e 5 but then again, (fuppofing all the other Re- quifites Remaining as they ought to be^ and Ready to do their Parts,) if that one, which was wanting is Reftored, there is again a Concurrence of all the Caufes Requifite to Life, and fo, with the Life, the Soul is faid to Return, or come again. For Example, there is in Snakes, in Dor- mice, in Swallows, and in other Dormi- the Creatures of that kind, and (if we

R (haU

L M^ J (hall believe Guagmnus , apud Schottum , Phyf. Curiof. / i. p^r^ 2. C 38. ^. 4. ) in fome Men too, ( for fo he fays of the In* habitants of Lucvmoriay a certain Country of Ruffia, that there is) an Adual Sufpen- fion of the Exercife of Life in all the Spe- cies of it during Winter, while their Spi- rits lie Congealed and un-a^Sive 5 fo that tho' all the Organs of thofe Animals, in other Refpeds, are duly Qualified and Difpofed, yet there being not, for that feafon, fufficient Heat Imparted to them from the Sun, to put their Spirits in Mo- tion, Thefcy like Mercury while Cold, are wholly un'ad:ive,and fo for feveral Months there is a Ceflation of Life ( for Life is a Sort of Adtion^ in all the fenfible Inftances of it. But then again on the other fide, nothing being wanting but a due Heat, (as unto Mercury^ to put it in Aftual Mo- tion,) as foonas the Sun Returns, and with its warmth, Communicates that Motion that is Requifite to the Spirits, and other Parts^ for the Invigorating, and the ftir- ring of them, there Refults that Adion, or Fxercife of Organs, which vpe call Lifs^ and which in many Places of Holy Scrip- ture^ is called the Soul, tho' commonly we call the Soul the Vrinciple^ not the Exercife of Life ^ but then by a Principle we muft mean the Concourfe of all the Requifite

CaufeS;»

L 24^ J

Caufes, and fo the Soul in Effed: will be but a Vacuity, or rather a Syftem of Fa- culties. And fo much for the Fhilofo.phi. cal Senfe of the Word Soul.

But befides the Former, there is Ano- ther meaning of the word [Soul]; which I call the Popular, becaufe it is the moft ufual, and that is>^ when it is Taken not for all the Caufes together, or the Refult of them, as in the Former, but for the Principal and Chief Caufe of Animal and Vital Ailions, which in the Holy Scrip- tures is called the Spirit j [who k^oweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth Upward, or the Spirit of a Beafl that goeth Downward ?] And fo when a Perfon dies,he is faid to to give up his Spirit, to Give up the Ghoft,

And thus a Soul may be Conceived, a Syftem of very fubtle Refined M^^^er,fuch ^s Light, (but in fome more, in others lefe Refined) that gives the laft Difpofiti- on to aBody and itsOrgans for the receive- ing of Vital Cogitative Influence , from the Original Mind 5 it is the Texture and Quali- fication of the \Body, and the Organs that compofe it, that is the Ligameat and Bond of union between this fubtle Matter or Spirit, and That •, but it is the Subtle Matter or Spirit that is the Vinculum or Bond of Union between the Body and the Original Mind,

R 2 In

L 244 1

In this way of Conceiving ; This Sy- ftem of Subtle Matter while it is in the Body, tho' it is called a Spirit^ becaufe of its fubtlety, in truth, may be but a Souly that is 5 a Means only of Conveying the Vital Influence into the Body, from the Original Mind ^ but then again, out of the Body, as the Syftem of it may be, it may become a Spir/t properly fo called 5 it being then no longer a Part, (as a Soul mufl: V be), which is only a Mediate Sub- jed,) but a whole, and fo a Terminative Subjeft, of the Influence of the Original Mind : in (hort, it becomes a Suppofitum or Subfiftent by it felf. That the Soul is but a Mediate Subject while it is in the Body, and not a Terminative, fo that properly the Animal^ (which is Soul and Body,) and not the Soul only, is Agent in all that Pafles, feems Probable, in that all the Ordinary ABions of the Man, that commonly are faid to be the Souls, are plainly Organical-^ nothing can be In- stanced in, as Proceeding from the Soul while it is in the Body, that is not pro- perly Animal : even IntelleBion it felf, is not an Aftion only of the Soul, or Anima^ but (as the Latins would Exprefs it, ) an Auction of the Animus or Underftanding 5 rchich is to be Conceived as an Animal and Organical Faculty, that is, as a thing a-

rifing I

[^45 ] rifing Principally, but not only, from the Soul : for fo does Cotta Diftinguifli, apud Cicerol. 3. de nat, Deor, when he fays, Frohabilim 'videttir tale quiddam ejfe Ani- mum, ut Jit ex Igne^atque Animatemperatum. It is true, the Ordinary way of Con- ceiving is much othcrmfe, for the Soul is Conlidered by the /Moji, as if it were an Angel or Spirit, that only dwelt in the Body 3S in a Houfe •, and thus the Soul is the man^the Body but as a Taberuacle. or a Gar- ment to it : nor is this a meer Flatoiiical No- tion •. it is Conformable to the way of/peak^ ing in the Holy Scriptures-^aSjWhere St.Paid fays, 1 Dejire to he Diffohed, and to be with Chrift-j Alfo, where he tells the Corinthi- ans, we kjiovp if our Earthly Houfe of this Tabernacle rrere Diffohed, &c. And for certain, if the Theory of the Pre-extjience of Souls is a True one, this Opinion is beyond difpute. However, I will not De- termine in this matter, iince the Language of the Scripture is often Adapted but to the Conceptions of the Vulgar, and there- fore cannot be the Standard of Philofo- phical Truth 5 and it is certain, that even in our Saviours time a many Pythagorean and Platonical DoBrines^ and this in par- ticular of the Pre-exiftence of Souls, and the Souls being the Man, had obtained to be Vulgar among the Jews \ As appears by R 3 ' that

C 246 1

that Queftion of the DifiipleSy which they put to our Lord, was this ManBorn Blind for his orvn^ or for his Far ems fin ? for it fuppofes, that the Man might fin, and therefore alfo fuppofes that he was^ before he was Born, for he could not Sin, if he was not (in Being. J) Befides, the Genefis or way of Generation of Animals, feems to Favour the form.er opinion more than the latter -, for in the latter Opinion, the Soul is conceived as an Afftfiant, rather than an Informing Form^ and fo rather as an Animal^ than as a Vart of one: which doth not fo well confift with the Method of Generation. In fine, the Di- ftindtion between Souls and Abftrafl Spirits, as to their Natures, cannot be fet out with that Diftinftnefs and clearnefs in the Lat- ter, as in the Former Opinion.

But Take it either way •, if we Diftin- guifli Soul and Faculties, and do hold, that Animal A5iions are the EfFefts of Faculties, ^ut that the Soul is the Principal cauie of thoTe Faculties -, why may it not be Affir- med Cas I Hinted before) that the Mofai- cal Spirit is, unto all the Bodies in the Tilniv^fe, ("thofe of Invinfible, as well as pFVifible Animals ) what the Soul Con- xeiyed of, after this manner, is in our ftlves untQ mrs ? So that AH particular Animals inTefpe^'oftheUBiverfe,'ftrouki

be

C H7 ] be but as the feveral Organs in any Par- ticular Animal , and then Particular Souls fliould be but as fo many Torttons of the fubtle Matter y through which, and by means of which, the Mofaical Spirit (as a Soul of the Univevfe) (hould Radiate into the feveral Bodies, and give them their Faculties, In (hort, we may conceive particular Souls as fomany .J«/V«^ (for now I Diftinguifh, as Cotta. do's, between Am- mm and ihiima ^ ) and that the Animay that is the Sourfe of All thefe Animi, is but one, throughout the Univerfe. Why may not this be fo? And if it may, it muft, fince then, the being of Subordinate 4nima (^other than Animi would be fu* perfluous and unneceffary •, and beings are not to be Multiplied but on Ne- ceflity.

Befides, there is Reafon to think there is but one Soul Diffused throughout the Univerfe, if it be Allowable to make the fame Judgment in Reference to the whole, that, upon good Confiderations, may be Framed of the Parts which come Diftind:- ly within our View. For in this ler- reftrial World, as to the feveral Regions of it, the Animal, the Vegetable, and the Mineral, it is as certain, that all had but one Plajiicy as that the Body of a Man, or any pther particular Animal, had not R 4 more

C M8 ] more. The Evidence is the fame for Both. There is a fenfible Analogy and Correfpondence in Fabnc and Conibrma- tion, not only between the feveral Species of Animals J ( which is very manifeft in Comparative Anatomy)-^ but alib^ in a good degree, between Plants and Animals^ and Minerals and Plants. Again, there is a like Connexion between the Beings that fill thofe feveral Regions, as there is be- tween the Parts that compofe particular Animals 5 Ihere are no Vacuities-, or Gaps in Nature, in refped of Species, no Jumps or Leaps, but all in orderly Gradation : Extreams are Knit and United by Parti- ciples that partake of Both •, and all is full, without any Chafms. Thus ( to touch it in an Example ) Minerals and Vegetables are Joyned by Lithodendra or Stone- Plants, fuch as Coral and the like ^ Vegetables and ■Jnimals by Zoophytes or Plantanimals,fuch as the fenfible i:'lant, the Scythian Lamb, and the like. And in the General Kinds of Animals, between Fowls and Beajis, the Bat -, Between Pifhes and Fowls, the Flying Fi/h ; between Terreflrial and Aquatic Animals, thofe that are called Amphibiom, are Middle Uniting Species, &c. Farther, there is a Conformity in their Origination, as well as in their Strudure and Fabrick 5 for Plants as well as Animals are Produced

by

C H9 ]

by Semination ; and even Minerals and Mettals have their Matrices-, and tho' they have not what is properly called Seed, they have fomething that is Analogous in their Produdion. In fine, the 7ranfmutationoi things, and the Ealie Tranfition of them from one Region unto Another, evinces it. The Iran/mutation of Earthly and r queous Bodies into Vegetables^ is fo Obvious, as I need not to Inftance-, That of Vegetables into Animal Concretes is as certain, tho' not fo Obvious and Ufual. The Anima- tion of Horfe-hairs that fall into Pools in the Summer time, may be an Example 5 but thofe are more Adequate, that are Given in the Generation of Barnacles •, and in the Animation of the Branches of cer- tain Trees, I Vouch not thefe Inftances upon uncertain Report (tho' fome will be- lieve it no other,) but on the credit of a Perlon Grave and Unfufpedled, I mean the Excellent Schottm, who in his Fhjjica Curiofa, 1. i C 2c. among other Examples very pertinent to this purpofe, relates thofe I have mentioned, on his own Knowledge. Pili, ("fays he, e caudis equorum in aquam pluviam, foffts ac fcrohihns exceptant deci- denies Animantur, tff in graciles ac Longos vermes inflar Serpentum convertuntur, MP ipfemet nonfernel vidi. Aves Anatum forma ex Ramis Arborum decidui^ intra aquas in

Scotid

Scjoiia. ^ Hehridibus InfulU nafci teflantm tnuhi Scriptores •, Ipjemet vidi Ramorum ex- tremitaies paulatim unimafen^tiva. Informatas decidijfo £^ Avolajjfe.

Now, lb much Uniformity even in dif- formity ; fuch Connexion ^ and fo Ealie Iranfition from one Region into Another^ cannot be conceived to be in the World, without conceiving at the fame time, that as it had but one Author or common Plaftic at firft •, fo ftiil it has but one Principky that hath the ordering, the Difpofing the Framing and A(5tuating of it, in all its Parts.

But to make it more Conceivable, that all Particular Beings may be Animated by but Oney and yet being fuch Diverfity as they are, let us conti Jer that Glorious thing we call Li^ht, which as it Proceeds and IfTues from the Sun, is of one Nature, but meeting with divers Objecls, and Re- ceiving Different Modifications, according to thofe of the Objefts it meets with, is varied into a Ihmfand Colours^ of Different Natures from the tight, as well as ojnQ from Another. And it is even thus with the {'ital Energy y or Light that flow§ from God (the Intellectual Sun and Father of Spirits,) for thisy tho as it Proceeds and flows from him, it is but of one; Nature, y?t^ according tQ th§ ^odie^ it mefts with,

(it;

(it) becomes Diverfified and Varied, into a Thoufand (hall I fay ? or rather into In- finite Faculties and Powers, that, in their particular Natures, are as Different from the Original Vital Energy it felf, ( taken in it felf, ) as All are one from Another. In fhort, the h'rft Subject of VitaJ Energy i^ ihe Mofakal Spirit ^ but Thi^, as it is Received in Bodies of feveral Fabricks, Difpofitions and Textures, (a^ well in Vi- able, as in invilible Aftimals, ; become Diverfified into ieveral Powers and facul- ties •, or (which is the fame in Effect,) be- comes in Each a Prhcipk oi Aftioos that Differ one from Another, as much a^ the Bodies do that Inyeft it, and a« the Motions ^ that, by means of thofe Bodies, do AiFed and Modifie it. Modifications of the Co- gitative Faculties, or of the Immediate Principle that makes the jBdiig CogLtative, are called Ideas, or Images, and are the fame unto the .Mind, in the &r;/^, and the Underfirndpiig^ that Senflhle Species (^as they commonly are caUol ) are unto the Light in the Air ; for as ibefe are nothing but Modification of the Li^t, Xq Jhofe are of the Mind,

SECT.

C 252 3

SECT. IL

Several Objections againft the Former Hypo- thejis confidered, firft, that it tnakes Souls to be Faculties or Towers ^ whereas indeed they are JBions, or A5ls, This ObjeBion Jnfwered, and the notion of the Souls be- ing a Principle and Faculty^ rather than an ABion, cleared, *the Second Obje5lion^ that in this Hypothejis the Deity is conji- dered as an Immanent, and not {what he is) as a Iranfient caufe of all things^ Re- moved ^ and how he is both the one and the other ^ jhewed, and Confirmed by the Authori- ty of St. Auftin, and other Chriftian Fa- thers 5 as well as of the Chief eft Philofo- fhers. the Third ObjeBion, that hereby God and Nature are Confounded y Anfwer- ed, by jhewing how God and Nature are Viftinguijlied in this Hypothejis. Jhs Laft andflrongefl ObjeBion, that if there were hut one Original Perceptive Principle throughout the liniverfe, all Animals would have the fame Perceptions ^ which they have not. Jhis OhjeBion Removed^ and the Rea- fon of Different Perceptions in Different Animals cleared.

Iho'

L M3 J

THO' I have Endeavoured to Antici- pate Objeftions in theDifcourfe that 1 have made, all along as I made it, yet, to give them a farther clearing, and there- by elucidate more fully the Hypothefis that I Efpoufe, this Sedion (hall be Employed in propofing in exprefs Terms, fuch Ob- jeBions as do lye againft it, and in giving them the neceflary Anfwers.

The Firft OhjeBion againft this Hypo- thefis is, that it (peaks of Souls as of Facul- ties or Pouters, and not as of things that are EiTentially A^he 3 whereas a Soul is a Knowledge, a Cogitation 5 or at ieaft a thing that is alv^ays Bufie and Doing-, in- fomuch, that even in fleep it does not ail Reft, but that Men do always Dream when they deep, tho' perhaps they are not al- ways fenfible, that they do.

I know not how truly it is faid, that the Soul is always Bufie, and that MeB do always Drea^n when they fleep 5 but I could wifh they did only Dream at that Time 5 for then we fhould not be Trou- bled with fo many Groundlefs Fantafticfc Opinions. But to come nearer the Matter, I know a perfon who Affirms, that, to his Knowledge, he neijer Dreamt in his whole Life •, and certainly, fince we are

always

L ^54 J

always Ccnfciom that we Dream, when ever we do, we ought to believe we have not Dreamed at all, when we are not fen- fible we have. Befides, how do they know that the Soul is always Doing ^ foF my part, I am much miftaken if I da not Ex- perience in my felf Cwhat I think any o- ther may) that I am able to fuffetid aU Thought, or (as we commonly Exprefs it] think of nothing. To be fure, every one who hath made the Leaft Reflexion muft needs know, that as we have Eyes, and Ears, and other fenfitive Organs, and fo do fee, and hear, and are Confcious of o- ther Sentiments, in Cafe our Eyes and Ears and thofe other Organs which we have, are Imprefled by External ObjeSs 5 fb (ordinarily) we do neither fee, nor Hear, or are Confcious of any otlier fenti- ment of any External OhjeBs^ if thefe do not Affeft our Organs : without the pre- fence of Objeds v\ e are only faid to have the Faculties or Powers, that is, we are faid, only to be Able to fee, to Hear, tffc. but upon the prefence of Objefts, and the Application of our Faculties or Powers, we are faid to have the Exercife of them, and a6lually to See and Hear, ifc. Thus it is in the External Senfe, Now, fince the MinJ or Underftanding is an Organic cal thing as well as the External fenfe, I

fee

I- ^5S J fee no Reafon to think, but that as there is no Adual Senfation but when the Or- gans of the fenfe are ftirred, fo there is no Actual Intelledion but when that of the Underftanding is 5 and that tho^ we have always the Power of Underftanding, as we have that of feeing, yet we do not adually Exercife that Power, but when it is drawn into AB, by fome Impreflion up- on it, either from the WiU withitK, or from ObjeBs without-, any more than we do Actually fee, 6^c. but when the Eye, t^c. is AfFed:ed. In fine, fmce nothing of Co- gitation 15 done within las by the Soul Im- mediately^ but only by means of the Un- derftanding, or of the will, or of the fenfe. External, or Internal, and Ail thefe ^r€ rather faculties than Adions, I believe I hav^ Reafon to Conclude, that the Sotd is rather a Syftem of the Faculties, or elfe a Principle of them, than that it is a Per- f>etual iiever ceafing Exercife or Aftion, It is rather ABm, than AUioy in the Lan- guage of the Schools. Av\A tho in the O- pinion of thefe, it be Eflentially an Aft, ^^us Corpork^ an Informing form to the Body, m, in other Refpeds it is but ^Bm Frimusj not A5tu6 Secundus % for the' it be an Original Principle of Adion, and ib an Aaive Power, yet, in it felf, it is but a Power, and inot Afteally Aftive, or

A^ing

C 2y^ ]

Aaing, but in the Requifite Circumftan- ces. 1 hus we are Obliged to fpeak, to wit, inadequately^ in the Notions of P^a?er and ABy or Faculties and Exercife. And thus much for the Firft Objedion.

The Second is, that in this Hypothe/isy in the laft Refult, God is made the Imma- nent caufe, whereas Really, and accord- ing to the truth of Revelation, Gen. i. he is only a Tranfient Caufe of all things. But to this the Anfwer is Eafie •, for tho' in Gen. i: God is Reprefented ( as he is in Reality) to be the Almighty Creator of all, and fo as a Tranfient Caufe, yet in this fenfe, he is alfo the Immanent ^ that, by the Mofaical Spirit, he giveth Life and Being, and Motion unto all 5 and this according to the Apoftle, who fays, that in him we live, and move, and have our being 3 as well as to Common Metaphyficks^ which tell us, that all Beings are either Firft, or fecond Beings 3 and that Second Beings are Participations of the Firft. And however ftrange it may Look now, it was certainly of Old, the Common fentiment of all the Wifer part of the Worlds the Jemjh Dodors, as well as Gentile Philofophersy and even of many Ancient Fathers of the Chriftian Church 3 it would be Superfluous, as well as Tedious, to mention all ( if I could,) and therefore to

confine

C ^)7 3

confine my felf within Fitting Bounds , I will inftance two or three of the Chief for Examples. The firft (hall be Jpule us in his Book de Mundo (a Book afcribeJ to Ariftotle^ and by Huetius to PofidoniuSy and for certain it was originally Greeks,) where he fays, vetus opinid eft, atque Cogitdtiones omnium horr.inum penitns Infedity Deum Ef- Jentia originis haberi AttBorem, Deumque ipfum falutem ejfe tsf Terfeverantiam earum quas ejfecerit rerujn^ neqne uUa Res eft qucc viduata del Aaxilioy fui natura contenta jit. HancOpinionem vatesfecuti profiteri aufi funt^ omnid Jove plena eJfe, It is an Ancient Opinion, and imprinted oi the hearts of all Mortals, (ifc. And afterwards he adds, Sed cum credamus Deum per omnia permeare, tsf ad noSy t^ ad ultra^ poteftatem fui nomi- nis tender e^ quantum abeft, vel Imminety tantum ExiftnHandum eft eum amplius minu- fue rebus utilitatis dare.

Tho' it is true, that in conclufion he compares God to a Great King, that does many things by his Miniflers.

The fecond (hall be Seneca^ who in his Gsth Epiftle, among many other expref- fions to the fame purpofe, has this in fo many words. Quern in hoc Mundo hocum Deus Obtinetjjunc inhomine Animus, What God is, in reference to the World 5 that fame the Soul is^ in refped of a Man,

S The

[258 ]

The third (hall be the Emperor Marcus Antoninus y who in his ^th Book, SeB, 40

'sTTLyoeiv, b'c. Be always minding that this World is like an Animal, that hath but one Subftance or one Soul. I had not cited this Emperor , after I had cited Se- neca^ feeing both were Stoicks^ but that in doing fo I knew I fhould have occafion to refer my ^ Reader to Mr. Gatak^er^ who, in his Annotations on this paiTage of Anto- ninus^ has m^e a large Collection of Au- thorities to the fame intendment, which iavesme a^ferther Labour. \i The laft that I will mention (hall be a mod Celebrated Father in the Chriftian Church, the great St. Auftin^ (for I omit the Excellent Origen, tho' as Learned as he, for b^ing more obnoxious,) and I will cite the Teftimony he gives, as I find it in a Schoolman, to fhow, that fome even of the Schoolmen were in the fame Opi- nion. OrbelUs then (for he is the School- man I intend^ upon the firft of the Sen- tences, Vift. 8. Q^ 2. fays (juft as Seneca) Sicut Dens in Majori Mnndo, fie Anima in Minor ii, as God is in the greater World, fo is the Soul in the kfTer : and then by a fimple Converfipn of the Sentences, what the Soul isijj the kfler World ((rfMan,)

that

C 25^ 3

that God muft be in the greater ^ and this he fays is according to St. AaguJUne, ficut enim (fays he) Deus efl in Majori Mundoy fic Anima inMimriy viz* in bomine^ fecundum Juguftinmn,

Only here it muft be obferved, that when 6od is compared unto a Sonly it muft be underrtood with clue limitation 3 to wit, as a Soul is taken only for a Principle of Powers and Adions, and not as it is an informing Form,, or part of the Animal 5 for that God ftiould be a Soul in this lat. ter fenfe, is a notion no ways agreeing to him, who, in himfelf is all, and only per- feftion.

<<' Another OhjeBion is, that God and Na- tme are confounded in this Hypothefis, fa that it is not eafie to fay what is the inte- reft of God. in things, and what isiV^^Ke/, or how they differ 5 to which I Reply^ that indeed in the Holy Scriptures all is afcri- bed to God, and the Spirit of God, with- out any mention of Nature-, and yet fince there are fecond Caufes, as well as a firft^ and fo there is a thing which we call Na- ture, f for by this I now mean nothing but fee fnd Caufes and their v/orking-,) it will be very convenient to (how hove God, how Nature does operate, and how they di&r : and this perl^aps may be done upon the propofed Hypothefis better than qbx any S 2 other.

[ 26o 3

other. For in this^ God and Nature are diftinguifhed, as the Soul of an Animal, and the Syftem of Faculties-, taking the Soul (as it is in the common Opinion) for the Principle of Faculties, and Faculties for the immediate Principles of all actions of Animals-^ and thu^A^ive Nciture is the Syflem of all the Powers, all the Faculties of the Univerfe, and God the effential Principle of them. Or more plainly, fince Faculties and Principles are notions rather than things, and fome will be apt enough, without confidering their grounds, to re- gard them only as meer notions, I (hall therefore fet out the difference that is be- tween them, in more Real Expreffions^ by faying, that the Influence of God, or his aftive prefence in things by means of the Mofaical Spirit, is as Lights and that Natme, (the Syftem of all the Powers in the Univerfe) is as a Complex of all Co- lours -5 fo that as Colour is the Modification of Light, and Light the effence of Colour, fo particular Powers and Anions (that are but Powers in aft,) are Modifications of the Divine Energy, and the Divine Energy the fubftanceboth of the Ad: and the tow- er ^ and thus the influence of the firft and ficond Caufes differ, as Motion^ and Modi* ficatioH of Motion •, the Motion arifes from the-firji^ the Modification from the fecond

Caufe,

[ 2^1 ]

Caufe, either as it is an Organs or as an Object : and fo too, the Aberrations of Na- ture in Monfters, and in other inftances, are accounted for, either by the ill Tex- ture of the Organs, the over- whelming of matter, or by fome other vitiofity and de- fed in thd fecond Caufes, without any impeachment of the firft. As the fcribHngs of a bad mifhaping Pen, are not imputed to the hand that guides it, which perhaps may be skilful enough; but to the Inftru- ment that depraves the motion-, and this, tho' the Motion comes from the Writer. In fine, I do not fee any reafon why vital Energy may not be Imparted and Commu- nicated, as well as Local, which our fenfe evinces to befo: one Body that is in mo- tion, ftriking another that is not, thereby Communicates its Motion to it*, ^nd thus ^ Cogitative vital Lnergy may co;??^ from God, and being diffufed as Light is throughout the Univerfe, may be catched by agreeable Organs, and Modified byObjeds, in the way that I have (hewed before. I only hint this by way of Anticipation, to fuch as will inquire, whether this Cogitative vital Energy, diffused throughout the World, be God himfelf or no, or what it is •, for there I ftick, and call in the aflift- ance and united force of greater under- ftandings, mine beginning to be dazled

S 3 with

[ 262 2

with the luftre, or the fubtilty of the Ob- je(ft: as yet I take it to be the Mofaical Spirit. So much for this Objection.

The laji I fhall propofe is the Herculean one, that is infifted upon by many Great and very Judicious Men, which is, that if there is but one Original Perceptive throughout the Univerfe, all Animals would have the y'-wwe Perceptions, fo that what is known by one^ could be ignored by none ^ ay, the fame fentiments, the fame Refentments, the fame Pains, the fame pleafures, that are in any one, would be in every one ^ and there could be no Numerication, no individuation of Spirits, or Souls, becaufe no feparate, particular Perceptions.

But this Objesftion as it is greater in ap- pearance than in reality, fo it can have little effe<5l, if we confider, that it does equally deftroy the diverfity of Perceptions in the feverai Organs and Parts of one km- mal, which yet our own Experience at- tefts unto, as that of the perceptions ofy^- veral Animals in the Univerfe 5 fince, as there is but one Original Perceptive throughout the Univerfe, in the propofed Opinion •, fo in the common, there is but one m every Animal 3 and yet, tho' the Soul is but me^ the Faculties ar^many, and the exercifes of them feverai. For if but i... one

C ^6j ]

one Eye is inflamed, the fetife of Pain is

mt^ in both 3 and when but one Arm, or one Hand is wounded, the fmarc thereof is only in one •, ay, the pains and ailments of the Superior Parts, are not felt in the Inferior^ nor the fufferances of thefe in thofe ^ fo that though the Animal it felf may be faid to have the Perception of all thofe of its feveral parts, yet thefe cannot be truly faid to have one anothers.' I ac- knowledge, that as the Soul may be faid to have a common fenfe of all perceptions, but the feveral Members, each to have but a private fenfe for it felf ^ fo anfwer- ably, tho' the Original Perceptive is fenfible of ^//, fand needs muft, for he that made the Eye muft needs fee, and he that plan- ted the Ear, muft needs hear ^ and he that gave an heart unto man muft needs under- ftand J yet Particular Percipients^ particu- lar Animals, as fo many particular Or- gans muft have hut their fhare : one Ani- mal can no more pretend to have the per- ceptions of another, (tho' the Original per- ceptive is the fame in both, and is confci- ous to the perceptions of both) than in the fame Animal the Eye can pretend to Hear^ or the Ear to See, or either of them to SmeU.

Hence it is evident, that the Individua- tion and Numerication of Perceptionsj and S 4 confe-

[264 3:

quenrly of Perceptive Powers^ arifes from the Bodies^ or Organs, by means of which fuch perceptions are made -, for where the Bociies are feparatedy or the Organs dij}m5i^ there the Perceptions made in thofe Bodies^ and by means of fuch Organs are hkewife Jo. In fhort, as I hinted before, percep- tions and perceptive powers are individua- ted by Bodies, in the fame ways as Images are by Looktng-Glajfesj cr Eccbos by the (Contrivance oiObje5ls.

but to demonltrate it in Experience, as well as by difcourfe, I will add a Hiftory or two of Monfters, that will do it plainly. The firft fhall be out of Iriiet, and in his own Terms, (as I read them in an Ancient Manufcript^ who reports the Accident juft as Stgebert dXio does in his Chronicle add, 4n. ^96, * In the time of this Talent inian

* fays he (but it (hould be as others fay, ^ in the time oiJbeodofius) at the Town of

* Imaus in Jewry, there was a Child bore;,

* the which from the Navel upward, had

* double Body, that is to fay double Breaft, ?and double Head, and proper feeling of

* all parts-, and fometimes the oyie fleepeth,

* and eateth, and drinketh, when the o- f ther doth nought, and otherwife they ' eat, and drink, and fleeep together 3 and ? fometimes they weep and fmile together, [ and fometimes firived and chid together,

*and

C ^^5 ]

^ and when they were almofl: of two year ^ Age, tlie one of them died four days be- ' fore the other.

Schenckjus the Son, Reports another, but refembling ftory, and wkh more Par- ticularity and Circumliance, and Confe- quently more to our purpofe. out of Bh- chanan his Scottifh HiAory ^ Mohftrum mvi generis (fays he) in Scotia vatum eft, infe- riore quidem corporis parte fpecie Maris ^ nes quicquam a conununi hominum forma difcre- pansy UmhilicMn vero ftipra^ trunco corporis ac reliquis omnibus membris geminis &" ad iifum atque fpectem difcretis 5 id Rex dili- genter ^ Educandutn, ^ erudiendum curavit^ ac maxime in mujicis^ qua in re mirabiliter profecit, quin 6t* varia^ Linguas edidicit, (f variis wluntatilus duo Corpora fecum difcor- dia dijfentiebanty ac interim Litigabant^ cum aliud alii placeret, interim rueluti in communi confultabant. Illud etiam in eo 7nemorabile fuity quod cmn inferna crura lumbive offende- rentur^ commune Corpus utrumque dolorem [entirety cum vero fuperne Pungeretur, aut alioqui Laderetur^ ad Alteruin corpus tan- tum doloris fenfus perveniret. Quod difcri- men in morte fuit magis Confpicuum. Nam cum alternum corpus complures ante alterum dies extinSium fuifet, quod fuperfles fuit, dimidio fui Computrefcente paulatim contabuit, Vixit id monfirum Annos Viginti Oifo^ ac de-

cefflt^

[ ^^6 3

cecity Adminiftrante rem Scoticoin Joanm Trorege. Hac de re fcribimus eo Confiden- tius, quod adhuc fuperfint homines botiefti Compluresy qui heec viderint. So Buchanan^ and Schenkius from him.

I will not give my felf the trouble to tranflate the Relation, becaufe I tind it in Mr. Rofs his continuation of Sir Walter Rawleigh's Hiftory of the World, who thus tells the Story, ad An, 1490. About this time (fays he) a ftrange Monfter was born in Scotland, which beneath the Navel was one Body, but above j two diftinil Bo- dies, having different Senfes, Souls, and Wills 3 any hurt beneath the Navel is equally felt by Both Bodies above, but if any of the upper Members were hurt, one of the Bodies only felt the pain. This Mon- fter the King caufed to be inftruded in IMuiick, and divers Languages. One of the Bodies died fome days before the other, which alfo fhortly after pined and confu- med away. It lived Eight and Twenty years.

I might inftance in many other Stories of this kind, but thefe fuiiice to evince what I induce them for, that the numerica- tion of SouJs, and confequently of other Spirits, depends upon that of Bodies ^ for in the alledged Examples, efpeciaily the lat- ter, it is plain, that where the Bodies

were

C ^6-^ ]

were divided and feparated, the Powers of 'Perception lik^wife irere-, fo that the of- fences of but one, were not felt by both, but by one only ^ and yet again, in the parts beneath the Navel, common unto both the Bodies, any hurts in thefe were equally perceived by both. I take the Iheodojiau and Scottiih Monfters to be evi- dent illuftrations of my Hypothefis. And fo much for Subftance, Harmonically con- fidered.

CHAP.

C 268 ]

CHAP. IX.

Of Suhflanpe in the Scholaftical Confi deration of it, Suhfiance rvhat, that tt is Firfi Of ' Second. Second Subftance is called a fin- gtilar, afuppo/Itum, or afubfiftenr. Of the Principle of Individuation, or that which makes a fingtdar to he fo. Dr. Sherlock's Notion of the Individuation of Spirits. Of a Per/on, The true Idea of it, Lauren - tius Valla his notion of a Perfon, the unufe- fuluefs of it to the falving of the Holy Tri- nity Jhewed. The Trinity a Myjlery , and Do5lrine of Faith •, 72ot a Point ofPhilofo^ phy 5 and fo the Idea of it to he derived only from Revelation in the Holy Scriptures y and not from hare Difcourfes of Reafon.

I Have Difcourfed of Sub/lance after the Harmonical way, in the Precedent Chapters. It now remaineth that I add fomething concerning it in the Scholaftical •, and thus, Subftance is defined to be a thing that is by it felf, or that is under others called Accidents •, and is divided in- to Firfty and Secoyid. The ^econd Sub- ftance is that which is not in a Subjeft, but may be Predicated of it, and fuch are Generical and Specifical Subftances ^ as

for

[ ^^9 ]

for example, Living Creature, and Man 5 neither of which is in a fubjecl, as an /Occident is, but both are Predicated of it j for Living Creature is Pr^edicated of Man^ and Man of Pe/er, James ^ John, &c. • As for firft Subftance ('which is the fub- flance I defign to fpeak of more particular- ly,) it is defined to be that which neither is in a Subjed (as an Accident is,) nor is Pr*edicated of it, as the fecond fubftance is 5 it is alfo called a Suppo/itum, a fubfift- ent, or a fingular, in which is u ont to be diflingulTied Nature and Suh[iftence^ Subfijience is a mode of Exiftence, to which it adds Perfeity, and Exigence is Effence in A6t ^ the Nature is the Idea or Defini- tive Conception of a Subftance. Or thus, the Mature is the Thing or Subftance as it is defined ♦, a Suppofitum, is the Thing or Subftance that hath that Nature or Defini- tion. Nature and Subfiftence differ but as ElTence and Exiftence •, Subfiftence being but the Exiftence of a fubftantial Nature. But Nature and a Suppofitum Differ, as Ejfentia and £wj, the Former fignifying (as the Schools fpeak) ut Qua, the latter ut Quod,

In a fingular Subftance or Suppojitum^ that which comes particularly into Confi- deration, is the Principle ^as Schollars call it) of Individuation, or that which makes

a fingular to become a fingular, for the Nature is fuppofed to belong to one parti- cular no more than to another, but to be a thing abftraded from all Particulars, and thence the queftion arifes, what that is that fingttlarizes the Nature 5 (for exam- ple, that of Man,) and makes it to belong to Feter, or to Johrij or to James in parti- cular. This Principle of Individuation> (be it what it will,} may (as is thought by fomej be called the individuating dif- fereme-j as well as that which does divide the Genius and conftitute the Species, is called the fpeeififcal, fince this indiuidua- ting Principle doth as much divide the Speviesy and conftitute the individual, as the fpecifical difference divides the Geniusj and conftitutes the fpecies. Much ado there is what this Principle fliould be; but after all, they feern to me to come neareft to the Truth, who do affirm, that a lingular or individual becomes fo, not by any diftinft Principle of individuation, but immediately and per fe, and in that, that it is in beings juft as Quantity is ter- minated by felf, and not by mediation of another Thing, that fliould confine and bound its and in like manner is Figured, not by any thing fuperadded to it, but barely in that it is thus and thus Termi- nated. - I am

1 171 ]

I am already almoft tired with this idle fruitlefi way of talking, and (liould not overcome my felf to proceed any farther in it, but that the Notion a Learned Perfoa has of late delivered to the World, about the Indhiduation of Spirits ^ will oblige me to Confider it, and by affording matter of more intelligible Difcourfe, make fome a- mends for the drynefs and barrennefs of the former. It is Dr. Sherlock^ I mean, who in his vindication of the Trinity, 5. 4. p. 48. tells us, ^ that in Created

* Finite Spirits their numerical onenefs can ' be nothing but every Spirits Unity^ ' within it felf, and diftindt and feparate ^ fubfiftence from all other Created Spirits 5

* now this felfunity of the Spirit can be ^ nothing elfe but felf-Confcioufnefs 5 that it

* is Conlcious to its own thoughts, Reafo- ^ nings, PalTions, which no other Spirit is ^ Confcious to but it felf. This makes a

* Finite Spirit Numerically oney and fepa-

* rates it from all other Spirits, that every

* Spirit /ee/i" only its own Thoughts and Faf ^Jions^hut is not Confcious to the Thoughts < and Paflfions of any other Spirit 5 and

* therefore if there were three Created Spi- ^ rits fo United as to be Confcious each to ^ others Thoughts, I cannot fee any Rea- ^ fon why we might not fay that three

* fucli Perfons were w* jQumerically one.

He

C 27^ ]

* He adds, let any Man, who can give nie ' any other notion of the numerical One- 'nefs of an Infinite Mind but felf-eonfciouf-

* nefs.

Thus this Learned Perfon.

It muft be coni^ff^d, thK the Numerical Onenefs of Spirits can be nothing elfe but (as this Learned Author fays it h) every Spirits Unity (he might as well have faid OnenefsJ v\ ith it felf, and its diftind and feparate fubfiftence from all other Created Spirits. But this is not the onenefs oi Sp- rits only, but of e-very thing elfe that is one 5 for as omne ens efi iinum^ fo unum ejt^ quod efi indivifum infe, t!f Divifum a quoli- let Alio ^ and therefore it doth hold in Bo- dies as well as in Spirits, and perhaps in the Infinite firfl: Being, as well as in all Created Finite Beings. But to confine my felf, (^as this Learned Author does) to the Numerical Onenefs of Spirits -^ I cannot fay farther of it, as he has, that it can be no- thing elfe but felf Con fcioufnefs^ in the fenfe of the word as he unfolds it, I fay as he Unfolds it % for elfe, taking felf-confciouf- nefs for a Spirits felf-being, fo I take it the numerical onenefs of a Spirit is nothing but its felf-confcioufnefs, for then the meaning is, that a Spirit (which is a Co- gitative Being i is it [elf, and not any other things but taking Confcioulnefs as he

doesy

C 27J 3

does, for a Spirits Being fenfihle of its own MtoNs and Paffions, lo its numerical one- nefs cannot be its felf-confcioufnefs. Foras a Being (and even a Cogitative Being as a Being; muft be conceived to k, before it can be conceived to JB ; fo again, it muft be conceived to ad, that is to m-;;^. to Keafon, to Love, to Hate, i forthefe are the Adions he inftances in; for fome moment ot Keafon before it can be conceived to be Confcwuj of thefe its adings. Now for that MmeKt of Reafon, in which a Spirit is conceived m Being, without being concei- ved to be aifting, and in which it is concei- ved Aawg before it becomes Confdous of Its actings in that precedent moment, rwhich fpeaks order, not duration,) it muft be conceived to be o>2e withitfelf, and nu- merically different from everything be- iides, and therefore that it is/., cannot a- rife from felf confcioufnefs, or its being confcious of its own adings. So that if there were (as in the Authors fuppofal ) three created Spirits, that were as confcious to each others Thoughts and Paffions, as each of them unto his own, there would yet be no reafon, that we ftiould fay (as he fays we muft) that three fuch perfons would

could they be Three? fince the number Three, is not the number One, and they

cannot

C ^74 ] cannot be Three in number, if they are but one in number ; to be Three is to be more than One •, to be but One is not to be more than one. All that could be laid of them is, that upon that fuppofal they would be intimate with one another, but with nu- merical diftinftion ^ for ftill one of them would not be the other^ and fo they would remain Three Perfons ftill, not one Per- fon. Self-Unity is before Self-Confcioufnefs, and may confift with Confcioufnefs of o- thers. Again^ in Dr. Sherlockis way of Dif- courfing, which is, that Three Perfons fo intimate to one another as he fuppofes, would become numerically one, I do not fee but thatinftead oitheThree Perfons of the Blefled trinity, (which doubtiefs he will own to be really as intimate to one another, as he fuppofes his Three Finite ones to be,) we fhall have but one Perfon (in number.) In fine, if l- erfons by being fo intimate to one another do become numerically one, I do not fee but that, by this reafoning, God who is as confcious to all the Anions, Paf- fions, and Thoughts, of all Finite Created Spirits, as thefe are to their own, and as the Dodors Imaginary Perfons are to one anothers, he muft be numerically one with them all. i' ut perhaps the Dodor will tell me, that he affirms the Three Eternal Minds (for fo he calls them) are numeri- cally

L 27J 3

Gaily one Gody not one Perfon, [Three Per fons, one God 5 ] but then it will be de- manded of him, fince Three are thrice one, what that is that makes each Perfon one in it felf, and diftinguiihes it from both the others ? for it muft be fomething that is not Common, which felf-confcioufnefs is, (in his fenfe of the word,) all being as confciousro one anothers Thoughts and Actings, as each unto its own: whereas that which makes a thing numerically one, muft be Differenangmd Particular. Not to infift, that to be an Eternal Mind is the trua Idea or notion of Ciod, and then if there be (as he owns there be) Three Eternal Minds Creally diftinc^,; it will I confefs, be no great difficulty to evince them Three Per- fons, but I doubt it will, intelligibly to make it out, that thefe Three (Three E- ternal Minds, really diftinft from one ano- ther,) are not Three G^Ji, as well as Three Perfons. So that methinks the knot re- mains untied. For my own part, I believe as the Scriptures inftruft me, that there is but one God, tho' Three Perfons -, each of which is God; which I fay on'y to prevent Miftakes. But I refolve to Difcourfe more fullyof^ff/>;orOnenefs, when I come to treat of the notions of Whole and Part.

As for the name [Perfon] it properly belongs to Men 3 we do not commonly ap-

T 2 ply

[ 27^ 3

Ply it to Eeaftsy or unto Jngeh, or other Spirits, but by Tranflatidn and Metaphor, when they do appear in the Figure or (hape of Men. Nor is [Perfon] a name of Na- ture yt^king nature in the fenfe of the School- men •, for Nature is Common untoall of the kind, but that only is Perfonal which is di- ftinguifhing and peculiar among thofe in the fame kind. Thus, Man is a name of the kind -y or fpecifical Nature, the Nature in commcn ♦, A Man an expreflion of the Nature ^sjingnlarized-j hut Perfon properly is the name of that which differences Men from one another. When we fpeak of the Perfon of a Man, we mean by it that Cumble of Accidents, External, Internal, of Body, of Mind, Adventitious and Ex- trinfical, Abfolate or Relative, whereby he is diftinguifhed, and known from others. Hence Perfona in Latin, is Trpio-ctiTrov in Greek.j and Trf^oaooTrov fignifies the Counte- nance or Face, in thefirft place-, and from thence, a Perfon, in the fecond (place,) be- caufe the Countenance or Face is that by which we do chiefly diftinguifli Men, In conformity to this Idea or notion of Perfon, lunderftand Levit, 19. 15. Thoujhah not favour the Perfon of the Poor, nor honour the Perfon of the Mighty ^ the word for Perfon is Trpoa-MTrov in the Septuagint TranflatioH, and the meaning of the Text is plainly

This,

i ^77 3 This, thou (halt not in giving Judgment have regard to the Poverty of the one, or to the Riches of another 5 for thefe concern the Per/on, not the Caufe. In this fenfe alfo is God faid to be 'ATrpoo-aTroAiTrryj-; HO Ac- cepter of Mem Perfons^ for that he in judge- ment refpeds not (as Men too often do) the foreign Qualities and Accidents that do diftinguifh them from one another, as, their vi^it, or their u^eaknefs •, their comeli. nefs, or their deformity ^ their riches, or their Poverty-, their Grandeur or their Littlenefs of Figure in the World. But all is as one to him,when he enters into Judge- ment 5 for he judges uprightly, according to the merits of the Caufe, without regard to the Perfon, fave v^-here the Confideration of the Perfon is of moment (as fometimes jt is) in the merits of the Caufe. But as the Perfon of a Man is that bundle of Qua- lities that do diftinguifh him from others 5 foA Perfon is a Man vt^ith thofe Qualities 5 that is, a Perfon is a Diftinguifhed Man 5 and fo the word comes to be taken, not only for the Qualities that do diftinguifh, but for the M^» that is diftinguiflied, by thofe qualities 3 in which fenfe the word is ufed, not only by the Schoolmen, who after Boetiu^y define a Perfon to be a ratio- nal fubfiftent, Rationalis Nature Individua MJiantia 5 but by the Apojile, when he

fpeaks

C 278 1

fpeaks, 2 Cor. l. i r. of Thanks being given bjf many Perfons/<?r him.

By what I have faid (mi I have faid the more for chat the caufe of late has had a fre(h Rehearing J we may judge of the juftice oiLan- rentiHs Valla^ who in his Elegance, /. VL c, 34. feverely, (or rather infolently) reflc(as oport Boetiw for aifer^ing that a Perfon was not a Quality, or in any other Predicament but that of Subftance 5 l^e ftiaw<i in many inftances, that [Perfon] fignlfies ^ality, and thence infers, that the fame man may fuftain a hundred Per- fonSj VAl^ofit^ fays he, m ^fjlt mihi Multiplex Terfona ac Diver fa^ fed nn^ tantnm fnhflantia 'y'2 and to give an Example, he fancies himfelf a HeQory and {ays {^ad Priam um fum Perjond Filiij dd ylftianaBa perfond Patris , ad Andromacham perfond f^trij ad Par idem per fend Fratris^ ad Sat' fedonem perfond Amici •, ad Achillem perfond Ini' mid'] In fine, making application of what he fays unto the Deity, \\t thinks that he has carried the Prize, by demonitrating bow God may be but one Stthfiance, and yet be Three Perfons 5 But 'tis in a way in which his He[lor may be a Hnn- dredy and God as manj^ and more. So that I had not believed it worth my while to mention this Opinion, but that an Excellent Perfon of our own has given itfrefli reputation, by going the fame way •, for the Learned Author of the Three Sermons concerning the Sacred Triny, (hewSj as LanrentiM ralta does, that the word LPerfon] was ufed of old tofij^nifie i\\q State^ Quality, or Condition of a Man. as he ftands related to other Men, either as a King or a Subje^, or as Father^ ov a Son, Scc- Thus he obferves the Latin Phrafe is Perfonam Imponere when a Man is

put

C ^19 ]

put intoOfiice or a Dignity Conferred upon him; Jnduere per'onam^ when he takes upon him the Office 5 ^tiftinere perfonam, when one bears, or Executes an Office, &c. In Ihort, he tells us, (as LaurentiHs f^alU hasJthat 'tis BOthing ft range for ih^fame man to fuftain Divers Perfons, ia- flancing in Tully^ who fays ; ftiftineo anus Tres Terfoxoiy Meam, Jdv^rlani^jHdi is^ I being buC one, do yet fuftain Three Perfons, my own, that of an Adverfaryjsad that of a Judge. In pr2Cy he makes the fame application of it to the Divine Trin-unity that Laurentins FaUa doth.for (fays he; If Three Perfons may be one man, what hinders but that Three Divers Perfons may be one God ? and that ih^fame God as Ma- ker of the World, or God the Creator may be God the Father-, and as Author of our Redemp- tion be God the Redeemer, or God the Son ; and as working effeftually in the hearts of hisEle^a, be God the Sandifier or God the Holy Ghoft.

I confefs if this is ^//that is in the Myftery, it is very Conceiveable, and (which will bean unvaluable happinefs to the Chriftian World; there u ill need to be no more difpgte about it ; but ^siht Received Do^rine of the Divine Trii)- unity is quite another thing, fo muft it have a very different Expofinon. Befides, LaHremius ValU feeras to fuppole that the difficulty is only about the iror^[Perfona But this is hismiftakcj for the word [Perfon] as applied to the Trini- ty is but of a later ufe, and of the Schoolmen, ra- ther than of the Faiberu whofe word is H'^po^d" fis, which isalfothe>^po/?/^j word ; ^.o rhatun- lefs it can be found, that one Man can be three Hjpoftafes. or Subliftents, and that for God to be a Creator, a Redeemer, and a Sanaifierj, is,

CO

[ 28o 3

to be three Hypoflafes in the Fathers fenfe, as

well as Three Perfons in Cicero's, the Difficulty is not removed, but only avoided. Infine^ it is not the fame thing to fay that one fn[iains Three Perfons, as to fay that one is Three Per- fons : For he that only fuftains a Perfon, doth but A[l the part of that Perfon which he is faid to fuftain3 and thus Cicero fuftained Three Perfons, when he aded as if he had been Three fevcral Men under different Characters : To Perfonate a Judge is not to be one: And in this fenfe of the word Perfon Seneca fays, Ep, 24. fion hominibas tantum^ fed & Rebus PERSON A Derriendaeft, & reddwda fades fu^,

I fay not this with any intention to enter into a Difcourfc of the Divine Trin-unity, the doing of which won!d be im- proper, io a Trcatife that pretends butto Metaphyficks: C have only luention'd ic on occafion, as an inquirv after the Idea andnotionof a 5«/»/?o//:;/w, and that of a Ptrfon, ob.'iged me. The Do6lrine of the Irimtj is a point of pure Rn eUtbn, not oiPhUofaphj or Science j all Difcouafcs and explications of ir, not derived from the Holy Scriptures, and grounded upon them, but on Analogies and Rcfemblances in mture^ or 00 Principles ot Human Difceurfe and meer Reafon, are as Foreign unto it, as Earth is to Heaven. It is an Article of Faith, and a Fundamental one too; indeed the chief of all thofe of which the yipoftle fays, they arc fuch as mithcr Eye fjvpy nor Ear heard of, nor tntrtd into the heart of man to conctive, before they v^cre brought to light in the Gofpel. Where- fore, 'tis there only that we arc obliged to feek it, and there only, in rhe Jnalogy of Faith, tliat we can hope to difcover it, in its true Idea and Notion. And fo much for Subftance 3S Scholaftically Confidcr'd.

FINIS.

121 B973E 410990