THE EUROPEAN WAR

VOL. II

MARCH TO SEPTEMBER

By
Anthony Arnoux, Ph. D., LL. B.


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VOLUME II.

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The Campaign in the West

CHAPTER I.

FROM ARRAS TO THE SEA

For the sake of convenience in description, we shall divide this campaign into two sections, the first of which, the northern, begins at Westende on the Belgian sea coast and continues southeastwardly to Ypres; thence curving southwardly to Arras. At Arras the southern division begins; the line first running south as far as Noyon and thence running by irregular courses eastwardly to Belfort. The reason these two divisions are made is because it permits us most conveniently to handle the correlated offenses of both the Allies and the Germans on the Ypres and Arras front separately from those in Champagne, the Argonne, Vosges and Alsace to the east; thus making for clearness in comprehension of the military manoeuvres between March and the first of September.

These two sets of manoeuvres, both in a topographical sense and in a military sense, are sharply divided. The objective of the German operations in the northern section was the conquest of the seaports of Dunkirk and Calais, and the objective of the Allies' operations in this same region was the turning or piercing of the German left wing so as to compel its retreat, firstly, from Lille, its base in northern France, and, secondly, from the Belgian territory held by it.

The operations further to the east affected only the French territory, the German offensives in this section were aimed at crushing the French army if possible, while the French offensives were aimed more at resisting this process than in attempting any seizure of strategic points which would necessitate a German retreat of more than local significance. These two characteristics of the military significance of the fighting on the Germans' left wing and on their center and right continued all through the period we have under consideration; and the keeping of this difference in objectives in mind will

greatly conduce to a proper understanding of the strategy which was practised by both sides during the spring and summer of 1915.

The German line in the Ypres and Arras region began at a small place known as Nieuport, two miles southwest from Westende, and thence ran as a general course, southeasterly to Ypres.

The Belgian coast here is a broad field of hill-high sand dunes, which extend far down the coast into France. The little places along the shore were, in times of peace, summer resorts, which enjoyed a wide-spread international popularity: particularly was this true of the baths of Westende which was one of the most aristocratic resorts in Europe, near enough to Ostend to participate in the somewhat Bohemian pleasures of that famous resort, and yet far enough away (seven miles) to be completely free from the presence of the more objectionable visitors to that place.

To the southeast of Ypres (the territory around which town was sufficiently described in the first volume) lies the Arras region, which is better known under the name of "the Artois." The German line in this district began at Armentieres on the Belgian frontier south of Ypres and ran north and south to Bapaume, which is sixteen miles southeast of Arras. The whole length of the line is a little more than forty miles.

The Artois contains a number of important industrial towns, such as Bethune, Aire, Bapaume, Lillers, St. Pol and Hestin; but its greatest reputation is that of a pasture and farming land. The cultivation is largely intensive and the many small holdings produce enormous quantities of those wonderful vegetables, in the production of which France outranks any country in the world. The larger farms produce grain of various kinds, as well as hops, which are particularly renowned among the French breweries.

The Artois has had a varied history. It first belonged to the Counts of Flanders and then passed into the possession of France through the marriage of Philip Augustus to Isabella of Hainault. The House of Burgundy attained it in the Fourteenth Century, and later, through the marriage of a Burgundian heiress to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, it passed to the Hapsburgs; and from the Austrians to the Spanish in 1634, from whom the French took it in 1659 and have since held it.

When the month of March opened on this line, the

first flush of early Spring was in the air. The rain, which had been almost constant during February, ceased, and the ground, which was, except in the sandier portions towards the seashore, a sea of mud, began to dry up. The desultory fighting which had been going on without interruption during the winter continued during the early days of March with little change; this fighting, while costing a high price in lives, had little military significance, and resulted in no change of positions on the part of the contending forces of even the slightest importance. But this comparative inaction was but a prelude to the most important movement which the British forces, as a unit, had undertaken up to that time during the war.

As early as the 19th of February, 1915, Sir John French had communicated to General Sir Douglas Haig a secret memorandum in which instructions were given for a forward movement to be launched at the earliest opportune moment. The reasons for this were many: firstly, there was the necessity for substituting some more vigorous and appealing form of action than the monotonous trench fighting which had lasted during the whole winter, in order to keep up the spirit of his own troops and, secondly, there was the necessity of stilling voices in France which were murmuring at the comparative inaction of the British forces and complaining of their insufficiency in point of numbers to accomplish any result. Moreover, as the British press, and, to some extent, the British War Office, had announced continuously during the winter that the British armies would begin in the spring a great forward movement, which would have most important military consequences favorable to the Allies, the British public was on tip-toe with expectation and clamorously demanding a fulfillment of these promises.

On March 8th the final instructions were issued by the British headquarters to the division commanders, and March 10th was fixed as the day upon which this concerted attack should be made. The immediate objective of this attack was to be the village of Neuve Chapelle near La Bassée, from which it is about four miles north and about eleven miles west to Lille. The real objective was Lille. This village lies in a flat, marshy country much cut up by dikes, which are, of course, a characteristic feature of the landscape in Artois, but to the east of the point where the village lies,

the land rises slowly towards a ridge which curves westward from Fromelles through Aubers to a point directly opposite and to the east of Neuve Chapelle, known as Haute Pommerau, whence it runs to the southward, curving slightly to the place known as Illies. This ridge runs away northeast from Fromelles to within two miles of the southwest of Lille and along its crest runs a road to Lille.

The capture of this road probably would have meant that the Germans would have been unable to continue in possession of Lille, particularly as behind this ridge runs a railroad to Don which was necessary to the German chain of communications. This ridge approaches, at Haute Pommerau, to within a short mile of the village of Neuve Chapelle, which village was, therefore, the key to its possession. The ground between Haute Pommerau and Neuve Chapelle was comparatively easy, broken only by a wood called the Bois du Biez, about half a mile from Neuve Chapelle, between which wood and that village ran a small stream, the River des Layes, running from northeast to southwest, but presenting no difficulty in its crossing. On the west of the village ran the main road from Estaires to La Bassée. The German lines began to the north of the village at Pont Logy and ran to the fortification known as Port Arthur, a little to the south of the center of the village of Neuve Chapelle, and were only about 100 yards from the line of the British which was also the case in the intervening distance. From Pont Logy northward the German trenches curved a little to the eastward, and the distance grew much greater between the opponents, as was also the case to the southeast of Port Arthur. From Port Arthur a second line of German trenches ran northeast along the eastern bank of River des Layes to a point known as the Pietre Mill, almost directly opposite Aubers on the ridge, and distant perhaps three-quarters of a mile therefrom at the northern extremity.

The Germans had also established entrenchments in the Bois du Biez, still further to the east of River des Layes and almost directly in front of the very important point of Haute Pommerau, whose situation has already been described.

In accordance with their established custom, the Germans kept their first line defenses with few men, and at the time of the attack on Neuve Chapelle had only about four battalions in the front line at and around that vil-

lage. Large reserves were held behind their main lines, it being possible to throw those reserves wherever their presence might be necessary by means of existing and excellent lines of communication, these have been a distinguishing feature of the German scheme of field fortifications and entrenchments.

The action opened at half past seven in the morning and began with the most powerful bombardment of the German trenches that had, up to that time, been seen in this war. Indeed, it is said, and credibly, that during the engagement at Neuve Chapelle the British artillery, which was supported by the French, fired more shells than had been consumed in the entire Boer War. The effect of this bombardment is described by eye witnesses on both sides as being terrible. A constant rain of heavy shells and shrapnel forced the Germans to hide in their trenches and prevented their observing the enemy, while the discharge of the shrapnel had the further effect of preventing re-enforcements from the rear from reaching the Germans in the first line trenches, as the intervening territory became a death zone which it was impossible for troops to pass.

The effect of the bombardment was terrific, the German trenches were badly cut to pieces, burying their occupants in their ruins, the wire entanglements before them were swept away, and, what was equally important, the morale of the surviving defenders was shaken to such an extent that these latter, at the moment the infantry advanced, were unable to oppose even a perfunctory resistance.

This was true along the whole line of attack, except at the northern extremity, where the results achieved were much less important; which lack of results, however, was to exercise the greatest possible effect upon the final issue of the battle, and to which lack may be most fairly attributed the failure of the movement in its broad lines and the non-attainment of either its immediate objective, the possession of the road leading along the Aubers Ridge to Lille, or its ultimate objective, the capture of Lille itself.

The number of guns engaged in this bombardment is, as close as can be now estimated, about 400 heavy pieces, re-enforced by innumerable small calibre weapons. For thirty-five minutes this bombardment lasted, the last few minutes being the most intense period. According to the testimony of persons present, during the last few

minutes the discharge of the heavy pieces was so rapid and so continuous that the effect produced upon the ear of the listener was that of a machine gun of enormous size, so continuous, regular and unabating was the volume of sound. The bombardment once finished, the infantry advanced to the attack, which was made simultaneously on the village of Neuve Chapelle from two sides; on the northwest, where the 4th Army Corps, under General Rawlinson, attacked; and on the west and southwest where the Garhwali Brigade, of Indian troops, attacked.

The southwestern attack was the most successful and the Indians captured the first line of German breastworks in a very few minutes. The 25th brigade also was successful, and pushed forward into the village of Neuve Chapelle, though here the resistance was more sustained. In the northeastern attack, however, the 23rd Brigade was unable to perform the part assigned to it in this battle, because it was on this front that the preliminary artillery bombardment had failed to destroy the wire entanglements in front of the German trenches, and consequently this brigade, the defense at this point being much more energetic, was held up in front of these entanglements and cut to pieces by a terrific fire of rifle, machine gun and shrapnel bullets. The terrible character of the fire which the brigade sustained can be estimated by the fact that one battalion of the Second Scottish Rifles, (the Cameronians), lost 850 men out of a thousand in less than twenty minutes. The other regiments also suffered heavily, and the brigade was not able to break through but was compelled to lie down in the open and call on the artillery behind it to destroy the wire entanglements; not until this was done were the British able to take the first line of the German trenches. But even with these taken, they were in little better situation, since the German artillery in the rear immediately began to shell the captured trenches.

In the meantime the 25th Brigade and the Indian Brigade to the south had pushed forward into the village, which was an appalling spectacle reduced to complete ruin as a result of the bombardment. It even tore up the village churchyard and disinterred the long-buried dead.

The arrival of these troops in the village enabled forces to be thrown to turn the left flank of the Germans in front of the 23rd Brigade which, we have seen, was in

great difficulty; and the result of this manoeuvre was that the remnant of the 23rd was brought into a position of safety.

Street fighting took place for a considerable time in the ruins of the village, and it was not until the Ghurkas had made a house to house inspection, using their kukuris freely, that the German resistance in the village itself was overcome. After the conquest of the village the united British forces then moved forward to the eastward towards the River des Layes and the Bois du Biez During the fighting in the village the British artillery along the old front had been firing at long range upon movements of reserve troops which the Germans had been endeavoring to throw forward to Neuve Chapelle, and had been remarkably and peculiarly proficient in preventing the bringing up of these reserves, even at a very considerable distance, ten to twelve miles from the field of action. Consequently, after the village was captured, for some time, the British troops which took part in its capture were enabled to manoeuvre freely. For four and a half hours they occupied themselves with consolidating the positions already won and attempting to restore their lines of communication from front to rear,—which in their turn were being commanded by German artillery fire directly from the top of the Aubers Ridge,—and await reenforcements. This delay of four and a half hours was one of the contributing causes which prevented the capture of the Aubers Ridge and the success of the movement. Sir John French, however, lays it to the slowness with which the commander of the 4th Army Corps brought his reserve brigade forward. But the truth probably is that when the British at eleven o'clock succeeded in entering the village and driving the Germans out, they were so physically exhausted by the hard fighting which had taken place that neither they nor any other troops could have followed up this advantage immediately. Moreover, the lines of communication from their front and rear being under fire, it would have been an extremely costly and dangerous operation to bring up the reserves until the British artillery had silenced the German artillery on the Aubers Ridge.

The British artillery which had so distinguished itself in the morning in preventing the Germans from bringing up re-enforcements to their hard-pressed troops, about noon ceased firing, which was promptly taken ad-

vantage of by the Germans to re-enforce their third line defenses, not only with troops but with light artillery, which, on a second attack by the British had a most decisive effect in stopping permanently their advance. At this stage of the battle, from eleven o'clock to half past three in the morning, it was most important that the heavy fire of the British artillery should be continued in order to protect the advance already achieved, to destroy the German opposing artillery, and thereby permit re-enforcements to come up to the British in the village, but this was not done. As this British artillery was necessarily several miles distant to the westward from Neuve Chapelle, and absolutely under the control of the British Commander-in-Chief, who had ample time in which to inform himself as to the causes of its inactivity during the four and a half hours that it was silent, it does not seem either just or generous in that Commander-in-Chief to attempt to shift the blame for the failure of the British attack of Neuve Chapelle to other shoulders.

At half past three in the afternoon the positions were as follows: The British held the village of Neuve Chapelle and the ground south thereof through and including the field fortification of Port Arthur on the main road running north to Estaires. North of that the line changed to almost directly north and they held the road from Neuve Chapelle to its juncture with the road called Rue Tilleloy running towards Armentieres and the line crossing this road and running north to the Rue de Bacquot which runs parallel to the Rue Tilleloy already mentioned. The whole front was just under three miles.

At half past three the second attack began. One section of the British forces, the extreme left of the line, attempted to advance to and take the Pietre Mill. But this force was soon checked by machine gun fire from the German third line of defense and from the mill itself. Another and simultaneous thrust was made at the cross-road northwest of Pietre while another thrust was also made directly at Haute Pommerau, which was, as has been said, the critical point on the Aubers Ridge. This attack was held up near the bridge across the River des Layes by heavy machine gun fire both from the opposite bank of the river and from the German trenches in the intervening space between this bridge and the Aubers Ridge, and the British were forced to fall back. The Indian troops moved on the Bois du Biez to the south of this bridge, but they, too,

fell into difficulties. The German trenches in front of the wood were protected by wire entanglements which it was necessary for the Indians to break through in order to advance, in which breaking through they failed, with extremely heavy losses, particularly among the Garhwalis.

This repulse ended the afternoon attack and the British forces remained in about the same positions already outlined, though the Germans attacked fitfully several times during the night, and the British artillery made an attack upon the bridge over the River des Layes which it was necessary to capture in order to make any further advance upon the Aubers Ridge. Re-enforcements were sent for to the 1st Corps at Givenchy. This 1st corps had during the day delivered an attack south of Neuve Chapelle from Givenchy, but its operations and its results were of no particular importance.

The next day, Thursday, March 11th, as the real objective of this movement had not been attained, the British commanders resolved to renew the attack on the Aubers Ridge and early in the morning the same two forces, the 4th Division and the Indians, which had led the fighting in the battle of the day previous, moved forward to the attack. The British forces had, a few moments before this movement began, repulsed a German attack on portions of their line with comparative ease and really heavy losses to the attackers, the attack having been delivered from the general direction of Pietre.

The British, in this advance, suffered rather heavily from a cause which should have been obviated, being entirely the result of their own carelessness and inattention to those necessary details which very often, as in this case, largely influence the success or failure of military movements. The day before in their successful attack which resulted in the occupation of Neuve Chapelle, the German artillery, shelling the country behind Neuve Chapelle, had cut the telephone communications between the English batteries on the line behind Neuve Chapelle and the military artillery observers in advance. The result was that until these were repaired and communication between the observers and the batteries re-established, it was impossible for the British artillery, unless directed from air-craft, to fire with such nice accuracy so as not to hit their own men advancing and at same time to be effective upon the enemy. On this particular

day, direction from the air was impossible owing to the condition of the weather. The 4th Division and the Indian Corps in their opening attack advanced for a short distance towards the Pietre Mill and towards the wood of Biez and then were held up by German fire from the ruins of the houses and other temporary shelters of various kinds which the Germans were able to use for defense purposes which were scattered around on the eastern outskirts of the village. It was clear that until the artillery in the rear had shelled the whole terrain in front of the British lines, it would be impossible for the line to make a successful advance. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued and the British stormed and took quite a number of the houses and other shelters out of which the Germans had made improvised defenses, as shown above. But then a fatal thing occurred: the British artillery in the rear, which by this time had opened up fire for the purpose of shelling the German positions in front of the British advance, continued its fire and, as a result of the British capture of these shelters, was shelling its own men. This fire was not stopped as it should have been, for some reason which we do not know, as the excuse of broken telephone wires and the impossibility of aerial communication does not seem to be a sufficient one, in view of the fact that these advance lines were a scant three miles from the artillery positions, which distance could have been covered by a mounted man or even a pedestrian, in a comparatively short space of time. The loss among the British for this cause was heavy and ultimately the advance parties were obliged to abandon the points of vantage they had taken and rejoin the main line which then fell back to its original positions of the early morning. This ended the day's fighting, except that during the afternoon the German artillery on the Aubers Ridge opened upon the British positions at Neuve Chapelle and to the north and south thereof with considerable strength, and inflicted some losses, but it was not able to force the abandonment of the British positions.

The next day, Friday, March 12th, the movement, as far as it had the character of the British offensive, was over. During the night the Germans brought up re-enforcements from other points on the line, and on that morning began a counter-attack on Neuve Chapelle at about five o'clock, reducing the role of the British troops to that of the defensive. This German attack

was directed against the extreme right and the extreme left of the British positions and was carried out mostly by Bavarians and Saxons. Both of these attacks were unsuccessful and resulted in considerable loss to the assailants, with no compensating gain of ground.

About the middle of the morning the British launched a counter-attack on Pietre Mill and the bridge head over the River des Layes, with orders to break down the positions around the German field fortifications at any cost; and very violent hand-to-hand fighting ensued with alternate gains and losses on the part of the combatants, but which ultimately terminated in a British repulse with, perhaps, the heaviest losses of the fighting, so far, in proportion to the number of men engaged.

Northeast of the village the Germans' counter-attack did for a time attain a measure of success and they succeeded in entering the British trenches, but they were unable to hold this position and in a few hours were driven out. This attack and counter-attack continued all the afternoon, although the whole operation had the character of the German offensive; and when night came the British Commander-in-Chief, being convinced that nothing further could be done for the time being, gave orders to suspend any further offensive and to attempt to consolidate the position already taken.

It is fair to say that this gain was made over ground which had been turned by the Germans into successive lines of deeply built and well defended trenches, and was, therefore, more difficult to capture than the measure of its area would seem to indicate.

On Saturday, the 13th, the Germans opened the day with a heavy bombardment of the British positions and kept this up practically all day. In addition to this artillery assault there were several small counter-attacks during the morning and a heavy one towards four o'clock in the afternoon which the British troops managed to repulse, although, owing to weariness from the fighting of preceding days and the necessity for constant digging in order to maintain the positions already won, this was done with difficulty.

Sunday, the 14th, the artillery duel continued, but there were no infantry attacks on either side, and the fighting of Neuve Chapelle can be considered to have finished this day. The ultimate result was that the British had gained 300 to 400 yards of ground. The price which this gain cost them was 190 officers and 2357 men

of the rank and file killed outright, 359 officers and 8174 men wounded, 23 officers and 1723 men missing. The price was too heavy for the result achieved. From a military standpoint, the operation was a complete failure, in that it did not achieve any of the objects for which it was undertaken. The only thing that it did show was that if the British were willing to pour out blood like water, out of all proportion to the results achieved, they could at a given point force back the German lines a very short distance; but as the German defenses extended in successive lines for many miles northward, a gain of a few thousand yards on a two mile front, at a cost of between 12,000 and 13,000 men, (the whole front extending east and west several hundred miles) indicated that the cost in men alone to drive the Germans to the French boundary at this rate of loss would far exceed the entire effective force of both the French and German army added together and multiplied by three. It, therefore, became evident that operations of this character were so expensive as to be out of consideration.

In summing up the whole of the fight, one British authority, says:

"It must be admitted that the battle was as creditable to the Germans as to the British. The British massed secretly large forces and an over-powering weight of artillery and fell upon a small force of unsuspecting Germans and pressed a way for themselves through the enemy's first line of defenses. In this phase of the battle it is business-like organization which we have to commend on the British side; the infantry could not help winning those battered trenches. The second phase of the battle was the converse of the first. It showed the organization of that which brought about the fatal delay. The Germans are entitled to congratulate themselves upon the ready skill and tenacity with which they took much of the British blunder on the first day and the successes which attended their efforts. They could not help losing their first line of defense. Only determined fighters could afterwards have saved, as they did, the Aubers Ridge and the road to Lille."

"On the whole it gave this much to the British side, that it stopped for a time the attacks of the Germans, but it exercised no equally substantial influence over the subsequent cost of the campaign.

"The German losses during the three days of battle

were about equal to the British; 30 officers and 1657 men were captured, about 2000 were killed and 8000 to 9000 wounded."

This summary was written by a British military officer of the highest standing, a comparatively short time after the battle.

How very different this reads from the extraordinary accounts sent forth by the London press agencies to the United States concerning this fight at the time of and immediately subsequent to the fight; which accounts were subserviently printed with the usual accompaniment of startling headlines in the American press without the slightest attempt at control or editing; preferring, as that press always does, the sensational and the improbable to the credible and the true.

CHAPTER II.

While this fighting was going on at Neuve Chapelle, the British forces to the north of Neuve Chapelle made supporting attacks in the night between March 11th and 12th on the German positions at l'Epinette, a little village northeast of Neuve Chapelle, near Armentieres, which they captured. The casualties here were slight on both sides and the British, after taking the position successfully, resisted the German counter-attack.

On Friday afternoon another supporting attack was launched by the British on the German positions to the southwest of Wytschaete. This effected practically nothing. As said, these attacks were merely supporting attacks to the main attack at Neuve Chapelle.

North of this last mentioned place lies the village of St. Eloi, immediately south of the Comines Canal and some 3¼ miles south of Ypres on the road leading from Ypres to Armentieres which runs north and south, and also at the junction of an east and west road as well as to a third road running southeast to Wanaton.

The British position on the 14th of March ran through the outskirts of the village on the east, then turned southward on the south of the village, gradually running more to the westward. A large mound occupied the southeast corner of the British position inside their line. The German lines faced this line it its entirety. On the afternoon of the 14th, which was a foggy day, the Germans took advantage of this fog and concentrated a large force of artillery in front of the village, and towards five o'clock in the afternoon opened a heavy bombardment of the entire British position in the village itself and to the north and southwest of it. Prior to this, by mining operations, the Germans had succeeded in placing a mine of great force under the mound already spoken of, and when the bombardment of the British positions by the artillery was at its height, this mine was exploded, sending the mound skyward and resulting in great confusion among the defending forces. This confusion was taken advantage of by the Germans to launch an infantry attack, which, of course, continued to be protected by its artillery and which attack resulted

in the British being obliged to execute a general retirement just before dark, leaving not only their trenches but a considerable portion of the village in the hands of the Germans.

Towards two o'clock in the morning, the British launched a counter-attack and followed it up an hour later with a second counter-attack in support of the first, and had the satisfaction of recovering in these two attacks that portion of the village which the Germans had previously taken in the late afternoon, but did not recapture their original positions to the east of the village nor in the vicinity of the mound. The fighting here was very severe because the German infantry had erected barricades along the village streets and mounted machine guns upon them; consequently the British casualties were extremely high. The Princess Patricia Light Infantry, a Canadian regiment, suffering most severely.

In this fighting at St. Eloi the British lost very heavily both in the original attack and in their partially successful counter-attacks. Their total losses may be computed at about 4000 killed and wounded, 1000 prisoners, and 1000 to 1500 missing. The Germans losses, on the contrary, while heavy in proportion to the number of men engaged, did not exceed 3000 to 3500.

The following day, Monday, small attacks continued, and on Wednesday, the 17th of March, the Germans launched another vigorous attack in the effort to recover their position in the village, which they had lost; but this was unsuccessful.

After the conclusion of this fight at St. Eloi the whole line from Ypres to the south of Neuve Chapelle relapsed into quietness, which was not broken for nearly a month, till the Germans launched an assault upon the extreme left of the British line in early April. This assault, however, was not a serious one, and resulted in no change of positions, though it caused the usual large number of casualties.

After the fighting above described ceased, a period of almost complete inaction ensued which lasted until about the middle of April and was only broken by minor movements which need only be hastily glanced at. The activity of the air men during this period, however, was quite remarkable on both side, and many raids were made, the favorite points of attack being, for the Allied air-craft, the submarine bases which the Germans had established along the Belgian coast, particularly at Zee-

brugge and Ostend; while the German aviators paid particular attention to the French seaboards of Dunkirk and Calais. During this time also the British and French fleets operating in the channel off the Belgian coast paid attention to these submarine bases of the Germans, which were bombarded several times more or less violently. It is, however, doubtful whether outside of causing a loss in lives, these bombardments or air attacks accomplished any serious or at all irreparable damage to the towns which suffered.

On March 11th the Belgians who occupied the extreme left of the Allied line took a small fort east of Lombartzyde and subsequently took the defensive advance to Scherrbakke where there was some fighting.

On the 23rd of March a Belgian force did cross the Yser, but was unable to maintain its position there.

In the early part of April the Germans made a thrust to the south from their position south of Dixmude. The objective of this movement was Furnes, but success was prevented by the French artillery which held up the German advance until a few days later, on April 6th, the Belgian force succeeded in driving it back to Neroken. During all this period from the middle of March to the middle of April Ypres continued to be bombarded, and the final ruin of the justly celebrated Cloth Hall, one of the most interesting and picturesque buildings of Europe, and of the Cathedral, was accomplished. In fact, the whole town was almost leveled to the ground and the few remaining inhabitants were taking refuge and living in the cellars. As an instance, however, of the power of human beings to accustom themselves to almost anything, it may be mentioned that those inhabitants who remained grew so accustomed to the dropping of large calibre shells in their immediate vicinity that on the testimony of really credible witnesses who were in the town from time to time during this period, they grew so careless that an explosion even in their immediate vicinity did not cause them even to look at the point from which the sound of the explosion came. The children remaining, of whom there were quite a number, appeared also totally indifferent to the bombs.

The writer was told by a personal friend, who was in Ypres several times during the latter part of March and the early part of April, that on one occasion when he was there towards eight or nine o'clock in the morning a shell fell near a house at the side of which some four or

five children were playing. The shell exploded and the house and the children vanished, he seeing the scene of the catastrophe but a few moments after the fall of the shell. In the afternoon of the same day he was again in Ypres and saw the same spot and saw children playing unconcernedly in the debris of the house wrecked in the morning, and on the very spot where their little comrades had perished a few hours earlier.

The ruined condition of Ypres is typical of the ruined condition of most of these villages along the front in Flanders and France, as far south as La Bassée.

The middle of April it became evident to the commander of the British forces facing the Germans south of Ypres that his opponents were about to begin an offensive, and remembering, perhaps, the maxim of Napoleon, that the best defensive is an offensive, he resolved to anticipate their action.

Hill No. 60 is located on the railroad running from Ypres south to Comines about three miles to the southeast of Ypres and about an equal distance to the northeast of St. Eloi. This hill forms part of the Klein Zillebeke ridge, and is its highest point. The ridge itself is cut through by the railroad. This word "hill" must be taken in a relative sense as really "Hill No. 60" in anything but a flat country would not be designated by this title, being only 62 feet high; but in so flat a country as that immediately to the south of Ypres the 62 feet there are equivalent, in a more broken country, to many times that number of feet. The summit of the hill is open and was usually cultivated with the sides covered by woods. The great importance of this hill was that the Germans, holding as they did the slopes and the summit, could watch what was going on in the flat country to the west of them where were the British trenches, and could signal to their heavy artillery, posted near Zandvoorde further to the east on an elevation, the direction to aim.

The distance between the German trenches on the slopes of this hill and the British trenches at the bottom was only some 50 yards. Another thing was that the elevation of Zandvoorde was one of the keys in the German line to the east of Ypres and by capturing Hill 60 and planting artillery on it, it might be possible to force the Germans to evacuate that hill. The British prepared for this offensive by mining operations which extended under Hill No. 60, which operations escaped the notice

of the Germans. It seems a curious fact, as the British official report states that five galleries were used in this mining operation and it was unusual for so large a number of galleries to be driven without the noise of the work attracting the attention of those against whom the work was directed. However, the Germans did not notice these mining operations but at 7 P. M. of April 17th all the mines were fired together, with the result that the German trenches on the west side of Hill No. 60 went up into the air. Hardly had the clouds resulting from the explosion of the mines lifted themselves into the air before the British artillery to the west commenced to pour in shells and shrapnel on the ruins. An infantry attack had been prepared, and as soon as the artillery had pounded the remaining first line trenches to pieces, the signal for its advance was given. This attack, composed of the West Kents and the Scotch Borderers, as far as the first trenches were concerned, had comparatively easy work, but on reaching the communication trenches the Germans, who, naturally, had been thrown into considerable disorder by the explosion of the mines and the subsequent artillery pounding, rallied and very severe hand-to-hand fighting took place, in which hand grenades and bombs played a prominent part. The enemy, however, was unable to stand and the British forces succeeded in taking and holding the first line of the German trenches with the communication trenches leading from them to a short distance after a very hot 20-minute fight. Then in its turn the German artillery commenced to pound the positions won by the British attack, and though the two regiments which had made the attack held their positions for the night in spite of very heavy losses, in the early morning they were compelled to fall back to the craters occasioned by the explosion.

Early on April 18th the Germans delivered two counter-attacks which were repulsed, by a liberal use of machine guns by the British. In spite of these repulses, the Germans rallied again and again to the attack and the fighting continued all day, with the result that towards evening the Germans succeeded in recovering the southern portion of the hill and the British were pushed back to the other side of the crest. Then heavy re-enforcements were brought up to the British and they in their turn made an attack which resulted in their gaining some ground, practically reaching the positions from which they had been driven in the morning.

All through the next day incessant artillery fighting and bomb and hand grenade fighting took place on this southern slope of Hill No. 60, with results of minimum importance.

On the 20th the action, as far as the artillery was concerned, became more violent on the German side, and the intervening country, and Ypres itself was subjected to the firing of pieces of the heaviest calibre. On Hill No. 60 itself two assaults were made in the afternoon by the Germans, which were repulsed by a very liberal use of machine guns. Nevertheless the struggle continued all through the night and on the 21st it was found the Germans had again gained a foothold on the hill. The British counter-attacked and nearly cleared the hill of the enemy, and in spite of a heavy bombardment, maintained the positions they had won at such great cost.

Hill No. 60, though small, will always remain famous in military annals as a result of the four days' fighting.

During the time that this struggle was taking place, on Hill No. 60, there had been considerable activity among the air forces of the several combatants in places further west along this front and in Belgium, but, as usual in these aerial attacks, the amount of the damage done was extremely uncertain. The attacker always reports great material results from the attack, which reports are promptly denied by the attacked; and this characteristic has been true of all this class of fighting from the beginning of the war to the present time. It may be seriously doubted whether anything of real importance has been achieved by the attacks of air-craft using bombs at any time during the war at any place. Some few unfortunate civilians have been killed, but this can hardly be termed a military result of importance.

Air-craft have undoubted value for scouting purposes or locating the positions of the enemy, for directing the fire of artillery, for photographing the terrain behind the lines of the enemy and for watching the movement of troops in the country of the enemy's lines: but here their value and their utility seem to end.

The spectacular combats in mid-air attract the attention and arouse the interest of the casual readers of war news, but after all, these combats are more spectacular than useful and savor more of the theatrical, than of the military art.

CHAPTER III.

On Thursday, April 22nd, an event of considerable importance took place. The Germans, who had, prior to this date, perfected an apparatus for the manufacture of a poisonous gas, used it on this day with success.

Before proceeding to a description of the battle of this day, a little retrospection may be advisable in view of the intense clamor raised by the British concerning this use of poisonous gas. In August of 1914 Professor Turpin, a French scientist, conducted experiments on flocks of sheep in the Bois du Bologne, Paris, with a gas which he had invented and which he hoped would be practical for French military use in destroying their opponents. The experiments were partially successful, sufficiently so, in fact, to justify an attempt to use this gas for the purpose for which Prof. Turpin designed it. Accordingly, in September, 1914, the French did attempt its use, as was reported with many additions and much coloring in the American, British and French newspapers of last September. The experiment was made in two places, in Champagne and in the Argonne, and we were regaled with descriptions of its terrible effect; how it struck down the Germans in masses; particularly how one soldier died in the act of lighting a cigarette, holding the cigarette in his lips and the extinguished match in his hand three-quarters advanced towards its end, standing upright and gazing with fixed and visionless eyes.

These experiments, stripped of the war correspondent's romances, however, did not prove successful. The French apparatus for the use of this gas was not sufficiently safe in that it was as liable to drive the turpinite on the French troops as it was on those of the enemy. Efforts were made to remedy this, but unsuccessfully, and hence the use of turpinite was abandoned. But it was not abandoned because its use was in contravention of the spirit of the Hague Conference of 1899, nor because, as one Englishman states, it was in contravention of the mal-practices condemned by the most civilized thinkers of Greece and Rome, by Christian teachers and almost all international lawyers since

Grotius. This English statesman was speaking of the use of gas by the Germans but there is, of course, a self-evident distinction between the use of the same means by the British or their Allies, and their use by their opponents since the British have introduced this new principle in warfare, that any acts done by the British, no matter what they are, are legitimate; whereas, the same acts done by their opponents are the height of cruelty and barbarity. Curiously enough, there being so much sentimentality and mock-humanitarianism extant in the world, the British have been able to persuade the bulk of the population of one supposedly neutral but very sentimental nation that this proposition (false on its face) is true.

On the morning of the 22nd the position of the British and their French Allies in the northern section of the salient of Ypres, which was the first section attacked by gas, was about as follows:

From the Yperlee Canal at Steenstraate, west of Bixschoote, around the North of Langemarck to the road leading from Ypres to Poelcappelle was held by French colonial troops, Turcos and other Algerians, Tunisians, Senegalase or other negroes. The Canadians occupied a position next to them, from the road leading from Ypres to Poelcappelle to the railroad running from Ypres to Roulers, which it reached near Zonnebekke. From this point, Zonnebekke, to the south of the railroad, the British troops held the line to the outskirts of Becelaere, whence the line ran to Hill No. 60 and to the canal from Ypres to Comines.

Behind these forces so disposed there were considerable reserves which were so placed as to be able to reach any point of the salient that was threatened, not only with men but with guns.

For the success of the Germans' plan it was necessary that the wind should blow from their trenches towards the enemy, and this condition prevailed at about five o'clock of the afternoon of Thursday, the 22nd of April.

An aviator was the first to give the alarm, reporting that yellow-greenish smoke was rising all along the German front from Bixschoote to Langemarck. The Turcos were the first to perceive this smoke, which, according to their story, was white, rising some few feet from the ground, and in front of which was a greenish mist which rose considerably higher than a man, and which was blown by the wind towards them, being thick enough

not to be readily dissipated by the air currents, but at the same time in large measure translucent. On this mist reaching them, the Turcos began to first cough, spit blood, and then to suffocate. Out of the mist suddenly appeared detachments of the enemy equipped with India rubber respirators which fastened around the neck, which respirators contained a cloth soaked with some chemical solution to neutralize the effects of the gas. The Turcos, of course, were completely taken by surprise and in a large measure paralyzed and thrown into confusion, which confusion spread with considerable degree to the French troops further in the rear. The result was that the Turcos and the other French troops abandoned their ground and retreated in considerable disorder, leaving many hundred prisoners and 50 guns of various calibres in the possession of the enemy, besides suffering were heavy casualties.

The German force pushed onward and captured a battery of guns in the wood west of St. Julien, belonging to the 2nd London Battery of heavy artillery. Everywhere on the whole front, on the Yperlee Canal to Dixmude the Germans were attacking, and, what was more important, by the retreat of the French the left flank of the Canadian Division (whose position has been already described) was turned the enemy being entrenched at right angles thereto thus cutting them off from Ypres. A gas attack had been made on the Canadians, but the wind at this point of the line was not so favorable as it was at that point of the line where the Turcos had been stationed, and consequently, though the Canadians felt some effects of the gas, the full effect was not achieved upon them.

But a German infantry attack followed this somewhat abortive gas attack, and the situation of the Canadian troops became extremely precarious. The first two assaults of the Germans were beaten off and then the left of the brigade was withdrawn from the front of Poelcappelle until it arrived at a position west of the road leading from that place to Ypres, which line it then attempted to hold until the French troops were rallied and re-enforcements from the rear were brought forward to fill the gaps between Ypres and St. Julien. This the Canadians, to their great credit, succeeded in doing. But they did even more than this, and by a gallant counter-attack succeeded in defeating the German project of capturing Ypres. This counter-attack had

for its object the recovery of the wood west of St. Julien and the recapture of the guns lost there. As this action was probably the most gallant performed by any British troops during the war from the beginning to the present time, the Canadian forces participating in this charge are entitled to be specifically mentioned: they were the 16th Battalion of the 3rd Canadian Brigade and the 10th Battalion of the Second Brigade. They re-took the wood, and by so doing relieved the pressure and saved the French to the west of the canal, and further saved four battalions of the 5th Corps who were between St. Julien and the canal in a most dangerous situation. Owing, however, to the fire which the German artillery immediately concentrated on this wood, it was impossible to hold it, but the object which these Canadian troops had in view was achieved, and they were able to retire with the consciousness of having heroically performed their duty under the most adverse circumstances that can well be imagined.

Another force of Canadians, those of the 2nd Brigade, which rested on the railroad line from Ypres to Roulers, near Zonnebekke, and a British force east of Zonnebekke, had also been violently attacked and the fighting here kept up all day and all night; the crux of the fighting coming at 1.30 A. M. on Friday morning, but they held firm. At 4 A. M. on Friday this Canadian force occupied a position about 2500 yards long on the Gravenstafel Ridge but was gassed by the Germans, with the result that portions of the force retreated temporarily from their positions. While this was going on, an attempt was made by the Germans to break through the Allied line south of the wood west of St. Julien, and the fighting here was very severe. Charge after charge by both sides was gallantly delivered and was gallantly resisted. In this fighting the 4th Battalion of the 1st Canadian Brigade particularly distinguished itself. By eleven o'clock on the 23rd, the Allied line had been driven in so that it ran from St. Julien almost due west for about a mile, then curved to the southwest, then to the north, and reached the Ypres-Yperlee Canal near Boesinghe. Across the canal Lizerne was in the possession of the Germans.

The whole of Friday the battle raged along the battle fronts with great violence, and the inhabitants of Ypres behind the lines began to abandon the place, thinking its capture imminent. But the British and French line

to the north of the town held firm during that day, and even made a little progress south of Pilkem and along the Ypres-Yperlee Canal, but this progress was short-lived and gradually the Canadians were drawn to the north-east of St. Julien. The fighting continued into the night, but abated towards its middle. About 3 A. M. on the 24th the German artillery fire which had ceased for a time, was suddenly violently renewed and a gas attack was then made to the east of St. Julien. Although this was not successful, it compelled a general retirement of the 3rd and 2nd Canadian Brigades, though they did manage to link connections again with each other and with the line to the right and left of them, just to the east of St. Julien. At noon the Germans delivered a general assault on the village of St. Julien in the direction of Poelcapelle and the village was carried by this assault. The entire Canadian force and the French were thrown to the west of St. Julien and the village fell completely into the hands of the enemy.

A counter-attack in the afternoon by the British was unsuccessful in its object of re-taking the village. The Canadian losses in this fighting were extremely severe, and when night fell, they were on the Passchendaele road from Fortuin to Gravenstafel. From Gravenstafel to Broodseinde the line was held by some British troops. The territorials held the line from Fortuin to Boesinghe with the regular brigade. Behind them, however, another regular brigade was coming up accompanied by the Lahore division, as well as several other battalions of Indian troops. In the afternoon the French had made a gallant attack on Pilkem and almost recovered it, but were driven back. General Foch, however, the ablest of the French commanders, had arranged to concentrate fresh troops between Woesten and Crombeke, and to this concentration and its influence on the fighting of the next two days, probably Ypres owes the fact that it was not taken.

While speaking of General Foch, it is perhaps pertinent to say that during the entire war this French general has distinguished himself above all the generals either of the French or British armies by his remarkable strategy, his fertility of resource and his wonderful and almost instinctive power of doing the right thing at the right time, which power he combines with an almost superhuman coolness in critical and dangerous situations. In all the varied circumstances to which a year's

hard fighting has exposed this general, he has invariably risen to the necessity of each situation, and it is perhaps not too great a eulogy to say that he is by all odds the ablest strategist and commander that the Allied armies have produced.

CHAPTER IV.

Sunday, the 25th of April, at 4:30 in the morning, the British made an attack on St. Julien and the woods around it with a brigade plus two batteries. This force reached the village near the edge of the woods, but there the German machine guns brought it to a halt, which halt continued all day, the British being unable to advance in the face of this withering machine gun fire and the German infantry unable to turn it out of its position. Some idea of the fierceness of the fighting at this point may be gathered from the fact that the British during that day threw in no less than 15 batteries, besides considerable artillery to the support of this one force.

Further to the east, at Gravenstafel, there was also hard fighting from two o'clock Sunday afternoon. At night-fall the British here were obliged to retreat, and by midnight had fallen back as far as the eastern bank of the Haanebeeke rivulet. At Broodseinde, directly south from Gravenstafel, the fighting was hard all day Sunday, but here the British did better than elsewhere and held their position, though violently shelled in addition to the heavy infantry attacks. Along and to the west of the Yser-Yperlee Canal, from Boesinghe to Woesten and Crombeke, the French held the line, and held it gallantly, supporting several German attacks all Sunday and Sunday night; and Monday morning found them still in their original positions, though badly cut up.

The Belgians, still further to the west, (south of Dixmude), were severely attacked on Sunday night, but they also held their ground. On Monday, the 26th, the British moved the Lahore Division of Indian troops north of Ypres, where the fighting was most severe; and also threw what was left of the 7th Canadian Brigade into the line. During this day the British were driven back from Broodseinde, and the British force on the Haanebeeke was thrown back to the west side of that stream. The Germans, in possession of the village of St. Julien, were able to launch attack after attack from that village towards the Ypres-Yperlee Canal, having in front of them remaining Canadians, to whose stub-

born resistance at this point it is partly due that Ypres was not captured. The position of the British at this point on this front became desperate. As their salient was being forced in more and more, and therefore became exposed to fire of the enemy's artillery on three sides, strong measures had to be taken to disengage the troops from their desperate position. Accordingly about ten o'clock in the morning a regular brigade under General Riddle, and the Lahore Division, moved on Fortuin under orders to re-take St. Julien and the woods around it. When this attack was delivered, the French beyond the Yser-Yperlee Canal were delivering an assault on Lizerne, supported by Belgian artillery and also had engaged the Germans who had forced their way to the west bank of the canal.

At Boesinghe another advance movement was being made towards Pilkem by French colored troops. The idea of this movement was for all these forces to move in unison. When the attack was delivered, however, the Germans again made use of gas and this broke up the attack of the French colored troops on Pilkem, as they received the full force of the gas. The Indian troops and General Riddle's Brigade attacking St. Julien succeeded in taking the outskirts of that village, but were held up there until General Riddle fell, about half past three, after which this force was obliged to fall back and abandon the ground taken. That night the Allied line of battle was further driven back until it ran from the station at Zonnebekke westward to the Gravenstafel ridge, then southwest to the western side of the Hannebeeke River to a point a little to the east of St. Julien, whence, curving around this point, it proceeded to a point on the Ypres-Poelcappelle road and thence ran to Boesinghe on the Yser-Yperlee Canal and on the railroad from Ypres to Bruges. Here it crossed the canal and ran northward to Lizerne to the west of the canal, which was held by the French whose line continued northward until it joined that of the Belgians still further to the west, towards the channel coast.

The following day what was left of the Lahore Divison of Indian troops, and the French who touched on their position on the left, made another attempt to attack the Germans, but this was defeated and no progress was made. The Germans again used gas to halt this attack.

Both sides were now nearly exhausted, and the next day, (Wednesday, the 28th) the whole line rested, except that the French made a successful advance movement on Lizerne to the west of the canal, north of Boesinghe, and managed also to get a footing in the hamlet of Het Sast on the east bank of the canal between these two places.

Sir John French, the next day, was about to withdraw his forces from the line of Boesinghe-Zonnebekke, owing to the fear he had that their communications would be cut as a result of the capture of St. Julien by the Germans. General Foch, however, with great difficulty persuaded the British Generalissimo to hold his position for a short time longer because General Foch intended, after re-enforcing the French troops north of Lizerne, to make a vigorous attack on the Germans from Lizerne and from Het Sast. Except for artillery duels on the 29th, north of Ypres, neither side moved.

On the 30th General Foch carried out his promise and the French forces under General Putz made a most vigorous attack on the Germans from the two places above mentioned as a base. This attack was partly successful and the Germans were forced back a considerable distance in the vicinity of Pilkem. Some artillery and some prisoners were captured; heavy losses being inflicted upon the Teutonic troops. But this attack was fruitless for the reason that from Het Sast south towards Ypres, upon the canal, the Germans had most strongly installed themselves and established several lines of defensive trenches which it would be impossible to take rapidly, and as long as these remained untaken the British position was gravely menaced. General French therefore sent an order on May 1st for the British troops to withdraw, which retreat was carried out more or less in good order.

Sir John French has been considerably criticized by military experts for this retrograde movement, but it was thought that it was necessary at this time, because the English troops were exposed to gas attacks by the Germans on three sides and, further, were not then equipped with respirators and other devices which enabled them, later, to come through these attacks practically without injury.

Two gas attacks were made this day by the Germans

at Hill No. 60 and at Neuve Chapelle, but as wind conditions were not favorable, these attacks accomplished little.

The early part of Sunday, the 2nd of May, passed quietly, but in the late afternoon another attempt was made by the Germans to force a passage through the Allied line between Boesinghe on the Yser-Yperlee Canal and Zonnebekke on the railroad from Ypres to Roulers. At one point south of St. Julien, and at another between Fortuin and Zonnebekke, the British line was forced back, but the timely arrival of reserves which came up from Potijze enabled the British to return to the charge and to retake their abandoned trenches. Some bayonet fighting, in which both sides claimed the advantage, took place on either flank of this main attack.

On Monday, the 3rd, the Germans renewed the attack on the British lines by delivering a feint attack between St. Julien and Pilkem, on which the Allied artillery opened and halted, whereupon the Germans assaulted the northern side of the salient and forced the British in the village of Gravenstafel to fall back to the northwest of that village. Night attacks followed these day attacks, but accomplished little. During the night the British fell back again and constituted a new line beginning at the French trenches to the west of the road running from Ypres to Langemarck and running to the Haanebeeke stream to a point thereon known as the Frezenberg road. From here it turned south, running to the east of Hooge and curving southward to the famous Hill 60. All the area to the east of this, which had been the scene of the violent combats described heretofore in the past few days, was thus abandoned. Meanwhile, south of Dixmude to the west of the French position, there had been severe fighting between the Germans and the Belgians, in which the Belgians showed remarkable tenacity and managed to hold the enemy.

May 5th was characterized by hard fighting between the Germans and French along the Ypres-Yperlee Canal, where the Germans stopped a vigorous attack by the French under General Putz which had for its object to drive them back across this canal. This fight continued more or less violently for the next ten days. The French abandoned infantry attacks and endeavored to force their way forward on the line from Lizerne to Boesinghe and Steenstraate and the banks of the canal. Early in the morning of May 5th a gas attack was made

upon Hill 60 by the Germans, which resulted in a British retreat. The Germans followed, standing gallantly up under severe punishment by the British artillery, and took the trenches on the north of the hill and carried this movement as far forward as the British trenches in the direction of Zillebeke. Attack and counter-attack in this section followed all day, and the struggle was probably as severe as fighting well could be. Both sides lost heavily, and apparently without consciousness of their losses, the fighting being of a desperate hand-to-hand character which gave no opportunity for the combatants to even look around. The result was that when the night fell the Germans had made a further gain and had taken the crest of the hill. During the night the British dealt a violent counter-attack against the German positions on the crest of the hill but were repulsed; and the Germans then attacking, the British fell back, so that the early morning of May 6th found the Germans in possession of Hill 60 and the supporting trenches to the northward.

While these events were taking place around Hill 60, there had been attempts on the part of the Germans to pierce the British line along the Ypres-Roulers Railroad, but these were unsuccessful.

May 7th was a comparatively quiet day, but the struggle on May 8th more than made up for any quietness of the preceding day. This day of May 8th was probably as animated as any prior day in this movement. The struggle began with a German artillery attack on the British positions north and south of Frezenberg, which is a small village lying between Zonnebekke and Ypres, almost directly north of Westhoek, and about three-quarters of a mile to west of the Haanebeeke river. This artillery attack caused numerous losses to the British, and when a little later the enemy's infantry attack was launched against the British front between the Ypres-Poelcappelle and the Ypres-Menin road, one to the north and another to the south of the Ypres-Roulers railroad, (these two roads forming the two sides of a triangle and the British line the base), the British line broke and would have been totally overwhelmed had it not been for the devoted gallantry of a Canadian regiment, the Princess Patricia Light Infantry, whose courage and daring momentarily saved the situation. A little while later another portion of the British line broke, necessitating the retirement of the whole line,

and the consequent capture of Frezenberg by the Germans. But the British were not yet beaten and after a short time a counter-attack by them was launched, and after very fierce fighting Frezenberg was recovered, but only momentarily. The Germans immediately concentrated a heavy artillery fire upon this point and the British were again forced to retire, which they did to a line running north and south of Velorenhoek, a hamlet about a mile to the west of Frezenberg. About a mile north of this hamlet lies the village of Wieltje, and in a short time the Germans not only captured Wieltje but other forces came through the Bellewaarde Woods and threatened the British position on that side also. Re-enforcements were promptly sent to Wieltje and after a very hard fight this place was recaptured near midnight by the British and the tension on the north removed.

The next day the Allies, acting in concert, attempted, by a general offensive on the fronts from Armentieres to Arras, to relieve the pressure on this Ypres front, and undoubtedly did compel the withdrawal of German troops from the Ypres front; to which circumstances it may be partly attributed that the German attack on Ypres at this time was not successful.

All this day the fight continued on all sides of the town, but the only marked advance by the Germans was the capture of the Chateau de Hooge, a point to the west of the Bellewaarde Woods on the Menin-Ypres road.

The next day there was considerable fighting north and south of this Menin-Ypres road, following an artillery attack, which fighting was indecisive, though on the north side this attack destroyed the British trenches and forced the British to abandon the Bellewaarde Woods completely.

The next day, the 11th, the Germans bombarded Ypres itself, though there were some skirmishes south of the Menin road. This bombardment continued all through Wednesday but on this day particular attention was paid to the British trenches which led the British to believe that a determined assault would be made soon; this idea induced them to bring up practically all their reserves into the fighting line, particularly the center.

Thursday, May 13th, opened with a very heavy bombardment by the Germans of the British line. The weather was abominable, which added to the British discomfort. Early in the morning the British forces, cross-

ing the Ypres-Roulers railroad, were forced to fall back about a quarter of a mile, as a result of the strength of the bombardment. The rest of the line, however, held firm. In the afternoon a counter-attack was delivered by the British, which was successful for a time, and regained the positions abandoned in the morning, but was unable to hold them as the Germans immediately opened a very heavy artillery fire on the British, forcing them again to withdraw. Nightfall found the enemies in practically the position of the early afternoon. This was the last serious fighting at this portion of the line for some time.

Further north, a little later, the French, under General Putz, on May 15th, attacked the hamlets of Steenstraate and Het Sast. This movement was performed by Zouaves and Algerian native troops, and was successful, the Algerians taking Steenstraate, and the Zouaves Het Sast. The Germans that night counter-attacked at both places, but after severe fighting, in which there were many casualties on both sides, this counter-attack was thrown back. This was the last hard fighting in this section of the line and from this date on the west bank of the Ypres-Yperlee Canal may be considered to have been clear of the Germans.

While these things were taking place here, further to the west there were minor engagements between the Germans and the Belgians from time to time, but which were without any particular significance or any real effect on the main battle. In addition to this, the ports of the Belgian coast, which the Germans had already transformed into submarine bases, were bombarded occasionally by French and British warships; the bombarders reporting that they had inflicted great damage and the bombarded stating that the bombarders had accomplished but little. The presumption is that the bombardment of a land position from the sea inflicts no very great amount of material damage.

These Belgian ports, as well as points in the interior of Belgium used by the Germans for munition depots or supply points, were from time to time attacked by Allied air-men, and the same claims and counter-claims made by both sides as to the results of these attacks. Though not specifically mentioned in the description of the fighting in and around Ypres, there was, during the entire period of this conflict (to which history will probably give the name of the Second Battle of Ypres)

continuous activity by the aircraft on both sides and many interesting and exciting mid-air conflicts took place, but as these had no real effect on the issue of the battle, the exigencies of space forbid more than this brief mention of them.

In summing up the second battle of Ypres, it may be said that the Allies owed the fact that Ypres was not taken to the splendid courage and brilliant fighting qualities of the Canadian troops present on this field; and among the Canadian regiments which should be cited as having particularly distinguished themselves, should be mentioned the Princess Patricia Light Infantry, which at the beginning of this battle had effective about 1500 men and came out of it with 150 fighting men and a few stretcher bearers; thus losing 90 per cent of its effective, a record which is perhaps unequalled in the annals of war.

CHAPTER V

We will now turn our attention to the fighting which began May 9th to the south of Ypres. The most northern portion of these fights was again fought in the same terrain as that on which the battle of Neuve Chapelle in March (hereinbefore described) had taken place, and was part of a French and British offensive which began a little to the south of Armentieres and extended to just north of Arras. It will be remembered in the account of the battle of Neuve Chapelle that the Aubers Ridge was indicated as the ultimate objective of the British in that battle, and the reasons why the position of this ridge was so important were indicated and the ridge itself described. The only real result of this battle of Neuve Chapelle accruing to the British was that the village of Neuve Chapelle itself had been captured, enabling them to launch the offensive which they were now about to undertake against the Aubers Ridge, from a starting point near the Aubers Ridge. The action began on the west, the British concentration taking place from Bethune to Armentieres, and opened with an artillery attack which commenced at daybreak the morning of May 9th. This artillery attack lasted about an hour, and towards 6 o'clock the infantry attack began by an advance north of Fromelles by a portion of the 4th British Corps who carried the first German trenches at the point of the bayonet and pressed on nearly to Haubourdin, a suburb of Lille. But at this time the Germans launched a counter-attack from the city of Lille itself, which forced them back and recovered all the ground which the British troops had gained in that first rush.

Further south, on the line from Neuve Chapelle to Festubert, (a village to the southwest of Neuve Chapelle) another British attack, composed of the 1st Corps and the Indian contingent, was hurled in the direction of Aubers. This attack, like the other attack, was at first successful. The Indians got across the River des Layes and captured a position in front of the village of Fromelles, a little to the northeast of Aubers, which village, with Aubers itself and the first line of German trenches

on the heights of the ridge of the same name, had been pounded to pieces by the British artillery attack. But the Germans had merely retreated to their second line trenches, and as soon as the British had reached their former first line trenches, they, by a counter-attack, aided by a very large number of machine guns, succeeded in throwing back in some confusion the British punch at their center, and forcing the enemy to fall back to practically the same positions from which they started, with the result that the attack was called off.

On the morning of May 10th the 4th and 1st British Corps were drawn back close together and an attack on the Aubers Ridge, upon a front running from Neuve Chapelle to Givenchy, was determined upon. But it was resolved that this attack would not be made until the British artillery had more thoroughly prepared the ground for the infantry advance than had been the case the day before. To this end artillery re-enforcements were hurried to this front and the offensive fixed for the night of the 12th. For various reasons, however, this was subsequently postponed until the night of the 15th. This interval was occupied by more or less vigorous artillery duels between the combatants, and in this interval the Canadian Division was brought down from Ypres and thrown into the battle line, presumably because the British commanders knew that these troops could be relied upon to advance without flinching. The assault was to be delivered from a point to the south of Neuve Chapelle on the road to La Bassée, known as Richebourg-l'Avoué, and another little hamlet to the southwest of this point on the road towards Festubert, known as La Quinque Rue, and thence to Festubert. The country between here and the foot of the Aubers Ridge was flat and intersected at intervals by ditches of more or less width and depth, but which were largely concealed by grass. Comparatively little protection was afforded to the enemy by trees or by other natural defenses. A few houses were scattered over this flat land, which had been converted by the Germans into block houses and equipped with machine guns. The real German defenses were along three lines of trenches which intervened between the British and the Aubers Ridge, and which were constructed with all the refinements known to the art of field fortification.

This time night was chosen for the assault and about midnight on the 15th the British left their trenches and

advanced to the assault. The first misfortune happened to the Indians who were advancing through Richebourg-l'Avoué and who were held up at that point for some time by the intensity of the infantry and machine gun fire of the Germans. South of these came the 2nd Division, whose left reached the first line of German trenches but was obliged to halt there to wait for the Indians to disentangle themselves and to come up, so as not to break connection with them.

The center and right of this 4th Division were more fortunate, as they penetrated for about 600 yards, on an 800-yard front, into the German second line of trenches, but these advances were only gained at the price of numerous losses on the part of the assailants.

Towards three o'clock in the morning, the 7th Division was launched to the attack from Festubert, and this attack succeeded so well that by seven o'clock this division had advanced to the east of La Quinque Rue, but was not in touch with the 2nd Division in the north from whom it was divided by the enemy's field fortifications.

An attack against the German rear lines of communication, launched from La Quinque Rue, was made early in the morning, but did not succeed. The attack of the Indians to the north which, as has been said, was unsuccessful, was completely suspended. During the rest of the day the British endeavored to connect the flanks of the 2nd and 7th Divisions.

Towards evening the Germans counter-attacked, and the advance points of the 7th Division were driven in on the main body of the salient.

Next morning, May 17th, in the midst of a driving rain, the British again attemptd to advance, and in the case of the 7th Division in front of Festubert were successful. This division pressed along southward to the German trenches and the 2nd Division to the north fought its way towards Violaines; while still further the left wing (the Indian corps) threw itself upon Estaires, and this joint movement attained a considerable degree of success in that it captured practically the entire first line of German trenches and, in a number of places, the second and third lines as well; while, in a few places, the British had reached the foot of the Aubers Ridge.

On the 18th the advance continued on the part of the British and by night they had advanced to a point some 1200 yards north of their original line of departure

along the Festubert-La Quinque Rue road. But this was the culmination of their efforts and the battle the next day was recognized as having been finished by the withdrawal of the 2nd and 7th Divisions. For the second time Aubers had not been attained.

Some minor fighting concluded the battle. On Thursday, the 18th of May, the Canadians gained a little ground northeast of the Festubert-La Quinque Rue road, and the next day they repulsed several severe counter-attacks from the direction of Chapelle St. Roch. But on the 23rd the Germans made a strong counter-attack in an effort to break through the Canadian position at Festubert, but this was unsuccessful, as was a like counter-attack on the night of the 24th and 25th.

The battle was now completely over, and as a net result the British had gained on a four-mile front an average width of 300 to 350 yards. But this had cost them from 6000 to 7000 men, and it may be doubted whether this comparatively trifling advantage was worth the price paid for it in human life and in human suffering.

Sir John French so often in his reports talks of the moral superiority which the British achieve over the Germans. His very first report, in August of 1914, lays claim to this superiority, and in his report of the last battle, of Aubers and Festubert, he again lays claim to the same moral superiority. But to the neutral observer this appears to be unproven because an army which had established moral superiority over its enemy would hardly have retired as consistently and as continuously before that enemy as has been the case of the British army from August 1914 to the end of this particular battle.

CHAPTER VI

South of Neuve Chappelle on a 25 to 30 mile line separating that village from the town of Arras, during the month of April, there had been the usual indecisive and uninteresting trench fighting interspersed with hand grenade combats and occasional infantry skirmishes between the French and their German opponents, but nothing had taken place which materially influenced the positions of the respective contending forces. And this condition of affairs continued during the month of April and into the early part of May. But this apparent calm sealed, in reality, extensive preparations by General Joffre for an offensive against the German position on this line.

By May 8th, French troops in large numbers had been concentered on the national highroad which ran southward from Bethune to Arras. At this time the German lines were on all sides of Arras, but the western side of Arras itself was but a salient exposed to heavy artillery fire and had, in fact, been several times bombarded and was nearly destroyed as a city.

North of Arras the German line had been pushed a considerable distance to the west, the most westerly point of this line being the village of Carency which had been turned by the Germans into defensive field fortifications of great strength; and to the north of Carency, Loos, which was a little northwest of Lens, had also been similarly fortified. The end of this German line was La Bassée which had by this time completely lost the semblance of a town, so many times had it been bombarded by the French and English in their efforts, which had been unsuccessful, to destroy the German field fortifications there.

South of Arras the German line again curved to the west. The immediate objective of this French attack, which was delivered practically along the whole line already set forth, was the capture of Lens, which was an important point not only because it was the center of the French coal mining district, but also because at it

concentrated several railroads and many high roads, with the consequence that it played an extremely important part in the German line of communications.

The French attack was made in two directions, from Arras in the south, whence it proceeded northeasterly in the general direction of Lens, and from Bethune, whence it proceeded southwest; also towards Lens, where it was intended that the two columns should unite in the event they succeeded in breaking through the German lines.

The first point of shock was Carency and the attack began, as usual, with artillery preparation. The object of artillery preparation is three-fold: first, to destroy that class of defenses such as wire entanglements, etc., etc., which intervene between advancing troops and the enemy's first line of defenses; second, to destroy and render untenable the first line of defenses; and, thirdly, by means of a fire trained beyond the first line of defenses and between it and the second line of defenses, or such points in the rear as reserves may be known to be stationed at, to prevent aid being brought to the first line of defenses from the rear thereof. In addition to these three, there is a collateral object; that of destroying the morale of the opposing troops so that when the infantry rush, which follows the artillery preparation, comes, these troops being depressed and dejected—stunned as it were—by the artillery fire, will not put up so strong a resistance as they would otherwise.

The concentration of artillery on Carency was perhaps the heaviest which had been known to that time on the western front. From official sources we know that the French had concentered along a line of not more than six or seven miles to the westward of this town 1050 guns of various calibres. These opened in chorus as soon as day broke on May 8th and this bombardment continued about four hours, when towards nine o'clock in the morning the infantry advance was ordered.

According to the testimony of eye witnesses, the effects of this bombardment were terrific. Trenches were blown into the air and their defenders battered out of all semblance of humanity, while the ground in front of the French artillery positions seemed like a field traversed by gigantic furrows.

The infantry attack after such preparation was taken part in by four French army corps and was successful. During the first day, the French advanced

steadily and took trench after trench from the Germans, the movement finally culminating in the capture of the town of Carency with its garrison of considerable strength, with much artillery of all kinds and more munitions of war than had been captured by the French in any action against the Germans since the battle of the Aisne.

While these things were taking place at Carency, the same day the French further north made an advance in the direction of Loos, which, as it will be remembered, is a little to the northwest of Lens. This advance was at first successful and material gains were made by the French all along the line, but a German counter-offensive delivered almost immediately succeeded in recapturing most of the ground lost, and consequently there was but little net gain for the French in this operation. South of Carency the advance was also not so successful, though the French line was pushed forward to the outskirts of Souchez. This ground was steadily fought over from May 30th to June 17th without intermission or respite. There was not an hour of truce nor an instant of repose. The heat was great and the men fought almost stripped. Both sides lost heavily, but the morale of the troops of neither was in the slightest degree impaired. The struggle was to a very large degree a hand to hand fight of desperate intensity. To the east of Arras, however, the French attack beat itself in vain against the German defensive.

On all these points fighting continued almost without intermission for the remainder of this month, the most important points of conflict being those points which figured so often in the bulletins at this time,—Souchez, Neuville, Angers, Lorette Heights and the Labyrinth; and the struggle for which places lasted for weeks.

Space forbids the narration of the ebb and flow of the fighting in this sector, since points on this long line changed hands during the period of the next two or three months a dozen times; for instance at the famous Labyrinth, the village of Souchez, the cemetery of which was taken and retaken no less than nineteen times, while the sugar refinery, a little further to the east, changed hands almost daily for a period of several weeks.

At the beginning of July the French had made a gain on this front of perhaps, at its greatest distance from

west to east, three miles, but which averages, necessarily, much less. This had been accomplished at an awful cost to both sides.

The whole operation can be characterized as a "nibble," and bore no resemblance to the strong drive so often and so constantly announced officially and unofficially from London during the early Spring. And this gain, important as it may hereafter prove, is fairly said to be counter-balanced by the German advance in the Ypres sector.

From July onward to September 1st the operations on this front dwindled away to a form of trench fighting which differed but little from that of the monotonous days of the preceding winter, and present no features of interest to the reader. One day so greatly resembled the other that the only incidents reported were an occasional gain of a few feet of trenches by one combatant or the other, an artillery duel of more or less violence, (principally less); in short, a dull monotony of routine fighting in which the great object of both sides was to conserve as far as possible their resources both of men and of materials.

From the first of May until towards the end of August, the French port of Dunkirk on the Channel, far behind the Allied lines, as well as two or three other smaller towns in the same region, were somewhat mysteriously bombarded by a German gun of enormous calibre from a point, the location of which remains unknown to this day. From the distance at which the German lines were from this town, it is certain that this gun could not have been closer to Dunkirk than a distance of 21 miles, and was, perhaps located even two or three miles further off. The effect of this bombardment was more moral than otherwise. A few of the population of Dunkirk were killed and a few buildings damaged, but, on the whole, its material result was insignificant. It was, however, of the greatest interest to learn that it was possible for a piece of artillery to be used effectively at anything like this distance, as nothing similar had occurred before in the annals of war; which fact opens up a great vista of possibilities in the future, when guns of this character are more nearly perfected and become more numerous, since then it would be entirely feasible to conduct an effective bombardment of a place from a distance of over twenty miles; a thing which only a few years ago would never have been dreamed of as being

even within the limits of possibility. Too technical to be treated of here, an analaysis of the trajectory of the projectile fired from this giant piece would be most interesting to those of my readers who are mathematically inclined. One fact which is understandable by the non-technical reader, and may be of interest, however, is that this projectile must have reached a height of at least eight miles from the mouth of the cannon from which it was fired in order to have covered this distance; and nothing made by human beings has been established, even mathematically, to have attained this height from the earth, heretofore.

South of Arras to the great angle of the line at Rebucourt from March 1st to September 1st, comparatively little occurred. In the early days of June the French launched an attack on the town of Hubertine, some 13 miles to the southwest of Arras, in which they scored an unimportant advantage and took a few prisoners; while about this same time a few miles southeast of Noyons, north of the Aisne, the French made another attack on the German positions and again captured a few prisoners.

Towards the end of June, south of Noyons, fighting began around the so-called Quennevieres Farm, in which the French gained an initial success and captured the farm.

During the next three or four weeks this portion of the line was the scene of considerable activity, the Germans making several counter-attacks in an endeavor to re-capture the position, but failing therein.

CHAPTER VII

IN CHAMPAGNE

During the whole month of March, on this portion of the line, there was but little to record, though between Rheims and the Argonne the French offensive, which had been raging in the Champagne district and the plain of Chalons and its neighborhood since late in January, still gave some signs of life and still strove intermittently to push north in the plain of the Chalons, with the object of interposing a French force between the German armies in front of Verdun in the east, and in front of Rheims in the west. A line of railroad runs south from Sedan reaching Vouziers and, turning west, runs in that direction from the north of Rheims towards the Channel. If the French had been successful in cutting this line, which was their object, the German army in front of Rheims would have been cut off from eastern communication; the French would have been upon their left flank and would have been reaching out towards other lines of communication in the rear, which would have placed this army in a somewhat precarious position.

But though for weeks, more or less action took place in this campaign, and LeMesne, Perthes and Beausejour, and the neighborhood, were the scenes of continual fighting, the French made little or no progress. The fiercest of this fighting took place in the early part of March, when the French made an attack on the German position between the Sabot Wood and Perthes. Souain and Perthes are connected by a road which runs nearly all the way on the crest of the hills between these two places. The German trenches extended north of this road, while the French ran to the south thereof, partly protected by the ground. In order to make the French position secure, it was necessary to capture the crest line which ran east and west through this Sabot Wood and which was strongly fortified by the Germans.

On March 7th an infantry attack was made on this German position, after the usual preliminary bombardment. This assault was delivered both from the west and from the southwest. The western attack was brought to

a standstill on entering the Sabot Wood, by tremendous fire from machine guns. The southwestern attack was more successful and resulted in the capture of both the German first and second line trenches, and even advanced beyond this point, but was thrown back, and the French installed themselves in the captured German second line trenches. During the night of the 7th the Germans attacked the French in this position continually, hoping to regain the lost ground. On the 8th hard fighting took place, and the French held their ground. The next few days were spent in consolidating the position, and on the 14th a further attack was made on the German positions to the east, but unsuccessfully.

A second attack was made on the 15th and after hard fighting the French were successful and the Germans evacuated the Sabot Wood completely. Elsewhere on the line the policy of nibbling, which Joffre had inaugurated, was continued, but this also produced no results of the slightest strategic importance. This policy of nibbling was simply a plan of making a series of attacks at widely separated points, at which points the attackers would mass large forces of infantry supported by very heavy concentrations of artillery, under the fire of which the first German trenches were to be rushed. The assailants were then to face these trenches about and in them resist counter-attacks which the Germans would find themselves obliged to make. This policy would, it was supposed, cost the Germans far more men than it would the Allies, and, by so doing, would weaken the German defense, already weaker than the Allies in point of numbers.

The inventors of this nibbling strategy, however, did not explain why their assaults could be accomplished at comparatively little expense in point of casualties, nor why the German attacks upon the new positions which these assaults won would be so much more costly to the Germans than the assaults had been to the Allies.

This plan further contemplated a fresh attack on any point of the line from which it was found that the Germans had sent troops to reenforce the German line at any point which the Allies were engaged in attacking. To accomplish this successfully, we suppose two things: firstly, that the Allies at the original attacking point would be able to identify the fresh troops brought against them, and that the General Staff of the Allies knew exactly the positions on this long line of all the German troops in or-

der that they might be able to gradually determine what point in the line opposed to them had been weakened by the withdrawal of such troops; secondly, it necessitated the power on the part of the Allies to hold their lines permanently at points in great numerical superiority to the Germans, or else to be able to concentrate at any time, at any point in the line, a large force very quickly. Unless either one of these alternatives were performed by them, they could not hope to attack successfully the weakened point of the German line.

To the Allied mind, the objective of these nibbling offensives was not so much to pierce the German line as to keep up a continual wearing-down process which, if persisted in for a long enough time, would so weaken the German line that it would have to give, practically all along this front.

The correctness of this view depended on whether or not the British and French General Staffs were accurate in their contention that the German resources in men had reached their zenith and would thenceforth decline, since, if this was not true, the Germans could at any time throw fresh troops from new levies into this western line and replace the losses caused by this attrition policy of the Allies.

The history of the past six months shows that the Allies were completely mistaken in their estimate of Germany's lack of power to renew its forces; because, during this time, Germany has held the western line, to all intents and purposes, in exactly the position it was on March 1st, 1915; has waged a campaign against Russia which has forced that nation to a most disastrous retreat; while her ally, Austria, (the supposedly decrepit) has been able to aid her efficiently in the enterprise against Russia and has held back the Italian army on the south.

One great misfortune of the Allies all through this war has been that, with the exception of France, they have been intoxicated by the sense of their own importance and have continuously and extraordinarily underestimated their opponents' resources, both in men, money and ingenuity. The result of all of which has been disastrous to themselves; since wars are won by fighting with the arms and not with the tongue.

This condition of quiescence continued on this portion of the western front practically all the month of May, and the only incidents of any importance were a few skirmishes in the angle between the Oise and the Aisne

Rivers in the vicinity of Tracy-le-Val; further to the east in the forest of Le Pretre, to the north of Pont-a-Mousson in what has now come to be known as the St. Mihiel salient, the French, in a fight lasting intermittently for several weeks, gained considerable ground. And this was the sum total of the Allied reply to the victories in Galicia.

It will be remembered that several months before, in an interview which, though at first denied, was afterwards admitted to be substantially correct, Lord Kitchener, the British Minister of War, and the man responsible for the recent organization of Britain's new armies, to which the title of "Kitchener's Millions" had been given by the British Press, and accordingly grasped by the American, had said that the war would begin about the first of May. On this statement of Lord Kitchener's, for the whole winter the English Press and American copyists teamed with allusions to the coming of the spring as the beginning of a great drive which was to hurl the German army out of France and Belgium in confusion and disorder, and was to redeem England's promise to Belgium of August and September, 1914.

On June 1st, 1915, this promise remained unfulfilled. The British then held, as they had held for months, but a trifle more than thirty miles of the 500 miles of this western front, and this they held with great difficulty. True it is that a force whose strength cannot be accurately given had been thrown into France from England, composed of half-drilled boys, lacking in officers who had ever seen a battlefield or who had ever led their men even into a skirmish. This is not said in disparagement to the individual courage of those troops; it is merely said to point out the reason why these half-baked bricks had to be held in France for several months and, to a large extent, drilled and trained by French officers who had smelt powder; because it is a fact that these English troops were so drilled and so trained, and that a special organization of French officers was formed to supply deficiencies of the training which had been given these men in England.

This was not Kitchener's fault, considering the extraordinary manner in which he had been forced by the British government to raise men to defend Great Britain plunged in the greatest war of history. By a form of solicitation they dragged the honor and dignity of the nation in the gutter in that most disgraceful advertising

campaign, wherein a British subject was solicited to do as a favor that duty which the State should have compelled him to do as its right; thus putting the supreme service to one's country in the same class of commodity as a soap or a particular kind of cigarette, or the bargains in the ladies' shops.

It was, in truth, marvelous that Kitchener achieved what he did in raising troops for Great Britain, and it may be said that his achievements were made in spite of, and not with the aid of, this most remarkable exhibition of cowardice on the part of the British government.

This advertising campaign was probably unique in the world's history: it appealed not only to men themselves to enlist, but appealed to the women of Great Britain to make them enlist; appealed to the clergymen to use their influence upon their male parishioners for a like end, to masters to procure the enlistment of their servants, to wives to send away their husbands, dangling before their eyes the separation allowance, greater than those husbands' earnings, etc., etc.

Every art and device of advertising which experience has shown to be successful in inducing the public to purchase a new baby food or other article that appeals to the popular imagination, was used.

The occasion called for other and more dignified methods, which would have required an infinitely smaller expense and produced an infinitely greater result, and would have savored less of the methods of the advance agent of a circus. "By their fruits shall ye know them," and the fruits of this British advertising campaign for men, which had begun months beforehand, resulted, on June 1, 1915, in the British holding thirty odd miles of the western front; the French holding over five hundred miles; but the French had not resorted to a campaign of publicity to raise an army.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

The fighting in the Forest of the Argonne during the month of March was confined almost entirely to artillery duels and to mining operations, these latter being out of proportion in their number on this front owing to the topography of the country.

The Forest of Argonne, which is the name given to the entire region stretching, roughly, from Suippes to near Apremont, is at once one of the most difficult and important fields of campaign in the French line. The object of the German army here is to force its way forward through the forest, past Valmy and Triaucourt, so that the line, instead of running to the east as it now does would run almost directly south from the vicinity of Charnyto Beauzée, and even further to the east of Beauzée; the ultimate design being to connect this line with the line at St. Mihiel, and to complete, thereby, the surrounding of the fortress of Verdun, which is the most important point on the battle line in France. No conquest of France can be really made until this position is in the hands of the invader. It is to-day what it always has been, the key to Paris and to the heart of France.

In the early part of the struggle, just before the Battle of the Marne, the German line had nearly reached the above described position leaving only the gap of less than 30 miles between Beauzée and the point nearest to it on the German line to the east to be closed; but, subsequent to the Battle of the Marne, as my readers know, the German line had retreated considerably to the northward. A reference to the map in the first volume will show the distance more plainly than words.

In March, as has already been said, the fighting was of a very confined character; the forest was full of snow, and when, later, in April, the thaw set in, infantry fighting then became almost impossible and consequently it was not until fairly late in May that any real infantry fighting took place.

About the 20th of May, the French began an attack on the German positions in the center of the forest, pre-

paring the way by artillery preparation as usual, and on the 22nd made an infantry attack on these positions. For a couple of days the fighting continued rather severely and culminated in a general action all along the line on the 23rd. This, however, finally resulted in the French being repulsed and falling back to their original positions with very heavy losses in proportion to the number engaged.

For several days after this intermittent attacks were made by the French which resulted in little, if any, gain for them.

With the coming of June the fighting resumed its usual character and all the early portion of the month passed without any serious attack by one side or the other, though it must also be remembered that continuous bitter trench fighting was going on through this entire period and that this form of fighting is relatively high in casualties.

Late in the month the Germans made an attack on the French positions on the east of the Forest, and here, for the first time in the Argonne, they employed the gas which had been used further to the west. This fighting lasted for nearly a week and resulted in small German gains at various points along this portion of the Argonne front, but finally the fighting reverted to its previous character of intensive trench fighting, in which asphyxiating bombs, flaming liquids and mines play so extensive and so deadly a part. But this calm was not for long.

In the early days of July the Germans began a general offensive, and in a combat which lasted for more than a week and which progressed from artillery and rifle fire to close hand to hand fighting with bayonet and grenade, the French trenches between Binarville and La Four de Paris were captured after fighting as intense perhaps as witnessed anywhere on this front during the war. It is difficult to decide which was the most admirable, the intrepidity of the German advance or the desperate resistance of the French. Certain it is that this fighting was honorable alike for victor and vanquished.

Besides the capture of these trenches, the Germans took in the neighborhood of 3000 prisoners; the most considerable number they had taken for some time, and, with these prisoners, a large quantity of artillery and supplies of all kinds.

This success was followed up in the following week by

an offensive launched by the Germans at Vienne-le-Chateau, where, after capturing the hill called La Fille Morte, an elevation of strategic importance well fortified and defended, they also took over 3000 French prisoners and again captured artillery and supplies.

In this action also the fighting was distinguished by the extreme tenacity of the attack and obstinacy of the defense.

On the 19th of July a rather weak attempt was made by the French to re-capture this lost position, but this effort was not crowned with success.

This completed the activity for this month, both sides being apparently exhausted.

At the commencement of August, however, a new struggle began in the Argonne, which lasted well through the month and centered around the road from Vienne-le-Chateau to Binarville; the Germans endeavoring to force forward towards the strategic center of this district, St. Mihiel, threw themselves with ardor upon the French defenses. For the next two weeks the fighting here was continuous and desperate; every form of military activity being used. Artillery duels were succeeded by infantry attacks characterized by hard hand to hand fighting with the bayonet and with grenades. The line wavered to and fro; one moment the Germans gaining and the next moment the French by counter-attacks succeeding in forcing them back. Finally the troops of the Crown Prince succeeded towards the 18th of the month in momentarily piercing the French lines at one point, though the majority of the attacks failed, but the French brought up large re-enforcements and succeeded by a final desperate effort in ousting the Germans from the positions which they had so gallantly won.

From this time on, to the end of August, the fighting on this front continued hard and relentless, but with fortune favoring neither side;—one day the Germans being the aggressors and the next the French. When the record of the period under consideration closed, the line was still swaying to and fro with no indication of the ultimate result. The whole result of the summer campaign had, however, now been in a slight degree favorable to the Germans. They had not only held, but in sections of the line they had improved, their positions though they were still far from their strategic object of forcing the line southeastward to meet the salient at St. Mihiel, and thus close the circle around the Verdun.

THE ARGONNE TO ALSACE

To the east of the Verdun, and from that point southward, the possession by the Germans of the line to St. Mihiel, which constitutes the so-called St. Mihiel salient, has been, since it fell into the hands of the Germans late in 1914 until the present day, a continual sore in the French side. The fortress of Verdun, which is situated in the extreme northern point of the loop formed by the German line herein was, by the very existence of this line, cut from rail communication with the rest of France, except by the single line running due west from the fortress and passing through Claremont-en-Argonne. One of the highways leading westward ran so close to the German positions to its north as to be incapable of use; which left, therefore, only the road to the south through Soiliy and thence to Belnoue to the west of Bar-le-Duc, as the highway by which the fortress could reach the rest of France.

To drive back the German line from St. Mihiel northeastward in the direction of Mars la Tour was of the highest importance to the French, while, on the other hand, it was of equal importance to the Germans to hold their position here even though it might be impossible to advance therefrom. Consequently, in this region attack succeeded attack.

The whole month of March until about the middle of April the French continued the offensive in this district, that is, from the north of Verdun to the south of St. Mihiel, which they had begun in January and in which they had been, to a degree, successful, foot by foot, tree by tree, driving back their enemy.

By the middle of April Lamorville was altogether in their possession, and the fighting in this region had, except for occasional bombardments at long range, moved out into the open country beyond Les Eparges. From the east side of the forest here the ground falls in a fairly steep descent until it rises again towards Les Eparges to a ridge over a thousand feet high, which is a part of the Hautes de Meuse and commands the plain of the Woevre, and in the middle thereof the French had attained a position from which it was comparatively easy for them to guard against unexpected attack, as it was impossible for the Germans to concentrate troops in the region which separated the forest from Les Eparges.

In the forest of Apremont and Le Bois Le Prêtre there had been almost continuous fighting to the south of Les

Eparges and the heights of the Meuse northeast of St. Mihiel. In this part of France the fighting in the forest had superseded the fighting in the forts, which both sides had been long ago forced to abandon for the alternative of concealed and disguised batteries. And there were acres and acres of these forests, not only here but all along this portion of the line, where every single tree had been cut clean off by the storm of shells and where even the ground itself was torn and battered by the great projectiles, till it was like a roughly plowed field.

By the end of April the French had advanced so that they held the northern edge of the Bois le Prêtre, and along the front northwestward to the Bois du Mort Mare, a distance of 10 or 12 miles.

By the middle of July the French had advanced on an average on the whole of this front about two miles. In the Bois Brule and the Bois Dailly the French were also gaining and were slowly pressing the enemy backward.

Further south around St. Mihiel there had been some desperate fighting, but the positions remained the same on the line running eastward towards St. Mihiel. Towards Pont-a-Mousson the desperate deadlock of the winter still continued, and appeared to be no nearer a decision than it had been six months before.

CHAPTER IX

Such was the situation in the last days of May when the Germans began an offensive along this entire front, in which the fighting was particularly bitter around Les Eparges and which resulted in the Germans considerably ameliorating their position in this sector, particularly to the southwest of Les Eparges and to the east of the so-called Grande Tranchée de Calonne. They also attempted an advance in the Bois le Prêtre, but here the French largely owing to their numerical superiority, succeeded in not only repulsing the German attack but in gaining ground on the western part of the ridge themselves.

These attacks and counter-attacks covered a period of about two weeks, after which quietness settled upon this line until towards the end of June, when the French began a movement which had as its object the re-capture of the position lost at Les Eparges. This attack began about noon on the 27th of June by a violent artillery fire directed against the German positions at Les Eparges beyond the Tranchée, and in the course of the afternoon two simultaneous attacks were launched, one of them on the German position southwest of Les Eparges and the other east of the Tranchée; these attacks the Germans repulsed. In the afternoon the French again attacked; this time the attack was directed against the whole of the German northern front, but this was thrown back. During the night of the 28th the French brought up some more heavy guns to support their artillery against the two German positions already referred to, and at dawn of the 28th opened a very murderous fire on the entire line, on both the front and rear lines of the Germans. Early in the morning an infantry attack was made by the French against the German positions on the Les Eparges ridge, which was launched from the Sonvaux gorge, but this the Germans succeeded in repulsing. During the course of this day, four other attacks were launched against these same positions.

During the night of the 28th the French artillery opened against the German line from Combres to beyond the Tranchée, but only attacked with infantry to the east of the Tranchée.

On the 29th the German positions were violently shelled by the French artillery, and an infantry attack

was launched on Les Eparges about noon, with the strongest force that the French had hitherto employed. The fighting all the afternoon was very heavy and both sides suffered tremendous casualties. In the late afternoon and the whole night the French shelled the entire German positions vigorously, and not only these German positions but the roads leading to them and the villages situated on the easterly side of the Côtes Lorraines. The object of this shelling was to prevent re-enforcements from coming up to the Germans, as part of the district shelled was behind their lines.

The next day, the last of June, the fighting was hard all day and the losses were again considerable on both sides. Towards evening the attacks slackened and the succeeding day was rather quiet; but fighting again began on the second of July, accompanied by a violent preliminary bombardment, the French having strengthened their force of artillery on this front. This bombardment continued not only during the day but all the ensuing night, and on the 3rd of July the fighting was the most violent of the offensive. Repeated infantry attacks were made by the French, each of them preceded by a violent bombardment, especially with shells containing asphyxiating gases and accompanied by showers of hand grenades.

Four desperate charges were made by the French on this day at Les Eparges, but were repulsed. The next two days (the 4th and 5th of July) were rather quiet, only artillery duels being made.

On the 5th of July two attempts were made by the French to break through the German positions, but unsuccessfully. The 6th was begun with a very heavy artillery bombardment of the German positions by the French and these were followed by the heaviest infantry attacks which this movement had seen, which followed one another in rapid succession the whole of the day, but against which the German line stood firm.

On the 7th more artillery duels followed but with less violence. On the 8th and 9th a repetition thereof took place. During these three days there were no infantry attacks.

On the whole, in this operation the French gained some ground, but it was comparatively insignificant in amount and of little strategic importance, though at one point of the front they did win, and held, a location from which their artillery could command the plain of the Woevre

and embarrass the advance of the German troops from the east. The casualties in this fighting were extremely heavy.

From the end of this offensive this part of the line reverted to trench fighting of an uninteresting character, though extremely sanguinary. French and German trenches were not a great distance apart, and in many places so close that hand grenades could be and were hurled from one trench to the other.

No further incidents of any importance occurred on this line to the time this record closes.

Further south, at about the same time, in Bois le Prêtre where, as has been said, the French had made a considerable advance in their offensive which had ended on the 30th of May and obtained possession practically of the entire forest, or wood, the Germans in their turn attacked in the early days of July.

This Bois le Prêtre is an extensive wooded territory which stretches northwest of the village of Pont-a-Mousson to the ridge which rises in a sharp curve from the Moselle valley to a height of 500 or 600 feet along the Moselle River. The slope in the direction of Pont-a-Mousson, as far as the Fey-en-Haye-Norroy road is known to the Germans in its entirety as "Priesterwald," while the French only call the southern half of the wood by the title of "Bois le Prêtre," the northern part being called Bois Communaux by them.

This Bois le Prêtre is a typical Lorraine forest; the roads are few in number and poorly made, and the thick undergrowth prevents any movement except on these roads. But by this time the artillery of the belligerents had torn this forest well to pieces and had mowed down many of the trees. The ridge extends from the Fey-en-Hayes-Norroy road to the wood on the east which is the highest point of this wooded territory, on the summit of which Croix des Carmes is situated, and along this ridge the German positions extended. On their capture of the southern portion of this wood and a gain of ground on the western part of the ridge, the French had built out six or seven consecutive positions with a total depth of about 500 feet.

On the 4th of July, in the afternoon, after preliminary mining operations and an artillery bombardment, the Germans delivered an attack on this position from the section thereof bordering on the Moselle River, and in their first rush penetrated the French position to the ex-

tent of about 800 feet and blew up five French block houses with their garrisons, and then proceeded to drive further into the French position, with the result that they re-captured practically the entire position which the French had taken from them during the prior months. By the evening the operation was finished. The French in this affair lost about 1000 prisoners, besides a very considerable quantity of artillery of various kinds and an engineer depot with its supplies.

The next day the French rather feebly counter-attacked but were repulsed. Desultory fighting followed until the middle of July, the Germans retaining the captured points. The middle of July the French, finding they were unable to make any great advances, gave up the effort and from this time forward the fighting here degenerated into trench fighting with an occasional artillery duel, and so continued until the end of the period we have under consideration.

Further east, in Alsace, during March, April and May, there was continuous but scattered fighting. Here again the topography played a very considerable part. In this rough broken country which gradually rises in height until at the eastern end of the mountains, where they run into the Alsatian plain, the fighting at times took place at an elevation of from 3000 to 4000 feet above the sea, where heavy artillery could be of very little use. To describe these isolated combats would be almost impossible; suffice it to say that the terminating mountains, those that border the Alsatian plain, were the scenes of the most desperate struggles. The reason of this was that the French desired to capture those points of observation from which they could see the operations of the Germans in the plain stretching to the eastward, which desire the Germans had every reason to prevent. One of these vantage points, for instance, was the Hartsmanweiler-Kopf which in these fights changed hands no less than six times; one day being in the possession of the French and a few days later in that of the Germans.

This struggle continued unabated for months. The principal events in this region were the capture of Metzeral by the French in the last days of June, which at the time it was thought might pave the way to the capture by the French of the important position of Colmar, but which did not, because the Germans massed troops along the line near Neubreisach-Mulhausen which prevented their advancing further. The struggle over Ban-de-Sapt

which lasted for several days in early July resulted in a brilliant French success in which they took over 800 prisoners, and which the Germans, though they counter-attacked, were unable to re-take.

Towards the last of July the French made a night attack from this captured position and again inflicted a rather severe defeat on their German adversaries, taking over 800 men, but were not so fortunate in another attack on the Lingekopf-Barrenkopf line, in which they were thrown back with severe losses.

Isolated struggles continued unremittingly, sometimes won by one side and sometimes by the other, but these produced no results of any importance.

At one time in August the French opened a bombardment of Muenster, but this did not continue long. Otherwise, there were no incidents of sufficient importance to be chronicled, though the fighting was continuous and fierce.

In the period from March to September, on this western line, it cannot be said that either side gained any serious advantage. It is true that the Allies did on the Artois front make some slight gains, and it is true that in the Alsace-Lorraine region the French advanced perceptibly to the eastward, but these gains for the Allies were fully offset by the German gains on the Ypres front and in the Argonne Forest.

The hold of the Germans on the industrial portion of Northern France was not shaken, nor was their possession of the Minette district disturbed, so that, in surveying the situation generally, it can be said that during these six months the respective positions of the combatants suffered no modification of any strategic or economic importance, and that, to all intents and purposes, the adversaries found themselves in exactly the same general situation on the first of September that they had been six months previous.

The Campaign in the East

CHAPTER X

MARCH AND APRIL IN GALICIA

On the first of March, as will be remembered from the prior volume, the Russian line in Galicia began on the Vistula at the Russian border, directly north of Tarnow, and, in a general sense, ran directly south through Tarnow to the southern side of the Carpathians, the mountain range which divides Galicia from Hungary, thence running eastwardly and along the southern side of the crest of this range until it reached the western border of the Austrian Crown Lands of Bukowina, whence thence ran along the boundary of this province almost directly north to a point near Stanislau and thence to the east to the Russian border.

At several points south of the Carpathians the Russian advance guards had established themselves in Hungarian towns and villages.

In Central Galicia the fortress of Przemysl, which the Russians had been besieging for months, still held out.

March opened badly for the Austrians. In its early days Stanislau in Eastern Galicia, one of the few important points in that section which remained in their hands, was captured by the Russians, and the Austrian forces driven therefrom to Kolomea to the south of Delatyn a point a little to the north of the Bukowina border. Thus all of Eastern Galicia passed into the hands of the invaders.

An offensive movement was begun very late in February by the Austrians, which had as its objective the relief of Przemysl; which offensive, though carried out with considerable force and with a mixed army of German and Austrian troops; the Germans being thrown in to give steadiness to the Austrians, as this fighting was of a different character from the fighting in the mountains; and under German commanders, did succeed in making an advance in the direction of the Tilicz Pass, and also in the direction of Sanok on the south-

ern railway of Galicia which runs, in a broad sense, from Sandec by winding courses through Sanok, Sambor and Stryj to Stanislau. Gorlice, towards the western end of this offensive, was the first place captured north of the Carpathian passes, and from here the offensive moved towards Sanok, but was just to the south of Sanok, to the railroad running through it, when, on March 22nd the fortress of Przemysl, which had held out for the last two weeks short of food and with its ammunition exhausted, was surrendered by the Austrians.

Prior, however, to this surrender, the garrison had destroyed much of the artillery, a considerable portion of the fortifications, and most of the military stores of various kinds, as well as the ammunition which the fortress contained.

The Russians, who had sacrificed many tens of thousands of men, both in the earlier assault on the fort and in the attempt to take it by assault in the second siege, were naturally very greatly elated by the first, and, to the present time the only, successful effort in besieging a strong place which the Russian army and its commanders had shown themselves capable of.

Accounts differ widely as to the booty secured by the Russians in the capture of this stronghold. The Russians themselves at the time put the number of prisoners taken at 132,000, besides 2000 cannon and innumerable quantities of rifles and other implements of war, as well as a quantity of ammunition, stores, provisions, etc., too vast to be computed. There is, however, more than good reason to suppose that these figures were subjected to that usual Russian exaggeration which has characterized all Russian utterances, official and non-official, during this war, particularly the war bulletins; and it is probable that in this case, as in others, the Russians included the civilian inhabitants of the town, some 60,000, in the number of prisoners taken by them. The Austrians admitted that at the time of the surrender of the fortress there were some 32,000 valid troops within its enclosure, besides a considerable number of wounded, as well as some 15,000 to 18,000 Russian prisoners of war, who had been captured in the various fights around the fortress during the time of its siege. There can be little doubt that the Russians also counted these prisoners of war among the number of prisoners taken by them.

On the whole, it would seem a fair estimate to say that the number of fighting men belonging to the armies of their opponents, wounded and unwounded, sick or well, which were captured by the Russians at this time, was in the vicinity of 60,000.

But the main importance in the capture of Przemysl was not so much in the number of prisoners taken with the fortress, or even with the taking of the fortress itself, as in the strategic importance of removing from the rear of the Russian armies operating to the south and to the west of this fortress a point which could be utilized by the enemy for such attacks; and, further, of releasing a very considerable number of Russian troops, from 175,000 to 200,000, which the siege of this fortress had held immobile; for use in the battle lines which were pushing their way towards Hungary and the west. Consequently, the capture of this fortress appeared to be destined to have a rather decisive effect upon the entire Russian plan of campaign against Austria and its ally, Germany.

The defense of this fortress had been a fairly good one, but, as was said in the first volume, in the relief of this western fortress in the early days of October, by the Austrians (which relief permitted them to establish complete communication with its defenders(a capital mistake was made by the Austrians in that they drew upon the stores of provisions and ammunition which it contained for supplies for an offensive against the Russians further to the east, and thereby, within a comparatively short time, used up munitions of war and other supplies which they had not withdrawn them from the fortress, would have made its holding for at least a year, with a garrison equal in strength to that which it contained, a comparatively easy matter. But this withdrawal of these supplies starved out the garrison before it had stood even a siege of half that length of time, so that, in large measure, the capture of the fortress of Przemysl by the Russians was due to the Austrian lack of foresight.

It is probably true that the Austrians expected to be successful in their offensive further to the east, and that they, therefore, would have ample time to bring supplies from the west to replace those taken; but they were disappointed in this hope of success in the east and were

driven back to the west, and their communication with the fortress severed, before they were able to accomplish any reprovisioning.

This illustrates that the unexpected often happens in military operations; another illustration of which fact even more striking was to be given by the future progress of events in Galicia,—this time at the expense of the Russians. The Russians naturally expected that the removal of the presence of these Austrian forces in their rear would enable them to complete the conquest of Galicia, to take Cracow, to pour their forces through the passes of the Carpathians into Hungary and conquer that fertile land; and they had good reasons for these expectations, apparently. But Providence which, after all, regulates the affairs of men, had planned otherwise.

After the fall of Przemysl, the Russian forces which had been around it were hurried forward to the Carpathians, particularly to the Russian front at the Dukla Pass, through which it was the intention of the Russians to pour the bulk of their forces upon the Hungarian plains.

These Carpathian passes are not all similar. The general idea of a pass is realized in many of them, but there are others, like the Lupkow, which is more a district through which easy communications are possible, than it is that of a pass in the ordinary sense of the term. For instance, through the Lupkow region half a dozen ways are feasible for armies, whereas through the Dukla Pass there is only one pass from the north to the south valleys, with only one steep rise to the crest of the ridge on the north and an equally steep descent on the southern side.

Another peculiarity of these Carpathian passes is that between the Dukla and the Uzsok Passes the rivers do not run as they do in all the other sections, north and south through the mountains, but east and west, parallel to the mountains, in valleys running also parallel to the mountains. The mountains in this section are much lower than in the other sections and these valleys, therefore, of less depth; consequently, this section favors the development of a more continuous battle-front along and across the whole range of mountains.

As a consequence of this topographical difference, the heaviest fighting in the Carpathians in March and April took place along this front.

Further to the east of Lupkow, at the Rosztoki, Uzsok

and Wyszkow Passes, the mountains are much higher and wider, and, except for the narrow openings through which the passes run, do not afford any opportunity for continuous fighting.

The strongest Russian position at the time of the fall of Przemysl was at the Dukla Pass, of which they held both the northern and southern sides, the latter as far as the Hungarian town of Bartfeld; and it was here and to this point that the Russians directed most of those troops which the fall of Przemysl had set free for operations in other spheres, and launched a most desperate attack southward.

On the southern slopes of this pass and on the sides of the hills leading southward, the Austrians had established field fortifications of considerable strength, from which they were able to command the Russians in the valley below, and during the months of fighting which followed these were utilized to the fullest advantage for inflicting such punishment upon the enemy as, with their aid, the Austrians could administer. In spite of assault after assault by the Russians on these positions and on the Austrian frontal positions just south of Bartfeld, the ground gained by the Russians was negligible. The Austrian line held firm.

The daily incidents of the fighting need not be told because these incidents consisted almost entirely of many hand-to-hand engagements scattered over a wide front, and never in any one particular engagement between large bodies of troops, although the numbers of the troops in all the engagements, in the aggregate, were very considerable. The main point to be emphasized, and which was characteristic of the struggle in this region from the fall of Przemysl to May 1st, was that the Austrian line managed to hold back the overpowering masses of Russians that were hurled at it continuously with all the energy and desperation that animated the Russian commanders, who knew that Russia's entry into Hungary must be then forced or postponed indefinitely.

In the middle of March the bulk of the Austrian forces were in position between the Uzsok and Lupkow Passes, and the Russians made their grand attack here. After heavy fighting, about the 26th of March they reached Zboro on the south of the Carpathians, and by April 2nd they reached the village of Cigielka on the southeast flank of the Austrian position near Bartfeld.

On March 23rd the main attack was delivered and

heavy fighting took place for the possession of the crest of the mountains south of Jasliska and to the west of the Lupkow Pass, in which many thousands of Austrians were captured.

During the next few days the Russians gained ground in all directions here and finally another general battle along the entire line from the Lupkow to the Uzsok began in the night of March 28-29, and continued for a couple of days, the result of which was that the Russians gained ground and captured over 5000 Austrians, besides very considerable quantities of artillery.

This pressure continued the following night and on March 30th a stab was made at the Austrian lines of communication to the south, which developed severe fighting between Dvernik and Nasieczna, which also ended in an Austrian defeat. This fighting took place in deep snow.

By April 1st the Russians had so advanced that they controlled the crest of the Carpathians in this region. In the meantime the Russians were making a further movement from the north on to the Smolnik-Kalnica line, which resultd in the capture of Vola Michova on the railway, and was followed by the capture of Cisna on April 4th.

On the main line very heavy snowfalls took place on April 2nd and 3rd, which held up the fighting; but on April 4th the advance was resumed upon the entire line. The Rosztoki-Gorne Pass was taken and the Hungarian villages in the valley of the Siroka also fell into the hands of the Russians.

From April 5th to April 7th or 8th the Austrians who had been reenforced by a few German troops, managed to hold their lines firm, but on April 9th the Russian advance was resumed, with the result that the Austro-Germans were repulsed along the entire length of the principal chain of the Carpathians in the region of the Russian offensive, which line was more than 70 miles long from the Dukla to the Uzsok Passes. The Russians were completely triumphant everywhere, except on the lower end of the line near the Uzsok Pass. A battle at this Uzsok Pass began on the 10th of April. On the 11th severe fighting took place northwest and northeast of the pass, which ended in a deadlock on or about April 14th; whereupon the Russians undertook to adance from Szektin towards Berezna, which advance, if successful, would have meant their seizing the line of communication be-

tween the Uzsok and Ungvar Passes and would have compelled the Teutonic Allies to evacuate their positions on the southerly slope of the Uzsok.

The Russians had been reaching forward from Volosate, to the east of the Uzsok Pass, where fighting continued up to April 21st the result of which was in the nature of a draw.

There were, of course, during this period skirmishes all along the line of the mountains, but these it is impossible to mention in detail. To the east of Uzsok, except as mentioned, the principal fighting was in the Orawa valley, where the Germans attempted to get possession of Koziowa. This fighting dragged through April.

From April 20th onward there was little fighting in the main regions of the Carpathians.

The weather had changed from cold to warm and the snow had begun to melt, with the result that the rivers overflowed their banks; such roads as there are became mere mud and any movement of troops was, for the next few weeks, almost impossible in these mountains.

Further to the east, north of Czernowitz in Bukownia, there was some fighting. It will be remembered that Czernowitz was recaptured on February 20th by the Austrians, when the Russians withdrew to the northern bank of the River Pruth. About the middle of March the Russians attempted an offensive from this point against Czernowitz and crossed to the south bank of the river to a place known as Ludihoricza; their main position on the northern bank being Oldzuczka. At this time their main line in this sector ran from Novo Sielcic in the abutting Russian province, along the northern bank of the Pruth, through Bojan and Mahala to Oldzucka, thence running northeast to Sadagora.

On the 21st the Austrian attacked the Russian positions between Oldzucka and Sadagora, and on the 22nd the Russians surrendered the latter town. The fight continued several days and finally the Russians were defeated on March 27th and retreated to Bojan, from which town they were turned out on April 10th, though they subsequently returned for a brief period.

In the early part of March the Austrians made a cavalry raid towards Cholim without much result.

Zaleszczyki, on the Dniester, was, during this time, the scene of some hard fighting which had as its object the capture of this town, an important center of roads,

on a railroad, with several bridges across the Dniester. Near here the Dniester forms a canyon, to some degree like those of the western rivers, about 300 feet deep. On March 23rd the Austrians made an attack with the object of turning the Russian positions near the town, but this was unsuccessful. Another attack was made on April 10th, and another on April 17th, but these also were unsuccessful, though the attack of April 17th nearly achieved its object. The Russian counter-offensive, made on April 4th, which crossed the Dniester, was badly cut to pieces and the Russians were obliged to recross the Dniester after suffering very heavy losses, and to burn the bridge which they had constructed for their crossing.

Along the line of the Dunajec, from Tarnow south to the Carpathian Mountains, which form the western line of the Russian advance into Galicia, little happened during the Spring.

CHAPTER XI

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

As we are now about to discuss one of the most important military movements which has taken place in the History of the world's wars, it will be well to give in detail, exactly as it can be done, the exact position of the Russians on May 1st, 1915, in Galicia and in Bukowina.

In a general sense it may be said that the Russian line at that time began at Opatowie, where the River Dunajec flows into the Vistula; it followed the eastern bank of that river down to the point where the River Biala, in its turn, flows into the Dunajec, just to the northwest of Tarnow, at the town of Biala; thence ran south along the River Biala through the town of Grybow to the Carpathian Mountains; and thence crossed the road to Bartfeld near Hungary; thence turning and running northeast to Zboro and Polyanka; from which point it followed the crest of the Carpathian ridge eastward to the boundary of the Austrian Crown Lands of Bukowina; with salients at intervals reaching down from the crest of the ridge into Hungary.

The principal passes were all, on their northern ends, at least, in the hands of the Russians, and the southern ends of most of them were, to all practical intents and purposes, also in the Russian control. At the frontier of Bukowina the line turned northeast and continued in that direction until the Pruth River was reached, when it turned and followed the northern bank of this stream to the Russian frontier.

All of Galicia comprised within this line was in Russian hands. A Russian governor administered the affairs of the province from Lemberg and Russian law had been introduced. The Orthodox church had even begun proselyting by its well known mildly persuasive methods among the portion of the population which, prior to the contest, had not been affiliated with that sect. Russian Schools, in many places, had been established, and that language introduced as far as possible. The pre-existing Austrian educational institutions had been either discontinued or affiliated with these new

Russian schools. The University at Lemberg had been, to a considerable extent, remodeled and the Russian language introduced as the vehicle by which its instruction was conveyed.

The population of Galicia contains many Jews, and in order to prove to them the truth of that tender solicitation which the Czar of Russia had expressed in his proclamation to the Jews in Poland in the Autumn of 1914, wherein this autocrat styled the Hebrews his "Dear Jews," the Russians had even introduced the pogrom and in many places, notably Lemberg, Stryj and Tarnopol, the Jews had suffered the most violent and humiliating treatment. When the history of the Russian occupation of Galicia comes to be written in detail, there will be probably no sadder chapter in it than that which deals with the atrocities and barbarities inflicted by the Muscovite upon the Jewish portion of its population. Necessarily, the details cannot here be given, because though, at the present time, we know much, we do not begin to know all. But it is to be hoped that one day this story of the infamies perpetrated by the rude Russian soldiery at the command of their superiors upon the Jews in Galicia will be written in order that the gross hypocrisy of the Czar's proclamation alluded to may be shown clearly to the world.

The Polish portion of the population were also treated with great severity; in fact, it may be said that in all the numerous ethnic elements which combine to form the population of Galicia only the Ruthenians had any reason to be satisfied with the change. These Ruthenians, who are among the most ignorant and most miserable white people in the world, of almost arrested intellectual development, for many years prior to this invasion had been made the subjects, by the Russian Church, of a religious propaganda, to carry out which a special ecclesiastical organization had been organized by that church with headquarters in the city of Chocim. From this conveniently located city it had directed the propaganda and had, to some degree, brought back into the fold of the Orthodox Russian Church these Ruthenians who, by blood, by race, and by intellectual development, are Russian Moujiks. These also had been most valuable auxiliaries to the Russian army in its original advance into Galicia.

For some time before the first of May the Russians had noticed that a large Austro-German force was being

concentrated to the west of the line of the Dunajec and Biala Rivers; but though thus warned with characteristic short-sightedness, had not taken the necessary measures to concentrate sufficient troops on this front to meet the onslaught which was about to be made.

In fact, all through this Galician campaign, from the early days of its inception until this time, the Russian offensive had been one which was so strategically unsound that, had it been encountered by first-class troops in sufficient quantity to face the hordes of the Muscovites, it is certain that long before this offensive would have broken down, though not perhaps so ignominiously as it was destined to ultimately. The strategy of the Grand Duke Nicholas had been, from the first, weak.

In choosing Eastern Galicia (the Lemberg district) as the primary objective of his offensive, this commander sacrificed the militarly sound to the spectacularly unsound. Looked at from any standpoint of strategy, from the very moment of the first invasion of Galicia the brunt of the Russian attack should have been directed against Cracow, because of the far more important results that would necessarily follow from the capture of this city. It would have opened the door at once to an invasion of Silesia in Germany and to the east would have delivered Galicia even more thoroughly into Russian hands. But the desire to wear easily gathered laurels of victory, and to be able to pose before the eyes of the world as an ever-successful commander, led this general to ignore the basic principle of strategy—that a blow to the enemy should be delivered where it will most effectually injure his major or his alternative plan of campaign and at the same time advance the army holding the offensive to a definite strategic end.

It is true that Eastern Galicia was easy of conquest. It is true that in this easy conquest the Russian invaders had the help of an admirably organized corps supplying information among the civilian Ruthenian population, which sacrificed the interests of its own country to aid those of the invading stranger, and which, as the sequel will show, reaped the usual reward of traitors.

A glimpse at the topography of the country through which the Dunajec flows may be interesting. In this particular part of the Carpathian Mountains the river has cut for itself a deep channel between high walls of rock. As it approaches the point where the Biala flows into it, its valley widens considerably and is interspersed

with islands which render its crossing more easy. From this confluence of the Dunajec and the Biala, to the point where the Dunajec flows into the Vistula twenty miles distant, the river is so deep as to be practically unfordable. The valley continues to broaden and on this stretch of twenty miles is from six to seven miles wide, with a range of low hills on each side of the valley covered with woods for from two to three miles in depth.

In May the Austrians occupied the western ridge of these hills, in the main, from the Vistula to the point where the Biala flows into the Dunajec, though at some points the Russians had crossed the river and had seized the opposite bank, holding thereon the village of Radlow. From the confluence of the Biala and the Dunajec to the town of Gromnik, fourteen miles to the south, the armies occupied the general line of this stream. The bridges over both rivers had all been destroyed prior to May 1st; though, in the case of the railroad bridge near the junction of the two rivers, enough of it remained to make crossing feasible.

From Gromnik to the south the positions of the Teutons still ran along the banks of the Biala for about twelve miles to a point a little south of Bobova, where the Austrian line crossed over to the east side of the Biala and continued to run south from Ciezkowice, then turned southeast and ran to Gorlice and thence to Malastow, from whence it ran almost directly south to Konieczna, to Zboro, and further south still to a point to the west of Bartfeld. The Russian line followed this general line to Bartfeld, where it turned east, running to Kurime and Mezo Laborcz, and then generally along the crest of the Carpathians to the Bukowina border.

It will be observed that this Russian position in its broad lines was that of a right angle whose shorter side ran from the Vistula to Bartfeld, and whose longer side ran from Bartfeld to the Bukowina border.

The Russian army in Galicia, at this time, must have been close to a million and a half men. This refers to the army that was actually in Galicia on May 1st, and does not include the forces which were subsequently brought up and thrown into Galicia in the hopes of saving that province to Russia.

General Von Mackensen, who had distinguished himself in the Polish fighting, was the supreme commander of the Austro-German armies, and had under him about twenty-four army corps, or somewhere in the vicinity of

875,000 to 900,000 men. But he also possessed what was probably the most formidable force of artillery which the world had, up to that time, ever seen assembled at once for the support of any army. The disadvantage of the Russian forces was that they were more or less scattered all the way along this long line, and thus their position was not coherent; which fault may be considered one of the most glaring pieces of incompetency that the Russian commander-in-chief had ever been guilty of.

The Russian field commanders included Ivanoff, probably the most competent Russian general, Radko, Dmitrieff and Viusioff, but was nothing like so well protected with artillery as the Germans, though numerically far superior.

On May 1st the German artillery opened at all points along the line from the northern to the southern boundaries of Galicia, but it soon became evident that the strength of the assault was to be thrown in the attack on Gorlice, a town of some importance, in southwestern Galicia, in the possession of the Russians; and by May 2nd there were concentrated on this short front, it is said, some 1500 guns, of which 500 were of heavy caliber.

Perhaps never before were troops called upon to stand such a bombardment. The object of this attack was to break through the shortest side of the right angle of the Russian line running from the northern Galician border to the southern, and to pour through this gap, thus made, sufficient forces to march from west to east along the line of the Carpathians, and, in so doing, to roll up the Russian battle line which ran from west to east in these mountains: a daring manoeuvre which Stonewall Jackson had once executed with success in the American Civil War, on a much smaller scale, but which had never been attempted heretofore in the history of war on a scale so enormous and so far-reaching.

This gap which was successfully plowed, did more, however, than permit this manoeuvre to be made. It broke for all time the continuity of the Russian armies and divided the Russian forces, from the day the wedge was driven through their lines into the vicinity of Gorlice, into two sections; the one operating from Warsaw southward to north of Gorlice and the other operating from Gorlice eastward to the line of the Carpathians and then northward through Lemberg to the Russian border, and from that day to this never have these two forces of the Russian army been able to rejoin their shattered line.

The taking of Gorlice, therefore, by the Germans, which was done a few days later, after an artillery bombardment had destroyed the Russian entrenchments, the wire entanglements and other defenses before them, was the most important event of the entire war in the east up to the present time; and the real success of the Teutonic armies which has now, in the Autumn of 1915, become so well marked and so clearly apparent, may be said to date from this one event, the capture of Gorlice and the breaking of the Russian line in front of it.

This event has influenced not only the entire history of the eastern campaign but also that of the western and of the Dardanelles, and has most materially affected the strategy of the war in Europe regarded as a whole. There have been other battles in the war more spectacular, in which greater numbers of men were engaged, in which the casualties were far more numerous, but there has been none, which has had any influence on the whole course of the war, at all comparable to this capture of Gorlice. The Battle of the Marne was important, but it only affected the development in the western campaign: the Battle of Tannenburg, in East Prussia, was important, but it merely shattered the first Russian advance on German territory: the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes in late January of 1915 was also a battle of great importance, but that, too, only exercised an influence on the eastern campaign itself, and that influence was limited to relieving Russian pressure on the northern portion of the eastern battle line.

But the result of the fighting at Gorlice meant the re-capture of Lemberg, the re-capture of Przemysl, the breaking forever, apparently, of the grand battle line of the Russians, the re-capture of Warsaw, the complete capture of Poland, and all the other advances which the Teutonic forces have since made in the eastern field of operations; while it meant, further, the discouragement of the Allies in the West, the necessity of their increasing their forces on that line, and brought about the general confusion which reigned among the Allies on September 1st, 1915.

France depended on Russia to be a great factor in the land fighting, and this hope began to fade from the day Gorlice was taken, and faded continuously thereafter as the Russian defeat in the eastern campaign became more and more marked, until, at the end of that campaign it has so completely faded that no sane French-

man now expects the Russian army, henceforth, to be an important factor in the present war. All of these things can be dated from the capture of Gorlice by the Austro-German armies in the early days of May, 1915.

One more thing can also be accredited to this capture of Gorlice: it started the exposure of the absolute military incompetence of the Russian commander-in-chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas.

CHAPTER XII

On May 1st, the Teutonic forces quietly took up a position between Ciezkowice and Senkova. Opposite to them were the Russians, whose line ran in the southeasterly direction from Ciezkowice, with the heights of Viatrovka, Pustki and Kamieniec forming the main point of their defense. At Gorlice they held a very strong strategic point in the mountains rising to the east of the town near the River Ropa. To the southward was the mountain group whose hills ranged from 1500 to 2000 feet in height; the most important among them being the Zamczysko Mountain. Southwest of Malastow was the mountain of Magora and the mountain of Ustogora, each about 2500 feet in height, which formed the strong point of the Russian line in this vicinity. The evening of May 1st was without much incident, the Austro-German batteries opening on the Russian line at the usual hour and apparently indulging in the routine evening bombardment. The Russians were heedless of this manoeuvre and took no unusual precautions, in spite of the fact, which they knew at this time, that during the preceding days there had been larger enforcements of artillery received by the Austro-German line facing them. What happened was really this: the Austro-Germans had concentrated on this comparatively short line probably the largest number of pieces of artillery, in proportion to the distance, that had ever been concentrated; and about 6 o'clock on the following morning this concentration of artillery unmasked and a tremendously heavy attack on the Russian lines was begun. This attack continued for between four and five hours, during which time the Russians, with their customary exaggeration, stated that some 700,000 shells were fired on their position—probably this is three times the truth. At all events, this artillery bombarded with such force as to completely destroy the Russians in the first line of trenches, comparatively early in the attack. When these first line trenches had been destroyed, with the wire entanglements and other defenses in front of them, the artillery turned its attention to the second line and destroyed that, at the same time, in so doing, establishing a zone of artillery fire between the first and second line trenches which no human being could pass alive.

About 10 o'clock in the morning this bombardment had destroyed the Russian positions so as to make an infantry attack feasible, and this was accordingly delivered all along the line, with the result that after some of the heaviest fighting probably seen in this war, the entire Russian first and second lines, including the town of Gorlice, were carried, and the Russians forced back to the Biecz-Lipinki-Bednarka front; which front runs along the heights of Kobylanka; Tatarowka, Lysa Gora and Rekaw were the principal strategic points. Reckoned in miles, this advance covered perhaps five over a front of perhaps fifteen.

South of Senkova, where a like bombardment took place, the Bavarians delivered an infantry attack at about the same time and with a like result, so that in the evening the entire area of the Zamczysko Heights had been conquered and the Bavarians had driven forward their line to the village of Bednarka; while further south the mountains of Magora, in the Austro-Gora group had also changed masters.

The capture of the town of Gorlice was particularly important as Gorlice was one of the centers of the petroleum districts in Galicia, for the lack of which the Germans and Austrians had been suffering ever since the Russian conquest of Galicia and which had impeded and hindered the mobility of their armies on all fronts.

The Russians, in their retreat, endeavored to set fire to the oil wells and destroy the tanks, power stations, etc., but were only partially successful, so that a couple of days after the town changed masters, and the Austrians re-entered into their own, by dint of hard work some supplies of petroleum were already being drawn from this area by the victorious Teutons.

The 8th Russian Army, which was charged with the defense of Gorlice was very badly cut to pieces, and it is no exaggeration to say that on the day of May 2nd it lost more than half its effective.

Further north towards Tarnow the Russians were in possession of three heights, those of 402, 419 and 469: these heights taking their designation from numbers given them on the Austrian topographical map; and the recapture of these heights was necessary for the Austro-Germans in order to make any advance against Tarnow itself.

On May 2nd, at this point of the line, as elsewhere, a very large number of pieces of artillery were concentra-

ted and very early in the morning this Austrian artillery opened fire from Mt. Val, on the western bank of the Dunajec River, against Hill 419. About eleven o'clock an infantry attack by Tyrolean troops was delivered against this hill, but was unsuccessful for the reason that another hill (412) which was also in Russian hands, was able, by a cross fire, to drive back the attacking column.

The next day, May 3rd, this hill and Hill 419 were heavily bombarded. Then the Austrian infantry advanced and attacked Hill 412, with the result that the Russian position on Hill 419 became untenable. The Russians, therefore, fell back to Hill 269 which they subsequently abandoned when the retreat became general.

During the night of May 1st and 2nd, protected by a very heavy artillery fire, Austrian engineers succeeded in throwing a pontoon bridge across the Dunajec near the village named Olszyny over which the Austrian infantry rapidly moved across so that by evening the Austrians were established on a wide front on the eastern bank of the Dunajec, had seized the railroad between Tarnow and Szczucin and broken connections between the Russian armies to the north and south of the point at which it seized the railroad. And this break in the Russian communications was most important in its influence on the fortunes of the Russian army.

Near Gorlice the Teutonic army, which had pierced the Russian lines, turned, part to the southeast and began moving in the direction of the Dukla Pass, while another part, marching directly to the east, began to move directly forward against the Russian positions at Biecz and to the south thereof. The first army then began in very short order an attack upon Dembica and Rceszow. The effect of these two manoeuvres was to compel the Russians ultimately to abandon their line along the Vistula River, which in turn forced the line further to the north to retreat from Tarnow.

Continuing, however, in the southern section there was hard fighting between May 3rd and 4th for the hills between the Biala and the Vistula. On May 3rd the Prussian Guard captured these hills, while still further to the south the Russian position at Zagorzany was carried by the Hungarians, which victory opened the road towards Jaslo to the victorious Teutons. South of this the Bavarians forced their way forward along the Bednarka-Zmigrod to Krempna, which town they took on May 4th, forcing the Russians to evacuate all of Northern

Hungary in their possession, west of the Lupkow Pass.

Jaslo itself now became untenable. Further in the north, on May 4th, a vigorous second offensive was launched in the direction of Tarnow from Tuchow to the south of it, on the Biala River, which pushed forward so strenuously and so rapidly that it became apparent before the evening of that day to the Russian commander, that a retreat all along the Russian line from the River Vistula to the Carpathian Mountains, was inevitable, and accordingly preparations began to be made for this retreat.

During these three days, May 2nd, 3rd and 4th, the Russians lost over 30,000 in prisoners alone, with casualties probably totaling twice that number.

CHAPTER XIII

On May 5th the Austro-German forces which were in position south of the Carpathians in Hungary, extending from Bartfeld to the Uzsok, whose line was at right angles to the German line operating north and south in Galicia, began to push the Russian line in Northern Hungary backward all the way from Bartfeld to the Uzsok Pass; and by thus forcing them backward towards the Carpathian Passes, throwing them upon the Russian armies retreating from the west from Gorlice, the former Russian line in that vicinity.

Running to the north, this same day most of the ground between the Dunajec and the Biala, between Tarnow and Tuchow, to the south, had been occupied by the Austrians, who had also crossed the Dunajec, and captured positions on the east bank of this river to the north of Tarnow, and by this manoeuvre cut the communications between the Russian force south of the point at which they crossed the river and those to the north of them up to the Polish frontier and in Poland. The effect of this was to force another retreat of the entire Russian line, which now fell back in considerable confusion to Dembica in the north, to the east of Jaslo in the center, and to Rymanow and Bukovsko in the south, where a determined effort was made to hold the positions until the Russian troops which had been in Northern Hungary, Bartfeld and the Dukla Pass, should be able to escape northward.

This movement finally culminated in the capture of Tarnow on May 6th; its complete evacuation by the Russian armies which had held this place, and their retreat to the north and northeast.

The next day brought added pressure on the entire Russian front, and the evening of May 9th found that the Russians across Galicia had swung still further eastward on this southern extremity, so that the line now ran nearly straight from Szczucin to a point in the Carpathians to the west of the Uzsok Pass.

One feature which distinguishes this German offensive was the lightning-like manner in which it was operated. Never before in the history of the war, perhaps, had large forces of troops and large bodies of artillery been

moved from place to place with anything like the startling quickness with which they were manoeuvred on this occasion. Some of the German regiments marched as much as 40 miles a day, not for one but for several days in succession, fighting from time to time.

On May 9th the Russian line made an attempt to stand, but their position had no coherence and was strategically weak, with the result that on May 10th, not being able on this line to stand the attack of the German assault, a general Russian retreat was begun, and mid-Galicia was lost. This retreat was necessarily to the west bank of the San River, and was carried out in considerable confusion. Here again extreme rapidity characterized the advance of the German forces in pursuit. The western front of Przemysl was reached by one of the Austrian army corps on May 14th, only thirteen days after its offensive began at Gorlice. The remainder of the attacking force came up a little later, converging to a common center from the northwest and southwest. This advance was not achieved without incident, but the various details of the capture of the isolated towns from time to time would extend this story to too great a length, so that only the main features can be sketched.

The movement against the Russians troops on the southern side of the Carpathians, by attacking the passes through these mountains, was eminently successful. By May 6th the Russian troops in the entire region of the Lupkow Pass became carried away in the flood of the Russian retreat from the westward. On May 7th the Virava-Nagy-Polena line, which they had won some weeks earlier at the cost of so many lives, had to be abandoned, and thus Hungary was nearly freed from their presence.

On the 8th these troops had fallen completely to the east of a north and south line drawn through Sanok. At the same time, it must be said that the Russian troops that fell back from the Carpathian Passes, fought with desperate bravery, and to this bravery and the subsequent events may be attributed the fact that this Russian rout did not end in complete disaster, and that the main Russian army operating in Galicia itself was able to fall back upon the San River line with any semblance of order.

The San River divides Galicia into two almost equal parts. It joins the Vistula a little to the north of Sand-

omierz, and then flows southeasterly through Grodzisko to Jaroslav, where it turns and runs for a distance almost southerly to Przemysl, where it again turns and runs almost directly to the west to Dynow, thence south through Sanok and southeast towards the foothills of the Carpathians, which it reaches a little to the northwest of Uzsok Pass. This river, it will be remembered, was conquered with great difficulty by the Russians in their early invasion and only after considerable time was spent on the task of forcing its passage. The river presents many natural difficulties both in its depth and width, and these obstacles were, during this campaign, rendered more difficult to overcome by the fact that the bridges over this stream were nearly everywhere blown up or otherwise destroyed.

The Austro-Germans' advance to the San River had been made in three sections; the first section marched in a general direction from Tarnow to Jaroslav, the second section came slightly northeast from the direction of Gorlice through Sanok towards Przemysl, while the third section was composed of those Austro-German troops which had been holding the southerly slope of the Carpathians, and which advanced north and northeast on Przemysl. The first section was the earliest to force the crossing of the San, which it did on May 15th at Jaroslav, and, in spite of desperate Russian resistance, succeeded in establishing itself upon the eastern bank of that river and spread north and south along that bank. Other Teutonic forces, once the foothold was attained on this eastern bank, succeeded in their turn in crossing the river to the north at Sieniawa. When the crossing of the river at these points was completed, these troops divided into three groups, one of which advanced slightly to the northeastward in the direction of Rawa Ruska, which, as my readers will remember, was the scene of very hard fighting during the Russian advance into Galicia in August and September of 1914. Another section moved to the southeast of Jaroslav towards Jaworow and aided in the movements on Lemberg; while the third section moved northwest towards Grodzisko and along the San towards the point where this river flows into the Vistula, and, in conjunction with other troops which joined it from the west, took part in the clearing of this promontory of Galicia which juts forward into Poland—the so-called "neck" of the Vistula.

The army that moved towards Rawa-Ruska had, as

we will hereafter see, a most important and, to a large extent, decisive influence in aiding in the success of the wedge that was subsequently driven through the line of the Russian left wing. The final position of this army at Rawa-Ruska not only permitted an attack from the north on Lemberg, but more than that, forced the Russians to retreat to the east of Lemberg and broke the continuity of the Russian line even in retreat. The success of this manoeuvre has played, since this time, a very important part in this whole Polish and Galician campaign. To the central section which advanced from the west towards the River San, fell the task of taking the fortress of Przemysl from the Russians, who had captured it some few weeks before. And while its center was thus taking up its position, the southern section, coming through the passes of the Carpathians, was driving towards Przemysl and Stryj all those Russian forces which formerly had occupied the crest of these mountains. Przemysl itself did not resist very long. The Russians, since their capture of this famous stronghold, had made every effort to strengthen its defenses, which had been seriously damaged by the work of destruction wrought thereon by the Austrian troops before its surrender but except for a slight defense along the line of the outer ring of forts, the Russians were unable to hold off the enemy, and on May 17th the fortress was invested from three sides; by the Bavarians on the north and by the Austrians on the west and south; but these forces, not having with them their heaviest artillery, were obliged from this date to about May 25th to remain quiet in the position which they had won.

During this time, however, the Russians attempted a counter-offensive, which lasted from May 21st to 25th, from the north and northeast, and attempted to cut the lines of communication of the German forces which had crossed the San to the north. This offensive was at first attended with some measure of success, and the Teutonic forces were obliged to fall back to the left bank of the River San, with the loss of some prisoners and artillery. This movement culminated in the capture of Sieniawa on May 27th, when the Russians won a victory of considerable importance. But in this northern section, on May 24th, the Austro-Germans had resumed their offensive and captured Wysocko, Makovisko, Bobrowka and Radymno, which forced the Russians to fall back to the eastern bank of the San.

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On May 25th the San was again crossed at Radymno, and on the following day Nienovice was taken, while further north the German advance was pushed as far east as Zapalow-Korzenica, and after a few days stubborn fighting the Germans reached and took the village of Naklo, but were unable to take the highlands south of it, which would have enabled them to cut off the Russian retreat from Przemysl towards Lemberg. South of Przemysl, from the 15th onward, there had been hard fighting. Here the Russian line ran from Nizankowice to the northeast of Sambor. This position was hard fought over, the trenches therein being in alternate possession for a time. However, finally by May 19th, the Austrians troops had completely driven in the Russian forces and had advanced to within six miles of Mosciska and were threatening to cut off from the south the Russian retreat along the railroad from Przemysl to Lemberg. The Russians, however, threw heavy re-enforcements from the direction of Lemberg, and were able to open an offensive in this sector, which for two or three days held up this Austrian advance, which was resumed about May 25th and was pushed simultaneously from the north and south of the German forces; so that on May 30th the ends of the Austro-German lines surrounding Przemysl were only about ten miles apart on the east, and the railway from Przemysl to Grodek and Lemberg was within range of the fire of the heavy Teutonic artillery.

Returning to Przemysl, Fort No. 7 was attacked by the Austrians the night of May 30th, which attack continued to the afternoon of the following day. This Fort No. 7 is on the east of Przemysl. This attack, however, was unsuccessful.

The same day the Bavarians in the north began a bombardment of the northern sector of the outer ring of forts around Przemysl (Nos. 10-A, 11-A and 11), and continued this bombardment the following day until the afternoon, when these forts were stormed by the Bavarians and taken.

The next day, May 31st, the trenches east of Fort 11 were captured by the Teutonic forces, and Forts 10 and 12 were bombarded by very heavy artillery.

On June 2nd the Bavarians captured Fort 10, and the Prussian Grenadier Guards Fort No. 12. That night the village of Zuravica, within the ring of outer defenses of Przemysl, was taken by these same forces.

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In the southwest, while these things had been going on, the Austrian troops had also broken through and had captured Zasanie on the left bank of the San. For several days the Russians had seen that this fortress could not be held for any great length of time, and had been hurriedly sending their munitions of war, supplies and troops to the eastward.

The night of June 2nd saw this operation completed, the Russians fled and early in the morning of June 3rd the Teutonic forces entered the town in triumph. The Russians had taken this fortress on March 22nd, and were obliged to evacuate on June 2nd, so that their tenure had been but little over nine weeks. But this nine weeks the Jews of Przemysl, who form a very large percentage of its population, will long have reason to remember, as during that period no less than two semi-official pogroms took place, to say nothing of the continual and daily persecutions which were favored, apparently, by the Russian commanders.

The fall of Przemysl completed the Russian débâcle in Central Galicia.

While these events were taking place in the north, another event of possibly even greater significance was taking place in the south. A portion of the German forces of the third section, which succeeded in moving northeast to Przemysl had continued their march straight to the east, following the line of the railroad running across Galicia from Sandec to the border of Bukowina, and had taken in succession the important towns of Lisko, Chyrom and Sambor, and had finally advanced to and taken the extremely important railroad center of Stryj. The Russians attempted to resist here, well knowing the importance of this place, and the effect that its fall would have on their hold on the city of Lemberg and their general position north and east; but the Austro-Germans brought up their heavy batteries and on May 31st opened fire against them, with the result that after a short bombardment which destroyed their defensive works, the entire Russian line here was obliged to fall back behind the line of the Dniester River.

The capture of the two strategic points of Przemysl and Stryj, closes what may be termed the second phase of the Austro-German offensive against the Russians in Galicia; the first being the forcing of the Dunajec River to the West.

CHAPTER XIV

We will now consider the third phase, the capture of Lemberg. Lemberg to the west was defended by a line of lakes and marshes which run along the small river Vereszyca from north to south, and which is usually referred to as the Grodek line. To the south it is defended by the line of the Dniester, which is extremely strong, comprising as it does a broad and deep river running swiftly in what may be described as a canyon with abrupt sides, and therefore most easily defended by any force wishing to resist its passage by an enemy. On the north, however, as has been already observed in connection with the attack on Lemberg by the Russians, the line of defense runs from Rawa-Ruska, and Rawa-Ruska had already, as a matter of protection, been occupied by another Austro-German force. The attack on Lemberg opened along the line of the railroad running to the westward from it through Grodek and Wisznia to Przemysl, but was desperately defended by the Russians.

At the same time a portion of the Austro-German forces which were on the Rawa-Ruska line commenced to move south from that point on Lemberg, while the Austro-German forces to the south of the Dniester made strenuous efforts to advance. For a few days, however, this advance was slow and the Russian forces near the northern border of Central Galicia, in the vicinity of Ulanow and Rudnik to the northwest of Sieniawa, attempted to relieve the pressure towards Lemberg by a counter-offensive which lasted three or four days their object being to cut the railroad from Tarnow to Jaroslav, which was an essential element in the line of communication of the Austro-German army. This attack, however, though, gaining initial successes, was on June 4th halted at the Leng River by the Teutonic forces whereafter the Russians retreated; the next day the whole of their advance was lost. Mosciska, on the railroad from Przemysl to Lemberg, was reached by the Teutons moving from the southwest on June 14th. The slowness of this advance can be attributed to the necessity of resting the Teutonic troops, whose rapid advance to and strong efforts at the second siege of Przemysl required a

brief period in which to recuperate. While this was going on, however, a new concentration of artillery took place around Jaroslav, and on June 12th a violent bombardment of the Russian positions enabled the Austrians to cross the San in two directions; one force proceeding to the north and occupying Sieniawa and Ciesanov, while the other moving easterly proceeded through Krakovic, capturing Lubaczow, Niemirowo, Jaworow and Sadova; thus clearing the whole of the country north and northeast of Przemysl of the enemy.

During the time occupied in this eastward movement, the forces proceeding to the north continued in that direction and on June 16th crossed the Russian frontier, their advance now being due north. The other section of this army, after seizing Jaworow, as heretofore stated, at the head of the railroad running from Lemberg to that town, moved steadily forward through Sckip in the direction of Janow.

The two armies which had met at Mosciska, had also made progress during this time, and on June 16th as one army took contact with the retreating Russians about three miles west of Grodek whom it drove across the river Vereszyca, the line of defense which has already been described, and during the night took by assault the town of Grodek.

The army in the north which had advanced across the Russian border, continued this advance and on June 17th captured Tarnogrod, Krzeszow and Narol, and the next day established themselves on the Tanew River, a strategic position of great importance since it could be held, owing to the character of the ground beyond its northern bank, with very small forces. To the west of the San River in this sector the Russians had been driven back practically to the line of Opatow River and thus the whole of the banks of the San and Vistula was free from the Muscovite.

While these things were taking place in the north, heavy fighting was going on to the east of Stryj on the southern bank of the Dniester, where the Germans made several attempts to cross this river. For several days hard fighting took place around Zydaczow and Mikolajow, but the real attack began on June 5th at Zuravno, on which day this town was captured. The next day Bukaczovce, an important strategic point on the north bank of the river, was taken, and on the same day Kal-

usz, further to the south, was occupied. The objective of this movement was to capture Halicz and Stanislau from the east and to turn the Russian positions along the river with a force which was in the vicinity of Zuravno. The battle began all along this line on June 8th and finished on the 10th when the Austro-Germans were driven back across the Dniester line, losing rather heavily.

However, on June 11th, these forces returned to the fray and re-captured Zuravno, following up this success the next day by advancing beyond this point to Roganzna. Further to the east the Germans had succeeded in taking possession of the south bank of this river along the entire line from Jazupol to Zaleszczyki, crossing it at several points, particularly in the neighborhood of Nizniow; and on June 16th the positions were about as described along the Dniester River.

But events of more importance were happening in the north. At this time the Russian position defending Lemberg was, roughly, from Magierow to Laszczow, and thence to Kolodruby on the Dniester.

On June 18th the Austro-Germans assaulted this whole line and though comparatively unsuccessful in the middle, were successful in the north, so that on the 20th the town Zolkiev was occupied, by which capture the Russian position on the north was turned and its defenders were obliged to fall back on their last line of defense in front of Lemberg.

But the Russians had seen that Lemberg, could not be held, and had several days before begun to send out of that city everything of value that was transportable; using here the same tactics that they used at Przemysl and were destined to use at all the Polish cities, that is, to render the captured city as little valuable to the enemy gaining its possession as possible.

On the 21st the Russians were on a line running from Zoltancz Pass through Koliukw to the north of Brzuchcvic, while to the west of Lemberg their position was along the line of the River Szczerszec. The battle fought here lasted all day, and during the night the Russians fell back to the immediate outskirts of Lemberg and fought a delaying action a portion of the next day, but were driven back and through the city which the Austro-German forces occupied on Tuesday, June 22nd, at four o'clock in the afternoon. Thus terminated the Russian possession of this, the largest, city in Galicia.

THE FREEING OF GALICIA

The Russian Governor had retired from the town several days before. The rest of the story of the redemption of Galicia can be briefly told, and consisted merely of a cleaning up operation which took perhaps a month and would be of little attraction to the reader after the events we have just chronicled, since it was in the nature of routine manoeuvres. The Russian troops moved steadily towards their frontiers, being turned out of position after position by the Austro-German forces flushed with victory.

The next move was directly to the east of Lemberg and the railroad to Busk and Brody, while on a general north and south line from this railroad to the Carpathians the Austro-Germans moved steadily forward, dislodging the Russians from their positions along the rivers which parallel each other in this extreme eastern part of Galicia. The line along the Dnieper River from Dunajow to Halicz was cleared, then the line along the Zlota and Dnieper further to the east was taken, and finally the Russians were hurled to the eastward of the Stripa; then the line of the Stripa was seized, and finally the Russians were driven back to the eastward of the line of the Sireth and from their arrival on its banks, until the end of the period we have under consideration, no fighting of any importance or of any significance took place. The Austro-Germans were content to hold this line, leaving the town of Tarnopol and a very narrow strip of territory south from that town to Jezierzany in Russian hands, for the strategic reason that this river afforded a better holding line than could be found for a great distance to the east.

Thus was Galicia cleared of the Russians.

The Polish and Russian Campaign

CHAPTER XV

THE INVASION

In the early Spring the German forces in Poland south of the Vistula formed a line beginning in a general sense with the junction of the Bzura with the Vistula, south along that stream to Sochaczew and thence across country to Skierniewice, and thence south to the Pilica River, whose course the line followed southward to the Galician border.

Not much took place along this front during the month of March, both armies being content to maintain their respective positions in the trenches which they had made towards the end of December and which had, during the intervening time, been developed into quite elaborate fortifications.

North of the Vistula there was, however, considerably more fighting on the Niemen and Narow fronts. The fortress of Ossowiec had been bombarded for a considerable period but had managed to resist until the middle of March, when, thaws commencing, and the coat of ice which enveloped this boggy country beginning to disappear, the Germans were obliged to draw back their heavy artillery before the ground became so heavy as to become impassable.

On March 27th the cannonading ceased, but was resumed on April 11th, and on April 14th an attempt was made to take the outskirts of the fort by assault, but was unsuccessful, and the siege of Ossowiec came to an end.

Along the Orzec and the Ormula Rivers the usual routine of trench war-fare kept up, but presents nothing sufficiently interesting to dwell on.

Along the Niemen much the same condition prevailed; the only important movement being that on March 27th the Germans advanced from Kalvaria to Krasno and met the Russians in a passage between the town of Zimnow

and Lake Dusiec. This lake the Germans crossed in order to reach the Russian position, but the Russians having been forewarned of this movement were able to defeat it and inflict severe punishment on the Teutonic invaders. Otherwise, for a considerable time, fighting continued to preserve the general character of trench warfare.

At the northern end of the line, where the end of Prussia juts forward like a narrow finger, between Russia and the Baltic Sea, the Russian troops began a movement on March 17th from Tauroggen towards Memel and after a fight on the border with German troops, whom they defeated, they entered the town of Memel in the evening of that day. Street fighting took place and the town was bombarded in retaliation and the population were rather badly treated. This advance was in the nature of a raid and the Russians did not maintain their positions long. A considerable force of Germans was sent to relieve the town on March 22nd; the Russians were compelled to evacuate it, and were hurled backward over their border, and Northern Prussia was cleared again of the Russian troops.

On March 23rd the Russian town of Polangen, near the Prussian frontier, was bombarded by the German fleet, and on March 28th the Russian port of Libau was also bombarded; the latter bombardment being the more serious of the two.

The district between Memel, Tilsit and Tauroggen was the scene of inconsequential skirmishes during the latter part of April.

Towards the end of the month a general attack against the Baltic provinces was launched. These Baltic provinces had been for years one of the great granaries of Eastern Europe. A noticeable portion of their inhabitants were Germans or descendants of Germans, and composed the upper class of the population—landholders and merchants; the great majority of the population, however, were either Ethonians or Letts.

Since the Russian raid on Memel at the end of March, there had been more or less fighting around the town of Tauroggen across the Russian border. At the end of April a considerable German force was concentered between Tilsit and Jurburg, which was estimated at one and a half corps of infantry and about the same number of cavalry. This unusually large proportion of cavalry was due to the necessity that the advance should be rapid

and there being facilities, the infantry could be brought up, following the cavalry, in motor cars. This force advanced in three columns, the main body moving along the road from Tauroggen to Shavli, but on the left a large force of cavalry moved from Tilsit towards Muravio, where, by taking the railroad, they cut Libau off from any communication to the eastward.

On April 29th a fight took place between the Germans and Russians at Shavli, and the Russians, being beaten, fell back towards Metau.

On April 30th the Germans captured Muravio and Radzilishki to the east of Metau, and on May 1st German cavalry patrols appeared on the outskirts of Libau.

On May 3rd was the fight of Rossienie and on May 5th and 7th the Russians repulsed a German advance towards Metau in the center and forced them to evacuate their position near Janishki to the south of Metau. A new German column, however, had been launched from Memel and moved along the seashore towards Libau, and on May 8th the Germans entered this city, from which the Russians had fled, and captured it and have succeeded in holding it up to the present time.

In the center, however, the Germans did not fare so well. An offensive by them had been made towards the east, northeast of Rossienie, which succeeded on May 8th, (the same day Libau was taken) in reaching the railroad station of Cejy on the railroad running from Vilna to Shavli; thus threatening to out-flank the Russian troops to the west, and at the same time to cut from the north the railroad connecting with the main line of the railway running from Warsaw to Petrograd. This force, however, was attacked by the Russians and defeated on the same day that they reached the railroad station, and rather badly cut to pieces, and forced to retreat north to a point near Krakinov where, on May 9th, a battle was fought which also resulted adversely to the Germans who began to retreat further the next day, but were not followed up energetically by the Russian forces.

The effect of this retreat was to clear all the country to the east of the Rivers Vindava and Dubissa of the Germans, so that the Russians were able to resume railroad communication on May 14th between Riga and Mitau. At this time the only real fruit of this German

invasion of the Baltic provinces was the possession of Libau and the country to the east of it as far as the two rivers mentioned.

The Russians thought the invasion was to stop here, but the course of subsequent events considerably disappointed this hope though for some time no very energetic efforts were made by the Germans to advance still further.

The probable object of this manoeuvre at this time was to give so much occupation to the Russians in the extreme north, that they would be unable to send re-enforcements to the Galician front where at this time the Austro-German offensive was in full swing.

CHAPTER XVI

In the account of the history of the redemption of Galicia, it will be remembered that we pointed out that an Austro-German army had moved to the northward from Sieniawa through Cieszanov across the Russian border, had captured Krzeszow and Tarnogrod and had finally taken up a position along the Tarnow River extending from Ulanow on the San River and stretching to the eastward to Narol. It will also be remembered that a portion of the Austro-German army which had attained Rawa-Ruska was left there when the attack was made on Lemberg from the north. This army did not remain long in this position at Rawa-Ruska, but even before Lemberg fell had moved north and northwest and, in its turn, crossed the Russian border; then advancing into Russia, seized Tomaszow and extended its line from east to west of that place, finally making a junction on its left wing with the army extending along the Tanew.

The objective of this united army was the two cities of Lublin and Cholm on the railroad which runs from Warsaw through Ivangorod and these two towns eastward, to Kovel and ultimately to Kieff, and was in continuation of the movements of separation of the grand Russian line which began at Gorlice in Western Galicia.

When the wedge was driven through at Gorlice, the Russians, to the north of the point of entrance of that wedge into the Russian line, had moved in a general sense northward while the Russians to the south and east of the wedge were those who had moved to the eastward towards Przemysl and Lemberg, in which retreat they were joined by the troops from the Carpathians and those in Central and Eastern Galicia. It was important to prevent their making a northward movement so as to bring themselves again in contact with the main line of the Russian army stretching through Kovno, Warsaw and Ivangorod to the south; and this had been accomplished in the first instance by the movement from Jaroslav to Rawa-Ruska, and the driving of the wedge which we have now under consideration was to make this separation a permanent one and one which it would be impossible for the Russians to recover from.

This position then, which by June 22nd, (the date

Lemberg fell) represented a front of about 75 miles long, extended from the point where the River Tanew joined the River San, to the town of Mikolajow on the Dniester. The eastern portion of this line does not enter into our story to any great degree, because the troops which advanced from Rawa-Ruska eventually moved to the eastward and took Sokal, thus stretching their line to the Bug River and separating themselves from the lines running southeastward to the Dniester. The exploits of this portion of the line, after the fall of Lemberg, have been narrated in their place in the account of the campaign in Galicia.

During their occupation of Galicia, the Russians in the winter of 1914-1915 had built a line of railway south of Lublin which connected with the Galician railways at Rozapadow on the San, a little north of Ulanow, as well as another line also running southward from Cholm to Balzec northwest of Rawa-Ruska, and had thus put their Polish railway system, which is the most highly developed in the Russian Empire, into complete union with the railroad system of Galicia. This they had done for the purpose of facilitating their control of the conquered territory and of the movement of troops, supplies and ammunition calculating that it would be to their advantage. As will be seen, the sequel made the construction of these two lines an advantage to their enemies and not to the Russians.

The pre-existing lines of the Russian railroad in Southern Poland came no nearer at any point to the Austrian frontier than 40 miles between the Vistula and the Bug. Further to the east, Brody, on the extreme eastern border of Galicia, is the only place where the Russian railroad system linked up with the Austrian before the war.

The general Russian position at this time was that the bulk of their forces were concentrated in Central Poland with a very strong line running southward from this main position to near the Galician border; that between this Russian position and the Russian position further to the east, in Volhynia, an Austro-German wedge had been driven which completely separatd these Russian forces from each other. The Austro-German movement northward was a repetition of the same movement which the Austrians initiated at the commencement of their campaign against Russia, and which was treated of in the first volume. My readers will remember the lack of success of this early movement and the conse-

quent Austrian retreat, in confusion and disaster. But this time this ending was not destined to be the portion of the Austro-Germans, so that here was one occasion in which history did not show its traditional propensity to repeat itself.

The right wing of this army extending from near Sokal towards Ulanow remained in about this position during all the first part of the Austro-German offensive against Lublin and Cholm, until the Austrian defeat which took place in the vicinity of Krasnik about July 7th.

Now, returning to the Austro-German center and left wing, that is, that part of the line running westward from Narew and Rawa-Ruska to the Tanew and the San Rivers. A forward movement of this line began on June 28th, and on July 1st reached the environs of Krasnik and the rivers Por and Volika, the average rate of advance having been about ten miles a day.

On July 2nd, the Austrians, who had taken Krasnik, attempted to move forward towards Lublin, but encountered the Russian forces, which were too strong for them, and after a battle which lasted all that day, they were obliged to fall back to the town of Krasnik, which town they evacuated that evening; but on the next day a hot fight re-captured the place from the Russians, whom they drove into the forests north and northeast of the town and back on the village of Budzin.

On July 5th the Austro-Germans carried this village by storm, and also made a considerable advance to the north of Krasnik. On the evening of this day there was severe fighting near Vilkolaz where the Russians launched a counter-attack which was successful and had the effect of holding up further advances north of Krasnik for some time. A general battle began along the Krasnik-Vilkolaz-Lublin road and along the Bystrzyca and Kosarzewka rivers, where the Russians attacked in force and were reasonably successful, to the extent that they broke through the Austro-German line near Urzendowka to the northeast of Krasnik, and had the Austrians not shown a capacity for stubborn resistance, it is probable that serious defeat would have been inflicted upon them. But this attack advanced no further and the Russians were obliged to take up a position along the line of the Urzendowka River and to remain contended with having

for the time being halted the Austro-German advance in this section.

For nearly a week after this severe fighting, both lines remained quiet; the Austrians waiting for re-enforcements to reach them, and the Russians occupying themselves with strengthening their positions. On July 15th, however, fighting again began, but not on the western end of this offensive, on the contrary, an attack was delivered by the Austro-Germans on the extreme eastern end of the line. This movement opened with severe Austro-German pressure on the Russian positions around Sokal, in Northeastern Galicia, which resulted in that town being taken on July 19th and in the Russians withdrawing towards Tartakow to the east, and nearer to the Russian border.

The Russians on the 20th made a counter-attack on Sokal but this attack was repulsed and the Russians were never able to re-take the place. The possession of Sokal protected the right flank of the Austro-German forces, and enabled the movement hereinafter described to be successfully executed. This movement was launched from the north of Zamosc, a few miles south of Krasnostaw, a place almost midway between Lublin and Cholm, and a little to the south of the railway connecting those two places, where the Austro-Germans massed a large number of heavy batteries, bombarded their opponents' trenches at a given point, and followed up this bombardment with heavy infantry attacks. This battle opened on July 17th, and may be said to have lasted until the 27th each day showing some advance, but which advance, owing to the nature of the country traversed, was necessarily slow. Krasnostaw itself was taken at the end of the fighting and then the left wing of the army which had been manoeuvering to the north of Krasnik, advanced from that point, also fighting, and finally on July 30th entered triumphantly into the important town of Lublin thus gaining possession of the railroad uniting north and south Poland. The town of Cholm was taken a few days afterwards and with it the control of the railroad northward to the fortress of Brest-Litovsk; so that by the early days of August the entire quadrangle between the Vistula and the Bug on the east and west, the Galician border, and the railroad running from Lublin to Cholm on the south and north, respectively, had passed into the hands of the Austro-Germans. The Russian armies which had defended them retreated partly north-

ward along the Bug, and partly northwestward in the general dirction of Warsaw. This completed the conquest of this portion of Poland.

CHAPTER XVII

While these things were taking place on the line of the Lublin-Cholm quadrangle, events of great interest were taking place in Central Poland. Ivangorod, Warsaw, Novo Georgievsk, Sierock, Pultusk, Rozan, Ostrolenka, Lomza, Osoviec and Grodno, form an almost continuous line of fortresses from Southern Poland to the Narev River. Any natural defenses had been carefully taken advantage of in the selection of the sites of these fortresses, with the exception, perhaps, of one or two cities which, by reason of their size, had attained great importance before the construction of this chain of fortresses was begun. But, in such cases, (as, for instance, that of Warsaw which itself was reasonably strong), subordinate fortresses, such as Novo Georgievsk, had been constructed for their protection.

Behind this first line of fortresses was the great fortress of Brest-Litovsk to the east, which was supposed to be able to defend the River Bug, and which probably would have been, in connection with this more westerly chain of fortresses, had those defenses been supplemented by a strong, well-organized army. Ivangorod, Warsaw and Novo Georgievsk defended the Vistula. Sierock, Pultusk and Ostrolenka defended Warsaw on the north and the Narev River; while Osoviec defended the passage of the Bobr. A well organized railroad system connected the principal of these fortresses with the surrounding country both to the east and west, and also with each other. Ivangorod had been attacked unsuccessfully several months before, and the so-called siege of Osoviec (which was in reality a bombardment from the northerly side only) had ceased but a few weeks before the movement of which we are about to treat opened.

The general scheme of the new Austro-German attack against this line of fortresses, and the territory in which they stand which is generally known as the Polish salient, began in the middle of July and had the object of forcing the Vistula line and taking Warsaw by concentric attack. Simultaneously with this attack a serious

attack began in the north, which will be hereafter described, and also the attack on the Lublin-Cholm line, which we have already dealt with.

The Germans had carefully prepared their offensive and were particularly well equipped with heavy artillery and machine guns, thoroughly provided with the necessary explosives, and also used the existing railroad lines in that portion of Poland which was in their hands, and those that they had constructed with much care and difficulty during the Spring and early Summer of the year, in supplement to the already existing railroads, with great skill. So that, though attacking the enormous Russian army which had been gathered from all quarters of the Russian Empire to defend the line of the Vistula, with numerically inferior forces they were able to overcome this superiority in numbers of the Russians, by a masterful use of these railroads in rapidly concentrating upon any point of the front a force of troops superior to those of their adversaries, this superiority being not only in numbers but also in morale, discipline and leadership. Opposed to them was an army numerically far superior operating in its own country with the advantage of numerous strongholds by way of support, and composed of well-meaning troops. Unfortunately for them they were led by probably the most incompetent leader who has appeared on the pages of modern history, the Grand Duke Nicholas, who, in the brief space of four short months, succeeded in dissipating, for all practical purposes, an army which in its total aggregate must have numbered 4,000,000 men at a minimum and most probably was considerably larger; lost more fortresses than any other general in the world's history during an equal time, besides more stores and artillery than any other commander up to the present time has succeeded in doing.

In prisoners alone this leader led so well that over one million of his own men were taken by his adversary between May 1st and September 1st. If there was a strategic blunder to be perpetrated, it can be said that this commander rose to the occasion and perpetrated it. The theory of a strategic retreat which was invented and used to save this incompetent reputation, or, as the Chinese say, "face," is a mere piece of fiction of the imaginative order. No retreat can be strategic unless it has a purpose, and the aimless and continuous retreat of the Russians, surrendering stronghold after stronghold, which

lasted from the day the cannon opened on the crossing of the Dunajec River to even the present writing, had no objective or no end towards which it was working.

The Grand Duke has been represented as having adopted the plan of campaign which the Russians adopted against Napoleon during his famous advance to the capture of Moscow and to have had the design of luring the Teutonic forces into the interior of Russia, there to hold them until the Russian winter with all its severity fell upon them, when they would be attacked by a partly reorganized, partly newly created, Russian army. But the first thing to be observed is that the myth of Napoleon having been defeated by the winter was invented subsequent to the retreat from Moscow, and that, as a matter of fact, what defeated his purpose in invading Russia was the failure of his lines of communication, and nothing else. The story so often told of the retreat of the Grand Army overwhelmed by the snow and cold of the Russian winter, has no historical foundation in fact. Snow did not fall at all, as Napoleon himself says in his account of this retreat written within a few months after it actually occurred, until he himself had nearly reached Warsaw; nor did the retreating French troops who followed him have difficulties with snow until they were within a comparatively short distance of the Russian frontier. Afterward, Napoleon, when at St. Helena, seeking an excuse for his defeat, and not wishing to avow his strategic mistake in the campaign, created this myth of the snows, but any reader of history can find the refutation of this fable in the contemporary diary of Napoleon himself.

These facts must have been known to the Russian military commanders.

The German army had passed the previous winter exposed to the full rigors of the Polish winter, which the Russians said in the Autumn of 1914, would compel them to evacuate Poland; and had not only not evacuated Poland but had driven their lines further and deeper into the heart of that country. The fight at Lodz took place in the midst of these wintry rigors, as did the severe fighting of December, 1914, to January, 1915. So that it was clearly apparent to the Russian commander-in-chief that neither snow nor cold was a potent weapon in favor of the Russians against the Germans.

From the foregoing it is, therefore, clearly seen that the Russian General Staff did not adopt the plan adopted

by the Russians against Napoleon, for the extremely simple reason that the Russians of that time adopted no plan whatever; and, further, the Russian General Staff knew that the Germans could stand a winter campaign in Russia because they had already stood it. These two facts make this theory of the lure by the Russians of the Germans into the interior of Poland for any strategic object absurd. The real reason why the Russians retreated into the interior of Poland, abandoning fortress after fortress, was because they were defeated wherever they made a stand and forced to retreat; because they could not stand the unrelenting, continuous and ceaseless pressure of the German armies upon their line, even though holding the interior line which was the shortest and the easiest defended.

About the middle of July, then, the main offensive against this Polish chain of fortresses opened. In the district of Przasnysz, which had been the scene of hard fighting up to the middle of March, and which is in the proximity of the railroad running from Mlawa to Novo Georgievsk, where the Germans occupied a line stretching northeast and southwest south of Mlawa-Chorzele, with its center on the elevations on which stood the village of Granty, preparation for the offensive began on July 9th with the making of advance saps for the concentration of artillery. In three days all was ready and at daybreak on July 13th all the artillery started a bombardment of the Russian trenches about half a mile distant, which was kept up for about three hours. Towards eight o'clock the infantry advance began and captured a strategic point (Hill 164) to the west of Mlawa-Ciechanow Railroad, while the left wing occupied the village of Dunsk. From both sides the Germans closed in on Przasnysz and that town was occupied by them on July 14th. The Russians fell back in the direction of Ciznov and attempted by cavalry charges to hold up the German advance, but did not succeed, and on July 16th Ciznov was taken by the Germans. The Russians attempted to make a stand near Gorne without success and on the 18th the German advance guards got within the range of the artillery of Novo Georgievsk and occupied the northern bank of the Narev from this point, to Pultusk-Rosan and Ostrolenka, holding the line of the Bobr and the Narev between the last two points, and on the same day began an attack on some of the bridge-heads on its line. The crossing of Narev was soon effected at

several points. During the next week the Germans surrounded the fortress of Novo Georgievsk and opened their attack on the various fortresses along the banks of the Narev from Ostrolenka to the south. By this isolation of Novo Georgievsk the Germans eliminated the possibility of any relief to Warsaw from that strong fortress, which was supposed to be, as was Brest-Litovsk, untakeable.

The siege of this fortress was confided to a special body of troops under command of the general who had been so successful in reducing Antwerp in the early days of the war. The siege proper may be said to have begun on July 20th, and its history from that time until its fall late in August consists of a daily record of small German advances which brought them nearer and nearer to their goal.

On the fall of this fortress, the Germans took, all told, about 95,000 prisoners, and in the neighborhood of 900 cannon, the most important booty they had to that time taken in Poland.

It is exceedingly curious that Novo Georgievsk, which was at least as strong a fortress as Przemysl, was unable to resist a length of time comparable with that in which the Austrian fortress held off its assailants; and this fact illustrates most strikingly either the extreme efficiency of the German besiegers of Novo Georgievsk as compared with the Russian assailants of Przemysl, or the extreme tenacity of the defenders of Przemysl as compared with the defenders of Novo Georgievsk. That one of the strongest fortresses in the world, on which within the past few years money had been spent like water by the Russian government, to bring the defenses of the stronghold to the highest point of efficiency, which was amply equipped with the best modern artillery, and contained ammunition in such abundance that at the time of its capture by the Germans there was enough left for the ordinary needs of a year's defense, should have been captured speedily, does not reflect great credit upon the Russian military authorities or its defenders.

After surrounding the fortress as stated, the German forces which had come from the north and had here formed a junction with another German force which had moved from Plock along the northern bank of the Vistula, moved southwest upon Warsaw.

CHAPTER XVIII

In the center of the Warsaw front, the winter quietness had lasted practically up to the middle of July, though of course there had been some activity, but none which materially influenced either the strategy of the campaign or the positions of the respective combatants. The Germans, simultaneously with the offensive to the north of the Vistula which has been hereinbefore described, began a movement which extended all along the line from the Vistula River to the point where the Austro-German armies in the center took contact with the same armies which were attempting to take Lublin and Cholm.

The first part of this line was known as the Bzura River line, and here the Russians had managed to withstand for a considerable period of time German assaults both in the early attempt on Warsaw and during the succeeding winter. Without much fighting, on July 19th, owing to the result of the pressure to the north and to the south of this line, the Russians retreated therefrom, thus transferring the activity west of Warsaw from this Bzura River line to the line which ran north and south through Blonie, and then swung over from Nadarzyn to Piaseczno, and thence to Kalvaria on the Vistula. Of course this retrogressive movement was not effected all at once, particularly as far as the retreat on the southern front is concerned; and this movement was not complete until some time after July 19th. The Germans attacked the Blonie line, the name given to the line above described on July 25th and 26th, but were not fortunate in their assault. The crux of operations was then transferred a little to the south. Here, on July 29th, the Germans performed one of the most interesting and important feats of the attack on Warsaw, and succeeded in crossing the Vistula River at a point some eighteen miles to the north of the fortress of Ivangorod, where the Radomka River flows into the Vistula. These troops which performed this manoeuvre were detached from those which had been destined for the attack on Ivangorod which had advanced from the southwest through Kielce to Radom on one line and along the Pilica from Tomaszow on the other. Hard fighting ensued, which took

place principally around the village of Kobylnica. The Russians had considered the Vistula a protection against any invasion from the west, since the river is both deep and varies from 800 to 1200 yards in width between Ivangorod and Warsaw, and which between these towns is not crossed by any permanent bridge. The eastern bank being higher than the western from which the Germans must necessarily launch any attempt to cross the stream, the Russians considered that such crossing would present such natural difficulties that with reasonable forces on the higher banks of the river, the eastern, it would be impossible for the Germans to cross. But they reckoned erroneously, and the Germans, after sending an advance guard to the eastern bank of the river on pontoons, succeeded in throwing bridges over the stream. The Russians, when they saw that the stream had been successfully crossed, detached forces from their army defending Warsaw, in order to oppose the advance of these Germans who had crossed the Vistula northwesterly on the east bank of that stream towards Warsaw; but these troops were unable to get to the threatened points in time. By the first of August the Germans had thrown 80,000 men across the river and 120,000 more (three Austrian corps) were rapidly effecting the crossing as well. Consequently, the Russians who had advanced from the army defending Warsaw fell back and finally formed a junction, on August 4th, near Gora-Kalvaria, with a portion of the army defending Warsaw on the western bank of the river, which abandoned their positions there during the night, crossed the Vistula on pontoons and retreated in the direction of Brest-Litovsk.

The closing scenes of the Russian defense of Warsaw were not remarkably heroic. On July 31st there was some fighting near Blonie and near Brwinow, which resulted in the Russians being driven in further towards the defenses of Warsaw itself.

During the next day the Germans moved slightly to the eastward, and began an assault on the Russian position directly to the south of Warsaw; Grojec and Suzk being the principal scenes of action. Here again the Russians were defeated.

It had previously become apparent to the Russians that Warsaw could not be held much longer and for some time they had been sending out of that city everything port-

able of the slightest value. Days before the exodus of the civil population had begun—at first voluntarily, and afterwards, particularly in the case of the Jews of some financial standing, compulsorily.

Fighting continued on the line around Warsaw for the next two days, and finally, with the fall of Ivangorod on August 4th, came an immediate necessity to withdraw from Warsaw completely, since the fall of Ivangorod uncovered the western flank of the Russian army operating around Warsaw.

During the night of August 3rd and 4th the retreat began, the Germans being held back as much as possible by rear-guard actions. The Russian forces which occupied the triangle between Blonie, the Vistula River and Warsaw, withdrew in a northeasterly direction to aid in the defense of the River Narev. The line of retreat of those in the southern sector has already been indicated. Those in the city itself crossed to the suburb of Praga on the east bank of the Vistula as rapidly as possible, so that in the early morning of August 5th the city was completely evacuated; and it was at this time that the bridges across the Vistula, between Warsaw and Praga, were blown up in the hope of arresting the German pursuit.

The Germans entered the town at six in the morning, and thus realized one of the objectives of their advance into Poland. The city was calm and still possessed the great bulk of its population, in spite of the compulsory exodus of some of the civilian population during the last ten days. There was little street fighting and the German entrance and possession may be said to have been a quiet one. A municipal government was immediately organized and in a few days the city resumed a normal aspect.

As a remarkable instance of the thoroughness with which the Germans organized their conquest of the central portions of Poland and of the city of Warsaw itself, it may be remarked that within two weeks after their entry into this capital of Poland, an express train began to run daily between Liege in Belgium and Warsaw in Poland without changes.

It may here be said that the manner in which the Germans have organized territory conquered by them during this war reflects the highest credit upon their power of organization and of administration. The mails and the other ordinary conveniences of life have been rapidly and

efficiently established; in many cases more efficiently than they ever were under the prior possessors of the territory. Even such details as the registration of vital statistics, the preservation of the public health, the organization of hospitals and other instruments for the treatment of disease; in a word an entire civil administration has been well and efficiently organized in a period of time so short as to make the results achieved almost incredible.

In certain portions of the territory, notably Southern Belgium, where the population has not co-operated with the organization to that degree which it has elsewhere, the government has been correspondingly drastic and severe; but with this exception it may be said that the government organized by the Germans in conquered territory has been both reasonable and humane.

Ivangorod lies 50 miles to the southeast of Warsaw, and against this, towards the middle of July, a general movement was executed by the Germans from the general direction of the Opatow and Kielce line, which through the remaining days of July advanced steadily, though the advance was disputed from time to time, by the Russians, and this advance in its progress successively captured Grabowiec, Kazanow, Radom, the junction of the Radomka River, Glowaczew, Granice and Kozienice; until by the end of the month the Austro-German armies captured the outward defenses of the fortresses on the right bank of the Vistula and brought their artillery to bear on Ivangorod itself.

The Vistula and the Wieprz form the defenses of this fortress on the west and on the south and create a strong position which possibly could not have been taken. But a portion of the German army which, as we have seen, crossed the Vistula at the point where the Radomka meets that stream, instead of proceeding northwesterly towards Warsaw with the main body, turned south then easterly and fairly rapidly covered the distance separating itself from the fortress. This force opened, on August 1st, a violent bombardment against the northern outer forts on the east bank of the river, and on the same day took some of them by storm.

The next day the bombardment continued, and other forts, both on the northern side of the stronghold, on the east bank, and the outer forts on the west bank of the river, fell.

On August 3rd the bombardment of the main enceinte

began and on the morning of August 4th, Ivangorod surrendered. A number of prisoners were captured here, as well as considerable artillery and supplies of war. The effect of the fall of Ivangorod was, as we have seen, to bring about the immediate fall of Warsaw, as it uncovered the western flank of the army defending that capital.

On August 6th the course of the Vistula from Novo Georgievsk to Ivangorod had fallen into the enemy's hands, together with the railroad from Lublin to Cholm and all the country to the west and south of this line. The Russian troops expelled from Ivangorod and points to the south made their way, as rapidly and in as good order as they could under the circumstances, towards Brest-Litovsk.

North of Warsaw, on the Narev, heavy fighting continued heavily along the Narev line which, as we have seen, was forced by Germans some time before. This portion of the Russian defenses in Poland was not taken until some little time after the fall of Warsaw.

While Warsaw was being captured, the Germans to the north of this city were attacking the chain of fortresses running from Sierock to Grodno, in the north, which prevented their advancing to the railroad running from Warsaw northeastwardly to Petrograd and stopping communication between those two cities. Of these fortresses Lomza was occupied first; General Falcke's armies entering that town on the 10th of August, while Sierock changed masters one day thereafter. On this line the German forward movement was very slow and this prevented their being able to cut off that portion of the Russian army which escaped from Warsaw and retreated northeastwardly towards Bialystok. The siege of Osoviec to the northwest of Bialystok had again been undertaken and this time the bombardment was much more severe than during the first siege, but this valiant little fortress held out beyond the time at which this record closes. The history of the siege of Osoviec shows what the Russians could have accomplished with their chain of fortresses in Central Poland had all of them been as intrepidly commanded as was this rather minor defense. Whoever conducted this defense certainly proved himself to be head and shoulders above any other Russian fortress commander, and was a ray of capacity in the Russian darkness of military incompetence.

Ostrolenka, on the Narev, fell in the middle of August,

and the capture of this place and Lomza permitted the Germans to march to the east in the direction of the Bobr-Narev line, south of Lomza. The Russians attempted to make a stand on the strongly fortified sections of the Caerwony-Brok position, but were defeated, and this defeat opened the way for the advance towards Bialystok positions hereafter referred to.

Further to the north, above Grodno, on the River Niemen, just a little west of the point where the river turns to the west, was the important Russian fortress of Kovno which covered Vilna to the east and the railroad to Petrograd. Early in July the Germans commenced an advance in the general direction of Kovno, and by August 10th after considerable hard and bloody fighting in the intervening territory, succeeded in surrounding the fortress and in cutting off its lines of communication in every direction except to the east towards Vilna, also in getting their heavy artillery in a position for a siege. Kovno was considered one of the strongest of the Russian fortresses, and consists of the usual enceinte with a ring of main forts eleven in number surrounding it and the town, at distances varying from two to four miles. The town itself is located on the left bank of the Niemen, where the Niemen is joined by the Vilia and a mile or so below the point where the Niemen and Jessia flow together. The ring of forts not only surrounds the town but also these two river junctions and the railroad bridge across the Niemen. Three of the forts are to the east; one covers the railroad bridge, and seven protect the southern and western sides of the town.

The first serious attack took place on August 8th when a bombardment commenced in the early morning with 16-inch guns, and was followed by an infantry attack which lasted two hours and resulted in a temporary repulse for the Germans. This was followed by another attack at noon which was more successful, and towards nightfall by a third attack which took the village of Piple, the strategic point in the attack on which was the section to the front of the southwest between the Niemen and the Jessia. This assault was followed by a bombardment which lasted a couple of days. Here, as in Osoviec, the Russian resistance was much more determined than it was in the case of the fortresses further to the south, though it only lasted a few days. After very severe fighting on the 16th and 17th of August the Germans who had battered with their artillery the ex-

terior defenses on this and prior days succeeded in taking and storming these exterior lines of defenses, and on the 18th of August finished the siege by taking the enceinte by storm. The Russians lost here more than 25,000 prisoners and over 1000 cannon, but nevertheless, were able to withdraw a large portion of the defending forces along the line of the railway eastwardly towards Vilna. The Germans immediately launched columns in their pursuit, and heavy fighting took place at the crossing of the Niemen River to the east of Kovno along the line of the railroad leading to Vilna, between Kovno and Koshedary; in which both sides suffered heavy losses, but, as an ultimate result of which, the Russians were forced to fall back further in the direction of Vilna, which in the last days of August, when reached by the Germans, was being hastily evacuated by its civil population and stripped of all portable articles which by any possibility could be valuable to the German invaders, since its fall was seen to be but a question of a short time. Meanwhile, and between the fall of Kovno and the end of the month, heavy fighting was proceeding on the line south of that place, towards Grodno. Pitched battles were fought at Mariampol and Gudele, while a force which moved from the westward was endeavoring to force the line of the Niemen River between Kovno and Olita; which object, however, was not accomplished at the time that the period under consideration closes.

Further south, about the time that operations first began against Kovno, a force moving from Augustowo had fought its way eastward towards Grodno, a fortress fully equal in strength to Kovno or to Brest-Litovsk. Here, however, operations had proceeded more slowly than they had further to the north; the Russian resistance here being even more stubborn than at Kovno. However, slowly but surely the Russian outer defenses were taken one after the other, and the Russians, foot by foot, driven in to the defenses proper of the fortress, which eventually shared the fate of the other Polish fortresses and passed from Russian into German possession on the first of September.

By this capture of Grodno, the Russian second line of defense was completely pierced as all of the fortresses to the west had by this time fallen. The German army could boast a greater string of trophies taken in the brief space of two months, (since that period covers all the time which was consumed from the real opening of the

German offensive in Central and Northern Poland until their conquest of the first line of Russian defenses was absolutely complete) than possibly any army has ever before taken in any military campaign of modern times.

Many of these fortresses were not earnestly defended, and had they been in the hands of competent leaders at the head of well-trained and disciplined troops, such a conquest would have been almost beyond the limits of possibility, because, as we have seen in the case of the siege of Przemysl, (where the Russians for a very considerable time were supplied with heavy artillery) the heavy artillery of the assailant is not the only factor; the quality of the defenders counts for much.

We have now described the events which took place in the conquest of Poland, except those which happened in the area of the triangle of which Bialystok is the northern apex, from which one side runs to Warsaw, another side to Cholm and the third side from Cholm through Brest-Litovsk to Bialystok.

Almost directly east of Warsaw, and on the north and south line of Bialystok to Cholm, lies the Russian fortress of Brest-Litovsk on the River Bug; which fortress, by many military authorities, was considered the strongest fortress in Russia.

The Germans who captured Warsaw immediately began operations to force the crossing of the Vistula River. The Russians in Praga (a suburb of Warsaw, on the eastern bank of the Vistula) for a couple of days maintained a stubborn resistance, but finally the Germans succeeded by a free use of artillery in dislodging them from their positions there. This dislodgment of the Russians was helped by the fact that above Warsaw the Germans succeeded in crossing the river with a fairly considerable force, which then turning south commenced an infantry attack upon the defenders of Praga. The Russians thereupon fell back and eventually began a general retreat towards Brest-Litovsk, hotly pursued by the Germans. In the meantime the mixed force of Austrians and Germans which had captured Ivangorod, also began to move forward towards Brest-Litovsk, along the railway running from Ivangorod northeast to Lukow, while a third mixed force of Austrians and Germans moved to the northeast from Lublin. At first these three movements were separated, but before many days these armies took contact with each other and from this moment forward advanced on Brest in an unbroken front. The

point of junction may be roughly described as the railroad running from Siedlce through Lukow to Parczew.

A fourth force moved northward from Cholm along the line of the railroad running from Cholm almost directly north towards Brest-Litovsk, but this force did not fuse with the others until Brest-Litovsk was nearly invested.

The German army moving from Warsaw succeeded in a short time in occupying Minsk, the junction of the branch railroad, connecting the railroad from Warsaw to Bialystok and the railroad from Warsaw to Ivangorod; thereafter this army moved through Kahiszyn to Siedlce. While this army was covering this district, the Ivangorod army had moved through Noszczanka, Lipiny, Radzyn, and Stanin, to Lukow; and between Lukow and Siedlce the right wing of the Warsaw army and the left wing of the Ivangorod army joined; and near here, too, the right wing of the Ivangorod and the left wing of the Lublin army took contact in the vicinity of Kakolownica, towards which point the Lublin army had made its way through Lubartow, Ostrow and Wohyn.

Brest-Litovsk was now effectually cut off from communication with the west. The Russians fought rear-guard actions almost continually during this retreat but were not able anywhere to make a sufficient stand to hold back the German advance, and two weeks after Warsaw was taken the German advance guards had reached within thirteen miles of Brest-Litovsk on the southeast in the direction of Podlesie. A very few days later the entire Teutonic army stood in front of the fortress.

In the meantime, Bialystok had been struck at by the forces which had succeeded in forcing the Ostrolenka-Sierock chain of defenses, which had advanced from both the west directly on Bialystok, and also from the southwest of that point, crossing the River Bug near Malkin, and then swinging their right wing from Ciechanowice, finally capturing Bielsk on the railroad connecting Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok, which capture cut the communications between Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok.

At the same time, another force had advanced east from Siedlce and cut this railroad a day or two later, a little to the northeast of Siemiabycze, so that Brest-Litovsk was absolutely isolated from all communication from the outside world, except by the railway lines running to the east towards Pinsk and towards Baranowitshi.

The position at Bialystok grew so difficult that the

Russians, in order to avoid having their forces there entirely surrounded, evacuated the town and retreated directly to the eastward towards Slonim.

It may be here remarked that all through this Polish campaign of July and August, 1915, the Russians pursued the policy of evacuating, after a perfunctory resistance, their strongholds, and in their retreat therefrom devastating as far as possible the country through which they passed, so as to make it as difficult as possible for the pursuing enemy.

At Brest-Litovsk itself, after the main armies arrived, siege operations began and lasted for about a week. This fortress of Brest-Litovsk was regarded by the Russians as the most powerful stronghold of their Empire, standing, as it does, at the junction of the two rivers, the Bug and the Nukovhots, whereby it is protected. It lies on the right bank of the Bug, here considerably higher than the left bank and steep as well, besides which the river turns here from the north to northeast. The town is about a mile from the fortress. The inner fortifications have a circumference of about four miles, while the field works outside of them, which had been kept in excellent condition, (money having been spent upon them lavishly) were of much greater circumference. The Russians had announced their intention of making a determined stand at this point, as well as at Bialystok, but on August 19th, like the Arabs in the poem, they folded their tents and silently stole away.

Previous to this, although there had been some fighting in the outer circumference, it was not what could be termed severe, and this Russian decision to retreat from the strongest fortress of the Empire can only be viewed with the utmost astonishment. Their stated reason for this retreat was that all communications from this fortress in any direction except to the east having been cut off, the fortress itself became worthless as a defense and, furthermore, communication to the east was threatened by the Austrian forces which, after taking Kovel had advanced northeast of that town, and was moving towards the railroads towards Slonim and Pinsk.

The German troops entered this fortress in triumph on August 25th, and the Russian first line of defense had completely fallen by this capture. For many weeks before this first line of defense was taken, we were informed in the Allied press that it was untakable and that when once the Russians, in their retreat from Galicia and

from Western Poland reached this line, it would be found to be a rock upon which the German invaders would dash themselves in pieces. This rock did not last seven weeks from the time its actual assault was begun.

The Russians' second line of defense begins at Riga, and thence runs along the Duna River to Dunaberg and from thence, following the railroad from Vilna, through Baranowitshi, Pinsk and Rowno. And to this second line of defenses the entire Russian army from the north to the south began to fall back in more or less disorder; Grodno being the only point which still held out, and which fell only a few days afterwards.

So we thus leave the German army in possession, at the first of September, of the Russian first line of defense.

After the fall of Brest-Litovsk, as said, the Russian army commenced to fall back in the last week of August to the Russian second line of defense to the east of Brest-Litovsk itself, and the Austro-German forces entered the region of the marshes, and to the east of the line running from Bialystok to Brest-Litovsk entered the only forest which now remains in Europe where the bison still roams in liberty.

Further north, on the 26th, the Russians evacuated the fortress of Olita, which was immediately seized by the German troops which had crossed the Niemen near Meretch, and which now directed themselves against the railroad running between Vilna and Grodno. The main attack upon the Russian positions was near Orany, where some fighting took place which was of considerable importance, the town finally falling into German hands on the 31st day of August, and which ultimately lead to the capture of Grodno hereinbefore described.

A glance remains to be given to the operations to the south which took place from and after the time of the fall of Brest-Litovsk during the few remaining days of the period under consideration, as these were of considerable importance.

Brest-Litovsk fell on the 25th of August, but two days before that time, on the 23rd of August, the Austrians had entered Kovno and with the possession of this place began a movement on the so-called triangle of the Volhynian fortresses, Lutsk, Dubno and Rovno, which were the center and the pivot of the Russian armies under the command of General Ivanhoff.

Another force of Austrians was at this time operating on the River Styr on a frontal attack on the fortress of Lutsk.

The fall of Kovel and of the town of Vladimir Volynsky made necessary the abandonment of the line of the Upper Bug and of the Zlota Lipa in Galicia to the south as the line of the Middle Bug having been pierced by the capture of Kovel it would have left the Russian forces on the Lower Bug without support.

On August 28th the Austrians assaulted the Russian positions at Gologory and took them; the Russians falling back to Bialykamien.

The following day the Austrians captured Zlochoff, and another Austro-German army crossed the Zlota Lipa at Brzezany, while in the south a movement against Buczacz was inaugurated. The result of this pressure was that the Russians hurriedly abandoned the line of the Upper Bug and Zlota Lipa and fell back first to the line of the Strypa and then to the line of the Sereth.

A concentric movement against Rovno now began, which was launched from Kovel through Lutsk and from northeastern Galicia through Dubno. And on August 29th a fierce battle commenced on the entire front running from Bialykamien to Radziechoff, and continued on the two following days, the Russians here showing unusual powers of resistance.

But on the 31st of August the fight finished with a Russian defeat. The Austro German forces captured Lutsk and crossed the Strypa River, which necessitated a Russian retreat along the whole front to a distance of about 30 miles to the eastward.

On September 1st Brody fell into the hands of the Austro-Germans.

It may here be remarked that this capture of Poland, like that of Northern France, had an economic as well as military significance. It is in Poland that there are located the great centers of the Russian textile industry and the principal metallurgical establishments of the Empire. A large percentage of the coal mined in Russia is produced here, and, besides, Poland is one of the centers of the cattle-raising industry of Russia, as well as being important agriculturally.

While perhaps Poland does not bear quite so great importance to the Russian Empire as does the industrial territory in the north to France, the German possession of it has had such considerable effect that this occupa-

tion is alleged by the Russian Treasury officials to be the cause of the very considerable drop in Russia's revenue which has taken place since the time the Germans became masters of the ancient territory of Sobieski.

CHAPTER XIX

In the extreme north, from the middle of May until towards the middle of July, the German and Russian armies faced each other on a front of about 150 miles running between Libau and Kovno. The dividing line between the lines was, roughly speaking, formed by three rivers, the Vindava, the Venta and the Dubysa. The town of Shavli, located at about the central point in this line, was the scene of the most active operations. Previously on June 14th the Germans had begun an offensive against this town and succeeded in taking the town of Kuze but were unable to smash the Russian defenses between that place and Shavli. From this time until the middle of July there was little fighting in this region.

On July 13th a new offensive against Shavli was opened by the Germans. The Vindava, a stream about fifty yards wide with forest-lined banks, was first crossed at Niegraden, and then between Muravjevo and Kurshany, these crossings being effected without serious difficulty. The Germans were particularly strong in cavalry and threw large forces of this arm forward in front of their infantry to screen its advance. The left wing of the German forces which ran north and east from the Vindava had for its objective, Mitau, its movement on which was supported by another army which was moved along the sea-shore against Goldingen and Windau.

On July 15th this offensive against Mitau captured Frauenburg, while a couple of days later Doblen was the scene of a fight which the Germans won, and, advancing rapidly, found themselves on July 18th within a few miles of the town of Mitau. This town is on the railroad between Riga and Shavli, and occupies a strong defensive position protected by two rivers and with a forest several miles broad on its southern side.

On July 26th the Germans, who had been advancing along the seashore, and who had occupied Goldingen and Windau turned east from these places, crossed the Vindava, and came upon the railway from Vindau and Mitau, which they followed and reached the River Aa east of Mitau, at Bowsk, thus completing the line around Mitau.

On August 1st the Germans stormed and captured the

town of Mitau and cut off all direct communication between Riga and Shavli.

During the time that these events were taking place, at or near Mitau, the Russian troops between Mitau and Shavli had fallen back to the eastward as the result of an attack which was made upon them by German troops which had crossed the river Dubysa near Rossienie to the south of Shavli, whose operations were aided by an attack on this position directly from the west through Telshe and Triszky. The effect of these joint attacks was to drive the Russians along this line rather rapidly to the eastward, so that on July 23rd this Russian army had retreated as far as Shadoff, and eventually fell back towards the Duna River line, the Germans in pursuit.

On the 25th the German pursuers arrived in front of Posvol and Ponieviesh, and on August 2nd reached the railroad leading from this last named place to Dunaberg, at a point about 15 miles to the eastward of Ponieviesh.

In the beginning of August the civilian population of Riga received orders to leave; and the evacuation of the city and the removal therefrom of such supplies as might be of use to the Germans immediately began and was pursued with vigor for the next few days, the Russians not expecting that the city could be successfully defended for any time. Then suddenly, and for some reason which is unknown to us even at the present time, the pressure of the Germans on this city from the south relaxed. There are some who believe that this relaxation took place because the Germans hoped to force this line of the Dwina, which forcing the fall of Riga would have been brought about by naval attacks on the city and its coast from Riga Bay. In fact, one such attack was made on August 9th, but resulted in a draw.

Ten days afterwards, August 19th, was the date of the famous naval battle of Riga Bay which is probably unique among naval encounters, in that, it never took place. My readers will, however, remember how the British and American press at that time teemed with accounts of the destruction of a German battle cruiser, besides two light cruisers and nine torpedo boats and destroyers by a Russian fleet assisted by British submarines, in the waters of this Bay. But, after much editorial wisdom had been expended in sage deductions regarding the power of recuperation of the Russian fleet from the naval disasters of the Russo-Japanese war, and those that had befallen it in this war, an official Russian

bulletin, three weeks later, dissipated the myth which had been created by British correspondents of London papers in St. Petersburg on the evening of the 19th of August, which bulletin recited that in place of losses of any battle cruisers or light cruisers or even humble destroyers and torpedo boats, the Germans had sunk themselves, to block certain passages between the islands in Riga Bay, several small craft. On this extremely unstable foundation the whole structure of the great Russian naval victory in the Bay of Riga had been constructed.

About the 20th of August the Germans made an advance in the center to the east of Mitau against the Dwina, and after strenuous resistance carried the bridgeheads of Lennewaden and Freidrichstadt, the Russians losing heavily both in casualties and prisoners. On these bridgeheads being carried, the Russians hurriedly retreated across the Dwina, destroying those two bridges in their retreat.

Another attack was made simultaneously upon the bridgehead at Jacobstadt, which was also carried, the Russians being driven to the northern bank of the Dwina, after which hostilities languished on this front until after the first of September.

Italy Goes to War

CHAPTER XX

THE TREACHERY

In the year 1882 Italy entered the Dual Alliance of Austria and Germany, thus forming that alliance which thereafter was known as the Triple Alliance by the treaty signed May 20th, 1882. The reason why Italy separated herself from her Latin sister France was because in the Spring of 1881 France occupied Tunis with a military force, establishing a French Protectorate over that country by the Treaty of Bardo signed in that same year.

Italy had long considered the northern coast of Africa, from the Eastern Algerian frontier to the frontier of Egypt, as territory which one day or other was destined to belong to her. In addition to the national and popular feeling in regard to these countries, there had been for a quite a number of years a large Italian emigration to them and at the time of the annexation of Tunis to France about 75,000 Italians were living within the territorial limits thereof. The result of this annexation by France was that the Italian ministry of the day fell, and Depretis, who then became prime minister, though he saw that the only way in which Italy's interests in the Mediterranean could be preserved against France and the French activity along its coasts, was by cultivating close relations with Germany and with the hereditary enemy Austria, still clung to the idea that it would be possible to cultivate a renewed friendship with France. This course, however, was opposed by the best Italian public opinion, and Mancini, the then Foreign Minister, early in 1882 opened diplomatic pourparlers on the subject with Austria.

These negotiations dragged over a considerable time as Austria desired Italy, once and for all, to recognize formally the full validity of the Austrian possession of Trieste and the Trentino; while, on the other hand, Aus-

tria was not willing to guarantee to Italy a like possession of the formal Papal States.

Austria's title to Trieste and the Trentino was beyond reproach, but a political party of small importance but great noisiness had been organized in Italy in prior years, which had as its reason for existence the idea that all Italian-speaking territories contiguous to Italy should form a part of Italy politically. This would have included the Austrian territory, or a large portion of the Trentino, the Swiss Canton of Tescino, the French island of Corsica, Nice, and the French coast as far as Nice.

This test of language was a sophistry; none of the Austrian territory coveted had for centuries formed part of Italy politically, and all its interests, commercial, political and economic, were best served by remaining parts of the Austrian Empire; nor was there any popular demand for such annexation in these territories. A few Italian emigrants in Trieste formed there a vociferous but small minority, who, not unnaturally, demanded the annexation of Trieste by Italy, though the great bulk of the city's population were adverse.

Trieste is a sea port of importance which owes that importance to the fact that through it goes practically all the foreign commerce of the great Austro-Hungarian Empire. As an Italian port, it would lose the handling of all of this business, which would not be replaced by any correspondingly large, and, consequently, the population would find themselves in the situation of the Italian ports such as Genoa, Naples, Bari and Palermo, which have a hard struggle to maintain their maritime and commercial importance.

But these substantial advantages (leaving out of consideration the history of Trieste and the Trentino) meant nothing to the imaginative Italian who was willing to sacrifice the economic good of the population of those regions for a more or less glittering and tawdry idea. The Irredentists had, on several occasions, stirred up grave riots in Rome and in other parts of Italy.

That veteran agitator, Garibaldi, had, in the latter stages of his career when he was at odds with Victor Emmanuel, Cavour and the government of Italy, joined himself to this party and had brought with him a considerable following of those red-shirted enthusiasts which had followed him in the war of Italian liberation. After his death his descendants followed in his footsteps, the members of this family seeming to be born to be political

agitators, though all of the ability of the family departed with the first and greatest of the name. These Irredentists were destined to play a not inconsiderable part in the melodrama of May 1915.

On March 17, 1887, a second treaty between Italy and Austria was signed, and, at the same time, a parallel treaty or understanding was entered into with Great Britain, by which joint action in the Mediterranean by the British and Italian fleets was arranged for in the event of any disturbance; and, from this time forward, Italy acted in complete accordance with British desires in the Mediterranean problems.

This Alliance was again renewed in June, 1891, for a period of twelve years; and once more, in 1902, also for a period of twelve years, to run from 1903. However, before the end of this last period was reached, the relations between the members of the Triple Alliance were nothing like as cordial as they had been, on account of the failure of the Teutonic members of this Alliance to give effective support to the Italian policy in the Mediterranean, and also on account of the discords which, during this last period, had arisen between Italy and Austria over questions affecting what may be broadly called "The Balkans."

On the other hand, the relations with France during this time had grown steadily better, and the influence of kindred bloods was commencing to have a decided effect upon Italian popular opinion and political action.

Then came the war made by Italy upon Turkey, and the protection of Turkey by Austria and Germany who declined to admit the right of Italy to make any attack upon Turkey in Europe. As France created no difficulties in this war, popular opinion swung still more strongly in her favor, but in the middle of January, 1912, this tendency was arrested suddenly on account of the energetic protests of the French against the stoppage of the steamers Carthage and Manouba. This stoppage was for the purpose of inspection of the cargo of both vessels, in order to see whether or not such cargoes contained munitions of war, etc., destined to Northern Africa. These incidents assumed serious proportions, but were finally referred to the Hague Tribunal for decision, which body held that Italy had been correct in her actions.

At this time also the bulk of Italian feeling towards England was seriously chilled by the attitude of the British public and press in regard to the warlike action of

Italy in Northern Africa, which was intensified by the vituperative attacks of the British Liberal members upon Italian military preparedness and the value of her army. The result of this growth of hostility towards both France and Great Britain was that when the Triple Alliance was renewed on December 7, 1912, for the fourth time, there was no opposition to it in Italy, but the subsequent course of events in the Balkans was destined to again change the Italian attitude.

For some time Italy had been considering that the lower Dalmatian coast should belong to her, and the limits of her claims embraced the present Principality of Albania. This view her Allies did not agree with. In view of their refusal to permit her to extend in this direction, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austrians added to her resentment.

At the time war broke out, the Marquis di San Giuliano was Foreign Minister of Italy, and immediately thereafter a meeting took place between himself and the German Ambassador, at which Signor Salandra, the Premier, was present; wherein, among other things, the German Ambassador was informed by Italy "that Austria had no right, according to the spirit of the Triple Alliance Treaty, to make such a move as she has made at Belgrade without previous agreement with her allies. Austria, in fact, from the tone in which the note is conceived and from the demands she makes, demands which are of little effect against the pan-Serb danger, but are profoundly offensive to Serbia, and indirectly to Russia, has shown clearly that she wishes to provoke a war."

Flotow was therefore told that "in consideration of Austria's method of procedure and of the defensive and conservative nature of the Triple Alliance, Italy is under no obligation to help Austria if, as a result of this move of hers, she should find herself at war with Russia."

And on July 27th and 28th the government dispatched notes to both Berlin and Vienna, which declared that if Italy did not receive adequate compensation for Austria's disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium, "the Triple Alliance would be irreparably broken."

These notes also raised the question of Austria ceding to Italy her Italian provinces as a recompense for her disturbance in the Balkan situation.

On the 4th of August Italy made a formal declaration of neutrality in the war and in this declaration of neutrality she asserted that, according to the terms of the

Triple Alliance, Austria had not embarked upon a defensive war, and therefore the condition of the treaty which required the participation of Italy did not arise.

San Giuliano's illness, which had by this time begun and which terminated in his death on Oct. 16th, possibly had something to do with the fact that this claim of Italy for compensation by the cession by Austria of the Italian provinces had not been taken up, but more probably the real reason was that San Giuliano never had in mind the making of so wide-extending a demand as was made by Sonnino, who succeeded him in the Italian Foreign Office in November. It is also stated that at this time, August 1914, the Italian army was in bad condition, lacking artillery, ammunition and other equipment, and consequently, was in no position to take the field.

On December 9th Sonnino sent a note to Austria in which, among other things, he said:

"The actual military advance of Austria-Hungary in Serbia constitutes a fact which must be an object of examination by the Italian and Austro-Hungarian Governments on the basis of the stipulations contained in Article VII of the Triple Alliance. From this article derives the obligation of the Austro-Hungarian Government, even in the case of temporary occupations, to come to a previous agreement with Italy and to arrange for compensations. The Imperial and Royal Government ought, therefore, to have approached us and come to an agreement with us before sending its troops across the Serbian frontier."

The note further demands a stable pledge that Austria-Hungary would not acquire any of the Serbian territory, and attempts to point out the importance to Italy "of the full integrity and of the political and economic independence of Serbia," and demanded immediate entrance upon definite negotiations, stating that Italian public opinion was directly occupied with "Italian national aspirations."

The Austrian reply to this was unsatisfactory and the Italian Foreign Minister replied by insisting upon the rights secured to Italy under Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. In view of its importance, this article may be perhaps quoted in full:

"Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might

be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case arise, that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the Aegean Seas becomes impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the *status quo* for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing *status quo,* and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties."

The result of this was that the Austrian Foreign Minister, in reply stated his willingness to discuss the question of compensation, but this was negatived almost immediately by a change in the Austrian Foreign Office and the accession of Baron Burian to the Austrian Portfolio of Foreign Affairs, which resulted in Austria's adopting a much firmer position; in effect, refusing to accept the Italian claims for the cession of any Austrian territory at all, and suggesting that if compensation were to be given, Italy should find it in Albania.

Prince von Bulow, who has been Chancellor of the German Empire, and who had married an Italian wife, a member of a very prominent and politically influential Italian family, was now put forward by Germany in an effort to arrange the threatened deadlock between Italy and Austria. His first effort was to induce Italy to be satisfied with the cession to it by Austria of the Trentino, but Sonnino refused this and insisted on the cession of Trieste as well, stating that no arrangement could be made which would satisfy Italy unless both of these territories were ceded. Then Prince von Bulow asked Italy to formulate her entire demands, which Sonnino refused to do until Austria would agree that the only basis of negotiations should be "the cession of territories actually in possession of the Monarchy;" refusing to define this phrase which might have meant anything, and included much territory, on the basis of language, (the Irreden-

tist test) not comprised in the Trentino and Trieste. Much discussion followed and on February 12th Sonnino terminated negotiations and warned Austria that any military action undertaken in the Balkans against Serbia or Montenegro would be regarded by Italy as a violation of the 7th Article of the Triple Alliance Treaty hereinbefore quoted; and would result in Italy's resuming her liberty of action in order to safe-guard her own interests.

Further negotiations followed, but Sonnino remained firm in his demands for a time.

On March 10th, however, Sonnino formulated three conditions under which further negotiations must be conducted:

First—That absolute secrecy should be preserved;

Second—Whatever agreement might be reached should be immediately carried into effect; and,

Third—That the whole period of the war, as far as the scope of Article VII was involved, should be covered.

Vienna balked at these conditions; particularly the second, which provided that the terms of such agreement as might be reached should take effect at once; and refused to accept its requirements, so that a deadlock ensued. This deadlock Prince von Bulow attempted to break, offering that Germany should guarantee the faithful performances of the terms of any agreement arrived at; in reply to which Sonnino reaffirmed the essential condition and stated that it was quite possible that at the end of the war Germany might not be so situated as to be able to give effect to her guarantee.

The negotiations dragged on, and finally, on March 27th, Burian made the first offer to the Italian government, which consisted in the cession of certain territories in South Tyrol; but Sonnino refused this, called the cession offered "a strip of territory" and stated that this offer did not meet any of Italy's demands. This was followed up by a more definite offer by Burian, to which Italy did not reply, which resulted in Burian's asking for Italy's counter-proposals. Accordingly, on the 8th of April, Italy formulated her demands as follows:

I.—The Trentino, with the boundaries fixed for the Kingdom of Italy in 1811.

II.—A new eastern frontier including Gradisca and Gorizia.

III.—Trieste and its neighborhood to be formed into an autonomous State, with complete independence from Austro-Hungarian rule; with Trieste a free port.

IV.—The Curzolari Islands on the Dalmatian coast to be ceded by Austria.

V.—Immediate occupation of ceded territories by Italy.

VI.—The Italian sovereignty over Vallona and its region to be recognized by Austria.

VII.—All Austrian claims in Albania to be renounced.

VIII.—A general amnesty.

On the 17th of April the Austrian reply was received. The second, third and fourth articles were absolutely rejected. The fifth article was not accepted; the sixth and seventh articles were left open for argument; and the eighth article was accepted.

Further negotiations followed, but produced little result as neither side was willing to make any concessions or to recognize the reasonableness of the position of the other side; and finally, on May 3rd, 1915, Sonnino sent to Vienna a formal denunciation of the Italo-Austrian Alliance.

So much for the history of the negotiations, but one or two observations remain to be made on them.

It will be noticed that Sonnino's definite demands of the cession of definite territory were first made when the Austrian military situation in Galicia, then being invaded by the Russians, had become difficult, and that his demands increased in proportion to the Russian advance into Austrian territory. It may further be said that, historically, the Kingdom of Italy never had, and has not at this day, any right, political, legal, or moral, to the territories to which she lays claim, and that the demand for them was merely an impertinent taking advantage of the difficult position in which Austria-Hungary found herself at the time when the demand was made; and, further, it may be confidently predicted later that in a period of greater calm, when the facts are all known (many of them being now obscure) this demand of Sonnino's will be regarded as nothing more or less than a repetition on the part of a nation, of Jack Shepard's famous demand in the good old days, to travelers on the York road, of "Your money or your life!"

Public opinion in Italy was, up to the end of March, strongly in favor of Italy's continuing the wise policy of neutrality which she had declared at the beginning of the war. Italy is a poor country and perhaps more heavily burdened with taxation of all kinds and characters than any other of the European countries of any importance. Her commerce and her industries are languishing and her educated classes were fully aware of the

fact that neither economically nor politically was she in position to embark on a doubtful and dubious adventure; and until that time these classes had been able to curb the demand among the dregs of the populace and their Irredentist allies for energetic action of one character or another; which demand on the part of this portion of the Italian population was undoubtedly stimulated by the distribution of largesse among them in its most primitive form, by representatives of those Powers of Europe who had most interest in seeing Italy embark in the war upon their side.

Furthermore, a sentimental crusade had been started by a certain school of erotic romancers and poets, to have Italy take up arms on behalf of her great Latin sister, France. The most prominent representative of this school was the degenerate Gabrielli d'Annunzio.

Popular movements, and for the matter of that all movements, political and otherwise, have occasionally had at their head what the French call "un triste héros," but it may be doubted whether any political movement of importance, in modern times, has ever been led by so sad a hero as this bard of the cess-pools, nor by a leader whose personal character was so utterly beyond the pale, to prove which only one incident in his career need be mentioned, which is his blackmailing Eleanora Duse, the great Italian tragedienne, with her own love letters to him, which he offered to return to her for money or otherwise threatening to sell them to the press.

But on the progress of events between the end of March and the declaration of war by Italy upon Austria, this poetic charlatan had the greatest influence, in that he was able to make himself the voice of the Lazzeroni and of the debauched and the violent elements of the Italian populace, who, having nothing to lose in any way themselves, were desirous of seeing Italy embark on a course of political and military action which then and to-day seems bound to set back the clock of economic progress in Italy for a hundred years and more. Thus he was one of the instruments by which the triumphant sentimentality (not sentiment) was assured.

We do not know, as yet, with any degree of positiveness, the forces that were at work in this period more worthy of serious consideration than this mountebank, but such serious forces must have been at work or else the hesitation of the King to embark on this vague and uncertain adventure, the opposition to such a course of

Giolitti, the veteran of Italian politicians, and the carrying away from the position theretofore assumed by it of the entire Italian Chamber and Senate, could not have been brought about.

To-day we can only see the scum that floated on the surface of the Italian political cauldron in those six weeks, which conceals from us the deeper forces which were at work to produce this result. We can only surmise that all the forces of discontent in Italy, (and they are many) united not so much with the object of forcing Italy into this war, as the object of bringing about a political and social revolution in that kingdom, and that the conservative classes were at the last moment forced to divert this stream of discontent into a new channel; that the declaration of war upon Austria furnished the new channel, and thus saved the Italian State.

On May 9th Giolitti returned to Rome to try to stem the tide.

On May 13th, knowing that Giolitti held the majority in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, Salandra resigned. This precipitated the crisis, and the King summoned Signor Marcora to form a Cabinet. But this was impossible, and on the 15th the King refused to accept Salandra's resignation.

Giolitti foreseeing defeat left Rome on the 17th and his so-doing so disorganized his supporters that when the Italian Parliament met on May 20th Salandra was master of the two Chambers, and forced the passage of the bill whereby extraordinary powers were conferred upon the government in case of war.

On May 22nd a general mobilization was ordered, and on May 23rd a declaration of war against Austria was issued. The Italian army was then sent forward to what may prove to be another Adowa.

CHAPTER XXII

THE CAMPAIGN

When the Italian General Staff contemplated the attack on Austria, a glance at the map showed them that this frontier fell into three great divisions; the Trent-Cadore front, the Carnia front and the Isonzo front. Behind the Trent-Cadore and behind the Carnia front lay the tempting prizes of Trent and Trieste which were Italy's real object in entering the war, and for which she chose, as she thought, the fitting moment when Austria was hard pressed by the Russians in Galicia.

The Trent salient is like all salients; it possesses the advantage of being a point from which a strong offensive can be launched; but it also possesses the disadvantage of being subject to lateral pressure on both sides which would render it untenable in the event that this pressure is not successfully withstood.

The Cadore front, the northeast section of the Trent front is impossible, owing to its extremely mountainous nature, for the launching of any important offensive from the Italian side.

The Carnia front is difficult also for the Italians to penetrate, while the Isonzo front is difficult in the upper and middle reaches of the Isonzo River which flows through a mountainous country; but the lower portion of this stream flows through a fairly level country presenting no very great difficulties.

Italy's strategic task, then, was to press the war on and to make her strongest effort towards the east, to break through the Isonzo position and to take Trieste. The pressure on the north was necessary to avoid an offensive being launched from that direction by the Austrians, which, if done successfully, would have rendered the Italian position on the Carnic front untenable, as they thus could have been attacked from the northwest by the Austrians who had advanced from the north.

The Austrian line along this frontier was and is rather weak as Austria does not dispose of enough troops to hold the border in force, but this line has the advantage of extremely good natural defenses which had been strengthened by all the artifices of the art of fortification; besides

which, military railroads had been constructed behind the defenses all along these fronts, wherever feasible, by means of which it is possible to move troops and artillery rapidly from one point of the line to another, as the necessities of the campaign might require; and thus extreme mobility for this comparatively slender force was obtained.

One more natural fact, however, constituted an even greater difficulty for the Italians, which was that practically along the entire line of their frontier, from west to east, the ground sloped upward from the Italian territory to the Austrian frontier, and that, consequently, the Italian troops had to fight up-hill continually, which, in itself, was a disadvantage; but the main disadvantage lay in the fact that the Austrians everywhere occupied a dominant position, from whence their artillery could do tremendous execution upon the Italian troops advancing upwards.

This is true of the entire line, except a small portion of the lower Isonzo which has been already described.

The Italian army presents one remarkable force,—the so-called Alpini, of some twenty-six battalions; picked troops of magnificent physique, trained and habituated for mountain war-fare, in which they have become exceedingly expert, being as much at home on the ice of the glaciers or on the crags of the precipitous Dolomites, as they are on gently sloping hillsides. They are perhaps the most magnificent mountain troops in the world, not excepting the French Alpins.

Another remarkable force is the Bersagliere, the pick of the Italian infantry, and most wonderful marchers. These number twelve regiments, or, approximately, 36,000 men, and the brunt of the campaign waged by Italy was to fall on these two forces, in the Trentino and Carnic fronts, as the regular infantry, unaccustomed to work in the mountains, would be of comparatively little use in this rough country, particularly pitted against such a force of men accustomed to the mountains from childhood as Austria was able to raise among the Tyroleans and place along these borders.

Another force of some importance to Italy, which also could be reckoned as among her best troops, were her 15 battalions of mountain artillery who did yeoman service in this campaign, but who are not sufficiently numerous to really become a decisive factor in the mountain fighting.

THE CAMPAIGN

On May 23rd, Italy formally declared a state of war against Austria-Hungary and was to exist from the following day, and on the following day both countries opened hostilities. The Austrians made an attack with aeroplanes and warships in various places on the Adriatic coast, and, among other exploits, bombarded the arsenal of Venice, doing little damage. On the other hand, the Italian troops opened in an offensive on three fronts against the Austrian frontiers, which they crossed at several points; one army opening an attack against the Trent salient from the southwest, along the Lago di Garda and up the Adige Valley, while another moved through the Dolomites from the east, from the Ampezzo to the Brenta valleys, and a third from the Stebvio Pass to Lago di Garda from the west. Another force advanced towards Pontebba near the upper Drave Valley, with the object of cutting communications between Vienna and the Trent region, which it would have achieved had it been able to cut the railroad running through the Pusterthal, a long narrow valley running from east to west in Austrian territory almost parallel to the Italian frontier and not very far distant therefrom. From the neighborhood of Udine a third army moved across the Italian frontier in the direction of the Isonzo River, a stream flowing almost north and south from a point to the east of Pontebba to the Adriatic.

By June 15th the Italian army on this front was approaching Gorizia on the east bank of the river, the first point which they had reached on the Austrian first line of defense. Prior to this time, however, they had taken Tolmino, Plova, Gradisca, Sagretto and Montfalcone, places of some importance which commanded the crossings of the river, and had sought further north to capture the railroad which runs southward from Assling to Montfalcone and thence to Trieste, in order to cut off communication between Trieste and the north by this line, but in which they were not successful.

Up to this time their operations on this front had not resulted in even feeling out the Austrian position. In the taking of the towns mentioned, minor combats had taken place, which had resulted usually in Italian victories, wherein they had captured some few Austrians, but in these operations there was nothing to indicate the ultimate results of the campaign.

Once arrived at this first line of Austrian defenses, the Italian offensive, much to the surprise of its com-

manders, struck a barrier as firm as a rock. For months thereafter, by artillery and aerocraft attacks, by bombardments, by infantry assaults, and by every form of assault known to the artifices of war, the Italian army tried to break this barrier, but it remained, and has remained from June 15th to September 1st, when this record closes, immovable and untakable.

At several points on the line which they have attained, the Italian forces are within twenty miles of Trieste, which city is in plain sight of their army from more than one point on its front; but in spite of every effort, and in spite of an enormous waste of men and materials, barely a foot of this distance has been won by the Italian forces from the moment these forces took contact with the Austrians' first line of defense to the present day.

On this front the Italian campaign has been an utter and an absolute failure. The Austrian line of defense may be possible to pierce, but not by General Cadorna and his legions.

On the other sectors they were even more unfortunate. On the middle front, the Carnic, which faces the Dolomite Alps, in spite of the best efforts of those really good troops, the Alpini and the Bersaglieri, little or no progress has been made, and the frontier has been really barely crossed.

In these mountains are interspersed, from point to point, Austrian fortresses; and of these not one had been taken by September 1st. This shows the sterility and fruitlessness of the Italian campaign on this front. On the Trent front some little progress has been made, the result of incessant, obscure and un-named skirmishes; but the distance of twenty miles between the frontier to the city of Trent has nowhere been traversed for more than five miles. Riva, on Lago di Garda, five miles from the Italian frontier, and the first place of importance in Austrian territory, still remains Austrian; while the offensive through the Stebvio Pass has not, as yet, succeeded in getting through the Pass.

Towards Borgo, the northwest point of this western frontier of Italy and Austria, where an attempt was made to break through from Neumarkt to the north of Trent, not one foot of ground has been won.

Considered as a whole, this Italian offensive may be dismissed as inoffensive. It is doubtful whether any

military operation involving so large a number of men, has continued for so long a time, in modern history, and produced such utterly insignificant, and, strategically, such worthless results.

The Austrian losses cannot be estimated, except very vaguely; but it can be reasonably inferred, from the positions occupied by their troops, and the fact that they are, as a general thing, receiving and not delivering assaults, that these losses do not by any means equal those of the Italians.

Like the French, the Italians do not publish any account of their losses, but from such scattered information as has reached us these can be estimated as somewhere in the vicinity of 200,000 to 225,000.

What developments this Austro-Italian campaign holds for the future, are extremely problematic, and the only manoeuvre which seems to offer any possibility of creating a campaign of any interest is the assumption by the Austrians, aided by the German troops, of an offensive against the Italians. But for various reasons there seems no ground for supposing that such an offensive will be undertaken; more particularly as Italy has never declared war upon Germany, nor has Germany upon her; and, officially at least, long after September 1st, 1915, these two nations were at peace. One result of this will be, necessarily, that neither will send troops against the other until war between them is declared.

Here it may be said that the question of the exact present condition of the relations between Germany and Italy constitutes a puzzle which seems without solution.

The Dardanelles

CHAPTER XXIII

THE NAVAL ATTACKS

On March 1st Fort Dardanus was bombarded by the Triumph, the Ocean and the Albion, from the Straits, and the same night mine sweepers supported by destroyers swept the straits nearly up to Kephez Point, at the very beginning of the Narrows. That same day the French warships bombarded the Bulair Isthmus from the Gulf of Saros.

On March 2nd the Canopus, an old battleship which had figured in the battle of the Falkland Islands against Admiral Spree's squadron, the Swiftsure and the Cornwallis, got in closer to Fort Dardanus and again shelled it. These battleships were hit by the fire of the Tekke battery located on the peninsula just below Kilid Bahr, but suffered only slight casualties. The Allied squadron was joined the same day by a Russian cruiser, the Askold. The French were again active in the Gulf of Saros.

On March 3rd Fort Dardanus was again bombarded by a squadron of several battleships and on March 4th marines were landed at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr to destroy these partially ruined towns, but found Turkish infantry hidden in the ruins and received a warm reception, particularly the party at Kum Kale who were driven back to their boats. The British casualties in this affair were about fifty.

Various minor attacks on Turkish land positions took place this same day.

On March 5th a serious attack on the main defenses of the Narrows was begun, the fire of the ships being concentrated upon the three Turkish batteries;—the first the Rumeli Medjidieh of two 11-inch and four 9.4-inch guns, besides several smaller guns; the second the Hamidieh II., of two 14-inch guns; and the third the Namazieh, consisting of one 11-inch, one 10.2-inch, eleven 9.4-inch and three 8.2-inch guns, besides several smaller

pieces. This latter battery was one of the strongest of all the Turkish batteries and commanded the Straits at their narrowest point from the seaward side of Kilid Bahr, near which were also located the other two batteries.

The Queen Elizabeth, with two other battleships, the Inflexible and the Prince George, took their positions in th Gulf of Saros west of the forts and bombarded these three batteries. Though the Queen Elizabeth fired a large number of shots from her 15-inch guns, the damage done to these batteries does not appear to have been very great.

The next day, March 6th, an attack was made on the batteries at and near Chanak, on the eastern side of the Narrows, the idea being first to disable the batteries on the western, or European, side, and then those on the eastern, or Asiatic, side. The batteries attacked were the Hamidieh I. of two 14-inch and two 9.4-inch guns, and the Hamidieh III. of two 14-inch and one 9.4-inch guns and several smaller pieces. In this bombardment the Queen Elizabeth, the Agamemnon and the Ocean participated at a range of about 12 miles from the outside of the Gallipoli Peninsula. A strong Allied squadron, composed of the Vengeance, the Albion, the Majestic, the Prince George and the Suffren, entered the Straits and engaged Fort Dardanus and the other batteries in its vicinity. The artillery fighting was quite fierce and both sides scored several hits, the Fort Rumeli Medjidieh suddenly participating in the bombardment, which showed that the Queen Elizabeth, in her bombardment of it across the peninsula the preceding day, had not damaged it greatly.

The results of this action were comparatively unimportant, however. The following day the Agamemnon and the Lord Nelson advanced into the Straits and bombarded the forts near Kilid Bahr, paying particular attention to Fort Rumeli Medjidieh and Fort Hamidieh I.

The French squadron, the Gaulois, the Charlemagne, the Bouvet and the Suffren, advanced further into the Straits and bombarded Fort Dardanus. Most of the ships were hit but no great damage was done to any of them or to the forts.

On the 8th the Queen Elizabeth and four other battleships went into the Straits and again shelled Fort Medjidieh. After this, for several days, no further attack was undertaken though mine sweeping was kept up dur-

ing the period. It had become evident that the various bombardments of the Turkish forts at long range, by the Allied fleet, which had been going on for some time, had fallen far short of accomplishing their purpose. The batteries at the Narrows were still capable of replying vigorously and had apparently suffered no damage of moment, and by tacit consent it was resolved to pursue this plan no further and to wait until an army, which was being gathered, should be brought to the scene of action in order to support the operations of the fleet.

On March 10th and 11th the Allies were obliged to again shell the batteries at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr, which they had previously destroyed, since the Turks, having taken a position in the ruins, were directing and firing light guns therefrom.

On the 13th the light cruiser Amethyst was badly damaged at Sari Siglar Bay at the entrance to the Narrows, the casualties being over fifty.

On the 16th a trawler was hit by Turkish fire and destroyed in the Straits.

While these things were taking place in the Dardanelles themselves, subsidiary operations were going on on the coast of Asia Minor where, on the 5th of March, the East India battle squadron of the British Navy appeared in the harbor of Smyrna and bombarded the chief fort, Yeni Kale, for several hours, with no particular results; while the Sapphire shelled troops on the shore of Adramyti.

On the 6th of March the bombardment of Smyrna was renewed and continued for several hours; both sides scoring several hits. This bombardment was, however, not followed up.

Meanwhile, the Russian warships in the Black Sea had given several spectacular performances in attacking the Turkish coasts at various points, the most melodramatic of which was the much-advertised and much head-lined attack on the Black Sea defenses of the Bosphorous, which apparently consisted (from the reports of eye-witnesses) of the Russian men-of-war throwing shells towards the shore from a point so distant from that shore that their guns could not carry to it. Nevertheless, this performance served to furnish many a head-line in the newspapers of Great Britain and America.

A little while before March 6th, the Allies had suffered a great disappointment: they had intended to enlist the land forces of Greece in their attack upon the

Dardanelles and had intrigued with the various political factions of that country, looking towards that end. M Venezelos, the Grecian Prime Minister, was more or less apparently, in sympathy with this project, but his policy in this respect was not sustained by King Constantine, who wished to maintain an attitude of neutrality, he not being certain of the issue of the war. M. Venezelos, finding himself opposed by the King, resigned on March 6th, and his successor declared in favor of a policy of stricter neutrality.

The French government had, prior to March 11th, concentrated an expeditionary force in North Africa under the command of General d'Amade. On March 15th this entire force was in the Aegean Sea in transports. A British force, consisting of the 29th Division and the Royal Naval Division, with the Australian and New Zealand Divisions, a Territorial Division, to which some Indian troops were added, was gotten together, placed in transports and brought to the Island of Lemnos by March 20th. This Island of Lemnos, which is located about fifty miles from the entrance to the Dardanelles, belonged to Greece, and, according to the famous declaration of the Hague Convention, so often quoted, though not applying, in the case of Belgium, the territory of a neutral power was inviolate; but the Allies, without even going through the formality of requesting the consent of Greece which she could not have given and remained neutral, occupied it. Gen. Hamilton, the British Commander, on arriving at the scene of action on the 17th of March, on whose arrival the Allies had planned a general combined attack on the Turkish defenses of the Dardanelles by both land and sea, found that in the haste and hurry of preparing the transports, the weapons, the equipments and the munitions first required had been very carefully packed in the bottoms of the holds of the transports, and that these transports would have to be completely unloaded before the supplies of all kinds necessary to the attack could be gotten at. Consequently, General Hamilton was obliged to order the return of most of the transports to their base point for the necessary changes in the manner of their loading to be made, there being no facilities for this operation at Lemnos, before the attack could be made.

On this announcement being made to Admiral de Robeck, who had succeeded Admiral Carden in the command of the Allied Fleet on the 16th of March, that Ad-

miral announced his intention of proceeding to the attack on the Straits of the Dardanelles with all the naval forces at his command, on the next day, March 18th, without waiting for the land forces to be ready.

Accordingly at about eleven o'clock on the morning of March 18th, in bright, clear weather, and with a smooth sea, the attack was begun upon the Straits by the Queen Elizabeth, the Inflexible, the Agamemnon, the Lord Nelson, the Triumph and the Swiftsure, which took a position about 3½ miles from the mouth of the Straits between the village of Krithia, which will hereafter figure in our account of the land attack on the Peninsula itself, and the village of Erenkeui on the main-land, from whence they opened a long range fire on the defenses of the Narrows.

The Triumph and the Swiftsure advanced further up the Straits and engaged the batteries at Fort Dardanus, at Kephez Point and at Suandere. The defenses of the shore replied vigorously and the artillery duel became very fierce. The town of Chanak was set on fire and other villages along the shore were destroyed. The French squadron, at about half past twelve, consisting of four ships, the Suffren, the Gaulois, the Charlemagne and the Bouvet, moved up past the British squadron to a position off Kephez Point, and also began to bombard the forts. The bombardment by these two squadrons kept up for a couple of hours, by which time all the forts had ceased firing, which made those on board the ships believe that they had been destroyed so completely as to be silenced.

A relief squadron, consisting of the Vengeance, the Irresistible, the Albion, the Ocean, the Swiftsure and the Majestic, at about three o'clock, came into the Straits when the battleships which had participated in the first part of the bombardment began to withdraw. The French battleship Bouvet, which was to the side of the Straits was at this time hit three times on the port side and twice on the starboard side. An explosion followed and in a couple of minutes she went to the bottom in 36 fathoms of water, a little north of Erenkeui. About 560 men went down with her.

The British at the time stated that she had been sunk by a mine, which may be true, but it now seems more probable that she was sunk by gun-fire. The sight of this disaster stimulated the attack of the Allied squadrons, which was begun again at a few minutes after three and

continued for several hours. About an hour after beginning the attack, the Irresistible, a British battleship, was badly injured either by a mine or by gun-fire—the exact cause being unknown—and sank a couple of hours later; during which interval she had managed to get to the entrance of the Straits. Nearly all of her crew was saved, a result due largely to the gallantry of the Commander of the destroyer Wear, who brought his vessel to the Irresistible under a concentrated fire, and took off most of the crew.

A short time before the Irresistible was sunk, it was seen that another of the French battleships, the Gaulois, was in great difficulties. She had been badly hit by Turkish fire and was almost an absolute wreck, but her sister ships managed to take off her crew and to tow her in safety to Tenedos, from whence she was sent to Malta, where, later, she was repaired sufficiently to allow her to be towed to the French naval port of Toulon.

Just before the Gaulois got into difficulties the British battleship Inflexible was badly hit, with resultant casualties. She was not, however, at this time, damaged sufficiently to put her out of action, but somewhat later she was struck by a mine which exploded and damaged her irreparably, so that she had to fall out of the line and make for Tenedos in her turn. This island she reached in almost a sinking condition. She was subsequently sent to Malta and there repaired sufficiently to be sent home.

After these events, the bombardment continued unabated; the forts replying with vigor, and at about six o'clock the Ocean, another British battleship, was sunk in deep water, but whether this result was to be attributed to a mine or to gun-fire, is even at this late day uncertain. It would appear to have been more probable that the disaster was caused by gun-fire, because the great majority of the crew was saved, and had the damage been done by a mine there would hardly have been time to get them off the vessel, being, as she was, in deep water.

Soon after this, darkness fell on the sea, and the squadrons withdrew.

The British Admiralty, a few days later, issued a statement wherein they made the following remarkable claim, which, in view of the history of this bombardment, must

be classed with the best efforts of the Russian official bulletins:

"The power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses by superiority of fire appears to be established."

How such a remark could be made of a bombardment which had cost the attacking fleet five units, and which bombardment had not silenced any of the forts of the enemy, is one of those things which cannot be understood. The proof of the pudding is the eating, and the eating in this case consisted of the fact that never from this time, has there been any serious naval attack made upon the Dardanelles defenses.

From this date until April 25th nothing of any moment happened in this sphere of naval action. From time to time desultory bombardments of isolated positions on the Turkish shore were made by single vessels of the Allied fleet, but there was no concerted action, and the results of these bombardments were insignificant.

On April 17th the British lost submarine E15. Two days before this the Majestic and the Swiftsure bombarded Gaba Tepe, on the Peninsula. Several hostile visits of warships were made to Enos on the Aegean, near to the Turko-Bulgarian frontier, without any apparent object.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE LAND ATTACK

Sir Ian Hamilton, soon after his arrival, went to Egypt to oversee the re-loading of the expeditionary transports, but returned to the Island of Lemnos on the 7th of April.

The group of islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles comprises the Rabbit, the Imbros, the Tenedos and Lemnos islands, and is bound to play a great part in the history of the Near East in the future, as it is on the possession of these islands that Great Britain relies to check the Russians, in the event that the Allies are successful in this war. These islands, except the Rabbit group, were, up to October, 1914, in the possession of Greece, by virtue of the Treaty of London. The largest of the Rabbit group is only 9½ English miles from the entrance to the Dardanelles, and about five miles from the town of Yeni Shehr on the coast of Anatolia. Its topography makes it, though small, an excellent site for coast batteries, while on its southern coast a naval harbor and base for small vessels, submarines, torpedo boats and destroyers, could be created with great ease. Entry into and exit from the Dardanelles could, without difficulty, be controlled from this island.

Imbros is about 12½ miles, at its nearest point, from the Turkish fortress Sedd-el-Bahr and only thirteen miles from the main channel entering the Dardanelles, and on this island batteries could be erected which would most effectually support those on the largest of the Rabbit Islands in controlling the entrance to the Dardanelles; and further batteries on these two islands, acting together, could establish a cross-fire on this entrance.

Lemnos is 41 miles from the entrance to the Dardanelles and is exactly in the position it should be to form a naval base for operations against this Strait, and fortifications could be established here which would support those on Rabbit and Imbros Islands. Between Imbros and Lemnos islands the passage is but thirteen miles and easily controllable by batteries on the shores of these islands.

From the foregoing it will be readily seen that Great Britain, even though as a result of the war the Bosphor-

ous and the Dardanelles should pass into the possession of Russia, would still, holding these islands, be in a position to stop that passage absolutely at any time it might enter into her plans to do so. With the Dardanelles open and it and Constantinople in Russian hands, if Russia ever developed a merchant marine in the Black Sea of any very considerable extent, and sought to transport the products of her empire in her own bottoms, and thus avoid paying toll to Great Britain's maritime power, Great Britain would undoubtedly find this a cause for such action as she (Great Britain) has invariably taken against any power showing signs of becoming a maritime rival in the last 200 years. Of these powers whose maritime commerce she has destroyed by direct or indirect means, the United States is perhaps the most melancholy example.

At present in these islands Great Britain is thoroughly established and Greece, their lawful possessor, exercises no authority, civil or military. This violation of neutrality, being made by Great Britain, has of course provoked no adverse comment from the American press. But Russia is cognizant of the situation and has twice made representations to the British government on this subject, and it may be that, in the event of Allied victory, the possession of these islands would be one of the causes which will produce a war among the present Allies analogous to the second Balkan War.

By April 25th all preparations for military attack were completed and in the early morning of that day the attack was delivered. As has already been said, the topography of this peninsula is peculiar and affords strong natural defenses to its defenders, particularly available in the case of an advance into the peninsula of any force which might land on its shores, traversed as it is by successive reaches of hills opposing the path of an invader: which natural defenses had been skilfully taken advantage of by those directing the Turkish defense.

The two points chosen for the landing were the Sedd-el-Bahr for the British and Kum Kale for the French, which points are just at the entrance of the European and Asiatic sides thereof.

We will deal with the French landing on the Asiastic side first.

Supported by heavy fire from the Allied warships, the French succeeded in making a landing between Kum Kale and Yeni Shehr and then sought to advance from

these points along the road which leads to Erenkeui, Kephez and Chanak. The French were, however, not particularly successful in this advance and although they continued for a short period to make an effort to force their way in the direction of Chanak, it soon became apparent that they were unequal to the task.

It will be remembered, however, how the press at this time reveled in the descriptions of the French victories on the site of ancient Troy, and drew interesting and entertaining parallels between the situation in 1914 and the days when Achilles and Hector opposed each other on the same plains. Unfortunately for the truth of these narrations, the most advanced positions of the French were never anywhere near the scene of the battles that Homer sang.

Eventually the French were obliged to retreat and to re-embark on their ships, losing rather heavily both in the retreat and getting off to their transports. They were then taken over to the European side of the Straits and landed at Sedd-el-Bahr and Tekke Burnu, to support the British efforts to advance towards Krithia; and from that day forward the Asiatic side was left undisturbed by the tread of alien feet.

Such was the situation on May 5th, by which time the British commanders had discovered that the Turks were an enemy whom it was not well to under-estimate; a fact which the British and its copyist press, the American, had not up to that time discovered, nor did they for some time thereafter.

On May 5th, after the hard fighting hereinbefore described, the Allied commanders were hard pressed for re-enforcements and it was no longer found possible to keep the two expeditionary forces separate, as had been the original intention; and it therefore became necessary to mix the French and the British without regard to their nationality, so as to make one compact and thoroughly homogeneous force. A general advance was resolved upon because it had become apparent that the positions they had held were so circumscribed as to be useless and Krithia was made the objective of this advance. Accordingly, on May 6th the effort to reach Krithia began and on that day and the two following days the fighting was extremely fierce. Senegalese and Tirailleurs opened the fighting and had the honor of leading the advance. With their drums and bugles

sounding a charge, these rushed forward, a flock of skirmishers which seemed for one moment to cover the entire ridge of Kerevesdah and reached the first Turkish redoubts which formed the defenses at that hill. Hardly had they reached the Turkish positions before the Turkish artillery opened, supplemented by machine gun fire, and overwhelmed the French troops. These recoiled, were rallied, rushed forward once more, and were again repulsed. By that time the fighting had become general all along the line, extending along the whole front of Kerevesdah and from thence across the peninsula to the point known as Gully Beach, but, being broken by the topography of the country into isolated groups, the fighting was a succession of larger or smaller skirmishes.

On the 7th and 8th of May fighting of this character continued, attack and counter-attack succeeded each other without intermission, and continued practically until the morning of May 10th, when the Allied commanders were able, for the first time, to relieve a portion of the forces on the fighting line since those forces had landed on the peninsula eighteen days before. The net result of this five days battle had been a gain of 600 yards on the right of the British, and 400 yards on the left and in the center. Krithia was still far away.

The position after the 10th was that the opposing fronts stretched parallel from the sea to the Straits with but very little scope left for tactics, in view of the unbroken lines of barbed wire and Turkish trenches which, one behind the other, stretched across this space. The limit of what could be attained by the Allies from attacking with their forces was reached, and siege or trench warfare of the type common on the western front was bound to, and did, supersede manoeuvre battles in the open.

The British front was then divided into four sections. Skirmishes took place fitfully up to May 18th, when the Turks delivered a violent assault on the British positions with forces which the British and French estimated at 30,000, which forces were, it is said, under Field Marshal von Sanders himself. The struggle continued for three or four days unabated, with frightful losses on both sides, but without producing any definite result. Both the Allied and the Turkish lines rested at the conclusion of the battle, practically in the same position that they were at its opening.

THE LAND ATTACK

The next three or four days were spent in negotiations for a suspension of hostilities for the purpose of burying the dead, which, in this climate, is an absolute necessity, as otherwise the living would soon all be poisoned, and on May 24th a four days' armistice was agreed upon, which was afterwards prolonged for another couple of days.

From this time forward, on this front, which may be described as a straight line running from a point on the Dardanelles themselves, from a little northeast of De Tott's Battery, northwardly to a point on the coast of the Aegean Sea near Beach Y to the north of Gurkha Bluff, the positions have not changed since the end of May. Both sides have dug themselves in thoroughly and both fronts are defended not only by the trenches, but by auxiliary defenses of all characters, so that the situation has degenerated into an absolute deadlock. From time to time, half-hearted assaults have been made by one or the other of the combatants upon their opponent's position, in which the Allies have the advantage of being to a considerable degree supported by the fire of their fleet. But the result has been the same. In fact, it can be said that since the end of May, during the three months of June, July and August, neither side has advanced in a straight line to the opponent's side a distance equal to 100 yards; and this demonstrates clearly that while it is still possible for the Allies to dislodge the Turks, it is impossible for them to do so within the range of reasonable and permissible sacrifices of men. On the other hand, while the Turks could probably drive the Allies' troops from this tip of the peninsula, they also would lose so heavily from the fire of both the troops and the ships that the loss would be out of proportion to any advantage gained thereby.

Such operations as the Allies have conducted have been for the purpose of gaining possession of a hill known as Eljed Tepe, from which they thought, if they could place heavy guns thereon, they could easily silence the forts of Kilid Bahr; though a careful survey of the ground raises a question as to whether or not their theory is correct. The Turks, however, took no chances and have defended this elevation successfully. The net distance which the Allies have advanced from their landing places in a straight line on this Sedd-el-Bahr front

does not, at its furthest point, exceed 3¼ miles, and this advance has only been achieved at the cost of tens of thousands of lives.

CHAPTER XXV

On the 25th of April there were supposed to be about 125,000 Turkish troops at or near the Dardanelles, but these were not equipped with as much field artillery or as many machine guns as were proportionate to this number of troops, and consequently much of the fighting was done with infantry, which under ordinary circumstances would have been done by artillery or machine guns.

The Turkish troops engaged here were mostly Anatolian peasants, strong, hardy, used to and contemptuous of hardship, who were able to get along with comparatively little food and water, and who, in addition to these qualities, have the greater quality of being natural born soldiers, careless of death or suffering.

The plan of the Allies contemplated two main landings, the first on the extreme tip of Gallipoli Peninsula, on each side of Cape Helles, and the other on the western side of the peninsula to the north of Gaba Tepe. This plan then was for the forces that landed at the tip of the peninsula to attack Krithia and the heights of Acha Baba at the northeastward, while the forces disembarked at the second landing were to advance across the hills separating the Sari Bahr and the Kilid Bahr towards the town of Maidos, where the plan contemplated that both forces would unite. To the landings at the tip of the peninsula which were five in number the Allies gave the names of S, V, W, X and Y. V, W and X were to be the main landings, while the landings at S and Y were, according to Sir Ian Hamilton the Commander-in-Chief, "designed mainly to protect the flanks, to decimate the forces of the enemy and to interrupt the landing of its re-enforcements." Beach "S" was just under De Tott's battery at Eski Hissarlik Point, which battery built years before was in ruins. This point was commanded by the fire of the Turkish batteries from the Asiatic coast.

Beach "V" was very close to Cape Helles and quite near the fort of Sedd-el-Bahr; according to Sir Ian Hamilton this was "a sandy beach about 300 yards across, facing a semi-circle of steeply rising ground, as the flat bottom of a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by an old castle and on the other

side by a modern fort." This beach was 10 yards wide and 350 yards long, beyond which were grassy slopes 150 feet high. The castle referred to had already been made a ruin by the prior bombardments of the fleet, while the Turkish fort was practically useless for the same reason.

Beach "W" was between Cape Helles and Cape Tekke and "was a strip of deep powdery sand some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide; situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs." On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously, but in the center a number of sand dunes afford a more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. This ridge, however, was commanded by two strong Turkish field works on the heights above it.

Beach "X" was on the other, or northern, side of Cape Tekke and was a strip of sand some 200 yards long by 8 yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. This also was commanded by Turkish field fortifications above it.

Beach "Y" was directly west of the village of Krithia and was a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high. This was not defended by the Turks.

We will now describe the operations which took place at these landings.

Two feints, on Beaches S and Y were intended to be delivered at dawn, while Beaches V, W and X were to be bombarded by the fleet for a time and then the troops landed; the time of which landing, it was expected, would be about half past five in the morning.

At five o'clock a British squadron consisting of the battleships Swiftsure, Implacable, Cornwallis, Albion, Vengeance, Lord Nelson, Prince George, and the cruisers Euryalus, Talbot, Minerva and Dublin, preceded by a flotilla of mine sweepers, took up their position facing the end of the peninsula and the bombardment began. A few minutes after the force which had been designated for the fight to be delivered at the "S" Beach, below De Tott's Battery, moved forward, and had a slight set-back owing to the swift current in the Straits which rendered its debarkation from the transports to smaller vessels which could approach the shore a difficult operation; but, by half past seven, this force was on shore and carried an enemy trench which it found on the beach. These troops then fought their way up the cliff slowly, and

reached De Tott's Battery about ten in the morning, and immediately dug themselves in.

In the afternoon they were attacked by a force of the enemy consisting of two battalions, which the British repulsed with the aid of the fleet. Another attack was made by the enemy on the following day, with a like result, and on the 27th the British turned over this position to the French who had been withdrawn from the Asiatic shore. This was perhaps the most successful of all the landings.

Taking up now the other feint on Beach Y, which, as has been said, was directly west of Krithia on the Aegean, and not on the Dardanelles, the battleship Goliath and two cruisers, the Amethyst and Sapphire, and some transports with the troops on board, arrived at their positions about daylight. Here the Turks were surprised and the landing was not opposed, so that it was easily carried out. The cliffs, however, were very steep and it was only after some difficulty that the troops succeeded in reaching their top. When the top was reached, in compliance with their orders, this force, which amounted to two battalions, started to march back along the coast in order to effect a junction with the force which was to be landed at Beach X, nearer to Cape Tekke. However, these two battalions did not proceed very far in this direction before they encountered a force of Turkish infantry, which they immediately attacked. Hard fighting followed, and the progress of the two battalions halted. A little later the Turks brought up re-enforcements from the direction of the village of Krithia. The Allied forces then started to entrench, as they were almost out-flanked, and in a very precarious and dangerous position; almost surrounded, as they were, by superior forces of the enemy who had brought up field guns which were inflicting heavy losses upon the landing party who were in such a position as regards the sea that the guns of the ships were of no avail to them. The Turkish attacks increased in strength, during the afternoon and evening, and the fighting continued all night.

It was in this fighting that the British commanders discovered that the much-despised Turk was in reality a fighter fully equal to their men, and from this time we may note the increasing respect with which the Turkish soldier is spoken of in the reports of the British commanders.

Re-enforcements were sent for, but they did not arrive,

and by seven o'clock the following morning the British situation was a desperate one; they had fought continuously since the middle of the day before, and were worn out. Under these circumstances, the British troops began to retreat with the design of re-embarking as rapidly as possible.

As soon as they got to near the top of the cliffs the guns of the fleet were able to play upon their enemies and prevent them from following; which saved the British, who were taken off to their transports again, and this landing was a complete failure.

We will now take up the main landings. The first was made at Beach X, just north of Cape Tekke. This landing had one advantage, in that the cliff behind the beach on which it took place, was low and, consequently, the warships were able to shell thoroughly the Turkish defensive works on top of that cliff and make it impossible for the Turks to oppose the landing itself, and for this reason the British were able to disembark their forces with very little loss of life. After landing, the British advanced for about 1000 yards or so into the interior, when they were heavily attacked by the Turks and the British right wing, which was rather exposed, came under the fire of a field battery near Krithia. This Turkish attack forced the advancing British to give ground at first, but the British were re-enforced and ultimately succeeded in carrying the top of the hill where about noon they were joined by British troops who had landed at Beach W on the other slope of this same hill; which landing will be hereafter described.

The Turks now began a series of vigorous attacks on this united force and succeeded in driving them almost to the edge of the cliffs over-hanging the sea, but here the British managed to entrench themselves and held their ground with resolute determination. At night-fall their trenches extended for about half a mile around their landing place, and included therein the hill won earlier in the day.

Beach W on the other side of this same hill, to the south, was the scene of very hard fighting. The landing at this point had been foreseen by the Turks who had prepared in every possible way to resist it. Sea mines had been strewn off the shore, complicated with concealed barbed wire in the shallow waters, and land mines and a broad wire entanglement had been constructed the whole length of the beach on the edge of the sea. Suit-

able crevices and holes in the cliff had been searched out and machine guns concealed therein which commanded the beach, and on the hills surrounding it were strong field fortifications which also commanded it and were protected by barbed wire entanglements. From these field fortifications wire entanglements had been so arranged as to make communication between Beach W and Beach V further to the east impossible until the field fortifications had been taken.

The forces designated to attack at this point were in position at four o'clock, and at five the battleships accompanying them began to bombard the beach and its defenses with a concentrated fire which continued for over an hour.

At six o'clock small boats started for the beach in a column of eight. The boats in the center made straight for the middle of the beach, a few went nearer to Cape Helles, while eight boats aimed for certain rocks at the Cape Tekke end of the bay, (the left) on which it was possible to attain a precarious footing. To this action of these eight boats may be attributed the final capture of this beach.

The Turks held their fire until the first boat reached the beach, when the beach was swept by a burst of fire from all sides. The men in the first boats were practically all killed, but the few who were still alive behaved with desperate gallantry and throwing themselves on the wire entanglements at the edge of the sea, managed to hack their way through.

For a time it looked as though the landing was to be a failure, but it was saved by the force from the eight boats already mentioned, which had landed on the rocks beneath Cape Tekke. These had managed to turn the end of the wire entanglements spoken of and opened a rapid enfilading fire upon the enemy, while others climbed up the cliff side and searched for the machine guns hidden in the crevices thereof, and managed to silence the majority. This had the effect of giving the force in the center of the beach a breathing spell, which they improved by falling back to the left under the rocks of Cape Tekke and re-forming, when they rushed the hill side in front of them.

Another portion went to the right, and, under the rocks of Cape Helles, managed to form and to advance

up the cliff at that point but were finally stopped by wire entanglements stretching from the Turkish field fortifications to the edge of the cliff.

By nine o'clock the Cape Tekke cliffs had been seized. Heavy re-enforcements had been brought up and were landing on the beach. These also climbed up the rocks of Cape Tekke and by ten o'clock had captured, in conjunction with the original forces, three lines of Turkish trenches and took connection, as has already been shown, with the force which had landed at Beach X, to the north, about noon.

However, the Turkish field fortifications were still in Turkish hands and these had to be captured in order to make the position tenable. From one to two o'clock in the afternoon these were bombarded by the fleet and about two o'clock the British infantry advanced to the attack. The fighting was very hard, the Turks resisting with desperation, and the casualties were enormous. Nevtheless, about four in the afternoon the British carried the field works completely. Then it became necessary to try to send a portion of this force to help that British force which had landed on Beach V, and though re-enforcements had by this time arrived for the British, the Turkish opposition to this attempt was extremely vigorous and they counter-attacked incessantly so that it was impossible for the British to move from this Beach W to the aid of those on Beach V to the south, near Sedd-el-Bahr; therefore, the British at Beach W were obliged to entrench on the ground already won until the morning.

During the night the Turks continued their attacks, though driven back repeatedly, and gave the British no rest, so that these, though re-enforced during the night from troops landed on Beach X to the north of Beach W, had all they could do to hold their positions until the morning.

The landing on Beach V, which lay between Cape Helles and the fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, was the most difficult operation of all. This beach possessed all the defenses of Beach W, in addition to others even more formidable. It had no convenient ledges of rock on the ends whereof a foothold could be won, the cliffs of the Cape Helles end, towards Beach W, being so steep as to be impossible of ascent, while on the cliff at the other end were the ruins of a fort and a village, where sharpshooters in advantageous positions swarmed. Another ruin between

the shore and the village was also full of sharpshooters, while on the road in front of the bay was another ruin which commanded the entire landing and which was also used as cover for snipers. The grassy hillsides all around the landing were full of hidden sharpshooters; barbed wire entanglements had been used in profusion and on the crest of the hills were Turkish trenches. All of these things made it possible for the Turks to pour in on this landing place an extremely heavy rifle and machine gun fire, which swept the beach from end to end. Behind the first slopes rose a high hill known as 141, which also commanded the landing place and was covered with entrenchments, snipers and machine guns.

In view of the extreme difficulty which had been foreseen in making a landing at this place, the British commander had selected a collier, the River Clyde, and had her arranged to convey the troops who were to remain concealed within and protected by her steel hull until the time came when they could be advantageously employed. This was done by cutting doors in her sides which gave access to long gang planks sloping towards her bow. If she was gotten in sufficiently close to the shore so that the water was wadable, the problem of getting on shore from the gang planks was simple, but, otherwise, lighters were to be placed between the steamer and the beach so as to form a bridge.

About 2000 troops were on board this vessel, and comprised the bulk of the attacking force. Provision had been made for the first assault to be delivered by men who were to be sent ashore, as in other cases, in open boats.

At dawn the attack opened with a bombardment from the Albion. Then 32 open boats were sent to shore. The Turks here, as elsewhere, reserved their fire, and not a shot was heard until the first boat touched the beach. The moment this happened a murderous fire broke forth from every quarter, with the result that the attack by the boats was completely wiped out; almost none of the occupants of these boats surviving; not more than 15 or 20 men in all. Not a single boat ever returned, and it is said that in all the records of the British Army and Navy there is no like tale of slaughter so instant and complete.

While these things were going on, the River Clyde had come up and beached herself, bow on, near a reef of rock, but not at the point which had been selected, and in water too deep for the troops to wade ashore. Two

lighters which had been prepared, in view of this possible contingency, to form the bridge on which the troops would move ashore, were run out ahead of the collier and secured; but, in the hurry, a gap was left between the two which fact subsequently cost the lives of many gallant men.

The troops were then called upon to come ashore. The first company which responded to this call rushed down the gang-plank, leaped into the first lighter and tried to reach the shore, but the gap between the first and second lighters was too broad to jump. Some of the men jumped and some of the men fell into the sea, many being hit, because by this time the Turkish fire, which had opened as soon as the River Clyde had been perceived, had grown in intensity and was a perfect storm of prejectiles.

Those who either scrambled or fell into the sea were nearly all drowned, the weight of their equipment dragging them. Some few got ashore, and these took shelter under a low sandy bank which rose for about four feet at the point where the beach and the grassy slopes behind it joined.

The lighters then drifted into a worse position, and, more troops rushing forward to disembark, the confusion became intensified, but through the gallant efforts of the sailors communication was finally re-established between the shore and the River Clyde. Then a third company attempted to land, but the Turks had brought heavy artillery to bear, and this company was practically wiped out, in its passage from this lighter to the shore, by shrapnel. More battleships were brought up, including the Cornwallis and the Queen Elizabeth, who bombarded the shore for some time. Then another attempt was made to land the troops from the Clyde and a considerable number of men, including Brigadier-General Napier, got into the lighters. Hardly had they done so, when the line connecting the two vessels broke and the one nearest the Clyde swung around in deep water leaving a wide and impassable gap between them.

The Turks took advantage of this accident to shell both lighters, with the result that a large number of their occupants were killed, including General Napier.

By this time it was eleven o'clock, and 1000 men had attempted to land from the River Clyde, of whom barely 150 had succeeded. Fully half had been killed. There still remained on the Clyde about 1000 men, but as the

Turkish fire had grown so strong that it was certain death to attempt to pass from that vessel to the shore, it became clear that nothing more could be done while the daylight lasted, and the Commander-in-Chief sent orders to suspend any landing operations until darkness fell.

The other troops on the battleships who were intended to re-enforce those of the Clyde, had the landing been carried out successfully, were sent off to Beach W where re-enforcements had also been called for.

All the rest of the day the Turks attacked the Clyde with artillery, but, owing to the fact that the calibre of the artillery which they had on the shore at this point was comparatively small, little damage was done to her, though her sides were pierced by four shells.

This Turkish fire continued until sunset and then completely ceased. About eight o'clock in the evening, without a shot being fired against them, the men still remaining on the Clyde came ashore. Efforts were then made to clear the territory immediately abutting upon the beach, but without success as in each attack the British were repulsed. It was then determined to await the coming of the day before making any attempt to advance inland.

CHAPTER XXVI

While these events were taking place at the tip of the peninsula, the Australians and New Zealanders were making their attack a little to the north of Gaba Tepe, in greater force than had been attempted at any other point. The battleships Queen, London, Prince of Wales, Triumph and Majestic, and the cruiser Bacchante, together with a number of destroyers and trawlers, and the whole fleet of transports took part in this attack. At one o'clock in the morning of April 25th the squadron reached the point from which the disembarkation was to be made and at 1:20 the order was given to lower the boats and the picket boats which were to tow them, and at 2:05 the order was given for the first 1500 men to embark; another 2500 men being held in readiness to follow up this first 1500 at the earliest possible moment.

By three o'clock the embarkation was completed and the squadron moved slowly towards the shore, the picket boats with their tows following behind them. At about four o'clock when the squadron was about 2500 yards from the shore the picket boats were ordered to move forward and went past the line of battleships with their tows. The battleships did not bombard the coast before the landing, because there was a hope of making a surprise. At a few minutes of five, when the boats were close in shore, the enemy opened fire with rifles and machine guns and inflicted a number of casualties on the occupants of the advancing boats; but these persisted, and reached the shore. The Australians leaped out and charged the Turkish entrenchments on the beach, which they carried, forcing their defenders to flee.

From the beach rose a steep cliff covered with undergrowth. A Turkish trench was located about half way up this and poured in a continuous fire not only on the defenders of the beach below but on the boats which were approaching the shore with the other 2500 troops. The Australians already landed determinedly clambered up the cliff and after a hot fight cleared the Turkish trench on the cliff-side and followed this up by a rush for the top, which they succeeded in gaining. But here they

were obliged to halt, because the Turks brought up field guns and opened upon the Australians at the edge of the cliff.

Delay was also caused by the fact that the Turkish warships in the Dardanelles began firing shells across the peninsula at the beach upon which the Australians were landing. This caused considerable casualties and also forced the transference of troops from the transports to the small boats, which was still going on (the second and first Australian Brigades having also arrived on the scene of action on transports) to be effected further out from the beach.

It was very fortunate that the Australians were capable of irregular fighting themselves, also because the nature of the ground here made that obligatory and also required initiative in the individual man. This initiative was, however, pushed too far, since small bodies of the Australians pressed a very long way into the peninsula and these were either taken prisoners or killed, as they never returned.

The battle now degenerated into a series of isolated skirmishes, in which the Australians had the upper hand and pushed the Turks back; but no connected account of this can be given.

Towards two o'clock, however, when 12,000 Australians had landed, as well as a couple of batteries of artillery, the battle had assumed a more coherent form. The Turks had at this time about 20,000 men on or near the firing line. The Australians were occupying a position from a point known as Fisherman's Hut, a little south of Chailak Dere, to a point about a mile north of Gaba Tepe. That afternoon the Turks made charge after charge and the Australians were unable to advance, though once or twice they made counter-attacks of no particular importance.

At 5 P. M. the Turks made an attack in great force and pounded the Third Brigade hard. This attack was supported by artillery and was successful to the point that the Australians contracted their line. The Turks continued bringing up more men and during the night they attacked frequently and gave the Australians no rest. The casualties on both sides were remarkably heavy. At daybreak the Australians found themselves in a fair position but their line was more contracted than it had been the night before. This line they held all the next day.

THE LAND ATTACK

On April 26th, by which time large re-enforcements had been landed at all points, the Allies attempted an advance from the southern tip of the peninsula, which was successful, to the extent of capturing the fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, though this advantage was purchased at a great cost in lives. This was followed by hard fighting on the next day, but this fighting was so confused that only the result can be given, which was that the Allies made an advance of practically 1½ miles from their landing and controlled the tip of the peninsula for that distance.

On the 28th the Australians advanced, from the points which they had won at landing, a reasonable distance in the direction of Sari Bahr.

The next few days were most remarkable for the exploits of the British submarine E-14 in the Sea of Marmora where it sank a transport and a Turkish gun-boat, but on the 30th the British AE-2 was sunk, in attempting to enter the Sea of Marmora, by the Turkish batteries defending the entrance of that sea.

From April 30th to May 6th continuous streams of troops were re-enforcing the Allies in Gallipoli and on May 6th, thinking themselves strong enough to force the issue, they delivered battle in the southern section of the peninsula. The objective of this attack was Krithia and Achi Baba; that Achi Baba which they had expected to take by evening of the first day and which, seven months afterwards, was still in the hands of their enemies.

The battle for Krithia continued three days and concerning this, as the other land actions on the Gallipoli Peninsula, not much can be said as no consecutive account of the incidents of the fight is possible, since this battle, like the others in this campaign, differs from ordinary battles in that it was broken up into a series of unconnected struggles of isolated units. This form of battle is remarkably prolific in casualties but has no sequence or continuity.

On May 8th fighting ended and the gains by the Allies were slight.

From May 8th the character of operations completely changed. The assaults gave place to a slower advance prepared with care and methodically conducted.

The southern part of the peninsula of Gallipoli, as far as Kilid Bahr, where the narrowing of the Straits and the works on the two banks prevented the passage of the fleet, presents the form of a triangle. The base of this triangle, between Gaba Tepe and Kilid Bahr, is 7½ miles

Midway rises the tip of Achi Baba about 750 feet high, the outlying defenses of which stretch across the peninsula and constitute a very powerful defensive position. The ground in front of the position slopes gently, and artillery, as well as infantry fire, is able to sweep it as though it were the glacis of a fort. The narrowness of the front precludes the possibility of manoeuvre and only admits of the works of the enemy being attacked and carried by frontal assaults.

The Turks had thoroughly organized their resistance. The region was honeycombed with deep entrenchments backed by machine guns and barbed wire and other obstacles. From this point on, the fighting on the southern front was entirely of trench character, like that which prevailed in the west.

But one or two incidents remain to be noticed. The Allied fleet, as has already been said, delivered no attack on the forts of a serious character from the time of the March fiasco, but it was nevertheless destined to lose several of its units, though it confined itself to merely guarding the entrance of the Straits and an occasional attack on the Turkish land defenses in support of troop operations.

The first of these units so lost was the Goliath, an old battleship of 11,000 odd tons, which was torpedoed by the Turks in the Dardanelles between De Tott's Battery and Kilid Bahr; about 500 of her crew were lost with her.

On May 26th and May 27th respectively, the Triumph and the Majestic, two British battleships, the one of 12,800 tons and the other of 14,000 tons, were torpedoed and sunk outside of the Straits of the Dardanelles between the mouth thereof and the Island of Tenedos by a German submarine, which had made the long voyage from German base around the British Isles and through the Straits of Gibraltar, and which arrived off the mouth of the Dardanelles the very same day on which it secured its first victim, the Triumph.

Later on in the summer this loss was partly avenged by a British submarine which, on August 9th, torpedoed the Turkish battleship Barbarossa, which sank carrying down with it many of its crew. The only other naval loss of any importance in this campaign, up to the time this record closes, was that of the Marlotte, a French submarine which was sunk in these Straits on July 26th.

The Australians, whom we had left on the top of the

cliffs above the so-called Anzac Cove, during the next six months made many efforts to take or capture the Anafarta District, but always without success, though they inflicted and received much punishment in their efforts. The skirmishes here so closely resembled each other that the story of one is the story of all. Suffice it to say that when this record closes on the first of September the Australian position, though slightly ameliorated and with a slightly greater area of ground held, had not progressed, strategically, one iota from what it was at nightfall on the 27th of April.

This whole attack upon the Dardanelles has been one of the maddest military conceptions of modern history, and to this original madness of conception has been added tactical blunder after blunder. In the original landing the division of the forces into five units, when one or at most two, would have been the correct number, weakened the attack, and on this initiatory blunder, like Pelion on Ossa, have been piled almost daily blunders of greater or lesser magnitude. So that it is possible to say almost with confidence that the expedition will never achieve its end, that is, to force the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora and capture Constantinople, in spite of the enormous number of lives which it has cost.

The Minor Campaigns

CHAPTER XXVII

Caucasus.

On the whole during the six months' period under consideration but little of interest occurred on the Caucasian front.

Till the beginning of May in fact there was no fighting of any consequence whatever as a result of the deep snow which blocked the mountain passes as well as their ridges and the high plateaux and valleys.

In the early days of May, however, operations on an important scale began and resulted in a Turkish defeat near Olti. This name, though the name of a town, is also the name of a region and it is probable that when used in the bulletins it refers to the region and not to the town. In this fighting about an army corps on each side was engaged and after a couple of days the Turks gave ground and finally retreated, leaving a considerable number of prisoners in the hands of the Russians. Near Tabriz a little later there was also some fighting which resulted in the Russians getting possession of the South Pass and of some villages beyond it.

From this time on the fighting was general and usually resulted in Russian advantages which arose from the fact that the Turks had withdrawn many of their troops from the Caucasian campaign to use in the defense of Constantinople. However, the Russian advance was slow.

Towards the end of May the Russians had advanced far enough in the Van region to occupy Baslan. In early June rather heavy fighting took place in the Olti region with no marked result. About the middle of June the Turks inaugurated an offensive in the region which finally culminated in a Turkish victory, the Russians losing heavily and also having much material of war taken, the scene of this Russian defeat being about 55 miles west of Kars.

Late in June the Russians occupied the town of Got, twenty-five miles north of Lake Van driving the Turks

out. Fighting also took place near Britis about the same time. This fighting continued intermittently the rest of June and the early part of July. About the middle of July it became much livelier, particularly to the north and south of Lake Van, and also in the Olti region, the Russians appearing to have the upper hand. All the rest of July and the early part of August was more quiet, possibly owing to the fact that in response to calls from their other front for re-enforcements both the Turks and Russians withdrew troops from this front.

About the middle of August the Russians attempted to take the offensive but this effort was soon broken and the Turks, following up their advantage, thus gained, forced the Russians backward along the whole front and finally on August 16th recaptured the town of Van, a very important point only, however, to lose it again on the next day. Hard fighting then took place around this city for the next few days but the Russians clung obstinately to the town. After this burst of activity the campaign languished on the whole front until the time our record closes.

SERBIA.

During the entire period under consideration almost no military events took place on this front. The Austrians merely maintained a sufficient number of men on the northern side of the Danube to prevent the Serbians from invading their southern provinces had they been so disposed and the exchange of a few cannon shot at long range from time to time marked the extent of the fighting.

On two or three occasions in the spring and summer an Austrian cannonade of more than usual violence was directed at Belgrade from the other side of the river but beyond killing a few civilians and doing considerable material damage to the buildings of the city, these artillery attacks produced little or no effect.

All the spring and most of thè summer Serbia was afflicted by a continuation of the frightful epidemic of typhus of which mention was made in the last volume, and which continued its ravages among the Serbian population. How many tens of thousands died of this fearful plague will probably never be known, but the mortality must have totalled a very considerable percentage of the population of the country. To the ravages of the typhus were added the miseries of a great shortage of food. The

preceding summer the fighting had prevented the final steps in the cultivation of the crops and their harvesting, owing to the absence from the fields of practically all the male population and though the women did their utmost, necessarily the absence of the men had unfortunate results.

Great efforts were made by private British efforts to afford relief in all ways to the stricken country, and with a very considerable measure of success. This success of individual or co-operative private effort on the part of the British stands out in striking contrast to the public or government activities of Great Britain all through the war. The government seems paralyzed in everything it attempts through a fear of offending King Mob on whose votes it depends for its continuance in office, while the private individual sees the thing necessary to be done and does it efficiently.

In this noble work of alleviating human suffering the British were joined by the kind hearted of many other nations, among which our own played a not altogether inconspicuous part.

Too much cannot be said of the courage and devotion of the physicians and nurses who participated in this work of relief. These literally took their lives in their hands and many of them accomplished triumphantly the great sacrifice whereof the Master has spoken so beautifully.

Along the northern border of Montenegro and in the abutting portions of Bosnia there was almost continual irregular fighting between the Montenegriens and Austrians all the spring and summer. These skirmishes were, however, without military importance or significance and their details need not detain us.

Suez Canal and Egypt.

After the repulse of the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal described in the first volume, very little took place in this sphere of action.

From time to time unimportant skirmish fighting occurred between the Turkish troops which after their defeat by the British had retired into the desert in the general direction of El Arish, and reconnoitering parties of the British forces, but these merely served the purpose of keeping the opposing forces in occasional touch with each other. Thus the spring and summer passed away without the initiation of any serious offensive by other side.

THE MINOR CAMPAIGNS

In July a short lived Turkish offensive, supported to some degree by the local Arabs was launched against the well known British port and town of Aden. At first the British troops in the hinterland behind the city were obliged to retire and the possibility of the capture of the town had to be envisaged. However, the Turkish attack was apparently lacking in virility and was not pushed home rapidly, so that time was afforded for the British to strengthen their forces from India. When this was accomplished the Turks apparently thought that a further attack would be attended with considerable difficulty and withdrew.

Little occurred in Egypt during the six months under consideration except that here as in India there was considerable unrest among the native population which unrest in Egypt expressed itself in several attacks on the British-made sultan, none of which succeeded in their object.

The Holy War solemnly proclaimed by the Sultan had little effect on the followers of Mahomet throughout the eastern world. Many explanations are offered for this failure, the most probable of which is that the probabilities of Turkish success in the conflict had not become sufficiently well defined. The very important British advance from the Persian Gulf into Mesopotamia which had for its real objective the capture of Bagdad remains to be glanced at.

The expeditionary force under Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Barrett consisted, apparently, of three Indo-British infantry brigades, a brigade of Indian cavalry and artillery and auxiliary services in proportion—in all probability some 18,000.

In the first volume we followed the progress of this force up to December 9th when it defeated the Turks and Arabs opposing it at Kurna, at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and captured the town. For the next months the expedition was occupied in consolidating the position thus won and in subduing the rather primitive tribes in the vicinity of that town, so that it did not resume its march forward until sometime in March. We are almost totally ignorant of the events occurring in this forward march, but we do know that at the end of June the expedition had after considerable fighting with the Turks who sought to oppose its march, reached Shaiba well above Kurna, and that a month later Amara was taken after severe fighting, while towards the beginning

of September a brief report from the commander announced that the main body of the expedition, proceeding along the Tigris had reached Kut-el-Amara about 95 miles from its objective, Bagdad.

Africa.

The campaign against the various German colonies in Africa by the French and British was between the first of March and the first of September pushed to a conclusion as regards all of these colonies except German East Africa.

The details of these campaigns are lacking to a considerable degree owing to the causes set forth in the first volume, but in general it may be said that the British directed their principal efforts against German Southwest Africa, while the French directed their campaign against the Cameroons.

General Botha, that general who distinguished himself greatly in fighting against England during the Boer war, and subsequently accepted the situation to his political advantage and who became the head of the ministry, was commander-in-chief of the British.

It must be remembered that the Germans in Africa were completely cut off from any communication with the outside world from the very early days of the war, and were thus compelled to completely rely on themselves and had no opportunity to replenish their stores of provisions, munitions of war or ammunition from any sources, facts which worked necessarily to their considerable disadvantage.

General Botha directed the British campaign with considerable skill and first captured Swakopmund, the most important point in German Southwest Africa.

In connection with this capture a considerable clamor was raised by the British concerning the poisoning of six wells by the Germans with arsenical cattle wash, and General Botha stated that the German commander informed him that he was acting under orders from home in poisoning such wells. It afterwards turned out, however, that the attention of General Botha had been called to the fact that these wells were so poisoned by the German commander himself and an explanation of the poisoning by accident was given. The very fact that General Botha was so advised by his opponent removes the possibility that this poisoning was done with any expectation or desire to injure the British troops, since had such

hope or desire existed no warning would have been given to the British by th German commander.

This whole affair reflects no credit on General Botha.

After the capture of Swakopmund General Botha's forces pressed onward and about the first of May inflicted a severe defeat on the Germans near Gibson, taking in addition to the town, a couple of hundred prisoners, a railroad train, transport wagons, and some artillery.

This success was followed up by General Botha by an unopposed entrance on May 12th of Windhock, the capital of the Colony which capture put the entire Colony practically into the hands of the British. No resistance was made by the Germans for the reason that their stock of ammunition was very greatly depleted and hence any attempt to defend the town would have been hopeless.

This situation of affairs a month later, on July 8th, brought about the unconditional surrender of the German forces in Southwest Africa to General Botha, much of the time intervening between this date and the fall of Windhock having been passed in negotiations looking to this surrender and comparatively little fighting having taken place.

The campaign against the Cameroons was mostly carried on by the French, though occasionally their troops received aid from the British. The principal events in this campaign of which we have any knowledge are, the taking of Esoka by the French on May 11th. The capture of Monso after heavy fighting occurred on May 24th. This place was taken by the French colonial troops after taking position after position and the capture was a severe blow to the Germans as the bulk of their white troops in the colony were made prisoners, besides which large quantities of stores and munitions of war fell into the hands of the French. After this capture, the French began an offensive movement toward Besam to the southwest of Tormis. The capture of Garna, an important station on the Benne River on June 12th, followed. Nothing further of importance has happened in this field of operations since.

German East Africa.

The campaign here by the British which had begun in September 1914 by a German attack on Monitassa, was repulsed at Gazi, some twenty-five miles from Monitassa itself.

The British with a force of some 6000 white and Indian

troops early in November, 1914, began an attack on Tanga and Jassin, which captured Jassin very late in November, but were unsuccessful in their attack on the important port of Tanga. Jassin was subsequently recaptured by the Germans.

Some fighting also took place at Shirati on Lake Victoria Nyanza in January and really heavy fighting occurred at Karnuga on the lake in March, the Germans losing and being driven back with considerable loss.

From March to June the main British forces were engaged in concentrating for an attack on Bukota, an important town on the opposite side of the lake from Shirati. This attack took place on June 22nd, the Germans having about 400 rifles opposed to 5000. Naturally there could be but one result. The British took the town, and obtained possession of its wireless station, their main objective.

Various other attacks and counter-attacks occurred during the summer, but unfortunately the details of these operations are almost completely lacking.

It is safe to say, however, that on September 1st, the British had made little real progress in the conquest of this German colony, the only one of Germany's colonies at that time remaining unconquered.

General Christian de Wet, one of the leaders of the rebellion in South Africa against the British government, who won fame as one of the ablest generals of the Boers, in the Boer War, was captured by the South African forces, was tried for treason and found guilty thereof on June 21st and sentenced to six years' imprisonment together with a fine of ten thousand dollars. Some of the other leaders of this rebellion were shot as traitors, while others were sentenced to imprisonment, in the final settlement of this unsuccessful rebellion.

The Naval War on all Seas

CHAPTER XXVIII

In the last volume the plan was followed of dividing the War of the Seas into sections according to the oceans upon which the combats occurred. This plan it is not feasible to follow in this volume, for the reason that there was comparatively little naval activity during the period which we are considering.

Some portion of this naval activity, has been treated of in the campaigns with which it was connected, as, for instance, the sinking of the British and French warships in the Dardanelles. The submarine warfare against merchant vessels and its consequences will be treated of in the chapter following and hence will not be discussed herein.

During the very early days of March there was little or no naval activity. On the 10th of March, 1915, the United States was excited by the entry of the German auxiliary cruiser Prince Eitel Fritz into the harbor of Newport News. This cruiser had been engaged in a commerce destroying voyage which extended over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, covering more than 30,000 miles therein. In this cruise she had sunk three British vessels (two steamers and one sailing), three French vessels (one steamer and two sailing), one Russian sailing vessel, and one American sailing vessel, the William P. Frye. This latter vessel was sunk on January 28th, after the crew had been removed; the Frye carrying a cargo of wheat "to order" for the British Isles, which the Commander of the Prince Eitel Fritz judged to be contraband.

This sinking of the William P. Frye gave rise to considerable friction between the United States and Germany, which is not fully settled at the time these words are written.

It does not seem to the writer fitting, at the present time, to enter into any discussion of the issues raised by various actions of Germany or Austria, or by Great Britain or France, which affected the United States and which have given rise to diplomatic correspondence between these countries and the government of the United

States. This is not because the writer has not fairly well defined opinions on these matters, which are largely questions of international law, but because in most of them the facts have not been ascertained as yet with that positiveness which is necessary in order to found a reasonable opinion thereon or to make a correct application of the principles of international law thereto. At some future time it is the writer's purpose to discuss these questions from the standpoint of law and not of sentimentality or of partisanship. This explanation is given at this point so that not only the writer's position will be understood, but also his avoidance of a discussion of these topics here, particularly in relation to submarine warfare.

The Eitel Fritz, after her arrival at Newport News, for some days announced an intention of again seeking the high seas after such repairs as were necessary to the vessel were made, but finally on April 7th the Captain decided not to attempt to pass the six or seven Allied cruisers which were waiting for his vessel outside of the three mile limit, and, consequently, the ship was interned by the government of the United States until the end of the war.

At Corsewell Point, Wigtownshire, Scotland, on March 11, the British auxiliary cruiser, Bayano, was sunk by a German submarine while engaged in patrol duty. This vessel was a converted merchantman of about 3500 tons; and with her about 190 men went down.

Juan Fernandez Island, the island which tradition identifies as the island upon which Alexander Selkirk (the man whose adventures gave Defoe his idea of Robinson Crusoe) was shipwrecked and remained several years, a couple of centuries or so ago, lies about 400 miles to the west of the coast of Chili and belongs to that republic. At the time of the naval battle of the Falkland Islands, which took place, as my readers will remember, on the 8th of December, 1914, and which resulted in the destruction of the German squadron under Admiral Spree, one vessel of that squadron, the Dresden, succeeded in making its escape, although chased by the fleetest of the British cruisers present at this fight, and disappeared from sight; running to the westward towards the Straits of Magellan. From that time until the 9th of March her whereabouts were unknown though a dozen British warships hunted every inch of the east and west coasts of lower South America for her. From time to

time she was reported at various places, such as Punta Arenas on the coast of southern Chili: but, as it subsequently turned out, there was no truth in these reports.

The Dresden was the only German warship known to be at large in the South Atlantic or the Pacific Oceans, and in order to make the boast of the British Navy good, that they had swept the German Navy from the ocean, it was necessary to find and destroy the Dresden at all costs; and this necessity may possibly be the explanation of the untoward event which subsequently took place.

On March 9th, 1915, the Dresden appeared in Cumberland Bay, and, sending a boat ashore, asked permission of the Chilian Governor of this Chilian territory, the Island of Juan Fernandez, to remain in the waters of Chili for a space of eight days, in order to make repairs to her engines which had been damaged in her voyagings since the battle of the Falkland Islands. This request, however, the Governor of the Island refused, and ordered her captain to take the Dresden out of the waters of Chili within twenty-four hours. At this time the Dresden was anchored between four and five hundred yards from the shore, and thus over 2½ miles inward from the line on the waters which mark the limit of the jurisdiction of the Republic of Chili.

The captain of the Dresden, however, did not see fit to obey this order, and, at the expiration of this time the Chilian Governor notified the captain of the Dresden that the Dresden was interned in accordance with the rules of international law.

The captain of the Dresden, in compliance with the order of internment given to him by the Governor, anchored his ship fore and aft and began to put her in order for a long stay. This happened on the 11th of March.

On the 14th of March, three days later, at nine o'clock in the morning a British Squadron composed of the Glasgow, Kent, and the auxiliary cruiser Oroma, appeared in the offing. On these vessels being sighted, the Governor put out from the Island towards the Glasgow to inform her captain of his action and of the fact that the Dresden was interned. The Dresden was at this time flying a flag of truce. The Governor, however, was unable to proceed to the British ships and to deliver his statement because the British ships immediately opened fire on the Dresden and moved in within a few hundred yards of her and well into Chilian waters, signalling to her captain to surrender. The Dres-

den made no reply to the gun-fire of the British, and, the British desire to capture or destroy his vessel was so great that they paid no attention to the fact that they were in Chilian waters, the captain of the Dresden blew up the magazine of the ship, thereby sinking her.

The point at which she sank was, by actual measurement thereafter, determined to be under 400 yards from the shore of the Island. The British made prisoners of a portion of the crew; but, well knowing that their action was a gross violation of international law, since the capture was effected in the territory of a neutral power, landed most of these prisoners at Valparaiso, in Chili, on their arrival at that point.

On this violation becoming known to the Government of Chili, that government addressed a formal protest against this violation of its territory and of its neutrality, to the British government, which resulted on the 15th of May in a full and complete apology by the British government for its violation of Chilian waters and for the action of its naval officers. This of course disposed of the matter as far as Chili was concerned, but did not restore the lives of the German sailors killed in the attack on the Dresden, nor did it replace the Dresden in her former position.

The pseudo sentimentalists who are so extremely fond of criticizing every act of warfare of the Germans which results in the death of non-combatants, or, in many cases, of combatants, and who disturb the otherwise calm air with their periodic shrieks of "murder," etc., might find in the death of these German sailors an opportunity for vehement denunciation of another power than Germany should they so desire. It is probable, however, that that power being the "mother country," their extreme sense of obligation and inferiority to that country will stifle their natural impulse to hysteria.

During the rest of the month of March little happened on the high seas. The British fleet continued to patrol the North Sea and to guard the entrance of the Mediterranean as far as possible, while the German main battle fleet still remained in its harbors.

On April 11th Newport News again became the center of excitement on the arrival of another German auxiliary cruiser, the Kronprinz Wilhelm, which had left New York Harbor nearly eight months before, just after the war broke out, since which time she had been cruising as a commerce destroyer in the South Atlantic and else-

where, and had not touched at a single port. During the course of this cruise she had destroyed fourteen enemy's ships of various kinds, which ships, with their cargoes, were estimated to be of a value exceeding $7,000,000.

On April 5th the Turkish cruiser, the Medjidieh, a small vessel of 3432 tons which had been built in America in 1903, struck a mine in the Black Sea, according to Russian reports, and was sunk.

On the 15th of April, following the example of the Eitel Fritz, the captain of the Kronprinz Wilhelm also notified the United States of his desire to have his vessel interned for the remainder of the war, which was done.

Several minor actions took place about the middle of April between hostile flotillas of destroyers and torpedo boats off the Belgian coast, but the results of this fighting are not very definitely known.

On April 29th France suffered her second heaviest naval loss during the war, when her armored cruiser Leon Gambetta was torpedoed by an Austrian submarine, the U-6, in the Straits of Otranto, where this cruiser was performing patrol duty with squadrons to which it was attached, in order to prevent the Austrian warships from coming out of the Adriatic. The Gambetta went to the bottom rapidly, and of her crew of 600 men comparatively few were saved. The Admiral of the squadron, her captain and all her officers went down with her.

On May 1st a fight took place between a German and a British flotilla of destroyers in the North Sea, which, after several hours' combat, resulted in a victory for the British flotilla, which sank two of the German destroyers, themselves losing one.

A week later the Germans evened the score, sinking a British destroyer off Zeebrugge, Belgium, and capturing her crew.

On May 9th the Russians accomplished, or rather said they had accomplished, a most marvellous feat, by sinking with their Black Sea fleet two Turkish transports in the Sea of Marmora. As this Black Sea fleet was never closer to the northern entrance to the Bosphorous than three or four miles, it becomes a little difficult to understand how this fleet could have sunk vessels in the Sea of Marmora, which is many miles to the south of that northern entrance. The Russian fleet did, however, sink a number of Turkish merchant vessels in the Black Sea itself on this and succeeding days.

An Austrian destroyer squadron operated along the

Italian Adriatic coast about the middle of the month and did considerable damage to the towns along the shore besides sinking an Italian destroyer near Barletta. Finally an indecisive combat between this flotilla and an Italian squadron took place after which the Austrian flotilla returned to its base.

On May 27th the British auxiliary cruiser, the Princess Irene, blew up off Sheerness, in which disaster several hundred men lost their lives. The explosion bears a marked resemblance to that on the battleship Bulwark on the first day of the year. The suggested reason in the case of the Princess Irene, which was being employed as a mine ship and on other analogous duty, was that the careless handling of explosives was the cause of the disaster.

An Austrian destroyer squadron operated along the combat in the Adriatic on May 28th, the Austrians sinking an Italian destroyer, while an Austrian submarine fell a victim to the Italians.

In the early days of June an Italian squadron cruised along the Austrian Dalmatian coast and besides destroying cables and lighthouses sank several Austrian merchant vessels. Another Italian squadron of larger vessels on June 6th and the two or three days following, bombarded the railroad between Cattaro and Ragusa, and shelled Montefalcone.

On the 11th of June a small Turkish cruiser sank a Russian torpedo boat destroyer in the Black Sea.

Very little happened in the Baltic during the month of May or in the early days of June, until June 4th when the Russians beat off a fleet of German transports, which with an escort of destroyers and small cruisers had attempted to enter the Bay of Riga; one of the transports was sunk. The next day in the Middle Baltic an engagement took place at long range between German and Russian squadrons, in which no very great damage was done.

A naval fight took place in the Adriatic on June 16th, when an Austrian light sqaudron attacked the Italian coast near the mouth of the Tagliamento River. Upon being in its turn attacked by an Italian squadron, the Austrian flotilla retired, and after a running fight succeeded in gaining the harbor of Pola. Monopoli was shelled about this time by an Austrian destroyer.

An Italian squadron aided by some French ships began, about June 18th, a systematic bombardment of the various Austrian islands on the Dalmatian coast and suc-

ceeded in doing very considerable damage. Some of these islands were afterwards occupied by Italian troops for a time. Towards the end of June there were skirmishes in the Baltic between German and Russian destroyers with no particular results.

At the end of July a battle occurred between German and Russian squadrons in the Baltic, between the Island of Oeland and the Courland Coast. The Russian squadron was both much larger in point of numbers than the German and also contained heavier ships, so that after a half hour's fight the German squadron sought refuge in flight, losing one of their units, the mine layer Albatross, which was wrecked by the Russian fire and beached by her crew. The Russian squadron then sailed northward and fell in with a German destroyer flotilla, of which, after a brief battle, it sank one. In one of these actions the Russians reported that they had sunk the German battleship Pommern, but this subsequently turned out to be one of those mistakes so prevalent in Russian bulletins, induced probably by over enthusiasm.

On the 6th of July Italy, by proclamation of a blockade, closed the Adriatic to merchant vessels of all nations.

On July 7th the Italians suffered their first naval loss of importance, when their armored cruiser Amalfi, built in 1904, the largest and most modern of the Italian navy, of this class, was torpedoed and sunk by a Austrian submarine in the Adriatic, with considerable loss of life, which was followed eleven days later by a like misfortune to the armored cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi, in the same sea. The Garibaldi, however, was a smaller vessel, of 7350 tons displacement and considerably older, she having been laid down in 1897.

The Koenigsberg, which, as my readers will remember, took refuge in the Rufigi River, on the coast of German East Africa, and had forced her way so far up the stream as to be out of the range of the guns of the British cruisers pursuing her (who drew too much water to follow her) but which had been supposed to have been destroyed thereafter by guns landed from these cruisers, was actually destroyed. It appears that the attacks in November and December upon her, were not successful and that the Koenigsberg had managed to work her way still further up the stream, in the channel of which she had sunk a couple of merchant vessels which formed a barrier between her and the British cruisers below her. In June,

the Koenigsberg being still undestroyed and still in the hands of the Germans, the British government sent the monitors Severn and Mersey, which had been used theretofore in the bombardment of the Belgian coast, to the east coast of South Africa, where they were joined by the British warship Weymouth and an Australian cruiser. The reason for sending these monitors there was that they drew even less water than the Koenigsberg and could consequently go up the river to her position, without difficulty.

On July 4th the two monitors attacked the Koenigsberg, while two other warships bombarded the shore positions which had been created for her defense. Several days fighting took place, and the Koenigsberg was finally destroyed completely on July 11th.

From this time onward, while the general activities of the several navies of the contending powers did not diminish greatly, in patrolling, etc., but few actual combats took place.

On July 26th a German torpedo boat was destroyed by the British off the Belgian coast; on which day the French also lost the Marlotte, (a submarine) in the Aegean, near the Dardanelles.

On August 9th the British lost the destroyer Lynx in the North Sea, she striking a mine; while the next day, August 10th, the India, an auxiliary cruiser of 7900 tons, was blown up by the Germans off the Swedish coast. The same day the old Turkish battleship, the Barbarossa, was torpedoed, or is reported to have been torpedoed, by a British submarine near the Dardanelles, and a few days later the Meteor, a German auxiliary cruiser, on finding herself surrounded by the British, was blown up by her crew; earlier on the same day the Meteor had sunk the English patrol boat, Ramsey, by shelling.

In all of these latter catastrophies to vessels, there was comparatively little loss of life. The larger warships, by midsummer, had become thoroughly accustomed to submarine attacks and adopted measures which appear to have been more or less efficient in rendering their attacks nugatory, and, as can be readily seen from the list of vessels lost during the months of July and August, with the exception of the two Italian armored cruisers, there was none of very great importance, and none whose loss could not be readily supplied.

The main fleets of the contending nations distinguished

themselves by very prudently remaining within harbors where they could be protected from submarine attacks. The North of Scotland was the base for the British fleet, and Kiel and the canal connecting it with the North Sea, as well as Wilhelmshaven, the German bases.

Except for the Dardanelles, and at the entrance to the Adriatic, the French Navy, during this period, was not much in evidence, while the Italian Navy, after the torpedoing of the Garibaldi, took no part whatever in the active naval hostilities against Austria or the other enemies of the Entente Cordiale. The naval fighting last summer was a distinct disappointment to those who hoped to see the question of the comparative efficiency of the submarine against the battleship tested in action and in fact, the naval events recorded during the last six months may be said to be distinctly uninteresting, with very few exceptions.

The Submarine Warfare

CHAPTER XXIX

It may be well to review the causes which led Germany to order her submarine fleets to attack British merchant vessels.

On January 26, 1915, Germany adopted a measure of conservation, for the civil population only, by means of a company organized for such purposes, of all food stuffs in Germany. This company was authorized by the law creating it to take over all stocks of food anywhere in the Empire in private hands, excepting a specified amount, which amount varied with the particular food, and to sell it to the people of the Empire in fixed quantities per head. The government of Germany hoped, by this legislation, to procure evenness of distribution in all parts of the Empire, and also to control the prices of foods, and to prevent an undue advance therein by private dealers.

Great Britain, immediately upon hearing that a general policy of conservation had been adopted, and before by any possibility the government of Great Britain could have actually seen the legislation affecting the subject, asserted, with characteristic disregard of the facts, that this was a confiscation of the food stuffs in Germany for military purposes; whereas, in point of fact, none of the food stuffs handled by the company above described were to be used by the military authorities for any purpose. However, the facts troubled the British government little; the pretext was all that was wanted. This pretext afforded, the British government placed all food stuffs of any kind upon the list of contraband of war, and gave orders to the vessels of her navy to seize the mercantile marines of neutral countries proceeding to Germany with cargoes of this character; and, going further, ordered the seizure of neutral ships proceeding to neutral ports with such cargoes, unless the ultimate destination of such cargoes was clearly proved not to be Germany or Austria.

This absolutely illegal and arbitrary action by Great Britain was followed by the establishment of a blockade of the waters adjacent to the British Isles, and the north

ern and western coasts of France, by Germany, on February 4th, at which time Germany warned the neutral powers that it was her intention to sink, without notice, all British, French or Russian mercantile ships found within that area after the 18th of February, 1915. And this was followed by a proclamation, on the 24th of February, including the Irish and North Channels and the Orkney and Shetland Islands within the scope of the blockade.

On March 1st Mr. Asquith announced in the House of Commons that it was the intention and purpose of Great Britain and France to cut Germany off from all trade with all the rest of the world, and stated that the British and French governments would, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships, carrying goods to presumed enemy destination or of enemy ownership or origin. This is perhaps the most sweeping assertion of national ownership of the seas ever made by Great Britain. The neutral countries protested against these acts, but with little result, as the chief neutral power which possessed the means of making this protest effective did not use this means against the chief violator of the rights of neutrals, Great Britain, but supinely, and apparently designedly, acquiesced by implication at this time, and subsequently, to the tortuous acts of the British government, to the detriment of the agricultural, commercial and maritime interests of its own people.

The month of March was largely occupied with these various negotiations on the part of the neutrals to secure the right to use the oceans. But, in the meantime, the two principal adversaries continued their attack upon each other; and during the month several neutral vessels, particularly the Swedish steamer "Hanna" and the Dutch steamer "Media" were torpedoed by German submarines.

Early in April the attack on British mercantile vessels was extended by the Germans so as to include the trawlers which supplied fish to the British population; the German argument being that as the British government had inaugurated a campaign of starvation of German civilian population, any measures that the German government might take in attacking the food supply of the British were, under the circumstances, justifiable.

Extreme activity of these submarines all around the British coast continued during this month. It is impossible in this narrative to do more than cite vessels of im-

portance sunk by the submarines, or those that gave rise to international complications. A list, which is believed to be reasonably complete, of all the vessels sunk by the submarines, with the date of their sinking and their nationality and tonnage, will be found in the appendix.

The losses suffered by their mercantile marine during the opening days of this submarine campaign roused the British to energetic action to grapple with this new peril which was both a danger to their food supply and also very destructive to their mercantile vessels; which destruction affected them the more inasmuch as there then was, and still is, a considerable shortage of tonnage for the British carrying trade, since vessels aggregating many hundreds of thousands of tons, which originally were engaged in commercial voyages, had been taken over by the British government and its Allies for military purposes of one kind and another, or were engaged in carrying munitions of war at very high rates from the United States to England, France and Russia, and thus as effectively withdrew from ordinary commercial uses, as though they had been taken over for military purposes by the governments themselves.

The British Channel was honeycombed with various devices (more or less fanciful descriptions of which have been, from time to time, given in the press) for the capture of submarines. These, however, as far as we can judge, have not been particularly efficacious, and a torpedo boat destroyer or an equivalently light vessel, heavily-armed, is still the most potent foe of the submarine.

One distinguishing feature of the submarine is its extreme vulnerability to gun-fire. Small two or three inch guns, such as even the merchantmen had been in recent months carrying, can send the largest and strongest submarine to the bottom, owing to the peculiarities necessary in her construction.

The rather fantastic and imaginary stories of nets, snares, and other mechanical devices, which have been said to have been efficacious in the British and Irish Channels in destroying submarines, can be dismissed without much comment. They either never existed or they have almost totally failed in their object.

On May 7th the first important incident which caused international complications took place. The famous Cunarder, Lusitania, sailed from New York for Liverpool on the first of May. Prior to its sailing, advertisements in the principal newspapers of the United States had

been inserted by the German Embassy at Washington, wherein Americans were warned that "travelers sailing in the war zone in ships of Great Britain or their Allies do so at their own risk." Comparatively little attention was paid to these notices by the travelling public.

On May 7th the Lusitania was torpedoed by a German submarine, said to be the U-39, a few miles off the Old Head of Kinsale, Ireland, and sank about eighteen minutes after she was torpedoed. In addition to neutral passengers, the Lusitania carried 1500 tons of cargo, among which were munitions of war which were destined for use by Great Britain against Germany. About 1150 persons were drowned on this occasion. Much excitement was caused in the United States by this sinking, owing to the fact that there were many American citizens on this vessel. American opinion had previously been skilfully excited by the Falaba, Cushing and Gulflight cases. Diplomatic negotiations over this matter were entered into by the President of the United States on the 13th of May, and continued thereafter for some time.

During the rest of the month submarines continued to destroy British merchant ships within the limits of the war zone indicated by Germany's original proclamation, in considerable numbers, and the British did everything in their power to cause the cessation of these attacks.

In June and July the campaign continued and even grew warmer. In this month occurred the most extraordinary incident which had, so far, taken place in submarine warfare, which was a battle between two submarines, wherein one sank the other. This battle took place on the 17th of June in the Adriatic. The Italian submarine Medusa was cruising under water in the northern Adriatic when her captain concluded to go to the surface, after first taking the customary observations through the periscope to satisfy himself that the waters were clear of any enemy. Within a comparatively few feet of him was cruising an Austrian submarine, of whose presence near the Medusa her captain was ignorant, as was the Commander of the Austrian submarine of the fact that the Medusa was in the vicinity of his vessel.

Shortly after the Medusa came to the surface, the captain of the Austrian submarine was also moved to emerge, but on raising his periscope above the surface of the water he discovered the Medusa was very near. To see, with this Captain, was to act, and submerging again complete-

ly he immediately torpedoed the Medusa which was still unsuspiciously cruising under the surface of the waters.

On the 19th of June the German Admiralty officially announced that the submarine U-29, commanded by Capt. Weddingen, which had been destroyed some weeks before and which was the submarine which sank the Cressy and her sister ships early in the year, had been rammed and sunk by a British tank steamer flying the Swedish flag, after the tanker had been ordered to stop.

While the submarine warfare was carried on with great vigor during this month, no other incidents of international or general interest occurred.

On the 9th of July the Cunarder Orduna narrowly escaped from being sunk near Queenstown. A submarine attacked her and missing her by only a few feet, afterwards shelled her.

All through this month and the early part of August the British continued to lose their merchant vessels in considerable number, but they also claim that during this period they sank or destroyed many of the German submarines.

On August 13th the British transport, the Royal Edward, was torpedoed in the Aegean Sea, over one thousand men being lost; and on August 19th the White Star Liner, Arabic, was sunk near Fastnet on the Irish coast, by a submarine. This incident also gave rise to diplomatic conversations between the United States and Germany.

Much bitter feeling was aroused in Great Britain by the adoption of the submarine campaign against her by Germany, and in the early portion of the submarine campaign it was proposed to deny the captured officers of the crews of the submarines the honors of war; Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, suggesting this procedure. Full effect was given thereto, and the officers and crews of submarines were, for a few weeks, treated as criminals and subjected to prison confinement and prison discipline. On information of this procedure reaching Germany, the German government picked out a number of British officers among the British prisoners of war in German hands, equal in numbers to the officers and crews of submarines who were prisoners in the hands of the English, who were deprived of the honors of war, and applied to these British officers the same treatment.

After a few weeks, however, and just before Winston Churchill fell from power in the Admiralty, at the time

of the British Cabinet crisis, Great Britain abandoned this policy as regards the treatment of submarine prisoners, and the cause therefor having ceased, Germany abandoned her policy of retaliation.

The question of the greatest interest in this entire submarine campaign is how far did Germany succeed in carrying out her proposed object of interfering with the free movement of munitions of war and of food stuffs from foreign countries to Great Britain in commercial bottoms? This question can only be, at the present time, imperfectly answered, for the reason that we are not at all certain that Great Britain has given a complete list of all the ships belonging to her sunk by the Germans.

Taking the imperfect statistics that we have at our disposal, however, and remembering the mercantile tonnage at the time of the declaration of war, we would have, approximately, the following result:

At the time war broke out there were registered as belonging to the United Kingdom a total of 8510 sailing vessels, with a net tonnage of 902,718 and 12,382 steamers with a net tonnage of 10,992,073; or a general total of 20,892 vessels with a net tonnage of 11,894,791. Up to the first of September the Germans had destroyed an approximate total of 900,000 tons of the total tonnage stated above; leaving 11,000,000 tons still available, apparently, for Great Britain's commerce; but this availability is more apparent than true. Approximately 3,500,000 of this tonnage is being used by the British government for various purposes connected with the war, the movement of troops, the carriage of supplies, etc. etc.; which only leaves about 7,500,000 tons available for ordinary commercial purposes.

In ordinary years, in addition to her own tonnage, the commercial interests of Great Britain drew to her ports a gross tonnage of 63,790,257, of which Germany and Austria supplied 17,000,000, and the minor maritime powers of the world the rest. But in the last year it is entirely improbable that, owing to the submarine menace, and for other reasons that the remaining tonnage was anything like as much as it was the year before, and it is probable that, in place of the 46,000,000 tons of that year, last year did not see more than 35,000,000 tons, or a grand total of about 55% of the ordinary tonnage aiding Great Britain to move her commerce. So that it may be concluded at the present time, both directly by the vessels it destroyed, and indirectly by the vessels it frightened away

from the coast, the submarine warfare conducted by Germany has very materially injured the movement of munitions, bread stuffs and manufactures to and from Great Britain. This is borne out by the fact that ocean freights in general, all over the world, have very materially advanced in the past year and indicate a great scarcity of available tonnage for commercial purposes.

The maritime policy so successfully pursued by the United States since the Civil War has resulted in the United States possessing no mercantile marine, and this has resulted in her suffering seriously in the last six months in her power to transport her products, agricultural and manufactured, to such foreign countries as she is still permitted to have free commercial relations with, by Great Britain.

It may be computed that the increase in freights paid by the American exporter, or paid by the foreign importer of American goods, in the last year alone, would have paid for ten years of subsidy to American ship owners, which would have enabled enough ships to be built and operated under the American flag to avoid the humiliating position as regards her mercantile marine which the United States occupies to-day, and this money would have remained, in its entirety, in American pockets.

This, however, presupposes also that the United States government would not have tacitly admitted that Great Britain owned the high seas.

The Aerial Warfare

CHAPTER XXX

It will be impossible, in a work of this character, to do more than to describe the exploits of the airships during the six months' period under consideration; leaving the question of the merits of the respective types of air machines and of the value, from a military standpoint, of air raids, to the technical writer. The first of these subjects is highly technical and it does not seem as though the experiences of the last few months have been sufficiently ample to base a judgment as to the best type of air-craft which is the type most efficient in inflicting material damage on the enemy.

Regarded from the standpoint of scouting purposes and of the obtaining of information, all of the various types seem to be successful; but regarded from the standpoint of inflicting damage upon the fortifications and military works of the enemy, as well as from the standpoint of terrorization, the question is very open as to which vehicle of aerial navigation produces the greatest result.

This, necessarily, involves also omitting any discussion of the questions raised by air raids on undefended towns.

On March 3rd the German aerial squadron bombarded Warsaw, and on March 4th the French, in the same manner, bombarded the German powder magazine at Rottweil. On March 5th several German machines operated at Calais and in the surrounding districts.

On March 7th the French government issued an official statement showing the activity of the French airmen during the war, and, according to this, this branch of the French military service had made over 10,000 aerial reconnaissances up to that time, had been 18,000 hours in the air, and had traveled more than 1,200,000 miles. This report is interesting, as indicating the extent to which the aircraft has been used in this war.

On March 9th a British aeroplane dropped bombs on Ostend; and on the 12th German airmen bombarded Osowiec, in northern Poland.

THE AERIAL WARFARE

On March 17th a German airship attempted to sink a British coasting steamer, the Blonde, in the North Sea, and unsuccessfully fired five bombs at her.

On March 18th Calais was again raided, and on March 20th Deal was also bombarded from the air.

On March 21st a Zeppelin raid was made upon Paris, with slight damage. On March 23rd an attack was made upon the British steamer Pandion at sea by an aeroplane, and on the following day the British freighter Teal was also bombarded in the same fashion. On that day, the 24th, the British made a raid on the Antwerp shipyards, reporting that they had destroyed one German submarine and damaged another.

On the 26th the French attacked Metz and were reported to have killed three soldiers.

On March 27th and 28th the Germans raided Calais and Dunkirk again, while on March 31st the Allies made one of the largest raids, so far, in the war, in point of the number of airships, on Thourout, Belgium, and killed and wounded quite a number of German soldiers. The same day the fortress of Ostrolenka, Poland, was attacked by fifteen German aeroplanes which dropped over 100 bombs thereon.

April opened with an attack by the French and British on Hoboken, a German submarine base near Antwerp, and the next day the French attacked with a large squadron the barracks and aeroplane hangars at Vigneulles behind the German lines northeast of St. Mihiel, and a joint fleet of British and French airships attacked Mulheim and Nurrenberg.

On the 4th the Germans attacked Nieukirk, near Ypres, an unusual number of fatalities attending this raid. The next day Mulheim was again attacked by the French.

On the 7th of April a squadron of Austrian aviators attacked the town of Pedgoritza in Montenegro, damaging many buildings and causing from sixty to seventy casualties.

On the 13th the French made another raid on Vigneulles; and on the night of the 14th of April the Germans made a night raid over the Tyne District of England, but this raid was rendered nugatory owing to the fact that the authorities were able to warn the inhabitants of the region in time to plunge the whole country in darkness, which baffled the pilot of the Zeppelin.

On April 15th fifteen French aeroplanes attacked the German military headquarters at Ostend, and on the

same day another squadron bombarded Frieburg in Briesgau and caused very numerous fatalities.

On the 16th the east coast of England was again attacked early in the morning by two Zeppelins. Lowestoft in Kent, Malden and Daganham, the latter place about eleven miles from London, received the most attention; very little damage, however, resulted. The same day a German raid on Amiens inflicted much damage and many casualties. The French again raided Metz and its environs, and the same day a combined British and French fleet raided a number of the Rhine towns.

On the 17th of April Strassburg was bombarded by the French, and Amiens by the Germans. In both cases there were a considerable number of fatalities.

On the 19th two French squadrons attacked the railroad along the Rhine, and bombarded the Mulheim and Habsheim railroad stations. Mannheim was also bombarded.

On the 20th an aeroplane fight took place between two French and British squadrons on the one side and a large German squadron on the other, between Basle and Mulhausen on the Rhine, which the German squadron won, and drove the Allied squadron back to the west.

Bialystok, Russian Poland, was attacked the same day by a German squadron, which dropped 100 bombs and caused many fatalities and much material damage.

On the 21st of April, British aviators attacked Ghent.

For the next few days a comparative lull occurred, but on the 26th of April the Germans again attacked Calais with Zeppelins and caused many casualties. The next day the British raided Belgian towns behind the German lines while the French attacked Chambray and Arnavaille and the Mauser rifle factory at Oberdorf.

On the 28th the Germans attacked Nancy and the Allies Oberdorf, where there were many fatalities, and the hangars of the dirigibles at Friedrichshafen, near Lake Constance.

On April 30th another Zeppelin raid on England took place; most of the points attacked were in Suffolk, and no casualties were reported.

The early part of May was comparatively quiet, though every day minor raids took place. On the 9th, however, the British raided the towns on that portion of the western front in the immediate vicinity of Lille, and the next day the Zeppelins raided the two English towns of Westcliffe and Southend-on-Sea in Essex, but very little

damage resulted. On the 17th Ramsgate, England, was visited by the Zeppelins. Here, little damage was done.

On the 22nd of May bombs were again dropped on Paris by German aviators who disguised their aeroplane as a French machine and were successful in passing through the French air patrol in this manner.

On May 24th the Austrians raided Venice, Porto Corsini, Ancona and Barletta, while the Germans again visited Paris on the following day.

On the 26th of May Southend-on-Sea, in Essex, was raided by Zeppelins for the second time, but little damage resulted. The Allies raided the aerodrome at Gontrobe, near Ghent, this same day, with, it was reported, a large number of casualties among the soldiers guarding the aerodrome and the practical destruction of the aerodrome itself.

On the 27th Ostend was raided by the Allies and it was reported fifty soldiers were killed. A large fleet of French aeroplanes attacked the important German manufactory of explosives at Ludwigshafen.

On May 29th the Austrians attacked Venice, doing some damage.

On May 31st London was again raided by night by the Zeppelins, the casualties, however, being small.

On June 3rd a very large fleet, 29 in all, of French aeroplanes attacked the headquarters of the German Crown Prince and on the next day, June 4th, the east and southeast coasts of England were again raided, the same vicinities being attacked two days later when five persons were killed.

On June 8th the Austrians again raided Venice.

On June 15th Carlsruhe was raided by the Allies, with many civilian casualties resulting.

On June 21st the Austrians again attacked Bari and Brindisi; and, on the 25th the station of Douai near Arras was attacked by the French; and the next day the British attacked Roulers, Belgium, causing the explosion of a large ammunition depot and the killing of a number of German soldiers.

On the 27th the French again visited Friedrichshafen in an effort to destroy the Zeppelin hangars.

On July 3rd Harwich, England, was raided by German aeroplanes which also bombarded a British torpedo boat destroyer; and ten days later a French squadron of 35 aviators attacked the railroad station of Vigneulles in the east; while another squadron, at the same time, bombard-

ed the railroad stations in the vicinity of Lille. The raid on Vigneulles was repeated on the 19th.

On the 20th of July the French were very active; one squadron of 38 bombarded the railroad station of Conglaus, and a squadron of six bombarded Colmar, while another squadron bombarded the railroad station of Challerange, south of Vousiers.

On the 27th the Austrians attacked Verona with aircraft; but little damage was done.

On August 9th 28 French aeroplanes bombarded the stations and factories of Saarbrucken, northeast of Metz. The next day, the 10th, a large fleet of Zeppelins bombarded the English east coast.

On August 17th London was again raided; about forty-six persons were injured or killed.

On August 25th the Austrians bombarded Brescia; 62 French aeroplanes bombarded Dillengen on the Rhine and another large squadron, on August 26th, of French, British and Belgian aeroplanes bombarded the Mont Huest Forest.

On the 26th occurred the first hit by a bomb dropped by an aeroplane upon a vessel. This feat was accomplished by the leader of a British Aeroplane Squadron, Commander Bigsworth, who sank a German submarine off the Belgian coast by dropping a bomb upon it, according to the British official report. It is fair to say, however, that the Germans deny that this bomb sank the submarine, although they admit it struck it.

On August 28th the German aeroplanes made another attack upon Paris, but were repulsed. A combat in mid-air took place between the attackers and the French defending squadrons.

One result of the summer's campaign in aeroplane fighting has been to show that the guns which were specially devised for the bringing down of air-craft have, so far at least, failed to fulfill the purposes for which they are devised. Numerous types of this gun have been invented and have been used extensively, particularly in defending London, but the number of aeroplanes brought down by their use has been remarkably small; so small, in fact, as to justify the statement that those guns are, as a defense, almost disregardable. The best defense against an air-craft raid seems to be the opposing of defending aircraft to the attacking.

There have been many romantic incidents reported in the papers of fights in mid-air, in which most thrilling

and wonderful deeds of bravery have been reported to have been done, but the larger portion of these are apparently due to the fervent imagination of press correspondents who are obliged to find exciting stories wherewith to regale their readers in order to justify their own utility. No doubt great courage, coolness and bravery have been shown in many cases by the aviators, but, like most brave men, these are disinclined to talk; besides which, the army regulations of most of the contending powers impose on them a discreet silence as to their exploits.

Political History of Europe

CHAPTER XXXI

BEFORE THE WAR

Among the very important diplomatic documents which have seen the light of day since the first volume of this work was published are those which have been published under the title of "European Politics during the decade before the war by Belgian Diplomatists. This volume comprises the dispatches of the representatives of Belgium at the three principal capitals of Europe in the ten years before the war, and though not in point of time dealing with the period primarily under consideration in this volume, yet as they were not available at the time the first volume was issued and as they are of great value in casting light on the history of the period preceding the war I have thought that some space could and should be devoted to them here.

In reading the following extracts from this correspondence it should be carefully borne in mind that they are written by professional diplomatists of years standing, actually on the spot where the events they narrate took place, possessing through their diplomatic positions unparalleled access to the facts, and with the great advantage of being completely detached from the consequences of these facts, and of being completely unprejudiced in regard to them.

Bearing these facts in mind it becomes most interesting and most significant that these disinterested, informed and competent observers all bear identical testimonies, and arrive at similar convictions. Which conviction may be briefly stated to be that Sir Edward Grey was for all this period a deliberate and persistent conspirator against the legitimate interests of Germany, whether they were commercial, diplomatic, territorial, maritime, or political.

Moreover, these documents fix on his shoulders—and remember they are the records of the observations of absolutely disinterested persons—the blame for the present war largely.

The writers of most of these reports were Count de Lalaing, Belgian minister to Great Britain, M. A. Leghait and Baron Guillaume, Belgian ministers to France, Baron Greindl and Baron Beyens, Belgian ministers to Berlin. Very occasionally a report is cited written by a charge d'affaires.

The first report is dated in February, 1905 and the last on July 2, 1914, so that these reports cover very nearly ten years.

These reports speak for themselves so that comment is unnecessary.

London, February 7, 1905.

. . . . The enmity of the English public towards the German nation is long standing. It seems to be based on jealousy and fear; on jealousy, because of the economic and commercial plans of Germany; on fear, in the thought that British supremacy at sea, the only supremacy to which England can lay claim, may one day be disputed by the German fleet. This state of mind is being fostered by the British press, regardless of international complications.

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London, February 7, 1905.

. . . . But the chauvinistic spirit is spreading among the English people, and the papers are slowly misleading public opinion, which has already been influenced so far as to think that Germany has no right to increase her naval forces and that her naval budget constitutes a provocation for England.

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London, April 1, 1905

. . . . The visit of the Emperor to Tangiers has not failed to evoke unfriendly articles in the press, which is happy to have occasion to give vent to its ill-feeling towards the sovereign of a country that is a commercial rival of England, that wants to create for itself a navy of the first order.

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London, April 1, 1905.

. . . . This British susceptibility in regard to Berlin has existed for a long time, but it is not reassuring to have to state that it is increasing instead of diminishing.

Ct. de Lalaing.

BEFORE THE WAR

Paris, May 7, 1905.

. . . . However that may be, the confidence which had been re-established in the Franco-German relations has disappeared, and matters are back at the point where they were about twenty years ago.

A. Leghait.

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Berlin, August 5, 1905.

. . . . The causes of the rivalry between England and Germany are too profound to be ameliorated by declarations of well-meaning people. The English are not willing that their commerce and power at sea should be placed in jeopardy. The gigantic progress of Germany is a perpetual menace to England, and she will not refrain from using any means in order to put a stop to this expansion.

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Berlin, August 5, 1905.

. . . . Wherever England can cause Germany embarrassment she at once seizes on that occasion. Significant in this connection is the unconcealed assistance which the English lent to the rebels in German Southwest Africa by acknowledging them as belligerents, and by prohibiting the transit of foodstuffs and munitions for the German troops through Cape Colony.

L. d'Ursel.

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Berlin, September 23, 1905.

. . . . For years a campaign has been conducted in the English newspapers, headed by the National Review, in favor of a rapprochement between England and Russia. Since the conclusion of the Franco-English agreement, French diplomacy has been making active endeavors in this direction. According to persistent rumors the negotiations are still progressing. Certain symptoms cause me to believe that they demand the closest attention. I have learned that the idea of putting a Russian loan on the market in England is no longer rejected by the great financiers at London. Only a short time ago the English bankers would not have consented even to discuss such a possibility.

Yesterday I asked Baron von Richthofen what was to be thought of the rumors that were abroad. He replied that there certainly existed in England a current favorable to a rapprochement with Russia, above all in the upper circles and in high places.

Berlin, September 23, 1905.

. . . . The Triple-Alliance under the leadership of Germany has given us thirty years of European peace. It is now weakened by the state of disintegration in which the Austro-Hungarian Empire finds itself. The new Triple Entente between France, England, and Russia could not supplant it. It would, on the contrary, be a cause of perpetual unrest.

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Berlin, September 30, 1905.

. . . . The general tone of the press campaign which is being conducted in England shows that the rapprochement with Russia is not desired from any pacific motives but with hostile intentions against Germany. It is to be feared that the King of England shares this sentiment.

Greindl.

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London, January 14, 1906.

. . . . As regards England she is whole-heartedly favoring France; as Sir E. Grey said in a speech: "England will do all in her power to improve her relations with Germany, but this rapprochement is always dependent on good terms between Germany and France."

Of late the Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeated at various occasions to the different Ambassadors accredited in London that Great Britain had engaged herself towards France in the Moroccan question and that she would meet her obligations fully even in case of a Franco-German war and at all costs.

Van Grootven.

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Paris, March 6, 1906.

. . . . King Edward VII arrived in Paris on Saturday evening and went to stay at the British Embassy. Besides that, and this is the interesting point, he received M. Loubet and M. Delcassé yesterday at luncheon.

This mark of courtesy towards M. Delcassé at this moment is very much discussed. It is generally considered as a very significant demonstration which is disconcerting on account of the extent and the gravity of the consequences which it may have.

If any doubts could still exist as to the intentions of Great Britain they have been dispelled.

A. Leghait.

BEFORE THE WAR

Berlin, April 5, 1906.

. . . . It can no longer be doubted that it was the King of England who, without sanction of the government, drove M. Delcassé into a bellicose policy and who gave him the promise, which he could not have kept, to land 100,000 British soldiers in Holstein.

The invitation extended by the King to M. Delcassé at the time of his passage through Paris can only be interpreted as a provocation.

IF ANY DOUBT COULD STILL HAVE EXISTED THE SINGULAR STEP TAKEN BY COLONEL BARNARDISTON WITH GENERAL DUCARNE WOULD HAVE DISPELLED IT.

There really is in England a court policy beside and independent of that of the responsible Ministry.

Greindl.

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Berlin, July 16, 1906.

. . . . What has transpired of the recent pourparlers is such as to confirm this suspicion. According to the Morning Post, England and Russia propose an understanding in order to give their consent to the construction of the Mesopotamian railway, on the condition that Russia be authorized to link her Caucasian railway to it and that England gain control of the new line from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf. Such an agreement, if it really should be concluded, would be the acme of impudence. The Sultan is an independent Sovereign; he gave the concession for the railway in Mesopotamia to a German bank. No foreign Power has the right nor even the feeblest pretext to interfere in this entirely internal affair of Turkey. Yet the plan exists. Lord Lansdowne recently declared in the House of Lords that in 1903 he tried without success to internationalize the Bagdad railway, and ever since its beginning England has sought to thwart that enterprise.

She endeavored to put her hand on Koweit, the only natural terminal port for the line unless an artificial and probably poor harbor be created at great expense in the swamps of the Shatt-el-Arab.

She at least favored the insurrection of the Arabs by supplying arms and munitions to the insurgents.

Greindl.

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London, February 8, 1907.

. . . . United in their sentiment of ill-will towards Em-

peror William, on the eve of the recent elections in Germany the British public counted on a victory of the opposition and on the triumph of the socialistic elements—one might even say that the public,without distinction of parties, was hoping for such a result. Even the Conservative press, in spite of its pronounced antagonism to socialism, announced with ill-disguised satisfaction that the Social Democrats were going to put a check on the Imperial policy, interior as well as colonial. The Liberal and the Radical papers prophesied that the attempts at a personal regime, which were a danger to European peace, would be branded by the German nation at the polls, and that at last events would cause the Emperor and his too complaisant Chancellor to think. As regards the English socialists their confidence in the success of their German comrades was complete.

* * * * Count de Lalaing.

Berlin, February 9, 1907.

. . . . I have been greatly surprised to see that serious newspapers abroad are attributing a bellicose meaning to the short address which the Emperor made on the evening of February 5th to the crowd which came to give him an ovation when the main results of the polling had become known. I had the honor to send you the text of that address in my report of the day before yesterday. Nobody here has thought of interpreting the words of his Majesty in the sense of a threat directed against foreign Powers. The habitual style of the Emperor is too well known for people to be under any misapprehension as to the import of his speeches. Nor is it right to doubt the sincerity of His Majesty's pacific intentions. He has furnished sufficient proof of them during a reign of eighteen years.

It seems to me that people abroad, too, ought to know what to believe in this matter. I question myself also as whether the alarm displayed is quite genuine. Is it not rather the continuation of that campaign of vilification undertaken years ago in the press of Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, and in which during the last weeks the Temps, the semi-official organ of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has particularly distinguished itself?

* * * * Greindl.

Paris, February 10, 1907.

. . . . The Sovereigns of England left Paris yesterday to return to London.

Paris, February 10, 1907.

. . . . In his conversations with M. Clémenceau and the Minister of War the King emphasized the necessity of keeping strong the forces of France on land and at sea.

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Paris, February 10, 1907.

. . . . The fact can hardly be glanced over that these tactics, outwardly intended to avoid war, threaten to lead to considerable displeasure at Berlin, and to provoke the desire to try everything in order to extricate Germany from the grasp in which she is held by the English policy.

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Paris, February 10, 1907.

. . . . It is realized here so well that France is in a delicate situation and has been dragged into a dangerous game, that all the semi-official organs and other serious papers are keeping silent on this occasion and that none of them dares to show pleasure in this new demonstration of English friendship.

A. Leghait

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Berlin, March 28, 1907.

. . . . French arrogance is becoming again what it was during the worst days of the second Empire and the cause of this is the entente cordiale. It has increased still more since it appears that the negotiations between London and St. Petersburg, to which without doubt France has not been a stranger, are going to lead to an entente.

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Berlin, April 8, 1907.

. . . . The telegram adds that it was not quite clear what concession France could make to Germany in the matter of the Bagdad railway. This railroad would be built some day and Germany was nowise in a hurry, as seemed to be believed. Besides, the construction of the railway was a Turkish affair which concerned Germany only in so far as the concession had, in a legitimate manner, been given to a financial group in which German capital was predominant.

Thus you perceive, Sir, that France is making pretensions as in 1870, to a right of intervention in affairs which are in no way her concern, and she imagines that she possesses a right of veto over agreements concluded between independent Powers.

We have recently had our own experiences, to our cost, of this return to the traditions of the second Empire, or

rather of the general French policy. Every time in the course of history when France thought herself strong she has tried to arrogate to herself supremacy over the whole world. Now it is the entente cordiale with England that gives her this confidence.

Instances are accumulating. You know that Denmark is absolutely a free-trade country. Her custom duties are purely fiscal. She proposes to lower them still more, and in order that the revenues of her treasury do not suffer therefrom, she proposes to raise the duty on wines, but only in a very moderate degree. Nothing is more justified. Wine is an article of luxury and it is just to demand from the well-to-do classes a sacrifice destined to increase the general welfare. I learn indirectly, but from an absolutely reliable source, that the French Minister at Copenhagen has nevertheless approached the Danish Government with representations formulated in an imperious tone and accompanied by threats of reprisals. The French procedure is all the more unusual as Denmark is bound to France by no treaty and the French customs tariff imposes a prohibitive duty on agricultural products which form the only Danish articles of export.

What has happened in Brussels, Berlin, and Copenhagen are perhaps not isolated cases. It is probable that elsewhere, also, France has reverted to her old conduct of not respecting her obligations when they annoy her and of demanding subservience to her will everywhere.

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Berlin, April 18, 1907.

. . . . The visit which the King of England is to make to-day to the King of Italy at Gaeta does not reveal anything either. Italy's understanding with England and France is also a fact, in spite of the Triple Alliance. It dates from the day when Italy came to an agreement with these Powers in the matter of the division of interests in the Mediterranean. If this understanding had not existed before, it would have come about of its own accord, when the entente cordiale between France and England was concluded. How could Italy in case of a conflict defend her extensive coast against the combined British and French fleets? And what could her German and Austro-Hungarian allies do to protect her?

This zeal in uniting Powers, whom no one is menacing, for alleged purposes of defense, can with good reason seem suspicious. The offer of 100,000 men made by the King of England to M. Delcassé cannot be forgotten in Berlin.

We ourselves have to record the singular overtures made by Colonel Barnardiston to General Ducarne and who knows if there have not been other similar intrigues which have not come to our knowledge?

Greindl.

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Berlin, June 8, 1907.

. . . . As Count de Lalaing rightly says, the King of England is personally directing a policy, the ultimate aim of which is the isolation of Germany. His action corresponds with the sentiments of the nation, misled by an unscrupulous press, the sole interest of which consists in a large circulation and which is therefore only anxious to flatter the passions of the populace. It is not only the cheap papers that lower themselves to such a part. For years the Times has pursued a campaign of vilification and slander. Its Berlin correspondent, who has every opportunity to be well-informed, nourishes the hatred of the English against the Germans by imputing to the Imperial Government ambitious schemes the absurdity of which is self-evident, and by accusing it of shady manoeuvres of which it has never thought. Nevertheless, the English public believes in them without wincing, because these inventions correspond with its prejudices. How could the anti-German current be turned by the very small group of more conscientious and more clear-sighted writers? The great majority of the English journalists who accepted the hospitality of Germany belong without a doubt to this select group. One has been preaching to converts.

Greindl.

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Berlin, January 27, 1908.

. . . . Where has M. Delcassé seen Germany endeavoring to impose her supremacy on other nations? We are her close neighbors, but for twenty years I have never observed in the Imperial Government the slightest desire to abuse its strength and our weakness. I wish that all the other Great Powers had used the same consideration towards us.

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Berlin, January 27, 1908.

. . . . Under what circumstances? When was the peace of Europe menaced except by the French ideas of revenge?

Berlin, May 30, 1908.

The Triple Alliance has guarded the peace of the world for thirty years, because it was directed by Germany, who was content with the political partition of Europe. The new grouping menaces peace because it is composed of Powers which desire a revision of the status quo so much that they have quelled the hatred of centuries in order to bring about the realization of that desire.

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Berlin, June 12, 1908.

. . . . The real thoughts of the Powers banded together by England in order to isolate Germany are not to be found either in the speeches of the Sovereigns or in the articles of the semi-official or inspired papers. Their real aims are so far removed from their conventional language that they cannot avoid betraying them by indiscretions. If one wishes to know them it is only necessary to read the admonition addressed by Le Temps to the King of Sweden. The Paris paper considers the friendly sentiments manifested by His Majesty for Germany as an offense against Russia, of which France has to bear the consequences. * * * *

Berlin, March 31, 1909.

. . . . The state of mind which prevails in England recalls that which existed in France from 1866 to 1870. At that period the French believed that they had the right to prevent Germany from re-establishing her unity, because they believed that it constituted a menace to the preponderance on the Continent which France had been enjoying until then. In the same way the refusal [of Germany] to bind herself by treaty to be at the mercy of England is considered in London to-day an unfriendly act and a menace to peace.

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Berlin, April 17, 1909.

. . . . Germany and Austria-Hungary are retaining, or rather tolerating, Italy in the Triple Alliance because her official withdrawal would mean a loss of prestige, and also because in it is seen the chance of not having her for an adversary in the case of a conflict. But that is all that is hoped of her.

is hoped of her. * * * *

Berlin, March 3rd, 1911.

Quite recently, the President of the French Senate, when handing the peace prize to M. d'Estournelles de Constant in the presence of a numerous audience and

under solemn circumstances, spoke more openly of the "revanche" than has been done for years.

The French press warmly applauded the measures taken in the matter of the Flushing fortifications. What M. Pichon is blamed for is not that he embarked rather thoughtlessly on this adventure, but that he failed in it.

The French papers daily discover reasons for imputing some wrong or other to Germany. That has become a habit, but recently the movement has doubled its energy.

It would seem that M. Delcassé was called into the Cabinet in consideration of this state of the public mind. The Foreign Affairs were not entrusted to him; that would have been a provocation, but everything was done that was possible without smashing the windows.

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Paris, March 4th, 1911.

. . . . I also learn that in Germany along the French frontier a regular propaganda is incessantly being carried on in order to cause desertions from the Imperial army for the benefit of the Foreign Legion.

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Berlin, March 20th, 1911.

. . . . The speech of Sir Edward Grey did not confine itself to empty phrases, as on previous occasions, It was accompanied, or rather preceded, by action. For years the English press has made the arrogant pretension to control and even to interdict the completion of the Bagdad railway, that is to say to put her hand on an enterprise which concerns only Turkey, the company to which the concession was granted, and indirectly the German Government which supported the latter.

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Paris, July 2nd, 1911.

. . . . It cannot be disputed to-day that the attitude of the Government of the Repulic has caused or at least made possible the landing of the Spanish at Larache and the despatch of a German man-of-war to Agadir.

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Paris, July 8, 1911.

. . . . The chances to come to an understanding with Germany will be much smaller if England takes part in the conversations.

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London, July 8, 1911.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Asquith is emphasizing the new situation which might affect the interests of England in a more direct manner. The thought that Agadir might in certain contingencies become a naval

base for the German fleet is apt to cause anxiety to the Government of the United Kingdom.

The press recalls that if Great Britain had waived her interests in Morocco in favor of France, it was because the Republic on her part gave England a free hand in Egypt, but that England never thought of allowing Germany to get a footing in Morocco.

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Paris, July 24, 1911.

. . . . For those, however, who admit that France went to Fez without serious reason, the fact is clear that she will hardly go out of Fez, or will see herself compelled to go back there again and that she thereby has violated the spirit of the act of Algeciras. If Germany in face of these facts claim a "compensation," it means that she does not propose to make France draw back and that she has for her part no intention of establishing herself in Agadir but she thinks that the Government of the Republic has disturbed a balance of forces which had been agreed upon and that she is demanding her share.

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Paris, July 28, 1911.

. . . . Germany cannot make war on account of Morocco nor in order to obtain the additional compensations which she is claiming by reason of France's acquisition of a more or less definite foothold at Fez.

I have on the whole less confidence in the desire for peace of Great Britain who rather enjoys seeing the others devouring one another. But in the present case it would be difficult for her—if not impossible—not to intervene "manu militari."

Yet England's internal situation is at present very precarious and the Liberal party is in power.

As I have thought from the first day the situation centers in London. There alone can it become grave. The French will give way on all points in order to have peace. It is different with the English who will not be found willing to compromise on certain principles and demands.

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London, November 18, 1911.

. . . . When I returned to my post last September I learned from various sources that some weeks before that time the political situation had been considered so grave that the British Government thought it necessary to take extraordinary precautions. I was informed through reli-

able sources that the officers of the active army had suddenly been called back from their furloughs, that horses had been bought for the cavalry, and that the North Sea squadron had immediately been put on war footing.

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London, November 28, 1911.

. . . . German version. This may be summed up in a few words: on June 30th, Germany informed the signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act of the despatch of the "Panther" to Agadir for the protection of German subjects threatened by natives. The Imperial Government aimed at no territorial conquest. On July 21st, Sir Edward Grey demanded of Count von Metternich an explanation for the continued presence of the vessel in the Moroccan port, adding that if the Franco-German negotiations should fail, the Agadir question would become acute and demanding that England take part in the negotiations. The German demands seemed to be unacceptable to France.

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London, November 28, 1911.

. . . . For the rest, Sir Edward Grey said that there was no secret treaty with France.

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. . . . Sir Edward Grey spoke the truth when he said that he was willing to do everything in his power in order to improve the relations between Germany and England. The present friendships of Great Britain to which he intended to remain faithful did not prevent him from contracting new ones. Far from trying to disturb the recent negotiations between Germany and France he was very glad of the success attained. He understood Germany's need of expansion and had no intention to thwart her. He even indicated the region in which Germany's colonial activity could take place. England had no plans for extending her possessions in Africa. (Is it proposed to barter our colonies away according to the principles of the new international law as practised at London and unfortunately elsewhere too? Morocco, Tripolis, Persia.)

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Berlin, December 6, 1911.

. . . . Thus he makes a rapprochement with Germany conditional on the inclusion of his French and Russian friends, as if it were not notorious that no French Gov-

ernment would dare to lend itself to such an attempt which public opinion in France would repudiate.

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. . . . Sir Edward Grey in qualifying the alarm shown on the continent as "political alcoholism" tried with a word play to pass over the embarrassment which the revelations of Captain Faber are causing him; but he did not deny their correctness as he would certainly not have failed to do if he had been able to. His silence is equivalent to a confirmation. In default of other information it must be considered as an established fact that the plan has been discussed in London of aiding France in a war with Germany by landing an English corps of 150,000 men. There is nothing in this which ought to surprise us. It is the continuation of the singular proposals which were made a few years ago to General Ducarne by Colonel Barnardiston, as well as of the Flushing intrigue.

Was it not also claiming a right of veto against Germany's enterprises when a hue and cry was raised because a German cruiser had cast anchor on the roadstead of Agadir, whereas England had not moved a muscle when watching the progressing conquest of Moroccan territory by France and Spain and the overthrow of the Sultan's independence?

England could not do otherwise. She was bound by her secret treaty with France. The explanation is very simple but is not such as to assuage German irritation. From this it follows that at the same moment when the act of Algeciras was being signed, at least three of the Powers who participated were contracting obligations among themselves which were incompatible with their public promises.

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Berlin, December 9, 1911.

. . . . What is most apparent from the speech of Sir Edward Grey is that he wishes to continue the policy of the Triple Entente in the spirit in which he has practiced it until now,—that is to say—in a spirit hostile to Germany.

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Berlin, December 9, 1911.

. . . . There is no more harmony between the peoples than there is between the Governments. The English continue to be jealous of Germany's expansion. The Ger-

mans, who six months ago were by no means hostile to England, have become so now.

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Berlin, October 18, 1912.

. . . . It was not the fault of the Imperial Government that the crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina found no better solution in 1909. The German Government caused the offer to be made to the Cabinet of Paris of a concerted action at Petersburg in order to induce Russia to change her attitude. This collaboration having been declined by M. Pichon, the Cabinet of Berlin decided to make the demarch, which is known, single-handed. I think it is useful to reestablish the truth on this historical point, which I learned recently at the French Embassy.

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Berlin, October 24, 1912.

. . . . The Ambassador of France, who must have special reasons for saying so, has repeatedly told me that the greatest danger for the maintenance of European peace consists in the lack of discipline and in the personal policy of the Russian agents abroad. They are almost without exception ardent Pan-Slavists, and to them the responsibility for the present events must be attributed to a great extent. They will, that cannot be doubted, secretly instigate their country to intervene in the Balkan conflict.

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Berlin, November 30, 1912.

. . . . There is no doubt that the Emperor, the Chancellor, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are passionately pacific.

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Berlin, November 30, 1912.

. . . . M. Sassonov has given up struggling against the Court party, which wants to draw Russia into a war, although the Russian Empire is undermined by the revolution and its military preparations are still insufficient.

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Paris, February 14, 1913.

. . . . The new President of the Republic is at present enjoying a popularity in France such as has been unknown to his predecessors. Only to mention the last two, the election of M. Loubet was rather badly received by the public and that of M. Fallières caused only indifference.

Paris, February 14, 1913.

. . . . This popularity is caused by various elements: his election has been ably prepared; it is realized that during his ministry he managed adroitly to bring France to the fore in the European concert; he used a few happy phrases which left an impression. But above all one must see in this a manifestation of that old French chauvinism which had disappeared for long years but has gained fresh force since the incidents of Agadir.

M. Poincaré is from Lorraine and misses no occasion to mention it. He was the collaborator and originator of M. Millerand's militarist policy. Finally, the first word which he pronounced on hearing of his electioin to the Presidency of the Republic was the promise to watch over the maintenance of all means of national defense.

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Paris, February 19, 1913.

. . . . The Minister does not consider the measures taken by Germany as a hostile step, but as a precautionary measure for the future. Germany feared to find herself in a conflict with Russia and France, and perhaps also with England, at a time when the help which Austria might lend her would be very much restricted by the Dual Monarchy's necessities in resisting the group of the Balkan States.

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Paris, February 21, 1913.

. . . . The news of the impending nomination of M. Delcassé as Ambassador at Petersburg burst here yesterday afternoon like a bomb. The papers reported it at the same time with the text of the message of the President of the Republic.

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Paris, February 21, 1913.

Here lies the danger of M. Poincaré's presence at the Elysée in the troubled times through which Europe is passing at present. It was under his ministry that the militarist and slightly chauvinistic instincts of the French people awoke. His hand could be seen in this change.

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Paris, March 3, 1913.

. . . . I am not in a good position here to fathom German public opinion; but I observe every day how public sentiment is daily growing more distrustful and more chauvinistic in France.

BEFORE THE WAR

Everyone you meet assures you that an early war with Germany is certain, inevitable. It is regretted but must be accepted. The demand is that all measures capable of increasing the defensive power of France be voted immediately and almost by acclamation. The most reasonable people maintain that it is necessary to arm up to the teeth in order to frighten the enemy and prevent war.

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Paris, March 3, 1913.

. . . . Last night I met M. Pichon, who repeated to me those same words: it is necessary to arm more and more to prevent war.

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Berlin, March 18, 1913.

. . . . In this they are also encouraged by the ambiguous attitude of Russia. The representatives of the Balkan States at Berlin are to-day no longer making any secret of the close ties which have never ceased to exist between their Governments and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The latter alone was informed about the alliance concluded between them and they did not march before they had Russia's approval. Russian diplomacy is, as it were, holding that of the allies in leash. From Russia they receive their instructions, from Russia they will take their orders. But Russian diplomacy itself has varied much since the beginning of the hostilities. When in a communicative mood, the French Ambassador at Berlin did not conceal from me how little one could count on the brilliant but changeable mind of the politicians who conduct the Empire allied to France, for they were playing a double game even with the latter. M. Cambon complained in particular at various times, of the influence which M. Iswolski still retained, because he was pursuing a policy of personal revenge against Austria-Hungary and would endeavor to spoil the game whenever she would seem to be on the point of winning it.

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Berlin, April 4, 1913.

. . . . The incident of Scutari is, no doubt, the gravest from the European point of view that has happened since the outbreak of the Balkan hostilities. It can be easily understood that the King of Montenegro persists in his resistance to the demands of Austria-Hungary and the pressure of the Powers. He is running the risk of losing his crown through his military failures, and has

no chance to keep it in the face of an internal revolution which will be the probable consequence of the despair of his subjects, unless they come to regard him as a victim of Austro-Hungarian policy. But he cannot continue the siege of Scutari without the co-operation of the Serbs. The arrogance and contempt with which the latter are receiving the complaints of the Cabinet of Vienna can only be explained by the support which they expect to find in St. Petersburg. The Servian Chargé d'Affairs here said recently that his Government would not have proceeded as it did for six months, regardless of the Austrian threats, if it had not been encouraged by the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, a diplomat of M. Iswolski's school. It must be admitted that the events have, so far, justified the adventurous audacity of the Cabinet of Belgrade.

It cannot be doubted that Paris is tired of these tergiversations, but France submits, though cursing them, to the consequences of the alliance and allows herself to be drawn along a path which may lead to a general war.

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Paris, April 16, 1913.

. . . . But these facts will doubtless show also—as I have repeatedly had the honor of reporting to you— that the public mind in France is becoming more and more chauvinistic and imprudent. Measures should be taken to stop this current which the Government has actually been encouraging since the incidents of Agadir and the accession of the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé Cabinet.

The Journal of this morning publishes in this connection an article by Victor Margueritte, entitled: "To the frontier," to which I take the liberty of drawing your attention.

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Paris, June 12, 1913.

Thus it is certain to-day that provisions are going to be introduced in the French legislature which the country will probably not be able to bear for a great length of time. The burdens of the new law will be so heavy for the population, the expenditure which it involves so exorbitant, that the country will soon protest, and France will be confronted with this alternative: renunciation which will be insufferable to her, or war within a short time.

The responsibility of those who have brought the country to this pass will be heavy. The people are following

them in a sort of madness, in a frenzy which is interesting but lamentable. It is forbidden to-day, on pain of being considered a traitor, to utter the slightest doubt of the necessity for the adoption of the three years' service. Everybody realizes that the nation as such is far from being in favor of the reform which is in preparation; everybody comprehends the danger which threatens the future; but one closes one's eyes and goes on.

The propaganda in favor of the three years' law by which chauvinism was to be reawakened was admirably prepared anl conducted; at the outset it helped the election of M. Poincaré to the Presidency of the Republic; it is still pursuing its work, heedless of the dangers which it entails; great uneasiness prevails in the country.

* * * *

Paris, January 16, 1914.

. . . . I have already had the honor to tell you that it was MM. Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand, and their friends who invented and followed the nationalistic, militaristic and chauvinistic policy, the revival of which we are witnessing. It is a danger for Europe—and for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril which is menacing the peace of Europe to-day; not that I have the right to suppose that the Government of the Republic intends to disturb it deliberately—I am rather inclined to believe the contrary—but because the attitude which the Barthou Cabinet has assumed is in my opinion the principal cause of the growth of militaristic tendencies in Germany.

* * * *

Paris, January 16, 1914.

. . . . M. Cailloux, who is the real Prime Minister, is known for his sentiments in favor of a rapprochement with Germany; he knows his country thoroughly and is aware of the fact that aside from the political leaders, a handful of chauvinists and people who do not dare to declare their thoughts and their preferences, the majority of the French, of the peasants, merchants, and manufacturers, are bearing only with impatience the excessive expenses and personal burdens which have been imposed on them.

* * * *

Paris, March 10, 1914.

. . . . It is not a secret to anyone that the fall of the Barthou cabinet was very painful to the President of

the Republic who did not mistake its meaning, understanding perfectly that his own person was involved. The necessity under which he found himself, owing to the defection of several politicians on whom he had believed he could count, to entrust the power to M. Caillaux while nominally investing M. Doumergue with it, put him very much out of humor. He had a strong dislike for the personality of the Minister of Finance whose worth, but also all of whose weaknesses, he knows. He saw in that necessity a check for the military and nationalistic policy which he has systematically followed from the day when he was placed at the head of the Government as Prime Minister.

Together with MM. Delcassé, Millerand, and several others, he preached incessantly the political and military rehabilitation of France, in conjunction with the closest and most intimate relations with Russia. He went to St. Petersburg as Prime Minister; he will go there again in a few months as President of the Republic.

He recently sent M. Delcassé to whom he entrusted the mission of endeavoring by all possible means to exalt the benefits of the Franco-Russian alliance, and to influence the great Empire to increase its military preparations.

* * * *

Berlin, April 24, 1914.

. . . . For us, the most interesting point in connection with the visit of the Sovereigns of Great Britain is to know whether the British Government would be as inclined to-day, as three years ago, to range itself by the side of France in the case of a conflict of the latter with Germany; we have had the proof that a co-operation of the British army and the despatching of an expeditionary corps to the Continent have been considered by the military authorities of the two countries. Would it be the same to-day and would we still have to fear the entry of British soldiers in Belgium in order to help us defend our neutrality by first compromising it?

* * * *

Paris, May 8, 1914.

. . . . It cannot be denied that the French nation has become more chauvinistic and more self-confident during the last few months. The same well-informed and competent people who, two years ago, showed lively apprehension at the mere mention of possible difficulties between France and Germany, have changed their tone to-

day. They say they are certain of victory; they make much of the progress, which is undeniable, made by the army of the Republic, and they say they are sure that at least they will be able to hold the German army in check long enough for Russia to mobilize her army, to concentrate her troops, and to throw herself on her western neighbor.

* * * *

Paris, May 8, 1914.

. . . . An experienced and high diplomat said recently: "If a grave incident were to occur one of these days between France and Germany, the statesmen of the two countries would have to exert themselves to have it peaceably settled within three days or there will be war."

* * * *

Paris, June 9, 1914.

. . . . The press campaign in favor of the three years' law was extremely violent during these last days. All means were tried to influence public opinion and it was even wanted to compromise the person of General Joffre. The French Ambassador at Petersburg has also, contrary to all custom, taken an initiative which is rather dangerous for France's future.

Is it true that the Cabinet of Petersburg imposed on France the adoption of three years' law, and that it is to-day using all its weight in order to secure its maintenance?

I have not been able to obtain any light on this delicate point, but it would be all the graver because the men who guide the destinies of the Empire of the Czar must know that the effort which is thus being demanded of the French nation is excessive and cannot be sustained for any length of time. Should the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg be based on the conviction that the events are sufficiently near at hand to use the tool which it intends to put into the hand of its ally?

* * * *

London, June 11, 1914.

. . . . The formation of the Ribot Cabinet has, consequently, been received with lively satisfaction, for it is thought that only the application of the three years' law can put the Republic in a position to fulfill the agreements which tie her to her ally, Russia, and her friend, England.

* * * *

Berlin, June 12, 1914.

. . . . It seems to-day from the spectacle which France is presenting to us that the Cabinet Barthou presumed too much on the strength and the sentiments of the country in demanding from it the reintroduction of the three year's military service, and that the Germans are right in thinking so. The French people have not on this occasion shown the patriotic abnegation of which they have given proof under other circumstances. This is doubtless due to the propagation of socialistic ideas in the lower classes of the nation. However that may be, it is a question whether the Cabinet Barthou did not act with too much precipitation; whether badly informed on the real intentions of the Imperial Government when it put the project of the law concerning the army increase on the table last year, they were right in replying at once by the law concerning the three years' service, instead of assuring themselves first that the increase of the effective strength of the German army was really an arm directed against France. In short, I believe, as Mr. von Bethmann Hollweg said from the rostrum of the Reichstag, that the danger of a Balkan Confederacy which would later on paralyze a large part of the Austrian forces was the dominant reason for the German law of 1913. Some weeks after this law was introduced, the Balkan Confederacy ceased to exist, but the Imperial Government saw itself face to face with another danger which it had not forseen: the introduction of a law augmenting the effective strength of the French army, followed by a violent campaign of speeches and newspaper articles directed against Germany.

* * * *

Berlin, June 12, 1914.

. . . . M. Barthou and M. Poincaré would, thus, perhaps have done better if they had examined with more coolness whether there was no better means of ensuring peace between France and Germany than competition in armaments and increasing effective strength, the burden of which the former is not capable of bearing as long as the latter.

Another reproach which might be made against the French supporters of the three years' service is that they constantly draw Russia into the discussion of this internal affair: Russia, whose political aims remain impenetrable, Russia who is directing the Dual Alliance to her ex-

clusive profit, Russia who is likewise and at an appaling rate increasing her armament without being threatened by Germany!

* * * *

Berlin, July 2, 1914.

. . . . What must be taken into account is the exasperation caused at Vienna by the crime, by the confession of the assassins as to the origin of the bombs which had been sent from Belgrade, and by the incautious language of some papers of that capital which tried to justify the crime in describing it is the well-deserved punishment for the oppression which Servian elements and Servian national feelings had had to suffer in Bosnia. The Pachitch Cabinet, which closed its eyes in order not to see the hot-bed of the anarchist propaganda in Belgrade, must not be surprised that it is requested to act with energy against the guilty instead of continuing to treat them with such blind tolerance.

Political History of Europe

CHAPTER XXXII

DURING THE WAR

On March 9th the House of Commons of Great Britain authorized the government to take control of the engineering trade of that country, in order to increase the output of war munitions, and on the 15th of March, Lord Kitchener, discussing the war situation in the House of Lords, expressed great anxiety over the slowness with which war materials were being manufactured in Great Britain. Up to this time the British government had not had an adequate supply of war munitions arriving in sufficient quantities, and regularly, to its field armies, which was one of the prime necessities to the successful action of those field armies.

The English working man, upon whom the Liberal party largely depends for its supply of votes, had been up to this time making more money perhaps than he had ever before done in the course of his life, and much of this he was passing into the tills of the dram shops. So great, indeed, had grown this evil, that in some portions of industrial England men only worked three days in the week, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, and spent Saturday and Sunday in getting drunk and Monday and Tuesday in sobering up. This was particularly true in the Midlands, in Yorkshire, and in the manufacturing districts of Scotland.

Necessarily the result of this abstention from labor reflected itself in the output, and those in England responsible for the conduct of the war saw that stringent measures of some sort would have to be taken to grapple with this evil. The Liberal party, however, was afraid to legislate directly against the evil, in spite of the fact that its leaders recognized it, since such legislation would affect the peculiar form of pleasure most indulged in by so many of their constituents. Various temporizing measures were proposed, but none enacted into law. Finally it was thought that the evil could be grappled

with by a social crusade against it, and the King of Great Britain, on the 31st of March, announced that he was ready to forbid the use of intoxicants in the Royal household and to give them up himself, as an example to the people of England. This example was followed by some, but not to any great extent by the classes to whom the example was intended especially to appeal. Later the King was followed by Lord Kitchener in this self denial, and a general agitation took place throughout the Kingdom along these lines.

On April 18th, for example, over ten thousand Protesttant churches observed what was known as "The King's Pledge Sunday" and many thousands of persons signed a pledge to abstain from intoxicants during the war. As against this, however, when Mr. Lloyd George, later in the month, proposed to increase the taxes on alcoholic drinks, many hundreds of thousands of British subjects protested informally through their representatives in Parliament.

On April 3rd the British government took possession of all the motor manufacturing plants, and on April 12th began the transferring of men from the working forces of the municipalities to factories making munitions of war.

During this month an organized effort was made to enroll women for war service; the women being supposed to pledge themselves to undertake various forms of labor in England which are usually done by men.

These various halting measures produced no great results.

Acute political agitation relative to the conduct of the war by the government had been for some time going on, the centers of which agitation were Mr. Winston Churchill the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Lloyd George, Field Marshal Sir John French, Lord Kitchener, and various other prominent members of the government. Space forbids giving a complete history of this movement; suffice it to say that at its real crisis the brunt of the attack was directed against Mr. Winston Churchill; he being charged as having instigated the invasion of Gallipoli Peninsula, which he was accused of mismanaging from the beginning. It then became known that the relations between Lord Fisher, a practical naval man, who was First Lord of the Admiralty, and Mr. Churchill were decidedly strained.

On May 12th, in the House of Commons, a Liberal

member asked the Prime Minister whether "in view of the war and in view of the steps necessary to be taken, in order to grapple with the re-arrangement of industrial and social life, consequent upon a prolonged struggle, he would consider the desirability of admitting into the ranks of the Ministers leading members of the various political parties in the House." To which question Mr. Asquith replied that the step suggested was "not in contemplation" and he was unaware of any public demand for such a step. This answer produced discontent, not only in the ranks of the parties opposed to the Cabinet, but also amidst its supporters, and a new alignment of parties was in process of being made when a crisis was precipitated by a cause quite independent of this political movement, the resignation of his office as First Lord of the Admiralty by Lord Fisher. The First Lord, Winston Churchill, had a tendency to assume technical responsibilities and to over-ride his expert advisors, which was the main cause in producing Lord Fisher's resignation.

There was also the prospect of a discussion of the supply of shells to the army, which was scheduled to come on before the House the week following this resignation, which was also causing the government the gravest anxiety concerning its power of continuing in office.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Asquith reversed himself in his determination not to constitute a coalition Cabinet, and, taking the bull by the horns, on May 19th announced to the House of Commons that "steps were in contemplation which involved the reconstruction of the government on a broader personal and political basis." At the same time he stated, for the benefit of the Liberals, that this reconstruction of the Cabinet was not to be taken as indicating any surrender or compromise on the part of any persons of their political purposes and ideals.

The constitution of this new coalition Cabinet took a long time, and it resulted in a Cabinet of twelve Liberals, eight Unionists, one Labor member, and Lord Kitchener. The principal changes were that Winston Churchill ceased to be the First Lord of the Admiralty, being succeeded by Mr. Balfour, a former Premier, and Mr. Churchill being translated to the rather ornamental position of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Lord Haldane left the Cabinet entirely, and the Lord Chancellorship was given to Sir S. Buckmaster. An assistant,

with equal authority, was given to Sir Edward Grey, in the person of Lord Landsdowne, who was made a Minister without Portfolio. Lord Curzon, the former Viceroy of India, became Lord Privy Seal; Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Chamberlain, the son of the famous Joseph, were given Cabinet portfolios; while Sir Edward Carson, who, at the outbreak of war, was leading the Ulsterites in their resistance of the Home Rule Bill, became Attorney General.

A new Ministry was created, that of Minister of Munitions, which was filled by Mr. Lloyd George; his place as Chancellor of the Exchequer being taken by Mr. McKenna.

The new Cabinet took office on June 11th, supported by the hopes of the public.

On June 21st a second war loan was introduced, which closed on July 10th, whereby something like £600,000,000 was realized.

On June 29th the government introduced the National Registration Bill, which had as its object to discover what the adults in the country, or what practically everyone in the United Kingdom, between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five, was already doing, and whether he or she were skilled in and able and willing to perform any other than the work in which he or she was at the time employed; and, if so, the nature of such alternative work as they could do, the object of this being to, as it were, mobilize the industrial and physical forces of the country. Great hopes were raised by the passage of this bill, which, unfortunately for Great Britain, have not been realized.

On July 15th 200,000 Welsh coal miners struck, in direct defiance of the orders issued by the government; thus showing the disorganization prevalent in England; and, in its results, showing the impotency of the government to cope with any resistance to its own laws or orders. This strike was not ended until July 25th, when, through the personal influence of Lloyd George the miners returned to work.

Signs of disintegration in the coalition Cabinet began to make themselves noticed at this time, and this disintegration and disorganization continued to grow through the summer.

In France, during April, a movement began against intoxicants, which decreased in strength later.

In Germany, at the end of March, the returns from the

second war loan showed that $2,265,000,000 had been subscribed.

On August 1st the Chancellor announced that the Teutonic Allies, after a year of war, had gained 78,385 square miles of hostile territory.

In neither France nor Germany, in this period, were there any cabinet changes of importance, nor any political events of any significance. Political events in Italy have been treated of sufficiently in the chapter devoted to Italy's going to war.

Of course, during all this period, there were rumors without number, started by the combatants, in regard to the political and economic situation of their opponents, but in hardly any case did these rumors have any substantial basis in fact.

During a considerable portion of this time the Allies were occupied in making a paper partition of the Turkish Empire, which subsequent events proved was a trifle premature. The entire period was marked by ceaseless villification of the several combatants by the others based, in some cases, upon the most impudent forgeries and the most tortured distortions of facts. It is perhaps needless to say that the American Press, as a whole, ceaselessly promulgatd any of the villifications which bore the London trade mark to its readers.

The situation in the Balkans occupied public attention for much of the time; the future actions and affiliations of those States being made the subject of much speculation. In this volume, however, the Balkan situation will not be gone into, as it will more appropriately find a place in the next, when Bulgaria's entry into the war is dealt with.

During the period under consideration numerous movements of greater or less (principally less) importance took place, looking to the establishment of peace. None of these were, however, sufficiently serious to be worthy of an extended mention. One very regrettable fact, however, was prominent in many of these attempts at re-establishing normal conditions throughout the world, which was their being undertaken and "promoted" (to use a financial word) by persons who had more their own glorification as an object than the re-establishment of peace.

Appendix

STATISTICS OF ITALY

The present constitution of Italy is an expansion of the 'Statuto fondamentale del Regno,' granted on March 4, 1848, by King Charles Albert to his Sardinian subjects. According to this charter, the executive power of the State belongs exclusively to the sovereign, and is exercised by him through responsible ministers; while the legislative authority rests conjointly in the King and Parliament, the latter consisting of two chambers —an upper one, the Senate, and a lower one, called the 'Camera de' Deputati.' The Senate is composed of the princes of the royal house who are twenty-one years of age (with the right to vote when twenty-five years of age), and of an unlimited number of members, above forty years old, who are nominated by the King for life; a condition of the nomination being that the person should either fill a high office, or have acquired fame in science, literature, or any other pursuit tending to the benefit of the nation, or, finally, should pay taxes to the annual amount of 3000 lire, or £120.

In 1914 there were 404 senators exclusive of six members of the royal family. The electoral law of June 30, 1912, made the suffrage almost universal for men 21 years of age, only denying the franchise to those younger than 30 who have neither performed their military service nor learnt to read and write. The number of deputies is 508, or 1 to every 71,000 of the population (census 1911). In 1913 the number of enrolled electors was 8,672,249 (24 per 100 inhabitants without distinction of sex or age) exclusive of the electors temporarily disfranchised on account of military service. For electoral purposes the whole of the Kingdom is divided into 508 electoral colleges or districts, and these again into several sections. No deputy can be returned to Parliament unless he has obtained a number of votes greater than one-tenth of the total number of inscribed electors, and than half the votes given. A deputy must be thirty years old. and have the requisites demanded by the electoral law. Incapable of being elected are all salaried Government officials, as well as all persons ordained for the priesthood and filling clerical charges, or receiving pay from

the State. Officers in the army and navy, ministers, under-secretaries of State, and various other classes of functionaries high in office, may be elected, but their number must never be more than 40, not including the ministers and the under-secretaries of State. Deputies are to receive £240 annually of which £160 will be direct payment, and the remainder will be represented by a current account with the railways and post office, defraying travelling and postal expenses.

Lower House, elected October, 1913; Constitutionalists, 318; Radicals, 70; Republicans, 16; Socialists, 77; Syndicalists, 3; and Catholics, 24.

The duration of a Parliament is five years, and it must meet annually; but the King has the power to dissolve the lower House at any time, being bound only to order new elections, and convoke a new meeting within four months. Each of the chambers has the right of introducing new bills, the same as the Government; but all the money bills must originate in the House of Deputies. The ministers have the right to attend the debates of both the upper and the lower House; but they have no vote unless they are members. No sitting is valid unless an absolute majority of the members are present.

The executive power is exercised, under the King, by a ministry divided into 12 departments which are:

President of the Council and Minister of the Interior.
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Minister for the Colonies.
Minister of Justice and of Ecclesiastical Affairs.
Minister of the Treasury.
Minister of Finance.
Minister of War.
Minister of Marine.
Minister of Public Instruction.
Minister of Public Works.
Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce.
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.

The administrative divisions of Italy are provinces, territories (circondari), districts and communes. There are 69 provinces: of which 60 are divided only into territories (circondari), 5 into territories and districts and four only into districts (the districts being found in the province of Mantua and the 8 provinces of Venetia). There are 205 territories and 71 districts. The districts have been de facto suppressed, though still nominally

existing as administrative divisions. The territories and districts are divided into communes.

In 1914 (January 1) there were 8339 communes. The two principal elective local administrative bodies are the communal councils and the provincial councils. According to the law of May 21, 1908 (amended June 19, 1913), each commune has a communal council, a municipal council and a syndic. Both the communal councils and the municipal councils vary according to the population, the members of the latter being selected by the former from among themselves. The syndic is the head of the communal administration, and is a Government official; he is elected by the communal council from among its own members, by secret vote. Each province has a provincial council and a provincial commission, the numbers varying according to population. The council elects its president and other officials. The provincial commission is elected by the council from its own members. It conducts the business of the province when the latter is not sitting. Both communal and provincial councillors are elected for 4 years. The communal council meets twice and the provincial once a year in ordinary session, though they may be convened for extraordinary purposes. All communal electors are eligible to the council execpt those having an official or pecuniary interest in the commune. Electors must be Italian citizens resident in the province, twenty-one years of age, able to read and write, be on the Parliamentary electoral list, or pay a direct annual contribution to the commune of any nature or comply with other conditions of a very simple character.

In 1911 the number of enrolled Administrative electors was 4,011,038 (11.2 percent. of population), As a result of the amended law of June 19, 1913, the number of these electors will be very considerably increased.

The following figures show the increase of the population of the present territory of the Kingdom of Italy from 1816 onwards in round numbers:—

Year (Jan. 1)	Population	Year (Jan. 1)	Population
1816	18,383,000	1882	28,460,000
1848	23,618,000	1901	32,475,000
1862	25,000,000	1911	34,671,377
1872	26,801,000		

The number of foreigners in Italy in 1901 was 61,606; 11,616 were Austrians, 10,757 Swiss, 6,953 French, 8,768 English, 10,745 Germans, 1,503 Russians, 2,907 Americans (United States), 763 Greeks, 1,400 Spaniards, and

the rest mainly Turks, Belgians, Swedes and Norwegians, Dutch, Egyptians, Argentines, Brazilians.

The population of Italy is in general perfectly homogeneous. According to statistics of 1901, the exceptions are: about 80,200 of French origin; 11,400 of Teutonic origin; 90,000 of Albanian origin; 31,200 of Greek origin; 9,800 of Spanish (Catalan) origin; 30,000 Slavs.

The population over 15 years of age in 1911 was 22,817,755; of these 8,039,129 were unmarried, 12,613,993 were married, 2,147,325 were widowers or widows, and 17,308 were returned as State unkown . Of the whole population, 19,789,718 or 57.3 percent. were unmarried; 12,629,930 or 36.5 percent. were married; 2,151,168 or 6.2 percent. were widowers or widows, and 100,961 were returned as State unknown.

Number of proprietors in Italy, 1901: proprietors of lands, 1,045,113; of building, 823,442; of lands and building, 2,241,578; total, 4,110,133. Proprietors of lands and building (4,110,133), per 100 of population, 12.7; proprietors of lands (3,286,691), per square mile, 29.7.

The Roman Catholic Church is, nominally, the ruling State religion of Italy; but the power of the Church and clergy is subordinated to the civil government, and there is freedom of worship to the adherents of all recognized religions.

The census returns of 1901 were as follows:—

Profession	Total	Per cent.
Roman Catholic	31,539,863	97.12
Evangelical Protestant	65,595	0.20
Greek Church	2,472	0.01
Israelite	35,617	0.11
Other professions	338	...
Not professing any religion ..	36,092	0.11
Not known	795,276	2.45
	32,475,253	100.00

Of the Protestants, 22,500 belonged to the Waldensian Church of Piedmont, about 10,000 to the other evangelical Italian Churches, and 30,000 to foreign Protestant bodies.

The suppression of the religious corporations began in 1855, and was completed by the law of June 19,1873, which extended the measure to the city and province of Rome. The method followed was simply the abolition of the legal status of religious corporations, so that they could not hold property. Thus mortmain land was set

free for agriculture and for buying and selling, while the State profited by relief from burdens and by direct taxation of the land thus freed from mortmain. Dispossessed monks and nuns received life pensions; houses which had been used for schools or for hospitals, etc., were, with restrictions, made over to the communes; in Rome, the hospitals, etc., were assigned to the various charitable institutions; everywhere the churches of the corporations necessary for public worship were preserved, as were monumental, artistic, and other corporation buildings. Of the monastic edifices some were occupied by the State, others assigned to communes or provinces. The corporations of Lombardy were privileged by the treaty of Zurich, and their lands and houses were left to the disposal of their individual members. All other immovable corporation property was sold, but the equivalent revenue (after certain deductions, including a 30 per cent. tax) was inscribed in the public debt book. The administration of the revenue from the proceeds of land destined for charity or instruction now belongs to the communes; that from monastic parish church property in Rome, to the parish churches; that from property of foreign religious orders, in Rome (400,000 lire) to the Holy See; while the remainder is administered by two institutes which pay the pensions and other dues, and provide (1) for beneficent work and for worship in Rome, and (2) for worship in the rest of Italy.

The State regulates public instruction, and maintains, either entirely or in conjunction with the communes and provinces, public schools of every grade. Every teacher must have the qualifications required by law.

Schools in Italy may be classified under four heads, according as they provide: (1) elementary instruction; (2) secondary instruction—classical; (3) secondary instruction—technical; (4) higher education.

The total Budget of State funds by the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1912-13 was £5,618,738 (of which £27,934 was extraordinary); as much more being provided by communes, provinces, foundations, etc.

In the last 46 years there has been an increase of 156 per cent. in school attendance.

Percentage of illiterates:—

	Over 6 years		Over 21 years	
Year	Male	Female	Male	Female
1911	32.6	42.4	34.7	48.5

According to the census of 1911 the smallest percentage of illiterates above six years was in Piedmont, male

9.1, female 12.8 (male and female 69.6), Since then there has been much improvement, and now there are circondari (arrondissements), e.g. Domodossola Pallanza, and Varallo in the province of Novara, and others in the provinces of Turin, Como, Cuneo, etc., where all young people twenty years of age can read and write.

Statistics of various classes of schools:—

	Elementary Schools				Secondary Schools	
			Pupils			
	Number	Teachers	Male	Female	Total	
Asili for infants (1907-08) .	3,576	7,392	—	—	343,563	
Public schools (1907-08) ...	61,497	61,944	—	—	3,002,168	
Private do. (1907-1908)	6,534	8,130	—	—	148,081	
Evening Etc., do. (1907-08).	4,783		148,233	34,140	182,373	
Government Schools (1910-11):—						
Normal schools	130		3,323	34,589	37,912	
Ginnasi	291		33,604	4,440	38,053	
Licei	159		13,551	791	14,342	
Technical schools	331		62,776	19,630	82,406	
Technical institutes	77		19,139	1,573	20,712	
Mercantile marine institutes	20		1,496	—	496	
Private (1909-10):—						
Normal schools	140		2	3,460	3,462	
Ginnasi	198		7,883	143	8,026	
Licei	62		1,328	—	1,328	
Technical schools	180		5,784	1,248	7,032	
Technical institutes	25		892	14	906	

STATISTICS

Italy has 5 courts of Cassation, (4 of which have jurisdiction exclusively in civil matters), and is divided for the administration of justice into 20 appeal court districts, subdivided into 162 tribunal districts, and these again into mandamenti, each with its own magistracy (Pretura), 1535 in all. In 12 of the principal towns there are also Pretori urbani (14) who have jurisdiction exclusively in penal matters. For civil business, besides the magistracy above-mentioned, Concilatori, have jurisdiction in petty plaints.

In Italy legal charity, in the sense of a right in the poor to be supported by the parish or commune, or of an obligation of the commune to relieve the poor does not exist. Public charity in general is exercised through the permanent charitable foundations, called 'Opere pie,' regulated by the law of July 17, 1890.

Direct taxes are those on lands, on houses and on incomes derived from movable capital and labor. The tax on lands, amounts to about 96 million lire. That on houses is at the rate of 12.5 per cent. (with three-tenths additional) of the amount taxable which is two-thirds of the real annual value in the case of factories, and three-fourths in the case of dwelling houses. The tax on incomes from movable wealth was raised to 20 percent. of the amount taxable. The amount taxable in the case of incomes varies from the whole income to fifteen-fortieths according to various conditions. The communes and provinces also tax lands and buildings. The State grants to the communes one-tenth of the proceeds of the tax on incomes as compensation for other communal revenues made over to the State by various laws.

The principal indirect taxes are: the customs duties, the octroi, the taxes on manufactures, the salt and tobacco monopolies, lotto.

Total revenue and expenditure for 1912-1913:

Total Revenue Lire	Total Expenditure Lire	Difference Lire
2,698,620,121	2,615,208,705	83,411,416

The capital (nominal) of the consolidated and redeemable debt amounted to 13,329,361,597 lire.

In the financial year 1911-12 the revenue from the State property was:—Railways, 32,498,614 lire; ecclesiastical, 511,051 lire; from fixed capital, 8,718,928 lire; from the Cavour Canals, 3,165,725 lire; various, 4,909,-541.

The extent of the land frontier of Italy is as follows: French frontier 300 miles; Swiss 418; Austro-Hungar-

ian 484; frontier of San Marino 24; in all (exclusive of San Marino) 1202 miles. The coast line of the peninsula measures 2,052 miles; of Sicily, 630; of Sardinia, 830; of Elba and the small islands, 648; the total length of coast is thus 4160 miles.

On the Continental frontier of Italy the principal passes of the Alps are defended by fortifications. The basin of the Po is also studded with fortified places, the chief strong places in the region are the following: Cassale, Piacenza, Verona, Mantua (these two belong to the old Austrian Quadrilatral), Venice, Alessandria. On the coasts and islands are the following fortified places: Vado, Genoa, Spezia, Monte Argentaro, Gaeta; works in the Straits of Messina, Taranto. To the north of Sardinia a group of fortified islands form the naval station of Maddalena. Rome is protected by a circle of forts.

Service in the army (or navy) is compulsory and universal. The total period is 19 years, beginning at the age of twenty. The young men of the year are divided into three categories; the first being posted to the permanent army; the second also to the permanent army but with 'unlimited leave'; and the third, that is those exempted from active service, to the territorial militia. The second catègory men form what is called the 'complementary force'.

The term of service in the ranks of the permanent army is two years for all arms. After passing through the ranks, the men are placed on 'unlimited leave,' i. e., they are transferred to the reserve, in which they remain until they have completed a total of eight years' service. From the reserve the soldier passes to the mobile militia, the term of service in which is four years. After completing his time in the mobile militia he is transferred to the territorial militia, in which he remains seven years; thus finishing his military service at the age of 39.

The second category recruits are regarded as belonging to the permanent army for the first eight years of their service. During this period they receive from two to six months' training, which may be spread over several years. They then pass to the mobile militia, and afterwards to the territorial militia, the periods of service in each being the same as in the case of the first category soldiers. The men allotted to the third cate-

gory, who are posted at once to the territorial militia, receive 30 days' training.

In Italy each regiment receives recruits from all parts of the country, and the troops change their stations by brigades every four years. On mobilization regiments would be filled up by reservists from the districts in which they are quartered at the time. Reliefs are so arranged that at least half the reservists shall have previously served in the unit which they would join on mobilization.

The field army consists of 12 army corps and three cavalry divisions. The army corps consist of two divisions, except the IXth army corps, in the Roman district, which has an additional division. There are two brigades of infantry each consisting of two regiments of three battalions, and a regiment of field artillery (five batteries) to each division, which has a war strength of 14,156 officers and men, 1399 horses, and 30 guns. There is a regiment of field artillery (six batteries of six guns), two or three heavy batteries, a cavalry regiment, and a regiment of Bersaglieri, to each army corps. Cavalry divisions each consist of two brigades of two regiments, and of two horse artillery batteries.

Each regiment of Bersaglieri (light infantry) consists of three battalions of infantry and one battalion of cyclists, the cyclists being intended to supplement the cavalry in the field. The Alpini are frontier troops, specially organized to defend the mountain passes leading into Italy; the consist of eight regiments (26 battalions) of Alpine infantry, and two regiments of 36 mountain artillery batteries. There are, furthermore, one regiment of horse artillery of eight batteries, two regiments of heavy artillery of 10 batteries each, and 10 regiments of fortress artillery: The engineers are organized as six regiments: two consist of pioneers, one of pontoon troops, one of telegraph troops, one of sappers and miners, and one of railway troops. The aeronautical service consists of a "specialist battalion" of five companies, of an experimental section, of a "flying battalion" of two companies, and of a growing number of field squadrons of seven aeroplanes each.

The Carabinieri are a force of military police. They are recruited by selection from the army, and they remain in the ranks of the force until they have completed three years' service. They then serve in the reserve of the carabinieri for four years, after which they are trans-

ferred to the territorial militia for the remainder of their service, and are reckoned as a part of the army.

The strength of the field army (12 army corps and independent cavalry) is about 400,000 combatants. The nominal strength of the mobile militia is 326,000, but the numbers put into the field would not perhaps exceed 200,000. The 'complementary' troops should be sufficient to maintain the strength of the first line and mobile militia in the field. The territorial militia is strong numerically, but only about half the number, viz.: the first category men who have passed through the army and mobile militia could be made use of, should its services ever be required.

The arm of the Italian infantry is the Mannlicher Carcano rifle, a magazine weapon of 6.5 m. m. calibre. The territorial militia has the old Vetterli. The field artillery is being rearmed with the De Port gun and carriage, calibre 7.5 cm., model 1912.

The following table gives the peace establishment of the Italian army in 1913, exclusive of troops in Africa—

	Officers	Men	Horses and Mules
Administration, staff, military schools, etc.	1,284	1,952	2,442
Infantry, 389 battalions, and 88 district headquarters	7,627	162,000	6,205
Cavalry, 150 squadrons, and 29 depots	1,006	27,416	25,467
Artillery, 263 batteries, 110 companies, 51 depots, etc.	2,359	49,256	23,084
Engineers, 82 companies and 10 companies engineer train	630	11,099	1,284
Medical, 12 companies	769	3,712	81
Commissariat, 12 companies	452	3,978	420
Carabineers, 12 legions	709	30,087	5,362
Total	15,172	289,500	64,345

The total military budget of Italy for 1913-14 amounted to £14,222,000. In 1908, extra credit of no less than £8,920,000 was granted, to be spread over nine years; this amount was to be spent on the re-armament of the artillery, guns for permanent works, fortifications, railways, barracks, mobilization stores, and horses.

The Italian navy estimates for financial years ending June 30th were:—

	£		£
1911-12 . .	7,802,488	1909-10 . .	6,685,440
1910-11 . .	6,950,988	1908-09 . .	6,335,880

STATISTICS

For the purpose of local naval administration and defence the Italian littoral is divided into three departments: 1, Spezia; 2, Naples; 3, Venice; 4, Taranto. The vessels are apportioned, for administrative purposes, between the four departments. There are torpedo stations all round the Italian coasts, the head stations being at Genoa, Spezia, Maddalena, Gaeta, Messina, Taranto, Brindisi, Ancona, and Venice.

Summary of the Italian navy:—

	Completed at end of 1913	1914	1915
Dreadnoughts	3	4	6
Pre-Dreadnoughts	11	8	8
Armored cruisers	10	9	9
Protected cruisers	12	13	16
Torpedo gunboats, etc.	10	10	10
Destroyers	35	35	46
Torpedo Boats	86	86	..
Submarines	20	25	..

DREADNOUGHTS

Date of Design	Name	Displacement tons	Armor Belt inches	Armor Guns inches	Main Armament	Torpedo tubes	Indicated horse power	Max. speed knots
1909	Dante Alighieri	19,000	9½	9½	12 12-in.; 20 4.7-in.	3	34,000	24
	Conte di Cavour							
1910	Giulio Cesare	21,500	9¾	9½	13 12-in.; 18 4.7-in.	3	24,000	22.5
	Leonardo da Vinci							
1912	Duilio	21,500	9¾	9½	13 12-in.; 18 6-in.	3	28,000	23
	Andrea Doria							
1914	4 New	30,000	13		8 15-in.			25

PRE-DREADNOUGHTS

1894	A. di Saint-Bon	9,800	10	10	4 10-in.; 8 6-in.;		14,296	18
	E. Filiberto				8 4.7-in.	4	13,552	
1897	Benedetto Brin	13,427	6	8	4 12-in.; 4 8-in.;		20,475	
	Regina Margherita				12 6-in.	4	19,822	21
	Vittorio Emanuele						19,000	
1901	Regina Elena	12,625	10	8	2 12-in.; 12 8-in.	2	19,298	22
	Napoli						19,000	
	Roma						20,000	

ARMORED CRUISERS

1890	Marco Polo	4,583	4		6 6-in; 10 4.7-in.	4	10,643	17.5
1890	Vettor Pisani	6,500	6		12 6-in.; 6 4.7-in.	4	13,219	18
	Carlo Elberto							
1897	Varese	7,350	6		1 10-in.; 2 8 in.;	4	13,885	20
	F. Ferruccio				14 6-in.		13,635	
	S. Giorgio	9,833					18,000	
1904	S. Marco		8	6½	4 10-in; 8 7.5-in.	3	20,000	22.5
	Pisa	10,118					19,000	

STATISTICS

The personnel consists of 1927 officers (comprising one admiral, 23 vice and rear-admirals, 232 captains and commanders, 444 lieutenants, 218 sub-lieutenants and midshipmen, 108 engineer-constructors, 312 engineers, 259 sanitary officers, 200 commissariat officers, 157 officers of the Corpo Reale Equipaggi); and 38,000 men (sailors, gunners, mechanicians, etc.) Both naval and military officers are attached indifferently to the aerial service.

The systems of cultivation in Italy may be reduced to three:—1. The system of peasant proprietorship (coltivazione per econmia o a mano propria); 2. That of partnership (colnia parziaria); 3. That of rent (affitto). Peasant proprietorship is most common in Piedmont and Liguria, but is found in many other parts of Italy. The system of partnership or colonia parziaria, more especially in the form of mezzadria, consists in a form of partnership between the proprietor and the cultivator. This system is general in Tuscany, the Marches, and Umbria. It is almost unknown in the Basilicata, little practised in Apulia, Calabria, and Sardinia, and has been entirely abandoned in the two most advanced centres of cultivation in the South, viz:—Barese and the province of Naples. Various modifications of the system exist in different parts of Italy. The system of rent (affitto) exists in Lombardy and Venetia.

In the census of February 10, 1901, there were 6,411,001 males and 3,200,002 females of nine years of age and upwards described as engaged in agriculture.

The area of Italy comprises 70,811,000 acres. Of this area, 51,309,310 acres are under crops and 11,272,339 acres are forests.

The principal crops for 1912 were as follows:—

	Acreage	Produce in cwts
Wheat	11,745,838	88,754,293
Barley	603,421	3,600,195
Oats	1,253,772	8,085,335
Rye	304,674	2,641,848
Maize	3,935,945	49,320,404
Rice	359,385	8,648,732
Beans	1,474,825	7,914,721
Various Pulses	1,852,500	4,624,464
Potatoes[1]	711,854	1,507,969
Sugar Beetroot[1]	133,380	1,714,987
Vines	11,022,368	131,523,700
Olives	5,712,122	11,998,025

[1]Produce in tons.

STATISTICS

In 1912 Italy exported 42,951 and imported 55,896 cattle; exported 34,092 and imported 2,803 sheep; exported 621 and imported 572 goats; exported 23,904 and imported 1,935 swine.

Silk culture, though flourishing most extensively in Piedmont and Lombardy, is carried on all over Italy. The average annual production of silk cocoons in the five years, 1909-13, is estimated at 50,800,000 kilogrammes, and of silk, at 5,118,000 kilogrammes (in 1876, 1,293,000 kilos.). In 1913 the estimated silk cocoon crop was 82,000 kilogrammes, as against 47,470,000 kilogrammes in 1912.

In the year 1898-99 there were only four sugar factories, with an output of 5,972 metric tons; in 1911-12 there were 37, their output being 158,663 tons.

The value of the output of industrial chemical products in 1912 was 181,000,000 lire (in 1893, 26,134,000 lire).

The forest area (exclusive of chestnut plantations) is about 4,000,000 hectares. The yield from the forests is valued at 124,132,000 lire (£4,965,280.)

Production in metric tons (1 metric ton=2,204 lbs., or 1,016 metric tons=1,000 English tons) of metallic ores and other minerals in 1912.

Ores, Etc.	Productive mines	Metric tons	Lire	Workers
Iron	27	582,066	12,406,837	1,730
Manganese	5	2,641	99,160	121
Copper	7	86,001	1,583,921	798
Zinc		149,776	18,286,272	
Lead	94	41,680	7,785,369	14,797
Lead and zinc		300	5,400	
Silver	1	27	77,200	68
Gold	2	2,366	66,356	78
Antimony, argentiferous	2	1,878	112,245	294
Mercury	8	88,200	4,370,400	945
Iron and cuprous pyrites	11	277,585	5,966,819	2,400
Mineral fuel	42	663,812	6,111,004	3,927
Sulphur ore	358	2,504,408	29,600,684	17,226
Asphaltic and bituminous substances	18	181,946	3,012,348	1,784
Boric acid	7	2,309	900,510	464
Totals (including graphite, petroleum and other minerals)	656	.....	94,213,223	46,064[1]

[1]Exclusive of 2,153 workers in non-productive mines. Of the total number of workers, 1,558 were female.

STATISTICS

On December 31, 1911, the number of vessels and boats employed in fishing was 28,402, with an aggregate tonnage of 78,981. These numbers include 47 boats of 458 tons engaged in coral fishing. There were 127,792 fishermen, of whom 6,447 were engaged in deep-sea or foreign fishing. The value of the fish caught in 1911 (excluding foreign fishing) was estimated at 24,265,000 lire; the value obtained from tunny-fishing was 4,111,000 lire and from coral fishing 75,320 lire, the quantity being estimated at 8,456 kilogrammes.

NAVIGATION AND SHIPPING

	Sailing Vessels			Steam Vessels		Total	
	No.	Tons		No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Over 2,000 tons..	5	10,695	Over 5,000 tons	11	58,190	11	58,190
1,001 to 2,000 tons	120	168,574	3,001—5,000 tons	44	157,992	44	157,992
501 to 1,000 tons	91	68,395	2,001—3,000 tons	74	179,926	79	190,621
101 to 500 tons	352	68,679	1,001—2,000 tons	145	210,235	265	378,809
1 to 100 tons	4,145	94,684	501—1,000 tons	76	54,199	167	122,594
			101— 500 tons	117	30,979	469	99,658
			1 to 100 tons	290	5,473	4,435	100,121
Total	4,713	410,991	Total....	757	696,994	5,470	1,107,985

STATISTICS

The Italian industrial census of June 10th, 1911 is as follows: Establishments, 243,985; the number of employees, 2,305,698; and the aggregate horse-power, 1,573,774.

COMMERCE

Year	Special trade (in sterling exclusive of precious metal) Imports	Exports	Precious Metals (in sterling) Imports	Exports
1912	144,164,000	95,846,000	1,036,000	1,659,000
1913	145,511,000	100,157,000	841,000	3,211,000

Length of State railways 8,540 miles (June 30th, 1913); all the railway lines 11,015 miles.

In 1911-12 the total receipts were 574,570,293 lire; in 1912-13, 604,381,000 lire (provisional).

In the year 1911 there were 10,238 post offices.

On June 30, 1911, the telegraph lines had a length of 31,726 miles, and the wires, 193,182 miles. There were 7,882 telegraph offices, of which 5,944 were State offices and 1,938 railway offices. There were, in the year, 15,-240,129 private telegrams sent inland; and 1,646,761 private international telegrams.

The telephone service in 1911 had 76,061 abonnés. There were 237 urban systems and 499 inter-urban systems with 19,439 miles of line and 37,761 miles of wire. Total number of conversations in the year 5,432,372. In 1907 the telephone service passed to the direct working of the State.

State notes and bank notes in circulation in lire:—

STATE NOTES 1908	1909	1910	1911	1912
435,671,090	432,924,715	442,119,195	485,290,695	498,973,615
BANK NOTES				
1908	1909	1910	1911	1912
1,862,557,800	1,931,663,450	2,026,847,950	2,193,381,850	2,212,381,000

There is no national bank in Italy. According to the law of August 10, 1893, there are only three banks of issue: the Banca d'Italia, the Banca di Napoli, the Banca di Sicilia. Assets and liabilities of those banks on December 31, 1912:

STATISTICS

ASSETS

	Lire
Cash and Reserve	1,624,557,088
Bills	802,827,022
Anticipations	170,253,717
Credits	138,370,360
Deposits	2,855,447,602
Various securities	567,678,478
Total	6,159,114,267

LIABILITIES

	Lire
Capital	302,000,000
Notes in Circulation	2,212,381,000
Accounts current, etc.	331,627,753
Titles and valuables deposited	2,855,447,602
Various	457,657,912
Total	6,159,114,267

On January 30, 1912, there were 862 co-operative credit societies and popular banks, 1,140 rural banks, 207 ordinary credit companies, and seven agrarian credit institutions, and (January, 1913) 11 crédit foncier companies, of which four were in liquidation, with 719,422,250 lire of 'cartelle fondiarie' in circulation, and with 649,092,867 lire of 'mutui conammortamento.'

The following table gives statistics of the savings banks at the end of 1912:—

	Offices	Depositors	Total Deposits Lire	Deposits during year Lire	Repayments during year Lire
Post-office savings banks	9,799	5,780,010	1,948,561,882	965,512,895	889,319,895
Ordinary savings banks	186	2,363,832	2,492,046,838	1,216,589,799	1,187,178,180

On December 31, 1912, the savings deposited with the co-operative credit societies amounted to 705,711,116, and ordinary credit companies to 560,730,438 lire.

On August 12, 1912, a law came into operation establishing life assurance as a State monopoly. The existing insurance companies were allowed to continue their operations for 10 years under certain conditions. The State activities in connection with life insurance is guided by the National Insurance Institute.

The money, weights, and measures of Italy are the same as those of France the names only being altered to the Italian form.

The lira of 100 centesimi; intrinsic value, 25.22-½s. to £1 sterling.

The coin in circulation consists of gold 10-lire and 20-lire pieces; of silver 50 cent. 1-lire, 2-lire, and 5-lire pieces; nickel 20 cent. pieces, and bronze 1, 2, 5, and 10 cent. pieces. Nickel coin is being substituted for bronze to a large amount. Bank notes of 50, 100, 500 and 1,000 lire are in circulation, also small notes, issued by the State, for 5, 10, and 25 lire.

The Italian possessions in the Red Sea are constituted as the Colony Eritrea with an area of about 45,800 square miles, and a population estimated at 450,000.

Another possession is the Colony and Protectorates of Italian Somaliland which has an area of 139,430 square miles and a population of about 400,000. They extend along the east coast of Africa. The principal occupation of the people is cattle raising.

The Italian concessions of Tientsin under the agreement with China of June 7, 1902 lies on the left bank of the Peiho and had an area of about 18 square miles with a native population of about 17,000. It contains a village and salt-pits.

Tripoli fell under Turkish domination in the Sixteenth century and, though in 1714, the Arab population secured some measure of independence, the country was in 1835 proclaimed a Turkish villayet. In September, 1911, a quarrel broke out between Turkey and Italy, and the latter invaded Tripoli and established an army there. On Nov. 5, 1911, a decree was issued annexing Tripoli, and on February 23, 1912, the Italian chamber passed the bill which ratified the decree of annexation, and in October 18, 1912, the Treaty of Ouchy was signed, by which the sovereignty of Italy in Tripoli was established. The entire territory is estimated at about 406,000 square miles and a population of about 523,176 natives.

LIST OF SHIPS SUNK BY SUBMARINES.

FEBRUARY.

Date and Name.	Nationality.	Tons.
18—Dinorah,	French	4,208
20—Belridge,	Norwegian	7,000
20—Cambank,	English	3,112
20—Downshire,	English	365
23—Oakby,	English	1,976
24—Regin,	Norwegian	1,844
24—Western Coast,	English	487
24—Deptford,	English	1,008

APPENDIX

Date and Name.	Nationality.	Tons.
24—Harpalion,	English	5,867
24—Rio Parana,	English	4,015
24—Branksome Chine,	English	2,026
MARCH.		
5—Noorsedyk,	Dutch	2,118
7—Bengrove,	English	3,840
9—Princess Victoria,	English	1,108
9—Tangistan,	English	3,738
9—Blackwood,	English	1,230
9—Gris Nez,	French	208
11—Auguste Consell,	English	2,952
11—Floranza,	English	4,600
11—Adenwen,	English	3,798
12—Haana,	Swedish	372
12—Headlands,	English	2,988
12—Andalusian,	English	2,346
12—Indian City,	English	4,645
13—Hartdale,	English	3,839
13—Invergyle,	English	1,794
14—Atlanta,	English	519
15—Fingal,	English	1,567
15—Durham Castle,	English	8,228
16—Leeuwarden,	English	990
16—Hyndford,	English	4,286
17—Glenartney,	English	5,201
17—Rivaulx Abbey,	English	1,166
18—Bluejacket,	English	3,515
19—Beeswing,	English	2,002
21—Cairntorr,	English	3,588
21—Concord,	English	2,861
24—Delmira,	English	3,459
27—Medea,	Dutch	1,235
27—Falaba,	English	4,860
27—Aguila,	English	2,114
28—Vosges,	English	1,095
29—Flaminian,	English	3,500
30—Crown of Castile,	English	4,505
31—The Emma,	French	1,617
31—Seven Seas,	English	632
APRIL.		
1—Jason,	English	176
1—Nov,	Norwegian	137
1—Gloxinia,	English	145
1—The Nellie,	English	109
2—Lockwood,	English	1,143
2—Southpoint,	English	3,837
2—Pacquerette,	French	400
4—Olivine,	English	634

Date and Name.	Nationality.	Tons.
4—Hermes,	Russian	1,019
4—City of Bremen,	English	782
5—Northlands,	English	2,776
5—Acantha,	English	171
7—Zarina,	English	154
8—Chateaubriand,	French	2,247
9—General de Sonis,	English	2,190
9—Elmina,	English	4,792
10—Hapalyce,	English	5,940
10—The President,	English	647
11—Frederick Franck,	French	973
12—Wayfarer,	English	9,509
14—Ptarmigan,	English	780
14—Rapid,	English	170
14—Resto,	English	169
14—Rio,	English	117
14—Mercia,	English	175
14—Ferret,	English	157
14—Stirling,	English	165
14—Horatio,	English	174
14—Argentina,	English	177
18—Ellispontos,	Greek	2,989
18—Vanilla	English	158
21—Frack,	Russian	210
21—Envoy,	English	156
22—Ruth,	English	3,461
22—St. Lawrence,	English	196
26—Recolo,	English	176
28—Lilidale,	English	129
28—Embla,	English	161
28—Mobile,	English	1,915
29—Eildon,	English	608
29—Chorbury,	English	3,220
29—Laila,	Norwegian	753
MAY.		
1—Edale,	English	3,110
1—Ellida,	Swedish	1,124
1—Svorono,	Russian	3,102
2—Baldwin,	Norweigan	599
2—Europe,	French	4,769
2—America,	Norwegian	2,305
2—Fulgent,	English	2,008
2—Columbia,	English	118
2—Sunray,	English	165
2—Cruiser (trawler),	English	155
2—Martaban,	English	148
2—Elsa,	Swedish	1,180
2—Mercury,	English	222
2—St. George,	English	229

APPENDIX

Date and Name.	Nationality.	Tons.
2—St. Louis,	English	211
2—Aberdon,	English	497
2—Emblem,	English	157
3—Iolanthe,	English	180
3—Hero,	English	173
3—Northward Ho,	English	180
3—Hector,	English	179
3—Progress,	English	273
3—Couguet,	English	176
3—Bob White,	English	180
3—Scottish Queen,	English	125
4—Rugby,	English	205
4—Uxbridge,	English	164
4—Sceptre,	English	166
5—Stratton,	English	383
5—Minterne,	English	3,018
5—Earl of Latham,	English	132
5—Cathay,	Danish	4,070
6—Candidate,	English	5,858
6—Centurion,	English	5,945
6—Truro,	English	836
6—Merry Islington,	English	147
6—Don,	English	168
7—Lusitania,	English	31,550
7—Bennington,	English	131
8—Queen Wilhelmina,	English	3,590
8—Hellenic,	English	180
8—Drumcree,	English	4,052
19—Dumfries,	English	4,121
19—Lucerne,	English	198
20—Chrysolyte,	English	222
20—St. Georges,	French	165
20—Crimond,	English	173
22—Minerva,	Norwegian	2,413
26—Morwena,	English	——
26—Betty,	Danish	1,267
28—Ethiope,	English	3,794
28—Tullochmoor,	English	3,520
29—Dixiana,	English	4,127
30—Soborg,	Danish	1,333
30—Glenlee,	English	2,650
30—Cysne,	Portuguese	623
30—Mars,	Russian	234
	JUNE.	
1—Saidieh,	English	1,984
2—Victoria,	English	210
2—Cubano,	Norwegian	2,805
2—Delta B,	Belgian	220
3—Hirold,	English	183

APPENDIX

Date and Name.	Nationality.	Tons.
3—Horace,	English	141
3—Economy,	English	183
3—Penfeld,	French	794
3—Lappland,	Swedish	1,417
3—Cyrus,	English	1,032
3—Iona,	English	2,085
3—Chrysoprasus,	English	119
3—Lowestoft,	English	172
4—Eben Ezer,	English	83
4—Ena May,	English	110
4—Strathbran,	English	163
4—George and Mary,	English	110
4—Kathleen,	English	198
4—Evening Star,	English	120
4—Cortes,	English	174
4—Sunnet Head,	English	371
5—Dogberry,	English	213
5—Persimmon,	English	255
5—Gazehound,	English	138
5—Curlew,	English	134
5—Bardolph,	English	215
6—Arctic,	English	169
6—Sunlight,	English	168
6—Star of West,	English	64
6—Dromio,	English	208
6—Adolf,	Russian	594
7—Menapier,	Belgian	1,425
7—Trudvang,	Norwegian	640
7—Superb,	Norwegian	1,393
7—Glittertind,	Norwegian	376
7—Pentland,	English	183
7—Saturn,	English	60
7—Nottingham,	English	1,033
8—Cardiff,	English	163
8—Qui Vive,	English	170
8—Edward,	English	146
9—Lady Salisbury,	English	889
9—Erna Boldt,	English	210
9—Letty,	English	339
9—Tunisian,	English	4,220
9—Castor,	English	182
9—Velocity,	English	186
10—Intrepid,	English	180
10—Strathcairn,	English	2,807
10—Thomasina,	Russian	1,869
10—Otheo,	Swedish	979
0—Dania,	Russian	1,689
0—James Lyman,	English	640
0—Britannia,	English	232
0—Waago,	English	154

APPENDIX

Date and Name.	Nationality.	Tons.
2—Leuctra,	English	3,027
2—Plymouth,	English	165
3—Crown of India,	English	2,056
13—Bellglade,	Norwegian	665
13—Diamant,	French	3,445
3—Cocos Merstal,	Danish	340
13—Duranger,	Norwegian	2,280
4—Hopemount,	English	3,300
15—Argyll,	English	280
5—Petrel,	English	265
5—Explorer,	English	156
15—Japonica,	English	145
15—Verdlandi,	Swedish	947
16—Strathnairn,	English	4,336
16—Trafford,	English	234
6—Desabla,	English	6,000
17—Turnwell,	English	4,264
19—Dulcie,	English	2,000
21—Carisbrook,	English	2,352
23—7 fishing vessels,	English	1,316
23—Truma,	Norwegian	1,557
23—Tunisania,	English	4,220
23—Leo,	Russian	480
27—Edith	English	1,210
27—Indrani,	English	3,640
28—Armenian,	English	8,825
28—Dumfriesshire,	English	2,565
29—Scottish Monarch,	English	5,043
30—Cambuskenneth,	Norwegian	1,925
30—Gjeso,	Norwegian	1,004
30—Krotka,	Norwegian	880
	JULY.	
1—Lomas,	English	3,048
1—Thistlebank,	English	2,430
1—Sardomene,	Italian	2,000
2—Welbury,	English	3,591
2—Inglemoor,	English	2,754
2—Caucasian,	English	2,965
2—L. C. Tower,	English	290
3—Richmond,	English	3,214
3—Craigard,	English	3,286
3—Larchmore,	English	4,355
3—Renfrew,	English	3,488
3—Gadsby	English	3,497
3—Boduognat,	Belgian	1441
4—Carthage,	French	5,275
5—Fiery Cross,	Norwegian	9
9—Guido,	English	2,145
9—Anna,	Russian	——

APPENDIX

Date and Name.	Nationality.	Tons.
9—Marion Lightbody,	Russian	——
10—Ellsmore,	English	1170
10—Clio,	Italian	——
10—Naardas,	Norwegian	——
15—Rym,	Norwegian	——
16—Balwa,	English	——
23—Rubonia,	Russian	5,424
24—Star of Peace,	English	Trawler
25—Danae,	French	1055
25—Firth,	English	406
25—Henry Charles,	English	Trawler
25—Kathleen,	English	Trawler
25—Activity,	English	Trawler
25—Prosper,	English	Trawler
25—Leelanaw,	American	1,924
26—Fimreite,	Norwegian	3,819
26—Grangewood	English	3,422
26—Harboe,	Norwegian	Trawler
26—Harbitz,	Norwegian	Trawler
27—Rosslyn,	English	Trawler
27—Celtic,	English	Trawler
27—Cydorna,	English	Trawler
27—Gadwell,	English	Trawler
27—Strathmore,	English	Trawler
27—Honoria,	English	Trawler
27—Cassio,	English	Trawler
27—Hermione,	English	Trawler
27—Sutton,	English	Trawler
27—Nogill,	Danish	——
28—Hogarth,	English	1,231
28—Sagndalen,	Swedish	——
28—Westwood Ho,	English	Smack
28—Mangara,	English	——
28—Icerni,	English	Trawler
28—Salacia,	English	Trawler
28—Emma,	Swedish	——
28—Maria,	Danish	——
28—Neptunis,	Danish	——
28—Lena,	Danish	——
29—Princesse Marie Jose,	Belgian	1,952
29—Fortuna,	Swedish	303
30—Prince Albert,	Belgian	1,810
30—Trondhjemsfjord,	Norwegian	2,730
31—Iberian,	English	5,223
AUGUST.		
2—Clintonia	English	3,838
2—Benvorlich,	English	3,381
2—Fulgens,	English	2,501
8—Glenravel,	English	1,092

APPENDIX

Date and Name.	Nationality.	Tons.
8—Malmland,	Swedish	3,779
8—Ocean Queen,	English	Trawler
9—Mai	Swedish	——
10—Jason	Danish	189
10—Westminster,	English	Trawler
10—Harbor Wiper,	English	Trawler
10—Benardna,	English	Trawler
10—Geiranger,	Norwegian	1,081
11—Oakwood,	English	4,279
11—Morna,	Norwegian	1,512
11—Francois,	French	2,212
11—Young Admiral,	English	Trawler
11—George Crabbe,	English	Trawler
11—Illustrious,	English	Trawler
11—Calm,	English	Trawler
11—Trevire	English	Trawler
11—Welcome,	English	Trawler
11—Utopia,	English	Trawler
11—Baltzur,	Russian	——
13—Jacona,	English	3,000
13—Osprey	English	Trawler
13—Summerfield,	English	2,438
13—Aura,	Norwegian	——
13—Thrush,	English	Trawler
13—Humfrey,	English	Trawler
14—Cairo,	English	1,621
14—Princess Caroline,	English	888
14—Isodoro,	Spanish	Smack
17—Ameshyst,	English	
18—	English	——
18—	English	——
18—Dunsley,	English	1,605
18—Peria Castillo,	Spanish	1,920
18—Sverresborg,	Norwegian	674
19—Arabic,	English	15,801
19—Grodno,	English	1,955
19—Serbino,	English	2,205
19—Magda,	Norwegian	1,063
20—Restormel,	English	2,118
20—Baron Eskine,	English	5,585
20—City of New York,	English	2,790
20—Samara,	English	3,172
20—Gladiator,	English	3,359
20—Bittern,	English	1,797
20—Ben Brachie,	English	3,908
20—Bras,	Norwegian	1,351
21—Carterswell,	English	4,000
21—Daghestan,	Belgian	2,818
22—Cober,	English	3,060

APPENDIX

A GLANCE AT MILITARISM.

One word has been much of late on the lips and in the minds of many well intentioned people, militarism. This word seems to express in itself to the minds of these good people all the qualities which are supposed to be antagonistic to political and *mental* liberty, to the growth of nations -along what they term democratic or humani tarian lines, to the rights of any but the stronger, in fact to all aspirations for freedom in any form of either individual or nation.

What then is militarism, is it a physical condition or a state of mind?

Is it the physical condition of preparedness for war by a nation? or the existence in the minds of the people of a nation of a desire for conquest, a lust for dominion, a yearning for commanding their neighbors and forcing them to do their will?

Let us assume then that this is a state of mind primarily, and basically.

To be of any importance, however, any state of mind must find some expression and it is by induction from this expression that we can ascertain the extent to which any given people is of this state of mind, a fact which there is no other method of ascertaining, since there exists no other measure applicable.

Now it is often charged with the utmost vehemence that Germany is and has been for many years a nation of more militaristic mind than Great Britain, than France, than Russia, or than Austria. Let us apply the test of the physical expression of militarism to these four nations and see what results we can draw therefrom.

The two forms of this physical expression by nations are the army and the navy, and the expenditures thereon. Taking up the physical expressions relating to the army first, we find in 1913 that the peace armies of these five nations were:

Russia	1,290,000
Germany	870,000
France	720,000
Austria	390,000
Great Britain	254,000

Per million inhabitants of all kinds, the number of soldiers was:

France	18,321
Germany	13,405
Russia	8,062

Austria	7,895
Great Britain	5,656

These nations spent on their armies in 1913:

Russia	$317,800,000
Great Britain	135,700,000
France	191,431,000
Germany	183,090,000
Austria	82,300,000

The per capita cost in these several countries of maintaining the army was in 1913:

Great Britain	$3.02
France	4.87
Germany	2.82
Russia	1.99
Austria	1.67

The average cost of maintenance, etc., of a soldier in each of these countries was in 1913:

Great Britain	$881
France	266
Russia	246
Austria	211
Germany	210

So that Germany had neither the largest army absolutely nor did she have the largest army relatively to the number of her population, nor did she spend the largest amount of money on her army in 1913.

If we turn to the Navy the figures run as follows:

Peace strength of navies:

Great Britain	137,500
Germany	66,783
France	60,621
Russia	52,463
Austria	17,581

The number of sailors per million inhabitants was:

Great Britain	3,056
France	1,542
Germany	1,029
Austria	356
Russia	328

and the gross cost of maintenance of these navies was as follows:

Great Britain	$224,140,000
Russia	122,500,000
France	119,571,000
Germany	111,300,000
Austria	42,000,000

and per capita of total population:

Great Britain	$4.98
France	3.04
Germany	1.71
Austria	0.85
Russia	0.77

The average cost per sailor to each country was as follows:

Austria	2,386
Russia	2,333
France	1,973
Germany	1,667
Great Britain	1,630

and the cost per capita to the several countries for both army and navy combined was as follows:

Great Britain	$8.00
France	7.91
Germany	4.53
Russia	2.76
Austria	2.52

By not one of these tests is Germany found to have been predominant in her physical manifestations of her militaristic state of mind.

There is, however, another physical test to be applied which is of importance and this is epitomized in the answer to the question how often in recent history have these several nations waged war? It can be fairly said that it is obvious that a militaristic nation wages war more frequently than a non-militaristic. Wars waged during the last 100 years—1814-1914:

Great Britain	31
France	26
Russia	8
Germany	4
Austria	3

But perhaps a hundred years is too long a period, since the dove of peace was completely absent for the early part of the 19th century.

Let us therefore only consider the period since the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, the period as the good people tell us of the rapid spread of democracy, the increase of knowledge, the diffusion of education, etc., etc. In these 43 years then we find these nations waged war as follows:

Great Britain	18 times
France	10 "

Russia	3	"
Germany	0	"
Austria	0	"

We now, therefore, arrive at the rather peculiar result that not only in the last hundred, but also in the last 43 years, the nation accused of the greatest militarism has waged the fewest wars, but also that in no other physical sympton of this terrible militarism is this nation predominant.

The moral protector of small nations (by annexation) has waged war oftenest, Russia has the largest army, France the most soldiers in proportion to her population, the latter country also spending the most per capita on her army, etc., etc.




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


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